MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

MEP López Aguilar: The Return Regulation Is a Violation of EU Fundamental Values

As the European Union implements its new Migration and Asylum Pact amid growing populist pressures, fundamental questions are emerging about the future of European constitutionalism. In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents “a violation of EU fundamental values” and warns that migration governance is increasingly being reshaped by radical-right narratives. Reflecting on the erosion of the cordon sanitaire, the “Melonization” of European migration policy, and the normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, MEP López Aguilar contends that “migration is a fact, not a crisis,” while insisting that “asylum is a right” that must remain protected. The interview offers a timely reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, human rights, and the future of European integration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when migration has become one of the most polarizing issues in European politics, the European Union finds itself confronting a profound constitutional dilemma. The implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, together with the Return Regulation, has reignited fundamental debates about sovereignty, solidarity, fundamental rights, and the future of European integration. Once conceived as a legal and political project founded upon supranational cooperation, shared responsibility, and the protection of human dignity, the European Union is increasingly facing accusations that it is redefining migration governance under the growing influence of populist radical-right politics. Against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, demographic change, electoral realignments, and increasingly contested debates over migration, the central question is no longer simply how Europe manages migration, but whether it can continue to do so without compromising the constitutional and humanitarian values upon which the Union itself was built.

Few policymakers are better positioned to reflect on these developments than Juan Fernando López Aguilar. A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Spain’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since 2009, López Aguilar previously served as Spain’s Minister of Justice and chaired the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) between 2019 and 2024. Trained as a constitutional lawyer and widely recognized as one of Europe’s foremost authorities on constitutionalism, the rule of law, migration governance, and fundamental rights, he has played a central role in shaping EU migration and asylum legislation over the past decade. His long engagement with the negotiations surrounding the Migration and Asylum Pact places him at the heart of one of the Union’s most consequential constitutional debates.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents far more than a technical adjustment to migration management. Rather, he contends that it constitutes “a violation of EU fundamental values” and departs from the legal architecture painstakingly constructed through the Migration and Asylum Pact. Rejecting the growing trend toward externalizing asylum responsibilities, he warns that “migration management cannot come at the expense of the rule of law,” insisting that migration must be addressed through a genuinely European response grounded in “shared responsibility and binding solidarity” rather than bilateral arrangements with third countries.

Throughout the interview, MEP López Aguilar situates the transformation of European migration policy within broader processes of democratic and political change. He argues that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) increasing cooperation with radical-right parties has effectively dismantled the traditional Brandmauer or cordon sanitaire, allowing what he calls the “Melonization” of European migration policy to become mainstream. In his assessment, attempts to externalize migration control, normalize return hubs, and securitize asylum are inseparable from the wider normalization of populist narratives within European politics. At the same time, he cautions that Europe risks undermining its own credibility as a global defender of human rights through increasingly visible double standards in both migration and foreign policy.

Perhaps most strikingly, MEP López Aguilar rejects the assumption that migration itself constitutes Europe’s principal challenge. “Migration is a fact, not a crisis,” he argues, insisting that “reducing migration to zero is not only impossible—it is stupid.” Likewise, he defends asylum as a non-negotiable legal obligation, declaring that “asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost.” For MEP López Aguilar, the real danger lies not in migration itself but in the gradual erosion of Europe’s constitutional identity through the normalization of policies and rhetoric that once belonged exclusively to the political fringes. The interview therefore offers not merely a critique of current migration policy, but a broader reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, constitutionalism, and the future of the European project itself.

Here is the revised version of our interview with MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Migration Management Cannot Come at the Expense of the Rule of Law

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar
MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar is interviewed by ECPS’ Selcuk Gultasli in his office at the European Parliament on July 2, 2026. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar, welcome! You argue that the new Return Regulation marks a constitutional rupture rather than merely another migration reform. Where, in your view, is the precise red line beyond which migration management ceases to be compatible with the European constitutional project?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: The red line is the lack of a European scale of response and the lack of consistency with EU fundamental values. Let me explain. We worked really hard to fulfil the mandate of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is part of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 67 and Article 77 make it clear that there should be not only an EU migration and asylum policy but also a migration and asylum system based on EU law. It wasn’t easy because migration is obviously the most divisive issue around, and it contaminates not only asylum policy and lawmaking in the member states but also policymaking at the European level. Yet there should be a European migration and asylum system based on law, and we worked for two consecutive mandates—10 years—to make it happen by combining eight pieces of legislation.

The underlying idea is that there should be a European-scale response. You know why? Because no member state can deal with it on its own. It cannot be only a Greek problem when migrants arrive on the Greek islands in the Aegean. It cannot be an Italian problem when migrants arrive on the Pelagic Islands, such as Lampedusa, in the Mediterranean, coming from the African shore. Nor should it be a Spanish problem that we receive 47,000 people a year on the island of El Hierro in the Canaries, coming from Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea-Conakry. No, there should be a European-scale response, based on shared responsibility and binding solidarity.

That is the idea behind the Migration and Asylum Pact. But what is the idea behind the Return Regulation? It is to give the member states back the competence to negotiate bilateral agreements with third-country rulers so that, in exchange for money, they keep migrants out of our sight. Is it worthy? Is it consistent with EU values? My answer is no.

There is no European-scale response in Melonizing Europe, in Melonizing migration policy. Giving member states the authority to negotiate bilaterally with whomever is willing to be paid to keep migrants out of our sight in a so-called return hub—which is, let’s face it, a concentration camp for an unlimited period of time—should not happen under EU law. That is inconsistent with the very idea of the Migration and Asylum Pact. And, of course, in my view, it amounts to a denial of EU fundamental values, which are rooted in the principle that the EU is bound by international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, which encompass shelter, rescue, and disease.

So, the conclusion is that this Return Regulation is not only a mistake; it is a violation of EU fundamental values and of EU law as enshrined in the Migration and Asylum Pact.

Reducing Migration to Zero Is Not Only Impossible—It Is Stupid

Only two years ago, you defended the Migration and Asylum Pact as the best achievable European compromise. Today, you argue that the Return Regulation fundamentally betrays European values. Did Europe cross a legal threshold, or has the political center itself shifted toward positions once associated exclusively with the far right?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Both. We worked so hard to put in place a migration and asylum system based on EU law precisely because it is difficult and deeply divisive. It is obvious that migration is geographically divisive. The perception in the Baltics is not the same as it is in the western member states of the European Union, let alone along the southern external border—namely Greece, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, or Spain—not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Canaries. Different member states have different views of the problem, and they also have different views of the importance of a European-scale response.

Still, it was possible precisely because the balance of forces in the previous mandate of the European Parliament made it possible. Of course, it took time. It was only after a long and difficult struggle that, at the end of the previous mandate—in December 2023—we finally reached an agreement, and the entire package of regulations was ultimately adopted in June 2024. That is why, two years later, in June 2026, it has finally entered into force. But what has happened since the 2024 elections? Yes, we now have a balance of forces leaning to the right and the far right more than ever before.

For the first time in the history of the European Parliament, the EPP, together with three far-right political groups, accounts for 60% of the vote, marginalizing the second-largest group, the Socialists, as well as the Greens, Renew, and the Left. The far right is dominating the House and shaping policy. And that means a great deal when we talk about migration and asylum policy.

It means that a negative vision of migration is dominating the political landscape in Europe. In my view, that is a terrible mistake. Migration is not a threat, let alone a crisis. Migration has always been a fact. It is a permanent fact in the history of mankind. Should we panic because migrants are hoping or longing to make it to Europe? We should not panic. We can handle it. We can handle it as long as we do it together, according to EU law, and without betraying EU values. If we do it that way, then we may succeed. If we do it separately, member state by member state, in contradiction with EU values, then we are doomed to fail. And, of course, trying to reduce migration to zero is also doomed to fail. It is not only impossible, but also stupid.

Return Hubs Without Legal Safeguards Betray European Values

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Supporters argue that external processing restores public confidence without abandoning humanitarian obligations. You contend that it instead erodes the Union’s constitutional identity. Why are they wrong?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Because once you authorize returns to third countries with no meaningful link to the returnees, you are prepared to transfer human beings—their families, vulnerable people, trafficked women, and minors—to countries where they do not belong, where it is impossible to ensure that their fundamental and human rights are respected. It is equally impossible to ensure that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is implemented because there is no obligation to apply the Charter when they are in Egypt, Niger, Tunisia, or Rwanda. Yet this has become the obsession of too many around the table of the Council of Ministers of the Interior of the European Union and also within the European Parliament. That is absolutely inconsistent with the obligation to put in place an EU-scale response that is bound by EU law and consistent with EU values.

You’ve got to make sure that fundamental rights are observed and respected. Even when you return people, there has to be a meaningful link, whether it is a country of transit or a country of origin. But it is unacceptable to send them back anywhere, as long as you are paying the ruler there to keep them out of your sight for an unlimited period of time.

Once they are in the European Union—and this is also, of course, subject to criticism—you may hold them in a retention center, in a so-called migration facility, for two years. That’s much too long. But once they are in a third country with no meaningful link to the returnees, there is no time limit. They can be held there forever, stockpiled forever. Is that acceptable? Is that consistent with EU law? The beauty of the Charter of Fundamental Rights lies precisely in the fact that it protects all human beings, not only European citizens. That’s the beauty.

Anyone under EU law is protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, whether you are a European citizen or not. If you, a Turkish citizen, are on European soil, you are also protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is not the case that it does not apply to you because you are not a European citizen. No, you are protected by EU law, by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, because you are under EU law and on European soil. That is the beauty of it. And that is also denied by the fact that people are being returned to third countries to which they do not belong, simply for the sake of paying a ruler who is willing to accept them. That is absolutely, in my view, in contradiction with the very idea of European law and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Treating Migration as a Threat Is a Terrible Mistake

You write that asylum is no longer treated as a fundamental right but increasingly as an administrative inconvenience. Has the EU effectively redefined refugees from rights-holders into security risks?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: The EU is a union of 27 member states. But the majority, for now, is leaning in that direction. It is allowing a negative approach to migration to prevail as the dominant political view: the denial of migration, the belief that migration can be reduced by discouraging migrants, and the idea that you can simply send them back.

As the far right chanted in a stunning ovation following the adoption of the Return Regulation in the plenary session in Strasbourg—and I quote—”Send them back, send them back, send them back.” The idea that you can send back all migrants in the European Union is preposterous. It is self-damaging and ultimately self-defeating. The European Union is ageing. We are losing weight. We are losing GDP in comparison with the world’s major powers and global competitors. We are also losing population in comparative terms. So we need to change our stance on migration. 

In Spain, there is an alternative. In Spain, there is a positive view of migration because there is a progressive government. For one thing, Spain has, for several years now, surprisingly become the number one engine of growth and job creation. Spain is growing four times as fast as Germany, France, and Italy, while creating jobs and making economic growth compatible with social justice. That means the minimum wage is rising, pensions are rising, social protection is expanding, and social services also benefit from the contribution of migrants who are willing to pay taxes in order to finance the services needed to fulfil social rights and fundamental rights altogether. So, Spain is demonstrating that there is an alternative. Yet Spain is not only being minoritized; it is actually isolated in this approach. The prevailing view is a negative one, and that approach is both self-defeating and self-damaging for the future of the European Union.

Double Standards Are Undermining Europe’s Global Credibility

Row of EU Flags in front of the European Union Commission building in Brussels. Photo: VanderWolf Images.

The European Union often presents itself as a global normative power. Can Europe continue to lecture the world on human rights while simultaneously exporting asylum responsibilities beyond its own borders?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Of course, I share the ambition that the European Union should grow—and grow fast—and become a relevant global actor. Of course, I agree that the European Union has to exercise hard power, not only soft power. I also agree that the European Union should join forces to build a truly credible and effective European diplomacy and combine its strengths so that it can become a meaningful actor in the global arena—one that is heard, respected, and worth listening to when engaging with other global powers. I mean talking to the United States, talking to Russia, talking to China, talking to India. That is what becoming global means. So, yes, I share that ambition. And yet I am also among those who criticise the fact that the European Union is still far from reaching that goal.

On the contrary, I am deeply critical of the evidence that the European Union is indulging in double standards. It is absolutely unforgivable that the European Union has tried to be hard and tough on Russia after Putin’s aggression against Ukraine while saying nothing about the genocide in Gaza and doing nothing about the genocide in Gaza. In my understanding, it is absolutely obnoxious and unacceptable that the Trump administration has imposed unilateral sanctions on members of the International Criminal Court who dared to call genocide a genocide.

And the European Union has not activated the Blocking Statute to protect members of the International Criminal Court who happen to reside in the EU. The International Criminal Court is located in The Hague, in the Netherlands, within the European Union. They should be protected by EU law. Yet the European Union says nothing, so as not to disturb Trump—the abuser, the bully, the bullying abuser in the global arena. That double standard, of course, damages the European Union’s reputation and credibility. I say this with sadness. I am not complacent.

I say it harshly because I am a fighter. I would like to bring about change so that we overcome those contradictions and double standards and actually gain leverage in the global arena by setting an example, by leading through example. That should be the idea. That should be the inspiration. Of course, I hope we learn how to do that in the foreseeable future.

There Is No Brandmauer Left in European Politics

You argue that the agreement became possible because the European People’s Party increasingly relies on cooperation with the radical right. Has the so-called cordon sanitaire effectively collapsed in migration policy?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Absolutely. There is no cordon sanitaire anymore. In German, they call it BrandmauerEs gibt keine Brandmauer mehr (there is no firewall anymore) in the European Union. There is no cordon sanitaire whatsoever. I have seen it with my own eyes. I have chaired the Committee on Civil Liberties and Human Rights for 10 years now, and I am the spokesperson of the S&D Group on constitutional affairs. And what do I see? Ever since we voted to invest the second European Commission with the votes of the EPP, the S&D, the Liberals, and the Greens, from that very moment—which marked the beginning of this parliamentary legislature—a so-called new majority has emerged, the Neue Mehrheit (New Majority), as they call it in German. It consists of the EPP together with three far-right political groups. They call themselves Conservatives, Patriots, and Sovereignists.

They are the majority. They are the ruling majority in the Parliament, in the Commission, and in the Council. And, of course, that means a great deal. In practical terms, it means there is certainly no cordon sanitaire anymore. None whatsoever. The EPP has broken all barriers against the rise of the far right. On the contrary, it is cooperating actively with the far right, and it is serving the far right’s self-congratulatory agenda. We saw that in the European Parliament when the far right, together with the EPP, secured the majority to adopt the Return Regulation, which was notorious and obnoxious in my view. They all stood up in a standing ovation and began chanting, “Send them back, send them back.” That is the picture. No Brandmauer, no cordon sanitaire anymore.

Progressives Have Been Better at Diagnosis Than at Therapy

Many observers argue that mainstream parties have not defeated populism but instead absorbed its migration agenda. Has populism already won the migration debate without necessarily winning elections?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: I’ll tell you something. I am a progressive. I am a Spanish socialist, and I have been involved in socialist- and progressive-led platforms and think tanks for many years now. That means I have taken part in countless roundtables, seminars, symposiums, congresses, and conferences of progressive parties dealing with the populist agenda and the rise of populism. My first point is this: we progressives are very good at diagnosis, but we are very bad at therapy. We are very good at analyzing what is going on, but we have not been effective so far in reversing the rising tide of populism.

Of course, we do know what populism is about. Populism is a way of simplifying complexity. It is a way of lying to people, of infantilizing them by scapegoating individuals or entire groups in order to exploit the anger directed against those who are being scapegoated. The idea is simple. You’re in pain, you’re in trouble, you’re in disarray, you feel discomfort. Are you angry? I tell you something: I don’t have a solution for you. I have something better. I have someone for you to hate, and I will point my finger at someone for you to hate.

Of course, migrants are the number one choice. But it can also be Muslims, Black people, LGBTQ people, or women, because men are supposedly becoming impoverished as women advance. That is also a very common idea on the far right. You, a young man, are told that you have fewer opportunities than your father did because your father did not have to compete with so many empowered women. Because women are empowered, you have fewer opportunities. And then young people move to the far right all over the place. It’s very tempting, but it’s stupid.

Of course, it should be challenged. It should be fought against. But still, populism is on the rise. Of course, it has heavily contaminated the migration agenda. Populism has managed, first and foremost, to spread fear everywhere: We have been invaded. Migration is out of control. Sooner or later, you’re going to be replaced. Europe is not going to be white and Christian by tomorrow evening. By tomorrow evening, Europe is going to be Black and Muslim. Don’t you see? They are invading us. They are out of control. You have to react. You have to do something about it.

That kind of fear is spreading everywhere. Of course, it is evil rhetoric. It has to be fought against. It has to be dismantled. To begin with, it is not true. It is not true that migration is massive. It is not true that migration is out of control. It is not true that it is a conspiracy. It is not true that Europe is changing color or religion. It is simply not true. It is simply a lie. But still, it works.

That is why we progressives have a challenge: not only to be good at diagnosis, but also to become good at therapy. What should we do to reverse this trend? That is a huge challenge for progressive thinking and for progressive policymaking.

The Return Regulation Europeanizes the Meloni Model

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet in Brussels, Belgium on November 03, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You have repeatedly criticized what you call the ‘Melonization’ of European migration policy. To what extent has Giorgia Meloni succeeded in redefining the migration agenda not only in Italy but across the European Union itself?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Take a look at the Return Regulation. What happened? First, Meloni tried to strike a deal with neighbouring Albania in order to establish return hubs outside Italy through an agreement based on an exchange of money. But then, the Italian courts struck down what is, in my understanding, a sick idea. They rejected the initiative on the grounds of Italian law.

Meloni then went to the European Commission and essentially said: “Hey, listen, I need an umbrella. I need an EU umbrella for this because the Italian umbrella is not enough. The Italian courts are rejecting the legality of what I’m trying to do with Albania. We should put it into EU law.” And that is how they Melonized the return policy. They effectively elevated the Italian idea—the Meloni idea—to the European level. But the bad news is that the Return Regulation contradicts the very principle that migration and asylum legislation at the European level should be based on shared responsibility and binding solidarity. There is no shared responsibility in negotiating with a third-country ruler to establish a return hub financed by your own budget. There is no European added value in legalizing and Melonizing return policy and legislation.

There is simply no added value. It is left to the member states to negotiate. Of course, Spain is not compelled to do that. Spain is not doing it, as long as the Spanish government remains in progressive hands. But others may try. They may ask, “Why shouldn’t I pay the ruler of Tunisia? Why shouldn’t I pay some African dictator so that I can fly some Black people out of my country?” Of course, as I have already explained, the idea itself is evil-minded. To begin with, I heard many times during the negotiations: “Fly them to Rwanda.” And my question was always: “Why Rwanda?” Only because you think it makes no difference as long as they are Black. As long as they are Black, you think it doesn’t matter whether they are in Rwanda. It doesn’t matter whether they come from Mali, Niger, or Uganda—you simply fly them to Rwanda because, supposedly, it makes no difference there as long as they are Black.

Is that not racism? Is it racist? Absolutely racist. You have to care about people, about human beings. You cannot fly a Malian or a Nigerian to Rwanda because there is no purpose. There is simply no point in flying them to Rwanda just because you are paying Paul Kagame, the ruler of Rwanda for 35 years now. That is a preposterous idea. And yet, that is the Melonization of return policy.

Asylum Is a Right That Must Be Respected, Whatever the Cost

The Commission argues that stronger returns are indispensable for preserving public support for legal asylum. Is Europe sacrificing liberal constitutionalism in an attempt to save political legitimacy?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Respect for asylum seekers must remain unwavering. The European Union is bound by international law, which includes both international humanitarian law and human rights. And, of course, the Geneva Convention relating to the protection of asylum seekers—the Refugee Convention—is international law, indeed one of the fundamental pillars of international law. So, yes, migration is a fact, not a crisis, not a threat. It is simply a fact. But you know what? Asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost, no matter what. It must be respected.

The problem is that there is now a prevailing idea within the current political landscape we have been discussing, one that is increasingly leaning to the right and the far right. That idea is that most asylum seekers are fraudulent. They are portrayed as economic migrants seeking better opportunities. According to this logic, they all have to be discouraged. Migrants are discouraged, and asylum seekers are discouraged as well. Because, as the ministers of the interior argue, most asylum seekers are actually fraudulent. They are not people being persecuted. They are not people whose physical integrity is at risk. They are simply people seeking better opportunities. So seeking asylum is presented as nothing more than legal advice given to them by their counsel. And they, too, have to be discouraged. That is deeply worrisome.

We should protect asylum seekers because that is part of the European Union’s identity and its commitment to human rights. It is both a fundamental principle and a legal obligation. Every member state, individually, is a signatory to the Geneva Convention. And the European Union itself is bound by international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights.

No Human Being Should Ever Be Described as Illegal

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

And lastly, you have warned that Europe risks normalizing practices that were once politically unthinkable. Looking beyond migration, do you see this normalization as part of a broader process of democratic backsliding within the European Union itself?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: We’ve got to care about it. I do care. I’m a fighter against that trend. I’ve always tried to stand up whenever I have seen signs of it unfolding before my eyes, here in the European Parliament and elsewhere. Of course, you can see that things are changing for the worse in the European Parliament in that regard as well. 

For instance, when I first came to the European Parliament, no one talked about illegal migrants. They spoke about irregular arrivals, but never about illegal human beings. Now it’s the new normal. You hear it a thousand times in every plenary session in Strasbourg. And you know what? No one notices anymore. No one stands up anymore and says, “Hey, listen, this is unacceptable. Are you talking about illegal human beings or what?” That’s unacceptable.

Migrants are not guilty because they tried, even in the worst of circumstances. Take, for instance, the boats coming to El Hierro in the Canary Islands. We receive 46,000 people a year in the Canaries, arriving by wooden boats departing from the western coast of Africa. It is the most perilous and deadliest route to the European Union. The Atlantic is much rougher than the Mediterranean. The waves are much higher in the Atlantic. And you know what? None of those trying to reach the European Union through the Canary Islands—because the Canary Islands are part of the European Union, absolutely—ignores the risk of perishing in the attempt, the risk of losing their lives. And still they try.

When they sink to the bottom of the sea, tragically, they are, in effect, saying, “Hey, listen, I’m dying, but still I had to try. I do not regret it because I had to try.” It’s terrible. That means a great deal. It means they are not taking a frivolous step, or trying to commit fraud, or trying to be troublemakers, or trying to create problems, or bring their problems to a foreign land. They are trying to do something with their lives out of despair. And that life is the only one they have. They are willing to sacrifice it for the sake of making it. That deserves respect.

The point I’m making is that the new normal is losing that human understanding of the tragedy I am describing. Instead, through aggressive rhetoric, those human beings are portrayed as illegal, as an invasion, as a threat to your security or to your identity. That is completely unworthy of the European Union. The European Union should not be like that.

So, I’m a fighter. Whenever I see that happening in the European Parliament, I react. But still, the question is: how long will it go?

Professor Aziz Huq.

Prof. Huq: The US Supreme Court Has Created the Conditions for Democratic Backsliding

As democratic backsliding increasingly unfolds through legal institutions rather than overt constitutional rupture, what distinguishes constitutional resilience from constitutional decline? In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago examines how populism, executive power, judicial doctrine, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence are transforming liberal constitutionalism in the United States and beyond. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, he argues that contemporary democratic erosion often proceeds “under the cover of law,” while warning that populists are developing their own constitutional vision. From presidential immunity and democratic backsliding to algorithmic governance and AI-driven power concentration, Professor Huq offers a timely and sophisticated analysis of democracy’s evolving constitutional challenges in the twenty-first century.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the democratic world, constitutional democracy is undergoing a profound transformation. Contemporary democratic erosion rarely arrives through military coups or overt constitutional rupture. Instead, it increasingly unfolds through courts, legislatures, executive decrees, and formally legal mechanisms that gradually weaken institutional constraints while preserving the appearance of constitutional continuity. At the same time, digital platforms and artificial intelligence are reshaping the public sphere, altering the production and circulation of political information, and redistributing power between states, private technology companies, and citizens. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future of liberal constitutionalism, democratic resilience, and the capacity of democratic institutions to withstand both populist governance and technological disruption.

Few scholars have done more to illuminate these intersecting challenges than Professor Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. One of the world’s leading authorities on constitutional law, democratic backsliding, judicial independence, executive power, and the constitutional implications of artificial intelligence, Professor Huq has produced influential scholarship that bridges American constitutional law with comparative democratic politics. His work has fundamentally reshaped scholarly debates on constitutional resilience, the institutional foundations of liberal democracy, and the legal mechanisms through which elected governments may gradually undermine democratic competition without abandoning constitutional forms.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Huq argues that understanding contemporary democratic backsliding requires moving beyond conventional labels such as populism or authoritarianism toward a more institutional analysis of incentives, constitutional design, and political time horizons. Drawing on Mancur Olson’s theory of the “stationary bandit,” he suggests that “the crucial question” is not simply whether a leader is populist, but “what the time horizon of a populist leader is.” In his view, democratic stability depends heavily on whether political leaders remain constrained by long-term institutional incentives or instead pursue short-term extraction of political and economic rents.

Turning to the United States, Professor Huq contends that “American democratic erosion is proceeding under the cover of law.” Rather than dramatic constitutional breakdown, he identifies legal innovations—including aggressive partisan gerrymandering, expansive presidential authority, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence—as mechanisms through which democratic competition is being incrementally weakened. Most strikingly, he argues that “the Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding,” particularly through its broad conception of presidential immunity and its endorsement of constitutional doctrines that facilitate the concentration of executive power.

Yet Professor Huq’s analysis extends well beyond the American case. He argues that “populists have developed their own version of constitutionalism,” challenging the assumption that constitutionalism necessarily remains synonymous with liberal democracy. Rather than witnessing the disappearance of constitutional government, he suggests, democracies may instead be entering an era in which competing constitutional visions coexist and contest one another. Simultaneously, the digital transformation of politics introduces an additional layer of constitutional complexity. While acknowledging that empirical evidence remains incomplete, Professor Huq warns that contemporary information ecosystems reward emotional engagement over deliberation, observing that “the shift from reasoning to emotion favors populist politics.” He also cautions that, despite its transformative potential, artificial intelligence is currently reinforcing rather than reducing inequalities, concluding that “AI is concentrating power rather than leveling the playing field.”

Ultimately, Professor Huq offers neither fatalism nor easy optimism. Instead, he presents a sober institutional diagnosis of democracy’s contemporary challenges while emphasizing that democratic renewal will require rebuilding effective constitutional constraints, representative institutions, and political organizations capable of responding both to populist pressures and to the unprecedented constitutional questions raised by the digital age.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Aziz Huq, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Crucial Question Is Whether a Populist Leader Has a Long or Short Time Horizon

Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: Joe Sohm.

Professor Aziz Huq, welcome! Let me begin with your recent commentary, “The Orange Bandit.” In this commentary, you employ Mancur Olson’s distinction between “stationary” and “roving” bandits to argue that Donald Trump’s second presidency has shifted from a potentially durable governing project toward the short-term extraction of political and economic rents. How does this framework deepen our understanding of democratic backsliding beyond the conventional language of populism or authoritarianism?

Professor Aziz Huq: Mancur Olson was an important political scientist and economist who wrote an influential article explaining both the origin of states and the way states evolve into either dictatorships or democracies. Olson’s model, although a highly simplified one, offers us a way of thinking about the development of states and the ways in which they legitimate themselves over time in a fashion that I think is helpful both in the United States and more generally.

Olson’s basic model is that a state begins when a powerful force that has acted as a predator upon a population ceases to move around. It goes from being mobile to what Olson called a stationary bandit and starts extracting revenues, in the form of taxation, from a stable and geographically persistent population. That part of Olson’s model explains the origin of the state.

What’s relevant here is that Olson then identifies two different strategies that the stationary bandit can pursue. The first is to extract a relatively limited amount of revenue with the aim of maintaining long-term economic prosperity and stability, thereby enabling a high rate of revenue extraction over time, even if only a relatively small percentage of revenue is extracted in any given period. So, that is a strategy that depends upon having a long-time horizon.

The second strategy that Olson identifies is one in which the stationary bandit seeks to extract as much as it can in as short a period of time as possible. That strategy is obviously not stable, but it is likely to produce both economic deterioration and political instability over the medium term.

One thing we have seen in the second Trump administration is an acceleration of revenue- and rent-extraction activities on the part of the White House. This is underscored by reporting that appeared in the last two days, after the Project Syndicate piece that you mentioned, describing the president’s increase in assets between 2024 and the end of 2025. That reporting shows that his assets have increased by about $2 billion. Much of this comes from activities in the cryptocurrency and financial speculation space. Other parts come from deals forged either with foreign governments or through the facilitation of foreign governments via the larger Trump Organization.

What the piece argues is that what we are seeing in the United States is a transition from the first to the second form of Olson’s stationary bandit. We are witnessing a move from a stationary bandit—or a state—that has a long-time horizon and therefore is able to constrain itself when it comes to rent extraction, to one in which the incentives for constraint seem to have vanished.

What is useful about Olson’s model—not just for the American case but more generally for the study of populism—is that it foregrounds a specific and important question. That question concerns the time horizon of a populist leader. It encourages us, I hope productively, to think about why a populist leader might, at certain moments, have a long time horizon, in which they are relatively constrained in terms of revenue and rent extraction, while at other moments they may have a much shorter time horizon, in which case the incentives for restraint are much weaker.

American Democratic Erosion Is Proceeding Under the Cover of Law

Much of your scholarship argues that democratic erosion proceeds through constitutional and legal mechanisms rather than overt constitutional rupture. Looking at the United States today, which recent developments most clearly illustrate constitutional backsliding under the veneer of legality, and how has Trumpism transformed the American constitutional order in ways that may outlast Donald Trump himself?

Professor Aziz Huq: Let me give you two examples of forms of backsliding—or mechanisms of backsliding—that are presently unfolding in the United States under legal cover. The first is the reorganization of legislative districts, which are the units of representation within the national Congress, through a process known as gerrymandering. Gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries in ways that make it almost certain that one party—the favored party—will win the election. Historically, gerrymandering has been constrained by a web of federal statutes and constitutional requirements. However, over the past 12 months, the Supreme Court has dramatically weakened those statutory and constitutional constraints, allegedly in the name of advancing democracy.

The president has pressed his political allies, first in Texas, then in Florida, and subsequently in other states, to aggressively gerrymander those states in favor of Republicans. The result is that the electoral map—initially in Republican-controlled states and then, in response, in Democratic-controlled states—has become one in which almost all districts are safely Republican or safely Democratic. In other words, politicians know in advance how those districts will vote because of their demographic composition, leaving very few genuinely competitive elections. This is a process that is producing, through formally legal means, an electoral map that is effectively glaciated and largely immune to changes in popular preferences. That is one example.

The second, much more recent example is that only last week, the US Supreme Court, in a case called Trump v. Slaughter, embraced a constitutional doctrine known as the Unitary Executive Theory. The Unitary Executive Theory holds that the president has virtually unlimited authority to remove almost all officials below him or her within the executive branch. The president has already exercised versions of the authority this theory confers by dismissing a large number of regulatory officials and prosecutors within the Department of Justice. Prosecutors within the Department of Justice who remain subject to the threat of dismissal have come under immense pressure to bring cases against individuals whom the president has identified as political opponents, including James Comey, the former Director of the FBI, and Letitia James, the Attorney General of New York State.

That is an example of a legal theory that the Supreme Court has embraced under the rubric of democracy and a particular interpretation of the Constitution—an interpretation that I find unpersuasive, to put it mildly. Its direct and significant consequence has been to facilitate the weaponization of prosecutorial power. And I know you know the Turkish case very well—but we also know from many other cases of democratic backsliding that once prosecutions become weaponized, the space for democratic contestation narrows dramatically.

History Is Made by Both Long-Term Structures and Unpredictable Moments

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Your work suggests that democratic fragility emerges from the interaction of long-term structural forces—including constitutional design, widening economic inequality, and identity politics—rather than isolated political events. To what extent should Trump’s rise be understood as a symptom of these deeper pathologies rather than their principal cause?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is a large question that verges on the philosophical. If you speak to historians, some will emphasize what French scholars call la longue durée—the tectonic, slow-moving social and economic forces that serve as the engines of historical change. Others will point to discrete events—for example, the COVID pandemic or 9/11, which, in recent memory, have been important turning points for the United States—as the principal drivers of change. Still others might point to so-called great men, particular individuals who appear to play an outsized historical role.

My own view is that both of these accounts capture part of the truth, albeit to different degrees and at different moments. I think that understanding our current political moment requires attention both to the underlying structural forces—which, as you suggest, are economic in nature and also concern cultural change—and to the particular and unpredictable effects of discrete individuals and discrete events.

For example, it would be difficult to explain Trump’s second electoral victory in 2024 without taking into account one medium-term structural factor: the rise and subsequent decline of inflation in the wake of the COVID pandemic. At the same time, it would be a mistake to explain that outcome without paying attention to discrete events, particularly the failed assassination attempts against President Trump and the manner in which he responded to it. Both of these factors are important. The weight one assigns to each is, however, in part a reflection of one’s underlying philosophical commitments.

There Are More Parallels Than Divergences Between the US and Other Backsliding Democracies

Comparative studies of democratic backsliding often highlight attacks on courts, electoral administration, the civil service, and independent oversight bodies. Does the United States now resemble trajectories previously observed in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Turkey, or India, or does its constitutional architecture produce a distinct American model of democratic erosion?

Professor Aziz Huq: There are more parallels than divergences between the United States and the other jurisdictions you mentioned. In the United States, the insulation of the independent bodies you listed has always been imperfect. The courts are probably the most constitutionally entrenched of those institutions. However, the appointment mechanism for judges to the federal bench in the United States has, since the 1780s, run through the White House and the Senate. As a consequence, it has always been politicized, and there has never been a moment in American history when the US Supreme Court, in particular, as the country’s apex court, has been meaningfully free from the partisan forces that have shaped and directed its agenda. So, the Supreme Court has always been political. It just so happened that, at the beginning of his second term, Trump inherited a Court with six justices aligned with his party, including three whom he himself had appointed.

With respect to the civil service and other independent bodies, there is a degree of insulation that is not embodied in the constitutional text but rather in federal statutes. At least this administration has been quite successful in attacking—or simply ignoring—those statutory constraints. One important way in which the United States does differ from other jurisdictions that have experienced democratic backsliding, however, is its federal structure. In this respect, it is unlike Hungary, unlike Poland, and unlike Turkey, as I understand it, although somewhat similar to India.

Critically, under the Constitution, responsibility for election administration is largely diffused across the state and local levels and is therefore insulated from direct federal control. What this means is that federal efforts to seize control of election administration face extraordinarily high transaction costs. This is why Trump has been pushing the SAVE Act in Congress, which represents an effort to partially federalize—arguably unlawfully—a number of aspects of election administration. This is also why there has been discussion of deploying immigration agents—ICE agents—to polling stations around the country in November. These are the pathways being pursued because the more direct instruments available in countries such as Hungary and Poland are not necessarily available in the United States due to its federal electoral structure.

Presidential Immunity Has Changed the Constitutional Balance of Power

Donald Trump
Photo: Aleksandr Potashev / Dreamstime.

In “The Counterdemocratic Difficulty and your work on judicial independence, you argue that courts shape democracy not merely through landmark decisions but through their broader institutional role. How should we evaluate today’s Supreme Court—and the federal judiciary more broadly—in either constraining or facilitating democratic backsliding during Trump’s second presidency?

Professor Aziz Huq: The Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding, not only through the mechanisms that I’ve already identified, but also through other decisions that have made democratic backsliding much easier and much more attractive.

The most important of those decisions is one that the scholarship you mentioned does not address because it postdates that work. This is the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision granting the president a broad, almost absolute degree of immunity from criminal prosecution. That decision arose from a case involving the president’s role in the violence of January 6, 2021, and the associated efforts to derail the certification of the 2020 presidential election results. The effect of this presidential immunity ruling, which formally applies only to the president but, in practice, is likely to extend to and shield much of the conduct of the president’s subordinates, has been profound.

This is why you now see presidential advisers willing to argue that all federal agents are effectively immune from legal constraints. Stephen Miller, for example, made precisely that claim only days before ICE agents shot and killed Alex Pretti in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This is why you see not only a sense of immunity on the part of the president, but also a broader community of federal officers and agents behaving as though the law no longer applies to them. I think responsibility for that consequence—and, arguably, moral responsibility for the harms, including the deaths that have followed—must be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court that issued the immunity ruling.

Populists Have Developed Their Own Version of Constitutionalism

Across Europe and North America, populist leaders increasingly portray constitutional checks, independent institutions, and the administrative state as obstacles to the authentic will of “the people.” Has constitutionalism entered a new phase in which its greatest challenge comes not from coups or revolutions but from democratically elected governments themselves?

Professor Aziz Huq: I would modify the question slightly and distinguish between, on the one hand, liberal democratic constitutionalism, which is coming under the pressure that you describe, and, on the other hand, new populist forms of constitutionalism.

I think we make an analytical mistake—or go analytically awry—if we do not take seriously the idea that the new wave of populists, from Hungary to Turkey, from India to Japan, and even to the United States, have developed their own version of constitutionalism. That version may or may not, in some of those jurisdictions, become a durable and long-term form of constitutional order. So, I do think that we are witnessing a change in the nature, or at least the potential, of constitutionalism as a style of government.

I also think that the liberal, individual rights-focused conception of constitutionalism—and democratic in the sense of enabling not only free political choice but also the revision and reconsideration of political preferences—is the defining characteristic of liberal democracy. Those ideas are coming under increasing pressure, not simply because of innovations in American constitutional theory, but because those innovations are being diffused. They are learned in one jurisdiction after first being developed and deployed in another. What emerges from this process is not the disappearance of constitutionalism, but rather something new: a different form of constitutionalism that has yet to assume a fully coherent shape, and one that many of us—I would certainly include myself among them—are still struggling to understand and to map.

The Shift from Reason to Emotion Favors Populist Politics

You have argued that digital platforms have become part of democracy’s constitutional infrastructure rather than merely private communication spaces. How are social media platforms, algorithmic amplification, and generative AI reshaping the dynamics of populism, democratic polarization, and constitutional governance?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is a very important question, but one on which the empirical evidence remains imperfect. We know that people, not just in the United States but around the world, increasingly obtain their news and information from social media, particularly from platforms such as TikTok and Instagram, where information is broken down into very small, highly digestible components.

We also know that many—though not all—social media algorithms are designed to recommend content not on the basis of its truthfulness, but according to its likelihood of generating further user engagement. These recommender algorithms tend to steer users toward increasingly radical forms of speech—politically radical speech, as well as speech that is radical with respect to cultural and ethical norms, particularly around questions of gender and sexuality.

What we do not yet have, however, is strong evidence about how what appear to be profound structural changes in the public sphere—and I use that term both in the technical sense employed by Habermas and in the ordinary sense that most people would understand—translate into changes in political behavior. We can clearly observe that the public sphere is changing, but the number of studies linking those transformations to changes in political behavior remains relatively small, and their findings are often inconclusive.

So, we have to be very careful, as scholars, when thinking about the relationship between changing structures of public communication, on the one hand, and changing patterns of political behavior, on the other. It does seem difficult to imagine, however, that the forces broadly described as populist would not benefit from this new kind of media environment. It is hard to see how they would not be advantaged by the abbreviation of communication, by the shift from reasoning to emotion, and by the outrage- and clickbait-driven structure of the information ecosystem through which people engage with and learn about the world.

AI Is Concentrating Power Rather Than Leveling the Playing Field

Photo: Dreamstime.

Your recent scholarship examines artificial intelligence through the lenses not only of procedural fairness and due process but also distributive justice. As AI becomes increasingly embedded in courts and public administration, how might these technologies either reinforce or reduce inequalities in access to justice, legal accountability, and the rule of law?

Professor Aziz Huq: One of the issues I’ve been thinking about concerns what happens when the state, and in particular its judicial apparatus, introduces or adopts new technologies such as generative AI and other predictive tools. How do these technologies change the way adjudication is delivered? How do they affect who has access to adjudication? And how do they alter the distribution of power between the state and private actors?

At present, what we see is AI tools being adopted primarily in contexts where the adopter is a relatively powerful, centralized actor. This is true in the private sector, but it is also true in the public sector, where the most significant applications that have been studied are found in criminal law, social control, and national security. These are all areas in which the state exercises coercive power to achieve its policy objectives, often in relatively opaque ways. Yet these are precisely the domains in which we are seeing the most rapid technological adoption. That suggests that the introduction of AI generally shifts power from private actors to the state.

At the same time, however, the state is becoming increasingly dependent on a very small number of private actors for the services it requires. For example, the American state functionally relies on Amazon Web Services for much of its computing capacity. It contracts with firms such as Palantir for many of its predictive capabilities. So, even as the state becomes more powerful, it is simultaneously empowering a relatively small coterie of commercial actors. This is perhaps the clearest in the case of Palantir, whose CEO, Alex Karp, has been very public about his governing philosophy. What you therefore have is a group of private corporate actors that has become increasingly influential while holding a very particular vision of the state and of its relationship to the state. What we have seen so far is a relative concentration of power, enabled by technology, in ways that are, at least on their face, not obviously normatively attractive.

On the other hand, although there are many proposals to use generative AI and other AI tools to empower actors who would otherwise be marginalized by the criminal justice system or by ordinary adjudicative processes, it is very difficult to identify examples of such projects being implemented and operating at scale. What this suggests is that, even if AI has the potential either to level the playing field or to make it more asymmetrical, in practice it appears to be making the playing field more asymmetrical.

Militant Democracy Cannot Simply Be Imported into the Digital Age

In “Militant Democracy Comes to the Metaverse?” you revisit the theory of militant democracy to analyze digital platforms. As generative AI accelerates misinformation, deepfakes, and synthetic political communication, should constitutional democracies reconsider traditional understandings of free speech, platform neutrality, and democratic self-defense without undermining liberal constitutional values?

Professor Aziz Huq: As digital platforms become increasingly important, it is inevitable that states will reconsider the ways in which they are regulated. The theory of militant democracy, which emerged in the 1930s in response to the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, provides us with important intellectual resources for thinking about that challenge. Militant democracy, however, has had, at best, a mixed track record in Europe. It has produced more misfires than successes.

So, part of the purpose of the paper you mentioned is to caution against any wholesale importation of militant democratic ideas into this new context. Rather, we should learn from both the successes and the failures of militant democracy and think carefully about how to adapt its successes to this new technological environment.

Populists Have Evolved Faster Than Their Democratic Opponents

Looking comparatively across the democratic world, do you believe constitutional democracies have become more resilient since the first global wave of democratic backsliding began roughly a decade ago, or have populist and authoritarian leaders simply become more sophisticated in pursuing incremental, legalistic forms of democratic erosion?

Professor Aziz Huq: What we have seen so far is rapid evolution on the side of populists, slower evolution on the side of those who oppose populists, and now, in countries such as Hungary and Poland, an effort to think about what happens after populism and how one insulates a polity from populism once it has taken hold.

I would not describe this as a situation in which one side has gained the upper hand while the other has been weakened. Rather, I would say that we have moved through different moments or cycles, each characterized by different forms of contestation and by different pragmatic and moral questions that have emerged.

The Next Great Democratic Challenge Is Rebuilding Political Representation

Voters wait in line at Mary Rose Cardenas Hall North on the University of Texas at Brownsville campus during the 2008 US presidential election on November 4, 2008. Photo: Dreamstime.

Finally, Professor Huq, if you were advising constitutional reformers seeking to future-proof liberal democracy against both authoritarian populism and the emerging challenges posed by artificial intelligence, digital platforms, and algorithmic governance, what institutional reforms would you prioritize?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is obviously the million-dollar question. And I don’t have a million-dollar answer. I do think that we have learned a lesson that the brilliant political scientist Juan Linz tried to teach us in the 1970s about what he called the perils of presidentialism. We’ve seen, time and again, the importance of having effective checks on the power of the executive branch. These can come from the courts, from so-called guarantor or fourth-branch institutions, such as auditors’ offices or independent prosecutors, and from the creation of a federal structure.

We’ve also seen the importance of building effective systems of representation that do not flow through the presidency. So, for example, in the United States, there is a real need to rethink how Congress is constituted. What are the structures of representation that generate the federal Congress? And how do you create a federal Congress that has both the incentive to respond to shifts in popular sentiment and is sufficiently coordinated to stand up to the presidency? That requires, among other things, a shift from a first-past-the-post system to a more proportional electoral system.

I also think it is difficult to imagine that this kind of reform of non-executive representative bodies can occur without also rethinking the political party structures that underpin them. One of the things that has happened over the last two decades is the collapse of traditional party structures. I think this is very clear in Europe. In the United States, you are seeing the same process unfold, albeit in a slower and more opaque fashion. The Republican Party has functionally collapsed. It has been taken over by its MAGA faction. And if you look at Democratic voters’ views of the Democratic Party, you see that the Democratic Party no longer has the kind of stable base or loyalists that it had 30 or 40 years ago. So that looks to me like a collapsed party structure of the kind that is plainly manifest in the United Kingdom, plainly manifest in France, and in other European jurisdictions. It simply has not yet taken an electoral form in the United States.

In that context, we need to think very hard about the associational forms of political representation. How do we coalesce into political communities in ways that effectively represent people, and, in particular, those who are on the sharp edge of economic change, whether that change stems from globalization or from the wave of unemployment that AI may well generate?

I don’t know if there is a general legal answer to that question. The answer in the United States is almost certainly going to be different from the answer in the United Kingdom, different from the answer in France, and different from what Turkey looks like. But it is one of the most important areas of reformist thinking that needs to be pursued over the next five to ten years.

Dr. Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Opposition to LGBT Rights Is Ultimately a Contest Over International Authority

Homophobic counter-protesters from Malopolscy Patrioci organization, during manifestation against Krakow Equality March (Pride parade) at Main Market Square in Krakow, Poland on August 29, 2020.

Dr. Pauselli, welcome! Let me begin with your recent research on LGBTQ+ rights and authoritarian politics. You suggest that opposition to LGBTQ+ rights is often embedded within broader resistance to the liberal international order. Why have sexual orientation and gender identity issues become such powerful symbols in contemporary struggles over sovereignty, nationalism, populism, and global norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: First, international law has historically been understood through consent. Sexual orientation and gender identity norms, by contrast, expanded rapidly at the international level, largely through the interpretive work of courts, treaty bodies, and non-state actors rather than through explicit state agreement. That makes them an almost ideal target for a sovereigntist critique: they can be portrayed as obligations imposed without consent by unelected actors, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of international institutions. The ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.

The second reason is that these issues rest upon the symbolic material that nationalism mobilizes: the family, reproduction, the gender order, and the continuity of the nation across generations. That makes them a clear boundary marker. In my own work, I think about this in terms of ingroups and outgroups. Criticism over human rights tends to produce compliance among states that see the critic as one of their own and backlash among those that see the critic as an adversary. LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.

Third, opposition is cheap. Restricting these rights carries little material cost and threatens no powerful economic interests, while yielding a high identity return. It is a low-cost, highly visible signal of standing apart from the liberal international order.

Many authoritarian governments portray LGBTQ+ rights as foreign impositions or manifestations of “Western values.” How much does this rhetoric overlap with contemporary populist narratives that oppose cosmopolitanism, globalization, and transnational human rights norms in the name of national sovereignty?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is exactly what I was mentioning. It is true that populist and conservative governments have used anti-LGBT rhetoric to challenge what is perceived as a foreign imposition. But this rhetoric, as I mentioned before, is itself borrowed from transnational actors, including both non-state actors and organized state actors abroad.

Economic Growth Can Strengthen, Rather Than Weaken, Anti-LGBT Projects

To what extent do anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns serve as political instruments through which populist and authoritarian leaders mobilize conservative constituencies, manufacture moral panics, and divert public attention from governance failures or economic grievances?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very common interpretation of the instrumentalization of anti-LGBT rhetoric. I wouldn’t say that this is not the case. This powerful strategy of opposing LGBT rights and LGBT norms does, indeed, divert attention away from economic grievances. But in the research that I’m conducting with a graduate student at the University of Illinois, what we’ve been observing is that this is not the full story. There’s also an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state and heteronormative norms.

So, on the one hand, it is true that there’s the scapegoating thesis, which basically argues that anti-LGBT rhetoric is useful for leaders because it diverts attention from the failures of their own policies. But at the same time, there is some evidence that, during periods of economic growth and economic development, this rhetoric actually becomes even more powerful in strengthening the state and reinforcing certain ideas about the state. In other words, it is precisely when the state has the resources to impose and advance these anti-LGBT projects that this rhetoric becomes most effective.

The Real Contest Is Over Who Has the Authority to Shape International Law

The UN Human Rights Council has become a major arena for disputes over sexual-minority rights. What do the debates surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) resolutions reveal about the changing nature of global human rights governance and the growing contest between liberal and illiberal visions of international order?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: The idea of sexual orientation and gender identity being discussed and debated at global international institutions, especially human rights organizations, is relatively new. In the UN Human Rights Council, the first attempt to pass a SOGI resolution occurred in 2003, while the first resolution to be voted on and adopted came only in 2011. So, this is a very recent development—less than two decades old. And every time these initiatives have emerged, we have observed strong opposition from a bloc of countries. Although this bloc has changed over time, SOGI resolutions have consistently been among the most contested issues before the UN Human Rights Council.

So, this leads to the question that I’m essentially reframing from your question: Why is this the case, and what does it tell us about the contestation between liberal and illiberal visions of the international order?

One of the things that has become much clearer recently, especially after the many interviews I conducted in Geneva last summer, is that many states—particularly liberal states—are deeply concerned about the ability of multiple international institutions to reshape international law independently. The concern is that—or at least the way many states frame it—non-state actors, including the Human Rights Council and treaty bodies, have modified or reinterpreted international law beyond the consent of states. This challenges the basic, traditional understanding of international law, which has historically rested primarily on state consent.

What many states argue is that they never signed up for this. They basically say that they never consented to incorporating sexual orientation as one of the categories protected by international human rights law. They’re not necessarily contesting that these rights should not be protected. Rather, they do not accept this as part of the international human rights project because they never consented to it.

There is no international human rights treaty that explicitly includes it, and it is not part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. So, the concern is deeper than sexual orientation and gender identity themselves. It is fundamentally about the ability of these bodies—these non-state actors—to reshape international law and then hold states accountable for standards to which they have never consented.

But there is also concern about these norms empowering domestic actors who are currently repressed and who might use these international frameworks to challenge the domestic status quo. For authoritarian rulers, this is particularly threatening. They fear allowing advances and changes at the international level that domestic actors could subsequently invoke to challenge their own rule.

Political Anxiety, Not LGBT Rights Themselves, Drives Much of the Conflict

Helsinki Pride parade.
Helsinki Pride parade on July 2, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, do you expect conflicts over LGBTQ+ rights to remain one of the principal battlegrounds between liberal and authoritarian visions of international order, or are other human rights issues likely to supersede them?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is very hard to tell. It’s very difficult to predict the future, and every time social scientists have tried to do that, they usually fail because we’re not trained to know what’s going to happen. But one thing I’ve been observing is that the transnational LGBT movement is learning how to counteract the conservative backlash. Actors who have been promoting and protecting LGBT rights have been thinking very carefully about the frameworks and strategies that might be most helpful and effective in preventing the conservative backlash from gaining further ground. If these actors ultimately succeed in limiting the conservative backlash, then conservatives will probably find another issue to politicize. In that case, LGBT rights would gradually move away from the center of this contestation over the international liberal order.

At the end of the day, societies care about their well-being. The lack of progress and the anxieties generated by technological change have probably led many individuals to embrace anti-LGBT rhetoric as a way of resisting change and channeling their own anxieties. But the current challenge for the conservative side is that it ultimately needs to start delivering results and providing answers to those anxieties. If opposition to LGBT rights fails to do that, then they may find themselves in some trouble. They may need to turn to another issue or rely on something else to maintain their political power.

Rising Powers Prefer to Reshape Existing Institutions Rather Than Replace Them

In your research on China’s influence within the UN Human Rights Council, you show that Beijing’s presence systematically affects the voting behavior of other states. What does this finding tell us about how rising powers can reshape international norms from within existing institutions rather than by creating alternative ones?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: There are many things that are relevant to this issue. One is that, when we observe China being effective or successful in undermining international legal norms through its participation in the UN Human Rights Council, the first thing that comes to mind is that creating new institutions and providing them with legitimacy is very difficult. So, many authoritarian or illiberal states that oppose the international liberal order may find it much easier to advance their own agenda—even if it is an illiberal one—from within existing institutions that already enjoy high levels of legitimacy than through creating new institutions that few people know about and that may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

But, to address your question directly, the first thing this tells us is that rising powers like China are deeply interested in global governance. They’re not after anarchy, per se. So, by opposing the international liberal order, they are not opposing order itself. They do value order and global governance, but they may object to the content of the current norms that sustain that order. As China rises to the top of the global power hierarchy, it does not isolate itself. On the contrary, it actively participates in international institutions that help build and sustain order at the global level. It works through these institutions to advance its own goals.

Secondly, the other point I want to make is that international organizations are very important actors in shaping international norms. These norms essentially delineate what constitutes appropriate state behavior and what does not. They may not have teeth. We know that there is no global police force, and there is no United Nations army. But the norms that are developed and shaped within international organizations create a context—a normative structure—in which certain forms of state behavior become more or less costly. That normative environment may benefit some countries more than others. That is precisely where the contestation lies.

Independent Expert Bodies Are More Resistant to Political Contestation

Your research challenges the assumption that participation in international institutions necessarily socializes rising powers into liberal norms. Based on the case of China, under what conditions can international institutions instead become vehicles for norm revision, contestation, and the diffusion of illiberal ideas?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very interesting question, and it’s a very difficult one for me to answer. I don’t think I have a definitive answer. What I would say is that, based on research conducted by colleagues, it seems that institutions with broad participation—especially those characterized by direct state participation, where governments send representatives who ultimately decide whether to approve an institutional outcome, and where there are no independent experts or autonomous bureaucracies—are the institutions most likely to be used by illiberal states to challenge and contest international liberal norms. That’s the case with the UN Human Rights Council, for example. Every state has one vote, and every resolution is adopted if a simple majority of states votes in favor of it.

That is not the case, for example, with treaty bodies, where decisions are made by independent experts who adjudicate the cases brought before the institution. In those settings, states cannot—or at least do not necessarily—directly influence the outcomes through official channels.

Opposition to Human Rights Is Old—Its Transnational Coordination Is New

Turkish women rallied in Istanbul to protest proposed anti-abortion laws by then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on June 18, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

How do you interpret the growing convergence between right-wing populist movements and authoritarian governments in their critiques of international human rights institutions? Are we witnessing the emergence of a transnational backlash against liberal universalism, and if so, what are its implications for the future of global human rights governance?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: One thing that I find very revealing when I teach international human rights to my students is that resistance to international human rights—and even to liberal conceptions of rights—has been with us for a long time, almost since the beginning of the universal human rights project in the post-war era. What I would say is that norms that provide tools for marginalized individuals, communities, and other actors to resist power, abuse, and the arbitrary exercise of power will always be resisted and criticized by those who benefit from the existing status quo.

What I do think is somewhat new in recent years, or perhaps over the past few decades, is the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels. This coordinated opposition to the international liberal order and its norms—especially human rights—is something that is genuinely new. The opposition itself has always existed, but the coordination of that opposition is new.

I’m not sure what the future of the human rights project will be. But I would be very surprised if attacks on the human rights project were successful without offering an appealing alternative. What I do think is that, in the short run, attacking the international liberal order may be politically appealing to some individuals or actors, but, at the end of the day, something else has to replace it. I don’t see that happening right now. Nor do I think such an alternative would be particularly appealing to most actors.

Fear Flourishes Where Diversity Is Least Experienced

Your research on intergroup contact suggests that exposure to diversity can increase support for human rights. How should we understand this finding in light of the success of many contemporary populist movements that thrive on anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and exclusionary narratives?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: It’s actually quite consistent with what we’ve been observing regarding the success of these movements in advancing anti-group rhetoric and exclusionary visions of society. If we think about Brexit, or about some research that I’ve conducted on the LGBT-free zones in Poland, the areas that have embraced this rhetoric most strongly are precisely those that have had the least contact with these perceived outgroups. So, these movements tend to be particularly successful in areas—and among individuals—with relatively little exposure to migrants, minorities, or other perceived outgroups.

Securitization Changes How Border Agents Perceive Threats

In your work with Beth Simmons, you demonstrate that border hardening can increase allegations of torture and abuse by border and immigration officials. What does this reveal about the unintended human rights consequences of securitization policies in contemporary states?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we find in our research is that the construction of border walls predicts, in the short run—between one and four years—an increase in allegations of torture committed by border and immigration officials. Importantly, this effect is limited to that specific subset of state agents. We do not observe a corresponding increase in torture allegations against other state agents, such as the police or the military, but only among those tasked with enforcing the border.

What these findings tell us is that there is a human cost to promoting securitization projects. Expensive and highly visible initiatives, such as border walls, which are designed to restrict the entry of individuals into a given country or territory, may signal to the state agents responsible for border enforcement that there is a serious threat out there—even if, in reality, there is not.

The presence of these highly visible and costly projects may also signal that these agents need to rely on more extreme measures to protect the nation or its territory. This ultimately translates into concrete actions in the form of more cases of physical abuse and human rights violations. It’s not necessarily that border walls constitute a direct instruction from political authorities to torture individuals. Rather, these projects are interpreted by border agents in two ways: first, that there is a heightened threat, and second, that they should rely on a broader range of tools to prevent that threat from affecting their own country.

Border Walls Transform Political Messages into Enforcement Practices

Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Many governments justify stricter border controls in the language of security and sovereignty. To what extent has the rise of populism transformed migration governance by legitimizing policies that may undermine international human rights protections while claiming democratic legitimacy?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we actually find in our research is very interesting in terms of the connection between populist movements and rhetoric. Rhetoric alone—whether expressing anxiety over borders or anger about migration—does not predict greater abuse. Simply having a leader speak publicly about the border, migrants, and the need to protect the nation from an external threat does not, by itself, translate into border agents committing more acts of torture. This is conceptually and theoretically related to the idea that security and sovereignty are not necessarily at odds with human rights, or at least with sovereign border control. In principle, they can coexist.

The real risk lies in how this rhetoric is interpreted by the agents tasked with enforcing the border. The situation changes when this rhetoric is combined with a costly signal. One thing is for an agent simply to hear the leader talking about the border. But it is something quite different to hear the leader talking about the border while also observing a massive border wall that has cost millions of dollars. That is a much more concrete signal that this is a serious issue, that it is a priority for the state, and that there is a serious threat out there.

Human Rights Monitoring Depends on Networks of Trust

Your research on international organizations and NGOs emphasizes the importance of trust-based relationships in the production of credible human rights information. Why are some NGOs more influential than others in shaping international responses to rights violations?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Here’s where we move to the micro level of these actors. As political scientists, we’ve traditionally thought about international organizations and NGOs as actors. We call them non-state actors, but, in reality, they are made up of individuals. NGOs do not walk down the street by themselves. We cannot observe an NGO in the same way we observe a person. An NGO doesn’t have a conscience, nor do international organizations. Individuals do. They are the staff of these organizations, and they are the ones who actually carry out their work. So, trust between organizations is often built through trust between the individuals who belong to those organizations.

In our research, we find that interactions between NGO members and international organization staff over time increase the likelihood that the international organization will later speak out about issues in the countries those NGOs care about. For example, during a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, certain NGOs participate in the proceedings. They interact with Commission members, have conversations, and even share coffee with them. Then, months or even a couple of years later, because they now have their WhatsApp number or email address, they can contact the Commission and say, “Look, this is what’s happening in this country right now.”

It’s not that the Commission would have been unaware of those violations if the NGO staff had not reached out. Rather, because the information comes from an NGO with which Commission members have already established a relationship, that information is trusted—or at least trusted more—than the same information arriving through other channels, where they may not have the same ability to assess the credibility of the source.

This is how interactions between NGOs and international organizations can shape the monitoring role of international organizations in holding states accountable to international norms. It’s not that NGOs are the only providers of this information. Rather, because of prior contacts and repeated interactions, the information they provide carries greater credibility and is therefore more likely to influence the organization’s response.

Illiberal Regimes Are Building Their Own NGO Networks

Across Europe and the Americas, populist leaders frequently frame international organizations, NGOs, and human rights advocates as unelected elites disconnected from ordinary citizens. How has this populist critique affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of global human rights institutions?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: That’s a very interesting question. At the moment, I’m not aware of research that provides a clear answer to it. But I can imagine a few ways in which we might approach it. I think rhetoric is a very powerful tool for advancing political goals. But at the same time, these same populist and authoritarian leaders have also used NGOs themselves to boost their own legitimacy and advance their own agendas. So, while they argue that nobody elected these organizations and that it is unclear whom these NGOs actually represent, they also send their own NGOs abroad and rely on the credibility of the broader NGO community to shield themselves from international criticism.

I am currently developing research with a colleague, Sarah Bush, in which we examine what we call “illiberal NGOs,” or “cheerleader NGOs.” These organizations essentially participate in international institutions to praise authoritarian governments. We’re still not sure whether this is an effective strategy, but these populist and authoritarian regimes are clearly relying on NGOs to advance their own rhetoric. At the same time, whenever NGOs say things these governments don’t like, they respond by arguing that nobody elected them. That they do not necessarily represent or enjoy the support of society.

Norms Are Contested Because They Redistribute Power

A young woman on street enjoy holding gay pride banner during a protest. Photo: Dan Rentea.

Across your scholarship, a recurring theme is that international norms are not simply imposed from above but are contested, negotiated, and reshaped through interactions among states, international organizations, and civil society actors. How should we rethink the process of norm diffusion in an increasingly multipolar world where populist, nationalist, and sovereigntist actors challenge the universality of human rights norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a tough question. I’d like to begin by saying that we should think about norms and international norms as not being value-free. They’re not value-free. At their core, a norm is an expectation of appropriate behavior. The content of these norms may reflect liberal ideas, but they can also generate expectations about illiberal behavior. It’s not the case that, simply because a norm exists, it is, by definition, a liberal one.

At the end of the day, norms are about what constitutes appropriate or expected behavior for states, actors, or individuals in general. That behavior may be either consistent or inconsistent with the status quo. The expectation may be for individuals or actors to behave differently from how they have behaved in the past, or to behave in ways that challenge the existing distribution of power.

Because norms create expectations about certain forms of behavior over others, multiple actors naturally become interested in how those norms are developed, diffused, or resisted, since they affect the status quo in one way or another. They either reinforce it or challenge it. The contestation and negotiation that you’re asking about are really about the content of these norms. Norm diffusion should be understood as the diffusion of normative frameworks that benefit certain groups over others, depending on the content of the norm.

The Future of Human Rights Depends on Their Relevance to Everyday Life

And lastly, Professor Pauselli, taken together, your work examines authoritarian resistance, rising powers, borders, human rights, international organizations, and civil society. Do you see contemporary populism as primarily a challenge to specific liberal policies, or as a broader challenge to the universalist foundations of the postwar human rights regime? What does this imply for the future of democracy and global human rights protection in the twenty-first century?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Many colleagues might not agree with this, but the way I understand populism, or the concept of populism, is that it is, by definition, at odds with liberal conceptions of the polity and of how societies are organized. In terms of what populism implies for the future of this project, populism is the latest effective tool that certain sectors of the elite have found for gaining and maintaining power. I’m not sure whether they even think about the future of the international human rights regime. Populism is simply instrumental for them in maintaining or gaining power. It is effective because of the contemporary anxieties that societies face—anxieties that many members of society do not necessarily see being addressed by liberal democracy or liberal norms.

So, basically, there are two things going on here. On the one hand, we have the supply side, where elites find populist strategies and rhetoric effective for gaining or retaining power. On the other hand, we have the demand side, where members of society are looking for alternatives that can reduce their anxieties over issues such as economic development, progress, and inequality in general. And this is why populism is so effective right now.

Now, turning specifically to the human rights project, those actors who are engaged—or have long been engaged—in promoting and protecting human rights, the liberal actors, in some way, should be thinking about developing and strengthening tools that effectively communicate, through people’s lived experiences, how these norms—how human rights—positively affect their lives. Their everyday lives, in the areas and issues they care most about. I know this is very difficult. It is very hard for a human rights NGO to communicate to rural communities, or even marginalized urban communities, that an abstract text signed 70 or 80 years ago is relevant to them if they cannot see exactly how it connects to their own lives, especially when their lives lack so many basic things. This is the main challenge if the human rights project is to survive in the future: for constituents, broadly speaking—not just elites—to understand the value of that project for their own lives.

Aung San Suu Kyi

Daughters of the Dynasties: Father-Daughter Succession in Asia and the United States

Please cite as:
Sharma, Dinesh; Romagna, Britt; Lowenthal, Zara & Perez-Hosein, Jamilla. (2026). “Daughters of the Dynasties: Father-Daughter Succession in Asia and the United States.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 30, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000125



Abstract

Why do some democracies consistently produce female national leaders from political dynasties while others—with equally prominent political families—do not? This article addresses this puzzle through a comparative analysis of father–daughter succession in South and Southeast Asia and the United States. Although both regions feature competitive electoral democracies, influential political families, and mass media politics, they have produced markedly different patterns of female executive leadership. While South and Southeast Asia has generated numerous female prime ministers and presidents from political dynasties, the United States has produced no comparable case of a daughter of a president ascending to the presidency. Drawing on psychohistory, political psychology, comparative politics, and gender studies, the article argues that populism assumes different institutional forms across democratic contexts. In much of South and Southeast Asia, populist politics frequently operates through dynastic legitimacy, allowing daughters to inherit symbolic authority from charismatic or martyred fathers. By contrast, American populism has historically defined itself against entrenched political dynasties, making hereditary succession a political liability rather than a source of democratic legitimacy. The analysis combines two complementary studies. The first compares patterns of political and corporate father–daughter succession across Asia and the United States, including contemporary comparisons such as Chelsea Clinton and Paetongtarn Shinawatra. The second presents a psychohistorical comparison of Indira Gandhi and Rosemary Kennedy, demonstrating how family socialization, gender norms, disability, political culture, and historical context shaped radically different life trajectories.  The article concludes that female dynastic succession is shaped not by democracy alone but by the interaction of political institutions, populist narratives, patriarchal norms, historical memory, and elite family structures. By integrating comparative politics with psychohistory, it offers a novel framework for understanding how democracies construct legitimacy, political inheritance, and pathways to female executive leadership across cultures

Keywords: Populism, Political Leadership, Female Political Leadership, Political Dynasties, Leadership Succession, Gender and Politics, Political Psychology, Chelsea Clinton, Indira Gandhi, Rosemary Kennedy, India, United States, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, Thailand

 

By Dinesh Sharma, Britt Romagna, Zara Lowenthal & Jamilla Perez-Hosein  

Introduction

During the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, South and Southeast Asia produced an unusually large number of female national leaders compared with global trends. Many of these women—including Indira Gandhi in India, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Corazon Aquino in the Philippines, and Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar—emerged from powerful political dynasties as daughters, widows, or wives of assassinated, persecuted, or charismatic male leaders. Scholars argue that these women inherited symbolic legitimacy through family lineage, particularly in contexts where political parties and nationalist movements were deeply personalized around founding fathers and political martyrs (Richter, 1990; Derichs et al., 2011).

Paradoxically, patriarchal political cultures sometimes facilitated rather than prevented the rise of elite women leaders. Because these women were viewed through traditional gender roles—as mothers, daughters, or widows of the nation—they were often perceived as morally virtuous and less threatening than male rivals (Choi, 2015). This gendered moral capital enabled them to unify fragmented political movements and inherit charismatic authority from deceased or persecuted male relatives. In the case of Aung San Suu Kyi, for example, her identity as the daughter of Burmese independence hero Aung San provided symbolic continuity that strengthened opposition to military rule (Fleschenberg, 2008).

However, scholars also note that the same patriarchal structures that enabled women’s political ascent often constrained their authority once in power. Female dynastic leaders frequently faced military coups, assassination, corruption allegations, or resistance from male political elites who expected them to serve symbolic rather than executive roles. Moreover, many studies conclude that these leaders did relatively little to advance broader women’s rights or challenge patriarchal systems, often relying instead on traditional gender norms and dynastic legitimacy to maintain political authority (Blackburn, 2004; Jalalzai, 2013). Thus, the rise of female dynastic leaders in Asia illustrates the complex relationship between patriarchy, populism, political inheritance, and gendered legitimacy in democratic and postcolonial societies.

Research Question

Why are some democracies able to consistently produce powerful female leaders from political dynasties, while others exhibit a lack, or near absence, of national female leadership? Utilizing a quasi-experimental design and a naturalistic or qualitative methodology that examines the life histories of the daughters of national leaders in different democratic contexts—namely South and Southeast Asia and the United States—reveals important differences in how these political systems construct female power and authority (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Both regions contain large electoral democracies with mass political participation, modern media environments, and long traditions of competitive politics (Dahl, 1971). Yet, the trajectories of the daughters of national leaders differ strikingly across these settings, with many prominent female leaders emerging from South and Southeast Asian political systems (Jalalzai, 2013). This paper attempts to address this comparative difference by using a multi-method approach.

By contrast, daughters of US presidents have rarely entered formal political leadership. Figures such as Chelsea Clinton, daughter of Bill Clinton, and Ivanka Trump, daughter of Donald Trump, participated in political campaigns or held advisory roles, yet neither became a nationally elected leader. Despite the prominence of political families in the United States, dynastic succession through daughters has not produced a female president or equivalent national executive leader (Kazin, 1995; Lipset, 1996).

This contrast creates a useful naturally occurring comparative experiment. Both regions share electoral democracy and highly visible political families, yet they produce different outcomes in the political careers of daughters of national leaders. Examining these divergent life histories helps illuminate how political institutions, dynastic networks, gender norms, and populist narratives shape pathways to female national leadership (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

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Morocco football fans.

The Game They Cannot Win: Nativist Populism, Agenda-Setting, and the Weaponization of Football

As Morocco and the Netherlands prepare to meet in the FIFA World Cup Round of 32 on June 30, 2026, Yacine Boubia examines how European populist radical-right parties increasingly transform sporting events into opportunities for anti-immigration mobilization. Drawing on agenda-setting theory, democratic theory, and comparative political analysis, Boubia argues that football matches involving teams associated with immigrant communities have become powerful vehicles for constructing civilizational threat narratives while diverting attention from unresolved structural challenges such as housing, demographic decline, and labor shortages. From the Netherlands to Hungary, the commentary situates contemporary nativist politics within a broader crisis of governance, showing why cultural mobilization has become a substitute for policy delivery—and why liberal democracies must resist the weaponization of sport for illiberal political ends.

By Yacine Boubia

It is World Cup month, and I have been watching more football than is perhaps professionally defensible. There is something about the tournament format—the compressed stakes, the improbable trajectories, the way national narratives crystallize around eleven players on a pitch—that makes it simultaneously the most democratic and the most politically charged sporting spectacle on earth. I follow these games as a football fan. I analyze what surrounds them as a researcher with a background in media and political communication. And what surrounds tomorrow’s (June 30) Round of 32 match between Morocco and the Netherlands has very little to do with football.

Over the past week, a coordinated mobilization has taken shape across Dutch political and media ecosystems—amplified by far-right networks, social media influencers, and the deliberate interventions of Geert Wilders and the Party for Freedom—that has transformed a round of 32 fixture into a site of civilizational anxiety and explicit immigration politics. The central claim propagated by Wilders and his allies is as structurally revealing as it is empirically unfalsifiable: that Moroccans will burn Amsterdam regardless of the result. If Morocco wins, the riots confirm the threat. If the Netherlands wins and incidents follow, they become evidence of Moroccan inability to accept defeat. If nothing occurs, the vigilance is credited. Every possible empirical outcome confirms the narrative that was constructed before a single player set foot on the pitch.

This is not a security analysis. It is political strategy—and it is a strategy with a recent precedent. Last month, French political and media actors spent ten days of prime media real estate anticipating disorder surrounding the PSG Champions League final, ultimately producing a few isolated incidents far smaller in scale than the anticipatory frame had constructed. The pattern is now establishing itself across European radical-right ecosystems: sporting events involving teams associated with immigrant communities are being systematically converted into opportunities for anti-immigration mobilization—moments when the cultural threat narrative can be activated, amplified, and installed as the dominant interpretive lens through which social reality is understood, at minimal political cost and with maximum emotional intensity.

This commentary examines that strategy analytically. It argues that the mobilization surrounding the June 30 match is not simply opportunistic xenophobia—though it is certainly that—but a deliberate and structurally significant political operation through which radical-right populist parties, operating within the imperatives of the contemporary attention economy, compensate for the absence of serious governing programmes addressing the structural conditions that actually shape their citizens’ lives. Understanding why requires examining both the agenda-setting mechanism that the strategy exploits and the structural conditions of European nativist populism that make sporting events politically necessary as substitutes for governance.

Radical Right Populism and the Weaponization of Sporting Events

Populist radical-right (PRR) parties share a defining structural characteristic that distinguishes them analytically from both classical conservative parties and the broader category of populist movements: they combine a maximalist identitarian programme, organized around ethnic, cultural, and civilizational threat narratives, with a conspicuous absence of serious governing proposals addressing the structural conditions that produce the material grievances their constituencies experience. Housing affordability, wage stagnation, demographic sustainability, and public service provision—the actual conditions shaping the daily lives of their voters—receive rhetorical acknowledgment but no policy architecture capable of addressing their structural causes. What these parties offer instead is what their governing vacuum requires: the permanent mobilization of cultural emergency.

Sporting events involving teams associated with immigrant communities have emerged as particularly efficient vehicles for this mobilization. They concentrate public attention at a predictable moment. They activate identity and belonging as primary emotional registers. They provide a binary narrative structure—us against them—that maps directly onto the populist frontier between the authentic people and the threatening other. And, crucially, they generate media amplification that radical-right parties cannot reliably produce through the routine operations of parliamentary politics. The anticipatory threat narrative surrounding a football match achieves in seventy-two hours what months of policy debate cannot: the installation of immigration as the dominant interpretive framework for social reality, occupying the prime media real estate that democratic governance should be using to address the structural conditions that the parties campaigning around this match have no programme to resolve.

Bernard Cohen (1963) observed that the press may not tell people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling people what to think about. McCombs and Shaw’s (1972) subsequent empirical development of agenda-setting theory demonstrated that the salience of issues in media coverage directly and measurably predicts their salience in public opinion—not through direct persuasion, but through the allocation of attention that determines which problems citizens regard as most important. The radical right’s systematic deployment of sporting events as vehicles for anti-immigration mobilization represents an intuitive mastery of this mechanism, adapted to the contemporary attention economy’s imperatives of emotional intensity, narrative simplicity, and viral amplification.

The unfalsifiable structure of the Wilders threat narrative surrounding June 30’s match is the mechanism’s most sophisticated expression. A frame constructed so that no empirical outcome can disconfirm it does not function as a security assessment—it functions as a permanent agenda-installation device. It ensures that, whatever occurs on June 30 evening in and around Amsterdam, immigration will be the interpretive framework through which it is processed. The disorder that materializes in these contexts—where it occurs at all—is typically produced by a specific and demographically narrow subgroup of peripheral urban youth whose tensions are the product of structural exclusion, decades of concentrated social housing policy, spatial segregation, and underinvestment in public services, rather than of cultural disposition or community-wide political orientation. 

The conflation of this subgroup with an entire diaspora, and then with immigration as a political category, is the logical operation through which the agenda-setting strategy converts a sporting event into an immigration crisis. It is an operation that serves parties whose governing programmes offer no answer to the structural exclusion that produces the tensions they then attribute to immigration itself.

The Red Tie Without the Conditions: European Nativist Imitation and Its Structural Limitations

Populism, as Ernesto Laclau argued, is not defined by ideological content but by a specific discursive logic: the construction of a frontier between an authentic people and a corrupt elite, the equivalential articulation of diverse grievances into a unified political identity, and the emergence of a leadership that claims to embody the popular will against its institutional betrayers. This logic is structurally indifferent to ideological direction, but it is not structurally indifferent to the material conditions within which it operates. Populism requires more than rhetoric; it requires conditions of possibility that rhetoric alone cannot supply.

The global resonance of Donald Trump’s political project has generated an imitative dynamic across Western democracies that systematically misreads the sources of its success. From Wilders in the Netherlands to Milei in Argentina, from the remnants of Fidesz’s international network to the nativist movements proliferating across Central and Eastern Europe, a recognizable political style has travelled: the combative social media register, the civilizational threat narrative, and the explicit identification of immigration as the master explanation for national decline. These movements wear the red tie of European nativist respectability without the structural conditions that made the American original politically sustainable. They perform the rhetoric without the infrastructure. They campaign for cultural homogeneity in societies whose population replacement already depends on the immigrant fertility they campaign against.

Trump operated within a specific constellation of structural advantages that has no European equivalent. Continental scale—9.8 million square kilometers, of which Texas alone covers an area approximately five times the total surface area of France—that absorbs the contradictions of cultural conflict and provides physical space for demographic growth without the density pressures defining European housing politics. Military and technological supremacy—satellite infrastructure, digital platform dominance, and the algorithmic architecture of the very social media networks that Wilders uses to conduct his cultural sovereignty campaign—that insulates domestic nationalist posturing from its geopolitical consequences. And a demographic reserve in Latin America that operates within the American economic and geopolitical sphere of influence, rendering immigration restriction simultaneously performable and practically reversible: the door can be closed and reopened as political and economic conditions require because the reserve does not diminish in the interim.

Wilders possesses the aesthetic without the architecture. He campaigns against immigration in a country of 41,543 square kilometers—approximately the size of the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan area—whose housing crisis is so acute that young Dutch people cannot afford to form independent households, whose fertility rate of 1.46 sits well below the 2.1 replacement threshold, and whose economy is structurally dependent on the immigrant labor force he campaigns against. 

Poland—whose successive nationalist governments have maintained some of the most hostile positions toward immigration in the EU, and whose fertility rate of 1.14 is among the lowest in Europe—simultaneously constitutes by far the largest source of EU labor migrants in the Netherlands, concentrated in the transport, logistics, and service sectors that the Dutch economy structurally requires, attracted by Dutch wages, which are among the highest in continental Europe, and by a professional environment that operates largely in English. These are not anomalies within the nativist project. They are its structural consequences: the emigration of the native workforce that pro-natalist and anti-immigration politics cannot retain, absorbed by the receiving economies that the same political movements claim to protect.

The football mobilization is the clearest possible expression of this governing vacancy. When a political movement with no serious housing programme, no credible fertility policy, and no coherent account of how its economy functions without the immigrant labor it campaigns against requires a Round of 32 World Cup fixture to generate the cultural conflict it cannot produce through governance, it reveals the depth of that vacancy. The game is not incidental to the political project. It is necessary to it—a substitute for the governing capacity the movement does not possess and the structural conditions it cannot address.

It is worth noting the precise character of the Moroccan squad’s relationship to Dutch society. Three players on the Moroccan national team hold Dutch nationality. In the Wilders framework, this detail does not complicate the nativist argument—it confirms it. Legal citizenship, in the nativist worldview, does not confer cultural belonging. A person of Moroccan origin holding a Dutch passport who chooses to represent Morocco demonstrates, for Wilders and his allies, the impossibility of genuine integration rather than its achievement: evidence of dual loyalty, of the fundamental unassimilability of a population that cannot be made Dutch regardless of its institutional status. 

The frame therefore does not turn on passport holding. It turns on ethnic and civilizational categories that civic citizenship cannot alter—which is precisely what liberal democracy’s foundational commitment to civic, rather than ethnic, citizenship is designed to reject. Wilders conducts this campaign on X, a platform owned by an American billionaire and running on American digital infrastructure. The tools of civilizational defense are provided by the very American technological dominance that the populist critique of globalism targets in other registers. The contradiction is structural, not rhetorical.

The Demographic Data That Nativism Cannot Answer

The fertility data across the European Union constitutes the most decisive empirical challenge to the nativist demographic project. According to Eurostat, the EU total fertility rate fell to 1.34 in 2024 — a historic low since the institution began tracking the aggregate figure in 2001, and a figure that stands at barely two-thirds of the 2.1 replacement threshold. Not a single EU member state reaches replacement level. The Netherlands sits at 1.46. Poland sits at 1.14. 

In 2024, 24 percent of newborns across the European Union had a foreign-born mother. European population replacement is already structurally dependent on immigrant fertility to a degree that no nativist policy programme can realistically reverse. The parties mobilizing the June 30 football match as an immigration crisis have no policy response to this demographic reality—because acknowledging it would require acknowledging that the immigrant communities they campaign against are structurally necessary to the demographic survival of the societies they claim to protect.

The contrast with the United States is material. Trump’s America possesses, in Latin America, a demographic reserve operating within its economic and geopolitical sphere of influence—hundreds of millions of people, economically motivated to migrate, geographically proximate, and available for rapid mobilization at any moment of political opening. The performative restriction of immigration does not eliminate this reserve. It holds it in suspension. European nations have no equivalent. Their demographic survival requires immigration not as a policy preference but as a structural necessity—and the media apparatus that allocates its prime real estate to the anticipated disorder surrounding football matches involving immigrant-community teams is not informing citizens about this structural reality. It is systematically displacing it in favor of a cultural threat narrative that serves the parties with the least to offer on the actual conditions of European demographic survival.

The Orbán Laboratory: What Sixteen Years of the Nativist Project Produced

The most instructive empirical test of European nativist politics is Hungary under Viktor Orbán — and the results are now available with unusual completeness. In his 2014 Băile Tușnad speech, Orbán explicitly declared his intention to construct an illiberal state, rejecting the liberal democratic framework of institutional pluralism and cultural openness in favor of ethnic nationalist cohesion and demographic protectionism. His government subsequently allocated approximately five percent of GDP to pro-natalist subsidies and maintained the most sustained anti-immigration political programme in European history for sixteen consecutive years.

The demographic results are documented with precision. Hungarian emigration to other EU member states accounted for 37.8 percent of Hungary’s total population decline between 2014 and 2024. The Come Home, Young People repatriation initiative—funded at approximately 245,000 euros—returned 105 individuals before being abandoned. Hungary’s EV battery industry, the second largest in Europe and the government’s economic showcase, operates on migrant labor, primarily Filipino and Ukrainian workers recruited internationally to fill positions that the domestically depleted workforce cannot supply. The anti-immigration government became structurally dependent on the immigration it campaigned against.

On 12 April 2026, the Hungarian electorate delivered its verdict. Péter Magyar’s Tisza Party defeated Fidesz, ending Orbán’s sixteen years in power. The laboratory is closed. The most sustained European attempt to construct a viable illiberal nativist project produced a demographically weakened country, an economically contradictory labor market, and, ultimately, an electoral rejection by the citizens it claimed to represent. The movements imitating this project across Europe—mobilizing football matches because they cannot mobilize governing results—are at earlier stages of a trajectory whose destination Hungary has now reached. The message is waning. The red tie travels. The conditions do not.

The Game and the Strategy: What Is Actually at Stake

Morocco and the Netherlands will play a round of 32 World Cup match on June 30, 2026. What is at stake on the pitch is a football match — ninety minutes of sporting competition that millions of people across the world will watch as a moment of collective experience, legitimate national pride, and the particular joy that football uniquely generates across cultural and national boundaries. What is at stake in the political theatre surrounding it is something considerably more consequential: the question of whether PRR parties can successfully convert a sporting event into an immigration mobilization vehicle that displaces housing, wages, demographic sustainability, and the structural conditions of democratic life from the public agenda.

The Moroccan players—three of whom hold Dutch nationality, the remainder of whom have lived, studied, and built careers across Europe and the world—are not participants in this political theatre. They are its object. They have been constructed, through the agenda-setting operation that Wilders and his allied media networks have conducted over the past week, as the embodiment of a civilizational threat that their presence on a football pitch is made to confirm. 

The hundreds of millions of people across Morocco, the Moroccan diaspora, and the broader Global South who will watch this match are watching something that matters to them entirely independently of European radical-right politics: a moment in which their nation competes on genuinely equal terms in the world’s relatively most democratic sporting competition. That this moment has been instrumentalized—converted into prime media real estate for an immigration mobilization strategy—represents a precise and deliberate political choice by actors who have calculated that the emotional intensity generated by eleven footballers exceeds anything their governing programmes can produce.

The disorder that the anticipatory narrative predicts—and that the unfalsifiable structure of the frame will claim to have confirmed regardless of what occurs—will not, if it materializes, be the expression of a community or a culture. It will be the expression of a specific subgroup of peripheral urban youth whose relationship to structural exclusion is the product of fifty years of European urban policy, of the banlieues and the ring roads and the social housing projects built at a deliberate distance from economic opportunity and civic life. Naming that exclusion as its cause, rather than the cultural pathology that the nativist frame installs in its place, is the analytical and democratic responsibility that the media apparatus surrounding the match has thus far declined to discharge.

Conclusion: Liberal Democracy’s First Imperative

Football has historically offered democratic societies something rare and valuable: a space in which the political identities that governance enforces are temporarily suspended in favor of a shared human experience. The systematic weaponization of that space by PRR parties—its conversion into the primary vehicle through which immigration is installed as the permanent priority of the public agenda—is not incidental to the illiberal project. It is constitutive of it. Orbán declared in 2014 that he would build an illiberal state. What he built was a country that haemorrhaged its youth, imported the workers it ideologically rejected, and, on 12 April 2026, received the electoral verdict of its own citizens. The laboratory failed. The message is waning. The red tie travels across European borders. The conditions that would make the project viable do not.

Liberal democracies face a first imperative that is prior to any debate about immigration policy, border management, or cultural integration: the imperative to stabilize multicultural societies, preserve the institutional architecture that makes demographic diversity politically manageable, and refuse the transition to illiberal alternatives whose empirical record—as Hungary now conclusively demonstrates—produces the opposite of their stated goals. This imperative includes a media responsibility that the weaponization of sporting events makes urgent: to identify and name the agenda-setting strategy through which PRR parties convert football matches into vehicles for immigration mobilization, and to resist the allocation of prime media real estate to anticipatory threat narratives whose unfalsifiable structure serves no democratic function. It serves only the movements that require permanent civilizational emergency as a substitute for governing capacity—movements whose structural fragility the mobilization surrounding June 30 game reveals more clearly than any polling data could.

On June 30, 2026, Morocco and the Netherlands will play football. The players on both sides will contribute to a spectacle that brings joy to people across the world—people from the Global South who watch this tournament as one of the few arenas in which their nations compete on genuinely equal terms with the industrialized world, and who deserve to do so without their joy being instrumentalized for political projects whose failure the demographic data, the electoral record, and the structural analysis of the continent on which they are played have already confirmed. Liberal democracy should be larger than the fear of eleven players. It should be larger, above all, than the political strategy that requires eleven players to perform the work that a governing programme cannot. 


 

References

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Cohen, Bernard C. (1963). The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Direkt36 / VSquare. (2025). “Inside Viktor Orbán’s Failure to Achieve His Demographic Goal.” July 10, 2025. https://vsquare.org/inside-viktor-orbans-failure-to-achieve-his-demographic-goal/

European Labour Authority. (2025). “Netherlands — Fair Mobility Board.” November 2025. https://www.ela.europa.eu/en/country/netherlands

Eurostat. (2026). “Fertility Statistics.” European Commission, Statistics Explained. March 2026. Dataset: demo_find. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Fertility_statistics

Follow the Money. (2026). “Migrant Workers Risk Missing Out on Billions in Dutch Wage Dispute.” March 31, 2026. https://www.ftm.eu/articles/netherlands-temporary-employment-agency-wage-dispute-migrant-workers

Laclau, Ernesto. (2005). On Populist Reason. London: Verso.

Levitsky, Steven and Ziblatt, Daniel. (2018). How Democracies Die. New York: Crown Publishing.

McCombs, Maxwell E. and Shaw, Donald L.. (1972). “The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media.” Public Opinion Quarterly, 36 (2): 176–187. https://doi.org/10.1086/267990

Migration Policy Institute. (2024). “European Immigrants in the United States.” January 11, 2024. https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/european-immigrants-united-states-2022

Mudde, Cas and Kaltwasser, Cristóbal Rovira. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Netherlands Embassy in Warsaw. (N.d.) “Labour Migration — Poland.” https://www.netherlandsandyou.nl/web/poland/themes/labour-migration

Norris, Pippa and Inglehart, Ronald. (2019). Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

ODI Global. (2024). “Learning Lessons the Hard Way: Hungary, Immigration and Competitiveness.” Overseas Development Institutehttps://odi.org/en/insights/learning-lessons-the-hard-way-hungary-immigration-and-competitiveness/

Orbán, Viktor. (2014). “Speech at the XXV. Bálványos Summer University and Student Camp.” Băile Tușnad, Romania, July 26, 2014. https://budapestbeacon.com/full-text-of-viktor-orbans-speech-at-baile-tusnad-tusnadfurdo-of-26-july-2014/

Schapendonk, Joris and Steel, Griet. (2022). “Mobility Power in the Migration Industry: Polish Workers’ Trajectories in the Netherlands.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48 (19): 4694–4711. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2022.2061931

Eric Hacopian

Eric Hacopian: Armenia Won’t Become Turkey, but the Warning Signs Are There

Armenia stands at a critical crossroads. In the aftermath of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, amid efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and against the backdrop of declining Russian influence, the country faces profound questions about democracy, national identity, state-building, and geopolitical orientation. In this ECPS interview, political analyst Eric Hacopian offers a candid and often provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic trajectory. He examines the risks of democratic backsliding, the criminalization of political opposition, the implications of the government’s “Real Armenia” narrative, and the challenges of preserving freedom in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes. More broadly, Hacopian reflects on democratic resilience, national trauma, and the enduring struggle to build a competent and genuinely democratic state.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The aftermath of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the pursuit of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the normalization process with Turkey, the erosion of Russian influence, and Armenia’s gradual reorientation toward Europe have transformed the country’s political landscape and raised fundamental questions about the future of Armenian democracy. At the same time, debates over national identity, state-building, democratic resilience, constitutional reform, and the limits of geopolitical accommodation have become increasingly central to public life. As Armenia seeks to navigate a volatile regional environment marked by authoritarian neighbors, unresolved security dilemmas, and profound national trauma, the country has emerged as an important case for understanding the challenges facing democracies under conditions of war, defeat, and external pressure. 

Against this backdrop, Eric Hacopian offers a critical and often unconventional assessment of Armenia’s current trajectory. An Armenian-American political analyst, public affairs consultant, and prominent commentator on Armenian politics, democracy, state-building, and regional geopolitics, Hacopian has become one of the most outspoken voices examining the consequences of the post-war political order. In this interview, he challenges many of the dominant assumptions shaping international discussions of Armenia, arguing that the country’s political divisions cannot be reduced to a simple choice between Russia and the West. Instead, he contends that deeper questions concerning sovereignty, accountability, national memory, and democratic legitimacy lie at the heart of contemporary Armenian politics. 

Throughout the conversation, Hacopian warns against the growing tendency to frame political disagreement as evidence of foreign influence. While acknowledging Russian efforts to shape Armenian politics, he argues that democracies must avoid adopting authoritarian methods in response. As he puts it, “You cannot use Russian methods to fight Russian disinformation,” emphasizing that transparency and due process remain essential safeguards against democratic backsliding. In his view, the criminalization of opposition figures and the use of vague accusations of foreign influence risk undermining the very democratic principles that Armenia seeks to protect. 

The interview also explores the contentious debate surrounding the government’s “Real Armenia” narrative and the legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle. Hacopian argues that attempts to reinterpret the Karabakh movement as a historical mistake are generating new forms of political polarization. More broadly, he warns that linking military defeat to democratization and westernization risks alienating younger generations and creating future instability. “Because Nikol Pashinyan is unwilling to take responsibility for his own failures,” Hacopian argues, the government is increasingly “identifying failure and defeat with democratization and westernization.” 

At the same time, Hacopian reflects on Armenia’s efforts to build a more competent state, the historic decline of Russian influence after 2023, and the broader geopolitical pressures confronting the country. Yet despite his concerns, he remains optimistic about Armenia’s democratic future. For him, the country’s greatest strength lies not in any particular leader or government but in a deeply rooted political culture. “Countries become democracies—or become free—because the people in them demand it and are willing to fight for it,” he argues. This conviction underpins his broader belief that Armenia’s long-term resilience will ultimately depend less on geopolitics than on the continued determination of its citizens to defend their freedoms and democratic institutions.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Armenian-American analyst Eric Hacopian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Real Issue Was Not Russia but the Finlandization of Armenia

Photo: Dreamstime.

Eric Hacopian, welcome! To begin, Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s peace agenda and strategic reorientation toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a democratic mandate for peace, a geopolitical rejection of Russia, or evidence that Pashinyan’s brand of anti-establishment populism continues to resonate despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Eric Hacopian: There’s a simplistic narrative, which is very easy to understand in the West, that the elections were simply about Russia: you go towards Russia, or you go towards Europe and the West. But it’s much more complicated than that. One of the keys to understanding our election results is recognizing that multiple, sometimes contradictory or overlapping things can be true at the same time.

There was obviously an attempt by Russia to interfere in the elections here. You would have to be very naive not to believe that happened. One of the primary candidates—actually the leading person in the opposition now—was someone who made his fortune in Russia and has never been involved in politics. So, it’s highly unlikely that he would have gotten involved in this, running in any elections here, if he had not been encouraged by the Kremlin. That’s just not how the Russian system works.

However, the gist of the opposition to Mr. Pashinyan and his party was not based on support for Russia; it was based on his policies. For the first time ever, more than half the country voted against the current government and the current Prime Minister.

What they are aghast at is what’s perceived to be the Finlandization of the country, in which the country’s national interests are not pursued, and the country is entirely pursuing policies that are orchestrated or demanded by a very unpleasant regime in Baku. Some people in the West—obviously this government and some of their Western allies—want to portray this differently because they don’t want to talk about that. That’s the 800-pound gorilla in the room because it’s not comfortable.

The Russian narrative is much more saleable because people are used to it, especially in the West, because of Moldova and other places, and because of real and supposed Russian attempts at interfering in other elections. And I don’t want to dismiss it. But it’s much more complicated than that, because all of these foreign and domestic forces have absolutely no problems with the Finlandization of Armenia, which is something that many voters object to.

They, sort of, sweep everything under the rug by labeling it pro-Russian, but that’s not the case. The pro-Russian position in Armenia is actually much, much smaller than it is, for example, in Moldova. The Russian influence here, if I was to guess, and if you do a poll, is probably no more than 15–20 percent of voters who can be called “pro-Russian.” If you have spent any time in this part of the world, you will understand that some of that pro-Russian sentiment is actually pro-Soviet nostalgia.

It’s older people who remember a time when they were younger, they were prettier, and they remember all the good things and none of the bad. It’s just a normal, natural reaction. This is true of all of Eastern Europe and all of the former Soviet countries, whether it’s Armenia, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, or Lithuania. There’s always that element among people.

So, to simply portray this as pro-Russian is misleading. This government wants to hide its own, essentially, compliance and Finlandization by the Baku regime by portraying any opposition to it as pro-Russian, which is simply intellectually dishonest.

You Cannot Use Russian Methods to Fight Russian Disinformation

You have argued that Armenia is experiencing “dangerous democratic backsliding” and warned against the criminalization of political opposition under the banner of combating Russian influence. How should democracies defend themselves against foreign interference without undermining democratic pluralism and civil liberties?

Eric Hacopian: The question you just asked is really the ultimate question, not just for here, but for everywhere. I always start with this one simple rule: You cannot use Russian methods to fight Russian disinformation. Because if you do, they win. Because part of the Russian effort in these areas is really not to have certain people win, but to discredit democratic systems. Because that’s also a win. If you’re a totalitarian system, you don’t want any kind of democratic development. People thinking that the democratic system is not legitimate is a victory. It’s a victory for all kinds of authoritarians, whether it’s China, Russia, or, in certain cases, the Erdogans of the world.

So, what you need—it’s a very fine balancing act. If you’re serious about it, where it really starts is by putting the light on people. For example, if you have proof of Russian interference, you out it. In a very open manner.  I’ll give you a perfect example. We have the head of the opposition, Samuel Karapetian. Right at this point, he’s under house arrest. Do I believe the Russians were involved in pushing him to run? Yes, but if you never put out any public evidence of it and then you go after the second person, you go after the third person on the same issue without providing any evidence of it, what are we supposed to think of it?

Obviously, I believe a Russian oligarch moving to Armenia to run is directed by the Russian state. But what about the second, or the third, or the fourth party? Or they’ll use this blanket claim: “Russia’s funding this.” Let’s just take it theoretically. What if Russia is funding someone who is not pro-Russian to disrupt our electoral process? Should that person be punished? It could easily be done, and I’ve seen it. Different sides were spending money promoting or attacking people who were going to finish fourth or fifth for that particular reason. So, on the one hand, you have to fight this interference, but you need to do it openly. You can’t just say, “Well, these are state secrets, and we don’t want to harm relationships with Russia.” Well, if Russia is attacking your political system, what’s more harmful than that? You have to do it openly.

Transparency Is the Only Democratic Answer to Russian Influence

At the same time, it cannot be an excuse to criminalize almost all of the opposition that you don’t like by connecting them, on the thinnest of evidence, to Russia. What we had, which was quite disturbing, is that there are a lot of Russian dissident sites that frankly do very good work exposing things that happen in Russia and between Russia and Ukraine. Many of these places were being used to dump blanket accusations. Imagine if I came up with a document claiming that you and three of your friends are involved in trafficking cocaine from Colombia. I put the name of a person who actually is trafficking cocaine from Colombia. And they have all of these schemes that they were going to ask you to help them, but there’s no evidence of them ever talking to you. Then, you understand, in the political context, you become a drug dealer. Because this is not a court. There’s no evidence. You’re in a document that’s put up on some credible site that has done good work. But who produced this? Obviously Western intelligence, whoever is involved, consultants that work for the current government.

So, it’s this very muddy situation where you need to fight disinformation without allowing governments like ours to use it to criminalize the opposition, or anybody they don’t like, by connecting them to Russia—which happened. Both of these things happened.

Is there a way out? To be honest with you, there’s no clean way out. There’s no perfect formula. It’s really a question of how you approach it in principle. If you’re going to maintain transparency while fighting this interference, that’s the best way to approach it. But holding these kangaroo courts, where evidence is never shown, is a very difficult process. It needs to be done in a way that, fundamentally, always goes back to this question: Is this what Russia would do to its own opponents?

I mean, you cannot use their methods. It’s a hard balancing act, but if you’re principled about it, you should come close to achieving it without ever arriving at a perfect formula, because it’s designed to be disruptive.

The Closest Political Figure to Pashinyan Is Actually Erdoğan

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your recent writings, you drew parallels between developments in Armenia and the post-2016 trajectory of Turkey. Do you believe Armenia faces a genuine risk of sliding toward a majoritarian or security-driven form of governance despite its democratic achievements since the Velvet Revolution?

Eric Hacopian: There are similarities to Turkey, and there are things that are clearly not similar. I do not think that we are heading in the same direction. Erdogan, for example, is essentially dismantling the last facade of a normal democratic process in Turkey, as we know it, by criminalizing the opposition. There’s some element of that here, but I don’t think we’ll get there.

What we’ll get is what we have today, only more magnified—this sort of demagoguery of “it’s me or Russia, it’s me or war.” The less popular he gets over time—and in almost any democratic system, you win your first election at 70, then you’re at 50, then you’re at 45—the problematic election comes when you could actually lose.

That’s when you’ll find out who’s a Democrat and who’s not, and who will be willing to leave. The similarity is actually not between countries; it’s between people. The closest political figure to Pashinyan is actually Erdogan. In their style and in their base. Erdogan has a base of 30 percent of voters who will never leave him under any circumstance. Because that base is really not about him; it’s about who he’s against. He’s the guy who broke the Kemalist white Turk world that oppressed them, however you want to describe it, for 70 or 80 years.

For Pashinyan, his base is rural, poor, and old—which is the same Erdogan base—and it’s based on social resentment over what was done to them by the old regime for 30 years. So, they’re both built on negative identity, or on what they’re historically against.

In that way, they’re quite similar. Mr. Erdogan had the famous line that democracy is a train, and I’ll get off when it takes me where I want to go. He’s already gotten off. Pashinyan is on the way.

Armenian political culture is anti-totalitarian. It always has been. There’s a difference between being pro-democratic and being anti-totalitarian. You cannot, for example, have the system they have in Azerbaijan, where you worship Heydar Aliyev or something. If you do that here, they’ll laugh at you. Political figures here are meant to be laughed at. They’re not there to be worshipped. So that authoritarian gene is very weak here. 

So, I think where he’ll go is to use the system and, essentially, create these false binaries, between either being for Russia or being for him, or being for war or being for him. He will just take that to further and further extremes. By any measure, most of the elected opposition has been criminalized.

What does that tell you? Even during the periods when Erdogan didn’t do that, he only recently started doing it. Now, you can say they have evidence of this. Well, if you have evidence, show it. If you’re saying he’s a plant by the FSB, then bring it out and show it.

So, there are similarities, but there are also dissimilarities, and they have to do with cultural factors. There are lines that you cannot cross here. Those lines are further down the road in Turkey, unfortunately.

So, I don’t think Pashinyan will go there. It’ll be more a matter of manipulating the system to get the results that you want.

Nagorno-Karabakh Cannot Be Reduced to a Historical Mistake

Pashinyan has increasingly advanced a “Real Armenia” narrative centered on the internationally recognized Republic of Armenia rather than historical territorial claims. Is this the emergence of a new civic patriotism, or does it represent a new form of populist nation-building that seeks to redefine Armenian identity around a different conception of “the people”?

Eric Hacopian: It’s much more basic than that. It’s really about a leader not taking responsibility for his failures. The ethnic cleansing in Artsakh, or Nagorno-Karabakh, is the greatest disaster in Armenian history since 1915. So, you have two ways of approaching it. Obviously, he was not singularly responsible for that result. There are many other people responsible for that result, but you’re the leader of the country at the time. So, you have two options. You can take moral responsibility for your own failures in that outcome, or you can attack and try to discredit a very noble cause. 

What was the noble cause? The noble cause is that, in 1988, the Armenian people as a collective decided that what happened to them in 1915 cannot repeat itself. That was the struggle of Nagorno-Karabakh. It was nothing beyond that. Now, how that would shape up in the end, what would it mean? Is Karabakh part of Azerbaijan? Is there a third option? Those are different things. But fundamentally, what drove millions of people to sacrifice, endure no heat, no water, and all of these things for all these years was that idea.

He is essentially saying that it was an illegitimate goal, or that it was a mistake. He is essentially saying that everybody who died, died for a no-good cause. That backfired entirely. This is a guy who was supposed to win by 60% of the vote, and not only did he not win by 60% of the vote, but he was also denied even a constitutional majority, which he’s trying to cheat his way into.

There were two kinds of opposition. There were these third-way, pro-Western, anti-Pashinyan parties, none of which made it into Parliament because they killed each other off. But the traditional old parties got 39% of the vote, and what happened is that 200,000–300,000 people came out who would have never voted and voted against him. Supporting people, they don’t even like. 

So, this “Real Armenia” concept entirely backfired politically. Because it’s not seen as legitimate, and it isn’t legitimate. There are intellectual cases to be made for what he’s saying, but he’s not the person to make them. Because if he’s making them, you’re simply not taking responsibility for your own failures.

This refusal to take responsibility for one’s own failures is a classic Armenian political-class trait. Nobody does it. Maybe nobody does around the world, to be perfectly honest, but nobody thinks that they need to take moral responsibility for their failures.

Now, good or bad, you can just say, “This is my portion of it. It’s not 100% my fault, but 20% of it is mine, and I take it, and I own it.”

Instead, what he does is to attack people while running away. You cannot convince 80–90% of Armenians that Nagorno-Karabakh is not Armenian, in the sense that Armenians have lived there since time immemorial. You’re not going to win that war.

What he’s done, actually, is that he’s got the 20–30% base—that’s his strong base. What he managed to do during this election was to create an equal base that hates him with the same fervor that his base likes him. Because he’s crossed too many red lines with those kinds of people by attacking history, by falsifying history.

Now, we can have a thousand discussions about the issue of Artsakh and this and that. But to say that the initial instinct of the people acting there was not correct is intellectually dishonest.

Armenia May Be Laying the Groundwork for a Future War Without Realizing It

You have posed a series of pointed questions regarding the government’s reinterpretation of the Karabakh movement. More broadly, can a stable Armenian democracy be built on a political narrative that treats the Karabakh project as a historical mistake, or does such a narrative risk deepening social polarization?

Eric Hacopian: Pashinyan is making a classic mistake, one for which we and our region will probably pay for another two generations. Because he’s unwilling to take responsibility for his own failures, he is identifying failure and defeat with democratization and westernization.

There’s a big age gap in Armenia. There are only two generally democratic countries in the world in which younger people are more conservative than their elders. It’s Armenia and Israel. Under-30s in this country opposed this government by a factor of 3 to 1, 4 to 1. They oppose the peace agreement because they see it as a humiliation of the country.

What he’s doing is seeding a future generation that is not going to accept this framework. They would have accepted this framework if he had been honest about it. But they came out and voted against him to defend historical narratives and what they conceive to be the truth, or what their friends died for.

Essentially, in Armenia, voters are now divided into two blocks. I call one the Weimar group, which is this government. This government is closer to the Weimar Republic than any other example in history because it’s a period of democratization, economic growth—especially in the early years—and all of that. But it’s also a deeply, ideologically anti-nationalist state, which is quite rare in this part of the world.

It’s anti-nationalist ideologically. Some of the things they do—taking Ararat off stamps, stupid things—I’m sure no Turkish official ever asked for that. It’s almost ideological with them.

They’re right now the bare majority, or the largest minority. Against them are the people who came out and voted against this government, not to support the opposition. It’s what I call the Armenian Likud. That tends to be younger, better educated, and have more money. In the long run—five years, ten years—Armenian Likud is going to beat Armenian Weimar.

This is a country that is becoming more technologically adept. Per capita income has doubled in this country. It’s a country that’s getting wealthier and stronger over time. It’s projected that by 2035; Armenia’s per capita income is going to be larger than Turkey’s and Russia’s. It probably already is larger than Turkey’s, depending on whose numbers you believe, because of inflation and half a dozen other factors.

You’re going to have a situation where this country is more functional, wealthier, technologically more adept, with AI centers, cutting-edge IT, and half a dozen different things, at the same time that Azerbaijan is literally moving into the post-oil era. That is a recipe for war. At some point, the Aliyev regime, as it starts moving into its debt spiral, may start a war to save itself.

We know there’s a history of this, whether it’s the Greek colonels in 1974 or Argentina in 1982, where regimes try to solve domestic problems externally. One of the reasons Ilham Aliyev will never sign a peace treaty is because he needs to have that card.

His regime, without an Armenian mythical enemy, becomes quite problematic. Because the moment Azerbaijan signs a peace treaty with Armenia, every issue in that country becomes domestic. Domestically, what does he have to point to? They’re less free than Iranians, according to the US government. They’re getting poorer and poorer compared to their resource-poor neighbors, Georgia and Armenia.

One of the things you’ve got to look at economically is the way the income gap between these countries is starting to open up—where Armenia and Georgia are going, and where Azerbaijan is going. Post-2035, according to their energy minister, they’re essentially moving into the post-oil era. Because oil, as a major export commodity, essentially will no longer be there, as production is declining by about 10 percent a year.

What we’re dealing with here is that we’re setting up a future war, except no one knows it. Pashinyan’s brand of anti-nationalism just drives that even further. Because when the new generation comes back to power, their entire ethos will be to undermine what they perceive to be the humiliation of the country over the last five or six years. It’s a very historically predictable scenario. We’ve seen it countless times.

Unfortunately, we’re probably heading toward a very uncertain world for the next twenty years. If you really want to understand our world today, we’re somewhat in a period resembling the era between the two World Wars—a setting in which there are rules, but there really aren’t rules. There’s a hegemon, but the hegemon has gone crazy.

You have these perceptions of different powers rising. Actually, that isn’t the case. Everyone is declining, in a way. The US is declining. China is going to have half the population it has today fifty years from now. How is that rising?

Turkey itself—everybody with brains wants to leave the country. I always love it when people talk about Turkey as a rising power. A rising power with an Argentine economy just doesn’t work.

So, this is a very uncertain timeframe, which means the threat of war is much greater. You can go from zero to war in three months. That’s my fear. My fear is that my objection to him and to his regime is that unbeknownst to them, they’re laying the groundwork for a future war.

The Biggest Challenge Facing Armenia Is Not Ideology but Competence

Armenia protest.
Anti-government protesters gather in front of the Armenian government building in Yerevan on December 9, 2020, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Photo: Corneius Brandt / Dreamstime.

One of your recurring themes is the need for Armenia to build a competent state. Looking back on the years since the Velvet Revolution, where has Armenia succeeded in strengthening state capacity, and where has it fallen short?

Eric Hacopian: I was born in Iran, lived in the United States most of my life, and then moved to Armenia. I learned one thing: there are three kinds of states in the world. There are the complete failed states—the Somalias and Syrias of the world—which are very few. Then you have the top 20 or 30 countries in the world, which have planning capacity, where you can actually think about where you want to be 20 years from now and plan for the future. Then you have this vast number of countries, and Armenia is one of them, that fall somewhere in between. You have a functional state. The police work. If you get assaulted, you can go to them. You can resolve property disputes. But you don’t have planning capacity.

State capacity in certain sectors in Armenia has vastly improved since 2018, mostly because taxes are being collected much more honestly. The budget has almost tripled. We now have a budget that’s close to the $8–10 billion range. It used to be in the $2–3 billion range. So, some things are actually starting to work. Some of that is a reflection of a private sector in this country that is far more functional than the public sector, as is true in almost every country in this region. Private sectors are always way ahead of the public sector in their capacity to function.

So, I would say that in certain areas—whether it’s setting up a new intelligence agency or reforming parts of the military—progress is happening. You’re getting a slightly more competent state. However, it’s nowhere near first-world standards, and it’s nowhere near progressing as fast as it should. Mostly because the talent level isn’t there.

One of the realities in countries like this is that the best and the brightest left the country for 30 years. Over time, that starts affecting what I would call the middle-management layer. Every political and economic system in the world is run by middle management. It’s not the Steve Jobses of the world. You’ll have the Elon Musks and the Steve Jobses, but then you also need 500,000 competent people who can run whatever they built. That’s what’s missing in this country. It’s missing in most of the countries in our region because of the brain drain.

The biggest issue in state-building in Armenia is competence. It’s not even ideological. We can say that Mr. Pashinyan may have the best intentions. I believe he actually does want to build a competent state—except in the realm of the judiciary, because he wants to keep that politicized. After all, which political actor doesn’t want the opportunity to politicize or criminalize their opponents? But for the most part, he genuinely wants to build a competent state. The cadre just aren’t there yet, or they’re still in the pipeline. So, yes, there has been some level of improvement in state-building, but it is nowhere near where it should be.

Russia Turned Armenia into the Most Pro-Western Country in the Region

Russia appears to have failed in its effort to prevent Pashinyan’s re-election. Does the election mark a decisive decline in Russian influence, or does Moscow still retain substantial leverage through economic ties, media networks, and security structures?

Eric Hacopian: I always tell our Russian colleagues or friends who visit that, in two years, Mr. Putin undid 200 years’ worth of work by the Tsars and the commissars. A Russia that allowed the ethnic cleansing of Nagorno-Karabakh and the imprisonment of its leaders is not a Russia that’s worth anything to Armenia. Russia died in those few weeks in September 2023. The Russian position has collapsed, and it will not be rebuilt for generations. They actually managed to take the least hostile country toward them in the region and turn it into the most pro-Western country in the region. It’s entirely their doing.

I have no sympathies for that state. Not for the people—for the state. I have absolutely no sympathies for them because they get everything they deserve. But do they have leverage? Yes, they absolutely have leverage, mostly for economic reasons. Through natural gas and many other areas, we’re still very closely tied to Russia. So, they can activate their capacity to cause problems here—by not allowing goods to pass through and through half a dozen other measures. They can do all of that. And they are doing it. But that essentially speeds up the death cycle of their influence.

The thing with the Russians is that it’s all sticks and never any carrots. The West, at least, will promise carrots and, in many cases, deliver carrots. With them, it’s just sticks. “This will happen to you if…” Who wants to live that way?

Then you have to understand, from the perspective of most people here—or most young people here—and in societies like ours, young people matter a lot more than older people because they’re the competent ones. If you ask an average person in Armenia, or anybody in this region, “Do you want Poland or do you want Belarus?” Poland is going to win 90–10. The problem with Russia is that its position collapsed long ago on an ideological level because it’s simply not an attractive model.

So, all that’s left are these forms of leverage: “We won’t allow your apricots to go through.” Well, you can endure that for one or two years, but eventually you’ll find other markets. It’s not easy, and it will harm a lot of people, granted. I don’t want to understate the problems. But I also think that the Russians do not want to burn the last bridges they have here. So, they’ll go to a certain extent, but they won’t go beyond that. Because if you want to understand the Russian approach, they do not understand democratic societies, or specifically democratic peoples. Interfering directly in elections here is the stupidest thing you could do. Absolutely the stupidest thing you could do. Because then the governing power makes you the issue. They turn the election into a referendum on you, and you’re not popular. I see this country moving west for many different reasons. Frankly, most of our region is moving west—not because the West is nirvana or because it has some great, bright future, but because the Russian system is collapsing and is no longer viable.

You Cannot Satisfy Authoritarians by Giving Them What They Want

Azerbaijan continues to demand constitutional changes as a condition for a final peace agreement. Should Armenians view such demands as a legitimate component of conflict resolution, or as an unacceptable intrusion into Armenia’s sovereign constitutional order?

Eric Hacopian: Absolutely, it should be rejected if you understand the purposes behind it. What Aliyev is demanding, technically, is actually not even in the Constitution; it’s in the Declaration of Independence. So, it’s not even a constitutional issue. The Armenian courts have essentially ruled that that statement is not binding on the Constitution, so that’s already been settled.

Mr. Aliyev needs a reason not to sign the peace treaty, and this is the best one. Demanding a constitutional vote serves several purposes for him. First of all, it takes away the onus of him not signing. When the Armenian side is willing to sign, it shifts the issue onto us.

Second, it causes a political civil war inside Armenia because he understands how difficult it is to pass a constitutional amendment. You not only need to win; you need a certain number of votes to win. You can get 58 percent of the vote and still not pass. You need to get to 650,000 votes, so it’s a difficult process. He knows that. He knows this will cause a political civil war inside Armenia, and he knows that if it fails, he can turn around and tell the world, “See, the Armenian people voted against peace.”

So, it’s a complete trap.

For this government to accept this as anything legitimate, when it actually violates one of the 17 points of the agreement—that you do not interfere in the other country’s internal political process—tells you the extent to which they’re Finlandized by the other side.

But if you really want to understand it, I’m sure you’re well aware of how totalitarian systems work. Totalitarian systems fundamentally operate through humiliation. This is an attempt to humiliate our population, not the leaders. This is an attempt to get people to vote for their own humiliation. That’s what he wants.

There’s a psychological component here. One of the reasons totalitarian systems work is that they force you to do things you don’t want to do, or to lie about things. By lying, you’re weakening yourself.

Why does North Korea have elections? Because they want to humiliate the population. They want to force you to participate in something that you know is a farce. So, based on everything I’ve outlined, any democratic society would need to reject his demand, because this will not be the last demand. He will come back and say, “Well, you know what? Now you need to allow 300,000 people to come back to Western Azerbaijan.”

Just yesterday, they held a giant festival—the Western Azerbaijan Festival. They were talking about the right of return and all of these other issues. So, what are we really talking about here?

This is an attempt to humiliate our population. If we have any democratic sense, we should vote against this if it’s ever put before us. It needs to be rejected.

It’s also completely illegitimate. If this was so important to you, why didn’t you negotiate it into the 17 points? You didn’t. You accepted the agreement without it. So, you’ve already initialed a peace agreement without this provision. What’s the logic here?

But as a small-d democrat—and by that I mean someone who believes in democratic systems and democratic processes—to me, it’s completely unacceptable for people who do not come from democratic processes to impose conditions and demands on democratic peoples. I don’t care if it’s Putin, I don’t care if it’s Aliyev, I don’t care who it is.

Because we know what those people think. We know what they want, and you can’t satisfy them by giving them what they want. They will always come back for more—and for more humiliation.

Armenia Can Remain an Oasis of Freedom in a Region of Authoritarians

In several of your writings, you have argued that Armenia should define itself internationally as an “island of freedom in a sea of tyrannies.” How sustainable is that vision when Armenia must normalize relations with increasingly authoritarian neighbors such as Azerbaijan and Turkey?

Eric Hacopian: Let’s be honest. I sit here, and I’m very critical of this government. I’m critical of our military, I’m critical of our prime minister, I’m critical of our intelligence services, and no one’s ever knocked on my door. It doesn’t mean that that moment won’t come.

That’s what you struggle against. But if you are principally dedicated to preserving freedom, there’s freedom and there’s democracy, and they’re completely different things sometimes. They’re not always the same.

If you have a culture of freedom—and this country, in a way, does have a culture of freedom—freedom is almost like a birthright. Armenians do not do tyrants. It just doesn’t work here.

If you have that resistance gene, you can likely protect a good part of your freedoms, even if you don’t have a completely democratic system, while living in an area surrounded by authoritarians.

Frankly, there are countless examples of this in history. You go to Amsterdam in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and there were places that functioned as small islands of freedom in vast seas of tyranny, yet they managed to preserve that character. Even today, you go to Holland, and they still have that culture of freedom. It’s defined in different ways, but it still exists.

You walk down the street here and you’ll see dissidents from Uzbekistan, dissidents from Chechnya, dissidents from Russia, and people from Ukraine. So, we already are that oasis. You’ll see Iranians everywhere.

I don’t think we lose that, because it’s not really tied to a government. It’s tied to a culture. I can say this, I can say that, or I can insult someone. We protect our right to insult our leaders very strongly. So, I think we can preserve it, but because of the cultural background of the country, not because of the political system.

Authoritarianism Has No Market in Armenia

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkstream) in Istanbul, Turkey on November 19, 2018.

And lastly, at a time when democratic backsliding, geopolitical coercion, and populist mobilization are reshaping politics across the world, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the post-Soviet space. What lessons—both positive and cautionary—does Armenia offer for understanding the relationship between populism, democratic resilience, military defeat, and national renewal under conditions of external pressure and profound national trauma?

Eric Hacopian: One of the things that I’ve learned, and that we’ve learned in a really hard way through the recent elections, is that countries become democracies—or become free—because the people in them demand it and are willing to fight for it. Freedom in Armenia was brought about by Armenians struggling for their own freedom, in the same way that one day freedom will come to Iran because Iranians have struggled for it, and one day it will come to Turkey because Turks have struggled for it.

So, I do not believe in any of these external forces “bringing you democracy”—these NGO complexes or whatever. We have a democracy because we were willing to fight for it, and we’re willing to keep it. People need to understand that.

I see this among our Georgian friends. They think that you go toward the EU and magically transform the country into Germany. It doesn’t work like that. What is your culture? Are you building a democratic culture? Are you building a culture in which the person who loses leaves, or a culture in which people don’t prosecute the opposition?

People always have to struggle against the state. The state is always the enemy, no matter how good it is. It’s always an enemy of people’s fundamental rights. So, you always have to have that struggle in you. I think we have that. We have to have that capacity to fight, and hopefully we can become an example for other people by fighting, because everybody has to win their own struggle.

As far as the trauma of war is concerned, Armenia faced a very fundamental choice after Azerbaijan lost the war in 1993–94. They decided to sacrifice freedom for safety by turning the country over to a corrupt family dynasty. But normally, at the end of that, you either get freedom, prosperity, or security. Because every Aliyev-type regime has an Assad- or Gaddafi-type ending. There’s always the last day when you’re on a plane to Ankara or you’re on a plane to Moscow. That’s how it’s going to end. There are no other scenarios in that scheme.

Armenia made a very conscious decision that, yes, we lost the war, but we don’t want to lose our freedoms, and we don’t want to lose our democracy. It was a very conscious decision. In a way, it was a very brave one. Because it was very uncertain. It is very easy at a moment like that to say, “I want the strong hand.” This country rejected the strong hand and took the risks. It might pay off; it might not pay off. I can’t say. The verdict is still out. But it was a fundamental choice.

People in this part of the world instinctively understand that authoritarianism does not have a future, and that you cannot build the future you want for your children—economically, politically, or even militarily—through authoritarianism. Because the corruption that accompanies these systems eventually leads to what it always leads to: some level of collapse. So, we made that decision. History will judge whether it was the correct one. But people here understand that. One of the reasons I’m confident about freedom in this country is that authoritarianism has no market here, and people understand that you cannot build the future you want by being corrupt, oligarchic, or non-democratic.

Professor Javier Corrales.

Prof. Corrales: Even Rigged Elections Can Still Produce Competitive Outcomes

At a time when democratic backsliding, populist polarization, and executive aggrandizement dominate political debate across the globe, Professor Javier Corrales offers a timely challenge to one of the most pervasive assumptions in contemporary political science: that democratic erosion inevitably culminates in consolidated authoritarianism. Drawing on his recent article, co-authored with Susan Stokes, Professor Corrales argues that elections, opposition mobilization, party coordination, and institutional constraints continue to provide viable pathways for removing democracy-eroding leaders. In this wide-ranging interview, he examines why even heavily manipulated elections can remain competitive, how opposition movements can overcome demoralization and fragmentation, why excessive presidential popularity may itself constitute a democratic vulnerability, and how courts, parties, and legal institutions shape democratic survival. His reflections offer both analytical insight and cautious optimism about the resilience of democratic politics in an age of global democratic uncertainty.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the contemporary world, democratic pessimism has become increasingly pervasive. From Latin America and Eastern Europe to South Asia and the United States, concerns about democratic backsliding, executive aggrandizement, institutional capture, and the erosion of liberal norms have fueled a growing belief that once elected leaders begin dismantling checks and balances, democratic decline becomes almost irreversible. In this climate, elections are often viewed with skepticism, particularly when incumbents manipulate institutions, tilt the playing field, and exploit state resources to entrench themselves in power.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Javier Corrales challenges this prevailing narrative. As the Dwight W. Morrow Professor of Political Science at Amherst College and one of the foremost scholars of democratic backsliding, populism, and authoritarianism, Professor Corrales has spent decades examining how democracies erode and how leaders concentrate power. Yet his recent work, co-authored with Susan Stokes and published in the Journal of Democracy under the title “How Aspiring Autocrats Exit,” offers a more nuanced and cautiously optimistic perspective. Rather than focusing exclusively on how democracies die, Professor Corrales asks an equally important question: How do aspiring autocrats leave power?

The answer, he argues, is more encouraging than many observers assume. While acknowledging that “there is plenty of evidence that illiberal presidents and hyper-populist presidents can undermine democracy, concentrate power, and erode liberal democracy,” Professor Corrales emphasizes that “they often do not go much farther than that, and they may even get ejected from office.” Indeed, one of the central findings of his research is that the most traditional democratic mechanism remains surprisingly resilient. As he puts it, “the most old-fashioned route is still available, which is defeating them at the polls.”

This conclusion runs counter to widespread assumptions about electoral politics under conditions of democratic erosion. Professor Corrales notes that many backsliding leaders continue to maintain elections even after weakening institutional constraints. Although such contests are frequently marred by irregularities and heavily skewed in favor of incumbents, they often remain meaningful arenas of political competition. “These elections,” he observes, “are very often incredibly rigged in favor of the incumbent. But the election still happens, and there can be enough opportunities for competition.”

The key challenge, according to Professor Corrales, is not merely institutional manipulation but political demoralization. Autocratizing leaders seek to convince citizens, and opposition forces that resistance is futile. Yet the comparative evidence from countries as diverse as Poland, Hungary, Brazil, Zambia, and elsewhere suggests that democratic recovery remains possible when opposition forces overcome fragmentation, mobilize new voters, and maintain faith in electoral competition.

In this interview Professor Corrales discusses the resilience of elections, the importance of opposition unity, the dangers of excessive presidential popularity, the role of courts and parties in democratic survival, and the common authoritarian playbook shared by populist leaders across ideological divides. His reflections offer a timely reminder that democratic backsliding is neither predetermined nor irreversible—and that even under adverse conditions, democratic institutions can still provide pathways to political renewal.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Javier Corrales, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Many Aspiring Autocrats Can Still Be Removed Through Elections

Then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro attends the 74th Anniversary of the Parachutist Infantry Battalion at the Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo Rodrigues.

Professor Corrales, welcome, and thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent research on how aspiring autocrats leave power. In your recent Journal of Democracy article, you challenge the widespread assumption that democratic backsliding inevitably culminates in consolidated authoritarianism. What motivated you to study how aspiring autocrats actually leave office, and what does this tell us about the resilience of democratic institutions in the twenty-first century?

Professor Javier Corrales: Let me preface this by saying that there is plenty of evidence that illiberal presidents and hyper-populist presidents can undermine democracy, concentrate power, and erode liberal democracy. There is ample evidence that this can happen. But they often do not go much farther than that, and they may even get ejected from office.

What prompted this research was Susan Stokes; she has just come out with a fantastic book on backsliding. We would give talks about the process of backsliding and all its dangers, and people always wanted to know: What can we do? So, we started to look at the evidence from cases where it was actually possible to put a stop to it. And we found that, many times, it is indeed possible to stop them and remove them from office. So that is the motivation: answering people’s call for what can be done. The most important point we make is that the most old-fashioned route is still available, which is defeating them at the polls.

The Biggest Mistake Is Believing the Election Is Already Lost

Your research identifies elections as the most common mechanism through which democracy-eroding leaders are removed from power. How do you explain the continued effectiveness of elections even in political systems where incumbents have already weakened checks and balances and tilted the playing field in their favor?

Professor Javier Corrales: This is a trend that we may not have a good answer for, but it is one that we have been able to identify ever since the field of democratic backsliding emerged. Presidents will concentrate a great deal of power and change the rules, but they still maintain elections. Obviously, we know—and this is where the term from Levitsky and Way comes in—about competitive authoritarianism and electoral autocracies. We are not really sure that we have settled the debate as to why they keep elections, but they do.

Now, these elections, of course, are full of irregularities. They are, very often, incredibly rigged in favor of the incumbent. But the election still happens, and there can be enough opportunities for competition. The problem is that many times leaders, as well as voters, give up. They think that the system is so unevenly stacked in favor of the incumbent that they say, “Why bother?”

What we find is that those opposition parties that counteract this tendency among voters to abstain and, of course, form a coalition can actually generate a coalition that is capable of winning an election. It is possible. It happens. But first, you have to overcome the tendency to abstain and also the tendency of the opposition to divide into multiple candidacies.

The First Battle Is Defeating Opposition Demoralization

Many opposition movements become demoralized once democratic backsliding reaches an advanced stage. Based on your findings, what strategic lessons should opposition parties draw from cases such as Hungary, Poland, Brazil, and Zambia regarding electoral mobilization under uneven conditions?

Professor Javier Corrales: Exactly, you’re totally right. One of the main objectives of autocratizing presidents is to demoralize the opposition. There is probably more intentionality behind demoralizing the opposition than behind repressing it, although they do some of that as well. The goal is to get the opposition to feel that the game is set, that they should not even bother. To almost make that perception credible. They almost do not hide the fact that this system—we are never going to admit it, but it is true—is stacked against you. They create this sense that we are invincible, that there is nothing you can do.

Those cases you mentioned, and others, show that the real objective of the opposition is to overcome that demoralization. In fact, in most of these cases, what you get is a surge in voting. So, you cannot simply rely on the conventional electorate that always votes. You have to be able to produce more voters, which means you actually have a very difficult battle in front of you. We find—I find in the vast majority of these electoral successes; the opposition wins only if it generates a voter surge. The number of people registering and voting increases significantly. We know that, many times, that surge tends to favor the opposition in autocratizing environments.

The Rise of Irregularities Is Not a Reason to Give Up

In your work on Venezuela, you have shown how electoral irregularities can coexist with regular elections and gradually contribute to democratic erosion. How can scholars and practitioners distinguish between elections that remain meaningful instruments of democratic accountability and those that have become largely authoritarian rituals?

Professor Javier Corrales: There is a fine line between a system that has a lot of irregularities but can still produce a competitive election and one in which those irregularities become so overwhelming that the situation is almost hopeless. All I can say is that you want to think like an athlete who faces increasingly difficult obstacles. In autocratizing environments, as the incumbent president introduces more and more irregularities, the way to think about this is to act like an amazing athlete. Consider what is happening as a series of new obstacles, and develop the skills needed to overcome them.

I understand that there comes a point when it becomes impossible. You can have an electoral authority that is so biased against you, or a type of malapportionment, or gerrymandering, or misallocation of funding, or attacks on the opposition. Sometimes the obstacles can become insurmountable, but there is a long way to go before you reach that point.

The point is not to feel defeated by the rise in irregularities, but to say, alright, we face a greater challenge—let’s see what we can do.

I know it’s easier said than done when you live in a country like this one. It’s so easy to come to the realization that the game is so rigged against you that you ask yourself, why bother trying? I get that. But the cases of electoral ejection of autocratizing presidents all show that the opposition engaged in effective strategies of voter mobilization.

The Biggest Institutional Challenge Is Opposition Fragmentation

Your research frequently emphasizes the importance of party systems. To what extent does the strength, cohesion, or fragmentation of opposition parties determine whether a backsliding leader ultimately exits through elections or succeeds in consolidating authoritarian rule?

Professor Javier Corrales: Thank you for bringing up that point, because I do think we need to talk about it. In many ways, Susan Stokes and I have been giving answers that have to do with agency. What is it that an opposition leadership ought to do? But in many ways, it also depends on the institutional context. I happen to think that the party system you have makes agency either easier or harder. To me, a crucial variable is what I call the potential fragmentation of the opposition. Other than the tendency of voters to abstain, this is perhaps the biggest institutional challenge facing the opposition.

Many times, we tend to think that a common foe unites. This is like what people say: people come together to defend themselves against a common foe. We assume that in situations of democratic backsliding, the opposition has a common enemy and therefore should reunite. But the central tendency is the opposite. The opposition tends to bicker among itself and engage in enormous disagreements about the right strategy, the right candidates, where to negotiate, what not to negotiate, and so on. This can lead to a splintering of the opposition.

This is probably why I hear people all the time saying, “Oh my God, you have a strongman, but the opposition is split.”Well, that is exactly what you are typically going to get. That is the starting point. The key issue is identifying those cases that manage to reduce the effective number of parties in the opposition. In other words, they lessen what I call the asymmetry of party fragmentation.

It is initially asymmetric because the ruling party is large and coherent and tends to operate like a personalist machine. It is a big tank. The opposition, by contrast, is fragmented. So, you need to restore some balance by reducing the effective number of parties representing the opposition and, ideally, by having unified candidates for every post being contested in an election.

Term Limits Are Often the Last Barrier to Executive Aggrandizement

You argue that term limits remain one of democracy’s most effective safeguards against executive aggrandizement. Yet many contemporary populists seek to weaken or abolish them. What explains the persistent attraction of term-limit removal among aspiring autocrats, and why do such efforts sometimes backfire politically?

Professor Javier Corrales: I started working on term limits before I began focusing on the theory of democratic backsliding, and I was looking at exactly that question: why is it that some presidents, not all of them, want to relax term limits or even abolish them? And I have come to the realization that there are times when term limits are all that works. Not always, because, as you say, the natural tendency of autocratizing presidents is to eliminate term limits. Here’s the logic.

One could argue that, in a liberal democracy, the strongest check on presidential power is the expiration date of an administration. The date that the Constitution says it’s over for you. If you think about it, that is probably the strongest check. This helps answer the question of why illiberal presidents focus on eroding term limits. We know that, by definition, illiberal presidents want to weaken checks on executive power. So, of course, when they encounter term limits, they are going to want to go after them, relax them, and try to circumvent them. As a result, we see many efforts in that direction.

But there are times when they fail to do so. There are times when that is the one thing, they are unable to change. And they end up respecting it. We saw a perfectly good example of this in Mexico in 2024. Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the president of Mexico at the time, entertained the possibility of ending term limits. Historically, they have been very firmly established in Mexico. He had the popularity to try it, but he didn’t. He respected the term limit, and so he stepped down.

Term limits simply mean that you are going to bring an end to an illiberal administration. They do not automatically replace it with a new democracy, but they provide a chance for the political system to reset itself.

Popularity Can Become a Populist Tool for Capturing the State

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Your work on presidential re-election in Latin America highlights the role of power asymmetries and presidential popularity. How should we understand the relationship between electoral popularity and democratic vulnerability? Can highly popular leaders become the greatest threat to constitutional constraints?

Professor Javier Corrales:  I think there are two extremes that one could argue are bad for democracy. One is having a democratically elected president who is very unpopular. That always ends badly. So, we should not pray for presidents to become super unpopular. Normally, what leads to that unpopularity is bad news, and the way presidents react to low popularity can also be dangerous. But I would go as far as to say that high popularity may be bad as well.

There was a time when we used to think, “Oh my God, this leader is so beloved, so well-liked. Citizens and voters really love him. He has a lot of popularity.” And we used to think that was great—that it was exactly what a leader needed to achieve. But what we now know is that illiberal presidents can weaponize that popularity. They can use it to create asymmetrical party-system fragmentation and turn it into an instrument for autocratizing the regime.

So now, after the research I have done, I think that if you have a populist president who wins by a very large margin and enjoys a great deal of popularity, rather than representing a triumph of democracy, this may actually constitute a democratic vulnerability. Because it creates an opportunity for the president to weaponize that popularity, capture state institutions, and go after detractors.

For example, this weekend there was a major election in Colombia. It was a close election, perhaps a little too close; it should not have been that close. But it may very well be that the new president, a far-right populist, will come to office with a small margin. Psychologically, it matters for both the president and the opposition to know that we do not have a president who was elected with an overwhelmingly broad mandate.

Voters need to know that, and the president does not need yet another advantage—high popularity—that can be used as an instrument for capturing the state. So, I now feel that these two extremes—an incredibly unpopular president on the one hand and a highly popular president on the other—represent serious democratic vulnerabilities.

There Is a Cost to Impeachment—and a Cost to Not Using It

One of the more surprising findings in your article is that impeachment has rarely succeeded in ending democratic backsliding. Does this suggest that constitutional accountability mechanisms are less effective than commonly assumed, or does it reveal deeper structural advantages enjoyed by incumbents?

Professor Javier Corrales: This point in our paper is still somewhat open to interpretation because there have been cases in which impeachments have worked to stop presidents who were on a path toward autocratization.

The thing is this: in many polarized democracies—and polarization is often even higher in autocratizing democracies—every attempt to remove a president through something other than a vote, namely an election, is immediately portrayed by the president’s defenders as a miscarriage of justice. It is presented as evidence that the other side is not playing by the rules.

As a result, illiberal forces can take full advantage of impeachment and make the case that it is their opponents who are trying to cheat their way into power. The hyper-politicization of the legislature can therefore work to the advantage of the incumbent.

For that reason, impeachment often fails. Presidents manage to secure popular or even legislative support to remain in office. They can create the perception that it is the opposition that is engaging in foul play.

That is why we do not see many cases of autocratizing presidents being removed through impeachment. We saw it in Peru with Pedro Castillo, and we saw it recently in South Korea. But for the most part, many of these presidents survive impeachment attempts. In fact, some autocratizing presidents emerge even stronger. This is what Donald Trump achieved during his first administration in the United States. He came out stronger after each impeachment.

So, while there is some evidence that impeachments can work, I also see considerable evidence that impeachment can backfire in ways that help autocratizing presidents more than they help the cause of democracy.

Now, here is the thing: when a president is breaking rules and norms and violating the Constitution, if you do nothing about it, people begin to think, “Oh my God, you can get away with murder. There are no consequences.” So, there is a cost to not using impeachment. It is important to recognize that. But we may need to understand that this cost is the price we pay for pursuing something that may not work, even if it appears to be the right thing to do from the standpoint of legality.

Polarization Diverts Attention Away from Democratic Erosion

Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. Protesters dressed as Musk, Farage, Vance, Putin, Trump, and Netanyahu. Photo: Ben Gingell.

In your work on intentional polarization, you argue that backsliding executives often deploy ideological extremism and policy radicalization strategically. How does polarization help aspiring autocrats survive politically, and under what conditions can it eventually undermine them instead?

Professor Javier Corrales: Right, the argument there is that we were trying to study why some presidents who seek to concentrate power end up adopting very radical ideologies, extremist ideologies, and sometimes even extreme policy positions. Not everywhere, but often enough. The argument we make in that paper is that, in many ways, this serves to shift attention away from debates about whether the president should have more power or less power, whether we should scrutinize the president’s illiberal actions, and instead redirect attention toward policy debates. But it is also a way of provoking the opposition—of encouraging the opposition to become more extremist, to scream very loudly, and to do crazy things.

There is, of course, a risk for incumbent presidents when they radicalize. The danger is that their radicalism may not sit well with moderates. So, there is a risk to them. But in the paper, we discuss how they mitigate that risk. In other words, they radicalize themselves while knowing that moderates may become less enthusiastic about them. So, they develop strategies to split the opposition, say bad things about the opposition, and co-opt parts of the opposition so that the other pole never becomes strong enough. Or they encourage the other pole to commit its own excesses. In other words, they provoke the opposition into becoming equally radical in certain ways.

So, you’re right that intentional polarization can backfire on the incumbent president. But we also discuss the strategies that incumbents deploy in conjunction with intentional polarization to protect themselves from those risks.

Populism’s Democratic Sugar Comes with Anti-Pluralist Salt

You have described populism as the “sugar, salt, and fat” of contemporary politics—highly appealing yet potentially toxic for democracy. How does populism interact with democratic backsliding, and why do populist movements often remain electorally resilient even after their leaders leave office?

Professor Javier Corrales: I developed this metaphor while reading about the food industry. Research has demonstrated that the food industry, at least in the United States, creates what are called ultra-processed foods by taking natural nutrients—things like sugar, salt, and fat. These are all macronutrients, and we should consume them. But if you manipulate the dosage—for example, if you make a chocolate bar with a lot more sugar, a lot more fat, and a lot more salt—you can create addiction. In other words, you manipulate the natural elements of food to produce a certain degree of addictiveness. That is what got me thinking that populism is a little bit like that.

Populists take the natural elements of democratic politics: sugar, fat, and salt. Sugar is the desire to do something for the little guys—the crowd-pleasing policies that are always characteristic of populism.

Salt is the condiment that heightens flavor. It is the transgressive speech directed against opponents, oligarchs, elites, and the perceived enemies of the community. It is intense and emotionally charged.

And fat, which is the equivalent of agenda density, comes from populists arriving with the idea that they are going to change everything, rewrite the Constitution, and take over the entire state—packing the system with energy and punch.

So, they oversupply these elements, and this produces followership, not unlike the way junk food produces addiction. It also produces opposition. It creates people who do not like these foods. Now, the point I wanted to make is that many people who continue to defend populism do so by focusing only on the sugar component. The sugar component of populism is the part that seeks to help the little guys, provide assistance to low-income groups if you are on the left, provide security for communities that feel threatened, and amplify the voices of those who are not being heard. All populist movements contain that element. Many people continue to argue that this makes populism democratic.

But what I wanted to emphasize is that populism also comes with a lot of fat and, especially, a lot of salt. The salt component—the high salt content—is the transgressive rhetoric directed at critics, the constant division of the electorate into “we, the good guys” and “you, the bad elites,” the privileged people. It is the notion that we must constantly restrict your rights. This is always part of populism, together with the sugar. They come as a package.

That is what I wanted to convey with this analogy. It helps explain why populism has always been so difficult to study within the context of democracy. It contains a deeply democratic component—the desire to include the little guys, the sugar coating. But it also contains what other scholars, such as Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, have described as an inherently anti-pluralistic element—an element that generates antagonism toward those who dissent. That is what that thought piece was about.

When the Referee Is Captured, the Game Is Over

Your scholarship on Venezuela demonstrates that democratic erosion often occurs incrementally through institutional capture rather than dramatic constitutional breakdown. Which institutions are most critical for preventing the transition from democratic backsliding to full authoritarianism, and why?

Professor Javier Corrales: They all matter, of course. But if I had to pick one—if I had to identify the institution whose fall would most concern me, the one that, once fully captured by the executive branch and the ruling party, signals the greatest danger—it would have to be the court system. More broadly, I mean the legal system: the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Justice Department.

This is not to say that the other institutions matter any less. But this one is especially important because, in a liberal democracy, the name of the game is competition—competition between the government and the opposition. And that competition can be ferocious.

You need an arbiter. You need a referee. It is essential.

The moment that referee becomes partial, becomes rigged, or becomes an instrument of one of the players, it is over.

The court system then gives you permission to engage in what I call autocratic legalism, whereby you begin to apply laws in ways that favor yourself and go after your critics.

Illiberal Leaders Need Institutional Vehicles to Succeed

Modern building of the Supreme Court of Poland in Warsaw, photographed on January 7, 2020. Photo: Dreamstime.

Many observers focus on charismatic leaders when analyzing democratic decline. Yet your research frequently highlights the importance of ruling parties, courts, electoral authorities, and state institutions. Are we still overestimating the role of leaders and underestimating the institutional foundations of autocratization and democratic recovery?

Professor Javier Corrales: In political science we have always had a debate between the role of agency and the role of institutions. Perhaps we should not be trying to choose between them. Rather, we should continue to recognize that agency operates within institutional contexts and that individual choices vary according to those contexts. At the same time, institutions alone, without taking agency into account, may not necessarily provide strong predictive power.

That said, I think the literature on democratic backsliding has come a long way in understanding the role of institutions. Let me give you an example. One of the best books on the subject that I have read recently focuses on whether a president has a ruling party that has become highly personalistic. This is work by Erica Frantz and her colleagues. The argument is that you may have an illiberal president with a great deal of illiberal agency. But that president may not go very far. They may not be able to advance democratic backsliding very far unless they possess the institutional mechanism of a personalized party. Frantz and her colleagues define precisely what they mean by that, and they make a very compelling case that you need a war tank—and that is what a personalistic party provides.

Now, the concept of a personalistic party has a long lineage in political science. We have been studying the rise, role, and institutionalization of parties since Huntington in the 1960s. So, we have long been familiar with the notion that parties can either become highly institutionalized machines or little more than rubber stamps for the leader in office. We are now at a point where important lines of research successfully incorporate both agency and institutional analysis into the study of democratic backsliding.

Corruption and Incompetence Are Authoritarianism’s Greatest Vulnerabilities

Your comparative work suggests that only a small number of backsliding cases ultimately culminate in consolidated authoritarianism. What explains why countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua crossed that threshold while others, despite serious democratic erosion, eventually experienced electoral turnover?

Professor Javier Corrales: Two words: corruption and incompetence. Let me expand. A natural, almost inevitable tendency of all autocratizing presidents is to engage in a significant amount of corruption. All the evidence I have seen, both from the work of others and from my own research, shows that as soon as you begin to erode the system of checks and balances, corruption proliferates. Corruption damages the popularity of all presidents. It is their greatest vulnerability. They can survive it, but it becomes a very significant weakness. These strongmen eventually become associated with highly corrupt regimes, and voters see it. They see it with their own eyes. So that is vulnerability number one.

The second vulnerability is less inevitable. Not all autocratizing presidents fall into this trap, and that is public-administration incompetence. Obviously, some autocracies are very technocracy oriented. That can happen. But we also know—and this comes from the work of Barbara Geddes in the 1990s—that autocratizing presidents, when deciding how to staff the bureaucracy and public administration, often face a choice between appointing technical experts and appointing loyalists. They choose loyalty. To the detriment of technical competence. Think about it. If you diminish technical competence and elevate loyalty, you may end up with a bureaucracy that always says yes to the president, but public administration is going to suffer.

And so, over time—not immediately—what happens is this: Many autocratizing presidents come to power with a specific problem they want to solve, and often they succeed. People appreciate it, and they get re-elected. But as time passes, that problem recedes and new problems emerge. By then, the bureaucracy has been transformed, with more loyalists and fewer technical experts. As new public-policy challenges arise, the government becomes less equipped to deal with them and increasing levels of incompetence become visible. This is why, over time, many autocratizing presidents lose popularity and electoral advantage.

That does not necessarily mean it is the end of the line for them. They can survive it. But I think those two elements—corruption and incompetence—are natural vulnerabilities associated with autocratization and the move away from liberal democracy.

Orbán and Chávez Followed Remarkably Similar Playbooks

Viktor Orban.
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Lastly, Professor Corrales, looking beyond Latin America, do you see common patterns connecting the trajectories of leaders such as Hugo Chávez, Viktor Orbán, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Narendra Modi, Donald Trump, and Andrés Manuel López Obrador? Or are regional and institutional differences ultimately more important than the shared label of populism?

Professor Javier Corrales: This is really the debate about what matters more. There are policy differences, and those differences can be very significant. There is no question that a far-right populist has policy preferences that appear very different from those of a left-wing populist president. No doubt about it.

Or should we focus instead on their commonalities? The commonality lies in their hostility toward checks and balances, their desire to expand presidential power through executive aggrandizement, and their disdain for pluralism. When we look at policy agendas, a right-wing leader like Orbán and a left-wing leader like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela appear to be polar opposites. But when you examine their approaches to government-opposition relations, they follow a remarkably similar playbook. They seek to do many of the same things: capture the state, engage in autocratic legalism, co-opt the legal system, attack the press, and portray critics as elites or privileged groups. The convergence is striking. They may have very different policy prescriptions for addressing poverty. But when it comes to dealing with the opposition, they converge. 

I spend a great deal of time thinking about democracy—which is fundamentally about regulating relations between governments and oppositions—I personally find the similarities more striking than the differences. It is remarkable that leaders who enter politics with such different ideological perspectives on the policy problems of the day ultimately converge on a very similar governing playbook. That is why the policy differences matter less than these commonalities. So, I would be comfortable saying that, in many ways, an illiberal president like Orbán and a left-wing president like Chávez represent different sides of the same coin.

UK PM Keir Starmer

Why Starmer Could Not Outflank Reform UK: Immigration, Culture Wars and the Collapse of Labour’s Anti-Populist Strategy

Why did Keir Starmer fail to neutralize Reform UK despite commanding a large parliamentary majority? In this incisive commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias argues that Reform UK’s greatest achievement was not electoral but discursive. By transforming immigration, sovereignty, national identity, and culture-war politics into the central measures of political authority, Nigel Farage’s party compelled Labour to react on terrain it did not control. Drawing on the scholarship of populism and radical-right agenda-setting, Dr. Dias shows how attempts to accommodate populist themes often strengthen rather than weaken their appeal. The result, he argues, was a politics of defensive adaptation that left Labour trapped between technocratic governance and populist mobilization, ultimately exposing the limits of mainstream anti-populist strategies.

By João Ferreira Dias

Keir Starmer did not fall simply because he lacked charisma or because Labour mismanaged government. He fell because Britain’s populist right succeeded in turning immigration and culture-war politics into the central test of political authority, and Labour never found a convincing answer. His resignation exposed a deeper crisis: a parliamentary landslide had not become political hegemony, and one of Europe’s oldest democracies was again being reorganized by forces outside the governing party. 

The paradox of Starmer’s premiership is therefore not that a cautious leader struggled to inspire, but a government with an overwhelming majority found itself reacting to a party that did not hold power. Reform UK did not need to govern in order to discipline the government. It only needed to define what counted as political reality: borders, sovereignty, national identity, crime, “common sense,” and the betrayal of ordinary people by remote elites.

Reform as the Agenda-setter 

There is a long-term debate in academia and the public sphere on how radical-right populist parties influence public debate and mainstream parties’ agendas. This influence is not only electoral. It is also discursive. Populist parties may lose elections, remain outside government, and still force the political system to speak their language (Meguid, 2005; Minkenberg, 2001; Mudde, 2019; Schmidt, 2025; Saldivia Gonzatti & Völker, 2026).

In many circumstances, parties — and especially governments — tend to address topics such as immigration, border control, national identity, and moral panic around Muslim migrants in terms already defined by the populist right (Poynting & Morgan, 2016; Mudde, 2019). This is one of the most important mechanisms of radical-right power: it wins when its opponents accept that its issues are the real issues, and that its vocabulary is the vocabulary of political seriousness.

As Cas Mudde argues, mainstream parties cannot address the radical-right agenda in its original terms. They must face the debate, the problems and public perceptions, but they must do so in democratic and moderate terms. Otherwise, they become contaminated by radical solutions or are perceived as opportunistic copies (Mudde, 2007, 2019).

This was Starmer’s first failure: the temptation to neutralize Reform UK by hardening Labour’s language on immigration and cultural values. The second failure was to do so while failing to recover public confidence, show authority, and offer ideological clarity.

Reform UK did not need to govern to impose its agenda. It shifted the debate to borders, sovereignty, national identity, crime, elites, and “common sense.” It made immigration not just one policy area among others, but the central test of whether the state still controlled the country.

That was the asymmetry. Farage could radicalize. Starmer had to calibrate. Reform could accuse. Labour had to administer. Reform could speak in symbols. Labour answered with management. And in a political moment dominated by anxiety, management was not enough.

Immigration as Reform UK’s Issue Ownership

Reform UK succeeded because it turned immigration into a symbol of state failure. It was no longer only about numbers, visas, asylum backlogs, or labor-market needs. It became a story about control, sovereignty and betrayal. This is why the issue was so powerful. Immigration became a metonymy for everything that seemed broken in Britain: pressure on housing, waiting lists, low wages, crime, cultural change, weak borders, and distant elites. The point was not simply that immigration was high. The point was that immigration could be used to explain almost every other failure.

For Reform UK, immigration was evidence that the state protected others before its own citizens. This is a classic populist grammar. The “people” are presented as abandoned; migrants become the visible beneficiaries of elite betrayal; and mainstream parties are accused of refusing to say what everyone allegedly knows (Mudde, 2007; Poynting & Morgan, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

The concept of issue ownership helps explain why this was so damaging for Labour. Once Reform UK became the party most strongly associated with immigration control, any Labour attempt to sound tougher risked confirming Reform’s authority over the issue. Mainstream parties can change their position, but they do not automatically change who voters trust on the issue itself (Meguid, 2005; Bale et al., 2010; Abou-Chadi & Krause, 2020).

Starmer never found a convincing answer to this framing. When he hardened the discourse, he validated Reform’s premise that immigration was the central problem. When he moderated, he looked evasive or weak. He was trapped between moral discomfort and electoral fear.

Culture Wars as a Substitute for an Economic Programme

Reform UK did not need to present a detailed economic programme if it could keep politics focused on immigration, “woke politics,” crime, free speech, gender, patriotism, and resentment against Westminster. These themes worked because they were not just policy topics. They were identity markers.

The advantage of culture-war politics is that it simplifies the political field. It divides the country between those who allegedly see reality and those who hide behind elite language. It allows Reform UK to present itself as the party of “common sense,” while Labour appears as the party of caution, procedure, and institutional restraint.

This was another Starmer problem. Labour answered with competence, seriousness, and technocracy. Reform answered with conflict, identity, and emotion. Starmer promised delivery. Farage offered recognition. Starmer said the state could be repaired. Reform said the state had been captured.

This dynamic fits the broader cultural-backlash argument: radical-right populism does not grow only from material insecurity, but also from conflicts over identity, status, cultural change, and national belonging (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This does not mean that Reform had better answers. It means that it had a clearer emotional structure. It knew who was guilty, who had been betrayed, and what had to be restored. Labour had policies, but Reform had a story.

The Mainstream Trap

The central mistake of mainstream parties is to believe that they can borrow the radical right’s themes without strengthening the radical right’s authority. But this rarely works. If a mainstream party copies the populist right, it confirms that the populist right identified the real problem first. If it refuses to engage, it looks detached from public anxiety.

This is the dilemma identified in much of the literature on mainstream responses to the radical right. Social-democratic parties, in particular, face a difficult strategic choice: they can ignore the radical right, confront it, or accommodate parts of its agenda. But accommodation often increases the salience of issues owned by the radical right, especially immigration and national identity (Bale et al., 2010; Akkerman et al., 2016; Meyer & Rosenberger, 2015).

This was Starmer’s dilemma. He could not ignore immigration, because silence would have allowed Reform to monopolize the issue. But he could not simply “out-Farage Farage,” because Reform would always sound more authentic on its own terrain.

The result was a politics of defensive adaptation. Labour tried to look tougher, but not too tough; moderate, but not weak; liberal, but not naïve. That balance may work in government documents. It does not work against a populist party that has reduced politics to betrayal, borders, and national decline.

Reform UK won the agenda because it forced Labour to react. And once Labour was reacting, its majority no longer looked like hegemony. It looked like “administration under pressure.”

Conclusion

Starmer’s fall shows that populist parties can shape politics before they capture power. Reform UK’s success was not only that it grew electorally. Its deeper success was that it made immigration, sovereignty, and culture-war politics the measure of political authority.

The lesson is not that mainstream parties should avoid immigration. That would be politically naïve and democratically dangerous. The lesson is that they must address immigration without accepting the populist frame that turns migrants into the master explanation for national decline.

A stronger Labour response would have linked immigration to state capacity, wages, housing, integration, public services and fairness. It would have spoken about control without cruelty, borders without scapegoating, and national solidarity without ethnic resentment.

Starmer could not outflank Reform UK because the contest was already being fought on Reform’s ground. Farage did not need to prove that he could govern. He only needed to prove that Labour was governing within a debate he had already defined.


 

References

Abou-Chadi, T., & Krause, W. (2020). “The causal effect of radical right success on mainstream parties’ policy positions: A regression discontinuity approach.” British Journal of Political Science, 50(3), 829–847.

Akkerman, T.; de Lange, S. L. & Rooduijn, M. (Eds.). (2016). Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe: Into the mainstream? Routledge.

Bale, T.; Green-Pedersen, C.; Krouwel, A.; Luther, K. R. & Sitter, N. (2010). “If you can’t beat them, join them? Explaining social democratic responses to the challenge from the populist radical right in Western Europe.” Political Studies, 58(3), 410–426.

Meguid, B. M. (2005). “Competition between unequals: The role of mainstream party strategy in niche party success.” American Political Science Review, 99(3), 347–359.

Meyer, S. & Rosenberger, S. (2015). “Just a shadow? The role of radical right parties in the politicization of immigration, 1995–2009.” Politics and Governance, 3(2), 1–17.

Minkenberg, M. (2001). “The radical right in public office: Agenda-setting and policy effects.” West European Politics, 24(4), 1–21.

Morgan, G. (2012). Global Islamophobia: Muslims and moral panic in the West. (S. Poynting, Ed.). Routledge.

Mudde, C. (2007). Populist radical right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. (2019). The far right today. Polity Press.

Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Saldivia Gonzatti, D. & Völker, T. (2026). “Far-right agenda setting: How the far right influences the political mainstream.” European Journal of Political Research, 65(1), 101–123.

Schmidt, V. A. (2025). “Populist agenda-setting: Shaping the narrative, framing the debate, captivating the ‘people,’ upending the mainstream, capturing power.” Journal of European Public Policy, 32(5), 1073–1096.

Maasai people.

Decolonizing Climate Governance: Why Indigenous Knowledge Remains on the Margins of Global Climate Action

As climate change intensifies, global climate governance increasingly acknowledges the value of Indigenous knowledge while continuing to marginalize Indigenous peoples from meaningful decision-making processes. In this insightful commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the paradox at the heart of contemporary climate governance: Indigenous knowledge is celebrated as essential for climate adaptation and environmental stewardship yet remains largely excluded from the institutions that shape climate policy. Drawing on debates surrounding epistemic injustice, decolonization, and democratic inclusion, Dr. Solaja argues that climate governance must move beyond symbolic recognition toward genuine power-sharing and knowledge co-production. The article highlights why the inclusion of Indigenous voices is not only a matter of justice but also a prerequisite for more effective, participatory, and sustainable climate futures.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja

Climate change is increasingly being labeled as the defining challenge of the twenty-first century, and although global climate governance now generally acknowledges the significance of Indigenous peoples and their knowledge systems, their voices still remain marginalized from decision-making bodies. States, scientists, multinational bodies and technical processes, that privilege Western epistemologies, continue to dominate international climate negotiations. The result is that Indigenous knowledge is both celebrated publicly and yet hardly translated into practice in climate policy design, implementation and governance, and consequently raises issues of representation, knowledge justice and climate governance future.

The emerging awareness of Indigenous knowledge in the discourse around climate change is rooted in a widespread understanding that the environmental challenges necessitate plural knowledges to find solutions to climate change impacts. Indigenous peoples manage or hold tenure over approximately one-quarter of the Earth’s land surface, much of which is of critical importance for biodiversity conservation and serves as a significant carbon store (Orlove et al., 2023). Research consistently demonstrates that Indigenous peoples are rich holders of knowledge, possessing profound and extensive understandings of the environment and ecosystems derived from thousands of years of interaction with their local surroundings (Lam et al., 2020; Turner et al., 2022). This knowledge encompasses biodiversity conservation, climate adaptation, sustainable resource use, and the maintenance of ecosystem resilience (Akalibey et al., 2024; Dorji et al., 2024).

However, the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge often remains largely symbolic; the issue is not merely one of inclusion but of power. Climate negotiations generally take place within institutions that, by their very design, determine whose knowledge is considered valid, whose expertise is valued, and whose voices shape policy outcomes. In this context, Indigenous knowledge is frequently treated as a supplement to scientific knowledge rather than recognized as an equally legitimate epistemology for understanding and addressing climate change (Latulippe & Klenk, 2020). This unequal positioning of knowledge has come to be understood as epistemic injustice—a systematic undervaluation of particular forms of knowledge and ways of knowing, as well as of the people who hold them (Byskov & Hyams, 2022). Such injustice occurs when Indigenous environmental observations are ignored, when local knowledge is extracted without meaningful participation and inclusion, or when Indigenous representatives are consulted without being granted decision-making authority. In doing so, it reproduces colonial frameworks of knowledge production and governance, perpetuating the long-standing exclusion of Indigenous peoples from environmental decision-making processes.

There exists a great paradox: while climate agreements increasingly recognize Indigenous knowledge, the governance frameworks that marginalize Indigenous participation remain largely unchanged. Both the Paris Agreement acknowledges the importance of Indigenous knowledge for climate adaptation, and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has established the Local Communities and Indigenous Peoples Platform (LCIPP) to strengthen Indigenous participation. Yet Indigenous peoples continue to receive only limited recognition in terms of meaningful participation in decision-making arenas, often serving merely as observers while states retain ultimate decision-making authority over climate-related issues.

In line with this observation, Carmona et al. (2024) demonstrate significant disparities in the integration of Indigenous rights and knowledge within Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the key instruments of the Paris Agreement, despite references to Indigenous peoples in some countries’ climate plans. This suggests a substantial gap between the theoretical acknowledgment and the practical incorporation of Indigenous knowledge in climate policy and implementation.

This situation is also evident in Canada, where numerous initiatives led by Indigenous peoples draw upon ancestral knowledge alongside modern sustainability measures for environmental conservation. Nevertheless, Indigenous leaders have argued that state climate policy design lacks genuine consultation and power-sharing mechanisms with Indigenous communities (Bell et al., 2025; McGregor, 2021), revealing the extent to which participation does not necessarily guarantee influence in decision-making processes. In contrast, Indigenous knowledge systems in Africa play significant roles in climate adaptation.

Traditional institutions have developed various methods for coping with climate variability, generating knowledge that enables communities to adapt to environmental changes through diverse ecological resource-management techniques. However, this knowledge is rarely reflected in state-level climate adaptation policies, which tend to prioritize externally developed technical solutions (Makondo & Thomas, 2018; Chanza & De Wit, 2016), thereby reflecting ongoing postcolonial epistemological hierarchies (David, 2024).

These dynamics have important implications for policy design, as local climate challenges cannot be effectively addressed through broad scientific models that ignore specific ecological, cultural, and economic contexts. As Orlove et al. (2023) note, the unique understanding Indigenous peoples possess of local environments in the Arctic, for instance, has proven vital for the early identification of environmental changes, including shifts in ice conditions and wildlife migration patterns.

Efforts in the Arctic, along with various similar initiatives led by Indigenous peoples (Bell et al., 2025), further demonstrate the benefits of knowledge co-production—an approach that seeks to bridge scientific and Indigenous knowledge in environmental research and governance. The challenge lies in the fact that these knowledge systems are often treated as separate and incompatible when, in reality, sustainability transformations must draw upon the interaction of multiple forms of knowledge in ways that are equitably structured, as argued by Lam et al. (2020).

However, calls for the integration of Indigenous knowledge into climate governance are not without complications. Critics have raised concerns about the transferability of context-specific Indigenous knowledge within international governance mechanisms, noting that environmental knowledge generated within a particular ecological setting may not be readily applicable to other contexts. Others have expressed concerns about representation, emphasizing the diversity that exists within Indigenous communities and arguing that no single individual or organization can represent the entirety of Indigenous knowledge systems.

Additional controversies arise from the differences between the verification procedures of scientific inquiry and knowledge rooted in oral traditions, cultural practices, and lived human experience. These issues warrant careful consideration and appropriate responses. However, they do not justify the continued marginalization of Indigenous knowledge. Rather, they highlight the need for governance systems that foster communication, mutual learning, and fair access to diverse knowledge systems.

The question is not whether Indigenous knowledge should be incorporated into governance mechanisms, but rather how institutions can create conditions that support knowledge co-production while respecting both scientific and Indigenous ways of knowing.

Decolonizing climate governance represents efforts toward the alteration of institutions, decision-making processes, and knowledge systems that still favor Western scientific approaches and marginalize Indigenous ways of knowing and learning. It is an attempt not only to include but also to redistribute power, authority, and governance over knowledge. Decolonization of climate governance, therefore, is not simply about the participation of Indigenous people at global conferences; it is about how climate knowledge is constructed, validated, and applied. Indigenous representatives must participate in decision-making processes as rights holders instead of mere advisors; climate funds must be allocated to support projects led by Indigenous peoples; intellectual property rights should be respected; and Indigenous knowledge should be recognized as a valid epistemology. 

Calls for the decolonization of climate agreements, such as that of Reed et al. (2024), assert that strengthening Indigenous participation would bolster not only the legitimacy but also the efficacy of climate action and decision-making, among many other positive outcomes beyond what has traditionally been understood. Thus, the matter extends beyond climate issues and deep into questions of democracy, representation, and justice in governance.

The marginalization of Indigenous voices within global climate governance also raises important questions about contemporary forms of exclusionary governance often associated with technocratic and elite-driven policymaking. While climate negotiations increasingly claim to represent global interests, decision-making processes remain concentrated among state actors, scientific experts, and international institutions. This concentration of authority creates a democratic deficit that mirrors broader concerns in populism studies regarding representation, voice, and the exclusion of marginalized communities from policy processes. Indigenous demands for greater participation therefore reflect not only environmental concerns but also broader struggles for recognition, representation, and democratic inclusion.

The increasing magnitude of climate impacts will continue to demand innovative and contextual solutions, and in this regard, Indigenous peoples have proven to be adaptable and capable environmental stewards through millennia of interaction with and knowledge generation about their environments. Thus, for a sustainable future, climate governance must seek to go beyond nominal engagement and move toward true recognition of power-sharing and the pluralism of knowledges. Therefore, the decolonization of climate governance is not simply a matter of justice for Indigenous peoples, but also a necessary condition for creating more effective, participatory, and sustainable climate futures. Indigenous knowledges can no longer remain peripheral actors in the processes that determine climate futures if global climate governance is to be truly transformative.


 

References

Akalibey, S.; Hlaváčková, P.; Schneider, J.; Fialová, J.; Darkwah, S. & Ahenkan, A. (2024). “Integrating indigenous knowledge and culture in sustainable forest management via global environmental policies.” Journal of Forest Science.https://doi.org/10.17221/20/2024-jfs

Bell, E.; Tremblay, C.; Carodenuto, S.; Downie, B.; Dearden, P.; Kileli, E. O. & McDougall, S. (2025). “Indigenous knowledge-bridging to support ecological stewardship in Canada and Tanzania.” People and Nature, 7, 1139–1150. https://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.70034

Byskov, M. F. & Hyams, K. (2022). “Epistemic injustice in climate adaptation.” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 25(5), 1099–1115. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10301-z

Carmona, R.; Reed, G.; Ford, J.; Thorsell, S.; Yon, R.; Carril, F. & Pickering, K. (2024). “Indigenous Peoples’ rights in national climate governance: An analysis of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).” Ambio, 53(1), 138–155. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01922-4

Chanza, N. & Wit, A. D. (2016). “Enhancing climate governance through indigenous knowledge: Case in sustainability science.” South African Journal of Science, 112, 7–7. https://doi.org/10.17159/sajs.2016/20140286

Dorji, T.; Moktan, K.; Tshering, K. & Wangchuk, T. (2024). “Understanding how Indigenous knowledge contributes to climate change adaptation and resilience: A systematic review.” Environmental Management, 74(3), 456–472. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00267-024-02032-x

Lam, D. P. M.; Hinz, E.; Lang, D.; Tengö, M.; Wehrden, H. & Martín-López, B. (2020). “Indigenous and local knowledge in sustainability transformations research: A literature review.” Ecology and Society, 25(3). https://doi.org/10.5751/es-11305-250103

Latulippe, N. & Klenk, N. L. (2020). “Making room and moving over: Knowledge co-production, Indigenous knowledge sovereignty and the politics of global environmental change decision-making.” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability, 42, 7–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cosust.2019.10.010

Makondo, C. & Thomas, D. (2018). “Climate change adaptation: Linking indigenous knowledge with western science for effective adaptation.” Environmental Science & Policyhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2018.06.014

McGregor, D. (2021). “Indigenous knowledge systems in environmental governance in Canada.” KULA: Knowledge Creation, Dissemination, and Preservation Studieshttps://doi.org/10.18357/kula.148

Orlove, B.; Sherpa, P.; Dawson, N.; Adelekan, I.; Alangui, W. V.; Carmona, R.; Coen, D.; Nelson, M. K.; Reyes-García, V.; Rubis, J.; Sanago, G., & Wilson, A. (2023). “Placing diverse knowledge systems at the core of transformative climate research.” Ambio, 52, 1431–1447. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-023-01857-w

Reed, G.; Alook, A. & McGregor, D. (2024). “Decolonizing climate agreements strengthens policy and research for all future generations.” Nature Communications, 15, Article 4810. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-024-49143-x

Turner, N.; Cuerrier, A. & Joseph, L. (2022). “Well grounded: Indigenous Peoples’ knowledge, ethnobiology and sustainability.” People and Naturehttps://doi.org/10.1002/pan3.10321

Professor Beatriz Magaloni.

Prof. Magaloni: Democratic Backsliding Is Not Universal; People Still Believe in Democracy, but They Want Better Delivery

Professor Beatriz Magaloni, Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, argues that contemporary democratic crises cannot be understood solely through institutional erosion or elite manipulation. Drawing on her recent research, she contends that growing dissatisfaction with democracy stems largely from failures of delivery rather than a rejection of democratic values themselves. While citizens remain strongly committed to civil liberties, competitive elections, and democratic norms, many feel that democratic governments are no longer providing security, opportunity, and effective public services. In this wide-ranging ECPS interview, Professor Magaloni examines democratic backsliding, populist leadership, authoritarian resilience, polarization, immigration, and the future of democracy. Her central message is clear: people still believe in democracy, but democracies must deliver better if they are to retain public trust and legitimacy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic backsliding, populist mobilization, declining institutional trust, and the rise of high-performing autocracies are reshaping political life across the globe, scholars and policymakers are increasingly confronted with a fundamental question: Are contemporary democratic crises primarily the result of institutional erosion and elite manipulation, or do they stem from a deeper failure of democratic systems to deliver tangible benefits to citizens? Few scholars are better positioned to address this question than Professor Beatriz Magaloni, the Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University and one of the world’s leading authorities on democracy, authoritarianism, state capacity, and political development.

Through seminal works such as Voting for Autocracy and a distinguished body of research on authoritarian resilience, electoral politics, governance, and political violence, Professor Magaloni has transformed scholarly understanding of why citizens support political regimes and how both democracies and autocracies maintain legitimacy. In recent years, her research has increasingly focused on the relationship between democratic legitimacy and state performance, arguing that democratic survival depends not only on institutions and norms but also on governments’ capacity to deliver meaningful outcomes.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Magaloni challenges conventional explanations of democratic decline that focus exclusively on populist leaders or institutional weaknesses. While acknowledging that democratic support remains rooted in principles and freedoms, she argues that scholars have overlooked what she calls “the critical importance of delivery.” Across regions as diverse as Europe, Latin America, Asia, and North America, voters increasingly believe that “democracy is not delivering what they want” and express growing dissatisfaction with democratic governance.

Yet Professor Magaloni rejects the notion that democracy itself is losing public legitimacy. On the contrary, she insists that “democratic backsliding is not universal” and cautions against interpreting dissatisfaction with government performance as a wholesale rejection of democratic values. Drawing on extensive survey research, she emphasizes that citizens remain strongly committed to core democratic principles, particularly civil liberties and competitive elections. “There is still commitment to democratic norms,” she argues. “What people are telling us is: please deliver better.”

The interview explores why citizens increasingly support anti-establishment leaders, how authoritarian regimes cultivate loyalty through performance and selective benefits, why immigration has become a powerful driver of populist radical-right mobilization, and how democratic institutions are being challenged in both established and emerging democracies. Despite expressing concern about contemporary developments—particularly in the United States and parts of Latin America—Professor Magaloni ultimately offers a cautiously optimistic assessment of democracy’s future. Her central message is both sobering and hopeful: citizens have not abandoned democracy, but democratic governments must become far more effective at meeting citizens’ expectations if they hope to preserve public trust and democratic resilience.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Beatriz Magaloni, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

We Have Missed the Critical Importance of Delivery

A banner depicts democracy as a leaf eaten by “caterpillars” named Putin, Kaczynski, Orban, Babis, Trump, and Fico on Labour Day, May 1, 2017 in Old Town Square, Prague. Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

Professor Magaloni, welcome! To begin, your recent article “Delivering for Democracy: Why Results Matter” challenges the view that democratic backsliding can be explained solely by elite manipulation and institutional erosion. To what extent do you believe contemporary democratic crises are rooted in a deeper failure of democratic systems to deliver security, opportunity, and public goods to citizens?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: Obviously, the process of backsliding is a complex one, and every country has some unique characteristics. In some countries, it is manifested more through fear of immigration and what that means for culture and also redistribution within a country. But what we have seen is an overarching dissatisfaction with what democracy delivers in many countries. As I argue, it is manifested differently in Europe, Latin America, the United States, Asia, and so on. But there is a common feeling among voters—and we see this in survey after survey—that democracy is not delivering what they want and that they are dissatisfied with the democratic system.

Of course, we see this in surveys with questions that ask whether people endorse democracy, whether they believe democracy is the best form of government, or whether they would be willing to accept a strongman or woman leader who would deliver what they want. We consistently observe a decline in satisfaction across the globe, and that worries us because we have been understanding democratic support as being based exclusively on principles, norms, freedoms, and the substantive normative content of democracy.

Voters are still committed to those things, but we have missed the critical importance of delivery. That is basically the content of that article. We have now extended this work, with other co-authors and myself, to the region of Latin America, asking very specific questions about what type of delivery people feel they are missing from democracies and how far they are willing to go in supporting leaders who would undermine some basic democratic norms in order to achieve economic security, health, and public service delivery that they are not observing. That is the general pattern that we are describing in that article that you just cited.

Voters Turn to Outsiders When Democratic Institutions Stop Delivering

Many scholars emphasize the role of populist leaders in undermining liberal-democratic institutions from within. In your view, why are significant portions of the electorate willing to support leaders who openly challenge constitutional constraints, judicial independence, and pluralism?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: I think it’s related to what we just mentioned. Often, dissatisfaction leads voters to reach conclusions about the current system. They conclude, for example, that political parties are ineffective. These are very unpopular institutions in the region that I study, but also across the globe. Party identification has declined. Voters also perceive legislators as incompetent. They don’t see legislators responding to what they want. They view the judiciary as something that imposes constraints. They don’t really understand specifically what each institution is doing, but we know that, for example, in Latin America, the least popular institutions, besides the police, are political parties and legislatures. 

So, these strong leaders are able to capitalize on this dissatisfaction and portray themselves as outsiders, people who do not even come from the political class. Often, they are entrepreneurs or people without political experience who are able to use very smart and strategic communication techniques, along with highly curated social media campaigns, to gain the attention and support of voters.

Often, these leaders are real outsiders. For example, in Colombia, in the elections right now—the second round that is going to take place this Sunday—the candidate, Abelardo de la Espriella, is clearly an outsider. He presents himself as a very successful entrepreneur. He even has Italian and US passports, so he has triple nationality. He portrays himself as a successful entrepreneur, very much in the way Trump tried to portray himself. And he is capitalizing on the very strong dissatisfaction among Colombians at the moment with the peace accords and what they have brought for some sectors of society, specifically those located more in the cities and in the peripheral areas of the cities, not so much in the countryside, where the war and human rights violations have been very significant and where he is not popular.

Similarly, Bukele in El Salvador was able to capitalize on a comparable dissatisfaction with the democratic political system, where two parties had alternated in power, left and right, and voters had concluded that neither of these parties had been able to deliver on something that was very dear to them, namely security. El Salvador was, back then, one of the most violent—and often the most violent—countries in the world. Even though homicides had been declining before Bukele took office, he was able to capitalize on that dissatisfaction to gain support and then, little by little, destroy democratic institutions.

We saw a similar process in Brazil with Bolsonaro, although he was not really an outsider. He was a congressman and a member of the military, but he also campaigned using the same language.

Similarly, Trump came to power with that same strategy. We also see that these leaders copy one another and have really figured out which strategies work. And there is also a very powerful dissemination of these messages through social media, and they have been very strategic in reaching across borders through different means.

Citizens Have Not Rejected Democracy

No King Protests.
Demonstrators at The People’s March, an evolution of the Women’s March, NYC, January 18, 2025. A protester holds a sign reading “Presidents Are Not Kings.” Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.

Across Europe and North America, surveys reveal declining trust in political parties, legislatures, and public institutions. Should this be interpreted as a crisis of liberal democracy itself, or rather as a crisis of state performance and governance capacity?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: We have to be cautious about saying that voters really don’t like democracy anymore. Also, in our surveys—again, in Latin America, but I can also go back to Europe and the United States—voters understand the value of these principles. So, when we see, for example, people protesting in the United States in the No Kings march, it’s a very well-attended march. Millions of voters, citizens in this case, and non-citizens come out to protest. When you read what they are protesting about, it is often violations of very concrete democratic institutions. That’s the meaning of No Kings. They don’t like that accumulation of power. They don’t like that Trump is concentrating power, going around Congress, dominating the judiciary, and prosecuting his opponents. Also, all the human rights violations that come through the way he’s enforcing immigration.

We see that constantly. We have also been very surprised in Europe—positively surprised—by voters putting a halt to this language and really choosing parties and candidates that are more moderate. So, we have to be cautious about saying, this is just going to happen everywhere. Democratic backsliding is not universal. It’s happening slowly in several countries. We see, surprisingly, attacks on norms and institutions that we have really become accustomed to, as well as the abandonment of the language of protecting these sacred institutions. But I don’t think we can reach the conclusion that there is no normative commitment to democracy at all.

There are very specific things voters are asking for. There is dissatisfaction with economic performance, dissatisfaction with service delivery, and dissatisfaction with immigration and the way countries have dealt with it. Obviously, this creates a great deal of tension in society. Parties on the left have also been able to correct their language and the way they have approached these processes.

However, I am not so pessimistic as to say that we’re going to observe the same backsliding all over Europe. Democracy in Europe has shown itself to be quite solid, although there is obviously space for these leaders, and people are paying attention to them.

Performance Matters—Even in Authoritarian Regimes

In Voting for Autocracy, you demonstrated how citizens may support authoritarian regimes not merely because of coercion but because authoritarian systems create incentives and dependencies that shape political behavior. Do you see similar mechanisms operating today in contemporary electoral autocracies and even in some democracies?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: Yes, in my work on authoritarianism, I really paid a lot of attention to the meaning of elections and the fact that voters can choose. So, these are electoral authoritarian regimes where there is real choice, although one single party or leader holds power. We see, for example, Venezuela with Chávez and then Maduro. Now what happened in Venezuela is a different story. Staying in power for a long time while having elections—the PRI in Mexico was in power for over 70 years with multi-party elections. There was obviously limited competition, but still those elections were meaningful. We see, increasingly around the world, that this is the modal form of authoritarianism. But we also observe countries like China, for example, where there are no elections.

My work really focused on why authoritarian leaders need to mobilize support from the masses or voters in order to stay in power. Essentially, I discovered that, similarly to democracies, voters and people in authoritarian regimes evaluate leaders according to what they deliver. So, authoritarian countries that are high-performing in terms of economic growth and some redistribution tend to be more solid and more stable than those that do not have economic growth, do not redistribute, do not create public goods, and do not invest in public goods. That’s the main finding of my work: performance matters. I started my work thinking about different ways in which voters evaluate autocracies. One of them is through what I call performance legitimacy, where the more economic growth and better performance you have observed—not only in the current electoral cycle but throughout your entire life cycle—the more loyal to that regime you become.

But obviously not every authoritarian regime can deliver. Some are not that great. For example, when I studied the Mexican PRI, the PRI stopped delivering as it used to with the debt crisis of the 1980s and the economic adjustments that all countries in the developing world had to go through. At that moment, the PRI started to become more strategic in terms of how the party targeted direct benefits to buy off electoral support—what I call clientelism. In that book, I call it the punishment regime, where autocrats reward supporters with benefits, and by that, I mean, for example, the benefits of social programs. Only those sectors of society that support the autocratic regime receive those benefits, while voters who do not support the system are punished. So, I argue that this creates, even in lower-performing autocracies, an incentive for many poorer voters to turn to the autocrat.

That’s the way I explain support for Chávez during his term in Venezuela. He was able to profit from the oil boom and use those profits to create social programs, the misiones bolivarianas, and many other investments that reached sectors of society that had been left out of the democratic system. By capturing that sector of society and punishing those who did not support him, he was able to gain a lot of support through that strategy, as well as through his rhetoric and all the other things we talked about—his anti-institutionalism and his language about revolution: “We are coming here to create a completely new system that democracy never delivered.”

But then, obviously, we saw Venezuela enter a huge economic recession under Maduro, accompanied by an enormous humanitarian crisis. The oil boom was no longer there, and the system started to use more and more coercion to stay in power. So that’s what I discovered: autocrats use multiple strategies to remain in power. But if they have economic performance and effective service delivery, they don’t need so much coercion to keep people supporting them. In fact, there can be genuine support for authoritarian leaders.

Power Sharing Is Essential for Dictators

President Erdogan greeted the citizens who showed great interest after the Friday prayer in Istanbul, Turkey on April 14, 2019. Photo: Mehmet Ali Poyraz.

Your work has shown that authoritarian regimes often survive through sophisticated mechanisms of power-sharing, co-optation, and institutional adaptation rather than brute repression alone. How useful is this framework for understanding the durability of contemporary authoritarian regimes such as those in Turkey, Russia, or Venezuela?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: Very good question. As I mentioned, autocrats use a combination of strategies. They use coercion, and they have that system in place because, ultimately, they are authoritarian. They are not going to cede power willingly. They are going to repress those who openly challenge the regime. And they can do that selectively rather than massively. They do retain coercion, and that’s very important to emphasize because, ultimately, that’s going to play out in the system. But they can do many other things—and they need to do many other things—to keep themselves in power if they want to succeed as dictators or autocrats.

One of those strategies is what I call power sharing. This is not only my work; other scholars studying authoritarian regimes have also focused on this. These are ways in which autocrats bring political and economic elites into a system of redistribution of benefits, often through institutions. For example, becoming part of the ruling party or the apparatus of government brings benefits, including economic benefits, to their cronies. That’s what I call power sharing. They create incentives for those supporters—very critical supporters at the elite level of the regime—to remain loyal. Because if they don’t, that is going to make the regime very vulnerable. Definitely, that’s essential. They operate through that mechanism, often by creating different institutions that bring different players into the system and allow them to share power. Obviously, these actors do not challenge the leader. Although in some unusual cases, like Mexico, there was alternation of the leader; there was alternation of the president himself. In China, for example, we see that as well. Less often than in Mexico, but there is a system to remove the leader and choose a new one.

That’s the second strategy. And finally, what we’ve been talking about: if they don’t mobilize and maintain some support or loyalty from the masses, what I discovered is that they become vulnerable. There is always a chance that someone within the regime could challenge the leader and the system. The more dissatisfaction there is among the population, the greater the opportunity for leaders, often emerging from within the ruling elite, to challenge the system.

That’s the set of strategies that we have seen—not only in my work. My work, I think, pioneered this line of research, but there has been a great deal of work since then on how these systems combine these strategies. But we have to acknowledge that coercion remains a powerful tool. That tool is used, and it is ultimately what distinguishes autocrats from democrats. That’s what we hope—that in democracies we do not observe this form of coercion. Although we can talk a little bit about that because my current work has moved into the instruments of coercion that are used in democracies and that unfortunately persist. Many of them have to do with the police and the carceral state, which are still used in democracies in ways that no democrat would agree are correct.

But definitely, yes, power sharing is essential for dictators. When we look at Turkey or, as you mentioned, Russia today, that is a very fine balance they have to maintain. One of my co-authors on this paper also argues that delivering very visible public goods is important. My co-auther, who is a PhD student, is writing his dissertation now, has a theory that is very solid: autocrats can signal good performance by delivering very visible public goods. So, investments in infrastructure—big bridges and airports that are highly visible, especially to middle-class voters—become important signals. And autocrats do pay attention to that.

Autocrats Are Becoming Increasingly Sophisticated

One recurring theme in your scholarship is that authoritarian institutions often perform functions that outside observers underestimate. What lessons should democracies draw from the institutional adaptability of authoritarian regimes without sacrificing democratic accountability?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: Yes, I think that’s where we are underperforming as democracies and democrats. I’ve been studying the regime in El Salvador under Bukele, and I am now paying very close attention to developments in Colombia. I have studied the PRI, and I have studied Venezuela. Clearly, the strategies that autocrats are using are becoming increasingly sophisticated.

As I mentioned, there is also coordination among populist leaders in their language, as well as in their electoral strategies, messaging, and interventions. People are very worried about foreign intervention, for example, from Donald Trump in Latin American elections, signaling who the right candidate is and, interestingly, delivering messages in support of certain candidates. Increasingly, if you look at the elections today in Colombia, for example, the candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, has been incredibly strategic in ways that we did not anticipate would become so popular. His way of communicating with voters—even through performing shows and doing things that excite voters—has been effective in ways that we would not have anticipated before.

So, I think that democracies and democrats around the world have not yet figured out how to respond to these strategies in similarly effective ways that truly reach voters, especially younger generations who have become more disappointed with the system because they have not grown up in a system that has delivered in the way some democracies delivered in the past.

Performance Failures Are Driving Democratic Vulnerability

The rise of high-performing autocracies has revived debates about whether citizens prioritize outcomes over democratic procedures. Is the contemporary challenge to democracy fundamentally ideological, or is it increasingly performance-based?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: That’s a very interesting question, and there is an ongoing debate in political science. Some scholars argue that democratic backsliding and challenges to democratic institutions often stem from the fact that voters are highly polarized along partisan lines, and especially along ideological lines. There is very important work by Milan Svolik, for example, and his co-authors, which shows that if people are polarized—not only ideologically, but also through what we call affective polarization, where they dehumanize their opponents and no longer see them as legitimate players in the democratic system—this affective polarization drives voters to condone violations of democratic institutions by their preferred leader and party. They would rather vote for a non-democrat than for an opponent who is no longer, in their view, a legitimate participant in the system.

So, we see that playing out very clearly in some political systems, such as the United States. And we observe that elsewhere as well. One could, for example, look at the elections in Colombia today, or even Peru, which recently experienced similarly contentious elections and is now in the process of determining who the next president will be. It looks like Keiko Fujimori is going to be. And there was very intense polarization in both countries.

But I don’t see this as necessarily ideological polarization in either Colombia or Peru. Rather, it is a polarization rooted in how people experience the state in their everyday lives. For example, voters who live in cities and in the peripheral areas of cities experience democracy very differently from voters living in the countryside—indigenous populations and Afro-descendant populations who were severely victimized during the civil war in Colombia.

So that polarization emerges not necessarily because of left-right ideology, but because of these different experiences of what the war meant to them and what the peace accords have meant to them. There is also a very strong anti-incumbent polarization. A large sector of society does not like Gustavo Petro today. They strongly dislike Petro because they see him as someone who negotiates with insurgents and guerrillas and who has brought about changes in society that a large segment of the population does not support. That’s the polarization we observe there. Which is also left and right, so there is polarization on those grounds as well. But I want to emphasize this experiential dimension—the experience people have in their everyday lives that leads them to adopt these positions. It’s not only about policy positions and what we traditionally understood as left and right. That has always been part of democratic politics. That’s what democracies are about. They are about policy debates and competing economic visions, where one party may favor less redistribution and another more redistribution.

What we are observing now is a different set of issues that are deeply dividing voters. So, I would agree with that aspect of Milan Svolik’s work—that polarization is indeed important. But what we are discovering in our own research across Latin America—and it is very expensive to conduct all these surveys across the region; I wish I could do that worldwide—but at least in the seven countries we have studied in great depth, we find that a great deal of the problem has to do with performance in areas that people regard as essential. If a party, or especially a candidate, promises to deliver what voters feel has been missing, they are often willing to go along with that leader, even if it means undermining institutions.

What Happens in the US Shapes Democratic Trends Worldwide

US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.

In the United States, democratic institutions have proven more resilient than many expected, yet political polarization remains extraordinarily high. Do you see polarization primarily as a symptom of institutional dysfunction, economic grievances, or deeper transformations in political identity?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: That’s a very important and complex question, and I think that the process in the United States has surprised many scholars. Because the United States has a high level of economic development and a long history of democratic institutions, we never thought that democratic institutions would backslide in the way they have in the United States. And I agree with you that the system has proven resilient because there is still opposition. But, to my surprise, that opposition seems to be coming more from the elites.

There has been incredible success in undermining key democratic institutions, principles, and norms in the system. Part of the reason, as I see it, is that the Republican Party has not put any brakes on what Donald Trump has been doing to the democratic system. They have gone along with him, placing no meaningful constraints on him, and that has allowed President Trump to do things that we would never have predicted could happen in the United States. This includes the way he is enforcing immigration laws today in non-democratic and completely non-humanitarian ways, but also the way he has persecuted his opponents.

For example, we observe lower-level courts putting a halt to anti-democratic actions. But when it comes to the Supreme Court, we have observed the Court surprisingly going along with Trump in ways that we would never have anticipated from a system of checks and balances. So, I do believe that the system is—or at least we hope the system is—resilient, because we are still waiting to see what is going to happen in the coming elections.

We have also observed a very clear intent to manipulate electoral rules at the state level in order to give Republicans an advantage, even when they are not popular. Trump is the least popular president. So, by all means, he should not be able to retain a majority in the House with his current levels of popularity. But we also have to understand that there are many elements in the democratic system in the United States that are not majoritarian, that give a great deal of power to minorities, and the system is designed that way. For example, the Electoral College is one of those institutions in which you can still win the presidency without winning a majority of the vote, and that places considerable power in certain states. For example, I teach at Stanford, so I live in California. If you are pro-Trump, you are really powerless in that state.

So, I am less optimistic, frankly, about what I have observed in the United States. I think the backsliding has gone farther than in any country in Europe. I think Europe has proven to be more solid as a region. Turkey, obviously, is not part of the EU, and it’s different. There is clear backsliding in Turkey. That’s not Europe, but it is part of it. But the United States has really, in my opinion, gone farther than any solid democracy has gone.

Many Voters See Immigration as Both a Cultural and Redistributive Threat

Europe is witnessing the normalization of parties that were once considered outside the democratic mainstream. How should we understand the growing electoral appeal of the populist radical right and far right: as a protest against globalization, a reaction to migration, or evidence of dissatisfaction with democratic governance itself?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: You just identified the right set of reasons why we observe these parties, which are very anti-system and often employ very non-democratic language, emerging as highly popular alternatives in Europe. I would place immigration as the number one reason, and particularly what it means to European societies. I think immigration has generated a strong reaction among voters because it is perceived as a cultural challenge to their way of life. But it is also because many feel threatened within the system of redistribution. They do not want to share the welfare system with people who are perceived as non-European. So, this is in part rooted in race and culture, and there has been a very strong reaction to that. Some people perceive immigrants as dangerous, not only in terms of security, but also in terms of culture and what immigration means for European societies.

There Is Still Considerable Commitment to Democracy Around the World

Finally, if current trends continue, what do you expect democracy to look like ten to twenty years from now? Are you ultimately optimistic that democracies can renew the social contract and restore public confidence, or are we entering a prolonged period of democratic fragility and authoritarian experimentation?

Professor Beatriz Magaloni: This is a difficult question. I tend to be more of an optimist, and I do see that there is a great deal of commitment to democracy. We have talked a lot about performance and why it matters, and that is a very important aspect for democrats to consider. They have to understand how to deliver better. 

In the surveys and research that I have been conducting, there is still a strong commitment to democratic norms. People remain very strongly committed to civil liberties. They do not want to be denied the right to protest. They want to see open debate. They do not want to see a system where opponents are sent to prison. They remain committed to certain principles. In the studies I have conducted, civil liberties rank first. Competitive elections are the second most important aspect that voters value. People want elections to take place, and they want their voices to be heard. And thirdly—and this is what worries me the most—there is less commitment to the rule of law. Due process and protecting individuals from the coercive apparatus of the state are less firmly supported in the surveys I have conducted. But there is still commitment to democratic norms. What people are telling us is: please deliver better. If democrats receive this message and manage to create a system in which delivery becomes the highest priority, democracies will be okay.

What I want to emphasize, however, is that what happens in the United States plays an important role in shaping global democratic trends. As I have mentioned, President Donald Trump has been directly supporting certain anti-institutional and anti-democratic candidates and has sent very clear signals about who those candidates are. He has sent very strong signals. So, what happens in the United States is going to continue influencing the rest of the world. That is why I am paying very close attention to these elections in November and to the coming years of this presidency in the United States, because it shapes the world in ways that we never expected would be so dramatic.

I want to end on an optimistic note. One example is what happened recently in Hungary, with the electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán by TISZA, and all the mobilization around democracy, the enthusiasm at the local level, and the extensive organizing that was undertaken to finally defeat Fidesz and Orbán in Hungary. I think that is a very important lesson. While these cycles are undoubtedly troubling—I think Latin America is entering a troubling cycle of extreme populist right-wing presidencies—some of these leaders, surprisingly, have not challenged democratic institutions. For example, in Argentina, Milei has been more respectful of democracy, even though he is an extreme-right libertarian leader. But we did not observe the same in El Salvador, where we have really witnessed the destruction of democracy. We are going to be watching Colombia very closely to see what happens there.

But I do want to end with a sense of optimism. These cycles happen and I just want to emphasize that there is still a considerable commitment to democracy around the world. We simply have to be more strategic and more careful about delivering what people want.