Professor Georg Lutz.

Prof. Lutz: Population Aging Has Changed the Immigration Debate in Switzerland

Switzerland’s rejection of the Swiss People’s Party’s proposal to cap the country’s population at ten million has been widely interpreted as a crucial test of contemporary European politics. While the referendum exposed persistent anxieties about immigration, housing, infrastructure, and national identity, it also revealed an emerging counter-narrative centered on demographic aging and labor-market needs. In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Georg Lutz examines the referendum’s implications for direct democracy, populism, and the future of liberal democracy. He discusses the resilience of the populist radical right, the role of issue ownership in electoral politics, and the opportunities and limits of direct democracy. Professor Lutz also reflects on political distrust, misinformation, democratic participation, and the evolving relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutional liberalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Switzerland is frequently portrayed as the world’s most sophisticated laboratory of direct democracy—a political system in which citizens regularly decide major policy questions through referendums and popular initiatives. Yet the country’s June 2026 referendum on the Swiss People’s Party’s (SVP) proposal to cap the population at ten million revealed that even Switzerland’s celebrated democratic model is increasingly shaped by the same tensions confronting liberal democracies across Europe: migration, demographic change, economic insecurity, national identity, and the rise of the populist radical right.

Although voters ultimately rejected the initiative, the campaign exposed deep divisions over immigration and the future direction of Swiss society. More importantly, it highlighted a significant shift in public debate. As Professor Georg Lutzargues in this interview, discussions about immigration are no longer driven solely by concerns over cultural identity or social cohesion. For the first time, a prominent counter-argument emerged around demographic realities and economic necessity. In his words, “all populations in European countries are aging,” and immigration was increasingly discussed as “something that is also necessary for the labor market.” As he notes, “we see a bit of a shift in this debate compared to what we have seen in previous times.”

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Lutz—Director of FORS, the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Lausanne—offers a nuanced assessment of the referendum, the resilience of the SVP, and the broader relationship between direct democracy and populism. Rejecting simplistic interpretations, he argues that the referendum result represented both a setback and a success for the SVP. While the initiative failed, “45 percent of the Swiss population voted in favor of limiting the population to 10 million,” a figure substantially higher than the party’s own electoral support.

The interview also explores whether direct democracy serves as a safeguard against populism or inadvertently empowers it. Professor Lutz challenges common assumptions on both sides of the debate. While acknowledging concerns about minority rights and majoritarian pressures, he argues that “the reality is much more nuanced” than many critics suggest. Direct democracy, he contends, is deeply intertwined with representative institutions and often acts as an indirect mechanism of accountability rather than a revolutionary alternative to parliamentary politics.

Perhaps most importantly, Professor Lutz shifts attention away from institutional design and toward what he sees as the more pressing threats facing contemporary democracies: the fragmentation of information systems, the spread of misinformation, growing political distrust, and systematic efforts to undermine confidence in democratic institutions. In an era of polarization and populist mobilization, his reflections offer important insights into both the strengths and vulnerabilities of democratic governance in Switzerland and beyond.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Georg Lutz, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Result Was Both a Defeat and a Success for the SVP

Switzerland-EU

Professor Lutz, welcome! To begin, Switzerland has just rejected the SVP’s proposal to cap the country’s population at ten million, despite widespread public concerns about immigration, housing, and infrastructure pressures. How should we interpret this outcome: as a defeat for the populist radical right, a rejection of anti-immigration maximalism, or evidence that Swiss voters remain more pragmatic than ideological?

Professor Georg Lutz: It’s probably a mixture of all three. If you looked at the leaders of the People’s Party (SVP) on Sunday when the results came in, you could see that they looked rather disappointed. They had hoped that the proposal could be won, because the party has succeeded with similar anti-immigration votes in the past, and the polls were quite favorable at the beginning. 

On the other hand, the party was also, to some extent, satisfied. After all, 45 percent of the Swiss population voted in favor of limiting the population to 10 million, and that is significantly higher than the party’s own vote share, which is only about 28 percent. So, the party mobilized well, particularly in rural areas, around one of the key issues on which it has been campaigning for more than 30 years now.

Many Swiss Voters Chose Stability Over Uncertainty

The referendum campaign was widely described as a “Swiss Brexit” moment because of its potential implications for relations with the European Union. Why did voters ultimately choose continuity over rupture, and what does this tell us about the limits of sovereigntist populism in Switzerland?

Professor Georg Lutz: It is probably a correct interpretation that, to some extent, the majority voted for stable relations with the European Union and also stability in terms of the labor market. There was a big debate about how limiting migration in Switzerland could potentially harm the labor market in the long term. 

But the campaign against the initiative also warned about the chaos that could result. It argued that it would create a great deal of bureaucracy for regulating the market, as in the health sector, as well as higher crime because of ending the Schengen Agreement. There would also be chaos because asylum seekers could simply come in. So, to some extent, it was a vote against this kind of chaos, which was a defining feature of the ‘No’ campaign.

Few Populist Parties Have the Historical Foundations of the SVP

The Swiss People’s Party remains one of Europe’s most successful right-wing populist parties despite this setback. What explains the long-term resilience of the SVP, particularly when many comparable populist parties elsewhere experience cycles of rapid ascent and decline?

Professor Georg Lutz: For this, it’s important to look a little bit into the history of the party, and you’re right, the Swiss People’s Party is quite unique in this respect. It is the strongest party in Switzerland. It has been the strongest party for many years, and it doesn’t experience as many fluctuations as other populist right-wing parties.

The party was founded around 100 years ago. It used to be an agrarian, more centrist, small-business-owner party and wasn’t a radical right-wing party at the very beginning. The party has also been in the Swiss government for almost 100 years, and that’s a very unique feature of Switzerland. Switzerland has a multi-member government with seven members, and the Swiss People’s Party now has two of these members. So, the party still has a strong foundation in the countryside, along with some more moderate voters.

It then started to transform, turning into a radical right party from the 1990s onward. It lost the more moderate wing and became a party strongly focused on anti-immigration, anti-EU, and anti-establishment sentiments—the classic features of other populist right-wing parties you see across the continent.

The Real Victory Was Keeping Immigration at the Center of Politics

Your research on issue ownership suggests that parties gain electorally when they are perceived as the most competent actors on salient issues. Has immigration become such a deeply “owned” issue for the SVP that even referendum defeats can reinforce its broader political influence?

Professor Georg Lutz: That’s actually not just a unique feature of the SVP; it’s a feature of all radical right parties. That’s something you see in modern campaigns. Modern political campaigns are not so much about positioning a party on all kinds of different issues that might attract voters; rather, they are about pushing the key issues with which a party is identified.

Again, it’s not unique to populist right parties. The same applies to Green parties, which are heavily identified with environmental and ecological issues. Liberal parties are generally aligned with economic issues, and social democrats, at least partially, with social issues. And that’s what the debate is about. That’s also why this vote has been a success for the party. They were able to campaign on a key issue, put it on the political agenda, and they are hoping that it will help them in the next national elections and in the many regional elections that we constantly have.

Migration Is Seen as Both a Cultural and an Economic Threat

Switzerland, immigrants, protest,
Young demonstrators in Zurich call for greater humanity and solidarity toward immigrants. Photo: Michael Müller / Dreamstime.

Across Europe, populist radical-right parties increasingly frame immigration not merely as an economic issue but as a question of national identity, demographic survival, and cultural continuity. How closely does the Swiss case resemble developments in countries such as France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands?

Professor Georg Lutz: I would probably argue that this is not necessarily a new development. It has been the defining feature explaining the success of many right-wing parties: their ability to frame migration as a cultural threat, as a threat to the cultural identity of a country. But I do believe it also goes, to some extent, a little beyond this.

There is also a perceived economic threat among part of the population, mainly those from lower income and educational backgrounds. That’s also usually the type of electorate that votes for radical right-wing parties, and it used to be, in many Western countries, a traditional social democratic stronghold. So, it’s not just cultural; it also has an economic component.

What was interesting in this campaign—and I, maybe, should have mentioned it before—is that there was also, for the first time, quite a strong debate about the need for immigration. All populations in European countries are aging. There is a demographic change. Viewing immigration as something that is also necessary for the labor market was quite prominent in this debate, and it is also one of the features that probably explains the strong opposition, or majority opposition, to this vote. So, we see a bit of a shift in this debate compared to what we have seen in previous times.

The Reality of Swiss Direct Democracy Is Far More Nuanced Than Its Critics Suggest

One of the recurring criticisms of direct democracy is that complex policy questions are often reduced to emotionally charged slogans and binary choices. Does the recent population referendum illustrate the strengths or the weaknesses of plebiscitary democracy?

Professor Georg Lutz: But, coming from Switzerland, we have a fairly relaxed approach to direct democracy. In Switzerland, you don’t find any politician who publicly opposes direct democracy. It’s so strongly embedded in the national identity and political culture, and Swiss people are quite proud of it. On the other hand, if you look abroad, direct democracy is indeed often seen as a threat and as an instrument of populism.

But, I think, the reality is much more nuanced if you look at what’s actually going on. On the one hand, direct democracy in Switzerland is very strongly interconnected with the representative system. The idea that outside political actors somehow dominate direct democracy with a populist agenda is far removed from reality. It is parties—even established parties—that usually launch direct democratic initiatives. They are also part of the campaign. All the major interest groups that intervene in the representative system are likewise part of the direct democratic campaign. So, there is a very strong interconnection.

It’s also important to say that, here, we are talking about popular initiatives—proposals that can be made by citizens with a certain number of signatures. They usually get defeated. Only about 10 percent, or one out of ten, ultimately find a majority. And usually, there is a ‘no’ vote, as was the case with this initiative.

The other thing is that if you assess the outcomes of direct democracy, you also have to assess them against the outcomes of representative democracy. You also see many radical right-wing parties pushing, sometimes successfully, for similar positions on immigration and anti-asylum-seeker policies. They, too, find majorities, and that has nothing to do with direct democracy.

Concerns About Minority Rights Are Real but Often Exaggerated

Switzerland is frequently celebrated as the world’s most advanced system of direct democracy. Yet critics argue that repeated referendums on immigration, asylum, religious minorities, and citizenship can place minority rights at the mercy of majority preferences. How serious is this concern in the Swiss context?

Professor Georg Lutz: It is a recurring concern in the Swiss context, but to some extent it is also kind of exaggerated. If you look at the track record, there have been some votes recently to ban minarets or burqas, and also some anti-immigration votes that found a majority. But they are still quite rare. There are also votes where minority protection is usually quite strong. When it comes to language minorities, there is broad acceptance that these minorities should be protected.

I think the problem is not so much direct democracy as such, but rather the absence of safeguards in the form of constitutional limitations. The constitution can be changed quite easily, and what is in the constitution cannot be challenged by any court. That is a defining feature of how the system is implemented in Switzerland.

But again, what is important is to consider what the benchmark is. Some similar initiatives, such as banning burqas, have passed in France or Denmark through purely representative systems, and these were indeed limitations on minority rights. Similarly, LGBTQ rights have been restricted in Poland and Hungary through purely representative systems. It happens, but it is not specific to direct democratic systems.

There Are Very Few Institutional Safeguards in the Swiss System

Some theorists warn of a potential tension between popular sovereignty and liberal constitutionalism. Can direct democracy become a vehicle through which majorities gradually undermine liberal norms and minority protections while remaining formally democratic?

Professor Georg Lutz: It can happen in theory because, as I just mentioned, Switzerland has very few limitations. Only binding international law—such as prohibitions against genocide or torture—is really excluded from being the subject of a popular vote, and even then, it requires a parliamentary decision. It’s not a court decision. Parliament could potentially decide that a proposal violates binding international law and, as a consequence, cannot be put to a vote. So, there are very few safeguards. As a result, there is, within this system, a kind of hope that voters are wise enough to respect minority rights, which, in fairness, in many cases also happens.

Campaigns Have Always Been About Mobilizing Emotions

Referendum posters in Geneva.
Referendum posters displayed on panels at Plainpalais in Geneva, Switzerland, ahead of the September 20, 2020 popular vote. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your work on turnout and direct democracy suggests that information levels may matter as much as participation rates. In an era increasingly shaped by social media, misinformation, disinformation, manipulation, and political polarization, are contemporary referendums becoming more vulnerable to emotional mobilization and simplistic narratives?

Professor Georg Lutz: I also studied history at some point in my life, and I would argue that campaigns—whether in direct democracy or in elections—have never really been the moment when a sophisticated exchange of arguments and public deliberation takes place. They are always the moment when parties or campaigners try to steer emotions and mobilize people, and that’s something you usually do with emotions rather than with complicated arguments. In fairness, this is not a unique feature of the radical right. Left parties have been doing this for more than 100 years as well, if you look at some campaigns in the early twentieth century.

There is, nevertheless, a big difference in how this is done between left- and right-wing parties. Right-wing parties use a lot of elements of exclusion and construct politics in terms of “us against the other,” and that is typically not what left parties do. They are much more likely to campaign on other dimensions, such as the idea that certain proposals threaten people’s well-being. That is the big difference—not that campaigns are trying to be emotional.

Much of Direct Democracy’s Influence Is Indirect Rather Than Direct

Many populist actors claim that referendums represent the purest expression of “the will of the people.” Do you agree that direct democracy offers a corrective to representative institutions, or does this claim underestimate the complexity and diversity of modern societies?

Professor Georg Lutz: It probably does. As I argued before, the outcomes of direct democratic decisions are often quite similar to the outcomes and decisions you could see in purely parliamentary systems, in any direction. So, in a way, the people are not fundamentally different from what elites choose.

I think that’s a strong argument in Switzerland. A lot of the effects of direct democracy are indirect. In any parliamentary decision and parliamentary deliberation, it is known that any law must potentially pass a majority in the population. So that often leads to oversized majorities in Parliament because it is known that, if there is a narrow result, it may lead to a referendum, and there is a risk that the proposal will be defeated. In that sense, referendums create indirect reality checks all the time. But they also, of course, create quite direct reality checks, because a proposal is either approved by Parliament or not. In terms of initiatives, the people, then, vote in favor of or against them.

Direct Democracy Both Empowers and Constrains Populism

Referendum poster for Switzerland’s September 20, 2020.
Referendum poster for Switzerland’s September 20, 2020 immigration vote displayed at Geneva’s Cornavin railway station. Photo: Dreamstime.

Switzerland’s direct-democratic institutions are often presented as antidotes to populism because they provide citizens with regular opportunities to express grievances. Yet populist parties have also become some of the most successful users of these instruments. Does direct democracy ultimately contain populism or empower it?

Professor Georg Lutz: Again, it’s both. Direct democracy has been used by populist parties on the right and on the left, more so than by centrist parties or interest groups. They use it for agenda setting, and they also use it to try to push their proposals and find a majority in the population.

On the other hand, and this is really interesting, what happens constantly in Switzerland is that whenever there is a protest movement of any kind, it immediately becomes the subject of a public debate. The response is essentially: sure, it’s an interesting proposal—try to find a majority.

What then happens is that these groups start collecting signatures, which is a demanding logistical and, to some extent, financial endeavor. The proposal then enters a parliamentary decision-making process. It cannot be stopped by Parliament or the government, but both Parliament and the government issue recommendations. Sometimes they also formulate counter-proposals.

Then it comes to a vote. So, these kinds of protests are immediately channeled into institutionally embedded mechanisms that form part of the direct democratic decision-making process. Because the process takes so long—usually several years between the launch of an initiative and the final vote—it also modulates and dampens, to some extent, very heated movements.

You Cannot Defeat Populists by Dismissing People’s Concerns

Recent research, including work to which you have contributed, links political distrust, life dissatisfaction, and anti-immigration attitudes to support for right-wing populist parties. To what extent is contemporary populism driven less by ideology than by broader feelings of dissatisfaction and alienation?

Professor Georg Lutz: It’s probably both, assuming that I would call nationalism an ideology, which you could probably argue against. But it has many defining features of an ideology, and it is what right-wing populist parties are capitalizing on. They are trying to mobilize those who are dissatisfied with the establishment and the elite, as well as those who feel disadvantaged in the labor market, also compared to foreigners, and threatened by globalization. These are all issues that these parties put forward.

To some extent, the causality actually goes the other way around. Right-wing populist parties constantly convey the message that voters should be dissatisfied with governments, the establishment, and immigration, so that’s also part of the connection. That’s why some of their voters hold such strong views.

But, in fairness, I would nevertheless argue that there is also a political economy of radical right-wing voting. It’s not just a purely cultural issue. The cultural dimension is what drove the success of these parties, and it remains quite dominant. At the same time, many people feel left behind by the establishment, also economically. So, they have concerns, whether perceived or real is a different debate. Often, especially in Switzerland, which has such a low unemployment rate, it is much more a perception of threat than an actual threat.

But I also think this is important to take seriously. And there is a lesson here for other parties that disagree with this notion of grievance: they need to provide answers to these perceived threats as well. You can’t simply say that populist right-wing parties are wrong. These concerns exist, and you have to offer an alternative if you want to be successful against populist right-wing parties.

Mass Voting Remains the Most Democratic Form of Participation

Looking beyond Switzerland, many governments are experimenting with referendums, citizen assemblies, deliberative mini-publics, and other participatory innovations. Which of these mechanisms do you believe are most promising for strengthening democratic legitimacy without sacrificing minority protections?

Professor Georg Lutz: Overall, a lot of countries would benefit from having more meaningful referenda. A lot of referenda are not simply bottom-up instruments; they are often top-down instruments used by governments to legitimize their own propositions. But, referenda can be a good mechanism if they are well moderated and integrated into the broader decision-making process on key issues. Everybody has become a bit worried since Brexit that things can go wrong—and can go horribly wrong. But there are also cases where referenda work quite well at the national level. To some extent, they are more transparent than parliamentary decision-making, where the influence of lobbies is often enormous and quite well hidden. In direct democracy, that influence comes to light more prominently.

I’m a bit more skeptical about other forms of participatory democracy, such as mini-publics or deliberative citizens’ assemblies. They are very difficult to scale up. They tend to become isolated features, and it is hard to make them a systematic part of decision-making. They also lack the legitimacy needed for decision-making because participation is usually limited to a selected number of people, and that’s not sufficient to make binding decisions.

One thing I am also somewhat skeptical about is that the moment these forms of participatory democracy become truly meaningful, they would likely be hijacked by established political actors. That’s what happens in direct democracy. Direct democracy has very little to do with “the people.” To a large extent, it is an elite instrument used by the same actors who are part of any representative system. I always worry that if these forms of decision-making become meaningful, you would see the same thing happening.

Then there is one final reason why I remain somewhat skeptical. There is a paradox of participatory democracy. The more forms of participation you introduce—and especially when those forms are demanding, as citizens’ assemblies are, requiring people to deliberate for several hours or even days—the more selective they become. As a result, they tend to become biased toward those who are already more interested and engaged.

There is a risk—it does not have to happen, but it is a risk—that new forms of participation simply create additional channels for those who already participate more. It is very difficult to design mechanisms that genuinely give voice to the underrepresented in these forms of decision-making. So, mass decision-making processes, such as voting in elections or referenda, remain by far the most democratic.

Switzerland’s Direct Democracy Was a Historical Accident

Switzerland voting.
Photo: Dreamstime

Some observers argue that Europe is witnessing a gradual transition from representative democracy toward increasingly plebiscitary forms of politics. Do you see this as a democratic renewal or as a development that could unintentionally strengthen majoritarian and populist tendencies?

Professor Georg Lutz: I’m not sure that I can really see a big, strong push in that direction. Referenda are certainly happening, but they were happening in previous decades as well, so it is not as if there has been a massive increase. You also see other forms of participatory democracy emerging, but I have not seen them becoming a systematic part of decision-making processes. I do see potential there, but we also have to be realistic. Political institutions are shaped by elites and political actors, and they always do this in ways that maximize their influence. This is not something new. It has been a defining feature of institutional engineering from the very beginning.

To some extent, the fact that Switzerland has so much direct democracy is a historical accident. It was adopted at a very early stage, when political parties were not yet strong and dominant actors. And once established, the country never got rid of it. That is the key reason why this is not happening in many other countries. Existing elites control decision-making, including decisions about political institutions, and as a consequence, they do not want to give up power—especially power that they cannot easily control. 

As a result, I don’t really see this happening on a widespread scale, neither in the form of referenda nor through any other form of political participation.

Being in Government Has Not Weakened Swiss Right-Wing Populism

Comparative research often finds that voters support populist parties for different reasons across countries. What aspects of the Swiss experience are genuinely unique, and what broader lessons does it offer for understanding the rise of the populist radical right across liberal democracies?

Professor Georg Lutz: What is unique in Switzerland is that you can be a populist right-wing party using direct democracy while being in government. The Swiss People’s Party is the strongest party and has been in government all along. The lesson from this is that there are hopes and ongoing discussions suggesting that, once right-wing populist parties are integrated into government, they become more moderate. There is also an expectation that they will become less popular because they usually cannot deliver on the promises they put forward—which is actually the case for most parties, not just populist right-wing parties. But we don’t see this happening in Switzerland. They remain strong, they maintain their position, they do not become more moderate, and they often do not get blamed for failed policies.

Information Fragmentation and Distrust Are Bigger Threats Than Institutional Design

And lastly, Professor Lutz, looking ahead, how do you foresee the relationship between direct democracy and liberal democracy evolving over the next decade? Are mechanisms of direct citizen participation likely to become safeguards against democratic backsliding, or could they increasingly become instruments through which illiberal and exclusionary projects gain legitimacy?

Professor Georg Lutz: Again, as I just argued, I don’t see a big push toward direct democracy for all the reasons I have already mentioned. As I’ve also tried to highlight, I have a pretty pragmatic view. Direct democracy is not a major threat to representative democratic systems, but neither is it much of a cure. It can certainly become part of a political decision-making system, but it is never going to fundamentally change how decision-making is conducted. In fairness, I also don’t see the greatest threat to our democracies today in the form of decision-making itself.

The biggest threat lies in the fragmentation of the information system, fueled by social media platforms and the algorithms that, to some extent, drive polarization. None of this is transparent, and it is very difficult to understand what is actually going on. There is also the spread of misinformation, increasingly facilitated by AI systems that can produce and distribute it in an automated and controlled way. As a result, we no longer have the common understanding of facts or major trends that existed for a long time.

The other major threat I see is that some parties, particularly on the right, seek to systematically undermine the credibility of and trust in key democratic institutions. You see this most clearly in the United States, where attacks on the media, the courts, electoral integrity, and the electoral system have been extremely systematic.

This creates a climate of distrust toward the foundations of democracy and democratic institutions that will be difficult to repair. Rebuilding that trust will take considerable time and require a strong effort. But again, this is something that is largely disconnected from the decision-making process and from direct democracy itself. It is something we see in Switzerland just as we see it in any other form of democracy.

Professor Marlene Laruelle.

Prof. Laruelle: Liberalism Is No Longer the Only Game in Town as It Was for the Past Four Decades

Professor Marlene Laruelle argues that the contemporary challenge to liberal democracy extends far beyond electoral populism. In this wide-ranging ECPS interview, she contends that illiberalism has evolved into a substantive political project that offers alternative visions of identity, belonging, community, and political order. Rejecting the notion that liberal democracy is merely a victim of external threats, Professor Laruelle emphasizes that many illiberal movements emerge from liberalism’s own contradictions, particularly the socio-economic and cultural consequences of neoliberalism. The interview explores the future of Trumpism, Christian nationalism, Russia’s role in global ideological networks, the rise of alternative epistemic communities, and the cultural foundations of “banal illiberalism.” Despite her concerns, Professor Laruelle sees the current moment as an opportunity to rethink and renew democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marlene Laruelle, Full Professor in the Department of Political Science at Luiss University in Rome and one of the foremost scholars of illiberalism, ideological contestation, and the global challenges facing liberal democracy, argues that contemporary politics can no longer be adequately understood through the lens of populism alone. Instead, she contends that the rise of illiberalism reflects a deeper ideological transformation—one that challenges the normative dominance liberalism has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War and forces democracies to confront fundamental questions about identity, belonging, and political community.

Drawing on her extensive scholarship on illiberalism, Russia, transnational ideological networks, and democratic contestation, Professor Laruelle maintains that “illiberalism is an alternative political project” rather than merely a reactionary or anti-democratic impulse. While populism functions as a mobilizing framework organized around the opposition between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” illiberalism offers a more substantive worldview that questions the foundational assumptions of the liberal order itself. In her view, understanding why illiberalism resonates requires moving beyond electoral behavior and examining the deeper social imaginaries through which citizens seek meaning, moral order, and collective belonging.

A central theme of the interview is Professor Laruelle’s rejection of the notion that illiberalism is simply liberalism’s external adversary. Instead, she argues that “liberalism is generating its own critics from within.” The social and economic consequences of neoliberal globalization, rising inequality, cultural fragmentation, and the erosion of shared forms of citizenship have created a growing demand for political projects that promise identity, security, and community. As she notes, liberal institutions often respond through procedural neutrality and technocratic solutions, while many citizens increasingly seek “belonging” and “meaningful answers.” This mismatch, she suggests, helps explain the appeal of illiberal movements across the democratic world.

Perhaps the most striking argument advanced by Professor Laruelle concerns the durability of the illiberal challenge. Contrary to interpretations that view Trumpism, Orbánism, and related movements as temporary electoral phenomena, she argues that “the illiberal offer is here to stay.” Electoral defeats may alter political leadership, but they do not eliminate the deeper cultural narratives, moral frameworks, and social aspirations that sustain illiberal politics. Indeed, Professor Laruelle believes that contemporary democracies are entering a new era of ideological competition in which “liberalism is no longer the obvious normative answer” and “no longer the only game in town, as it was for the last 30 or 40 years.”

The interview also explores the transnational circulation of illiberal ideas, Christian nationalism and its challenge to liberal pluralism, Russia’s role as an ideological laboratory rather than a “puppet master,” the emergence of alternative epistemic communities in the digital age, and the growing importance of what Professor Laruelle calls the cultural and everyday dimensions of “banal illiberalism.” Throughout, she emphasizes that the future of liberal democracy depends not only on institutional resilience but also on its ability to recover a compelling moral and social vision.

Yet despite her sober diagnosis, Professor Laruelle concludes on a cautiously hopeful note. The current crisis of liberalism, she argues, should also be understood as an opportunity—an invitation to reopen debates about the social contract, political imagination, and the kind of democratic future citizens wish to build together.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Marlene Laruelle, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Populism Mobilizes, Illiberalism Offers a Vision

Professor Laruelle, welcome! To begin, you have argued that the concept of illiberalism increasingly offers a more useful analytical framework than populism for understanding contemporary political transformations. What does the concept of illiberalism capture that populism cannot, and why do you believe the analytical focus should shift from populist mobilization to illiberal social imaginaries?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Populism is usually understood in the traditional literature—and there is a huge scholarship on it—as a kind of thin-centered ideology that is primarily organized around a binary opposition between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” It is essentially a mobilizing format that can then be filled with different content, whether on the left or the right.

Illiberalism, by contrast, is a substantive ideological orientation. It frames itself as a challenge to the foundational pillars of the liberal order. It opposes individual rights in favor of more collective rights; it opposes procedural mechanisms in favor of a majoritarian, more executive-power vision of law and order; and it opposes pluralism in favor of a more majoritarian vision. So, it is an alternative political project that captures the current political moment much better than populism has been able to do. The two overlap in many respects, but not in everything.

What I also find interesting is that illiberalism invites us to understand its thickness. Why does it work? It is not only about who is voting for whom and why, but also about why it makes sense to so many people. Why are people looking for belonging and for a new moral order that goes against liberal norms? Illiberalism therefore invites us to revisit social imaginaries and to ask why the liberal democratic order now seems to be marked by a kind of empty social imaginary. I think that is the key question today. For me, illiberalism is the best analytical tool for exploring these questions.

Neoliberalism Produced Winners and Losers

Your work suggests that illiberalism should not be understood simply as liberalism’s external enemy but also as a product of liberalism’s own contradictions. Which failures of contemporary liberal democracies have most significantly contributed to the rise of illiberal movements across Europe and North America?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: I’m not comfortable with this idea that illiberalism has somehow happened to liberal democracy, as if liberal democracy were the victim of illiberalism. I think it’s important to see liberalism as generating its own critics from within, and there are different types of failures that have been producing illiberalism.

Usually, the literature looks at both socio-economic issues, because we have always associated liberalism with economic prosperity. Political liberalism going hand in hand with economic liberalism. Ands now we live, at least in the Western world, in societies where there is a strong feeling that neoliberalism has produced some losers. We have rising socio-economic inequality and a sense that neoliberalism has failed to produce both socio-economic progress and equality. So, that’s the first major source of criticism against liberalism.

The second is more on the cultural side. Liberal progressivism and liberal multiculturalism have been difficult for part of our citizens to receive as a form of shared citizenship. Instead, they have been perceived as a reversal of privileges, a kind of hierarchy of victim narratives. And there is a growing feeling that a shared community is disappearing.

What is also important is that, globally, we now live in a world where we have grown into highly atomized individualities within a social and media environment that has deeply fragmented our communities.

At the same time, liberalism tends to respond through procedural rights by telling us that institutions are neutral. It tells us that it is not there to define what is good and what is not good, but simply to preserve the neutrality of institutions. In a sense, this creates a kind of ideological vacuum, because it offers an answer that is primarily normative and institutional. It sounds like a technocratic answer, while people are looking for belonging and for meaningful answers. And that is what illiberal movements are providing. They offer meaningful answers that speak to identity and security, that provide a sense of purpose, while liberalism tends to respond through institutions, neutrality, and rights. This mismatch is one of the reasons it has become so difficult for liberalism to formulate responses that resonate as common sense for many people.

The Illiberal Offer Is Here to Stay

Many observers continue to interpret Trumpism, Orbánism, and similar movements primarily through the lens of electoral populism. Do these cases represent temporary populist waves, or are they manifestations of a deeper civilizational challenge to liberal modernity itself?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: In a sense, they can be both. You can have a temporary electoral wave and, at the same time, a deep—though I wouldn’t use the term civilizational—social transformation in the way people envision what makes us live together. I think we are witnessing both.

The fact that Orbán lost the election after 16 years in Hungary may indicate that a particular electoral cycle has come to an end. But that does not mean illiberalism has lost. It does not mean that what illiberalism represented has disappeared.

In the same way, Trump may lose the next election, but that would not mean that illiberalism, as a political project in its American version, will disappear. So, the electoral cycle is one thing. The deeper transformation—and the fact that this illiberal offer is now there to challenge liberalism and to argue that liberalism is no longer the obvious normative answer that there are alternative visions of the political order—is something that I believe is here to stay.

This is a long-run phenomenon that will likely remain with us for several decades. Depending on the country, there will be different forms of competition. Sometimes the liberal vision seems to prevail; at other times, the illiberal one appears to gain the upper hand. So, I think we are now living through an interregnum moment in which ideological competition has returned. Liberalism is no longer the only game in town, as it was for the last 30 or 40 years.

Most Illiberal Movements Are Homegrown

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s supporters listening to his speech in Balıkesir, Turkey on April 6,l 2017. Photo: Thomas Koch.

Together with Christophe Jaffrelot, you have emphasized the transnational dimensions of global illiberalism. To what extent are contemporary illiberal actors consciously learning from one another across borders, and how important are these transnational exchanges in sustaining illiberal politics worldwide?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: The transnational dimension is real, but it is important not to overstate it in terms of organizational coherence. I would resist the idea that there is some kind of coordinated international project, because that would be a mistake of interpretation. The majority of illiberal phenomena are homegrown, operating through local actors who are adapted to their own cultural contexts.

What we see instead is parallel evolution—parallel transformations of societies in different cultural settings that are producing parallel responses and parallel illiberal strategies. At the same time, there is coordination between these different forces through forms of selective borrowing. They look at what works, both in terms of shared narratives and shared techniques for becoming influential.

Of course, social media play a role, but the culture of podcasts, for example, also matters: the kinds of language that are used and the ways certain ideas are repackaged. Concepts such as civilizationalism, gender ideology, and cultural Marxism circulate across borders. And, of course, there is mutual support and solidarity among different illiberal leaders. So, some coordination may exist, and there is certainly intellectual and tactical borrowing. But I still think the domestic context remains the key one, and I would strongly resist the idea that everything is highly coordinated.

When you look closely, we have very often tended to overemphasize, for example, Russian influence or, more recently, Trump’s influence on developments in Europe. When you examine these cases in detail, you still find that domestic influences and domestic mechanisms are the primary drivers, with local actors exercising their own agency. External influence can certainly be present, but it is an additional layer rather than the key structural element.

For Many, Trumpism Will Be Remembered as a Golden Age

You have described Christian nationalism as one of the “deep stories” behind Trumpism. How do you assess the relationship between MAGA politics and broader illiberal trends in the United States? Has Trumpism become a durable ideological project that will outlast Donald Trump himself?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: That’s an important—indeed, a key—question. Trumpism is already a repackaging of many elements that were present on the right and far-right landscape in America long before Trump. It is a repackaging of these ideas around Trump’s personality. One can imagine that once Trump leaves the political scene, many of these elements will continue to exist. Some aspects of the Trump cult of personality may disappear, but much more will remain. Many cultural visions of the world—the conspiracy culture, the broader Americana tradition, and the culture of podcasting—will endure. They may acquire a different hero, or even multiple heroes, but they will persist. For a segment of the American constituency, the age of Trumpism will probably be remembered as a kind of golden age.

So, they may move beyond Trump himself, but they will continue to envision America as a genuine, deep America—a Christian national America fighting against cosmopolitan coastal elites. All of these elements are likely to remain. They may be repackaged, and of course their relationship to institutional democracy could undergo important transformations, but they will endure even after Trump has left the scene.

That is why thinking about the electoral cycle is important, but I do not think it is the most strategic consideration. Even on the day Trump loses an election, I do not think Trumpism as a political culture will disappear.

Christian Nationalism Rejects Neutral Pluralism

A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.

In your recent work, you argue that Christian nationalism has evolved into an illiberal interpretation of religion. What makes contemporary Christian nationalism particularly consequential for liberal democracy, and how does it differ from more traditional forms of religious conservatism?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: What has been happening in the US with Christian nationalism is precisely that it has become politicized. It is no longer primarily about defending religious practices or institutional church interests; it is really about asserting a kind of civilizational claim over the public order. The claim is that America is a Christian nation and, therefore, that liberal pluralism cannot be neutral. If it is neutral, then it is hostile to the real identity of America. Consequently, the public order, the institutions, and the Constitution must be Christian in order to be in tune, in sync, with the country’s true identity. So, this is fundamentally an illiberal claim because it rejects the liberal premise of equal citizenship regardless of religious identity.

The other element that is really important for understanding Christian nationalism is that it essentializes political conflict. It gives a political-theological reading to every political struggle. If every political conflict is understood as a theological battle between Good and Evil—with capital letters—then, in a sense, you are pushing for your opponents to be defeated in a dramatic way, even through violence, because they represent Evil with a capital E.

So, it is really a way of essentializing political conflict and refusing any form of compromise. In that sense, it runs counter not only to liberalism but even to the basic requirements of a functional democracy. In that respect, it represents a major transformation of American political culture. Even if these elements were always present, they have now assumed a much larger dimension under the Trump administration.

Russia Amplifies More Than It Creates

Western discussions often focus on Russian military power or disinformation campaigns. Yet your scholarship points to Russia’s role as a producer and exporter of illiberal narratives. How should we understand Russia’s place within the global ecosystem of illiberal ideas today?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: I have indeed been working on this issue for years. I do not like the image of Russia as the puppet master behind all illiberal forces in Europe or the United States. Rather, I think Russia has been an incredibly productive ideological laboratory for illiberal ideas since the 1990s, for several reasons linked to the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

Russia has also functioned as a kind of legitimizing mirror. For many illiberal actors, it offered an example of developments they admired: the assertion of civilizational identity, the strong leader, the macho image embodied by Putin, and the narrative of traditional values. All of these elements helped illiberal forces in Europe and the United States feel validated in their own beliefs.

At the same time, I do not think Russia was the only model. For years, Orbán also played a similar role, embodying developments that other illiberal leaders hoped to see emerge in their own countries.

For me, it is important to understand Russia first as a precursor in articulating narratives around sovereignty, civilizationalism, traditional values, and multipolarity. Of course, Eurasianism carries its own distinctive identity and civilizational brand.

Russia should also be seen as a mirror through which illiberal forces could gain confidence in their own vision and seek different forms of support—whether through media recognition, political recognition, or, at times, financial recognition.

However, I do not subscribe to the puppet-master narrative, because I do not believe Russia created the majority of these illiberal forces. It amplifies and validates them, but, as I have emphasized, most of them are local actors with their own agency.

Russian Influence Thrives Through Decentralization

In your work on Russia’s “entrepreneurs of influence,” you challenge simplistic assumptions about centralized Kremlin control. How does this more decentralized model of ideological influence alter our understanding of how illiberal narratives travel across borders?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Russia has been very effective precisely because it was, or has been for a very long time, a weak and relatively poor state. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia operated through a highly decentralized strategy of rebuilding influence. It allowed various ideological influencers and entrepreneurs of influence to experiment with what could work in the media sphere, in forms of hybrid—or so-called hybrid—or asymmetric warfare, and in the creation of networks of support. 

This decentralization is actually what makes Russian influence more resilient, because it does not depend on a single channel that can be shut down. Instead, it creates a diffuse ideological ecosystem that is much harder to counter. Of course, the research you are referring to was conducted before the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Since 2022, things have changed considerably, and there has been a much greater closure of the Russian influence system, which has become far more centralized.

That said, if we look at how Russia continues to influence the broader contrarian ideological ecosystem, it still operates through multiple narratives. Russia has the capacity to produce narratives that resonate not only with the European far right but also with some of the contrarian leftist voices in Europe and the United States. It can speak to Muslim constituencies in the Middle East. It can appeal to anti-neocolonial forces in Africa. It can resonate with traditional anti-imperial movements in Latin America. It can also connect with more classic post-communist constituencies in countries such as Vietnam or China.

So, Russia still possesses this ability to frame a contrarian identity in different political and cultural languages, and that capacity remains intact. Of course, each of these audiences is relatively niche. But when all of these niches are taken together, they still constitute a significant network of influence.

Illiberalism Travels Through Demand, Not Design

Your research with Erica Marat argues that China and Russia often act less as exporters of illiberalism than as enablers of pre-existing domestic trends. How should we rethink the relationship between external authoritarian influence and indigenous sources of democratic backsliding?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Indeed, that is the subject of a book that will be published in a few months by Cornell University Press, titled A Farewell to Liberalism. In it, we examine six countries that have received what we call services for illiberal governance from Russia and China—whether technological services from China or more industrial, economic, and informational support from Russia.

What we try to demonstrate is that the existing literature often interprets these dynamics as cases of Russia and China exporting illiberalism or authoritarianism. Our argument, however, is that local actors are the ones deciding both the level of influence they wish to receive and the specific kinds of imports they are willing to accept from Russia and China. These choices depend on how they position themselves vis-à-vis the West and on how they manage their relationships with domestic civil society and political opposition.

So, this is fundamentally a book about the demand side of so-called democratic backsliding. It seeks to restore agency to local actors and to show that the spread of illiberal values around the world is far more a locally driven process of demand than the product of some grand design orchestrated by Russia and China. We need to restore agency to local actors and recognize that they selectively take from Russia, from China, but also from the United States, whatever they believe serves their interests and needs.

In that sense, the book offers a different reading of the international system—one that is deeply transactional in nature. Countries increasingly pursue strategies of multi-alignment, taking a little from Russia, a little from China, a little from the West, and a little from the United States, while creating their own room for maneuver by playing the great powers against one another.

Russia Was a Model of Successful Illiberalism

The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill and Russian President Vladimir Putin as they attended a ceremony celebrating the 1025 anniversary of the Baptism of Kievan Rus in Kiev, Ukraine on July, 27, 2013. Photo: Shutterstock.

Across Europe and beyond, segments of the radical right have long expressed admiration for Putin’s Russia. What explains this attraction, and how has Russia’s invasion of Ukraine altered—or failed to alter—these ideological affinities?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Russia was indeed, for a long time, a highly successful model for many European far-right movements, although there were always important nuances. For far-right actors in countries bordering Russia—such as Finland, Romania, Poland, and others with a long experience of Russian domination—the attitude was never particularly Russophile but rather Russophobic.

For much of the Western European far right, however, Russia was seen as a model of a successful illiberal political project: a strong state, sovereignty, the defense of traditional gender and family norms, openly Christian values, anti-globalism, and nationalism. It was a package that resonated with many Western far-right actors and was regarded as genuinely inspiring.

As I mentioned, Orbán’s Hungary also emerged as an alternative model that many found attractive. Already after 2014, it became apparent that, for many Western and American far-right actors, Hungary represented a more appealing model than Russia because it was perceived as less controversial.

After 2022, however, many of these far-right actors were forced to renegotiate how they framed their relationship with Russia. In most cases, they toned down their association with Russia, adopted a more nuanced position, and reframed their interpretation of the conflict. This did not necessarily mean becoming openly pro-Ukrainian. Rather, it meant arguing that too much money should not be spent on Ukraine’s defense or that Russia had its own reasons for launching the invasion.

Each country, depending on its cultural context and the political room for maneuver available to its far-right leaders, adjusted its narrative accordingly. An interesting case is Giorgia Meloni in Italy. She represents a good example of an illiberal leader who has consistently been pro-Western, pro-NATO, and anti-Russian. So, there was always diversity within the broader illiberal camp.

Since 2022, we have indeed witnessed a growing line of division. Some radical far-right groups have become openly pro-Ukrainian, with some individuals even going to fight on the Ukrainian side. Others have continued to maintain a pro-Russian position. The key dividing factor lies in how these actors interpret the broader geopolitical and civilizational divide. Either they adopt a pro-Western orientation, or they embrace a more multipolar worldview. That distinction largely explains whether they take a pro-Ukrainian or a pro-Russian stance.

Shared Rhetoric Masks Deep Geopolitical Differences

Your work on France, Italy, Hungary, and Serbia reveals important geopolitical divisions within the far right. Has the war in Ukraine fragmented the transnational far-right movement, or has it merely reshaped existing cleavages between nationalist actors?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Indeed, the geopolitical dimension has always generated tensions among different far-right groups, precisely because some have been perceived as too openly pro-Russian, while others have been viewed as too favorable to NATO. These tensions have always been present. If we look, for example, at the way far-right groups have operated in the European Parliament, the geopolitical line of division has consistently been an important factor.

I think this dynamic has been partly reshaped since Trump’s re-election in January 2025, because the relationship with the United States suddenly became part of the equation, not just the relationship with Russia. One of the key questions now concerns attitudes toward Trump: to what extent do Western and Central European far-right actors want to support the United States, and to what extent do they feel the need to distance themselves from it?

We saw this clearly when Trump made very aggressive claims regarding Greenland. There were significant differences among European illiberal leaders in how they interpreted their relationship with Trump. So, the geopolitical line of division is now no longer only about Russia; it also concerns the United States. 

At the same time, what we see emerging is that many of these actors have adopted a narrative that largely originated in the United States: the idea of Western civilization. Whatever their differences, there is a shared belief that Western civilization must be defended. Of course, this notion of Western civilization can have different boundaries and imply different relationships with Russia. But these actors are trying to construct a kind of empty signifier that is flexible enough to provide them with a common geopolitical narrative. In reality, however, they continue to hold quite diverse geopolitical perspectives.

Culture Matters as Much as Politics

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

You have shown that illiberal ideas circulate not only through parties and governments but also through novels, media personalities, intellectuals, and cultural networks. Are liberal democracies underestimating the cultural dimension of illiberal diffusion?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: Yes, that is something I feel very strongly about. We have looked at illiberalism too much through the lenses of institutions, elections, and disinformation, and in doing so, we have often overlooked the fact that illiberal values circulate through culture. By culture, I mean fiction, music, films, festivals, and the broader wave of patriotism and rediscovery of national or regional histories. Historical reenactments, lifestyles, food habits, clothing, body language, wellness, and health issues all play a role. Especially after COVID, everything related to health and the body became particularly important.

I think many of these elements contribute to shaping both liberal and illiberal cultures. If you look at the vast world of podcasters and influencers, many illiberal voices are not talking about politics in the narrow sense of institutions and parties. They are talking about ways of life. For me, this is the new frontier of research that we need to explore: what I would call ‘banal illiberalism’.

In much the same way that Michael Billig’s concept of banal nationalism captured the everyday, often aestheticized expressions of national identity, we need a concept that captures the everyday expression of a worldview infused with illiberal values. This is important because once illiberal values become embedded in lived experience, they cannot be countered through factchecking alone. The issue is no longer simply one of disinformation or misinformation. It is much more complex than that. It concerns the way people interpret the world and responding to that requires an entirely different set of tools from those we have spent the past decade developing to combat disinformation.

Fact-Checking Misses the Deeper Problem

To what extent have digital platforms enabled the construction of alternative epistemic communities in which illiberal narratives can flourish independently of traditional gatekeepers, experts, and mainstream media?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: That’s a good example of what I was saying. These digital platforms are indeed creating communities with their own authorities, their own validation procedures, and their own sense of what counts as credible evidence. That is why it becomes increasingly difficult to find ways of talking to one another. We find ourselves in a kind of post-trust system in which we have lost a common language for determining what is true and what is not, as well as a shared set of tools for deciding what constitutes reality.

Once you lose this common epistemic ground, it becomes very difficult to rebuild anything collectively. That is why I think factchecking and platform regulation can be useful, but they miss the deeper dynamic. And that deeper dynamic is probably the need to find ways of rebuilding communities that live together. I say that fully aware that it is much easier said than done. But I do think we are now functioning within increasingly closed epistemic worlds, and that reality needs to be taken very seriously.

Moreover, this tendency is likely to intensify as artificial intelligence further separates different perspectives on the world. Each of us may end up living in a more closed informational environment because AI will increasingly read and interpret the world for us in highly individualized ways. So, this is one of the major challenges we face because it directly affects the question of how democracy can survive. If each of us experiences a different reality, then the fundamental question becomes: what do we still share?

Liberalism Must Recover a Moral Language

If illiberalism reflects genuine social grievances and not merely manipulation or disinformation, can liberal democracies successfully counter it through institutional reforms alone, or must they also offer a new moral and cultural narrative capable of inspiring citizens?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: I belong to the group of people who believe that institutional answers alone will not be enough. Everything associated with institutional neutrality—the proceduralism of liberalism—has, to a large extent, lost credibility. It has become associated with technocracy, neoliberalism, depoliticization, and forms of elite control. So, I think that if liberalism is to succeed, it will need to be willing to make substantive normative claims about solidarity, social justice, dignity, and community, rather than relying solely on procedural principles.

Of course, that would be a challenging move and would inevitably create tensions within liberalism itself. But I do not think there is another way for liberalism to answer the fundamental questions people are asking: Why do we want to live together, and what do we want to share together? 

I also think liberalism will need to be willing to engage with the other side and recognize that it is no longer the only political offer on the table. Alternative political projects exist, and liberalism needs to accept being in dialogue with them, even if it tends to regard them as illegitimate.

At the same time, liberalism needs to have a very deep internal conversation about its relationship with neoliberalism. Many of the socio-economic tensions it faces today are rooted in the current political economy.

So, if liberalism is to be rescued, it will have to find a way to loosen or sever its relationship with neoliberalism, one way or another. It is a very difficult discussion, but I believe it is one that liberalism must be willing to confront if it hopes to survive.

The Firewall Strategy May Be Backfiring

Many governments have responded to illiberal challenges through regulation, fact-checking initiatives, and restrictions on foreign influence. Are these defensive measures sufficient, or do they risk reinforcing the very anti-elite narratives that fuel illiberal mobilization?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: That is a difficult question. These measures may sometimes be necessary, but they tend to backfire in the majority of cases. In a sense, they arrive too late. I am thinking, for example, of the election in Romania or the strategy of the firewall against certain European far-right parties—the idea that everyone should unite and vote against them in order to prevent them from gaining access to power. These parties have now become so strong that we may have passed the point at which such firewall strategies could still be effective. I wonder whether they are now primarily backfiring by creating the impression that democracy is refusing to give these actors a voice and refusing to accommodate them.

Of course, if you are a voter of a far right or illiberal party, you may feel that you are being denied the opportunity to test that political offer. As a result, we are caught in a kind of vicious circle that will be very difficult to break. We can see this in the debates surrounding the possibility of banning the AfD in Germany as an extremist party, or in the discussions in France about whether Marine Le Pen should be prevented from running for office. 

These examples illustrate the tensions that are emerging. The tension between democratic legitimacy and a justice system that operates according to its own form of legitimacy is becoming increasingly difficult to manage. Liberalism has traditionally been about managing such tensions. But once liberalism loses credibility, the relationship between democracy and justice itself becomes the problem.

The Illiberal Challenge Is Also an Opportunity

And lastly, Professor Laruelle, looking ahead, do you believe we are witnessing a temporary period of turbulence within liberal democracy, or the emergence of a genuinely post-liberal era in which illiberalism becomes a durable and legitimate alternative model of political order?

Professor Marlene Laruelle: I’m both optimistic and pessimistic. I think the illiberal offer is here to stay for a long time, and we should accept that reality. In a sense, we should view it as an opportunity to reinvent democracy. I am among those who believe that liberalism, as we have experienced it, has reached its limits and has, in many ways, been living off a kind of inherited rent that had become largely empty. What we are witnessing today is an opportunity to renew democracy in a deeper and more meaningful sense.

We should therefore see this moment as a chance to reopen fundamental debates: What kind of social contract do we want? What kind of vision do we have for the future? What kind of political imagination do we want to build together? On that level, I am optimistic. I think it depends on us to seize this opportunity and to put the big questions back on the table.

At the same time, I am pessimistic because I do not think this process will be easy. The challenges are enormous. We are facing multiple crises simultaneously, and the difficulties before us are profound. We are likely to experience several years, perhaps even decades, of turbulent and difficult times. Yet this remains a unique opportunity. In a sense, we have no alternative but to take up the challenge and confront it. So, despite everything, I want to remain optimistic.

Thomas de Waal,

Thomas de Waal: European Support for Armenia Must Be an Endorsement of Process, Not Personality

In this ECPS interview, Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and one of the leading scholars of the South Caucasus, examines Armenia’s post-Karabakh transformation following the 2026 parliamentary elections. Reflecting on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s renewed mandate, de Waal explores the interplay between populist leadership, democratic resilience, geopolitical diversification, and regional peacebuilding. While describing Pashinyan’s political style as remaining “very populist,” he argues that Armenia’s long-term democratic future depends less on charismatic leadership than on the strength of institutions. The interview discusses Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, prospects for normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey, the role of the European Union, and the challenges of constructing a new national identity after the end of the Karabakh era.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The South Caucasus is undergoing one of the most consequential geopolitical transformations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia’s devastating defeat in the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Russia’s declining credibility as a security guarantor, and the emergence of new opportunities for regional connectivity have collectively reshaped the country’s strategic outlook. At the center of this transformation stands Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose government has sought to redefine Armenia’s foreign policy, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and deepen ties with Europe and the United States. Yet these developments raise profound questions about democratic resilience, institutional consolidation, populist leadership, and the risks of excessive personalization in periods of political transition.

To explore these issues, we spoke with Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and one of the foremost scholars of the South Caucasus. Through influential works such as Black Garden and decades of research on conflict, democratization, and regional geopolitics, de Waal has established himself as one of the most authoritative interpreters of the region’s complex political landscape.

The interview comes in the wake of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections, in which Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party secured a renewed mandate. While many observers interpreted the result as a geopolitical endorsement of Armenia’s movement away from Russia and toward Europe, de Waal offers a more nuanced assessment. The election, he argues, was simultaneously “a kind of referendum” on peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, on Armenia’s foreign-policy diversification, and on Pashinyan’s domestic record. Rather than representing a simple choice between Russia and the West, Armenia’s evolving strategy reflects what de Waal describes as a broader effort to avoid renewed dependence on any single patron.

A central theme of this conversation concerns the relationship between democratic resilience and personalized leadership. Although de Waal describes Armenia as remaining “a democratic country, if a flawed one,” he warns that troubling trends should not be ignored. In particular, he notes that Armenia’s democratic checks and balances remain weak internally, making external democratic conditionality from Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States especially important.

It is in this context that de Waal offers one of the interview’s most important observations. Drawing lessons from Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution trajectory, he cautions Western governments against treating Armenia as a geopolitical project centered on a single leader. While welcoming unprecedented European attention to Armenia, he warns that such support can unintentionally reinforce personalized rule. As he puts it, international engagement can “feed the ego of a leader who may begin to feel that he can do no wrong.” Consequently, he argues that “this is not a personal endorsement of one man; it is a broader endorsement of a process,” emphasizing that any durable democratic transformation “needs to be grounded in institutions rather than in personalized government.”

The conversation also examines Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia, the prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, the strategic significance of the TRIPP corridor, Turkey’s role in regional normalization, the growing gap between diaspora nationalism and domestic political realities, and the long-term challenge of forging a new Armenian identity after the end of the Karabakh era.

In an era marked by democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the return of great-power competition, de Waal offers a measured and deeply informed assessment of Armenia’s uncertain future. His reflections remind us that democratic resilience depends not merely on elections or charismatic leaders, but on the gradual construction of institutions capable of surviving political transitions and geopolitical shocks alike.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Thomas de Waal, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Armenians Endorsed Pashinyan’s Vision Despite the Karabakh Trauma

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Thomas de Waal, welcome! To begin, Armenia’s 2026 election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic reorientation away from Russia and toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a geopolitical choice, a democratic mandate for peace, or a vote of confidence in Pashinyan’s leadership despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Thomas de Waal: This election was many things at once. Obviously, like all elections, it had its domestic aspects. The Armenian economy has been doing quite well in recent years, so that was one reason Mr. Pashinyan secured a third term in office. But, as you say, it was also a kind of referendum on his vision of peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, following through on the peace agreement and recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, which basically means saying goodbye to Nagorno-Karabakh.

It was also a referendum on his foreign policy, which has been slightly misinterpreted as a complete shift from reliance on Russia to the West. I would say it is more of a diversification policy, maintaining some connections with Russia, particularly economic ones. Armenia remains, for example, part of the Eurasian Economic Union, while also strengthening its political and economic ties with both Europe and the United States.

So, he won a mandate, albeit with a reduced number of votes compared to last time. We can discuss why it was the case.Pro-Russian parties also performed better than they did previously, but again, not well enough to prevent him from securing a full mandate. Mr. Pashinyan’s party, Civil Contract, received around 50 percent of the vote, while the pro-Russian opposition parties won around 37–38 percent.

Pashinyan’s Style Remains Populist, but His Political Base Has Changed

Pashinyan emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment reformer challenging entrenched elites. Does he still fit within the broader category of populist leadership, or has his project evolved into something fundamentally different as he has shifted from revolutionary mobilization to statecraft?

Thomas de Waal: It’s a very interesting question. His style remains very populist. He is very much a man of the street. He came to power, as you mentioned, in 2018 on the wave of street protest—people’s protest—what Armenians then called the Velvet Revolution of 2018. He likes talking to crowds, dresses informally, and travels on the Yerevan Metro. He has a very personal, personalized style of government, which is also a bit problematic.

But, for sure, he no longer appeals to the younger urban electorate that swept him to power in 2018. In this election, he cast himself very much as the stability candidate—the candidate for peace rather than war, for continuity rather than change. He actually received support from outside the capital city, Yerevan, including from villages and government workers—the kind of constituencies from which a traditional ruling party in the post-socialist world typically draws its support.

Armenia Remains Democratic, but There Are Worrying Trends

In your recent writings, you describe Armenia as the most democratic state in the South Caucasus while simultaneously warning about Pashinyan’s highly personalized style of governance. How should scholars reconcile democratic resilience with concerns about excessive personalization of political power?

Thomas de Waal: This is a tricky issue. Armenia certainly remains a democratic country, albeit a flawed one. There is a fairly free and competitive media. There were, obviously, problems with this election, but voters definitely had a choice and could vote freely for the opposition, which many of them did. This is in contrast to Georgia, which we always considered the most democratic and pluralist country in the region, but which has experienced a rapid decline over the last two or three years, with many people in jail and so on. 

What I am talking about here is more of a concern about trends. For example, several opposition candidates were detained during the election. Some faced allegations of vote-buying and so on, but others were detained with less justification. The main opposition leader was under house arrest for the duration of the election. Mr. Pashinyan also makes some quite fierce remarks about the opposition, saying that they need to know their place. 

So, what we are looking at is actually something similar to what we used to have in Georgia: a moderately democratic government where the checks and balances are not so much internal, because the judiciary is still very weak and under government control. Instead, the checks and balances are external. It is the conditionality we are seeing from Europe in particular, and to some degree from the United States, that will check what could otherwise become a tendency toward less democratic and more personalized rule on the part of Prime Minister Pashinyan.

The Georgian Experience Offers an Important Warning for Armenia

Mikheil Saakashvili addresses supporters during a political rally in central Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on September 21, 2017. Photo: Surov Dmytro / Dreamstime.

You have cautioned Europe against treating Armenia as a geopolitical project centered on a single leader. How serious is the risk that Western support for Pashinyan could inadvertently reproduce the mistakes made in other post-Soviet democracies, where institution-building lagged behind leader-centered reform?

Thomas de Waal: For sure, this is an issue, and it is not an easy one to deal with. We have the example of Georgia in the mid-2000s. There was also a peaceful revolution led by a young, charismatic leader. There are some obvious parallels there: Mikheil Saakashvili and the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003. What followed, however, was both a highly personalized regime in Georgia—where you can clearly see the parallels—and a gradual retreat from democratic norms. Because of the geopolitical stance that Saakashvili adopted, namely joining Western institutions in opposition to Russia, he received very enthusiastic support, particularly from the United States. In the process, some of the more problematic aspects of his government were overlooked. So, I think there is a lesson there.

Fortunately, some of Armenia’s European partners, the French in particular, understand these issues. We have seen unprecedented European attention focused on Armenia, first at the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan and then at the EU summit in May. That is obviously a positive development. And it was not only European leaders who attended—we also saw Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy there.

That is all good, but such attention can also feed the ego of a leader who may begin to feel that he can do no wrong. So, it is important to convey the message that this is not a personal endorsement of one man; it is a broader endorsement of a process. And if that process is to endure, it needs to be grounded in institutions rather than in personalized government.

The South Caucasus Is More Complex Than a Russia–West Contest

Many observers have described Armenia’s election as a contest between competing geopolitical orientations. Yet you have characterized the South Caucasus as a “geopolitical marketplace” rather than a binary struggle between Russia and the West. How does this framework alter conventional understandings of regional politics?

Thomas de Waal: There is a paradigm that you see in some of the Western media, where Armenia is portrayed as making a pivot to the West. Certainly, the Russian way of thinking is also very zero-sum and binary. President Putin actually said that Armenia should hold a referendum on whether it chooses the Eurasian Economic Union or the European Union. Prime Minister Pashinyan does not want that. He does not want to make that choice. He wants a diversification strategy. The Eurasian Economic Union has actually been very helpful to Armenia during the Ukraine war because Russia needed its traditional economic partners when its economic links with the West were cut off.

For those reasons, if he has a choice—and perhaps the Russians will force him to make one—Mr. Pashinyan is looking not only to the European Union and the United States, but also to India as a partner. India is selling weapons to Armenia, and you see many Indian guest workers in the country. The Gulf states are another option, as are countries such as Kazakhstan.

What Mr. Pashinyan rightly says is that what led Armenia to military defeat and isolation was its sole reliance on one patron, namely Russia. Russia became the security patron, with its border guards and military base; the economic patron, owning large parts of the economy; and also the energy patron, because Armenia is reliant on Russian gas. Around 90 percent of its gas comes from Russia.

For all those reasons, Armenia was relying on a partner that turned out to be unreliable. And I think one reason why he continues to enjoy support from the population, despite all the other issues they may have with him, is that he is the only one articulating that vision—that Armenia should not return to sole reliance on Russia.

Threatening Armenia May Further Weaken Moscow’s Position

Russia’s attempts to influence Armenian politics appear increasingly overt, ranging from economic pressure to disinformation campaigns. Does the Kremlin’s approach toward Armenia represent a broader transformation in how Russia manages its influence in the post-Soviet space?

Thomas de Waal: Objectively, Russia is not doing very well if you look at recent elections. Take Moldova last year. Hungary is a bit further afield, but they were clearly betting on Prime Minister Orbán there as well. So, Russia is not doing particularly well in its attempts to influence electoral politics. You could say that securing 36–37 percent of the vote through a group of parties in Armenia was not a bad result. But this is also a country in which many people are economically reliant on Russia, so some level of support is to be expected.

Russia’s problem is that it has responded to the Pashinyan government by threatening economic punishment. That is more likely to alienate voters than encourage them to wish they were closer to Russia. We have seen bans on agricultural exports and various others rather threatening statements coming from Moscow.

The Russian elite faces a choice. Does it adopt the kind of neo-imperialist stance we see in Ukraine—the idea that it must plant the flag and that countries essentially belong to Russia or to its sphere of influence? Or does it seek to get the best out of a partnership with a sovereign state, one based on economic cooperation, which of course works both ways? If Russia is banning imports from Armenia, that is not only bad for Armenia; it is also not good for Russia. And, we can see elements of both approaches in Russian policy toward Armenia: the more emotional one and the more pragmatic one.

I would like to think that, with Russia focused on other priorities and deeply preoccupied with its confrontation with the West and the war in Ukraine, it simply does not have the time or capacity for a neo-imperialist push toward Armenia. Instead, it may ultimately default to the previous relationship—perhaps not a happy one, but a relatively pragmatic one.

Most Armenians Want New Partnerships Without Severing Old Ones

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

You have said that most Armenians seek diversification rather than divorce from Russia. How sustainable is Armenia’s current balancing strategy, especially given its economic dependence on Russia and its growing political engagement with the European Union?

Thomas de Waal: Obviously, the plan of this ruling party, now returned to office, is to continue pursuing this course. Whether it can do so successfully depends, really, on what Russia decides to do. Will Russia, for example, choose to inflict economic punishment on Armenia? We have seen previous instances of Russia attempting this with Georgia and Moldova. In both cases, there was short-term pain, with people losing their jobs and facing economic hardship. But, ultimately, it accelerated a process of economic diversification.

Armenia’s situation is more complicated. I think Armenia is more economically reliant on Russia. But this is also a question for Armenia’s partners, especially the European Union, in terms of whether they are willing and able to provide financial assistance.

It is also a question for Azerbaijan and Turkey. If the border opens—particularly the border with Turkey—that would provide Armenia with significantly more economic options. Such a development would also be beneficial for eastern Turkey. So, this issue of Armenia’s relationship with Russia really puts the spotlight on Ankara in particular. What kind of policy, and what kind of relationship, does Turkey want to have with Armenia?

The Message of Peace Has Resonated More Than Many Expected

The trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to shape Armenian politics. To what extent has Pashinyan successfully reframed the loss of Karabakh as a foundation for a new national project rather than a symbol of national humiliation?

Thomas de Waal: This depends on which Armenians you’re talking to, obviously. For almost 40 years, going back to the late 1980s, the Armenians of Karabakh and the Karabakh cause were a kind of central idea for Armenians: the belief that Karabakh had been unjustly given to Azerbaijan in the 1920s and should instead be part of Soviet Armenia or, later, independent Armenia. The war of the 1990s was fought with Azerbaijan on that basis and was won by Armenia, which held on to Karabakh at great cost. Then, in 2020 and again in 2023, Azerbaijan used military force to recover the territories it had lost and, in 2023, to take over Karabakh entirely, causing the exodus of the entire Karabakh Armenian population of around 100,000 people.

The question, then, was how Armenians would respond to what was obviously a huge trauma. Many people expected, particularly in the Armenian diaspora, that voters would punish Pashinyan for his handling of the issue. But actually, what we see now is that Karabakh had a kind of dual meaning for Armenians in the Republic of Armenia. On the one hand, it was indeed a very important holy cause. On the other hand, it was also a millstone around their necks. It was a reason why sons and brothers went to fight and sometimes lost their lives. It was a reason why borders were closed. It was a drain on the economy. It was a problem internationally for Armenia. 

So, to many people’s surprise, after losing Karabakh and hearing Pashinyan’s message that now that this place had been lost, Armenia needed to move on, many Armenians actually responded cautiously but positively. And he has consistently hammered home the message that there is no alternative—that Armenia must make peace with its neighbors, and that peace means no more war. I think that message resonates with a large part of the electorate, if not all of it. Certainly not all of it, but it does resonate with a large part of it.

The Constitution Has Become a Powerful Instrument of Political Leverage

Azerbaijan insists that Armenia amend its constitution before a final peace agreement can be concluded. Do you see this demand primarily as a legitimate security concern, a diplomatic bargaining tool, or a mechanism for maintaining leverage over Armenia’s domestic political trajectory?

Thomas de Waal: That’s a great question. When you talk to Azerbaijani officials, they are very insistent on this issue. The reference is actually quite indirect, but it is there. The current Armenian constitution refers to the Declaration of Independence, and the Declaration of Independence from 1990 refers to the union of Armenia and Karabakh. So, the Azerbaijani position is essentially that Armenia should not have a constitution which, even indirectly, constitutes a territorial claim over Azerbaijan. They want to see proof that the people of Armenia are rejecting any territorial claim over Karabakh, and therefore they want to see a new constitution.

You can see the logic of that argument, but it is not something that people had particularly noticed before. It is definitely being used as an instrument of leverage over the Armenian government—a way of signaling that Armenia should not ask for too much and that Azerbaijan still retains this instrument of pressure. The problem we have now is that Mr. Pashinyan’s party has won around 64 out of 101 seats, and he needs a few more than that to secure a constitutional majority. He needs two-thirds of the seats in parliament to call a referendum on a new constitution. That now looks pretty difficult.

We should also note that even if a referendum were called, there appears to be considerable opposition to it within Armenia. So it is quite possible that, even if he somehow managed to initiate a referendum, the voters would reject it. So, the question becomes this: Azerbaijan has made this a prerequisite for signing a peace agreement and moving forward. How do we get out of this particular impasse?

This issue is currently under active discussion in all sorts of places—in Baku, Ankara, Yerevan, Europe, and the United States. Some people are suggesting that perhaps a signed peace agreement is not immediately necessary. Instead, the parties could move forward on practical measures. They could, for example, open the border. Many things could be done without establishing formal diplomatic relations, which would normally follow from a peace agreement.

This is particularly a question for Turkey. For many reasons, Turkish officials want to normalize relations with Armenia and open the border. They believe they have a uniquely useful partner in Prime Minister Pashinyan, and they see a window of opportunity while Russia is distracted—a window that may eventually close. I hope we will see a greater sense of urgency on the Turkish side, given that Ankara has largely outsourced its decision-making on this issue to Azerbaijan.

Two of my colleagues—and their commentary is well worth reading—Garo Paylan, the well-known former parliamentarian and Armenian-Turkish citizen now based in the United States, and Alper Coşkun, a former Turkish diplomat who is also with us in the United States, wrote a commentary last week that I would strongly recommend. Their argument is that Turkey should move forward, in particular by enabling trade with Armenia, even if the political issues have not yet been fully resolved.

Peace Agreements Endure Only When Societies Embrace Them

You have repeatedly emphasized that peace agreements require societal buy-in, not merely elite bargains. Given the deep historical grievances and mutual distrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, how fragile is the current peace process beneath its diplomatic successes?

Thomas de Waal: There is a well-known finding among scholars of peace processes: roughly half of all peace agreements fail within five years. The agreements that fail are generally those that lack societal buy-in and broader inclusion, and are instead negotiated exclusively at the elite level. When elite calculations change, those agreements can quickly unravel.

I am fairly optimistic, in general, about the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan for two reasons. First, both societies are tired of conflict. They do not want their sons and brothers to fight. Second, there is now a significant level of engagement from both the United States and Europe. The projected rail route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia even bears Donald Trump’s name. It is called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which suggests a degree of personal investment in the success of a peace agreement.

What worries me, however, is the possibility that we will not achieve a properly signed agreement and that societies—particularly Azerbaijani society—will continue to receive highly propagandistic messages about Armenians through schools and the media. If that continues, progress will inevitably slow. Even if there is meaningful progress in the short term, over the next few years, the political landscape could look very different in five or ten years’ time. I do not think we will return to full-scale war. But there could still be recurring tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the border, around the so-called Trump Route, and on other issues, simply because societies have not been brought along at the same pace as their leaders.

TRIPP Could Transform Geography Into Economic Interdependence

Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

The proposed TRIPP corridor has become one of the most ambitious geopolitical projects in the region. Beyond its economic significance, do you see TRIPP as a mechanism for building lasting interdependence and reducing the likelihood of future conflict?

Thomas de Waal: That’s the idea, and I think TRIPP has progressed fairly well. It has managed to square the circle of the competing demands of the two sides: Armenia’s insistence that any route crossing its territory fully respect Armenian sovereignty, and Azerbaijan’s desire for quick and easy access to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. I think the modalities have been sorted out, the financing is there, and the United States is working on that. The Iran war definitely slowed things down and complicated matters. But hopefully, we now have a ceasefire in Iran, which means that construction can begin.

There are obviously some question marks about how much private-sector investment can be attracted to this route, given that it passes through a rather strategically vulnerable and remote area. But I am sure the Americans are working on that as well. So, I think it is going pretty well. And this gets back to my previous point: we may see cargo beginning to flow along this route within three or four years, creating an important trading link. But if there is not a proper peace agreement, then the local communities may not be as involved, and it could prove more problematic for passengers to use the route.

The Key Obstacle Remains Erdoğan’s Deference to Aliyev

Turkey appears increasingly interested in normalization with Armenia, yet remains closely aligned with Azerbaijan. How much strategic autonomy does Ankara actually possess in shaping Armenian-Turkish relations, and what obstacles still stand in the way of a historic breakthrough?

Thomas de Waal: Of course, Turkey has as much strategic autonomy as it chooses to exercise. It is a much larger and more powerful country than Azerbaijan. What we are seeing is very much the result of a personal decision by President Erdoğan not to move faster than President Aliyev on the peace and normalization track. This is despite the fact that many officials at the medium and upper levels of the Turkish government, as I have already mentioned, see significant strategic advantages in normalizing relations with Armenia and opening the border. Such a move would weaken Russian influence, strengthen Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus, and benefit the Kars-Iğdır region in eastern Turkey, among many other areas. It would also help neutralize many of the difficulties Turkey faces in its relations with the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States. 

So, there are plenty of reasons to move forward. However, the decisive factor up to now has been President Erdoğan’s determination to keep his personal commitment to President Aliyev and not move ahead of him. Now, if there is a moment that could prompt a reassessment of that policy, it is this one. The rather inconclusive outcome of the Armenian election may provide such an opportunity.

It will be interesting to see whether this issue is discussed at the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, particularly among European and American officials. I suspect we will not see much of those discussions publicly, but we will be relying on informed journalists and analysts to shed light on them. Because, for sure, this is the moment when Turkey—perhaps not toward full normalization, but certainly toward a more proactive approach—needs to pick up speed.

European Support Must Be Accompanied by Democratic Expectations

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

Some critics argue that the European Union has largely overlooked democratic shortcomings within Armenia because it prioritizes the country’s geopolitical reorientation away from Russia. How would you assess the tension between strategic interests and democratic conditionality in the EU’s approach to Armenia?

Thomas de Waal: That’s a good question. Obviously, the European Union is not a monolith. There are different opinions within the EU, and even within different parts of the Brussels institutions. There is a feeling that, for geopolitical reasons, it is important to invest in this government and in its tilt toward Europe—even if it is not a complete shift—and, more broadly, to invest in Armenia. People on the ground have no illusions that this is not a fully democratic government.

That said, I think some degree of conditionality would be beneficial. The question, really, is how that conditionality is presented to the Armenian side. One particularly problematic area is the judiciary. There have been appointments of judges without due process. And, as in many countries of the region, the prosecutor’s office remains far too powerful and can be used as an instrument by the governing party against its opponents. That is certainly something to watch. 

France is a key partner in this regard. If anyone has replaced Russia as Armenia’s principal patron, it is definitely France. President Macron clearly has a strong interest in Armenia. And I think the French are also aware of these concerns. Hopefully, the message to Mr. Pashinyan is: congratulations on your victory, but now do not do anything stupid. We support you, but our support is not unconditional.

The Diaspora and Armenia Are Increasingly Speaking Different Languages

The Armenian diaspora has historically played a powerful role in shaping national narratives, particularly regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Turkey. How significant is the growing divide between diaspora nationalism and Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” agenda?

Thomas de Waal: When we talk about the Armenian diaspora, we have to be a bit careful, because there are obviously millions of Armenians outside Armenia, mainly descendants of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire who fled in 1915 and 1916 during what later became known as the Armenian Genocide. These communities are concentrated in places such as the Middle East, France, and the United States. Many of those people are not particularly political. However, there are powerful diaspora political organizations, particularly those associated with the Dashnak Party, the traditional nationalist Armenian party, and groups such as the ANCA in the United States. It is within these circles that we see a significant break with Pashinyan. There have been very critical commentaries directed at his government, with many expressing outrage at what they perceive as his abandonment of territorial claims relating to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

So, there is undoubtedly a substantial divide. What is striking, however, is how little influence this appears to have on political developments inside Armenia itself. The Dashnak Party in Armenia, I do not think, even contested this election, or, if it did, it received a very small share of the vote. Armenians inside Armenia were voting on other issues—certainly not on the questions that much of the diaspora continues to hold particularly dear. So, I think this may be a moment when diaspora organizations need to reassess and reconfigure their own understanding of reality. What exactly do they want from Armenia when the government of Armenia is articulating such a different vision of the country’s future?

It Is Still Too Early to Call Armenia a Success Story

More broadly, does Armenia represent a new model of post-Soviet transformation—one in which democratic consolidation, geopolitical diversification, and conflict resolution reinforce one another—or is that interpretation still premature?

Thomas de Waal: I think it is still premature. If you look at what happened in Georgia, there was a general assumption—including on my part—that democracy was fairly well consolidated and that the country’s pro-European trajectory was firmly established. Yet both of those assumptions have since been challenged, and quite dramatically so. So, it is always possible that Armenia could follow a different course than many currently expect.

The governing party did not win this election by a landslide. It secured many votes by default, largely because there was no credible democratic—or, indeed, any other credible—opposition. For that reason, we need to be cautious about drawing firm conclusions regarding Armenia’s future. It is entirely possible that a new third force could emerge, one that is neither aligned with the ruling party nor with Russia. It could even be a populist movement, perhaps resembling the Georgian Dream phenomenon that emerged in Georgia in 2012.

So, there remain many uncertainties. I do not think Armenian voters are yet fully consolidated in their support for the transformation the country has undergone. Things could still change, for sure.

Forging a New National Identity Will Be a Generational Project

Looking ahead, if Armenia succeeds in normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey while reducing dependence on Russia, what do you believe will be the most difficult challenge: institutionalizing democracy at home, managing external geopolitical pressures, or forging a new national identity after the end of the Karabakh era?

Thomas de Waal: Wow, I mean, all of those things are obviously difficult. Some of them will take years, perhaps even decades, to accomplish. A new national identity does not emerge overnight, and institution-building is a long-term process. And, of course, learning to live alongside former adversaries and adjusting to open borders with countries once regarded as enemies is not easy either. For all of those reasons, Armenians are understandably cautious about change.

That is precisely why change needs to be gradual and steady rather than abrupt. If the border is opened, for example, it should not be thrown fully open overnight to a large influx of people from across the border, which could trigger negative reactions.

But I suppose the good news is that Armenia is a small country receiving unprecedented levels of international attention. That, in itself, is a positive development. There are powerful and wealthy countries willing to support Armenia.  And, just let’s hope that the government understands properly how to utilize that help for good purposes.

Data center campus.

Data and Drought: A Community Fights Back

As artificial intelligence drives an unprecedented expansion of data-center infrastructure, questions of climate sustainability, democratic accountability, and technological governance are becoming increasingly urgent. In this timely commentary, Dr. Heidi Hart examines the controversy surrounding Utah’s proposed Stratos Project, a massive AI data-center complex planned for a drought-stricken region of the American West. Moving beyond conventional debates about innovation and economic growth, Dr. Hart explores how concerns over water scarcity, environmental degradation, energy consumption, and surveillance technologies have galvanized an unlikely coalition of local residents. Bringing together insights on climate politics, technocracy, populism, and grassroots mobilization, the commentary highlights how resistance to AI infrastructure is creating new political alignments and raising fundamental questions about who gets to decide the future of technology, land, and democratic participation.

By Heidi Hart

In the steppe geography of northern Utah in the US, sagebrush carries a spicy, resinous scent after a rare rainstorm. Cattle ranchers eye the land for better grazing amid historic drought. A dark rock cluster marks a 500-year-old Indigenous burial site. The northern tip of the Great Salt Lake, where Robert Smithson’s famous Spiral Jetty once disappeared underwater, now resembles a moonscape. Toxic dust from decades of industrial pollution blows across the valleys toward the heavily populated foothills of the Wasatch Mountains. 

In this already stressed land, a hyperscale data center project – originally planned to be the largest in the world, at over twice the size of Manhattan – has drawn international attention. At a time when the UN is warning about the environmental costs (including and extending beyond greenhouse emissions) of AI infrastructure, a recent study has shown that most data centers are being proposed for drought-stricken lands, and US legislatures debate the economic benefits versus costs to local communities’ quality of life, the Stratos Project in Utah has become a flashpoint for imagining the future of AI ecosystems. An unexpected side-effect of these debates has been a growing grassroots protest movement across political divides, from rural Trump-voter communities in the US South to the NAACP.

The Stratos project in Utah, conceived by Kevin O’Leary of Shark Tank fame and railroaded past any local or environmental review under the guise of military necessity, was first proposed at over 40,000 acres (62.5 square miles or 162 sqare kilometers). It would create a thermal load of close to 16 gigawatts or “the equivalent of about 23 atom bombs worth of energy … every single day,” according to Utah State University physics professor Robert Davies. With no existing electrical grid and plans to draw on the Ruby Pipeline for natural gas, the project would affect northern Utah’s already poor air quality and increase carbon emissions by 55% to 75%.  At or above 90 decibels, noise from data centers is notorious for causing hearing loss, insomnia, and even nausea in humans, not to mention the effects on wildlife in precarious desert ecosystems. 

The problem of water looms largest over the Stratos plan. Though the county government’s information site, which reads like marketing copy, estimates around 2,000 acre feet for year drawn from groundwater in a “closed-loop system,” that water is not an infinite resource, even in wetter periods, and environmental groups are only now making some headway in efforts to protect the shrinking Great Salt Lake. With global heating and atmospheric weather changes, the occasionally low-snow winters that have reduced spring runoff in the past could become the norm. Rapid population growth before and during the Covid years has also increased stress on Utah’s water supply. From irrigation and watering restrictions to the toxic dust problem, everyone in the crowded northern part of the state senses the scarcity. Add to this a massive power- and water-draining data complex, with its additional function as a surveillance machine, and locals have a reason to rise up. 

When the project was first announced earlier this year, Utah’s Republican governor Spencer Cox expressed enthusiasm for what O’ Leary called “Wonder Valley Utah” – and frustration with critics calling out the lack of review, discussion, and transparency. After finding that state leaders had approved a massive project that would affect their communities and ecosystems for generations to come, around 80 protesters confronted the Box Elder County Commission to decry lack of public input. The protests spread to the Utah State Capitol, where, on May 23, 2026, concerned citizens from across the political spectrum voiced their anger, as well as some humor about accusations that they were being paid by China. 

As a result of this pushback, and a poll finding that a majority of Box Elder County residents oppose the Stratos project, Governor Cox softened his stance in favor of public discussion and environmental review. O’Leary has agreed to scale down the project by 20,000 acres, a reduction by half. Still, local activists are not convinced. Nearly 700 protests have been filed with the Utah Division of Water Rights, a time-consuming process that has resulted in the withdrawal of two water rights applications for the data center. As of this writing, Box Elder County has approved a 180-day moratorium on data centers. 

The Stratos fight is far from over, but as in other US states, and in this one, where religious and political divides run deep, the data center threat has brought together unlikely collaborators. While not the form of populism that usually makes the news (the recent cage-fighting spectacle in front of the White House as a case in point), Utah’s anti-technocracy protest movement brings out cattle ranchers, university professors, hunters, eco-activists, churchgoers and nonbelievers, Republicans and Democrats. It’s hardly a cozy coalition, but it opens up a broader space for “the people” in a traditionally deep-red state. 

The movement also calls on Indigenous perspectives to ground its efforts. Darren Parry of the Northwest Band of the Shoshone Nation, interviewed for ECPS in 2021, has been a vocal opponent of the Stratos project, noting the Hansel Valley’s fragile ecosystem and rock-mound burial sites in the area. Parry has shared contrasting images of the high-desert valley (his own photograph) and the planned complex dominating the scene with glowing glass rectangles and steaming cooling towers. The sci-fi quality of the image is partly its point. AI can generate imaginary utopias or doomscapes, but it will take a messy, persistent human movement to keep the land itself alive.  

Social Media

The Politics of Attention: Visibility, Legitimacy, and the Transformation of Democratic Competition

As digital platforms increasingly shape how citizens encounter politics, longstanding assumptions about democratic competition are being challenged. In this insightful commentary, Yacine Boubia argues that attention has emerged as a distinct and increasingly decisive political resource, reshaping the foundations of legitimacy, influence, and power in contemporary democracies. Drawing on democratic theory, media studies, and political communication, he traces the historical transformation from an era of informational scarcity to one of informational abundance, where political success depends increasingly on the ability to command visibility. The commentary explores the rise of the influencer politician, the structural relationship between attention and populism, and the democratic consequences of communication systems optimized for engagement rather than deliberation. It offers a timely contribution to debates about democracy, media, and political power in the digital age.

By Yacine Boubia 

The dominant frameworks for understanding contemporary democratic politics remain, in their essential structure, remarkably stable. Elections are interpreted as contests between competing ideological visions. Political success is attributed to organizational strength, policy credibility, or the capacity to mobilize voters around shared material and cultural concerns. Institutions are evaluated according to their capacity to translate popular preferences into governing outcomes. These frameworks capture real and important dimensions of political life, and the scholarship they have generated—from electoral sociology to institutional analysis to the study of political communication—constitutes an indispensable foundation for understanding how democracies function.

Yet they have proven increasingly insufficient for explaining a transformation that has reshaped the terms of democratic competition over the past two decades: the emergence of attention as an autonomous political resource, distinct from votes, organizational capacity, or policy credibility, and increasingly determinative of political influence, legitimacy, and power.

This insufficiency is not accidental. The frameworks that dominate political analysis were developed within a communication environment that no longer fully exists. They assumed, often implicitly, that political information was relatively scarce, that citizens encountered it through a limited number of institutionally mediated channels, and that political competition was therefore primarily a competition for votes organized around the capacity to persuade.

The contemporary communication environment inverts each of these assumptions. Information is not scarce but superabundant. Citizens encounter political content through a multiplicity of channels whose institutional character has been progressively dissolved by commercial and algorithmic logics. And political competition, while still ultimately organized around the capacity to win elections, increasingly unfolds as a prior competition for something that votes cannot capture: the capacity to command public attention, to dominate communicative space, and to shape the political reality that citizens encounter before they have formed the preferences that democratic theory assumes they bring to the political process.

Understanding this transformation requires not a new theory of voting behavior but a historical account of how attention became political currency—and what its ascendancy has done to the conditions of democratic governance.

The Scarcity That Democracy Lost

Democratic theory has always assumed a particular relationship between citizens and political information. The deliberative tradition associated with Habermas (1989) posited a public sphere in which citizens encounter competing arguments, evaluate them against shared standards of reasonableness, and form political judgments through processes of communicative exchange. The aggregative tradition associated with electoral democracy assumed that citizens arrive at preferences through exposure to political alternatives and cast votes that translate those preferences into governing authority. Both traditions assumed, in different ways, that the problem confronting citizens was insufficient information — that the challenge of democratic participation was obtaining enough of the right kind of political content to make informed judgments. This assumption structured the institutional architecture of twentieth-century mass democracy: public broadcasting obligations, fairness doctrines, editorial standards, and regulatory frameworks governing media ownership were all, in different ways, responses to the perceived problem of informational scarcity and the democratic imperative to address it.

That problem no longer describes the condition of citizens in advanced democracies. The average American adult is estimated to encounter between six and ten thousand advertising messages per day — a figure that captures only a fraction of the total informational environment within which political content now competes for attention. News alerts, social media feeds, podcasts, video streams, online commentary, and the continuous production of digital content have created an environment not of informational scarcity but of informational superabundance — what the cognitive scientist Herbert Simon (1971) identified, with considerable prescience, as a condition in which the abundance of information creates a corresponding scarcity of attention.

The political implications of this inversion are profound and have been insufficiently theorized. When the scarce resource is not information but attention, the competition that matters is no longer primarily the competition to inform. It is the competition to be noticed—and the rules governing that competition are structured not by the norms of democratic deliberation but by the commercial and algorithmic logics of the platforms and media systems within which it takes place.

How Attention Became Political Capital

The transformation of attention into political capital did not occur suddenly with the emergence of social media platforms. It was prepared by a longer history of media commercialization whose political consequences were identified by critical scholars well before the digital age confirmed them empirically. The postwar settlement that organized mass media in most Western democracies rested on a partial and contested separation between commercial and civic imperatives: broadcasting was regulated as a public good, journalism maintained professional norms that distinguished it from entertainment, and the political information environment was organized, however imperfectly, around standards of balance, accuracy, and democratic accountability. These arrangements were neither neutral nor without their own distortions. But they embedded within the media system a set of institutional resistances to the pure logic of attention maximization that the subsequent decades of deregulation and commercialization systematically dismantled.

The consequences of that dismantling were theorized with particular clarity by scholars working at the intersection of media studies and democratic theory. Neil Postman’s (1985) diagnosis of television’s restructuring of public discourse—its substitution of image, emotion, and entertainment for the sustained argumentative exchange that print culture had historically demanded — identified the fundamental mechanism through which commercial media logic reshapes political communication. Guy Debord’s (1967) account of the society of the spectacle, developed within a different theoretical tradition, converged on the same structural observation: that the commercialization of communication progressively elevates visibility above substance, appearance above reality, and the capacity to capture attention above the capacity to govern. Daniel Boorstin’s (1961) earlier identification of the pseudo-event—the manufactured occurrence designed primarily for media coverage rather than emerging from genuine social processes—provided the most concrete institutional illustration of how the logic of attention transforms political communication from within. 

Writing in different contexts and from different theoretical perspectives, each of these scholars identified the same underlying dynamic: that media systems organized around the capture and monetization of attention progressively reward political actors who can supply what those systems demand, regardless of whether that supply serves the informational requirements of democratic citizenship.

The digital revolution accelerated and intensified this dynamic rather than reversing it. Social media platforms did not introduce the logic of attention maximization into democratic politics. They industrialized it—providing the technical infrastructure to measure attention with unprecedented precision, optimize content for its capture with algorithmic efficiency, and distribute the results at a scale and speed that no previous communication system had achieved. 

The political consequences of this industrialization were not the product of platform design choices made in bad faith. They were the structural output of commercial systems optimizing for engagement in an environment where engagement is measured by emotional activation, identity confirmation, and conflict — the precise communicative register that political communication organized around attention maximization has always, as Postman (1985) and Debord (1967) recognized, tended to favor.

Visibility, Legitamcy, and the Influencer Politician

The transformation of attention into political capital has produced consequences that extend beyond the familiar observations about media spectacle and political performance. Its deepest implication concerns the structural relationship between visibility and legitimacy in democratic politics — a relationship that has been quietly but fundamentally altered by the communication systems within which contemporary democratic competition takes place. Democratic legitimacy has historically been understood as deriving from a set of sources that are, in principle, independent of communicative visibility: electoral mandate, institutional position, policy expertise, party authority, and the capacity to govern effectively. These sources of legitimacy did not require continuous public attention to remain operative. An effective administrator, a competent legislator, or a credible party organization could exercise significant political authority while maintaining a relatively modest public profile.

The contemporary attention economy has disrupted this relationship in ways whose full implications are still being worked out. When political information reaches citizens primarily through platforms that rank content by engagement rather than by institutional authority or deliberative relevance, visibility itself becomes a source of legitimacy—not merely an instrument for communicating it. 

The political actor who commands sustained public attention acquires a form of democratic authority that is structurally independent of, and in some contexts more immediately potent than, the authority derived from institutional position or electoral mandate. This is not simply because attention-commanding actors reach more citizens, though they do. It is because the continuous presence in citizens’ informational environments that platform-mediated visibility provides constitutes, in itself, a form of political relationship—an ongoing communicative connection that substitutes, at the level of felt political reality, for the institutional relationships through which democratic authority has traditionally been organized and experienced.

The emergence of what might be termed the influencer politician represents the clearest institutional manifestation of this shift. Political authority has traditionally derived from the mediating structures of democratic governance: parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, and the formal processes through which citizens delegate authority to representatives accountable to collective institutions. The influencer politician — a figure whose political authority derives substantially from direct audience relationships built through continuous digital communication, personal branding, and the cultivation of online communities — represents a structural departure from this model that existing frameworks of democratic accountability were not designed to address. 

The boundaries separating political communication from celebrity culture and digital content creation have become genuinely blurred, not as a cultural curiosity but as a political-institutional development with significant consequences for how authority is constructed, legitimized, and challenged in contemporary democracies. Zeynep Tufekci’s (2017) account of how digital tools have transformed political organizing captures part of this dynamic, but the influencer politician phenomenon represents a further development: not merely the use of digital tools to organize existing political constituencies, but the construction of political authority itself through the logic of platform visibility.

The Communication Advantage and Its Democratic Costs

The history of modern democratic politics offers a consistent and instructive pattern: political leaders who master the dominant communication technologies of their era acquire advantages that transcend the specific content of their policy programs or the strength of their organizational support. Roosevelt’s fireside radio addresses exploited the intimacy of broadcast audio in ways that opponents trained in the conventions of print-era political oratory were unprepared to match. Ronald Reagan’s command of television — his capacity to project emotional warmth, moral clarity, and direct personal address within a medium that rewarded image and affect over argumentative substance — redefined the terms of presidential communication for a generation, demonstrating that the political resources derived from communication mastery could, in the right conditions, substantially compensate for weaknesses in policy credibility or institutional support. The pattern these cases illustrate is not merely that new media create new political opportunities. It is that new media restructure the entire field of political competition, altering the relative value of different political resources and systematically advantaging actors whose communicative capacities align with the demands of the new environment.

The political actors who have most effectively navigated the attention economy have demonstrated an intuitive understanding of this pattern. Donald Trump’s political communication represented not merely an adaptation to social media but a recognition—more explicit and more strategically deliberate than his opponents acknowledged—that the communication environment had undergone a structural shift whose implications mainstream political practice had not yet absorbed.      

His capacity to generate continuous attention through provocation, conflict, and the deliberate violation of communicative norms that the previous media environment had enforced was not a deviation from rational political strategy. It was a precise calibration to the incentive structures of platforms optimized for engagement, in an environment where engagement is disproportionately generated by content that is emotionally activating and conflict-driven. The platform algorithm did not produce his political style. But the convergence between that style and the reward structures of the attention economy gave him communicative resources that the institutional logic of democratic competition was not equipped to neutralize.

The democratic costs of this dynamic are real but require careful specification to avoid the twin errors of technological determinism and institutional nostalgia. The attention economy does not make deliberative democracy impossible. Citizens retain the capacity to evaluate political arguments, hold leaders accountable, and form political judgments that resist the simplifications that attention-maximizing communication encourages. What the attention economy does is alter the cost structure of different forms of political communication—making conflict cheaper than consensus, simplicity cheaper than complexity, and emotional activation cheaper than deliberative persuasion—in ways that systematically disadvantage the communicative forms that democratic theory has historically associated with informed political participation. This is not a claim about citizen irrationality. It is a claim about institutional design: that communication systems optimized for commercial engagement create structural incentives that are, at their core, in tension with the communicative requirements of democratic governance, and that this tension has political consequences that compound over time.

Attention, Populism, and the Restructuring of Democratic Competition

The relationship between the attention economy and the contemporary rise of populism is neither causal nor coincidental. It is structural. Populism, understood as a discursive political logic that constructs a frontier between an authentic people and a corrupt elite (Laclau, 2005), has always depended on communicative forms that the attention economy systematically rewards: emotional intensity, adversarial simplicity, the clear identification of enemies, and the cultivation of a direct affective relationship between leader and followers that bypasses the mediating institutions of representative democracy. These communicative requirements are not incidental features of populist politics. They are, as Laclau (2005) argued, constitutive of its discursive logic—the means through which diverse and otherwise disconnected grievances are articulated into a unified political identity capable of challenging established power. What the attention economy has done is not create these requirements but dramatically lower the cost of meeting them, providing the technical infrastructure through which populist communication can reach mass audiences at a scale and speed, and with a directness and emotional intensity that previous communication systems did not permit.

The implications extend beyond the electoral fortunes of specific populist movements. The deeper consequence is the progressive restructuring of democratic competition itself around the logic of attention—a restructuring that affects not only explicitly populist actors but all political actors operating within the same communication environment. When visibility becomes a prerequisite for political influence, all political actors face pressure to adapt their communication strategies to the demands of the attention economy, regardless of their ideological commitments or governing ambitions. 

The result is a gradual convergence of political communication styles toward the emotional, the conflictual, and the spectacular—a convergence that the attention economy rewards and that democratic deliberation, in its classical sense, cannot easily survive. Margaret Canovan’s (1999) observation that populism represents the permanent shadow of democracy acquires particular resonance in this context: the communication systems through which contemporary democracy operates have created conditions in which that shadow falls more heavily, and more continuously, than the institutional architecture of liberal democracy was designed to accommodate.

Conclusion: Attention, Democracy, and the Question of Institutional Design

The transformation of attention into political capital is not a temporary disruption produced by the novelty of digital platforms or the exceptional character of specific political figures. It reflects a structural shift in the communication environment within which democratic politics operates — a shift whose origins lie in the deregulation and commercialization of media that began in the 1980s and whose acceleration through platformization has produced a political information environment organized around fundamentally different imperatives than those that shaped the institutional architecture of postwar liberal democracy. 

The political consequences of this shift—the premium on visibility over competence, the restructuring of political legitimacy around audience relationships rather than institutional authority, the systematic rewarding of communicative forms that are in tension with deliberative democratic norms — are not the product of technology alone. They are the product of choices about how communication systems are designed, regulated, and governed, choices that reflect and reproduce particular distributions of power and particular understandings of what democratic communication is for.

The conventional responses to these developments — calls for platform regulation, media literacy education, the reform of campaign finance, or the restoration of public broadcasting — each address real dimensions of the problem without capturing its structural depth. The challenge is not merely to correct specific malfunctions within the existing communication environment but to recover a prior question that the attention economy has rendered increasingly difficult to ask: what kind of communicative infrastructure does democratic self-governance actually require? 

Habermas’s account of the public sphere as a constitutive condition of democratic legitimacy remains analytically indispensable here, not as a nostalgic ideal to be restored but as a standard against which the communicative conditions of contemporary democracy can be evaluated and found wanting. The public sphere that democratic theory requires is one in which citizens can encounter competing political arguments, evaluate them against shared standards of evidence and reason, and form political judgments through processes of collective deliberation. The communication environment that the attention economy has produced systematically undermines each of these requirements — not through overt censorship or deliberate political manipulation, but through the structural logic of systems optimized for engagement rather than understanding, visibility rather than accountability, and emotional activation rather than deliberative exchange.

The question facing contemporary democracies is therefore not simply who commands attention — though that question has become, as this analysis has argued, increasingly central to the distribution of political power. It is whether the institutional conditions can be reconstructed under which attention follows argument rather than precedes it, under which visibility derives from democratic accountability rather than substituting for it, and under which the communicative requirements of self-governance take precedence over the commercial imperatives of the platforms through which democratic politics now predominantly unfolds. That reconstruction is among the most consequential institutional challenges of the present democratic moment — and it cannot be addressed without first understanding, in its full historical depth, how attention became the currency it has.


 

References

Boorstin, D. J. (1961). The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. Harper & Row.

Canovan, M. (1999). “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Debord, G. (1967). La Société du spectacle. Buchet-Chastel. [English translation: The Society of the Spectacle, Zone Books, 1994.]

Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. MIT Press.

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. London: Verso (new edition, 2018).

Postman, N. (1985). Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. Viking.

Simon, H. A. (1971). “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World.” In: M. Greenberger (Ed.), Computers, Communication, and the Public Interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. Yale University Press.

Richard Giragosian

Giragosian: Russia Is Increasingly Seen as Part of the Problem by Armenians Rather Than the Solution

As Armenia navigates the aftermath of war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a far-reaching geopolitical realignment, one question looms large: Can democratic resilience survive amid regional insecurity and great-power competition? In this compelling ECPS interview, Richard Giragosian—Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, the democratic implications of Nikol Pashinyan’s populist leadership, and the country’s strategic turn toward Europe. Giragosian argues that many Armenians now view Russia as “part of the problem rather than part of the solution,” while emphasizing that Armenia’s recent election represented a mandate for peace, normalization, and democratic continuity. The conversation explores populism in power, post-war identity transformation, Armenia–Turkey normalization, democratic institution-building, and the future of the South Caucasus. Ultimately, Giragosian suggests that Armenia may be less a model than “an accidental exception” in an era of democratic backsliding and geopolitical upheaval. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Armenia emerges from one of the most turbulent periods in its modern history, the country stands at the intersection of democratic resilience, geopolitical realignment, and post-war transformation. The aftermath of the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, deepening estrangement from Russia, and ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan have profoundly reshaped Armenian politics and strategic thinking. Against this backdrop, the 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a referendum not only on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership but also on Armenia’s future place between Russia, Europe, and the wider region.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Richard Giragosian—Armenian-American academic, security analyst, and Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines the forces driving Armenia’s remarkable political trajectory. He argues that the election result reflected far more than a geopolitical choice. It represented a mandate for democratic continuity, political stability, and the pursuit of diplomatic normalization with Armenia’s neighbors. As Giragosian notes, the vote marked Armenia’s “third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote,” underscoring the country’s democratic consolidation despite war, insecurity, and external pressure.

A central theme of the conversation concerns the evolution of populism in power. Emerging from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan embodied a rare case of successful anti-establishment mobilization driven by nonviolent popular protest. Yet Giragosian argues that the qualities that enabled Pashinyan’s rise have not necessarily translated into effective governance. While acknowledging the historic significance of the revolution as “a rare victory of nonviolent people power,” he contends that Pashinyan remains “as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless,” while public policy continues to be “overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office.” In Giragosian’s assessment, the populist style that propelled Pashinyan to power now coexists with persistent institutional weaknesses and governance challenges.

The interview’s most striking insights, however, concern Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia. According to Giragosian, the war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh fundamentally altered Armenian perceptions of Moscow. Russia is no longer widely viewed as Armenia’s indispensable protector. Instead, he argues, many Armenians increasingly regard Russia as “dangerously unreliable,” adding that the conflict has led them to see Russia “as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.” This shift reflects not simply a foreign policy adjustment but a broader reassessment of Armenia’s security assumptions and strategic dependencies.

The discussion also explores Armenia’s efforts to balance relations with Europe and Russia, prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Turkey, democratic institution-building, and the emergence of a more civic and pragmatic understanding of patriotism. Yet Giragosian remains cautious about presenting Armenia as a model for others. Indeed, he suggests that Armenia may be “less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception”—a rare convergence of democratic mobilization, geopolitical opportunity, and regional recalibration. Whether that exception can endure may prove to be one of the defining questions for the future of the South Caucasus.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Richard Giragosian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Armenians Endorsed Peace, Stability, and Democratic Continuity

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Mr. Giragosian, welcome! To begin, the 2026 Armenian election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic reorientation away from Russia and toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a geopolitical choice, a democratic mandate for peace, or a vote of confidence in Pashinyan’s leadership despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good opening question. The answer is actually all of the above, to varying degrees. In other words, there was undeniably a geopolitical context to this election. But I do think there are two other important elements behind the re-election of the Pashinyan government in Armenia. 

First, it is an important mandate for sustaining the positive momentum of the Armenian government’s policies of diplomatic engagement and normalization with its neighbors. This represents a significant post-war adjustment to a new reality. 

Second, and this is often underestimated, the election marked the country’s third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote. That is extremely important for the further deepening of democracy and the consolidation of these democratic gains. 

So, basically, yes, there was a geopolitical context. But this election was much more a mandate for the government to move forward.

Public Policy Remains Too Centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office

Pashinyan emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment reformer challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent does he still embody a populist political project, and how has governing transformed the character of his populism?

Richard Giragosian: What we see, as you correctly identified, is a specific aspect of populism in practice. In 2018, we witnessed a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia. Nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails. In this context, it was a unique achievement.

However, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s advantages, assets, and political acumen that allowed him to come to power do not necessarily serve him well in governing the country. In other words, as leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan remains as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless. There is also a degree of inefficiency in governance. Public policy remains overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office and in the Prime Minister’s hands. So, in this regard, the element of populism that swept him into power does not necessarily make him an effective leader.

Nationalism No Longer Resonates as Strongly in Armenian Politics

Comparative studies often suggest that military defeat weakens incumbents and fuels political backlash. How do you explain Pashinyan’s ability to survive the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the subsequent political crises while still securing electoral legitimacy?

Richard Giragosian: The re-election of the Armenian government under Prime Minister Pashinyan, despite losing the war, is difficult to explain. But I do have an observation. And it is an observation that remained relevant in the recent election. Simply put, the reality is that there is no alternative to Pashinyan or his government. The opposition then, and the opposition now, remains deeply unpopular, discredited, and too closely tied to the previous authoritarian government. It is also rather weak, given its inability, as an opposition force, to propose any alternative strategy. Simply opposing normalization requires the presentation of an alternative strategy, and that is something the opposition has been unable to offer.

The opposition also reflects the reality that nationalism no longer resonates in Armenia. There are a pronounced acceptance and recognition of the need to normalize relations with Turkey and to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the surprising re-election of the Pashinyan government after losing the war remains an impressive achievement and has sparked a degree of jealousy among many Western leaders.

Armenia Has Passed the Point of Returning to the Pre-War Status Quo

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

You have argued that Armenia has embarked on its most decisive strategic reorientation since independence. Following the election, how irreversible is this shift toward Europe, and what factors could still derail it?

Richard Giragosian: Very good question, Selçuk. What we see is that Armenia has now gone past the tipping point. There is little real risk or danger of returning to the old reality, to pre-war arrogance and a pre-war aggressive posture. We are past that danger. However, it is not necessarily a matter of embracing the Western European model versus escaping the Russian orbit. It is more about Armenia seeking, delicately and under conditions of fragility, to strike a balance within the West-versus-Russia paradigm. This is driving Armenia to diversify and to seek a number of security partners. For example, the only arms procurement deal since the war of 2020 was with India. Very much on purpose—not with the West, but with a partner that is less provocative to Russia. What Armenia is seeking to do is risky, because it may fail. But it would be a greater failure not to try. That means seeking to challenge Russia, while avoiding an overreaction from Russia and carefully choosing its battles.

At the same time, it represents a return to the region. It is a realization that Armenia, like every country, does not choose its neighbors. We have no choice, no alternative, but to build a relationship with Azerbaijan, to normalize relations with Turkey, and to deal with Iran to the south and Georgia to the north. There is no real alternative to geography.

Russian Influence Has Changed, Not Disappeared

You have described Russia as suffering from both geopolitical distraction and declining power projection following its invasion of Ukraine. Has the recent election confirmed the erosion of Russian influence in Armenia, or does Moscow retain significant leverage through economic, security, and social channels?

Richard Giragosian: The short answer is both. The longer answer is yes. Russia remains overwhelmed and distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. But that is rather temporary. We do expect a resurgent Russia to return to the South Caucasus and seek to regain its diminished power and influence.

In the case of Russia-Armenia relations, Russian leverage remains strong, although it is different from what it was in the past. Previously, Russian leverage was based on security dependence, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serving as an instrument of influence. Now, however, Armenia’s vulnerability to Russia lies primarily in economics and trade. Russia is Armenia’s largest import-export partner. Armenia also remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, to cite two examples.

But if we look at Armenia-Turkey normalization, it underscores the importance and necessity of reopening that border—not only to lower transit costs, but also to create new economic opportunities capable of countering Russian dominance. At the same time, I do think Armenia has an advantage: a rare degree of legitimacy and stability, unlike many countries within the Russian orbit.

The Armenian Sense of Betrayal by Russia Is Deeply Entrenched

Critics of Pashinyan accuse him of fostering anti-Russian sentiment, while supporters argue that Armenia is simply responding to Russia’s failure to honor its security commitments. Is Armenia witnessing the rise of genuine Russophobia, or merely a more realistic assessment of Russia’s reliability as an ally?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest and candid, I think the Armenian government is quite correct, as is the majority of Armenian public opinion, in recognizing the threat from Russia. Russia has, belatedly but now quite markedly, come to be seen as dangerously unreliable. There is a deeply entrenched Armenian sense of betrayal by Russia. The war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh have led many Armenians to view Russia as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. I think this is a realistic assessment. 

I also think the lessons from the relationship with Russia illustrate the absence of any real choice or contest. For example, the European Union and the broader West are engaging with Armenia on the basis of attraction and persuasion. Russian policies toward Armenia, by contrast, have been rooted in coercion and pressure. There is really no contest here.

At the same time, I do think Russia’s arrogance, and its tendency to take Armenia for granted, actually contributed to this pre-existing tension in the relationship. I think Armenia’s future is much more closely tied to self-sufficiency, independence, and its regional role, and much less to being a Russian client, as it was in the past.

Russia’s Election Interference Failed to Deliver the Outcome It Wanted

Reports surrounding the election suggested attempts by Moscow and pro-Russian actors to influence public opinion. How should we understand Russian influence operations in Armenia today, and why did they fail to prevent a pro-Western electoral outcome?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a good question because there is an interesting paradox. Russia’s interference in the election generally failed to achieve any meaningful impact or result. However, we do see a vehemently pro-Russian political opposition garnering seats in the new Armenian Parliament. Two specifically pro-Russian parties were able to secure a significant minority share of the vote. This is an indication that we cannot become complacent about overcoming Russian influence, and that we must also recognize the challenge from within. The old-guard nationalist opposition, which continues to look to Russia, will undermine Armenian independence and challenge its policies toward its neighbors. So, we should not be overly complacent.

At the same time, I do think Russia is quite satisfied with the election result. There was little direct Russian support for the opposition, which would have been a much riskier move. But, for example, Russia is reassured that Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, while Armenia’s room to maneuver toward the West remains relatively limited and constrained. For that reason, I think the next challenge for Armenia will be to succeed in managing this new transactional relationship with Russia.

The European Union Has Become an Important Anchor for Reform

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

In your writings, you have emphasized that Armenia’s democratic development and European engagement are deeply interconnected. Can the European Union become a genuine democratic anchor for Armenia, or does Brussels still lack the strategic commitment necessary for long-term influence?

Richard Giragosian: I would say this is a rare example of the success of the European Union on the ground in Armenia. Certainly, it has served as an anchor for reform. But even more than that, we are witnessing an unprecedented level of EU engagement in Armenia. We see the deployment of EU monitors along the Armenian border with Azerbaijan to help stabilize the security situation. We also see unprecedented security assistance being provided to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF).

What makes this so remarkable is that Armenia still hosts a Russian military base, remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, and is also part of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. Despite these three realities, none of them has prevented the EU from deepening its engagement.

Part of the reason is the reality that Armenia has overtaken Georgia as the leading democracy in the region. There is also, to some degree, a European Union expectation that Armenia—and Armenia’s normalization with its Turkish partner—could help the EU achieve a broader geopolitical objective. In other words, Armenia–Turkey normalization is seen as a positive game changer not only for Armenia, but for the European Union as well.

And finally, Armenia has to be careful not to be used by the European Union or drawn into the broader paradigm of conflict between the EU and Russia that has intensified since the war in Ukraine. Armenia has to be somewhat cautious. But yes, the European Union’s engagement represents an important new element for Armenia.

The South Caucasus Is Unlikely to Remain a Long-Term US Priority

The United States has become increasingly involved in Armenian-Azerbaijani diplomacy. How do you assess Washington’s growing role in the South Caucasus, and could Armenia emerge as a new arena of strategic competition between the United States and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: I’m rather skeptical. I am skeptical about Armenia and the South Caucasus being a sustainable priority within the American national interest. Moreover, if we consider the unpredictability of the Trump administration, I also question the durability of its commitment to, and interest in, the region.

At the same time, Armenia’s diplomatic achievements with Azerbaijan owe much more to the leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and to their bilateral efforts. They were not solely the result of Western or American involvement. In fact, Armenia and Azerbaijan, acting on their own—without Russia and without the West—were able to achieve much more than before.

That said, there has been one very important achievement in terms of the American connectivity initiative. This modestly named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity envisions road and rail connections through southern Armenia, linking Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and onward to Turkey. This is important not only for the restoration of trade and transportation, but also for the return of deterrence, changing the strategic calculus and significantly reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.

So, when looking at American engagement, the record is mixed. But overall, it is a net positive. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, it would be a mistake to assume or rely too heavily on American involvement going forward.

Free Elections Are Necessary, but They Are Not Sufficient

You have often argued that democratic legitimacy is itself a strategic asset. To what extent has Armenia’s democratic trajectory strengthened its international standing, especially when compared with the authoritarian models represented by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: There are two concrete and practical advantages that we have seen emerge from Armenia’s legitimacy and democratic credentials. First, there has been a significant improvement in the investment climate. This helps explain the breakthrough agreements in the IT sector, Armenia’s establishment of data centers, its growing use of artificial intelligence, and advances in chip production. AI and chip diplomacy are a direct result of this improved investment climate.

A second notable achievement is that Armenia has come to be recognized as a predictable and reliable interlocutor. That is important both for Ankara and Baku—for Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia is increasingly accepted as a dependable, reliable, and predictable partner. In this part of the world, that is a rare achievement, and in many ways, it is even more important than democratic credentials alone.

Now, the bad news. Armenia’s institutional weakness in terms of democracy still needs to be addressed, and strengthening those institutions is just as important as holding free and fair elections. An election is not the answer, nor is it the complete recipe for democracy. Armenia still needs to strengthen its democratic institutions.

Concessions Can Contribute to Peace, but They Cannot Be Unilateral

Aliyev and Erdoğan.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attend TEKNOFEST in Istanbul, Turkey, on April 29, 2023. Photo: Evren Kalinbacak / Dreamstime.

Pashinyan has presented peace with Azerbaijan as a prerequisite for Armenia’s future security and prosperity. Does the election provide him with a stronger mandate to finalize a peace agreement, or do major domestic and external obstacles remain?

Richard Giragosian: Clearly, yes. The government’s re-election provides a renewed mandate to continue engaging with Azerbaijan and to move the process forward. However, there are still significant challenges, especially regarding the Azerbaijani demand that Armenia amend its constitution, as well as the fact that the bilateral peace treaty has been initialed but not yet signed.

The real difference here, however, is that Armenia has been willing to accept its weakness and embrace its defeat, while also turning the page and moving forward with a much less provocative and much less aggressive posture toward all of its neighbors. So, there is reason for justified optimism. But it also takes two countries to achieve bilateral peace and stability.

Therefore, the next move will have to come first from Azerbaijan and then from Turkey in terms of normalizing relations. Armenian concessions and compromises are important, but they should not be unilateral.

The Constitution Will Remain a Potential Source of Friction

One of the unresolved issues concerns constitutional changes sought by Azerbaijan as part of a final settlement. How politically feasible are such reforms after the election, and do they risk creating a new wave of nationalist mobilization inside Armenia?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good point, because despite the re-election of the government, with a working majority and a renewed mandate, the government still fell short of a two-thirds majority in Parliament. That would have been much more helpful for constitutional amendments. The government’s working majority will therefore present a challenge in moving forward with a referendum on constitutional change.

However, we do see a demonstrable climbdown on the Azerbaijani side. They have retreated from their previously maximalist position, and the Azerbaijanis have become much more patient and far less demanding regarding the constitutional change requirement. It is no longer such an immediate prerequisite, which suggests there may be some flexibility, as well as an understanding in Baku that the Armenian government lacks the parliamentary majority necessary to guarantee this demand. So, I do think there is room for flexibility. But yes, it will remain a potential source of friction going forward.

Azerbaijan Continues to Shape the Limits of Turkish Policy

You have argued that normalization between Turkey and Armenia represents a rare opportunity for regional stabilization and economic development. Has the election increased the prospects for genuine rapprochement, or does Azerbaijan remain the decisive variable shaping Ankara’s policy?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, despite the positive re-election of the Armenian government, there had already been notable progress before the election between Armenian and Turkish officials in moving incrementally closer to reopening the border. In this regard, when it comes to Armenian-Turkish normalization, the physical border has not yet opened. But the mental border has, and the issue has become much less poisonous and politically toxic within Turkey. 

However, unfortunately, the Turkish side remains hostage to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s approval and consent remain necessary for the fulfillment of normalization. Much to the frustration of the Erdoğan government, it is Azerbaijan that continues to limit Turkish options in the region. That reality is also rooted in the economic and commercial influence of SOCAR, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company, within the Turkish economy.

Nevertheless, we are seeing growing support and broader constituencies on the Turkish side in favor of reopening the border. And this is not about the Turkish economy in general. It is about the regional economy of eastern Turkey, particularly the underdeveloped and largely Kurdish-populated areas of the east. For the Turkish state, reopening the border is important not only for economically stabilizing the region but also for countering the PKK through jobs and economic opportunity rather than relying solely on police action. So, there is a clear security dimension as well. 

At the end of the day, even for Azerbaijan, Armenia-Turkey normalization represents a rare positive game changer—a genuine win-win.

Armenia May Influence Its Neighbors More Than Its Neighbors Influence Armenia

Armenia’s normalization efforts necessarily involve deeper engagement with two increasingly centralized and authoritarian neighboring states. Do you have concerns that closer political, economic, and institutional ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan could contribute to democratic erosion in Armenia? More specifically, just as Russia has long sought to project its political influence and governance model across the post-Soviet space, is there a risk that Ankara and Baku may also seek to export elements of their own illiberal political models to Armenia? Or do you believe that Armenia’s democratic institutions and growing engagement with Europe are sufficiently resilient to prevent such authoritarian diffusion?

Richard Giragosian: I’m less worried about the potential risk posed by neighboring Turkey or Azerbaijan in terms of eroding the Armenian democratic model, simply because it would be very difficult for Armenia’s population to accept any kind of role for either Turkey or Azerbaijan in shaping Armenia’s political development. The greater risk comes from Russia’s potential external interference.

At the same time, Armenia’s institutions remain rather fragile, vulnerable, and not yet sufficiently resilient. But I do think we are on a positive trajectory. And I also believe that the development of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Armenia and Turkey, can contribute positively to the democratic outlook of those countries.

So, I would reverse the question and focus on Armenia’s potential positive influence on its neighbors, rather than on the risk of intervention, interference, or democratic erosion emanating from Armenia’s neighbors and affecting Armenia itself.

Normalization Is Only the Foundation for Future Reconciliation

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh has forced Armenia to reconsider long-standing assumptions about identity, security, and statehood. Are we witnessing the emergence of a new civic understanding of Armenian nationalism, and how might this reshape populist politics in the future?

Richard Giragosian: We are witnessing a sea change in terms of identity. And in this regard, it is not nationalism that resonates. Rather, it is a more mature evolution toward a new concept of patriotism. Specifically, from an Armenian perspective, nationalism can also be very negative, rooted in hatred of the enemy. Patriotism, in contrast, is much more positive. It is based on pride in history rather than hatred of rivals, opponents, or enemies. So, I do think there is a healthy and constructive movement in the right direction.

Nevertheless, it is still grounded in a painful reminder that Armenia was dangerously arrogant, especially in relation to Azerbaijan. There were too many missed opportunities for diplomacy. But Armenia is now cutting its losses and learning painful lessons. And I think the outlook moving forward remains positive. Because for Armenia, the first challenge was recognizing the problem. And that was the first stage in this evolution toward patriotism. It is also about normalization, and understanding what normalization with neighbors is—and is not. For example, in relation to both Turkey and Azerbaijan, this is not reconciliation. It is not even a rapprochement. It is normalization. It is the first step. It is also the basic currency of neighborly relations and the foundation for subsequent reconciliation.

This is why much of the past, including the events of 1915 and the genocide issue, is not part of the normalization process. These issues are not relevant to normalization. They will come later, once that foundation has been put in place.

Armenia May Be Less a Model Than an Accidental Exception

And lastly, at a time when democratic backsliding, authoritarian populism, and geopolitical revisionism are reshaping international politics, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the post-Soviet space. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience under conditions of war, external pressure, and geopolitical uncertainty?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, I’m not sure. Armenia may be less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception. In other words, beginning with the change of government in 2018, it was a rare victory of nonviolence, of people power. Despite everything, despite later losing a war, despite Russia, what was the recipe for Armenia? I’m not quite sure. It could have been almost an accident of history.

But theoretically, we would say, sadly, that it took the loss of the war and the subsequent loss of Nagorno-Karabakh before Armenia could begin to rebound. At the same time, much of this opportunity also exists because Russia was distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. So, it is somewhat of an accidental convergence of interests.

At the same time, we do see Ankara, Yerevan, and Baku accidentally sharing similar concerns about Russia. There is an understanding that a regional identity, without any third-party involvement, is perhaps the real key to stability in terms of post-war adjustment. 

So, the short answer is: I’m not quite sure I have the answer.

Professor Cengiz Aktar.

Prof. Aktar: The EU Is Systematically Giving False Hopes to Armenia

In this timely ECPS interview, Professor Cengiz Aktar examines the political, geopolitical, and democratic implications of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections. While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic resilience in an authoritarian neighborhood, he challenges prevailing narratives about the country’s westward turn, arguing that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains profound. Describing the European Union as “the greatest populist actor in this game,” Professor Aktar contends that Brussels is fostering expectations it cannot realistically fulfill. The interview explores Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, post-Karabakh politics, democratic backsliding, normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russian influence, and the enduring significance of historical memory. At its core lies a fundamental question: how can a fragile democracy survive amid competing geopolitical pressures?

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a pivotal moment in the country’s post-Karabakh trajectory. Taking place amid the aftermath of military defeat, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and growing tensions between Russia and the West, the elections raised fundamental questions about democratic resilience, populism, sovereignty, and geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Cengiz Aktar—adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, guest lecturer at Yerevan State University, and one of the foremost analysts of Turkey-Armenia relations, memory politics, and regional geopolitics—offers a provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic future and its increasingly complex international environment.

While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic achievements, Professor Aktar stresses the extraordinary constraints under which the country operates. As he observes, Armenia remains “the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region,” a small, landlocked state surrounded by authoritarian neighbors and exposed to intense geopolitical pressures. Yet he warns that many assumptions currently shaping discussions of Armenia’s future rest on unrealistic expectations regarding Europe’s role and capacity.

The most striking theme of the interview concerns Armenia’s growing rapprochement with the European Union. Contrary to prevailing narratives that portray Armenia’s recent political direction as a decisive shift toward Europe, Professor Aktar argues that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains overwhelming and cannot be easily replaced. In his view, European policymakers are encouraging expectations that they cannot realistically fulfill. “None of this can be replaced by the European Union,” he argues. “Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill.”

Professor Aktar is equally skeptical of assumptions that Armenia faces a straightforward geopolitical choice between Russia and Europe. While recognizing the country’s genuine democratic aspirations and strong cultural connections with Europe, he contends that geography, energy dependence, trade networks, and security realities continue to bind Armenia closely to Moscow. For this reason, he warns that unrealistic promises of European integration may ultimately prove counterproductive, potentially undermining Armenia’s stability while provoking Russian backlash.

The interview also explores Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, the politics of peace and normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, democratic backsliding, Russia’s continuing influence, historical memory, and the unresolved legacy of the Armenian Genocide. Throughout, Professor Aktar returns to a central dilemma confronting Armenia today: how a fragile democracy can preserve its autonomy and democratic character while navigating an increasingly hostile regional environment shaped by authoritarian power politics and great-power competition.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Cengiz Aktar, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Armenians Were Tired of War, and Pashinyan Successfully Capitalized on That Fatigue

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Aktar, welcome! You recently argued that the 2026 elections would reveal the direction of Armenian democracy after the trauma of Karabakh and the pressures of regional geopolitics. How should we interpret Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election? Does it represent a democratic endorsement of his peace agenda, or merely a choice of the “least risky” option in a constrained political environment?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Before going into the details of the Armenian political microcosm, we should underline that this small country— less than 30,000 square kilometers after all—completely landlocked and surrounded by two enemy nations, Azerbaijan and Turkey, is the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region. This is something that people tend to forget. They are doing their best to remain a democracy. It is not easy because they have to deal with anti-democracies. But so far, they have been doing all right.

We will see how the final results of these elections play out. They are not final yet, and there are many issues—we will come to them. We will see the outcome and how the authorities address some of the serious questions that have arisen after the elections.

That being said, the people have re-elected the Prime Minister and, at the end of the day, endorsed his views. This is quite a remarkable achievement because, normally, when a leader loses a war and, moreover, loses a territory—which is the case with Nagorno-Karabakh, a historic Armenian land that was given by the Soviets to Azerbaijan and later reclaimed by Azerbaijan through war with Armenia, openly and extensively supported by the Turkish armed forces—the political consequences are severe. The reality was therefore quite harsh for a prime minister seeking a new mandate. Yet he succeeded. Of course, this may seem contradictory or paradoxical, but it is not.

There are two elements at play here. We could talk for hours about this. As you know, I have written extensively on the subject in Turkish for Agos, the Armenian newspaper published in Turkey in both Turkish and Armenian.

The first and foremost reason is that the people of Armenia are tired of fighting. There is a clear war fatigue. Although we cannot compare it to what is happening in our region, in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, this sense of insecurity has been very real. The Prime Minister used—and abused—this feeling extensively, essentially saying: if you do not vote for me, we will go to war. That was, of course, highly manipulative and a very populist way of dealing with such a sensitive issue as peace and security. Nevertheless, it worked.

The second element is that this country is virtually unrecognizable. I have been going there since 1990, and today Armenia is experiencing a boom in personal spending and consumption. It is becoming a mass-consumption society of the kind we saw in Western Europe after 1945. This, of course, is music to the ears of the Armenian public. I visit regularly, but this time I was genuinely amazed by the number of brand-new cars. There are hardly any old cars left in the city. Everybody seems to have a new one. Where does this money come from? Of course, no one asks such questions. But the main source of these finances, as in other countries of the region—including Turkey, Georgia, and others—comes from sanctions-busting.

The West—the United States and the European Union—sanctioned Russia, first after the annexation of Crimea and then following the full-scale war against Ukraine. Yet many countries have been circumventing these sanctions. This is not speculation. There are extensive reports on the matter, including in leading newspapers such as the Financial Times, documenting the flow of goods and cash to and from Russia. Russian gold, for example, moves through the South Caucasus and then to China and India, where it is processed and made marketable before returning to Russia. As one can imagine, this trade is extremely lucrative, and we see its effects in the economy of Yerevan.

So, all in all, the people have voted—although not for a full majority, and we will come to that. They voted for a different type of future. That is understandable. But is it sustainable? I think that is the real question.

Who Is Not Populist When Seeking Re-Election?

Pashinyan originally emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment figure challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent can he still be understood as a populist leader, and how has his populism evolved from opposition mobilization to governing power?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Who is not populist, Selçuk? Especially when one is running for re-election. It is almost compulsory to be a populist, unfortunately. Nikol Pashinyan was in full swing when it came to populist moves, actions, speeches, and narratives. That is all true. But it worked. The question is whether he really represents a future for the country. Some observers say so, but at what price? That is the real issue, the real problem that Armenians will have to confront sooner or later.

What he has managed to achieve with Turkey and Azerbaijan—two longstanding foes of Armenia—is not yet fully accomplished, but it is on track; it is in the pipeline. However, it has been pursued through, once again, a very populist way of handling highly sensitive matters. It has been achieved by making huge concessions to both countries, without really receiving anything in return. This is very dangerous in the sense that one cannot ignore the imbalance involved.

I often think of a famous observation by Henry Kissinger, who was not exactly a commendable figure. He used to say that the best and most sustainable peace deals are those concluded by parties that leave the negotiating table equally dissatisfied with the outcome. That is very true. Yet in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan—and also Turkey—that did not happen, and it will not happen, because Azerbaijan and Turkey do not have much to offer in return, except perhaps opening the border in Turkey’s case, and maybe Azerbaijan’s as well.

Even then, there are enormous conditions attached before anything concrete can happen. As you may have noticed, there has been much discussion in the Turkish media about the possibility that the two land border crossings could open during the summer. We will see whether Azerbaijan will allow Turkey to move forward with this symbolic—or perhaps concrete—opening of the border, which has been closed since 1993. That is a very long time.

As of today, the 12th of June, only five days after the elections, there remains a great deal of uncertainty. The Prime Minister did not get everything he wanted, and the opposition actually performed quite well. Does that mean that those who voted for the opposition are pro-Russian or anti-Western? I do not think so. That would be far too hasty a conclusion.

Frankly, I remain quite skeptical about the future, and there are some very unpleasant developments unfolding at the moment. But we will come to those in due course. 

People Were Willing to Sacrifice Almost Anything for Peace

Armenia protest.
Anti-government protesters gather in front of the Armenian government building in Yerevan on December 9, 2020, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Photo: Corneius Brandt / Dreamstime.

Comparative scholarship often suggests that military defeats weaken populist governments. Yet Pashinyan survived both the 2020 war and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. What explains his resilience, and what does it tell us about the relationship between populism, accountability, and democratic legitimacy?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Democratic legitimacy is a big word. But frankly, as I said at the beginning, the appeal of a consumer society and the symbolic peace narrative played a major role. Pashinyan used this message effectively, even adopting the little heart as the symbol of his campaign, which is totally un-Armenian. It is not something that is commonly used in Armenia, nor in the Caucasus. Anyhow, these two elements—peace and consumption apparently worked. That is the reality. But again, are they sustainable? That is the question.

It worked perfectly. Elderly people were appearing on television, in street interviews and similar formats, saying remarkable things about the importance of peace at any cost. They were prepared to give up almost anything in exchange for peace and greater consumption. So, once again, the question remains: is it sustainable? I do not think so.

The Dominant Geopolitical Orientation Remains Russia, Not Europe

Many observers described the election as a referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation. Do you think Armenian voters primarily voted on domestic democratic concerns, or was this fundamentally a choice between Russia and Europe?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: In Armenia, since the Velvet Revolution of 2018, there has been a genuine sense of democratic aspiration within society. Of course, not every individual is pro-democracy or democratic—that exists nowhere in the world—but overall, the aim, the tendency, and the willingness are there. Armenians want to build a democratic society.

But there are major impediments. It is a very small and a very dependent country. Despite the strong Western tropism that developed during the election campaign, particularly through the major event that took place in Yerevan at the beginning of May—the annual meeting of the so-called European Political Community, which was revived by Macron after an earlier French initiative had been abandoned in 1954—the reality remains quite different. The European Political Community is not a binding European institution; it is essentially a talk shop. Yet during this gathering, the whole of Europe was present, along with Canada, and they all delivered very warm messages to the Armenians. The message was essentially: “You are now part of Europe. You are welcome,” and so on.

But the reality is not quite that. The dominant and determining geopolitical orientation of Armenia remains Russia, not the West. Everything that happened during May before the elections—including these Western visits and those from the United States as well; the Vice President was there in March, carried the same message: “Armenia, we love you, and you are one of us.”

What explains this sudden affection? It is rooted in the anti-Russian policies of the West. In a sense, Armenia has been used for that purpose. Now tensions are emerging with Russia, which remains by far Armenia’s most influential neighbor. Armenia depends on Russia on an unbelievable scale. This dependence cannot be replaced or superseded by any European initiative, however well-intentioned. Geographically, historically, politically, and economically, it is impossible.

You have read what I have written about this dependency. More than 82 percent of Armenia’s gas and energy needs are covered by Russia, at an extraordinarily low price—$177.5 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. There is nothing comparable anywhere else. If Russia were to change that arrangement unilaterally, Armenia would face tremendous difficulties. Not to mention Metsamor, the country’s only nuclear power plant, located near the Turkish border. It was built by the Russians, and Rosatom supplies its fuel. Nor should we forget the petrol and oil products that Armenians use every day in their new cars. There is also the enormous Russian market for Armenian products such as fruits, vegetables, and flowers.

None of this can be replaced by the European Union. Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill. People are now even talking about future EU membership for Armenia. But that is out of the question. One of the indispensable conditions for EU membership is territorial continuity. So where is the territorial continuity? It simply does not exist. It will not happen. There is no realistic chance whatsoever. Yet people are buying into this rhetoric without fully understanding the realities involved, and in the process they are jeopardizing the country’s relations with Russia. That is where we find ourselves today.

Russia Remains the Ultimate Game Changer in Armenia

You have repeatedly emphasized Moscow’s declining credibility in Armenia after its failure to prevent the loss of Karabakh. Has Russia now lost its position as Armenia’s primary external reference point, or does it still possess significant instruments of influence inside the country?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Of course, as I said, yes. Russia remains the game changer in Armenia. Armenians are certainly not in love with Russia, particularly since the Russians did nothing to stop the Azeris and the Turks from taking back Nagorno-Karabakh. So, every Armenian has reason to be unhappy about what Russia did. But, the reality is something else. As I explained, the country remains highly dependent on Russia, and that dependence will not change from one day to the next.

Moscow May Have Felt No Need to Interfere

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

Several reports suggested Russian attempts to influence the election through economic pressure, disinformation, and support for pro-Russian actors. How should we understand these efforts within the broader framework of transnational authoritarian influence and democratic resilience?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was there. The ODIHR has a specialized body that monitors elections in OSCE member states, and it was present during these elections as well. According to ODIHR, there was no interference whatsoever. There was a great deal of fake news on the subject, but neither the Electoral Commission nor the independent media found any substantial evidence of vote-buying or influence operations orchestrated by Russia.

On the contrary, there were reports concerning officials from Civil Contract, Nikol Pashinyan’s party, exerting pressure on civil servants to vote for Civil Contract. A civil servant is, after all, an obedient servant, so if the boss says, “Go and vote for me,” he or she generally will. These kinds of irregularities were noted.

Overall, however, I do not think that Russia intervened in the Armenian elections. If I put myself in the position of Russian decision-makers, I would say that they are probably so confident in their leverage over the Armenian economy that they felt no need to intervene directly in order to influence the outcome of the elections.

European Tropism Is a Myth and a Pipe Dream

The election result appears to strengthen Armenia’s rapprochement with Europe. In your view, is this shift primarily strategic and security-driven, or does it also reflect a deeper normative commitment to liberal democracy and European political values?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: No, as I said, this European tropism is a myth. It is a myth. Armenians are not discovering Europe. Armenia is, in a way, a very European country. Just look at the diaspora. The European Armenian diaspora is very strong and remains highly present in Armenia itself. If you compare the two countries, for instance Azerbaijan and Armenia, Armenia is by far more European than Azerbaijan, which has virtually no connection to Europe whatsoever. There is no significant Azeri diaspora in Europe. That is not the case with Armenia. Armenia knows what Europe means, in a way.

But, having said that, I repeat: this European tropism is a pipe dream. It is a personal choice, but it will not have any real consequences for the development of Armenian democracy in the foreseeable future. They are not there, and they will not be there.

The Americans are another matter altogether. They are much more focused on transactionalism. They buy and sell, and they do not care at all about the democratic future of any country in the world—including their own.

Autocratic Tendencies Are Clearly Visible

Some critics argue that Pashinyan has displayed increasingly personalized leadership tendencies and a growing concentration of power. Do you see signs of democratic erosion under his government, or are such concerns exaggerated given Armenia’s broader regional context?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The trend is troubling. There have been some anti-democratic and illegal actions directed against the opposition, but not only against the opposition. Let me give you the example of the director of the Genocide Museum in Yerevan. This lady offered a book to the American Vice President during his visit to Yerevan. The book dealt with the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. As you know, 150,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh. She was subsequently sanctioned by the Prime Minister, who forced her resignation. This is far from any democratic way of handling public affairs. The lady was compelled to resign and was replaced by a bureaucrat close to the Prime Minister who has no real understanding of the history of the Armenian genocide.

He is also challenging the role of the Church. Etchmiadzin, the Holy See, is systematically under pressure from the government. That is not the role of a government—to intervene in the affairs of the Church, whatever the circumstances. There may be all sorts of accusations against the head of the Church, Karekin, involving embezzlement and other matters, but that is not the role of a government.

During the campaign as well, there were some quite worrisome developments targeting opposition figures, and these developments are still continuing.

Moreover, the election results are not yet entirely clear, because we still do not know whether a fourth party will make it into Parliament. Unfortunately, since the closure of voting on the night of the 7th June, there has been considerable pressure on election officials to ensure that this fourth party remains below the 4 percent threshold and does not enter Parliament. By cheating, of course. 

And now the scandal is completely out in the open. All opposition parties are protesting loudly. They are taking the matter to the Electoral Commission and will probably proceed to the Constitutional Court afterwards in order to seek a proper resolution, because this party’s votes have been cancelled. The objective has been to ensure that it does not enter Parliament and remains below the 4 percent threshold. We cannot call this democratic. It is anti-democratic, it is illegal, and it challenges the principle of free and fair elections. So, are there autocratic tendencies? Yes, definitely. They are very much there. Are they widespread? No. But the danger is there.

Concessions Without Reciprocity Create Fragile Peace

Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey flags.
Photo: Dreamstime.

Pashinyan campaigned explicitly on a message of peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey. Is this the emergence of a new political cleavage in Armenia between peace-oriented pragmatism and nationalist revisionism?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: It is a good question. National revisionism, okay—but revise what? Those who challenge the Prime Minister’s positions, policies, actions, and narratives are saying something that is very meaningful. They say: “We are not against peace.” After all, who can be against peace? Who can be in favor of war? That is a form of universal wisdom. But they are asking a different question: How did you achieve that peace? What do you receive in return when you make concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey? 

That is the real question. It is fascinating to observe that a very similar dynamic is unfolding in Turkey with the Kurds. The Kurds speak about peace, a peace process here and a peace process there. But what do they receive in return from the Turkish state? In line with their longstanding demands—for example, the freedom of the Kurdish language and the recognition of Kurdish as an official language in Turkey—they receive nothing.

It is the same in Armenia. The practice is exactly the same. Everybody talks about peace, but when you ask what they receive in return for their concessions, the answer is: nothing. They say they receive peace. But this peace exists entirely under the shadow and control of the other parties, who can challenge it at any moment. They have not given anything themselves, and therefore they can always come back and say: “No, we want more.”

That is precisely what is happening now. As you may know, before the elections—more specifically on May 15—there was an important development. The Azerbaijani ambassador to Ankara openly and quite happily declared that the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia was directly linked to the so-called peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that Baku and Ankara were coordinating their moves and policies. 

He was speaking on behalf of Baku, and the condition for this so-called peace process was—and still is—a change to the Armenian Constitution. Specifically, Azerbaijan wants the removal of the provision concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, which is referred to in the Armenian Constitution as an Armenian territory, or as a territory inhabited by Armenians. In other words, Baku wants Yerevan to eliminate this provision, and this remains the principal condition for accepting a lasting peace with its neighbor.

The problem is that, in order to do that, the Prime Minister needs a two-third qualified majority in Parliament, which he did not obtain. Now, with all the controversy surrounding vote-rigging and alleged manipulation concerning the fourth party I mentioned earlier, I do not see how he can satisfy the Azerbaijani demand by amending the Constitution and removing the reference to Nagorno-Karabakh. This means that the prospects for peace with Azerbaijan—and, consequently, with Turkey—are in serious difficulty.

They are compromised, and no one can foresee the outcome at this stage because we still do not have the final count, nor do we know exactly how many parties will ultimately enter Parliament. But in any case, even if the fourth party fails to enter Parliament, the ruling Civil Contract party still lacks the necessary majority to amend the Constitution. So, we are facing a deadlock, and no one really knows how it will evolve.

The Perversion of Justice Starts With the Denial of Memory

Professor Aktar, you have often argued that Turkey cannot become a fully democratic society without confronting its historical crimes, particularly the Armenian Genocide. How does the current normalization process affect questions of historical justice, memory, and democratic reconciliation?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: This is a question that really deserves a separate discussion, but in a nutshell, I can offer an example. Turkey is in dire straits. Turkish democracy does not exist. In fact, I would argue that it never truly existed. But the rule of law, for which Turks have struggled since 1923—and especially since the end of the Second World War—is now gone as well.

These are structural problems, even structural diseases. I do not particularly like using that term, but this is what we are dealing with: a dysfunction that goes back to the founding sin of the state—the Armenian Genocide and the Syriac Genocide, which are inseparable and which occurred more than a century ago.

A country that does not come to terms with such a painful and sinful past can easily digest other sins, as is the case today, including sins that are far less serious and far less painful than what happened 111 years ago.

What I am saying is not abstract. I am not talking about ghosts. I am talking about the perversion of the sense of justice in this country. And I am quite sure that Turkey will not make it through the remaining decades of the twenty-first century without recognizing, reflecting upon, and recalling this tragic past, which ultimately resulted in the disappearance of the entire non-Muslim population of Anatolia. We are talking about three million people.

So, it is really a matter of either-or. What is the significance of an embezzlement scandal involving a Turkish politician—for instance, Erdoğan—when compared with genocide? It is nothing. It is peanuts.

Therefore, a population, a polity, a society, and a state that do not wish to remember what happened a century ago—which was carried out by Turks and Kurds —can easily digest, accept, and live with far less serious wrongdoings, as we see happening today.

This is simply a normal consequence of this absence of memory, or rather this voluntary loss of memory and de-memorization of the past. It is very dangerous, and it is very unhealthy.

False European Hopes May Push Armenia Back Into Moscow’s Orbit

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Aktar, at a time when much of the post-Soviet space is characterized by authoritarian consolidation, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the region. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience, populism, and geopolitical pressure in the twenty-first century?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Interestingly, we began our discussion with this point, and we will conclude with it as well. Armenia remains the only country in its immediate neighborhood that is genuinely trying to remain a democracy. The next democratic country, after all, is Greece, which is quite far away.

It is doing its best to preserve democratic governance. But it is extremely difficult to survive in a non-democratic, and even anti-democratic, environment when you are surrounded by countries that do not share the values, principles, and norms of democracy.

This is not merely a theoretical issue; it is a practical one. Non-democracies and anti-democracies can conclude agreements with democratic countries, sign them, and then simply ignore their commitments. Because they are not accountable. A non-democratic or anti-democratic regime is not accountable to its population. It simply does not care.

Take Russia, for example. I mentioned earlier the figure of $177 for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas. That gas is supplied under an agreement between Moscow and Yerevan. But Moscow, as a non-democratic—indeed, a totalitarian—state, can simply say: “We are no longer bound by that agreement. We are raising the price to the international market level of $600. Take it or leave it.” This illustrates the difficulty of operating—and indeed surviving—in such an environment. I sincerely hope that the Armenians will manage and succeed.

The problem is that the false hopes offered by European countries and by the European Union itself are not helpful. In fact, they indirectly push Armenia back into Moscow’s orbit and deeper into Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russians are already deeply upset with the Europeans, not least because of what is happening in Ukraine. And they are unlikely to tolerate what they would perceive as a second strategic setback in their immediate neighborhood. After all, the Caucasus is their backyard.

There is one final point. Anyone interested in the South Caucasus should take a serious and analytical look at what happened in Georgia. Georgia went through a very similar process—loosening its ties with Russia and moving closer to the West. In the end, it failed. The country ended up with two portions of its territory effectively invaded and, while not formally annexed, indirectly administered by Russia. Meanwhile, all the Western hopes and aspirations of eventually joining the European Union have faded away. They are gone. Finished. Today the country is governed by a tycoon who is completely infatuated with Moscow.

This, unfortunately, is the reality of the South Caucasus. We will see how things evolve. I wish the very best to Armenia, but the task before it is not easy at all.

Street scene in Douala, Cameroon’s largest city.

Communaucratic Populism: Rethinking Identity-Based Electoral Mobilization in Postcolonial Africa

The authors introduce communaucratic populism as a novel conceptual framework for understanding a form of political mobilization in which electoral competition is structured less by ideological programs than by competing claims of communal belonging—ethnic, regional, or identitarian—to a state conceived as a collective patrimony. Drawing on Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election, the commentary argues that the dominant ideational, discursive, and strategic approaches to populism capture only fragments of postcolonial African electoral dynamics. Situated between ethnic populism and clientelism, communaucratic populism describes a moral economy of intercommunal rotation through which both incumbents and challengers seek legitimacy. The article identifies four constitutive dimensions of the concept, illustrates them empirically, and outlines a broader comparative research agenda on postcolonial democratic pluralism.

By Yves Valéry Obame*, Salomon Essaga Etémé** & Armand Leka Essomba***

Across sub-Saharan Africa, three decades of multiparty competition have produced a paradox that mainstream populism theory still struggles to name. Elections are held; oppositions mobilize; voters turn out, and yet executive turnover remains rare, while political contestation increasingly maps onto communal cleavages rather than programmatic ones. Cameroon offers an unusually clear instance of this puzzle. Since the 1990 return to multipartyism, no presidential alternation has occurred. The 2025 presidential election, which renewed the mandate of an incumbent in power since 1982, again unfolded along a familiar grammar: candidates summoned regional, ethnic, and identitarian solidarities; voters interpreted the state apparatus less as an instrument of policy delivery than as a collective resource to be conquered or defended; and post-electoral disputes were framed less as procedural grievances than as zero-sum struggles over communal access to power.

Such dynamics resist the standard analytical vocabulary of populism studies. They cannot be reduced to the binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite” (Mudde, 2004), nor fully captured by discursive theories of antagonism (Laclau, 2005), nor by strategic accounts centred on the unmediated personal leader (Weyland, 2001). Nor are they exhausted by the literature on ethnic politics or neo patrimonial clientelism. This commentary proposes a new analytical category – communaucratic populism – to designate this distinctive mode of political mobilization, and to begin specifying what its study requires.

Why African Electoral Politics Requires a New Conceptual Vocabulary

The three leading approaches to populism—ideational, discursive, and strategic—each illuminate a distinct facet of African electoral politics. Yet none adequately accounts for its defining feature: the routinized framing of elections as contests among communities for control of the state. The ideational approach (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) defines populism as a thin-centred ideology pitting a “morally pure people” against a “corrupt elite.” But in many postcolonial African contexts, the morally charged unit of political contestation is not “the people” as singular sovereign but a plurality of communities, each laying claim to representation. The Manichean cleavage runs not vertically (people against elite) but horizontally (community against community) with the state positioned as the contested prize.

The discursive approach (Laclau, 2005) is more accommodating: its emphasis on the construction of equivalently chains and antagonistic frontiers allows for the emergence of a “people” out of heterogeneous demands. Yet Laclau’s framework still presupposes that successful populist articulation generates a singular popular subject. Communaucratic mobilizationworks differently. It does not seek to dissolve communal particularities into a higher unity; it preserves them, and indeed instrumentalizes them, as the very currency of electoral legitimacy. Each candidate becomes a community’s standard-bearer; coalitions take the form of inter-communal arithmetic rather than ideological synthesis.

The strategic approach (Weyland, 2001) emphasizes the unmediated personalistic appeal of a leader to an atomized mass. This captures certain aspects of postcolonial leadership cultures, but overlooks what is most salient in cases such as Cameroon: the leader is not unmediated. He is, on the contrary, deeply mediated by community elders, regional notables, diaspora figures, customary chiefs, and digital opinion-makers who function as relays of communal endorsement. The leader is not “of the people” in Weyland’s sense, he is of his people, and recognition by other communities must be politically negotiated. To these blind spots one might add a fourth: existing accounts of ethnic populism (Brubaker, 2017) and African ethnopolitics (Posner, 2005; Lynch, 2011) treat communal mobilization either as a derivative of ethnicity or as an effect of strategic elite manipulation. Communaucratic populism, by contrast, designates a logic of political signification in its own right. 

The Four Constitutive Dimensions of Communaucratic Populism

Communaucratic populism is here understood as a mode of political mobilization in which electoral competition is structured around competing claims of communal belonging (ethnic, regional, religious, generational, or identitarian) to a state apparatus conceived as a collective patrimony to be distributed among groups. The concept articulates four constitutive dimensions.

The first is communitarian: Politics is organized around morally bounded we-groups that pre-date the electoral moment and persist beyond it. Communities are not residual identities awaiting modernization (Chabal & Daloz, 1999); they are political units in their own right, mobilized strategically but anchored in long-running histories of belonging (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009).

The second is identitarian: Communal claims do not function as raw expressions of ethnic interest but as moral narratives of dignity, recognition, and historical reparation. The demand is not merely for redistribution but for symbolic acknowledgment, the recognition that one’s community has been excluded long enough and deserves its turn.

The third is governmental: The state is figured not as a programmatic apparatus delivering public goods, but as a res communis, that is a common good to be circulated among communities. Incumbency by a single community is delegitimized over time not because policies fail, but because rotation has not occurred. Conversely, the incumbent’s coalition defends continuity through a symmetrical communal grammar: the defence of “our turn,” the avoidance of “their revenge.”

The fourth is discursive: Communaucratic mobilization deploys a distinctive vocabulary of patrimony, balance, equilibrium, and “the turn of others.” It produces a moral economy of electoral expectation in which losing is not merely defeat but exclusion, and winning is less mandate than custodianship. Communaucratic populism is therefore neither reducible to clientelism – which describes a transactional logic of patron-client exchange (Bach & Gazibo, 2012) – nor to ethnic populism in Brubaker’s (2017) sense, which presupposes a discursive construction of the people as ethnically delimited. It names a populism whose “people” is plural, whose antagonism is horizontal, and whose telos is rotation rather than rupture.

Cameroon’s 2025 Election as a Case of Communaucratic Mobilization

Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election illustrates each of these dimensions. With more than 250 ethnic communities and a long-standing regional cleavage structure – Northern, Centre-South, Western, Anglophone (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003) – electoral politics has long operated as a tacit accounting of communal weight. The incumbent’s longevity is itself read communaucratically: a particular regional constituency is perceived to have “had its turn” for too long, while others have not. This perception fuels mobilization not principally against authoritarianism per se, but against the retention of communal access to state power.

Three patterns observed during the 2025 electoral cycle substantiate the concept. First, alliance formation among opposition candidates followed a logic of inter-communal pooling: when a prominent Anglophone figure was excluded from the ballot, segments of his regional base redirected support not on ideological grounds but on the calculus of which alternative candidate could best aggregate non-incumbent communities. Second, digital political discourse – captured through nethnographic observation of social media debate – was saturated with communal markers: regional naming, ancestral references, and historical claims about precedence and exclusion. Third, post-electoral contestation, while invoking procedural irregularities, was decoded by participants and observers alike through a communaucratic frame: which group had been overrepresented in the tally, which underrepresented, and how the result would be received in each region.

Crucially, this is not “mere” ethnic politics. The communal grammar is articulated in the language of democratic legitimacy itself: rotation as fairness, balance as inclusion, alternation as the test of pluralism. Communaucratic populism does not reject democracy, it reinterprets it as a procedure for inter-communal distribution of state office (Bayart, 1989; Mbembe, 2001). This reinterpretation enriches existing analyses in three respects. i) Against the trope of failed transitions (Cheeseman, 2015), it specifies a coherent – if costly – logic of democratic operation under conditions of pluralism without programmatic differentiation. ii) Against the diagnosis of ethnic voting as informational shortcut, it highlights the moral and historical depth of communal claims. iii) And against the assumption that populism is a Northern import to be measured by Northern criteria, it foregrounds an indigenous configuration with its own conceptual demands (Resnick, 2014).

The Scope, Limits, and Future of the Concept

Communaucratic populism is not a universal key. Its analytical purchase depends on three contextual conditions: a politically salient pluri-communal structure; a state apparatus historically central to redistribution; and a democratic procedure understood – across the political spectrum – as a vehicle of inter-communal recognition. Where these conditions hold, the concept should travel productively: across the Gulf of Guinea (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gabon), into the Great Lakes region, and into postcolonial democracies beyond Africa where communal pluralism intersects with statist political economies.

Several limits should be acknowledged. The concept does not, on its own, account for coercion, electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2002), or the international determinants of incumbency. It works best in combination with – not as a replacement for – institutional and political economy analyses. Nor does it claim that ideology and policy are absent from African electoral life; it claims only those communal frames are routinely the dominant idiom through which they are translated. The agenda this opens is comparative and methodological: how to measure communaucratic intensity across cases? How to distinguish it operationally from clientelism and ethnic populism? And how to register its mutations under conditions of urbanization, digital mediation, and generational change?

Communaucratic populism is offered here as a working concept, not a finished theory. It seeks to render intelligible a political grammar that resists translation into the dominant categories of populism studies, and to do so without reducing African pluralism to deviation from a Northern norm. If populism describes, in its most general sense, a politics that makes the construction of “the people” its central operation, communaucratic populism names a variant in which that construction is irreducibly plural: where “the people” is always already a “people of peoples,” and where the democratic question is less who governs than whose turn it is to govern. The wager of the concept is that postcolonial pluralism deserves its own categories rather than borrowed ones. The discussion is only beginning.

The case of Cameroon is just a display of this reality since 1990. The initial idea has been that the Northern communities, through president Ahidjo have passed a turn to the Southern population of Cameroon through President Paul Biya. According to them, political power is supposed to go back to the North after Biya. In the year 1992, the ideology behind the Biya must go slogan was that it is the turn of the Anglophones. The Francophones have been managing power since independence. In 2018, the Bamileke populations, with in mind the ideology of Dongmo, the author of the Bamileke dynamism, stating that the Bamileke population must grab the power by demography, actually were convinced that it was their turn. The score of Issa Tchiroma Bakary in 2025, was partially due to a communaucratic coalition between the Bamileke and some Northern population, and some communacratic allies, who thought that communaucratic alliance could be the solution to overthrow the power of the Fang-Beti and Bulu. Politics in Cameroon has almost always been a matter of which is the new community to get into power? Whose turn is it?


 

(*) Dr. Yves Valéry Obame is affiliated with the University of Bertoua, the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC), and the Geneva Africa Lab (GAL).

(**) Dr. Salomon Essaga Etémé is affiliated with the University of Yaoundé I and the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).

(***) Professor Armand Leka Essomba is affiliated with the University of Yaoundé I and the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).


 

References

Bach, D. C. & Gazibo, M. (Eds.). (2012). Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. Routledge.

Bayart, J.-F. (1989). L’État en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Fayard.

Brubaker, R. (2017). “Why Populism?” Theory and Society, 46(5), 357–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7

Chabal, P. & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Indiana University Press

Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform. Cambridge University Press.

Dongmo, J-L. (1981). Le dynamisme Bamiléké. Yaoundé: CEPER.

Geschiere, P. (2009). The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. University of Chicago Press.

Konings, P. & Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2003). Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Brill.

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso.

Lynch, G. (2011). I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. University of Chicago Press.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

Müller, J.-W. (2016). What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Dongmo, J.-L. (1981). Le Dynamisme Bamiléké. (Vol. 1-2). Université de Yaoundé.

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006). Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa. Zed Books.

Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge University Press.

Resnick, D. (2014). Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies. Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, A. (2002). “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0031

Weyland, K. (2001). “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412

Residents flee burning homes in Belfast.

When Integration Falters, Nativism Advances: Europe’s Liberal Dilemma

Dr. João Ferreira Dias argues that the rise of anti-immigrant unrest across Europe reflects not simply tensions over migration, but a deeper crisis of democratic integration. In this timely commentary, he contends that diversity alone cannot sustain social cohesion without strong institutions capable of transforming difference into common citizenship. Drawing on scholarship by Robert Putnam, David Goodhart, Yascha Mounk, and others, Dr. Dias examines how weakening civic institutions, declining social trust, and unresolved integration challenges create fertile ground for nativist mobilization. Rather than framing the debate as a choice between openness and exclusion, he calls for renewed attention to the civic foundations that make pluralism politically sustainable. At stake, he argues, is Europe’s ability to reconcile diversity, solidarity, and democratic stability.

By João Ferreira Dias

Recent episodes of anti-immigrant unrest in cities such as Southampton and Belfast are often interpreted through the lens of public order, criminality, or political extremism. Yet these events may also be symptomatic of a deeper challenge confronting liberal democracies across Europe: the growing tension between openness and social cohesion.

One of the defining assumptions of the late twentieth-century liberal order was that increasingly open societies would naturally generate greater inclusion. Diversity, mobility, and multiculturalism were frequently treated not merely as compatible with democratic stability, but as self-evident expressions of it. What this assumption overlooks, however, is that openness alone does not produce integration.

Democratic societies require more than legal frameworks and economic opportunities. They depend upon a shared civic foundation capable of sustaining trust, cooperation, and political legitimacy. As Robert Putnam (2007) argued in his influential work on diversity and social capital, heterogeneity can enrich societies in the long term, but it may also create short-term challenges for social trust when institutions fail to mediate difference effectively.

The fragility of contemporary liberal democracies lies not in diversity itself, but in the weakening of the mechanisms that transform diversity into common citizenship. Schools, political parties, trade unions, local associations, and public institutions historically played a crucial role in integrating individuals from different backgrounds into a shared civic culture. When these mediating institutions weaken, identities that might otherwise coexist within a broader political community increasingly become sources of social fragmentation (Judt, 2010).

Immigration policy illustrates this dilemma particularly clearly. Contemporary European migration regimes often emerge from the intersection of several legitimate objectives: humanitarian obligations, historical responsibilities, labor market demands, and demographic decline. Yet political debate frequently neglects a more uncomfortable question: the absorptive capacity of receiving societies.

The notion that democratic states must continuously assess their capacity to integrate newcomers is often portrayed as morally suspect, as if limits necessarily imply exclusion. Yet a growing body of scholarship suggests the opposite. Sustainable inclusion requires not merely access, but incorporation into a common civic framework defined by rights and responsibilities, constitutional norms, linguistic participation, gender equality, and democratic values (Mounk, 2022; Miller, 2016).

Without such a framework, diversity risks evolving from pluralism into segmentation. Social groups become increasingly disconnected from one another, trust declines, and political entrepreneurs find fertile ground for mobilizing resentment. It is under these conditions that nativist movements gain traction.

The appeal of contemporary nativism rests on a powerful narrative: that European societies are losing control over their cultural continuity, historical identity, and political sovereignty. Whether empirically accurate or not, this perception acquires political force when citizens conclude that mainstream institutions are either unwilling or unable to address concerns related to integration, social cohesion, and public order.

Importantly, the rise of nativism should not be understood as a simple reaction to immigration itself. Such explanations are analytically insufficient. The same levels of migration can produce dramatically different political outcomes depending on the strength of institutions, the effectiveness of integration policies, and the degree of social trust present within a society (Goodhart, 2017; Krastev & Holmes, 2019).

The danger emerges when individual acts of crime, disorder, or social conflict cease to be interpreted as the actions of particular individuals and instead become symbolic markers of collective identity. In such contexts, immigrants are increasingly viewed as representatives of an undifferentiated out-group, while native populations come to see themselves as members of a threatened in-group. The resulting dynamic resembles what social psychologists have long identified as the transition from individual judgment to group-based political cognition.

History suggests that democracies become particularly vulnerable when they lose the ability to interpret and respond to the anxieties of their own citizens. Polarization thrives when complex social challenges are reduced to simplistic moral binaries, dividing societies into opposing camps of “us” and “them.” In this environment, both exclusionary nativism and uncompromising forms of ideological universalism feed off one another, narrowing the space for pragmatic democratic solutions.

The challenge facing Europe today is therefore not simply whether to accept more or fewer immigrants. It is whether liberal democracies can rebuild the institutional and civic foundations necessary to transform diversity into solidarity. The question is not openness versus closure, but whether openness can remain politically sustainable without a renewed commitment to integration.

The events witnessed in Southampton, Belfast, and elsewhere may not signal the inevitable triumph of nativism. They do, however, suggest that the political center is increasingly squeezed between competing certainties: on one side, an understanding of inclusion that often underestimates the importance of social cohesion; on the other, a nativist reaction that seeks belonging through exclusion.

Europe’s democratic future may well depend on its ability to recover the difficult middle ground between these two positions.

References

Goodhart, D. (2017). The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics. London, UK: Hurst.

Judt, T. (2010). Ill Fares the Land. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2019). The Light That Failed: A Reckoning. London, UK: Allen Lane.

Miller, D. (2016). Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mounk, Y. (2022). The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Putnam, R. D. (2007). “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century.” Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137–174.

Professor Stephan Haggard.

Prof. Haggard: Democratic Institutions Survive Only When Citizens Support Them

Professor Stephan Haggard, one of the world’s leading scholars of democratic backsliding and authoritarianism, argues that the survival of democracy depends not only on constitutional safeguards but also on sustained public commitment to democratic institutions. In this timely ECPS interview, he examines how populism, polarization, judicial erosion, and attacks on electoral integrity are reshaping democratic politics across the globe. Distinguishing between populism as a “thin ideology” and democratic backsliding as an institutional process, Professor Haggard warns that elected leaders increasingly challenge democracy from within. The conversation explores the weakening of horizontal checks, the rise of anti-institutional rhetoric, the diffusion of illiberal strategies across borders, and the growing importance of democratic resilience. As he cautions, democracy faces its greatest danger when populist movements cease to respect rights, the rule of law, and the integrity of elections.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic institutions are under mounting pressure from populist movements, partisan polarization, and growing distrust in public authority, understanding how democracies erode—and how they endure—has become one of the most urgent challenges in political science. Few scholars have contributed more to this debate than Professor Stephan Haggard, Research Professor and Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California San Diego. Over a distinguished career spanning comparative politics, political economy, authoritarianism, and democratic governance, Professor Haggard has produced some of the most influential scholarship on democratic transitions, institutional change, and regime durability.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Haggard reflects on the relationship between populism, democratic backsliding, judicial erosion, polarization, and the resilience of democratic institutions. Challenging simplistic understandings of democratic decline, he argues that contemporary autocratization increasingly unfolds not through military coups or abrupt regime collapses, but through gradual institutional weakening carried out by elected leaders operating within formally democratic systems.

One of the interview’s central themes is the fragility of democratic institutions when public support begins to erode. As Professor Haggard observes, “courts operate as checks only to the extent that there is support for courts operating as checks,” emphasizing that “democratic institutions survive only when citizens support them.” For him, the durability of democracy ultimately depends not only on constitutional design, but also on the willingness of political actors and citizens alike to defend the norms and institutions that sustain democratic rule.

Throughout the discussion, Professor Haggard distinguishes between populism as a political ideology and democratic backsliding as an institutional process. Drawing on Cas Mudde’s concept of populism as a “thin ideology,” he argues that populism becomes dangerous when commitments to majoritarian rule are accompanied by efforts to weaken rights, judicial independence, oversight of institutions, and other components of liberal democracy. “Populism is a kind of motivating ideology that can drive backsliding,” he explains, while democratic erosion manifests itself through concrete institutional consequences.

The interview also explores the growing challenge posed by anti-institutional rhetoric, attacks on electoral integrity, transnational networks of illiberal cooperation, and the emergence of authoritarian regional organizations that seek to reshape global governance. Particularly striking is Professor Haggard’s candid assessment of the contemporary United States. Reflecting on the resilience of advanced democracies, he acknowledges that he is “beginning to have doubts”about earlier assumptions that consolidated democracies are largely immune from authoritarian drift. Indeed, he remarks that if asked whether the United States remains a democracy, he would “have to scratch [his] head over that question.”

At once sobering and illuminating, this interview offers a powerful examination of the institutional foundations of democracy and the conditions under which they can be preserved—or lost.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Stephan Haggard, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Populism and Backsliding Should Be Seen as Distinct Phenomena

Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Haggard, welcome. To begin, in your recent work on democratic backsliding, you argue that democratic erosion unfolds through identifiable institutional pathways rather than abrupt regime breakdowns. To what extent has contemporary populism become the primary vehicle through which democratic backsliding is advancing across diverse contexts such as the United States, Hungary, India, Turkey, and Latin America?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Actually, your question made me think about the relationship between populism and backsliding in a more comprehensive way. Populism, to me, is a form of what Cas Mudde calls a thin ideology. And I am sure your center has done work in that vein. What I mean by that is something quite particular: it includes a belief that democracy should be majoritarian in form. By majoritarian democracy, I mean the simple concept that the people should rule, the public should rule, and that rights and horizontal checks should be minimized in the interest of popular sovereignty.

Now, that is related to the concept of backsliding insofar as believers in this kind of majoritarian conception of democracy see fit to dismantle things that we would consider components of liberal democracy in order to achieve their objectives. To make a long-winded answer short, I would say that populism is a kind of motivating ideology that can drive backsliding, but it should be seen as somewhat distinct from it, with backsliding being the institutional consequences of governments that hold these populist beliefs.

Courts Cannot Function as Checks Without Public Backing

Many contemporary populist leaders portray themselves as the authentic representatives of “the people” against allegedly corrupt elites and institutions. Why have legislatures, courts, and oversight bodies proven particularly vulnerable to populist attacks despite their central role in democratic accountability?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Again, what I find so fascinating about discussions of populism and backsliding is that they get us to the core components of how democracies survive and what we mean by democratic rule. Courts operate as checks only to the extent that there is support for courts operating as checks. If that support dwindles or diminishes, it becomes harder for them to play that function. This is true across the institutions that manage elections, it is true of courts, it is true of ombudsmen, it is true of anti-corruption agencies, and so forth. So, my answer to this question is that if you have populist movements that are robust and willing to achieve their goals by attacking these components of liberal democracy as we understand them, then it becomes difficult for those institutions to act as checks.

Let me say one thing about the incumbents of these offices as well, because this is something that I think deserves more research. In the United States, for example, in the electoral monitoring bodies, we have found that the individuals who staff those bodies are frequently quite committed to their democratic function. That has itself acted as a check, insofar as the personnel in these institutions have remained committed to their fundamental goals and thus supported them and made them viable. So that is another interesting area of research: the level of personnel, and whether they are committed to the democratic project or not.

Backsliding Has Become the Contemporary Route to Authoritarianism

Illustration: Design Rage.

Classical theories of democratic breakdown focused on military coups and overt authoritarian seizures of power. How has the rise of electoral populism transformed our understanding of democratic erosion and regime change in the twenty-first century?

Professor Stephan Haggard: I would see coups and backsliding as two quite different routes to authoritarian rule, and there may be others. For example, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way have recently published a very important book on authoritarian durability, in which they argue that social revolution is one path to authoritarian durability. But in general, over the course of the post-World War II world the main route to authoritarian governance historically was the coup. It was the military that challenged democratic rule, and it would typically do so quite suddenly. Military leaders would walk in front of a bank of microphones and say, “Congress is closed, the courts are closed, political parties are banned. The press is now going to be censored and controlled.” 

What is interesting is that, in general, this form of attack on democracy diminished in incidence over the post-war period.But it has not gone away altogether. We had a coup in Thailand in 2014 and in Myanmar in 2021, and we have seen a spate of recent coups in West Africa. We also have some hybrid forms, which are interesting. For example, the Korean case is quite interesting. That involved a declaration of martial law that was very short-lived. It was made by a civilian but then implicated the military and was ultimately rolled back.

Basically, my answer to your question is that these are two routes by which democracy is challenged. In some cases, the military is not fully under civilian control and ends up acting autonomously. More recently, however, backsliding seems to be the route whereby elected officials—duly elected officials, I should add, that is, officials elected through free and fair electoral processes—nonetheless attack the components of democratic rule.

Polarization Is Both a Cause and a Consequence of Backsliding

Your work emphasizes the importance of polarization in democratic backsliding. To what extent is polarization an unintended byproduct of contemporary politics, and to what extent is it deliberately cultivated by populist leaders seeking to weaken institutional constraints and consolidate executive power?

Professor Stephan Haggard: I took this question as suggesting two somewhat different issues, so let me address each of them. The first, which is explicit in your question, is a cause-and-effect question: Is polarization a cause of backsliding, or do backsliding leaders advance the cause of polarization? I think the answer is clearly both. We do see an intensification of polarization as a prelude to backsliding. But we also see political leaders—from Erdogan to Trump and many others in between—focusing on dividing publics in particular ways, casting society into categories such as the real people and the enemies of the people, and so on. So, we certainly observe that mechanism at work.

However, there is another question that Bob Kaufman and I struggled with while writing Backsliding, namely whether there is some common taproot underlying the kind of polarization we are currently seeing across the world. Our answer to that question was that it was difficult to find one. Susan Stokes has recently argued that inequality is really a kind of taproot of both polarization and backsliding. But we found a variety of different ways in which publics polarize, and not only over economic issues. They polarize over religion, for example, in Turkey. They polarize over cosmopolitan values in Russia and Eastern Europe. And they polarize around left-right issues in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

So, the whole question of polarization is certainly not something novel in Bob’s and my work on backsliding. But we do not see a single line of polarization that applies across all of these cases. Rather, polarization can arise around a variety of different social cleavages.

Control of Courts and Media Has Powerful Downstream Effects

The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.

Populist governments frequently justify attacks on courts by claiming that judges obstruct the popular will. In light of your work on judicial backsliding, do you see the judiciary as the central battleground in the contemporary conflict between populism and constitutional liberalism?

Professor Stephan Haggard: I wouldn’t say that it is the central institution where these contests are playing out, but I certainly think that two institutions deserve particular mention because they have what we might call downstream causal effects. By that, I mean that if you can get a hold of the judiciary, and if you can control the press, then you are able to propagate your narratives to the public, and you are able to remove a limitation on executive discretion.

So, I don’t think that the judiciary is the only locus of this backsliding narrative, or of the institutional changes associated with backsliding. But I do think that it is particularly important because, if backsliding leaders can gain control of the courts, it becomes possible for them to undertake other actions that contribute to their backsliding projects. I should say that I am obviously preoccupied with my own country, where it seems that backsliding is well entrenched.

There is now a quite significant debate emerging about the courts because, initially, it was believed that the courts were a block to Trump’s ambitions, for example with respect to the elections in 2020. But now, there are growing doubts about whether the Supreme Court is an adequate backstop against those ambitions. The ruling, which effectively grants him quite substantial immunity with respect to some actions he undertakes in the Oval Office, has cast doubt on whether the High Court can be fully trusted, even though lower courts seem to be standing up to the administration.

Oversight Failures Enable Executive Encroachment on Courts

Your research suggests that declining horizontal constraints are more important than simple legislative majorities in explaining judicial backsliding. Does populism become particularly dangerous when electoral victories are combined with the systematic dismantling of institutional veto points?

Professor Stephan Haggard: I’m really glad that you were willing to give some attention to this work I’ve done with Lydia Tiede on the subject of judicial backsliding, because we were quite excited about that project and about focusing on it in a relatively narrow way.

That paper was trying to make a relatively narrow analytic point, which is the following: there are two ways in which legislatures might play a role in undermining the independence of the courts. One is through their control over statutes. They can rewrite laws governing the judiciary in ways that reduce its independence. They can also allow for the firing of judges. They can give the executive more power in the appointment of judges and in the firing of judges.

So, legislatures can act in that way. But we also found that the dismantling of horizontal checks on the executive, in the form of legislative oversight, played a distinctive role in the process of judicial backsliding. And by the way, when I use the term judicial backsliding, I am referring simply to a reduction in the independence of the courts. 

We have a great deal of literature that talks about the sources of judicial independence, but much less that addresses the conditions under which judicial independence might be undermined. And we were simply making the point that legislatures play a role in that regard, either because they have anti-judicial majorities or because their oversight of the executive allows it to meddle in the courts in ways that are adverse to democracy.

Policy Change Is Democratic; Institutional Dismantling Is Not

Populists often frame democratic politics as a struggle between a virtuous people and corrupt elites. How can ordinary people distinguish between legitimate democratic majoritarianism and populist projects that gradually undermine liberal-democratic institutions in the name of popular sovereignty?

Professor Stephan Haggard: The answer to this question is both simple and complicated. It is simple in the following sense: populist projects have adverse effects on democracy when the argument is made that democratic institutions have to be partly dismantled in order to achieve the populist objective. That is really the key point. Let’s take a left-wing example. I could say that I’m Chávez. I could say that I think the Venezuelan government should be engaged in a more radical program of redistribution. Well, that’s fine. That is what democracy is. Democracy is a contest between different political ideas.

But it is quite different to say that we should have a radical redistributive program and to say that, in order to achieve it, I am going to eliminate Congress. Or that, in order to achieve it, I am going to resort to presidential executive orders or executive discretion. That is really where the paths diverge. Does the achievement of the populist objective require that democracy be modified or not? Because it is at that point that the arguments of the populists become worrying.

Anti-Bureaucratic Populism Risks Weakening State Capacity

Populist leaders frequently claim that independent institutions—from courts and central banks to universities and the media—constitute an unelected “deep state” obstructing the will of the people. How important is this anti-institutional discourse in facilitating democratic backsliding, and does it represent a common pattern across contemporary cases of autocratization?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Of all the questions you ask me, Selcuk, this is the one that probably deserves more attention among students of contemporary democracy. Let me try to frame it in a way that might be of interest to your readers. Contemporary advanced industrial states, of necessity, are engaged in complex efforts to regulate public policy in areas that rely heavily on scientific evidence. And the question here—and we are seeing this attack in the United States—goes something like this: Can the legislature delegate to the bureaucracy the process of writing rules that are often extremely technical in their design?

For example, a legislature might want to clean up water pollution. But doing so requires a whole series of technical actions and regulations that would restrict what polluters can do. The radical attack on the modern state is taking the form of arguing that those powers have to be very specifically delegated from Congress to the bureaucracy. My own thinking is that if we really go far down that route, we are going to be in significant trouble, because we will have court’s ruling on highly technical matters on which they really do not have the understanding or the capacity to make judgments.

So, the “deep state” argument, to me, is quite troubling because it basically argues that legislatures cannot delegate to bureaucracies or can only delegate in a very limited way. This is a particular ideological program aimed at dismantling not just the deep state, but what we think of as the contemporary state apparatus in advanced industrial democracies.

The United States Is Testing the Limits of Democratic Resilience

No King Protests.
Demonstrators at The People’s March, an evolution of the Women’s March, NYC, January 18, 2025. A protester holds a sign reading “Presidents Are Not Kings.” Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.

Recent years have seen increasing interaction between populism and what some scholars call “competitive authoritarianism.” Do you view populism primarily as a pathway into competitive authoritarian rule, or can populist movements remain compatible with democratic contestation under certain institutional conditions?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Let me start with the second part of the question, because I want to make sure that my position on this is clear. In a democracy, you are going to have competing ideas, and populist movements are going to emerge. They have every right to contest in the public sphere, just like anyone else. We have right-wing populists, and we have left-wing populists in the United States, such as Bernie Sanders. Donald Trump also has a right to run for political office and contest elections on a right-populist platform. We cannot restrict competition. Democracy is about that kind of political contestation.

But the question is whether those populist programs become attached to political demands for revisions in the nature of democratic rule. Under those circumstances, it is quite possible for populist movements to become anti-democratic in character.

Now, in the book I wrote with Bob, we made the prediction that advanced industrial democracies—or those that had become more extensively consolidated—would be less likely to descend into competitive authoritarian rule. We might think of consolidation as a temporal process involving many years, or as a reflection of the strength of institutions such as the courts. But I am beginning to have my doubts. If I were asked right now whether the United States is a democracy, I would have to scratch my head over that question.

I am not completely convinced that we are at the moment, because so much interference has occurred with respect to key institutions—or at least so many attempts have been made to subvert key institutions, such as the integrity of the electoral system—that there are now sincere doubts about whether the Republican Party in the United States can truly be considered a democratic party.

There Is Clearly a Right-Populist International

Many observers speak of an emerging international ecosystem of populist and illiberal actors. To what extent are contemporary populist leaders learning from one another’s strategies of institutional capture, constitutional revision, and democratic erosion?

Professor Stephan Haggard: You’re a very generous interviewer because you’ve opened up a topic that I’ve been working on recently. If anyone is interested in my work on this, we’re running a project called Illiberal Regimes in Global Governance, which addresses exactly these questions.

Now, the way you’ve framed this question relates directly to transnational movements of right-wing populism and to whether they can learn from one another, or whether there is a process that we might think of as the diffusion of right-populist norms and strategies. The answer to that question is quite clearly “yes.” There is a kind of right-populist international that stretches from Eastern Europe—which some populists in the United States clearly admire—to the Reform movement in the United Kingdom, and even farther afield into Russia and elsewhere. So, if the question is simply whether populists can learn from one another and even collaborate around some of their objectives, the answer is clearly yes.

Autocracies Draw Strength from International Resources

Your work on authoritarian international organizations highlights the external dimensions of autocratization. Are we also witnessing the emergence of transnational networks that facilitate the diffusion of populist narratives, governance strategies, and anti-liberal political practices?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Yes, my answer to the previous question touched on that issue of transnational movements. But let me say, at a more general level, before we continue in this vein, that autocratic governments, while jealously guarding their sovereignty, have always drawn on international resources to sustain their rule.

You can think about this at the highest geostrategic level in terms of alliances. In the early post-war Cold War period, for example, the United States maintained alliances with autocratic regimes that it believed advanced US strategic interests. We saw this in Latin America and in East Asia, with Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and others. 

So, as a general matter, it has always been the case that authoritarian regimes have relied on different forms of international support. What this project seeks to address, however, is the question of how authoritarian governments can use international organizations in particular to accomplish those objectives, a topic that I will describe in more detail.

Authoritarian Regional Organizations Deserve Far More Attention

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Logo of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), surrounded by the flags of its member and affiliated states. Founded in 2001, the SCO is an Eurasian intergovernmental organization focused on regional security, political cooperation, economic collaboration, and strategic coordination among its members. Photo: Dreamstime. Photo: Vladimir Gnedin / Dreamstime.

The post–Cold War expectation was that international institutions would reinforce democratic norms. Yet many contemporary populist movements portray these institutions as threats to national sovereignty. How has populist nationalism altered the relationship between international organizations and democratic governance?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Again, thanks for your generosity in focusing on some of the research I’ve done recently. We recently published a piece in the Review of International Organizations that explored the agenda of thinking about illiberal regimes in global governance. Let me mention three clusters of questions that are particularly important.

The first is that the major powers, particularly Russia and China, have clearly recognized that multilateral institutions are forums in which existing liberal norms can be contested. Moving forward, we are going to have to pay much more attention to the ways in which China, Russia, and their allies in the Global South are trying to reshape political norms within multilateral institutions. For example, China and a like-minded group of states at the Human Rights Council have been very adept at blocking efforts to use the Council to focus attention on human rights abuses committed by member states. There is something inherently contradictory about a Human Rights Council that is populated, in part, by authoritarian regimes that have no interest in external scrutiny of their actions.

But there are two other levels that are also interesting. Because you are located in Europe, you are obviously familiar with the first of these, which I call the Orban Problem. You have a democratic international institution with strong and specific democratic norms—the European Union. But it also has members that are engaged in backsliding and are actively challenging those norms. I think you and your readers know that it has been a very complicated fifteen-year process for the Union, both at the political level and through the Commission, to determine exactly how to manage the challenges posed by backsliding states within its own ranks.

The other phenomenon I have been working on recently—and I am actually sending off a book manuscript on this over the weekend—is that authoritarian regimes, as we are learning, are quite capable of forming their own regional organizations. And not only of forming them, but of using them for explicitly political purposes. I am thinking here of institutions such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Gulf Cooperation Council, ALBA in South America, and ASEAN in Southeast Asia as some of the major examples. I know you have an interest in Turkey, and Erdogan has led similar efforts around this sort of Turkic organization in that space.

What we are seeing is that these organizations are not formed solely for traditional functional purposes such as economic integration. They are also cooperating quite explicitly around political objectives. These include election monitoring, supporting members facing financial distress through lending, and judicial cooperation that eases extradition processes and contributes to transnational repression. So, these authoritarian regional organizations constitute a relatively small part of the global governance architecture, but they are nevertheless a significant one, and we need to pay close attention to what they are doing.

Distrust Can Be as Damaging as Electoral Manipulation

Across many democracies, populist actors increasingly challenge electoral authorities, voter registration systems, and election-monitoring institutions. Are elections themselves becoming a central arena through which populists seek to reshape democratic competition while preserving a veneer of electoral legitimacy?

Professor Stephan Haggard: Of course, the integrity of the electoral system is the bottom line at which backsliding intersects with a turn toward outright authoritarianism. Because I think of an authoritarian system as one in which the possibility of challenging an incumbent electorally falls toward zero. In other words, if my chances of winning an election fall to zero, then you are really dealing with an authoritarian regime.

But I want to emphasize something else about elections and electoral integrity that is equally troubling. It is not only a direct assault on electoral institutions that matters. That effort may fail. For example, it is likely to fail in the United States elections in the fall, and it will probably be well managed. But by repeatedly claiming that the electoral system lacks integrity and by challenging its legitimacy, populists also sow distrust among the public toward electoral institutions.

So, the objective is not only to undermine those institutions directly. It is also to sow doubt about electoral outcomes that populists believe may go against them. This issue poses as much of a challenge in many advanced industrial democracies as an outright attack on those institutions, because it creates a public that increasingly no longer believes that electoral results are free and fair.

Economic Inequality Can Fuel Both Left- and Right-Wing Populism

Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Your work has explored the relationship between inequality, distributive conflict, and regime change. How do economic grievances, perceptions of unfairness, and social insecurity interact with populist appeals to create conditions conducive to democratic backsliding?

Professor Stephan Haggard: If we have another conversation, we could probably spend the entire time discussing this question. But let me just offer a few thoughts.

First, levels of inequality differ quite substantially across the advanced industrial states, but the overall trend is fairly clear: inequality has been increasing. One might expect that rising inequality would give rise to what we would call left-wing populism. Indeed, we do see this across the advanced industrial world. There is a left-populist current out there. Again, speaking about my own country, you can see it in figures such as Mamdani, the mayor of New York, Bernie Sanders, and a number of politicians on the left of the political spectrum in the United States.

But the important point is that inequality does not necessarily manifest itself through left-populist rhetoric. It can also manifest itself through right-populist rhetoric. For example, it is quite common to see concerns about inequality coupled with anti-immigrant sentiment. Or with protectionist policies on trade. Or with opposition to what are perceived as liberal or cosmopolitan values, as opposed to more traditional ones. 

So, we need to be careful about two things. The first is the question of whether inequality is a causal factor in populism and democratic backsliding. The second is how that disaffection with democracy is expressed through different political programs. Those are two distinct questions, because a critique of inequality can just as easily be attached to a right-wing populist narrative.

Working Within Democratic Rules May Be the Strongest Response

Several countries have succeeded in slowing or reversing democratic backsliding despite strong populist movements. What institutional safeguards, opposition strategies, or forms of civic mobilization have proven most effective in countering populist assaults on democratic institutions?

Professor Stephan Haggard: In some ways, this is the most important question you have asked in this interview, and I wish I had more answers to it. I would simply note that there is currently a strong intellectual current within the academic literature that seeks to focus less on backsliding and more on the concept of resilience. Let me make a couple of observations in that regard. There are scholars whose work deserves much more attention, including Laura Gamboa, who has produced some very interesting research on South America.

One of the key questions concerns how confrontational opposition tactics should be. If I understand her work correctly, she emphasizes the use of legal challenges—working within existing rules rather than moving toward mass mobilization and street confrontation. Such strategies may be more effective because they are seen as upholding shared democratic norms.

Of course, there is always a dilemma when it comes to opposition movements confronting authoritarian regimes: whether mass mobilization, and especially the use of violence, can have counterproductive effects by allowing incumbent governments to blame the opposition for civic unrest.

So, there are many intricate questions surrounding this issue. But I would certainly place the study of democratic resilience high on the research agenda as something all of us should be paying closer attention to.

We Are Clearly Living Through a Populist Moment

And lastly, Professor Haggard, much of the literature on populism focuses on its causes, while your work highlights its institutional consequences. Looking ahead, do you believe that populism is a temporary challenge within democratic politics, or has it become a durable feature of contemporary democracy that requires a fundamental rethinking of democratic resilience and constitutional design?

Professor Stephan Haggard: I’ll close—unfortunately or fortunately—by reiterating a point I have made before, and it may sound simple and obvious. We are definitely experiencing a populist moment. There is really no question about that. At the same time, we need to be very careful to distinguish between populist movements that are willing to operate within a given democratic framework and those that seek to fundamentally challenge what we would regard as the core elements of a democratic society.

I’ll conclude by noting that this extends to issues of rights. Because extreme populist movements can argue that certain groups in society should not enjoy the rights they have come to possess and that those rights should be taken away. In both Europe and the United States, for example, this debate is playing out with respect to how immigrants should be treated. Whether they should be afforded due process and access to court hearings before they are deported or imprisoned, and so forth. These are very basic issues.

If populist movements are not committed to sustaining those components of democracy that we regard as essential—rights, horizontal checks on executive power, the rule of law, and the integrity of the electoral system—then we are facing a much deeper problem than if populism is simply being contested within the realm of routine policy disagreements among parties in a democracy.