Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights.

Professor Richard Falk: The US Is Experiencing a ‘Weimar Moment’

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In this urgent ECPS interview, Professor Richard Falk warns that the US is facing a “Weimar moment”—a fragile liberal democracy under siege by a resurgent ultra-right. A signatory of the International Declaration Against Fascism, Professor Falk links today’s “techno-fascist enthusiasts” to a global authoritarian drift. He critiques surveillance capitalism, weaponized nationalism, and soft authoritarianism, highlighting leaders like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as drivers of this ideological mutation. Despite this grim trajectory, Professor Falk calls for renewed “normative resistance”—a defiant civic ethics rooted in critical thinking, international law, and solidarity. This interview is a vital reflection on the future of democracy, authoritarianism, and global justice.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a political climate increasingly marked by creeping authoritarianism, disinformation, and democratic fragility, Dr. Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University, and former UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, offers a powerful and sobering warning: the United States, he says, is currently undergoing a “Weimar moment.” This, he explains, refers to “a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but one that is weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation.” Drawing on history and contemporary global trends, Professor Falk suggests we are witnessing not merely a democratic crisis, but the possible prelude to a systemic authoritarian transformation.

This interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) comes in the wake of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025. Professor Falk was one of the signatories, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism. Echoing the spirit of the 1925 Anti-Fascist Intellectuals’ Manifesto, the declaration warns that “the threat of fascism is back—and so we must summon that courage and defy it again.” It urges citizens worldwide to resist not only overt autocracy, but also the instrumentalization of law, culture, media, and technology in the service of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.”

In our interview, Professor Falk elaborates on how the architecture of 21st-century power—surveillance capitalism, digital disinformation, populist polarization—is reshaping classical authoritarian strategies. While differing in structure and aesthetic from 20th-century fascism, he argues today’s movements share its core ambitions: the monopolization of political space, the stigmatization of dissent, and the erosion of checks and balances under charismatic strongmen. He points to figures like Trump, Modi, Erdoğan, and Netanyahu as examples of a new ideological formation—what he elsewhere calls a “mutation of soft authoritarianism” that weaponizes nationalism, racialized resentment, and neoliberal precarity.

Yet Professor Falk is not entirely pessimistic. He highlights the enduring relevance of “normative resistance”—a civic and intellectual defiance rooted in critical inquiry, public ethics, and transnational solidarity. In an age of disinformation and partisan moralism, he calls for a recommitment to truth, international law, and the unfinished democratic project, warning that the erosion of global governance and international legal norms risks a regression “to an era of colonialism, suffering, and destruction.”

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Richard Falk, edited lightly for readability.

The Threat of Fascism Is Real, but the Form Has Mutated

Professor Richard Falk, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You were among the signatories of the recent declaration warning of the return of fascism. In your view, how does the current resurgence of authoritarian-nationalist politics differ in structure, aesthetic, and operational logic from the classical 20th-century fascism? Can we still meaningfully use the term “fascism” across such divergent historical contexts without diminishing its analytical precision?

Professor Richard Falk: That’s a very tough starting question and requires a good deal of reflection and nuance to do justice to it. It’s important—of course, a crucial question.

One of the striking differences is that the resurgence of especially autocratic tendencies in the West is less focused on internal class relations than on the threats of migration and immigration, and the outsider rather than the enemy inside, which was a feature particularly of the Nazi version of fascism. But generally, the struggles in Italy and Spain that resulted in fascist emergence as dominant forces were essentially internal in their vital strategy.

Furthermore, there was a different technological environment in the early decades of the 20th century than what exists currently. The forms of control and resistance are really radically different. In the present world situation, due to the innovative technology that we group under the phrase “digital age.”

But the core features of militarism and a single charismatic leader that exert control over the political space and do not respect divergent views—I think that feature is present. Also, the resistance of the state to dissent and protest is characteristic of this new wave of far-right politics.

Whether it’s useful to connect this current wave with the problems that underlay World War II is something that needs exploration and debate. I’ve sometimes referred to the situation in my country, the US, as experiencing what I call a “Weimar moment.” That is, where you have a democratic superstructure and a liberal opposition, but it’s weak and unable to really mount effective resistance to a rising, ultra-right political formation. It takes advantage of crises in the domestic economy and in the success or failure of state undertakings. But it’s essentially concerned with a monopolizing of political power and economic influence and control. And in that sense, there is a continuity. The German and Spanish versions of fascism particularly stress this alliance between the state and the military. In the Spanish case, you had the Catholic Church. There was a kind of anti-communist element in the struggle.

I don’t know as much about the Italian political atmosphere accompanying the rise of Mussolini, but I think there was also a right-left division in the country—a polarization. So each of these fascist narratives of the past has its own originality and characteristics, and in one sense even grouping them together may be questionable because it overlooks those differences.

So, on balance, it is useful to warn of the emergence of a new phase in the encounter between liberal democracies and fascist movements. However, it can be misleading to treat this phenomenon as uniform, given its inherently heterogeneous nature. The situation in the United States, for example, differs markedly from that in major European countries—and even more so from key Global South contexts such as India, or, in a different way, China and Russia. While these cases may fall outside the conventional scope of what is typically labeled “fascism,” they share certain characteristics: a concentration of power in the hands of a single leader, systematic surveillance, the stigmatization of dissent, and a concerted effort to monopolize the political sphere through an alliance between economic elites and political leaders.

Techno-Authoritarianism Has Already Arrived in Some States

Photo: Shutterstock

The declaration warns of “techno-fascist enthusiasts.” How do you interpret the convergence of surveillance capitalism, algorithmic governance, and digital disinformation ecosystems with authoritarian statecraft? Are we witnessing the emergence of a new modality of domination—a digital totalitarianism—beyond Orwellian metaphors?

Professor Richard Falk: I think that is a threat; whether it will materialize in that kind of absolutist form is not yet clear or certain. We are at a period, I believe, of transition in which resistance—and even a reversal of these tendencies—remains a possibility. In other words, I don’t think we’re predetermined at this stage to have that future, though there are alarming signs that this is where the major liberal democracies are headed.

Some of the more organized autocratic societies have already more or less arrived at those points. I would mention India, China, and Russia as being very well organized to manage a kind of techno-authoritarianism that, in the Chinese case, produces some pretty impressive results for its population. It is not war-prone in the way that fascism is usually portrayed. So, again, it may be misleading to group autocratic tendencies in various states into one category, because the originality of the Chinese path is quite notable and seems to have some advantages compared to the liberal democratic path.

Today’s Fascistic Movement Has a Blueprint, Opposition Does Not

A century after the Manifesto of the Anti-Fascist Intellectuals in 1925, what enduring ethical and strategic lessons can today’s democratic societies extract from those who risked everything to confront fascism at its inception? Are there analogues today to the cultural complicity and intellectual appeasement that enabled fascist ascendancy then?

Professor Richard Falk: I think again, speaking first about the United States, which I know best, there’s definitely that similarity of a weak liberal opposition and a very impassioned autocratic, fascistic movement that has very dedicated conceptions of what it wants to achieve. Trump came to his second presidential term with a very worked-out plan or blueprint of how to govern in the light of the acceptance of this autocratic, authoritarian, anti-democratic set of aspirations, and he seems to have at least temporarily neutralized the economic oligarchs by having them—for opportunistic reasons—join with his MAGA movement. And that does suggest a drift toward this kind of consolidated authoritarian governance structure.

There are some glimmers of light that suggest it may not be so simplistic to fulfill these autocratic ambitions. One of the glimmers of light was the outcome in New York City of the race to become mayor, which surprised most Americans—and even most New Yorkers—by selecting, by an impressive margin, the Muslim son of a mixed parental background, a self-proclaimed Democratic Socialist, who seemed to defy all the traditional biases associated with the drift to the ultra-right. And it’s at least being welcomed in the US as a warning to the Democratic establishment that they better get their oppositional act together or they’ll be bypassed by this more progressive alternative politics. I happen to know the parents of Zohran Mamdani quite well, and it’s very thrilling for people who had these progressive hopes.

Normative Resistance Persists in a Structurally Degraded Public Sphere

In a political landscape defined by polarization, truth decay, and performative resistance, what forms of civic defiance remain normatively defensible and strategically viable? Is there still space for what you have elsewhere called ‘normative resistance’ within a structurally degraded public sphere?

Professor Richard Falk: It’s a very interesting question, marked by contradictory tendencies. There is a clear effort to shrink the space for critical discourse, alongside a growing recognition that the ultra-right project is largely incompatible with knowledge-based politics. One of its defining features—and here we see continuity with earlier fascist movements—is a preference for mobilizing people through emotional and belief-based appeals, with little regard for empirical truth. It is therefore unsurprising that leading universities in the United States have become primary targets of this ultra-right agenda.

Equally unsurprising is the simultaneous embrace of an aggressive nationalism and a retreat from internationalism—whether in the form of the UN or collaborative responses to global challenges like climate change. These forces coexist in a contradictory political landscape where tensions are mounting but remain unresolved.

The harsh treatment of undocumented immigrants—who are nonetheless vital to key sectors of the economy—reveals some of these contradictions. Even Trump has had to walk back elements of his anti-immigration stance when it came to essential labor in agriculture, restaurants, and other industries where undocumented workers are difficult to replace.

Predatory Capitalism Fuels Authoritarian Resentment

A protester holds a banner demanding economic justice. Photo: Shutterstock.

You have long emphasized the dangers of ‘soft authoritarianism’ embedded within liberal orders. From Modi to Erdoğan, from Netanyahu to Trump, do you regard contemporary populist authoritarianism as a transitional phase toward a more explicit fascist ethos—or does it represent a distinct ideological mutation altogether?

Professor Richard Falk: Well again, that’s a very hard question which requires a clearer crystal ball than one in my possession. In other words, it can go either way—or both ways—and differently in different places. I think one of the interesting recent developments is the normalization of the language of genocide as applied to Israel’s violence in Gaza. That was—and still is—a prohibited terminology on the part of the governments supporting Israel, and it’s used selectively as a way of punishing protesters. But still, within societies at large, that terminology—the naming of the violence—is no longer abnormal or extreme: to refer to it as genocide, or to refer to the pre-October 7th situation as apartheid.

And that represents a victory of sorts for those who want a truth-based mode of governance, which is associated with liberalism, the tradition of the Enlightenment, and the whole role of science. So you have this peculiar attitude of the ultra-right, which on one side uses instrumentally the politics of surveillance—a kind of fascist variant of a surveillance state—and on the other side is very unsupportive of scientific research, technological innovation, and really of knowledge acquisition within leading centers of learning. And the hostility, for instance, to foreign students that is taking hold here—which was one of the tendencies of the Trump presidency—is emblematic of this tendency.

Your scholarship on global capitalism critiques the deep structural inequalities produced by neoliberal orthodoxy. How do you see these economic dislocations—especially the evisceration of public goods, precaritization of labor, and austerity—as constituting fertile ground for authoritarian-populist narratives and politics of resentment?

Professor Richard Falk: It has created those fertile grounds, and Trump and others around the world have known how to take advantage of them to win support from those elements of society that are most victimized by what I call ‘predatory capitalism’. This model is highly exploitative toward vulnerable sectors of society and facilitates growing inequalities between a tiny number of successful entrepreneurial individuals and the broader population. At the same time, it is fiscally stingy toward those at the bottom of the economic scale. This dynamic exacerbates class-based polarization and generates widespread alienation and resentment—sentiments that are effectively mobilized by belief-driven, strong leaders like Trump, Modi, or Erdoğan, as you mentioned.

Resistance Depends on Forces Outside the Bipartisan Order

Can the anti-fascist imperative itself become captive to ideological co-optation or instrumentalization? How can progressive actors preserve the ethical clarity of anti-fascist struggle without succumbing to partisan reductionism or performative moralism?

Professor Richard Falk: Of course, that remains to be seen—how strong they are. I don’t have much confidence in the liberal wing of the political spectrum, represented here by the Democratic Party and elsewhere, for instance, in the UK by the Labour Party. Those who accept the structure of capitalism and nationalism tend not to have the political will to maintain resistance in the face of strong repressive policies. That creates my fear that these autocratic, fascistic movements will test the resilience of the political system, and that resistance will depend on a surge of affiliation and commitment to what I call the progressive portions of society—those outside the framework of the bipartisan political structures that dominate most sovereign states.

In the light of Israel’s recent military operations in Gaza and the structural conditions of Palestinian dispossession, how would you assess the extent to which settler-colonial regimes today deploy fascistic methods under the rubric of democratic self-defense or counterterrorism?

Professor Richard Falk: That really depends on whether you consider Israel an anomaly or something more menacing globally as part of this regressive trend. I tend to view it as an anomaly because of the additional influence of Zionist ideology added onto the settler-colonial project, and that gives it a dehumanizing focus on dominating the other in the name of racial supremacy. And that’s why a Zionist state like Israel turns into an apartheid regime, treating the resident population as a persecuted presence in their own homeland.

It’s really a repetition of the story of settler colonialism in the white breakaway British colonies of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, where apartheid practices gave way to the embrace of a genocidal strategy in order to achieve the ends of a purified ethnic hierarchy that completely marginalizes the native population.

But I don’t see that happening beyond Israel—certainly not in as crude a form. You have some of it in India, with the treatment of Muslims by the Hindu nationalist orientation of the Modi government, especially in Kashmir, where many of these same tendencies are evident. But I don’t find it a general characteristic.

International Law as Sword for Enemies, Shield for Friends

And lastly, Professor Falk, you have consistently critiqued the asymmetries of global governance. Does the international community’s paralysis in the face of enduring Palestinian suffering reflect not only political hypocrisy but a deeper erosion of the normative foundations of international law itself?

Professor Richard Falk: Yes, I’m guilty of all those things. And I think the comparison between the Western reaction to the Russian attack on Ukraine and its reaction to Israel’s behavior in Gaza and the West Bank is illustrative of using international law and the UN as a sword against enemies while using international law and the UN as a shield protecting friends.

So you have complete double standards between how law is working when you’re dealing with an adversary, and how law works when you’re dealing with your own behavior or that of your close allies. You have that dualism in the reaction—on the one side, to Ukraine, where there are impassioned appeals to the UN and to the International Criminal Court; and with Israel, where the UN is denounced and the International Criminal Court is repudiated when it issues arrest warrants.

So it undermines law as a regulative framework that governs behavior and turns it into a policy instrument with inconsistent use for friends and enemies.

Professor Larry Diamond, a renowned expert on democratic development and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

Professor Diamond: Fascism Isn’t Back—But Its Features Are

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In this timely and wide-ranging interview, Stanford University’s Professor Larry Diamond explores the resurgence of authoritarianism and the global diffusion of fascistic features. “We don’t have the fully formed, classic version of fascism today,” he explains, “but there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent spreading worldwide.” Drawing on his democratic theory expertise and recent support for an international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond dissects how elected strongmen exploit polarization, subvert institutions, and erode epistemic authority. From Erdoğan to Orbán to Trump, he examines the authoritarian playbook and offers paths forward—through institutional reform, global alliances, and deliberative democracy—to defend liberal norms before they are incrementally strangled into irrelevance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an age of democratic erosion and the rise of authoritarian populism across continents, Professor Larry Diamond, one of the world’s foremost scholars on democracy, joins the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) to assess the contemporary mutations of fascism. As a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Diamond brings a deeply informed and historically grounded perspective to the question that frames this conversation: Are we witnessing a return of fascism—or something disturbingly adjacent?

Reflecting on the recent international declaration signed by Nobel laureates and leading intellectuals warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond strikes a careful but urgent tone. “I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se,” he explains, “because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Diamond underscores the ways in which elected strongmen—from Narendra Modi in India to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to Donald Trump in the United States—gradually dismantle liberal-democratic norms. This process, which he calls the “incremental strangulation” of democratic institutions, shares strategic continuities with the fascist playbook of the 20th century, even if it is less overtly violent in form.

The interview also addresses the weaponization of cultural and religious norms, the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties, and the epistemic breakdown that enables authoritarian actors to dominate public narratives. Professor Diamond warns of “a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party,” a dynamic echoed in the declaration’s call to “uphold facts and evidence” in the face of disinformation.

The Declaration Against the Return of Fascism, published on the centenary of the original 1925 anti-fascist manifesto, serves as a timely and powerful backdrop to this conversation. Signed by a wide array of Nobel laureates, leading scholars, and cultural figures, the declaration urges renewed commitment to democratic values, multilateralism, and human rights. It warns of a “renewed wave of far-right movements” that threaten to erode hard-won liberties under the guise of nationalism and moral purity.

As Professor Diamond makes clear, the danger we face today is not merely political—it is civilizational. And while the forms may differ from the 1930s, the stakes are every bit as high.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Larry Diamond.

We’re Not Seeing Classic Fascism

Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.

Professor Larry Diamond, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As a signatory of the recent international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” how would you characterize the most empirically robust indicators of this re-emergence? To what extent do contemporary manifestations differ from classical fascism in terms of institutional form and sociopolitical function?

Professor Larry Diamond: I thought it was a very good statement. I had reservations about it because I think the term fascism is used too casually. It’s a very specific historical phenomenon that involves elements of extreme authoritarianism, deprivation of civil liberties, contradiction of the rule of law, individual rights, and the very principle of individuality.

There are certainly a number of regimes around the world that manifest those characteristics or have been moving in that direction. But fascism is also ultra-nationalistic and typically quite aggressive and expansionist. It celebrates violence as a means of acquiring and maintaining rule and political domination, including the violence of extreme shock troops or irregular forces that do the bidding—celebrating and elevating the leader while intimidating anyone who would challenge them. Fascist regimes freely use violence or the threat of violence to suppress and silence the opposition and to threaten their neighbors as well.

So, I think there is no pure form of fascism in the world today that is entirely similar to what we saw in Germany or Italy in the 1930s. But there are a number of regimes that have fascistic elements or properties—certainly Vladimir Putin’s in Russia, and there are others, in Turkey and India. And now certain features of what Donald Trump has been trying to construct in the United States—in terms of the intimidation of opposition, threats to opposition, the invitation to violence, and the celebration of violence by his followers—have fascistic properties.

I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se, because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.

Authoritarian Regimes Are Repackaging Masculinity, Identity, and Power to Redraw Citizenship

The declaration identifies a resurgence of “manufactured traditional authority,” rooted in religious, gender, and national identity constructs. How do you see these cultural logics being instrumentalized within modern illiberal or authoritarian-populist regimes to reshape the boundaries of political legitimacy and citizenship?

Professor Larry Diamond: Well, you certainly see a kind of resurrection and celebration of extreme masculinity, and of very traditional—even martial or militaristic—notions of what constitutes male identity and the male role, and the effort to subjugate women, and to draw artificially rigid boundaries around sexual identity and sexual behavior, and just put people into rigid, state-sponsored, movement-sponsored boxes.

These are also elements of an extreme authoritarian or, in some ways, fascistic mentality. You see this in China too—although it’s kind of odd to call a Communist regime fascistic—but they share certain properties in terms of hierarchy, domination, chauvinism, militarism, and aggressive threats to their neighbors.

So I find it more useful personally—and I think we’re drifting in that direction in the world, and the phenomenon, with its many component parts, seems to be more relevant these days—but I find it more useful to break it apart into its pieces and analyze where these pieces are emerging or gaining momentum, and what it means for the character and dynamics—internally and internationally—of authoritarian behavior.

Autocrats Strangle Democracy in Stages

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

In your analysis of democratic regression, you emphasize the process of “incremental strangulation” of liberal institutions by elected executives. How does this slow erosion align with the historical trajectory of fascism, and would you consider today’s authoritarianism to be a technocratic mutation of the fascist archetype—less overtly violent, but no less repressive?

Professor Larry Diamond: It certainly is in most places less repressive than the classic instances of fascism, particularly in Nazi Germany. But some of them have been creeping in that direction. It didn’t take long between the time that Hitler entered power in early 1933 to the time, really just months later, that he had eliminated opposition and begun to throw his opponents in jail—and before too much longer, the emergence of concentration camps. I would not describe the collapse of the liberal and constitutional state in Germany after Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship as an incremental process. It happened in stages, but they came very rapidly and very brutally.

Italy was a little bit more incremental, but not in the same way as we’ve seen under Orbán in Hungary, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, under Narendra Modi in India—which remains sufficiently incremental so that people still debate whether we can call India an electoral democracy. I tend to think it’s crossed the line into authoritarianism.

It took a while in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It didn’t take very long this most recent time in power for Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. It happened pretty quickly under Bukele in El Salvador.

So it varies. But in the classic instance of a country that has been a democracy for some time—whether a liberal democracy or not—it usually is an incremental process that may move step by step over a period of years: to demonize the opposition, undermine the independence of the legislature, and certainly the judiciary, which must be quashed if authoritarian regimes are to have kind of free rein to emerge. And the ultimate elimination of all independent sources of power—regulatory institutions in the executive branch, civil society, the professional civil service, the business community, the mass media, and so on. Usually, it takes a few years, and sometimes a number of years, for an emerging autocrat to sufficiently conquer and crush these independent institutions in government and civil society so that they can have unchecked power.

Moreover, even when they’ve crossed the line into authoritarianism—which I think Erdoğan did within some number of years after taking power around 2003, more than two or three perhaps, but considerably less than ten—even after the line had been crossed from electoral democracy into electoral or competitive authoritarianism, the incremental descent can proceed. And the regime can become more authoritarian, more abusive, more terroristic, more domineering, more hegemonic—and, to use a word that is increasingly in vogue—with more and more frequent manifestations of fascism.

Authoritarianism Thrives Where Truth Dies

The declaration posits a growing epistemic crisis—an erosion of truth, science, and critical inquiry. Are we witnessing a systemic undermining of epistemic authority as a strategy of soft authoritarianism, and how does this epistemic degradation relate to the collapse of public trust and the spread of disinformation?

Professor Larry Diamond: I think the causation moves in both directions. It’s a collapse of trust in all kinds of institutions and sources of information that helps pave the way for authoritarian populism to come into power and elevate a leader—a “great leader”—as the source of all wisdom and authority, to try and rescue the country from various forms of treason, greed, sabotage, corruption, however they depict the ruling elite, the ruling establishment.

Then, of course, once in power, these kinds of leaders and parties further accentuate public distrust in science, in objective sources of knowledge, in alternative sources of information—in anything we know to be true, independent of what the dear leader and the ruling party say is true.

So, I think what you describe as an epistemic crisis typically precedes, to some degree, the coming to power of an authoritarian, hegemonic, extremely illiberal populist political party, with deeply authoritarian, if not fascistic, intentions and ambitions. And then they drive it—they drive the people—further into distrust and cynicism, and into a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party.

Why Democracy Must Lead the Fight Against Authoritarian Drift

The declaration calls for renewed multilateralism grounded in human rights and the rule of law. With international institutions facing legitimacy crises, what new or reformed global mechanisms might be necessary to counteract the diffusion of authoritarian norms and “sharp power” influence?

Professor Larry Diamond: There are many dimensions to the crisis we’re facing globally regarding the rule of law and the liberal international order. And obviously, these have worsened with the multiple conflicts in the Middle East over the last two and a half years, if not more.

I worry deeply about the damage that’s been done to the United Nations and the overall erosion of liberal international institutions, which are being undermined from all directions—by Russia and China, by Iran, and by Donald Trump in the United States, with his contempt for multilateral institutions and for the liberal international order itself. After all, that order has helped keep peace in Europe for 80 years—until Vladimir Putin shattered it. I believe it still remains our best hope for international peace, security, and individual freedom.

At present, international multilateral institutions are in serious distress. The United Nations has appeared quite feeble in response to the recent Middle East crisis. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization are all under significant strain. The entire nuclear nonproliferation regime—which, in my view, did a relatively poor job of restraining Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons—has also faltered.

To my mind, we need to begin with the democracies of the world and try to build outward from there, reaffirming commitments to the rule of law, international order, and collective security. That must include a reassertion of peace and security mechanisms in the Middle East, as well as a clear and unified message to the People’s Republic of China that the international community opposes any use of force to resolve the Taiwan conflict or differing interpretations of sovereignty across the strait. Certainly, it also means that Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to forcibly dissolve Ukraine into a greater imperial Russia.

We need a stronger NATO, a reinforced alliance of liberal democracies, a renewed commitment to the integrity of borders, and shared principles of collective defense. These are the building blocks for reconstituting global order. But we cannot begin rebuilding while the United States is in retreat from that very order.

In my view, we must not only deepen cooperation with our NATO and EU allies—as well as partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, where feasible, India—but also revitalize and relaunch the United States’ instruments of international engagement. This includes agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Voice of America, and other channels of diplomacy, assistance, and cultural exchange. We should be offering scholarships, promoting global educational exchange, and ensuring that our scientific, technological, and medical innovations are shared worldwide.

They Need to Polarize Politics to Seize Power

In “The Electoral Reform Imperative,” you diagnose affective polarization as a destabilizing force for democratic governance. How do populist actors exploit this emotional antagonism to reframe pluralism as moral corruption and consolidate plebiscitary rule under the guise of majoritarianism?

Professor Larry Diamond: They do it pretty much as your question describes. It’s very important to understand that people who want to crush democracy—and who seek to do so through politics, by winning power via competitive elections—need to create an atmosphere of fear and desperation. In other words, they need to polarize politics in order to seize power.

All of the agents of illiberal or authoritarian populism—Orban, Erdoğan, Robert Fico in Slovakia, certainly Modi in India, Andrés Manuel López Obrador during his six-year presidency in Mexico, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and now his successor, Nicolás Maduro—they all polarize politics. They must generate fear and hatred for the other side, because rational politics—deliberation, compromise, reason—(these) are the enemies of their project to conquer and entrench total power.

So they manufacture fear, animosity, and hatred. They deploy memes and narratives that divide people on an emotional level and manipulate symbols of fear, violence, militarism, and extreme ambition to pit citizens against one another. They typically identify a dangerous “other” within the country. Often it’s a minority group or outsider—it could be immigrants, a marginalized group like the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, or a religious minority of some kind. But they always need someone to scapegoat, someone to vilify and rally people to fear.

Deliberation Works—If You Create the Right Setting

Your collaborative work on “America in One Room” suggests that structured deliberation can depolarize attitudes and restore democratic norms. How scalable are these models of deliberative democracy in politically fragile or culturally heterogeneous societies—especially where civic trust is already eroded?

Professor Larry Diamond: We think the methods are scalable. The problem with scalability is not that you can’t bring people with very different political orientations or racial and religious backgrounds into one room. When you step outside the white-hot glare of politics and mass media polarization and simply invite people to deliberate, to share their views and listen to others, it often works. You don’t need to persuade people—it’s the setting that matters.

The real challenge is that in-person deliberation is very expensive. You have to fly people to a location, manage the logistics of in-person gatherings, and hire moderators to facilitate small-group sessions.

Now, at our Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University, we have an online platform—very similar to the one we’re using now—that can accommodate 10, 15, or even 20 participants. If it can handle 12, that’s already enough. This platform uses a simple form of artificial intelligence to manage the discussion: it poses questions, ensures everyone has a chance to speak, maintains respectful dialogue, and balances participation.

It’s a flexible, intuitive, and fair tool that has opened up dramatic new possibilities for scaling deliberation—provided the questions and the framework for engagement are well-designed.

Electoral Systems Must Temper, Not Amplify, Polarization

Illustration by Lightspring.

Given the weaponization of electoral legitimacy by populist incumbents to hollow out liberal checks and balances, do you view institutional reforms such as proportional representation or open primaries as viable defenses against democratic backsliding—or might they risk unintended consequences?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s a good question. When you start tinkering with institutions—certainly including electoral systems—you do risk unintended consequences. I think this should counsel some degree of humility on the part of institutional reformers.

In countries like India, the US, and the United Kingdom—where simple majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems prevail—allowing a candidate to win with just 35 or 38 percent of the vote, as has occurred in Britain with the Labour Party, is not particularly democratic. In an era of deep political polarization, requiring voters to choose only one candidate often results in leaders who command the support of just a third of the electorate. This outcome fuels political cynicism by granting disproportionate power to figures lacking broad public backing. And keep in mind what can happen: maybe in one election a moderate Labour Prime Minister comes to power, but four or five years later a more extreme party might win an absolute majority of seats due to the bonus effect inherent in first-past-the-post system.

In a social and psychological context of polarization—driven by rising economic inequality and social media—you don’t want an electoral system that exacerbates polarization further. So, I favor at a minimum moving to the Australian system of preferential voting, or what we call ranked-choice voting in the US. Another option is proportional representation. Although moving to proportional representation would be very hard for the US, if a country adopts it, I think a moderate version is preferable—one that avoids excessive party fragmentation and promotes open-list voting, so parties aren’t entirely in control of who within the party gets elected. For countries struggling with polarization, the Irish system of the single transferable vote is a good model to consider.

Co-Opting Without Capitulating

And lastly, Professor Diamond, to what extent does the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties accelerate the normalization of authoritarian populism? Is this a short-term electoral tactic or a structural accommodation with long-term implications for the ideological boundaries of democratic politics?

Professor Larry Diamond: It’s another good question. And since these projects have really been gaining momentum over the last 15 years or so, it’s still too soon to answer definitively. It’s even more recent in terms of right-of-center parties trying to co-opt some of the voters and agenda of the extreme right.

I will say this: on the one hand, right-of-center parties—and even progressive ones—are beginning to respond. A recent and insightful commentary by a progressive British analyst in The New York Times argued that progressive parties would be well-advised to take immigration management more seriously. His central point was that a cohesive sense of national identity is often necessary to foster the social solidarity required to support the disadvantaged—the poor, the marginalized, and others in need. That solidarity, however, becomes more difficult to sustain when segments of the population perceive that social benefits are increasingly directed toward newcomers who have not yet become part of the national fabric.

I think Europe, the United States, and other advanced industrial democracies need humane and generous immigration policies. For one thing, they need the labor. With declining populations or slowing growth rates, they will face labor shortages of various kinds. But they also need to be serious about preserving the integrity of borders. If you don’t have borders, you don’t really have a country.

So, on the one hand, it is right and proper for political parties—not only of the right but also of the center-left—to recognize the frustrations surrounding unchecked immigration that the far right, often tinged with fascistic overtones, has been fanning. These concerns should be acknowledged and addressed. But that does not mean adopting the racism, hatred, or xenophobia of the far right.

Being humane, decent, respectful, and committed to the dignity of all people, regardless of origin, is essential. But that doesn’t necessarily mean—and I don’t think it is sustainable for liberal democracies to assume it should mean—purely open borders. That’s just one example where mainstream or progressive parties can respond to some of the legitimate issues the far right has exploited.

The far right is also raising concerns about economic inequality and injustice—issues that are central to progressive platforms. So, I think this has to be approached on an issue-by-issue basis.

Professor Rafal Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University.

Prof. Soborski: The Recent Polish Election Shows That Shifting Right Doesn’t Win Over the Right

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.

Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.

This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”

In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.

For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”

This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.

Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such.
But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.

On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.

During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.

But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.

As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories.
Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.

Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.

Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.

We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.

Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine

You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral,
reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations. 

The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.

Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.

However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.

The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?

Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.

Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.

So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.

Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well

With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.

Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces.
So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.

PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal

Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.

In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?

Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.

Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.

Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?

Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU. 

Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.

I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback. 

I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.

Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.

Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right

What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?

Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results. 

Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.

Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?

Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity. 

But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs. 

The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.

And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?

Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.

A distressed Black woman professional faces gender discrimination and workplace bullying, as male colleagues point fingers and place blame. The image highlights the emotional toll of inequality and harassment in professional environments. Photo: Dreamstime.

“No One Can Make You Feel Inferior Without Your Consent”: Is Eleanor Roosevelt Right?

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceGenderHomeLeadership & Persona

Can we truly choose not to feel inferior? In this thought-provoking commentary, Syed Yousha Haider critically examines Eleanor Roosevelt’s famous quote, “No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Blending insights from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and social theory, Haider explores the limits of agency in the face of trauma, social conditioning, and structural inequality. While celebrating resilience and self-determination, he also challenges oversimplified notions of empowerment. This essay invites readers to reflect on the complex dynamics of self-worth, consent, and resistance in a world where internal struggles are often shaped by forces far beyond the individual.

By Syed Yousha Haider*

Eleanor Roosevelt’s much-quoted maxim—”No one can make you feel inferior without your consent”—has traveled a long way from its origins as a personal empowerment mantra. The quote says that individual choice is more important than what other people think, based on ideas about agency, dignity, and self-concept. But beneath its catchy simplicity lies a philosophical paradox: is it ever in our choice to refuse consent to feelings of inferiority? Are these kinds of feelings, at least in part, caused by social, psychological, and even neurobiological processes that we can’t control? This essay argues that Roosevelt’s maxim, as inspiring as it is, is only partially true. Individual agency is essential to self-perception, but the action of structural forces, psychological conditioning, and automatic cognitive processes complicate the idea that one can simply choose not to feel inferior.

The Appeal of Personal Agency

People still use Roosevelt’s quote because it fits with the liberal humanist idea of the self-governing person. For example, Stoic philosophy heard Epictetus say, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.” It seems like there is strength inside despite what is going on outside. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is probably the most scientifically-based type of psychotherapy. It also believes that how we feel is based on how we think about things, not the events themselves. This view says that changing the way you talk to yourself can help you get over feelings of inferiority and move on.

Also, there are literally countless examples from history of people who have overcome feelings of inferiority even though the system tried to make them feel less important. Viktor E. Frankl, a survivor of the Holocaust, famously said in his book Man’s Search for Meaning that the last of the human freedoms is “to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances.” Many people point to Frankl’s ability to survive extreme dehumanization as proof that accepting one’s inferiority is a choice..

After serving 27 years in prison for refusing to change his beliefs to suit apartheid’s demands, Nelson Mandela came out of prison with his dignity unharmed and guided South Africa through a peaceful transition. The strength of agency against humiliation is demonstrated by the fact that he was able to maintain his dignity despite institutional racism. After surviving a Taliban assassination attempt, Malala Yousafzai transformed personal hardship into a global movement for girls’ education. Her refusal to submit in the face of patriarchal violence is a brilliant illustration of how victims can become empowered..

The idea that people are powerless in the face of hardship is refuted by the resilience philosophy. The study of learned optimism by Dr. Martin Seligman emphasizes how our mental habits can influence how we react to criticism and failure. People can develop what Seligman refers to as “psychological immunity”—a defense against internalized inferiority—by confronting negative internal monologues and redefining failures as temporary and external. Roosevelt’s ideal can then be seen as psychologically realized through the development of optimism and internal locus of control.

Limits of Consent: Neuropsychological Constraints

However, this utopian vision is obscured by current psychological and neuroscientific research. Cognitive processes related to self-worth are not always under conscious control. The Default Mode Network (DMN) is primarily outside of conscious awareness and is active during self-referential cognition and daydreaming. In order to construct a cohesive sense of self, it is known to combine memories, emotions, and imagined situations, maintaining negative self-beliefs without conscious consent.

Furthermore, unconscious bias affects how we view ourselves from an early age. Implicit Association Tests demonstrate how years of exposure to social stereotypes can cause people to internalize group stereotype attitudes toward members of their own group, such as women being biased against women in positions of power. These are kept in the brain areas responsible for moral and emotional judgments, the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, demonstrating the neurobiological basis of negative self-perceptions.

Though unconscious, the trauma survivors feel ashamed and inferior. It has been observed that distorted self-perceptions, such as guilt and worthlessness, are more potent than logical thought in people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These are neurophysiologic reactions rather than choices, and correcting them usually requires a lengthy therapeutic intervention. In these situations, inferiority is more neurologically motivated than widely accepted.

Additionally, early attachment orientations are crucial in determining self-esteem and vulnerability to feelings of inadequacy, according to affective neuroscience research. A child who experiences emotional abuse or neglect may grow up with a persistent internal schema of worthlessness. The internalized, which was solidified during brain-sensitive developmental stages, restricts the person’s capacity to “withdraw consent” from inferiority complexes as an adult.

Second, feelings of inferiority might have adaptive roots, according to evolutionary psychology. Humans were made to live in small communities where access to resources and partners depended heavily on status and belonging. One adaptation that might have developed in order to survive is hypersensitivity to social rejection. However, this evolutionary baggage now shows up as irrational and habitual feelings of inferiority, especially in hierarchical environments like online forums, workplaces, and schools.

Social and Structural Determinants of Inferiority

In addition to the psychology of the individual, social structures also produce and enforce inferiority. Language, the media, and institutions are all infused with heteronormativity, which tends to dictate who is capable, desirable, or deserving. Symbolic violence, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, describes how dominant social groups impose meanings that are internalized as acceptable. For example, colonial education systems used to portray colonized people as intellectually inferior; this claim is still present in the disparities in academic accreditation around the world.

Erving Goffman studied how stigma, or the discrediting of people for supposedly deviating from the norm, contributes to feelings of shame and undesirableness. According to his theory, the stigmatized individual absorbs society’s scrutiny and agrees to being inferior out of social pressure rather than choice. This consent is not voluntary; it is coerced.

According to the “stereotype threat,” as defined by social psychologist Claude Steele, people perform less well when they are concerned about reinforcing unfavorable stereotypes about their identity category. For instance, when race is emphasized on tests, African American students do worse—not because they think they are less capable, but rather because the cultural script instills fear, which impairs performance. Such scripts can effectively short-circuit the will by altering behavior and thought.

Another sociocultural phenomenon is groupthink. People will repress contradictory self-concepts in order to preserve group harmony, embracing the flawed consensus. Conventional instances, like discouraging women’s aspirations for education or politics, demonstrate how social norms can force internalization of inferiority.

Furthermore, social media has given rise to new channels for the propagation of inferiority. Social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok propagate idealized beauty standards and manufactured lives, creating a culture of comparison that undermines self-worth. Younger generations, particularly teenage girls, are disproportionately targeted by algorithmic promotion of idealized imagery, which contributes to the rise in anxiety and depression. Here, inferiority is fostered by repeated exposure to distorted norms rather than being elected outright.

Such effects are amplified by intersectionality. The accumulation of marginalization experiences is demonstrated by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional matrix of oppressive systems, which includes racism, sexism, and classism. Black women who are economically marginalized may encounter overlapping social messages that portray them as inferior in multiple ways. These messages, which are delivered through cultural imagery and institutional norms, carry a cumulative psychological burden that is difficult to deny.

Resisting Inferiority: Possibility and Limits

Resistance is evident in opposition to these limits. The recovery of the imposed identity of inferiority has already been demanded by feminist and postcolonial theorists. “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation,” as Audre Lorde insists, is a rejection of internalizing the condemnation of the world. Black Pride and LGBTQ+ affirmations are just two examples of grassroots movements that have successfully challenged hegemonic discourses and empowered people to reject internalized oppression.

The solution to this difficulty lies in education. According to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the oppressed must be able to recognize internalized inferiority brought on by systemic injustice and recover their dignity via critical thinking, or conscientization. Only with time, resources, and support groups—things that not everyone has access to—can it be accomplished.

The ability to challenge hegemonic narratives and reinterpret value on their own terms has been made possible by cyberspace. Default inferiority narratives are countered by discourses like #BlackGirlMagic and #DisabledAndProud. In addition to being empowering in and of themselves, these claims also have a cumulative effect by changing the broader cultural environment.

However, not all attempts at resistance are successful. The enduring resilience of systemic powers is demonstrated by the continued existence of racial profiling, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions. One’s identity is typically determined by societal approval, even if you fight valiantly against subordinating ideologies. The internal conflict gets harder to sustain when one lacks acceptance and a sense of belonging.

However, resilience-building programs enable psychological resistance. Education and mental health programs that promote self-advocacy, growth mindsets, and trauma-informed care are essential. Instead of opposing systemic forces, these empower individuals to challenge internalized narratives. Roosevelt’s assertion is interpreted by adults as an invitation to build internal strength in tandem with structural change, rather than as a rejection of putting up with oppression.

The Philosophical Implications of Consent

Roosevelt only used the word “consent” to refer to a deliberate action. However, in ethics and the law, consent must be given voluntarily and free from coercion. Consent to be in a subordinate position cannot be based on psychological conditioning, neurobiology, or societal power dynamics that reduce one’s agency and awareness.

Here, it’s important to distinguish between “responsibility” and “causality.” One can be held accountable for facing their own shortcomings over time, even if they were never the direct cause of them. This nuanced stance maintains the moral requirement of agency while rejecting the all-powerful forces that exist within our inner selves.

The “dialogical self” theory of philosopher Charles Taylor makes consent more difficult to understand. According to Taylor, identity is socially constructed through interactions with other people rather than something that is determined for oneself. Feelings of inferiority could be exogenously programmed rather than endogenously generated if selfhood is relational. Roosevelt’s statement may therefore be exaggerated in light of the extent to which an individual can create their own sense of self-worth.

Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialist philosophers support radical freedom and self-creation. His theory that “existence precedes essence” holds that people must create their identities consciously since they are not born with predetermined natures. According to this viewpoint, willpower alone is sufficient to overcome inferiority complexes. But Sartre also introduced the idea of “bad faith,” which acknowledges the limitations of volition and refers to people lying to themselves in order to escape the responsibility that comes with freedom. In The Ethics of Belief, philosopher William Clifford makes the case that it is immoral to hold beliefs in the absence of adequate evidence. When used in this context, inferiority complexes that are based on erroneous social or psychological assumptions are illogical and ought to be disregarded. However, Thomas Nagel argues that human subjectivity cannot be avoided; irrational feelings, such as inferiority, are.

Conclusion

A powerful affirmation of human dignity and inner strength is the Eleanor Roosevelt maxim. However, it would be oversimplifying the combined influence of psychological, biological, and social factors on self-perception to claim that no one can ever make us feel inferior if we do not consent. Although agency still functions, it must be understood in the context of limitations. Since Roosevelt’s assertion that reassertion of value is as much a matter of will as it is of struggle against forces of inheritance, the reality is not so much a question of its complete cancellation or confirmation. Therefore, empowerment is more about knowing on what terms to give consent than it is about refusing it.

 

(*) Syed Yousha Haider is a student with a growing interest in understanding the human mind and behavior. In his own words, he has always been curious about what drives people to think, feel, and act the way they do. This curiosity, combined with his desire to understand himself and others better, naturally led him to explore the field of psychology. While he is still learning, he finds joy in asking questions, noticing patterns in emotions, and reflecting on the deeper reasons behind everyday choices. For him, psychology is more than a subject—it is a way to connect with people, understand their stories, and perhaps even help make sense of his own.

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition's policies in Ra'anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

Professor Ben-Porat: Israel’s Rightward Shift Is More Than Political Strategy

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In a candid and comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Guy Ben-Porat warns that Israel’s political rightward shift is not simply a strategic maneuver, but the product of deeper ideological currents. Describing the current coalition as “a unification of several forces,” Professor Ben-Porat highlights its populist hostility toward liberal institutions, minorities, and judicial independence. He draws direct parallels to Hungary and Poland, identifying a shared authoritarian trajectory. Professor Ben-Porat also reflects on how the October 7 attacks have further racialized political discourse, with Arab-Palestinian citizens facing intensified securitization. Yet, he sees hope in mass democratic mobilization: “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week… the fact that many Israelis are still fighting for democracy means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a period marked by growing polarization, religious populism, and democratic backsliding, Israel’s political landscape has undergone a profound transformation. In a wide-ranging and timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev—offers a critical diagnosis of Israel’s sharp rightward turn. “It’s more than strategy,” Professor Ben-Porat asserts, describing the current government as “a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government,” rooted in anti-liberalism, exclusionary nationalism, and religious traditionalism.

At the center of this transformation is a coalition led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, flanked by ultra-Orthodox parties and far-right figures such as Itamar Ben Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. Their political agenda, Professor Ben-Porat explains, has taken aim at core liberal-democratic institutions. “From the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court… What they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that will stamp upon the rights of minorities.”

This encroachment on judicial independence is not merely an Israeli phenomenon. Professor Ben-Porat highlights the striking parallels with populist regimes in Hungary and Poland, noting that “Orbán and what happened in Poland before the last elections were good examples for Israel… this was a copycat.” The broader objective is to reconfigure Israeli democracy into a more ethnocratic and majoritarian model—where Jewish identity increasingly overrides civic inclusion and pluralism.

In a particularly sobering observation, Professor Ben-Porat warns that the October 7 Hamas attacks have only deepened the state’s securitized and racialized posture toward its Arab-Palestinian citizens. “There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens,” he notes. And yet, despite populist figures like Ben Gvir hoping to use the crisis as justification for repression, Israel’s Arab citizens “did not play the game as expected”—remaining distant from Hamas and at times even risking their lives to protect Jewish compatriots.

Still, Professor Ben-Porat cautions that democratic decline is not inevitable. “Thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. That should not be discounted.” Though the protest movement remains largely focused on “Jewish democracy,” he sees the potential for it to evolve, to challenge systemic inequalities and the ongoing occupation. “It’s hard to be hopeful now,” he concludes, “but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.”

Professor Guy Ben-Porat—an expert in comparative politics and political sociology at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Guy Ben-Porat.

It’s More Than Strategy: A Unified Assault on Liberal Democracy

Professor Guy Ben-Porat, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you understand the convergence of neo-Zionist ideology and populist rhetoric in the post-2022 electoral landscape, particularly under the Ben Gvir–Smotrich axis within Netanyahu’s coalition?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a big question, with many terms—neo, Zionist, etc.—which I’m not sure I understand or use all of them. It’s a right-wing government that has several elements within it. Likud, Netanyahu’s party, is a populist party which has become an exclusionary populist party in recent years, centered on anti-Arab, anti-immigrant, and anti-liberal sentiments.

Alongside it are the ultra-Orthodox parties, which have a very special perspective on Israel’s future and on church–state relations. You mentioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich. This is a united party combining into an extreme right-wing party—maybe akin to some things you see among the extreme right in Europe. So, major populism is the main theme here. I think it’s a right-wing, religious government with populist elements within it.

To what extent can the recent rightward shift in Israeli politics be interpreted as a populist response to long-standing ethnic and religious cleavages rather than a mere electoral strategy?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more than strategy. I think the government has a common interest in undermining some of the established democratic features of Israel—namely, the Supreme Court in particular. And if you look at the internal scene, or the internal politics, from the get-go, this government was determined to undermine the power of the Supreme Court and what we call the checks and balances. Now each part of the government has a different take on the Supreme Court. 

For the ultra-Orthodox, the Supreme Court is perceived as liberal and as undermining their coalitional achievements, which they gain—particular gains for their own good—whether it is exemption from military service, whether it’s budgets for religious institutions, etc.

For the extreme right, the Supreme Court is perceived as slowing down the annexation of the West Bank and the territories. The Supreme Court is perceived as putting some blocks on the military and on the settlement movement—which, one could argue, it does not—but that’s the way they perceive it.

And for Netanyahu, being involved in a series of trials, the Supreme Court is perceived—or is depicted—as an attempt to remove an elected leader by the elites.

So each part of this government has its own take on democracy, kind of combining together into this coalition.

Now, what unites them is, first, a very right-wing perspective in terms of Palestinians and Arab citizens; a more religious attitude or more traditional attitude towards religion; and a strong dislike of what they describe as elites and liberal democracy. So all this together makes it more than a fluke, more than a conjecture. It’s a unification of several forces that make a very strong right-wing government.

Religion Is Used to Draw Boundaries—Not Just to Guide Lives

Does the growing prominence of religious populism in Israel suggest a broader transformation in the political culture, where the ethno-religious identity of “the people” overrides civic and pluralistic conceptions of citizenship?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think here it’s a bit more complex, and that’s what we do—Dani Filc and I—in our work. For some of the religious right, religion is about demarcating boundaries. Religion is used as a way to define the Jewish state, to defend Jewish privileges, and to exclude those who are not Jewish. But if you look at their perception of religion as a way of life—as an ethical way of living—then some of them are not religious, or not religious in the way that orthodoxy perceives religion. To make this a bit more clear: if you look at issues like LGBTQ rights or issues about women’s rights within the Jewish camp, they can be somewhat liberal.

So, in this government, there is a clear divide between those for whom religion is a genuine way of life—shaping their daily practices, beliefs, and ethical system—and those who use religion primarily to draw boundaries and assert identity. Take, for example, the policy issue of exempting yeshiva students from military service: for the ultra-Orthodox, this is entirely natural and self-evident. For Likud members, however, it is far less obvious. That’s where you see differences between what religion is for these people.

Ehud Olmert, former Israeli Prime Minister, in his article published in Haaretz/The Guardian recently, warns of Israel’s potential international isolation and prosecution over war crimes, describing a state policy of starvation and indiscriminate violence. How does the normalization of such extreme policies reflect the convergence of populist ethno-nationalism with authoritarian state practices and what are the long-term implications for democratic institutions and minority rights in Israel?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think we need to make a little separation of things. First, Olmert’s warning is true and real. Israel’s actions in Gaza are dangerous. Many civilian lives are lost, and one could say—in very careful terms—without good reason. Not that there’s ever a good reason, but this war has definitely gone to extremes.

Now, why is this war continuing? Well, I think there are some reasons. One: it’s the government’s policy. And for Netanyahu, as long as the war goes on, the government stays intact. It keeps the government together. If the war ends, then some of the more extreme elements of the government might pull it apart, which means that Netanyahu would have to stand trial without the protection of being Prime Minister. It means there’ll be new elections. It means that Jews will begin debating what happened on October 7th—who’s responsible for this debacle. So for the government, the continuation of the war serves several purposes.

For some, the war should be continued because “we should not stop before the final victory,” which I’m not sure what it means—but for them, it’s the annihilation of Hamas. And I’m not sure that’s even possible. For others, maybe we should end the war on better terms for Israel. Again, I have no idea what that means.

But you could say there’s a mixture of ideology—of extreme right-wing ideology—of political interests, and mainly the fact that the government, for reasons that relate to what I said before, has never really introduced a strategy for how to end this war. If you ask Netanyahu: when does this war end? What will be in Gaza? Who will rule Gaza? Where will Israel be? What’s the role of the Palestinian Authority? What’s the role of other countries? What’s going to happen in Gaza once this war ends? What are the goals of this war? What is the strategy? We don’t know.

A Coherent Network of Right-Wing Advocacy Is Shaping Israel’s Future

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

How has the increasing influence of religiously conservative diaspora-funded NGOs and settler movements shaped the neo-Zionist agenda, particularly under populist governance?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Within Israel, money from abroad is not a new thing. NGOs—from both the left and the right—are supported from abroad. That’s not a new phenomenon. The same goes for the government. The Jewish diaspora has always maintained strong ties with Israel and influenced Israeli politics.

You can see NGOs on the so-called left and on the right receiving funding from abroad. Now, from the right-wing perspective, it’s the money from abroad that’s financing the left. So if you look at the populist kind of discourse, it’s about international elites supporting leftist, anti-Zionist forces who are opposing the government. It depends on which side is telling the story.

But to be more precise, I think what we’re seeing today is a very strong connection between the Israeli right and the Trump administration, as well as right-wing organizations in Europe. That’s where you see, perhaps, a new development: a more coherent network of right-wing advocacy that also has influence on Israel.

In your analysis of ‘good citizenship’ among new religious movements, how do such actors reframe legitimacy within a populist framework that delegitimizes secular or liberal opponents?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: There are several ways this is conducted. Begin with “good citizenship” in Israel—the republican equation, as we call it—has often been about military service. Many on the right pride themselves on being the foot soldiers: “We are carrying out the mission of defending Israel. We are paying the price in blood,” whether it’s through settlement in the West Bank or military service. Hence, we are the good citizens.

They blame the other side for not doing as much. By the way, statistics don’t necessarily support that, but that’s the claim. So being a good citizen is framed around military service and combat. That’s how they define good citizenship.

Now, this of course has implications for issues of gender and ethnicity—namely, for non-Jewish citizens. This whole concept of good citizenship is used by populists to describe themselves as the good, contributing, fighting citizens, in contrast to the “detached elites”—those who are global, more fluid, who can use their money to escape responsibility.

Now, this is a myth—a fable. The Israeli center-left has been fighting on the streets for democracy for two years now. So the whole notion of detached elites is complete baloney. But it makes for a compelling narrative on the right: We are the good citizens. We are the ones who sacrifice. We are truly committed to the country, while you—the elites—are global cosmopolitans. This, by the way, echoes classic anti-Semitic tropes once used in Europe against Jews. Put that aside—but the story they tell is that we are the good people, and they are the detached elites with less commitment to the country’s welfare.

A Different Government Might Have Chosen Strategy Over Messianic Dreams

Had a centrist or center-left coalition prevailed in the 2022 elections, how might the Israeli state have handled the aftermath of the October 7 attacks differently—in terms of military response, international diplomacy, and internal discourse?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s hard to talk about things that didn’t happen. The “what if” is always very difficult. I can say one thing: if the October 7th debacle had happened under a center-left government, the right would have used all its power to force that government out, to place the blame squarely on them, and to sell the narrative that this is what happens when you have a left-leaning government—one that is weak and unequipped to fight. A left-wing government would have been discredited to the bones.

That hasn’t happened with the right. Netanyahu’s government has been fighting for almost two years now to shed responsibility. “It’s not us, it’s the military, it’s the intelligence.” They’ve been working very hard since October 7th—October 8th even—to deflect responsibility.

Now, what would a different government do? Hard to say. But what a sensible one would do is, at some stage early in the war, begin to form a strategy. On October 8th, right after October 7th, we had very strong international support. We could have fought Hamas, brought an alternative government to Gaza, brought back the hostages, and started thinking of a new future for the Middle East. We could have pursued Middle East alliances—with the Saudis, with the Gulf countries. There were opportunities on the table. This government, because of its right-wing, messianic, and ultra-nationalist agenda, simply threw that out the window. What we would have had instead is maybe a strategy—not messianic dreams. A strategy.

Would an alternative government have challenged the securitization logic that you argue has long shaped Israeli-Arab relations, or merely adopted a more technocratic or liberal gloss?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Again, hard to tell. I would take anything that improves the current situation. Gloss might become, at some point, substance. But I think the previous government—at least on one issue that I’m researching, internal security—had a different approach.

We have an ongoing crisis within Arab neighborhoods in Israel. Arab citizens make up about 20% of the country’s population, and they account for more than 50% of the murders in this country. The numbers are skyrocketing.

The previous government, through an attempt to create a strategy, was able for the first time to slightly reduce the number of people murdered among Arab citizens. In this government, the police are in the hands of Itamar Ben-Gvir, an extreme right-wing nationalist and, if I may say, a convicted criminal. Under his office, the numbers have doubled since the last government. So yes, a different government could have made a difference.

Copying Orbán: Undermining Democracy in the Name of Sovereignty

To what extent is the judicial overhaul effort by the Netanyahu-led coalition part of a broader pattern of populist institutional capture akin to what we have seen in Hungary or Poland?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s been mentioned many times, and the comparison has been made by many people. The connection between Orbán and Netanyahu is well known. Netanyahu’s son has been advocating and has become something of a poster child for some of these movements. So there’s a strong relationship between the Israeli right and the right in Europe and the US.

To a large extent, this was the playbook of the right: undermine liberal democratic institutions and give more power to the government. Orbán—and what happened in Poland before the last elections—were good examples for Israel. And I think, to some extent, this was a copycat. Yes, we saw this in Europe; we can do the same things here. It’s a kind of logic that follows its own lead—it doesn’t really need the examples from abroad. Still, I think the fact that this is happening on a global scale has some meaning.

Do you view the weakening of judicial independence in Israel as a calculated step toward majoritarian rule under the guise of popular sovereignty? How does this resonate with your broader work on state-minority relations?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: They’ve said it explicitly—so it’s not a mystery. Their position is clear: they want to transfer power from the judiciary to the government. That’s not a secret—it’s the stated policy of this government. The Supreme Court may have its faults, and liberal democracy can certainly be debated. But what they’re proposing is a majoritarian government that tramples the rights of minorities. Again, this isn’t hidden. Some members of the government openly declare that Israel is a Jewish state in which Jewish citizens should enjoy privileges over non-Jews.

Israel has long debated how to reconcile being both a Jewish state and a democracy. It’s an ongoing tension—these principles often clash. Liberal Israelis—and one can debate whether they were right or wrong—have tried to argue that the two can be balanced. A Jewish state, they’ve said, can still be fair toward its Arab citizens. It may not be perfect, it may have flaws, but the contradictions can be managed, even if not fully resolved.

Under the current government, however, there is a clear and explicit shift toward prioritizing the Jewish character of the state. If being both Jewish and democratic comes into conflict, their answer is unequivocal: it is a Jewish state, and democracy comes second. For some in this government, that’s not incidental—it’s ideological. That’s what they believe.

Annexation of Gaza Is No Longer a Whisper—It’s a Declared Agenda

Do you see a fundamental shift in the far right’s approach to governing Palestinians under occupation—moving from ‘managing’ the conflict to accelerating irreversible annexation?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: Absolutely. And again, these are things that are being said explicitly. You don’t really have to search—it’s not hypothetical. These are statements made by Smotrich, Ben Gvir, and others: that it’s time to annex the West Bank. So, it’s almost obvious. The only thing that has prevented it so far is international pressure. But under Trump, they believed the time had come—an opportunity to do what they always wanted: annex the West Bank. They’ve announced plans to build more settlements, to use more force against Palestinians, to expel so-called top terrorists—which can mean many things. So while these ideas are not yet fully implemented as policy, they are being openly discussed.

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the current political trajectory, do you believe Israel’s liberal democratic elements are in structural decline, or are there still viable pathways for democratic resilience—perhaps through civil society, judicial pushback, or international pressure?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think the jury is still out on this question. For many years, we’ve been lamenting the death of the left-liberal spectrum in Israel. The prevailing notion was that these people were tired—they were busy with themselves, individualistic, global, cosmopolitan. While the right appeared united and committed, the liberal left seemed aloof and less engaged.

However, over the past two years, we’ve witnessed something remarkable: thousands of people have taken to the streets every week. I think that should not be discounted. I’m not sure who will win, but two or three years ago, if you had told Israelis there would be large weekly rallies in defense of democracy, most would have dismissed it as impossible. Yet, when Israelis perceived that democracy was in danger, they rose up.

There is still a question about how far and how open this movement is. For the moment, it is focused on Jewish democracy. It does not yet address the occupation or fully include the rights of Palestinian citizens—that remains on the margins of the demonstrators’ consensus. The movement is centered on defending Israel’s democracy, and to maintain broad support, it has set aside, at least for now, the occupation and non-Jewish rights.

However, once a movement like this begins to grow and starts to confront the deeper implications of occupation and inequality, then maybe there is room for optimism. It’s hard to be hopeful right now—given the war and two years of ongoing struggle—but the fact that many Israelis are still on the streets, still fighting for democracy, means they haven’t thrown in the towel yet.

Fear Is Driving Policy—But That’s Exactly What Ben Gvir Wants

To what extent does the current populist ascendancy reflect a systemic recoding of Israel’s founding ethno-religious cleavages into a majoritarian regime logic, rather than a contingent electoral maneuver?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: I think it’s more contingent. We’ve had many years of cleavages and schisms that have come to the fore with the last elections, and we are seeing a very strong cleavage between center-left and right. But within those camps, there are divisions. People on both the right and the left can change their opinions.

Especially in the last 18 months—after October 7th—there has also been the fear factor. People are acting out of fear. Let’s look at the Palestinians, or Arab citizens, or the world. There is still a memory of October 7th. This trauma still lingers.

So, I think what needs to happen now is the restoration of hope and the development of a strategy—reaching out to people on the other side of the spectrum and trying to convince them that there is another option. Maybe then there’s room for change.

To answer your question: no, it’s not merely a contingency. It is the result of many years of struggles and cleavages. Netanyahu was able to position himself as a defender of “the true people” in a very populist sense. But the war has also somewhat shattered that image—being Mr. Security and managing the economy. So, while these shifts are, at the moment, tragic, they may in the future provide some room for change.

In the light of your work on the ‘shrinking of citizenship,’ how has the October 7 Hamas attack provided a discursive and policy framework for intensifying the racialized securitization of Arab-Palestinian citizens under the guise of national unity and collective trauma?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: It’s a good question. And again, it has several layers that we need to look at. To begin with—yes, Israel became more securitized. People are more afraid, which, of course, also shapes opinions and perceptions. When you’re afraid, it’s very hard to think things through and look at the long term. In that sense, it’s become more securitized. For example, political dissent is much less tolerated. There’s much more securitization of political statements and actions of Arab citizens.

At the same time, Ben Gvir was expecting Arab citizens to join in the October 7th events. That would have given him the reason to use more force against them. So, from Ben Gvir’s perspective or hopes, October 7th provided an opportunity to crack down on Israeli Arab citizens. This has not happened. Arab citizens did not play the game as expected. They remained very detached from Hamas. On October 7th, they were saying, “That is not us. We don’t condone these things.” More than that—among the hostages were Arab citizens, Bedouins from the Negev, who were taken by Hamas to Gaza, and some were killed by Hamas. Arab citizens on October 7th, in some cases, saved Jewish citizens.

The whole story became more complex. But now Gaza makes it more difficult—because those citizens are saying, “Those people in Gaza are our brothers.” When people are dying in Gaza in scores, “We can’t stand aside. People are starving in Gaza. We have to speak our mind. We have to protest.” And that’s the test for Israel. Can Jewish citizens be tolerant toward that? Or do their fears make them see those protests as pro-Hamas—which they are not? 

Now we’re in a very difficult situation where Arab citizens who are protesting against the war in Gaza feel themselves threatened by the government. It has not exploded yet. But that’s exactly what Ben Gvir wants. For him, that would be a good day—one in which he can make the connection: Arab citizens, Palestinians, Hamas—they’re all the same, and they’re all here to destroy us. “Now we have legitimacy to use all means.” That’s the scare right now.

Evangelical Backing Fuels Israel’s Right-Wing Populism

Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Ben-Porat, what role have transnational, religiously conservative, and diaspora-funded networks played in amplifying the settler-theocratic undercurrents of neo-Zionist populism, particularly in relation to territorial maximalism and cultural hegemony?

Professor Guy Ben-Porat: For many years there were relations between settlers and right-wing movements in Israel and similar or supportive movements abroad. As I said before, that is not unique in Israel. All movements—left, right, and center—have often found alliances abroad, whether among Jewish diasporas or liberals in America. So in that sense, what the right wing is doing is not unique.

This transnationality, to be fair, is something used by many groups in Israel for different purposes and reasons. You can say whether it’s good or bad, but the use itself is not unique. Where it is unique is in the US. If you look at Trump supporters in the US, the Evangelicals were a very strong element in his campaign. They provide very strong support for Israel, the right wing, and the settlers. That’s where the connection is important.

It’s more dramatic than it seems—because for many years, Israel was very careful to maintain a bipartisan approach in the US, having support from both Democrats and Republicans. Also remember, the Jewish community in the US is mostly pro-Democratic. So Israel traditionally refrained from taking sides in American politics. Israel was above the Republican–Democratic divide and maintained a relationship with the Jewish diaspora in the US, who are mostly pro-Democrats.

In the last decade or so, things have begun to change. Netanyahu has put his weight on the Republican camp—anti-Obama, anti-Biden, and pro-Trump in the US. His support came in many cases from either right-wing Jews, religious Jews, or right-wing Christians. So, the whole dynamic changes here. Before, it was bipartisan with strong support from the Jewish community. Now, it’s Republican—with support from right-wing Christians and Jews—and an alienation of a large part of the liberal Jewish community.

That’s a strange turn of events. But I think the important religious factor here is the right-wing religious Christians in the US. That’s probably the most important development in Israel’s foreign relations.

Dr. Radoslaw Markowski is Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences and Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator.

Professor Markowski on Poland’s President-Elect Karol Nawrocki: Future Statesman or Mere Footnote?

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling post-election interview, Professor Radosław Markowski offers a candid, expert analysis of Poland’s newly elected president, Karol Nawrocki. Backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, Nawrocki’s narrow win poses serious challenges to Prime Minister Tusk’s pro-European government. Professor Markowski dissects the roots of this upset—calling it the result of a “fantastically prepared campaign”—and warns of potential institutional gridlock and democratic backsliding. While describing Nawrocki as “inexperienced” and lacking policy depth, Professor Markowski holds out a sliver of hope that he may rise above partisan loyalties. With sharp insights into Polish society, EU disillusionment, and the dangers of populist overreach, this interview is essential reading on Poland’s increasingly polarized and uncertain political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the aftermath of Poland’s 2025 presidential election, the political landscape remains fraught with uncertainty, ideological tension, and institutional fragility. Karol Nawrocki, a nationalist conservative backed by PiS and inspired by Trump-style politics, narrowly secured victory with 50.89% of the vote, defeating centrist candidate Rafal Trzaskowski. His win delivers a major setback to Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European government, which has been striving to reverse judicial reforms enacted under the previous PiS administration. With presidential veto power at his disposal, Nawrocki is expected to obstruct key liberal policies, deepening political gridlock and intensifying concerns about democratic backsliding.

In this timely and probing interview, renowned political scientist Professor Radosław Markowski offers a sharp analysis of Nawrocki’s narrow win, calling it the product of a “fantastically prepared campaign” rather than a sign of a lasting ideological shift. Professor Markowski emphasizes that Nawrocki is “definitely inexperienced,” lacking basic knowledge of international relations and economics. Yet despite these limitations, he entertains a faint hope—perhaps naively—that Nawrocki might rise above his campaign alliances and “act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents.”

This cautious optimism is tempered by structural concerns about Poland’s democratic integrity. Professor Markowski draws a direct line between the present moment and the legacy of what he has termed “free but unfair” elections. Referencing his article in West European Politics, he highlights the disproportionality of PiS’s 2015 win—where only 18.8% of eligible voters delivered a 51% parliamentary majority—and the subsequent “eight years of structural lawlessness.” Nawrocki’s victory, Professor Markowski argues, does not signal a visionary mandate, but reflects the effective demobilization of liberal voters and the disciplined overperformance of a conservative-nationalist base.

With his strong nationalist rhetoric and pledges to limit EU influence while promoting Polish sovereignty, Nawrocki’s rise has been cheered by Eurosceptic leaders across Central Europe, including Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen. Yet his alignment with this populist-right alliance only heightens fears of further democratic erosion in a country once considered a model of post-communist European integration.

Whether Nawrocki becomes a transformative statesman or a forgettable footnote in Polish political history remains an open question. As Professor Markowski underscores, the new president now faces a choice: to entrench polarization and gridlock, or to rise above partisan constraints and define his legacy in the eyes of future generations.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Radosław Markowski.

Democracy at a Tipping Point

Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Radosław Markowski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of Karol Nawrocki’s narrow victory, how do you interpret this outcome within your framework of “plurality support for democratic decay”? Does this mark a deepening of democratic vulnerability in Poland, despite Law and Justice party’s (PiS) 2023 parliamentary loss?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s first try to recall the facts. In 2023, PiS won the elections against Platforma Obywatelska by nearly 4 percentage points—an equivalent of several hundred thousand votes—but it was unable to govern due to its lack of coalition-building capacity. Today in 2025, they won by a significantly smaller margin—just 1.5% effectively. It is a sort of a tie with a slight edge toward one of the candidates. However, the narrative remains consistent.

Polish society—and this is the focus of my ongoing research, soon to be published—is fundamentally liberal, progressive, and cosmopolitan. This stands in stark contrast to the narratives promoted by pundits and public intellectuals who advocate for a nationalist, conservative, and ultra-religious vision of Poland. The proportion of those who support liberal and progressive values over traditional and nationalistic ones is typically three to one, two to one, or at worst, three to two. Across more than 20 dimensions of this cultural divide, I see no evidence of conservative-nationalist dominance.

The problem lies in the fact that these conservative forces, supported by the Polish Catholic Church and representative of a departing world order, have successfully achieved nearly full mobilization in the last decade or decade and a half. Ninety to ninety-nine percent of all available nationalist-conservative voters turn out for elections.

On the other hand, the liberal-progressive side struggles, occasionally succeeding—as in 2023. Compounding this issue is the fact that PiS supporters are notably older, less educated, primarily from rural areas or outside the labor market by choice or by circumstance and are ill-equipped for success in a meritocratic modern world. They are part of society, of course—this is a description, not a judgment. Their mobilization is straightforward, relying on black-and-white imagery, simplifications, and the narrative of stark Manichean good versus evil.

In contrast, the liberal-progressive side comprises highly educated voters—predominantly individuals with high socioeconomic status, capable people who run their own businesses, academics, entrepreneurs, and the middle class. This is a challenging electorate. They are critical readers who verify information coming from politicians and reject simplistic depictions of the world. They ask not only about the goals but also about the means of achieving those goals. They question; they ask about possible side effects. They ask about alternative policies. They are concerned about trade-offs.

More so, they are very capricious in a way and dissatisfied with trivial answers to complicated matters. And this is precisely why it is so tough to attract these liberal, cosmopolitan, progressive voters. They are knowledgeable people who do not buy simplistic propaganda or demagoguery from politicians.

Eight Years of Structural Lawlessness in Poland

Logo and sign of the PiS (Law and Justice / Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party in Pruszcz Gdański, Poland, on April 11, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

You’ve previously described Polish elections as “free but unfair.” Do the 2025 presidential results reflect a continuity of institutional imbalance, particularly with regard to partisan control over historical institutions like the Institute of National Remembrance?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me say—this is a subtitle of one of my articles in West European Politics—that the elections were “free but unfair,” with unfair results. What I meant then is that in the 2015 elections, in which PiS won in a free and fair contest, they received 5.7 million votes out of nearly 31 million eligible voters—meaning that only 18.8% of eligible voters supported PiS, yet they gained a 51% parliamentary majority. You know, this kind of miracle almost never happens under proportional representation. But due to 17% of wasted votes and the D’Hondt formula—which eliminated a significant portion of minor votes—it was possible.

There would have been no problem with this kind of translation from 18.8% to 51% parliamentary majority if they had merely run the country in the sense of administrating government affairs. But unfortunately, they behaved after that election as if they had received a qualified majority, and they started changing the constitutional rules of the game.

I like Adam Przeworski’s definition of democracy, which says: democracy is institutionalized uncertainty. There should be frozen, strict, and obeyed rules of the game that never change during the process of electing politicians—but the outcomes of these rules are unknown, and that’s the beauty of democracy.

So, what PiS did illegally since 2015—because they thought this kind of miracle would never happen again—was to bash the Constitutional Tribunal, interfere with the Supreme Court by inventing a new chamber, the “Extraordinary Chamber of Something.” It is “extraordinary” in the sense that nobody in Europe or worldwide recognizes it. We experienced a period of eight years of structural lawlessness in Poland, which excluded us from the community of civilized democracies in the European Union.

We used to enjoy relatively high prestige with people like Jerzy Buzek, former President of the European Parliament, and Donald Tusk, who was President of the European Council. These roles may have even overstated Poland’s influence, but they indicated that Poland was politically important in the EU. That prestige vanished immediately after PiS came to power and began misbehaving in terms of the rule of law and democratic procedures.

Nawrocki’s Win: A Campaign Masterpiece or a Populist Rebrand?

Given Nawrocki’s political inexperience but ideological clarity, how do you interpret his victory as a possible recalibration of Poland’s populist-authoritarian project? Is this a new chapter or simply a rebranding of the PiS legacy?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It’s very hard to say who he is. He’s definitely inexperienced. He lacks basic knowledge about international relations, about economic issues, and so forth. Again, let me reiterate: Poland is a parliamentary democracy in which the executive power lies with the Prime Minister and his government. The president is mainly symbolic in terms of positive policies. He can propose something, but it is up to the parliamentary majority to pay attention to his activities. He, however, has negative powers. He can veto, and this is unfortunately what we expect from him. We’ll talk about that maybe later on.

But back to the campaign, I would say—well, in a way, it is quite interesting, and we’ll probably be teaching students about it in the future. It was a campaign masterpiece by Nawrocki’s electoral team—by the people who managed to craft a serious presidential contender out of almost nothing. Their most notable success was in discouraging turnout for Trzaskowski in the second round. Typically, second-round presidential contests hinge more on demobilizing the opponent’s base than on attracting new voters. In short, this was not a substantial victory in terms of broad public endorsement. Rather, it clearly illustrates how easily a poorly informed segment of the electorate can be—well, if you prefer, persuaded. If you prefer the term manipulated, that works too. Meanwhile, on Trzaskowski’s side, there was a clear failure of his electoral staff.

What does this outcome suggest about the limits of liberal coalition-building in Poland? Could Trzaskowski’s failure be linked to coalition fatigue, perceived elitism, or a lack of emotional mobilization compared to the nationalist right?

Professor Radosław Markowski: I already spoke about mobilization before, so I won’t repeat that here. But yes, the conservative nationalist camp is—quite frankly—astronomically over-mobilized. Virtually everyone in that camp turns out to vote. Unfortunately, the liberal democratic camp is less mobilized, and there are many reasons for that. One contributing factor is the one and a half years of the new government and its difficulties in implementing certain policies. However, it’s important to note that these delays—particularly on issues that matter deeply to many, such as abortion rights and women’s issues—were largely due to the fact that the current president, Andrzej Duda, had already made it clear he would veto such legislation.

So, the government was, de facto, waiting for a new opening—once the president is from their camp, or at least a person who is neutral and capable of reading what are the prerogatives of the president enshrined in the Polish constitution.

So, we have to wait and see. I don’t think I would interpret this win of Nawrocki as anything more than an incident and a fantastically prepared campaign by his staff, rather than something more deeply rooted. But one should also recognize that such victories—unexpected victories of unknown persons—sometimes redefine the political landscape and the political developments, and this should also be taken seriously into account.

Why Trzaskowski’s Campaign Missed the Mark

Rafał Trzaskowski, Mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate, campaigning in Łódź, Poland, on June 3, 2020. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

To what extent did the personalization of the campaign around symbolic figures (Trzaskowski as elite technocrat vs. Nawrocki as populist traditionalist) reinforce identity cleavages over policy-based electoral competition?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let me reiterate a point about Trzaskowski’s campaign that I mentioned earlier. His team made a fundamental mistake—one I publicly flagged six months ago: they attempted to court the right-wing electorate. This group is a clear minority in Poland and already firmly aligned and mobilized by parties like PiS and Confederacja. The likelihood of swaying voters from that camp was virtually nonexistent.

This approach came at the expense of engaging the left-liberal electorate with progressive, liberal ideas. Trzaskowski is not an ultra-progressive or ultra-liberal, but he is certainly a meritocratic, cosmopolitan liberal—someone who speaks several languages fluently, who comes from an elite Warsaw family. Yet, he and his campaign team decided to pretend he was “one of us”—an average guy. One of the campaign’s obsessions was to ensure that no one mentioned his multilingualism.

This is a typical populist miscalculation—thinking you win elections by downplaying meritocracy. Unfortunately, it backfired. We estimate that around 1.5 million people who voted for the current ruling coalition in 2023 became disillusioned with Trzaskowski due to these mixed signals and overt appeals to the right-wing electorate. It was a real disappointment for them.

In the light of your concept of “Eurodisappointment,” to what extent does Trzaskowski’s loss suggest growing frustration even among pro-European voters with the EU’s perceived ineffectiveness in addressing democratic backsliding?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Together with my co-author, we pointed out in an article in European Union Politics that we began observing, around 2021–2022, a new phenomenon we called “new Euroscepticism” or “Eurodisappointment” among Poles. This isn’t the typical Euroscepticism rooted in xenophobic or nationalist attitudes. Rather, it’s a disappointment driven by frustration with the European Union’s inability to push back against leaders like Orbán and Kaczyński.

That old saying— “Brussels barks but doesn’t bite”— began to resonate, especially among a segment of the Polish population that had long been very enthusiastic about the EU. It fostered a growing suspicion that the EU might not be genuinely committed to upholding its core axiological pillars—democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental values.

Poland’s Populist Path and the Limits of EU Leverage

Has the European Union’s cautious and often delayed response to autocratizing member states like Hungary and Poland amplified the populist portrayal of Brussels as politically impotent? Could Nawrocki’s presidency signal a shift toward a more defiant, nationalist approach to EU engagement—echoing Orbán’s model of selective integration without formal rupture?

Professor Radosław Markowski: It might not be exactly what Orbán has invented, because in Poland—unlike in Hungary—there isn’t a deep-rooted historical sentiment akin to Hungarians’ longing for “Greater Hungary” or resentment over the Treaty of Trianon. In Hungary today, you can walk into nearly any hotel or public space and see maps depicting a pre-Trianon Hungary—three times its current size.

Poland also had its imperial moments in the past, being much larger in both territory and population. But even among nationalists, that imperial history doesn’t serve as a powerful reference point in contemporary politics. So, emulating Orbán isn’t straightforward.

Also, Orbán won a constitutional majority in Hungary’s first free and fair 2010 election. He could legitimately claim the mandate to rewrite the rules—which he did. It’s another matter how he later amended the constitution. But that legitimacy gave him more latitude than PiS or Nawrocki have in Poland.

Back to Polish politics: Nawrocki’s attitude toward the EU is definitely critical. But unfortunately, this is paired with a kind of infantile pro-Americanism—specifically, pro-Trumpism. You hear ideas like Poland leading the Trimarium Pact (Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Georgia, North Macedonia, etc.). While maintaining good relations with these countries is important—especially those aspiring to EU membership—this can’t replace engagement with core EU mechanisms.

We should be at the heart of EU decision-making. Poland was recently re-invited by figures like Friedrich Merz and Emmanuel Macron to take a central role in European affairs—particularly because of our prescient warnings about Vladimir Putin and the war in Ukraine. As early as 2005, 2010, and 2014, we sounded alarms about Putin’s ambitions—warnings largely ignored by Angela Merkel and others in Western Europe. Now, Poland is being taken more seriously, and we should seize that moment.

Let me emphasize once again: Poland is a parliamentary democracy. Executive power lies with the Prime Minister and the government. Foreign policy is handled by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The President can influence foreign affairs symbolically or by refusing to appoint certain ambassadors, which creates problems for individuals and embassies. But in the grand scheme, it’s not a major institutional hurdle.

Nawrocki’s Risky Global Alliances

President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.

Nawrocki’s campaign drew symbolic and rhetorical support from leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán. How do you see Poland’s evolving position in the broader network of global populist-right alliances?

Professor Radosław Markowski: For Poland, this dynamic doesn’t resonate with the PiS electorate—the party’s core support remains around 6 to 6.5 million voters, not the full 10 million who voted for Nawrocki in the second round. While he ultimately secured over 10 million votes, PiS’s true, consistent base is closer to the 29% he garnered in the first round.

Unlike Hungary, Poland—due to its historical experience—cannot accept pro-Russian sentiment. That simply doesn’t resonate here. As PiS and Nawrocki continue aligning with figures like Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Salvini, and even the prime minister of Slovakia, it will become increasingly difficult to justify such alliances to the Polish public. Even on the political right, there is discomfort with someone like Donald Trump, who appears either overly sympathetic to or dangerously naive about Russia.

But again, Polish foreign policy is in the hands of one of Europe’s most talented politicians: Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski. So, I see no immediate cause for concern. External affairs will be shaped by the government and Sikorski, not the president.

Let me also point out something almost comical. Just a week ago, on May 25th, Donald Trump finally declared publicly that “Vladimir Putin is insane.” For Poles, this is hardly news. The average high school student here has known that for the last 15 to 20 years. It’s astonishing that it took so long for the most powerful man in the world—surrounded by the CIA and an array of intelligence agencies—to come to that conclusion.

So, in the long run, I believe Nawrocki will lose credibility and support if he aligns too closely with what I would call Kremlin muppets like Orbán, or with those financially entangled with Russia, like Salvini. It’s a very difficult political position in today’s Poland to be seen as a friend of Vladimir Putin.

Nawrocki’s Test: Rise Above Politics or Deepen the Deadlock?

Considering the veto powers of the presidency, how do you expect the new phase of institutional deadlock to evolve under Nawrocki, and what risks does it pose to executive-legislative accountability in Poland?

Professor Radosław Markowski: Let’s give Nawrocki a chance. He is not strictly a PiS politician. He has made certain agreements and signed deals with Confederacja and others, and he will formally become Poland’s president in early August this year.

Every person—no matter their troubled CV or ethically questionable behavior in the past—who becomes president of a mid-sized country at the heart of Europe has the opportunity to reflect on how they want to be remembered. Will he be just a short footnote—an irrelevant president who did nothing for Poland—or will he attempt to act reasonably and become a good politician serving the country and society he represents?

Let’s give him that chance. Perhaps he will become less dependent on the political actors who backed him during the campaign. It’s a naïve expectation, I know—but there’s still a bit of the child in me. Sometimes, I deliberately want to be naïve to leave room for optimism. I’ve seen people radically change their political biographies before.

But if not—if he ends up blindly vetoing everything based on ideological conviction—then we’re back to what we’ve had for the last two years: a tense standoff between a combative president and a determined prime minister. That’s not good for Poland. Still, it’s the reality we may face. And if that happens, Nawrocki and his camp will ultimately lose, because it will become clear that they are obstructing the work of the government. It will be easy to demonstrate that things are not getting done in this country because of the president’s stubbornness.

Colorful election posters featuring presidential candidate Leni Robredo during the Philippine General Elections 2022, seen in Manila on April 16, 2022. Photo: Jim Kayalar.

The ‘Pink Movement,’ Youth Vote, and the Future of Philippine Politics

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

The surprising midterm victories of Benigno Aquino IV and Kiko Pangilinan—both underdog candidates backed by the progressive Pink Movement—signal a potential turning point in Philippine politics. Despite polling poorly before the vote, both secured top spots in the Senate race, fueled largely by a mobilized youth electorate and disillusionment with traditional power blocs. The resurgence of the Pink Movement, rooted in civic resistance during the Duterte era, now finds new momentum amid internal fractures in the Marcos-Duterte alliance. While questions remain about the opposition’s long-term cohesion and whether these gains reflect lasting ideological shifts, the current momentum and demographic advantage suggest the Pink Movement—and the youth—could play a decisive role in shaping the 2028 national elections.

By Bernard Allan V. Garcia*

The most recent midterm elections in the Philippines came as a surprise to many. Benigno Aquino IV and Kiko Pangilinan—both seasoned politicians yet widely considered underdogs—secured spots in the Magic 12. Weeks and months before the elections, major polling firms in the Philippines had not projected them to make the cut. Pulse Asia’s final pre-election survey placed Aquino in the 11th–18th range and Pangilinan slightly behind in the 13th–20th range, both outside the winning circle (Pulse Asia Research, 2025). Similarly, the SWS Survey predicted that neither would secure a seat (Cupin, 2025). However, unofficial results revealed a dramatic shift: Aquino placed second and Pangilinan fifth. This unexpected outcome has since sparked widespread discussion on what led to such a turn of events.

The Pink Movement

The ‘Pink Movement’ is not an overnight project established by the opposition; it is a product of years of suppression and human rights abuse. To understand the movement, one must walk down memory lane and go back to 2016 when Rodrigo Roa Duterte was elected to power. Many controversial policies were made, including the infamous Oplan: Tokhang, a systematic government crackdown on illegal drugs that resulted in numerous extrajudicial killings. Most of the victims of this government policy are from the vulnerable sectors of the population, including low to lower-middle-income communities. The administration also made multiple attempts to silence media companies, activists, and educational institutions, while introducing a new systemic plague in the form of propaganda groups that distort truth and facts. In one notable instance, the government targeted activist organizations, and the practice of red-tagging has become a recurring theme in Philippine politics, radio broadcasts, and late-night press conferences.

The Duterte administration also saw a highly controversial shift in foreign policy—from a traditionally American-leaning stance to a China-oriented approach, all under the banner of an “independent foreign policy.” During this uneasy transition, the Philippines found itself in a precarious position: efforts to assert its claims in the West Philippine Sea were frequently met with Chinese aggression, yet the government consistently downplayed the tensions, portraying the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a good friend of the Philippines.

However, the worst is yet to come, as the Philippines suffered great losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. At some points during the pandemic and global shutdown, the Philippines had multiple surges of new cases. The evident lack of preparations manifested in sub-standard medical facilities, a lack of manpower, insufficient medical responses, and episodes of late-night press conferences. On top of all these difficulties, the Duterte-backed Congress also revoked the franchise of the local media giant, ABS-CBN Corporation, further dismantling information dissemination in the country. Needless to say, Filipinos had a rough six-year journey, and the power struggles of the vulnerable population were pretty evident. Along the lines of problems and incompetence, the Philippines had a glimpse of a silver lining. 

In 2022, the Pink Movement took fruition, from small numbers of young volunteers to having sectoral branches in almost every local government unit, the movement became a force. Leni Robredo, the then-incumbent vice president, became the face of the Pink Movement. Her presidential candidacy was backed by the youth, advocacy groups, multiple political parties, independents, and many academic institutions. Political rallies related to her campaign were attended by millions of people from different sectoral communities of the Philippines. Celebrities and public figures also shared their support for her candidacy. Despite having the elections during the pandemic, people showed up in support of good governance and to put an end to the return of the Marcoses to power.

Despite gallant efforts, the Pink Movement did not succeed. Robredo lost the presidential seat against Marcos, and Sara Duterte won the vice presidency against Kiko Pangilinan. However, the 2022 loss of the Pink Movement not only planted seeds for the next election but also established a huge demographic advantage – the youth vote. 

Youth Vote and Demographic Advantage

The foundation of Robredo’s 2022 Pink Movement is young. Most of the members of this movement are students, young entrepreneurs, and youth activists. Given that the demographic is young and the most recent 2025 midterm elections were just three years apart from the 2022 national elections, the solid foundation remained strong. Young individuals who were not able to vote in 2022 are now more than eligible to vote. The bulk of the Pink Movement’s foundation was carried over to the next election.

It is also interesting that the Pink Movement, with its hope for a more inclusive society, is backed by academics and student organizations. In several polling surveys conducted in universities, candidates affiliated with the Pink Movement top the surveys. Other left-leaning candidates, who are not necessarily affiliated with the Pink Movement, also top the surveys.

Political Climate and Political Ambivalence

The Pink Movement also benefited from the current political climate of the Philippines. The once uniteam partnership of President Marcos and Vice President Duterte dwindled, and the feud became pretty evident, resulting in a divide in the Congress and Senate. The two camps also introduced their senatorial lineups, both having an incomplete lineup of 12 candidates. It left an open opportunity for Filipinos to choose a better-suited candidate to complete the Magic 12.

It is also important to note that Aquino, in his interviews before the elections, took an ambivalent position on many social issues concerning the political climate of the country. In one instance, when asked regarding his position on Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment, he clarified that Filipinos are more interested in more important discussions, such as food, education, and basic services, than the political feud between the two political families (News5Everywhere, 2025). This ambivalent position, which is clearly the opposite of his character from the 2022 elections, is a personal choice. The recognition of the window of opportunity demands a safe and secure way to the goal of getting elected. 

The Challenge of Sustaining the Momentum

Aquino and Pangilinan’s entry in the Magic 12 of the 20th Congress is a celebratory milestone for Filipino voters, more so for the left-leaning political parties in the Philippines. Other than Aquino and Pangilinan, the left also won other seats, including three seats for the Akbayan Party (social democratic party) and one seat for the Mamamayang Liberal (liberal). Despite this win and a demographic dividend on their side, it is still a question whether the left has enough gas to turn the tide in the next national elections set to happen in 2028. It remains a challenge to unite a fragmented opposition, each with a distinct left ideology. A prime example of this is the never-ending debate between the national democratic organisations and the social democratic organisations. 

It is also difficult to say that the opposition has enough gas to succeed in the 2028 national elections because it could be that the win this year is due to the window of opportunity posed by the current political climate and not entirely due to a change in political ideals for many Filipinos. Also, there is not enough evidence on how many of the youth voted for the Pink Movement. Nevertheless, the win today is a statement that the left is gaining momentum, just not clear if it would be enough to push boundaries in 2028.

(*) Bernard Allan V. Garcia has a Master degree in Population Studies at University of the Philippines, Diliman and Early Career Researcher at Scalabrini Migration Center. Email: bvgarcia2@up.edu.ph


References

Cupin, B. (2025, May 8). “May 2025 SWS poll shows tight race for ‘Magic 12’.”  https://www.rappler.com/philippines/elections/senate-race-survey-results-sws-may-2025/

News5Everywhere (Director). (2025, February 11). “Bam Aquino sa VP Sara Duterte impeachment: Hindi siya isyu nung mga kababayan natin.” [Video recording]. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZRuFIP5pG4

Pulse Asia Research. (2025). “April 2025 Nationwide Survey on the May 2025 Elections.”

Pulse Asia Research Inc. https://pulseasia.ph/updates/april-2025-nationwide-survey-on-the-may-2025-elections/

George Simion

Dr. Bortun: Economic Insecurity Fuels the Rise of the Far Right in Romania

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In the wake of Romania’s high-turnout 2025 presidential election, Dr. Vladimir Bortun offers a powerful analysis of how deep-rooted economic insecurity—fueled by decades of neoliberal reform—has driven support for the far right. Despite a centrist victory, nationalist George Simion’s strong performance underscores a broader post-crisis populist consolidation. In this exclusive ECPS interview, Dr. Bortun explores the AUR’s appeal among the diaspora and rural poor, the ideological vacuum left by the mainstream left, and how Romania exemplifies a wider European shift from democratic to authoritarian neoliberalism. A must-read for anyone interested in the structural dynamics behind Europe’s populist realignment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Romania’s 2025 presidential election represented a pivotal moment for the country’s democratic trajectory and its place within the broader European political landscape. In a high-stakes runoff, centrist candidate and pro-European reformer Nicușor Dan secured a clear victory over George Simion, the leader of the far-right Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR). With the highest voter turnout in a quarter-century and the specter of a previously annulled election looming large, the vote was widely interpreted as a referendum on Romania’s political future—particularly on the tension between liberal democracy and the rising tide of far-right populism. Despite Simion’s defeat, his strong first-round performance and continued popularity signaled a deeper, more durable undercurrent of reactionary politics in Romania.

Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements. With unique insight into both the structural drivers and class dynamics underpinning political realignments in Romania and beyond, Dr. Bortun offers a compelling analysis of how economic insecurity—rooted in decades of neoliberal reforms, mass emigration, and systemic inequality—has created fertile ground for the rise of the far right.

In this wide-ranging interview, Dr. Bortun reflects on how the socioeconomic legacies of Romania’s post-1989 transition have failed to deliver on their liberal democratic promises, especially for large swaths of the population living in poverty or working precariously. He argues that this deep economic discontent, compounded by the collapse of credible left-wing alternatives and the ideological convergence of the center-left and center-right, has allowed far-right actors like Simion and AUR to present themselves as anti-establishment voices—even as their own policies serve entrenched economic elites.

Crucially, Dr. Bortun situates Romania within a broader European context, where authoritarian neoliberalism is increasingly replacing the post-Cold War liberal consensus. He draws instructive comparisons with Poland, France, and Southern Europe, exploring how the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric and policy by centrist parties—particularly around immigration and national sovereignty—has reshaped the ideological field.

By examining the rise of AUR’s support among the Romanian diaspora and among marginalized rural voters, Dr. Bortun challenges simplistic narratives about populism and brings attention to the lived realities of class, exclusion, and political abandonment. As he makes clear, the battle over Romania’s future is not only political or cultural—it is fundamentally about economic power, ownership, and whose voices get to shape the nation’s path forward.

Vladimir Bortun
Dr. Vladimir Bortun, a lecturer at the University of Oxford and an expert on European politics, transnational party networks, and left-populist movements.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Vladimir Bortun.

Neoliberalism Created the Perfect Storm

Professor Vladimir Bortun, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Given Simion’s stronger-than-expected first-round lead and his continued appeal despite being defeated in the runoff, how would you theorize the durability of far-right populism in Romania beyond the electoral cycle? Can this be conceptualized within a broader post-crisis populist consolidation rather than a mere reactionary surge?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very important question. First of all, thank you again for the invitation. I should clarify that I’m not a professor yet—just a lecturer.

To go straight into the topic: recent academic literature has shed significant light on the key drivers behind the rise of the populist far right across borders. While there are, of course, multiple factors at play—and we will explore some of them—the most consistent driver across all contexts is economic insecurity, rooted in decades of neoliberal globalization.

These conditions have only worsened in the aftermath of the 2007–2008 crisis, which—as you mentioned—took a particularly austerity-driven form in Europe, shaped by how both European institutions and national governments responded. Romania was no exception.

To provide some context on the socioeconomic situation in Romania: after 35 years of neoliberal capitalism and roughly 18 years since joining the European Union—which has brought certain benefits but, for many Romanians (including those who have supported the far right), has failed to fulfill its initial promises—we are now facing deeply concerning indicators.

Approximately 45% of the population lives in poverty or on the brink of it—the highest percentage in the European Union, meaning nearly half the population is affected. Romania also ranks first or second in terms of in-work poverty. Moreover, it allocates the lowest—or among the lowest—shares of GDP to healthcare, education, and social protection.

After Ireland, Romania has the lowest tax collection capacity in the European Union. It also maintains some of the lowest tax rates in the EU. There is a 10% flat income tax, which disproportionately affects workers and employees—particularly because, in addition to this tax, they are also responsible for paying social contributions that were previously covered by employers. These include contributions to healthcare and pensions.

Unsurprisingly, this flat tax structure primarily benefits the wealthier segments of society. In addition, Romania has a corporate tax rate of 16%, one of the lowest in the European Union.

These are clearly the right conditions for economic insecurity—fertile ground for the rise of the far right. But it’s not only the poorest in society that we should consider. Economic insecurity affects various social classes and class fractions.

In Romania, it has had a particularly strong impact on the petty bourgeoisie—small and medium-sized entrepreneurs—who have been closing down their businesses at an increasing rate over the past few years, especially since the COVID-19 pandemic. I believe the pandemic represents another critical crisis that must be factored into any explanation of the far right’s rise. These small and medium entrepreneurs, going bankrupt by the thousands, form a core component of the far right’s social base.

Nationalism Meets Neoliberalism in a Peripheral Economy

People in traditional national costume return from Sunday church service in Maramureș, Romania—a region renowned for preserving its cultural heritage. Photo: Theodor Bunica.

How would you situate the AUR’s electoral messaging—particularly its nationalist-economically neoliberal synthesis—within the wider genealogy of post-2008 far-right formations in Europe? Is there a uniquely Romanian hybrid emerging, or does AUR largely mirror external templates?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: There are certain similarities with the broader profile of the European far right. There is clearly this populist discourse they employ, which is built on the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.”The elite, as in other countries, is portrayed as those who have sold out our country—who don’t represent the interests of our country but rather represent foreign interests, globalist interests. And of course, other undesirable categories in society are targeted as well, such as the LGBTQ community and immigrants from non-European countries, who have started to come to Romania in recent years as cheap labor—these are the usual suspects in far-right rhetoric.

At the same time, there is an element of truth in relation to the domination of foreign interests in Romania. Foreign companies hold a dominant position in key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, manufacturing—especially the auto industry—and the banking sector. They make huge profits in Romania, which they then repatriate to their home countries rather than reinvesting, even partially, in the Romanian economy.

Foreign banks, in particular, are guilty of this kind of profit repatriation from Romania, and this has generated a level of dissatisfaction that can also be observed in other countries. For example, in Poland, there is a very interesting study on the role of “comprador bankers” in the rise to power of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), which governed the country for about a decade. These comprador bankers were Polish managers of foreign bank subsidiaries who eventually came to realize that these foreign banks were operating in Poland solely to extract profit—profits that were then repatriated to their home countries, rather than being reinvested in the Polish economy. They did not, for instance, offer affordable or advantageous loans to Polish businesses. In response, some of these managers rebelled against the model and aligned themselves with the national capitalist hegemonic project advanced by PiS.

So, there is an element of what I would call the “comprador professional managerial class” that has served foreign capital in these peripheral Central and Eastern European countries, now fighting back against this foreign capital domination—in coalition with the domestic capitalist class. Particularly, those fractions of the domestic capitalist class that are trying to secure the sectors where they are still dominant—especially in Romania, such as real estate, construction, and hospitality.

The party you mentioned—AUR—led by Simion, who lost the election, is heavily funded by segments of the domestic capitalist class, particularly in the construction, real estate, and hospitality sectors. These actors are seeking to ring-fence and protect their interests from foreign capital, while also attempting to gain state power in order to advance those interests.

This project of the national bourgeoisie reclaiming state power is a common regional feature across Central and Eastern Europe. Hungary, Poland, and now Romania exhibit this pattern. I would even argue that it extends beyond the region—to Turkey, for example. Correct me if I’m wrong, but the Erdogan project seems to share similar characteristics, as far as I understand.

Now, regarding the distinctive features of the Romanian case—since I’ve already outlined some of the common regional characteristics—there are two aspects that stand out about the Romanian far right. I would highlight these two features, and perhaps we’ll focus on one of them in the following questions.

The first is their particular appeal to the diaspora. The diaspora represents a significant portion of their social base, and I’ll elaborate later on why they’ve been so successful in mobilizing this group.

The second distinctive feature is their appeal to farmers. Romania has the highest share of the workforce employed in agriculture in the entire European Union—between 18% and 20% of the total workforce. To give you a sense of how high this is: the second-ranked country in the EU is Poland, with only 10% of its workforce in agriculture. France, despite having a strong agricultural sector, has just 2.4% of its workforce employed in this field.

So, this is a huge sector in Romania, and the vast majority of these people working in agriculture are subsistence farmers. They are small farmers who feel like nobody is looking after their interests. The state is perceived as only overburdening them with regulations and taxation, while favoring the interests of big foreign corporations. And the far right is managing to build inroads into this significant social class in Romania.

A Left in Name, Neoliberal in Practice

Crin Antonescu
Crin Antonescu, the pro-European presidential candidate, speaks during the Social Democratic Party (PSD) Congress in Bucharest, Romania, where he was officially confirmed as the party’s nominee on February 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the apparent paradox between widespread socioeconomic grievances and the relative electoral failure of redistributive political platforms, particularly in the light of the Social Democratic Party’s strategic vacillation and policy convergence with the right?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s the key factor from a subjective perspective. I’ve tried to talk about the objective factors, but in terms of the subjective conditions, clearly the key factor that has facilitated the rise of the far right—not just in Romania, but across the region and beyond—is the lack of a credible left-wing political project.

And the current left party, the center-left party you’ve mentioned—the PSD—is left in name, but not in substance, not in policy. They have actually governed for the majority of these 35 years of neoliberal capitalism—more or less 20 of those 35 years have seen them in government. So, they have implemented some of the very policies I mentioned earlier, which are responsible for the current socioeconomic conditions.

The very minimal social concessions they have made in terms of redistribution while in government have been largely limited to increasing the minimum wage—which is, of course, better than nothing. This partly explains why they remain the most voted-for party in Romania.

However, these measures are far from sufficient. Despite repeated increases over the past six or seven years, the minimum wage remains very low—about 30% below what would be considered a living wage in Romania, that is, the income necessary for a decent standard of living.

Moreover, Romania has the highest share of its workforce earning the minimum wage. Nearly 40% of all workers are on minimum wage—twice the EU average.

So, we are a minimum-wage economy, a low-taxation economy, and a low public spending economy. Romania is pretty much a paradigmatic case of neoliberalism—and the PSD is very much responsible for this. It is arguably the single most responsible political party for this situation.

Proletarians Abroad, Petit Bourgeois at Home

With over 60% of the diaspora backing Simion in the first round, what implications does this have for the dominant narratives that have historically cast diasporic Romanians as liberalizing or pro-European agents?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a significant shift indeed! And it started already in 2020, when the party AUR—which, by the way, stands for the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, but the acronym aur also means “gold” in Romanian— from the very beginning targeted its message toward the diaspora. They even called the diaspora “the gold of Romania” that they wanted to bring back to the country.

The party was launched in the diaspora in December 2019, one year before the first elections in which they stood candidates. Their launch meeting took place in the UK, among Romanians living there—not in Romania. So, from the outset, they were oriented toward the diaspora, and they managed to appeal to it in several ways.

On the one hand, this diaspora is not one unified entity; it consists of several diasporas. We’re talking about five million people, which is a quarter of Romania’s total population. They live very different lives in the West of Europe. Some of them live in quite squalid conditions, working very hard jobs for low wages, in poor environments, with little respect and little sense of being treated equally.

There is a widespread feeling among them that Romanians are treated as second-class citizens. Many are temporary or circular migrants—working on a construction site for three or four months, then returning to Romania, or working seasonal jobs picking vegetables on farms in Italy, Spain, the UK, or Germany, and then going back.

They don’t have a favorable context for integration or for deeper socialization in the host countries. But let’s be honest—those host countries themselves have experienced a surge in far-right politics. The far right is now much more mainstream in Western Europe than it was 10 or 20 years ago, when these migrants may have been sending back more liberal kinds of social remittances.

These societies have shifted significantly to the right. Anti-immigration discourse has become more mainstream, normalized, and legitimized—and Romanians living there have internalized some of that discourse.

In my own fieldwork, I often came across people who, despite being migrants themselves and suffering from anti-immigration attitudes and discourse, were nevertheless against other groups of migrants. They distinguished themselves from them—talking about “good migrants” and “bad migrants.” There is a real cognitive dissonance at play here, where migrants adopt anti-migration attitudes and political preferences.

Another aspect is that many feel Romania is a peripheral country that lacks a real voice in the European Union and in the broader global political stage. They perceive Romania as subordinated economically and geopolitically—which is true.

So, when a populist demagogue like Simion comes along and says, “I will make Romania stand tall again in the EU and in the world,” it resonates. It gives them a sense of restored dignity and pride.

Meanwhile, all the other political parties—including the PSD—are utterly uncritical in their allegiance to the EU, NATO, and the West in general. They refuse to acknowledge the real problems Romanians face, both in terms of their living conditions in the diaspora and in terms of Romania’s position within international power structures.

These parties speak only about the benefits and advantages of being part of these institutions, without addressing the contradictions, the challenges, or the structural disadvantages of Romania’s position in the European and international economic and political system. This, of course, creates a window of opportunity for the far right to come in and capitalize on people’s sense of marginalization and humiliation.

One additional point is that many of these migrants, as I mentioned, are circular or temporary migrants. They may be working blue-collar jobs abroad, but they’ve managed to accumulate enough capital to open a small business back home in their town or village of origin. This means they occupy a complex, dual class position: proletarians abroad, petit bourgeois at home. When they return home, after years of hard work abroad to save capital and open a small guesthouse, café, restaurant, or corner shop, they feel the state does nothing for them.

Instead, they feel overburdened by taxation. Increases in the minimum wage are perceived as a burden because they are now small employers who have to pay two, three, or four salaries. They blame the state—but they also blame those below them: people on minimum wage, or on welfare benefits, whom they see as lazy or asking for too much. They see themselves as the real hard-working people who have sacrificed abroad to invest in the Romanian economy—only to be abandoned by the state, which should be protecting their interests.

I think this is very important. I’m not saying it’s unique to Romania, but it is very salient here—and perhaps not as salient a feature in the social base of the far right in other European countries.

A Race to the Bottom Among Migrants

Building on your work on transnational political mobilization, how should we understand the AUR’s success among emigrants in Italy and Spain? Do these cases indicate a diasporic production of illiberal subjectivities shaped by specific host-country political contexts?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think I already touched on this in my previous answer. However, Italy and Spain are particularly illustrative of some of the dynamics I outlined earlier—especially Italy, where the far right has been in power for the past two and a half years.

In that context, migrants often find themselves in a race to the bottom, trying to prove they are more deserving than other migrant groups. I encountered numerous cases of Romanian migrants in Italy—or former migrants who had lived there for many years—expressing very negative attitudes toward Moroccan or Albanian migrants, for example.

Some even told me they had voted for the Northern League, now known as La Lega—Salvini’s party—which was the original far-right populist force before Brothers of Italy surpassed it in popularity. Ironically, this is a party that had made openly anti-Romanian statements in the Italian press. Nevertheless, this became their way of attempting to carve out a place for themselves—by identifying someone “below” them to target as the “bad” migrant.

In Spain, we see a similar surge with the Vox party over the last few years. It is now the third-largest political force in Spain—a country where the far right was outside of Parliament for decades.

Again, we’re talking about a Romanian diaspora that has suffered a lot of discrimination and marginalization. It took a long time for this community to settle. But there is also a split within these diasporas, as I mentioned—between the more settled, integrated diaspora, and the precariously employed, circular, temporary migrants who come and go and who cannot really find a foothold in these countries.

The Center Imitates, but the Far Right Dominates

Comparing Romania’s recent presidential runoff to parallel dynamics in Poland and Portugal, to what extent can we speak of converging or diverging trajectories in the European center-right’s strategy to contain or accommodate far-right surges?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: I think we see a very strong trend of accommodation of the far right—and not just from the center-right, but also from the center-left. In Denmark, for example—going a bit outside the region—the Social Democratic Party currently in government has adopted one of the harshest anti-immigration policies in Europe. And this trend extends further. Even here in the UK, the Starmer-led Labour Party has adopted many of the talking points not just from the Conservative Party but also from Reform UK. Just the other day, Starmer was speaking about Britain being “a country of strangers,” “an island of strangers” due to mass migration, according to him. Apparently, that makes me a stranger here.

There is a growing body of literature—by scholars like Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter—that refers to this as the mainstreaming of the far right: the normalization of reactionary ideas and policies. And this applies not just to rhetoric, but to actual policymaking, with both center-right and center-left parties adopting positions in an attempt to win back voters lost to the far right.

But as the saying goes, “the original is better than the copy.” People who want to vote for the far right for reactionary reasons—because they oppose immigration, for example—are unlikely to switch to the center-left just because it has adopted similar anti-immigration tropes. They will continue to vote for the far right. And we have seen this across the board.

The one Social Democratic party currently in power in Western Europe—in the EU at least—is in Spain. And they have resisted the temptation to go in this reactionary direction on issues like immigration and other topics dear to the far right. On the contrary, in some ways they have been an example of what a progressive government can and should say on key issues of our time, including the atrocities we are seeing in Gaza. They are, of course, not a perfect government—they have many flaws and shortcomings. But they demonstrate that it is still possible to stay true to Social Democratic values and policies and win elections. And that’s just speaking from a pragmatic point of view.

Corruption Isn’t the Cause—It’s the Symptom of a System

Romania protest.
Protesters gather for the 13th consecutive day in front of Victoria Palace, the government headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on February 12, 2017. Over 50,000 demonstrators rallied against controversial corruption reforms, illuminating the night with their mobile phones and forming the national flag with colored paper and cellophane. Photo: Dreamstime.

What insights might Romania’s 2025 election offer for understanding the evolving relationship between anti-corruption discourse and far-right populism, especially when contrasted with the cases of Poland’s Law and Justice or France’s National Rally?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: That’s a very interesting question. I think, on the one hand, the far right’s collusion with corrupt and clientelist practices shows that, after all, they are not such a real alternative to the mainstream parties they criticize. They are quite happy to engage in the same kind of bad politics that the mainstream parties are guilty of. 

On the other hand, while corruption is indeed a major issue in Romania—as it is in many other countries—it is often framed in a very legalistic or even moralistic way, as if it’s simply a flaw of character or the result of an inefficient state bureaucracy.

In this sense, corruption is frequently instrumentalized ideologically to justify the further shrinking of the state and additional cuts to public spending. For example, it’s often claimed that there’s widespread corruption in the welfare system—even though Romania already allocates the lowest percentage of its GDP to welfare in the entire European Union.

Nevertheless, this anti-corruption mantra remains highly salient in public discourse.

The anti-corruption discourse has thus been used to legitimize harsh austerity and neoliberal measures. At the same time, when actions are taken against corruption—such as jailing corrupt politicians—they often remain at a superficial, legalistic level.

This approach is ineffective against the far right. In the United States, we saw the democratic establishment spend four years trying to go after Trump through legal channels—and yet Trump still won the election. Le Pen has been barred from standing in elections, and her party continues to grow in the polls. It’s certainly not declining.

In Romania, the Constitutional Court canceled the November election and barred the winning candidate, Georgescu. Yet the person who replaced him—Simion—secured double the percentage in the first round. It didn’t work.

I’m not saying such measures shouldn’t be taken—if there is a legal basis for them, then by all means, pursue them. But we need to recognize that this is not a real solution to tackling the far right.

On the subject of corruption, an important point must be made beyond its ideological instrumentalization. Corruption is a real issue that must be addressed, but it is often decontextualized.

Corruption needs to be understood as a key vehicle for the primitive accumulation of capital—something characteristic of any early stage in the development of capitalism, in any country, at any point in history.

Corruption, along with other violent forms of capital accumulation, has always been present—even in so-called advanced, consolidated democracies that have practiced capitalism for a longer time. Corruption played a massive role in the emergence of capitalism and continues to play a central role in capital accumulation today.

After all, the dirty money of drug cartels, criminal syndicates, and authoritarian regimes around the world is largely laundered through the City of London—the very heart of global capital. So, if we truly want to tackle corruption, we need to go to the root of the problem and understand it as part of a broader structural and systemic issue.

From Democratic Neoliberalism to Its Authoritarian Mutation

Lastly, from a historical-comparative perspective, how does the Dan–Simion runoff recalibrate the ideological field established in the 1990s transition era? Are we witnessing a definitive exhaustion of post-1989 liberal centrism or its tactical reanimation?

Dr. Vladimir Bortun: This is a great question. There have been repeated claims about the death of the neoliberal center over the past 15 years—after the financial crisis, for instance. There were suggestions that neoliberalism was coming to an end, and that we would see a return to a more Keynesian type of economic model. That didn’t happen. Instead, we got more neoliberalism—more austerity, more privatizations, more deregulation, more flexibilization of the workforce.

Then, again, after the COVID-19 pandemic, there were claims that this marked the death of neoliberalism, especially given the forceful intervention of the state to keep societies afloat—or more accurately, to keep the accumulation of capital going. But again, that was temporary. Neoliberalism has returned in full force.

Now we are witnessing the militarization of Europe, with promises of spending cuts on the most important public services in society in order to fund military efforts. So, I’m afraid we are not seeing the end of neoliberal centrism, but rather its transformation into something more authoritarian—still neoliberal, but authoritarian. A shift, if you will, from democratic neoliberalism to authoritarian neoliberalism.

This transformation is being endorsed by the political center, which is increasingly adopting authoritarian measures across Europe. Here in the UK, the so-called center-left government has imprisoned individuals not for taking part in a protest, but simply for holding a Zoom meeting to plan one—specifically, a protest against environmental destruction. They were not punished for blocking a motorway, but merely for discussing civil disobedience in response to the climate crisis. This illustrates a clear shift toward authoritarianism. Yet when it comes to economic policy, there is a striking convergence between centrist parties and the far right.

The far right claims to be an alternative to the status quo and capitalizes on the grievances, socioeconomic anxiety, and insecurity of ordinary people. But if we look at their actual policy proposals—or, in places where they are in power, their actual policymaking—it’s more of the same. They might throw a few crumbs to ordinary people, to the popular classes, in order to maintain their support. But the bulk of their economic agenda still serves the business class and the wealthy—just different factions of the business class and wealthy than those typically represented by centrist parties.

Mark Riboldi

Dr. Riboldi: State Capture by Big Business Is a Core Threat to Australian Democracy—As Elsewhere

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling conversation with ECPS, Dr. Mark Riboldi unpacks how corporate influence and elite career pathways hollow out democratic representation in Australia. From revolving doors in politics to the marginalization of community voices, Dr. Riboldi warns that without transparency and reform, “the closed loop between politics and corporate power” will persist. He also explores party fragmentation, the Greens’ identity struggles, and the risks of technocratic drift. “Boldness needs legitimacy,” he insists, urging progressive parties to pair vision with credibility. Dr. Riboldi ultimately sees Australia’s electoral system as a “stopgap” against populist capture—but not an immunity. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Mark Riboldi—a lecturer at the University of Technology Sydney and scholar of political communication and civil society—offers a sobering yet constructive account of the structural pressures undermining democratic vitality in Australia. At the center of his critique lies a sharp diagnosis of state capture: “One of the biggest problems in Australia—and I think it’s probably the same in other liberal Western democracies—is the impact of big business on government,” Dr. Riboldi explains, stressing how revolving-door pathways from student politics to Parliament and then into private sector boardrooms bypass “real work experience and meaningful community engagement.”

This theme threads through his broader reflections on the fragmentation of Australian party politics, the rise of independents, and the populist logic animating both left- and right-wing actors. Dr. Riboldi rejects simplistic narratives that frame emotionally charged political messaging as inherently populist, noting instead that such communication has long been central to movements across the spectrum. Still, he warns that populism becomes dangerous when it feeds on legitimacy gaps and places all faith in personalistic saviors: “Let’s talk about a problem—I will fix it,” he says, paraphrasing the demagogic logic of figures like Donald Trump or Nigel Farage.

Dr. Riboldi’s insights into party dynamics are especially sharp in his discussion of the Greens. He views the party’s struggle between institutional respectability and activist roots not as a liability but as a productive tension: “It helps to keep a party like the Greens connected to their roots and accountable to those roots.” Yet he also cautions that technocratic messaging—as seen in their focus on parliamentary influence and minority government potential—can fall flat, especially when voters crave bold but believable visions for the future. “Boldness needs to be connected to legitimacy,” he insists, adding that the Greens’ record on housing and climate action has earned them the political capital to stake out such positions.

Ultimately, Dr. Riboldi remains cautiously optimistic about Australia’s institutional resilience. Compulsory voting, preferential ballots, and a proportional Senate system form what he calls a “stopgap” against populist insurgency. Nevertheless, his core warning remains clear: unless transparency is enforced and the influence of corporate power curtailed, Australian democracy—like others around the world—risks further erosion from within.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Mark Riboldi.

A Realignment, Not a Populist Break

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese attends the national memorial service for Queen Elizabeth II. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Mark Ribaldo, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You’ve written extensively on the fragmentation of party politics in Australia. To what extent do you see the rise of minor parties and independents—especially the Teals and Greens—as indicative of a populist moment or a broader realignment?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: It’s a good question. I should say that I’m not a populist scholar, so I’m not a scholar in populism. So my knowledge of populism literature generally is probably not as in-depth as some of your audience’s.

I think what’s been going on in Australia, probably for the last 50 years or so, is a sense that there’s something wrong with the current system, with the way that politics is working—the two-party system we have in Australia. And there’s a demand for better representation. So that has meant that people have been voting more and more frequently for independent or minor party candidates—or basically non-major party candidates.

Some of the research that I’ve done with some colleagues is showing that that trend away from major party voting is kind of aligning, realigning parts of the left and the right, rather than being more of a kind of a populist break from it. So, I’d probably say it’s more of a broader realignment than anything else.

In your co-authored article, you distinguish ‘party-like independents’ from traditional party politics. Do you see this trend as fostering a new form of populism, or rather as a correction to major-party ossification?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: What we’re talking about with party-like independents—independents operating in a party-like fashion—is a phenomenon in Australia where a central organization called Climate 200 has been collecting funds from various sources to back specific candidates in election campaigns, particularly against Liberal Party candidates. This organization has taken on functions typically associated with political parties, such as centralized fundraising, conducting research, and managing mass communications.

Ordinarily, an independent candidate might only have the resources to campaign within their local seat or engage in a limited range of activities. The existence of Climate 200 as a support vehicle allows these independents to access party-like resources and infrastructure.

So, I see this as a reaction to the major party system—specifically, a response to the right-wing Liberal-National Party in Australia. Climate 200 emerged in reaction to two primary issues: the Coalition’s failure to take meaningful action on climate change, and its inadequate representation of women. Notably, all the Climate 200-backed independents elected in the 2022 federal election were women, and they largely defeated male Liberal-National Party incumbents.

Sometimes You Win Them, Sometimes You Lose Them

How do you interpret the Greens’ recent electoral losses in the lower house within the broader context of Australia’s shifting political cleavages? Was this a rejection of their platform, leadership style, or something more structural like preferential voting patterns and redistributions?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: I think, in terms of the Greens, it’s important to understand that, yes, they lost seats in the lower house—the House of Government—but they maintained the same number of seats in the Senate, the House of Review. They’ve consistently secured two senators per state across the six states for the last three elections. So, the Greens’ Senate vote has been very stable. In contrast, as we saw in the most recent federal election, their position in the lower house has been less secure. The Greens went from holding four seats to just one. If a major party with 80-something seats loses three, it’s not a huge concern. But when you only have four seats, losing three is significant.

The tension for the Greens here is that there’s a big difference between getting a consistent vote in the Senate and winning a lower house seat. In the upper house, with a national vote around 12–13%, you can get those senators elected—as the Greens did. That’s very different from the lower house, where to win a seat consistently in Australia, you probably need a primary vote of over 40%.

So, what happened in the last election was, in part, a correction from the election before, where the Greens won some seats due to the preferential system—which we’ll talk about in a bit. Then, the surge of the left-wing Labor Party and the collapse of the right-wing Liberal Party meant the alignment of the top three candidates in those seats changed order, and so the Greens lost three of their seats. I don’t think it was necessarily a rejection of their platform or leadership style. I think part of it is just that when you have lower house seats, sometimes you win them, and sometimes you lose them.

Democratic Populism Must Be Modeled, Not Just Preached

You’ve emphasized the role of legitimacy and power dynamics in how political actors—especially civil society organisations (CSOs)—mobilize support. How do you see populist rhetoric reshaping public perceptions of legitimacy among CSOs and minor parties?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: It’s a danger when we’re thinking about populist rhetoric and the kinds of messages that appeal—especially the populist messages that resonate with people. Whether it’s in parts of Europe, the UK, the United States, or even Australia, it’s important to recognize that we shouldn’t simply write off those who respond to that rhetoric as anti-democratic or undemocratic. Often, there’s a real response to the political and social conditions people are experiencing—a demand for a greater say.

That said, this demand is definitely exploited by parts of the right. The way figures like Donald Trump, Nigel Farage, or right-wing leaders in Europe talk about democracy and legitimacy tends to be very narrow, even neoliberal. It’s framed as: “Here’s a problem, I will fix it,” placing all power in one individual—which we know is dangerous and can lead to autocracy.

I was rereading some notes this afternoon from Chantal Mouffe’s For a Left Populism—probably the one major piece of populism literature I’ve read—where she talks about the need for a form of left-wing populism. One that responds to the same concerns people have: the sense of being disenfranchised, the widening gap between the better-off and the less well-off. The left can respond to that—and as Mouffe suggests, and I would argue, the Greens in Australian politics do this—in ways that expand democracy rather than contract it.

For civil society organizations as well, there’s a crucial role: they need to be exemplars of democratic behavior and democratic activity. Because if CSOs and left-wing minor parties aren’t showing what democratic populism or left populism can look like, people are just going to turn to right-wing organizations instead.

Populists Exploit Gaps—But CSOs Must Defend Democratic Advocacy

Crowds hold “Say Yes to Cutting Carbon Pollution” and “Clean Energy” signs during a World Environment Day rally in Brisbane, Australia, on June 6, 2011. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your typology of CSO activities outlines both service delivery and systemic advocacy. How do you see populist actors either co-opting or challenging these CSO functions, especially during elections?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: That’s a good question. In the most recent election in Australia, a quite populist right-wing figure in the form of a coal baron—Clive Palmer—ran under the Trumpet of Patriots party. He spent millions and millions of dollars on billboards, social media advertising, and I think pretty much everyone in Australia received about four text messages from him during the campaign. His message included quite a few universalist claims like free education or canceling student debt—what we might call socialist concerns that genuinely resonate with people. That’s clearly a response to public concerns, but of course, there was no intention to follow through. And in the end, Trumpet of Patriots actually lost ground in the election.

On the advocacy side, we’ve also seen right-wing governments in Australia work to delegitimize advocacy as a function of civil society organizations and NGOs. Over the last 40–50 years, we’ve had roughly 20–25 years of right-wing governments, and they’ve consistently tried to undermine the ability of these organizations to engage in advocacy. Their argument is essentially, “We give NGOs money, so they should just deliver services and stop speaking out.”

Even left-wing governments, at times, take the attitude that civil society organizations should help them get elected—and then be quiet and let them govern without criticism. So it’s a real challenge. For me, systemic advocacy is a crucial democratic function. Civil society organizations play a vital role in sustaining a pluralist society, ensuring that multiple voices are heard in the political system.

In discussing power distribution within civil society, you raise concerns about homogeneity in the Climate 200 movement. How might this lack of diversity undermine their capacity to challenge right-wing populism and broaden their democratic appeal?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: So the Climate 200 independents in Australia are very middle class, and they’re very white. In Australia’s political spectrum, you might identify five main positions. You have the centre-left Australian Labor Party, the centre-right Liberal-National Coalition, and to the left of Labor, parties like the Greens. On the far-right, you have parties like One Nation—a very populist right-wing movement that, thankfully, has not been particularly electorally successful despite being around for some time. Then, in the middle of all that, you have Climate 200 and the independents they support.

These Climate 200-backed independents are very much centrist, middle-class, and white. I don’t think Climate 200 is positioned to meaningfully challenge right-wing populism. Rather, I see them as representing a realignment within the centre-right of Australian politics. So no, I don’t think they are a challenge to right-wing populism—I think they’re just a soft shift back toward the centre for parts of the Liberal Party’s traditional base.

People Want Vision, Not Parliamentary Machinations

You were critical of Adam Bandt’s leadership being perceived as too ‘insider’ or technocratic. In the context of Australian populism, how important is anti-elitist performance or outsider image, even for progressive candidates?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: I think it’s very important. My criticism of the Greens during the election was more about the lead slogan or the message they had in the campaign. Basically, they pitched around the potential role the Greens could play in a minority government, and that was a lot of the messaging they were putting forward. Even the Climate 200 independents were doing something similar. A lot of polling in the lead-up to the elections showed the potential for a minority government, so both the Greens and Climate 200 were pitching into that.

Late in the campaign, it became reasonably clear that the right-wing National Party wasn’t campaigning effectively, and their vote was collapsing. It became increasingly likely that the Labor Party would reclaim government with a larger majority. As a result, the technocratic message of the Greens didn’t really cut through—or at least didn’t appear to resonate with voters, in my view.

To the substance of the question: I think people are tired of that kind of talk. They don’t want to hear politicians discussing the machinations of Parliament—whether it’s minority government, who’s going to do what, or preferences and who’s going to prefer whom. People want to hear politicians talk about ideas and present a vision for Australia that’s bold yet realistic. So I think it’s a real problem if we don’t have political parties—and if a left-wing movement like the Greens isn’t articulating that vision clearly—because then they’re just falling into that more elitist style of politics.

The Greens’ emphasis on housing and renters’ rights was arguably a populist move, targeting a disenfranchised demographic. Do you think this issue can serve as a long-term populist wedge against both major parties, or was it electorally premature?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: I don’t think it was electorally premature. The Greens in Australia have been campaigning on housing at the state and federal levels for 10 to 15 years, if not a little more. There are places in Australia where there are more renters in electorates than there are homeowners. There’s an increasing demographic of people in Australia who are locked out of the housing market. It’s not just young people—there are people getting older, people around my age, who have been and will be lifelong renters.

Another aspect is that the rental system in Australia is heavily geared towards landlords, and so the power distribution between landlords and renters is very imbalanced. So I think it’s a perfect issue for the Greens and other social democratic institutions to campaign on. The political discourse in Australia for the last three years has been heavily dominated by housing.

The government has invested a lot of money. The Greens were able to negotiate about an extra $3 billion from the government for housing in the last term. But the problems around housing are not going to go away. The price of houses is going up, the price of rents is going up. There are no, as yet, systemic changes to the incentives for people to just buy investment properties and raise the rents again and again.

Emotion Isn’t New—But It Needs to Be Backed by Facts

An elderly woman prays amidst a busy crowd in Sydney, Australia. Photo: Martin Graf.

You argue that civil society groups often deploy emotionally charged messaging (e.g. “Truth,” “Stop Dutton”). Is this a sign of populist communication logic seeping into the mainstream left, or a necessary rhetorical strategy in the current media landscape?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: There’s nothing new about emotionally charged messaging in politics—on the left or the right. It’s a very common tool to mobilize supporters, get votes, and prompt people to take action. Emotion is a powerful political tool. I don’t think it’s necessarily tied to some kind of populist communication logic.

If you think about common framing devices used to get people engaged, one key example from the union movement is the “anger, hope, action” frame—which is still widely used today. You communicate something the opponent has done that makes people angry, then offer a sense of hope—saying we can do something about it—and finally, you give them an action: volunteer, protest, take to the streets. That frame is used by both the left and the right.

So no, emotionally charged language isn’t new. In fact, I think one mistake early on—particularly in the climate movement—was assuming that governments make decisions based on evidence. A lot of policy and progressive-minded people have believed that rational arguments alone will win the day. That’s a nice rationalist view, but I don’t think it’s ever truly been the case.

Balanced messaging needs both facts and emotion. The strongest messaging I’ve seen from either the workers’ rights movement or the climate movement in Australia combines solid facts with emotional language, compelling music, and strong visuals to connect with people. Getting people to make decisions is often driven by emotion. So yes, you need emotional rhetoric—it’s just a question of whether you can back it up with facts, or whether, as in the case of some populist figures in various places, you’re just full of shit.

Preferential Voting Acts as a Democratic Stopgap Against Populist Surges

Australia’s preferential voting system has helped both minor parties and independents. Do you think this electoral setup inadvertently creates fertile ground for populist insurgents, or does it actually moderate them compared to first-past-the-post systems?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: I think it’s the latter. Australia’s electoral system—and our system of government more broadly—means that Australia is largely governed from the center. We have compulsory voting, so you’re not just competing to get a small subset of people to vote—everyone votes. We also have preferential voting, which means that votes tend to flow toward one or the other of the major parties.

The third aspect is our proportional upper house. So for me, Australia’s political system functions as a kind of stopgap on populism and right-wing insurgency. We’ve had right-wing populist figures elected in Australia before, but they don’t seem particularly good at staying elected. In our research, we’ve found that many of the One Nation MPs who got elected often quit the party within 12 to 18 months and end up standing as independents. There’s a real fragmentation among the right in Australia—they don’t really have their act together in terms of getting elected, staying elected, and forming a sustained political force.

So while the preferential system might help third-party candidates get elected, it’s different from first-past-the-post systems like in the US or UK, where other voices are often completely locked out. That can suppress pluralism to the point where pressure builds and eventually erupts in some kind of populist insurgency. In contrast, Australia’s system allows for those moments of political breakthrough—a sudden rise of a particular voice in a community—but it also contains built-in checks and balances. So, for me, it functions as a pretty effective stopgap against populist insurgency.

Reclaiming Democracy Means Breaking the Corporate-Politics Conveyor Belt

Two businessmen shaking hands as Australian banknotes fall around them. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the increasing number of independents and minor party MPs, what reforms—if any—do you believe are necessary to maintain the integrity and functionality of parliamentary democracy in Australia?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: One of the biggest problems in Australia—and I think it’s probably the same in other liberal Western democracies—is the impact of big business on government and the broader issue of state capture. Some of the reforms that have been proposed in Australia include making ministers’ diaries and politicians’ diaries transparent, so the public can see exactly who is meeting with whom.

Another reform area involves strengthening laws around the declaration of interests—what politicians might own or have investments in—and addressing the issue of the “conveyor belt” from Parliament directly into high-paying jobs in industry. This same conveyor belt also often runs from student politics into Parliament and then into lucrative private sector roles. It’s a trajectory that tends to skip real work experience and meaningful community engagement.

So, trying to reclaim government for the community—by increasing transparency and breaking that closed loop between politics and corporate power—is a really important step for maintaining the integrity of parliamentary democracy.

Do you think the Greens face a strategic identity crisis: trying to be a party of responsible governance while also holding onto their roots in protest and radical critique? Is this tension a barrier to populist appeal and a strength in a polarized political climate?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: I think this tension is a good thing. It’s a healthy and important tension for a social democratic party on the left to have. It revolves around the connection that parties like the Greens maintain with the social movements they emerged from—whether that’s the environmental movement, the peace and nonviolence movements, or socialist movements in different parts of the country. These are deep, activist roots. On the other side of the tension are the elected parliamentarians, their staff, and those working to gain office and participate in running the country and forming government.

That’s a tension because some people might argue that the Greens should always stay a protest party—that their role is to represent activists and not be compromised by being in Parliament. And others might say, “Well, what’s the point of being in Parliament if you can’t actually go on to form government at some point?” So I think that tension is really useful. It helps to keep a party like the Greens connected to their roots and accountable to those roots.

The Australian Labor Party—one of the more successful labor parties in the world—still has very strong connections to the union movement, and the union movement is still able to discipline the Labor Party. That’s a tension too. The Labor Party can’t structurally drift away from its base in the way that the Democrats have in the US, for example. It’s just not structurally possible at this point.

So, those tensions are really important in parties—particularly in left-wing parties. It makes it harder for them to have a populist appeal, especially the older and more successful they become. As parties become more institutionalized, people want to take fewer risks because they’re interested in keeping their jobs or getting more people elected. But if you’ve got that tension—whether it’s from environmental movements, socialist movements, workers’ rights movements, peace and nonviolence movements—then you’ve got voices that can appeal to people in a populist way that speaks to their genuine democratic concerns for better representation.

Boldness Without Believability Risks Falling Flat

Protesters at the No Carbon Tax Rally in Canberra, Australia, on March 23, 2011. Photo: Phillip Minnis.

Bob Brown called for greater boldness from the Greens. In your view, what would ‘boldness’ actually look like in the current political climate? Is there a risk of boldness tipping into populist demagoguery?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: If boldness is not coupled with a sense of realism and believability—like I was mentioning before—then it risks falling flat. Clive Palmer and the Trumpet of Patriots were out there during the election saying they were going to give everyone free education, completely wipe out student debts, and do a whole lot of things. Some of it sounded quite good, but people didn’t believe them. People didn’t have faith that they would actually do those things.

So, boldness needs to be accompanied by legitimacy, and that’s something a party like the Greens does have. People can believe what the Greens are talking about. The Greens have been in Parliament now for well over a decade. They can point to reforms they’ve championed or contributed to—including the creation of a National Integrity Commission, action on climate change, and, as I mentioned before, securing extra funding for housing. People have seen the Greens deliver, so I think that has bought them, for lack of a better word, a degree of political capital they can spend on advocating for bold policies.

In that sense, I agree with Bob Brown. Boldness is about selling a compelling vision of what Australia’s future could be. I read an article today about the new Greens leadership where a former leader was saying, “We didn’t have new policies; we were just talking about the same things we’ve been talking about for 10 years.” And he said that as though he was proud of it. But for me, maybe that’s not the kind of message people wanted to hear. Perhaps they needed something different, especially when so much of the campaign was focused on the prospect of minority government.

So yes, boldness is important—but it needs to be grounded in legitimacy and an ability to achieve tangible outcomes in Parliament. The Greens have that, through their balance of power in the Senate and their track record of working in and around government.

Australia’s Institutions Also Act as a Stopgap Against Populist Surges

Finally, with the continuing fragmentation of both the left and right in Australian politics, do you foresee a populist surge from the right akin to the US or Europe—or is the Australian political system too institutionally embedded for such movements to dominate?

Dr. Mark Riboldi: This might be wishful thinking, but I do think that Australia has some structural resistance to those kinds of populist surges. That’s not to say there aren’t right-wing populist movements in Australia. I’ve mentioned Pauline Hanson’s One Nation a couple of times. Like other places, we’ve had protest movements around anti-vaxxers, and there are nationalist movements in parts of Australia that have jumped onto those kinds of issues. So we do have an active right-wing nationalist populist presence in Australia.

But I do think our electoral system is a bit of a stopgap for that. We have a proportional Upper House, and the government rarely has control of both houses of Parliament in Australia. Usually, the government is formed with control over the lower house—the House of Government—but in the Senate, they typically have to negotiate, similar to the US system, where passing bills requires working with different coalitions of senators. That serves as a useful check on populism and prevents one party from gaining total control and running rampant over the system.

I also think the preferential voting system helps mitigate that risk. And compulsory voting means people are more engaged in the system—the political pitch in Australia isn’t just to narrow bands of partisan voters, but to the broader political center. All of those things aren’t an antidote per se, but they act as a kind of stopgap. Populist surges in Australia might break in from outside the Parliament, but I don’t think they get a foothold or gain as much institutional power as they do in other places.

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio

Dr. Ragragio: Populism in the Philippines Is Enduring and Evolving

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this thought-provoking conversation, Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio—Gosling-Lim Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Michigan—discusses the resilience and transformation of populism in the Philippines. He explores how symbolic narratives of “pro-people, anti-elite” sentiment continue to drive support for dynastic figures like the Dutertes, despite mounting legal scrutiny. From social media toxicity to youth electoral shifts, Dr. Ragragio argues that populism is “here to stay,” shaped by local patronage networks and reinforced by mediatized political performance. He also highlights the importance of civic education and independent journalism as counterforces. This is a timely, incisive analysis of a political culture in flux.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio—Gosling-Lim Postdoctoral Fellow in Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Michigan—offers a sobering yet nuanced analysis of the enduring logic of populism in Philippine politics. With a research focus on media, democracy, and political communication in Southeast Asia, Dr. Ragragio traces how populist discourse and dynastic power have remained mutually reinforcing features of the Filipino political landscape.

“Populism in the Philippines is here to stay,” he affirms, stressing that whether “right-wing, illiberal, or left-wing-oriented,” such formations continue to thrive due to “an enduring clamor for pro-people, anti-elite sentiments” across both national and local arenas. This durability, Dr. Ragragio argues, is not merely rhetorical but structural, anchored in long-standing regional patronage networks and a media ecosystem conducive to symbolic politics.

Reflecting on the Duterte family’s electoral resurgence amid legal controversies—including former President Rodrigo Duterte’s detention at the ICC and Vice President Sara Duterte’s looming impeachment—Dr. Ragragio interprets this revival not simply as continuity, but as a strategic “recalibration of expressions of support” rooted in the “symbolic resilience” of populist narratives. Despite mounting legal and institutional scrutiny, he observes that “support can be sustained, especially at the local level,” even as national opposition gains ground.

Equally compelling is his analysis of political journalism as a contested discursive terrain. “Political journalism has long been a battleground,” Dr. Ragragio notes, shaped by both populist co-optation and democratic resistance. He commends outlets like Rappler and regional campus journalists for expanding critical coverage during the midterm elections, while also warning of the toxic political performance encouraged by algorithmic propaganda on platforms like Facebook.

Crucially, Dr. Ragragio identifies media literacy, civic education, and institutional accountability as key interventions in combating “authoritarian masculinity and political exceptionalism.” Yet he remains realistic about the persistence of dynastic dominance, noting that “a third of the Senate is composed of familial pairs.”

Ultimately, his insights reveal a landscape in flux—where democratic recalibration and populist entrenchment coexist in uneasy tension, and where the future of Philippine democracy hinges on how these competing narratives are mediated, institutionalized, and resisted from below.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio.

From Continuity to Calibration: The Evolving Symbolism of Duterte’s Populist Appeal

Former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte holds a Galil sniper rifle with outgoing Philippine National Police (PNP) chief Ronald dela Rosa (L) at Camp Crame in Manila on April 19, 2018. Photo: Salma Bashir Motiwala.

Professor Ragragio, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of Rodrigo Duterte’s International Criminal Court (ICC) detention and Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial, how do you interpret the Duterte family’s electoral resurgence as a recalibration of populist performativity rather than a simple continuation of its earlier iteration?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: Thanks very much to the ECPS for this kind invitation. So, your first question really is a hard question already. Just to be clear for your audience—I’m not a political scientist, and I’m not a legal expert. My area really is in media and democracy. I’m particularly focused on news media and independent journalism in the Philippines, and I’m trying to expand that to Southeast Asian countries as well. But I’m very much interested in media populism, and I think this is one of the main thrusts of the ECPS.

Maybe before I go into details, I think it would help if I provide some very brief background about the Philippine midterm elections. We have just recently concluded the midterm elections in the Philippines. Normally, the midterm elections are less enticing compared to the national ones. Why? Because they are usually a referendum or a test of the trust or approval ratings of the current president or the current administration as a whole.

This midterm election that we just had is relatively more colorful—and perhaps some would say more historic—compared to past election cycles because the strong support for the current administration did not stand still. So, I think my key takeaway for this election is that, at least if we look at the national results of the Senate race, the midterm election results are somewhat bad for President Bongbong Marcos. But at the same time, they are also not so good for Vice President Sara Duterte, who is currently—and will eventually be—facing an impeachment trial at the Senate. So, that’s my main takeaway.

Regarding your question, there is obviously a resurgence of support for the Dutertes. If we look at both the national and the regional/local levels, you can see some clear indications that there is indeed a resurgence of support for former President Rodrigo Duterte, who is currently detained at The Hague at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for charges of crimes against humanity, and also for the political clan of the Dutertes in general.

The former President Duterte won the majority race very easily, and his children have also won virtually all key positions in the city of Davao. So, if the question is: Is there a resurgence? The short answer is yes. Is there a recalibration of expressions of support for the Dutertes? There were clear recalibrations—but there are also some emerging, more complicated, mixed expressions of support for the Dutertes.

Populism After Accountability

Does the Duterte camp’s sustained support reflect what you have elsewhere called the “symbolic resilience” of populist narratives, particularly in contexts where legal accountability coexists with popular legitimacy?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: It appears they can. It appears they can sustain this support from the city, from the regional publics, regional voters. But also, there are clear indications that this public support can be cut down— can be trimmed down. 

Again, if we look at the national Senate race in the previous midterm elections, there is no clear and concise support going to the Dutertes, because this midterm election also opened opportunities for non-Dutertes—or anti-Dutertes rather—for supporters of the Liberal opposition, for example, which paved the way for the former Senators Aquino and Pangilinan to win this election cycle. So, yes, the support can be sustained, especially at the local level. But at the national or even regional levels, there might be some strong opposition—and consistent opposition as well—to the Dutertes.

To what extent does the Duterte revival indicate the adaptive strength of populist movements to institutional rupture and legal contestation? Can this be read as a post-accountability phase in Philippine populism?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: Oh, definitely. The resurgence, for example, of so-called young or youth voters—while we don’t yet have concrete data—appears to reflect a consensus among many observers that the youth vote delivered not for the Dutertes or the Marcoses, but rather for independent candidates who articulated strong platforms on governance issues such as agriculture, local livelihood, and basic education. So yes, the short answer to your question is also yes.

The resurgence, for example, of so-called young or youth voters—many of them, well, we have no concrete data yet, but it appears that many observers share a consensus that the young votes, or the youth vote rather, delivered not only for the Dutertes nor the Marcoses, but more on candidates—independent candidates—that spoke well of important platforms of governance, for example, agriculture, local livelihood, basic education, and so on. So yes, the short answer to your question is yes, as well.

Elite Rule in Anti-Elite Clothing

Davao City officials, including Vice President Sara Duterte, celebrated Philippine Independence Day on stage in Davao City, Philippines, on June 12, 2024. Photo: Elvie Lins.

Considering the dynastic entrenchment of both the Dutertes and the Marcoses, how does Philippine populism mediate between elite familial power and its rhetorical positioning as anti-elite, anti-establishment politics?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I’m not an expert in that field—I know there are scholars and political scientists who specialize in familial and patronage politics. But what I can say in response to your question is that anti-establishment expressions remain very much predominant—not only at the national level, but arguably even more so at the local and regional levels. For example, in races for the House of Representatives—what we call the “lower House of Congress”—and in contests for governorships, anti-elite and anti-establishment sentiments are widespread. And, not surprisingly, it’s often the same members of entrenched political families who deploy these very narratives. So yes, it’s a bit toxic, in a sense, to see how anti-elitism and anti-elite rhetoric continue to operate within regional and local elections.

How does the personalization of governance, exemplified by Sara Duterte’s political rhetoric and Rodrigo Duterte’s mayoral campaign from detention, reinforce the mythos of populist indispensability in Philippine political culture?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I think the indispensability aspect of your question relates to the durable brand of politics—and populism in particular—in its right-wing or authoritarian form, which I would emphasize more. There is a clear sense of durability because, in the first place, the Dutertes have held political power in the city of Davao for over two decades. This style—especially its mediated, authoritarian populist expression—has significantly contributed to their continued dominance. And, as you mentioned earlier, several institutional aspects and barriers also reinforce their hold on power. Political patronage is one such mechanism. Moreover, the collaboration between and among political clans in local politics has been instrumental in sustaining this durable brand of governance in Davao.

The Marcos-Duterte Rift and the Strategic Deployment of Populist Performance

Is the current Marcos-Duterte schism a rupture within populist logic itself—or does it signal a competition over the same populist register of “strongman sovereignty” and “political vengeance”?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I wouldn’t really call it a schism or a rupture in the context of populist politics because, first of all, it’s somewhat challenging to identify President Marcos as a populist. Of course, he has some expressions that could resonate or qualify as populist—such as being pro-people. But compared to the brand of populism espoused by former President Rodrigo Duterte, this isn’t really a schism between populist politics; it’s more about politics at large. For example, both President Marcos and Vice President Sara Duterte ran on a so-called platform of unity during the 2022 national elections. However, it only took them about a year—or even less—to realize that there was no unity at all in the brand of politics they had tried to project. So, while populism may not be at the forefront of the schism or rupture between the Marcoses and the Dutertes, if we define populism as an expression of how you resonate with the people—many segments of the public—this is where you can see the potential for both the use and misuse of populist politics.

In your analyses of editorial framing and mediatized nationalism, how has the news media contributed to either normalizing or contesting the discursive legitimacy of the Duterte camp’s post-presidency populism?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: Yeah, it’s a mixed bag. I haven’t yet expanded my study of editorials, but what I can say in relation to the recent midterm election cycle is that some independent news media outlets have done a commendable job of reporting. For example, if you look at the reporting by Rappler—an online news media platform—they expanded their coverage from the national level to include regional and local contexts. Covering regional and local elections has consistently been a challenge not only for national media outlets but even for local ones, largely due to a lack of sufficient manpower to cover election races in the provinces. But this time around, it’s commendable to see how media outlets collaborated with campus journalists—regional campus journalists in particular—who covered important local elections in their respective areas.

Toxic Platforms and Battleground Newsrooms

How would you assess the role of algorithmic propaganda networks, particularly on platforms like Facebook, in sustaining the Duterte narrative as a populist moral crusade amid institutional delegitimization?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I haven’t looked systematically yet at the social media aspect of this midterm election. But I would surmise—based on my very cursory reading of Facebook pages or posts by politicians—that social media platforms, especially Facebook in the Philippines, represent one of the most toxic political environments you can think of. What I mean is that this is where you often see politicians, both national and local, trying to craft or reinforce certain images that will resonate with their target publics.

For example, what makes this environment particularly toxic is that you might see a senatorial candidate who would rather dance and capitalize on his showbiz celebrity charisma on stage than discuss his platform of governance. This is one aspect of what makes social media campaigning more problematic.

Of course, I do not deny that social media platforms can also serve as important avenues for grievances and for the expression of credible sentiments—especially among young voters—who may use these channels to voice their discontent against the administration or any politician, for that matter.

Has political journalism in the Philippines evolved into a form of discursive battleground, where journalists are not just observers but are increasingly cast as either custodians or co-conspirators within populist frameworks?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I think political journalism in the country has been in that state for a long time. A quick backgrounder: Philippine journalism in general—the journalism environment—is regarded as one of the freest, if not the freest, practices of independent journalism in the region. Of course, there are many important and historical experiences by Filipino journalists that have shaped who they are and what they practice today.

So going back to your question, yes, political journalism has long been a discursive battleground for the expression of a variety of political sentiments. You have journalists who may support certain kinds of populist sentiments expressed by the Dutertes, but at the same time, you have journalists who are openly critical of the authoritarian populist sentiments of the leader. And then, of course, you also have some journalists—even some news media outlets—who are not so keen on expressing their political stance. Perhaps they prefer to observe, say, objectivity or nonpartisanship in the way they conduct their journalistic practices. 

Courts, Congress, and the Contest for Accountability in a Populist Legal Order

Militant groups storm the Mendiola Peace Arch near Malacanang Palace during the 64th Universal Declaration of Human Rights to protest alleged violations under the Noynoy Aquino government, Manila, Philippines, December 10, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

Drawing from your work on media law and the judiciary, how do you evaluate the potential of institutions like the Senate and the Supreme Court to act as bulwarks against populist legalism—or are they being absorbed into its logics?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I’d like to believe that—or at least have confidence in—institutions of checks and balances. For example, based on my work on the Supreme Court and press freedom in the country, I think there are avenues and strong potential for the Supreme Court to police and regulate extreme incivility coming from politicians and even from government officials.

In the case of the news media, as I mentioned earlier, there is also the potential for journalism—especially independent journalism—to express discontent and actively challenge illiberal politics and authoritarian populist sentiments. But I would go even further and consider the potential of other institutions. For instance, the role of the academia, of universities, and even credible polling or survey firms. These are critical institutions—critical organizations—that can contribute to building a more diverse and more democratic environment.

Is Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial a moment of institutional accountability or a spectacle of juridico-political theater shaped by dynastic rivalry? Given your analysis of the politicization of libel law, to what extent are legal instruments still being weaponized to manufacture legitimacy in the Duterte-Marcos power struggle?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I think there are two main questions there. One has to do with the impeachment trial of the current Vice President. This is definitely an expression of accountability. One thing we need to look at is the upcoming impeachment trial at the Senate, which is scheduled for sometime in July—likely the last week. This will be broadcast live, making the proceedings publicly accessible. What this means is that public sentiment will figure significantly in the way the senators—the sitting senator-jurors—decide on the trial.

That’s one aspect. The other concerns the institutions. I understand there are related libel cases—not only against the Marcoses and the Dutertes, but also involving other politicians. That is something we need to keep a close eye on. Fortunately, there have been recent trends and initiatives by the Supreme Court to take more seriously the question: How exactly do we treat libel? And is there room for the decriminalization of libel as a criminal offense? Because in the Philippines, libel is a criminal offense. I believe we are one of the few countries—if not the only one—left in the world that still treats libel as a criminal offense. So that’s another important development to watch.

Democratic Pluralism from Below?

With the electoral success of figures outside the dynastic duopoly, such as Bam Aquino and Francis Pangilinan, do you perceive a nascent re-articulation of democratic pluralism—perhaps even a counter-populist discourse—emerging from below?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: I’d like to believe that way. I’d like to think that there is really great potential for the Liberal opposition to challenge the toxic brand of authoritarian populism. But at the same time, there are some unfortunate realities. For example, if you look at the upcoming composition of the Senate—we have 24 senators—and a third of them, so we’re talking about eight members, are related to one another. We have four pairs of senators who are siblings. This is really a kind of toxic politics that we need to be critical about. So your question about political dynasty, I hope, is one thing that can be tackled seriously by the resurging Liberal opposition in this election cycle.

What civic, educational, or legal interventions do you view as most urgent to disrupt the entrenched narrative of authoritarian masculinity and political exceptionalism in Philippine populist politics?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: That’s an important question, because we have a lot of discussion in the Philippines—and even in Southeast Asia—on how to combat mis- and disinformation. So, I think that is critical to both political education and even civic education. How, or to what extent, can media literacy develop our astute understanding of what a credible political brand or what a credible political, electoral campaigning slogan really matters.

Populism Is Here to Stay in the Philippines

People flooded the streets of Manila to demand justice for all the victims of extrajudicial killings that happened during the time of President Duterte on June 30, 2021. Photo: Santino Quintero.

Finally, in your view, does the 2025 midterm outcome represent a deepening of the populist-authoritarian paradigm—or does it contain seeds of democratic recalibration amidst an increasingly mediatized and dynastically polarized landscape?

Dr. Jefferson Lyndon D. Ragragio: Well, the short answer is yes to both your questions. First, I think populism is here to stay. I understand there’s a lot of scholarly and public discussion about what populism really is. In many European and American contexts, we tend to distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, or illiberal populism. In the Philippines, although those categories are present, I think we also see historically and politically distinct forms of populism that deserve more focused attention.

That said, to answer your question—populism in the Philippines is here to stay. Whether we are dealing with right-wing, illiberal, or left-wing-oriented forms, populism persists because there is an enduring clamor for pro-people, anti-elite sentiments that resonate strongly within both national and local political landscapes.