Dr. Fizza Batool.

Dr. Fizza Batool: You Need to Understand the Society to Understand Populism

In this ECPS Voice of Youth (VoY) interview, Dr. Fizza Batool, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at SZABIST University in Pakistan, discusses the evolution of populism studies, the methodological challenges of researching populism in diverse political contexts, and the importance of incorporating perspectives from the Global South into comparative political research. Emphasizing that “you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism,” she advocates combining qualitative interpretation with computational methods and moving beyond Western-centered frameworks. Reflecting on her research into Pakistan’s populist politics, academic mentorship, and international scholarly networks, Dr. Batool also explores the relationship between religious nationalism and populism, including her forthcoming comparative research on Pakistan and Israel, while calling for greater attention to the public demand sustaining populist movements.

Interview by Natalia Crane

As populism continues to reshape political landscapes across the world, understanding its diverse manifestations requires moving beyond Western-centered theoretical frameworks and engaging more deeply with the historical, cultural, and political contexts of individual societies. In an insightful interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Dr. Fizza Batool, Assistant Professor of Social Sciences at the Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto Institute of Science and Technology (SZABIST) University in Pakistan, reflects on the intellectual, methodological, and institutional challenges confronting contemporary populism research.

Specializing in comparative politics, democratization, peace studies, and populism, Dr. Batool brings an interdisciplinary perspective shaped by more than a decade of experience in research and development. Her academic journey began unexpectedly in the natural sciences, where she studied physics, mathematics, and astronomy before transitioning to political science. Her interest in populism subsequently emerged through research on political participation and Pakistan’s evolving political landscape.

Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s discursive approach and Francisco Panizza’s understanding of populism as a mode of identification, Dr. Batool challenges the assumption that competing theoretical traditions must be mutually exclusive. Instead, she argues that ideational, stylistic, strategic, and discursive approaches illuminate different dimensions of the same political phenomenon. Her comparative research on Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Imran Khan further demonstrates how conventional distinctions between inclusionary and exclusionary populism can obscure the complex intersections of nationalism, religion, and socioeconomic discourse.

Central to her scholarly perspective is the conviction that “you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism.” She emphasizes that computational techniques and quantitative analysis must be complemented by qualitative interpretation and contextual knowledge. Populism in Pakistan, she explains, cannot necessarily be understood through analytical assumptions developed in Europe or the United States.

Looking ahead, Dr. Batool discusses her forthcoming research fellowship at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), beginning in February 2027, where she intends to investigate the relationship between religious populism and religious nationalism. Her proposed comparison of Pakistan and Israel highlights both the intellectual possibilities of cross-regional research and the mobility restrictions confronting scholars from the Global South.

She also advocates greater attention to the demand side of populism, asking why ordinary citizens develop and maintain populist attitudes rather than focusing exclusively on political leaders and their strategies.

Beyond theoretical debates, the interview addresses academic mentorship, international research networks, methodological innovation, and the obstacles facing early-career scholars. Dr. Batool stresses that research collaboration represents a “two-way learning process” through which younger scholars contribute perspectives that established researchers may overlook.

Dr. Batool’s reflections offer a compelling argument for a more globally inclusive, context-sensitive, and methodologically pluralistic study of populism—one that recognizes the distinctive experiences of societies beyond established Western democracies.

Interview with Dr. Fizza Batool lightly edited for clarity and flow.

An Unconventional Academic Journey

PTI supporter at Jinnah Cricket Stadium during a political rally of cricketer turned politician Imran Khan on March 23, 2012 in Sialkot, Pakistan. Photo: Jahanzaib Naiyyer.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic and professional journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to comparative politics, democratization, peace studies, and populism?

Dr. Fizza Batool: Thank you, Natalia, and thank you to ECPS for inviting me. I’m currently an Assistant Professor at SZABIST University in Pakistan, although from February 2027 I will be moving to Europe to take up a research fellowship at GIGA. My academic journey might be relatable to students from the Global South, but it was not a particularly conventional one. I initially graduated in the natural sciences, studying physics, mathematics, and astronomy—subjects that seem to have very little to do with populism or political science.

In many parts of the Global South, when students perform well academically, their parents do not necessarily encourage them to pursue the social sciences. It was difficult for me to make that transition, and I probably lost one or two years of my academic life trying to convince my parents that I wanted to study social sciences. Eventually, I was able to make that change, and looking at where I am today, I believe I made the right decision. I would encourage students who are considering popular or demanding fields of study to choose something they genuinely enjoy. In the long run, that will be much more rewarding.

My interest in populism developed almost by coincidence. When I began my PhD in International Relations, I was primarily interested in democracy and democratization. My doctoral research focused on political participation and voting behaviour across liberal and illiberal democracies. It was a comparative project that also incorporated quantitative and computational methods, with Pakistan as one of its case studies.

At the time, populism was not my main focus. However, Pakistan experienced a successful populist movement, and I became interested in understanding it. I kept encountering the term populism in journalistic discussions of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement, and I decided that I needed to study the concept more closely. I eventually wrote a paper on the subject. The findings were quite different from what I had initially expected, and that experience encouraged me to explore populism further. That is how my research journey in this field began.

Understanding Populism: Beyond Competing Definitions

How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular conceptual approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved throughout your academic journey, particularly as you have explored its manifestations in Pakistan?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I began with Ernesto Laclau’s definition of populism as a discursive logic, and I still use it. I consider it one of the most useful definitions we have. I also draw on Francisco Panizza’s work on populism as a mode of identification, applying this perspective to both political leaders and citizens. However, my conceptual understanding has evolved. When I first started researching populism, I treated the different approaches—the ideational, discursive, stylistic, and strategic schools—as separate categories that were competing with one another.

After working on populism for several years and particularly following discussions with Kenneth Roberts during my postdoctoral fellowship, I began to understand these approaches differently. I now see that the differences between Laclau’s understanding of populism and the ideational approach, particularly the definition developed by Cas Mudde, are largely about the questions they seek to answer.

Laclau is more concerned with the process of populist construction: how political actors construct the people as a collective identity. The ideational, stylistic, and strategic approaches, meanwhile, tend to focus more on the outcomes of that process.

I therefore don’t necessarily see these approaches as contradictory. They have different emphases. The process Laclau describes can produce outcomes that are then examined through other approaches. For example, Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style helps us understand how the distinction between high and low politics is communicated, while Mudde’s approach highlights the antagonistic division between the people and the elite.

I continue to use Laclau’s definition, but I don’t disagree with the other schools. I see them as offering different ways of understanding the same broader phenomenon.

Theoretical Debates and Misconceptions in Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates do you consider most consequential for the future of the field? And what misconceptions about populism do you encounter most frequently, both inside and outside academia?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I think we have reached a point where the debate about what populism is has become relatively settled. One misconception I frequently encounter in academic writing is the claim that populism has no clear definition. I disagree with that. I believe populism is as well-defined as other concepts in the social sciences. Most concepts begin as relatively general terms used in everyday language, newspapers, and public discussions. Eventually, social scientists begin to develop more precise definitions. This happened with democracy, nationalism, and many other concepts, and the same process occurred with populism.

A lack of complete consensus is therefore not something unique to populism. Most social science concepts have boundaries that are debated, but that does not mean we do not understand what they refer to. In populism studies, we now have a sufficiently developed understanding of the concept and how it differs from other discursive frameworks. I expect future debates to focus increasingly on how populism relates to other phenomena, particularly nationalism and authoritarianism, as well as its impact on democracy.

Outside academia, one common misconception—particularly in Pakistan—is that populism simply means being popular. The term is also frequently used as a negative or insulting label. This can make discussions difficult when engaging with audiences who are unfamiliar with its academic meaning.

There is another misconception that I encounter among people who already study populism. When I explain that I follow Laclau’s definition, some assume that everyone who uses his approach must also be a post-Marxist or must consider populism something inherently positive. I don’t think that is necessarily true. Following Laclau’s conceptualization does not mean that you automatically endorse a particular political position or view populism positively.

Methodological Challenges: Combining Discourse and Computational Analysis

How do you operationalize and measure populism in your own work, particularly when examining different political systems and contexts? What methodological challenges arise when studying populism in Pakistan, and how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Dr. Fizza Batool: Since I started with Laclau’s definition, I was initially more interested in the process through which the people are constructed as an identity group. Empirically analyzing populism through Laclau’s approach can be challenging. Studying a process is much more difficult than examining a specific event or outcome. Applying an ideational definition, for example, can be easier because there are already established scales and methods for analyzing political speeches and populist attitudes. The same resources were not as readily available for applying Laclau’s approach.

Nevertheless, this approach also allowed me to develop a broader and more comprehensive analysis. Discourse remains my main source of data because I believe language and discourse are central to the construction of political identities. However, I have combined computational methods, including text analysis, with qualitative approaches such as discourse-historical analysis.

I don’t think computational methods alone are sufficient, particularly when applying Laclau’s framework. You always need qualitative interpretation because populism in Pakistan might mean something quite different from populism in Europe, Turkey, or the United States. Understanding these differences requires contextual knowledge, and that is where qualitative research becomes essential.

The study of populism increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. How have these tools influenced your research, and how have they transformed the study of populist movements, particularly in South Asia?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One positive development is that social media has made large amounts of political data much more accessible. Politicians are constantly publishing statements, commenting on events, and communicating with their audiences. Even when a political event is not originally digital, a recording or written transcript of a speech can often be found online. The problem of accessing data has therefore been reduced considerably. However, the growing volume of available information also means that researchers need to enhance their analytical skills.

I began with qualitative research, which requires a great deal of in-depth analysis. I developed my computational research skills much later in my academic journey. This is something I often recommend to my students: build your quantitative and computational skills much earlier in your academic career. We are now dealing with so much information that it is no longer possible for an individual researcher to analyze everything manually. We need computational techniques, but we also need to combine computational analysis with our own understanding of the subject.

Unexpected Findings in Pakistan’s Populist Politics

Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) Chairman Imran Khan addresses to his supporters during public gathering held on December 11, 2012 in Lodheran, Pakistan.

In your work examining populism in Pakistan, what has been the most surprising finding? Have you encountered evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions?

Dr. Fizza Batool: My first research project on populism began when I was still relatively unfamiliar with the concept. I selected a theoretical framework that was particularly popular at the time: the distinction between inclusionary and exclusionary populism.

I chose two cases from Pakistan’s political history. I expected Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was a left-wing populist in the 1970s, to represent inclusionary populism. Imran Khan, whom I understood as a right-wing nationalist and populist, seemed likely to represent an exclusionary form. However, when I began analyzing their speeches, I realized that the distinction was not so straightforward. Both leaders drew on religion and religious nationalism. Both used narratives that constructed divisions between Muslims and non-Muslims, including in relation to India. Nationalist discourse was very prominent in Bhutto’s speeches, despite his association with left-wing politics.

At the same time, I found considerable socialist discourse in Imran Khan’s speeches, particularly around social justice and equality. This was surprising because it challenged the categories I had initially expected to find. It also encouraged me to develop a different analytical framework, which I later applied in my first book. In many ways, my involvement in populism studies began with a finding that contradicted my original assumptions.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics and Maintaining Objectivity

Populism frequently operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation and contested narratives. Have these dynamics affected your ability to collect data and conduct research? How do you approach politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor?

Dr. Fizza Batool: This is a particularly important question given the level of polarization we are currently witnessing. Data access, disinformation, and the wider political environment are all concerns. I come from a society where certain subjects are difficult to research. You can face discouragement, obstacles to accessing data, criticism, and even social media campaigns directed against you. However, these pressures were not my greatest concern. What I found more challenging was recognizing my own political opinions and making sure they did not influence my research.

Imran Khan was the main populist case I was studying, but I did not support him or agree with his policies. I was concerned that my personal disapproval of his politics might affect how I analyzed his movement. I, therefore, had to remind myself repeatedly that my responsibility as a researcher was to remain objective. This is a challenge that many scholars face. You might dislike Donald Trump as a person or disagree with his politics, for example, but when researching his political movement, you still need to approach the subject analytically.

There are several tools that can help. Computational analysis can be useful because it allows researchers to examine data systematically before interpreting the results. A clearly defined theoretical framework is equally important, even when conducting qualitative research. You need to operationalize every concept you use. If you are studying democratic backsliding or political polarization, for example, you need to explain precisely what you mean by those terms and how you intend to identify them in your research. You cannot be completely neutral, but you can take steps to make your research more objective.

Academia, Public Debate, and the Role of the Classroom

Given your experience in academic research, policy research, and contributing to English-language newspapers and international publications, do you believe scholars have a responsibility to intervene in public discussions? How do you communicate complex academic findings to broader audiences?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I entered academia after spending several years working in policy research. My first professional engagement was, therefore, with policymakers and public institutions. Later, I began writing academic papers and books.

When I initially moved into an academic career, I thought that policy commentary and newspaper articles would remain my main ways of engaging with the public. However, I have come to believe that the classroom is one of the most important places where scholars can initiate these discussions.

With technological developments and the availability of large language models, access to information is no longer the main problem. Students can find information relatively easily. Therefore, we should not treat the classroom simply as a place where lecturers transfer information. Instead, it should be a space where we initiate debates and inspire students. I try to use my classroom to teach students how to be tolerant of different perspectives and how to engage constructively with disagreement.

Of course, students represent only a relatively small and often highly educated section of society. But they will eventually enter different professions and areas of public life. The discussions they experience in the classroom can therefore influence how they approach disagreements and political debates in the future. I believe this is one of the most important tools available to academics.

Looking Beyond Populism as a Challenge to Democracy

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

Beyond academic publications, what impact would you ideally like your research to have? How can scholarly work contribute to addressing democratic challenges associated with populism, political polarization, and institutional instability, particularly in developing democracies?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One impact I would really like to have is to encourage people to look beyond the idea that populism is the only challenge facing democracy. There is currently considerable attention devoted to populism, but I believe several other forces are working together and contributing to the challenges facing democratic systems. We also need to examine the problems that emerge from within democracy itself.

We need to be critical and progressive in the sense that we should look for practical solutions—not only for established democracies, but also for hybrid regimes and autocracies. How can these societies be transformed? Questions of social justice, economic equality, and other structural factors are important to this discussion.

I also believe scholars should be careful not to become advocates who simply decide what is good or bad. Earlier in my career, I was more inclined to approach research in that way, but I now try to position myself as an analyst. My responsibility is to present the findings of my research rather than provide moral judgements. I want to give readers the results of my analysis and allow them to decide what they make of them.

International Collaboration and Opportunities for Global South Scholars

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research and professional development?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I consider myself fortunate to have been among the scholars in Pakistan who began working on populism and were introduced to international researchers relatively early in their careers. When I submitted my first research paper on populism, I had no idea that one of the reviewers was Ihsan Yilmaz. Because the paper underwent blind peer review, he did not know who had written it either.

Later, when I was looking for a supervisor for my postdoctoral research, I contacted him and shared the paper. He told me that he had been one of its reviewers and that he considered it an excellent piece of research. That was how I was introduced to him, and subsequently to ECPS.

I attended the ECPS Summer School and was able to meet many other scholars working on populism. This was the beginning of a much wider academic network.

I strongly believe that these networks play a very important role, particularly for scholars from the Global South. Researchers in these countries often have limited access to academic databases and research funding, and they may also lack the guidance and institutional support available elsewhere. I would therefore encourage scholars from the Global South to join international networks and become part of the wider academic community working on their research topics.

I have also been fortunate to work with senior scholars such as Kirk Hawkins and Ihsan Yilmaz. During my postdoctoral fellowship at Central European University, I worked with senior academics who became important role models for me. Beyond the knowledge they shared, they showed me how to support early-career researchers. They taught me that mentorship is not only about transferring knowledge, but also about encouraging younger scholars and helping them develop professionally. That is something I now try to do with my own students. I believe this connection between generations of scholars needs to continue and should never be broken.

Professional Challenges and the Importance of Academic Mobility

Having worked for more than a decade in the research and development sector, including in managerial positions, before and alongside your academic career, what have been your greatest personal and professional challenges? How has moving between policy-oriented work and academia influenced your approach?

Dr. Fizza Batool: As someone based in Pakistan, one of the greatest challenges is mobility. Pakistani citizens face significant difficulties in obtaining visas and attending international conferences. Travel grants are not always available, and universities do not necessarily provide financial support for international academic participation. Researchers therefore often depend on grants offered by external organizations and must repeatedly apply for funding to attend conferences and academic events.

This connects to the importance of international collaboration. Academic exchange is always a two-way learning process. It is not simply about providing students with access to international networks; younger researchers also bring perspectives and knowledge that more established scholars may not have considered. A younger student might see something differently, and that perspective can be valuable. This is why academic mobility is particularly important for early-career researchers, even though it remains difficult for many of them.

As scholars progress in their careers, they also face the challenge of balancing research with teaching and administrative responsibilities. These are common difficulties for academics everywhere.

On a personal level, I have been fortunate to have a very supportive family. My first postdoctoral fellowship took place only a few months after my wedding, and my husband was extremely encouraging. He supported my decision to spend eight months away for the fellowship, even though it was at the beginning of our life together.

I therefore experienced fewer personal obstacles, although professional challenges have certainly been present. Ultimately, I believe persistence is essential when navigating these challenges.

The Rewards of Academic Research

SummerSchool
Photo: Matej Kastelic.

Looking back at your academic and professional journey, what has been the most rewarding aspect of your research? Is there anything you would approach differently if you were beginning your academic career today?

Dr. Fizza Batool: One of the most rewarding experiences has been seeing my books published. Holding them in print was a particularly meaningful moment.

Another important experience was receiving my first postdoctoral fellowship. I had spent almost a year contacting scholars, applying for different opportunities, and receiving rejections. When the fellowship finally came through, it was an extremely rewarding moment. Rejection is never easy, and it can be discouraging. However, you need to be prepared for it. With persistence, you can eventually find opportunities.

I also find it very rewarding to see my students develop. When you supervise and teach students and later see them grow in their careers, it is a particularly fulfilling experience.

If I could go back and change something, I would develop my computational skills much earlier and begin publishing sooner. Because I entered academia after working in policy research, I started publishing relatively late. My advice to students would be to begin developing the skills they want to use in their careers as early as possible. It is important to balance learning information with building practical research skills.

Intellectual Influences and Academic Mentorship

Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, political experiences, or academic traditions that have shaped your thinking about populism, comparative democratization, and peace studies?

Dr. Fizza Batool: When it comes to academic literature, Francisco Panizza’s work has been particularly influential. I sometimes wish he had written more on populism because his application of Laclau’s definition to understand populism at the level of the public was, for me, a very different and valuable approach. I don’t think it has received as much attention as it deserves.

I am also currently working with Kirk Hawkins on a paper, and he has been another important intellectual influence. I have written two books with Ihsan Yilmaz, who has influenced me not only as a scholar but also through his personal qualities. He is an excellent person, and that has been a positive influence on me.

Beyond individual scholars, I also learn from the regions I research. Every region has its own particularities, and my experiences working in different academic, political, and social environments have influenced how I approach my work.

Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering the field?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I have already mentioned the importance of developing computational and data-analysis skills, as well as understanding that rejection is part of the academic process.

Another thing I would encourage students to do is focus more on theoretical reading. Empirical research is important and rewarding, but young scholars should also learn to question existing theories rather than simply apply them.

Try to think differently and be critical of the theoretical frameworks you encounter. If you begin working on theoretical development early in your academic career, it can help you establish a stronger foundation as a researcher and support your future development.

The Future of Populism Studies: A More Global Perspective

Where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Should greater attention be given to populism beyond Western democracies, particularly in South Asia and other developing political contexts? Which neglected research areas deserve more attention?

Dr. Fizza Batool: I certainly believe that populism studies need to become more global. We need to understand more cases because each one contributes something different to the field.

I also expect to see more debate about the relationship between populism and other political phenomena, including nationalism, securitization, and other ideological and discursive frameworks. I don’t see populism studies losing relevance. On the contrary, I believe it will become increasingly important.

There are, however, several areas that remain under-researched.

One is the demand side of populism. Apart from the populist attitude scales that already exist, we have not explored enough alternative methods for measuring populism among the public. I have tried to address this in one of my books, but I believe we need to develop further qualitative and quantitative techniques to understand and empirically analyze populist demand.

Another area is the relationship between populist leaders in power and the foreign policies they develop. Although foreign policy has received more attention in recent years, there is still considerable room for research.

I am also currently interested in the relationship between religious nationalism and religious populism. There is already a substantial body of work on both subjects individually, but I want to understand how religious nationalism contributes to religious populism, and whether the relationship also works in the opposite direction.

I expect these connections to become increasingly important in future research.

Religious Populism, Nationalism, and the Case of Israel

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? More broadly, what do you hope will be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Dr. Fizza Batool: For the postdoctoral fellowship I will begin in February 2027, I will be working on the relationship between religious populism and religious nationalism. One of my case studies will be Israel, and I would really like to visit the country and study it in person.

I believe Israel shares several important characteristics with Pakistan. Both countries were founded with religion playing a central role in their national projects, and religious nationalism was present from the beginning of their political histories. I would therefore like to compare Pakistan and Israel.

However, as a Pakistani citizen, I cannot currently visit Israel because travel there is not permitted under my passport arrangements. This presents an important practical obstacle, so I will have to rely on publicly available data. If these barriers were ever removed, I would love to spend time in Israel and study its society directly. I have always believed that you need to understand a society in order to understand its populism.

Another important contribution I would like to make is to develop research on the demand side of populism. We already know from existing populist attitude scales that populist attitudes are widespread, but the question of why people develop and maintain these attitudes remains important.

There is considerable research on how populist leaders operate within society, but I think we need to understand more about the public demand that sustains populism. That is an area I would really like to explore further.

Paraguayan guaraní banknotes.

Paraguay’s Ueno Bank Collapse: A Financial, Political, and Institutional Crisis 

In an analysis for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Prerna Chahar examines the financial, political, and institutional ramifications of Paraguay’s Ueno Bank collapse in November 2026. Moving beyond the immediate banking crisis, she explores how rapid digital financial expansion, regulatory shortcomings, alleged political-business entanglements, and institutional vulnerabilities have undermined public confidence. Dr. Chahar analyzes the political fallout surrounding President Santiago Peña’s removal, the challenges of restoring regulatory independence, and the potential consequences for Paraguay’s investment credibility. Situating the crisis within broader Latin American debates on financial inclusion and institutional accountability, she argues that sustainable banking modernization requires transparent governance, robust depositor protection, effective regulatory oversight, and institutional safeguards capable of preventing political influence over financial supervision.

By Prerna Chahar*

The collapse of Paraguay’s Ueno Bank in November 2026 represents far more than a banking crisis. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of rapidly evolving digital banking, shortcomings in financial regulation, the risks associated with political-business linkages and, more broadly, the challenges of maintaining financial, political, and institutional credibility across Latin America. The primary concern is not necessarily the threat of banking contagion per se, but rather the potential erosion of confidence in an already fragile regional financial system as a consequence of institutional turmoil in Paraguay.

From Digital Banking Success to Institutional Crisis

Founded in 2021, Ueno rapidly evolved from a fledgling financial technology start-up into one of Paraguay’s largest commercial banks. Its digital-first approach attracted nearly three million customers in a country with a population of approximately 6.5 million. This demonstrated how financial technology could expand access to banking services, simplify transactions, and integrate underbanked populations into the formal financial system.

However, its rapid expansion also masked underlying vulnerabilities that became increasingly apparent as the bank overextended its operations. Concerns emerged regarding Grupo Vázquez-affiliated companies, large-scale lending, asset quality, and regulatory oversight. On November 3, 2026, the Central Bank of Paraguay initiated a resolution process after the bank revised its financial statements, revealing a deteriorating solvency position.

The intervention disrupted access to deposits held by households, businesses, pensioners, and public institutions. The failure carried considerable systemic significance, as Ueno accounted for approximately 9 percent of Paraguay’s banking deposits and 8 percent of its loans.

From Banking Resolution to Political Fallout

The crisis soon extended beyond the financial sector, acquiring significant political and institutional dimensions. Following the bank’s collapse, President Santiago Peña faced questions regarding his previous associations with Grupo Vázquez and the appointment of former Ueno executive Carlos Carvallo as president of the Central Bank. Prosecutors also accused Peña of using his office to direct public funds towards the bank while insider lending practices were taking place. On November 6, Congress removed Peña from office following impeachment proceedings, and former Vice-President Pedro Alliana was sworn in as president. This political transition has placed the new administration under considerable pressure to ensure that investigations proceed transparently and without political interference.

These developments have transformed the Ueno crisis into a test of institutional accountability as much as financial supervision. The central question is no longer limited to whether depositors can recover their savings. It also concerns whether investigators can establish responsibility for the bank’s lending and governance failures, whether regulators can demonstrate institutional independence, and whether the new administration can restore public confidence without further deepening political polarization.

Implications for Financial Investment Credibility

Paraguay has sought to position itself as an attractive destination for investment in South America. It has strengthened its economic profile through investment-grade sovereign ratings, relative macroeconomic stability, and opportunities in agriculture, energy, and infrastructure. However, the Ueno crisis could undermine this narrative. Financial markets assess economies not only on the basis of inflation, fiscal indicators, and GDP growth, but also on the transparency and independence of regulatory institutions, the enforcement of contracts, and the reliability of governance structures.

If Paraguay’s financial oversight is perceived by investors as vulnerable to political or commercial influence, the country could face higher risk premiums, increased borrowing costs, and delays in investment decisions. This is particularly significant for an economy that will continue to depend on foreign investment to develop its infrastructure, energy, logistics, and industrial sectors.

The crisis also offers a broader lesson for Latin America, where digital banking has emerged as an important instrument of financial inclusion. Digital platforms can reduce transaction costs, overcome geographical barriers, and extend formal financial services to populations traditionally excluded from conventional banking.

Ueno initially exemplified this potential. However, its collapse highlighted the risks of regulatory institutions failing to keep pace with technological innovation and the rapid expansion of digital financial services. Digital banks can attract customers and deposits at considerable speed, but their failure can simultaneously disrupt payments, salaries, pensions, and the operations of small businesses.

The crisis therefore underscores the need for stronger regulatory supervision of related-party lending, liquidity management, capital adequacy, and concentrated financial exposures. Deposit insurance frameworks also require greater attention. While existing guarantee mechanisms may provide protection to a substantial proportion of small depositors, larger corporate and institutional depositors remain particularly exposed. Consequently, financial inclusion initiatives must be accompanied by credible depositor protection mechanisms and effective prudential oversight.

Restoring Confidence: A Test of Institutional Resilience

The collapse of Ueno Bank represents a crucial test of Paraguay’s political institutions and the governance of its financial system. Its regional significance lies not merely in the possibility of financial contagion, but also in the broader implications for political accountability, regulatory independence, and institutional credibility.

The larger message for Latin America is that banking systems must not only be modernized but also strengthened institutionally. Digital banking and expanding credit markets can contribute to economic development, but their sustainability depends on transparent governance, effective supervision, and public trust. Paraguay’s experience illustrates the importance of independent regulatory institutions and robust democratic oversight, particularly where financial interests intersect with political power.

The crisis will test Paraguay’s ability to establish stronger safeguards for depositors, rebuild confidence, and demonstrate to regional governments and the international investment community that political connections cannot compromise regulatory integrity.

The central question now is not simply whether Paraguay can contain the immediate financial fallout. With advance compensation payments reaching more than 1.8 million eligible depositors and the removal of Santiago Peña, the crisis has entered a new phase. The challenge is to translate these immediate responses into meaningful institutional reforms.

To restore confidence among citizens, international investors, and regional partners, Paraguay must ensure transparent investigations, establish accountability for alleged related-party lending and regulatory failures, strengthen the independence of financial oversight institutions, and address the long-term financial position of depositors and the sustainability of the deposit guarantee framework.

More broadly, regulators across Latin America should strengthen their supervision of related-party lending, liquidity management, capital adequacy, and concentrated financial exposures. Deposit insurance frameworks also warrant greater attention, particularly in protecting larger corporate and institutional depositors who may remain exposed beyond existing guaranteed limits. Ultimately, efforts to expand financial inclusion must be complemented by credible depositor protection, institutional accountability, and effective regulatory safeguards.

The Ueno Bank collapse is therefore a reminder that the credibility of modern banking rests as much on the strength of institutions and the integrity of governance as it does on technological innovation and financial expansion.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi, India. Her research interests focus on US foreign policy, Latin America and the Caribbean, inter-American relations, and regional cooperation in East Asia.

The entrance of Athens Polytechnic University.

The Politics of Forgetting: Populism and the Rewriting of Greece’s Dictatorial Past

In this Voices of Youth (VoY) Commentary for the ECPS, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how populist narratives reshape Greece’s collective memory of the 1967–1974 military dictatorship. Focusing on the November 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising, she explores the political implications of historical revisionism, authoritarian nostalgia, and selective national remembrance. By revisiting the dictatorship’s repression and its role in the Cyprus crisis, Papapavlou demonstrates how nationalist narratives can minimize authoritarian crimes while selectively invoking patriotism and national betrayal. Drawing on contemporary theories of populism, she argues that historical memory becomes a political weapon when documented facts are subordinated to ideological loyalties. Her commentary underscores the importance of historical accountability, critical remembrance, and democratic vigilance in confronting authoritarian revisionism.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

There is something deeply unsettling about the way a nation remembers its past. We celebrate certain moments, commemorate certain struggles and build our national identity around stories of resistance and courage. Yet, sometimes, the same history becomes uncomfortable when it challenges the image we have constructed of ourselves. And when that happens, remembering can become selective.

In Greece, few historical events carry the symbolic weight of the Athens Polytechnic uprising of November 1973. More than five decades later, it remains a defining moment in the country’s transition towards democracy. Yet, the meaning of the uprising, the crimes of the military dictatorship and even the historical record itself continue to be questioned. The issue is no longer simply how Greece remembers its past, but how that past is used in contemporary political discourse.

To understand this, we must first return to what happened. 

Three Days That Challenged a Dictatorship

On November 14, 1973, students from different faculties gathered at the National Technical University of Athens and began occupying the Polytechnic. What initially developed as a student protest soon grew into a broader uprising against the military dictatorship, which had ruled Greece since the coup of April 21, 1967. The regime, led by Georgios Papadopoulos, Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos, had suspended democratic institutions, restricted political freedoms, imposed censorship and persecuted those who opposed it.

The occupation quickly became more than a protest over university affairs. Students organized themselves through a coordinating committee, while anti-dictatorship slogans began to fill the building and surrounding streets. Their demands were increasingly political: freedom, democracy and an end to authoritarian rule.

By November 15, the movement had acquired a voice of its own. An improvised radio station began broadcasting messages from inside the Polytechnic, calling on Athenians to support the students. Its broadcasts carried beyond the university walls, turning the occupation into a focal point of resistance. People began gathering outside, bringing food and medical supplies and expressing their solidarity. The Polytechnic was no longer an isolated student movement. It had become a public challenge to the regime.

On November 16, demonstrations spread across central Athens. Students were joined by workers and ordinary citizens, transforming the protest into a mass mobilization. The response of the authorities was violent. Police forces confronted demonstrators, tear gas was used, and gunfire was reported as clashes intensified throughout the city. The situation escalated rapidly, and the military was called in.

During the night of November 16 and the early hours of November 17, tanks surrounded the Polytechnic. Shortly after 2 a.m., an armored vehicle advanced towards the central gate. At approximately 3 a.m., a tank broke through it, while students and other people remained inside the grounds. Military forces entered the university and brought the occupation to an end. The violence, however, did not remain confined to the Polytechnic. Clashes and shootings continued in the streets of Athens, leaving people dead and injured.

Historical research by Leonidas Kallivretakis at the National Hellenic Research Foundation has documented 24 deaths connected to the November 1973 events. It is important to distinguish between the location of those deaths and the events themselves: no death has been conclusively documented within the Polytechnic grounds, but this does not mean that nobody was killed during the uprising and its violent suppression. The victims were part of a wider crackdown across Athens.

The distinction matters because historical accuracy should clarify the past, not provide an excuse to diminish it. The absence of a confirmed death inside the university does not erase the deaths outside it, the wounded, the arrests or the violence inflicted by the dictatorship.

Nor did the uprising immediately bring the regime down. On November 25, 1973, Papadopoulos was overthrown in an internal coup led by Ioannidis, and the dictatorship continued. It eventually collapsed in July 1974, following the catastrophic events in Cyprus. The Polytechnic, however, had exposed the regime’s vulnerability and become a lasting symbol of resistance.

The Contradiction of Authoritarian Nostalgia

Today, the historical record exists alongside a different narrative: that life under the dictatorship was orderly, that the economy was better, that the leaders were patriots, or that, at least, people had enough to eat. Such statements are often presented as harmless nostalgia or as an alternative interpretation of history.

But what exactly is being remembered when the repression is left out?

The dictatorship was not simply a different political administration with a different economic approach. It was a regime that abolished democratic government, censored the press, imprisoned and tortured opponents, and denied citizens fundamental political freedoms. Economic performance, even where particular indicators may be debated, cannot be used to cancel these realities.

This is where historical revisionism becomes politically significant. It does not always require denying every documented event. Sometimes, it works by changing the emphasis: repression becomes an unfortunate detail, resistance becomes exaggeration, and authoritarian rule is recast as a period of national discipline. The contradiction becomes even clearer when we consider Cyprus.

Patriotism, Cyprus and Selective National Memory

The Greek military regime repeatedly invoked patriotism and national unity. Yet, on July 15, 1974, the junta backed a coup against the elected government of Cyprus, carried out by the Cypriot National Guard under the direction of Greek officers. Five days later, Turkey launched its military operation on the island. The subsequent Turkish offensives resulted in the occupation of a substantial part of Cyprus, mass displacement and the division of the island. Greece’s dictatorship collapsed amid the crisis.

The coup and the Turkish invasion must be understood as distinct actions, with distinct responsibilities. Turkey bears responsibility for its military intervention and the occupation that followed. But the Greek junta’s role in overthrowing the legitimate government of Cyprus remains an essential part of the historical record. This raises an uncomfortable question: how can a regime that claimed to defend the nation be remembered without confronting its role in the Cyprus catastrophe?

A similar selectivity can be observed in debates surrounding the 2018 Prespa Agreement. The agreement with what is now North Macedonia remains a legitimate subject of political criticism and public debate. Yet, in some nationalist narratives, it was presented as an unforgivable surrender of national interests, while the junta’s responsibility for the events that led to the Cyprus disaster receives far less attention. The point is not that the two events are equivalent, or that criticism of the Prespa Agreement is illegitimate. It is that national sensitivity appears to be applied selectively. Some political narratives treat certain compromises as historical betrayals while allowing other, far more consequential failures to fade from collective memory.

When History Becomes a Political Weapon

This selective approach to the past connects to a broader feature of contemporary politics: populism. Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that divides society into two supposedly homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Populist movements claim to represent the authentic will of the people, often portraying their opponents as illegitimate or disconnected from the nation.

Populism can emerge on both the left and the right. However, its radical-right manifestation often combines this division with nationalism and an exclusionary understanding of national identity. In such narratives, patriotism becomes something that one political camp can claim to own, while opponents are portrayed as insufficiently loyal, dangerous or even hostile to the nation.

History becomes particularly useful in this process. Evidence that challenges the preferred national narrative can be dismissed as political propaganda. Accounts of repression become ideological exaggerations. Historical debate is reduced to a confrontation between those who supposedly defend the nation and those accused of undermining it.

The danger is not that people disagree about history. Disagreement is necessary for historical inquiry and democratic debate. The danger emerges when documented facts are treated as matters of political preference, and when acknowledging the crimes of an authoritarian regime is presented as an act of disloyalty. A democracy cannot afford to remember only the parts of its history that make it proud. It must also confront the parts that expose its failures, contradictions and responsibilities.

The Polytechnic is not merely a date in the Greek calendar, nor is its significance dependent on the political identity of those who commemorate it. It is a historical event, with documented victims, a clear context of authoritarian repression and a lasting place in Greece’s democratic history. Perhaps the most dangerous thing a society can do is not forget its past entirely but remember it selectively. Because once history becomes whatever serves the politics of the present, the line between remembering and rewriting begins to disappear. 


 

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Professor Maya Tudor.

Prof. Maya Tudor: Without Substantial Liberal Rights, There Is No Democracy

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the University of Oxford, examines democratic backsliding, authoritarian resilience, and the challenges of democratic restoration across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan. Challenging electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy, Professor Tudor argues that “if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” She explains how elections can survive while political freedoms erode and warns that defeating authoritarian incumbents does not necessarily dismantle the systems sustaining their power. Emphasizing independent media, political equality, opposition coordination, and institutional safeguards, she concludes that democracy’s ultimate test is whether future opposition forces can compete freely.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As democratic institutions confront intensifying pressures worldwide, a fundamental question has returned to the center of scholarly debate: Can a political system remain democratic when elections survive but the liberal rights that make political competition meaningful are systematically undermined? In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Maya Tudor, Professor of Politics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and Fellow at St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, offers a compelling comparative assessment of democratic erosion, authoritarian resilience, and the conditions necessary for genuine democratic restoration.

The discussion unfolds against a paradoxical global backdrop. Recent electoral developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States demonstrate the continuing potential for democratic resistance, even as authoritarian populism, institutional capture, and majoritarian nationalism remain formidable challenges. India’s democratic decline under Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s enduring military dominance further expose the fragility of democratic institutions. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the boundaries between democracy and autocracy and the prospects for reversing democratic backsliding.

Drawing on her research with Andrea Vaccaro, Professor Tudor challenges electoral-minimalist conceptions of democracy. Her central argument is unequivocal: “If you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.” As she explains, democracy concerns not merely elections but what citizens are entitled to do between them. India illustrates this distinction particularly clearly: “Democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless.” Restrictions on opposition mobilization, media independence, and minority rights can fundamentally undermine electoral competition without formally eliminating it.

Turning to Hungary, Professor Tudor cautions against conflating electoral victory with institutional transformation: “Defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed.” Similar dilemmas emerge in Serbia and Brazil, where civic mobilization and opposition coordination must develop into durable political organization. As she emphasizes, “Power has to be organized before it can be used.”

The United States presents another critical test. Reflecting on Trump’s second presidency and the 2026 midterm elections, Professor Tudor warns that “Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion.” Institutional checks, political pluralism, and the recovery of loyal opposition therefore remain indispensable.

Her policy recommendations emphasize independent media, freedom of association, political equality, transparent electoral procedures, and meaningful alternation in power. Ultimately, she argues, democratic restoration must be measured against a demanding standard: “The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely.” Across these cases, Professor Tudor advances a central proposition: democracy’s resilience depends not simply on removing authoritarian incumbents, but on ensuring that their successors cannot monopolize power.

Here is our interview with Professor Maya Tudor, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Elections Alone Cannot Distinguish Democracy from Electoral Autocracy

Nepal elections.
Voter education volunteer instructs residents on using a sample ballot in Ward No. 4, Inaruwa, Nepal, February 17, 2026, as part of a local election awareness program led by the Sunsari Election Office. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula / Dreamstime.

Professor Tudor, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent Democratization article, coauthored with Andrea Vaccaro, “Why Liberal Rights Define Democracy.” In this article, you argue that substantial liberal rights are constitutive of democracy. Does this make “illiberal democracy” a conceptual contradiction, and where should we draw the boundary between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s an important question. We should start with the fundamental insight that many people equate democracy with elections, although many of us know that democracy is much more than just what happens on election day. It also involves what citizens have a right to do between elections.

When you’re able to cast a ballot, but the opposition isn’t on the ballot because it hasn’t been able to organize, key opposition figures have been intimidated, or the media doesn’t give airtime to their stories, that affects democracy. And that’s not a marginal issue; it’s a really core issue for democracy. The core argument of our paper is that if you do not have substantial liberal rights, you don’t have a democracy.

The reason this is an important issue to raise is that research and scholarship increasingly use the term “illiberal democracy” to describe regimes that have elections but substantially lack civil rights.

You asked the really interesting question of how we should think about the difference between electoral democracy and electoral autocracy. Those are labels that democracy watchdog organizations use. Notice that both have elections, but there’s a distinction—and a gray area—between regimes that have substantial civil rights and those that don’t.

It is a gray area, and you’re going to have to make some judgment calls. Many of these democracy watchdogs do a very good job of making those calls. I just think we’re misleading people when we call something an electoral democracy when it actually substantially lacks civil liberties. And that was the point of the paper.

Democracy’s Benefits Are Cumulative, but Its Shortcomings Are Immediately Visible

In “What Democracy Does… And Does Not Do,” you find that democracies generally outperform autocracies in health, education, economic growth, and security. Why, then, is public confidence in democracy declining while authoritarian alternatives are gaining legitimacy?

Professor Maya Tudor: Democracy is no guarantee of good government, but neither is autocracy. The fastest-growing regimes in the world are disproportionately likely to be autocracies, but so too are the worst-performing regimes. That’s what the article discusses: on average, democracies provide a kind of insurance against the absolutely worst outcomes.But many democracies around the world have been declining in quality. We know this from the democratic backsliding literature: they’re becoming less democratic, even while remaining democracies. This links to your previous question because civil rights are often eroding, the independence of non-executive institutions is weakening, and the quality of democracy is declining.

What we’ve been seeing in recent events around the globe, whether in Serbia, Bangladesh, Nepal, or Sri Lanka, are youth-led movements pushing back against institutions that are often captured by older generations. When the opportunities available to younger generations are found wanting, people become dissatisfied with the system that produced that lack of opportunities. 

Democracy’s benefits are cumulative, while its shortcomings are immediately visible. One of those shortcomings is that democracies govern, by definition, on electoral timelines. This makes it harder for democratic governments to develop longer-term plans that they can implement over multiple electoral cycles. But that doesn’t mean they perform worse, and this is why I wrote the article. I wrote it because I teach in a very international environment. This year, we have 59 countries represented in the cohort I teach. Many of those students say, “Well, why should we? Democracy doesn’t deliver.” I wrote this article to say that, actually, yes, it does. It delivers on average, and in many ways, it delivers better than you might think.

Autocracies Can Project Decisiveness While Concealing Their Failures

The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

The analogy I use in the article concerns COVID. In 2020, autocratic regimes looked remarkable in their capacity to deal with COVID. Take China, for example. It shut down, traced people very effectively, built hospitals and infrastructure in a matter of weeks, and sequenced the genome. It seemed to demonstrate what capable authoritarian regimes were able to do. Fast-forward to 2022, though, and the picture looks very different. Interestingly, in 2021, a slew of articles appeared asking, “Do autocracies do better in times of crisis?” 

By 2022—and most people around the world would agree that COVID, on and off, lasted from 2020 to 2022—if you look across those three years, what democracies generally did better than autocracies were adapted to changing circumstances on the ground. As it became clear that children who were out of school were suffering in terms of their learning, and that lockdowns were having negative mental health effects, for example, authoritarian governments generally pivoted. Now, that’s a different story. If you look, for example, at how China performed during COVID in terms of deaths per capita, independently verified estimates vary, but within that range, China doesn’t look better than neighboring democracies such as Japan and South Korea.

So, I would ask your audience, students, and others thinking about this to be consistent in how they approach the question: How should we judge whether democracies are better or worse? That doesn’t mean democracies will always deliver, and we need to be careful here. Autocracies can often present a very compelling narrative of decisiveness and quick action. They can also censor, so their failures are often hidden. One of the studies I cite in the article shows that authoritarian governments tend to overstate their GDP per capita by around one percentage point. One percentage point! It’s extraordinary. So, we need to carefully distinguish between the narrative and what we know to be true on the ground.

The final thing I’ll say is something I think is relatively obvious: there is now a growing number of powerful countries around the globe whose own legitimation depends on delegitimizing democratic forms of government. That is another reason why we’re seeing this narrative. It’s also worth adding that democratic governments, such as the United States, have often used democracy as a cudgel while turning a blind eye to authoritarian governments’ misbehavior when doing so serves their interests. That has undermined the legitimacy of the democratic norm.

Exclusionary Nationalism Creates Second-Class Citizens by Definition

Your research with Dan Slater and Harris Mylonas emphasizes how inclusive and exclusionary national narratives shape political regimes. Under what conditions does nationalism strengthen democratic solidarity, and when does it become an instrument of authoritarian majoritarianism, as seen in Modi’s India, Erdogan’s Turkey, Orbán’s Hungary, or Trump’s America?

Professor Maya Tudor: Nationalism is a narrative of “we the people.” But what building blocks do we use to define this group we call “we the people”? That’s not inherently democratic or autocratic. It depends on how the nation is defined and who’s included in it.

One of the things I argue, both in my work with Dan Slater and in my work with Harris Mylonas, is that all national narratives draw boundaries between “we the people” and everybody else. That’s the boundary of the nation. But many countries also draw internal hierarchies of belonging. Take the United States, for example. For most of American history, if you were a Black American, you were a second-class citizen. You were not fully included in this narrative of belonging, either at the founding or during the Civil War.

Exclusionary nationalism, as we argue—and as I argue in some of my earlier work as well—is a nationalism that creates those internal hierarchies by fusing a fixed narrative of the nation with religion, race, ethnicity, or other social categories that we can’t choose. When those social categories become the basis for belonging to the nation, you create second-class citizens by definition.

The argument we make is that majoritarian nationalism—nationalism that governs in the name of a majority—is particularly dangerous when it becomes fused with exclusionary nationalism. You always have majorities, but those majorities are electorally fluid when they’re not fixed to a social category. But when you say that to be Malaysian is to be Malay, with its ethnic and religious markers, or that in Myanmar, to be Burmese is to be Buddhist and of Bamar ethnicity, you’re creating second-class citizens. And that creates ideological resources for political entrepreneurs who come to power to exclude those second-class citizens.

My theory of politics is that politicians, including would-be politicians in democracies, are always trying to come to power with new narratives. When the history we all share and our sense of who we are become fused with a fixed category, it becomes very easy—even incentivized—for politicians to “other” the group that is not core to the definition of the nation.

India Shows How Elections Can Remain Meaningful but Deeply Unfair

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

In “Why India’s Democracy Is Dying,” you explain how democratic institutions can survive formally while their underlying norms deteriorate. Has Modi’s India now crossed the threshold from democratic backsliding into consolidated electoral autocracy, or does meaningful democratic competition remain?

Professor Maya Tudor: I think meaningful democratic competition still remains, but India is an example that reminds us that democracy can be hollowed out without elections ever being abolished or becoming meaningless. In all competitive authoritarian regimes, elections are still meaningful, and incumbents sweat them because, as long as the act of voting is protected, it’s always possible for incumbents to be voted out.

But many of the liberal rights that define a democracy have been substantially eroded. That erosion has occurred through restrictions on the opposition’s ability to mobilize on the streets, as we’ve seen in recent protests; pressure on the media; the acquisition of independent media houses such as NDTV by businessmen close to the government; attacks on minorities, especially when it’s electorally fruitful ahead of state elections; and the use of state institutions, such as the Enforcement Directorate, to target and investigate political opponents through tax proceedings and the like.

However, the existence of competition doesn’t necessarily mean that the process is entirely fair. The analogy I like to use is a football match. Imagine a football match where no one is saying that the players can’t go out and play, but the referee calls all the fouls on only one team. Maybe he’s not allowing one team to practice in advance, while the other team is allowed to practice. Maybe there are penalties called. There are all kinds of ways to tilt the playing field in favor of one side while still respecting the rules of the game.

That’s really important, but it’s hard for people who aren’t paying close attention to see because this is a gray and foggy area. It’s difficult to tell exactly what’s going on because the media itself is captured to a large degree. So, these labels—electoral autocracy versus electoral democracy—are less important because what they have in common is that both have elections and civil liberties have been substantially diminished. Where exactly that boundary lies is less important than the fact that this is a regime in which democracy as a system of government is struggling to survive.

India’s Electoral Rolls and the Manipulation of Political Equality

India’s controversial Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has generated accusations of mass voter exclusion and politicization of the Election Commission. Does this illustrate a broader authoritarian strategy of manipulating electoral competition through formally legal procedures rather than openly abolishing elections?

Professor Maya Tudor: This is a tricky one. There is absolutely no clarity on this question. For people who may not be familiar with the Indian context, the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls removed 130 million voters in a country of 1.4 billion. That’s almost 10% of the population.

India is a young country, and those electoral rolls certainly needed some attention and updating. No one is doubting that. But if this had been done properly, you would expect openness and transparency about the process. There would also be a means of redress for citizens who had been removed from the electoral rolls, and that is missing.

The state of Bengal held an election earlier this year. The key question people are asking about that election concerns the deletion of voters, which occurred to a greater degree in Muslim-majority districts. According to national voting patterns, one could infer that Muslim-majority districts were less likely to vote for the BJP. Did those deletions swing the state election in favor of the ruling party? This is a state that the Modi government’s party, the BJP, had never ruled. It won for the first time in Bengal’s history.

So, there’s at least prima facie reason to believe that something nefarious might be going on here. And then there’s the situation within India’s Election Commission, which historically had a very different role. India was a country with high levels of illiteracy when the Election Commission came into being, and its job was to go out and register every voter. It wasn’t to say, “Show me your documents.”

The move toward a system that asks voters to show documents, when large proportions of the population are still illiterate and documentation is scarce, changes the situation. Asking people to prove their eligibility to vote changes the function of the Election Commission and the way it operates.

The key issues here are transparency, independent oversight, and appeals. The reason this became such a major issue in India this year is that the Indian Express reported 14 instances in which commissioners within the Election Commission, which led the Special Intensive Revision, had raised objections. These were not outsiders; they were insiders whose objections were overruled by the chief election commissioner. That’s why many of the recent protests called for the chief election commissioner’s resignation.

This is absolutely an ongoing process, and it highlights, in many ways, why modern democratic erosion often operates through the law rather than outside it. The question is whether legal procedures protect political equality or undermine it.

Social Media Can Launch a Movement, but Organization Sustains It

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest.
Students participate in a peaceful nighttime protest organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) in New Delhi, India. Demonstrators sit together on the road, holding placards and posters, chanting slogans, and expressing their demands. Photo: Kamlesh Kumar / Dreamstime.

The emerging Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) movement has mobilized young Indians against alleged electoral manipulation and institutional capture. Drawing on your work on political organization and democratic resilience, can such movements generate lasting democratic renewal without coordinated opposition parties, durable grassroots networks, and clearly defined political demands?

Professor Maya Tudor: That is the million-dollar question. Social media can launch a movement, but organization is what allows it to survive and change politics at the ballot box. What we don’t yet know is whether the CJP can produce that kind of lasting democratic renewal.

Look, we’re seeing this play out in Serbia right now as well. Can a movement that brought people together and threw out an autocratic incumbent actually govern instead? That is very difficult. One reason it’s difficult is that there’s a different logic of politics when you’re banding together to overthrow an existing government or regime. You have all these different groups of people coming together, and what they share is the belief that the government is a problem. So, the governing logic is unity: let’s come together, let’s mobilize, and let’s throw that government out.

Imagine that the government is actually thrown out, as it was in Serbia, and this group of very disparate people then has to govern. Unless they’ve spent some of that time while they were united trying to hammer out what they’ll do when they come to power, governing becomes very difficult because the groups start pulling apart. Some say, “Well, let’s do this policy,” while others say, “No, let’s do that policy.”

When agreement on matters of policy hasn’t been worked out under a logic of unity, it’s much harder to reach that agreement once the logic of unity has given way to people tussling for political power. So, one of the things I teach my students is that power has to be organized before it can be used. Online mobilization is not the same as durable political organization.

Independent Media Are the Connective Tissue of Democratic Resistance

In your recent Journal of Democracy article, “How to Protect the Media in Eroding Democracies” (2026), you characterize independent media as the connective tissue of democratic resistance. How can opposition movements challenge authoritarian dominance over digital platforms, advertising revenues, and information networks, particularly in countries such as India, Turkey, and Hungary?

Professor Maya Tudor: This article examined four countries: India, Sri Lanka, Poland, and Hungary. Two of them have experienced much more severe democratic backsliding in the media space, while the other two have experienced more moderate backsliding. I was trying to compare these two sets of countries, with two countries in each region, to understand the differences between those that experienced much more complete media capture and those that experienced more moderate capture.

I identified five strategies that made a difference. The first was effective digital distribution; the second was diversified funding sources; the third was legal defense; and the fourth was a networked media ecosystem, with journalists and editors well connected across the media space. The fifth was connecting democratic erosion to everyday life, as Peter Magyar had done in Hungary. For example, he connected the decline in EU funding to a lack of investment in hospitals, thereby linking democratic erosion to citizens’ everyday concerns.

One of the things I highlight in that article is that media plays an even more important role in protecting democracies today than it did a generation or two ago. And here’s why. I think of public opinion formation as taking place 100 years ago in physical public squares. People would pass through a public square in the center of a town, where speakers in different corners expressed different views on the politics of the time. We all had a sense of what was being said in one corner or another. We might have gravitated toward one corner more than another, but these conversations were generally in dialogue with one another.

That’s what it looked like when a country had a couple of newspapers and everyone read that handful of newspapers. But now, younger generations are getting all their content online. Even when they follow national media sources, they do so through online platforms. Those platforms have different algorithmic structures that funnel them into smaller and smaller communities. That means we no longer have this public square where people are connected to one another, even if only loosely. Now, you can have very small subcultures that never speak to each other. As I put it, it’s like a mansion with a thousand rooms, and nobody knows what the conversation is like in the next room.

These communities are really siloed, which means our ability as a public to have conversations about what is in the public interest is also much more siloed. That’s a real problem because independent journalism is critical infrastructure for holding governments accountable and providing independent evaluations of what’s actually happening out there that we can trust. So, the core point of that article was to make clear that independent media is like the connective tissue—the highway upon which citizens must travel to discover their mutual interests.

Defeating an Authoritarian Government Is Not Dismantling Its System

Viktor Orban.
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Viktor Orbán’s defeat by Péter Magyar in April 2026 demonstrated that even deeply entrenched illiberal governments can lose elections. What explains the limits of Fidesz’s authoritarian resilience, and how can Hungary restore liberal-democratic institutions without reproducing the executive concentration of power that enabled democratic erosion?

Professor Maya Tudor: It’s a great question, and it’s one we all need to think much more about. I don’t have a silver-bullet answer here. One thing this makes very clear is that defeating an authoritarian government is not the same as dismantling the authoritarian system the incumbent constructed. Orbán achieved extensive media and institutional capture, and Péter Magyar showed us the importance of opposition coordination, bringing together disaffected ruling-party supporters, and providing credible alternatives.

But winning an election is only the beginning of this process, which is very difficult. Some of the events in Poland have shown just how difficult it can be. The danger is often that the new government uses its electoral mandate to concentrate power in precisely the manner it previously condemned.

Here’s where being clear about what you were elected to do—what the people elected you to do—is very important, because you cannot achieve everything in one term of government. But if you could choose just a couple of things that you promise to deliver on, then, presumably, that would be enough to win you an electoral mandate to continue doing what you were elected to do in the next term.

Opposition Coordination Converts Protest into Power at the Ballot Box

Serbia’s October 2026 elections delivered a parliamentary majority to the student-backed movement, challenging Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism. What can Serbia and Hungary teach us about the relative importance of opposition coordination, civic mobilization, elite defections, and institutional safeguards in reversing democratic backsliding?

Professor Maya Tudor: The central lesson here is that authoritarian governments can lose when social mobilization connects discontent with credible electoral alternatives. That connection is essential. There’s always discontent bubbling up in any society at any given time.

One of the Achilles’ heels of authoritarian governments is that they don’t actually understand how much disaffection there is. By definition, there is a cost to speaking the truth in an electoral regime where people’s rights and civil liberties are not protected. People are not going to speak truth to power because there’s a cost to doing so. That means authoritarian governments don’t understand what people are frustrated by as well as the opposition coordinating on the ground does.

So, protests generate pressure on the government, but it’s opposition coordination that converts that pressure into political power at the ballot box. I think that’s what Serbia and Hungary teach us.

Democratic Restoration Cannot Depend on the Continued Success of One Leader

Brazilia’s Luiz Inácio Lula is seen during the 2022 election campaign in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on October 20, 2022. Photo: Aline Alcantara.

Lula’s narrow October 2026 reelection victory over Flávio Bolsonaro demonstrated both the resilience of electoral competition and the enduring strength of radical-right populism. Does Brazil suggest that defeating authoritarian-populist candidates at the ballot box is insufficient to reverse the social polarization and institutional vulnerabilities sustaining their movements?

Professor Maya Tudor: You can defeat an authoritarian populist at the ballot box without defeating the political conditions that made that candidate appealing. Brazil was lucky to have Lula around, but who is Lula’s successor? Lula’s 81, isn’t he?

I think polarization isn’t necessarily a problem for democracy in the way the average person might assume when they say, “Oh, it’s a problem; we’re deeply polarized as a society.” One of our key theorists of democracy, Robert Dahl, argued that democracy can resemble a heated family feud. People can disagree deeply about policies, but they need to agree on the boundaries of the nation and recognize that we’re all part of the same political community. Once that shared understanding disappears, polarization really becomes a problem.

When I look at Lula and his victory, I think having these older statesmen who’ve been around for a while is great because it has helped protect some of the core democratic institutions, as illustrated by the court’s decision to send Bolsonaro Sr. to prison. But democratic restoration cannot simply depend on the continued success of one leader.

That’s not a party. So, what is the party beyond Lula? This is true of many opposition parties. The same applies to India’s opposition party, the Indian National Congress. Rahul Gandhi is at the helm, and he’s done some work to bring in opposition voices. He’s also coordinating with the Cockroach Janta Party that we discussed earlier. But ultimately, he needs to make space for young people to reinvigorate the ranks of opposition movements.

Elections Alone Cannot Repair Institutions Weakened by Democratic Erosion

Trump’s second presidency has intensified concerns over executive power, institutional independence, and liberal rights. The November 3, 2026, midterm elections delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Does this electoral setback constrain authoritarian tendencies, or can democratic erosion continue despite renewed institutional checks?

Professor Maya Tudor: Elections will certainly interrupt that process, but they cannot, by themselves, repair the institutions and norms weakened by democratic erosion. 

It looks like the latest count is that, if Alaska goes Democratic, there will be 56 Democratic senators in the US Senate.That still means there are over 40 Republican senators, and during these first two years of Trump’s second presidential term, they have served as no check whatsoever on his power. That represents real institutional erosion because these systems work only if checks and balances continue to hold, and they haven’t held during the first half of Trump’s second term.

So, the deeper test going forward is whether political actors across party lines defend their opponents’ right to disagree. To me, the very concept of loyal opposition needs to be recovered. You can be a Trump supporter and vote for Trump, or a supporter of the Democratic Party and vote for the Democratic Party. But are these groups of people loyal citizens to one another? That is something that needs to be recovered.

Pakistan’s Military Can Lose Legitimacy Without Losing Power

T.J.P members are holding Jinnah Rally on the occasion of Birthday Anniversary of Father of Nation Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah in Karachi on December 25, 2017. Photo: Asianet-Pakistan

In The Promise of Power and your research with Adeel Malik, you examine Pakistan’s historical authoritarian foundations and emerging challenges to military dominance. Can generational change, an aspirational middle class, and digitally mobilized opposition weaken the military establishment without fundamental institutional transformation?

Professor Maya Tudor: Unlikely. The military can lose legitimacy without losing power, and that’s certainly what happened in the last election. The real question is whether societal change can be translated into changes in civilian institutions. As I wrote in The Promise of Power, Pakistan’s military dominance is rooted in an early historical pattern of state formation, when there was considerable political instability and the military stepped into power.

What we know from research is that once the military steps into power and governs, especially for a prolonged period, it’s very difficult to reverse that pattern. The conditional probability of another coup is much higher once you’ve had a first coup. The military often develops very strong economic interests. This is not just true of Pakistan, but also of Myanmar, Egypt, and Thailand. It was also true of Indonesia, and probably still is, even though the military has left power there, at least for the foreseeable future. These vested interests in particular patterns of the economy make it even harder to undertake electoral reforms. If you had a regime that was somewhat independent of those vested interests, such reforms might be easier to undertake.

In my piece with Adeel Malik, I talked about the emergence of a new aspirational middle class, the weakening of traditional authority structures, and mounting economic pressures, particularly those related to climate, as future sources of crises in Pakistan. But that doesn’t mean the military is going to step out of power. The past is not always the best indication of the future, but you have to see something really change. Right now, I don’t see any incentive for the military to relinquish any of its power.

The Ultimate Test of Democracy Is Whether Tomorrow’s Opposition Can Compete Freely

Looking across India, Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, the United States, and Pakistan, what distinguishes temporary electoral setbacks for authoritarian-populist forces from genuine democratic restoration? Which institutional and societal conditions are most essential for sustaining democratic resilience?

Professor Maya Tudor: The process of democratic restoration begins with the removal from office of an incumbent who has eroded democracy. But the ultimate test is not simply whether the opposition can win. That is an important step—a critical step. The ultimate test is also whether tomorrow’s opposition will be allowed to compete freely. That is something we have to watch for whenever there is a turnover in power. There’s a great deal of attention—a glare of attention—focused on electoral moments in any country. But what happens after the election?

An election may represent a setback for an authoritarian-populist movement, but genuine restoration requires protecting the political equality of all citizens. It requires independent media that, by definition, are able to criticize the government. It also requires freedom of association, especially when groups assemble to protest against the government. If they’re simply supporting the government, then those freedoms aren’t, in a sense, really needed.

Genuine restoration requires the possibility of alternation in power and recovering the idea that you can oppose the government while still being a loyal citizen. Democracy is strongest when electoral losers retain their rights and winners accept constraints on their power in future electoral cycles. Democratic restoration should therefore be judged not just by whether an incumbent loses, but by whether the next government makes it harder for any future leader to monopolize power.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Supporters of Brazilian President and Workers’ Party (PT) presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend a reelection campaign rally on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil, on October 24, 2026.

Brazil After the Ballots: From Lula’s Digital Army to a Democratic Base

In this commentary, Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano examines Brazil’s 2026 presidential election through the interplay of digital populism, social inequalities, and political mobilization. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and campaign observations, he explores how Lula’s remarkable electoral comeback was supported by André Janones’s Exército do Lula, a digitally coordinated network that mobilized millions of supporters. Moving beyond conventional distinctions between online and offline politics, Dr. Bayarri Toscano analyzes how economic precarity, political identities, and social relationships shape contemporary populist movements. While highlighting the effectiveness of digital campaigning, he questions whether hierarchical online mobilization can evolve into sustainable democratic participation. He argues that Brazil’s central challenge lies in transforming electoral mobilization into enduring collective organization, democratic literacy, and meaningful participation beyond election day.

By Gabriel Bayarri Toscano*

The Material and Ideological Terrain of the Contest

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election cannot be understood without first considering the country’s social complexity. The election took place in a Brazil where the figure of the formal, industrial, unionized worker no longer captured the experience of large segments of the population. As in many countries where informal work is widespread, the growth of digital platforms and the “Uberization” of the economy had expanded self-employment and insecurity: many people pieced together jobs, small businesses, and other activities to make ends meet. In this fragmented labor market, demands for equality and rights coexisted with aspirations for individual prosperity, religious fulfillment, family life, and consumption, without necessarily finding a common political expression.

Nor was Brazilian society divided into two homogeneous blocs. Working classes in urban and peripheral areas, along with large informal sectors, had demands that did not automatically coalesce into a shared political project. Brazil’s bourgeoisie brought together financial, industrial, and commercial interests, as well as those tied to agribusiness, and formed shifting alliances with the urban middle classes. In the countryside, agribusiness and conservative forces held sway alongside rural workers, peasant movements, and Indigenous peoples. Understanding this social composition helps explain why the electoral contest was not simply a confrontation between rich and poor or a competition between online messages. It was also a struggle over what prosperity meant, who could claim to represent working people, and how political actors addressed precarity and insecurity.

We can understand Bolsonarism only in light of this complexity. It did not coalesce around a single social group or rely solely on spreading reactionary messages online; instead, it brought together, often uneasily, experiences of precarity, aspirations for autonomy, conservative values, and promises of prosperity. This coalition did not erase the differences among its supporters, but it gave them a shared language and political identity. For the Workers’ Party (PT), the challenge is not only to oppose Bolsonarism but also to understand why it attracts support and what material future the PT can offer people who do not see their own concerns reflected in the popular demands the party has historically championed.

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Digital Populism

The social complexity outlined in the previous section also became visible during my fieldwork. Over the past several months, I conducted interviews and carried out participant observation at Bolsonarist campaign events. The day before the election, I attended the campaign’s closing rally in Barra da Tijuca, an area where the right enjoys strong support in Rio de Janeiro. The crowd spanned different ages, backgrounds, and life experiences. Attendees wore Brazilian national team jerseys, sang the national anthem, and displayed flags of Israel and the United States. This diversity did not form a uniform social identity, but it showed Bolsonarism’s capacity to bring different symbols and experiences together. The interviews suggested a similar pattern: people connected WhatsApp messages with family conversations, social gatherings, and their experiences of work, religion, insecurity, and the pursuit of prosperity. The digital and the in-person did not appear as separate spheres, but as dimensions of the same political life.

This connection poses a methodological challenge: the tools we use to study politics can also separate the digital from the in-person, metrics from meaning, and content circulation from the relationships that sustain it. Metrics can show a message’s reach, interactions, and speed of circulation, but they cannot explain what it means to those who receive it or why they trust the person sharing it. Interviews help reconstruct these meanings, but on their own they cannot show how many people share them or whether a message influenced their vote. Digital ethnography lets us trace how messages move across platforms and in-person relationships, and how people interpret them in specific situations, but it cannot establish causality on its own either. That is why we need to break down the barriers between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and between studying online networks and observing in-person life. The goal is not to find a method that explains everything, but to combine approaches to understand how circulation, meaning, and political relationships work together.

The theoretical challenge is just as important. A central question in populism theory is how political actors articulate heterogeneous demands into a collective will and define it against an adversary. Studying digital populism means keeping that question in view while developing our own tools to explain what changes when this process unfolds across platforms and in-person relationships. We cannot simply transpose concepts developed for other settings onto social media, as if the digital were just another channel. Platforms reshape the pace and form of political struggle: users repeat and edit political signifiers, linking them to different experiences, while demands come together around shared ideas of work, faith, security, prosperity, and fairness. These moral economies are diverse and sometimes in conflict; they meet and clash through increasingly rapid cycles of circulation.

Hybridity, then, means more than combining online activity with a presence on the street; it is essential to understanding how populist politics works today. Studying it means tracing both the circulation of content and the relationships, interpretations, and experiences that give it meaning. Lula’s comeback offers a concrete case for examining this relationship: the role Janones and the Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”) played raises the question of how digital mobilization connects messages and participants, and whether it can build a social base capable of acting beyond election day.

Lula’s Army, Janones, and the Comeback

Brazil elects its president through a two-round system. If no candidate wins more than half of the valid votes in the first round, the top two candidates advance to a runoff. On October 4, 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of the vote, while Lula received 45.16 percent. Three weeks later, Lula won the runoff with 51.79 percent, compared with 48.21 percent for his opponent. The result was truly unexpected and unprecedented in Brazil’s democratic history: Lula had trailed by more than two million votes and ended up with 10,379,615 more votes than in the first round.

Several factors contributed to the comeback, but we cannot understand it without looking at the mobilization led by André Janones, a federal deputy from Minas Gerais. Through the WhatsApp channel Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”), Janones coordinated campaign materials and urged supporters to take part on other platforms. The channel amassed 10.8 million followers. On Flávio Bolsonaro’s side, Tropa do Flávio (“Flávio’s Troop”) reached around 2.1 million. A study of the campaign found a substantial difference in response times: some tasks issued through Lula’s channel reached other platforms within seconds, while the fastest responses recorded in the rival channel took several minutes. This comparison covers specific actions and does not, by itself, measure the campaigns as a whole, but it illustrates the scale, speed, and effectiveness of Lula’s operation.

Janones’s channel did more than amass a large audience. Participants followed instructions on how to edit and cut videos, repost them on other platforms, promote hashtags, and share content with their contacts. This coordinated strategy turned followers into active distributors of messages. It helped Lula’s camp regain the initiative after the first round had left many supporters with little hope. The comeback, however, was not the work of a single channel or leader. Individuals and groups outside the PT’s official campaign structure also took part; supporters spoke with people face-to-face; and the campaign drew on social and political networks that were already in place.

From Digital Mobilization to Democratic Participation

Despite the PT’s presidential victory, the Liberal Party, the main Bolsonarist force, and other right-wing parties will hold majorities in both houses of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and retain control of key municipalities and states, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Lula will need to build legislative coalitions to advance his agenda in a Congress where the opposition can block reforms, raise the cost of negotiations, and sustain polarization. These disputes will involve budget priorities and policies that directly affect everyday life, from social protection to working conditions. The government’s ability to act will depend on its parliamentary alliances, as well as on the social support it can sustain beyond Congress. The presidential defeat does not mean that Bolsonarism has disappeared. It may instead adapt by putting forward more moderate-looking figures who retain the movement’s original violent rhetoric but use it with less force and brutality than the Bolsonaro family has so far.

The different trajectories of these political camps raise a central question about the recent success of Lula’s Army: how can digital mobilization become a social base capable of acting after the election? The Exército do Lula showed that rapid coordination could change the mood of a campaign and help mobilize millions of people. It also revealed some of the model’s built-in limitations. Its military language (a “general” summoning “soldiers”) allowed organizers to assign tasks and respond quickly, but it also concentrated decision-making. The model’s ability to circulate messages does not guarantee that those sharing them can discuss the organization’s goals, set its priorities, or sustain it once the campaign is over.

The operation provided participants with primarily technical skills: they learned to edit, cut, and repost videos, distribute them across platforms, and drive engagement. During the campaign, many felt they were “breaking the algorithm” and opening new possibilities for digital sovereignty. That feeling did not mean they controlled the platforms or had changed their rules. This hierarchical, binary logic can help campaigns compete for online visibility, but it is not the same as democratic literacy. Democratic literacy requires participants to help shape messages, disagree, make proposals, and make decisions collectively. Janones’s recommendation not to debate Bolsonarist opponents could work as a short-term tactic; for example, when responding to a provocation would only amplify misleading content. But if avoiding opponents becomes a general rule, the strategy reinforces isolation between groups. A democratic base must be able to mobilize while also creating spaces for disagreement.

Building a democratic digital politics also means going beyond learning how to game the algorithm or calling for its regulation. Digital sovereignty means asking who controls the infrastructure, the data, and the conditions under which content circulates, and who gets to make those decisions.

Some Indigenous epistemologies offer a valuable perspective because they understand knowledge as rooted in relationships among community, territory, memory, and responsibility, rather than as a resource detached from the people who produce it. Alongside community networks, independent media, and collective decision-making about communication, these perspectives help us imagine digital infrastructures that communities govern. The Exército do Lulashowed that popular mobilization could, at least temporarily, change who had visibility. The task now is to turn that possibility into spaces where participation means more than sharing messages: it must also mean having a say in decisions.

Lula begins his new term with a presidential victory and a Congress dominated by the right. Legislative negotiations will be difficult, and the Bolsonarist opposition remains strong enough to obstruct, polarize, and pressure institutions. The central challenge is to connect governing and mobilizing without subordinating mobilization to the government or reducing democracy to a permanent campaign. The Exército do Lula showed how digital coordination could help secure an electoral victory. The political challenge is to ensure that those who made it possible can keep organizing, take part in decisions, and sustain shared demands after the election.


 

(*) Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is a lecturer in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and the social sciences. His research focuses on the “far right” and contemporary polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Dr. Bayarri Toscano has conducted research in European and Latin American contexts. He has also delivered regular courses and guest lectures at various international academic institutions. Email: gabriel.bayarri@urjc.es

Tunisia flag.

Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism

Please cite as:
Ben Abdallah, Chahira. (2026). “Conspiracy Narratives and the Discursive Identity of ‘the Other’ in Tunisian Political Populism.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). November 16, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000133         

 

Abstract

This research focuses on political conspiracy communication and relies on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism in order to demonstrate the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication. We extracted the six conspiratorial narratives that were frequently repeated in Saied’s speeches and statements covering the period from the so-called July 25 coup in 2021 to the 2024 presidential election campaign. To examine these narratives, we focus on the mechanisms of constructing the identity of the other/conspirators from three aspects: signifying practices, definitional frontiers, and the employment of passions. Our three-level analysis led us to a number of conclusions revealing that Saied’s conspiracy narratives represent a logic of simplification of political spaces. These narratives play on ambiguity, floating signifiers, and nationalist biases to create a common enemy and to make it the scapegoat responsible for the crisis. Therefore, these narratives are polarizing, divisive, and thus antagonistic. The power of conspiracy in Saied’s narratives stems from its ability to produce new meanings from existing facts and from not being locked into a fixed meaning. This is what Laclau and Mouffe call “articulation.” These narratives, loaded with moral stigmatization, have two functions: conspiratorial demonization, used to attack and delegitimize opponents, and conspiratorial mobilization, used to mobilize a more tangible “mass” of supporters through the formation of a collective identity.

Keywords: Political Conspiracy Communication, conspiracy theories, discursive identity, populism, political discourse analysis, Laclau and Mouffe’s approach

 

By Chahira Ben Abdallah*

Introduction

In the last decade, the return to conspiracy theory has coincided with nationalist and identity reversals driven by racism and hate. At the same time, there has been a steady increase in the diffusion of conspiracy theories in political communication. Consequently, there has been a surge in the number of studies tackling the use of conspiracy theories by political actors as a communication strategy. These studies have highlighted the fact that beliefs in conspiracy theories are very often associated with populism (Van Prooijen, 2018; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Merkley, 2020). In fact, the hypothesis of an “elective affinity” between populism and conspiratorial ideas is old and can be traced back to the American literature on populism in the mid-1950s (Ivaldi, 2021). However, the adoption of conspiracy theories by populists in the twenty-first century is attributed to Donald Trump’s populism in the United States, which has relied heavily on conspiratorial ideas and the dissemination of fake news.

Conspiracy theories, such as those surrounding the origin of the COVID-19 virus and vaccines, as well as those related to immigration, such as the “Great Replacement” theory, have become an integral part of the ideological framework of both right-wing populist and non-populist politicians. In Italy, conspiracy theories were at the heart of the populist campaigns of the Lega as well as the M5S (Maccaferri, 2022). In France, Marine Le Pen’s party did not hesitate, during the coronavirus pandemic, to denounce the “incompetence” and “lies” of the executive authority. Likewise, in Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro’s management of the COVID-19 epidemic was very strongly marked by “scientific denialism” (Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2022).

These examples show the growing political relevance of conspiracy theories and the close connection between populism and conspiracy beliefs, “especially due to their common dichotomic nature” (Markou, 2022: 161) and “Manichean and antagonistic societal outlook” (Hameleers, 2020: 107). On that basis, our research aims to focus on the Tunisian political context in order to study “the specific case of the presidency of Kais Saied in Tunisia, which has been labelled as a form of constitutional populism integrating conspiracy theories” (Annovi, 2024: 43). We estimate that the conspiracy logic that Kais Saied frequently adopts is strategically exploited as a kind of “alternative reality” and a defense mechanism that he resorts to for strategic and pragmatic reasons.

Our analysis is based on the theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, which examines populism as a reason/logic and considers the political opponent (other) as a central element in the analysis because it acquires a formative character in the formation of political discourse. We will rely on the key theoretical components of Laclau and Mouffe’s theory of populism: antagonism, chain of equivalence, empty signifier, and the role of passions. This discursive approach, with the aim of showing the performative power and the persuasive appeal of conspiracy narratives in Kais Saied’s political communication, enables us to understand his “conspiracy rhetoric” (Goldzwig, 2002) or “conspiratorial imagination” (Jasmin, 2009).

Despite growing academic interest in the relationship between populism and conspiracy theories, and even though some studies have touched upon “conspiratorial populism” in the case of Kais Saied (Annovi, 2024; Kahlaoui, 2024; Sayfo & Kmeczko, 2026), there are, to the best of my knowledge, no studies that have examined Kais Saied’s discourse from the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe’s method. Thus, this study wants to fill this gap by using this well-known method to look at populism (discourse theory), thereby adding to the growing number of studies about the link between populism and conspiracy stories while offering a way to use discourse theory in the study of modern political communication in the Tunisian situation.

Thus, the questions that this study deals with are the following: What are the functions of conspiracy theory rhetoric used by the populist leader Kais Saied? Did Saied succeed in giving sense to the empty signifiers associated with the concept of conspiracy and linking them to a nodal point revolving around collective identity? What are the determinants of similarity and difference that Saied’s conspiracy discourse has formulated to construct the discursive identity of the other/conspirators? How did Saied’s conspiracy discourse employ emotions to motivate feelings of hostility and resentment?


(*) Chahira Ben Abdallah is an Assistant Professor and researcher in media and communication at the Institute of Press and Information Sciences, University of Manouba, Tunisia.

Read Full JPS Article

 

Aerial view of the construction of a new artificial intelligence (AI) hub and data center on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA.

Governing AI’s Creative Destruction: Shared Prosperity, Financial Risks, and Democratic Resilience

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the political economy of artificial intelligence (AI), highlighting its productive potential alongside distributional inequalities, financial vulnerabilities, and environmental costs. Distinguishing infrastructure investment from AI’s diffusion across the economy, he explores how productivity gains affect employment, wages, prices, inflation, and market concentration. The analysis considers how data governance, computing infrastructure, and financing arrangements shape the distribution of benefits and risks. Professor Ozturk also examines how labor displacement and economic insecurity may create opportunities for authoritarian populist mobilization, while AI-enabled surveillance raises concerns about democratic accountability. He advocates policies that distribute technological gains more equitably, strengthen institutional oversight, and protect household security. The central benchmark is a decent, dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and retirement.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Artificial intelligence (AI) is rapidly reshaping the global economy, offering unprecedented opportunities for productivity growth, innovation, and economic transformation while raising profound questions about inequality, financial stability, environmental sustainability, and democratic governance. As investment in AI infrastructure accelerates, the diffusion of its applications across the real economy presents complex challenges concerning employment, wages, prices, inflation, and the distribution of economic gains. While AI can expand productive capacity and reduce costs, its benefits may become concentrated among powerful firms and capital owners, potentially transferring financial and environmental burdens to households. 

These developments also raise concerns about market concentration, labor displacement, economic insecurity, and the political conditions that may facilitate authoritarian populist mobilization. Against this backdrop, this article examines the interconnected macroeconomic, distributional, financial, environmental, and institutional dimensions of AI, emphasizing the importance of effective governance, equitable access to technological benefits, and policies that protect economic security. The central challenge is ensuring that technological progress translates into shared prosperity, allowing households to maintain a decent and dependable standard of living throughout employment transitions and into retirement.

An AI system may help a worker complete a task in half the time. Who gains the other half? A firm may use the savings to lower prices, improve its product, reduce working hours, or cut its payroll. Its technology supplier may capture part of the gain through subscription fees, while shareholders benefit from higher margins. The same improvement in technical capability can therefore produce very different outcomes for workers, consumers, and investors. Those outcomes matter politically because they determine who can withstand disruption and who must depend on the discretion of employers, platforms, or public officials.

The distribution of these gains depends on two processes that unfold at different speeds. The investment cycle commits capital to data centers, chips, power, and networks before their revenues are known. The diffusion cycle depends on whether firms and public institutions can reorganize production around useful applications. Their interaction determines when costs are incurred, when productivity gains appear, and whether firms, households, or public institutions capture them.

Historical Lessons from Technological Transitions

The historical record of major technological transformations provides critical empirical and theoretical insights into the current AI trajectory. Joseph Schumpeter’s paradigm of “creative destruction” details how radical innovations continuously revolutionize the economic structure from within, destroying old industries and creating new ones. However, as Karl Polanyi famously demonstrated in his analysis of the Industrial Revolution, the expansion of the self-regulating market inflicts severe social dislocation during the transition. The pivotal political-economic question centers on the temporal duration of this transition: How long does the period of destruction last before new livelihoods emerge, and who possesses the financial resilience to endure it?

Britain’s Industrial Revolution offers a sobering historical precedent known as “Engels’ Pause.” As Allen documents, for nearly half a century after the initial adoption of industrial technologies, output per worker expanded significantly while real wages remained stagnant. Corporate profits claimed an escalating share of national income, accumulating to early industrial capitalists while working-class households suffered prolonged wage depression and deteriorating living conditions. Even if real wages eventually rise in the long run, the intergenerational timing of gains is central: workers displaced in one decade cannot feed their families on the theoretical equilibrium of a subsequent generation. Similarly, the rollout of electricity as a general-purpose technology (GPT) demonstrates that macro-level productivity acceleration requires extensive, multi-decade investments in complementary machinery, organizational workflows, and human capital. As Perez emphasizes, financial capital frequently accelerates the installation phase of new technological paradigms, driving speculative asset valuations long before real-economy productivity gains materialize. 

The central historical challenge for AI is whether public institutions, labor markets, and non-tech sectors can cultivate human-centric applications as quickly as financial markets build out computational capacity. As Acemogluargues, technological trajectories are not preordained; innovation can be explicitly directed toward augmenting human capabilities rather than merely automating labor to cut immediate payroll costs.

Productivity, Prices and the Cost of Living

The task framework developed by Acemoglu and Restrepo distinguishes between automation that displaces labor and innovation that creates new tasks for people. An occupation often contains both kinds of opportunity. A nurse may spend less time on documentation and more time with patients. A firm could instead use the saved hours to raise staffing ratios. Which outcome follows depends on management decisions, demand for services, and workers’ and service users’ ability to influence deployment. The ILO’s occupational exposure estimates accordingly help identify where tasks may change. Actual displacement depends on adoption, cost, regulation, and work organization.

Evidence of complementarity deserves attention. In a study of customer support, AI assistance raised productivity by about 15 percent on average, with larger benefits for less experienced and lower-skilled agents. Access to advice previously available mainly through experience can help workers learn and perform more complex tasks. At the same time, a firm can use the same technology to change staffing levels or monitor individual performance. A productivity increase observed in one workplace tells us what the tool achieved in that setting. The division of the gain among wages, profits, and consumers is a separate empirical question. Estimates of aggregate productivity are sensitive to the share of tasks affected, the savings actually realized, and the cost of implementation.

The aggregate effect depends on the economic weight of the tasks affected, the savings realized after implementation costs and the scale of adoption. At the firm level, faster completion of a task raises output only when the task constrains production or the resources released can be put to productive use. A hospital that reduces administrative work may be able to see more patients if staff time is the binding constraint. If beds or specialist capacity are scarce, the gain may instead appear in shorter paperwork queues or better service quality. Investment in software, training, and organizational redesign also absorbs resources during the transition.

Control over specialized chips, cloud capacity, models, and distribution channels can influence where profits accrue. Large firms can capture substantial gains when other firms depend on their infrastructure or face high switching costs. Historical evidence on superstar firms links shifts in market share toward firms with lower labor shares to the aggregate decline in labor’s share. In AI markets, the relevant competition questions concern access to inputs and the terms on which firms can switch suppliers or reach customers. Control over training data and intellectual property adds another barrier: contested access to copyrighted works and uncertain licensing terms can favor incumbents with legal and computing scale. High market valuations indicate expectations about future earnings. Evidence of durable rents requires examining realized returns, entry barriers, and the scope for competition.

A decline in unit costs can lower prices when customers have credible alternatives and firms compete for their business. The same gain can widen margins or be captured upstream by providers of models and cloud infrastructure. The effect on the cost of living depends on the prices of goods and services that households actually buy, their budget shares and their disposable incomes. Cheaper digital services may raise consumer welfare while housing, food or utility bills continue to strain household budgets. For that reason, the relevant outcome is real purchasing power after essential expenses.

The inflation effect depends on timing. During the buildout, investment can raise demand for construction, equipment and electricity before new capacity comes online. As adoption spreads, lower unit costs and greater productive capacity can ease price pressures. Stronger investment or household spending can offset part of that effect. A one-time fall in the price of a service lowers its contribution to measured inflation during the adjustment period. A sustained change in aggregate inflation depends on how supply, demand and monetary policy respond.

Data Centers, Environmental Costs and Financial Risk

Data centers make the physical demands of AI visible. New facilities require power connections, cooling, and land. Their local effects depend on the energy mix, water availability, and utility tariff design. A utility may commit to network upgrades before a facility begins operating. If the project is delayed or uses less capacity than contracted, the allocation of the resulting costs depends on the tariff and the developer’s commitments. Local authorities should distinguish temporary construction jobs from continuing employment and compare expected tax receipts with abatements and the cost of public infrastructure. The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) analysis underlines the importance of location and grid capacity when assessing data center electricity demand.

Political resistance reaches beyond immediate neighbors. In a May 2026 survey reported by Axios, 49 percent of registered voters supported a temporary moratorium on new data center construction. Among respondents opposed to data centers, 8 percent said they knew of a facility near their home. That figure measures reported awareness of proximity. In July, Navigator Research found that 65 percent of respondents in its survey of competitive congressional districts agreed with a statement accusing AI executives of using their wealth to influence politics for their own benefit. Taken together, these results are consistent with broader distrust of how the investment boom is governed. Local referendums and campaigns in the November midterms gave that distrust a political outlet. 

The scale of financing makes the distribution of risk equally important. Van Nieuwerburgh estimates that a scenario in which the United States builds 188 GW of AI capacity by 2032 would require nearly $9 trillion in investment, equivalent to about 3.2 percent of annual GDP over 2025–2032. The estimate depends on the assumed capacity and costs. Project loans, leases, joint ventures, and private credit spread funding across several parties, and their terms determine where losses fall. An investor who has yet to commit can defer spending. A leveraged project under construction can face continued interest charges while a grid connection or permit delays revenue.

Accounting depreciation spreads an asset’s recorded cost over its useful life. Investment recovery depends on cash flow, while debt maturity determines when creditors must be paid or refinanced. These schedules can diverge. A building and its power connection may serve multiple generations of equipment. Accelerators can lose economic value more quickly as newer chips become available. The project must cover operating costs and equipment replacement as well as debt service. A project that relies on a small number of tenants is also exposed to their capacity to honor commitments. If borrowing costs rise as utilization disappoints, the financing problem can become acute well before the site loses productive value.

Janeway separates the productive legacy of speculative investment from the financial consequences of its collapse. Railways, electricity networks, and fiber networks could continue to serve users after their original investors suffered losses. AI infrastructure may have a similar afterlife, although that possibility varies across power connections, buildings, and rapidly aging chips. The applications that justify investment on a social basis can take longer to spread than the contracts that finance the investment allow. The risk to the wider economy depends on who has financed the buildout and how leveraged those institutions are. Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2015) and Janeway (2026) have shown that historical asset bubbles fueled by credit tended to be followed by deeper recessions. For AI, that finding motivates scrutiny of banks’ direct and indirect exposures, including through private credit. It leaves the scale of those exposures to be established empirically.

A useful test is to compare the operator’s expected return with the project’s wider benefits and costs. The latter include productivity in sectors using AI, net employment and tax benefits in host communities, the resources drawn from local power and water systems, and the opportunity cost of public subsidies. A profitable project can impose costs on households if tariffs transfer network expenses to them. An unprofitable project can leave useful infrastructure behind. The terms of approval and financing determine how much of either outcome is shared with the public.

Electricity and water also link environmental constraints to financing. A delayed grid connection can leave a completed facility unable to earn revenue while interest continues to accrue. If the utility has already expanded capacity and the project is canceled, tariffs and contracts determine whether the developer, the utility or other ratepayers bear the cost. Water availability must be assessed at the basin level, and emissions depend on the generation mix and the power actually added to serve the load.

Income Distribution, Wealth and Economic Security

Four distributional questions follow. The first concerns wages among workers. The second concerns labor’s share of income relative to capital. The third concerns the ownership of assets that generate capital income. The fourth concerns where gains accrue geographically. An AI tool can narrow skill differences among employees while shifting income towards capital owners. The wealth effects can persist if higher capital returns are reinvested and ownership remains concentrated.

International distribution raises another issue. Countries reliant on labor-intensive exports can face weaker demand for some tasks even as firms elsewhere capture automation gains. Access to affordable computing, skills, and local infrastructure can help those countries develop their own uses. Their capacity to tax internationally mobile income also influences whether productivity gains finance public services where workers bear transition costs. US–China semiconductor controls and efforts to build sovereign AI capacity raise the cost of access for third countries, making compute dependence a new channel of geopolitical and developmental inequality. Redistribution within the economies that host the largest technology firms can leave these cross-border effects largely untouched.

Labor income, wealth and security can move in different directions. Labor’s share can decline even as some real wages rise, while higher average wages can coexist with fewer routes into stable employment. Job loss, volatile hours and insecure retirement affect people’s ability to plan and withstand shocks. A distributional assessment should therefore track real disposable income after essential expenses, exposure to income losses and pension adequacy alongside wage dispersion, labor’s share and wealth concentration.

Economic Insecurity, Surveillance and Authoritarian Populism

Workers’ ability to refuse unfavorable terms depends partly on their access to other jobs, savings, and public support. A technological shock can weaken those alternatives before it reduces headline employment. Workers may accept worse conditions because replacement seems more plausible. Younger entrants can face fewer opportunities to gain experience if employers automate the tasks through which they previously learned. The distribution of these risks matters for political trust, particularly where the costs fall on communities that already have few alternatives.

Evidence from previous waves of automation identifies one pathway. Anelli, Colantone, and Stanig find that exposure to industrial robots increased support for the radical right in their study of 13 Western European countries. The study concerns a particular kind of automation and a particular political context. It offers a mechanism to test in the AI transition. Parties can frame economic insecurity as a loss of status or control and promise protection through exclusion or personal loyalty. The strength of that appeal depends on local institutions, political organization, and the narratives that parties and media advance. The backlash against data centers likewise can lead to ordinary democratic demands for transparency and cost sharing. Opposition becomes relevant to authoritarian populism when political actors mobilize it against pluralism or use selective protection to reward supporters.

A second pathway concerns the tools available to governments. Beraja et al. document how procurement of facial recognition technology in China helped strengthen political control and supported further development of the technology. Public demand for surveillance can therefore help create a market for capabilities that reinforce the incumbent’s power. This evidence concerns a specific regime and technology. It illustrates why oversight of procurement, access to personal data, and avenues of legal challenge matter as AI spreads into public administration.

The two pathways can interact when citizens with fewer economic alternatives also face more intrusive monitoring. If access to work or public benefits is mediated by opaque scoring systems, challenging a decision may become costly for people who rely on it. Where the government controls access to benefits or tolerates selective enforcement, it can use economic insecurity to reward loyalty. Opaque models can also amplify bias in credit, hiring and public-benefit decisions, while synthetic media can lower the cost of electoral deception and weaken trust in public evidence. Rights to explanation, appeal, independent review and provenance disclosures matter because they make both automated decisions and manipulated information contestable.

Policies for Sharing Gains and Protecting Independence

The structure of the AI economy creates strong pressures toward faster wealth concentration and a more unequal distribution of income. A central question for democratic political economy is whether these pressures can coexist with a decent and dependable standard of living for the broad majority. That standard has concrete implications: households should be able to meet ordinary expenses without persistent anxiety, withstand a spell of unemployment or a temporary loss of earnings without financial distress, and look ahead to retirement with reasonable confidence. The policy test is whether people can count on that level of security throughout their lives as technological change alters the jobs and income sources on which they depend.

This distinction matters for understanding the appeal of authoritarian populism. When people lose confidence that established institutions can offer a credible path to a secure life, promises of protection from leaders who claim to speak for those left behind can gain force. A dependable income floor, backed by enforceable social rights and adequate pensions, would help restore the material basis for confidence in democratic institutions. How widely that security is shared should be a central criterion for judging the distributional consequences of the AI transition.

The immediate task is to align investment decisions with the costs they create. Utilities and regulators can require large users to cover attributable network upgrades and establish credible payment commitments if demand falls short. Local authorities can publish expected fiscal costs and benefits, assess water use in the affected basin, and tie incentives to measurable commitments. Financial supervisors need visibility into the routes by which leveraged projects can transmit losses. Separately, AI agents linked to payments, national accounts or critical infrastructure introduce operational and cyber risks: unauthorized instructions, data leakage and correlated model failures can transmit shocks even without excessive leverage. These measures clarify who bears the risk before the public is asked to absorb it.

Tax policy can then address who receives the gains. The case for reviewing the treatment of capital income and economic rents becomes stronger if automation shifts the tax base away from wages while raising demand for social protection. The design should distinguish returns needed to finance investment from rents sustained by market power or privileged access to scarce resources. The IMF staff analysis favors strengthening capital income taxation over a general tax on generative AI use. Models that find a role for taxing automation show that the result depends on transition conditions and workers’ ability to move into new occupations. International coordination can help keep mobile profits within reach of taxation, while leaving room for governments to choose how to support local adjustment.

The use of revenue is as important as its collection. Portable benefits and income support can allow workers to change jobs without losing basic security. Education systems must also prepare entrants for AI-complementary judgment, digital literacy, and transferable skills; reskilling is more valuable when it connects to actual demand, and workers can afford to take it up. Collective bargaining can give employees a say in how productivity gains translate into pay, working time, or the quality of services. Broad-based capital ownership, including through independently governed public or worker funds, could extend access to investment returns. Such arrangements require transparent rules for governance and distribution.

Public institutions also influence which applications are developed. Open procurement and access to shared computing resources can expand the pool of firms and researchers able to develop applications. Governments can use procurement to specify observable goals such as reducing administrative burdens, improving service quality, or giving professionals more time with patients and students. Risk-tiered audits, human oversight, data provenance and enforceable rights to challenge automated decisions are especially important when the public cannot choose another provider. Copyright licensing and creator remuneration should be addressed without allowing rights aggregation to entrench dominant platforms. The test is whether these arrangements increase the capacity of people and institutions to make their own decisions as they adopt the technology.

In conclusion, the AI transition will be shaped by the gap between the pace of infrastructure investment and the rate at which useful applications spread. Investment can strain power systems and balance sheets before productivity gains are realized. As those gains arrive, competition, ownership, and bargaining institutions will determine how much reaches households through prices, wages, and public services. The democratic consequences depend partly on whether people can absorb disruption without becoming dependent on discretionary protection. A credible response must link investment risk to the distribution of returns, safeguard critical systems and epistemic integrity, and preserve households’ ability to plan their lives. Without institutions that govern ownership, data, and public accountability, productivity alone cannot guarantee shared prosperity or democratic resilience.

Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK.

The Hood on Rhodes and the Politics of Moral Purification

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the controversy surrounding a planned talk by philosopher Nathan Cofnas at Oxford University’s Oriel College, following a protest in which a Ku Klux Klan hood was placed on the statue of Cecil Rhodes. Drawing on debates about academic freedom, safetyism, moral purification, and Popper’s paradox of tolerance, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores the tensions between free expression, institutional responsibility, and the protection of students from discrimination. While rejecting Cofnas’s racial hereditarianism as scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable, he distinguishes institutional endorsement from providing a platform for public debate. He argues that universities should apply consistent principles, protect legitimate protest, and encourage critical engagement rather than allowing moral disagreement alone to justify exclusion.

By João Ferreira Dias

On November 12, 2026, a Ku Klux Klan hood appeared on the statue of Cecil Rhodes above the entrance to Oriel College. Below it, a sign read “racists welcome here.” The people who placed it there were protesting against a talk by Nathan Cofnas, scheduled for November 17. Why put the hood on Rhodes? The statue gave the protesters a way to make an accusation about the college. An institution that continues to honor a British imperialist, they suggested, was acting in character when it gave Cofnas a room.

Who invited Cofnas?

Cofnas is a philosopher affiliated with Ghent University. In his public writings, he argues that genetic differences contribute to alleged differences in average intelligence between racial groups. He uses this claim to predict who would reach positions of elite status under what he considers meritocratic selection. There are two questions here. What evidence establishes a genetic explanation for differences between groups? And why should a test score carry the weight in selection that Cofnas gives it? A trait’s heritability within a population, by itself, tells us nothing about the cause of a difference between population averages. Nor would such a difference tell a university what an individual candidate deserves.

The invitation came from the Oxon Universities’ Reform Society, a student association that describes itself as linked to Reform UK. Its public announcement advertised a talk on whether diversity policies affect university hiring and academic quality, with advance booking and questions from the audience. That topic explains why Cofnas’s wider views matter to the controversy, even though the announcement leaves open whether he would present his argument about race. Oriel College described the event as a booking by a registered student society under its freedom of speech code.

A college speaks in its own name when it chooses whom to commemorate. When it makes rooms available under general rules, it exercises authority over access. Of course, Oxford’s prestige can lend weight to an invitation issued by students. That makes the terms of access and the nature of the event worth stating plainly. As Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) argue, academic freedom includes the authority of scholars to decide which work meets disciplinary standards. A political society’s invitation to an academic for a public discussion and a department’s decision to feature his research in a seminar involve different judgements.

When Disagreement Becomes a Safety Question

An open letter reported by Varsity called on Oriel to cancel the invitation or halt the event pending a published risk assessment, an independent review and safeguards for Black students and staff. At a meeting on November 11, student representatives asked how risks had been assessed. A college has a duty to take credible threats and harassment seriously. Those reports leave open what specific dangers the signatories anticipated. The question is what would justify withdrawal if the concern were that hearing Cofnas’s views would itself make students unsafe.

The term safetyism describes what happens when safety expands to override other values (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Mounk (2023) identifies a difficulty for free expression when the category of harm comes to include the expression of an objectionable view as such. There is a paradox in the intellectual background to this argument. The suspicion that prevailing accounts of truth are shaped by power can coexist with a remarkable certainty about which views others should be permitted to hear. In a university, that certainty can become paternalism. Students who might ask Cofnas to defend his premises are imagined chiefly as people who need to be shielded from them.

The hood expressed a further claim. If opening the door implicates Oriel in what Cofnas believes, closing it becomes evidence of the college’s moral rectitude. Mary Douglas’s account of pollution and social boundaries helps explain how exclusion can take on that meaning (Douglas, 1966/2002). It also helps explain why a demand for cancellation can benefit the very association it was intended to oppose. Removing the room leaves the argument circulating and gives the organizers a reason to talk about censorship instead of answering for their choice of speaker.

Who May Organize on Campus?

Oxford also has student associations on the left, including the Oxford Labour Club. The university publishes general criteria for registered societies. The harder question is whether a university can apply its rules to a society whose politics many of its members consider objectionable. Progressives may regard their own associations as morally preferable. Institutional legitimacy requires reasons that can also be applied when the people exercising authority have different political sympathies.

This is where Popper’s paradox of tolerance is useful. Popper (1945, chap. 7, note 4) considered suppression unwise while intolerant views could be met by argument and checked by public opinion. He reserved the possibility of restraint for circumstances in which movements sought to prevent argument, including through intimidation or violence. At Oxford, a society can be expected to respect the conditions of participation and contestation it claims for itself. Students must also be free to protest against its events. A request to cancel a talk is itself an exercise of expression. The college’s decision to act on that request requires its own justification.

There is a temptation to think that our generation, after a long history of arriving at better moral judgements, has reached the final version of social morality. Yet convictions about equality can be held firmly while leaving room to test what we believe follows from them. Suppose another student society invites a historian who argues that Rhodes should come down. Opponents claim that giving her a room amounts to endorsing her account of British imperialism. What would we ask Oriel to do? The rule we would accept then should also govern how the college treats the students who invited Cofnas. I find his racial hereditarianism scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable. Even if the organizers and their opponents leave with their views unchanged, other students will have had the chance to hear the claims challenged and make up their own minds. 


 

References

Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure. Penguin Press.

Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies: Vol. 1. The spell of Plato. George Routledge & Sons.

Simpson, R. M., & Srinivasan, A. (2018). “No platforming.” In: J. Lackey (Ed.), Academic freedom, (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011

Doctoral researcher Fabiola Ermer.

Fabiola Ermer: Illiberal Political Ideas Become Socially Embedded Through Less Visible Mechanisms

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Fabiola Ermer, doctoral researcher at the Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, discusses her comparative research on right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, the role of education in shaping ethno-national belonging, and the importance of looking beyond political leaders to understand how illiberal ideas become embedded in society. Examining educational programmes, transnational ideological networks, and the societal infrastructures of illiberalism, Ermer highlights the less visible mechanisms through which political narratives acquire legitimacy and become normalized. She also distinguishes illiberalism from democratic backsliding, reflects on the methodological challenges of comparative research, and emphasizes scholarly independence, international collaboration, and critical engagement with education’s role in reproducing political identities and sustaining ideological influence beyond electoral change.

Interview by Natalia Crane

In an era of democratic backsliding and increasingly interconnected illiberal movements, understanding how political ideas become embedded in society requires looking beyond electoral competition, political leaders, and formal institutions. Education, ideological networks, and the construction of national belonging constitute less visible but consequential dimensions of contemporary populism.

Fabiola Ermer is a doctoral researcher at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies and a doctoral fellow of the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Foundation (ELES). Her doctoral research examines right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, focusing on how their educational programmes for young adults contribute to the construction of ethno-national conceptions of belonging and form part of broader infrastructures of illiberalism.

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Ermer reflects on the development of her academic interests, the relationship between populism and democracy, and the methodological challenges of comparative research. She also discusses international academic collaboration, education’s role in reproducing political ideas, and the mechanisms through which political narratives become socially embedded.

Drawing on comparative research in Israel and Hungary, Ermer emphasizes the importance of studying the ideological infrastructures operating between governments and society. “We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders,” she argues, calling for closer examination of how political ideas acquire institutional durability and social legitimacy.

Central to her research is the recognition that education is not inherently democratic or emancipatory. As Ermer explains, “education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging.” She therefore encourages researchers to examine who provides education, which values are communicated, and how educational programmes relate to broader political structures.

Ermer also challenges the tendency to equate illiberalism with democratic backsliding, emphasizing the analytical distinction between rejecting liberal values and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Her comparative approach highlights how think tanks, transnational networks, and educational initiatives contribute to constructing the boundaries of political belonging.

Regarding scholarly responsibility, she advocates methodological transparency, analytical independence, and greater public engagement. Researchers, she argues, should “make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context.”

Ermer hopes her research will illuminate “the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion,” offering a perspective on the societal foundations of illiberalism and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Interview with Fabiola Ermer lightly edited for clarity and flow.

From Israel’s Judicial Reform to Comparative Research on Hungary

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to your studies, and why do you believe these areas of research are particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Fabiola Ermer: Thanks for the invitation again. I’m currently a PhD student at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and also at Heidelberg University. I’m supervised by two professors: Professor Johannes Becke, who is based at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and Professor Dani Filc, who is a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel.

I studied Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Semitic Languages, mostly in Germany, in Düsseldorf and Heidelberg. My interest in this particular topic, and in Israel and Hungary, actually started with an internship in Israel in 2023, before October 7. At that time, judicial reform dominated public and political debates in Israel. There were constant comparisons with Orbán’s judicial changes in Hungary. I became increasingly intrigued by this, and I was looking for a topic for my master’s thesis. I thought it was a perfect opportunity because it was such a current issue. So, I asked whether Hungary could serve as a role model for an illiberal transformation in Israel.

To make it very short, Orbán’s mechanisms would have been quite difficult to replicate in Israel for several reasons. One important difference is that Israel has no constitution, whereas Hungary’s constitutional changes in 2012 played a major role in its transformation.

What I realized while researching was how closely connected many actors, especially those on the right-wing spectrum, were between Hungary and Israel. They were working together, sharing interests, and organizing conferences together. I became very interested in the topic and decided that I wanted to pursue a PhD in this field, maintaining the comparison between Hungary and Israel.

Now I’m researching how right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary use educational programmes, mostly for young adults, to construct ethno-national conceptions of belonging. I’m also asking how and why these programmes may become part of a broader infrastructure of illiberalism. I’m not saying that they are the reason illiberalism is happening, but they are one element within a much broader process.

Populism, Illiberalism, and the Construction of Belonging

Your doctoral research examines think tanks in Israel and Hungary, particularly their role in shaping political and civic understandings of the people. How does your work intersect with broader debates in populism studies? How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved since you began your academic career?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m working mostly with a broad approach to populism, particularly the definition by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. They define populism as a thin-centered ideology that sees society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people” and the corrupt elite. It holds that politics should express the general will of the people. This approach is useful for me because it focuses on the content, which is exactly what I’m researching: how actors construct the idea of “the pure people” and, in this case, who belongs and who is excluded.

However, I’m not actually looking at leaders or campaigns. I’m looking more at the structures behind them, such as think tanks and educational programmes. In my framework, populism is therefore one element rather than the whole story. I’m working with four connected dimensions. The first is illiberalism and democratic backsliding as a broader process. The second is ethno-national and national-populist construction. The third is content and hegemony, particularly in a Gramscian sense. And the fourth is education as the medium through which these ideas are transmitted.

I would say that my understanding has changed. Before, I was more focused on how populism is articulated through governments and at the governmental level. Now I’m looking at it from different perspectives. I remember reading about the idea that populism works along a vertical axis, with the people positioned against the elite, while nationalism works along a horizontal axis. I’m essentially combining these two axes. I’ve realized that it isn’t always easy to define them strictly as two separate groups. They are much more interconnected. I think that’s where my understanding has changed most over the last year. I’ve just finished my first year of PhD research, so everything is still developing, but that is probably the biggest shift in my thinking about populism.

The Relationship Between Populism and Democracy

Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Given your research, which theoretical debates would you consider most consequential for the future of the field? What misconceptions about populism, illiberalism, and democratic backsliding do you encounter most frequently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most important debates we are still facing, both in academia and in public discussions, concerns the relationship between populism and democracy. We need to ask how we deal with populism and to what extent it can even nurture democracy by raising questions that might otherwise not be asked. However, especially now, with increasing polarization, illiberal actors are managing more and more to present themselves as the true defenders of democracy, mostly understood through elections and majority rule. Courts, liberal elites, and supranational institutions, such as the European Union, are increasingly framed as obstacles imposed from above.

To connect this, I think of Adam Przeworski, whose work I really admire. He discusses one of the key questions we face when defending democracy: Are we defending democracy itself, or the values we personally attach to it? And what happens when different people attach different values to democracy? This is where the tension between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy becomes much more decisive. From a minimalist perspective, the erosion of liberal safeguards may become visible much later, when democratic backsliding is already happening. Hungary was quite a good example of this. There may now be a change, but it is still far too early to say whether there will be a shift from minimalist to maximalist ideas of democracy.

As for misconceptions, I think one of the most common ones, especially in public debate rather than academia, is that illiberalism and democratic backsliding are treated as synonymous. But technically, they are not the same. Democratic backsliding refers to the deterioration of democratic qualities, such as less competitive elections or restricted participation. We have seen this in Hungary and Serbia, for example. Illiberalism itself refers to the rejection of liberal values. From a minimalist understanding of democracy, an illiberal system may still be considered a valid form of democracy, even if it is not necessarily the form of democracy we personally want. This also raises the question of whether liberal democracy is the only form of democracy we should defend, or whether it is a more Western idea that we sometimes try to impose on systems that may work differently.

Another misconception is that we focus too much on governmental levels and not enough on the population or the actors behind governments. These actors still receive comparatively little attention.

Methodological Challenges in Comparing Israel and Hungary

How do you operationalize populism in your research? What challenges arise when comparing different national contexts, such as Hungary and Israel? And how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m still working on my methodology, so there are some things that are changing. At the moment, I have a qualitative and comparative research design, with the individual organization as the unit of comparison. Instead of measuring populism quantitatively, I’m combining two procedures with separate tasks. One is a structured qualitative content analysis, which captures what the programmes actually communicate.

I have four main categories: the construction of the people, identity and belonging, concepts of democracy, and enemies and demarcations. These are closely connected to the populist narrative of “us versus them.” Another important category is the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland, which is relevant to both Israel and Hungary, although in different ways.

The subcategories I will use are likely to be developed from the material itself. In addition, I’m using discourse-analytical reading to capture how meaning is produced, particularly through language, metaphors, and implicit assumptions that make belonging appear natural and apolitical.

One of the main challenges is that both political systems are changing. Another is that the two cases are neither a most-similar nor a most-different design, so I had to look more closely at what makes them comparable in a qualitative analysis. I think I’ve now figured out how to frame this well enough for my PhD. I’m using the distinction between ethnic belonging and formal citizenship, which is anchored in the legal frameworks of both countries. Israel does not have a constitution, but it has a Basic Law with a somewhat ambiguous constitutional character. The distinction is also anchored in the Hungarian constitution. That is where the two cases are most similar. 

They differ, however, in how they draw their boundaries. Following other political scientists, Israel can be classified as an ethnic democracy. We also see this in other countries, such as Slovakia and Estonia. Hungary, on the other hand, is not generally considered an ethnic democracy. It is one of the most homogeneous countries in the European Union. Its inclusive boundary extends to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, such as Slovakia and Romania, while its exclusive boundary is drawn against more constructed threats. That is one of the limitations I have to deal with when comparing the two systems.

Do you plan to conduct fieldwork in these countries, particularly by speaking with people about ethnic belonging and related issues?

Fabiola Ermer: I do. The question now is whether I might shift more towards interviews. The difficulty with my research is that I won’t be able to make claims about the effects of these programmes. It would be too broad, and I don’t think it would be academically rigorous to say that someone attended classes at a think tank for a year, for example, and consequently developed more illiberal ideas. I can’t really speak about that effect. 

Instead, I’m looking more at why people, such as the heads of organizations, construct these courses in particular ways. Why are certain topics included? Even the names of subjects and the literature used to frame them can already provide hints. For example, in the Hungarian case, when organizations offer classes about Hungarian minorities, they may use Hungarian terminology for countries that have not been part of Hungary for more than a hundred years. That already communicates a particular idea before the lecture even begins. So, I will conduct fieldwork in the sense that I will speak with people and try to gather as much material as possible.

Digital Research and the Importance of Archiving

Social Media
Photo: Sujin Surakoon / Dreamstime.

The study of populism and contemporary political movements increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. Given the importance of political communication and transnational networks in your area of research, what role have these tools played in your own work? How might they help scholars better understand political ideas and the development of movements?

Fabiola Ermer: Computational methods are not necessarily at the center of my methodology, but digital work matters in a different way. I actually didn’t expect this before, but with the changes in Hungary, I’ve become quite experienced in archiving websites. Websites and programmes are often digitalized, and they are among the most important sources for my research. When I want to understand how a class is framed beforehand, for example, and an organization has a Moodle course, I would really like to know how that course is presented. However, with the political changes, some materials are disappearing, particularly when organizations come under political pressure. So, I’ve started archiving relevant websites at regular intervals and working with earlier versions through web archives.

In general, digital methods have expanded considerably. They make it possible to analyze communication across large datasets and trace how messages travel across networks and platforms, sometimes even across countries and continents. But I think we need to be careful not to treat digital visibility directly as political influence. There are many more factors involved. Social media data tell us a lot about communication and mobilization, and they help us identify certain trends. But they do not necessarily tell us how ideas become embedded in institutions or in everyday understandings of society.

There is also the danger of being in certain bubbles all the time. Ideas can suddenly seem more natural, or it can seem as though everybody is saying something, when in reality, you’re only seeing a small bubble that appears much bigger than it is. Nevertheless, I don’t think any academic research field can ignore digital methods completely. They are important sources of data, but we should approach them carefully and make sure to bring other perspectives into the analysis.

Unexpected Discoveries and Changing Research Assumptions

What has been the most surprising finding in your work so far? Have you encountered any evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions or shifted your thinking?

Fabiola Ermer: When I started my PhD, Hungary was still under Orbán’s government, while the Israeli political system was relatively stable, despite the elections and other developments. There was nothing fundamentally changing in the way we have now seen in Hungary. Orbán still had a two-thirds majority and was firmly in power. I think even many political scientists in Hungary would not have expected Magyar to win with such a strong majority in April.

One of my hypotheses was that institutions, once established, could endure even through political changes, particularly if they had been in place for a long time. But I hadn’t really considered what would happen if one two-thirds-majority system shifted into another two-thirds-majority system. With new legislation, defunding, and the creation of new foundations in Hungary, everything became very chaotic. That was one of my main surprises. Perhaps I should have considered it beforehand, but it was so hypothetical that even in April, many people thought such a fundamental change was unlikely.

Another interesting discovery came from comparing the organizations themselves. I’m currently looking at two or three Israeli think tanks, mostly on the right-wing spectrum, that are structured somewhat similarly to the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary. They offer classes for young adults, mostly between 18 and 26, with the aim of building a new intellectual elite.

What I found particularly interesting was how differently these organizations are structured. Hungary has, in a way, perfected the model of putting everything under one roof: a think tank, an educational sector, and other activities within one institution. In Israel, these activities are more divided between different think tanks, but the organizations are still closely connected. They may have the same lecturers or receive funding from the same organizations.

At first, I wasn’t sure whether this asymmetry would be a problem for comparing the cases. But after discussing it with my supervisor, I decided to approach it as two distinct modes of hegemonic articulation: direct pedagogical formation on one side and mediated ideological dissemination on the other.

I was also surprised by how little political foundations, and their non-governmental activities have been researched. We know quite a lot about institutions such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium and their role within the Orbán regime, but there is still much less research on what they actually do at the non-governmental level. This is important because democratic backsliding and illiberalism do not necessarily happen only at the highest political level. They can also develop at an intermediary level, between the population and the government.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics

Viktor Orbán campaign poster ahead of Hungary’s 2026 elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

Populism often operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation campaigns and contested narratives. Do you foresee these dynamics affecting your ability to collect data, access reliable resources, and conduct research? How do you navigate politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor and analytical distance?

Fabiola Ermer: These dynamics have mainly affected the actors I’m researching. Internal teaching materials are particularly difficult to obtain, especially when they belong to organizations operating in a system that is undergoing political change. The situation in the Hungarian parliament is still quite heated and polarized, and access requests are currently being declined, often without any explanation.

Some of the materials in the Israeli cases are also difficult to obtain. Think tanks are generally not very willing to share their materials, and the broader polarization of the Israeli political system, as well as the international context, makes this even more complicated. Everything seems to be becoming more exclusive, and organizations are less willing to include outsiders.

Another substantive challenge is that the organizations I’m studying sometimes describe their work in ideological terms. Some openly state what they want to achieve, which can make certain questions easier to answer. But when programmes are presented as civic education, leadership training, or academic excellence, it becomes more difficult to understand their underlying purpose. I also don’t think it is academically sound to assume that because an organization describes its work in a certain way, that is necessarily what happens in practice. That’s why I’m trying to look more closely at why these programmes are constructed, not only how they are constructed.

With polarization more generally, I think it will become increasingly difficult for scholars to access materials. People are also becoming less willing to talk to those who may not share their ideas or worldviews, and this affects journalists and researchers alike.

The Responsibility of Scholars in Public Debate

When controversial topics such as populism generate intense public debate, do you believe scholars have a responsibility not only to produce research but also to intervene in these discussions? How can academics communicate complex findings to policymakers, journalists, civil society, and broader audiences?

Fabiola Ermer: Scholars have a responsibility to take part in public debate, especially when political concepts are used in simplified or highly polarized ways. However, I wouldn’t say our task is necessarily to provide political solutions. We are more the people who provide the facts and the analytical perspective.

The most important thing is that we are able to make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context. I feel that this is actually a problem in political science. We talk so much about theory that people outside the field, or even people who work in a different academic discipline, sometimes ask themselves: What is actually happening? We need to adapt more to different settings and accept that each format requires something different. Policy advice is fundamentally different from writing about elections for a political journal or having a discussion within a political party and explaining what is happening in a particular country. Each format requires something different. In general, an audience needs a clear argument and a concrete example, so we should make our work as accessible as possible.

I think this is also one reason why populist narratives can be so effective. They are often very simple: they do this, everything else is bad, and we are here. There is no room for anything in between. But there are people in between, and we need to explain why things are not as simple as they may appear. This is where academia should intervene more. At the same time, academia should remain a place where fundamental disagreements can be discussed openly and where discussions are based on evidence and argument.

The debates surrounding Israel, in particular, show how polarization can reach into academic agenda-setting. It can affect which questions are considered legitimate and which perspectives are heard. We should not allow political positions to determine in advance which questions can even be asked. People sometimes misunderstand academia as a place where researchers are necessarily political activists. That can be true for some individuals, but academia should remain grounded in facts, evidence, and arguments rather than feelings.

The Broader Impact of Research on Democracy and Education

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Beyond academic publications and your doctoral thesis, what kind of impact would you ideally like your research to have? How would you like scholarly work to contribute to our understanding of democratic challenges while avoiding becoming politicized itself?

Fabiola Ermer: Ideally, I would like my research to help explain how illiberal ideas become established beyond formal institutions. Democratic backsliding is still usually studied through constitutional reforms, judicial independence, or electoral cycles. All of these things matter, of course, but we also need to understand the societal infrastructures that make such challenges possible or acceptable. That’s where I would really like to contribute. With the Hungarian case, my research is also shifting towards a new question: How durable are these infrastructures once they have become well established? And how durable are they when there is an actual change in government or a fundamental political transformation?

The topic of education is also very personal to me. I would like to encourage a more critical perspective on education because, especially in Western democracies, education is often assumed to be democratic or emancipatory by nature. But we tend to forget that education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging. I don’t want to say that every politically oriented programme is inherently problematic. That’s not what I’m trying to argue. It is important, however, to pay attention to who provides education, which values it communicates, and how it relates to wider political structures. We should also ask why people feel the need to seek out alternative educational infrastructures rather than considering the existing government structures sufficient.

Regarding politicization, it is quite difficult to avoid it completely with my topic. But, in the end, I’m conducting academic research, and I distinguish between political advocacy and academic intervention. Research can contribute to democratic debate by making the mechanisms in both countries visible and hopefully providing evidence. But I’m not telling people what they should think. I’m stating what I have found, and then it is up to them to process that information.

The best protection I know is to be transparent about your methods, your materials, and the limitations of your research. It is also important to take seriously evidence that contradicts your expectations or even your results. In science, it is entirely possible that in ten years everything will have changed so fundamentally that our current findings no longer hold. But they are relevant to the period we are studying now.

International Collaboration and Academic Exchange

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and transnational initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research, professional development, and intellectual outlook? How important are international dimensions to your work?

Fabiola Ermer: As you said, my whole project is international by design. It is co-supervised in Israel, and my co-supervisor primarily researches right-wing populism in Israel. He has already become a very important reference for me. This has shaped certain narratives, questions, and programmes that I’m looking at, particularly in the Israeli context. But it also means constantly moving between two academic environments, with different debates and assumptions.

What I learned quite quickly is that scholars are generally very open to helping if you ask them. Although I’m based in Germany, I speak with professors in Hungary and researchers in Israel. Even when you spend only a few weeks in a country and engage with people there, you can gain new insights, challenge assumptions, make connections, and meet people. Everybody knows someone who might be able to help, and that’s a great benefit of academia.

I also attended the ECPS Summer School, and it was a good example of this. We worked on a policy paper or policy advice in an interdisciplinary group, with people whose backgrounds were very different from my own. It encouraged communication across disciplines and helped us think in policy terms. I found it very enriching, and the connections we made continued even after the course finished. These international connections and regular opportunities to discuss ongoing work help prevent projects from becoming too narrow or one-sided.

To return to populism, it is generally a transnational phenomenon. The actors themselves work across borders, particularly when we look at right-wing networks. Studying populism therefore also requires transnational exchange.

Challenges Facing Early-Career Researchers

US Dollar
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.

Are there any personal or professional challenges you have faced while pursuing your research, particularly as an early-career scholar? What has enabled you to overcome these challenges? Has working on politically sensitive subjects presented any additional difficulties?

Fabiola Ermer: In general, one of the biggest challenges when starting a PhD or becoming an early-career researcher is the financial aspect. I’m very lucky to have a scholarship now, but in the beginning, there is a period when you don’t know whether your research will actually be financed or whether the funding will be sufficient.

For me, the first six months were particularly challenging because I was trying to obtain a scholarship and applying for different opportunities. Applications are very time-consuming, especially because every foundation wants something different. You write and rewrite applications, and sometimes you suddenly need another recommendation letter when you thought two would be enough.

Another challenge is balancing theoretical ambition with empirical feasibility. My project touches on so many theoretical dimensions: populism, illiberalism, democratic backsliding, nationalism, and education. At some point, it becomes tempting to cover everything, but that’s simply not possible. You sometimes have to overcome your own perfectionism and accept that you need to focus on a particular subject, even if there are many other interesting things you would like to explore. Otherwise, you could easily end up with enough material for several PhDs.

In the beginning, I wanted to compare three countries. Austria was one of the cases I considered because it offered a different ethno-national conception from Israel and Hungary. I thought it would be interesting to include a third case to show the contrast. But I realized quite quickly that the differences would make the comparison very difficult. Focusing on Israel and Hungary would actually make the project stronger.

I think that not losing focus is one of the most challenging things, at least based on my first year of experience. There are so many interesting things happening that it is easy to get lost in the details and become overwhelmed.

The Most Rewarding Aspects of Academic Research

What has been the most rewarding aspect of your work so far during your first year? Is there anything you would approach differently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most rewarding things has been starting to feel that people are actually interested in what I’m doing. I’ve been invited to talk about my research, present my ideas, and exchange views with other researchers.

Over the last year, I was invited to speak about the Hungarian system and the changes taking place there. Previously, I had been looking more at right-wing networks in Hungary and how they cooperate with other networks globally. It was really great to be invited and to have people interested in hearing me talk about it. I felt very honored.

I’m also grateful that I can work on something I’m genuinely interested in. I have to admit that when I first started studying Political Science, I hated it. I really didn’t like it. Perhaps I was too young when I started, but many things didn’t make sense to me, particularly political theory and democratic theory. That changed during my master’s degree. Now I’m doing my PhD in this field, and I genuinely look forward to reading and working on these topics. I think being able to work in a field that interests me so much is one of the best things I could have.

If I could start again, I would try to work more systematically with my materials from the beginning. I’m still at an early stage, so I have time to improve things, but the Hungarian case has become particularly challenging because of all the political changes. I suddenly have to archive as much material as possible, as quickly as possible.

I would also have liked to understand earlier that a dissertation does not need to address an enormous number of questions. It needs to address two or three fundamental questions that are important for the research and that ultimately help develop a clear and convincing argument.

Scholars and Ideas That Have Influenced Her Research

Professor Adam Przeworski.
Professor Adam Przeworski is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU).

Are there any particular scholars, theoretical traditions, books, or experiences that have fundamentally shaped your thinking about populism, ethno-nationalism, democratic backsliding, or the relationship between education and politics?

Fabiola Ermer: So far, the most important experience was probably the internship I had in Israel in 2023. That’s where everything started to develop, and I’m pretty sure I wouldn’t have chosen this topic if I hadn’t been there at that particular time.

My supervisors have also been very influential, especially my first supervisor. He brought me back into the political science part of my research when I presented my first draft for what would become my master’s thesis. He later encouraged me to pursue a PhD and supported me throughout the process.

On a theoretical level, Adam Przeworski has been particularly important. He’s a Polish political scientist who has lived in the United States for decades. His distinction between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy is quite simple and logical when you first read it. But it changed a lot for me, especially in terms of the question of what we do with people who attach different values to democracy. It changed not only how I approached my own research topic but also how I engage with political debates when presenting my research and encountering different ideas.

It’s such a fundamental question: how do we deal with people who attach different values to democracy? Perhaps this is also one reason why we are becoming more polarized. We have started to neglect the question of how to deal with different values, and we sometimes assume that the values we attach to democracy are the only ones that matter. Przeworski essentially framed much of the theoretical framework of my PhD.

Other influential scholars include Fareed Zakaria, who helped popularize the distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism, as well as Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, particularly their work on formal and informal institutions.

For the Israeli context, the concept of ethnic democracy has also been important, particularly how it is understood in different countries and compared with European contexts. My second supervisor’s work on how Jewish populism has changed over the centuries has also influenced how I developed my own thinking.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Scholars

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do you believe young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering populism studies?

Fabiola Ermer: There are quite a few things, although I’m still figuring them out myself. First, it’s important to be very precise about the definitions you use at the beginning of your research. You need to clearly explain what a concept captures and what it doesn’t. Rather than adopting a new term on every page, you should be clear about the concepts you’re working with.

I also think language skills are extremely important. We live in a world that is so globally connected, and even with AI and translation tools, linguistic skills remain essential. You can understand so many more nuances when you know the language and understand why a particular word is being used instead of another. This is particularly important in populism studies because different forms of populism can be quite subtle. When you’re not researching in your native language, having at least some basic language skills can be extremely helpful.

If there is an opportunity to receive a scholarship or participate in an academic exchange, I would also encourage researchers to spend time in the country they are studying and immerse themselves in its context. That’s one of the best skills we can develop.

Finally, being able to ask for help is an important skill. During bachelor’s and master’s programmes, you’re often expected to work independently, and it may not feel natural to approach your professors with questions all the time. But during a PhD, the expectations change. People ask why you didn’t seek help earlier. It’s important to develop the habit of asking questions and seeking guidance early, rather than continuing in one direction without knowing whether it is the right one.

The Future of Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention than they currently receive?

Fabiola Ermer: From an academic perspective, I’m quite optimistic that the topic won’t disappear. We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders. We should ask more systematically how these ideas become embedded, rather than simply describing that they are becoming embedded.

Transnational networks are another important area. There are increasingly more mapping studies, and this kind of research will continue to develop. Social media also helps connect people globally and can facilitate the spread of populist narratives.

Another question that deserves more attention is what happens when populist governments lose power. Why do people become dissatisfied with the ideas these governments promote? Are they dissatisfied because those governments were populist, or are there other reasons why they decide to vote them out? We should also ask what happens to the infrastructures built during those years. Do they disappear, adapt, move somewhere else, or remain in the background? I think we will have more case studies to explore these questions, and they will become increasingly important.

We are also seeing populism become a much more prominent part of political debates in Western European countries. It will be interesting to compare countries where populist governments are losing power with those where populist movements are gaining influence.

The times are changing very quickly, and developments can be quite surprising. But these are some of the directions in which populism studies could develop.

Looking Beyond Israel and Hungary

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? Would you be interested in expanding your comparative research beyond Israel and Hungary or exploring other dimensions of transnational national-conservative networks? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Fabiola Ermer: I would actually like to continue working on both countries, perhaps not necessarily as a direct comparison, but within a broader comparative project on how ideas of national belonging are transmitted across borders.

I would also like to focus more on diaspora programmes, transnational political networks, and how these different elements work together. This is particularly interesting in the Israeli case, but perhaps even more significant in Hungary, where these ideas are much more deeply embedded. For example, the whole idea of mystifying or romanticizing Hungarian history, and how that has become embedded in Hungarian society, is something I find very interesting. This is one of the lasting effects of the Orbán regime. The idea of Treaty of Trianon has become much more visible over the last fourteen years. You can see it in monuments standing in small villages, including those near Hungary’s former borders. It is very visible, and it also plays a role in how the idea of the people is constructed.

There is a similar phenomenon in Israel, although it operates in a different and less pronounced way.

I would really like to research the broader idea of romanticizing history and how it is narrated through political contexts. There are so many connected dimensions that could also be explored, such as how schoolbooks are designed and which vocabulary is used. These things are closely connected to my current topic, but there are so many nuances that I cannot examine all of them at the moment without making the project far too broad.

Ultimately, my hope is that my work can contribute to understanding the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion, and how these mechanisms shape the transformations taking place in our democracies today.

Professor Frances E. Lee.

Prof. Frances E. Lee: I Anticipate Very Hardball Politics in the US Over the Next Two Years

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Frances E. Lee of Princeton University examines the implications of the November 2026 US midterm elections, which delivered Democratic majorities in both chambers of Congress. Challenging interpretations of Trump’s presidency as consolidated competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee argues that authoritarian ambitions have encountered significant institutional constraints, particularly decentralized election administration, federalism, and judicial independence. While warning that Trump’s expansive use of emergency and tariff powers has exposed constitutional vulnerabilities, she emphasizes the importance of congressional oversight and bipartisan accountability. Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic coalition can survive his departure, even as populist rhetoric remains influential. Despite Democratic electoral gains, she anticipates continued polarization and intense partisan confrontation: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

The November 2026 US midterm elections delivered a significant political setback for President Donald Trump, with Democrats securing majorities in both chambers of Congress. Driven partly by public dissatisfaction with inflation, rising prices, and the cost of living, the results underscored the continuing relevance of electoral accountability while raising fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, institutional resilience, and the future of authoritarian populism. With divided government returning in January 2027, the next two years will test Congress’s capacity to constrain presidential power and restore institutional accountability.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Frances E. Lee, Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, jointly appointed in Princeton University’s Department of Politics and School of Public and International Affairs, offers a nuanced assessment of Trump’s electoral defeat and its implications for American democracy. Drawing on her research into congressional politics, party competition, and institutional constraints, Professor Lee challenges interpretations that equate authoritarian ambitions with successful democratic capture.

Addressing the debate over competitive authoritarianism, Professor Lee distinguishes between the administration’s attempts to undermine democratic institutions and its actual capacity to manipulate electoral competition. Despite serious concerns about attacks on civil society, universities, due process, and the rule of law, she emphasizes that “what the administration attempted to do looked like something straight out of the authoritarian playbook. But what it actually achieved was far more limited.”

Central to this resilience, Professor Lee argues, is America’s decentralized electoral system. State and local control over election administration prevented Republicans from changing electoral rules nationwide, even amid unprecedented mid-cycle redistricting efforts. As she explains, “A key source of that resilience is the decentralization of the US electoral system.” Federalism, judicial independence, and presidential term limits provide additional barriers against authoritarian consolidation.

Yet institutional resilience does not eliminate constitutional vulnerabilities. Professor Lee warns that Trump’s expansive interpretation of emergency authorities and tariff powers has exposed previously unrecognized weaknesses. She urges Congress to “rein in presidential emergency powers” by imposing time limits and reconsidering executive authorities that have enabled presidential overreach. She also advocates restraint in congressional investigations, emphasizing the greater credibility of bipartisan oversight.

Looking toward 2028, Professor Lee questions whether Trump’s personalistic political coalition can survive without its founder. “It may be that the Trump movement has reached its limits,” she observes. Nevertheless, populist rhetoric, anti-establishment appeals, and impatience with liberal-democratic constraints remain deeply embedded in American politics.

Finally, Professor Lee cautions against interpreting Democratic electoral gains as the beginning of partisan reconciliation. Given the continuing intensity of party competition and Republicans’ expectations of recovering power, she predicts: “I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.” Her analysis thus presents American democracy as simultaneously resilient, institutionally vulnerable, and politically polarized.

Here is our interview with Professor Frances E. Lee, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

America’s Decentralized Electoral System Is a Source of Democratic Resilience

Source: BBC.

Professor Lee, thank you for joining us. In your September 2026 article, Normal Politics Under Stress, you predicted that the midterms would follow conventional electoral patterns. Following the Democrats’ victories in both chambers, does the outcome simply confirm your expectations, or does it reveal something more significant about American democracy’s resilience against authoritarian populism? 

Professor Frances E. Lee: The election outcomes conform to historical norms. You would have expected the president’s party to lose seats in Congress, given that it was a midterm election and the president’s approval ratings were low. In fact, the president’s party lost roughly the number of seats you would expect based on his approval rating.

Everything proceeded as normal. The elections were held on time, their administration went smoothly, and the results were accepted afterward, with losing candidates conceding. It looked like a normal election. But, of course, the circumstances were not normal. There was considerable anxiety about potential election interference and whether the president would acknowledge his party’s defeat, given his history of refusing to accept adverse election results.

In the lead-up to the elections, the president’s party made a major effort across the country to insulate itself from electoral reversal. This included attempts to gerrymander and redraw congressional district boundaries to reduce the number of seats it was expected to lose in the midterms. This was far outside the norms of American politics. We had never seen this level of change to the electoral system in the middle of a census cycle. Normally, redistricting takes place once every ten years, but these changes were clearly undertaken with the upcoming elections in mind. There were therefore substantial reasons for concern. Nevertheless, the elections proceeded normally. Judging solely by the outcomes, you would never know that anything out of the ordinary had occurred.

What does this tell us? I would argue that there is significant institutional resilience against efforts to stack the deck in favor of one party or another. A key source of that resilience is the decentralization of the US electoral system. The party in power had no mechanism through which it could change the rules of the game nationwide.

Instead, President Trump could pressure states that already leaned Republican to redraw their district boundaries, and some did. But there was less to be gained from this because Republicans already performed well in those states. Meanwhile, he could not persuade Democratic-leaning states to redraw their districts to his advantage. In fact, they did the opposite. California, for example, redrew its district boundaries to benefit Democrats and counter what the administration was doing.

This decentralization makes it impossible for a party holding power at the national level to control the electoral process sufficiently to protect itself against electoral reversal. It is a form of institutional resilience that political scientists do not necessarily favor because the absence of national standards can create problems for election administration. Nevertheless, it is also a source of strength because it protects the electoral system against manipulation.

Trump’s Authoritarian Tactics Have Had Limited Electoral Impact

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way have characterized the United States under Trump as a form of competitive authoritarianism. You have questioned this assessment, particularly regarding electoral fairness. Does the 2026 outcome undermine their argument, or can democratic backsliding persist despite an opposition electoral victory?

Professor Frances E. Lee: In assessing the claim that the US has become a competitive authoritarian regime, I would distinguish between what the party in power, or a president, attempts to do and what they can actually achieve in terms of shifting the balance of power in the electoral arena.

There has been considerable pressure on civil society since the administration took office in 2025. We have seen federal funding used as leverage to induce compliance among civil society organizations, universities, and researchers, as well as immigration enforcement used to suppress debate on college campuses. These actions and the pressure exerted by the administration are troubling. Due process has not been respected, and the rule of law has been disregarded in numerous ways. Many of these issues are still being litigated, but the courts are simply too slow to effectively police such actions. These are serious concerns, and they are precisely what Levitsky, Way, and Ziblatt emphasize most strongly.

However, the question is whether these actions actually have the power to tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the governing party. Here, I think the case is much weaker. When the administration pressures news organizations and threatens them through the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), there remains a wide range of media beyond its regulatory reach, including social media and online discussion. Even if we focus exclusively on mainstream broadcast media, they continue to be highly critical of the administration. It receives relatively little positive news coverage, as was documented during Trump’s first administration and is being documented again. In other words, the administration continues to face criticism.

Civil society also remains vibrant. Numerous organizations oppose the administration, and many states are governed by Democrats, the party opposing the president. So, there is still a free-for-all in public debate. Political discourse is not controlled in any meaningful sense.

Moreover, the election was decided largely by issues voters could experience directly, such as rising prices, inflation, and gas prices. These reactions do not require elaborate discussion in the news media. People were frustrated by their everyday experiences and responded by voting against the administration. Ultimately, the administration experienced the electoral reversal normally expected in midterm elections. In many cases, what the administration attempted to do looked like something straight out of the authoritarian playbook. But what it actually achieved was far more limited.

Trump Still Holds Extraordinary Power Over Republican Political Careers

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In your research on the post-2020 Republican Party, you emphasize how congressional Republicans maintained institutional autonomy while avoiding direct confrontation with Trump. Will the 2026 defeat weaken Trump’s dominance over the Republican Party, or could Trumpism survive independently of his electoral fortunes?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The 2026 election outcomes undoubtedly weaken President Trump in some respects within his own party. It’s clear that his low approval rating was an electoral liability for Republicans. Many incumbents lost because of their association with the president, which harmed their electoral prospects and made it harder for them to win the November general elections.

Another factor is that Trump cannot run for president again. We’re now past the midterm elections of his final term, so the Republican Party must begin looking toward succession. That will increasingly preoccupy members of Congress over time. Both factors weaken the president’s position. The question is how strong Trump’s support remains among voters who still identify with the Republican Party. Congressional Republicans still need those voters. They cannot afford to alienate Trump supporters in their constituencies because they depend on them for their own electoral standing.

This brings us to Trump’s influence over Republican primaries. He has ended the careers of many congressional Republicans, demonstrating an ability that exceeds what we normally see from presidents. Typically, presidents do not succeed in purging their parties of internal opponents to the extent that Trump has. Congressional Republicans will therefore remain attentive to that influence. Nevertheless, Trump’s power is waning because of the constitutional limit on his presidency and the party’s increasing focus on the 2028 election.

America’s Political Parties Remain Vulnerable to Populist Takeovers

In “Populism and the American Party System,” you argue that American institutions constrain organized populist parties while leaving mainstream parties vulnerable to populist insurgencies. Does the Republican Party’s experience under Trump demonstrate the enduring strength or the limits of these institutional constraints?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I would say it’s both. Trump illustrates both the power of populism and its limits. The US system of open primaries is highly vulnerable to populist takeover. To take control of one of the national parties, all you need to do is win the presidential primary by being more appealing than the other candidates in the race. Trump’s success demonstrates that this path remains open to other populists. Others tried it before him, but Trump succeeded where they failed.

Nothing closes off that path, and it is available in both parties. There is also good reason to believe it remains viable in terms of voter preferences. If you listened to the discourse during the 2026 elections, you heard candidates from both parties using considerable populist rhetoric. There was widespread denunciation of the establishment as out of touch. This kind of language pits the establishment against the people and positions the speaker on the side of the people. All these traditional populist tropes were very much in evidence during the 2026 midterms. So, there is still a strong appetite for populism among the American electorate. That path remains open, and there is reason to believe it can succeed. Both establishment parties remain deeply unpopular, leaving them vulnerable to someone like Trump in the future.

Nevertheless, the institutional constraints remain real. At the constitutional level, these include federalism, the importance of the states, and the fact that winning power at the national level is not sufficient to govern. Judicial independence is another constraint. Judicial checks have remained important, even though Democrats have been frustrated that the courts have not blocked more of the administration’s actions. Nevertheless, the courts have prevented many things the administration wanted to do. There is also decentralized election administration, which we discussed earlier, making it difficult to stack the electoral deck.

Then there are term limits. Populist leaders build direct relationships with voters and constituents, often with a strong personalistic dimension. This is certainly true of Trump. Many people admire Trump as a person and political figure. But he cannot remain in office beyond two terms. Consequently, that personalistic connection with his coalition disappears from the presidency and must be rebuilt.

There are many constraints, but I would highlight one final political limitation on populist leaders: the polarization of American politics. No leader has demonstrated an ability to achieve overwhelming popularity in US politics during the polarized era. Trump was unpopular, Biden was unpopular, and Obama had the approval of roughly half the electorate. Obama performed relatively well, but his approval was still around half. George W. Bush became deeply unpopular after the Iraq War and left office with very low approval ratings following the financial crisis. So, we have experienced a series of presidents with limited popularity. That limits what they can accomplish in ways that constrain authoritarianism.

Closely Matched Parties Have Little Incentive to Moderate Their Political Strategies

Your research suggests that intensified party competition can exacerbate polarization rather than encourage moderation. Could the Democrats’ unexpectedly broad electoral gains reduce partisan antagonism, or will heightened competition further radicalize congressional politics?

Professor Frances E. Lee: One of the distinguishing characteristics of contemporary US politics is the close balance of power between the two parties and the fact that every national election seems to offer the prospect of a change in party control of one institution or another. This incentivizes parties in Congress to focus constantly on the next elections. Both parties feel insecure. The party in power worries about losing its majority, while the party out of power looks for a way back in and believes it can succeed.

In this context, the parties amplify their differences. They’re constantly posturing, trying to appeal to their voters, emphasize the stakes, and energize their supporters. I wouldn’t necessarily call this radicalism because the policies they pursue and enact haven’t really been radical. There have been no large-scale changes, at least in domestic policy. There have been some bold actions in foreign policy, but when the parties must reach an agreement in Congress, they check each other. Very little legislation passes solely with the votes of one party. Lawmaking usually requires some degree of bipartisanship, which constrains what either party can accomplish. However, their rhetoric frequently includes appeals such as “This is the most important election of our lives.” These kinds of statements reflect the intense competition between the parties.

The question is whether the 2026 elections change that calculation. I don’t think they do, at least not yet, even though Democrats won very significant majorities. We don’t know the exact numbers because some races remain undecided, but these will be the largest majorities we’ve seen in the polarized era. They’re comparable to, and perhaps slightly larger than, the Democratic majorities during the first two years of Obama’s presidency. So, these are substantial majorities. However, the majorities Democrats secured after the 2008 elections were wiped out in 2010, when Republicans regained control.

I therefore don’t think Republicans see themselves as being out of power for an extended period. They don’t know when they’ll return to power, but I don’t think they’re discouraged. I expect them to pursue the same strategies we’ve seen throughout the polarized era: highlighting disagreements with the Democratic Party, forcing Democrats to take difficult votes, and withholding cooperation in Congress. I anticipate very hardball politics over the next two years.

If Democrats were to win again, and win decisively, Republicans might begin to reconsider their approach, saying to themselves, “We need to do some rethinking here. We’re not going to get right back in at the next elections. Maybe the people have spoken, and we need to cooperate.” We might then see a return to some of the political practices more common in the 20th century. But what I’m describing is essentially how American politics has functioned in the 21st century, with the two parties closely matched in power.

Congress Can Block Trump’s Agenda but Cannot Easily Compel Him to Act

The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC.
The Capitol and Reflecting Pool in Washington, DC. Photo: Jon Bilous / Dreamstime.

You have described divided government as the Constitution’s ordinary remedy for an unpopular president. With Democrats controlling both chambers from January 2027, how effectively can Congress constrain Trump’s executive overreach, particularly regarding immigration enforcement, politicized prosecutions, and institutional accountability?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The party controlling Congress can rarely win a direct confrontation with the president. It cannot force the president to take actions he doesn’t want to take. The president has veto power. Congress can attempt to legislate changes to immigration policy or impose restrictions on the administration, but the president can veto those measures. Overriding a veto would require Republican support. So, it is very difficult for Congress to win a direct confrontation and compel the administration to do something it opposes.

Congress’s power comes primarily from its ability to block the administration’s initiatives. The administration needs funding. In fact, it is currently requesting a supplemental appropriation to fund the war in Iran. It also needs Senate confirmation of its nominees. The administration must therefore come to Congress for these things, and Congress can use that leverage to secure concessions. However, under divided government, both parties must consent. Congress cannot simply force the president to do things he doesn’t want to do. Instead, it can block the president when he requests something. That’s how we should assess what Congress can accomplish under these circumstances. Its power is limited, but it remains important.

I would also add that Congress’s role in shaping political discourse in the US will change after these elections. Criticism from Congress, the hearings it holds, and the investigations it conducts will receive news media coverage, forcing the administration to react and respond. This has the potential to influence public opinion in ways that Congress could not, or would not, when the same party controlled both branches. In that sense, Congress can shape the broader political environment.

Democrats Must Avoid Partisan Overreach

Drawing on your recent book, A Case for Congress, what should be the principal institutional priorities of the incoming Democratic Congress? How should it balance legislative oversight, investigations, institutional reform, and constructive policymaking?

Professor Frances E. Lee: Oversight is going to change the most. Congress’s oversight role will change significantly after these elections because of the Democratic Party’s new agenda-setting power. The kinds of hearings held, the investigations conducted, and the demands for information from Congress will all change.

The main thing Democrats, as the new party in power, need to watch out for is overreach. If they conduct too many investigations, they risk diluting their impact. If those investigations begin to appear highly partisan, the news media may simply roll their eyes and conclude that there’s nothing substantial there. Democrats therefore need to exercise restraint and pursue only the most egregious cases—those that are undeniably important and, ideally, attract some Republican support. Investigations with bipartisan support carry much greater weight with the news media, which regard them as far more credible than investigations pursued solely by the administration’s partisan opponents. That’s the biggest change these elections will bring to Congress’s role.

When it comes to lawmaking, however, it doesn’t matter whether government is divided or unified. Very little legislation passes with support from only one party. Right now, on questions of government funding, the administration meets with the bipartisan, bicameral congressional leadership—the so-called Big Four, consisting of the majority and minority leaders in both chambers. That’s how they’re currently negotiating government funding.

We have unified government at the moment, but the same process will continue under divided government next year. Much about Congress’s role simply doesn’t change. I would characterize that as a kind of institutional strength. Congress serves as a ballast; it is difficult to move. With both parties as unpopular as they are, the fact that they check each other in Congress is quite useful in terms of institutional performance.

Divided Government Makes It Easier for Democrats to Maintain Party Unity

Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez.
Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at the “Bernie Is Back” political rally in Queensbridge Park, Queens, New York, on October 19, 2019. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin / Dreamstime.

Your research with James Curry demonstrates that intraparty disagreement can obstruct legislative agendas as much as the Senate filibuster. How should Democrats manage divisions between progressive and moderate factions while confronting presidential vetoes and institutional constraints?

Professor Frances E. Lee: The Democratic Party now has an easier task than it would under unified Democratic control. Democrats can get their moderates and progressives on the same page to pass legislation, even when they expect the president to veto it. In other words, divided government allows for considerable symbolic action, through which a party communicates to its constituencies what it would like to accomplish while recognizing that it cannot do so without bipartisan support. This actually makes it easier to hold the party together. What is really difficult is when a party has unified control and the power to enact legislation, provided it can reach agreement internally. That’s when different factions end up holding each other hostage.

We saw Republicans struggle with this under Trump in 2017. Their biggest priority that year was repealing and replacing Obamacare. They spent most of the year trying to do so but ultimately failed because they couldn’t reach an internal agreement. Similarly, under President Biden, following the Democrats’ return to unified control after the 2020 elections, there was the so-called “Build Back Better” agenda. This was a very ambitious domestic policy agenda, encompassing a wide range of measures intended to strengthen what they called the care economy, including healthcare, childcare, elder care, and related areas. But Democrats couldn’t reach an internal agreement. In the end, they passed a significantly watered-down version of the agenda, called the Inflation Reduction Act.

So, parties have difficulty reaching internal agreement when they hold unified control of government. But after these elections, we have divided government. In a sense, that makes things easier for Democrats. They don’t have to negotiate as seriously because much of what they attempt to do cannot become law. That makes it easier to reach internal agreement. The consequences, however, will be very limited at present.

Decentralized Elections Are a Strength of American Democracy

Given the erosion of democratic norms under Trump, which reforms should Congress prioritize to reinforce electoral integrity, judicial independence, congressional oversight, and the constitutional separation of powers?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I wouldn’t actually advocate doing much on the electoral front at the national level. One of the clearest lessons from recent years in American politics is that decentralized election administration, with states and localities running their own elections, is a strength of the American system. So, anything Congress might do to federalize election rules is somewhat dangerous. It’s better to keep election administration decentralized. Congress can provide funding to help administer elections and protect election workers against threats of violence, for example, by involving the FBI. But I don’t think strengthening the national government’s role in election administration is a good idea.

On judicial independence, I don’t anticipate any significant reforms. However, the president will face considerable difficulty getting more of his nominees confirmed to the federal bench. That will help balance things out by leaving some judicial seats vacant. Depending on who wins the next presidential election, we could see greater partisan balance in the judiciary as a consequence of these elections, even without an explicit reform agenda.

I also hope Congress will work to rein in presidential emergency powers, particularly the open-ended emergency powers the president has been claiming, by imposing some form of time limit on them. The president’s tariff powers also need to be restrained in ways that were not previously evident to Congress. The president has been very creative in his use of existing authorities, and I hope Congress will be willing to revisit those powers.

These changes may not happen immediately, but clearly, a vulnerability in the American political system has emerged that had not previously been recognized.

Electoral System Produces More Proportional Outcomes Than Many Would Expect

Your research on geographic representation and electoral institutions highlights structural inequalities in American democracy. What lessons should Democrats draw from the failure of Republican gerrymandering to prevent electoral reversal, and what reforms could strengthen fair representation without reproducing partisan manipulation?

Professor Frances E. Lee: There was considerable pessimism among Democrats and progressive organizations about the way Congress seemed to be tilted in favor of Republicans, making it easier for them to win. The typical state, which, of course, elects senators, was more Republican-leaning than the country as a whole. There were similar concerns about how congressional district lines were drawn for the House of Representatives, making it easier for Republicans to win power. Democrats would need a larger share of the national vote to secure a corresponding share of seats. So, there was considerable anxiety about that. But then came the 2026 elections, and Democrats ended up winning in places where you would never have expected them to win. This weakens the impetus for reform on these issues. Democrats demonstrated that, whatever imbalances exist, they could overcome them quite dramatically. They achieved very large majorities.

We can also compare these with the majorities Republicans have achieved. The Democrats’ House majority is much larger than any Republican majority during the polarized era. It also looks as though their Senate majority will be larger once the final races are called. One of the things I examined in my latest book, A Case for Congress, is that there’s less imbalance between congressional and presidential election outcomes than you might expect. In fact, they correspond quite closely. 

For example, the share of the vote Democrats received in the 2024 elections corresponds fairly closely to the share of seats they won in the House and Senate. The same was true in 2020 and 2016. If we were to move to a proportional representation system, it would be difficult to improve on what we’ve already been seeing in national politics. It’s strange because there’s no particular reason to expect it to work out that way. We have a very old-fashioned electoral system. Nevertheless, the two parties have ended up winning shares of seats that are reasonably proportional to their support in the national electorate.

So, I’m not an advocate for electoral reform based on the patterns we’ve been observing. I understand the problem in theory, but in practice, it hasn’t really manifested itself. As the saying goes, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” So, I’m somewhat skeptical.

The Republican Party Faces a Profound Struggle Over Its Post-Trump Identity

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Does the 2026 electoral backlash suggest that authoritarian populism has reached its political limits in the United States, or might Trumpism reconstitute itself through new leaders, grievances, and strategies ahead of the 2028 presidential election?

Professor Frances E. Lee: That’s a big and outstanding question. Is the Trump coalition sustainable without Trump? Is there a successor who can hold together the party he has built?

The Republican Party is going to face a major internal battle looking toward 2028. Many organizations and Republicans at all levels of government in the US would like to return to pre-Trump conservative orthodoxies on trade, entitlements, budget deficits, and other aspects of traditional conservatism against which Trump rebelled. They would like to move back in that direction. So, will the succession produce a Trump-style Republican Party rooted in populist conservatism or a return to more traditional conservatism? That remains very much an open question.

Democrats also face internal battles between progressives and moderates, but I would say the questions are more profound for Republicans. They will have to work them out among themselves.

I personally think much of Trump’s appeal is personalistic, rooted in his unique celebrity and charisma. I have doubts about whether anyone can step into his shoes and continue to hold the party together as he has. So, it may be that the Trump movement has reached its limits.

Nevertheless, as we discussed earlier, populist rhetoric remains popular and widely used. Those kinds of appeals, the impatience with the institutions and processes of liberal democracy, and the tendency to strain against statutory constraints—all these elements of that political style may well continue, given the rhetoric we hear. But who will represent that style of politics and what they will stand for in both parties remain open questions.

Trump’s International Unpopularity Has Turned Political Association Into a Liability

Labour Day celebrations
Labour Day celebrations at Old Town Square in Prague on May 1, 2017, featuring a banner depicting democracy as a leaf eaten by caterpillars labeled Putin, Kaczyński, Orbán, Babiš, Trump, and Fico.
Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

And finally, Professor Lee, viewed comparatively alongside the populist radical right in Europe and authoritarian-populist movements elsewhere, how might Trump’s electoral setback affect their political legitimacy, transnational networks, and strategic calculations? Could the American experience offer broader lessons for reversing democratic backsliding?

Professor Frances E. Lee: I think these networks will persist, but I’m not sure what they’ve yielded. Transnational right-wing populist movements collaborate, discuss ideas, and share information. I would expect all of that to continue. But what does it actually get them? Vice President Vance went to Hungary to campaign for Orbán, and yet Orbán lost.

If Trump is no longer president after 2028, and he has already demonstrated the limits of his political appeal here in the US, how inspirational will he be to other figures around the world who might want to pursue similar policies? He doesn’t provide an example of what you would call a path to sustained electoral success. It’s difficult for right-leaning leaders around the world, whether in Europe or Canada, to be friendly with Trump because he is so unpopular internationally. Association with Trump can be embarrassing for these leaders.

It looked as though a conservative in the Trump mold was going to come to power in Canada. All the polls seemed to indicate that. Then Trump launched a trade war against Canada, which rallied the country around the liberal leadership and effectively tanked that conservative leader’s chances.

So, looking around the world, I don’t think Trump has been particularly helpful to the right-wing populist cause. Even where he has tried to help, his efforts have backfired. I’m sure these movements will continue to collaborate, but they are now on the defensive here in the US, and it’s unclear what the future holds.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.