This commentary by Dr. Oludele Solaja advances a compelling decolonial critique of populism by relocating its analytical center from ideology to material life. It argues that, in the Global South, democratic breakdown is experienced less through electoral conflict than through ecological failure—flooding, waste accumulation, and infrastructural neglect. In this context, environmental crisis becomes a language of political judgment and a site of democratic contestation. The study highlights how citizens respond by improvising governance, producing forms of “everyday sovereignty” that reconfigure legitimacy around performance rather than formal institutions. By foregrounding environmental citizenship and survival politics, the article calls for a fundamental rethinking of populism theory, emphasizing the material genesis of antagonism and the centrality of ecology in shaping contemporary democratic claims.
Democratic anxiety is being defined by populism everywhere today. With elections becoming increasingly polarized, institutions increasingly distrusted, and elites denigrated by citizens hungry for clear moral answers in an age of uncertainty, contemporary populism theory increasingly defines the crisis of democracy in terms of ideological confrontation between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.” Influential concepts such as those of Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau define this process in terms of party politics, electoral struggles, and discursive clashes, strongly grounded in European experience. The rise of democratic contestation globally necessitates a reassessment of these ideas.
Citizens in many parts of the Global South do not often frame political resentment first and foremost in terms of party politics, immigrant threats or nationalist appeals. For them the crisis of democracy often occurs when streets become inundated, waste accumulates, sanitation collapses, water becomes polluted, food prices spike and the everyday fragility of survival in urban space defines the state’s responsiveness. Citizens experience this failure of government less as a constitutional crisis and more as a systematic material breakdown, turning ecology into language for political dissent.
This is a crucial insight because democratic legitimacy is increasingly negotiated in terms of environmental realities. When storm drainage becomes a source of flooding and waste management failures prevent sanitation, ordinary people perceive these as evidence of the abandonment of the populace, or of their lives being deprivileged by governing authorities. Such environmental breakdown becomes a source of moral judgment, casting doubt upon the moral authority of political elites.
The work of a growing body of scholars is showing that climate and ecological crisis is reframing populist narratives not only through established ideological distinctions. Some argue that the ideational framework of climate populism theory has already failed because it cannot accommodate the varied ways in which ecological grievance leads to different kinds of articulation across various institutions.
The implications are vast: the study of populism cannot be separated from the ecological reality with which it is increasingly tied.
Why Existing Theory Is Not Enough
The existing literature assumes that populist actors are largely capable of mobilizing symbolic opposition against rulers within relatively functioning institutions. In weak democracies the institutional framework is precarious, and the state can be rhetorically present, but materially absent. This creates a unique political terrain.
When institutions routinely fail to provide sanitation, safety and infrastructure, anti-elite discourse emerges less as a battle of ideologies and more as a concrete test of the performance of the state and democratic governance. Citizens criticize rulers not just for corruption, but because roads are impassable, waste remains undeposited and water and electricity do not function properly.
This kind of anti-elite sentiment, in this situation, does not always constitute a threat to democracy. Instead, it constitutes claims to practical citizenship. This is the point at which a decolonial critique must be introduced, for in weak democracies in the Global South the language of populism increasingly derives from everyday experience with ecological neglect.
Environmental Degradation as Democratic Testament
In places of rapid urbanization such as Lagos, Nigeria, environmental crisis has become the defining public face of democratic strain. Repeated flooding, collapsing drainage, rising sea levels, escalating waste accumulation and the spread of disease have increasingly defined the political experiences of urban inhabitants. A recent analysis of flood vulnerability in Lagos highlights how poor waste management, inadequate urban planning enforcement and a lack of community participation continue to undermine efforts to respond to climate risks, despite multiple state interventions. This demonstrates not simply administrative shortcomings, but a failure to provide unequal protection.
Environmental risk in Lagos and elsewhere is socially and materially distributed. Informally governed settlements and the poor suffer greater and more repeated ecological risks than more affluent neighborhoods, yet it is precisely these vulnerable communities that receive slower and poorer infrastructural responses from authorities. Ecology thus becomes a language of inequality and injustice.
The impact of class and settlement vulnerability on flood exposure is reflected in recent studies of urban spatial inequality in Lagos, demonstrating that environmental insecurity is inextricably linked to democratic exclusion. Ecological collapse thus acquires symbolic power: floodwaters signify state abandonment, waste streams become markers of inequality, and infrastructural failures translate into tangible accusations of undemocratic neglect. Citizens may not explicitly define these dynamics as “populist” framework, but the underlying logic is clearly so—a confrontation between the common people and a distant, selectively responsive, and morally indifferent government.
Informal Governance and Everyday Sovereignty
People rarely wait patiently when their formal institutions persistently fail. They improvise governance. Communities organize the cleaning of drainage ditches, youth groups coordinate waste disposal, street vendors pay for sanitation services, religious networks provide disaster relief, and neighborhood committees enforce rules that sustain survival infrastructures. This is not merely emergency survival; it is also a form of practice that demonstrates effective political authority.
This may be understood as everyday sovereignty: the transfer of legitimacy and power from a failing formal state to individuals and organizations that produce concrete solutions to community needs. In weak democracies, citizens increasingly trust those who demonstrate competence in managing crises to produce political order, rather than those who hold office but fail to deliver. This has profound democratic implications. Authority is no longer legitimized primarily by institutions but is increasingly validated by performance. Recent research in Lagos on struggles against displacement-driven urban restructuring shows how communities develop collective strategies to resist state interventions, contest policies, and articulate claims to political belonging as formal governance proves exclusionary.
This demonstrates a radical redistribution of democratic legitimacy from the state to citizens and communities. Waste itself, more than anything else, has become one of the most significant symbolic sites of democratic breakdown. It is immediate, material, accumulating, and unevenly distributed—settling where and when political neglect occurs and public disorder emerges. The prolonged presence of waste in public space signifies delayed state intervention, while its concentrated accumulation in poorer neighborhoods clearly articulates unequal treatment of citizens.
Waste thus emerges as a public inscription of political relations, where the accumulation and persistence of material residue represent not merely sanitation problems but a testament to the priorities governments set in service provision. This sense of abandonment and differentiated citizenship—captured in narratives such as “we contribute but are not protected” or “they rule but do not care”—mirrors populist discourse: the citizenry versus a distant state and ruling elites. Waste has therefore become not only a material problem but also a democratic issue, constituting a core site of political struggle over resource access and state responsibility. It demonstrates that environmental sociology and populist studies must engage more closely to account for the material genesis of antagonism—the very foundation of populism.
A Decolonial Perspective: Three Shifts Required in Populism Studies
For a theory of populism to be decolonized, it needs to abandon some established ideas:
i) Instead of viewing populism as an ideology of the people versus corrupt elites, a material approach to governance can frame political resentment. This recognizes that in fragile democracies, such feelings emerge not from abstract ideas of morality but from tangible experiences of infrastructural failure.
ii) The electoral arena needs to be widened to include the daily life of neighborhood politics, where claims to citizenship are made on the basis of practical survival mechanisms, not solely through party-led contests.
iii) Instead of a detached analysis of the “people,” the concept of environmental citizenship becomes crucial to understanding populism, as citizens engage in political struggle as part of a struggle over their own survival in an ecological context that increasingly determines who has rights and who has a claim to care.
These adjustments do not necessarily invalidate previous research in the field. Rather, they enable populism studies to engage with phenomena that extend far beyond what has until recently been considered “the political.” Increasingly, the theory of populism itself is being reshaped by the recognition of ecological dynamics; this process has arguably already begun in Europe, where ecological movements are contributing to new populist formations. The Global South, however, reveals an even more radical potential, because for its citizens, ecology is often not merely about ideology but about survival itself.
Why Now Is the Critical Moment
Democratic theory needs to acknowledge that political legitimacy is increasingly tied to how effectively the state responds to ecological challenges. In Europe, political disillusionment is fueled by the climate crisis, and the perceived indifference of governments only intensifies citizens’ perceptions of exclusion and corruption. The implications of populist struggles for the state’s capacity and functioning—at both local and international levels—are becoming evident worldwide. The effects are even more pronounced in weaker states, where democratic buffers are less robust and citizens may prioritize life-sustaining functions over procedural norms in demanding effective governance. This underscores that managing drainage systems, coastal defenses, and waste management can no longer be treated as peripheral issues.
Conclusion: Democracy Is Now Being Judged by Its Performance on Ecology
A decolonized approach to the theory of populism must address how it plays out on the ground in contexts where people navigate the daily crises of floods, waste, and uncertain service provision, and where ordinary survival politics are becoming increasingly central struggles that often define the state’s legitimacy in their eyes. It is no longer sufficient for democratic theorists to focus solely on elections and parliamentary institutions when seeking to understand the challenges confronting the globe. The crisis of democracy and the rise of populism in the Global South are, in many respects, a testament to the critical role of ecological and environmental realities in mediating and generating political conflict and claims in everyday life.
In this ECPS interview, Dr. Filip Milacic argues that democrats should not abandon patriotic language to autocrats. Instead, they must develop inclusive and emotionally resonant national counternarratives. Warning that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy,” Dr. Milacic explains how authoritarian incumbents justify democratic erosion through “threat narratives” portraying the nation, sovereignty, or identity as endangered. He emphasizes that dignity, recognition, and belonging are crucial drivers of political behavior often neglected by liberal democratic theory. Drawing on cases from Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and the United States, he argues that democratic resilience requires institutions, strategy, and narratives—because politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”
At a moment when democratic systems across Europe and beyond are increasingly challenged by populist mobilization, identity conflicts, and institutional erosion, the politics of nationalism has re-emerged as a central battleground. Authoritarian and illiberal actors have proven particularly adept at embedding their political projects within emotionally resonant narratives of national protection, sovereignty, and belonging. It is within this contested terrain that Dr. Filip Milacic’s intervention—captured in the striking claim that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy”—acquires both analytical urgency and normative significance. His work invites a reconsideration of how democratic actors engage with the nation not as a fixed identity, but as a politically constructed and contested narrative space.
In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Milacic—senior researcher at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s “Democracy of the Future” office—offers an empirically rich account of democratic backsliding, authoritarian legitimation, and the role of narrative politics. Central to his argument is the contention that opposition forces face a strategic dilemma when confronting nationalist authoritarianism: to ignore the nation, to mimic exclusionary nationalism, or to construct an alternative vision. While the first two options remain common, Dr. Milacic insists that “the third option is the most promising”—namely, the development of a democratic counter-narrative that is both emotionally compelling and normatively inclusive.
This emphasis on narrative is not merely rhetorical but deeply structural. As Dr. Milacic underscores, authoritarian actors do not simply dismantle democratic institutions; they justify such actions through what he terms “threat narratives.” In these narratives, “the state is under attack” and “the nation, national identity, or national sovereignty [is] threatened,”thereby creating a moral and emotional framework within which democratic erosion becomes acceptable, even necessary. Crucially, these narratives resonate not because citizens misunderstand democracy, but because, as he notes, voters often support such leaders “not because of their authoritarian policies, but in spite of them.” This insight shifts the analytical focus from institutional breakdown alone to the discursive processes that legitimize it.
Equally important is Dr. Milacic’s critique of prevailing assumptions within liberal democratic theory. By foregrounding dignity, recognition, and belonging, he challenges the reduction of political behavior to economic rationality. Instead, he argues that “interests related to self-esteem, dignity, and recognition are significant,” and that the nation remains a powerful source of both identity and security. This helps explain why authoritarian narratives, particularly in contexts marked by “formative rifts” such as territorial disputes or contested identities, gain traction so effectively.
Yet Dr. Milacic resists deterministic conclusions. While some societies may be more structurally susceptible to such narratives, they are not condemned to authoritarian outcomes. Democratic resilience, he argues, depends on political agency and the capacity to craft inclusive, emotionally resonant counter-narratives. Ultimately, the interview advances a compelling thesis: that the defense of democracy today requires not only institutional safeguards but also a re-engagement with the symbolic and affective dimensions of political life—because, as Dr. Milacic concludes, politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”
Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Filip Milacic, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Reclaiming Patriotism Without Exclusion
Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Milacic, welcome. In “How to Defeat the Authoritarian Message,” you argue that democrats cannot leave patriotic language to autocrats. How can liberal-democratic actors reclaim national identity without reproducing exclusionary nationalism or validating the authoritarian framing of “the nation under siege”?
Dr. Filip Milacic: What I argue in my book, and also in a recent piece in the Journal of Democracy, is that when the opposition is faced with an authoritarian incumbent who uses national appeals as a justification for the subversion of democracy, it has two or three options. The first is to ignore the issue of the nation. The second is to try to outflank the authoritarian incumbent from the right, meaning to be more nationalist. The third is to create a counter-narrative. I think this third option is the most promising.
However, developing a counter-narrative is not easy. What I have tried to do is offer some guidance to political actors on how to draft such a narrative, based on research I have conducted in several countries. The first criterion is to identify a topic with a strong emotional underpinning. This is crucial. The topic must also be linked to the concept of the nation, because only then can it effectively mobilize voters.
At the same time, this is context-dependent. There is no single topic that fits all cases. It depends on the country. The topic could relate to national history or to contemporary issues. In choosing it, the opposition faces a trade-off. If it wants to defeat the authoritarian incumbent, it needs to win over some of the incumbent’s voters. This requires a narrative that is inclusive not only for its own supporters but also for moderate voters on the other side—those who are willing to switch and are not strongly partisan.
This task is easier in ethnically and religiously homogeneous societies, where it is more feasible to find an inclusive theme. In countries marked by so-called formative rifts—disputes over national identity or territory—it becomes much harder. These rifts are often instrumentalized by authoritarian incumbents as a justification for undermining democracy.
As a result, such issues are very difficult for the opposition to ignore. The Kosovo issue in Serbia or the Kurdish issue in Turkey, for example, is frequently used to legitimize attacks on democracy. The key question is therefore how to approach them. In my research, including cases such as Israel, I find that the opposition faces another trade-off: whether to prioritize inclusion of moderate voters from the majority population or to be more inclusive toward minorities, assuming a deep societal divide between the two.
This depends on the scale and depth of the conflict. In some cases, the divide is so entrenched that the opposition is reluctant to accommodate minority concerns. For instance, the Israeli protest movement in 2023 was more inclusive toward moderate government voters than toward Israeli Arabs. By contrast, in Turkey, the opposition has recently become more inclusive toward the Kurdish minority. Yet this raises another question: will such a strategy also appeal to some government voters? To win elections, the opposition must attract at least a portion of them.
Reconciling these groups is therefore extremely difficult. Finding a topic that addresses a formative rift while remaining sufficiently inclusive is a major challenge. Still, it is not impossible. There are windows of opportunity that allow the opposition to construct an inclusive narrative and even bypass these deeply politicized divides, which authoritarian incumbents rely on to sustain their power.
One example, though not part of my systematic research, is Sri Lanka. Despite strong ethnic cleavages, a presidential candidate recently campaigned on a platform centered on economic progress, good governance, and the provision of public goods for all citizens. However, this approach is often contingent on a severe economic crisis and widespread corruption. In such conditions, these issues acquire strong emotional resonance, extending beyond purely economic concerns.
In this context, it becomes possible to construct a patriotic counter-narrative based on good governance, partially bypassing identity-based conflicts. This is not a universally applicable or particularly reassuring solution, as it implies that such narratives emerge under conditions of crisis. Nonetheless, we observe similar dynamics elsewhere. In Hungary, for example, dissatisfaction with economic performance and corruption has enabled figures like Peter Magyar to develop elements of a counter-narrative centered on good governance.
In some contexts, therefore, widespread corruption and economic failure can open a window of opportunity to bridge divides between electoral groups and construct a patriotic narrative focused on good governance.
Backsliding Is Also a Battle Over the Nation
Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.
Your argument suggests that authoritarian incumbents succeed not simply by attacking institutions, but by embedding those attacks in emotionally resonant narratives of national protection. Should we therefore understand democratic backsliding primarily as an institutional process, or as a discursive struggle over who legitimately embodies the nation?
Dr. Filip Milacic: I do not deny that democratic backsliding is primarily institutional, based on attacks against different elements of democracy, especially so-called executive aggrandizement. However, what I am trying to suggest is that we need to take a step back.
In my work, I have conducted numerous surveys across different countries, and I can say that even voters of parties associated with democratic backsliding—such as Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland, or SNS in Serbia—also endorse and value democracy. This raises an important question: do they perhaps not understand what democracy is? My colleagues and I examined this by asking questions related to so-called democratic competence, and we found that most of them do understand what democracy is and what it is not. Yet they continue to re-elect leaders such as Orbán, Kaczyński previously, and Vučić in Serbia.
So the question becomes: if the majority is pro-democratic and understands democracy, why do they still support these leaders? What I try to do is take a step back and show that they are not voting for these leaders because of their authoritarian policies, but in spite of them. I then investigated this further and found substantial evidence for what I call a “threat narrative.” In the cases I analyzed, before attacks on democracy occurred, there was consistently a narrative suggesting that the state was under attack—that the nation, national identity, or national sovereignty was threatened.
This narrative serves as a crucial justification for attacks on democracy in the name of the nation. In other words, we need to pay attention not only to the institutional dimension of democratic backsliding but also to how such actions are justified. Authoritarian incumbents do not simply undermine democratic institutions and expect voters to accept it; justification is key. My argument is that, before subverting democracy in the name of the nation, these actors construct a narrative in which the nation itself is under threat—and this narrative resonates with voters.
Dignity and Belonging Drive Politics
You emphasize dignity, recognition, and belonging as neglected dimensions of political behavior. To what extent has liberal democratic theory underestimated the affective power of the nation, and how should democratic strategy change once nationalism is understood as a source of personal and collective dignity?
Dr. Filip Milacic: I personally think that we have at least a partially flawed conception of human nature. Much of the literature is based on the assumption that actors are rational individuals whose primary aim is to maximize their economic benefits. While this is partly true, it does not provide a complete picture. There are also interests that are not related to the economy but are nonetheless very important to voters, such as recognition and personal dignity.
These interests may seem abstract. They are not as concrete as wanting more money in one’s pocket or an increase in one’s pension. However, interests related to self-esteem, dignity, and recognition are significant, even if they are less tangible, and this is precisely why they are often overlooked. I believe they are crucial drivers of voting behavior.
If we accept that dignity and recognition matter to voters, we must also acknowledge that people derive a great deal of their self-esteem from group membership. This is why belonging and community are so important. The nation, in particular, is one of the most significant groups. Belonging to a nation contributes not only to individual self-esteem but also to how people perceive their own value.
A simple example illustrates this dynamic. Whether we like it or not, we often feel proud and happy when our country succeeds in international sports competitions. This affects our sense of self-worth, even if we do not fully recognize it. It is a straightforward illustration of how group belonging reinforces self-esteem.
At the same time, groups such as the nation are not only important for self-esteem but also for security. Social psychology shows that belonging to a group provides individuals with a sense of security, which becomes particularly important in times of crisis and uncertainty, such as those we are currently experiencing.
In other words, if we accept that groups like the nation are central to individuals’ self-esteem and sense of security, we can better understand political developments over the past 10 or 15 years. Economic explanations alone are not sufficient.
Identity Conflicts Fuel Authoritarianism
Kurdish people walk by the bombed buildings after the curfew in Şırnak province of Turkey on March 3, 2016. Armed conflict between Turkish security forces and PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party) members killed hundreds of people.
In your work on stateness and democratic backsliding, you show that unresolved questions of statehood and national identity create fertile ground for ethno-political entrepreneurship. How should democrats respond when autocrats exploit formative rifts—such as Kosovo in Serbia, the Kurdish question in Turkey, or territorial disputes elsewhere—as justification for concentrating power?
Dr. Filip Milacic: As I mentioned in response to your previous question, context is crucial, particularly in my research. I have found that countries marked by so-called formative rifts—meaning disputed territory or contested national identity—are especially prone to the subversion of democracy in the name of the nation. These disputes generate nationalism and provide a powerful resource for authoritarian incumbents, as it is much easier to develop a so-called threat narrative when such issues remain unresolved. By contrast, where no such issues exist, threats to the nation often have to be constructed.
Let me compare Turkey and Hungary. In Hungary, Orbán had to invent threats to the nation, portraying immigrants or sexual minorities as dangers. For Erdoğan, this was easier because of the ongoing conflict between the Turks and Kurds. The presence of a real, unresolved dispute makes it easier to construct a convincing threat narrative.
How, then, should the opposition respond? As I suggested earlier, it should not attempt to outbid the authoritarian incumbent on nationalist grounds. In Turkey, the opposition initially pursued this strategy but eventually realized that it only reinforced the incumbent’s narrative. Instead, the opposition needs to develop a counter-narrative. A similar dynamic can be observed in Serbia, where Vučić has consistently used the Kosovo issue to justify attacks on democracy. Whenever the opposition tried to outflank him from the right, it failed.
However, developing such a counter-narrative is extremely difficult. When there is a deep conflict between majority and minority groups, the opposition faces a dilemma. To defeat the incumbent, it must win over some of their voters. This requires a narrative that does not ignore the formative rift but is still acceptable to both minority groups and segments of the government’s electorate. This is very challenging, and I do not have a definitive answer on how to resolve it.
What I can suggest is that there are moments when these conflicts become less salient, creating a window of opportunity. The opposition should use such moments to develop a narrative based on good governance, if the context allows. When the economy is underperforming, corruption is widespread, and citizens are dissatisfied with economic outcomes, these issues can become central. In such cases, it is possible to construct a patriotic narrative centered on good governance and strong institutions that deliver for all parts of society. This kind of narrative can be inclusive enough to appeal across different electoral groups.
Legislative Capture Enables Power Consolidation
Your Serbia research identifies “legislative capture” as a pathway through which Aleksandar Vučić transformed nationalist legitimacy into institutional domination. How does this pathway differ from more familiar forms of executive aggrandizement, and what early warning signs should democratic actors watch for?
Dr. Filip Milacic: I do not disagree that in Serbia the key issue is executive aggrandizement, meaning the accumulation of power in the hands of Aleksandar Vučić. However, what I sought to highlight is the role of parliament. Even though we now have a very strong executive at the expense of other branches of government, this process largely unfolded through parliament. Some scholars refer to this as so-called autocratic legalism. In this contemporary process of democratic backsliding, many measures are formally adopted through parliamentary procedures.
This is why it is called legislative capture. Full control of parliament becomes crucial for initiating democratic backsliding, and to achieve that, one must fully control the parliamentary majority. I believe this was the mechanism in Serbia, and in many other countries: a leader who fully controls the party. This is important to emphasize, as the role of political parties in democratic backsliding is often overlooked.
Once Vučić established control over the party and, consequently, over the parliamentary majority, it became much easier for him to implement anti-democratic policies and engage in attacks on various elements of democracy. In my view, the first step was his portrayal of himself as the savior of the nation and of the West as a threat to Serbia, particularly in relation to the Kosovo issue. This strengthened his legitimacy as a so-called savior of the nation, which in turn enabled him to consolidate control over his party, followed by full control of parliament. The final step is that full control of parliament allows the leader to extend control over many nominally independent institutions and to engage in broader power consolidation.
As for early warning signs, I would focus on these threat narratives. If we see an incumbent portraying himself as the savior of the nation while presenting the nation as being under threat, this should be understood as a clear warning sign of potential attacks on democracy carried out in the name of protecting the nation.
Nationalism Outbidding Strengthens Autocrats
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.
In the Serbian case, Vučić’s self-presentation as defender of Kosovo and of the Serbian nation gave him a special legitimacy that facilitated party control, parliamentary capture, and the weakening of oversight institutions. How can opposition forces challenge such “national protector” narratives without appearing indifferent to national concerns?
Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, Serbia is a very interesting case, because Kosovo has played a central role in justifying attacks on democracy. The key question, as I also mentioned in relation to the Kurdish issue or the Israeli–Arab divide in Israel, is how to overcome these divisions and build an electoral majority.
In Serbia, opposition actors at times tried to be more nationalist on the Kosovo issue than Vučić, but this strategy failed. The question, then, is how to address voters’ concerns on these issues—on these formative rifts—without strengthening the authoritarian incumbent. I think the opposition in Serbia may now have an opportunity due to a major tragedy, when part of a railway station collapsed, killing 16 citizens. This event demonstrated that, in the absence of the rule of law and strong institutions, and in the presence of widespread corruption, it can cost lives. It is not only that the system fails to perform; people’s lives are put at risk.
This creates the kind of window of opportunity, allowing the opposition to move beyond the Kosovo issue, which strongly divides the electorate. It can instead construct a counter-narrative based on good governance, the rule of law, and democracy, but framed in patriotic terms. In other words, this tragedy illustrates what happens when a country lacks strong institutions and democratic governance.
These are the kinds of windows of opportunity—often arising from tragic circumstances—that the opposition can use to build a narrative that is inclusive enough to appeal to different segments of the electorate.
No Society Is Doomed to Authoritarianism
Your comparative work suggests that authoritarian threat narratives are most effective when they resonate with preexisting historical memories, territorial losses, demographic anxieties, or narratives of victimhood. Are some societies structurally more vulnerable to authoritarian nationalism, or can democratic counternarratives neutralize these vulnerabilities?
Dr. Filip Milacic: As I noted in response to your earlier question, justification is central to attacks on democracy, and threat narratives play a key role in that process. Research by other scholars also shows that narratives about endangered identity or sovereignty tend to resonate more strongly in societies marked by historical losses of territory or sovereignty, as well as in those shaped by formative rifts and demographic anxieties.
All the cases I analyze in my book exhibit these characteristics, which made it easier for authoritarian incumbents to develop narratives that resonated with the population. This resonance is essential, as it makes voters more willing to accept attacks on democracy in the name of protecting an allegedly endangered nation.
However, this does not imply a deterministic path dependency. Societies marked by these factors are not doomed. Poland is a good example. Despite being characterized by many of these conditions, the opposition managed to develop a counter-narrative in 2023 based on EU membership and its role in shaping Polish identity as part of the West. They also emphasized that PiS was jeopardizing this position through its authoritarian policies. This demonstrates that an inclusive counter-narrative is possible even in societies that are historically and structurally more prone to threat-driven narratives.
Another example, not covered in my book, is the United States. It is not marked by the same historical experiences of territorial or sovereignty loss, yet Donald Trump was able to construct a threat-driven narrative that resonated widely. This suggests that contemporary issues, such as immigration, can also serve as the basis for such narratives.
Ultimately, political agency plays a crucial role. It matters greatly whether the opposition is able to develop a counter-narrative that resonates with the public.
Inclusive Narratives Strengthen Democracy
Photo: Dreamstime.
You argue that democratic resistance must develop a nation-related counternarrative rather than ignore nationalism or try to outbid autocrats ethno-nationally. What distinguishes a democratic patriotic counternarrative from a merely softer version of authoritarian nationalism?
Dr. Filip Milacic: I would return to what I said at the beginning about “the three options.” Sometimes the opposition ignores this issue, but when it does not, it often tries to outbid the authoritarian incumbent or, as you mentioned, develops a softer ethno-nationalist alternative. I believe that is the wrong approach.
So how can we differentiate between trying to outflank the authoritarian incumbent and developing a genuine counter-narrative? It comes down to content. A counter-narrative must be inclusive. I am not suggesting that it needs to include 100 percent of the population, but it should be inclusive of a large majority. This is important not only for practical reasons, such as winning elections, but also because it is morally justified and helps define what an inclusive national narrative should be.
First, the choice of topic and its framing are crucial—they must be inclusive. Second, the purpose of the narrative differs. Threat-driven narratives are used to justify attacks on democracy. A counter-narrative should do the opposite: it should be designed to strengthen and safeguard democracy, rather than to serve as a justification for undermining it.
Political Agency Shapes Counter-Narratives
In Poland, Brazil, Israel, and Hungary, you identify cases where opposition actors used patriotic or nationally rooted language to mobilize resistance. What made these counternarratives persuasive, and why have similar efforts been weaker in cases such as Serbia, Turkey, India, or the United States?
Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, political agency is very important here. I conducted many interviews with political actors while researching my book, particularly from the opposition, and I identified two types of politicians. One group would say that the nation as a topic is not relevant and would therefore avoid addressing it. The second group would acknowledge its relevance but admit that they do not know how to develop a counter-narrative. This is why political agency matters so much.
I understand that developing a counter-narrative is not easy, but if a politician chooses to pursue it, some guidance can be offered. The first criterion is that the topic must be emotional, because this is the only way to mobilize people—not only in the streets but also at the ballot box. The topic may be drawn from national history, but it can also be something contemporary.
For example, in Brazil, President Lula frequently framed the contemporary international context—particularly the role of the United States—as a challenge to Brazilian sovereignty, portraying his opponents as aligned with external interests while presenting himself as a defender of national autonomy. The EU, in the case of Poland—and more recently Hungary—served as another contemporary reference point. Péter Magyar, for instance, framed the election as a choice between Hungary as a European, Western democracy or as what he called an Eastern autocracy. This illustrates how contemporary themes can be effective, although historical references can also play a powerful role.
The Israeli protest movement in 2023 provides another example. Protesters invoked the Israeli Declaration of Independence, emphasizing its vision of Israel as a liberal democracy. They argued that the government, by introducing authoritarian measures, was acting against this founding principle—that Israel is a state of all its citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background.
These examples show that the choice of topic is highly context-dependent. Each opposition must draw on its own national context. In some cases, the economy can also be important. Where authoritarian incumbents mismanage the economy and corruption is widespread, as in Hungary, good governance can become a powerful basis for a patriotic narrative, as Magyar has demonstrated.
However, I am not suggesting that the economy is always decisive. In some contexts it matters, but not in all. For example, in Poland, GDP grew significantly during the PiS period, yet PiS was still voted out of office. This indicates that economic performance alone is not sufficient. Still, when combined with widespread corruption and public dissatisfaction, economic issues can provide a strong foundation for an inclusive and resonant counter-narrative.
Narratives Must Reinforce Community and Democratic Norms
If both ethno-national and pluralist identity claims can become grounds for democratic trade-offs, how should scholars distinguish between identity politics that strengthens liberal democracy and identity politics that weakens democratic resilience?
Dr. Filip Milacic: For me, the key issue is context. It also depends on whether identity politics is inclusive toward a large majority of citizens or whether it is exclusionary. We can, more or less, clearly distinguish between narratives that are inclusive and those that are exclusionary.
The second criterion is the purpose of these narratives. For authoritarian incumbents, the purpose is to justify attacks on democracy; such narratives serve as a cover for power grabs and as a means of legitimizing violations of democratic norms and principles. For pro-democratic opposition actors, the purpose is the opposite. Their narratives are not only aimed at defeating the authoritarian incumbent but also at strengthening democracy, reinforcing the political community, and protecting the elements of democracy that are under attack.
Politics Is a Battle of Narratives
Collage by Marek Uliasz / Dreamstime.
And finally, Dr. Milacic, looking across Hungary, Poland, Israel, Serbia, Austria, Turkey, and the United States, what does democratic resilience require today: stronger institutions, better opposition strategy, more effective patriotic counternarratives, or a deeper rethinking of liberal democracy’s relationship to nationhood?
Dr. Filip Milacic: I would say all of the above. The struggle for democracy is fought on all of these fronts. However, if I may add, the focus has primarily been on the institutional dimension. This is understandable, as democratic backsliding involves the capture, weakening, or dismantling of institutions.
At the same time, the fight for democracy is also fought through words. We should therefore pay much greater attention to the narrative level. This is precisely what I try to do in my research: to explore how democracy can be defended through narratives. It is not only about electoral mobilization; it is also about strengthening democracy by showing people why it matters and why it is important in an emotionally compelling way. For a narrative to succeed, it must resonate emotionally.
I would also acknowledge that the other side—autocrats—is often more successful in this regard than democratic opposition actors. This is because democratic actors tend to focus primarily on output, on what democracy delivers. I am not suggesting that this is unimportant, but it is not sufficient. We also need to engage with authoritarian-leaning actors at the level of narratives. After all, politics is fundamentally a battle of narratives.
Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.
Overview
In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.
At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.
For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.
Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas.
It offers a unique opportunity to explore:
The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.
You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.
Tentative Program
Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026
Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics
This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.
Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) –Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order
Lecturer:Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).
Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) –Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade
TBC
Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026
Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism
Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.
Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) – Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations
Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).
Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) –Populism and the Erosion/Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Trade Cooperation
Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).
Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026
Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy
This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.
Lecture Five: (15:00-16:30) –EU–US–China Trade Relations and Global Power Competition
Lecturer:Ramón Pacheco Pardo (Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance of Vrije Universiteit Brussel).
Lecture Six: (17:30-19:00) –Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools
Lecturer:Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).
Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026
Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre
This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.
Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) –US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications
Lecturer:Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) –EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)
Lecturer:Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).
Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026
Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership
This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.
Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) – Scenarios for the Future of Global Trade Governance (Fragmentation vs Reform)
Lecturer:Manfred Elsig (Professor of International Relations and Managing Director of the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern). (TBC)
Lecture Ten: (17:30-19:00) –Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence
Lecturer:Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University).
Methodology
The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.
The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.
Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.
Who should apply?
This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.
The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.
We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds.
Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance
Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.
Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.
Credit
This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.
A high-level roundtable convened by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) at the Center for American Progress (CAP) on April 20, 2026, brought together leading scholars and policy experts to examine how populism is reshaping transatlantic relations. Held under the Chatham House Rule, the discussion highlighted growing concerns over declining trust, institutional erosion, and the shift toward more transactional and unpredictable forms of diplomacy. Participants emphasized that populism operates less as a coherent ideology than as a governing style marked by rule-breaking and strategic uncertainty, with far-reaching consequences for global cooperation. The exchange pointed to an evolving transatlantic partnership—more selective, fragile, and contingent—while underscoring the need for renewed democratic coordination, institutional resilience, and sustained engagement beyond government channels.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On April 20, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with the Center for American Progress (CAP), convened a closed expert roundtable in Washington, D.C., to examine the evolving nexus between populism and transatlantic relations. Bringing together a select group of scholars, policy analysts, and practitioners, the discussion focused on how contemporary political transformations—particularly the resurgence of populist leadership in the United States—are reshaping the strategic, institutional, and normative foundations of the transatlantic partnership.
Building on ECPS’s prior engagements in European policy circles, the Washington meeting shifted analytical attention toward the United States as a central agenda-setter in transatlantic relations. The discussion was structured around three thematic blocks: (1) US strategic reorientation, (2) populism and commitment to liberal democracy, and (3) pathways to re-engagement.
Framing the Discussion: A Relationship at a Turning Point
The roundtable opened with reflections on the ECPS report, which framed the current moment as a potential turning point in transatlantic relations. Participants broadly agreed that the relationship is undergoing a qualitative transformation, characterized by declining trust, shifting strategic priorities, and growing uncertainty about the durability of shared norms.
A central theme emerging from the introductory presentations was the distinction between structural and contingent explanations. While some developments—such as the US pivot to the Indo-Pacific and the relative rise of other global powers—reflect long-term structural changes, others appear closely tied to the political agency of contemporary populist leadership.
The discussion underscored that these dynamics are not mutually exclusive. Instead, structural pressures and political contingencies interact in ways that amplify uncertainty. In particular, the return of a populist administration in the United States has accelerated tendencies toward unilateralism, transactional diplomacy, and skepticism toward multilateral institutions.
Participants noted that, unlike earlier periods of tension, current disruptions are compounded by a deeper erosion of trust. European actors increasingly perceive the transatlantic relationship as subject to abrupt shifts across electoral cycles, undermining its reliability as a strategic anchor.
Populism as Political Agency: Rule-Breaking and Uncertainty
A key analytical contribution of the discussion concerned the conceptualization of populism. Rather than treating populism as a coherent ideology, participants emphasized its manifestation through political agency—specifically, the capacity of populist leaders to disrupt established norms and institutional constraints.
In this regard, populism was associated with a distinctive governing style characterized by rule-breaking behavior and the strategic use of uncertainty. As one participant argued, populist leaders often derive power from their willingness to challenge established rules, thereby reshaping the expectations that underpin international cooperation.
This dynamic has profound implications for the transatlantic system. The postwar order was built on a rules-based framework that enabled long-term planning, reduced transaction costs, and facilitated stable cooperation. When key actors repeatedly violate or reinterpret these rules, the system’s self-correcting mechanisms begin to erode.
Participants highlighted the cascading effects of such behavior. Even when most actors continue to adhere to established norms, the actions of rule-breaking leaders can disrupt dispute-resolution mechanisms, fragment global value chains, and generate systemic instability.
This perspective shifts attention from populism as rhetoric to populism as practice—an approach that foregrounds the operational consequences of leadership choices in shaping international relations.
Trade, Institutions, and the Erosion of Multilateralism
The discussion devoted significant attention to the impact of populist governance on international economic and institutional frameworks. In the domain of trade, participants noted that recent policy shifts—particularly the imposition of unpredictable tariffs—have undermined the predictability essential to global commerce.
These developments reflect a broader move toward transactionalism, in which economic relations are subordinated to short-term political objectives. While the majority of international trade continues to follow established rules, the weakening of dispute-resolution mechanisms has diminished the system’s capacity to manage conflicts effectively.
A parallel erosion was observed in multilateral institutions. Participants emphasized that these institutions depend not only on formal rules but also on the willingness of major powers to support and sustain them. When leading actors withdraw resources or disengage from cooperative frameworks, institutional effectiveness declines.
Examples discussed included the consequences of reduced US participation in global governance structures, which can create funding gaps, disrupt information-sharing networks, and weaken collective problem-solving capacities.
Importantly, participants noted that the current crisis of multilateralism is not solely the result of populist leadership. It also reflects longstanding concerns about representation and legitimacy within global institutions. Populist actors have capitalized on these grievances, framing institutional disengagement as a defense of national sovereignty.
Strategic Reorientation: Competition, Cooperation, and Fragmentation
The first thematic block of the discussion addressed the strategic dimension of transatlantic relations. Participants debated whether recent shifts represent a temporary deviation or a more durable realignment.
Several contributors argued that the United States is undergoing a strategic reorientation driven by both domestic politics and global competition. The increasing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, coupled with a more transactional approach to alliances, suggests a recalibration of priorities that may persist beyond any single administration.
At the same time, the discussion highlighted the risks of fragmentation. As global value chains are reconfigured to enhance resilience and reduce dependency, they may become less compatible across regions. This process could lead to a form of “competitive strategic autonomy,” in which major actors develop parallel economic systems with limited interoperability.
For Europe, this presents a complex challenge. On one hand, there is a growing recognition of the need to reduce reliance on the United States and to enhance strategic autonomy. On the other hand, the transatlantic relationship remains a critical pillar of security and economic cooperation.
Participants suggested that the most plausible scenario is neither full decoupling nor a return to previous levels of integration, but rather a narrower and more selective partnership.
Populism and Liberal Democracy: Normative Divergence
The second thematic block focused on the normative dimension of transatlantic relations, particularly the status of shared democratic values. Participants expressed concern that populist politics are contributing to a divergence in commitments to liberal democratic principles.
Key tensions identified included the relationship between geopolitics and democracy promotion, the credibility of values-based foreign policy, and the role of non-state actors in sustaining democratic norms.
One line of argument emphasized that populist leaders often frame international institutions as constraints on national sovereignty, thereby weakening support for multilateral cooperation. Another perspective highlighted the internal contradictions of populist governance, noting that nationalist policies can lead to conflicts even among ideologically aligned actors.
The discussion also explored the potential for an alternative conception of transatlantic relations grounded in civilizational or cultural affinities rather than universalist values. While such narratives may resonate with certain political constituencies, participants questioned their viability as a basis for stable cooperation.
At the same time, the discussion acknowledged that populism is not inherently antithetical to democracy. Some participants emphasized its roots in legitimate grievances, including perceptions of inequality, corruption, and elite unresponsiveness. This perspective suggests that addressing the underlying drivers of populism is essential for restoring democratic legitimacy.
Pathways to Re-Engagement: Actors and Strategies
The final thematic block examined potential pathways for stabilizing and renewing transatlantic relations. Participants identified a range of actors and mechanisms that could mitigate political volatility and sustain cooperation.
At the governmental level, there was recognition of the need for pragmatic engagement across political divides. While ideological differences may limit the scope of cooperation, targeted initiatives in areas of mutual interest—such as security, trade, and technology—could provide a basis for continued collaboration.
Civil society and academic networks were highlighted as particularly important buffers against political disruption. Universities, think tanks, and research collaborations play a crucial role in maintaining dialogue, generating knowledge, and fostering mutual understanding.
Policy networks and economic stakeholders were also identified as key actors. Business communities, advocacy groups, and transnational partnerships can help sustain cooperation by emphasizing shared interests and interdependencies.
Participants emphasized that these actors are not substitutes for governmental engagement but rather complementary forces that can enhance resilience and adaptability.
Policy Reflections: Toward a More Resilient Partnership
In the concluding segment, participants were invited to propose concrete steps for improving transatlantic relations over the next two to three years.
Several recurring themes emerged:
Rebuilding Trust: Restoring predictability in policy and communication was identified as a critical priority. This includes strengthening institutional mechanisms that can endure political transitions.
Enhancing Strategic Autonomy: European actors should continue to develop independent capabilities while maintaining cooperation with the United States.
Reforming Multilateral Institutions: Addressing concerns about representation and effectiveness could help restore confidence in global governance frameworks.
Investing in Non-State Networks: Expanding collaboration among civil society, academia, and the private sector can provide stability in times of political uncertainty.
Addressing Domestic Drivers of Populism: Tackling inequality, corruption, and governance deficits is essential for mitigating the appeal of populist narratives.
Conclusion
The ECPS roundtable provided a multidimensional assessment of the challenges facing transatlantic relations in an era of populist resurgence. While the discussion highlighted significant risks—including institutional erosion, normative divergence, and strategic fragmentation—it also identified opportunities for adaptation and renewal.
A central conclusion of the meeting is that the transatlantic relationship is unlikely to return to its previous form. Instead, it is evolving into a more contingent and selective partnership shaped by both structural transformations and political agency.
At the same time, the discussion underscored the enduring importance of shared interests and values. Even as these foundations are contested, they continue to provide a basis for cooperation and resilience.
Ultimately, the future of transatlantic relations will depend not only on the actions of governments but also on the capacity of societies to sustain democratic norms, foster inclusive growth, and engage constructively across borders. In this sense, the challenge is not merely to defend existing institutions but to reimagine them in ways that reflect the complexities of a changing world.
The roundtable thus reaffirmed the need for sustained dialogue, critical reflection, and collaborative action, and essential ingredients for navigating the uncertain terrain of contemporary global politics.
In this interview, Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University, challenges dominant narratives of a global democratic crisis. Against widespread claims of democratic recession and authoritarian resurgence, he argues: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.” For Professor Przeworski, democracy remains best understood as a mechanism for processing conflict through elections rather than as a system that resolves all social, economic, or moral disagreements. While he acknowledges unprecedented developments—party-system instability, polarization, and the rise of new right-wing parties—he cautions against conflating these shifts with systemic collapse. His analysis highlights democracy’s self-preserving capacity, insisting that while “small transgressions may be tolerated,” major violations of democratic rules eventually encounter resistance.
In an era increasingly defined by claims of democratic recession, authoritarian resurgence, and the global diffusion of populist politics, few voices carry the analytical weight and empirical authority of Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU). A foundational figure in democratic theory, Professor Przeworski has long conceptualized democracy not as a teleological endpoint, but as a contingent institutional arrangement grounded in electoral competition and the management of conflict. His minimalist definition—“a system in which governments can be selected and removed through elections”—offers a parsimonious yet powerful framework for evaluating both democratic resilience and vulnerability. In this interview, conducted against the backdrop of intensifying scholarly and public concern about democratic backsliding, Professor Przeworski advances a deliberately counterintuitive claim: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.”
This assertion stands in sharp contrast to dominant narratives, including those informed by datasets such as V-Dem, which suggest a global shift toward autocratization. Yet Professor Przeworski challenges both the empirical basis and the interpretive framing of such claims. “What does it really mean to say that a majority of the world’s population lives under authoritarian governments?” he asks, expressing skepticism toward measurement strategies that, in his view, risk overstating crisis dynamics. Instead, he emphasizes a more structural and historically grounded perspective: “There are more democratic regimes—more democratic countries—in the world today than ever before.” For Professor Przeworski, the proliferation of democratic regimes, even amid evident tensions, complicates the narrative of systemic collapse.
At the core of his argument lies a reconceptualization of democratic instability. While acknowledging “recent changes that are indeed unprecedented—such as the weakening of political parties, the instability of party systems, and the emergence of new parties, particularly on the political right,” he resists interpreting these developments as evidence of a generalized breakdown. Rather, they reflect shifting configurations within democratic systems that have always been characterized by conflict, contestation, and dissatisfaction. Indeed, as he notes, “as much as half of the population is always dissatisfied with what democracy produces,” a condition intrinsic to competitive politics rather than indicative of systemic failure.
Crucially, Professor Przeworski situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader theory of political conflict and institutional equilibrium. Democracy endures not because it resolves all conflicts, but because it provides a mechanism—elections—through which they can be processed and temporarily settled. Even processes of democratic erosion, he suggests, remain bounded by this logic. While incumbents may attempt to “undermine democracy without abolishing elections,” such strategies are neither universally successful nor irreversible. On the contrary, recent electoral developments in countries such as Poland and Brazil illustrate democracy’s capacity for self-correction. “Attempts to usurp power through various means eventually encounter resistance,” he observes, emphasizing that “small transgressions may be tolerated, but major violations of democratic rules are not.”
This perspective invites a more nuanced understanding of both populism and authoritarianism. Rather than external threats to democracy, they emerge as endogenous features of political competition under conditions of inequality, polarization, and institutional strain. At the same time, Professor Przeworski underscores the enduring appeal of democratic choice itself. “The very possibility of choosing who governs us,” he argues, “is an extraordinarily strong value to which people adhere.”
By challenging prevailing assumptions about democratic decline, this interview offers a sobering yet cautiously optimistic account of contemporary politics. It suggests that while liberal democracy faces significant pressures, its foundational mechanisms—and the normative commitments that sustain them—remain more resilient than often assumed.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Adam Przeworski, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Democracy as Conflict Management
Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
Professor Przeworski, welcome. Your minimalist conception defines democracy as a system in which governments can be selected and removed through elections. In light of contemporary backsliding, does this procedural definition remain analytically sufficient, or do recent developments compel us to integrate more substantive criteria concerning rights, accountability, and the rule of law?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I think that to understand my view of democracy—the minimalist view of democracy—one has to start with the observation that, in every country, at every time, there is conflict. These conflicts are often normative; that is, people expect democracy to implement certain values, such as those you mentioned. There are also economic conflicts—indeed, most conflicts are economic—dealing with the distribution of income, work, and so on. Sometimes they are purely symbolic. I often cite the example of a government in the Weimar Republic that fell because it changed the colors of the national flag. But the key point is that there was conflict.
The essence of the minimalist conception is that we must find ways to manage these conflicts—ways to resolve them, at least temporarily. After all, different people expect different things from democracy: some emphasize freedom, others equality. So how do we resolve these conflicts? This is where my argument comes in. I contend that we resolve them through elections. Whatever else people expect from democracy, we must have a mechanism through which conflicts are processed and resolved.
No Generalized Crisis of Democracy
You distinguish democracy as a mechanism for processing conflict from democracy as a normative ideal. To what extent has the growing expectation that democracy should deliver not only representation, but also economic equality and moral outcomes contributed to its current crisis of legitimacy?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I am not sure that this represents something new. As long as democracy has existed—in some countries for 200 years, and in at least 13 countries for 100 consecutive years—there have been such divergences. We have always disagreed about what we should expect of democracy, and which values it ought to implement. There is nothing new about that.
From this perspective, some people—and perhaps, in many cases, as much as half of the population—are always dissatisfied with what democracy produces. From time to time, they express this dissatisfaction by voting incumbent governments out. That is the instrument available to them, and that is how the system works.
For this reason, I do not think there is something like a generalized crisis of democracy. That said, there are recent changes that are indeed unprecedented—such as the weakening of political parties, the instability of party systems, and the emergence of new parties, particularly on the political right. These are significant developments, and they should prompt concern. But I would not characterize them as evidence of a new, generalized crisis of democracy. As I said at the outset, I do not believe such a generalized crisis exists.
The US as the Exception
Your work emphasizes that democracy endures when the stakes of losing power are not existential. How should we interpret rising inequality, identity polarization, and winner-takes-all political competition in this regard—do they structurally raise the cost of electoral defeat beyond sustainable thresholds?
Professor Adam Przeworski: The stakes in elections have indeed increased in recent years. At the same time, however, I do not see a generalized threat to democracy. There is, of course, an elephant in the room: the United States. In the United States, democracy is truly in danger. But if we consider similar countries—economically highly developed societies with comparable, perhaps somewhat lower, levels of inequality, significant political polarization, and long democratic traditions—the picture looks different.
In these countries, even when right-wing parties, including those with fascist roots, come to power—at least as members of governing coalitions—they do not necessarily threaten democracy. What strikes me is that, if you look at Italy, for example, where a party with explicit fascist roots is governing, or Austria or Sweden, where such parties have been part of coalitions, they still adhere to democratic values. They may advance unprecedented programs—programs that many of us, including myself, may strongly dislike—but they do not, in themselves, threaten democracy. In that sense, the threat to democracy appears to be largely exceptional to the United States.
Democracy Under Formal Trappings
Following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, protests erupted across numerous cities in Turkey. Citizens took to the streets to voice their opposition to the decision and express growing discontent. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have argued that contemporary democratic breakdowns occur primarily through elected incumbents. Does this shift from coups to endogenous erosion indicate that the institutional architecture of modern democracies has become intrinsically vulnerable to strategic capture?
Professor Adam Przeworski: That is an extremely controversial topic, but the answer is probably yes. When you look at the data, military coups have almost completely disappeared in the 21st century. Until around the year 2000, democracies were typically destroyed in a visible way—through military takeovers and coups. Since then, the only democracy that has experienced a coup is Thailand. While there have been many coups in Africa, particularly in North Africa, they have not been directed against democratic regimes. This suggests a new pattern.
It is likely new because some governments have learned that they can remain in power while preserving the formal trappings of democracy—by subordinating institutions other than the executive, controlling the media and economic resources, and employing a degree of repression, as in Turkey. In other words, they have learned to operate under the guise of democracy while using a range of instruments to entrench their rule.
At the same time, these governments do lose elections. They lost an election in Poland, and more recently in Hungary, contrary to many expectations and the more pessimistic forecasts of some analysts. This indicates that, while incumbents have developed strategies to gradually undermine democracy without abolishing elections or fully delegitimizing the opposition, the process is neither complete nor irreversible. For that reason, I would not characterize this as a universal phenomenon, and it remains unclear how durable it will be.
The Dilemma of Democratic Resistance
Within your strategic framework, incumbents choose whether to uphold or subvert electoral competition. How should we conceptualize “stealth authoritarianism,” where legalistic and incremental institutional changes cumulatively undermine democracy without triggering immediate resistance?
Professor Adam Przeworski: Let me begin with the question of immediate resistance. These governments win elections—Erdoğan won elections; Chávez and then Maduro won elections; Orbán won elections; and in Poland, the right-wing party won elections. They come to power on a program, and then the opposition faces a difficult choice. The opposition may see that these governments threaten democracy but opposing them can itself appear undemocratic. After all, these leaders have just won an election. Taking to the streets to say, “No, these people cannot govern,” risks being perceived as an anti-democratic act.
At some point, however, it may become too late. If these governments succeed in consolidating their partisan advantage—as in Venezuela or Turkey—then by the time the opposition decides that it can no longer tolerate the situation because democracy is being undermined, incumbents may already be too strong. They may be able to repress their opponents or otherwise entrench themselves in power. So, strategically, this is a very difficult situation. The opposition must be extremely careful about what to oppose and when to oppose it.
Public Tolerance and Democratic Erosion
Serbian students and citizens protest against government corruption following the Novi Sad railway station accident, at Slavija Square in Belgrade, Serbia, on December 22, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic / Dreamstime.
You suggest that democratic vulnerability can arise both from highly popular incumbents through populism and from deeply unpopular ones through polarization. How should we interpret cases where these dynamics converge, producing simultaneously mobilized support and entrenched opposition?
Professor Adam Przeworski: The way I think about it is that governments which, in fact, threaten democracy sometimes win elections. We now have extensive evidence, originally due to Professor Milan Svolik at Yale, showing that people are willing to tolerate certain violations of democratic norms and rules in exchange for substantive outcomes they value. As Svolik and Matthew H. Graham demonstrate in a well-known article, the number of unconditional democrats—that is, people who would not tolerate any violation of democratic norms for any substantive outcome—is very small in the United States. If I recall correctly, they estimate it at around 6 percent.
At the same time, evidence from Carlos Boix and his collaborators shows that when the question is framed more broadly—whether people are willing to give up democracy altogether—the answer is strongly negative. In other words, people may tolerate some transgressions, but not a complete abandonment of democracy. This creates a particular dynamic in processes of democratic backsliding. People may accept certain violations, but when governments go too far, they react—they protest, object, and sometimes vote incumbents out of office, as seen in Hungary and Poland.
In this sense, governments sometimes backslide because they can—because such actions are tolerated. At other times, however, they may backslide defensively, because failing to do so could risk electoral defeat. Thus, there are two distinct forms of backsliding: one supported by public tolerance, and another that unfolds in tension with public opinion.
Delegation, Trust, and Anti-Democratic Populism
Populist leaders frequently claim to embody a unified “people” against institutional constraints. In your analytical framework, is populism best understood as a pathology of democratic representation, or as an endogenous feature of electoral competition under conditions of high stakes and limited trust?
Professor Adam Przeworski: This is, again, a theme that is inherent in democracy. We do not like to be ruled. There is always a government that tells us what we can do and, very often, what we cannot do—and we do not like it. There have always been movements demanding a greater voice for the people in governance. As you know, there are many proposals aimed at increasing the role of voters in governing—various kinds of assemblies, referendums, participatory budgeting, and so on. Numerous reforms have sought to expand the role of citizens in their governments.
At the same time, there is a form of right-wing or anti-democratic populism in which people are willing to delegate governance to a leader, as long as that leader governs well. In such cases, people say, “We will place our trust in a government that does what we want.” Both of these tendencies can be dangerous to democracy.
Populism Is Inherent in Democracy
You have argued that citizens may knowingly tolerate democratic erosion when incumbents are perceived as highly appealing. Does this imply that populism is not external to democracy, but rather a rational equilibrium outcome within it?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I think that populism, understood as a desire among voters to have a stronger and more direct voice in governing, is inherent in democracy. Populism is a slippery concept. This is why Mudde, who popularized the term, has described it as a “thin” or weak ideology. At its core, it presents a view of the world that pits elites against the people. Some version of this dynamic has always been present. It was already visible at the time the American Constitution was being written. The Anti-Federalists, for example, were populists in this sense. They advocated very short terms of office—sometimes as short as one year—as well as prohibitions on re-election, reflecting a fear that elites would capture power and use it in their own interests rather than in those of the broader population.
This dynamic is therefore as old as democracy itself, and it resurfaces from time to time. At the same time, when the question is framed more fundamentally—whether people are willing to give up democracy altogether for some alternative—we have overwhelming evidence that they are not. People are not willing to accept that; they will defend democracy.
Dissatisfaction Is Democracy’s Constant
Given your argument that political conflict is structured by the available policy alternatives, how does populism reshape the political agenda in ways that both intensify polarization and foreclose the possibility of compromise?
Professor Adam Przeworski: We do have a great deal of evidence of polarization. The proportion of the electorate willing to change its partisan preferences is almost zero, which is somewhat surprising given that party systems themselves are quite unstable. People are increasingly likely to see one another as enemies, and as a result, they are less willing to accept compromise. That said, I do not think we are living in an era of a generalized crisis of democracy. Democracy continues to function quite well in several countries. The fact that we are often dissatisfied with the outcomes of governments and their policies is nothing new.
Consider that there are almost no democratic elections in which any party wins more than 50 percent of the vote. This means that roughly half of voters are dissatisfied with the result from the outset. Once in power, governments inevitably fail to implement all their promises, and perhaps about half of their own supporters become dissatisfied as well. What we observe, then, is a broad and persistent dissatisfaction with both electoral outcomes and government performance. Yet people continue to expect that next time they will prevail, and that the government will deliver on its promises. Elections are, in a sense, a siren song—they renew our optimism that, even if it did not work this time, it might work next time. This dynamic is inherent in democracy and is likely to persist. That is why I am not inclined to interpret current developments as evidence of a generalized crisis.
Why Some Autocracies Gain Support
The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.
Your work challenges the assumption that authoritarian regimes are inherently fragile, highlighting instead their capacity to govern effectively and generate support. Does this require a fundamental revision of democratic theory’s expectations about the instability of autocracies?
Professor Adam Przeworski: It is difficult for democrats to understand why someone would be satisfied with, or even support, an authoritarian regime. We tend to assume that people would not be willing to give up their political freedom—and sometimes more than that, their cultural freedom—and trust that a government will act in their interests. As a result, much of the literature we produce in the West suggests that authoritarian regimes survive only because of misinformation, censorship, and propaganda. I do not think that is entirely true. There are authoritarian regimes that enjoy passive acceptance, and perhaps even passive support. China is one example. Why? Because authoritarian governments still have to govern—and they do govern. They repair streets, issue licenses, collect garbage; in short, they perform the everyday functions of governance. Moreover, people often do not see viable alternatives. In China, for instance, many do not seriously consider a different system; they simply live within the one they have.
So, my view is that we should not be surprised that some authoritarian regimes are relatively successful and enjoy a degree of popular support. Singapore might be one example, China another. This does not mean that all authoritarian regimes do so—many rely heavily on repression, arbitrariness, and violence in the interests of narrow elites. But the broader point is that authoritarian regimes are not sustained only by deception. Some of them do enjoy genuine support.
Development Sustains Democracy, But May Not Create It
If authoritarian regimes can derive legitimacy through economic performance, symbolic politics, or identity appeals, how does this complicate the long-standing modernization thesis linking development to democratization?
Professor Adam Przeworski: This is a long topic on which I have written extensively. What we know from the evidence is that if a democratic regime exists in an economically developed country, it is very likely to endure. That is the central lesson. In a 1997 article co-authored with Fernando Limongi, we observed that no democracy had ever fallen in a country with a per capita income higher than Argentina’s in 1976. Since then, only Thailand has experienced a democratic breakdown at a slightly higher income level. Overall, however, the evidence is clear: when democracy exists in a developed country, it tends to persist.
A different question is whether countries are more likely to become democratic as they develop economically. This was a widespread belief in the 1960s and 1970s and formed the basis of modernization theory. My conclusion, based on empirical research, is that we have no evidence supporting this claim. In other words, higher levels of economic development do not necessarily make a country more likely to become democratic. So, in a sense, one half of modernization theory is supported by the evidence, while the other half is not.
Why Some Autocracies Endure
What, in your view, distinguishes durable authoritarian regimes from fragile ones—particularly in terms of their ability to balance repression, co-optation, and everyday governance?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I do not really know; I have not studied this question directly. My view is more of a conjecture—and it is no more than that, not strongly supported by empirical evidence, largely because we do not yet have sufficient data. My sense is that when authoritarian regimes reach high levels of income, they tend to become more stable. Singapore and China, for me, are illustrative examples.
When we look at the empirical data, authoritarian regimes appear to be most vulnerable at intermediate levels of income. That is when they are more likely to collapse. By contrast, once they reach sufficiently high levels of income—and there are very few such cases—they seem more likely to endure.
At present, there is only one authoritarian regime with a per capita income comparable to that of most democracies, and that is Singapore. China, despite its significant development, has not yet reached that level. So, from this perspective, we still do not know with certainty whether authoritarian regimes are more likely to survive in developed contexts. However, the available empirical patterns suggest that they probably are.
Legitimacy Without Alternatives
You have critiqued formal models of authoritarianism for neglecting the quotidian practices of governance. How should scholars reconceptualize authoritarian stability to account for these routine, non-coercive dimensions of rule?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I have a particular view of legitimacy, which I spelled out many years ago. I think a regime is legitimate when people do not perceive organized alternatives. When you think about China, whatever else may be true, people simply do not see an alternative. More broadly, our regime preferences are, to a large extent, endogenous—endogenous in the sense that people living under particular regimes, unless those regimes are especially flagrant, tend to accept them. They accept them passively because they do not see much chance of changing them.
Someone living in the state of Iowa in the United States does not think, “What if the American system were like the Chinese one?” Similarly, someone living in Guangdong does not think, “What if our system were like the American one?” People live their everyday lives, and they do not perceive politically organized alternatives. That is simply the way things are.
When such alternatives do appear—when there is a genuinely organized democratic opposition—open conflict emerges, and some authoritarian regimes collapse. We saw this in the fall of the communist bloc, where regimes collapsed one after another.
Challenging the V-Dem Crisis Narrative
Recent V-Dem report findings indicate that a substantial majority of the world’s population now lives under authoritarian regimes, with autocracies outnumbering democracies. How should we interpret this reversal in light of your argument that democracy is historically contingent rather than teleologically progressive?
Professor Adam Przeworski: I think this claim is simply false. In a sense, I see V-Dem as a figment of the imagination. What does it really mean to say that a majority of the world’s population lives under authoritarian governments? How is that measured? I do not have much trust in V-Dem’s measurements of democracy. I think they seek media exposure by heralding crises of democracy. I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy, so I do not take this claim seriously. On the contrary, there are more democratic regimes—more democratic countries—in the world today than ever before. I am not referring to population, but to the number of countries.
Electorates Can Reverse Illiberal Drift
And finally, Professor Przeworski, recent political developments in countries such as Poland, Brazil, and—potentially—Hungary suggest that electorates can reverse authoritarian or illiberal trajectories through democratic means. To what extent do these cases support the view that democracy retains a self-correcting capacity, and what structural or institutional conditions are necessary for such reversals to succeed rather than produce only partial or fragile restorations?
Professor Adam Przeworski: You are right that what has happened in Brazil, Poland, and Hungary shows that democracies possess a kind of self-preserving capacity. When democracy is truly at stake, people are willing to set aside other values and preferences in order to defend it. There is something about the very possibility of choosing who governs us that constitutes an extraordinarily strong value, to which people remain deeply attached. The examples you cited illustrate this clearly. Attempts to usurp power through various means eventually encounter resistance. Small transgressions may be tolerated, but major violations of democratic rules are not.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 3: Normalizing Authoritarian Populism — Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00151
The third panel of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium examined how authoritarian populism becomes normalized across institutions, media ecosystems, and political identities. Bringing together perspectives from political science, media studies, and political theory, the session highlighted the interplay between executive overreach, institutional erosion, and algorithmically amplified communication. Contributions by Professor Larry Diamond and Professor Bruce Cain underscored the dynamics of democratic backsliding and “autocratic drift” within the United States, while Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi demonstrated how AI-driven media and “slopaganda” reshape populist mobilization in a hyperreal digital environment. Concluding the panel, Professor Tariq Modood proposed multicultural nationalism as a unifying alternative to exclusionary populism. Collectively, the panel offered a multidimensional framework for understanding and resisting contemporary authoritarian trajectories.
Reported by ECPS Staff
Third Panel of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, “Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience,” convened under the title “Normalizing Authoritarian Populism: Institutions, Algorithms, and Fascist Drift.” Moderated by Professor Werner Pascha, Emeritus Professor of Economics at Duisburg-Essen University and affiliated with the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), the panel examined how authoritarian populism becomes normalized through institutional weakening, executive overreach, media transformation, algorithmic amplification, and exclusionary forms of nationalism.
Professor Pascha guided the session as a moderator attentive to both institutional and conceptual linkages. His role was especially important in bringing together the panel’s diverse disciplinary perspectives—from comparative democratization and American political institutions to media studies, war narratives, and multicultural political theory—into a coherent discussion on the contemporary vulnerabilities of liberal democracy.
The panel opened with Professor Larry Diamond, William L. Clayton Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute, and Bass University Fellow. In his presentation, “The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It,” Professor Diamond assessed the trajectory of authoritarian populism in the United States, drawing on V-Dem indicators and comparative lessons from Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. He emphasized electoral manipulation, corruption, attacks on institutions, and the importance of broad democratic mobilization.
The second speaker, Professor Bruce Cain, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center, presented “The Institutional Enablement of American Populism.” Professor Cain offered a measured analysis of autocratic drift in the United States, distinguishing between rule-of-law erosion and longer-term shifts in America’s federalized institutional structure. His remarks highlighted executive power, emergency authority, judicial interpretation, federalism, and the political economy of democratic resilience.
The third presentation, “Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake,” was delivered by Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, Associate Professor at The American College of the Mediterranean and the Department of International Relations at Central European University. Assoc. Prof. Al-Marashi explored how AI-generated media, memes, “slopaganda,” and hyperreal digital narratives reshape war, propaganda, and populist communication.
The final speaker, Professor Tariq Modood, Professor of Sociology, Politics and Public Policy at the University of Bristol, presented “From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging: Multicultural Nationalism as an Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism.” Professor Modood proposed multicultural nationalism as a constructive response to exclusionary populism, seeking to integrate majority anxieties and minority vulnerabilities within a shared framework of equal citizenship and belonging.
Together, the panel offered a rich interdisciplinary account of how authoritarian populism is institutionalized, mediated, normalized, and potentially resisted.
Professor Larry Diamond: The Arc of Authoritarian Populism in the US under Donald Trump, How Far It Has Progressed, and the Prospects of Reversing It
Professor Larry Diamond, a renowned expert on democratic development and Senior Fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.
As the first speaker of the third panel, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a wide-ranging and analytically grounded presentation that examined the trajectory of authoritarian populism and the prospects for reversing democratic backsliding. Moving briskly through his slides, Professor Diamond framed his remarks around two central questions: how far authoritarian populism has advanced, and what strategies may effectively counter its expansion. Drawing in part on V-Dem data as well as arguments developed in his book Ill Winds, Professor Diamond outlined what he described as an “autocrat’s 12-step program,” emphasizing the cumulative and systematic nature of democratic erosion.
While not elaborating each step in detail, Professor Diamond underscored the critical importance of electoral manipulation and control, identifying it as the decisive stage in authoritarian consolidation. He noted that this dimension often determines whether democratic decline becomes entrenched, referencing recent developments in Hungary as a salient example. Turning to the United States, Professor Diamond traced the evolution of authoritarian tendencies under Donald Trump, emphasizing both continuity from the first term and new developments in the second.
Executive Power and Erosion
Among the defining features identified by Professor Diamond were the use of political pressure to deter intra-party dissent, particularly among Republican legislators, and the expansion of attacks on independent institutions, including law firms, universities, and media organizations. He highlighted the increasing concentration of media ownership in the hands of political allies, suggesting that such developments have already begun to shape editorial practices in major outlets. In addition, Professor Diamond pointed to the erosion of conflict-of-interest norms, arguing that corruption has become deeply embedded within the governing project and may ultimately prove politically destabilizing.
Further institutional concerns included the dismissal of inspectors general, the impoundment of congressionally appropriated funds, and the transformation of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) into a broader instrument of political enforcement. Professor Diamond also emphasized attempts to weaponize the Justice Department and to gain control over electoral administration, including efforts to weaken election security infrastructure. These actions, in his view, reflected a coherent strategy aimed at consolidating executive power.
Assessing the extent of democratic decline, Professor Diamond drew on V-Dem indicators to demonstrate a significant deterioration in the United States’ liberal democracy score. He highlighted a particularly sharp decline during the first year of Trump’s second presidency, noting that the country has shifted from a high-performing liberal democracy to a more illiberal form. Quantitatively, he described a 28-point decline from the end of the Obama administration, a scale of regression comparable only to early developments under Viktor Orbán among advanced democracies.
Disaggregating these trends, Professor Diamond identified pronounced declines in academic freedom, freedom of expression, and legislative constraints on the executive. At the same time, he suggested that these constraints could partially recover depending on electoral outcomes, particularly if opposition parties regain control of one or both houses of Congress. This possibility led him to argue that the trajectory toward autocracy, while serious, has recently slowed.
Courts, Protests, and Declining Support
Several factors, according to Professor Diamond, have contributed to this deceleration. The judiciary, though uneven in its responses, has played a significant role. Lower federal courts have blocked numerous executive actions, while even the Supreme Court, despite issuing decisions that expand presidential authority, has begun to show signs of resistance. Professor Diamond pointed in particular to anticipated rulings on birthright citizenship as potential indicators of judicial limits.
Equally important, in his view, has been the scale and geographic breadth of public protest. Mass mobilizations, including demonstrations in both urban centers and traditionally conservative regions, have signaled widespread opposition. However, the most decisive constraint, Professor Diamond argued, is declining presidential popularity. He emphasized that public approval functions as a critical political resource, and that current approval ratings—marked by substantial negative margins—place the administration in a vulnerable position.
Electoral dynamics, he suggested, have also shifted. Policy decisions, including military engagement with Iran and its economic consequences, have contributed to declining support and may influence forthcoming elections. These developments, combined with structural features such as the Senate filibuster and the federal system, have limited the administration’s capacity to enact more sweeping institutional changes. Professor Diamond noted that resistance within the Senate, particularly regarding efforts to remove the filibuster, has been a key factor in constraining legislative overreach.
Electoral Integrity Under Pressure
Turning to governance capacity, Professor Diamond highlighted patterns of administrative instability and perceived incompetence. Frequent turnover in key positions, coupled with broader depletion of the federal workforce, has created gaps in institutional effectiveness. Drawing on observations from public service monitoring organizations, he warned that these deficiencies may have tangible consequences for crisis response and public service delivery, further undermining political legitimacy.
In the legal domain, Professor Diamond cited data indicating that federal courts have blocked a substantial number of executive actions, suggesting that judicial resistance has been more extensive than often assumed. Nonetheless, he cautioned that such interventions have not always been sufficient to prevent institutional damage, particularly when agencies are dismantled before legal remedies take effect.
A central concern in Professor Diamond’s analysis was the potential manipulation of electoral processes. He identified legislative initiatives such as the SAVE Act as instruments that could be used to restrict voter participation, and warned of more extreme scenarios involving the declaration of electoral emergencies or interference with vote counting. While acknowledging that such outcomes are contingent on political conditions, he stressed that close electoral contests increase their plausibility.
Strategies for Democratic Renewal
In concluding his presentation, Professor Diamond turned to strategies for democratic reversal. He emphasized the importance of early and coordinated intervention, noting that the probability of successful resistance increases when democratic actors mobilize before authoritarian consolidation is complete. Drawing on comparative examples, including recent electoral developments in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, he highlighted the necessity of broad opposition unity and effective mobilization.
Importantly, Professor Diamond argued against adopting the polarizing tactics of authoritarian leaders, instead advocating for strategies that transcend political divisions and appeal to a wider electorate. He underscored the importance of addressing economic concerns and everyday issues, while also exposing vulnerabilities related to corruption and wealth concentration. Reclaiming national symbols and articulating an inclusive democratic vision were identified as key components of successful opposition strategies.
Finally, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of leadership. Effective democratic leadership, in his view, must project optimism, confidence, and strength, offering a compelling alternative to authoritarian narratives. Through this combination of institutional analysis and strategic reflection, Professor Diamond provided a comprehensive assessment of both the challenges posed by authoritarian populism and the conditions under which democratic resilience may be restored.
Professor Bruce Cain: The Institutional Enablement of American Populism
Bruce E. Cain is Professor of Political Science, Stanford University; Director, Bill Lane Center.
As the second speaker of the third panel, Professor Bruce E. Cain presented an institutionally grounded analysis. Positioning his remarks between alarmist and dismissive interpretations, Professor Cain described himself as “seriously concerned,” offering a measured assessment of democratic change in the United States. His intervention built upon earlier contributions while introducing a distinctive analytical framework centered on institutional dynamics, historical precedents, and the structural features of American governance.
At the outset, Professor Cain engaged directly with the empirical evidence of democratic decline, particularly the V-Dem data referenced throughout the symposium. While acknowledging the sharp downward trajectory, he emphasized that the decline effectively returns the United States to levels comparable to the mid-twentieth century. This regression, he argued, is normatively troubling given subsequent democratic reforms, yet it does not constitute a transition to outright autocracy. Rather, Professor Cain conceptualized the current situation as “autocratic drift”—a directional movement that erodes democratic quality without fully dismantling democratic status. This distinction, he suggested, is essential for maintaining analytical clarity.
Trump as Accelerator, Not Origin
Structuring his presentation around two central questions, Professor Cain first addressed whether autocratic drift has occurred and whether it is attributable to Donald Trump. He answered affirmatively, while also emphasizing that such drift must be understood in context. His second question concerned normalization: whether these changes are becoming embedded in institutional practice and therefore more difficult to reverse. This latter issue, he indicated, is closely tied to the problem of reversibility raised by other speakers.
A key contribution of Professor Cain’s analysis lies in his differentiation between two forms of autocratic drift. The first pertains to the erosion of the rule of law and fundamental democratic principles. The second concerns shifts in the distinctive institutional structure of the United States, characterized by a highly federalized and fragmented system of governance. This dual framework allowed Professor Cain to separate concerns about core democratic norms from changes in institutional balance, arguing that while both are significant, the former poses a more serious threat.
In discussing the institutional structure of American democracy, Professor Cain emphasized the importance of federalism and the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of power. He noted that while unified partisan control—so-called “trifecta government”—can weaken horizontal checks, vertical fragmentation remains a critical source of resistance. State and local governments retain substantial autonomy, complicating efforts to centralize authority. This institutional design, he argued, was deliberately constructed to prevent the concentration of power, and continues to function as a constraint on executive overreach.
At the same time, Professor Cain acknowledged that the very features that limit executive power can also produce governance difficulties, particularly under conditions of polarization. The paralysis associated with divided government has encouraged successive administrations—both Democratic and Republican—to rely increasingly on executive actions as institutional workarounds. In this sense, Professor Cain argued that autocratic drift predates Trump and reflects longer-term adaptations within the American system. Trump, in this framework, is both an accelerant and an innovator: he has intensified existing practices while also introducing new forms of institutional challenge.
From Institutional Change to Norm Erosion
Historically situating these developments, Professor Cain traced shifts in the balance of power between branches of government. The nineteenth century, he noted, was characterized by strong legislatures, while the Progressive Era marked a transition toward stronger executive authority. A partial reassertion of legislative power followed Watergate, but recent decades have again seen movement toward executive dominance. These oscillations, in his view, suggest that institutional balance is inherently dynamic, and that not all shifts toward executive power necessarily constitute democratic breakdown.
However, Professor Cain distinguished this structural evolution from the more troubling erosion of the rule of law. He identified several areas where recent developments represent a significant departure from established norms. Foremost among these was the attempt to disrupt the electoral process in 2020, which he described as a “serious and almost unthinkable act.” He also highlighted the pardoning of individuals involved in the January 6 events, noting that the combination of expansive pardon powers and judicially affirmed presidential immunity creates a particularly concerning institutional configuration.
In this regard, Professor Cain emphasized that the interaction between legal immunity and pardon authority raises the risk that individuals may engage in unlawful actions on behalf of the executive, anticipating protection from legal consequences. This possibility, he suggested, is a central concern within the election law community, which has responded by increasing monitoring efforts and preparing legal challenges. Despite these risks, Professor Cain expressed cautious optimism, citing the failure of many previous legal challenges to succeed and the presence of institutional actors willing to resist.
Executive Power and Conflict-of-Interest Gaps
Another dimension of rule-of-law erosion identified by Professor Cain was the use of public office for personal enrichment. He pointed out that the president is uniquely exempt from conflict-of-interest regulations, creating opportunities for financial gain that extend beyond direct transactions to include networks of associates and affiliates. This structural gap, he argued, undermines anti-corruption efforts and poses a significant challenge for reform.
Turning to the issue of normalization, Professor Cain argued that contemporary developments are partly rooted in earlier precedents. Instances of misconduct by previous administrations—across party lines—have contributed to a gradual lowering of normative standards. Trump’s actions, in this context, represent an amplification rather than a complete departure. This cumulative process, he suggested, increases the risk that practices once considered exceptional may become institutionalized.
Professor Cain also addressed the role of the judiciary, particularly the use of the “shadow docket,” whereby courts allow contested policies to remain in effect pending review. He suggested that recent criticism of this practice may prompt judicial recalibration, though its long-term implications remain uncertain. Similarly, he discussed the politicization of judicial appointments, linking it to procedural changes such as the elimination of the filibuster for judicial nominees, which has facilitated partisan control over the courts.
In examining the broader institutional landscape, Professor Cain identified multiple factors contributing to the concentration of executive power, including the expansion of unilateral war powers, the use of emergency authorities, and the increasing reliance on executive orders. He emphasized that these developments are not confined to a single administration, but reflect broader systemic trends shaped by both parties.
Reversibility and Enduring Change
In considering reversibility, Professor Cain suggested that many recent changes could be undone relatively quickly, particularly those associated with executive actions. However, deeper institutional shifts—especially those affecting legal interpretations and structural balances—may prove more enduring. The future direction of the judiciary, particularly regarding the unitary executive theory, will be a critical factor in this regard.
In his concluding remarks, Professor Cain introduced a provocative argument concerning the relationship between democracy and capitalism. He observed that the United States’ institutional stability has historically supported a favorable business environment, and suggested that disruptions caused by executive unpredictability may undermine this stability. He further posited that, for many voters, economic considerations may outweigh concerns about democratic norms. In this sense, the political consequences of current developments may be driven as much by economic performance as by institutional integrity.
Ultimately, Professor Cain’s presentation offered a layered and historically informed analysis of autocratic drift in the United States. By distinguishing between different forms of institutional change and situating contemporary developments within longer-term trajectories, he provided a framework that highlights both the resilience and the vulnerabilities of American democracy.
Associate Professor Al Marashi: Algorithmic Populism in the Age of the Deep-Fake
Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos.
As the third speaker of the session, Associate Professor Al Marashi delivered a conceptually rich and interdisciplinary presentation that brought together insights from history and media studies to examine the evolving relationship between warfare, communication technologies, and populism. His intervention underscored the rapid transformation of contemporary conflict environments, emphasizing that the analytical frameworks used to interpret war must adapt to the accelerating pace of technological change—particularly the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and digitally mediated communication.
Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi opened by noting the obsolescence of his earlier research on what he had initially framed as the “12-Day War,” explaining that subsequent developments had already rendered that framing outdated. Instead, he proposed understanding the current situation as a prolonged and continuous conflict—extending to approximately forty days—thereby challenging conventional temporal boundaries used in historical analysis. From a geopolitical perspective, he suggested that this conflict could be interpreted as the third Gulf War from a United States vantage point, and the fourth from the perspective of the Gulf region. This reframing illustrated the fluidity of contemporary conflict narratives and the difficulty of capturing them in real time.
From CNN to Slopaganda
Central to Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s argument was the interplay between media evolution and the conduct of war. He traced a historical trajectory beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, often referred to as the “CNN War,” which marked the emergence of the 24-hour news cycle and introduced a model of continuous, real-time broadcast coverage. This phase, characterized by one-way communication, allowed audiences to consume war as a mediated spectacle, reinforcing a centralized narrative shaped by state and corporate media institutions.
He then contrasted this with the 2003 Iraq War, which he described as the “Al Jazeera War,” highlighting the emergence of alternative global media platforms that challenged Western-centric narratives. The early presence of blogs during this period signaled the beginnings of participatory media, although such participation remained limited in scope. These developments, according to Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi, laid the groundwork for the current media environment, in which social media, Web 2.0 technologies, and AI-driven content production have fundamentally transformed the dynamics of information dissemination.
In this contemporary phase, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi introduced the concept of “slopaganda,” referring to the proliferation of AI-generated content—often low-quality but highly viral—that saturates digital platforms. Unlike earlier forms of propaganda, which were largely centralized and controlled by state actors, slopaganda operates in a decentralized and participatory environment. This shift enables not only governments but also individuals to generate and disseminate persuasive content at unprecedented speed and scale.
AI, Hyperreality, and Memetic Warfare
Drawing on Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum that “the medium is the message,” Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi argued that the significance of AI-generated media lies not only in its content but in its form. The ease with which such content can be created and shared transforms the very nature of political communication. In the context of populism, this facilitates direct engagement with mass audiences, bypassing traditional intermediaries and amplifying the personalization of political narratives.
Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi illustrated this dynamic through examples of AI-generated imagery depicting political leaders in exaggerated, often mythologized forms. These representations contribute to the construction of a digital “cult of personality,” reinforcing populist leadership styles while simultaneously creating easily recognizable targets for opposition narratives. This dual function—both consolidating support and inviting critique—highlights the interactive nature of contemporary propaganda ecosystems.
To further conceptualize this transformation, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi invoked the work of Jean Baudrillard, particularly the notion of hyperreality. He revisited Baudrillard’s controversial claim that the 1991 Gulf War “did not take place,” clarifying that the argument referred not to the absence of physical conflict but to the dominance of mediated representations over lived experience. In the current context, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi suggested that AI-generated media intensifies this condition, producing a form of warfare that exists simultaneously in physical and digital domains.
A key feature of this new media environment, as highlighted by Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi, is the participatory nature of content production. Unlike earlier conflicts, where propaganda was disseminated through hierarchical channels, contemporary warfare involves widespread public engagement in the creation and circulation of narratives. Metrics such as likes, shares, and comments become integral to the propagation of these narratives, transforming audiences into active participants in what he described as “memetic warfare.”
Personalized War and Symbolic Power
Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi also examined the personalization of conflict narratives, noting that contemporary wars are often framed around central political figures. In this case, he identified the prominence of a single leader as the focal point of one side’s narrative, while observing that the opposing side’s representation relied on a different kind of symbolic figure—one that may not occupy a formal leadership position but nonetheless becomes a viral emblem of resistance.
This observation led Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi to a deeper exploration of the cultural and historical dimensions of political representation, particularly in the Iranian context. He argued that understanding the nature of Iranian political communication requires engagement with the historical and religious traditions of Shiism, especially the concept of martyrdom rooted in the Battle of Karbala. This tradition, centered on the figures of Imam Ali and Imam Hussein, provides a powerful symbolic framework through which contemporary political events are interpreted.
Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi emphasized that this framework differs fundamentally from Western conceptions of political succession and legitimacy. Rather than viewing leadership transitions through a purely institutional or dynastic lens, the Iranian context incorporates elements of charismatic authority and inherited symbolic meaning. The notion of martyrdom, he suggested, serves as a potent mobilizing force, capable of generating emotional resonance and collective identity.
Importantly, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi noted that the absence of a central figure in certain visual representations does not diminish their impact. On the contrary, the symbolic power of absence—rooted in the historical narratives of Shiism—can enhance the effectiveness of these representations. In this sense, the production of memes and viral content becomes intertwined with deeply embedded cultural narratives, creating a hybrid form of communication that blends tradition with technological innovation.
War in the Age of Digital Hallucination
In concluding his presentation, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi returned to the broader theoretical implications of his analysis. Drawing on the science fiction writer William Gibson’s concept of cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination,” he argued that AI-driven media environments create a new kind of political reality—one that exists beyond physical space yet exerts tangible influence on perceptions and behavior. This “political hallucination,” as he described it, challenges conventional distinctions between reality and representation.
Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s final reflection posed a provocative question: whether the contemporary conflict, as experienced through these mediated forms, can be said to have “taken place” in the traditional sense. By framing the war as both a physical and a digital phenomenon, he invited a reconsideration of how scholars conceptualize and analyze conflict in the age of AI and networked communication.
Overall, Assoc. Prof. Al Marashi’s presentation offered a compelling synthesis of historical perspective and media theory, highlighting the transformative impact of digital technologies on the practice of warfare and the dynamics of populism. His analysis underscored the need for interdisciplinary approaches to understanding contemporary conflicts, as well as the importance of adapting analytical frameworks to the rapidly evolving landscape of global communication.
Professor Tariq Modood: From Populist Capture to Democratic Belonging –Multicultural Nationalism as an Alternative to Exclusionary Nationalism
Professor Tariq Modood, the founding Director of the Bristol University Research Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship.
As the final speaker of the third panel, Professor Tariq Modood presented a theoretically grounded and normatively oriented intervention that addressed one of the central ideological tensions of contemporary politics: the relationship between populist nationalism and multiculturalism. His presentation sought not merely to critique exclusionary nationalist narratives but to articulate a constructive alternative capable of reconciling majority and minority identities within a shared political framework.
Professor Modood began by outlining the core challenge posed by populist forms of exclusionary nationalism, which frequently depict multiculturalism as privileging minorities at the expense of the majority. In response, he argued that analytical critique alone is insufficient. Instead, what is required is a positive and politically viable framework that affirms the normative status of both majorities and minorities. This framework, which he termed “multicultural nationalism,” aims to cultivate a shared sense of belonging that does not demand the erasure of distinct identities.
Pluralistic Nationhood and Shared Identity
Central to Professor Modood’s conceptualization of multiculturalism is the notion of subgroup identity. He defined multiculturalism as the right of subgroups—understood as communities smaller than the polity as a whole—to have their identities recognized and incorporated within the framework of equal citizenship. This recognition is not limited to symbolic affirmation but extends to institutional accommodation and the reconfiguration of public identity. In this sense, multiculturalism involves a transformation of the national community itself, enabling previously marginalized groups to participate in shaping the collective identity on equal terms.
A key dimension of this process, as emphasized by Professor Modood, is the principle of mutual or dialogical recognition. Rejecting the idea that recognition operates in a one-directional manner—where some groups bestow recognition while others receive it—he argued that all members of the polity must participate as both givers and receivers of recognition. This reciprocity is essential for establishing a genuinely inclusive form of citizenship, in which belonging is co-constructed rather than unilaterally granted.
Professor Modood further clarified the relationship between majority and minority rights within this framework. Contrary to populist claims that minority rights undermine majority status, he argued that the rights of minorities are logically grounded in the pre-existing rights of majorities. Majorities already benefit from a national culture and identity that reflects their historical experiences and values. Extending similar recognition to minorities, therefore, is not a matter of granting special privileges but of ensuring equal participation in the shared national project. Multicultural citizenship, in this view, entails a continuous process of remaking national identity to accommodate diverse contributions.
This perspective led Professor Modood to distinguish multicultural nationalism from liberal nationalism. While liberal nationalism emphasizes individual rights, redistribution, and a neutral or secular public sphere, multicultural nationalismforegrounds the recognition of group identities, including ethno-religious communities. Moreover, he challenged the liberal nationalist notion that national culture should be “thinned” to minimize alienation among minorities. Instead, he proposed a process of “pluralistic thickening,” whereby the national culture is enriched through the inclusion of diverse identities. This additive approach seeks to expand, rather than dilute, the symbolic and cultural content of the nation.
Inclusive Nationhood Against Polarization
In addressing the contemporary political context, Professor Modood identified three key contributions that multicultural nationalism can make in responding to polarization and populism. First, he distinguished multiculturalism from cosmopolitan human rights frameworks, emphasizing that it is not inherently linked to open-border policies or specific immigration regimes. Rather than focusing on immigration, multiculturalism is concerned with citizenship and the formation of a shared “we.” This distinction allows it to engage with concerns about migration without adopting positions that may alienate segments of the electorate.
Second, Professor Modood highlighted the importance of addressing identity anxieties, particularly those experienced by majority populations. While multiculturalism has traditionally focused on minority vulnerabilities, he argued that it must also take seriously the concerns of majorities, which are often dismissed in public discourse. Recognizing these anxieties does not entail endorsing exclusionary views but rather integrating them into a broader framework of mutual respect and understanding. This approach seeks to move beyond polarized narratives that pit majority and minority identities against each other.
Third, Professor Modood emphasized the centrality of national identity in sustaining democratic citizenship. He argued that citizenship cannot function solely as a legal or institutional construct; it must be accompanied by a sense of belonging rooted in shared narratives and collective self-understanding. National identity, in this sense, is not static but continuously evolving, shaped by both historical legacies and contemporary agency. Multicultural nationalism embraces this dynamism, advocating for an inclusive national identity that reflects the diversity of the population while maintaining a coherent sense of collective purpose.
In elaborating this vision, Professor Modood stressed the need for institutional and symbolic reforms that support inclusion. These include accommodating the specific needs of minority communities, particularly in relation to ethno-religious practices, as well as reimagining public symbols and spaces to reflect a more diverse national narrative. Such measures are intended to foster a sense of belonging among all citizens, reinforcing the legitimacy of the national community.
Multicultural Nationalism as a Middle Path
In his concluding remarks, Professor Modood presented multicultural nationalism as a feasible and necessary alternative to the current dichotomy between monocultural nationalism and anti-nationalist or purely cosmopolitan approaches. By affirming the value of collective identities—both majority and minority—within the framework of equal citizenship, it offers a unifying political vision capable of bridging ideological divides. Importantly, this vision does not abandon the principles of multiculturalism but seeks to integrate them more fully into the concept of the nation.
Overall, Professor Modood’s presentation provided a sophisticated normative framework for addressing the challenges posed by populism and polarization. By reconciling the demands of diversity with the need for shared belonging, his concept of multicultural nationalism offers a pathway toward a more inclusive and resilient democratic order.
Discussions
The discussion at the end of the panel extended the presentations’ core concerns by focusing on institutional reform, executive discretion, emergency powers, constitutional safeguards, and the practical meaning of multicultural nationalism. The exchange brought together questions of democratic vulnerability in the United States with broader normative reflections on national identity and belonging.
Professor Kent Jones opened the discussion by identifying a central institutional dilemma in the American system: the broad deference often granted to presidential discretion. He noted that many legal and constitutional questions depend on executive judgment, particularly in areas framed as emergencies. Whether a situation qualifies as an emergency, whether emergency tariffs are justified, or whether extraordinary powers may be invoked often depends heavily on presidential interpretation. In the current context, this becomes especially troubling because, as Professor Jones observed, almost any justification may be constructed as an “emergency” if institutional constraints are weak.
Professor Jones connected this concern directly to anxieties surrounding future elections. If a president can define emergencies expansively, such powers could be used to justify extraordinary measures, including martial law, deployment of enforcement agencies near polling places, or other interventions that could intimidate voters or disrupt electoral administration. He therefore asked whether meaningful reform would require changes in judicial doctrine, statutory law, or even constitutional amendment, particularly in relation to powers such as presidential pardons.
Procedural Limits on Executive Authority
Responding first, Professor Bruce E. Cain agreed that reforms are necessary, though he cautioned that reliance on constitutional amendment would be unrealistic. He outlined two possible approaches. The first would be to define “emergency” more precisely in law, thereby limiting the executive’s capacity to invoke emergency powers arbitrarily. Yet Professor Cain also recognized the practical difficulty of this path: genuine emergencies may be unpredictable, and excessively rigid definitions might hinder legitimate executive action in unforeseen crises.
For that reason, Professor Cain emphasized a procedural solution modeled on the War Powers Act. Rather than trying to define every emergency in advance, he argued that arbitrary executive power should require subsequent validation by another branch of government, especially Congress. In this model, the executive could act initially, but legislative affirmation would be required within a specified period. Such a framework would force members of Congress to go on record, preventing them from hiding behind presidential action while avoiding political responsibility.
Professor Cain’s response highlighted a deeper institutional problem: the American constitutional system assumes that Congress will defend its own prerogatives. Yet under conditions of polarization and professionalized politics, legislators may be less interested in preserving institutional authority than in avoiding political risk or pursuing career advancement. As a result, Congress may fail to resist executive overreach even when its constitutional role is being weakened. Professor Cain suggested that courts may need to play a stronger role in compelling Congress to live up to its own laws and procedural responsibilities.
Professor Larry Diamond largely endorsed Professor Cain’s analysis, describing himself as strongly aligned with his approach. However, he offered one “friendly amendment” to Professor Cain’s skepticism about constitutional reform. Professor Diamond proposed that one constitutional amendment might be both politically viable and democratically valuable: a requirement that any presidential pardon take effect only with two-thirds approval of the United States Senate. In his view, the abuse of the pardon power has become a serious threat to liberal democracy, especially when combined with executive immunity and loyalty-based political networks. A president who voluntarily proposed such a constraint at the beginning of a new administration, Professor Diamond argued, would make a visionary democratic gesture and place opponents in a difficult political position.
Defining Nationhood in Plural Societies
Professor Werner Pascha is an Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies (Japan and Korea) and Associate Member of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) at the University of Duisburg-Essen.
The discussion then turned from American institutional design to the normative and political content of multicultural nationalism. Professor Werner Pascha addressed Professor Modood’s concept directly, noting its relevance to countries such as Germany, where debates over national identity remain intense and unresolved. He asked what the concrete content of multicultural nationalism might be and how one might answer the question of what it means to be German, British, French, or American in a plural society.
Professor Tariq Modood responded by affirming the value of national debates about identity. For him, multiculturalism is fundamentally dialogical: it requires listening, learning, negotiation, and, where possible, compromise. He stressed that such dialogue does not always produce easy consensus and may sometimes remain unresolved. Yet it is still essential because national identity cannot be imposed unilaterally if it is to include all citizens.
Professor Modood used Britain as his principal example. He argued that the British case has been shaped by two important factors. First, Britain has been influenced by American debates over hyphenated identities, such as Irish American, Jewish American, and Black American. Second, Britain has long been a multinational polity, incorporating Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and broader plural traditions. These historical conditions have made it somewhat easier to imagine Britishness in plural terms. If one can be Scottish-British, Professor Modood suggested, then the idea of being Black British or British Muslim becomes less anomalous.
In institutional terms, Professor Modood pointed especially to education and the school curriculum. A multicultural national identity would require teaching national history, geography, literature, and civic belonging in ways that recognize contemporary diversity and its relationship to the past. This includes confronting difficult histories such as empire and slavery. Such engagement, he argued, is not a threat to national unity but a condition for building a more inclusive and credible national narrative.
Conclusion
The third panel of the symposium brought into sharp relief the multidimensional processes through which authoritarian populism is not only advanced but also normalized across institutional, communicative, and ideological domains. Taken together, the contributions of Professor Larry Diamond, Professor Bruce E. Cain, Assoc. Prof. Ibrahim Al-Marashi, and Professor Tariq Modood underscore that contemporary democratic backsliding cannot be reduced to a single trajectory or causal mechanism. Rather, it emerges through the interaction of institutional vulnerabilities, political agency, technological transformation, and competing visions of collective identity.
A central analytical thread running through the panel is the distinction between erosion and consolidation. As Professor Diamond emphasized, the trajectory of authoritarian populism is cumulative, often advancing through incremental yet coordinated steps that target electoral integrity, institutional autonomy, and normative constraints. At the same time, Professor Cain’s concept of “autocratic drift” provides an important corrective to overly deterministic narratives, highlighting both the resilience and the fragility of democratic systems. His distinction between structural shifts in governance and the erosion of the rule of law clarifies that not all institutional change is equally consequential, even as both may contribute to a broader pattern of democratic weakening.
The panel also demonstrated that normalization operates not only through formal institutions but through the transformation of the public sphere. Assoc. Prof. Al-Marashi’s analysis of AI-driven media ecosystems revealed how the proliferation of “slopaganda” and hyperreal digital narratives reshapes the conditions under which political legitimacy is constructed and contested. In this environment, populist communication is amplified, personalized, and decentralized, blurring the boundaries between producers and consumers of political meaning. This shift complicates traditional understandings of propaganda and underscores the need to rethink democratic accountability in an era of algorithmic mediation.
Against this backdrop, Professor Modood’s intervention offers a normative horizon for democratic renewal. By articulating multicultural nationalism as an inclusive and dialogical framework, he addresses the identity-based anxieties that populist movements often exploit. His emphasis on mutual recognition, institutional accommodation, and the dynamic remaking of national identity suggests that democratic resilience depends not only on institutional safeguards but also on the capacity to construct a shared sense of belonging.
Finally, the panel discussion reinforced the urgency of institutional reform, particularly in relation to executive discretion, emergency powers, and constitutional safeguards. The exchanges between Professor Kent Jones, Professor Cain, and Professor Diamond highlighted both the difficulties and the necessity of recalibrating the balance of power in democratic systems. While no single reform can fully resolve these challenges, the emphasis on procedural accountability, legislative responsibility, and targeted constitutional change points toward a pragmatic path forward.
In sum, the panel illuminated both the depth of the current democratic crisis and the range of intellectual and political resources available to confront it. By integrating empirical analysis, institutional theory, media studies, and normative political thought, it provided a comprehensive framework for understanding—and ultimately resisting—the normalization of authoritarian populism.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2026). “ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 1: From Grievance to Radicalization — Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00149
This panel offered a concise yet conceptually rich account of how contemporary populism transforms diffuse grievances into structured political radicalization. Bridging discourse analysis, religious studies, international political economy, and historical sociology, the discussion illuminated the multi-layered processes through which democratic erosion unfolds. Rather than locating the problem solely within institutional decline, the panel foregrounded the interplay of rhetoric, identity, and emotional mobilization—particularly the roles of humiliation, status anxiety, and perceived loss of recognition. Contributions by Professors Ruth Wodak, Julie Ingersoll, Stephan Klingebiel, and Benjamin Carter Hett collectively demonstrated that populist dynamics are sustained by both narrative construction and structural change. The session thus advanced a nuanced analytical framework for understanding how anti-pluralist politics emerge, normalize, and gain legitimacy across diverse contexts.
Reported by ECPS Staff
Panel 1 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, titled “From Grievance to Radicalization: Rhetoric, Ideology, and the International Politics of Populism,” offered a rich and interdisciplinary examination of how discontent is translated into exclusionary politics, institutional erosion, and authoritarian opportunity. Bringing together perspectives from discourse studies, religious studies, development policy, and modern history, the panel explored the pathways through which grievance is narrated, organized, and mobilized across national and transnational contexts. Although the presentations addressed distinct empirical terrains—from far-right rhetoric in Europe and Christian nationalism in the United States to multilateral institutions and the lessons of Weimar Germany—they converged around a shared concern: democratic decline rarely emerges suddenly, but is prepared through the cumulative interaction of ideas, identities, institutions, and political strategies.
Moderated by Professor Ibrahim Ozturk, the session unfolded as a tightly connected conversation on the mechanisms through which populist and far-right forces gain traction in moments of social unease and political dislocation. A central strength of the panel lay in its refusal to treat populism as a singular or self-explanatory phenomenon. Instead, the speakers unpacked the rhetorical, ideological, emotional, and institutional infrastructures that enable anti-pluralist politics to flourish.
Professor Ruth Wodak showed how democratic norms are eroded through discourse, provocation, and the normalization of exclusionary language. Professor Julie Ingersoll demonstrated how theocratic and anti-democratic religious movements, though internally diverse, have strategically converged to influence contemporary American politics. Professor Stephan Klingebiel widened the frame to the international level, showing how populist governance affects not only domestic politics but also the normative foundations of multilateral cooperation. Professor Benjamin Carter Hett, drawing on the history of late Weimar Germany, highlighted humiliation and status anxiety as powerful emotional drivers of anti-system politics, offering a historically grounded lens for understanding present-day grievance mobilization.
Taken together, the panel made clear that contemporary democratic crises cannot be understood through institutional analysis alone. What emerged instead was a layered account in which fear, humiliation, identity, ideology, and strategic communication are inseparable from formal political change. The subsequent discussion deepened these insights further, linking personal experience, comparative reflection, and normative concerns in ways that reinforced the panel’s interdisciplinary value.
In this sense, Panel 1 did more than diagnose the current moment. It established an intellectual framework for thinking about how democratic erosion is prepared, legitimized, and accelerated across multiple arenas. By tracing the movement from grievance to radicalization, the session illuminated not only the fragility of democratic norms, but also the urgency of confronting the political, cultural, and institutional conditions that allow authoritarian and exclusionary projects to take root.
Professor Ruth Wodak: ‘Driving On the Right’: Analyzing Far-Right Rhetoric.
Professor Ruth Wodak is Emerita Distinguished Professor of Discourse Studies at Lancaster University, affiliated with the University of Vienna, and a member of the ECPS Advisory Board.
Professor Ruth Wodak’s presentation offered a theoretically grounded and empirically attentive exploration of how democratic erosion unfolds through discourse, rhetoric, and the gradual normalization of exclusionary politics. As the first speaker of the panel, Professor Wodak set a reflective and analytically rigorous tone by anchoring her remarks in a historical insight from John Dewey. Quoting his 1931 warning that democracy becomes a farce when citizens are not equipped to think critically and recognize propaganda, she established a conceptual bridge between past and present. While acknowledging that historical analogies must be handled with caution, she argued that certain patterns—particularly the weakening of critical judgment and the manipulation of public discourse—remain deeply relevant for understanding contemporary political developments.
Building on this premise, Professor Wodak turned to the identification of observable criteria that signal when democracies are under threat. Drawing in part on recent analytical frameworks and public debates, she outlined a series of interrelated developments that characterize processes of autocratization. These included attacks on freedom of expression, the systematic defamation or marginalization of political opponents, pressures on judicial independence, and the potential use of emergency powers to bypass institutional constraints. Additional indicators encompassed the gradual discrimination of minorities, the erosion of press freedom, the undermining of academic and scientific autonomy, the emergence of personality cults, the spread of corruption and kleptocratic practices, and the strategic redesign of legal and electoral frameworks to consolidate power.
The Politics of Shameless Normalization
A central emphasis of her argument was that these developments rarely appear in their most extreme form at the outset. Rather, they emerge incrementally, as part of a cumulative and often normalized process. Each step, while perhaps appearing limited or defensible in isolation, contributes to a broader trajectory in which democratic norms are steadily weakened. This step-by-step dynamic, she suggested, is crucial for understanding why democratic backsliding can advance without triggering immediate resistance.
The core of Professor Wodak’s presentation focused on the linguistic and rhetorical mechanisms that facilitate this gradual transformation. At the center of her analysis was the concept of “shameless normalization,” which she has developed extensively in her work. This refers to a process through which the boundaries of what is publicly acceptable are progressively expanded. Statements, ideas, and attitudes that were previously considered taboo or beyond the limits of legitimate discourse are reintroduced, repeated, and ultimately rendered acceptable. Political actors present themselves as articulating what “ordinary people” supposedly think but have been unable or unwilling to express, thereby framing transgressive speech as a form of authenticity.
Professor Wodak highlighted that this process is often driven by continuous provocation. By deliberately testing and crossing normative boundaries, political actors can shift the parameters of public debate. Over time, what initially appears shocking or unacceptable becomes familiar and normalized. This strategy, she argued, is particularly effective when it is reinforced by broader political dynamics, including the willingness of mainstream actors to adopt or adapt elements of far-right discourse.
Importantly, she emphasized that normalization does not always take an overtly aggressive or confrontational form. Alongside provocation, one also encounters what she termed “coarse civility,” a mode of communication in which exclusionary or discriminatory ideas are presented in a seemingly moderate, polite, or technocratic language. This rhetorical softening allows such ideas to circulate more widely and gain legitimacy, especially when they are taken up by mainstream conservative parties. In this way, the normalization of far-right discourse often proceeds not only through radicalization at the margins, but through incorporation at the center.
To illustrate these dynamics, Professor Wodak drew on examples from Austrian politics. She traced the trajectory of a slogan originally used by a far-right politician in the 1980s, which emphasized speaking “the language of the people.” Over time, this slogan was adopted by a mainstream conservative leader and subsequently reappropriated by the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ). This example demonstrated how political language travels across ideological boundaries, shedding its original stigma and becoming part of a broader repertoire of acceptable discourse. Such processes, she argued, reveal how the mainstreaming of far-right ideas occurs through repetition, adaptation, and gradual legitimation.
Euphemism and Power: Sanitizing Coercion in Democratic Politics
In the final part of her presentation, Professor Wodak turned to the role of euphemism in shaping public perceptions of policy. Drawing on contemporary European debates on migration and asylum, she showed how practices such as detention are reframed through sanitized terminology, including phrases like “waiting zones” or “closed control access centers.” These linguistic choices, she argued, obscure the coercive nature of such measures and render them more palatable to the public. In this sense, language functions not merely as a descriptive tool, but as a mechanism that shapes what can be politically imagined and justified.
Professor Wodak concluded by synthesizing the broader implications of her analysis. Shameless normalization, she argued, performs multiple functions: it constructs a sense of authenticity, rejects the norms of rational deliberation, fosters identification between political leaders and “the people,” and diverts attention through provocation and scandalization. Most significantly, it facilitates the implementation of exclusionary and anti-democratic policies by embedding them within mainstream political discourse.
Her presentation thus underscored that democratic erosion is not only an institutional or legal process, but also a profoundly discursive one. The weakening of democracy occurs through shifts in language, norms, and public sensibilities, often long before formal institutional breakdown becomes visible. By foregrounding the role of rhetoric and normalization, Professor Wodak provided a compelling framework for understanding how contemporary democracies are challenged from within, and why resisting such processes requires not only institutional safeguards but also sustained critical engagement with political language and discourse.
Professor Julie Ingersoll: The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda
Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida.
Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation offered a detailed and analytically nuanced account of the ideological and organizational foundations of contemporary Christian nationalism in the United States, situating it as a significant—though not singular—driver of democratic erosion. Her intervention moved beyond surface-level interpretations of religion in politics, instead tracing the historical formation, internal diversity, and strategic convergence of several distinct religious currents that have, over time, coalesced into a politically influential coalition aligned with authoritarian and anti-pluralist tendencies.
Professor Ingersoll began by clarifying a crucial analytical point: Christian nationalism in the United States is not a monolithic or representative expression of Christianity as a whole. Rather, it is a minority movement whose political influence far exceeds its demographic weight. This disproportionate power, she argued, is the product of decades-long institutional work, coalition-building, and strategic positioning within key domains of political and cultural life. Understanding its impact, therefore, requires attention not only to its beliefs but to the mechanisms through which it has embedded itself within broader structures of authority.
Three Strands, One Project: The Convergence of Christian Nationalism
At the core of her analysis was the identification of three principal strands that together constitute contemporary Christian nationalism: a white conservative evangelical tradition rooted in Christian Reconstructionism, a Catholic integralist tradition, and a Pentecostal-charismatic current associated with the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR). Each of these strands, Professor Ingersoll demonstrated, has its own theological foundations, historical trajectories, and internal logics. Yet, despite significant doctrinal differences, they have converged around shared political objectives and a common perception of existential crisis.
The first strand, Christian Reconstructionism, was presented as a theocratic and patriarchal movement with origins in mid-twentieth-century American religious thought and deeper roots in earlier Southern Presbyterian traditions. Professor Ingersoll emphasized its rejection of pluralism and its insistence that biblical law should govern all aspects of social and political life. Central to this framework is the concept of “calling,” derived from Calvinist theology, which legitimizes hierarchical social arrangements and challenges the democratic principle that authority derives from popular consent. In this view, leadership is not conferred through elections but through divine designation, a premise that fundamentally undermines democratic legitimacy.
The second strand, Catholic integralism, similarly rejects the separation of church and state, advocating instead for a political order grounded in religious authority. Professor Ingersoll noted its growing influence within legal and judicial institutions, particularly through long-term efforts to shape the composition and orientation of the judiciary. Integralist thought, she argued, frames modern liberal institutions—especially those promoting equality—as sources of moral and social decay. Its critique of the administrative state and its support for a strong, centralized executive authority align closely with broader authoritarian tendencies.
The third strand, the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR), introduces a distinct but complementary dimension rooted in charismatic and Pentecostal traditions. This movement emphasizes ongoing revelation, spiritual warfare, and apocalyptic expectation. Its doctrine of the “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions the systematic transformation of key societal domains—such as government, media, education, and culture—under Christian authority. Professor Ingersoll highlighted the movement’s belief in the active presence of spiritual forces in contemporary political life, a worldview that intensifies polarization and, in some cases, increases the potential for legitimizing conflict and even violence.
Political Convergence in Religious Movements
A central analytical contribution of the presentation lay in explaining how these three strands, despite profound theological disagreements, have formed a cohesive political alliance. Professor Ingersoll challenged the conventional “world religions” model, which treats religious traditions as internally coherent and mutually distinct systems. Instead, she proposed a more fluid understanding of religion as a set of practices and narratives that can be selectively combined to serve social and political purposes. In this framework, doctrinal inconsistencies are less significant than shared goals related to power, identity, and social ordering.
To illustrate this point, she examined differing approaches to biblical authority across the three traditions. While Catholic integralists rely on the interpretive authority of the Church, evangelicals emphasize direct textual interpretation, and Pentecostal-charismatic actors embrace ongoing revelation. These differences, while substantial, are subordinated in practice to a set of shared political commitments: the rejection of pluralism, the affirmation of hierarchical social structures, the belief in divinely ordained leadership, and the pursuit of a theocratic or quasi-theocratic order.
Professor Ingersoll further argued that these movements are united by a common narrative of civilizational crisis. Each interprets contemporary social and political developments—whether related to gender equality, racial justice, or secular governance—as evidence of moral decline. This sense of crisis provides both a justification for radical political intervention and a framework for mobilizing supporters. Within this narrative, democratic institutions are often portrayed not as safeguards of freedom, but as obstacles to the restoration of a divinely sanctioned social order.
Internal Tensions within Christian Nationalism
The presentation also addressed the strategic flexibility of this coalition. While its proponents may utilize democratic mechanisms to gain power, they do not view democracy as intrinsically valuable. Rather, democracy is treated instrumentally, as one possible means of achieving a broader objective. Authoritarian or hierarchical forms of governance are equally acceptable if they are perceived to align with divine authority. This instrumental view of democracy, Professor Ingersoll suggested, represents a fundamental challenge to liberal democratic norms.
In her concluding remarks, Professor Ingersoll pointed to emerging internal tensions within the movement. Differences in theological interpretation, strategic priorities, and leadership styles are beginning to generate visible fractures. For example, divergent understandings of apocalyptic timelines or the role of political violence create points of friction. Additionally, certain political developments—such as controversial leadership claims or symbolic actions—have alienated segments within the coalition. While these divisions do not currently outweigh the movement’s shared objectives, they may become more significant over time.
In sum, Professor Ingersoll’s presentation provided a comprehensive and deeply contextualized analysis of Christian nationalism as a complex, evolving, and strategically coordinated force. By highlighting its internal diversity, institutional entrenchment, and ideological coherence around anti-pluralist principles, she illuminated the ways in which religious narratives and political power intersect in contemporary democratic backsliding. Her analysis underscored that the challenge posed by such movements is not merely theological or cultural, but fundamentally political, with direct implications for the future of democratic governance.
Professor Stephan Klingebiel: International Organizations in Times of Populism
Professor Stephan Klingebiel is Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).
Professor Stephan Klingebiel delivered a wide-ranging and analytically grounded presentation examining how the contemporary rise of populism—particularly under the second administration of Donald Trump—is reshaping international organizations, development cooperation, and the normative foundations of global governance. His intervention moved carefully between institutional analysis and broader systemic implications, offering both empirical observations and conceptual framing.
At the outset, Professor Klingebiel positioned his remarks at the intersection of two overlapping domains: the functioning of international organizations and the evolving discourse on development and sustainability. He focused especially on the United Nations Development System, the OECD, and multilateral development banks such as the World Bank. These institutions, he argued, serve not only operational roles in development assistance but also act as key norm-setters in shaping global cooperation. It is precisely these normative and institutional roles that have come under increasing pressure in the current political climate.
From Multilateralism to Uncertainty
Reflecting on developments since early 2025, Professor Klingebiel suggested that the treatment of development cooperation—particularly the dismantling of USAID—served as an early signal of broader patterns in the second Trump administration’s approach to international engagement. What initially appeared as a sector-specific shift quickly revealed itself as part of a more comprehensive reorientation affecting multilateralism as a whole.
To explain these dynamics, Professor Klingebiel identified four interrelated driving logics. First, he pointed to what he termed “crude transactionalism,” a form of foreign policy that reduces international cooperation to immediate, bilateral exchanges rather than long-term institutional commitments. While transactional approaches have long existed in development policy, he argued that the current form is qualitatively different in its intensity and scope, extending into areas such as conflict mediation and geopolitical bargaining.
Second, he highlighted the role of ideological motivations, particularly in relation to issues such as family planning, gender policy, and population governance. Certain international agencies, including those working on reproductive health, have become focal points of contestation, reflecting deeper ideological divides over the scope and purpose of development cooperation.
Third, Professor Klingebiel emphasized the element of institutional disruption driven not by coherent strategy but by what he described as systemic unpredictability. Drawing on insider accounts of the dismantling of USAID, he suggested that many policy decisions appear to lack a consistent strategic foundation, instead reflecting fragmented and reactive processes.
Finally, he identified an “obsession with disruption” as a defining feature of the current approach. This involves the deliberate use of abrupt and highly visible actions—such as withdrawal announcements or dramatic policy shifts—to reshape expectations and unsettle established practices within international cooperation.
Populism and the Fragmentation of Global Cooperation
These underlying logics have translated into a series of concrete policy outcomes. Among the most striking is the dramatic reduction in US foreign aid, which, according to recent OECD data, declined by approximately 57 percent within a single year. Such a contraction, Professor Klingebiel noted, has profound implications not only for recipient countries but also for the broader ecosystem of development actors, including civil society organizations and democracy-support initiatives.
Equally significant is the announced withdrawal from dozens of international bodies. While the practical implementation of these withdrawals remains uneven, their symbolic impact is considerable. They signal a retreat from multilateral engagement and contribute to an atmosphere of uncertainty regarding the future of global cooperation.
However, Professor Klingebiel’s central concern extended beyond these immediate policy shifts to their deeper normative consequences. He argued that the most consequential impact of contemporary populism lies in its erosion of shared frameworks that have historically underpinned international cooperation. These include not only formal institutions but also the implicit agreements on language, priorities, and goals that enable collective action.
This erosion was illustrated through the example of the United Nations 2030 Agenda and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Once widely accepted as a minimal global consensus on issues such as poverty reduction, inequality, and gender equality, this framework is now increasingly contested. Professor Klingebiel noted that it has been reframed by some political actors as a form of “soft global governance” incompatible with national sovereignty, leading to active efforts to undermine it.
Fragmented Vocabulary, Fragmented Order
A particularly revealing dimension of this shift is the politicization of language itself. Drawing on recent analyses, Professor Klingebiel described how specific terms—such as “gender,” “gender-based violence,” and “climate change”—have become sites of contestation within international forums. The rejection of these terms is not merely semantic; it reflects a broader attempt to reshape the normative boundaries of acceptable discourse. In practice, this has led to subtle but significant changes, with institutions adopting alternative terminology that dilutes or reframes established concepts.
This process, he argued, contributes to a broader fragmentation of normative consensus. Where international cooperation once relied on a shared vocabulary and a baseline agreement on goals, it now operates within an increasingly contested and politicized environment. This fragmentation is further intensified by the emergence of competing visions of world order, in which different actors promote alternative frameworks for development and governance.
At the same time, Professor Klingebiel cautioned against attributing these transformations solely to Western populism. He emphasized the growing agency of actors in what is often termed the Global South, including countries such as China and India, as well as smaller states that increasingly pursue multi-alignment strategies. These actors are not merely passive recipients of global norms but active participants in shaping them, contributing to a more complex and pluralistic international landscape.
Within this evolving context, development cooperation itself is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Rather than serving primarily as a tool for poverty reduction or social development, it is increasingly embedded within geopolitical and geo-economic competition. Institutions originally designed for development purposes are being repurposed to secure access to strategic resources or to advance national interests.
Pockets of Cooperation: Uneven Continuity in Global Governance
Despite this challenging environment, Professor Klingebiel identified areas of cautious optimism. He pointed to the emergence of what he termed “mixed coalitions”—alliances that bring together actors from both the Global North and South who remain committed to multilateralism. Additionally, he highlighted the existence of “pockets of effectiveness,” instances in which international cooperation continues to function successfully despite broader systemic pressures.
These pockets, while limited, suggest that multilateralism is not uniformly in decline but rather unevenly contested. Understanding the conditions under which cooperation remains viable, Professor Klingebiel suggested, may offer valuable insights for sustaining and rebuilding international frameworks in the future.
In concluding, his presentation offered a sober but nuanced assessment. The current moment is marked not only by policy shifts but by a deeper transformation of the principles and assumptions that have long guided international cooperation. Yet within this transformation, there remain spaces for adaptation, coalition-building, and renewed engagement—provided that these efforts are grounded in a clear understanding of the changing landscape.
Professor Benjamin Carter Hett: Humiliation, Elite Impunity, and the Anti-System Gamble — Weimar-Type Mechanisms in Contemporary Grievance Politics
Professor Benjamin Carter Hett is a leading historian of Nazi Germany at Hunter College and the Graduate Center, CUNY.
Professor Benjamin Carter Hett’s presentation offered a historically grounded and analytically provocative reflection on the political mechanisms that enabled the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of National Socialism, while also considering the relevance of those mechanisms for contemporary grievance politics. Drawing on decades of research into late Weimar Germany, Professor Hett approached the subject with both scholarly caution and interpretive clarity. He was careful not to collapse historical contexts into one another, yet he argued that certain recurring dynamics—particularly humiliation, status anxiety, and the search for anti-system solutions—remain crucial for understanding how democratic orders become vulnerable to authoritarian appeals.
Professor Hett began by acknowledging the uneasy position of the historian in conversations about the present. Historians, he suggested, may at times reconstruct the past with care, but they are not necessarily the best guides to contemporary politics or future developments. Nonetheless, his long engagement with the final years of the Weimar Republic had led him to a set of conclusions about why that democracy failed, and these conclusions, he argued, may still offer insight into current political developments.
Humiliation and Status Anxiety
The core of Professor Hett’s argument was that the Nazi breakthrough in Germany cannot be fully understood simply through economic distress, institutional weakness, or generalized political radicalization. While all of these factors mattered, he emphasized that the message which most powerfully resonated with Nazi voters was a message organized around humiliation and its close companion, status anxiety. The emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life, in his reading, were central. What drove substantial sectors of the electorate toward the Nazis was not only hardship, but the belief that they had been dishonored, displaced, and stripped of their rightful standing.
To develop this claim, Professor Hett drew on voting studies, especially the work of German political scientist Jürgen W. Falter, whose statistical analyses remain among the most important accounts of Nazi electoral support. Since Germany in the late 1920s and early 1930s did not have opinion polling in the modern sense, scholars must reconstruct political behavior by examining constituency-level voting patterns and comparing them with the themes emphasized in Nazi campaigning. This allows one to identify which messages resonated with which groups, and why.
From this evidence, Professor Hett argued that Nazi appeals found their strongest reception among those constituencies most susceptible to humiliation and fears of status loss. These were particularly concentrated among Protestant middle-class voters, especially in rural northern and eastern Germany. The Nazi Party’s success, in his account, lay in its ability to transform diffuse anxieties into a coherent political narrative: Germany was being humiliated by external forces, weakened by internal enemies, and betrayed by a democratic system incapable of defending national dignity.
A major source of this humiliation, he suggested, was Germany’s place in the post-World War I international order. The Treaty of Versailles, reparations, the international oversight of German finance, and the constraints imposed on national sovereignty created a pervasive sense that Germany had lost control over its own destiny. Economic arrangements linked to reparations, including the role of international banking mechanisms and the subordination of German monetary policy to Allied preferences, reinforced this sense of national dependency. What later generations might describe as resentment toward globalization, Professor Hett argued, already had clear political expression in this period, even if the term itself was not yet available.
Seeds of Nazi Mobilization
This resentment was especially powerful in the countryside. Reduced tariffs and intensified agricultural competition placed heavy pressure on German farmers, especially in the north and east, where farm bankruptcies became common. At the same time, Germany’s limited ability to control its eastern border, particularly with newly established Poland, turned migration and refugee flows into volatile political issues. These developments fed the perception that the democratic state was either unwilling or unable to defend the nation’s interests. The Nazis capitalized on precisely these grievances, presenting themselves as nationalist champions against foreign domination, financial dependency, border insecurity, and economic dislocation.
Professor Hett also introduced a second, equally important dimension of humiliation: the perceived loss of religious and cultural status among German Protestants. Here his analysis intersected with broader questions of identity and belonging. Before World War I, Protestantism had enjoyed a privileged position within the German Empire. But the Weimar Republic, in the eyes of many Protestants, appeared to be politically shaped by forces outside that tradition. Its principal architects and defenders included Social Democrats, Catholics, and the Jewish legal scholar Hugo Preuss, who played a major role in drafting the constitution.
For many Protestants, Professor Hett argued, this generated a deep sense of displacement. They experienced the new order not merely as politically different, but as a system in which they had lost social and moral primacy. In electoral terms, this proved crucial. Catholics largely did not vote Nazi, in part because they had a confessional political home within the Center Party and did not feel comparably estranged from the Weimar system. Nor did the industrial working-class core of the Social Democrats move en masse toward the Nazis. The party that the Nazis most successfully destroyed, Professor Hett observed, was the Protestant middle class. In this sense, National Socialism became, to a significant degree, the party of aggrieved Protestant respectability.
This reading also enabled Professor Hett to place Weimar Germany within a broader comparative pattern. Across the authoritarian turn of the 1920s and 1930s, humiliation appeared repeatedly as a politically generative force. Citing the work of historian Robert Paxton, he noted that the rise of fascist or authoritarian systems correlated strongly with defeat in World War I—or, in some cases, with a perceived defeat. Italy, for example, had technically emerged from the war on the victorious side, yet many Italians experienced the outcome as a “mutilated victory,” a phrase that captured their sense of insult and dispossession. Authoritarian politics fed on that perception.
Global Echoes: From MAGA to European Anti-Globalization Movements
Having established these historical mechanisms, Professor Hett turned more tentatively to the present. Here he stressed again that analogies must remain cautious, yet he argued that the politics of humiliation and status anxiety are clearly visible in contemporary democracies, especially in the United States. In his view, these dynamics are among the strongest factors behind support for Donald Trump. Trump’s appeal, he suggested, has been rooted not simply in policy commitments or ideological clarity, but in the promise of retribution for those who feel displaced by social and demographic change.
The rhetoric of “I am your retribution,” which Trump used in the 2024 campaign, was especially telling in this regard. Retribution for what, Professor Hett asked implicitly, if not for a perceived historical loss of primacy? The contemporary politics of race, migration, and hostility to diversity initiatives were, in his interpretation, best understood as efforts to reassure a predominantly white constituency that feels that others have unjustly advanced at its expense. The appeal to a mythologized past—captured in slogans such as “Make America Great Again”—functions not simply as nostalgia, but as a restoration narrative aimed at those who believe they have been humiliated by modern equality.
Professor Hett then broadened the frame to Europe. Anti-globalization sentiment, he argued, has played a comparable role in the rise of populist and authoritarian parties across the continent. The Brexit vote, the rise of the Alternative for Germany (AfD), and wider resentment toward migration all reflect forms of status anxiety tied to the belief that one’s country is becoming “someone else’s country.” In the German case, he pointed especially to eastern Germany, where support for the far right remains heavily concentrated. Drawing on personal observations as well as broader political patterns, he described a durable sense among many East Germans that they have been serially humiliated since reunification.
From Status Loss to Authoritarian Opportunity
These feelings, he suggested, are not reducible to economics alone. They involve wounded dignity, symbolic exclusion, and the perception that one’s world has been politically and culturally devalued. In this sense, grievance politics becomes especially potent when it can link structural change to a narrative of dishonor.
Professor Hett concluded by suggesting, modestly, that if humiliation and status anxiety are indeed major drivers of anti-system politics, then effective democratic responses must address the material and symbolic conditions that sustain them. He mentioned the idea of a kind of “Marshall Plan 2.0” as one possible way of mitigating some of the economic transformations that deepen discontent. Yet he remained cautious about prescribing solutions beyond his field of expertise.
What his presentation offered most powerfully was not a simple warning from history, but a historically informed framework for thinking about how democracies are undone. By centering humiliation, elite impunity, and status loss, Professor Hett illuminated the emotional structure of grievance politics and the ways in which anti-system actors transform wounded identities into authoritarian opportunity.
Discussions
The Q&A session following the first panel unfolded as a reflective and deeply engaged exchange, bringing together personal testimony, empirical insight, and conceptual debate. The discussion not only reinforced several core arguments presented earlier—particularly those concerning humiliation, status anxiety, and democratic erosion—but also broadened the analytical frame by introducing additional variables, including pandemic effects, structural inequality, and adaptive institutional responses.
Irina von Wiese opened the exchange with a personal intervention that lent lived texture to the abstract dynamics discussed by Professor Benjamin Carter Hett. Drawing on her own experience as a West German working in eastern Germany immediately after reunification, she offered a candid account of the asymmetries that characterized that moment. As a young legal advisor involved in constitutional development in Mecklenburg-West Pomerania, she observed what she described as a pervasive arrogance among West German professionals toward their East German counterparts—many of whom had endured political repression but lacked formal credentials. This imbalance, she suggested, generated a reservoir of resentment that remained latent for decades before finding political expression.
Her reflections underscored a central theme in Professor Hett’s analysis: that humiliation is not always immediate in its political effects, but can endure, accumulate, and eventually crystallize into protest or support for anti-system actors. Von Wiese noted that the eventual rise of far-right mobilization in eastern Germany was not sudden, but rather the delayed outcome of long-standing grievances awaiting political articulation. In this sense, the emergence of parties such as the far right can be seen less as the origin of discontent than as its vehicle.
Extending her argument beyond Germany, von Wiese pointed to similar dynamics in other contexts, including her experiences in the United States and the United Kingdom. She recalled the stark social contrasts she encountered outside elite academic environments in the United States during the early 1990s, particularly in relation to poverty and racial segregation. These conditions, she argued, formed part of the underlying landscape that later enabled figures like Donald Trump to mobilize political support. Likewise, she interpreted the Brexit campaign as deeply rooted in narratives of national decline and loss of status, with appeals to a diminished imperial past serving as a powerful emotional driver.
While affirming the explanatory value of humiliation and status anxiety, von Wiese also raised a critical question regarding remedies. She expressed skepticism about whether economic interventions alone—such as a modern “Marshall Plan”—would suffice, suggesting that deeper systemic transformations may be required, particularly in relation to inequality and the structure of contemporary capitalism. Her intervention thus shifted the discussion from diagnosis to the more difficult terrain of response.
The Multi-Dimensional Nature of Democratic Backsliding
Professor Ruth Wodak followed by situating the panel within a broader interdisciplinary framework. She emphasized the importance of integrating multiple analytical perspectives in order to grasp the complexity of contemporary democratic challenges. While acknowledging the relevance of Professor Hett’s emphasis on humiliation and recognition, she cautioned against overly singular explanations. In her view, democratic backsliding and far-right mobilization are multi-causal phenomena that cannot be reduced to a single driver.
Professor Wodak introduced two additional factors that she argued deserve greater attention. The first was the long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. She suggested that the pandemic generated widespread fear and uncertainty on a global scale, creating fertile ground for both authoritarian narratives and renewed forms of religiosity. Drawing on sociological insights, she noted that periods of existential anxiety often lead individuals to seek stability in identity-based frameworks, including religion, while also increasing susceptibility to aggression and polarization. In this sense, the pandemic may have functioned as an accelerant in the latest phase of far-right mobilization.
The second factor she highlighted was what might be termed anticipatory anxiety. While Professor Hett’s framework emphasizes the experience of humiliation and loss, Professor Wodak pointed to cases where far-right support is strongest not among the most economically deprived, but in relatively affluent societies. Citing examples such as Austria, Switzerland, and Denmark, she observed that high levels of prosperity have not prevented the rise of far-right parties. Instead, she suggested, these contexts are characterized by a fear of losing existing advantages—a forward-looking anxiety rather than a retrospective grievance. This introduces a subtle but important distinction: the politics of resentment may be driven as much by perceived future decline as by past injustice.
Turning to the question of institutional response, Professor Wodak engaged with the earlier presentation by Professor Stephan Klingebiel on the politicization of development discourse. She noted that while certain policy areas—such as gender and climate—have become targets of political contestation, actors within international organizations have begun to develop adaptive strategies. One such strategy involves reframing or relabeling projects in order to avoid triggering ideological opposition, while continuing substantive work under different terminology. This form of quiet institutional resilience, she suggested, illustrates how bureaucratic actors may navigate hostile political environments without abandoning core objectives.
At the same time, Professor Wodak did not understate the severity of recent developments, particularly the dismantling of major development institutions and the reduction of aid flows. She highlighted the moral and human consequences of such policies, noting the stark contradiction between global wealth concentration and the withdrawal of support for the world’s most vulnerable populations. Her remarks conveyed both analytical concern and normative urgency.
Explaining Religious-Political Convergence
The Q&A session continued with a focused exchange between Dr. Bulent Kenes, and Professor Julie Ingersoll, centering on the timing and recent consolidation of religiously driven political movements in the United States. The question probed a central puzzle emerging from the panel: while religious actors have long played a role in American public life, why have certain strands of Christian nationalism reached a new peak of visibility and influence at this particular historical juncture?
In posing the question, Dr. Kenes framed the issue as one of convergence. He invited Professor Ingersoll to reflect on whether the current moment could be explained by the interaction of structural and contingent factors—demographic change, economic insecurity, intensifying political polarization, and the strategic mobilization of religious networks within populist movements. His formulation implicitly shifted the discussion from historical description to causal explanation, asking not simply what these movements are, but why their influence has crystallized now.
In her response, Professor Ingersoll offered a careful recalibration of the premise. She challenged the assumption that these religious formations have always existed in their present form, emphasizing instead their relatively recent consolidation. While acknowledging that certain traditions—particularly Catholic political engagement—have deep historical roots, she argued that the specific configurations associated with contemporary Christian nationalism represent a more recent development. These movements, in her account, should not be understood as continuous extensions of longstanding traditions, but as new iterations shaped by decades of strategic organization.
A central element of her explanation was the long-term institutional work undertaken by groups such as the Christian Reconstructionists. Over several decades, these actors invested in building parallel educational infrastructures, including private Christian school networks that later evolved into homeschooling systems. These institutions did more than provide alternative education; they cultivated generational continuity, transmitting a distinct worldview and historical narrative that diverged from mainstream interpretations. This process, Professor Ingersoll suggested, has created a durable social base capable of sustaining and amplifying political influence.
Importantly, she situated the expansion of these networks within a specific historical context: the desegregation of public schools. The timing was consequential. As integration policies reshaped the public education system, segments of white evangelical communities withdrew into private and religious schooling structures. While often framed in theological terms, this shift also intersected with broader social and racial dynamics, allowing communities to maintain separation while articulating their choices through religious language. Over time, these parallel institutions became key sites of ideological formation.
Professor Ingersoll also pointed to more recent catalysts, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. Echoing earlier remarks in the panel, she argued that the pandemic functioned as a moment of intensified mobilization. Religious actors capitalized on widespread uncertainty and fear, framing public health measures—such as restrictions on gatherings—as threats to religious freedom. This narrative, she suggested, resonated strongly within conservative constituencies, reinforcing existing suspicions of state overreach and contributing to a broader sense of existential threat.
At the same time, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that no single factor can account for the current prominence of these movements. Rather, their rise reflects the cumulative effect of long-term organizational strategies interacting with more immediate political and social disruptions. What appears as a sudden surge is, in her formulation, the visible outcome of processes that have been unfolding over decades.
Secularization, Inequality, and Backlash
The exchange moved beyond diagnosis toward a more reflective interrogation of responsibility, causality, and the limits of existing analytical frameworks. Professor Jack A. Goldstone suggested that what is currently unfolding across multiple contexts is not merely the resurgence of religion or populism in isolation, but the normalization of an assertive and exclusionary ideological fusion—where perceived humiliation is channeled into aggressive identity-based politics. In this reading, religious nationalism operates not only as belief, but as a vehicle for reasserting dominance in response to status loss.
Professor Goldstone then turned a critical eye toward the role of social science itself, arguing that earlier intellectual assumptions may have inadvertently contributed to the present moment. The expectation that secularization would steadily marginalize religion, he suggested, proved deeply misleading. Instead, policies and discourses shaped by this assumption often alienated religious communities, creating fertile ground for backlash movements that now seek to reintegrate religion into the core of political authority. Parallel to this, he identified a second misjudgment in economic thinking: the prioritization of growth over distribution. While aggregate prosperity increased, the failure to address inequality produced widespread discontent, reinforcing perceptions of exclusion and injustice.
Extending this argument, Professor Goldstone highlighted a longer-term global transformation. Over the past half century, the relative dominance of Western societies has eroded, as economic and technological advancements in other regions have reshaped the global hierarchy. This shift, he argued, has unsettled previously taken-for-granted assumptions of superiority among segments of Western populations. The resulting nostalgia—rooted in a memory of unchallenged status—feeds contemporary grievance politics. His central question, directed to the panel, concerned how societies might address this structural recalibration without intensifying resentment, exclusion, and the normalization of antagonistic rhetoric.
The Deepening Impact of Populist Pressure
Responding to earlier interventions and this broader framing, Professor Stephan Klingebiel emphasized that the current transformations cannot be reduced to discursive shifts alone. While the strategic avoidance or substitution of politically sensitive terminology—such as replacing “climate change” or “gender” with more neutral language—may offer short-term tactical advantages, he cautioned that such practices risk deeper forms of self-censorship. This “self-policing,” as he described it, signals not adaptation but internalization of external pressure, ultimately weakening the normative foundations of international cooperation.
Professor Klingebiel further underscored that the stakes extend beyond language to the substance of policy and institutional priorities. Changes in funding allocations, the redirection of development agendas, and the politicization of multilateral institutions reflect a broader erosion of solidarity. He pointed to a shifting political climate in which engagement with development cooperation—once a source of professional and political legitimacy—has become increasingly stigmatized. This transformation, he suggested, illustrates how populist pressures reshape not only public discourse but also the incentives and self-perceptions of policymakers.
At the same time, Professor Klingebiel stressed the necessity of active resistance. Silence or strategic accommodation, in his view, risks accelerating the very dynamics it seeks to navigate. Instead, he advocated for the formation of new coalitions among actors committed to multilateralism and democratic norms. Crucially, he also called for a rethinking of how academic and policy communities communicate their work. Empirical evidence, while indispensable, is no longer sufficient in isolation. To counter populist narratives effectively, scholars must engage more directly with the emotional and symbolic dimensions of political life—crafting narratives that resonate beyond technocratic audiences.
In sum, this segment of the discussion highlighted a convergence around a central insight: contemporary democratic challenges are sustained by an interplay of structural change, emotional response, and discursive transformation. Addressing them requires not only institutional reform or policy adjustment, but also a deeper engagement with the narratives through which individuals interpret their place in a rapidly changing world.
Conclusion
Panel 1 of the symposium offered more than a set of parallel analyses; it articulated a coherent and multi-dimensional understanding of how contemporary democratic erosion takes shape. Across the presentations and subsequent discussion, a consistent insight emerged: populist radicalization is neither episodic nor accidental, but the outcome of long-term interactions between structural transformations, ideological projects, and affective dynamics. Grievance, as the panel demonstrated, does not automatically translate into anti-democratic politics. It becomes politically consequential when it is narrated, organized, and strategically mobilized through discursive, institutional, and symbolic means.
A central contribution of the panel lies in its insistence on integrating the emotional and the structural. Processes such as humiliation, status anxiety, and fear of future loss were shown to operate not as secondary effects, but as constitutive elements of political mobilization. At the same time, these affective dynamics are embedded within broader shifts – economic dislocation, geopolitical reordering, and the erosion of normative consensus in international cooperation. The convergence of these factors creates conditions under which exclusionary ideologies can gain legitimacy and resonance across diverse contexts.
Equally important was the panel’s attention to the role of agency – both in the emergence of populist forces and in the responses available to democratic actors. The discussions highlighted how political entrepreneurs, religious movements, and institutional actors actively construct narratives that transform diffuse unease into coherent political projects. Yet they also pointed to the adaptive capacities within democratic systems, including the formation of new coalitions, the persistence of institutional “pockets of effectiveness,” and the possibility of recalibrating political communication to address not only facts, but meanings and emotions.
The implications of these insights are both analytical and normative. If democratic erosion is prepared through gradual normalization, discursive shifts, and the instrumentalization of identity, then its counter requires equally sustained and multidimensional responses. Institutional reforms, while necessary, are insufficient in isolation. What is required is a renewed engagement with the cultural, social, and emotional foundations of democratic life – an effort to reconstruct not only policies, but also the narratives and forms of recognition that underpin democratic legitimacy.
In sum, the panel underscored that the trajectory from grievance to radicalization is not predetermined. It remains contingent on how societies interpret, articulate, and respond to the pressures they face. Understanding this contingency is essential not only for diagnosing democratic decline, but for imagining pathways of resilience and renewal in an increasingly unsettled global order.
Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, in an interview with the ECPS, offers a compelling analysis of Bulgaria’s post-election trajectory under Rumen Radev. Following a landslide victory driven by anti-corruption sentiment and political fatigue, Radev has consolidated power in a system marked by institutional fragility. Assoc. Prof. Otova argues that his success reflects not a new geopolitical shift, but a strategic exploitation of existing cleavages, enabled by a “specific discursive situation” of empty rhetoric and symbolic politics. While his ambiguity has mobilized a broad electorate, it also masks deeper risks. As populism transitions from protest to governance, Assoc. Prof. Otova warns that, under conditions of concentrated power and weak safeguards, “the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.”
In the aftermath of Bulgaria’s April 2026 parliamentary elections, the country has entered a new and uncertain political phase marked by both the promise of stability and the risk of accelerated democratic erosion. Rumen Radev’s newly formed Progressive Bulgaria party secured a decisive majority after years of political fragmentation, capitalizing on widespread anti-corruption sentiment, voter fatigue with repeated elections, and growing socioeconomic anxieties following eurozone accession. While his victory ended a prolonged cycle of unstable coalition governments, it also raised urgent questions about the future trajectory of Bulgarian democracy, particularly given Radev’s ambivalent positioning between the European Union and Russia.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, Head of Political Science Department at New Bulgarian University, offers a nuanced and analytically rigorous assessment of the structural and discursive dynamics underpinning Radev’s rise. As she argues, his victory “should not be attributed solely to Russia or to the broader Europe-Russia divide”; rather, it reflects a more complex political environment in which he has “skillfully exploited” existing cleavages, often “using minimal words and gestures to convey what different audiences want to hear.” This strategic ambiguity has allowed him to mobilize a remarkably heterogeneous electorate, ranging from pro-European reformists to nationalist and pro-Russian constituencies.
Assoc. Prof. Otova situates this development within a broader pattern of normalized populism in Bulgaria, where “what was once an episodic phenomenon has become a structural feature of the system.” In such a context, Radev’s success appears less as an anomaly than as the predictable result of a political order shaped by institutional distrust, party-system exhaustion, and what she terms a “specific discursive situation” characterized by cycles of “empty rhetoric” and symbolic politics. His campaign slogan, “We are ready, we can do it, and we will succeed,” captured this dynamic, offering not policy substance but an affective promise of exit from political stagnation.
At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Otova underscores the deeper identity tensions that continue to shape Bulgarian politics. Euroscepticism, she notes, is structured by enduring paradoxes, including the perception of the EU as an external imposition, contrasted with the framing of Russia as culturally “internal.” This ambivalence has enabled Radev to navigate competing geopolitical imaginaries while maintaining what she describes as a dual discourse, one directed at domestic audiences, another at Brussels.
Yet the central concern animating Assoc. Prof. Otova’s analysis is the transformation of populism from oppositional rhetoric into governing practice. With a consolidated parliamentary majority and limited institutional constraints, “concrete actions and policies are required,” and it is precisely under these conditions, she warns, that “the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.” In a system already marked by weak institutional safeguards and vulnerability to state capture, the concentration of executive power risks reproducing, rather than dismantling, entrenched oligarchic networks.
This interview with ECPS situates Bulgaria at a critical juncture. While Radev’s rise reflects broader global trends of democratic backsliding and populist normalization, Assoc. Prof. Otova’s insights highlight the contingent nature of political outcomes, shaped not only by leadership, but by institutional resilience, societal mobilization, and the unresolved tensions at the heart of Bulgaria’s democratic and European identity.
Ildiko Otova, an Associate Professor of Political Science and the Head of Political Science Department at New Bulgarian University.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Ildiko Otova, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Not a New Cleavage, but a Strategic Exploitation of Old Divides
Professor Otova, given your argument that Bulgarian Euroscepticism must be read through the historically embedded Europe–Russia axis, does Rumen Radev’s victory mark a new phase in this cleavage, or merely its latest institutional expression?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Relations with Russia have long been central to Bulgarian politics, shaped by shared history, culture, personal connections, economic ties, and geopolitical factors. A widely circulated photo of Radev with Putin drew significant attention, prompting international media to describe him as “Russia’s new Trojan horse in Europe.” Experts have rightly pointed to Russia’s involvement in Radev’s political rise and raised concerns about campaign interference, online influence operations, and opaque funding sources suggesting substantial investment.
However, Radev’s victory should not be attributed solely to Russia or to the broader Europe–Russia divide. His win does not mark a new phase in this cleavage; rather, he has skillfully exploited it, using minimal words and gestures to convey what different audiences want to hear. In a campaign—and a political environment—often full of empty rhetoric, Radev has become adept at using silence, paradoxically communicating exactly what various constituencies seek.
In practice, little is known about the figures in his party, but among those who have become visible, we observe both openly provocative pro-Russian positions and the exact opposite. This is not to downplay Russia’s role; instead, it underscores the need for more comprehensive explanations.
Euroscepticism Built on Cultural Paradoxes and Identity Tensions
To what extent does Radev’s rise reflect not only geopolitical ambivalence but also a deeper identity crisis in post-communist Bulgaria, where competing civilizational imaginaries—Europeanization, Slavic-Orthodox affinity, and post-socialist nostalgia—intersect? In your framework, how does this identity fragmentation reshape the nature of Bulgarian Euroscepticism?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Bulgarian Euroscepticism rests on several paradoxes. The first is that the EU and “Europe” are frequently depicted as external to Bulgaria and Bulgarians—as actors that impose unacceptable values and adopt a lecturing posture. Yet this hostility toward external influence does not extend to all external actors. Russia, for example, is often not perceived as foreign in the same way; rather, it is framed as culturally “internal” due to a presumed Slavic-Orthodox affinity.
The second paradox is temporal. Resistance to the EU did not precede Bulgaria’s accession but developed alongside it. Until the early 2000s, Bulgaria was characterized by a broad pro-European consensus.
Third, although Bulgaria has been an EU member state for years, European issues remain weakly embedded in its domestic political agenda. This does not mean that anti-EU narratives are absent. On the contrary, they are visible in discourses about massive migration allegedly changing the national gene pool, “stealing” the pensions of the elderly because EU policies and values are too liberal, and attacks on so-called “gender ideology,” among other themes.
Fourth, the deeper Bulgaria’s European integration becomes, the more its political elites tend to adopt anti-European positions. This shift occurs primarily through the normalization of populism. In this sense, within the Bulgarian context, the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism is particularly important—though not predetermined. There are also examples of populist, anti-establishment projects that remain pro-European. Among voters, too, there are those who are anti-establishment and anti-corruption yet remain pro-European. Notably, Radev has managed to mobilize them as well, including a significant portion of the so-called Generation Z.
There is also one more factor that should not be overlooked: his flirtation with the idea of a potential referendum on the euro. People do not necessarily need a rational explanation for why food is expensive; they need someone or something to blame. Prices do not even have to rise in reality—it is enough to sustain a narrative of rising costs. In this sense, the timing and the overall situation played perfectly into Radev’s hands.
Exhaustion, Silence, and the Power of Narrative Control
Protesters chant anti-government slogans during a demonstration in central Sofia, Bulgaria on July 26, 2013. Photo: Anton Chalakov / Dreamstime.
Should Radev’s success be understood primarily as anti-establishment populism, geopolitical revisionism, or a hybrid formation in which anti-corruption discourse masks a deeper pro-Russian reorientation?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Any of these three explanations is valid, yet even taken together, they remain too simplistic. As a citizen, I find it increasingly difficult to remain silent about the pervasive corruption in Bulgaria and the broader condition of the country, or to withhold my solidarity with the despair my fellow citizens feel toward the political elite. After the events of recent years, and the evident futility of going to the polls for an eighth time, there is a sense of collective exhaustion. Nevertheless, I will attempt an answer within an academic framework.
In my view, the main reason for his victory lies in what I would describe as a specific discursive situation. Since 2020, Bulgaria has been caught not only in a cycle of repeated elections but also in a cycle of empty rhetoric. Radev has managed to control the narrative so effectively that he appears to tell everyone what they want to hear—largely through silence. This is neither classic anti-elitist rhetoric built on the populist trope of the corrupt elite versus the honest, long-suffering people nor a standard expression of movements grounded in a thin-centred ideology.
“We are ready, we can do it, and we will succeed”—the words with which he announced his departure from the presidency, later adopted as his campaign slogan—projected a sense of purpose. They offered not concrete details, but hope for an exit from a cycle of meaningless repetition. In a political environment where emotions and symbolic gestures carry greater weight than rational argument, and where both traditional and digital media amplify urgency and a pervasive sense of crisis, this has proven sufficient. For citizens who are exhausted and perceive threats as omnipresent, such messaging resonates deeply.
Populism as the New Normal in Bulgarian Politics
In your work with Evelina Staykova, you argue that populism in Bulgaria has become normalized through party-system exhaustion, state–economy fusion, institutional distrust, and the digital turn. Does the 2026 election represent the culmination of this normalization?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Since 2001, Bulgaria has experienced several so-called waves of populism: the return of Simeon Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the rise of GERB, and the emergence of post-2020, protest-driven, short-lived “pop-up” political projects. Taken together, these developments illustrate how what was once an episodic phenomenon has become a structural feature of the system. Paradoxically, the populist wave has itself become a constant.
Populism is now the defining characteristic of Bulgaria’s political order—the norm rather than the exception—making it unrealistic to expect fundamentally different outcomes. Radev fits squarely within this pattern: his victory represents not an unexpected populist surge, but the predictable result of a persistently populist political environment, shaped by the specific discursive situation I mentioned.
If this moment does represent a culmination, one might expect either a subsequent decline in populism or a reversion to pre-populist politics. However, such a scenario currently appears unlikely.
Radev has long combined anti-corruption, nationalist, and anti-establishment rhetoric from within one of the state’s highest institutions. Does his transition from the presidency to executive power illustrate the transformation of populism from protest discourse into governing logic?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: This is the greatest challenge he faces. The presidency, even though he ultimately governed alone through caretaker governments and later during the pre-election period, gave him the opportunity to craft narratives. However, when one commands such a majority and holds executive power, concrete actions and policies are required.
We have had populists in power before—the GERB administration is one such example—but the dynamics were different. The coalition nature of those governments, especially the most recent one, created room to maneuver. Under Radev, there will be no such leeway. And that is the greatest challenge we face. Under these conditions, the path to autocracy becomes all too easy.
Limits of the Orbán Analogy
Editorial illustration: Rumen Radev and Viktor Orbán depicted against national flags, symbolizing political tensions between Bulgaria and Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.
How should we assess the analogy between Radev and Orbán? Does Radev possess the ideological coherence and institutional ambition required for Orbán-style illiberal state-building, or is Bulgaria’s EU dependency likely to constrain him?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Let us begin with the obvious: Orbán is an experienced politician with a long, well-documented, and easily traceable career. Radev, by contrast, was effectively parachuted from the military into the presidency—a role he has never fully mastered. He entered politics without a solid ideological, political, or broader conceptual foundation, essentially as an empty vessel into which almost anything could be poured.
Another obvious point is that Bulgaria is not Hungary. Radev lacks ideological consistency and has no substantial political background or prior experience; he is, to a large extent, a product of the circumstances that enabled his rise—a product of the status quo, the absence of alternatives, and the prevailing populist momentum. Looking back, we also cannot entirely rule out the possibility that his ascent was shaped by external forces. What is beyond doubt, however, is the presence of clear ambition.
In this sense, the emergence of a non-liberal form of democracy in Bulgaria cannot be ruled out. The European Union, having learned from its experience with Hungary, is likely to be far more cautious. Against this backdrop, Radev’s first major test will be the so-called judicial reform.
Is Radev better understood as an Orbán-type system builder, a Fico-type pragmatic Eurosceptic, or a specifically Bulgarian figure shaped by Russophile memory, anti-corruption politics, and institutional volatility?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I do not think these comparisons meaningfully deepen our understanding of Radev or improve our ability to predict future developments. There are simply too many specific factors at play, and the international landscape is in constant flux. What existed elsewhere yesterday may not necessarily apply here tomorrow.
The Politics of Dual Discourse
Your research suggests that Bulgarian populism often blurs ideological distinctions. How should we classify Progressive Bulgaria: left-conservative, national-populist, technocratic-populist, or post-ideological?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Yes, populism undoubtedly blurs ideological distinctions; this is intrinsic to its nature. Consider Progressive Bulgaria’s program: despite the label “progressive,” its economic agenda is largely far right, even though some members of its expert economic team previously worked on more left-leaning projects. This example alone illustrates the extent to which ideological lines are being blurred.
For this reason, I see the party as best fitting within a post-ideological framework. Populism can be understood as a de-ideologized ideology. It incorporates elements from other ideologies, yet remains neither left nor right, and this is precisely one of the greatest dangers it poses—the de-ideologization, and consequently the depoliticization, of the political. Progressive Bulgaria, at least for now, aligns well with this understanding.
Does Radev’s discourse of “pragmatism” toward Russia and “critical thinking” toward Europe signal a strategic foreign policy stance, or does it reveal a more profound ontological insecurity in Bulgaria’s self-understanding as both a European and historically Russia-linked polity? How does identity anxiety translate into political legitimacy for such leaders?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I believe these statements by Radev are part of a broader strategy to tell each audience what it wants to hear. It is highly likely that he will continue to use one discourse in Bulgaria and another in Brussels. This is nothing new; Bulgarian politicians have long maintained such a dual discourse. In Radev’s case, however, it will be especially evident, likely conveyed through various spokespersons as well.
At the same time, Radev will have to speak not only to pro-Russian citizens at home. The EU still enjoys the support of more than half of Bulgarians, and some of those who backed Radev did so not because of his pro-Russian stance, but because of his anti-corruption declarations. He will have to meet their expectations with tangible actions, as narrative alone will no longer suffice.
Strategic Ambiguity Between Brussels and Moscow
Radev’s Ukraine stance appears to combine opposition to military aid with reluctance to openly block EU decisions. Is this strategic ambiguity a governing necessity, or a sign of deeper tension between his electorate’s geopolitical pluralism and his own Russophile instincts?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I cannot say whether Radev holds Russophile instincts. If he does, it would be rather ironic given his background in American military academies. Joking aside, there is a Russian saying: “We will live and we will see”—time will tell. However, I would assume that Radev will not openly oppose EU decisions.
To what extent did Radev absorb the political space of openly pro-Russian and nationalist parties such as Revival, and does this suggest moderation of the far right or mainstreaming of its core themes?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: The myth of moderation is remarkably persistent, but I do not find it convincing. For years, analysts have claimed that once the far right gains power, it will be tamed. The opposite has happened: instead, far-right views have steadily become the norm. One need only look across the EU to observe this trend.
When it comes to Revival, Radev succeeded in attracting a significant portion of its electorate. As I have already noted, he now faces the difficult task of continuing to speak to multiple constituencies at once—and to do so convincingly through his actions. This will determine whether he fully absorbs the Revival electorate or, conversely, whether that electorate becomes further radicalized and shifts into opposition. I would not underestimate the leader of Revival, who is a seasoned political actor.
Given Bulgaria’s captured institutions, weak trust, and repeated anti-corruption mobilizations, can Radev realistically dismantle oligarchic networks, or does his concentration of power risk reproducing the same state-capture logic under a new banner?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: This issue is extremely important. The resignation of the acting chief prosecutor, coming just days after Radev’s victory, was among the first signs of a new arrangement and already signals a realignment within oligarchic networks. I would also return to the question of how Radev’s seemingly expensive campaign was funded. Where did that money come from? Even these few points leave little room for optimism.
Radev’s regime is likely to reconstitute a state-capture model—perhaps initially in a more covert and less overtly assertive form—but such a configuration is unlikely to remain restrained over time.
From Anti-Elite Narrative to Elite Reality
Anti-government protests against corruption intensified across Sofia, Bulgaria on July 15, 2020. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have argued that anti-establishment populists in power may themselves become the new elite. How quickly might this paradox confront Radev once he assumes responsibility for inflation, eurozone adjustment, corruption reform, and EU funding?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Radev has long belonged to the elite. After all, he has been the sitting president for nearly nine years. His seemingly modest gestures—driving his own car, grumbling about the lack of parking spaces in Sofia, and publicly paying his parking tickets—are mostly for show, part of the narrative drafting.
That said, I understand the core of the question. Given the international environment and the many urgent issues awaiting resolution, the risk that mounting challenges will overwhelm the new status quo is very real. Radev’s victory will ultimately need to be substantiated through concrete actions. Let us return to the notion of a “de-ideologized ideology” and the broader process of depoliticizing politics. How can genuinely sustainable policies be designed when they are no longer anchored in a clear and coherent vision?
My concern is that the emerging political reality is stripping politics of its very essence: not only the capacity to deliver immediate solutions, but also the obligation to develop policies grounded in a substantive vision of the world and its internal order. Returning to Radev, it is entirely possible that the failure of the new elite could trigger a fresh wave of protests. The key questions are whether such protests would be strong enough and, more importantly, what kind of new political configuration they might produce.
A new, powerful actor—a new master of the narrative who can and will succeed—will not emerge overnight. The possibility that, if Radev fails, Bulgaria could enter yet another cycle of instability cannot be ruled out. Even so, I am inclined to believe that Radev and those around him will, at least for a while, remain in power.
Diaspora Divides and the Limits of Democratic Agency
In your work on contestatory citizenship, you highlight the transformative potential of civic agency. In the current context, can civic mobilization and diaspora engagement mitigate what appears to be an emerging crisis of democratic and European identity, or are these forms of participation themselves being reshaped by populist narratives of belonging and exclusion?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: Let me begin by noting that the diaspora is not necessarily pro-European—quite the contrary. While some are pro-European, others are anti-European, including Bulgarian emigrants in other EU member states. I continue to believe in the power of contestatory citizenship. However, as I have already noted, the key question is what exactly a new wave of protests might bring about.
Looking ahead, do you expect Radev’s Bulgaria to become a pragmatic EU-anchored government with Russophile rhetoric, a soft illiberal regime inside the EU, or an unstable populist experiment likely to fracture under the burdens of governance?
Assoc. Prof. Ildiko Otova: I do not think these three options are mutually exclusive.
In this incisive analysis, Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois interrogates how contemporary far-right discourse mobilizes gendered and aesthetic hierarchies to structure political legitimacy. Focusing on the controversy surrounding Rassemblement National (RN) leader Jordan Bardella’s relationship with Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies, Dr. Bauvois demonstrates how misogynistic rhetoric operates through a dual mechanism of delegitimation and idealization. The stigmatized figure of the female sociologist—constructed as intellectually suspect and aesthetically deficient—is juxtaposed with the idealized “princess” archetype, embodying socially sanctioned femininity. This contrast reveals how populist communication instrumentalizes gendered imagery, transforming private relationships into symbolic resources that reinforce political narratives, hierarchies of visibility, and claims to cultural legitimacy.
The relationship between Jordan Bardella, president of the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN), and Princess Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies has recently attracted significant media attention in France and abroad, particularly after their romance was featured on the cover of a gossip magazine and circulated widely across both political and lifestyle media outlets.
During a televised exchange on this subject, Sébastien Chenu, a leading figure of the Rassemblement National, stated: “I am delighted that [Bardella] is in love, I am delighted that his partner, who could possibly become First Lady, is a young lady who speaks six languages.” Interpelled by the journalist who noted that Maria Carolina is a “luxury influencer,” he responded: “Why not!” He then added: “Not everyone is destined to be a sociology lecturer,”“ugly, badly groomed, and bitter,” (Chenu, n.d.).
Chenu’s remarks triggered significant backlash across political, media, and academic circles.As a national spokesperson for the Rassemblement National, Chenu is already recognized for his provocative communication style, which was especially apparent in this instance. The French National Union of Researchers, for instance, stated that these comments reflect the Rassemblement National’s anti-feminist positioning, which regularly targets women’s rights and reproduces outdated gender stereotypes.
The Sociologist: Failed Femininity
At the center of Chenu’s remark lies the figure of the Sociologist, a familiar symbolic target in far-right discourse. In France, sociology occupies a particularly visible position within broader “culture wars” dynamics, where academic disciplines become entangled in political and ideological conflicts over questions of identity, inequality, and gender. Within this context, sociology is often framed by some right-wing and far-right political actors as emblematic of a politicized or ideologically biased academia.
Crucially, however, the figure used by Chenu is here implicitly gendered: it is not a neutral academic subject that is evoked, but specifically the female sociology lecturer, whose presence is central to the rhetorical effect of the statement rather than incidental to it. The emphasis on a woman in an academic position is significant because it enables the statement to operate simultaneously through professional and gendered delegitimation, thereby amplifying its symbolic effect.
This framing reflects three intersecting discursive logics. First, populist anti-intellectualism constructs experts and academics, more often in social science, as ideologically driven rather than legitimate producers of knowledge. Second, it specifically frames female academics as socially deviant and suspect. Third, misogynistic aesthetic stereotyping delegitimizes women through appearance and affect, casting them as Chenu describes as “ugly” and “bitter.” Together, these patterns construct the figure of the female social sciences academic as a rhetorically productive figure within far-right discourse, whose authority is simultaneously undermined along epistemic, social, and gendered lines.
Female academics and public intellectuals are disproportionately targeted through appearance-based insults and narratives of emotional instability, particularly when they are associated with feminist or progressive positions. Within this frame, the figure of the female sociology lecturer mobilized by Chenu is used as an instance of failed femininity, insofar as she is represented as failing to conform to normative expectations of feminine appearance, emotional disposition, respectability and desirability.
The Princess: Worthy Femininity
In contrast to the representation of the female sociologist as ugly and bitter, Maria Carolina of Bourbon-Two Sicilies is implicitly constructed through a combination of aristocratic lineage and conventional markers of attractiveness—youth, blonde hair, and normative beauty—alongside her prestige and glamour. The opposition between these stereotypes reflects two radically different regimes of femininity within far-right populist discourse, structured around processes of delegitimation and idealization.
Within this configuration, the figure of the Princess does not merely function as an aesthetic ideal, but also as a form of symbolic validation. It produces a culturally legible ideal of femininity in which aesthetic conformity and social status reinforce one another. It illustrates how visibility and worth are distributed unevenly, rendering certain bodies desirable and socially legitimate, while others are marked as deviant or unworthy —an opposition explicitly echoed in Chenu’s references to ugliness and bodily neglect.
More than a static ideal, the Princess figure operates as a normative reference point for acceptable and desirable femininity, where beauty, refinement, and social legitimacy are tightly aligned. Taken together, these contrasting constructions of femininity serve a broader populist logic of image-making, in which gendered archetypes are mobilized to organize hierarchies of legitimacy, visibility, and credibility. In this sense, the Princess archetype embodies the “right” kind of femininity and womanhood within this symbolic economy—one that is aesthetically intelligible, socially valorized, and politically functional.
The Princess figure also works particularly well in the context of Bardella’s electoral positioning ahead of the 2027 presidential race, especially given the timing and circulation of the orchestrated, paparazzi-style photographs of the couple. The Princess figure is highly media-friendly and easily integrated into simplified narrative formats, including “fairy-tale” framings that translate personal relationships into emotionally resonant political stories. In this sense, rather than functioning as a private individual, the Princess operates as a branding resource.
The Populist Leader and the Princess: Romance as Political Resource?
This romance between the young, ambitious populist leader of the French far right and the glamorous jet-setter princess can indeed be seen as part of a wider strategy of political communication and personal branding, contributing to the construction of Bardella’s profile as a prospective presidential candidate.
It also reinforces a narrative of upward social mobility, in which Bardella’s self-presentation as emerging from a modest, working-class background is juxtaposed with his growing proximity to aristocratic lineage and inherited forms of cultural and social capital.
However, this construction is also potentially ambivalent. Bardella has long cultivated an image as a politician who speaks for ordinary people against the elites, a figure of social ascent from below. Yet his relationship with a luxury influencer, jetsetter and heir to a fortune worth several hundred million euros—risks complicating that populist narrative of proximity to these “ordinary people” he claims to represent.
References
Chenu, S. [@sebchenu]. (n.d.). “Je suis ravi de voir @J_Bardella amoureux et que tous les deux soient épanouis ! N’en déplaise à certains, tout le monde n’a pas vocation à finir comme une prof de sociologie à Nanterre, moche, mal coiffée et aigrie ! @franceinfo” [Post]. X.https://x.com/sebchenu/status/2045028471185821837
Urban waste governance in Nigeria reveals a critical yet overlooked nexus between environmental management, informality, and political legitimacy. This policy brief introduces the concept of survivalist populism to capture how structural exclusion within the informal waste economy generates distinct political subjectivities rooted in precarity, distrust, and disengagement. Despite underpinning material recovery and urban sustainability, informal waste workers remain marginalized, stigmatized, and criminalized—exposing a contradiction at the heart of state governance. The analysis demonstrates that exclusionary environmental regimes not only produce inefficiencies but also erode democratic legitimacy and risk fostering grievance-driven political mobilization. By advocating inclusive, circular governance frameworks, the brief positions environmental policy as a key site for democratic renewal, social inclusion, and the mitigation of emerging populist discontent.
In Nigeria, urban waste governance has remained an under-researched domain where the intersection of political contention, social marginalization, and emerging populist subjectivities can be observed. It is estimated that more than 32 million tons of solid waste are produced annually across the country, with approximately 13,000–15,000 tons generated daily by metropolitan Lagos alone, of which less than 40% is managed by formal waste collection systems (World Bank, 2020). This structural deficit has given rise to a vast informal waste sector, including scavengers, mobile waste traders, and community-based collectors, who constitute the backbone of material recovery systems—particularly for plastics and metals—thereby contributing to urban environmental sustainability.
Despite their indispensability for material recovery, the sector remains largely institutionally marginalized, socially stigmatized, and increasingly criminalized. This apparent contradiction—the necessity of these informal actors for material recovery alongside their political exclusion—points to a broader challenge in environmental governance at the nexus of urban informality and state legitimacy. Building on an urban political sociology perspective, alongside environmental governance scholarship, this policy brief argues that waste governance in Nigeria is fundamentally an issue of political legitimacy and citizenship at the urban level (Migdal, 2001; Davis, 2006).
Survivalist Populism and Urban Exclusion
This policy brief proposes the term survivalist populism to capture the emergence of political consciousness driven by structural exclusion in the informal economy. Survivalist populism describes a political orientation shaped by a lack of material security, institutional exclusion, and the daily struggle for urban survival. Distinct from programmatically oriented ideological populism and electorally driven populism, survivalist populism is affective, experience-driven, and rooted in the everyday conditions of survival.
In the informal waste economy, this type of political consciousness typically manifests through: (1) deep and entrenched distrust in state institutions; (2) narratives of neglect and exclusion; and (3) pragmatic avoidance of formal politics. This orientation signals a weakening of state legitimacy, as governance is often perceived as coercive rather than as a mechanism for welfare delivery.
As Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue, such dynamics often reflect a sustained political backlash rooted in prolonged social insecurity and inequality affecting marginalized populations. Phrases such as “we are unseen by government,” commonly used by actors in the informal waste sector, convey a sense of injustice and represent a redefinition of political identity beyond formal politics. This aligns with studies of informality demonstrating how marginalized groups often construct their own systems of governance in the absence of adequate state engagement (Hart, 1973; Migdal, 2001).
Informality, Labor and Urban Survival
Nigeria’s informal waste sector provides employment for millions and is a cornerstone of the wider informal economy, which supports more than 60 percent of national employment. The sector comprises a diverse group of predominantly young, often vulnerable and economically deprived individuals excluded from the formal economy. Their employment conditions are characterized by extreme income volatility, with earnings frequently falling below minimum wage benchmarks. At the same time, work is marked by precarious health and safety conditions, as it is typically carried out without personal protective equipment and often involves encounters with state agents, leading to harassment, evictions, and displacement.
Paradoxically, these informal workers are integral to urban environmental governance processes, recovering well over 50 percent of plastics across several Nigerian cities, reducing pressure on landfills, and supporting local manufacturing value chains. This situation exemplifies what Davis (2006) describes as the “structural indispensability of the urban poor within systems that simultaneously exclude them,” reflecting a persistent, state-induced failure to integrate informal labor, even as it continues to be tolerated and relied upon.
Governance Failures and Democratic Risks
The systemic exclusion of informal waste workers results in significant governance and democratic risks.
First, it reinforces the state’s dominant reliance on punitive, rather than inclusive, approaches to environmental governance by criminalizing participation in the sector. Informal waste picking is often banned or tightly regulated at the state level without providing viable livelihood alternatives.
Second, enforcement-led approaches to environmental regulation erode state legitimacy, as interventions are primarily experienced as coercive rather than enabling, particularly among excluded groups (Migdal, 2001).
Third, there are emerging signs of the political instrumentalization of exclusion and grievance, whereby marginalized groups are invoked in electoral rhetoric but excluded from substantive policymaking—a pattern that may transform social and environmental exclusion into a tool for political leverage.
Finally, these dynamics generate environmental inefficiencies, as the marginalization of recyclers weakens waste sorting and recovery systems, thereby increasing pressure on landfills. Collectively, these processes risk fostering long-term political disillusionment and undermining stability in urban governance.
Achieving effective environmental governance requires a critical shift toward inclusive, circular economy frameworks that recognize informal labor as essential to urban environmental sustainability.
Formal Integration and Recognition: Relevant environmental agencies at both state and national levels should take measures to formally recognize and register workers in the informal waste economy and ensure their inclusion in urban waste management systems through collaborative arrangements and partnerships among the state, the formal sector, and informal waste actors.
Circular Economy Integration: Circular economy strategies at both subnational and national levels must clearly identify and define informal waste workers as central participants in sustainable waste management, with targeted incentive packages to support small recycling enterprises and strengthen informal material recovery value chains.
Social Protection Measures: Support for these workers should be complemented by a targeted system of social protection that provides access to essential services such as microcredit and health insurance, as well as structured livelihood development and transition support programs.
Participatory Governance Structures: Urban waste management authorities should develop and operationalize structured participatory mechanisms that provide informal waste workers with a platform for engagement and a voice in decision-making processes affecting their livelihoods and the environment.
Narrative Reframing and Public Recognition: The persistent social stigmatization of informal waste workers should be actively challenged through reframing their roles as valuable contributors to urban environmental sustainability, rather than as nuisances within the cityscape, by both state institutions and the media.
Policy Implications for Europe and the Global South
The findings from Nigeria’s informal waste sector offer important lessons for European policymakers transitioning toward a circular economy, as well as for cities in the Global South undergoing rapid urbanization, where informality remains integral to urban service provision, but policy responses often oscillate between marginalization and criminalization. In Nigeria, neglecting informal environmental actors not only undermines the efficiency of environmental systems but can also lead to significant political consequences, including alienation, disengagement, and the emergence of populist responses.
This case underscores for European actors—particularly in contexts of increasing migration, urban informalization, and the shift toward circular economy models—the imperative of designing inclusive governance mechanisms that integrate vulnerable labor into formal systems rather than pushing it to the margins. More broadly, the findings highlight the need to conceptualize environmental governance as a tool of social inclusion and political consolidation, not merely technical efficiency. Failure to implement such reforms is likely to deepen urban political disaffection and accelerate the rise of grievance-driven populist mobilization.
Conclusion
The crisis of waste management in Nigeria is a manifestation of the structural tension between environmental governance and democratic inclusion. The persistence of exclusionary waste regimes reinforces a survivalist populist orientation grounded in precarity and institutional marginality, which may contribute to political instability. Conversely, the inclusion of marginalized informal waste collectors in formal policymaking processes offers mutually beneficial outcomes in terms of environmental efficiency and democratic legitimacy, thereby repositioning waste governance beyond a purely environmental imperative toward a nexus for inclusive urban democracy.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria and Nonresident Research Fellow at the ECPS.
References
Davis, M. (2006). Planet of slums. Verso. London
Hart, K. (1973). “Informal income opportunities and urban employment in Ghana.” The Journal of Modern African Studies, 11(1), 61–89.
Migdal, J. S. (2001). State in society: Studying how states and societies transform and constitute one another. Cambridge University Press.
Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563.
Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.
World Bank. (2020). Nigeria: Enhancing solid waste management for sustainable urban development.
