JosephWright

Prof. Wright: The Most Troubling Aspect of Trump 2.0 Is the Personalization of the Security Forces

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Joseph Wright (Penn State University) warns that the most alarming development of “Trump 2.0” is the rapid personalization of the state’s coercive apparatus. “The most troubling aspect… is the personalization of the security forces. That is the single most damaging thing that can happen to a country,” he cautions. Professor Wright notes that ICE has evolved into “a fully militarized internal security organization,” now poised to become one of the world’s largest such forces—capable, he warns, of being deployed “to seize ballot boxes” or “shoot protesters.” While federalism still offers partial safeguards, Professor Wright argues the United States is witnessing early signs of institutional capture characteristic of personalist regimes worldwide.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and sobering interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Joseph Wright of Penn State University offers a stark assessment of the United States’ democratic trajectory under a second Trump administration. Drawing on his extensive comparative research on personalist rule, bureaucratic erosion, and autocratization, Professor Wright argues that the defining danger of “Trump 2.0” lies in the accelerating personalization of the state apparatus, and especially of the coercive arms of government. As he warns, “What appears to me to be the most troubling aspect of the personalization of the government [is] the personalization of the security forces. That is the single most damaging thing that can happen to a country.”

Professor Wright situates his analysis within a broader global pattern in which elected strongmen—figures such as Erdoğan, Orbán, and other personalist executives—transform political parties, bureaucracies, and security institutions into instruments of personal power. Applying these insights to the contemporary United States, he identifies three markers of personalist party consolidation: a leader’s control of financial resources, control over candidate nominations, and the elevation of loyalists who depend entirely on the leader for their political survival. “He controls the money… he controls nominations, and… he appoints loyalists,” Professor Wright explains, noting that together these dynamics render party elites “basically unwilling to stand up to him.”

While the United States remains far from the fully consolidated autocracies seen in Turkey or Hungary, Professor Wright warns that early signs of bureaucratic hollowing and selective purges have already emerged. The Department of Justice, he argues, is the clearest example, where loyalist appointments and the abandonment of legal enforcement norms have created “a green light to lots of actors to be able to break the law.” Particularly concerning is the rise of a militarized internal security force centered on ICE, which he describes as “a fully militarized internal security organization” now positioned to become one of the largest coercive bodies in the world. Such a force, he cautions, could be deployed “to seize ballot boxes, to shoot protesters… or deter people from showing up at the voting booths,” mirroring patterns observed in autocratizing regimes elsewhere.

Yet, Professor Wright also emphasizes the continued importance of federalism as a barrier to total centralization. Local law-enforcement autonomy and decentralized election administration remain crucial buffers. Still, he stresses that the danger is not hypothetical but unfolding: “We don’t know where it’s going to go… things have progressed rapidly.”

Taken together, Professor Wright’s analysis offers one of the clearest comparative warnings to date: the durability of American democracy now hinges not only on electoral outcomes, but on whether the country can resist the deepening personalization of its most powerful state institutions.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Joseph Wright, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Virtual Workshops -Session 7

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 7: Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

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Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a compelling interdisciplinary examination of how contemporary populism unsettles the foundations of democratic representation. Bringing together insights from digital politics, the history of political thought, and critical social theory, the session illuminated the multiple arenas—affective, constitutional, and epistemic—through which representation is being reconfigured. Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano revealed how memetic communication and generative AI reshape political identities and moral boundaries within far-right movements. Maria Giorgia Caraceni traced these dynamics to enduring tensions within the conceptual history of popular sovereignty, while Elif Başak Ürdem demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy generates misrecognition and drives grievances toward populist articulation. Collectively, the session highlighted the necessity of integrated, cross-disciplinary approaches for understanding the evolving crisis of democratic representation.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 27, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 7 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism,” assembled an interdisciplinary group of scholars to interrogate the shifting boundaries of political representation in an era defined by populist appeals, democratic fragmentation, and technological transformation. The workshop opened with a brief orientation by ECPS intern Reka Koleszar, who welcomed participants, provided technical guidance, and formally introduced the moderator, presenters, and discussant on behalf of ECPS, ensuring a smooth and well-structured beginning to the session.

Under the steady and incisive moderation of Dr. Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor at Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University), the session unfolded as a robust intellectual engagement with the crises and possibilities surrounding contemporary democratic representation. Dr. Magno framed the event by situating today’s populist moment within broader transformations affecting democratic institutions, public trust, and communicative infrastructures. Emphasizing that representation must be understood not only institutionally but also symbolically and epistemically, he set the stage for the three presentations, each of which approached the problem of representation from a distinct but complementary angle.

The first presentation, delivered by Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University), examined how memes, short-form videos, and AI-generated images operate as potent vehicles of populist discourse. His talk demonstrated how digital visual cultures simplify complex ideological battles, construct moralized identities, and normalize hostility—revealing the emotional and aesthetic foundations of far-right mobilization in Latin America. By mapping differences in memetic ecosystems across Argentina, Brazil, and El Salvador, Dr. Bayarri illuminated how digital artifacts reshape political communication and reconfigure the representational field.

Next, Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; and Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V) offered a long-term conceptual genealogy of popular sovereignty, tracing contemporary populism to the enduring tension between monist and pluralist understandings of “the people.” Through a reconstruction of Rousseauian and Madisonian frameworks, Caraceni argued that the conflict between unfettered majority rule and constitutional constraints is not a modern anomaly but a persistent structural dilemma within democratic theory—one that populism reactivates with renewed force.

The final presentation, by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University), analyzed populism as a political response to the failures of neoliberal meritocracy. Introducing the concept of epistemic misrecognition, Ürdem argued that meritocratic regimes undermine democratic parity by devaluing non-credentialed forms of knowledge, generating status injury, and closing off channels of political voice. Her synthesis of Nancy Fraser’s tripartite justice framework and Ernesto Laclau’s theory of political articulation offered a novel explanation for why unaddressed grievances increasingly channel into populist mobilization.

The session concluded with deeply engaged feedback given by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford), whose discussant reflections synthesized the thematic intersections among the papers while posing incisive questions that broadened the theoretical and comparative horizons of the workshop.

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ManuelLarrabure

Assoc. Prof. Larrabure: A New Right-Wing Alliance Is Emerging in Latin America—and Democracy Will Take a Toll

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Chile’s November 16, 2025 presidential vote has produced an unprecedented runoff between José Antonio Kast and Jeannette Jara, crystallizing what Assoc. Prof. Manuel Larrabure calls a historic ideological rupture. Speaking to ECPS, he warns that Chile’s shift must be understood within a broader continental realignment: “A new right-wing alliance is emerging in Latin America—and democracy will take a toll.” According to Larrabure, this bloc is not restoring old authoritarianism but “reinventing democracy—and it’s working.” Kast’s coalition embodies a regional “Bolsonaro–Milei playbook,” powered by what Larrabure terms “rule by chaos,” amplified by compulsory voting and disinformation ecosystems. Meanwhile, the Chilean left enters the run-off severely weakened—“the final nail in the coffin” of a long cycle of progressive contestation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Chile’s first-round presidential election on November 16, 2025 has produced one of the most consequential political realignments in the country’s post-authoritarian history. For the first time since return to democracy, voters are confronted with a stark extreme-right–versus–Communist runoff between José Antonio Kast and Jeannette Jara—an outcome that crystallizes the profound fragmentation and ideological polarization reshaping Chilean politics. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Associate Professor Manuel Larrabure, a scholar of Latin American Studies at Bucknell University, whose research on Latin American political transformations offers a critical vantage point on Chile’s current trajectory. As he notes, the 2025 election marks not merely a national turning point, but a regional one: “A new right-wing alliance is emerging in Latin America—and democracy will take a toll.”

Dr. Larrabure situates Chile’s sharp bifurcation within a wider continental pattern of right-wing recomposition, one increasingly linked across Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and beyond. This emergent bloc, he argues, is not driven by nostalgia for past authoritarianism but by a more adaptive and experimental form of illiberal governance. “They are not trying to destroy democracy,” he stresses. “They are trying to reinvent it—and it’s working.” Kast’s coalition, he suggests, fits squarely within this “Bolsonaro–Milei playbook,” but is tempered by Chile’s more conservative political culture. Still, the danger is clear: the right is forging a novel repertoire of power in an era defined by global monopolies, weakened party systems, and disoriented progressive forces.

One of Dr. Larrabure’s most striking insights concerns what he calls the right wing’s mastery of “rule by chaos.” Rather than relying solely on repression, the contemporary right activates social anxieties—around crime, immigration, and insecurity—to mobilize working-class discontent. This dynamic has been amplified, he argues, by Chile’s reintroduced system of compulsory voting, which “absolutely turned out working in favor of the right wing” during the failed constitutional plebiscite of 2022. Social mediaecosystems have further strengthened the right’s influence by “creating an atmosphere of general misinformation and chaos, communicational chaos and informational chaos, in which they can operate with ease.”

By contrast, the Chilean left enters the 2025 runoff severely weakened. Dr. Larrabure describes the election as “the final nail in the coffin of a cycle of contestation” that began with the 2006 school protests, peaked in the 2011 student movement, and culminated in the aborted constitutional process of 2019–2022. Progressive forces, he contends, have struggled to translate grassroots innovation into institutional power, hampered in part by diminished capacities for popular education and an unresolved tension between participatory democratic ideals and party-led governance.

Looking ahead, Dr. Larrabure foresees intensified social conflict but also the latent possibility of democratic renewal. Chile’s constitutional debate, he argues, is effectively over; yet social movements will continue to respond. Ultimately, the question is whether they can forge a transformative project capable of “learning from the mistakes of the past” amid an increasingly securitized and polarized political landscape.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Manuel Larrabure, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

LisaZanotti2

Asst. Prof. Zanotti: Presidential Systems Ease Populists’ Rise to Power in Latin America

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In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lisa Zanotti—Assistant Professor at Diego Portales University and researcher at COES and Ultra-Lab—offers a sharply focused analysis of the far right’s accelerating rise in Latin America and its implications for Chile’s 2025 election. She underscores a crucial structural insight: “presidential systems ease populists’ rise to power in Latin America,” helping figures like José Antonio Kast gain rapid executive influence. While Chile’s rightward shift appears dramatic, Dr. Zanotti cautions that it is driven less by ideological conversion than by strong anti-elite and anti-incumbent sentiment. She also highlights the authoritarian core of the Latin American PRR, warning that “when the far right remains in power for an extended period, democratic backsliding occurs.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lisa Zanotti—an Assistant Professor at Diego Portales University in Santiago, an adjunct researcher at the Center for the Study of Social Conflict and Cohesion (COES), and a researcher at the Laboratory for the Study of the Far Right (Ultra-Lab)—offers one of the most analytically rich and empirically grounded assessments of Chile’s rapidly shifting political landscape. Her comparative research on democratic backsliding, authoritarian value orientations, and the ideological evolution of the Latin American populist radical right (PRR) provides an indispensable framework for understanding the stakes of Chile’s 2025 presidential contest. As she succinctly puts it, “presidential systems ease populists’ rise to power in Latin America,” a structural insight that defines the broader context in which José Antonio Kast is poised to ascend.

In this interview, Dr. Zanotti situates Chile within the region’s accelerating rightward turn, connecting domestic dynamics to a fourth wave of radical-right expansion across Latin America. While acknowledging the ideological coherence of certain far-right constituencies, she emphasizes that Chile’s electoral realignment is driven less by ideological conversion than by powerful anti-elite and anti-incumbent sentiment. As she notes, “there is clearly a shift occurring, but I would not describe it primarily as an ideological one… Ideology plays a role, but it does not fully account for this transformation.”This perspective helps illuminate the surprising convergence of voters behind right-wing candidates in the first-round results, as well as the immediate endorsements Kast received from figures such as Johannes Kaiser and Evelyn Matthei.

A central theme in Dr. Zanotti’s scholarship—and in her interpretation of Kast’s rise—is the distinctively authoritarian character of the Latin American PRR. Chile, she argues, represents a partial exception due to Kast’s unusually explicit anti-immigrant discourse, yet his worldview still fits squarely within an authoritarian framework. “Those who disrupt that order must be punished severely,” she explains, underscoring Kast’s fusion of conservative moral hierarchies, punitive security policies, and anti-liberal social views.

Dr. Zanotti also challenges conventional assumptions about digital populism. While acknowledging the role of disinformation, she cautions: “I don’t think there is compelling evidence that far-right or populist radical-right leaders use digital media… significantly more than other parties.” Instead, disengaged voters gravitate toward whichever camp dominates the agenda—this year, Kast on crime and immigration, and Franco Parisi on anti-establishment appeals.

The conversation concludes with a sobering reflection on democratic erosion. Drawing on comparative cases such as Hungary and Poland, Dr. Zanotti warns: “when the far right remains in power for an extended period, democratic backsliding occurs.” Chile’s future therefore hinges on the durability of its institutions, the fragmentation of its party system, and the evolving attitudes of an electorate increasingly shaped by insecurity and disaffection.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Assisstant Professor Lisa Zanotti, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Richard Youngs

Professor Youngs: We Are in an Interregnum Between the Liberal Global Order and Whatever Comes Next

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In his interview with ECPS, Professor Richard Youngs (Carnegie Europe; University of Warwick) offers a sharp assessment of today’s democratic crisis. Highlighting a “qualitative shift” in autocratization, he points to two transformative forces: digital technologies and a rapidly changing international order. As he observes, “we are in an interregnum between the liberal global order and whatever comes next.” Professor Youngs warns that democratic erosion is driven not only by structural pressures but by the “incremental tactics” of illiberal leaders who steadily undermine checks and balances—often learning directly from one another. Looking ahead, he argues that mere institutional survival is insufficient: democracies must pursue renewal and resilience, noting that “it is much easier to undo democracy than to reassemble good-quality democratic norms.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and analytically rich interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Richard Youngs—Senior Fellow in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program at Carnegie Europe and Professor of International Relations at the University of Warwick—offers a compelling diagnosis of the global democratic landscape at a moment of profound uncertainty. Reflecting on accelerating autocratization, shifts in global power, EU democratic dilemmas, and the prospects for democratic renewal, Professor Youngs provides both conceptual clarity and sobering realism. As he puts it, “we are in an interregnum between the liberal global order and whatever comes next”—a liminal period in which the rules, norms, and institutional anchors of the past three decades no longer hold firm, even as no coherent alternative has yet emerged.

Professor Youngs identifies two forces that make the current wave of democratic regression qualitatively distinct from earlier cycles: the disruptive role of digital technologies and far-reaching structural changes in the international order. Both realms, he argues, remain fluid, capable of generating either deeper democratic decay or future sources of resilience. Although digital platforms currently “carry very negative implications for democracy,” Professor Youngs reminds us that past expectations of their democratizing potential need not be abandoned entirely if regulation becomes more effective. Similarly, while rising non-democratic powers are reshaping global geopolitics, there remains “many democratic powers that might coordinate more effectively in the future” to safeguard liberal norms within a reconfigured global system.

This transitional moment is further complicated by the rise of radical-right populism, the diffusion of illiberal tactics across borders, and democratic backsliding in core Western states. Professor Youngs emphasizes that the potency of contemporary autocratization stems not from structural shifts alone but from the “very skillful way in which many leaders have deployed incremental tactics to undermine democratic equality.” Autocrats, he notes, actively learn from one another—sometimes “copying and pasting” repressive legal templates—creating a transnational ecosystem of illiberal innovation.

The interview also probes dilemmas within the European Union, from the risks of technocratic overreach in “defensive democracy” measures to the strategic tensions posed by engaging or isolating radical-right parties. Professor Youngs is clear-eyed about the difficulty of balancing pluralism with the defense of liberal norms, describing the EU’s predicament as a “catch-22.”

Looking ahead, Professor Youngs argues that scholarship and policy must shift from diagnosing democratic decline to theorizing and cultivating democratic resilience. Yet this resilience must go beyond “pure survival” and involve deeper processes of reform, renewal, and societal empowerment. As he cautions, “it is much easier to undo democracy than to reassemble good-quality democratic norms,” and the work of rebuilding will require sustained, coordinated effort at both national and international levels.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Richard Youngs, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Barry Sullivan

Professor Sullivan: The Separation of Powers in the US Does Not Function as the Framers Anticipated

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In a penetrating interview with ECPS, Professor Barry Sullivan warns that “the separation of powers does not function as the Framers anticipated,” offering one of the starkest legal assessments yet of America’s constitutional crisis. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Trump v. United States, he argues that “the constitutional doctrine and the man have met the moment,” producing a presidency with “virtually total control, without suffering any consequences.” Sullivan traces this shift to a revival of a “Nixonian” view of executive authority—summarized in Nixon’s infamous claim, “If the President does it, it is not illegal.” Such developments, he cautions, create “enclaves of unaccountable power” and dramatically heighten the risk of democratic backsliding, especially amid polarized parties and eroding constitutional conventions. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Barry Sullivan—the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History at Loyola University—offers one of the most sobering legal assessments to date of the United States’ ongoing constitutional transformation. As he warns, “the separation of powers does not function as the Framers anticipated,” and the consequences for American democracy are profound.

Speaking against the backdrop of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Trump v. United States, Professor Sullivan argues that “the constitutional doctrine and the man have met the moment.” Over the last fifteen years, the Supreme Court has steadily expanded presidential authority, culminating in an immunity doctrine that grants the President “virtually total control, without suffering any consequences.” This shift, Professor Sullivan notes, aligns disturbingly well with Donald Trump’s populist narrative of a personalized leader whose will supersedes institutional constraint.

Calling this new jurisprudence a revival of a “Nixonian” conception of executive power, Professor Sullivan underscores the danger. If the Court has effectively embraced the claim that “if the President does it, it is not illegal,” then the risk of democratic backsliding—especially when paired with the pardon power—becomes “very great.” This combination, he stresses, allows a President not only to immunize himself but “in effect, to grant immunity to those whose efforts on his behalf he needs,” creating what constitutional theorists call enclaves of unaccountable authority.

Throughout the interview, Professor Sullivan situates these developments within broader populist dynamics: the weaponization of “retribution” narratives, the erosion of constitutional conventions, and the increasing collapse of the administrative state under a muscular unitary executive model. His warning is stark: under the Court’s interpretation, the President possesses “virtually unlimited power,” and recent behavior shows “there is nothing that is too great or too small to capture his imagination,” from foreign policy decisions to symbolic renovations of federal buildings.

Crucially, Professor Sullivan emphasizes that the Framers never anticipated the rise of disciplined, polarized political parties—developments that have hollowed out checks and balances. As he notes, the Founders “would be absolutely aghast” at how party alignment now disables Congress and the courts from restraining executive overreach.

Finally, Professor Sullivan stresses that reversing democratic backsliding will require not only judicial recalibration but also broader political and civic reform. The core problem, he argues, is “not a constitutional problem but a political problem” rooted in polarization, unified government, and the abandonment of institutional good faith.

This interview offers an essential window into how constitutional design, judicial interpretation, and populist leadership together shape the current crisis of American democracy.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Barry Sullivan, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Patricio Navia

Professor Navia: Chileans Vote For Radicals, but Expect Moderate Governance

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Patricio Navia underscores a defining paradox of Chile’s 2025 election: “Chileans ended up voting for two radical candidates in the first round, but they want them to govern as moderates.” He stresses that the apparent right-wing surge is less ideological than punitive, describing the first round as “a punishment vote against the left-wing ruling party.” Professor Navia highlights how insecurity reshaped the campaign, noting that the right “successfully turned the migration issue into an issue of insecurity and crime,” yet simultaneously embraced moderate positions on social rights. While Kast’s discourse may appear Trumpian, Professor Navia cautions that “Trump is a protectionist; Kast is a free-market advocate.” Ultimately, he argues, Chileans remain centrist in expectations: “They expect those candidates to govern as moderates.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Patricio Navia — Full Professor of Liberal Studies and Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at New York University — offers a penetrating analysis of Chile’s 2025 presidential election, an election defined, paradoxically, by radical electoral choices and enduring moderate expectations. As Professor Navia succinctly puts it, “Chileans ended up voting for two radical candidates in the first round, but they want them to govern as moderates.” This apparent contradiction lies at the heart of his interpretation of Chile’s shifting political dynamics, voter psychology, and institutional constraints.

Professor Navia begins by challenging simplified readings of the first-round results. While over 70% of voters opted for right-wing presidential candidates, he warns that this does not signal a deep ideological realignment. Rather, it reflects what he calls “a punishment vote against the left-wing ruling party,” noting that legislative voting patterns remained more balanced. This reflects a chronic feature of Chilean politics: electorates punish incumbents but do not necessarily embrace the ideological alternatives they vote for.

A central axis of Professor Navia’s argument is the politicization of insecurity. The right has, in his words, “successfully turned the migration issue into an issue of insecurity and crime,” capitalizing on fears that have intensified alongside Chile’s unprecedented migration influx. Yet even here, the story is not one of unbounded radicalization. Professor Navia notes that right-wing candidates simultaneously “promised to keep the social rights and the growing welfare system” and signaled restraint on moral issues—evidence of a moderated right adapting to a centrist electorate.

In discussing José Antonio Kast’s rise, Professor Navia cautions against superficial comparisons to Donald Trump. “Trump is a protectionist; Kast is a free-market advocate,” he argues, stressing both the distinct historical context of Chilean immigration and the ways Kast has fused crime-control narratives with nativist appeals. Still, he highlights the limits of this strategy: policy promises such as deporting large numbers of undocumented migrants are unrealistic and risk generating “discontent against this government that promised easy solutions.”

Crucially, Professor Navia emphasizes the resilience of Chile’s institutions. Despite concerns about authoritarian drift, he argues that “Congress will curtail the president significantly,” given its growing assertiveness and Kast’s lack of a congressional majority. For that reason, he sees no scenario in which Kast successfully expands executive power or revives Pinochet-era nostalgia: “If he says Pinochet was good, then he’s going to lose popular support.”

Ultimately, Professor Navia’s analysis underscores the stability of Chile’s political center—less visible electorally, but palpable in voter expectations. Voters may choose radicals, he argues, but “they expect those candidates to govern as moderates.” This tension will shape not only a Kast administration but the trajectory of Chilean politics in the years ahead.

 

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Patricio Navia, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Axel Klein

Prof. Klein: It Is Difficult to Label Japanese PM Takaichi a Populist, Despite Her Nationalism and Anti-Feminism

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In this incisive interview for the ECPS, Professor Axel Klein offers a nuanced assessment of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ideological profile. While her blend of nationalism, anti-feminism, and strong-leader rhetoric has led some observers to categorize her as a populist, Professor Klein cautions against this simplification. As he notes, “nationalism and anti-feminism… are trademarks of a conservative or right-wing politician, but they are not necessarily populist phenomena per se.” Instead, he situates PM Takaichi within Japan’s broader political culture—one shaped by nostalgia, stability-seeking voters, and the enduring dominance of the LDP—arguing that her conservatism reflects continuity more than populist rupture.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Sanae Takaichi’s rise to the premiership marks one of the most significant ideological shifts in Japanese politics in recent decades. Her ascent has sparked debates not only within Japan but also among scholars of comparative populism who are examining whether her blend of nationalism, anti-feminism, and assertive leadership constitutes a new populist moment in East Asia. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Axel Klein— Professor for Social Sciences of East Asia / Japanese Politics at Institute of East Asian Studies and Faculty of Social Science, University of Duisburg-Essen and one of Europe’s leading specialists on Japanese politics and populism—offers a nuanced interpretation of her leadership style and ideological positioning.

Reflecting on the definitional complexities of populism, Professor Klein begins by cautioning against the automatic classification of PM Takaichi as a populist merely because she deploys rhetoric familiar from global right-wing movements. As he notes, “I think you would find it difficult to label her a populist… nationalism and anti-feminism… are trademarks of a conservative or right-wing politician, but they are not necessarily populist phenomena per se.” This observation forms the conceptual backbone of the interview. It foregrounds a tension between PM Takaichi’s affective, backward-looking appeals and the analytical criteria political scientists typically use to identify populist actors.

Several sections of the interview explore the symbolic and strategic dimensions of her conservatism. PM Takaichi’s frequent invocation of Margaret Thatcher, for instance, is not simply an ideological alignment but part of a deliberate performance of decisiveness and moral clarity. Professor Klein situates this “Thatcherian” posture within Japan’s evolving political culture, noting that a significant segment of the electorate has come to desire a strong, assertive leader capable of cutting through bureaucratic inertia. Her rejection of feminist policy is similarly framed as part of a broader moral and nostalgic project rather than a carefully structured ideological program.

The interview further scrutinizes PM Takaichi’s positioning in domestic and international contexts: her recourse to economic protectionism toward China, her appeal to Japan’s aging conservative base, and her relationship to emergent right-wing actors such as Sanseito. Professor Klein’s long-term analysis of Japanese democratic institutions raises critical questions about whether her brand of conservative moralism represents a stabilizing force or a potential risk for democratic quality. While Japan’s electoral patterns and party system differ markedly from Western cases of democratic backsliding, Professor Klein argues that structural conservatism, low youth engagement, and a dominant-party landscape may create conditions in which moralizing politics can flourish without substantial opposition.

Taken together, the interview provides an analytically rich and contextually grounded assessment of PM Takaichi’s leadership, situating her not as a straightforward populist but as a figure whose political significance lies in the interplay between nostalgia, nationalism, and Japan’s institutional continuity.

 

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Axel Klein, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Jan Kubik

Professor Kubik: Populism in CEE Is Rooted in Deep Feudal Structures Rather Than in the Communist Past

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In a compelling interview with ECPS, Professor Jan Kubik challenges one of the most persistent assumptions about Central and Eastern Europe: that right-wing populism is primarily a legacy of communism. Instead, he argues, its roots lie in far older social hierarchies. “Many people say populists are stronger in East-Central Europe because of communism. I think that misses the point. It is much deeper. It is actual feudalism… long before communism,” he explains. Professor Kubik outlines how these deep-seated structures—traditional authority patterns, weak middle classes, and historically delayed modernization—interact with neo-traditionalist narratives deployed by parties like PiS and Fidesz. The result, he warns, is a durable populist ecosystem requiring both organic civic renewal and, potentially, a dramatic institutional reset.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging and analytically rich conversation, Distinguished Professor Jan Kubik—a leading scholar of political anthropology and Central and Eastern European (CEE) politics—offers a profound rethinking of the foundations of right-wing populism in the region. Drawing on insights from two major European Commission–funded projects, FATIGUE and POPREBEL, Professor Kubik challenges one of the most enduring explanations for the region’s democratic backsliding: the legacy of communism. Instead, he underscores that the roots run far deeper. As he succinctly puts it, “Many people say populists are stronger in East-Central Europe because of communism. I think that misses the point. It is much deeper. It is actual feudalism, in a sense, and the structural composition of these societies… which started forming long before communism.”

The interview traces how this neo-feudal inheritance—characterized by hierarchical authority structures, traditionalist cultural norms, and weakly developed middle classes—interacts with the neo-traditionalist narratives mobilized by contemporary right-wing populists. Professor Kubik describes neo-traditionalism as a deliberate attempt to revive or manufacture tradition, often through cultural engineering, to legitimize a new political–economic order. In this context, parties like Fidesz and PiS sacralize national identity through education, religion, heritage, and memory politics, exploiting societies in which, as he notes, “authority is… male-chauvinistic… and that person simply belongs there… because this is how it is.” These deeply rooted cultural logics, he argues, help explain why symbolic interventions resonate so powerfully in Poland and Hungary, but far less in an urbanized and secularized Czech Republic.

Professor Kubik also provides conceptual clarity on the interdependence of political and economic power in right-wing populist regimes. POPREBEL identifies a “neo-feudal” regime type marked by weak business actors, strong political actors, and legitimation through neo-traditionalist, anti-market narratives. Programs such as Poland’s 500+—which “dramatically reduced childhood poverty”—are not merely economic interventions but cultural–political tools for consolidating authority.

A significant part of the interview concerns the durability of these systems. Professor Kubik warns that entrenched cultural substructures and polarized value systems make right-wing populism unusually resilient. This resilience is reinforced institutionally through the capture of courts, media, and cultural institutions—producing distinct patterns in Poland, Hungary, and Czechia.

Finally, the interview concludes with a discussion of democratic renewal. Professor Kubik’s twin proposal combines “organic, society-wide work”—especially civic education from an early age—with, on the other hand, “a dramatic institutional reset.” While the latter may sound radical, he argues that moments of deep crisis sometimes require systemic reinvention, citing Charles de Gaulle’s 1958 constitutional overhaul as precedent.

Taken together, Professor Kubik’s insights offer a compelling and ambitious reframing of populism in CEE—not as a post-communist aberration, but as a twenty-first-century expression of far older structural legacies.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Jan Kubik, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

DamonLinker

Dr. Linker: Trump Is the Worst Possible Example of a Right-wing Populist

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In this interview for the ECPS, Dr. Damon Linker delivers a stark assessment of Trumpism’s place in the global surge of right-wing populism. Dr. Linker argues that Donald Trump is “the worst possible example of a right-wing populist,” not only for his ideological extremism but for a uniquely volatile mix of narcissism, vindictiveness, and disregard for constitutional limits. Central to his warning is Trump’s assault on what he calls the democratic “middle layer”—the professional civil servants who “act as a layer of defense” against executive tyranny. By “uniting the bottom and the top to crush that middle layer,” Dr. Linker contends, Trumpism pushes the United States toward an authoritarian model unprecedented in its modern political history.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Damon Linker—Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Senior Fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center, columnist, and author of The Theocons and The Religious Test—offers one of the clearest and most sobering analyses of Trumpism’s evolving place within the global wave of right-wing populism. Across the conversation, Dr. Linker advances a central contention: Donald Trump is “the worst possible example of a right-wing populist,” not only because of ideological extremism but because of a personally distinctive mix of narcissism, vindictiveness, and strategic opportunism that intensifies the authoritarian tendencies inherent in contemporary populist governance.

A recurring theme in the interview—and the one that speaks most directly to the headline—is Dr. Linker’s argument that Trumpism seeks to eliminate what he calls the “middle layer” of democratic states. In his formulation, liberal democracies depend on “informed, intelligent, educated… people in that middle layer of the state” who carry out laws, uphold norms, and prevent the executive from “acting like a tyrant.” Trump, by contrast, “tries to unite the bottom and the top in an effort to crush that middle layer—leaving only ‘the people’ and the strongman running the country.” This dynamic, Dr. Linker warns, places the United States closer to the logic of authoritarian rule than at any point in the modern era.

The interview situates Trumpism within both historical cycles and global patterns. Dr. Linker argues that the Republican Party is returning to an older “rejectionist” impulse rooted in its reaction to the New Deal. Yet Trump’s version is more expansive and more radical, because what the right now seeks to overturn is far larger: the post-war regulatory, administrative, and cultural state. At the same time, Dr. Linker stresses that while Trumpism shares features with “authoritarian populism” abroad, Trump himself stands out for being “personally irresponsible… rage-fueled… corrupt… [and] willing to use state power… to hurt his enemies and help his friends.”

The interview also maps the institutional consequences of this project. Dr. Linker shows how Trumpism simultaneously directs bottom-up grievance and top-down coercion to pressure universities, law firms, media, bureaucratic agencies, and cultural institutions. Some actors, he notes, resist, while others “capitulate” under threat of political or financial retaliation. The overall pattern reveals an increasingly fragmented institutional landscape marked by selective vulnerability rather than systemic resilience.

Finally, Dr. Linker reflects on the future of American party politics. If Democrats cannot adapt—by embracing a modestly populist reformism and distancing themselves from the “old, discredited establishment”—they risk long-term marginalization. Yet he remains cautiously optimistic: “As long as we have free and fair elections… my very strong suspicion is [the Democrats] will win again. We just have to be a little patient about it.”

This interview thus offers a penetrating, historically informed account of Trumpism as both a symptom and accelerant of democratic decay in the US—and a warning about what may come next.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Damon Linker, slightly revised for clarity and flow.