Posts in category: PROGRAMS

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, constitutional scholar Professor Yaniv Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could threaten the country’s liberal-democratic future. In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, he declares: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” Examining democratic backsliding, judicial independence, political polarization, and the growing influence of religious nationalism, Professor Roznai also cautions that Netanyahu’s defeat would mark only the beginning of democratic restoration. Drawing comparisons with Poland and Hungary, he argues that Israel’s fragmented opposition would face formidable coalition challenges. Meaningful democratic renewal, he maintains, requires constitutional safeguards, stronger institutional checks and balances, and democratic education.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its democracy faces profound challenges stemming from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, the controversial judicial overhaul, and the devastating consequences of October 7 and the war in Gaza. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, constitutional resilience, and whether electoral change can reverse the institutional and societal transformations of recent years.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director of the Rubinstein Center for Constitutional Challenges at Reichman University and Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University’s University Center for Human Values, offers a deeply concerned assessment of Israel’s democratic trajectory. A leading scholar of constitutionalism, populism, and democratic erosion, Professor Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could have existential consequences for Israel’s liberal-democratic future.

Reflecting on the possibility of Netanyahu remaining in power, Professor Roznai states: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” His warning extends beyond institutional deterioration to the potential departure of Israel’s educated and liberal population. “I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years,” he observes, pointing to the already significant emigration of academics, doctors, and other professionals.

Professor Roznai situates these concerns within a broader analysis of populist constitutionalism. Although Israel has not yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism, he argues that its democratic institutions remain vulnerable to executive encroachment. As he explains, “The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.” He identifies the judiciary, independent legal authorities, and civil society as essential safeguards against the concentration of political power.

Drawing on comparative experiences, Professor Roznai argues that a post-Netanyahu Israel would resemble Poland more than Hungary, primarily because of the fragmentation of its opposition and the complexities of coalition formation. Unlike Hungary, where Péter Magyar emerged as a dominant opposition leader, Israel’s alternative political camp encompasses ideologically diverse parties from the left, center, and right, alongside Arab parties. Even if Netanyahu loses, Professor Roznai cautions, the resulting government would struggle to pursue a unified agenda of democratic restoration. “From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary,” he observes, emphasizing that Israel would not have “a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition.” Such fragmentation could complicate efforts to reverse institutional abuses and strengthen democratic safeguards.

Professor Roznai also cautions against assuming that Netanyahu’s electoral defeat would automatically restore democratic governance. “That will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning,” he emphasizes. Meaningful restoration, in his assessment, would require completing Israel’s Bill of Rights, strengthening constitutional safeguards, protecting judicial independence, and rebuilding democratic literacy through education.

Ultimately, his assessment presents the coming elections not simply as a contest over political leadership but as a critical juncture in the struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity, democratic institutions, and long-term national future.

Here is our interview with Professor Yaniv Roznai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu Has Used Polarization to Weaken Commitment to Democratic Values

Professor Roznai, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent research on Israel’s democratic crisis. In your study with Noam Gidron, “Israel – Populism, Polarization and the Crisis of Democracy,” you identify the interaction between populist leadership, affective polarization, and institutional vulnerability as a major driver of democratic backsliding. How has Netanyahu exploited these dynamics, and has Israel crossed the threshold from democratic erosion toward competitive authoritarianism?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Thank you for this question. The relationship between populism and polarization has been particularly interesting in the Israeli case. Since the early days of the current government, in late 2022 and early 2023, we have seen attempts to undermine various mechanisms of checks and balances. The main target has been the judiciary, but the government has also sought to weaken independent media, institutional gatekeepers such as the Attorney General and the Ombudsman for the Judiciary, civil society organizations, and others.

Of course, the gravest attack has been on the courts, through attempts to limit judicial review and capture the judiciary. Some of these attempts have failed because of the truly outstanding protest movement that emerged in 2023, when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets against the judicial overhaul and Netanyahu.

What is particularly interesting, however, is how Netanyahu has used polarization. Various surveys conducted in 2023 asked Likud voters whether they supported the proposed constitutional reforms concerning the judiciary. About one-third said they did not support them. Let’s put them aside.

The remaining two-thirds supported the reforms. When asked why they supported these changes to the judiciary—whether because they regarded judges as detached elites or believed democracy was simply about the will of the majority—the strongest predictor of support was how much they loved Netanyahu and how much they hated the opposition. In other words, it was about love and hate. It was about affective polarization.

This analysis worries me greatly because it creates an incentive for populist leaders who want to introduce reforms harmful to democracy and capture the judiciary to deepen polarization. The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.

This is precisely the dynamic we have seen in Israel. On the one hand, Netanyahu has attempted to advance major reforms that would undermine democracy. On the other, he has sought to deepen polarization so that his political base would not punish him for those reforms. This is the mutual symbiosis between populism and polarization that we have observed in Israel.

Now, I do not think Israel has yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism. We are not there yet, particularly because Netanyahu has failed to implement the vast majority of his program. He has failed to capture the judiciary and to remove the independent Attorney General. We still have relatively independent media and a very strong civil society.

We can discuss this further later, but we have seen how civil society has organized to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive. Netanyahu has certainly managed to enact various problematic laws and undermine civil society in significant ways. I believe we are clearly experiencing democratic erosion, or democratic backsliding.

However, we have not yet crossed that threshold. If Netanyahu is elected again and the same coalition remains in power, it will be a different ballgame. Then, it will be game over for Israel’s liberal democratic project. That is why I very much hope the coming elections will bring about major change.

Personalized Loyalty to Netanyahu Threatens Democratic Rotation of Power

Your research suggests that emotional attachment to Netanyahu and hostility toward his opponents predict support for the judicial overhaul more strongly than ideological commitments. Does this indicate that Netanyahuism has become a form of personalized authoritarian populism in which loyalty to the leader supersedes constitutional principles?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: The answer to that question is certainly yes. It’s quite remarkable. You see this in various street surveys in which voters are asked, “Who are you going to vote for?” And they respond, “Oh, I will vote for Netanyahu.”

When asked, “But wait, he has proposed reforms that could undermine your rights. He hasn’t really won the war in Gaza. Hamas is still standing. We know the situation with thousands of soldiers serving in the reserves, while he is allowing the ultra-Orthodox not to serve in the military. How can you still support him?” people simply respond, “I support Netanyahu because that’s what I do. I just support Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

Even when you discuss specific policies, it doesn’t matter. Real-world facts make no difference. Democratic or constitutional values make no difference. It’s entirely personal: “We want Netanyahu. He is all we know. My parents voted for Netanyahu, and I will vote for Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

This is deeply frustrating in a democracy because it raises a fundamental question: How are we supposed to convince one another and maintain some form of democratic rotation of power if, regardless of what happens, one side of the political spectrum continues to vote for the same person simply because of who he is?

Israel’s Coalition Has Sought to Create a ‘Frankenstate’

In “Populist Constitutionalism and the Judicial Overhaul in Israel,” written with Amichai Cohen, you argue that Israel’s institutional architecture makes it particularly vulnerable to populist capture. How have the absence of a rigid constitution, unicameralism, and concentrated executive power facilitated Netanyahu’s attempts to weaken democratic checks and balances?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a good question. To answer it, I’ll start with how Netanyahu has been abusing comparative constitutional law. The main pillars of the judicial overhaul were to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee so that the coalition would control the appointment of all judges; limit the courts’ authority to review laws; enact an override clause that would allow a majority of members of parliament to override various decisions of the Court; change the status and independence of legal advisors in government; and weaken administrative judicial review by abolishing the reasonableness doctrine, which is central to Israeli administrative law.

I emphasize this because one of the key arguments Netanyahu and his coalition members used to justify these reforms was comparative law. Netanyahu repeatedly says, “But look, in the United States, politicians select the judges. Is the US not a democracy? In Canada, there is an override clause. We simply want to enact a similar override clause. What, Canada is not a democracy? In the UK, the courts cannot strike down laws. What, the UK is not a democracy?”

Essentially, the coalition has been doing what Kim Lane Scheppele calls the “Frankenstate.” Through what Rosalind Dixon and David Landau describe as “abusive borrowing,” elements are borrowed from different countries and combined to create a monster state rather than a functioning liberal democracy.

This brings me to the question of checks and balances. It is true that Canada has an override clause, that politicians in the US select Supreme Court justices, and that the Attorney General in the UK does not have the same authority as in Israel. 

However, when you compare democracies around the world, you find various mechanisms of checks and balances designed to ensure that political power is not concentrated in a single body. These may include a presidential system with veto powers, a federal system with a vertical separation of powers between the central government and the states, or a bicameral legislature with upper and lower houses elected differently. In Europe, there are also supranational institutions.

Israel has none of these mechanisms of political checks and balances. We have a unicameral Knesset controlled by the government. Essentially, five or six politicians who lead the coalition can impose their will through coalition discipline. 

There is also no rigid constitution. In a single day, the Knesset can enact or abolish a Basic Law by a simple majority. For example, Basic Law: Human Dignity or Basic Law: The Judiciary could be abolished in a single day by an ordinary majority, even by a vote of two to one.

Because of this weak system of checks and balances, we must be very cautious when making comparative arguments. Given the weakness of Israel’s political checks and balances, the only real constraints on political power are the judiciary and the Attorney General. That is precisely why these institutions are relatively strong in Israel. If you weaken them, you risk creating an unlimited government with absolute powers. That was the fundamental danger of the judicial overhaul.

Netanyahu’s Judicial Overhaul Was Designed to Give His Government Absolute Power

Your work distinguishes legitimate constitutional reform from abusive constitutionalism. Looking at the Netanyahu government’s judicial overhaul since 2023, which measures most clearly reveal an effort to consolidate executive power rather than improve democratic governance?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is true. I’m the last person in Israel who would argue that the judicial system needs no reform, that the office of the Attorney General should remain untouched, or that no changes should be made to constitutional review mechanisms. I’m not saying that the system is perfect.

The problem is that Netanyahu’s reforms had nothing to do with the issues that actually needed correction. The purpose of his judicial overhaul was to provide his government with absolute power, without any mechanisms of checks and balances. That was the fundamental problem, and my concern was precisely the concentration of absolute power in the executive.

We’ll probably discuss this further later, but I believe various constitutional reforms are needed to improve the system. The judicial overhaul, however, was not about such improvements. It was entirely abusive because it would have undermined the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the very democratic identity of the state. It would also have severely undermined, if not completely destroyed, judicial independence. In that respect, it was fundamentally abusive, unfortunately.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel’s constitutional system is extremely flexible, making it remarkably easy to enact a Basic Law. To give you some numbers, Israel has undergone more constitutional changes in the past decade than the United States has experienced throughout its entire history. Since the enactment of our first Basic Law, we have had more than 140 constitutional changes.

Many of these changes have involved ad hoc, personalized amendments, sometimes even temporary ones, introduced for the benefit of incumbents, political convenience, or the government’s narrow political interests. Unfortunately, this is a deeply abusive practice.

Democratic Erosion Has Shifted from Major Constitutional Reforms to Incremental Institutional Changes

In “From the Hungarian Blitz to the Polish Salami,” you describe how Israel’s judicial overhaul shifted from rapid institutional transformation to incremental democratic erosion. Has this strategy proved more effective under the cover of the Gaza war, particularly through changes to judicial appointments and the weakening of independent legal authorities?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is indeed the case. In early 2023, Netanyahu’s government, primarily through Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, announced a sweeping judicial reform on national television. This triggered a civil backlash and an unprecedented protest movement, with hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets every week for 10 months to demonstrate against the judicial overhaul.

In mid-2023, these protests prompted Netanyahu to enter negotiations with the opposition under the auspices of the president. When those negotiations failed, the coalition changed its modus operandi. Instead of pursuing a single major package of constitutional reforms, it adopted what I call the “salami system”—introducing changes slice by slice.

The first slice came in July 2023 with the abolition of the reasonableness doctrine in administrative review. This amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary was subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court in early 2024. However, as the coalition itself indicated, this was merely the amuse-bouche, the first dish in a series of reforms that would follow.

Following October 7 and the war in Gaza, the coalition changed its approach entirely. Rather than pursuing major constitutional reforms, it shifted toward subconstitutional measures, including ordinary laws, regulations, secondary legislation, and, above all, administrative actions, particularly concerning appointments and civil society.

Let me briefly outline the various measures undertaken after October 7, although I can elaborate on each of them if you wish. The government refused to appoint a president of the Supreme Court according to the seniority rule and subsequently refused to recognize Justice Amit’s appointment as president. It does not recognize him as president of the Supreme Court and refuses to address him by that title. The government has also failed to fill four Supreme Court vacancies since October 2023, leaving only 11 justices instead of 15.

The coalition also unlawfully attempted to dismiss the Attorney General and enacted legislation undermining the authority of that office. In 2025, it changed the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. For many months, the Minister of Justice refused to convene the committee until the Supreme Court compelled him to do so.

The government also changed the law governing the Ombudsman for the Judiciary and the procedure for appointing the Civil Service Commissioner. It introduced legislation to weaken the Israeli Bar Association. The police underwent extensive politicization, primarily through appointments.

In addition, the coalition enacted legislation undermining independent media and made various attempts to ban political parties.

So, what we have witnessed is a broad package of legislative and administrative measures rather than a few sweeping constitutional reforms. That is the fundamental difference.

The Supreme Court and Incremental Democratic Erosion

In your article “When the First Brick Falls of the Fortress of Democracy,” you argue that courts must resist even the earliest stages of authoritarian constitutional change. Has Israel’s Supreme Court adequately defended its institutional independence, or has incremental executive encroachment already weakened its capacity to protect democracy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a serious problem around the world, not just in Israel. We know that democratic erosion occurs incrementally, step by step. I often refer to what I call the “bald guy paradox.” Imagine a person with a full head of hair who removes one hair every day. We know that eventually this person will become bald, but when exactly can we say that he is bald? We cannot identify the precise day. Democratic erosion works in exactly the same way.

You weaken the courts a little, independent media a little, the opposition, the ombudsman, and civil society. But at what point does this gradual weakening transform a country from a democracy into an autocracy? It is very difficult to draw that line. That is precisely the problem.

Various constitutional doctrines, such as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine and eternity clauses, are ill-equipped to address this kind of incremental erosion. These doctrines tend to envision a single amendment that explicitly transforms a country into something other than a democracy.

Consider France in July 1940, when a single law granted Marshal Pétain both executive and legislative authority, effectively concentrating all powers in his hands. But this is no longer how democratic erosion typically occurs. We are unlikely to see such an explicit law. Instead, we see multiple laws that, slowly but surely, undermine and ultimately destroy democracy. Courts must therefore recognize this process in their jurisprudence.

They need to shift their judicial thinking away from examining only the individual amendment or law before them. Instead, they must adopt a more aggregated, cumulative approach that also considers the broader context.

This is what I argued in July 2023, when the Knesset enacted a Basic Law amendment undermining the reasonableness doctrine. I maintained that the Court should examine this amendment within its broader context. There were already various other laws awaiting enactment, but the crucial question was why the government was so determined to abolish the reasonableness doctrine.

The reason was that, without the reasonableness doctrine, the government could remove other institutional gatekeepers, most importantly the Attorney General. Once the Attorney General was removed, the government could interfere with elections and pursue other measures. This is why such amendments must be examined within their broader context.

Here, I must say that the Court refused to adopt the idea of aggregated judicial review. Nonetheless, it struck down the amendment concerning reasonableness. The Court concluded that, even when examined on its own, the amendment so seriously undermined the rule of law and the separation of powers that it had to be declared, for the first time in Israel’s history, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.

So, notwithstanding the various attacks it has faced over the past four years, the Court has remained quite strong and has resisted these threats whenever it could.

Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and the Rise of the Far Right

The political empowerment of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich has elevated religious ultranationalism within Israel’s governing institutions. Are these actors merely radical coalition partners, or do they represent a more fundamental project to replace liberal constitutionalism with an exclusionary, ethno-religious conception of sovereignty?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s an extremely important and troubling question. If you had asked me five years ago, I would have said, “Look, Ben-Gvir is extremely radical. He’s a clown. He has no support.” In earlier election campaigns, Netanyahu himself refused even to be photographed with Ben-Gvir because he was regarded as such an extreme outlier.

Unfortunately, I don’t think that is the case anymore. After four years in power and the trauma of October 7, significant segments of Israeli society have moved further toward the extreme right.

I also want to emphasize the role of social media. Ben-Gvir has been remarkably clever in his use of social media, particularly in influencing young people and young voters. You can now go into schools and hear children shouting “Ben-Gvir” and expressing their support for him. He has been extremely effective on social media, which I find quite frightening.

I’m afraid that Ben-Gvir is gaining more and more supporters. What is particularly troubling is the damage he has done to the police, the fact that Netanyahu has not removed him from office, and the fact that the Court has allowed his appointment to stand rather than removing him. We should remember that this man, who serves as Minister of National Security, has a criminal conviction for assisting a terrorist organization.

To me, this is a complete disaster. Unfortunately, I expect his political support to grow in the coming elections. I can no longer dismiss him as some kind of clown—an extreme figure with no meaningful support. That situation has fundamentally changed over the past few years.

Religious Nationalism and the Coalition Against Judicial Independence

Religious Zionist parties, ultra-Orthodox movements, and Likud approach questions of Jewish identity, religious authority, military service, and territorial sovereignty differently. Despite these differences, have they formed a durable illiberal alliance against judicial independence and constitutional limitations on majority power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: A useful way to analyze what has been happening in Israel over the past four years, particularly regarding the attacks on democracy, is to examine the different interests of the groups that formed the current coalition.

On the one hand, you have extreme groups led by figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. These parties have been pushing for annexation and the deepening of the occupation of the occupied territories. That is one group.

Another powerful group is the ultra-Orthodox. Their primary concerns are twofold: first, securing exemptions from military service for their communities; and second, obtaining budgets for their population through discriminatory budget allocations.

The Supreme Court has been the only central institution that has so far blocked these initiatives—deepening the occupation, exemptions from military service, and discriminatory budget allocations. This explains why these two groups within the coalition have such a strong incentive to weaken or capture the Court, or to introduce an override clause that would allow the coalition to override its decisions.

There are two additional incentives. First, there are people within the coalition, such as Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, who are genuine ideologues. They are populists who believe that democracy is essentially the will of the majority. Their thinking is: “We have the majority. We won the elections. That means we represent the people, and we can do whatever we want because we have the authority of popular sovereignty.” These are genuine ideological convictions.

Then there is Netanyahu. We must remember that he has been undergoing a criminal trial for several years. Previously, Netanyahu had blocked meaningful attempts to undermine the judiciary. It is only since facing his own criminal trial that he has been willing to give the Minister of Justice a blank check to undermine the judiciary and the Attorney General. These developments are interconnected.

If the Attorney General is dismissed and Netanyahu can appoint whomever he wants to that position, the consequences could be significant. In Israel, the Attorney General also heads the prosecution. There is no separation between the offices of Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor; they are effectively the same position.

A newly appointed Attorney General could therefore stop Netanyahu’s criminal trial or at least negotiate a favorable deal for him. This is one of Netanyahu’s major incentives, and it illustrates how these interests are connected.

This provides a useful framework for understanding the situation. And absolutely, the ultra-Orthodox, through their ambition to expand the role of religion in public life and the public sphere, are also directly challenging the liberal and secular way of life. This is certainly a struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity.

The Gaza War Weakened Democratic Protests

In your analysis of the judicial overhaul after October 7, you argue that the security crisis facilitated rather than suspended the government’s populist constitutional project. How did the Hamas attacks and subsequent war weaken democratic resistance while enabling further concentration of executive power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting question because, in the days following October 7, many people in Israel, myself included, believed the judicial overhaul was over. We were convinced that, given the grave security threats, the trauma of October 7, the challenges of the war, and the hundreds of thousands of people displaced from northern and southern Israel, the government would focus on what really mattered: security, the economy, the hostages, and the wounded. We assumed it would set aside its plans and ambitions concerning the judicial system.

But I was wrong. During the first few months of the war, we had a unity government, and during that period, the government indeed pursued only legislation related to the war, rather than other matters. However, soon after the unity government collapsed, the government resumed its attacks on democracy under the fog of war. Essentially, the coalition used the war as an excuse to continue its judicial overhaul.

First, we saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were responsible for October 7. Instead of acknowledging responsibility, the government argued, “It’s because of the Court’s activism, because of Aharon Barak, and because of the legal advisors who tie the hands of the IDF that October 7 happened.”

We also saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were assisting Hamas. Whenever the Supreme Court heard petitions concerning humanitarian aid to Gaza, for example, the government accused the Court of assisting Hamas and being “Nukhba lovers.”

We also need to consider the broader impact on the media and civil society. As I mentioned earlier, throughout 2023, we had major weekly protests against the judicial overhaul for 10 months. But during the war, people were much less willing to take to the streets to protest against the government.

Especially during wartime, we see what is known as the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. People tend to unite around the government rather than protest against it. Although demonstrations continued, they were nowhere near the scale of those before the war. Tens of thousands of people were serving in the military reserves, while others were preoccupied with the economy or the war itself.

Similarly, media and public attention shifted almost entirely toward the war, particularly the hostages. Even most of the protests focused on ending the war and bringing the hostages home rather than opposing the judicial overhaul.

There are two further points worth emphasizing. First, military reservists had played a crucial role in the protest movement. Many had declared that if the judicial overhaul were enacted, they would refuse to serve in the reserves under a dictatorship.

However, during the war, there was understandably enormous reluctance to use military service as a means of protest.

Second, we need to recognize that populism in Israel, unlike in Europe or the United States, is very much security-based. There is an excellent article by Yonatan Levy and Shai Agmon, Security-Based Populism, which shows how the Israeli government has employed friend-versus-enemy rhetoric primarily around questions of security rather than economic or cultural issues.

So, of course, security threats enabled the government to deepen its populist project.

Netanyahu Has Used the War to Strengthen His Political Power

The October 7 attacks exposed profound failures of Israel’s security establishment and political leadership. Yet Netanyahu remains electorally competitive. Has the politics of existential insecurity enabled him to transform accountability for these failures into renewed claims of national leadership and political legitimacy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: It’s quite remarkable. First, we need to understand just how extraordinary the situation is. Netanyahu has refused to establish a national commission of inquiry into the failures that led to October 7. For three years, he has refused to establish such a commission, while managing to instill in his political base a lack of trust and confidence in the Supreme Court and in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry.

Under Israeli law, the government usually decides whether to establish a commission of inquiry, while the President of the Supreme Court appoints its members. Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, “We have no trust in the judiciary. We have no trust in the President of the Court. We don’t recognize the President of the Court.” This, in turn, has generated distrust in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry. I believe that undermining confidence in the President of the Court was part of his intention.

Why does he refuse to establish a commission of inquiry? Because he knows he bears responsibility for October 7. There were dozens of threats and warnings before the attacks, and he ignored them all. He continued providing millions of dollars to Hamas because he wanted to preserve the separation between Gaza and the Palestinian Authority.

Although he knows he bears responsibility, everyone else has paid some kind of price. Senior officials, including the heads of intelligence and the Shin Bet and the Minister of Security, have resigned from office. Netanyahu is the only one who has remained in power since October 7. He has also refused to call elections following the war. No one in Israel imagined that he would remain in power after the war.

Netanyahu has been using the war to strengthen and entrench his political power, primarily through two strategies.

First, he blames the “deep state.” His argument is essentially: “It was you—the military, the security services, the judges, and the protest movement. You deliberately failed to warn me. You didn’t wake me up on the morning of October 7 because you didn’t want me to respond to the threat. You wanted this to happen so that I would abandon the judicial overhaul and my government would fall.” In other words, he blames the deep state for October 7.

Second, he argues, “Look, even if there were failures before October 7, from October 8 onward, I was the one fighting. I fought against Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Hamas. I was the only one who fought. Everyone else wanted to surrender or give up. I’m the only one who can continue fighting.”

It’s interesting how he makes this shift. Essentially, he claims, “From October 8 onward, I have been the best leader, and no one can replace me.” Unfortunately, many people in Israel still accept what he is telling them. And here, we need to say something about the media.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel still has free and independent media. However, Netanyahu also has what I would describe as his own propaganda channel, Channel 14. It is a propaganda channel par excellence, conveying Netanyahu’s messages almost exclusively. Unfortunately, for many people, this is the only news channel they watch. As a result, his messages and slogans continue to resonate throughout the public sphere.

Developments in the Occupied Territories Are Undermining Democracy Inside Israel

Israel’s devastating military campaign in Gaza, accompanied by mass civilian casualties, displacement, and allegations of war crimes and genocide, raises profound questions about constitutional democracy. Can Israel meaningfully safeguard liberal-democratic principles domestically while maintaining a system of occupation and denying Palestinians political self-determination?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a profoundly important issue in Israel because, for many years, many Israelis have tried to draw a distinction between what is happening in the occupied territories and what is taking place inside Israel, as if developments in the territories had nothing to do with Israel’s domestic affairs.

For decades, many Israelis maintained the illusion that Israel was a liberal democracy. They acknowledged that there were serious problems in the occupied territories but believed that, domestically, Israel remained a liberal democracy.

However, what we have witnessed since the war demonstrates how difficult it is to maintain this distinction. It is not a binary separation. Developments in the occupied territories are increasingly affecting what happens inside Israel. How can a country sustain its identity as a liberal democracy for decades while maintaining control over other territories through occupation?

I don’t think this situation is sustainable in the long term. It has profound implications for the very project of Israel as a liberal democracy. These issues are interconnected.

On the one hand, we have the negative consequences of the occupation, which undermine Israel’s project as a liberal democracy. On the other hand, as we discussed earlier, we have an increasingly influential religious element within Israeli society that is also growing demographically.

I don’t think a liberal democracy can be sustained indefinitely under these two pressures. So, I hope the next government will be able to bring about meaningful changes in both areas.

Higher Arab Voter Turnout Could Transform Jewish-Arab Political Cooperation

Your constitutional scholarship emphasizes the protection of fundamental rights against unchecked majoritarian power. How does the increasing political marginalization of Palestinian Arab citizens, alongside intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank, expose the tensions between Israel’s Jewish-national character and its democratic commitments?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting and challenging question, particularly because we’ve also witnessed changes within Israel’s Arab minority. About 22 percent of Israeli citizens are Arab Palestinians. They have suffered more than almost any other group under this government, apart from Palestinians in the occupied territories. I’m referring specifically to Arab citizens living within Israel. They have suffered particularly from violence within their communities. Under Ben-Gvir, we’ve seen large numbers of deaths and shooting incidents, with devastating consequences for the Arab population.

The reason I emphasize this is that, until now, the Arab population has shown relatively limited interest in participating in Israeli politics. Voter turnout among Arab citizens in Knesset elections has generally been quite low. Of course, there is another side to this. Until a few years ago, hardly anyone imagined that Arab parties could play a meaningful role in government or become part of a governing coalition. That changed in 2021 with the government of change, when, for the first time, an Arab party, Ra’am, a Muslim party, joined the coalition.

I emphasize this because we may see another change in the coming elections. According to surveys, given the grave situation facing the Arab population, turnout among Arab voters could increase substantially. I certainly hope so. Until recently, we were discussing turnout rates of around 50–55 percent. Now, surveys suggest turnout could reach 65 percent, which would represent a significant change. If that happens, it will be extremely important and send a powerful message.

It would strengthen the visibility of Arab politicians in the Knesset and perhaps encourage greater collaboration between Jewish and Arab parties. More importantly, for the first time, we have a senior Jewish politician, Yoav Segalovich, who previously served as Deputy Chief of Police and was a member of the major political party Yesh Atid. He has now moved to become the number two candidate in Ra’am, the Muslim Arab party, and is its candidate to replace Ben-Gvir as Minister of National Security.

If Ra’am supports the next government and Segalovich becomes Minister of National Security as a representative of that party, it would be an extraordinary example of Jewish-Arab collaboration. I very much hope the coming elections will also bring meaningful change in the relationship between Arab voters, the broader Arab population, and Jewish political parties.

I should also remind your audience that Israel, like Germany and Turkey, has a legal mechanism for banning political parties. Last month, the plenary of the Central Elections Committee voted to ban all Arab parties—parties representing more than 20 percent of the population. This was purely political propaganda because the coalition knew the decision would be overturned by the Court.

Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the decision. But this created a win-win situation for the coalition because it could then accuse the Court of supporting Arabs and terrorists, and so on. From the coalition’s perspective, it was a win-win situation. It was simply political propaganda. Nevertheless, this episode reveals the zeitgeist of the current Israeli coalition toward the Arab minority, which I find deeply saddening.

Netanyahu Could Refuse to Recognize Election Results if He Loses

In your June 2026 article “The Populist Coalition in Israel Is Stressed from Orbán’s Loss and Is Gaslighting,” you examine the implications of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat for Netanyahu’s coalition. What lessons does Hungary’s experience offer regarding the defeat of entrenched populist leaders, electoral integrity, and the prospects for democratic restoration in Israel?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: After Orbán lost the elections in Hungary, several members of the Israeli coalition, including Simcha Rothman, chair of the Constitution Committee and one of the leaders of the judicial overhaul, said, “You, Professor Yaniv Roznai, and the protesters were lying to us throughout 2023. You warned that we would become an autocratic government, like Poland or Hungary. But look, Poland held elections and experienced a rotation of power. Now Orbán has lost the elections in Hungary. So what kind of dictatorship have you been trying to convince us we were becoming?”

I tried to explain what had actually happened in Hungary. I also traveled there during the elections to observe and learn from the experience. My point was that Hungary was not an autocracy like North Korea, but its electoral system was neither genuinely competitive nor free and fair. I explained the various ways Orbán had manipulated the electoral system during his 16 years in power. Israel’s situation is different. Institutionally and structurally, Israel still has a competitive electoral system.

That is precisely why I am concerned that Netanyahu and his coalition, lacking substantial public support and certainly not enjoying majority support, will resort to various manipulations and tricks to undermine electoral integrity in the coming elections. We have already seen the creation of fake videos, including deepfakes, designed to influence voters. We know that personal data on voters is being collected in attempts to influence them.

We also know about plans involving intimidation at polling stations, including the possibility of gangs threatening voters, particularly in Arab cities and villages, to discourage Arab citizens from voting. So, there are various plans that concern us. But what I find remarkable about these elections, something we have not witnessed in previous elections, is that civil society has redirected the enormous energy of the 2023 protest movement toward protecting electoral integrity.

We now have tens of thousands of volunteers. To give you an idea of the scale, according to official figures from the Central Elections Committee, 270,000 people have applied to serve as polling station secretaries to ensure that voting is conducted according to the rules. That is an extraordinary number.

Similarly, in the nonprofit civil society organization I work with to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive, tens of thousands of people have expressed interest in volunteering as observers, either inside or outside polling stations, to prevent violence, intimidation, cheating, and other irregularities.

For the first time in Israel’s history, civil society has organized on such a scale to safeguard free and fair elections. This mobilization reflects our concern that Netanyahu may attempt various forms of electoral manipulation.

Over the past six months, we have also witnessed a campaign by Netanyahu and his coalition members to undermine public confidence in the Central Elections Committee and in the electoral process itself. For example, they have portrayed the chair of the Central Elections Committee, who is actually a religious conservative Supreme Court judge, as an extreme left-wing figure. They claim, “This extreme left-wing guy wants to steal the elections.” That is, of course, ridiculous.

But this is the campaign they have been conducting. It appears designed to prepare the ground for what might happen afterward, particularly if Netanyahu loses and refuses to recognize the results. We have seen what happened with Bolsonaro in Brazil and the events at the US Capitol involving Donald Trump. I am concerned that we could witness similar developments in Israel, with Netanyahu refusing to recognize the election results if he loses.

A Post-Netanyahu Government Would Resemble Poland More Than Hungary

Recent polling suggests a highly fragmented electoral landscape, with Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar challenging Likud and opposition parties confronting difficult coalition arithmetic. Given Netanyahu’s resilience and the potential parliamentary importance of Arab parties, which post-election scenarios appear most plausible—and what risks do you foresee for electoral legitimacy and a peaceful transfer of power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is an issue we are all struggling with. Although Netanyahu and Likud have been dramatically weakened since the previous elections, and certainly since October 7, Netanyahu’s bloc remains very homogeneous, united under a single leader: Netanyahu.

On the other hand, the opposition, despite leading in the polls, is highly fragmented. We have Gadi Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, the Democrats, Lieberman, and the Arab parties. These are different political forces, and they cannot agree on a single candidate. Anyone hoping that the next government will be a coalition of change, entirely different from the current coalition and capable of reversing all the problematic laws that have been enacted, shifting Israel toward liberal democracy, and strengthening judicial independence, will probably be disappointed.

Even if Netanyahu steps down and another coalition takes power, it will be a very diverse coalition rather than a homogeneous one, bringing together left-wing and right-wing parties. Advancing a common agenda under such circumstances would be extremely challenging.

From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary. We would not have a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition. That simply would not be the case.

The situation would be especially challenging if Arab parties were part of the coalition, given the delegitimization of the Arab population by Netanyahu and his political allies. Maintaining a strong coalition that depends on the support of Arab parties would be particularly difficult.

So, I do not envision a scenario in which we could simply say, “That’s it. Like Péter Magyar in Hungary, we’ll win the elections, and then we can do whatever we want.” That is not how things would work.

One possible scenario is that Netanyahu loses and a new, highly complex coalition emerges, one that would have to navigate competing interests and political differences.

A second possibility is some form of national unity government, with or without Netanyahu. One scenario involves Netanyahu receiving a pardon from the president, which could restore his political legitimacy, at least to some extent. Currently, other parties refuse to cooperate with him because he is undergoing a criminal trial.

If he receives a presidential pardon, he would no longer be facing that trial, which would also allow him to serve as a minister. We could therefore imagine a mixed coalition in which Likud joins other Zionist parties to form a national unity government.

Another scenario is that no party or bloc succeeds in forming a government, leading to another cycle of elections. Remember that between 2019 and 2022, Israel held five rounds of elections. That was extraordinary.

Imagine continuing to hold elections while Netanyahu remains prime minister of successive caretaker governments. This is a scenario I very much hope we can avoid.

People understand that these are among the most consequential elections in Israel’s history. Thousands upon thousands of Israelis living abroad, myself included, are returning to Israel specifically to vote. I do not expect this level of mobilization to continue if we enter another prolonged cycle of elections. That is why I sincerely hope the election results will be decisive.

Post-Populist Populism and Democratic Restoration

In your work on post-populist populism, you warn that governments succeeding populist incumbents may reproduce their predecessors’ illiberal governing practices. If Netanyahu loses on October 27, what constitutional reforms would be essential to prevent a new government from perpetuating the institutional abuses it was elected to reverse?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a challenge we see around the world. Professor Amichai Cohen and I wrote a blog post on post-populist populism, and we are now editing a special volume of Constitutional Studies on this topic, bringing together experts from around the world. Post-populism presents a fundamental rule-of-law challenge. On the one hand, you want to restore democracy. Let’s say a populist leader loses an election, and a post-populist government comes to power with the aim of restoring democracy.

But the judiciary has been captured by political judges appointed by the previous government. You have civil servants who are either controlled by or allied with the previous government. You also have media organizations that have been politicized and brought under its control. What do you do to dismantle these structures?

If you start dismissing civil servants and judges or attempting to capture the courts yourself, you risk falling into the trap of using exactly the same methods as the populists. You also expose yourself to accusations such as, “Aha, when we captured the courts, you called it populism, fascism, or dictatorship. But when you do the same thing, it’s acceptable because you’re the good guys. How do you explain that?”

This is the rule-of-law dilemma. The problem is that populism corrupts the entire political playing field, while the populist toolkit remains available. Resisting the temptation to use those tools is an enormous challenge. You want to use them, but for good purposes. This creates a dilemma that we are still not sure how to resolve.

Of course, much depends on how deeply the system has already been corrupted. In Hungary, after 16 years, the corruption is so deeply entrenched that correcting it will take years, and decisive action will be necessary. Looking at Poland and Hungary, one important lesson is that an incoming government has a very narrow window of opportunity during which it has the legitimacy to act quickly and decisively. If it fails to act within that window, it may lose the ability to act effectively.

For a new Israeli government, this means addressing the most pressing issues immediately. Take, for example, the 2025 amendment concerning the Judicial Selection Committee, which completely politicized the system. I believe one of the first things the new government must do is repeal that amendment and restore the status quo ante.

In terms of procedure and due process, there is an important distinction between introducing an entirely new reform and repealing an existing amendment to restore the previous situation. The latter can be accomplished much more quickly. So, I believe the new government must act rapidly on two priorities: establishing a commission of inquiry into October 7 and repealing the three or four principal judicial overhaul laws that were enacted. 

However, when it comes to pursuing more comprehensive reforms, the government must proceed much more carefully to secure the legitimacy required for such changes, especially if it lacks a substantial parliamentary majority. If it has only a narrow majority, I fear that undertaking sweeping reforms would be extremely risky. Nevertheless, it would need to entrench the essential constitutional safeguards to ensure that another judicial overhaul cannot be carried out in the near future.

Trump’s Endorsement Is Unlikely to Change Deeply Polarized Electoral Landscape

What will be the impact of US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Oct. 27 elections?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, we’ve seen Trump’s intervention in the Israeli elections through his endorsement of Netanyahu. Let me make a few observations. First, we also witnessed US intervention on behalf of Orbán in Hungary, and it did not help him. In fact, it may have made things worse for Orbán.

In Israel, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will have the same negative effect because Trump is very popular among Israelis. However, I also don’t believe it will make a significant difference. Israeli society is so deeply polarized that voters rarely move between the pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu camps. Such shifts are particularly unlikely just a week before the elections. So, I don’t expect the endorsement to bring about any major change.

There is also an interesting possibility that I’ve heard discussed. According to a media report published today, Netanyahu wanted to launch an attack on Iran, but Trump prevented him from doing so. One possibility is that Trump’s public endorsement of Netanyahu’s candidacy was offered in exchange for Netanyahu refraining from attacking Iran. I don’t know whether that’s the case. It’s an assumption I’ve heard, and it sounds plausible to me. Nevertheless, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will make a substantial difference.

Defeating Netanyahu Would Be Only the Beginning of Restoring Israeli Democracy

And lastly, Professor Roznai, looking beyond the elections, would Netanyahu’s defeat and the exclusion of the religious-nationalist far right constitute a genuine democratic turning point, or would meaningful restoration require a deeper constitutional settlement addressing judicial independence, minority rights, executive accountability, and Palestinian self-determination? Are Israel’s democratic institutions sufficiently resilient to withstand another Netanyahu government?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s the million-dollar question. My analysis is that even if Netanyahu loses the elections and the alternative camp—what we call the camp of change or the camp of restoring democracy—wins, that will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning.

To truly restore democracy in Israel, we need to undertake various reforms, beginning at the institutional level. First, we must complete our Bill of Rights. Unlike other countries, Israel does not have a comprehensive Bill of Rights. For example, fundamental constitutional rights, such as equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, are not formally enshrined in a Basic Law. We need to complete the Bill of Rights and introduce a Basic Law on legislation that would stabilize our constitutional system. Such a law should ensure that enacting or amending a Basic Law requires a supermajority, as is the case in other countries. Institutionally, we must also strengthen checks and balances and other independent institutional gatekeepers. These are essential reforms at the constitutional level.

But we also need to do much more in education. For many years, we have neglected education about democracy and democratic literacy. Regardless of how strong or independent the Court may be, or how rigid our Basic Laws become, democracy cannot survive without committed small-d democrats—citizens who understand the importance of liberal democracy and what it truly means. So, we have important work to do at both the constitutional and educational levels. We need to strengthen the understanding of liberal democracy within Israeli society.

My aspiration is to establish a unified stream of education. You need to understand that Israel currently has different educational streams: a religious stream, an Arab stream, and a more secular stream. What is remarkable is that large numbers of children in Israeli schools have little understanding of democracy or liberal democracy, while Arab children often have little understanding of what it means to live in a Jewish state. We need a unified educational framework that explains to students that they live in a state that is both Jewish and democratic, and how these two potentially conflicting values are supposed to coexist.

I believe it will take years to repair the damage that the current coalition has inflicted on Israel. And the only way to begin that process of correction and democratic restoration is to win the elections. That is the first step.

I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years. That would be a disaster. Already, tens of thousands have left, many of them liberals, academics, and doctors. There was a cartoon in one of the Israeli newspapers depicting a flight attendant asking, “Is there a doctor on the plane?” And everyone on the plane was raising their hands. It’s funny, but at the same time, it isn’t funny because it’s not merely a joke; it reflects reality. I know many academics who have already left Israel, and I’m deeply concerned that many more will leave if another Netanyahu coalition takes power.

According to a recent survey published by News Channel 12, approximately a quarter of opposition voters said they would consider leaving the country if Netanyahu wins. That is an extraordinary number. So, I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.