In this analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how geopolitical tensions around the strategic oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz transmit economic shocks across the global political economy and disproportionately affect African states. Because many African economies remain highly dependent on commodity exports and imported energy, oil price volatility quickly translates into inflation, fiscal stress, and social pressure. Even oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria face paradoxical effects, benefiting from higher crude revenues while simultaneously suffering from rising domestic fuel costs. These inflationary pressures can fuel economic discontent, weaken government legitimacy, and create fertile ground for populist mobilization. Dr. Solaja argues that recurrent commodity shocks expose deep structural vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for economic diversification, energy transition, and stronger regional integration to build resilience.
By Oludele Solaja*
Geopolitical conflicts rarely stay within their battlefield boundaries. In a world with integrated economy, war in strategic energy corridor would swiftly lead to inflation, political instability and governmental pressures far from conflict. Geopolitical tensions in the strategic energy corridor are central to the functioning of the global political economy. The Strait of Hormuz holds a peculiar important position in the transit routes among all. Some one fifth of the global petroleum liquids passes through the narrow maritime passage in between Iran and Arabian Peninsula (US Energy Information Administration, 2023), hence the perception of armed conflict even if it’s just the rumor of one in the area would lead to an immediate volatility shock in the global oil market.
Not just the physical supply disruptions but the uncertainty itself would create price volatility. Higher cost of insuring the vessels, shifting of the routes and market responses all contribute to the volatility as well. Scholars of energy politics have always acknowledged that oil markets are intrinsically connected with national security and strategic rivalry (Bridge & Le Billon, 2017). As such, conflict occurring in energy producing areas could have economic impact across nations without any boundaries.
The effects on the developing nations would be even worse. World Bank warns that such shocks from the Middle Eastern energy supply chains could push the oil prices beyond $100/barrel, creating inflation pressure and fiscal burden upon developing nations. In an integrated global economy, a geopolitical shock will be transmitted across the commodity supply chain. Energy supply, food production, transportation network and capital flow are all interconnected.
Inflation Transmission and African Political Economy
When energy prices shock happens in African countries, typically there are two related effects: windfall profit to oil exporters, and inflationary pressure to domestic markets.
On one hand, oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria could profit from rising crude oil prices through high export revenues and balance of payments surplus. In theory, windfalls can stabilize fiscal conditions and support increase development expenditure. Nevertheless, political economy literature argues that commodity windfalls often reproduce and strengthen existing vulnerabilities of the economies, which fail to transform into sustainable development instead of generating rent-seeking behavior without firm institutions and diversified economies (Auty, 2001; Ross, 2012).
On the other hand, rising global oil prices will transmit inflation through the domestic economies. Transportation costs rise with higher fuel prices, pushing the price up of goods including foods, which need logistics and transportation, as well as costs for manufactured goods and fertilizers for farming. Electricity costs are also higher and so forth.
In Nigeria, this paradox is crystal clear. Despite being one of Africa’s biggest exporters of crude oil, Nigeria needs to import its supply of refined petroleum products as its own refining capacity is insufficient. This creates two divergent effects at the same time: Nigeria has to pay high fuel import costs from imported refined oil, while export revenue is expected to rise with higher crude prices. Informal sector workers who are in the vast majority in Nigerian labor market would experience increasing cost of living.
The consequences for oil-importing African countries are even harsher. Rising costs of fuel import not only leads to greater trade deficit and depreciation of national currency but also increase countries’ exposure to sovereign debt distress.
Commodity Shocks and Politics of Economic Discontent
The macroeconomic impact beyond energy sector can reshape the domestic political landscape by raising costs of living especially in the vulnerable societies. Political scientists have noted that a sudden increase in living costs can cause popular unrest, weaken government legitimacy, and contribute to the emergence of populism (Rodrik, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).
In this case, a global economic shock would have translated into domestic political pressure. When confronting with inflation pressures, African governments often are compelled to subsidize the consumption of oil or enforce price caps, which have proven to undermine fiscal positions and postpone necessary structural adjustments. Repeated commodity shocks in institutionally weak economies can reproduce the same vicious cycles of economic discontent and political instability.
Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors therefore do more than creating turbulence for economies. They challenge domestic political legitimacy by accentuating conflicts between different strata of society about inflation, social welfare, and commodity distribution.
Structural Vulnerability in Commodity-dependent Economies
All of the aforementioned highlights the inherent structural vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent economic systems. Dependency theorists have consistently asserted that countries that depend on exports of primary commodities are exposed to volatility in international commodity markets (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1976). Moreover, the “resource curse” debate emphasizes rent seeking, volatility, and limited industrial development in extracting economies (Ross, 2012).
Energy geopolitical shock can only intensify this vulnerability. Shipping disruptions or higher freight costs resulting from higher insurance fees due to conflict at Persian Gulf can be re-routed around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, further intensifying the costs borne by all importing nations, especially those relying on food imports, manufactured goods and agricultural inputs. In such cases, the impacts of wars fought at energy corridors are redistributed across the commodity markets that link the Strait of Hormuz to consumers across a faraway land.
Policy Implications: Building Resilience
Mitigating vulnerability of geopolitical commodity shocks requires a long-term perspective beyond ad hoc management strategies. The first thing for African countries is to speed up economic diversification (industrialization and value adding in agriculture), because it will lead to sustainable development not only by reducing dependence on the exports of oil. Secondly, investment in infrastructure and on renewable energies will lead to energy sustainability in African countries and reduces the reliance on imported refined goods. Third, strengthen the social safety net (cash transfers, food security program, etc.) can shield the poorest households from inflationary shocks. Fourth, expand intra-African trade using the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make the region reduce dependence on unstable international commodity market.
Conclusion
Volatility in strategic energy corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz is a manifestation of geopolitical tensions’ spread across the global political economy. For Africa’s commodity-dependent economies, it amplifies the persistent structural vulnerabilities that are embedded in extraction-based development strategies. Short term export gains associated with rising prices rarely outweigh the subsequent inflationary pressures and fiscal instability in the longer run. Unless these development strategies are actively reformed to emphasize diversification, energy transition and resilience, each commodity shock following every conflict will result in the similar outcomes: temporary windfall gains followed by inflation-induced hardship and fragile development. Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors, hence, are not just regional security issues; they are fundamentally tests of structural resilience in the development agenda of the Global South.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Monthly Review Press.
Auty, R. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press.
Bridge, G., & Le Billon, P. (2017). Oil. Polity Press.
Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.
Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press.
Rodrik, D. (2018). “Populism and the economics of globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33.
Ross, M. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023). World oil transit chokepoints. https://www.eia.gov
World Bank. (2023). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.
This research note introduces high frequency “real-time” Google Trends data as a novel tool for studying public engagement with major political speeches. Unlike traditional dial-testing, which captures emotional reactions, “googling” patterns reveal cognitive engagement—moments when audiences actively seek information about claims, people, or policies mentioned by the speaker. Analyzing the 2026 State of the Union Address by President Donald J. Trump, the study shows that search activity spiked around issues such as TrumpRX, “Trump Accounts,” and D.E.I., as well as narratives tied to culture-war themes like the story of Sage Blair. The findings suggest that policy proposals addressing material needs—combined with culture-war framing—can mobilize significant public attention, echoing strategies seen in contemporary populist politics.
This research note introduces high frequency “real time” Google Trends data as a tool for research on the general public’s engagement with high-profile political speeches. Contrary to the well-known dial-testing – providing data on emotional engagement – “googling” patterns offer glimpse into the cognitive engagement – actual efforts to obtain additional information on the issues introduced in the speech.
The 2026 State of the Union (SOTU) Address by President Donald J. Trump offered promising testing ground for such tool, due to its prominence, extraordinary length, diverse content and involvement of extraordinary invitees personifying the key narratives. The results indicate that TrumpRX and “Trump Accounts” – generated substantial interest among audience – as well as D.E.I. (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion). Moreover, search data revealed noticeable interest in the history of Sage Blair – an example of engaging framing of the culture war issues. These narratives could be applied in forthcoming campaigns to construct the mix of policies addressing material needs of anti-elitist voters and the culture war narrative – the sort of “bread and circuses” already deployed by Central European illiberals.
Introduction
On 24 February 2026 President Donald J. Trump delivered the first State of the Union (SOTU) address of his second term. The one hour and 47 minutes performance – breaking President Clinton’s 2000 record by over 20 percent (Peters, 2026) – provided unique communication opportunity for president facing tensions among his MAGA fandom as midterm elections approaches.
Staged in the most “presidential” setting imaginable – a joint session of the United States Congress in a year marking 250 years of US independence – President Trump’s spectacle involved proclamation of “the golden age of America,” litany of 47th President’s achievements and bashing on the “craziness” of his opponents. It also featured appearance of extraordinary invitees, personifying President’s narratives on the past, present and future of the United States. Indeed, as noticed by The Economist, the speech was “light on policy and heavy on theatre” as “more than 60% of it made no reference to specific proposals, far more than any other address in the past 50 year.”[1]
According to the Nielsen data, SOTU attracted 32.6 million TV viewers.[2] In a 24 February survey, conducted for CNN via text message using the SSRS Text Message Panel among 482 respondents who watched the speech,[3] 64% reacted positively (of them 38% very positively) and 36% negatively (of them 20% very negatively). Noteworthy, the sample was noticeably skewed towards the right – only 18% of respondents described themselves as Democrats, 41% as Republicans, and 41% as independents or others.
As put by W. Mead, “Trump does not speak in order to convey information to his hearers” but rather say things and then see how they react.[4] Undoubtedly SOTU spectacle offered extraordinary occasion for that, with President spending nearly two hours probing wide array of themes and narratives. In that sense the event can be considered an experiment, and the vast amount of collected data will likely be meticulously crunched in order to develop communication strategies for approaching midterm elections.
On top of surveys, such data can be collected using so called dial-testing – technique developed in 1984 to record real-time reactions of the focus group participants (Kirk & Schill, 2011). For example, Fox News enriched its covering of 2026 SOTU address with dial-testing results from panel made up of 29 Democrats, 30 independents and 41 Republicans.[5]
The goal of this research note is to introduce another data source, that can be applied to elicit real-time reactions audience of such political event – the “real time”[6] high-frequency Google Trends data.
Contrary to the dial-testing, aimed at recording feelings and attitudes (emotional reaction), Google Trends reflects actual behaviour of millions of people engaging in the effort to obtain additional information on the issues introduced by the speaker. That could involve attempts to fact-check or learn more about the piece of information mentioned as a part of the bigger narrative.
The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section II briefly introduces Google Trends as a data source, Section IIIapplies them to the President Trump’s 2026 SOTU address, focusing on people explicitly mentioned by the President, as well as keywords relevant for his key topics. Section IV concludes.
2) “Real Time” Google Trends data
Presented research design is based upon assumption that as of 24 February 2026, “googling” remained sufficiently popular tool for searching factual information in the USA (as compared to alternative search engines or conversations with AI chatbots), that Google Trends data can provide meaningful depiction of this process.
As explained in FAQ about Google Trends data,[7] its aim is to “display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography.” Search data is normalized “to the time and location of a query … each data point is divided by the total searches of the geography and time range it represents to compare relative popularity … the resulting numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a topic’s proportion to all searches on all topics.”
Some categories of searches are filtered out, including: (i) searches made by very few people; (ii) repeated searches from the same person over a short period of time; (iii) queries with apostrophes and other special characters as well as (iv) searches made by Google products and services. However, it is admitted that data “can also reflect irregular search activity, such as automated searches or queries that may be associated with attempts to spam our search results.”[8]
Technically, public Google Trends tool produces data using “largely unfiltered sample[9] of actual search requests made to Google.” The “real time” data relies on sample spanning seven days only, however it can be accessed in intervals up to one minute – frequency sufficiently high to trace reactions to the political speech. Unfortunately, reliance on sampling and the “rolling” character of the data diminishes replicability of the results.
Summing up, the search data provided by public Google Trends tool have serious limitations from the scientific point of view. Indeed, users are directly reminded that it is “not scientific and might not be a perfect mirror of search activity.”
However, it offers too many opportunities to be simply ignored, as indicated by application to the topics ranging from macroeconomics (Varian & Choi, 2012), electoral politics (Prado-Román et al. 2021) and pandemic dynamics (Saegner & Austys, 2022).
3) The Results
To gain in-depth insight into the search patterns of US general public during the SOTU address, “real time” Google Trends data for the territory of the United States had been collected with highest available frequency – i.e. with one-minute intervals. The data spanned window from 9:00 PM to 11:00 PM Eastern Time, with SOTU address scheduled at 9:00 PM ET (actually started at 9:11 PM ET).
By design, the values of the search volume index ranged from 0 to 100 – which, in this particular sample, denoted the search volume for “Trump” at 9:42 PM, after President discussed “Trump Accounts”.
3.1. Searches related to the individuals mentioned during the 2026 SOTU address
To demonstrate analytical potential of “real time” Google Trends data for analysis high-profile political speeches, search volume for each of the 30 individuals explicitly referred to by the President Trump during 2026 SOTU address (see table 1 for list) had been plotted on figure 1.
Table 1. Summary of individuals mentioned by President Donald J. Trump during 2026 SOTU address
Name
Description based on the President Trump’s address and open sources
Joe Biden
46th US President
Connor Hellebuyck
Ice-hockey goaltender, gold medalist of Team U.S.A.
Buddy Taggart
World War II veteran
Milly Cate McClymond
Survivor of Texas flood of 4 July 2025
Scott Ruskan
Coast Guard rescue swimmer during Texas flood of 4 July 2025
Megan Hemhauser
Beneficiary of President Trump’s tax cuts
M. and S. Dell
Donors of the $6,250,000,000 to fund the “Trump accounts”
Brad Gerstner
Another donor for “Trump accounts”
Catherine Rayner
Beneficiary of President Trump’s drug discounts, undergoing IVF
Raysall Wiggins
Placed bids on 20 homes but lost to gigantic investment firms
Nancy Pelosi
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Dalilah Coleman
Victim of a car crash caused by “illegal alien”
Lizbeth Medina
Victim of a murder committed by “illegal alien”
Sage Blair
In 2021 socially transitioned to a new gender
Melania Trump
The First Lady
Charlie Kirk
Assassinated MAGA activist
Anya Zarutska
Ukrainian war refugee, victim of a murder
Sarah Beckstrom
National Guard Specialist killed in the terrorist attack in Washington, DC
Andrew Wolfe
National Guard Staff Sgt., survivor of the terrorist attack in Washington, DC
Steve Witkoff
Special Envoy
Jared Kushner
Special Envoy, Ivanka Trump’s husband
Marco Rubio
U.S. Secretary of State
Suleimani
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general killed in U.S. attack
Nicolás Maduro
President of Venezuela raided by US forces in 2026
Delcy Rodríguez
Acting president of Venezuela
E. and A. Gonzalez
Venezuelan opposition leader freed from prison and his niece
Eric Slover
U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer 5, helicopter pilot during Maduro raid
Royce Williams
World War II, Korean war and Vietnam war veteran
Thomas Jefferson
Founder of the USA, Third US President
Source: Own compilation based on transcript by The New York Times[10]
As one could expect, celebrity status of C. Hellebuyck and Melania Trump was reflected in the volume of related searches. Other individuals mentioned by President Trump, who attracted highest search volumes involved: (i) Michael and Susan Dell and (ii) Brad Gerstner – “Trump Accounts” donors, (iii) Nancy Pelosi, (iv) Sage Blair – personifying narrative on risks associated with gender transition, (v) Charlie Kirk – assassinated MAGA activist, (vi) Andrew Wolfe – Washington D.C. terrorist attack survivor , (vii) Marco Rubio – US Secretary of State and (viii) Royce Williams – war veteran awarded with Congressional Medal of Honor.
Undoubtedly the exact reasons for “googling” specific individuals in a given time can differ. To use example of Nancy Pelosi, first peak involved President’s quip on Stop Insider Trading Act, and the second coincided with her appearance in Fox broadcast[11] wearing “Release the Files” button.[12] Despite that, the search volume for “Epstein” remained unaffected (see fig. 2). One can imagine that peak for Thomas Jefferson reflected the attempts to fact-check date of his death provided by the President.
3..2. Search words related to key issues raised by President Trump during 2026 SOTU address
Figure 2 plots second group of keywords examined in this note – those related to the topics raised by the President Trump, selected on the basis of the transcript of the speech.
The top panel illustrates the most-searched keywords, starting with the President himself, D.E.I. and two Trump-named programs – “Trump accounts” (saving vehicle for American children[13]) and TrumpRX (website providing access to large discounts on high-priced medicines[14]). Also, the recent decision of the Supreme Court on tariffs and President’s quip on the renaming of Fort Bragg had been reflected in “googling” data.
The middle panel illustrates primarily keywords referring to the economy and costs of living. Despite President Trump’s references to the inflation data or the remarks on the price of eggs and beef, there is no doubt that “$1.85 a gallon for gasoline” inspired the most factchecking.
Finally, the searches on crime and murder peaked as President Trump urged Congress to pass “tough legislation to make sure violent and dangerous repeat offenders are put behind bars, and importantly, that they stay there” (search volume for murder previously peaked when President proclaimed that the “murder rate saw its single largest decline in recorded history”). Also, President’s references to the insider trading and voter ID legislation – as well as quips on “Somali pirates who ransacked Minnesota” – had been reflected in the respective keywords search volumes.
In a survey conducted for the CNN,[15] 45% of respondents claimed that the President focused too little on the economy and costs of living (according to 53% it was the right amount) and 38% claimed that he focused too much on immigration (according to 56% it was the right amount) – assessment that seems consistent with patterns observed in web searches. As of foreign policy 62% claimed the President devoted the right amount.
Given substantial search volumes for D.E.I. and two Trump-named programs, it is interesting to explore their state-level differences. The data indicates that in some states D.E.I. was “googled” much more intensely than both Trump-named programs (like Rhode Island and Vermont). TrumpRX attracted considerably more attention than D.E.I. in several Republican states, as well as District of Columbia and Virginia. “Trump Accounts” did so in Alaska, Montana and D.C., but not in South Dakota.
4) Conclusions
The goal of this note was to introduce high frequency “real time” Google Trends data as a tool for examining the general public’s reactions to the high-profile political speeches. Contrary to the well-known dial-testing – providing data on emotional reactions – “googling” patterns offers glimpse into the cognitive reactions – actual efforts to obtain additional information on the issues introduced in the speech. The 2026 SOTU address by President Trump offered promising testing ground for such tool, due to its prominence, length, range of topics and extraordinary invitees personifying the key narratives.
To illustrate its analytic potential, one can compare obtained results with the conventional wisdom on 2026 SOTU. In particular, relatively scant attention is paid to the issue of TrumpRX or “Trump Accounts” – that actually inspired a lot of information searching.
That could indicate, that as of 2026, programmes directed at the material needs of voters – although with distinct, US characteristics, like reliance on market mechanisms and billionaire donations – could resonate among President Trump’s bases. Thereby, their importance in his political strategy could increase.
Moreover, as judged by “googling” patterns, topics like D.E.I., political correctness (like renaming Fort Bragg) still attract attention of US public. The interest in the history of Sage Blair confirmed that her story offered engaging example of framing culture war issues.
If indeed deployed, the mix of policies addressing material needs of anti-elitist voters coupled with the culture war narrative could provide MAGA with the sort of “bread and circuses” already deployed by Central European illiberals, ending what Timothy Snyder called “sado-populism.”
(*) Kamil Joński, Ph.D. is an assistant in the Department of Tax Law at the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) and an economist by training. He holds a degree from SGH and is currently employed as part of a research project at the institution. Dr. Joński has participated in several research projects funded by the National Science Centre and conducted at the Warsaw School of Economics, the University of Economics in Kraków, and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. His research focuses on the functioning of public institutions—particularly common and administrative courts—as well as public policy formulation and implementation, tax policy, and legislative processes.
References
Peters, G. (2026). “Length of State of the Union Addresses in Minutes (from 1966).” The American Presidency Project. Ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California. 1999-2026. Available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/324136/ (accessed on February 26, 2026).
Prado-Román, C.; Gómez-Martínez, R.; Orden-Cruz, C. (2021). “Google Trends as a Predictor of Presidential Elections: The United States Versus Canada.” American Behavioral Scientist. 2021;65(4):666-680. doi:10.1177/0002764220975067
Saegner, T; Austys, D. (2022). “Forecasting and Surveillance of COVID-19 Spread Using Google Trends: Literature Review.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2022, Sep 29;19(19):12394. doi: 10.3390/ijerph191912394.
Kirk R.; D. Schill. (2011). “CNN’s Dial Testing of the Presidential Debates. Parameters of Discussion in Tech Driven Politics.” In: Hendricks, J.A., & Kaid, L.L. (Eds.), Techno Politics in Presidential Campaigning: New Voices, New Technologies, and New Voters, Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203851265
Footnotes
[1] https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/02/25/our-language-analysis-of-donald-trumps-state-of-the-union-address (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[2] https://www.nielsen.com/news-center/2026/32-6-million-watch-2026-state-of-the-union-address/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[3] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27411442-cnn-poll-conducted-by-ssrs-state-of-the-union-reaction/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[4] LSE public event “American foreign policy in the age of Trump”, 19 February 2026, available at: https://youtu.be/5OhbCXoJ-kM?list=PLK4elntcUEy3kR3B4Ws8PcKndb1g5a68Y&t=779 11584551 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[5] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/voters-react-trump-touts-signature-tariff-plan-state-union (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[6] https://medium.com/google-news-lab/what-is-google-trends-data-and-what-does-it-mean-b48f07342ee8 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[7] https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[8] It is explained that “these searches may be retained in Google Trends as a security measure: filtering them from Google Trends would help those issuing such queries to understand we’ve identified them”.
[9] As explained later: “Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, we can look at a dataset representative of all Google searches, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world”.
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/25/us/politics/state-of-the-union-transcript-trump.html (Accessed 2 March 2026). See also text and video available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/386357 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[11] Video recording by LiveNOW from FOX, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zF7Vve53z4k (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[12] https://nypost.com/2026/02/24/us-news/democratic-womens-caucus-reps-wear-all-white-attire-epstein-related-pins-to-state-of-the-union-2026-address/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/research/2025/08/trump-accounts-give-the-next-generation-a-jump-start-on-saving/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[14] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-launches-trumprx-gov-to-bring-lower-drug-prices-to-american-patients/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[15] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27411442-cnn-poll-conducted-by-ssrs-state-of-the-union-reaction/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein argues that Trumpism is best analyzed not primarily as populism, but as patrimonial rule—where “the state itself becomes an extension of the ruler’s household” and governance turns into “a family business.” In this ECPS interview, Professor Kopstein distinguishes patrimonialism from classic competitive authoritarianism: rather than merely “tilting the playing field,” patrimonial leaders seek to “own the entire field.” He traces how loyalty tests, selective legality, and the “monetization of office” reshape elite incentives and accelerate institutional hollowing. Drawing on Weberian theory, Professor Kopstein warns that irreversibility arrives when career survival depends on pleasing a patron rather than serving an office—and when the line between public and private interests starts to seem “quaint.” The interview also examines selective impunity, conditional judicial autonomy, personalized coercion, and why democratic resistance must target structural vulnerabilities rather than “waiting for collapse.”
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Jeffrey Kopstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, offers a conceptually rigorous reinterpretation of Trumpism that moves beyond the familiar vocabulary of populism and competitive authoritarianism. Anchored in Weberian state theory and comparative authoritarianism, Professor Kopstein argues that the most analytically precise framework for understanding the contemporary transformation of American governance is patrimonialism—a form of rule in which the state is treated as the personal domain of the leader. As he memorably puts it, under patrimonial logic “the state itself becomes an extension of the ruler’s household,” collapsing the boundary between public authority and private interest and turning governance into what he repeatedly calls “a family business.”
Professor Kopstein’s intervention challenges dominant scholarly narratives that focus primarily on rhetoric, electoral manipulation, or ideological polarization. While competitive authoritarianism “rigs the game,” he contends, patrimonialism seeks something more radical: ownership of the system itself. In his words, the logic is “not simply to tilt the playing field, but to own the entire field.” This shift, he suggests, captures a deeper transformation from constitutional republicanism toward personalized rule structured by loyalty, selective legality, and the monetization of office. Trumpism, he argues, is best understood through this lens because its defining features—“loyalty tests, public humiliation of subordinates, monetization of office, and the personalization of coercive authority”—are not incidental pathologies but the governing principle of the system.
A central theme of the interview is institutional hollowing. Drawing on Max Weber’s theory of modern bureaucracy, Professor Kopstein explains how privileging personal loyalty over professional expertise erodes state capacity from within. When career advancement depends on pleasing the patron rather than serving impersonal offices, information deteriorates, policy becomes erratic, and public goods provision declines. The critical threshold, he warns, is reached when citizens and elites alike lose the ability to distinguish between public and private interests—when that distinction begins to seem “quaint.” At that point, patrimonial consolidation is effectively complete.
Equally significant is Professor Kopstein’s analysis of elite incentives. When public office becomes a revenue stream, neutrality becomes costly and adaptation becomes rational. Economic success increasingly depends not on market entrepreneurship but on proximity to power, reversing the conventional liberal assumption that wealth generates political influence. In patrimonial systems, he notes, the causal arrow often runs in the opposite direction: political power produces wealth. This dynamic helps explain why scandals, legal controversies, or reputational crises frequently fail to weaken such regimes. Surviving scandal without consequences signals immunity and reinforces an aura of invincibility among supporters.
By reframing Trumpism as a patrimonial project rather than merely a populist movement, Professor Kopstein invites scholars to redirect analytical attention from mass ideology to elite control over institutions, resources, and coercive capacity. The interview thus situates contemporary American politics within a broader comparative perspective on personalist rule, offering a sobering account of how democratic systems can be gradually transformed without the overt dismantling of formal institutions.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Not Tilting the Field but Owning It: Trumpism as Patrimonial Rule
US President Donald Trump delivers a speech to voters at an event in Phoenix, Arizona. Photo: Danny Raustadt.
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In yourPersuasionarticle, you argue that Trumpism represents a shift from constitutional republicanism toward patrimonial rule. Conceptually, how does this transformation differ from classic competitive authoritarianism, and why does patrimonialism better capture the logic of power under Trump?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: First of all, thanks so much for having me. Competitive authoritarianism—I’m not a specialist on exactly that concept, but I’ve read it, and I know Lucan Way very well—refers to regimes that manipulate electoral competition while preserving institutional arenas as sites of contestation. Elections still matter, courts still operate, and opposition exists, albeit under constraints.
By contrast, patrimonialism treats the state itself as an extension of the ruler’s household. It becomes a family business. Offices turn into instruments of personal loyalty, law is applied selectively, and the boundaries—most importantly—between public power and private benefit collapse. The logic here is not simply, to use their language, to tilt the playing field, but to own the entire field. In this view, the state is a family business.
Stephen Hanson and I argue that Trumpism is better understood in patrimonial terms because its defining features are loyalty tests, public humiliation of subordinates, monetization of office, and the personalization of coercive authority. These are not incidental excesses; they are the governing principle. If I could leave you with a sound bite, competitive authoritarianism rigs the game, whereas patrimonialism claims ownership of the stadium.
When Pleasing the Patron Overrides Serving the Office
Drawing on Weberian theory and your work on modern statehood, how does the systematic privileging of personal loyalty over bureaucratic expertise in the US reshape state capacity—and at what point does institutional hollowing become politically irreversible?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: Let’s go back to Weber. It’s always the right thing to do. Weber argued that modern statehood depends on impersonal offices and expertise. When loyalty replaces competence, three things happen: information degrades, exits increase, and compliance becomes politicized. Policies become erratic, feedback loops collapse, and public goods deteriorate.
Irreversibility sets in not in a single legal moment, but when expectations shift—when career incentives depend on pleasing the patron rather than serving the office. At that point, even restoration-minded elites begin to hesitate to act.
So, there is no single point of no return, but it arrives when survival in government depends on loyalty rather than competence. We are not in a perfect patrimonial world yet in the United States. The way I would put it is this: our notion of the state depends on a clear separation between the public interest and the private interest. When we are no longer able to understand that difference, when it seems quaint, then we will know that the patrimonial regime has fully consolidated.
From Market Entrepreneurship to Proximity to Power
Caricature: Shutterstock.
You describe the Trump presidency as collapsing the boundary between public authority and private enrichment. How does this blurring alter elite incentives, especially among business, judicial, and security elites who must decide whether to resist, adapt, or profit?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It’s a really important question. Clearly, Trump has been very busy turning the state into a family business, and as we say in the article, business is booming. When public office becomes monetizable, elites shift incentives toward adaptation and profit rather than resistance. And we see that already. We see that with chip makers; rather than economic entrepreneurship, it’s proximity to power that determines whether you are a rich elite. We just saw that this last week with Anthropic and AI.
If you’re out of favor with the government, they can, sort of, crush you. Even in that dust-up between Elon Musk and Trump, it’s super interesting. Here you have the richest man in the world versus the most powerful man in the world, and in that fight, my judgment is Trump crushed him like a bug. It was not close. We’re used to thinking in the United States—and basic political science says—that if you’re rich, that gives you power, that economics determines political power. But in many parts of the world, and at many times in history, it’s actually the reverse: great power yields great wealth. And I think we’re starting to see that in the United States. So, the bottom line is that when office becomes a revenue stream, neutrality becomes a liability.
In Patrimonial Systems, Scandals Create an Aura of Invincibility
How should scholars interpret the political effects of the Epstein files and Trump’s alleged proximity to that scandal—not in moral terms, but as a demonstration of selective impunity within a patrimonial system? Under what conditions do scandals cease to delegitimize power and instead reinforce it?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: In patrimonial systems, surviving scandal often reinforces power. Scandals cease to delegitimize authority when media ecosystems are polarized, selective enforcement is normalized, and elites expect law to be wielded strategically rather than neutrally.
So, under these conditions, I think proximity to scandal that produces no consequences signals immunity—that they can’t be punished. And everybody understands this. So, people stop thinking in terms of enforcing the law, or in terms of, is Trump competent? Is he crazy? Is he a pervert? I mean, all of those things become sort of uninteresting. It’s not that people won’t continue to try; it’s that each one of those he survives within a patrimonial regime doesn’t weaken him—it actually strengthens him, because it creates this aura of invincibility.
So, the bottom line is that, in a rule-of-law system, the kinds of things that would have disqualified Trump long ago—in a patrimonial system—succeed, at least for his most ardent followers, in creating, to put it in Weberian terms, for the leader and his staff, a kind of image of strength.
Patrimonial Stability Rests on Ambition, Fear, and Beneficiaries
Comparatively speaking, how does Trump’s apparent insulation from reputational or legal consequences resemble patterns observed in other patrimonial regimes, such as Russia, Turkey, or Hungary? Is this best understood as elite coordination failure or as successful authoritarian learning?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: Does it have to be either? It could be both. Insulation from consequences reflects both coordination failure and successful authoritarian learning. The fragmentation of opposition enables consolidation, and we see that with the Democratic Party in the United States right now. It’s somewhat of a mess, although they are trying to find their footing.
In Hungary, we’re going to see what happens. Orban has succeeded, in a sense, in playing the opposition like a fiddle. He appears to be threatened right now, and we will see whether he moves toward a full authoritarian route, as opposed to the competitive authoritarian route, though he may. The same dynamic applies to Turkey as well—though you would know much better than I do. My understanding is that it is also in a similar situation. Over time, rulers manage elites through selective reward and punishment, especially through court-politics dynamics. People at the top, if they begin opposing, either leave—or, if the regime is fully consolidated, as in Russia, they may face physical liquidation.
Now, in most patrimonial regimes, it is not like Russia. You can have patrimonialism in both a democracy and a dictatorship; the line runs orthogonal to the distinction between the two. It is not coterminous with it. Patrimonial stability does not require universal support. It relies on individualized ambition and fear. There are large numbers of distributional beneficiaries of Erdogan, of Orban, of Netanyahu in Israel, and now increasingly of Trump in the United States. So, yes.
Courts Persist Under Patrimonialism but Align in Political Cases
The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.
You note that courts rarely disappear under patrimonialism but instead become conditionally autonomous. How does the high rate of judicial alignment with Trump administration interests reshape expectations about the judiciary as a democratic backstop?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I think you raise a really important point. Even in a patrimonial regime, even in an authoritarian regime, for the most part courts continue to exist. They handle normal matters—inheritance, ordinary criminal behavior, standard criminal law—but here we are really talking about political cases, cases that deal especially with the power of the executive.
Under those circumstances, the courts begin to align with the patron. You see that somewhat in the United States. There are already things that people on the Court want. Those who, for example, are interested in libertarian ideas hope Trump will deliver them, although Trump is not a pure libertarian. Those interested in Christian nationalism in the United States hope he will give them what they want as well. Those interested in enhanced executive authority—there are some on the Court in that camp too—are also aligned with the Federalist Society and want that outcome. They, of course, expect Trump to deliver it.
That said, there are certain issues on which the Court will resist. We saw that in the case of tariffs, where the Court ruled against Trump. They may still allow him to pursue similar goals by other means. Over time, the Court figures out how far it can contradict the great father figure—which is what patrimonialism actually implies—and where it cannot.
From a patrimonial perspective, how does the use of agencies such as ICE—operating with diminished oversight and heightened personal loyalty—alter the relationship between citizens and the state? Does this represent bureaucratic drift or deliberate personalization of coercion?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It could be both, but patrimonialism really highlights the personalization of coercion. If you look at the US budget right now, Trump has, on purpose, cut a huge number of regular bureaucratic jobs, which appears to align exactly with what one would expect Republicans to do. However, the budget has not gone down.
They have actually created this huge new bureaucracy that is personally dependent on Trump, and that’s ICE. And it’s becoming not just a personal empire; it’s becoming something like a real estate empire. They’re acquiring a lot of territory, which, of course, Trump likes—real estate. So this personalization of coercive agencies is deliberate. It takes away not only from legal oversight, but also removes or disempowers people who are not personally dependent on Trump.
Thus, the legal forms remain while the zones of exceptional enforcement expand. When oversight weakens and loyalty is rewarded, enforcement becomes personalized. It becomes somewhat theatrical. The objective is not efficient enforcement, but loyal enforcement. Those two things can overlap, but they can also be very different.
Episodic Force and Symbolic Threat as Tools of Control
Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.
Unlike 20th-century dictatorships, Trumpism relies less on mass repression and more on episodic coercion and symbolic threat. How much actual violence is necessary for patrimonial consolidation in a mature media democracy?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I’ve written pretty extensively on this. Consolidation does not require mass repression. There has been a lot of discussion of fascism and totalitarianism and all that kind of stuff, Hanson and I worry about it a great deal. But what is probably also true is that selective, visible coercion effectively reshapes expectations. A few exemplary punishments communicate risk pretty broadly. It’s not to say that there won’t continue to be resistance to ICE. We saw that in Minnesota; we’ve seen it in other places. I’m here in California, where we have a pretty active resistance, and our state government—California has 40 million people; it’s a country—has continued to resist. But ICE is still around; it’s in my neighborhood. It doesn’t need to terrorize everyone; it only needs to make everyone calculate as if it could. And that’s the case. It changes expectations.
Succession Anxiety Is the Structural Weakness of Personalist Rule
You argue that succession is the Achilles’ heel of patrimonial regimes. How does Trump’s discourse around a third term function strategically to freeze elite expectations and delay post-Trump realignments?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It’s absolutely crucial. As you said, succession is the Achilles’ heel of a patrimonial regime. Under most circumstances, patrimonialism is the oldest form of government in the world. Under most circumstances, patrimonialism is related to kingship or queenship. It passes on through the royal family. Of course, remaking the state as a family business in the modern world—we don’t have kings or queens anymore—so you would think it would pass through his family. It doesn’t seem all that likely in Trump’s case that the sons are going to be the successors. Interestingly, the daughter Ivanka is probably the most cognitively fit to be the successor. But patrimonial women don’t do very well either.
But the key here is that personalist regimes destabilize when elites anticipate an endpoint. So, signaling negotiable terms that that endpoint may not come freezes expectations and discourages hedging. As the end comes closer, the staff start scrambling like rats on the deck of a sinking ship. And the whole point of this third-term discussion—which he may very well want, and I don’t think he could easily get, but he will try, and it is to be taken extremely seriously as a pressure point against the consolidation of a patrimonial regime—is that it is extremely important that it be opposed, because it’s all about maintaining the leader and his staff. And if the staff see that endpoint, the regime itself becomes destabilized. So, yes, succession anxiety is the Achilles’ heel of a patrimonial regime. All experience shows that.
To what extent does labeling Trumpism as “populist” obscure its deeper patrimonial logic? What analytical errors follow if scholars focus too heavily on mass ideology rather than elite control of resources and institutions?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I think it’s really important. On the one hand, populism—most of political science, most scholars, most social science are very interested in this, and populism is part of it—focuses on how people come to power, the rhetoric, the appeal, and how they stay in power. What patrimonialism looks at is something different: it examines what they do when they come to power, how they actually govern. Governance is extremely important, and populism, we think, obscures patrimonial control. It highlights rhetoric.
Patrimonialism highlights elite control over appointments, enforcement, resources—things that populism doesn’t talk about at all. The two aren’t completely contradictory, but they address really different dimensions. So, populism, or dictatorship versus democracy, is part of a discourse concerned with how leaders come to power and stay in power. Patrimonialism is interested in what they do to the state once they come to power. And that’s just something very different.
Foreign Policy as Regime Maintenance by Other Means
US Army advances during a demonstration at MCAS Miramar, October 5, 2008. Photo: Anton Hlushchenko / Dreamstime.
How does Trump’s coercive, transactional foreign policy—toward NATO allies, territorial revisionism (as in Greenland), and extraterritorial enforcement—serve domestic patrimonial consolidation rather than traditional strategic goals?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: As we’re talking about this, of course, the world’s foreign policies are in great flux and turmoil with what’s going on in the Middle East. One of the things about patrimonialism is that patrimonial leaders, because they have a very traditionalist view, no longer see borders as legal; they view them as historical and traditional—fuzzy, if you will—and that really works at odds with the modern world.
Even more important than that, they view their relations with other countries, as you said, as transactional. Transactional diplomacy dramatizes sovereignty and creates distributable rents for loyalists. So, who’s going to control Greenland? Will it be Donald Trump Jr. creating mines for strategic minerals that university professors will be forced to work in like a gulag? I don’t think so, but that’s the idea.
So, foreign policy becomes a sort of regime maintenance by other means. It’s an extension. Traditional international relations tends to ignore the makeup, the regime type, of domestic politics, but we think that foreign policy—and Trump’s foreign policy in particular—is especially driven by this domestic makeup, by domestic politics.
Patrimonial Stability Depends on Cohesion Between Leader and Staff
From a comparative international perspective, how likely is it that sustained allied resistance and strategic balancing against the United States could feed back into domestic regime instability—or do patrimonial rulers generally externalize such costs successfully?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: They can. It’s an excellent question, and we don’t have a great answer to that, to be honest. But, on the one hand, foreign wars—and we’re in one right now—can produce a sort of rally-around-the-flag phenomenon, although in the United States right now my understanding is that the war, the bombing of Iran, is not very popular.
But here’s the point: external resistance destabilizes only if it fractures key domestic elites. That’s the point. Again, Weber and patrimonialism tells us, that you need to look at the relationship between the leader and his staff.
And so it only works—it only destabilizes—if it fractures the elites underneath the leader. And why? Because balancing imposes costs. Destabilization occurs when those costs split the coalition. So, that’s how I would answer that, although our emphasis is really not on foreign policy. But it’s an important question.
When the State Becomes a Family Business, Public Goods Deteriorate
You emphasize that patrimonial regimes are structurally bad at providing public goods. What kinds of policy failures—climate disasters, pandemics, financial crises—are most likely to puncture the aura of inevitability surrounding Trumpism?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: What you would expect from a patrimonial regime, as you said quite correctly, is that as a bureaucracy based on merit recruitment is degraded and becomes a plaything of the family business, you would see a systematic under-provision of public goods, or only those public goods that serve the interests of the extended household of the leader being provided. So, you’d expect two things to happen. One—and the one you pointed to—is that when we need the state to respond to disasters, and we saw this with COVID, but you can also see it with financial crises and other kinds of public health breakdowns, there is an institutional halt. When we need the state, what the state represents under those circumstances is a hedge against disaster. And so we need the state, and we may not have it.
I’m living here in California. We get earthquakes. If we need the state after a really bad earthquake, if it has been degraded enough, we won’t have it. But there’s a second type of deterioration that is slower moving, and that is the under-provision of public goods for things like roads, bridges, and airports. Over time, what you should see is public infrastructure decaying, and we already have that in the United States, and it’s going to get worse. I live next to the second-largest city in the United States, Los Angeles, and the airport here is like a third-world airport. It’s not really being built up or maintained. That’s called LAX (Los Angeles International Airport). You should expect to see much of the public infrastructure in the United States start to look more and more like LAX.
Effective Opposition Raises the Costs of Loyalty and Lowers the Costs of Exit
“No Kings” protest against the Trump administration, New York City, USA — June 14, 2025. Demonstrators march down Fifth Avenue as part of the nationwide “No Kings” movement opposing President Donald Trump and his administration. Photo: Dreamstime.
And finally, Professor Kopstein, given your critique of “waiting for collapse,” what forms of democratic resistance are most effective against patrimonial rule? Specifically, how can opposition forces exploit structural weaknesses—succession anxiety, declining popularity, and governance failure—without reinforcing siege narratives?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: That’s the hardest question you’ve asked yet, but I want to reinforce the assumption we make, and as we wrote in this article, that we should not expect scandal, incompetence, the Supreme Court, nor foreign policy failures to save us. None of those things will probably work. Patrimonial leaders are pretty good at dealing with all of them. The weaknesses of patrimonialism, as we’ve been discussing, are much more structural, as you said quite explicitly. They’re slow-moving. They’re unspectacular. So, we’ve talked about splits, succession failures, institutional hollowing—things that are slow-moving and fly under the radar. That is why it is so difficult for us to deal with this type of regime, to understand it, and to expose it.
So, I think focusing on succession and undermining inevitability is key. That is why each congressional House race matters: if you can show that the Democrats won by more than expected, or that Trump did not win by as much as he expected in a particular district, that punctures the aura of inevitability. Most important is to connect governance failures to institutional hollowing. That is the key weak point here—to connect those two—and to avoid rhetoric that is easily reframed as elite disdain. The bottom line is: don’t wait for collapse. Raise the costs of loyalty, fracture the elite, and lower the costs of exit.
Along Nigeria’s vulnerable coastline, climate change is not a projection but a daily struggle shaping survival, governance, and democracy. In this incisive commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reveals how communities—from Lagos to Cross River—are filling critical gaps left by weak institutions, organizing drainage cleanups, mangrove restoration, and informal warning systems to confront flooding, pollution, and shoreline loss. These grassroots practices constitute “climate security from below,” challenging state-centric narratives that equate security with national planning alone. Yet this resilience also exposes deep democratic deficits, as citizens assume responsibilities that should belong to public authorities. The Nigerian case calls for a rethinking of climate security—one that bridges community initiative with accountable governance and recognizes local actors not as substitutes for the state, but as indispensable partners in building sustainable, democratic adaptation.
By Oludele Solaja*
Along the Nigerian coast, climate change is not a distant forecast; it is an everyday reality. Floodwaters inundate homes. Shorelines relentlessly recede. Saltwater contaminates freshwater supplies. Drains choke with plastic refuse, transforming streets into temporary lakes when the rains arrive. For those in the Niger Delta and adjacent coastal areas, climate insecurity is not a concept but a lived experience.
Yet climate security is often discussed in terms of state stability, resource conflicts, or national-level adaptation planning. On the ground, the picture is very different. In many parts of the Nigerian coast, securing the climate is a local endeavor—it is climate security from below.
All along Nigeria’s long coastal belt—from Lagos in the west to Cross River in the east—communities are filling governance gaps caused by weak infrastructure, state absenteeism, and an economy structured around extractive activities. Their everyday efforts to prevent environmental hazards, safeguard livelihoods, and protect daily life from environmental instability constitute a concrete instance of climate security from below.
Climate Risk and Governance Gaps
Among all regions of Nigeria, the coastal zone—characterized by high population density, vital ecosystems, and extensive oil-sector industrial development—is one of the country’s most climate-sensitive areas. Devastating nationwide floods (2012 and 2022) caused massive population displacement (UN OCHA, 2023), while the low-lying areas of the delta region are vulnerable to flooding due to the combined effects of sea-level rise and subsidence. The persistent and serious pollution of marine and coastal areas by oil (UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2021) is another major challenge to the region’s resilience, in addition to the issue of waste disposal.
However, these climate hazards do not operate independently of existing governance failures: the most basic measures of environmental protection—drainage, waste management systems, shoreline stabilization, and adaptation measures—are still absent from the majority of coastal Nigerian communities even after over half a century of oil production. The institutions responsible for addressing these hazards often exist only on paper rather than being effectively implementable, and are seen by communities as out of reach, lacking sufficient resources, or being overly controlled by industrial corporations (Watts, 2004; Adekola & Mitchell, 2011).
National planning and large infrastructure projects have come to dominate official discourse on climate security. However, daily maintenance tasks—such as unblocking drainage channels and maintaining vegetation cover along coastlines—appear to receive little attention. The resulting governance gaps mean that environmental risks mount even as the ability of institutions to respond to them fails to keep pace. The response? Communities themselves have filled these gaps.
Everyday Climate Security
Across the Nigerian coast, locals organize cleanups of drainage channels in anticipation of the rains. Youth groups remove plastic waste from waterways. Local fishers actively plant mangrove trees that offer protection from storm surges, and some local leaders invest in manually reinforcing shorelines. Informal communication networks are established to disseminate warnings during extreme weather events. These actions perform critical climate-security functions: clearing waterways reduces flooding risks, planting mangroves strengthens coastlines, waste removal enhances public health, and social networks bolster community solidarity during critical moments.
This is climate security lived through everyday practice. It involves the extensive use of local ecological knowledge—the implicit understanding of local tidal systems, sedimentation processes, vegetation cover, and flood dynamics that formal engineering approaches sometimes fail to capture (Berkes, 2018). These efforts are frequently outside state plans, organized through communal labor, volunteers, and community associations (Adger et al., 2005; IPCC, 2022). This form of security has moved from a distant policy objective to a matter of routine—often invisible, often unpaid—maintenance that ensures continued habitation in these communities.
The Politics of Resilience
However, community agency is only one aspect of the story. It reveals deep democratic deficits in Nigeria’s governance landscape. Many communities in Nigeria’s coast have had minimal participation in environmental decision-making and very limited input in planning related to coastal infrastructure (Adekola & Mitchell, 2011). Environmental damage and subsequent exclusion caused by the operations of the oil industry in the Niger Delta continue to fuel local suspicion and resentment of both the state and oil companies (UNEP, 2011).
Dominant narratives about national development tend to focus on megaprojects, especially those involving infrastructure such as new highways and expanding coastal reclamation schemes, instead of the vital work of maintaining drains or planting mangroves. Communities therefore take on tasks that ought to be part of municipal governance. On the one hand, this enhances community resilience; yet, on the other, it may inadvertently normalize state withdrawal and a general lack of commitment from both national and subnational governments. When people do not expect the municipality to respond, self-help becomes the norm, and they may no longer notice the absence of this state function. Climate security from below becomes both a function of and evidence of failed state governance. Understanding this dynamic is critical; the ability of a community to exhibit resilience through its own actions should not serve as justification for abandoning its rights to a participatory state governance structure.
Informality and Legitimacy
A significant proportion of this community-based environmental management along Nigeria’s coast operates informally. There are no municipal plans that document these practices, nor are there official funds allocated to support them, yet they possess strong local legitimacy. The practice of collective labor and a long tradition of shared ownership over local environments continue to be powerful social resources. The application of indigenous ecological knowledge enhances their efficacy, given that local actors may possess more detailed knowledge of flood dynamics than engineers. For instance, locally managed mangrove planting may have higher survival rates than centrally implemented technical solutions that are often not sensitive to local ecology (Berkes, 2018; IPCC, 2022). Nevertheless, informality means that these efforts struggle when faced with widespread industrial pollution or encroaching urban waste. Sustained resilience under such conditions requires not only community initiative but also institutional support and legitimacy.
Rethinking Climate Security
The Nigerian case thus requires a reconsideration of conventional understandings of climate security. Security may not simply entail preventing conflict and safeguarding states but also includes the protection of livelihoods, human health, and natural ecosystems threatened by contemporary climate change processes. In the Global South, resilience is emerging first in informal, grassroots, locally managed communities rather than through national adaptation planning.
To achieve sustainable climate security, bridging grassroots efforts and inclusive state governance institutions must be a priority. Formal acknowledgement of these community-led adaptations within national adaptation frameworks, cooperative frameworks integrating local knowledge and technical capacity, participatory planning mechanisms to overcome democratic gaps, small-scale climate financing to support community projects without over-bureaucratization, as well as the integration of local ecological knowledge into formal assessments are some policy strategies. This reconfigures communities not as a substitute for the state but as legitimate and important partners in governance.
Conclusion
In fact, climate security is already being constructed from below on Nigeria’s coast—with drainage repair, mangrove planting, waste disposal, and vigilant self-policing, communities are managing daily life under accelerating environmental breakdown. This is indicative of both community strength and utter policy collapse simultaneously. The Nigerian case makes clear that strategies for climate security need to consider possibilities beyond the state and engage in discussions around daily security practices if adaptation is to become the practice of democratic, responsive statehood.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Adger, W. N.; Hughes, T. P.; Folke, C.; Carpenter; S. R. & Rockström, J. (2005). “Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters.” Science, 309(5737), 1036–1039.
Adekola, O. & Mitchell, G. (2011). “The Niger Delta wetlands: Threats to ecosystem services, their importance to dependent communities and possible management measures.” International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 7(1), 50–68.
Berkes, F. (2018). Sacred ecology (4th ed.). Routledge.
IPCC. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press.
UNEP. (2011). Environmental assessment of Ogoniland. United Nations Environment Programme.
UN OCHA. (2023). Nigeria floods situation report 2022–2023. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Watts, M. (2004). “Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta.” Geopolitics, 9(1), 50–80.
World Bank. (2021). Climate risk country profile: Nigeria. World Bank Group.
In this ECPS interview, Dr. Soheila Shahriari offers a theoretically grounded diagnosis of Rojava’s most precarious post-ISIS moment. She argues that the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria should be understood not as a wartime improvisation, but as a long-evolving counter-hegemonic project rooted in democratic confederalism, gender equality, pluralism, and social ecology. Yet Dr. Shahriari underscores a stark geopolitical constraint: without formal recognition and enforceable guarantees from Western actors—especially the EU and the United States—Rojava lacks the diplomatic leverage to secure a durable decentralized settlement with Damascus. The interview explores how instrumental Western engagement, Turkey’s securitization paradigm, and Syria’s recentralization drive converge to endanger non-state democratic experiments. It also examines diaspora mobilization, the global resonance of Kurdish women’s politics, and the fragile future of local partnerships in conflict zones.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Soheila Shahriari from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in France offers a wide-ranging and theoretically grounded assessment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) at a moment of profound uncertainty. As shifting regional alignments, great-power bargaining, and Syrian state consolidation converge to narrow the space for Kurdish self-rule, Dr. Shahriari situates Rojava not merely as a wartime anomaly but as a counter-hegemonic democratic experiment struggling to survive in an international system dominated by state sovereignty, realpolitik, and authoritarian resurgence. The interview is organized around a central warning captured in the headline: Without formal recognition and protection from Western actors, Rojava lacks the diplomatic leverage necessary to secure a durable decentralized settlement with Damascus.
Dr. Shahriari argues that the current crisis stems less from military weakness than from structural diplomatic isolation. Despite their decisive role in defeating ISIS alongside the United States, Kurdish-led forces failed to convert battlefield legitimacy into institutional guarantees. The January ceasefire and negotiations over integration into Syrian state structures illustrate the narrowing options available to the Autonomous Administration under pressure from Damascus, Ankara, and shifting US priorities. In this context, Dr. Shahriari emphasizes that external recognition is not symbolic but constitutive of survival: without enforceable guarantees from actors such as the European Union and the United States, any decentralization arrangement risks becoming a temporary tactical compromise rather than a stable power-sharing order.
At the same time, the interview highlights the distinctive ideological and institutional character of the Rojava project. Dr. Shahriari describes it as an anti-statist political paradigm rooted in democratic confederalism, gender equality, pluralism, and ecological principles—an alternative model of governance emerging amid global democratic recession and Middle Eastern authoritarian consolidation. The conversation also explores how women-led institutions function as a “symbolic infrastructure” of resilience, how diaspora activism and transnational networks have reshaped Kurdish political imaginaries, and how the global visibility of Kurdish women fighters transformed international legitimacy. Yet these achievements, she notes, have not translated into formal diplomatic recognition, leaving the experiment vulnerable to geopolitical bargaining among states.
The interview also examines the structural limits of liberal internationalism and the instrumental nature of Western engagement with non-state democratic actors. Dr. Shahriari contends that Western powers’ prioritization of strategic alliances—particularly with Turkey—over normative commitments has undermined both Rojava’s prospects and the credibility of democratic rhetoric. Consequently, the future of Kurdish self-administration depends not only on negotiations with Damascus but on whether Western governments are willing to move from tactical cooperation to institutional protection.
Ultimately, Dr. Shahriari frames Rojava’s predicament as emblematic of a broader tension in contemporary world politics: the clash between innovative democratic experiments and an international order still organized around sovereign states and security competition. Whether Rojava becomes a model of negotiated decentralization or a casualty of regional power politics, she concludes, will depend on the availability of credible external guarantees—without which even the most resilient non-state democracy faces structural vulnerability.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Soheila Shahriari, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Rojava Should Be Read as a Post-National Political Project, not a Wartime Anomaly
Kurdish demonstrators protest Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s military operation in northern Syria, expressing support for Rojava and the YPG in Prague, Czech Republic on October 17, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Soheila Shahriari, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Your research frames Rojava as a counter-hegemonic democratic experiment emerging amid global democratic recession and Middle Eastern authoritarian consolidation. To what extent should Rojava be understood as a transformative model of post-nation-state governance versus a context-specific survival mechanism born of state collapse, particularly in a regional environment shaped by authoritarian resilience and populist Islamism and nationalism?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Thank you for having me. This is a very interesting question. I think reducing Rojava to a context-specific survival mechanism born of state collapse is analytically insufficient. While the collapse of state authority during the Syrian Civil War created the structural opening for Rojava’s institutional experiment, this was, to use Michel Foucault’s terms, a condition of possibility rather than the cause of Rojava’s emergence. These are two distinct things. Many argue that a power vacuum in Syria, combined with the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad’s forces, explains Rojava’s emergence. But this was merely a facilitating condition, not the primary cause, and it is a somewhat simplistic way of understanding the issue.
Rojava can be described as post-national in some respects, but it differs from structures such as the European Union due to its distinct sociopolitical development and historical contingencies. It is better understood as an anti-state progressive political project grounded in women’s rights, pluralism, and ecological principles, operating within a hostile and authoritarian Middle Eastern environment.
It represents the institutionalization of a political paradigm that evolved over decades within the Kurdish movement, particularly through the theoretical trajectories associated with Abdullah Öcalan. The shift from Marxist-Leninist national liberation to democratic confederalism reflects a deep epistemological transformation—a move away from state sovereignty toward decentralized, council-based, multiethnic self-governance. Its pillars—radical democracy, women’s liberation, pluralism, and social ecology—are therefore not improvised wartime adaptations, but the product of sustained ideological development.
Rojava Transformed the Kurdish Imaginary from Ethno-Nationalism to Gender-Equal Pluralism
In your dissertation, you analyze how the Rojava revolution reshaped the Kurdish national imaginary in the diaspora, particularly through gender equality and pluralism. How has this transnational reconfiguration fed back into political mobilization within Kurdish regions themselves?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: When we are talking about the Kurdish diaspora, we have to move beyond the conventional understanding of diaspora because of the particular situation of Kurdistan. Kurdistan has a very distinct dynamism in terms of its diaspora community, marked by intensely reciprocal political, cultural, and social engagement and ties between different parts of Kurdistan and the West. Political developments in one area feed directly and immediately into others. They are highly interconnected, forming a transnational political space shaped by the unique circumstances of the Kurdish question.
So, the Rojava Revolution has fundamentally reshaped the Kurdish national imaginary in my research, shifting it from a traditional nationalist framework toward a radically gender-equal and pluralistic new system of being. This transformation affects Kurds as a whole, not just in the diaspora or in the West. Evidence for this claim includes the women-led uprising in Kurdistan, inspired very directly by the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi), which was the very first slogan of Rojava’s gender revolution.
This is one clear example of how developments in Rojava have fed back into Kurdistan itself. The influence from Rojava toward diaspora communities in the West, and the domino effect of Rojava across the Middle East, was visible in the women-led uprising in Rojhelat, or Iranian Kurdistan. It also elevated Kurdish actors as agents of democratization across the region, not just in Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) but more broadly in the Middle East. Politically, this influence is visible in coalition-building and pluralistic alliances.
By coalition-building, I mean Rojava’s alliances with democratic forces—Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other minorities—which have inspired Kurdish actors, especially in Iranian Kurdistan, to build coalitions with other national minorities across Iran against authoritarian central regimes. These are two telling examples of Rojava’s domino effect in the Middle East, especially in Iran: the women-led uprising in Iranian Kurdistan in 2022 and coalition-building with other national minority forces inside Iran, inspired by the same experience.
Women-Led Governance Is the Backbone of Rojava
Protest by Kurdish demonstrators following attacks on Rojava in northern Syria, Trier, Germany, January 24, 2026.
You argue that women-led governance structures in Rojava function as a “symbolic infrastructure” of democratic resilience. How sustainable is this feminist institutional architecture under conditions of militarization, economic blockade, diplomatic isolation, and the surrounding pressures of authoritarian and autocratic regimes?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: First of all, the sustainability and mobility of Rojava’s feminist institutional architecture rests on its own radical resilience. Women-led governance structures, as you mentioned, are not merely symbolic but constitute foundational pillars of the political project. This is evident in the practical effectiveness of structures such as the co-presidency system, “Jineology” as an intellectual foundation of Rojava, the metamorphosis of the justice system in Rojava, and women-friendly structures like Mala Jin (Women’s Houses), the eco-feminist village of Jinwar, and women’s self-defense initiatives like the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). These structures have demonstrated durability over a decade of conflict, yet their long-term viability is constrained by a geopolitical zero-sum game.
Again, the engagement of Rojava with Western allies in the fight against ISIS involved immense sacrifices, with 11,000 or 12,000 lives lost in the fight against ISIS, without securing formal international recognition or protection from Western allies. The problem starts here. When we look at the fragility and vulnerability of Rojava today, the crux of the matter is that Rojava made extraordinary sacrifices against the international threat of ISIS, yet this was a zero-sum game for Kurdish actors in Rojava. They did not succeed in securing international recognition or protection from the West.
As you mentioned in your question, the feminist governance model faces severe existential threats from militarization, economic blockade, and the hostility of neighboring states, particularly Turkey, as well as pressure from the central Syrian state of Ahmed al-Shara. In this context, its stability and durability hinge on sustained engagement with Western democracies, which must be held accountable, as a moral necessity, to defend Rojava’s democratic and gender-progressive structures against broader authoritarian and Islamist dynamics.
Decentralization Requires External Guarantees
With the recent military setbacks and integration pressures from Damascus, do you see the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) transitioning from a de facto autonomous entity toward negotiated decentralization, or facing structural dismantlementwithin a re-centralized Syrian state increasingly characterized by autocratic restoration?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The most viable path to avoid the worst-case scenario—I mean, the worst case is the structural dismantlement of Rojava within a re-centralized Syrian state—is sustained diplomatic engagement. Again, I emphasize sustained diplomatic engagement with Western countries. The preservation of the autonomous administration heavily depends on the political will of key actors, particularly the EU and the United States, to counter Turkey’s hostility, the Syrian state’s push for recentralization, and ongoing power pressures. Crucial and strategic steps have already been taken in this direction in recent months.
This includes the European Parliament resolution of February 2026, which explicitly calls on Turkey not to interfere in negotiations between the SDF and the central government. Another example is the invitation of General Mazloum Kobani, Commander-in-Chief of the SDF, along with Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Department of Foreign Relations of Rojava, to participate in the Munich Security Conference in February. A further example is the invitation of Ilham Ahmed and the Commander-in-Chief of the YPG to hold a press conference at the European Parliament on February 25, 2026.
These actions are essential to ensure that the rights of Kurds, as a collective entity, not only as individuals, are recognized within the Syrian Constitution. Without international backing and pressure, Rojava faces the risk of enforced decentralization under hostile conditions or full structural dismantlement in a centralized, autocratically restored Syrian state. Without such international recognition from Western actors, especially the EU or the United States, Rojava possesses limited diplomatic leverage to compel Damascus into a permanent decentralized power-sharing agreement.
War Conditions Distort Democratic Experiments
Destroyed residential building in a rebel-held area of Aleppo, Syria, February 12, 2013; three children collect firewood amid the rubble. Photo: Richard Harvey / Dreamstime.
Some critics suggest that Rojava’s multiethnic model struggled to maintain legitimacy among Arab populations in eastern Syria. To what degree were these tensions structural limits of democratic confederalism versus consequences of wartime governance conditions?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: I do not think that democratic confederalism as a theory contains a structural flaw. It is a highly progressive and democratic theory. It is not built on Kurdish supremacy or exclusionary nationalism; rather, it is explicitly anti-ethnic in its political logic. It seeks to transcend ethnicity as the basis of sovereignty and instead centers pluralism, decentralization, and participatory government.
Where tensions emerge is not at the level of theory itself but at the level of implementation. The translation of radical, ideologically dense thought into heterogeneous, war-torn territory—particularly among Arab populations who were not socialized into the PKK-led movement’s democratic and feminist paradigm—inevitably creates friction. These communities had lived for decades under authoritarian rule without meaningful experience of democratic institutionalization, gender parity mechanisms, or participatory governance.
The sudden introduction of a transformative political model such as Rojava under militarized conditions naturally produces uneven incorporation of Arab populations. Thus, the issue is less of a structural flaw of democratic confederalism itself and more of a gap between normative ambition and historically shaped political socialization under conditions of war.
Without Recognition, Vulnerability Persists
How do you assess the long-term viability of non-state democratic models like Rojava in an international system still dominated by state sovereignty and realpolitik, where authoritarian and populist governments increasingly shape regional norms?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The long-term viability of non-state democratic models like Rojava within an international system still structured by state sovereignty and realpolitik, as you mentioned, depends largely on their capacity to secure external guarantees for survival. In Rojava’s case, this means convincingly persuading key international actors, particularly, as I mentioned before, the EU and the United States, to recognize and protect its status as a de facto autonomous region. If I put it differently, I would say that Rojava must engage in sustained and intensive diplomatic negotiation with Western powers—not regional powers—in order to transform its considerable transnational soft power—by soft power, I mean the radical democratic structures, the feminist institutions that I mentioned before, and pluralism and tolerance among religious, sexual, and linguistic minorities in Rojava.
As I mentioned, this negotiation must focus on transforming this considerable transnational soft power into formal diplomatic recognition as a legitimate de facto political entity. Without such international diplomatic recognition, the democratic experiment of Rojava remains structurally vulnerable within a regional order increasingly shaped by authoritarian consolidation and populist realignment, especially given the hostile stance of Turkey.
Autonomy Without Safeguards Risks Re-Centralization
The new Syrian leadership continues to frame Kurdish autonomy as separatism. In your view, what institutional arrangements—federalism, asymmetrical decentralization, or cultural autonomy—could realistically reconcile Kurdish self-administration with Syrian territorial integrity?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The reconciliation of Kurdish self-administration with Syrian territorial integrity seems very complicated. While the Syrian leadership continues to frame Kurdish autonomy as separatism, the Rojava project is grounded in democratic confederalism, an explicitly anti-centralist political project that seeks to decentralize sovereignty through bottom-up popular organization rather than secession. So, you see that the political language is not the same. The political language of the Kurdish actors is completely different here. It is not easily understandable for Arabs in Syria, especially when it comes to talking about the central government.
Among the possible institutional arrangements that you mentioned, Rojava should work toward the consolidation of its de facto self-governance as a form of federalism or democratic confederalism. We can put it differently: a constitutionally guaranteed form of political, administrative, and security autonomy within a unified Syrian state could, in principle, reconcile self-administration with territorial integrity. But cultural autonomy alone would likely be completely insufficient, in my view, as it would not secure institutional or security guarantees.
However, the viability of any such arrangement depends, again—I emphasize this time and again—on formal constitutional recognition and enforceable guarantees. Without concrete international diplomatic backing, federalism or decentralization in Rojava or in Syria risks becoming a temporary tactical compromise rather than a durable political settlement in a context where the central government may seek to reconsolidate autocratic authority once stabilized. Any agreement lacking structural safeguards could devolve into a zero-sum game for Kurdish actors in Rojava. Therefore, reconciliation is not merely a question of institutional design, but of credible guarantees and power-balancing mechanisms capable of preventing the re-centralization of the Syrian state.
People in London protest against President Erdoğan and alleged war crimes against Syrians and Kurds following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the area. Photo: Nicoleta Raluca Tudor / Dreamstime.
Turkey’s policy toward Rojava has been shaped by a security paradigm linking the region to the PKK, while unresolved domestic Kurdish issues — despite the ongoing so-called settlement process — reinforce threat perceptions. How might an “ethical-geopolitical repositioning,” combining security with legitimacy, alter Ankara’s strategic calculus, particularly within a political environment marked by populist securitization narratives?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: A very interesting question. Turkey’s approach to Rojava is anchored in a securitization paradigm, viewing the region as an existential threat because of its structural and ideological link to the PKK. Domestic political imperatives reinforce this framing. The AKP uses the label of terrorism to delegitimize Kurdish political claims and consolidate support among nationalist, ultra-nationalist or jingoistic constituencies.
An ethical-geopolitical repositioning would require Ankara to move beyond this monolithic security-centered view and recognize the legitimacy of the international soft power the Rojava project has generated. This would involve deconstructing the entrenched narrative that equates Kurdish self-governance with inherent terrorism and engaging in political and security arrangements that combine oversight with recognition. But in practical terms, for a state like Turkey, shaped by populist securitization narratives and the persistence of the Sevres syndrome in the mentality and psyche not just of the Turkish state but of the Turkish populace as well, such a shift appears to me highly unlikely, unfortunately.
Nation-State Bias Limits Support for Non-State Democracy
Western, especially American engagement with Rojava has often been instrumental—most visibly during the anti-ISIS campaign—yet politically noncommittal. Does this pattern reflect structural limits of liberal internationalism when confronted with non-state democratic experiments?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Western, particularly American engagement with Rojava has been largely tactical and situational rather than strategic or politically committed. This shows the structural limits of liberal internationalism which remains anchored in a nation-state-centric world order and struggles to accommodate or integrate non-state actors, especially democratic experiments like Rojava.
At the same time, Western powers consistently prioritize geopolitical and economic interests over democratic or humanitarian principles. Human rights rhetoric often collapses when it conflicts with the strategic value of allies like Turkey as a NATO member. In practice, realpolitik sets aside commitment to progressive non-state actors, unfortunately.
This pattern also illuminates the broader decline of Western democracies and the rise of populist nationalist leadership. The synergy between, for example, leaders like Donald Trump and regional autocrats like Recep Tayyip Erdogan created an environment in which the law of the jungle replaces internationalist norms, highlighting that even the most progressive and resilient non-state societies like Rojava can be sacrificed very easily for the sake of authoritarian resilience and short-term realpolitik.
Abandonment Erodes Trust in Western Alliances
US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.
The perceived abandonment of local Kurdish forces after their decisive role in defeating ISIS — alongside growing concerns about a possible resurgence of the organization in the event of instability in northeastern Syria — has raised questions about the credibility of Western alliances. What implications might this have for future local partnerships in conflict zones?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The perceived abandonment of the Kurdish forces in Rojava after their decisive role in defeating ISIS raises serious questions about the credibility of Western alliances and the viability of future local partnerships in conflict zones. Such experiences highlight the transactional nature of tactical cooperation and contribute to a broader erosion of trust in Western democratic commitments.
By allowing an authoritarian and Islamist state to challenge a progressive, non-state democratic experiment, Western powers, particularly the United States and, to a lesser extent, the EU, undermine their own moral authority and global leadership. This pattern may push local actors in future conflicts to seek alternative alliances, prioritize defensive nationalism, or act independently, recognizing that even democracies cannot always be trusted or relied upon to protect human rights or progressive governance.
Diaspora Mobilization Reshapes Western Perceptions
Your research highlights diaspora activism aimed at reshaping international perceptions of Kurdish movements, including efforts to de-list the PKK as a “terrorist organization.” How influential has diaspora lobbying been in shaping Western policy debates on the Kurdish question, particularly amid rising populist politics and securitized migration debates in Europe?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The Rojava Revolution, and especially the Battle of Kobani, marked a turning point for the Kurdish diaspora, legitimizing transnational political engagement and reshaping Western perceptions of the Kurdish movement. Diaspora activism has intensified and diversified, with efforts to de-list the PKK as a terrorist organization becoming a central focus. While most Western governments maintain the PKK designation under pressure from Turkey, diaspora lobbying has influenced key legal and legislative debates. For example, the Belgium Court of Appeal ruled that the PKK was a party in a non-international armed conflict rather than a terrorist group.
In Sweden and Germany, Kurdish diaspora actors have leveraged parliamentary and public channels to present the Kurdish movement as a vanguard of democratization in the Middle East, advocating for formal cooperation with Rojava authorities. Yet, these efforts face structural limits, as Western states often prioritize realpolitik and Turkey’s strategic value as a NATO ally, maintaining the terrorist label despite democratic claims.
We have two examples of de-listing efforts. One of them is the Belgium Court of Appeal ruling the PKK not to be a terrorist organization. The other was a similar effort at the EU level, which initially moved toward delaying the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization but, unfortunately, under pressure from Turkey, reinstated the label. So, there has been a clear dynamism in the post-Rojava revolution era within diaspora communities to de-list the PKK.
Feminization Transforms Image, Alliances, and Moral Authority
To what extent has the “feminization” of Kurdish politics—symbolized by the global visibility of Kurdish women fighters and leaders—altered international legitimacy and solidarity networks compared to earlier phases of Kurdish mobilization?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Since the Rojava Revolution in 2012–13, the feminization of Kurdish politics has dramatically enhanced the movement’s international legitimacy and expanded its solidarity networks. Earlier phases, particularly in the 1990s and the early 2000s, were dominated by male-dominated nationalist frameworks, with the PKK largely criminalized and marginalized in Western eyes, limiting advocacy and framing Kurds primarily as security threats.
The emergence of the YPJ, the Women’s Protection Units, and their decisive role in the Battle of Kobani in late 2014 and early 2015 marked a turning point. The global visibility of Kurdish women fighters aligned Kurdish political claims with the values of gender equality, secularism, and radical democracy, making the continued terrorist designation of the PKK increasingly incoherent and nonsensical in Western public opinion. Being Kurdish is now associated with supporting progressive governance, women’s rights, and secularism, distinguishing the Kurdish movement from other Middle Eastern actors or movements.
This shift has enabled the Kurdish movement to move beyond traditional ethno-nationalist alliances and cultivate broad intersectional solidarity networks. The transition from a male-dominated nationalist movement to a gender-centered revolutionary project has positioned the Kurds as a recognized driving force for democratization in the Middle East, securing global moral authority and institutional support that were absent in earlier decades.
Self-Determination, Not Statehood, Defines the Kurdish Question
And lastly, Dr. Shahriari, looking ahead, do you foresee the Kurdish political movement evolving toward statehood, a post-state transnational network model, a renewed pursuit of territorial autonomy within existing states, or fragmentation into divergent regional trajectories shaped by Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq?
Dr. Soheila Shahriari: I think it is a very good final question. What I can say is that I will not go into great detail, but the crux of the matter is that the Kurdish struggle over the past century has always centered on one fundamental issue: the right to self-determination. Everything else—the form of governance, whether federalism, autonomous self-rule, radical democracy, democratic confederalism, or full statehood of Greater Kurdistan—is epiphenomenal, or a secondary question.
The fundamental issue is the right to self-determination. These forms are largely, as I said, epiphenomenal and contingent, shaped by regional dynamics, international politics, and the balance of power at a given time. The future of the Kurdish movement will therefore be defined less by ideology and more by the practical ability to secure recognition and exercise collective rights within or across existing state frameworks.
Giving an interview to the ECPS, Professor Oona A. Hathaway reflects on the resilience and fragility of the post-1945 international legal order at what she describes as a moment of both peril and possibility. She identifies the prohibition on the use of force as the “bedrock of the modern legal order,” yet warns that today’s geopolitical climate is marked by “extraordinary instability” and mounting challenges from major powers. International law, she argues, ultimately depends on shared belief: “what makes international law work is that states believe it works.” If repeated unilateral uses of force erode that belief, a “reverse norm cascade” could follow. Yet Professor Hathaway also stresses that crisis can generate renewal—an opportunity to reimagine and reconstruct a more equitable and effective international legal order rather than surrender to fatalism.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Oona A. Hathaway—Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School; Professor of Political Science in Yale’s Department of Political Science; Faculty at the Jackson School of Global Affairs; Director of the Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges; and president-elect of the American Society of International Law—reflects on the resilience and fragility of the post-1945 international legal order at a moment she describes as both perilous and generative. The organizing theme of the interview is captured in the headline, “A Moment of Peril—and Possibility—to Reimagine the International Legal Order.” For Professor Hathaway, the contemporary crisis is not simply episodic noncompliance but a potentially systemic turning point—one that tests whether the prohibition on the use of force, which she calls the “bedrock of the modern legal order,” can endure under conditions of populism, geopolitical rivalry, and eroding rule-of-law commitments.
Professor Hathaway situates today’s tensions within a longer arc of normative transformation. The post-1945 order, she argues, was both a “genuine normative revolution that restrained power” and a system sustained by the strategic interests of dominant states. Yet the present moment raises acute questions about its durability. In her view, “what makes international law work is that states believe it works,” and the danger is that repeated unilateral uses of force could tip the system toward a “reverse norm cascade,” in which states “no longer believe that these rules matter and therefore no longer act as if they matter.” The concern is not only erosion, but the possibility of a broader unraveling in which the rules cease to structure expectations.
Several sections of the interview underscore why “today’s instability is unprecedented in the postwar international legal order.” Professor Hathaway emphasizes that in the post–World War II era “we’ve ever been at a moment of such instability and uncertainty” as when the most powerful state appears “clearly willing to use military force in violation of the UN Charter that it once championed.” This connects directly to another theme: “when rule-makers break the rules, the damage is far greater.” As Professor Hathaway notes, US violations are “particularly destructive,” not least because of the “failure of the international community to respond or push back forcefully,” shaped by entrenched assumptions about US stewardship and deep economic interdependence.
Yet Professor Hathaway also insists that breakdown need not foreclose renewal. “It is a moment of extreme challenge,”she concludes, “but it is also a moment of opportunity and creativity.” The task, she suggests, is to resist fatalism and instead “think together about what a more equitable and effective international legal order might look like”—because “it is up to us to decide which it will be.”
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Oona A. Hathaway, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
A Normative Revolution—and a Strategic Settlement
Photo: Zoia Fedorova| Dreamstime.
Professor Oona Hathaway, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Your scholarship traces the historic shift from a world in which war was lawful to one structured by the prohibition on the use of force. How should we understand the post-1945 legal order—as a genuine normative revolution restraining power, or as a contingent equilibrium sustained by the strategic interests of dominant states?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think both, actually. I don’t think they are inconsistent with one another. It was a genuine normative revolution that restrained power. There was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which initially outlawed war. It obviously didn’t succeed—we had World War II—but it began a process of both deconstructing the previous legal order and constructing something new that set in motion the creation of a new legal system. That was then reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter, in the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). It was really restating the prohibition on war from the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But it was created by dominant states because they believed in these ideas. They believed in the prohibition on the use of force and that might doesn’t make right, and they had just fought a war with the Nazis over this principle of non-domination and the rejection of using military force to seize territory from other states.
But it was also in their interests, because they had gone through massive territorial expansion. The United States, of course, had acquired what is now the entire continental United States, plus Alaska and Hawaii, and has a number of other islands that are part of it as well, including Puerto Rico. It was therefore in the interest of these states—and, of course, at the time this was created, Britain still had a major empire, and France still had a major empire. China, of course, dominated a vast territory. It was a good time to say you can’t conquer territory through the use of force. It was a good time for these states to say, “let’s stop moving those borders around, let’s firm up these borders, and let’s say no one can take territory from anyone else.” Once you’ve already completed your accumulation of territory, it’s in your best interest to call a halt to the game.
So, it was in their interests, but it was also in their values; it was consistent with the values they fought the war for. They then sustained it both because they believed in the values of the system and because the system served their interests. It made for a much more peaceful and prosperous world. So, I don’t necessarily see the two as inconsistent with one another.
When the Bedrock Norm Is Strained, the Entire System Is at Risk
You describe the prohibition on force as the “bedrock” of the modern international order. To what extent did its success depend less on legal internalization than on the alignment between US hegemony and rule-based constraints, and what happens when that alignment dissolves?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: You’re right. I do believe that the prohibition on force is the bedrock of the modern legal order. It’s right at the beginning of the United Nations Charter, and in the book The Internationalists, which I wrote with my co-author Scott Shapiro, we talk about how that is the core norm of the system on which everything else rests.
So it depended on internalization, and that process that I described from 1928 to 1945 was a process of thinking through what it means to shift an order on its axis—to change it from a world order where force is permitted, where might makes right, where states can use military force to resolve disputes with one another, as used to be the case before 1928, before war was outlawed, to a world in which that’s no longer allowed, and then everything else has to flip on its head. Conquest was legal; now conquest has to be illegal. Gunboat diplomacy was legal; now gunboat diplomacy has to be illegal. And that requires a massive shift that I think they didn’t fully appreciate in 1928, but that unfolded from 1928 to 1945 and was internalized through the Charter and all the subsequent rules that were adopted.
But it is also the case, again, that this was in the interest of the United States. The United States both believed in these principles, but these principles also served a hegemonic state. It is a good thing if states are not trying to use military force to take territory from one another if what you want is not to have to be running around as a global power intervening to try to put out wars between states. So it is both the case that these were rules that were internalized and that they served US interests.
Now, what happens when that alignment dissolves? I mean, the US has made clear it doesn’t necessarily adhere to those legal principles any longer and has taken actions that are in violation of the UN Charter, most recently the intervention in Venezuela. We might see a military operation in Iran before long that would also be illegal. I think it puts major stress on the system, to the point that I’m not sure the legal order, as it is, can survive it. You know, it’s not just the US; it’s also Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s seizing of islands, rocks, and reefs in the South China Sea. There are a lot of assaults, but in a way the US, because it has been such a critical supporter of the international legal order, turning on that order in the way that it seems to be is a blow that may be hard to recover from.
A Normative Revolution Forged by Power, Values, and Interest
Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.
Does the contemporary erosion of the prohibition on the use of force—as exemplified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ unilateral military operation against Venezuela under the second Trump administration—reflect primarily a failure of international enforcement institutions, a crisis of belief in the legitimacy of international law among major powers, or a deeper transformation in how states conceptualize sovereignty, security, and permissible violence in an era of populism and geopolitical rivalry?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think it’s just too early to say exactly how deep the transformation we’re seeing really is. I’ve written a bit about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Trump administration’s unilateral military operation against Venezuela, as I mentioned before, as truly fundamental challenges to the modern international legal order.
It is the case that international law relies on collective enforcement. And it’s very difficult for that collective enforcement to work when members of the Security Council are themselves violating the rules, because the institutional structures that are in place to enforce them can’t be used. Russia, the US, and China all have veto power and can block any action by the United Nations to enforce the legal rules. At the same time, the states that have traditionally led the charge in enforcing the rules through other means—through what Scott Shapiro and I have called outcasting—have relied on economic and other measures to respond to unlawful action and to encourage collective action, sanctions, and economic pressure. Russia was kicked out of the G8, which became the G7; Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe; and there are many ways in which Russia has been excluded from international institutions it had benefited from as a response to its unlawful actions, in addition to the economic sanctions that have been imposed and the funding and support provided by Ukraine’s allies to help it stand up to Russia. But it is very difficult to do that against a hegemon and a major economic power.
I think you are beginning to see some response by states that may represent the beginnings of an answer to that question, though it is still a little early to tell.
Power Shifts and Populism Are Eroding Restraints on Unilateral Force
How do shifts in global power distribution interact with ideological transformations—particularly nationalism and populism—to weaken constraints on unilateral force?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: Yes, there are major shifts in global power distribution. There are changes in economic power and changes in military power. You have the rise of China, both as an economic power and as a military power. It’s building a major navy and has become a more significant geopolitical force in a variety of ways. It’s also investing more in international institutions, which is important to note. So it’s not just building up its military; it has also become more active at the UN and other international institutions.
Soi it’s hard to say at this moment where that’s going. Is that going to weaken constraints on unilateral force or not? I think what’s weakening constraints on unilateral force is the use of unilateral force by states like the US and Russia. And it’s not just the use of force, but also the response that you receive. Russia has had a pretty forceful response from the international community. So far, the US has not. There was a relatively modest response to the unilateral intervention in Venezuela.
States are frankly scared of Trump. They’re worried that he’s going to slap tariffs on them if they criticize him. I think the only answer is going to be to act collectively—for states to band together to try to shore up the international system and the prohibition on the use of force in particular. It’s going to be hard for any of them to criticize Trump individually, but acting more collectively and building alternative sources of economic power may be possible. So, for example, what Canada is doing in forming alternative economic partnerships and responding to US tariffs suggests one possible path forward. That is an answer to this problem—maybe the only answer to this problem.
Between the Old World Order and a World With No Rules
The headquarters of the United Nations in New York City. Photo: Dreamstime.
Do contemporary developments signal not merely norm erosion but a structural reversion toward an “Old World Order” in which material power once again functions as a source of legal entitlement?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: In the book The Internationalists, we talk about the Old World Order as the order in which war was lawful and states could use military force to resolve disputes, and what they took, they could keep—so might made right.
One of the questions is whether we are in a moment of reverting back to that. The book describes both this old legal order and how we rejected it and created a new legal order built on the prohibition on force. And the question that certainly emerges at this moment, where we’re seeing states like the United States unilaterally using force, is: are we going to go back? Are we going to return to a world where military force was lawful and where material power functions as a source of legal entitlement?
It’s possible that we will. It’s also possible that there is something even worse. Scott and I wrote a recent piece in Foreign Affairs that argues there is only one thing worse than going back to something like the Old World Order—a legal order built on the idea that might makes right, where states can resolve disputes and enforce claims through military force—and that is a world with no rules at all, where there is no coherent legal system. The old order, for all its faults, was at least coherent and clear.
One of the problems we see with Venezuela, with the Trump intervention there, is that it was really just about one man’s whim. And that is very disruptive and chaotic, because if it becomes permissible for states to decide to go to war for no clear reason, it becomes very hard for other states to avoid war, because they don’t know what they would need to do to avoid falling afoul of a state that might want to use military force.
I recommend that to your readers if they want to take a look at it. They can find all my work, by the way, on oonahathaway.com. All my work is posted there, so if they want to track down any of these pieces, that’s a good place to go.
Populist Sovereignty Claims Are Challenging International Constraints
How do populist leaders’ claims to embody the “true people” reshape state attitudes toward international law, especially regarding multilateral constraints perceived as external impositions on sovereignty?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think I can speak most authoritatively, perhaps, to the Trump administration’s claims to embody “real Americans” as part of the argument that the United States should resist international law and that these multilateral constraints don’t serve America.
And what people are saying, if you look at his approval ratings, which are in free fall, is that he doesn’t actually represent real Americans. People care about the price of groceries, clothes, and other consumer goods. Those have been going up, and people’s real incomes have not been keeping pace with inflation. He came into office on a promise that he would make things more affordable for people, and he has done the opposite.
People were told at the State of the Union Address that things are better than ever, but most people’s experience is inconsistent with that—they actually feel that things are not better than ever. So, what you’re seeing is a contrast between a claim to speak for a set of people and people’s own experience of the effects of those policies.
I like to believe that, as a result, people are going to see that these policies are not in their best interest—that tariffs are not serving the United States and that wars of choice are not in the best interests of the American people—and reject them. So far, it does seem that people are not approving of what’s happening. I think that strategy is not going to be a winning one for the Trump administration for much longer.
The Impact of Populism Depends on the Resilience of Institutions
Frontal view of the U.S. Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 2024. Photo: Gualberto Becerra P.
Is populism inherently destabilizing for rule-based international order, or can populist governments operate within legal frameworks when institutional checks remain robust?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: Gosh, that’s kind of an impossible question to answer. I don’t know if it’s inherently destabilizing; it depends a little on what one means by populism. Can populist governments operate within legal frameworks when institutional checks remain robust? Absolutely—of course they can.
I think they will respond to the incentives they face. And if there is a major cost to acting in ways that are inconsistent with legal frameworks, it is difficult for populist leaders to sustain violations of international law for long in the face of that. But that’s not uniformly true. This is just a hard question to answer. It is more a case-by-case matter, rather than something that lends itself to a general conclusion about the impact of populism on legal frameworks. It all depends on how strong and how robust those institutional checks remain, and on the nature of those checks. That is highly contingent.
When Law Ceases to Constrain Power, the System Cannot Function
To what extent does democratic backsliding within powerful democracies—through executive aggrandizement and weakened oversight—pose a greater systemic threat to international law than the rise of authoritarian states that never fully internalized those norms?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think that democratic backsliding is a real challenge to international law, in part because what we’re seeing is not just democratic backsliding, but threats to the very idea of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. When law is no longer a constraint on governmental power—again, whether domestic or international—that obviously makes it impossible for the international system to function.
I don’t know that I would fully accept the idea that authoritarian states never internalized those norms—maybe that’s fair—but they internalized them more than is sometimes appreciated, because the international legal order operates in large part by changing expectations about how others will react to what you do. Authoritarian states see that if they invade their neighbors, there are going to be consequences. Saddam Hussein learned that when he invaded Kuwait and attempted to take it over. The international community responded by rejecting his effort to conquer Kuwait and pushing him back. That was an instance in which an authoritarian ruler learned a hard lesson—that this was a norm the international community was willing to defend.
That was a useful lesson for other authoritarians to observe, and it made a difference in reaffirming the prohibition on the use of force and the idea that states can’t conquer territory, even when they have a dispute with a neighbor—that the way to resolve it isn’t to use military force. So, that authoritarian regimes, too, can be constrained by international law.
The important thing to remember about international law is that you don’t have to think you’re obeying it to obey it. International law works by changing the background norms and expectations that states have. You don’t have to be fully cognizant of the ways in which it is shaping your behavior for it to do so. Even authoritarian states are often abiding by international law in ways they may not fully appreciate or understand, and nonetheless international law remains very powerful in shaping their behavior.
When Rule-Makers Break the Rules, the Damage Is Especially Severe
Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. Protesters dressed as Musk, Farage, Vance, Putin, Trump, and Netanyahu. Photo: Ben Gingell.
When a historically law-creating state violates the rules it helped design, how does that differ from violations by revisionist powers in terms of precedent, legitimacy, and global imitation effects?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: This is obviously the question of whether US violations are more destructive than those of other states, given that the US has historically been a significant law-creating power. It wrote the first draft of the UN Charter, championed the United Nations system after the Second World War, and has been a key player—though it has not perfectly observed those rules. It’s important to point out that this is not the first time the United States has failed to play by the rules it helped put in place. But yes, I do think it is particularly destructive, especially when coupled with the broader set of assaults on the legal order from Russia.
What really matters, and what has been especially destructive so far, is the failure of the international community to respond or push back forcefully against the United States. That’s partly because people are used to thinking of the United States as a good actor, as a steward of the system. They also have deep economic ties that make any kind of criticism or economic sanctions against the United States almost impossible for them to contemplate. But, we are starting to see states recognize that what might once have seemed unimaginable is now imaginable, and that they have to begin thinking about how to reinforce the legal order in a situation where the United States can no longer be counted on to be a positive partner or actor.
So, we might begin to see some pushback, but we haven’t yet, and that is part of why this has been such a destructive moment.
Repeated Unilateral Force Could Trigger a Reverse Norm Cascade
Could repeated unilateral uses of force by leading powers generate a “reverse norm cascade,” transforming restraint from expectation into exception and thereby reshaping customary international law?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: That’s the fear. The fear is that these unilateral uses of force will eventually overwhelm the system. You can sustain a certain number of blows, but at a certain point the system becomes so weakened that it begins to fall apart. And the question is: when do you cross that line? When do we reach a point where we have a kind of reverse norm cascade, as you put it, in which states no longer believe that these rules matter and therefore no longer act as if they matter? What makes international law work is that states believe it works.
If they no longer believe in it, then it ceases to function. So, enough unilateral uses of force could, at a certain point, lead states to conclude that the system is not working very well and to ask why they should abide by the rules if others are not. That’s when you begin to see the whole structure start to fall apart. Are we there yet? I think not. Three more years of this? Maybe.
Expansive Self-Defense Claims Are Eroding the Prohibition on Force
How might expansive interpretations of self-defense—particularly against nonstate actors—gradually alter the legal architecture governing the use of force?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I have written about this as well, and I think we don’t talk about it enough as a challenge to the international legal order—this expansive interpretation of the Article 51 right of self-defense in the Charter. It allows states to respond unilaterally; you don’t have to go to the Security Council to defend yourself. But the language of the Charter refers to situations in which a state has been subject to an armed attack.
There have been increasingly expansive interpretations of the Article 51 right of self-defense, including, as you mentioned, extending it to attacks by nonstate actors, which was not understood as falling within the scope of Article 51 at its inception. This interpretation has been adopted particularly in the post-9/11 era, and you see more and more states embracing it after 2014 and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. I do think this is extremely corrosive to the international system. It has really eroded the prohibition on the use of force, because at a certain point everything becomes self-defense.
The Charter defined this right of self-defense very narrowly, as a response to armed attack, and it did so for a reason. The drafters were very aware that defensive wars and offensive wars were sometimes very hard to distinguish. They wanted to establish a fairly narrow right for states to respond. They had to include the right of self-defense because many states insisted on it—you shouldn’t have to wait for the Security Council to act if you are literally under attack. But they intentionally meant for it to be a fairly narrow right, because once you start talking about wars of defense based on the idea that another state might pose a threat down the road, the distinction between offensive and defensive wars begins to collapse.
So yes, I do think this has been a real problem. And again, if your readers are interested, if you search my website for “self-defense,” you will find an article I’ve written on exactly this issue. It’s a real problem, and it predates the Trump administration; it is a bipartisan problem. Both Democratic and Republican presidents have presided over that erosion, so this is not an entirely new phenomenon.
When Dual-Use Becomes a Justification, Civilians Bear the Cost
Your research on the targeting of dual-use objects highlights the blurring of civilian and military categories. Does this evolution risk transforming international humanitarian law from a protective regime into a justificatory framework for expanded violence?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I’d point your readers to a piece that I wrote in the Yale Law Journal on dual-use objects, called “The Rise of Dual-Use Objects,”with Azmat Khan and a third co-author, Mara Revkin, my former student and an amazing legal academic. This piece shows that the US has increasingly been targeting objects that it recognizes as dual-use, meaning both military and civilian use.
We argue in that piece that the rise of targeting dual-use objects has significantly eroded protections for civilians in wartime. We discuss this generally, but we also use evidence drawn from post-strike analyses of US counterterrorism strikes. We analyzed the targets of those strikes, which were gathered by Azmat Khan, a reporter from The New York Times, through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of Defense—requests she had to sue to obtain. So we have very specific data in the piece about what kinds of dual-use objects are being targeted, and we can show that civilians are really at risk in the targeting of these objects.
The argument we make is that this practice is blurring the distinction between civilian and military targets that is so critical to protecting civilians in wartime, and that we need to take significant steps to better protect civilians and to clarify this distinction between military and civilian objects, taking into account the impact on civilians of targeting such sites—not just the civilians who happen to be present at that moment, but also the long-term reverberating effects. You blow up a water treatment plant, and it’s not just the civilian workers there who are harmed; it’s everyone who now lacks access to clean water. You blow up an apartment building, and it’s not only the residents who are killed or injured, but also those who are deprived of housing. You blow up a bridge, and there may be civilians present on it, but afterward people cannot get to work, school, or their families because there is no access from one place to another. So, this is a really critical part of our thinking about how to protect civilians in wartime.
The Unraveling Order Also Opens Space to Imagine a More Equitable One
And lastly, Prof. Hathaway, are we witnessing the collapse of the post-1945 legal order or its transformation into a plural system of competing legal regimes—and what institutional or normative developments would be necessary to prevent the “gradual and then sudden” unraveling you warn about from becoming irreversible?
Professor Oona A. Hathaway: This is a reference to my piece in The New York Times titled “The Great Unraveling,”which looks at what’s happening to the modern legal order and argues that we might be witnessing its collapse. The question is whether we are in the midst of a collapse, on the precipice of one, or whether it has already occurred—and what is coming next. I don’t know that anybody really knows the answer to those questions. I think we’re in uncharted waters. In the post–World War II era, I don’t think we’ve ever been at a moment of such instability and uncertainty in the international legal order as we are today, where you have the most powerful nation in the world clearly willing to use military force in violation of the UN Charter that it once championed, and the prohibition on the use of force that is core to the normative legal order.
But we don’t know how aggressive President Trump is going to be. We don’t know yet if other states are going to follow in the United States’ footsteps and use force against their neighbors in ways that would previously have been clearly forbidden. And we don’t know whether something is going to emerge in its place if this system is collapsing.
We see some signs. We see Canada, for instance, trying to rally middle powers to work together to create an alternative economic system, because a lot of states are deeply concerned about the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration, and that has led them not to speak up or respond when the US acts in ways they view as inconsistent with the international legal order. This is going to be an important part of the response, but it hasn’t taken shape yet. So, the short answer is that we don’t know where this is headed. We are in a moment of extraordinary instability.
Let me end on a somewhat more hopeful note. Although this moment of instability is scary and concerning—for someone like me who believes that the core norm of the international legal order is the prohibition on the use of military force, and who sees that norm as uniquely at risk—it is also a moment when we can start to think about how to construct a new legal order. What might a new legal order look like? What new possibilities might emerge? What can we hope for, dream about, or imagine? How can we make the legal order more equitable?
So, it is a moment of extreme challenge, but it is also a moment of opportunity and creativity. We should be careful not to give up or assume that everything is lost, but instead try to think together about what a more equitable and effective international legal order might look like, and whether this is a moment in which the opportunity is opening to do something new and different. That new and different future could be bad, but it could also be a profound improvement. It is up to us to decide which it will be.
Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.
Overview
In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.
At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.
For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.
Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas.
It offers a unique opportunity to explore:
The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.
You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.
Tentative Program
Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026
Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics
This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.
Lecture 1: Evolution of EU trade policy and global trade order
Lecture 2: Populism, legitimacy, and the politicization of trade
Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026
Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism
Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.
Lecture 1: Political economy of EU–US trade relations
Lecture 2: Populism and the erosion/reconfiguration of transatlantic trade cooperation
Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026
Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy
This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.
Lecture 1: EU–US–China trade relations and global power competition
Lecture 2: Strategic autonomy, de-risking, and EU economic security tools
Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026
Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre
This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.
Lecture 1: US Indo-Pacific strategy and its trade implications
Lecture 2: EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, partnerships, strategic positioning)
Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026
Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership
This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.
Lecture 1: Scenarios for the future of global trade governance (fragmentation vs reform)
Lecture 2: Can the EU lead? Policy tools, regulatory power, and global influence
Methodology
The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.
The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.
Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.
Who should apply?
This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.
The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.
We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds.
Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance
Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.
Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.
Credit
This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.
In this ECPS interview, Professor Elin Bjarnegård (Uppsala University) argues that gender is no longer a side issue but “a useful, malleable concept for authoritarian leaders”—and will become “an increasingly central fault line” separating liberal democracy from authoritarian populism. Moving beyond a simple backlash thesis, she shows how regimes alternate between ‘genderbashing’ and ‘genderwashing’, weaponizing equality talk for legitimacy at home and abroad. Professor Bjarnegård also links democratic backsliding to gendered intimidation, online harassment, and what she calls “sexual corruption.” Noting that the Epstein files revealed abuses “in the corridors of power” in democratic settings too, she warns that personalistic rule heightens risk—especially the “impunity surrounding them.” She urges resisting polarization, scrutinizing symbols, and asking where gender concretely matters in policy.
In an era marked by democratic erosion and the global rise of authoritarian populism, gender politics has emerged not merely as a cultural battleground but as a strategic axis of regime competition. In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Elin Bjarnegård of Uppsala University argues that gender will increasingly function as a defining fault line separating liberal democratic governance from authoritarian populist rule. Moving beyond conventional explanations that frame anti-gender politics primarily as ideological backlash, Professor Bjarnegård emphasizes the instrumentalization of gender as a tool of political survival, legitimacy, and international signaling. As she explains, “gender becomes a useful, malleable concept for authoritarian leaders—a powerful symbol that can be mobilized for regime purposes,” underscoring how strategic deployment rather than doctrinal conviction often drives contemporary gender politics.
This strategic perspective helps explain why gender rights are likely to intensify as a central arena of geopolitical and normative contestation. Professor Bjarnegård anticipates that “gender rights, or perhaps the strategic use of gender, will become an increasingly central fault line,” not only because of ideological polarization but also because gender provides an “easy, simplistic narrative to deploy strategically” in polarized societies. Such narratives enable regimes to oscillate between exclusionary rhetoric and symbolic inclusion, reinforcing domestic authority while communicating selectively with international audiences.
The interview also highlights the darker governance implications of weakened accountability in populist and authoritarian systems, particularly regarding gendered abuses of power. Drawing on her concept of “sexual corruption,” Professor Bjarnegård reframes such abuses as systemic governance failures rather than isolated misconduct. Referencing the recent release of the Epstein files, she cautions against simplistic regime-type explanations, noting that “these gendered abuses of authority have also proliferated in the corridors of power in predominantly democratic contexts in Europe and the United States.” Yet she stresses that personalistic rule and eroded oversight create heightened risks in authoritarian settings, where such systems are “more at risk both of experiencing these gendered abuses and, perhaps especially, of the impunity surrounding them—of people not reporting them, of them remaining unseen, and of not being addressed.” This dynamic speaks directly to the broader vulnerability of populist authoritarian governance to gendered exploitation and unaccountable power.
More broadly, Professor Bjarnegård situates these patterns within a continuum of gendered violence that includes psychological intimidation, reputational attacks, and digitally mediated harassment—forms of coercion that undermine democratic participation without overt repression. Taken together, her analysis suggests that gender politics is becoming a diagnostic lens through which scholars can assess democratic resilience, institutional integrity, and the trajectory of global political competition. The interview thus positions gender not as a peripheral social issue but as a central structural dimension of contemporary struggles between liberal democracy and authoritarian populism.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Elin Bjarnegård, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Gender Is a Strategic Resource for Authoritarian Survival
Illustration: Dreamstime.
Professor Elin Bjarnegård, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your scholarship, you argue that authoritarian leaders treat gender not primarily as ideology but as a strategic resource for regime survival. How does this perspective revise dominant interpretations of populism’s relationship to gender politics beyond the conventional “backlash against feminism” thesis?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: Thank you for that question. I would say that what this perspective really adds is a strategic dimension. It is not that we want to suggest there is no ideology involved—of course ideology plays a role. The relationship between populism and gender politics, and the backlash narrative in particular, still has analytical value. However, what is often overlooked is the presence of a very important strategic component. That is what we seek to foreground by adding this strategic dimension to the equation.
So we are not arguing that ideology is irrelevant, but rather that strategy deserves more attention. In this sense, gender becomes a useful, malleable concept for authoritarian leaders—a powerful symbol that can be mobilized for regime purposes.
From an ideological perspective, one must focus on policy positions and attempts to persuade opponents. A strategic perspective, by contrast, emphasizes negotiation and maneuvering. This is why I believe it is an important lens to introduce. It opens possibilities for collaboration in a polarized world and encourages us to see political opponents as actors with whom dialogue remains possible, particularly when we recognize the strategic component of their actions.
Gender Equality as Both Shield and Weapon in Global Politics
Your work distinguishes between “genderbashing” and “genderwashing” as complementary authoritarian strategies. Under what structural and international conditions do regimes oscillate between these tactics, and how does the global bundling of democracy and gender equality norms enable such strategic manipulation?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: We see this oscillation, as you say, more clearly now and in recent years because we have had a fairly strong global norm of gender equality for the past three decades or so. That norm is now evaporating, or at least stagnating, and we also see alternative norms emerging. As the global order itself is increasingly questioned, the norm of gender equality is likewise being challenged. In a multipolar world, actors may view gender mainstreaming—as promoted by the UN or the EU—as no longer the only legitimate path. This creates space, particularly for authoritarian actors, to use gender equality as an instrument to portray themselves as modern, progressive, or even democratic, especially since gender equality and democracy have long been bundled together in major democracy-promotion efforts.
At the same time, however, this shift opens the door to a different interpretation, in which gender is used to distance regimes from global institutions such as the UN and the EU by rejecting what they frame as the foreign imposition of values in favor of traditional family norms. What was once a relatively stable landscape—where countries knew their allies, audiences, and signaling targets—has become more fluid. States now communicate simultaneously with multiple audiences. As a result, the same country may present itself as supportive of gender equality and committed to combating violence against women on the one hand, while simultaneously promoting homophobic narratives to justify, for example, military engagement with other countries.
Feminationalism Turns Inclusion Into a Weapon
Photo: Dreamstime.
Many populist actors claim to defend women’s rights selectively — for instance, against migrants or minorities — while undermining broader gender equality. How does this selective emancipation differ from classical authoritarian gender politics, and what dilemmas does it pose for liberal and intersectional feminism?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: This type of politics—sometimes called feminationalism, or homonationalism, depending on the target group—is also part of the broader package I mentioned earlier about bringing strategy into gender politics and into authoritarian politics. It is a clear illustration of how highly strategic these dynamics can be, because in these narratives, inclusion is deployed, as you say, only selectively or strategically—and ultimately for the purpose of excluding certain groups.
If the intersectional perspective, as originally conceived, aimed to ensure that we identify the most vulnerable groups and recognize multiple systems of oppression so that people do not fall between the cracks but instead benefit from policies designed to protect them, this type of feminationalism—or the selective defense of women’s rights deployed against minorities, for instance—does the opposite: it pits these systems of oppression against each other.
In a way, it draws on our knowledge about intersectional layers of oppression but turns them against one another, claiming, for example, that gender equality and women’s rights are under threat from migration. The dilemma it poses is quite similar to that of genderbashing and genderwashing. Insofar as there is a solution, it requires caution. We need to scrutinize these narratives carefully and be specific—not simply respond to symbolism or easy answers, but examine what is actually being claimed and who is being favored—in order to look beyond the strategy.
Your research on militarized masculinity suggests that patriarchal norms can coexist with formal democratic institutions and fuel political violence. How does the persistence of such masculinist political cultures help explain the gendered appeal of authoritarian populism across diverse contexts?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: I think masculinist cultures are both persistent, as you say, and increasingly revealing themselves and being strengthened in many places. We can begin with the fact that they coexist with, and also exist within, democratic settings. Democratic institutions were originally built by men, for men, and are imbued with male norms; studies of feminist institutionalism, for instance, have made this argument for a long time. Patriarchal norms have therefore always coexisted, to some extent, with formal democratic institutions. However, they have been challenged in recent decades, and they certainly vary and take different forms across contexts.
Many of us associate the political with masculinity to such an extent that it becomes difficult to pinpoint. While there has been significant focus on women in politics, there has been far less attention to men and masculinity in politics. Several research projects in Europe are now examining political science questions from a masculinity perspective, reflecting the rise of new forms of hegemonic and militarized masculinities that make clear the need for deeper understanding. “Men4Them” is one such project, examining radicalized young men as well as leadership and the spillover effects between the two. As part of this project, we seek both to understand the masculine ideals that politicians and leaders attempt to embody and, importantly, how these ideals can be transformed. We know change is possible: not long ago, in my country, Sweden, party leaders competed to present themselves as feminists, which is no longer the case.
This shift is likely related to the broader global order. We see geopolitical tensions and increasing militarization, alongside a reversal of the movement from soft power toward hard power. Narratives emphasizing traditionally masculine traits—such as strength over cooperation—are returning. Research shows these cultures have always existed, but what is striking today is that they are once again becoming, if not hegemonic, at least highly prominent.
Protection Narratives and the Return of Strongman Politics
Women rally in Istanbul to protest proposed anti-abortion legislation by then–Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, June 18, 2012. Photo: Sadık Güleç.
Relatedly, how do hypermasculine narratives and honor ideologies shape the emotional and symbolic appeal of strongman leadership, particularly among male constituencies experiencing status anxiety in periods of social transformation?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: This goes back again to the question we have just discussed, because, of course, it is about leadership and about what an ideal leader is supposed to be in a specific context at a particular point in time. But as I mentioned, it is really important to consider the spillover and interaction between leaders and their constituents. There is a constant interplay between the two.
In this context of status anxiety and social transformation, there is a great deal of fear and uncertainty, which tends to favor the presentation of easy solutions to complex problems. I think one of the easiest sentiments to mobilize is a sense of lost entitlement, and looking back at traditional gender roles can provide a feeling of security.
These honor ideologies often build on an idea of protection, which speaks to a basic need for security. At the same time, we need to scrutinize this and critically examine strongman ideology. Protection may be necessary, but the key question becomes who is positioned to protect whom. It also relies on a separation between genders and assigns different values to them. This reflects a return to hard-power narratives that signal traditional strongman characteristics—protection achieved not through collaboration, but through the display of force, coercion, and strength.
You have shown that violence against women in politics often operates along a continuum that includes psychological intimidation and reputational attacks. How does this less visible violence function as an informal mechanism of democratic backsliding even in electoral regimes?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: Violence against women, as well as violence against political actors in general, operates along this continuum. But we do see that violence against political actors has gendered components.
Specifically, if we look at those gendered components and include the continuum you mentioned, it becomes important to recognize violations that occur not only physically but also psychologically and online, because the types of reputation-damaging slander that women and men encounter are fundamentally different in character. It is not that men are protected online—that is not the case—but if we examine the types of slander campaigns deployed against men and women politicians, we see that, to a much larger extent, women politicians face narratives targeting them as persons, often highly sexualized and directed at their family members, whereas men are more often, sometimes harshly and unfairly, criticized for their policy stances or political positions.
I, therefore, think it is important to demonstrate this continuum and to include psychological intimidation and reputational attacks, because they can be equally damaging to democratic procedures. They reflect a similar readiness to violate democratic integrity as physical forms of violence. Although such actions may not violate bodily integrity to the same extent as physical violence, they certainly violate personal integrity just as much. If we are concerned with threats to democracy and with disrespect for democratic procedures and institutions, I believe that violations occurring online must also be included in that continuum.
Homosocial Recruitment Sustains Male Dominance in Populist Parties
Your feminist institutionalist research highlights how informal party networks and homosocial recruitment reproduce male dominance. To what extent do populist radical right parties intensify these exclusionary mechanisms compared to mainstream parties?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: It is a difference in degree rather than in kind. In general, what we see in parties and organizations alike is that if you only or primarily network with like-minded people who tend to think, act, and behave like you, and if you mainly recognize competence in those you perceive as similar to yourself, you may be able to shape a very strong and coherent message. Collaboration may be smooth in that group, and you will be surrounded by people who agree with you.
But you will not have broad representation, you will not hear other perspectives, and you will not be challenged by—or learn from—others. Insofar as populist radical right parties tend to build more on loyalties than on representational claims, and more on personal relationships than on bureaucratic recruitment procedures, we can certainly see this type of homosocial recruitment producing male dominance there as well. It becomes a kind of celebration of like-mindedness rather than a reflection of a diversity of ideas. This plays a significant role in the masculine dominance we observe both among constituents and within these parties themselves.
Gender Equality as a Tool of Authoritarian Legitimacy
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.
Authoritarian regimes sometimes increase women’s descriptive representation through quotas while simultaneously restricting civil liberties. Does such symbolic inclusion risk legitimizing illiberal rule by projecting an image of progress without substantive empowerment?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: That is exactly the risk of what my colleague Per Setterberg and I have come to call autocratic genderwashing, especially when this descriptive representation does not lead to substantive representation, or when it is limited and includes only women affiliated with the government, for instance.
In many places, with Rwanda perhaps as one of the clearest examples, we do see that the introduction of gender quotas really boosts the representation of women. But if we take a closer look, we see that it mainly boosts the representation of government-affiliated women. This then leads to an even stronger electoral dominance of an already dominant authoritarian party, at the same time as it generates goodwill and international prestige, because the country is seen as favoring and promoting gender equality and women’s representation. It can present itself as modern and progressive and, interestingly enough, because of this bundling of democracy and gender, even as a democratic country.
All the while, if we look more closely at what happens behind the scenes, we also know that this is a country that keeps jailing opponents, restricting civil liberties, and remains authoritarian. So it is about taking a closer look and considering what kinds of signals they are able to send and who this reform actually favors. It can be that it favors both. We can end up in tricky situations where a gender equality reform improves conditions for women—perhaps for a select group of women, but nevertheless for women—while at the same time strengthening the hold on power of an autocratic regime.
That is, in a way, an impossible conundrum we are faced with, but we nevertheless have to recognize it. That is really what we hope to spur discussion on: not to see it as one thing or the other, or simply accept the image these regimes want to portray, but to recognize these value clashes, these conundrums, and discuss what we should do in such cases.
Democratization Does Not Automatically Deliver Gender Equality
Your work suggests democratization does not automatically produce gender equality and may even coexist with patriarchal power structures. How should scholars rethink linear assumptions linking democratic transitions to women’s rights advancements?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: In principle, if you ask most scholars, my guess would be that this linear assumption has been rethought. At the same time, it remains a very relevant question, because versions of it still persist in people’s minds. Even when asked explicitly, people may not believe in a strictly linear progression where one development automatically produces the other. As I have often noted, in democracy promotion and in discussions about how to advance democracy, the inclusion of women has become a core component.
While many would define democracy as something that cannot exist without the proper inclusion of all groups—and the inclusion of women is, of course, necessary and important for a genuine democracy—it does not follow that inclusion can compensate for a lack of competition. This is where we have often gone wrong, allowing inclusion to substitute for the absence of political competition in the eyes of the international community, for instance.
Looking back historically, if we examine the issue more closely, some cosmetic gender-equality reforms—for example, in many communist countries where equality was a prominent ideological principle and women were relatively well represented in parliament—did not make those systems democratic. We have also seen in many contexts that women played crucial roles in democratic transition movements, only to be marginalized once parties and institutions were established. The relationship is therefore far more complex than the linear assumption suggests. At the same time, the connection is not entirely absent, because inclusion remains an important principle of democracy; it is simply not the only one.
Sexual Corruption Is a Systemic, Not Isolated, Problem
Float featuring a caricature of Jeffrey Epstein and the slogan “Everyone protected the criminals and ignored the victims” at the Rosenmontag carnival parade in Düsseldorf, North Rhine-Westphalia. Photo: Elena Frolova / Dreamstime.
Your concept of “sexual corruption” reframes gendered abuses of authority as governance failures rather than isolated misconduct. Do such practices proliferate under populist or authoritarian rule where institutional accountability mechanisms are weakened?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: Yes, such practices proliferate anywhere institutional accountability mechanisms are weak. But then again, as the recent release of the Epstein files, for instance, has clearly demonstrated, these gendered abuses of authority have also proliferated in the corridors of power in predominantly democratic contexts in Europe and the United States. So it is not as simple as a matter of them and us when it comes to sexual corruption and this kind of gendered abuse of power. The problem exists everywhere.
Interestingly, it has perhaps received the most attention in areas like Sub-Saharan Africa, where there have been significant campaigns against practices such as teachers handing out grades in exchange for sex. But we have to look at different contexts and recognize that they carry different types of risks in different areas.
Insofar as your question concerns populist and authoritarian rule, these systems generally have a greater propensity to overlook institutional accountability mechanisms in favor of, as we discussed earlier, more personalistic loyalties. They are therefore certainly more at risk both of experiencing these gendered abuses and, perhaps especially, of the impunity surrounding them—of people not reporting them, of them remaining unseen, and of not being addressed.
Digital Harassment as a Tool to Exclude Women from Politics
How are online harassment, disinformation, and gendered hate speech transforming the authoritarian toolkit, particularly as methods for discouraging women’s political participation without overt repression?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: Yes, we talked a bit about this earlier when we discussed the continuum of violence, which of course includes psychological forms of violence, intimidation, and hate speech that increasingly take place online. The use of technology in this type of harassment, disinformation, and hate speech is making an already effective and efficient authoritarian toolkit even more efficient, because it gives it wider reach, causes more harm than before, and can project images and ideas that are simply not true.
The fact that these violations have increasingly moved online, or are also spread online, means that technology is now used both to spread fear and to disseminate propaganda in new ways. It also represents a move away from ideological discussion, because it often disregards ideological stances entirely, relying instead on targeted messaging and algorithms to influence different groups in a particular direction, making it more like marketing than politics in a sense. It is not about convincing people; it is about moving them in a specific direction, even if it means misinforming them. This is an area where the authoritarian toolkit is clearly expanding. For women’s political participation, as well as participation in general, we see a number of new methods emerging here.
Trumpism Normalized Anti-Gender Rhetoric Globally
Woman wearing a red “Make America Great Again” hat prays at a “Stop the Steal” rally in Helena, Montana, on November 7, 2020, in support of Donald Trump and claims that the election was stolen by Joe Biden. Photo: Dreamstime.
From a comparative perspective, how do you evaluate the global impact of Donald Trump’s presidency on gender politics? Did Trumpism normalize gender-based rhetoric and policy rollbacks that other populist leaders subsequently emulated?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: It is almost hard to overestimate the impact, but nevertheless I think that what we see happening in the US did not come from nowhere. There was already a platform for this kind of discussion. Political leaders like Putin, Orbán, and Erdoğan had already drawn media attention for both sexist remarks and derogatory statements about what they called “gender ideology,” a broad concept often deployed to describe perceived threats to gender equality against traditional family values. So I think that during Donald Trump’s second term in office, he could simply follow these already existing international narratives, and he did so even in his inaugural address. He vowed to dismantle gender mainstreaming and announced an executive order for government agencies to remove statements, policies, and regulations that promote or otherwise incorporate gender ideology.
This is certainly rhetoric he could build on, and we could say that sometimes it functions mainly as a strategy to align himself with certain parts of the population while distancing himself from others. But the potential danger with these narratives, and with genderbashing in general, is that to be a credible leader, one sometimes also has to follow through. We see that in the US: it has not just stopped at rhetoric. We have also seen the dismantling of diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives across various sectors.
This shows that he had a platform to build on and could follow suit, but when both this rhetoric and these policy rollbacks occur in the US, they also normalize these types of discussions and narratives, portraying gender not necessarily as something positive but as something potentially dangerous and harmful.
The Rise and Fall of Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy
Sweden’s feminist foreign policy was widely seen as a pioneering normative project yet was later discontinued. What does this reversal reveal about the resilience — or fragility — of gender-progressive policies amid shifting political coalitions and populist radical right pressures?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: Sweden’s feminist foreign policy is an interesting case in point because it vividly illustrates how much the world has changed in just a few years. When the feminist foreign policy was first adopted and launched in Sweden in 2014, it was the first of its kind. It was, as you said, seen as pioneering. We were in a world where being feminist was seen as a good thing and where this was something people competed over in Sweden and elsewhere, and we could also see that a lot of countries followed suit. It is a bit difficult to know exactly what constitutes a feminist foreign policy, but at least 15 or 16 other countries declared, in one way or another, that they also wanted to pursue a feminist foreign policy.
But then, just a few years later, in 2022, when we had a new government, the very first thing they did was to withdraw the feminist foreign policy, claiming that they were not against gender equality but against these labels, which were more about showcasing and using the word feminist than about actually doing things. It is interesting that the first country in the world to adopt a feminist foreign policy was also the first country in the world to withdraw it, and it is very symptomatic of the development we are seeing.
I think it goes back to many of the issues we discussed, particularly the potential danger that gender as a word, and gender equality as a norm, has been so all-encompassing. In gender mainstreaming, for instance, it has been something said to apply to all sectors, all policies, and all genders. In the success story of gender equality over the past few decades, we may have run the risk of not being specific enough, of not saying what matters and why it matters. That leaves the door open for interpretations, misinterpretations, and adaptations of what gender as this big concept actually is and could be.
That is what we are seeing now, and it explains why leaders can juxtapose using gender equality as a good thing with using gender ideology as a bad thing, oscillating between the two, because it is not necessarily clear what it is supposed to mean. That is also why it has been difficult, to some extent, to evaluate policies like the feminist foreign policy. But what we did see is that it was, at least, more than a label. It did change the way things were carried out in Swedish foreign policy, even though it was in place for only a few years.
Gender Rights as the Next Global Fault Line
And lastly, Professor Bjarnegård, looking ahead, do you anticipate that gender rights will become an increasingly central fault line in the global contest between liberal democracy and authoritarian populism — and what forms might meaningful resistance and democratic renewal take?
Professor Elin Bjarnegård: That is the million-dollar question. I do, unfortunately, anticipate that gender rights, or perhaps the strategic use of gender, will become an increasingly central fault line. But I also think that this is why the strategic component we are trying to remind people of is important, because it means that we can find areas where it may not be all about sexism, misogyny, and ideological differences, but also about how gender has become a useful, easy, and simplistic narrative to deploy strategically.
If we try to resist not by increasing polarization but rather by finding spaces for negotiation and discussion, it helps—at least it does for me—to think that part of this is strategy, not only ideological conviction. I really think the first step is to be a bit more cautious whenever we see people speaking about gender, either in the form of potential genderbashing—building this large phantasm of so-called gender ideology—or genderwashing, emphasizing all the good things a country or regime has done for gender equality. We should be careful not to fall into the trap of letting gender become a single, overarching symbol, but instead try to be specific: where and how does it matter in a particular policy area?
Sometimes we also have to be clear about the trade-offs and value clashes that are part of politics. We cannot always have everything that is good, and not everything that is good is compatible. At least for me, looking back at the past decades, it has been an unprecedentedly positive era for women’s rights, and it is in many ways remarkable that gender equality achieved such status as a global norm. But that also means we now need to take a second look in this different era and ask where we need to be more careful and more specific about why it matters, focusing on concrete issues rather than treating gender merely as a symbol, because it is important for many other reasons as well.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series / Session 12 — Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 23, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00143
Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series explored how “decolonizing democracy” requires attention to the material and symbolic structures shaping participation, legitimacy, and representation. The presentations framed democracy not as a settled institutional model but as a contested field shaped by colonial legacies, extractive political economies, and identity-based struggles over inclusion and authority. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s comparative study of Nigeria and the United Kingdom showed how environmental governance can produce “participation without power,” where formal inclusion coexists with persistent injustice. Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s analysis of Cameroon highlighted how pluralism has intensified communal claims to state ownership, complicating political alternation. Supported by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi’s feedback, the session underscored the value of concepts such as biocultural sovereignty and communocratic populism and emphasized the need for context-sensitive, interdisciplinary approaches to democratic renewal in the Global South.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On Thursday, February 19, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 12 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the theme “Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” The session foregrounded a core problem in contemporary democratic theory and practice: how democratic institutions—often inherited, transplanted, or externally modeled—are reshaped, contested, and resisted in postcolonial contexts marked by extractive political economies, unequal state–society relations, and enduring struggles over recognition and voice.
Moderated by Neo Sithole (University of Szeged), the workshop approached “the people” not as a stable category but as a contested political project—produced through governance arrangements, mobilized through identity, and asserted through resistance. Across the session, democracy emerged less as an institutional endpoint than as a field of struggle in which colonial legacies, state power, and community agency intersect. Rather than treating decolonization as a symbolic discourse, contributors examined its concrete implications for how participation is structured, how resources are governed, and how legitimacy is claimed in environments where the state’s democratic form may coexist with exclusionary or coercive practices.
The session brought together two presentations that, while distinct in focus, converged on a shared concern with democratic deficit: the gap between formal mechanisms of participation and the effective capacity of communities to shape political and material outcomes. First, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Olabisi Onabanjo University) examined environmental governance as a critical site of democratic contestation in a paper jointly authored with Busayo Olakitan Badmos (Olabisi Onabanjo University), titled “Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.” Positioning environmental politics within the broader architecture of power, he explored how colonial histories and technocratic governance models marginalize local knowledge and produce “participation without power,” while proposing biocultural sovereignty as a pathway toward more inclusive ecological governance.
Second, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme (University of Ngaoundéré) analyzed electoral politics and identity mobilization in Cameroon in “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” jointly authored with Dr. Yves Valéry Obame (University of Bertoua / Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab). His contribution interrogated how multiparty competition can intensify communal claims to representation, framing elections not as programmatic contests but as struggles over inclusion, alternation, and the symbolic ownership of the state.
The discussion was anchored by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi (National Institute of Cartography; ICEDIS), whose role as discussant helped connect the papers’ empirical insights to broader debates on coloniality, accountability, and democratic substance. His interventions highlighted how both contributions disrupt common analytical shortcuts—whether the assumption that environmental injustice is confined to the Global South, or the notion that repeated elections necessarily constitute democratic consolidation.
Taken together, Session 12 offered a layered and comparative exploration of how democracy is challenged—and potentially renewed—through the politics of governance, identity, and resistance in postcolonial settings.
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja:“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom”
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University.
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja of Olabisi Onabanjo University delivered a thought-provoking presentation examining the entanglement of environmental governance, colonial legacies, and democratic practice. Speaking from a comparative Nigeria–United Kingdom framework, he advanced the central claim that environmental governance should be understood not merely as a technical or administrative domain but as a site of democratic struggle shaped by historical power asymmetries and contemporary political economies.
Positioning his research within ongoing debates on participation and sustainability, Dr. Solaja noted that mainstream environmental governance literature often assumes that stakeholder inclusion naturally enhances democratic legitimacy and ecological outcomes. However, he argued that such frameworks frequently overlook how colonial histories and extractive economic structures continue to shape decision-making processes. In many contexts, governance systems privilege capital accumulation over community well-being, thereby reproducing ecological inequality across regions. From this perspective, environmental governance cannot be treated as politically neutral; rather, it reflects contested struggles over resources, voice, and knowledge.
The study was guided by three principal research questions: i) how colonial legacies continue to shape environmental governance in both Nigeria and the United Kingdom; ii) how distributive, procedural, and recognitional injustices manifest across the two cases; and iii) how Indigenous and decolonial approaches might offer alternative pathways toward sustainable governance.
By placing a Global South extractive economy alongside a Global North post-industrial democracy, the project sought to challenge the assumption that environmental injustice is primarily a Southern phenomenon and instead reveal its structural character across diverse political systems.
Dr. Solaja explained that the comparison was deliberately constructed. Nigeria’s Niger Delta represents a post-colonial, resource-dependent region marked by centralized control, oil extraction, and militarized environmental conflict. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s post-industrial regions—particularly South Wales and Northern England—illustrate an advanced industrial democracy navigating decarbonization and energy transition. Despite these differences in institutional capacity and policy development, both contexts exhibit what he termed a “democratic deficit” embedded within environmental governance arrangements.
The presentation’s theoretical foundation drew on decolonial environmentalism, particularly the work of Walter Mignoloand related scholars. Dr. Solaja argued that dominant environmental governance models are shaped by Eurocentric and technocratic assumptions that privilege market-oriented and state-centric solutions while marginalizing relational, place-based, and Indigenous ecological knowledge systems. Decoloniality, in this sense, involves challenging the presumed universality of Western sustainability paradigms and embracing what he described as “epistemic disobedience”—the refusal to accept a single authoritative model of environmental knowledge. Environmental conflicts, therefore, emerge not only from competition over resources but also from struggles over recognition and authority.
Methodologically, the study employed a cooperative qualitative case-study design grounded in critical interpretivism. The research team analyzed legislative archives, reports from NGOs and international organizations, media coverage, environmental indices, and data from the Environmental Justice Atlas. Through thematic coding, they identified patterns related to governance models, justice dimensions, and underlying power relations shaped by colonial continuities.
Turning to the findings, Dr. Solaja highlighted stark contrasts and parallels. In the Niger Delta, thousands of oil spill incidents in recent years have produced severe ecological damage, including heavy-metal contamination and concentrated environmental risk zones near pipeline infrastructure. While official narratives often attribute spills to sabotage, the research emphasized the role of weak regulation and aging infrastructure. The result is pronounced distributive injustice, with local communities bearing disproportionate environmental burdens.
The United Kingdom, by contrast, has achieved measurable progress in decarbonization, including the phase-out of coal and expansion of renewable energy. Yet structural tensions remain: fossil fuels continue to dominate overall energy consumption, new oil projects are still approved, and community influence over environmental decision-making is often limited. Thus, although distributive injustice may appear less severe in absolute terms, procedural and recognitional deficits persist.
Across both cases, environmental injustice manifested along three dimensions. Distributive injustice concerned the unequal allocation of environmental harms and benefits. Procedural injustice involved exclusion from meaningful decision-making processes, whether through repression in Nigeria or limited consultation mechanisms in the United Kingdom. Recognitional injustice referred to the marginalization of local knowledge, identities, and historical experiences. Dr. Solaja summarized this dynamic as “participation without power”: communities may be consulted, yet they rarely possess the authority to shape outcomes.
The presentation also underscored the role of resistance movements. In the Niger Delta, environmental activism is intertwined with ethnic identity, territorial sovereignty, and cultural survival, exemplified by movements such as the Ogoni struggle. In the United Kingdom, climate justice activism often reflects class, regional, and generational concerns. Despite contextual differences, movements in both regions increasingly share strategies, including civil disobedience, digital mobilization, and transnational solidarity networks—suggesting the emergence of a broader planetary justice framework.
In concluding, Dr. Solaja proposed alternative pathways centered on “biocultural sovereignty” and plural ecological governance. In Nigeria, this could involve ethical extractivism grounded in free, prior, and informed consent, equitable benefit sharing, and stronger accountability mechanisms. In the United Kingdom, community-owned renewable energy initiatives and locally driven transitions could advance energy democracy. Ultimately, he argued that democracy must extend beyond electoral institutions to encompass ecological sovereignty, epistemic plurality, and intergenerational justice. Only through such transformations, he concluded, can environmental governance become genuinely democratic.
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme:“Cameroon at the Trial of Democracy: Presidential Elections, Communaucratic Populism, and the Crisis of Political Transition”
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme is from the University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc).
In his presentation, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme offered a sociologically grounded analysis of electoral politics in Cameroon, advancing the concept of “communocratic populism” to explain the enduring tensions between democratic pluralism and community-based political mobilization. The presentation situated Cameroon’s contemporary political trajectory within the broader challenges of democratic transition in postcolonial African states, where formal multiparty systems coexist with deeply rooted communal identities.
Dr. Essaga Eteme began by framing the study within Cameroon’s transition to political pluralism in 1990, a watershed moment that introduced multiparty competition after decades of single-party dominance. While this transition generated widespread optimism about democratic reform, he argued that it also revealed structural constraints. Cameroon is composed of more than 250 ethnic communities, each with distinct historical and political aspirations. In such a context, electoral competition has increasingly become a mechanism for negotiating communal representation rather than contesting ideological programs. Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections alike are thus shaped by the imperative to secure community backing, transforming democratic participation into what Dr. Essaga Eteme conceptualized as communocratic populism—political mobilization grounded in communal identity claims rather than policy platforms.
The presentation traced the historical roots of this phenomenon to Cameroon’s post-independence political consolidation. From 1972 until the early 1990s, the country operated under a highly centralized system characterized by limited political freedoms and restricted avenues for dissent. The transition to multiparty democracy raised hopes for political alternation and broader participation. However, Dr. Essaga Eteme noted that the persistence of long-term incumbency—particularly the extended tenure of President Paul Biya—has generated both expectations and frustrations. While some citizens initially viewed democratic reforms as an opportunity for renewal, others increasingly perceived them as insufficient to produce meaningful change, thereby fueling community-based demands for political inclusion.
Central to the analysis was the observation that presidential elections have become focal points for communal competition. The announcement of President Biya’s candidacy in the 2025 election, after decades in power, intensified perceptions among various groups that political authority had been monopolized by a particular regional or ethnic constituency. This perception, Dr. Essaga Eteme argued, reinvigorated communocratic narratives asserting that leadership should rotate among communities. Such narratives do not necessarily reject democracy but reinterpret it as a mechanism for redistributing access to state power among identity groups.
The research was guided by three principal questions: i) identifying the forms and manifestations of communocratic populism during presidential elections; ii) examining how community affiliation shapes voter alignment; and iii) analyzing how political actors exploit communal sentiments either to legitimize incumbency or to challenge it. To address these questions, Dr. Essaga Eteme employed a mixed-methods approach combining field observations, social media analysis, and electoral data from recent presidential contests, particularly those of 2025. This methodology enabled a multi-layered understanding of both elite strategies and grassroots perceptions.
Empirical findings highlighted patterns of continuity across successive elections. Electoral outcomes revealed the sustained dominance of the incumbent leadership, accompanied by accusations of fraud and declining trust in electoral institutions. At the same time, opposition candidates frequently mobilized support by appealing to communal solidarity. For example, challengers from northern, western, or Anglophone regions framed their campaigns around the notion that their respective communities deserved access to national leadership after prolonged exclusion. Such appeals resonated strongly with voters who interpreted political power as a collective resource to be shared among groups.
Dr. Essaga Eteme illustrated how these dynamics have evolved over time. Earlier opposition figures, including prominent Anglophone leaders in the 1990s and 2000s, mobilized regional grievances against perceived Francophone dominance, contributing to tensions that later fed into the Anglophone crisis. More recent challengers have similarly invoked regional identity, arguing that the concentration of power within one community undermines national cohesion. Even post-electoral disputes often reflect communal narratives, with defeated candidates attributing outcomes to structural favoritism toward the incumbent’s group rather than to programmatic differences.
The presentation emphasized that communocratic populism shifts the focus of democratic competition from ideological debate to identity-based claims. Elections become symbolic contests over which community will control the state apparatus rather than deliberations over policy direction. This dynamic, Dr. Essaga Eteme suggested, contributes to a broader crisis of political transition, as democratic institutions struggle to mediate between national integration and communal representation. Instead of fostering a shared civic identity, electoral politics may reinforce divisions by encouraging leaders to frame political demands in communal terms.
At the same time, the analysis acknowledged the ambivalent character of communocratic mobilization. On one hand, it can serve as a vehicle for marginalized groups to articulate grievances and demand inclusion. On the other hand, it risks entrenching zero-sum perceptions of power, where one group’s gain is viewed as another’s loss. This tension complicates efforts to build stable democratic institutions capable of transcending identity politics.
Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that Cameroon’s experience demonstrates the limits of procedural democratization in deeply plural societies. The introduction of multiparty elections does not automatically produce programmatic competition or institutional trust; instead, it may activate preexisting communal cleavages. Addressing the crisis of political transition therefore requires reimagining democracy beyond electoral mechanics, fostering inclusive governance structures that balance communal recognition with national cohesion. Without such reforms, communocratic populism is likely to remain a defining feature of Cameroon’s political landscape, continuing to shape both the aspirations and anxieties of its democratic experiment.
Discussant Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi’s Feedback
Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi is a researcher at the National Institute of Cartography (NIC), and lecturer at the Cameroonian Institute of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (ICEDIS).
Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi offered substantive and analytically rich feedback on the presentations delivered by Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja and Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme, highlighting their contributions to contemporary debates on populism, governance, and democratic transformation from African perspectives. His remarks underscored both the conceptual significance and the empirical originality of the two studies while posing clarifying questions aimed at strengthening their theoretical implications.
Regarding Dr. Solaja’s presentation on decolonial environmentalism and democratic deficit, Dr. Nguijoi characterized the paper as a stimulating and timely contribution to populism and governance studies. He was particularly struck by the comparative framework linking environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, which juxtaposed a Global South extractive context with a developed post-industrial democracy. This transnational comparison, he emphasized, offered a compelling analytical lens that challenged conventional assumptions that environmental injustice is primarily a problem of the Global South. Instead, the paper demonstrated that tensions between resource governance and democratic accountability transcend regional boundaries and manifest across different political systems.
Dr. Nguijoi highlighted the presentation’s central argument that environmental governance is not politically neutral but historically embedded in colonial legacies and extractive political economies. He noted that this insight implicitly raised a profound normative question: whether democracy can genuinely flourish within development models that reproduce forms of colonial extractivism. In his view, this question extended beyond environmental politics to the broader relationship between governance structures and historical power asymmetries.
He further praised the paper for introducing environmental issues into populism discourse, an area often dominated by identity, economic, or institutional analyses. By situating environmental governance within debates on decolonization, identity, and resistance in the Global South, the presentation expanded the conceptual terrain of populism studies. At the same time, Dr. Nguijoi invited further clarification on the concept of decolonial environmentalism. Specifically, he asked whether the approach implied epistemic recognition of Indigenous knowledge systems alone, or whether it also entailed deeper institutional transformation involving ownership, participation, accountability, and governance restructuring. He also questioned whether environmental resistance movements, while democratizing public discourse, were capable of transforming governance architectures in practice. Overall, he expressed strong appreciation for the paper’s innovative integration of environmental governance into analyses of populism and democratic transformation.
Turning to Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism and the crisis of political alternation in Cameroon, Dr. Nguijoi described the case as particularly significant given the country’s long-standing presidential incumbency and its implications for democratic renewal. He framed the study as addressing a structurally sensitive question: whether identity-based mobilization in electoral politics represents democratic participation or contributes to democratic erosion.
Dr. Nguijoi identified two principal analytical strengths in the presentation. The first concerned the centrality of identity mobilization in Cameroonian politics. He observed that political competition in this context appears structured less around ideological programs than around communal belonging, regional solidarity, historical grievances, and narratives of stability and protection advanced by political elites. In his interpretation, this dynamic captured the essence of communocratic populism, whereby electoral alignment becomes embedded in community affiliation, particularly during presidential elections. He noted empirical examples illustrating how opposition candidates mobilized regional and communal support bases in recent electoral contests, reinforcing the salience of identity in political mobilization.
The second strength he highlighted was the analysis of political alternation as a test of democratic substance. Although elections have been regularly held since the country’s transition to pluralism, executive turnover has not occurred, raising questions about whether democracy can be reduced to procedural repetition or must include a credible possibility of leadership change. Dr. Nguijoi suggested that Cameroon exhibits a pattern of electoral persistence without alternation, where communal rhetoric frames political competition as a struggle for survival, regional balance, or national stability. This dynamic, he argued, renders alternation structurally improbable and complicates assessments of democratic consolidation.
In concluding his feedback, Dr. Nguijoi emphasized that both presentations addressed crucial themes linking populism, identity, governance, and democratic transformation. He commended their focus on historically embedded structures — colonial legacies in the Nigerian case and identity-based mobilization in Cameroon — while encouraging further theoretical clarification. His remarks framed the two studies as important contributions to understanding how democratic processes are shaped, constrained, and contested in diverse political contexts.
Responses to Discussant’s Feedback
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja
In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja expressed appreciation for the questions and comments, clarifying key aspects of his comparative framework on environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Speaking from a reflective standpoint, he emphasized that the contrast between the two cases was deliberate and methodological rather than evaluative. The study, he explained, did not seek to measure or compare the degree of environmental injustice across the two countries. Instead, its primary objective was to identify and illuminate democratic deficits present in both contexts despite their differing levels of development.
Solaja underscored that the United Kingdom, as a developed country with robust institutional structures, regulatory frameworks, and environmental governance mechanisms, nonetheless exhibits forms of democratic deficit. He noted that certain communities and groups remain marginalized in decision-making processes, particularly regarding environmental policy formulation and implementation. Even within a system characterized by strong democratic representation, unequal participation and limited voice for affected communities persist, revealing that institutional strength alone does not eliminate governance shortcomings.
Turning to the Nigerian case, Dr. Solaja highlighted the enduring influence of colonial legacies on environmental management. He argued that Nigeria inherited centralized, state-centric governance structures from colonial administrations, which continue to shape contemporary environmental policies. In this framework, the state retains dominant control over natural resources and extraction activities, often without meaningful consultation with indigenous populations or local communities. As a result, those who bear the ecological consequences of extraction are frequently excluded from decision-making processes, creating a pronounced democratic deficit.
He reiterated that the comparative analysis aimed to demonstrate that environmental governance challenges are not exclusive to the Global South. By juxtaposing Nigeria with the United Kingdom, the study sought to challenge the assumption that democratic deficits in environmental management are primarily a Southern phenomenon. Instead, Dr. Solaja argued, such deficits manifest in different forms across both the Global South and Global North, shaped by distinct historical and institutional trajectories.
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme
In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme expressed gratitude for the discussant’s observations and used the opportunity to clarify key dynamics underlying his concept of communocratic populism in Cameroon. He focused particularly on the role of alliance formation among opposition forces and communities during presidential elections, presenting it as empirical evidence reinforcing his analytical framework.
Dr. Essaga Eteme explained that the persistent contestation of electoral procedures since the country’s transition to pluralism in 1990 has created a political environment marked by distrust and accusations of fraud. While acknowledging that post-electoral disputes are not uncommon in many democracies, he emphasized that in Cameroon such contestation often takes on a communal dimension. Opposition parties and communities excluded from power tend to interpret electoral outcomes as illegitimate, prompting efforts to build cross-community alliances against the incumbent’s support base.
He highlighted the 2025 presidential election as a revealing example. According to his account, when a prominent opposition figure was deemed ineligible to run by electoral authorities, segments of his regional support base redirected their backing to another candidate from a different community. This strategic convergence of voters across communal lines, he argued, illustrates how alliance-building operates within a communocratic logic: electoral behavior becomes driven less by ideological affinity than by the shared objective of displacing the community perceived to monopolize power.
Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that these alliance dynamics demonstrate the adaptive nature of communocratic populism. Faced with a dominant ruling party and entrenched incumbency, opposition actors mobilize communal solidarities and forge temporary coalitions to challenge the status quo. In his view, such practices further substantiate his argument that identity-based mobilization remains central to understanding Cameroon’s electoral politics.
Q&A Session
The Q&A session developed into a wide-ranging and intellectually engaged dialogue that deepened the themes raised in the presentations, particularly the intersections between populism, environmental governance, democratic legitimacy, and identity-based political mobilization. Moderated by Neo Sithole, the discussion brought together conceptual reflections, empirical clarifications, and comparative insights, revealing the broader implications of the research beyond the specific case studies of Nigeria and Cameroon.
Opening the session, Sithole offered strong praise for Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s paper, emphasizing its methodological rigor and its successful integration of theory with empirical evidence. He noted that the study provided not only a clear conceptual framework but also concrete proof, particularly through environmental data from the Niger Delta demonstrating the presence of harmful chemicals and minerals in topsoil affecting local populations. Sithole framed the discussion within a broader critique of minimalist understandings of democracy, arguing that governance should not be confined to electoral processes but must extend to everyday conditions of life, including environmental quality and access to clean resources. In his view, the paper effectively illustrated how democratic governance—or its absence—directly shapes environmental outcomes.
Sithole also situated the Niger Delta within a wider global political economy, highlighting how multinational corporations often relocate environmentally harmful extraction activities to regions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia where regulatory frameworks are weaker. He characterized the Niger Delta as both one of the longest-running cases of environmental degradation and one of the most sustained examples of environmental resistance, noting that such resistance has become embedded in local identity. Extending the argument, he suggested that dissatisfaction with democratic governance across Africa stems from unmet expectations following the democratic transitions of the 1990s and 2000s, when many citizens assumed political liberalization would lead to improved living conditions. Instead, he observed, many postcolonial states continue to operate within institutional frameworks inherited from colonial administrations that were not designed to address local needs.
Drawing on examples from Kenya and South Africa, Sithole highlighted ongoing disputes over land rights and resource ownership, illustrating how colonial-era patterns of dispossession persist in contemporary governance. He posed a forward-looking question about whether environmental resistance movements across the continent could serve as catalysts for democratic renewal at a broader scale.
In response, Dr. Solaja clarified the intent of his research. He stressed that the study did not advocate dismantling existing environmental governance frameworks but rather reforming them through the integration of indigenous ecological knowledge systems. According to Dr. Solaja, contemporary democratic institutions in many postcolonial societies were externally derived and insufficiently adapted to local realities. The proposed solution, which he described as a biocultural approach, involves incorporating indigenous practices and knowledge into formal governance structures to create more inclusive and effective systems. This approach, he argued, would address democratic deficits while strengthening environmental stewardship by recognizing the long-standing expertise of local communities.
The discussion then shifted toward the question of accountability and reporting mechanisms. Sithole raised concerns about the effectiveness of multinational institutions and international organizations in contexts where domestic environmental reporting systems are weak or unreliable. He asked whether reliance on external actors was sufficient to ensure environmental justice or whether strengthening state capacity should be prioritized.
Dr. Solaja responded by emphasizing the importance of community participation in monitoring environmental conditions. He proposed bottom-up reporting mechanisms that would enable local populations to communicate environmental challenges directly to authorities, potentially using technological tools such as mobile applications. While acknowledging the necessity of formal institutional frameworks, he argued that they must be complemented by indigenous knowledge and grassroots engagement to achieve meaningful environmental democracy.
Dr. Bülent Kenes expanded the discussion by introducing a geopolitical perspective that connected environmental governance in Africa to the rise of contemporary populist movements in Western countries. He framed his question around the potential global implications of political ideologies associated with figures such as Donald Trump and the MAGA movement, which he characterized as challenging postcolonial frameworks and signaling a form of renewed imperial assertiveness. Dr. Kenes invited the speakers to reflect on whether African states and societies should be concerned about the broader consequences of these developments, particularly in relation to historical patterns of external domination. He specifically asked whether such political trends could generate new forms of re-colonization or intensified exploitation of African resources, labor, and environmental assets. His intervention underscored the possibility that shifting power dynamics in the Global North might place renewed pressure on Africa’s ecological systems and resource governance, thereby linking domestic environmental issues to wider geopolitical transformations.
In his response, Dr. Solaja addressed the geopolitical concerns surrounding potential renewed exploitation of African resources by situating them within a longer historical continuum of extractivism. He emphasized that African communities have endured the adverse consequences of intensive resource extraction both during colonial rule and in the post-independence period, often with limited benefits for local populations. According to Dr. Solaja, the well-being of affected communities has frequently been compromised, while state interventions have tended to be delayed, insufficient, or absent altogether. In many cases, assistance has been mediated through international donors or multinational corporations rather than delivered directly by national governments, creating complex arrangements that do not always serve the interests of local beneficiaries.
Dr. Solaja noted that although most African countries have been politically independent for decades, the persistence of asymmetrical global economic relationships continues to shape environmental governance and resource management. He argued that while no country can operate in isolation, interactions between the Global North and Global South should evolve toward more equitable and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than exploitative ones.
Returning to the conceptual framework of his paper, Dr. Solaja reiterated the importance of biocultural sovereignty, which advocates integrating indigenous knowledge systems into formal environmental governance structures. He suggested that empowering local communities to participate in decision-making over resource control, distribution, and management could reduce conflict and resistance movements. By drawing on longstanding indigenous ecological practices, he concluded, marginalized communities could gain greater democratic voice and contribute to more sustainable and inclusive resource governance.
The session also addressed conceptual issues arising from Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism. Dr. Kenes noted the novelty of the concept and requested clarification of its meaning and applicability beyond the Cameroonian context. Dr. Eteme explained that communocratic populism refers to a form of political mobilization grounded in community identity rather than ideological programs. In this framework, electoral competition becomes a contest among communal groups seeking access to state power, often leading to alliances between communities aiming to displace incumbents.
He elaborated that political discourse frequently attributes governmental actions to entire communities rather than to individual leaders, reinforcing identity-based interpretations of power. As a result, electoral campaigns focus less on policy proposals and more on demonstrating communal strength, intelligence, or entitlement to rule. Dr. Eteme further explained that communocratic alliances emerge when communities perceive the existing power structure as monopolized by a particular group. These alliances are pragmatic and strategic, formed not around shared ideological visions but around the collective objective of redistributing political power.
Throughout the discussion, participants acknowledged that such dynamics complicate conventional democratic theory, which assumes competition based on policy alternatives and public interest. Instead, identity-based mobilization can transform elections into zero-sum contests among communities, challenging the ideal of governance oriented toward the common good.
The Q&A session concluded with a recognition of the originality and relevance of the concepts introduced by the presenters, particularly the integration of environmental governance into populism studies and the articulation of communocratic populism as a framework for understanding identity-driven electoral politics. The exchange underscored the importance of interdisciplinary approaches that consider historical legacies, institutional structures, and socio-cultural dynamics in analyzing contemporary democracy.
Overall, the session demonstrated how localized case studies—whether environmental conflicts in the Niger Delta or identity politics in Cameroon—can illuminate broader structural challenges facing democratic governance in the Global South and beyond. By fostering dialogue between empirical research and theoretical reflection, the discussion highlighted the value of comparative and context-sensitive analyses for advancing the study of populism, governance, and democratic transformation.
Concluding Remarks
ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole. Photo: Umit Vurel.
In his concluding remarks, moderator Neo Sithole reflected on the thematic contributions of the presentations and highlighted their broader significance for understanding populism and democracy in African contexts. He began by acknowledging his limited familiarity with the politics of Central Francophone Africa but noted that the presentations resonated with patterns he had observed elsewhere, particularly the role of geographical and historical divides in shaping populist mobilization. Drawing on comparative examples, he emphasized how north–south disparities rooted in colonial infrastructure development have produced enduring political imbalances in several postcolonial states. He commended the presenters for illuminating these structural divides and their implications for democratic governance. Sithole also encouraged further scholarly development of the concept of communocratic populism.
Offering brief feedback on the presentations, Sithole observed that both papers revealed understudied dimensions of populist expression in Africa. He noted that Dr. Solaja’s research demonstrated how environmental resistance can become central to local identity while exposing the persistence of colonial-era governance practices that continue to marginalize affected communities. In contrast, Dr. Essaga Eteme’s work shed light on identity-based mobilization and the enduring dominance of strong leadership patterns in certain Francophone states, where communal affiliation shapes political competition.
Conclusion
Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series underscored the urgency of rethinking democracy through the lenses of decolonization, governance, and identity in the Global South. By juxtaposing environmental struggles in Nigeria and the United Kingdom with identity-driven electoral politics in Cameroon, the session demonstrated that democratic deficit is neither geographically confined nor institutionally uniform. Rather, it manifests in diverse forms shaped by colonial legacies, political economies of extraction, and enduring contestations over representation and authority. The discussions revealed that formal democratic procedures—whether participatory environmental frameworks or multiparty elections—do not automatically translate into substantive inclusion or equitable outcomes. Instead, communities often confront structures that allow consultation without empowerment and participation without transformative capacity.
A key takeaway was the necessity of expanding democratic theory beyond procedural benchmarks toward a more substantive understanding that incorporates ecological justice, epistemic plurality, and communal recognition. The concept of biocultural sovereignty advanced in the environmental context, alongside the notion of communocratic populism in electoral politics, illustrated how locally grounded analytical frameworks can illuminate dynamics that conventional models overlook. Both contributions highlighted the ambivalence of resistance movements and identity mobilization, which may simultaneously articulate legitimate grievances and risk reinforcing new forms of exclusion.
Ultimately, the session emphasized that decolonizing democracy requires confronting the historical and structural conditions that shape contemporary governance, rather than merely adapting existing institutional templates. By bringing empirical case studies into dialogue with broader theoretical debates, Session 12 contributed to a more nuanced understanding of how democracy is negotiated, contested, and reimagined in postcolonial settings. It thus reinforced the importance of interdisciplinary and context-sensitive approaches for advancing scholarship on populism, governance, and democratic transformation in an increasingly interconnected world.
In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Nandini Sundar (Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University) delivers a stark assessment of India’s institutional trajectory under the BJP and its ideological parent, the RSS. Her central claim is unequivocal: “Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda.” She situates current developments within the longer history of Hindutva ideology, emphasizing the RSS’s founding goal of a Hindu supremacist state. Professor Sundar argues that a narrative of majoritarian victimhood underpins historical revisionism, institutional capture, and restrictions on academic freedom. She also highlights transnational pressures, noting that a “very active Hindutva diaspora” has targeted scholars abroad, constraining research and debate globally.
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Nandini Sundar— Professor of Sociology at the Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University, and one of India’s most prominent sociologists and a leading voice on democracy, violence, and state power—offers a stark assessment of the trajectory of Indian institutions under the rule of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Her central claim is unequivocal: “Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda.” Situating contemporary developments within the longer history of Hindutva ideology, Professor Sundar argues that the BJP cannot be understood apart from the RSS, “an unregistered, secretive organization” founded in 1925 “to establish a Hindu supremacist state in which all others would be second-class citizens.”
At the heart of this project, she explains, lies a powerful narrative of majoritarian victimhood. RSS discourse portrays Hindus as historical victims of “800 years of colonialism,” conflating Muslim rule with British imperialism and mobilizing a sense of lost civilizational pride. This paradox—an overwhelming majority imagining itself as dispossessed—underpins a wide array of policies, from historical revisionism to institutional capture. According to Professor Sundar, the claim to represent a wronged majority translates into concrete restrictions on academic freedom through ideological appointments, funding pressures, surveillance, and curricular transformation. Universities, in particular, have been reshaped to ensure that “only our narrative, only our voice, should count,” transforming spaces once associated with pluralism into arenas of political conformity and patronage.
The interview highlights how Hindutva governance operates not only through formal state mechanisms but also through diffuse networks of affiliated organizations and vigilante actors. Student groups such as the ABVP (the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad) and other RSS-linked formations function simultaneously as political mobilizers and instruments of intimidation, embedding campuses within what Professor Sundar calls a broader “ecosystem of vigilantism.” Meanwhile, democratic institutions—from courts to electoral bodies and media regulators—are portrayed as formally intact yet substantively hollowed out, enabling what she describes as the preservation of democratic form alongside the erosion of democratic substance.
Professor Sundar also draws attention to the transnational dimension of these dynamics. A “very active Hindutva diaspora,” she notes, has targeted scholars abroad, orchestrating harassment campaigns and reputational attacks that restrict academic inquiry on India globally. As a result, she warns, it has become “very difficult for anyone working on India to be able to research, write, and think freely, whether inside the country or outside the country.”
Taken together, her analysis presents Hindutva not merely as a domestic political ideology but as a comprehensive project of institutional transformation, cultural redefinition, and epistemic control. By foregrounding the links between majoritarian resentment, institutional subversion, and the policing of knowledge, this interview offers a sobering account of how democratic systems can be repurposed to sustain exclusionary rule while maintaining the appearance of constitutional continuity.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Nandini Sundar, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
The BJP Cannot Be Understood Apart from the RSS and Its Supremacist Project
A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.
Professor Nandini Sundar, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent work on majoritarian resentment and the inversion of victimhood, how do you conceptualize the BJP’s claim to represent a historically wronged “majority,” and how does that claim translate into concrete restrictions on academic freedom (appointments, funding, policing, curricula)?
Professor Nandini Sundar: The BJP was founded by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), an unregistered, secretive organization that has proliferated into many different fronts—education, labor, and virtually every sector, each with its own affiliated bodies. The BJP is the political wing of the RSS, which was founded exactly 100 years ago, in 1925, to establish a Hindu supremacist state in which all others would be second-class citizens.
If you look at RSS literature, it consistently portrays Hindus as victims suffering from what they call 800 years of colonialism, because they conflate periods of Muslim rule with British colonialism. This reflects a deep sense that India was ruled by Muslim rulers for many centuries and that a lost Hindu pride must now be regained. The past they invoke—often framed as a glorious Vedic age—overlooks the fact that ancient India consisted of many different communities practicing a variety of religions, rather than a unified “Hindu” civilization.
This constructed sense of victimhood, despite Hindus being the overwhelming majority—over 80 percent of the population—translates into efforts to rewrite history, for example by erasing the Mughal period. Yet it is impossible to understand India without considering the Mughal era or the various sultanates that existed from the 12th to the 18th centuries.
It also manifests in demographic anxieties, such as claims that Hindus are being overtaken by Muslims due to allegedly higher Muslim fertility rates—claims that are not supported by empirical evidence, since fertility rates among Muslims have declined sharply and vary across regions. In short, historical narratives, demographic fears, and broader perceptions of victimhood are mobilized together.
As noted, this translates first into historical revisionism. Second, in universities, vacancies have been systematically filled with individuals aligned with their ideology. This is not simply a matter of feeling victimized, because in the past, although the system was not always perfect, there was at least a perception that appointments were based on merit. If their candidates were not selected, it was often due to a lack of scholarly expertise rather than ideological exclusion.
Now, victimhood is invoked to claim that “our people” were neglected while positions were monopolized by the left. In reality, universities have been systematically reshaped to reflect their ideological preferences, and this has also become a source of patronage for their cadre.
Taken together, these developments reveal not only a discourse of victimhood but also a broader assertion of dominance—the belief that they are now the only legitimate force, and that only their narrative and voice should prevail.
Democratic Institutions Have Been Hollowed Out from Within
Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi addressing the Nation on the occasion of 75th Independence Day from the ramparts of Red Fort, in Delhi on August 15, 2021.
In “Inside Modi’s Assault on Academic Freedom,” you trace how formally democratic institutions can be repurposed to discipline dissent. What are the key mechanisms—legal, bureaucratic, and vigilante—through which democratic form is preserved while democratic substance is hollowed out?
Professor Nandini Sundar: Almost every institution in this country has now collapsed, or has been subverted, in order to further the supremacist agenda. If you look at the judiciary—take the Supreme Court, for instance—we have had several BJP chief ministers issuing hate speeches. There was a recent incident involving the chief minister of Assam, which has quite a sizable Muslim minority, putting out a video of him shooting Muslims with a gun, targeting them so that you could see Muslims in the viewfinder being shot at. People took this to the Supreme Court, and the Court refused to intervene, saying that you are only targeting BJP chief ministers, and has basically refused to do anything about hate speech coming from the highest constitutional authorities. If you look at any number of judicial pronouncements in the last decade and a half, they have consistently favored the BJP.
If you look at the Election Commission, which again has been packed with chosen bureaucrats, right now they are conducting a massive exercise across the country to register voters. Historically, everybody who has been living here has been considered a voter, apart from immigrants or others. The onus used to be on the state to find and register voters. Now the onus is on voters to prove that they are citizens of this country and produce birth certificates of their parents, grandparents, their own exam mark sheets, and a whole range of certificates to show that they are indeed genuine citizens. That has led to the disenfranchisement of large numbers—hundreds of thousands of people in each state. For example, about 600,000 in one state. It is just ridiculous, because these are all actual, genuine voters who have not been able to produce the right certificates, often because they are poor, or especially women who migrate. So, you can see that elections, too, are completely controlled by the BJP.
When it comes to the media, if you look at the Modi government’s spending on advertisements, the amount that goes to favored media, and the way that media critical of the government has repeatedly had court cases slapped on them, with independent journalists arrested—every field is under attack. Universities are one major field—higher education in particular, but education more generally—where the BJP and the RSS have been attacking all conventions, all democratic procedures, and installing their own people.
Precarity in Universities Is Undermining Academic Freedom
How do budget cuts, contractualization, and precaritization in higher education function as governance tools—producing compliance not only through ideology, but also through material dependence and career risk?
Professor Nandini Sundar: There’s been a change in the way universities are funded. Many university colleges are being asked to go autonomous, which means that they will be responsible for raising their own funding. This increases fees for students, and at the same time, minority students—say Muslims and Christians who were receiving fellowships—have seen those fellowships cut down. So, there has been a general reduction in student fellowships.
In terms of faculty recruitment, we see that even earlier there were a number of precarious positions—contractual teachers—and that still continues quite widely across private colleges. Precarious teachers, those without fixed contracts, obviously find it hard to be critical of anything that is going on and hard to teach freely. But you also see that now, whenever the precarity issue among teachers has been addressed, those positions have been filled with their own people.
So, in either situation, both among students and among faculty, contractualization and the reduction of fellowships are making it difficult for there to be a strong autonomous voice from students and faculty.
Terror Laws Are Weaponized Against Democratic Protest
Protest against the CAA and NRC at Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University (BAMU), Aurangabad, Maharashtra, India, as students and citizens demonstrate in defense of constitutional rights. Photo: Imran Shaikh.
Many accounts emphasize arrests, sedition/terror charges, and prolonged pre-trial detention. Analytically, how should we understand “process as punishment” as a populist-authoritarian technique of rule in India?
Professor Nandini Sundar: Absolutely. The whole judicial system is designed for process without punishment. If you take the case of Sharjeel Imam and Umar Khalid, two student leaders who have been arrested for over five years now without the case even coming to trial. The charges relate to their involvement in a movement for equal citizenship. In 2019, the government passed an act that would grant citizenship to refugees from every other country except Pakistan and Bangladesh, and to every other religion except Islam. This was also seen as the first step toward disenfranchising Indian Muslims, and there was a massive protest against it—a huge, peaceful, democratic protest, predominantly led by women in many parts of the country, but especially in Delhi.
These students, both from JNU (Jawaharlal Nehru University) and from Jamia (Jamia Millia Islamia), were involved in this democratic protest, and it was actually a very powerful democratic moment in this country’s history. But many students—predominantly Muslim students—were arrested. There were many people who took part in that protest, Muslims and Hindus, but only the Muslim students were arrested, and they have been in jail for the last five years. We have recorded speeches from them talking about the need for unity, upholding the Constitution, and love, yet they have been accused under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, which deals with terror.
They have been accused of terror conspiracies, which is completely ludicrous. The case has not even come to trial, and the evidence against them is completely flimsy. But everyone knows that they are being kept in jail because they are articulate student leaders who had a democratic vision for this country.
Campuses Are Embedded in a Wider Ecosystem of Vigilantism
How do you interpret the role of affiliated organizations (student wings, vigilante groups, informal “sentiment” enforcers) in expanding state capacity to intimidate universities while maintaining deniable distance?
Professor Nandini Sundar: The RSS has the biggest student wing in the whole country, the ABVP, the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, which has been engaged in a number of attacks on other student organizations. It has also attacked various seminars that have gone against BJP ideology. It functions both as a student wing—providing the kind of membership and mobilization for ordinary student activities that any student organization does—and as a vigilante force.
There are also a number of other fronts of the RSS—the Bajrang Dal, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and various other wings—which intimidate students and faculty on campuses. This is part of a more generalized surge in vigilantism, as vigilantes have been attacking Muslim traders, Muslims transporting cattle across state boundaries, Muslim shopkeepers, and Christian pastors. There is a whole range of vigilante forces that the RSS tacitly supports and grants immunity and impunity. So, the university is not free of this; it is completely embedded in that wider ecosystem of vigilantism.
Universities Modeling Diversity Became Central Adversaries
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), a public central university in New Delhi, India. Photo: Mrinal Pal.
Why do institutions like JNU become such central targets in majoritarian projects? Is it their historical role in mass politics, their social composition, their epistemic authority—or the way they model pluralism?
Professor Nandini Sundar: All of the above, I should say. Many universities in India were set up as part of a nationalist project. For instance, Jamia, which was established before independence, was founded by nationalist leaders to provide an alternative form of education to the British colonial model, and it has had a very long, rich tradition of scholarship and student mobilization.
JNU was set up in the 1970s on a very distinct model of higher education, where the effort was to bring in students from all across the country, especially from underserved regions. It had an extremely interesting system of deprivation points, whereby students from backward regions would receive extra marks in addition to whatever they obtained in the entrance test. In this way, it managed to achieve a real plurality of students from across the country. They also had excellent faculty, and some departments were truly the best in the country, known for their academic excellence. Even today, it remains one of the strongest universities academically in India.
Partly because of this academic excellence and the pluralism of its students, JNU also developed a very strong left tradition. It is one place where left student unions have consistently won student elections, and it has had a distinctive style of politics in which debates on a wide range of national issues would continue late into the night, alongside campus concerns such as hostel bills, food, accommodation, and fees. So, it has been a very unusual kind of university, an iconic institution for liberal-left education, and that was something the BJP felt it had to attack and destroy.
Rewriting the Past to Control the Nation’s Narrative
How do textbook “rationalization” and selective historical erasure operate as a struggle over national temporality—who gets to narrate the past, and who is authorized to speak for the nation?
Professor Nandini Sundar: The RSS thinks that it is authorized to speak for the nation, and since it has control over the government and textbooks—because under the Indian system education is a matter both for the central (federal) government and for the states—there are also some boards that operate nationally, in addition to the state boards. So, the major producer of textbooks in India is the NCERT, the National Council of Educational Research and Training, which produces textbooks that are then used by these different boards or even used by state boards as models.
What the BJP has been doing is systematically changing these NCERT textbooks. For instance, removing references to caste, removing all traces of Mughal history from middle school textbooks, and giving more space to certain false narratives that promote Hindu rulers at the expense of others. So, it has huge power. I mean, the central government has enormous power to rewrite historical narratives. It is also, if you look at other fields—archaeology, for instance—it underplays the contributions of the South in historical research.
I don’t know how to put it, but it is enormously powerful in rewriting history and rewriting sociology, rewriting politics—everything, really.
National Security as a Catch-All Tool of Suppression
The state’s framing of “internal affairs,” “sensitive issues,” and “national security” often appears deliberately expansive. What does this elasticity reveal about authoritarian boundary-making in the knowledge sphere?
Professor Nandini Sundar: It also reveals something about authoritarian fragility. Just to give you a very recent example.The Wire, which is a news portal, ran a 52-second clip showing Prime Minister Modi running away from Parliament. This was during a debate in Parliament about how he had not taken a resolute stand when the Chinese were coming into India in 2020, and then he claimed that women MPs were threatening to bite him, and that’s why he didn’t attend Parliament. So, this was just a somewhat humorous video about how Modi was supposedly scared of being bitten by women MPs. The Wire’s Instagram page was shut down, there was a privilege motion against them from Parliament, and it was described as a national security issue. Now, there was nothing remotely related to national security about a small cartoon of Modi running away from women MPs.
But anything and everything can be described as a national security issue. People are being arrested, especially journalists in Kashmir, or students in Kashmir, who are really living under a state of terror. It is such a loosely applied concept, and the problem is that the law puts the onus squarely on the person who is accused under such laws. It is very hard to get bail under UAPA (Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act), which is why people like Umar and Sharjeel and other human rights activists in what is called the BK16 case (the 16 individuals locked up without a trial in the Bhima Koregaon case. S.G.), or across the country more generally, are finding it very difficult to get out of this, because they are accused under national security acts.
So, it is a very expansive definition. It is very, very open to abuse, and these laws should have no place in any democracy.
Food, Caste, and Control under Hindutva Governance
Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.
Beyond overt ideological control, what is the relationship between Hindutva governance and everyday disciplinary practices (food regimes, hostel rules, policing intimacy), and how do these practices intersect with gendered and caste-based hierarchies?
Professor Nandini Sundar: One of the things that the RSS, the Hindutva regime, has been trying to promote is the idea that India is a vegetarian country, and that people who eat meat are in some way inferior or should not be eating meat. They have been trying to associate that with Muslims and use it to target Muslims or Dalits, who were formerly called untouchables and who are still treated very badly and exploited by the system.
In fact, about 80% of India is non-vegetarian. But this has become a big issue in certain hostels. For instance, some of the Indian Institutes of Technology have had separate messes in hostels for vegetarians and non-vegetarians. In the past, people were free to eat whatever they wanted, and they could sit together and eat, but this kind of segregation creates a hierarchical divide in which those who eat pure vegetarian food are seen as somehow superior, because historically it has also been a caste issue.
There have been student movements against this segregation and hierarchy, but they have again been suppressed by the administration. A lot of what the Hindutva regime is doing is feeding into existing caste and religious prejudices, aggravating them, and creating a hierarchy in which Hindu upper-caste voices are seen as representing the whole nation.
Just another example: for some strange reason—because it is inconceivable that this government would do anything that progressive—the University Grants Commission (UGC), which governs the higher education space, issued rules mandating equity for students from historically discriminated backgrounds, such as Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, minorities, and OBCs (The Other Backward Classes). There was a huge protest against this by upper-caste students, who have been coming out on the streets saying that they are under threat and in danger from this equity movement. The Supreme Court has stayed the equity regulations, and the BJP government is really happy, because it has got the Supreme Court to do so. On the one hand, they put out these UGC equity regulations, but they actually did not want to implement them; their constituency of upper-caste people is against it, and fortunately for them, it has been stayed by the Supreme Court.
So, there is a very neat dovetailing between Hindutva upper-caste ideology and the various practices of this government.
Masculinist Power and the Politics of ‘Teaching a Lesson’
How do masculinist styles of leadership and majoritarian “strength” narratives shape state behavior toward universities—especially in the public performance of punishment, humiliation, and “teaching a lesson”?
Professor Nandini Sundar: It is a very masculinist ideology, and historically the RSS did not have room for women as part of its cadre; there was a separate women’s wing.
If you look at the state of Kashmir, for instance, and education in Kashmir—higher education in particular—the entire process has been about this. In 2019, the state of Jammu and Kashmir was stripped of its constitutional autonomy and reduced from a state to a union territory. The whole thing was couched in terms of teaching them a lesson, because it was seen as a source of terrorism, since it is the only Muslim-majority state in India, and there was a conscious effort to show them their place.
When it comes to universities, Kashmiri students in different parts of the country have been especially targeted and victimized, and again this is very much part of showing Muslims their place, showing Kashmiris their place in India. When it comes to women, there are many more subtle ways in which women have been affected. If you look at the entrance exams, thanks to a new system of multiple-choice entrance exams, the number of women entering colleges has dramatically declined. Even if the government officially says that its policy is inclusive of women studying, in fact many of its practical policies discriminate against women.
People wait in queues to cast votes at a polling station during the 3rd phase of Lok Sabha polls, in Guwahati, India on May 7, 2024. Photo: Hafiz Ahmed.
Targeting Scholars Abroad: Hindutva’s Reach Beyond India
To what extent do you see an externalization of repression—through harassment campaigns, institutional pressure, and reputational attacks—aimed at shaping scholarship on India outside India?
Professor Nandini Sundar: There’s a very active Hindutva diaspora that has been targeting academics who work on India in the US, the UK, and Europe. There was this conference called Dismantling Hindutva some years ago, where the active Hindutva diaspora went after the organizers of the conference. They flooded universities with so much hate mail against faculty members who were part of this conference that some of their servers collapsed.
It is really an organized, very virulent Hindutva diaspora, especially in the US, which has links with Zionists and follows the same sorts of procedures as some of the American far right. Unfortunately for them, the American far right, because they are Christian fundamentalists, has no regard for Hindu fundamentalists, so they are not really sure where they stand now. But they are just a very vicious, virulent lot when it comes to attacking people who are working on India.
For instance, there is an American historian called Audrey Truschke, who writes on Aurangzeb, the last Mughal emperor, and she has been relentlessly attacked. One could name various other people who have been singled out and attacked. The Indian government has also denied visas to a lot of academics working on India. This is really kind of inexplicable, because some of these academics have hugely contributed to the understanding of subjects the government itself promotes. For instance, there is a historian who works on Hindi. Now, the BJP government is insistent that everybody in the country should speak Hindi, that everybody should replace their own languages and know Hindi, yet this historian, who has contributed greatly to the understanding and study of Hindi, was denied a visa. There is absolutely no sense in this, even from their own perspective, because it is not like she was studying anything they would consider anti-national; she was studying Hindi literature.
So, it has become very difficult for anyone working on India to be able to research, write, and think freely, whether inside the country or outside the country.
Recasting the Past for Power
How has the language of decolonization and cultural authenticity been retooled to delegitimate critique—both within India and in global academia—while recoding censorship as civilizational self-defense?
Professor Nandini Sundar: That’s a really good question, because if you look at some of these Hindutva ideologues, they’ve adopted the language of decoloniality to claim that whatever has been done in Indian history, for instance, is colonial because it does not go back to ancient Hindu roots or does not adopt an Indic perspective.
In fact, the BJP or the RSS version of history is itself following a completely colonial template. They have adopted a periodization of Indian history based on Hindu, Muslim, and British India, which is a colonial construct, and that is what they have been following in the name of decolonization.
If you look at one major thrust of their programs, it has been to develop what they call Indic knowledge systems. By Indic knowledge systems, they basically mean Hindu and Vedic knowledge systems. This is something they have been pushing in every syllabus revision process, along with organizing a wide variety of seminars on Indic or Indigenous knowledge systems.
They have actually ignored all the work that has been done over the years, because scholars have already been working on different versions of Indian history and Indian society from a variety of perspectives, many of them indigenous. So, to say that they are coming up with some new framework is actually reinventing the colonial wheel while at the same time claiming that they are adopting some kind of great decolonial epistemology.
A Global Crisis of Academic Freedom Requires Collective Resistance
And lastly, Professor Sundar, given the risks of speaking, organizing, and even researching “sensitive” themes, what forms of collective strategy (professional associations, transnational solidarity, union politics, legal defense infrastructures) do you see as most effective—and what ethical obligations do scholars outside India have in confronting these dynamics without reproducing paternalistic frames?
Professor Nandini Sundar: I don’t think it is about scholars outside India or inside India. I think that scholars across the world are now facing similar threats, whether in Turkey, the US, or Europe. We are all being censored. We are all facing the Palestinian exception—nobody can talk about Palestine or teach about Palestine, not just in the US but in Germany and everywhere.
So, I don’t think there are any easy answers as to what can be done. We are all facing similar kinds of issues, so we need to share across countries how people have dealt with this, and work out ways in which we can collectively keep the university going as a space for research and critical thinking, and above all for teaching freely.
And I have hope that students—not the ABVP type, but ordinary students—are keen and curious about what is actually happening in the world, and I have great hope that students will be the ones who keep the university going. That is something that I think we will all have to face collectively, together across the world.