In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja introduces the notion of “survival populism” to capture how environmental crisis and material insecurity are reshaping democratic politics in the Global South. Moving beyond conventional ideational approaches, the article foregrounds lived experiences of hardship—linking fuel price shocks, flooding, energy insecurity, and inflation to moral claims about fairness, state responsibility, and distributive justice. Through the case of Nigeria, Dr. Solaja demonstrates how climate-related disruptions and policy reforms converge to erode institutional trust and reconfigure political contestation. Rather than rejecting climate policy per se, citizens contest its unequal burdens. The article thus reframes democratic distress as rooted in distributive conflict, offering a compelling framework for understanding how ecological crisis fuels new forms of populist mobilization and legitimacy crises.
In much of the Global South, the politics of survival and the politics of environmental crisis have become deeply intertwined. What were once distinct policy domains—the politics of fuel prices, flood mitigation, food inflation, waste accumulation, and energy insecurity—have converged into a single, lived experience of persistent hardship. For millions of citizens, the environmental crisis is not primarily defined by climate reports, international negotiations, or adaptation frameworks, but by submerged homes, rising transport costs, prolonged electricity outages, disrupted livelihoods, and escalating prices for basic goods.
Within such contexts of livelihood insecurity, ecological degradation takes on political meaning. Citizens come to see hardship not just as the result of misfortune or climatic fluctuation, but as an instance of unequal protection, institutional neglect and democratic distance. Under such conditions, public politics enters a new phase: a populism of survival emerges.
“Populism of survival” names a distinct mode of political interpretation that links environmental and economic distress to moral claims about state responsibility, fairness, and sacrifice. It departs from classical theories of populism by foregrounding the lived experience of hardship. Unlike the variants often associated with populist mobilizations in the Global North and East—typically structured around a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite”—populism of survival is rooted in citizens’ experiences of material insecurity. Fuel becomes political when rising prices constrain mobility and limit access to basic goods; flooding becomes political when relief is inadequate or unevenly distributed; waste becomes political when its unequal management deepens social inequalities and disproportionately endangers already vulnerable populations.
In such contexts, public anger arises not only from opposition to environmental policy reforms but also from citizens’ everyday moral intuitions about who bears the costs of environmental disruption, who is required to pay, and who is protected. The relationship between climate policy and democratic legitimacy begins to erode when policies are perceived as non-distributive or unfair. Increasingly, the roots of climate populism lie in conflicts over how the costs and benefits of environmental transition are allocated. As Harrison (2025) observes, “across many settings, opposition to environmental reforms may stem not from a rejection of climate policies per se, but from opposition to the inequities of how their costs are distributed.”
An illustrative example of these dynamics can be found in Nigeria, where the government removed fuel subsidies in May 2023 and framed the resulting increase in fuel prices as a necessary macroeconomic adjustment. Public discourse surrounding the policy quickly became highly politicized, as rising fuel costs contributed to significant inflation and tightened household budgets. While state officials justified the reform in terms of fiscal discipline and economic rationalization, many citizens interpreted it through a moral lens: why should those at the bottom struggle to make ends meet while those with access to power remain insulated from such burdens? As Gbadebo (2025) argues, public responses to subsidy removal were shaped not only by the material consequences of economic hardship but also by concerns over governmental credibility and the plausibility of promised developmental outcomes.
These processes were intensified by other long-standing environmental and structural vulnerabilities and crises that now affected a wider portion of society than in past years. Following the floods that devastated numerous states—destroying livelihoods, homes, and arable lands—rising costs merged with food insecurity and frequent blackouts to form an inseparable social and ecological predicament. The state could no longer frame this predicament as exclusively “natural” or solely as the outcome of a natural disaster or poor market conditions. The experience was one of combined, cumulative crisis, and the credibility of the state in addressing such predicaments is tied to its performance on both fronts.
Flooding has, in particular, emerged as a major site of citizen dissatisfaction and a potent factor driving democratic distress. Displaced communities that have lost homes and productive capacity immediately feel cheated when the amount or distribution of government aid seems to reproduce and reinforce existing patterns of social inequality, and they begin to ask why state assistance appears uneven across communities and is not delivered to them preferentially. Climate policy has entered a phase in which state legitimacy is judged not solely in terms of its objectives or rationale, but also in terms of the effectiveness and fairness of its management of combined environmental and social threats.
Studies such as those by Okonkwo and Ezenwegbu (2024), which find that subsidy removal in Nigeria sparked significant concern among citizens who lacked a clear understanding of mitigation strategies or social protection, as well as analyses of the success and failure of fossil-fuel subsidy reform across various settings by Droste et al (2024), indicate that, when it comes to distributing the burdens of adjustment policies effectively, “technical argumentation alone has rarely been able to overcome such deeply seated mistrust.” The need for state institutions to earn citizens’ confidence through fairness, reciprocity, and demonstrable competence is therefore crucial in contexts with lower levels of public trust.
These issues are exacerbated in countries such as Nigeria, which suffer from chronic failures in infrastructure provision. Hussainzad and Gou (2024) show, for instance, that informality places the burden of adapting to ecological threats onto already existing socio-ecological inequalities. The populism of survival therefore cannot be interpreted solely as a product of irrational or ideological anti-state discourse, but as a request for a visible display of state competence. It requires public recognition from the state that it is aware of how these crises disproportionately affect ordinary citizens and is therefore prepared to demonstrate fairness and protection when such crises occur.
It may or may not amount to explicitly anti-government discourse; but at its core, it expresses a demand for visibility. What citizens seek is not just state intervention, but a demonstration of its commitment to justice when addressing both economic pressures and the demands of adapting to the climate crisis. These developments are interpreted by populists as a crucial and opening field of study centered on real, survival-oriented daily experiences, rather than on the ideologies and leaders of state actors. The main dilemma for democratic governments in the coming decade will be less about acknowledging that an environmental crisis is underway than about fairly distributing the costs of confronting it.
References
Droste, N.; Chatterton, B. & Skovgaard, J. (2024). “A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries.” Nature Communications, 15, 5452.
Gbadebo, A. D. (2025). “The political economy of fuel subsidy removal: Governance and sustainable development in Nigeria.” Journal of Governance and Administrative Reform, 6(1), 1–18.
Hussainzad, E. A., & Gou, Z. (2024). “Climate risk and vulnerability assessment in informal settlements of the Global South: A critical review.” Land, 13(9), 1357.
Okonkwo, A. E., & Ezenwegbu, J. C. (2024). “Removal of petrol subsidies and its impact for democratic governance in Nigeria.” Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 38–47.
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi argues that Hungary’s April 12 election represents a critical test of whether entrenched populist rule can be electorally challenged. While he notes that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” he emphasizes that deeper dynamics—“ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control”—remain decisive. Assoc. Prof. Csehi highlights growing limits in Orbán’s populist discourse, which “has lost its novelty,” alongside shifting political conditions marked by economic grievances and the rise of the Tisza Party as a credible challenger. Yet, even in the event of electoral turnover, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, potentially leading to “a prolonged struggle over state capacity.” Hungary thus offers a crucial case for assessing the resilience and limits of populist governance in Europe.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Csehi, Associate Professor and Program Director of the Political Science Doctoral Program at the Corvinus University of Budapest, offers a nuanced and theoretically grounded assessment of Hungary’s evolving political landscape on the eve of a pivotal electoral contest.
As Hungary approaches its parliamentary elections on April 12, 2026, the country stands at a critical juncture. After sixteen years of rule under Viktor Orbán, the election has come to signify more than routine democratic competition. It represents a broader test of whether entrenched populist governance—characterized by institutional consolidation, discursive dominance, and asymmetrical resource control—can be meaningfully challenged through electoral mechanisms. The campaign unfolds amid deep polarization, intensifying geopolitical tensions, and mounting concerns over democratic resilience, media pluralism, and institutional fairness. At the same time, the emergence of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has introduced a new dynamic into Hungary’s political competition.
Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Csehi underscores that “it will definitely be a test of incumbency survival,” while emphasizing that the stakes extend beyond electoral turnover to questions of “ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control.” In his view, the durability of Hungary’s populist system is no longer assured. He identifies emerging cracks within the governing discourse, noting that “the supply of the populist worldview… has become less creative” and “has lost its novelty,” with the government increasingly relying on repetitive narratives—particularly around the war in Ukraine—to sustain mobilization.
At the same time, structural shifts on both the supply and demand sides of politics are reshaping the electoral terrain. The rise of the Tisza Party, Assoc. Prof. Csehi observes, has created “a new channel for people to express their grievances,”while also reactivating political engagement at the grassroots level. Concurrently, worsening economic conditions have intensified public discontent, as “people’s everyday grievances are rising,” and the government finds it increasingly difficult to externalize responsibility for inflation, corruption, and declining public services.
Assoc. Prof. Csehi’s analysis situates Hungary within a broader comparative framework, highlighting the uncertain trajectory of mature populist regimes. While electoral defeat could mark “the end of the Orbán regime” in formal terms, he cautions that deeply embedded institutional structures may persist, generating “a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture.” Conversely, a renewed victory for Fidesz would signal that such regimes retain significant resilience, even under conditions of economic strain and ideological fatigue.
Ultimately, as Assoc. Prof. Csehi concludes, the Hungarian case offers a critical empirical test: whether “a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed… in an electoral process.” In this sense, Hungary’s 2026 election stands as a defining moment not only for the country itself, but for understanding the resilience—and limits—of populist rule across Europe.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Robert Csehi, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Populist Discourse Losing Creativity
Poster from political party Fidesz showing the opponents of Hungarian PM Viktor Orban surrounding billionaire philanthropist George Soros, Budapest, April 8, 2017.
Professor Csehi, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your scholarship, you argue that Hungarian populism has endured through the continuous reconstruction of “the people,” the redefinition of “the elite,” and the rearticulation of popular sovereignty. In the current campaign, do you still see this triadic logic operating effectively, or are its mobilizational limits beginning to emerge?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I don’t think we do see some limitations to the effectiveness of this renewed populist discourse in Hungary. I think there are fundamentally three changes that actually challenge Orban’s effective populist discourse.
The first one is, in essence, that the supply of the populist worldview in the discourse has become less creative. It has lost its novelty. There were references to the war, for example, in Ukraine already in the 2022 elections—so four years ago. I mean, the war had just broken out, and they already used warmongering during that period. They pushed the campaign to the extreme in 2024 during the European parliamentary elections. They used essentially the same narrative, the same discourse. And they haven’t managed to really renew this discourse, and they keep talking about the same thing. They keep appealing to people’s fear of the war now. So, in comparison to previous elections, where every four years you had a new enemy and a new elite that was conspiring against Hungary and the government, we don’t really see that in 2026 compared to 2022 or 2024. So that’s one major change.
The second one obviously also affects, or concerns, the supply side of politics, and you already mentioned the rise of the opposition Tisza Party, which means there is actually a new channel for people to express their grievances and to mobilize their political demands behind a party which seems to have more legitimacy. It’s probably not the right word, but it resonates with people much better than the old opposition parties, which, on many grounds, have lost the trust of the people over the years—not only because they were ineffective, but also because they were involved in all sorts of scandals throughout the years. And now there is a new party which actually effectively challenges the government on a lot of issues and calls attention to many things that previously the old opposition, as we refer to it now, had not done. Plus, they really go down to the countryside, and they really do talk to people. They are engaging with the people and the electorate, and that makes a huge difference. So these are on the supply side, which are extremely relevant.
And then there is one demand-side feature which really has had a great effect. Since 2022, the Hungarian economy has not been doing very well. So, this has put a lot of things on the political agenda. People’s everyday grievances are rising, from inflation to public services, corruption, etc. It is not like Fidesz or Orban is able to cover these up anymore. We had skyrocketing inflation in the past few years, and it has become extremely difficult for the government to externalize these kinds of problems. And so people don’t shove it off anymore, like, “Oh, well, we’re still doing better no matter what the government does.” “Yeah, they might be corrupt, they might be wrong on certain policy issues, et cetera, et cetera, but we’re still better off than we were four years ago.” They don’t say that anymore. So, effectively, the economy plays a huge role in this entire story as well.
Election Tests Incumbency Survival
To what extent should the April 12 election be understood not merely as a contest between Fidesz and Tisza, but as a broader test of whether long-term populist incumbency can withstand mounting economic pressures, corruption fatigue, and shifting voter expectations?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s a good question. It will definitely be a test of incumbency survival, in a sense, but, in the background, it is really about ideological adaptation, state resource asymmetries, and narrative control—namely, the extent to which these can still be maintained and used to hold power. I’m not sure to what extent these can actually withstand all the structural- and agency-based challenges that I’ve mentioned previously. So, it is going to be an interesting test from a political science perspective as well, to see whether they actually manage to survive or not, and to what extent a mature, populist-authoritarian regime can still be changed or won over in an electoral process. The jury is still out, and I’m really looking forward to seeing what happens afterwards.
EU Framed As Background Enemy
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium on Dec. 13, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
You have shown that Orbán’s Eurosceptic populism often adopts an anti-imperialist framing, portraying Brussels as an external elite constraining Hungarian sovereignty. How central is this narrative in the current campaign, and does it retain its resonance in a context where access to EU funds and economic stability are increasingly salient concerns?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: It’s a very important point in the elections. Not in terms of the EU being a central topic—by all means, that’s not the case. Really, Orbán’s campaign is focusing on the war in Ukraine. Still, they have managed to somehow link this up with the EU. They have had billboard campaigns showing Ursula von der Leyen and Manfred Weber together with Volodymyr Zelensky, suggesting that the EU is taking the money of Hungarians and channeling it to Ukraine and to President Zelensky. So, they try to mingle these things together, mix them, and bring in the EU as, again, this sort of background power that is mistaken and on the side of war.
They have populist, moralist, discursive division, where Orbán portrays himself as a pro-peace political actor, whereas everybody else who does not agree with him, by definition, becomes pro-war, even if it does not really make sense.
So, in a sense, the EU is still there; it is referenced as, once again, occupying a pro-war position. As I said previously, they try to repeat the same claims as they did in the 2024 European parliamentary elections—drawing these very fine lines between who is on the side of peace and who is on the side of war, and they clearly place Brussels and the EU on the side of the war. And as I said, it is not only about the war per se. They also try to refer to the financial side of it, bringing this back repeatedly—claiming that the EU is taking your money, holding back funds, and channeling them to Ukraine. So, they frame it as financing the war instead of supporting Hungarian people, etc.
So, it is not center stage—I would say it is still the sort of antagonistic relationship between Ukraine and Hungary at the moment—but they do try to bring this into the discussion: that the EU is somewhere in the background, conspiring and doing all sorts of shady and harmful things. And the reason why they do that is that over the past years they have managed to convert their electorate into the most Eurosceptic segment of the population. In comparison to all other party supporters—with the exception of Our Homeland, the far-right party—probably the most Eurosceptic electorate is behind Fidesz at the moment. So it is just natural that they also play those tunes for their voters.
Tisza Promises Policy Reset
Tisza leader Péter Magyar begins a symbolic “one million steps” march to Nagyvárad, Romania, addressing reporters with supporters in Budapest, Hungary on May 14, 2025. Photo: Istvan Balogh / Dreamstime.
From the perspective of European integration, do you interpret this election as a confrontation between two competing models of EU membership—one sovereigntist and illiberal, the other oriented toward re-integration through rule-of-law compliance and institutional alignment?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Yes and no. On the one hand, I would agree that Orban has had a very particular idea of defending sovereignty in the EU. He has thought that the defense of national sovereignty and national interest could only be pursued in a confrontational way. You have to use the channels of the European Council or the Council itself to block things and not really participate in negotiations and deliberations.
There have been multiple occasions where Orban was not present—they sent him out to have a coffee. From research, we know that Council negotiations have shifted somewhat in recent years. What we would describe as a kind of de-Europeanization in the Hungarian approach to EU affairs is what has occurred on multiple fronts.
Compared to that, Tisza and Magyar’s approach are definitely different from Orban’s on some issues. You mentioned the rule of law. Tisza claims that it will join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office as soon as it is in government. It also promises to resolve some of these rule-of-law issues and to bring back the funds that have been frozen under Orban’s regime. So, we can expect a return to more normal relations with the EU. This promise is also supported by the personnel envisioned to lead foreign and European affairs within the party.
That said, I say yes and no because I do think that Tisza also supports a model of European integration based on strengthening intergovernmental relations, as opposed to a supranational takeover in multiple areas. We have seen this time and again. They have run into conflicts on different policy measures, even within the European Parliament and within their own faction in the European People’s Party.
So, on the one hand, there is likely to be an effort to restore relations and the credibility of Hungary as a partner within the EU. On the other hand, there will be areas where they confront and challenge the direction of European policy. It is not going to be a return to the old days where Hungarian representatives simply nodded to everything the European Union demanded from the government. Rather, it will involve a stronger representation of national interests, but in a more cooperative—as opposed to confrontational—manner than Orban has pursued.
Turnover Won’t End Orbánism
If Péter Magyar and the Tisza party were to win, would that necessarily signify the end of the Orbán era, or has Orbánism become sufficiently institutionalized within the state, the media landscape, and patronage networks to persist beyond electoral turnover?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi:The easy answer, obviously, is that electorally this would be the end of the Orbán regime, at least temporarily.But when we really look into the structural features, I would say no. This will, in fact, be a very interesting period to study, to see how deep the roots of the regime actually went and grew, and how these roots actually act and behave under a new government.I would say there is fundamentally a deeper institutional structure here, which could make the life of the new government miserable on multiple accounts—from financial oversight to judicial oversight, etc. There are many aspects where the government has to govern effectively with its hands tied behind its back. So it is going to be difficult.
I would imagine that this will be something like a prolonged struggle over state capacity and institutional de-capture. They will try to take back some of these institutions with whatever legal means there are. Nevertheless, the government will have greater room for maneuver in terms of policies in many areas, and I do think that they can make changes that could have a positive outcome or resonance with the public.
And one thing we cannot really exclude as a possibility—again, the poll numbers are all over the place—but most independent pollsters show a 15 to even 20 percentage point lead for the opposition party, which could effectively also mean that Tisza would gain a two-thirds, or constitutional, majority. That would be a completely different ballgame, because with that, they could de-capture those institutions more easily. To what extent this would be done in a democratic way, or whether they would repeat something similar to what we have seen during the Fidesz era, I am not sure. I am just saying that there might be an opportunity for the new government to actually de-root the system, provided that they have a constitutional majority.
No Majority, No Regime Change
Some observers suggest that even a Tisza-led government could face significant institutional constraints stemming from constitutional engineering and entrenched loyalist networks. How should we conceptualize the possibility of electoral alternation without substantive regime transformation?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: This goes in line with my previous answer. Without a constitutional majority, what you will see is that there is likely to be governmental turnover, but there is not going to be a regime transformation. And then, there are different scenarios as to what will happen. If there is a constitutional majority, then we see a re-orientation or a re-democratization. If there is only governmental turnover without real regime transformation, what kind of room for maneuver does the new government have?
How do we conceptualize this? So this is definitely going to be an interesting case to analyze in terms of re-democratization attempts—whether they actually go deep or whether they are just going to hover at the surface, which we have seen before. We even had a study on this, on local governments, examining how they try to re-democratize even under a populist authoritarian regime. We might actually see something of this sort at the national level. But once again, the possible measures might be more confined if there is only a simple majority in Parliament, and that would definitely limit the options of the next government.
Loyalty And Shielding Protect Fidesz
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán gives a speech to convince his respondents in Szeged on March 4, 2014.
Your work on populist resilience to corruption highlights how such regimes adapt to and withstand scandal. In Hungary today, which mechanisms—discursive reframing, institutional shielding, or partisan loyalty—appear most crucial in sustaining support for Fidesz?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: Given that the regime has reached its peak and is really a mature system, from a populist regime perspective, I would say, in line with our theoretical frame, that it is mostly the institutional shielding and the partisan loyalty that dominate at the moment. Let me give you an example, which is essentially a reflection of both. There is this huge scandal about the former governor of the National Bank (György Matolcsy) and his son. There is a scandal going around that hundreds of billions of forints were actually channeled out into private funds—essentially, they were just paid out to… we do not even necessarily know whom. We do know that the governor’s son really benefited from this. And what is happening now is that there is practically no police investigation going on, or, if there is, it is extremely slow. We do not really know what is happening. In the meantime, we already know that, for example, the governor’s son has tried to, or has already started to, ship his luxury car collection to Dubai, and these kinds of things.
So wealth is going out, and in the meantime, nothing is really happening. And nobody is really talking about the Matolcsy family, etc. So there is this partisan loyalty going on, and there is this institutional shielding, which does not allow these institutions to actually do anything about it. There is no prosecution going on. There might be some prosecution, but we do not really know why it is so limited, why it is so slow, why it is kept secret, and why they basically let the governor’s son do anything he pleases, given the fact that we know that hundreds of billions of forints were, in a sense, privatized. So, I do think that these two mechanisms are the most dominant ones.
Discursively, they do not even really try anymore. It is more like, “Well, we have nothing to do with the issue—let the institutions run their course,” but the institutions are not doing anything. So, it is just a sort of bogus narrative behind it.
What has really changed, on the other hand, is Péter Magyar’s rise in politics, because he is essentially an insider. And when he appeared, that was one of his biggest assets in politics, since this insider status was extremely relevant. When he talks about corruption claims against the government, it seems to mobilize anger much more effectively. This is what really matters here, because, on many issues, anger is a very strong motivational factor in politics, including in unseating incumbent governments. This is absolutely not a good feeling, I have to say, but it does trigger mobilization, and mobilization is key, obviously.
Peace Narrative Masks Polarization
The campaign has been strongly shaped by geopolitical narratives, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine. Has Orbán’s positioning as a “peace-oriented” leader maintained its electoral appeal, or is his perceived proximity to Moscow becoming a source of political vulnerability?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: That’s not an easy question to answer. First of all, his portrayal of himself as “peace-oriented” is really just buying into his populist discourse of being a pro-peace person, while everybody else who does not agree with him is, by definition, pro-war. So, once again, you have this Manichean, moralistic kind of division within politics that populists are very fond of. Essentially, this type of division turns every political discussion and agenda point into a life-or-death situation. Here, it is literally portrayed as such: if we do not want this, then the next day, everybody is sent to the Ukrainian front and people will die there.
But I would not buy into this “peace-oriented leader” narrative at all. There is a columnist in one of the Hungarian weeklies who consistently describes Orbán as aggressor-oriented, and I think that is probably a better portrayal of what he actually is—without taking any normative position. If you ask what he means by peace, the government does not really have a clear idea of what peace would entail or how it should be achieved. In that sense, the aggressor-oriented description may be more accurate.
As for whether this narrative still works, I think it holds up quite well among the core electorate. We know from sociological and political studies that most of Orbán’s supporters come from the countryside, with lower levels of education and generally more limited economic means. Among these groups, the message still resonates. Talking about the war—through fearmongering, warmongering, and similar appeals—continues to be effective.
What they have also done quite effectively, and this is why they remain competitive, is to turn uncertainty around the war into anger. Studies on populism show that fear is not the main driver; anger is. Fear reflects uncertainty, whereas anger is directed—it needs a target. They have managed to convert uncertainty and fear into anger.
To some extent, President Zelensky also inadvertently contributed to this dynamic. A particular quote was picked up and amplified by pro-government media, portraying it as a threat to Orbán. This helped channel anger toward Zelensky and Ukraine.
They also continue to layer in additional discursive elements, such as claims that “they are taking your money.” Recently, the prime minister held town hall meetings across the country, where he accused protesters of siding with Ukraine and attempting to divert Hungarian resources there. This reflects a level of political rhetoric that is, frankly, quite unprecedented. Similarly, incidents such as damage to the Druzhba gas pipeline have been reframed as evidence that Ukraine is withholding Hungary’s energy supplies and weaponizing resources. This contributes to a constant, artificially orchestrated sense of anger directed at Ukraine. In that sense, the narrative still resonates with certain segments. There is some degree of creativity, but in terms of the broader narrative, they have not significantly shifted away from the war-centered discourse seen in 2022 and 2024.
Regarding Trump and Moscow, the situation is more complicated. Trump’s own actions—particularly the wars associated with his leadership—no longer support the earlier framing of him as a “pro-peace” figure. As a result, the government has largely stopped emphasizing this aspect and instead downplays it. Attempts to reinterpret such developments rhetorically have not been particularly convincing.
As for relations with Moscow, recent leaks concerning communications between Hungarian and Russian officials have raised questions. Depending on interpretation, these either reflect pragmatic diplomacy or suggest alignment with Russian interests, including the sharing of sensitive information.
Overall, both the Trump factor and the Russian connection appear to increase the government’s political vulnerability.
Trump Effect Mostly Symbolic
US President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán arrive for a working dinner at the NATO Summit in Brussels, Belgium on July 11, 2018. Photo: Gints Ivuskans / Dreamstime.
Hungary has long been embedded in a broader transnational network of right-wing populist actors. How significant is the “Trump effect” and Musk’s influence in this election, both in terms of symbolic validation and in reinforcing Orbán’s model of governance?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: I think it is really symbolic. I am not sure that, in terms of governance features, there is much there. Quite the reverse, I would say. It is really some American governors and high-ranking politicians who keep talking about copying this or that from Orbán, when it comes to, for example, dealing with LGBTQ issues in their states, etc. So, Orbán tries to position himself—and to some extent successfully—as a governance genius who should and could be copied by some of these international partners.
On the other hand, the extent to which they actually contribute to Orbán’s success is largely symbolic. As I said, the campaign is mainly about the war at this moment, so it is not really a question of whether there is transnational conservative endorsement or not—it does not matter that much. I do not see it that way. We had CPAC (the Conservative Political Action Conference) Hungary, which is a sort of mimic meeting of CPAC in the US where they invite right-wing politicians and intellectuals. It is a significant event. Just a couple of days ago, they announced that J.D. Vance, the US Vice President, is coming next Tuesday to Hungary. They probably wanted Trump to come but could not manage it, so it will be J.D. Vance. And the American government has already signaled that it supports Orbán’s re-election.
But, what matters most, once again, for the future—or for the short-term political room for maneuver of the government—is really the European partners. The EU and other European right-wing leaders are closely watching the election, because it could fundamentally change dynamics within the European Council and more generally within the integration process in the EU.
Hungary Tests Populism’s Limits
Finally, Professor Csehi, from a comparative perspective, what would each plausible outcome—a renewed Fidesz victory, a Tisza-led breakthrough, or a contested post-election scenario—tell us about the broader trajectory of populist rule in Europe and the capacity of democratic systems to dislodge entrenched illiberal incumbents?
Assoc. Prof. Robert Csehi: If Fidesz wins, this is still going to be an interesting scenario and an interesting political experience, which would tell us that, despite economic strains and despite the ideological fatigue that the government shows, and despite a strong challenger—a new challenger party emerging—the system still has some resilience. Then we would need to find out what actually triggered this resilience, or what made this resilience possible.
Now, this resilience, obviously, would send a message that electoral challenge is still possible, even with a populist regime that is extremely mature in its institutional design and structural features, etc. Therefore, none of these populist regimes are actually immune to a more systemic fatigue, and, if they want to survive, they need to be more creative in how they maintain the system.
But definitely, with a Tisza win, we would get very good information on how much democratic backsliding there actually was in the system, across different aspects. Most likely, this would generate immense knowledge that we could gain, and that would be extremely valuable for future studies. So I am very much looking forward to seeing what will happen. Those are my two cents on this point.
In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Thomas Carothers offers a nuanced reassessment of contemporary democratic backsliding, challenging dominant explanations that prioritize socioeconomic grievances over political agency. He argues that elite opportunism and institutional permissiveness are central drivers of democratic erosion, cautioning against overgeneralizing from Western experiences. Emphasizing that “when institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense,” Dr. Carothers highlights the enduring role of civic mobilization in constraining authoritarian drift. At the same time, he resists declinist narratives, noting that democratic “guardrails” continue to hold in many contexts. The interview ultimately frames global democracy as entering a new phase of contested resilience, shaped by the dynamic interplay of elites, institutions, and citizen action.
At a time when democracies across the globe face mounting pressures—from intensifying polarization in the United States and Europe to the growing assertiveness of authoritarian powers—the question of how democratic systems erode, endure, and renew themselves has taken on renewed urgency. In this context, Dr. Thomas Carothers, Director of the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program and Harvey V. Fineberg Chair for Democracy Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, offers a timely and nuanced intervention. Speaking to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Carothers challenges prevailing explanatory frameworks and calls for a more differentiated understanding of democratic backsliding and resilience.
Central to his analysis is a critique of the widely invoked “democracy-not-delivering” thesis. As he observes,“democratic backsliding has been spreading around the world for over 20 years, but we’re still struggling to figure out why it’s occurring,” urging “a bit of humility” from both scholars and policymakers. Rather than attributing democratic erosion primarily to socioeconomic grievances, Dr. Carothers emphasizes the role of “power holders—elites and elite agency” in actively constraining democratic choice. He cautions against generalizing from the American and European experience, noting that in many contexts, citizens are not opting for extremist alternatives but are instead “not being allowed to make those choices” due to authoritarian interventions.
This analytical shift foregrounds the importance of political agency and institutional dynamics over structural determinism. Dr. Carothers expresses skepticism toward rigid dichotomies, arguing that the “structure-versus-agency framework… is not a particularly useful way” to understand contemporary democratic crises. Instead, he advocates for context-sensitive analysis that recognizes the interplay between institutional vulnerabilities and strategic elite behavior.
It is within this framework that Dr. Carothers advances one of his most compelling claims: “When institutions fail, protest becomes the last line of democratic defense.” In settings where courts, media, and civil society are systematically undermined, public protest emerges as a residual yet powerful mechanism of accountability. While acknowledging that even protest can be violently suppressed—as in cases like Tanzania or Nicaragua—he underscores that, in many democracies, mass mobilization continues to function as a critical constraint on executive overreach.
At the same time, Dr. Carothers resists overly pessimistic narratives. While democratic backsliding persists, he notes that “the rapid wave of backsliding has slowed somewhat,” and that in numerous cases institutional “guardrails have been holding up.” Drawing on comparative examples from Brazil, Senegal, and beyond, he highlights the capacity of civic mobilization and institutional resilience to counteract authoritarian drift.
Taken together, this interview situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader landscape of contestation, adaptation, and uneven resilience. Rather than signaling an inevitable decline, Dr. Carothers suggests the emergence of a more complex equilibrium—one in which democratic erosion and renewal coexist, and where the future of democracy will depend on the dynamic interaction between elites, institutions, and citizens.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Thomas Carothers, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
We Still Don’t Fully Understand Democratic Backsliding
Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.
Dr. Carothers, welcome. Let me begin with the broader picture: In your recent work, you challenge the “democracy-not-delivering” thesis by emphasizing elite opportunism and institutional permissiveness over socioeconomic failure. In light of current developments—from democratic strain in the United States to governance crises elsewhere—how does this shift reshape dominant explanatory frameworks, and what does it imply for the balance between structural and agency-based accounts?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: I appreciate this broad question. It’s surprising if we step back. Democratic backsliding has been spreading around the world for over 20 years, but we’re still struggling to figure out why it’s occurring. It’s interesting, and in a way surprising, that we haven’t really figured it out yet, and that there isn’t as much consensus as you might think there would be. I start with that. I think a bit of humility for all of us is in order here. If the policy community is looking to experts and saying, “Give us some answers,” I’m not sure the expert community is doing all that well, and I count myself in that.
But I would start by saying that, in a broad sense, Americans and Europeans—who have been experiencing a lot of democratic uncertainty and tremors, and in the case of the United States, some real backsliding in the last 5–10 years—are tending to take a pattern of events in their own countries and turn that into a very general explanation that I don’t think works very well in many places. What do I mean by that?
In the United States and Europe, broadly speaking, what you have seen over the last 20 years are societies where economic growth has slowed. A lot of people are angry about that, especially middle classes who don’t feel they are doing very well. At the same time, there has been significant sociocultural change in the form of immigration and broader progressive shifts across these societies. It turns out that many people are uncomfortable with that. So, many people are not happy economically, they feel quite unsettled socio-culturally, and in some cases they are opting for politicians or parties outside the mainstream, on both the right and the left. They are moving away from conventional center-left and center-right parties toward alternatives at the extremes, and that is unsettling for democracy.
But this is not a good explanation for what is happening with democratic backsliding in many other parts of the world. Let me take one case: Tanzania. Tanzania was a kind of so-so democracy in Africa—not very democratic, but not very autocratic—for a fairly long time.
Western Explanations Misread Global Democratic Decline
In the last year, however, it has undergone severe backsliding. There was an election, and people challenged the president, seeking some change. The president and her team essentially stole the election. When people protested, she cracked down in an unprecedented way. Hundreds of people were killed by security services. That is democratic backsliding. It had nothing to do with the Tanzanian middle class choosing alternatives at the extremes. They simply wanted decent reform and governance. What we see instead is a predatory power holder hanging onto power and violently suppressing dissent.
This is similar to what we see in Nicaragua, where Daniel Ortega, over the last 10 years, has been challenged because he governs for the benefit of himself, his family, and a small circle of allies. When large-scale protests erupted in 2018, there was a severe crackdown—violence, repression, and more.
So, taking the American-European experience and assuming that this must be what is happening everywhere—that people are choosing the “wrong” politicians because they are unhappy with democracies not delivering—is misleading. Yes, people are unhappy in many countries, but in large parts of the world they are not choosing extremes; rather, they are choosing democratic alternatives and are not being allowed to make those choices because power holders—elites and elite agency—block them.
For this reason, I am very uncomfortable with the structure-versus-agency distinction. If we come in as analysts and say, “I think it’s mostly structure” or “I think it’s mostly agency,” we risk oversimplifying. Instead, we should take each case on its own terms, try to understand what is happening, and relax the insistence on categorizing it as one or the other. It is usually a combination of both.
Moreover, the concept of “structure” often covers a range of analytic ambiguities. Do we mean religious divisions? Immigration patterns? Social class structures? The term itself is quite vague.
In short—though I realize this is a long opening—the American-European experience is quite different from that of many other parts of the world. In those contexts, democratic backsliding often involves predatory power holders cracking down and steamrolling countervailing institutions and public protests. And the structure-versus-agency framework, in my view, is not a particularly useful way to approach such situations.
Public Protest Remains the Hardest Constraint on Elite Power
No Kings protest in New York City, USA, October 18, 2025—demonstrators rally against authoritarian policies and corruption in Donald Trump’s administration. Photo: Dreamstime.
If democratic erosion is primarily elite-driven, how should we reconceptualize citizen agency today—especially in highly polarized societies like the US and parts of Europe—where publics may appear simultaneously mobilized, constrained, and politically fragmented?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: If we recognize the power of elites to overturn constraints on their power—which is what’s happening in a lot of places, and it startles us when it happens, say, in India—we had tended to think that the rule of law in India was pretty well established. India had a very good court system for a long time. It had a high degree of judicial independence and a judicial excellence. Of course, there is a lot at the lower levels, a lot of backlogs, and all that kind of stuff, but India was a country with pretty solid rule of law in certain ways.
However, Modi has been able to undercut that in ways that have really unsettled people in India and that they did not expect. That’s through elite agency—through structure, it’s through his determined decision-making to think, I can say this, I can do that, I can put these people here, I can defy this—that’s elite agency in action.
Given that, what we have to think is: wow, the power of elite agency in many cases is formidable. And what can stop that? What can stop that is a very strong fortification of those norms, and also people protesting when that is happening, and people saying, we won’t take this. That’s why I focus so much on protests, because when elites steamroller the different institutions, they undercut the courts, they close down the media, they strangle civil society, they go through all the independent sources of power, strangle them one by one, asphyxiate them, cut them off.
The one thing they have trouble overcoming is public protest, because it’s not really an institution they can just undercut. Now, they can, once it happens, as in Tanzania or Nicaragua, get police and security services of different types to come out, detain people, arrest them, beat them up, and kill them. Unfortunately, they can override public protest. But that is, fortunately, at least in some democracies, a line that leaders don’t cross. They don’t go that far, and protests therefore have a really powerful effect, as in Nepal or Bangladesh, where protesters were able to overcome attempts to stop them, and they pushed for some really democratic change. So elite agency—the power of it—should make us think hard about what powers can stop it, and what we can do, if we care about democracy, to try to fortify those things that can limit elite agency.
Economic Development Still Stabilizes Democracy
To what extent does ongoing backsliding in relatively affluent democracies challenge modernization theory’s assumption that economic development stabilizes democracy, particularly under conditions of cultural backlash and identity-driven politics?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: It has certainly been a surprise for many political scientists that the United States is experiencing significant backsliding. The recent V-Dem report on democracy in the world charted an 18-point decline for the United States, which is a very large drop in the last year. The Freedom House report shows only a 3-point decline, but even 3 points is quite significant in the Freedom House methodology. So, we do have the case of the United States, which raises questions about the crucial work that Adam Przeworski did—showing the relationship between the level of economic development and the absence of democratic breakdown—but I think we need to be very careful.
The United States is the only wealthy established democracy—other than perhaps Israel. By “established,” I mean a pre-1989 democracy. I am not including Hungary and Poland in that category, as they are post-1989. Among long-established democracies at a certain level of wealth, it is the only one that has experienced significant backsliding in the last 10 to 15 years.
It is true that many Europeans feel unsettled by the rise of illiberal political forces in their societies, but none of those countries is experiencing significant backsliding yet. Now, it may come—there is no question that it might. So, I do not think modernization theory, or the idea that once you reach a certain level of economic development you are bound to be more stable democratically, has been overturned by events. Rather, I think the United States is a head-scratching case as to why this is happening there. What is more interesting analytically is not to discard modernization theory, but instead to ask: what is it about the United States that is so different from all the other wealthy established democracies—Canada, Australia, Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and so on—that makes it so democratically fragile at this moment?
So, modernization theory, or at least the theory about the relationship between economic development and democracy, is still holding. However, we do have this powerful and unusual case of the United States, which requires very careful thought.
Executive Aggrandizement, Not Populism, Drives Backsliding
Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
How can we analytically disentangle populism as a discursive logic from executive aggrandizement as an institutional process, especially when contemporary leaders employ formally legal mechanisms to incrementally erode democratic norms?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: Wow, there are a lot of questions here; they’re very compact. Executive aggrandizement, which is the core pattern of backsliding that we see in many places, is where an executive amasses overweening power that is able to subvert the rest of the democratic system. Executive aggrandizement is the tool by which de-democratization and greater autocratization are occurring in a whole bunch of countries. But that’s not the same as populism, and we have to be really careful here. Some of these leaders who are carrying out executive aggrandizement are populists. Hugo Chávez was such a leader—he was elected, dismantled democracy, and engaged in executive aggrandizement; he was populist to the core.
Vladimir Putin has been aggrandizing the power of the executive in Russia over the last 25 years. In my view, he is not a populist. President Putin came from within the system. A populist is someone who comes from outside the system, divides, and says, “I’m going to attack the elite; I represent the people.” President Putin was not about the people versus the elite. He was the security service rising back up and asserting its power over Russian life—hardly a populist. He rode around on a horse once with his shirt off and had a picture taken, which some Russians felt made him look pretty good. I guess you could call that a populist technique. But I hardly think of him as a populist.
President Xi in China has been carrying out executive aggrandizement by removing term limits and by attempting, for example, to bring the military under greater political control. It is classic executive aggrandizement. Again, President Xi is not someone from outside the system who is dividing the country into old elites and the new people. He is the system. He rose up—his father was a grandee—he is a very well-integrated, well-embedded part of the system.
Therefore, executive aggrandizement is a process that leaders are using, both elected leaders and non-elected leaders, as in the case of President Xi. It is a form of taking over systems that is different from military coups and from state collapse, and so forth. It is the process that is defining democratic backsliding and autocratization in many countries. It is not the same thing as populism. Some populists engage in executive aggrandizement, not all. Some figures who engage in executive aggrandizement are populist, not all. So, it is very important to keep these concepts fairly clearly separate from each other.
Deep Structural Divides Drive America’s Polarization
In the current US context—marked by renewed Trumpism, institutional contestation, and electoral polarization—should we interpret developments as a case of “backsliding from within,” or as the exposure of long-standing structural vulnerabilities in American democracy?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: That gets to the question of what constitutes a structural vulnerability. The United States has some very basic fissures in society that have long been at the root of severe episodes of polarization in American life. The country has experienced waves of extreme polarization throughout its history. The Civil War was a period of intense polarization, and the country later moved beyond it. There was less polarization afterwards. The 1930s and the New Deal were also tremendously polarizing, followed by a period of lower polarization through World War II. In the 1960s and 1970s, polarization began increasing again and has reached very high levels over the past 10 to 20 years. So, the United States has this recurrent pattern of extreme polarization.
These waves tend to be rooted in the same underlying fissures—three in particular. One is a racial divide, which has been deeply divisive, not only in Black-white terms but also in a broader sense between those who support a more inclusive society and those who prefer a less inclusive one.
Second, religion in politics. The United States is, in many ways, a fairly religious society, and there has long been debate over the role of religion in public and political life. This debate continues today and remains highly divisive. Some believe religion should play a greater role, while others advocate for a clearer separation between religion and the state.
Third, the question of federal versus state control. Should the country have a strong federal government, or should power reside primarily with the states? This debate goes back to the founding of the Republic and was deeply embedded in the Civil War. It has remained a persistent and contested issue.
So, the United States has these structures. You could describe racial realities as a structure. You could consider federal versus state power as a structure. Religion—can that be called a structure? In some sense, yes. These factors provide a foundation that is distinct from Europe, where all three are generally less pronounced as basic fissures. They help explain why the United States, unlike many European countries, has experienced recurring waves of polarization.
I think what we are seeing in the United States today is the product of the latest episode of extreme polarization. Is this due to structure or agency? As I noted, there are underlying structural features of American society that contribute to the current divisions. At the same time, elite agency is clearly playing a role. When people discuss polarization in the United States, they often point to specific political actors—this politician did this, that politician did that—as polarizing forces. So, elite agency is also part of the picture.
When Politics Turns Tribal, Democracy Suffers
To what degree does affective polarization—visible in both US and European politics—function as a permissive condition for democratic erosion, enabling citizens to tolerate or justify norm violations by co-partisan leaders?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: Affective polarization—when one side basically hates the other, doesn’t trust it, and doesn’t think it should be allowed to come to power—is no longer just “I don’t like their tax policy.” Instead, it becomes, “I think they are bad Americans and would do terrible things to the country if they came to power, and I don’t want my daughter or son marrying one of them.” Affective polarization of that type is incredibly corrosive.
Because if it is based on the idea that the people on the other side—I hate them, I don’t trust them, and I think they are going to do harm to the country if they run it—then, when an election comes along, I may say: well, the choice is between a leader who is tidy-whitey and is going to follow every democratic norm but might let the other side in, versus someone who is really strong and willing to break the dishes needed to stay in power and keep those dangerous other people out. In that case, unfortunately, people trade off democratic norms for the sake of protecting their tribe, as people like to say.
In the United States, the very distinguished political scientist at Yale University, Milan Svolik, has done fundamental work showing that under conditions of extreme polarization, people are willing to trade away democratic norms for the sake of protecting their side.
Citizen Mobilization Can Halt Democratic Backsliding
Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.
Your work suggests that protests serve both as indicators of democratic strain and as potential agents of renewal. How should we theorize this dual role in light of recent protest waves in the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: At Carnegie, we run something called the Global Protest Tracker, which tries to keep track of every major anti-government protest in the world. If you go to it, you’ll see a list, and you can click on a country, and it turns out, oh, look, the Philippines just had major protests last month. Why? What were they about? And so forth. So, we’ve been watching protests very closely for a while. We’ve been running the tracker for seven years, and you learn a lot just by reading it every month.
Our researchers produce—Judy Lee, who works with us, is our main researcher on this—a tremendous memo every month analyzing the latest protests around the world. And you see that a good share of protests is about democracy. They are about citizens responding to executive overreach, often in the form of a stolen or compromised election. Sometimes they respond to attempts by a leader to remove a constitutional limit on power – “I’m going to serve a third or fourth term, no matter what the Constitution says. My ally at the Supreme Court will say that’s perfectly fine.”
So, citizens are protesting a great deal about democratic backsliding. Those protests are a sign of democratic strain, as you put it in your question, or even a sign of democratic breakdown. In many cases, they are also a major source of hope for stopping that process. They have stopped a number of efforts to extend constitutional term limits and have blocked some attempts to manipulate elections, although unfortunately not in other cases, such as Georgia or Belarus.
Protests like these reflect democratic strain, but they are also an embodiment of hope for something better. In more extreme cases, such as Bangladesh—extreme in the sense that events went very far—protesters swept out an autocratic regime and called for a return to a period when the country was at least reasonably democratic. Protests are key here.
Of course, many protests today are driven by economic grievances—fuel prices rise, people cannot afford to feed their families, and they protest about that, understandably. But there are linkages. In many places, protests are sparked by some kind of economic or governance trigger. In Serbia, for example, a specific incident occurred—a train station roof collapse, if I recall correctly. People then took to the streets and said, “This government stinks, it ought to go—I’ve had it with this regime.” A protest that begins over a particular trigger can then snowball into a broader anti-regime movement that pushes a government out or at least tries to.
Nepal was somewhat similar—an initial spark related to a government attempt to limit access to social media platforms. People began protesting, and one thing led to another, and soon the prime minister was out.
So, protests are critical in this age—particularly in an era of hard-headed leaders dismantling many of the institutions that might otherwise constrain them. As I said before, protests are critical here.
Some Movements Make Democracy More Exclusionary
In these contexts, how can we distinguish between mobilizations that deepen democratic accountability—such as rights-based or institutional reform protests—and those that instead amplify anti-system, populist, or illiberal dynamics?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: Be careful about that distinction. You can have an anti-system protest that is quite rights-based. For example, the Serbian protests have turned into anti-system protests, but they are also based on the idea that there should be greater rights. Nepal was similar – “Don’t take away our right to access this information”—and that, too, turned into an anti-system protest.
Now, as you are alluding to, there are protests that, if you look at their goals or the issues that have stirred them up, may be quite different. There might be an anti-immigrant protest—an immigrant is involved in a crime, and people go out and protest, saying, “We hate these people who look like this or talk like this.” That is not especially good for democracy; it could shrink democracy and make it more exclusive.
Or people may protest against efforts to make vaccines widely available, arguing that they are dangerous and opposing public health policies. That could be described as rights-based in some sense, but it is probably not going to do much to further democracy in that country.
There are certainly many protests that pursue goals other than what we would consider core democratic rights. It is more a matter of looking at the cause—what people are trying to advance through the protest—and then deciding whether it is pro-democratic or whether it is pushing democracy in a more exclusive or limited direction.
Decentralization Empowers Protest but Weakens Strategy
With the growing prevalence of decentralized, leaderless movements, does organizational horizontality enhance democratic inclusivity and resilience, or does it risk weakening strategic coherence and long-term political impact?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: A lot of protest movements are what analysts like to call leaderless protests these days, and leaderless protests are often a reality in countries that are fairly repressive, where people are afraid or unable to form leadership councils or to organize in a very visible way, and so they are leaderless by necessity. Some are more leaderless; others are leaderless simply because that is how they arose. They may begin with a group of students who are very unhappy about something, and someone texts, “Let’s all meet at the square at 9 p.m.,” and people surge out and start protesting. Then someone else says, “Tomorrow at 3 o’clock in the afternoon, let’s meet here,” and it starts to grow. The protest becomes a movement, but there was no real guiding council at any point.
Because of technology that facilitates organization in many countries, this encourages a decentralization of authority within protest movements, which can make for quick, unpredictable, and, in some cases, powerful protests. But as you suggest in your question, once a protest is successful, there comes a point when demands have to be formulated. There also comes a point when negotiations with those in power become necessary, or when something must happen to focalize the discontent into a platform for specific change.
I remember Tahrir Square during the protests in Egypt and the Arab Spring. It was a surge of people. There were many civic groups involved, so it was not entirely leaderless, but there were many different actors trying to mobilize. At a certain point, the military said to the protesters, “We need to talk seriously about what is going to happen with Mubarak—we are ready to talk. With whom do we talk?”
A group of people did emerge within the protest. One of them happened to be a friend of mine, an Egyptian. I remember being in my office in Washington, picking up the phone, and it was him calling me from Cairo. He said, “I’m with a group of protesters, and we’ve been asked to go talk to the military. What should we ask for? What is our demand with respect to Mubarak?” That was the moment when I thought that what had started as a kind of leaderless protest—or a protest with many different elements—was now focalizing. The military wanted to negotiate with someone and say, “If we agree that Mubarak is going to step down and go to Sharm el-Sheikh or somewhere else, will you leave Tahrir Square and go home?” They needed to negotiate with someone.
It is hard to negotiate with a leaderless octopus. So, there is a moment when these movements have to coalesce, and then, if they are successful—as in Nepal, where the government is out—who is in charge? Something has to happen. Leaderlessness can be beneficial for a while, but then things need to move forward, and there needs to be a concretization of the movement into some form of institutionalized action and development.
How States Respond to Protest Defines Democracy
‘March for Europe’ demonstrations in support of EU integration and membership at Liberty Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 20, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic.
How do different state responses—from accommodation and co-optation in liberal democracies to repression in more authoritarian settings—shape protest trajectories, and what do these patterns reveal about regime adaptability?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: There is a pretty sharp line. A protest occurs in a country; it is large, it challenges the system, and it asks for fundamental change. And here is the line: do you turn the security services on the protest and say, “We are going to detain you, arrest you, beat you up, and kill you”? Or do you say, “We are a democracy, people have rights here, and you have the right to protest, and we will talk with you and try to address your concerns so that you will go away?” At that moment, when the regime really has its back to the wall and protests are surging, do they respond with repression, or do they respond through negotiation, patience, or some other non-repressive approach? That is a defining test of whether you are in a democracy or not.
In Georgia—Georgia was a democracy for a while—protests emerged and were then fueled by the alleged stealing of elections by Georgian Dream. The political system, or the regime, began cracking down on this protest movement, detaining and arresting people and allowing a certain degree of violence. That is a sign that Georgia was moving off the democratic path and into a more repressive direction.
This is a defining moment—how protests are treated—and I pay very close attention to it. There is not always a clear threshold: sometimes three protesters are killed—is that enough? But in extreme cases like Iran, where tens of thousands appear to have been killed by security services, that is a clear sign of a profoundly repressive, anti-democratic regime in which democracy has been entirely suffocated. Georgia is suffocating its democracy. Belarus has asphyxiated and suffocated its democracy.
Whereas other countries have remained on the other side of that line. Hungary, for example, has had significant protests over the last 5–10 years. Many people are unhappy with the Fidesz government, but it has not responded with outright repression. It has taken many steps to undercut civic groups, tilt the playing field, and use state resources for party purposes. These are anti-democratic actions, but it has not turned the guns on protesters, because Hungary is still on this side of that repressive line. So that line is very fundamental to understanding the overall trajectory of a country.
Broad Mobilization Creates a Firewall Against Authoritarianism
Your research highlights the importance of civil society mobilization and opposition coordination in reversing backsliding. How do these factors interact with institutional legacies in determining whether democratic erosion can be halted or reversed?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: It relates to what I’m saying. Civil society mobilization is critical in many places, such as Brazil in 2022. Bolsonaro had been in power for four years; he was an anti-democratic leader, disrespectful of democratic norms. He sought to undercut the courts, and there were real doubts about whether he would respect an electoral outcome. Later evidence suggested that he was trying to overturn the electoral result through coup planning and so forth.
In early 2022, as elections were on the horizon, there was very broad-scale citizen mobilization. It was civic mobilization, which included a political role for established political actors, but it was civic in the sense that it brought together a broad tent of people with many different views, united around the idea that Brazil should reject an undemocratic path and pursue a democratic one. Most of those involved believed this meant voting for Lula da Silva, but it was nonetheless a civic mobilization that proved quite effective in creating a firewall against the de-democratization of Brazil.
Poland was somewhat similar before the 2023 elections. There was extensive civic mobilization, with people frustrated by the PiS government and its anti-democratic characteristics.
Civic mobilization in cases of significant backsliding is very important. In the United States, you are seeing an increasing number of protests. Recently, there was another round of the “No Kings” protests; I think up to 8 million people were involved last time. That is a significant number—about 2–3 percent of the US population—engaged in protest activity. This kind of broad-based civic mobilization is often a critical element in pushing back against democratic erosion.
Democracy Support Faces a Moment of Profound Rethink
In an international environment shaped by intensifying great-power competition, declining Western commitment, rising authoritarian influence, and intensifying geopolitical competition and conflicts such as the Iran crisis, and the global diffusion of authoritarian practices, how should democracy promotion be reimagined—does it require normative re-legitimation, institutional reinvention, or a fundamentally new model of transnational democratic support?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: International democracy support needs a lot of things. International democracy support had been struggling for 10 or 15 years in the face of democratic backsliding in the world. Backsliding was happening, and people were saying that whatever amount of democracy support we were giving—both the amount and the nature of it—was not solving the problem. Backsliding was still spreading. What we were doing was not enough, and maybe it was also not the right thing.
There was already a lot of questioning of international democracy support and then came the arrival to power of Donald Trump in January 2025. He and his team rapidly put an end to almost all US democracy aid that was directly sponsored by the government. The United States had been, by far, the largest funder of such aid in the world. It simply walked away from that field and said: no election monitoring support—we do not do that anymore; support to civic groups—we do not do that anymore; we are going to close down our public broadcasting in other places; human rights support—no, we do not do that anymore. So that was a tremendous blow to the field of international democracy support.
Unfortunately, in that same year, a number of European governments, for different reasons, also faced significant pressure on their aid budgets. There was a great deal of strain on those budgets, partly because of the need to allocate resources to support Ukraine in its war against Russia. As a result, aid budgets in Europe were tight, and 2025 was a bad year for international democracy support.
Now the field, a year on, is in a period of reassessment. My colleague Richard Youngs and I, together with Rachel Kleinfeld, are working on this issue. We published a paper last year titled What Future for International Democracy Support?, and we are preparing an updated version later this year to assess how the field is evolving.
What we are finding so far is that there is a great deal of ferment. You mentioned the need for institutional rejuvenation, normative re-legitimation, and new methods. People are actively asking these questions: what narratives should we use to describe democracy more effectively? Given the sharp decline in available aid dollars and euros, we need new forms of engagement that are more localized and more network-oriented. We need to move away from the traditional model of “the West has the answers, and the rest of the world has the problems.” Today, everyone faces challenges. How can we work on a more horizontal basis? How can we move beyond the notion of aid as a one-way process and instead recognize that we are all confronting shared difficulties?
There is a great deal happening in the field, but it is constrained by limited resources. It is on the back foot and still in a state of shock after developments over the past year or two. Many people are out of work, many are frustrated, and many are disappointed. The field is therefore in a period of reconsolidation.
At the same time, it is not disappearing. Many organizations and democratic governments still want to support democracy beyond their borders. There are also regional organizations in Africa, Latin America, Europe, and elsewhere that maintain pro-democratic norms. There are multilateral institutions at the global level that remain engaged, as well as numerous international non-governmental organizations. So, there is still a substantial international democracy support community, but it is undergoing a profound process of rethinking and reorientation.
Democratic Backsliding Has Slowed—but Risks Remain
Protesters protest for the freedom of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil on April 7, 2019. Photo: Cris Faga.
And lastly, Dr. Carothers, looking ahead, given the coexistence of democratic erosion, persistent polarization, and emerging forms of resistance, do you foresee a trajectory of continued democratic decline, adaptive resilience, or the emergence of a new equilibrium of “contested democracy” in the coming decade?
Dr. Thomas Carothers: That last question of yours is common in the final questions that I get, which are basically, you’re walking across a bridge as a democracy specialist—do you jump off into the river in despair, or do you keep walking and think, we’ll probably come through this? But you put it much more elegantly than I just did.
I think over the last 5 to 7 years, the rapid wave of backsliding has slowed somewhat. There is still a lot of backsliding occurring, but there are also a number of countries where guardrails have been holding up. Brazil was an important case of that in 2022–23. One could name many others. Senegal managed to withstand a fairly concerted attack on its democratic institutions by its president in the last couple of years. The Philippines came out of the Duterte period. The successor leader is not the world’s most democratic leader, but he is not Duterte. Bangladesh is undergoing some kind of renovation. Bolivia came through a period in which the government was trying to undercut democratic norms and institutions. So, there are many countries where democracy is holding up.
I was in a conversation the other day with the research director at Freedom House, who made the important observation that about three-quarters of the countries in the world do not change their democratic status year in, year out. We tend to think, it’s like our phone, where every app is jiggling and moving around. The world is not really like that. There is actually a fair amount of stability, and the number of cases that are moving rapidly in one direction or the other is quite small. So, I’m walking across the bridge—I’m not jumping off—but, it’s going to be difficult.
This commentary examines how fuel pricing in Nigeria has become a central site of democratic contestation, linking economic reform to everyday political experience. Drawing on recent scholarship, Dr. Oludele Solaja shows that the removal of fuel subsidies is interpreted less through macroeconomic logic than through lived realities—rising transport costs, food inflation, and declining purchasing power. In this context, fuel policy functions as a visible test of state credibility and fairness. The analysis highlights how “everyday populism” emerges as citizens frame reforms through moral distinctions between suffering publics and detached elites. Crucially, the study argues that climate and fiscal reforms cannot succeed without trust: where institutional credibility is weak, even economically rational policies risk generating political backlash and deepening democratic discontent.
In Nigeria, fuel isn’t simply a commodity but perhaps one of the most immediate points through which Nigerians engage with the state. Changes at the pump influence transport prices, the distribution of food, the nature of informal work, substitutes to electricity, household coping mechanisms. Any significant change at the pump is rapidly translated through market and commuters’ routes, domestic budgets, turning fiscal policy into political experience. Consequently, fuel pricing has evolved into perhaps the most visible site of democratic validation and of state-society trust (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024).
The lifting of a long-standing petrol subsidy as part of recent reforms re-ignited an ever recurrent and sensitive national debate around governance, fairness and burden-sharing. The declared rationale for subsidy removal was correction of unsustainable fiscal spending, drain on public finances and constraint on welfare and infrastructure investment (Gbadebo, 2025). Nevertheless, macroeconomic rationales never fully determine political meaning. In the view of many Nigerians, what is primarily being assessed in post subsidy withdrawal policy aren’t ratios in macro-economic indicators, but transport fare hikes, food price volatility, diminishing purchasing power and pervasive uncertainty; studies found mitigation measures to be inadequate and unevenly distributed, which compounded distrust in the government (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024).
This dilemma reveals the more important sociological aspect of the problem: economic reform easily gains political meaning in fragile trust situation. Populism is not merely about elite discourse or electoral tactics, but also everyday interpretation where citizens divide the social world along the moral lines of “normal citizens in suffering” and “detached politicians.” Petrol pricing is one aspect where it comes into the citizen vocabulary as its impact is immediate, transparent, and social inequal (Yang et al., 2021; Moerenhout et al., 2021). Rather than seeing it as the market correction, for many citizens the rising of petrol price is viewed as an indication of their anxieties over issues of justice, elite benefit and the credibility of the state.
Public conversations often return to questions such as: Why must austerity begin with ordinary households? Why do reforms demand sacrifice where visible political restraint appears limited? These questions contribute to what may be called everyday environmental populism — a form of public meaning‑making in which environmental and economic reforms are judged through moral experiences of inequality and institutional betrayal (Gbadebo, 2025). While classic fuel subsidy literature focuses on economic costs and distributional effects, political economy research highlights that reform success depends on public trust and the social contract between state and citizens (Yang et al., 2021).
The contradiction is clear: long‑term fiscal rationality collides with short‑term social hardship. In principle, subsidy removal may improve efficiency and reduce distortions in consumption. But in an unequal society with fragile institutional credibility, citizens encounter “energy transition” through transport costs, generator fuel, food inflation, and daily mobility (Esekpa, 2024).
Within an urban environment, such as Lagos, rises in fuel price can rapidly influence commuter patterns, market costs and flow of informal economy money. In peri-urban and rural settings electricity is already unreliable, with generators being extensively used. Here price of fuel is likely to define the profitability of a micro business. In a local study within Nigeria, increases in fuel price are seen to correlate with economic suffering and an increase in the cost of living, therefore reinforcing the public opinion that the burden of reforms is primarily on the common man (Abaddah, 2025).
This explains why trust becomes central to policy legitimacy. Historical memory matters: earlier reforms were often accompanied by promises of safety nets, infrastructure improvements, or welfare expansions that many citizens believe were never fully realized. Consequently, new fuel adjustments are interpreted not in isolation but against accumulated experiences of unfulfilled government commitments and governance shortfalls (Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024).
Public reactions in both formal surveys and public commentary reflect this complex interpretation. A nationally representative household study finds that opposition to fuel subsidy reform is strongly linked with beliefs about government corruption and capacity to deliver compensatory programs; respondents were more likely to support reform only where they believed in transparent governance and effective social protection (Yang et al., 2021).
There is also a profound communication gap in Nigerian fuel governance. Policy announcements often emphasize fiscal necessity while underestimating how reforms are emotionally and morally received. Citizens rarely oppose reform simply because they reject technical economics; rather, they resist because they doubt institutional fairness. This creates fertile ground for populist framing and political contestation around trust and governance (Gbadebo, 2025; Yang et al., 2021).
The political symbolism is intensified by Nigeria’s oil‑dependent identity. In a major oil‑producing country, public expectations remain shaped by the belief that resource wealth should translate into broad social benefit. When hardship deepens in an oil-rich economy, citizens often interpret such contradictions politically. Research on global subsidies also shows that fuel subsidy reforms often generate political controversy where institutional quality is low and trust weak (Droste et al., 2024).
While some assessments confirm that reducing subsidies can yield macroeconomic benefits, these gains do not automatically produce democratic legitimacy where hardship expands faster than visible welfare delivery. The result is a politics of resentment, where state actions are judged through everyday experiences of inequality rather than abstract fiscal reasoning (Gbadebo, 2025). For this reason, fuel policy should be understood not merely as economic reform but as democratic communication. The challenge is not only whether subsidy should exist, but whether citizens can trust that reform burdens are socially shared, publicly justified, and institutions remain accountable (Yang et al., 2021).
This is where Nigeria’s climate politics becomes especially instructive. The democratic sustainability transition in developing democracies can no longer be carried out through technocratic sequencing. It will demand overt distribution, convincing social protection and credible assurance that burdens are not unilateral (Gbadebo, 2025). Fuel becomes politicized in the sense that it encapsulates a variety of societal fears including inequalities, citizenship, institutional trust and the moral narrative of the state itself. Therefore, the sociology of petrol prices illustrates how the politics of environment is evaluated by “the governed,” in relation to everyday politics of trust, fairness and public meaning (Yang et al., 2021; Esekpa, 2024).
The lesson here is stark: climate and fiscal reforms implemented without democratic trust are politically dangerous, even when economically defensible. For the citizen in Nigeria asks the basic and obvious question of who bears the cost, who reaps the reward, and to whom should believe (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024).
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is an Environmental Sociologist and Developmental Scholar based in Olabisi Onabanjo University, Nigeria. His research focuses on environmental governance, climate policy, and everyday political populism in African contexts. He is a Nonresident Research Fellow at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) and has published extensively on climate governance, citizen trust, and socio-political interpretations of environmental reforms.
Droste, N., Chatterton, B., & Skovgaard, J. (2024). A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries. Nature Communications, 15, 5452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-49835-4
Esekpa, O. I., Ekarika, W. A., & Njama, G. J. (2024). Economic implications of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. Journal of Public Administration, Policy and Governance Research.https://jpapgr.com/index.php/research/article/view/131
Gbadebo, A. D. (2025). The political economy of fuel subsidy removal: Governance and sustainable development in Nigeria. Journal of Social Political Sciences, 6(3), 206–224. https://doaj.org/article/e97ce91a0aff459a9106ff8fc6cff551
Okonkwo, A. E., & Ezenwegbu, J. C. (2024). Removal of petrol subsidies and its impact on democratic governance in Nigeria. Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 38–47. https://najops.org.ng/index.php/najops/article/view/267
This commentary advances a critical intervention in debates on political persuasion by foregrounding original pilot research on communication and trust. Based on an online experiment with 322 UK participants, the study isolates the effects of communication style from semantic content by comparing responses to a still image, an untranslated video, and a subtitled populist message. The findings are striking: trust in political leaders is shaped more by audiovisual and paralinguistic cues—such as tone, gesture, and perceived authenticity—than by populist content itself. Notably, participants reported higher trust when exposed to communication they could not understand than when presented with translated political messaging. These results challenge conventional assumptions about persuasion and highlight the central role of communication form in shaping political judgement.
Public debate often assumes persuasion comes from ideology, populist rhetoric, or misinformation. When people worry about political manipulation, propaganda, or foreign interference, they usually focus on what is being said. Is a message false? Is it extremist? Is it conspiratorial? Is it anti-democratic?
Those questions matter. But they do not capture the full problem.
Political influence may depend as much on how messages are communicated as on what they say. In the digital attention economy, communication format, emotional cues, and presentation style shape political judgement. Citizens do not encounter political communication as detached analysts. They encounter it as viewers, listeners, social media users, and members of social groups, responding not only to claims and arguments but also to tone, confidence, visual presence, rhythm, repetition, and emotional force. Research has shown that falsehood spreads rapidly online, that emotional processing can increase belief in misleading information, and that anger can heighten partisan vulnerability to political misperceptions (Vosoughi et al., 2018; Martel et al., 2020; Weeks, 2015).
How Communication Shapes Trust Beyond Content
That matters not only for domestic politics but also for international politics. Strategic narratives research in IR has long argued that actors exercise power by shaping stories about who “we” are, what kind of crisis we face, and what political future is possible (Freedman, 2006; Miskimmon et al., 2013). Sharp power research has shown that authoritarian influence often works not through open persuasion alone but through manipulative, coercive, and opaque forms of projection that distort democratic information environments (Walker, 2018; Nye, 2018; Pinto, 2023). And scholarship on emotions in world politics has demonstrated that fear, resentment, nostalgia, pride, and humiliation are not peripheral to politics. They are part of how power works, both domestically and internationally (Hutchison & Bleiker, 2014; Valentino et al., 2011; Van Rythoven, 2021).
If this is right, then the key issue is not only whether citizens encounter false claims. It is how political messages are delivered, processed, remembered, and made to feel credible. That is where our pilot research becomes important.
Our pilot study, which serves as the basis for this commentary, examines how a political leader’s communication style shapes trust. In an online experiment, participants (322 UK residents) were exposed to three versions of the same political message, varying in communication richness: a still image of a (Romanian) political leader taken from a video (control condition), the video in Romanian without translation, and a subtitled version containing populist content. The aim was to disentangle the effects of visual and paralinguistic cues—such as tone, gestures, facial expressions, and emotional cadence—from those of semantic content. Put simply, the study asks whether people respond more to how a leader communicates than to what the leader actually says. It measures perceptions of the leader’s credibility, trustworthiness, appeal, and emotional impact, alongside relevant moderating variables.
Media Modality, Memory, and the Construction of Trust
The result is striking. Communication condition significantly affects trust in the candidate. Video with content but no meaning produces the highest trust, while the static picture produces the lowest. Trust in the leader is also higher when people are exposed to communication only (foreign language), compared to when they are exposed to the translated message. Just as importantly, perceptions of populism do not mediate trust in the speaker. Instead, trust appears to be shaped more by delivery cues—such as tone, credibility, authenticity, and leader appeal—than by populist framing alone.
This should make us stop and think.
A dynamic audiovisual performance can make a political figure appear stronger, more sincere, more persuasive, or more leader-like even when audiences cannot understand the words being spoken. A still image, by contrast, strips away much of what creates immediacy and emotional connection. This does not mean content is irrelevant. It means content is not the whole story. Political trust may be built through cues that sit alongside semantic meaning and sometimes outrun it.
The significance of this finding becomes even clearer when placed beside Kobayashi’s broader work on modality, memory, and political processing. The basic point is simple but important: people do not process text, still images, and video in the same way. Different media formats shape attention differently. They influence what is encoded, what is remembered, and what lingers as a political impression. Visual and multimedia formats can strengthen memory and recall, even when the content itself is weak, misleading, or only partly understood. This means that persuasion is not only about the literal content of a message. It is also about how the message enters cognition and what remains afterward.
That insight matters in domestic politics because democratic contestation now unfolds across short-form video, reels, clips, speeches, memes, livestreams, and highly personalized feeds. In such settings, communication style is not a surface feature. It becomes part of the mechanism through which trust is built. A leader who appears authentic may be granted credibility beyond the evidence. A speaker who appears forceful may seem persuasive even when the argument is thin. A compelling audiovisual fragment may leave a stronger impression than a detailed correction delivered later as plain text. Recent work also shows that democratic publics can become receptive to illiberal narratives under certain conditions, including aversion to protest and responsiveness to authoritarian framing (Kobayashi, Toriumi & Yoshida 2025; Kobayashi et al. 2025).
Strategic Narratives, Emotion, and the Transnational Politics of Influence
But this also matters for foreign policy and IR. Contemporary influence campaigns do not simply try to convince publics through formal argument. They work through strategic narratives, emotional resonance, symbolic performance, and technologically amplified circulation. States and state-aligned actors increasingly compete not only over territory, institutions, or material resources, but also over meaning, perception, and legitimacy. Public diplomacy, strategic communication, soft power, sharp power, and digital authoritarian influence all operate in this wider environment of mediated political judgement (Miskimmon et al., 2013; Walker, 2018; Nye, 2018; Roberts & Oosterom, 2025; NED, 2024).
The domestic and the international are not separate spheres here. They overlap through digital platforms, diasporas, transnational narratives, and emotionally charged content that travels across borders and is then reinterpreted in local settings. IR scholars have long argued that ideas, norms, and frames do not simply move intact from one place to another. They are localized, contested, adapted, and selectively internalized (Acharya, 2004; Wiener, 2008). That matters enormously today. A communication style that builds trust at home can also be effective abroad. A leader’s visual authenticity, emotional cadence, and symbolic performance can travel transnationally through clips, commentary networks, subtitled fragments, and influencer ecosystems. Narratives that appear domestic can be amplified internationally; narratives projected from abroad can be domesticated by local actors.
This is one reason why the distinction between domestic polarization and foreign influence is often less clear than policymakers assume. Influence is not just broadcast. It is processed through emotion, identity, memory, and media form. That is also why our broader scholarship has focused on how digital politics, civilizational narratives, and sharp-power dynamics travel through both domestic and transnational channels. Yilmaz and Morieson have shown how civilizational narratives are politically mobilized through crisis, victimhood, moral hierarchy, and claims of threatened identity (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023; Yilmaz & Morieson 2025). Yilmaz and Shakil have shown that soft and sharp power do not circulate as neutral content but are received through affect, identification, and local meaning-making (Yilmaz & Shakil, 2025). Yilmaz, Bliuc, Betts, and Morieson (2025) have argued that foreign interference can remain hidden in plain sight when it works through sharp power rather than obvious coercion.
The same is true of the work by Bliuc and Betts on online communities, identity, cohesion, and polarization. Bliuc and colleagues have shown how online communities intensify collective identity, emotional alignment, and hostility under certain socio-political conditions (Bliuc et al., 2019; Bliuc et al., 2020; Bliuc, Smith, and Moynihan 2020). Betts and Bliuc have shown how influencers can shape polarization dynamics, and later work by Betts, Bliuc, and Courtney extends this to charismatic digital actors (Betts & Bliuc 2022; Betts et al., 2025). Taken together, this body of scholarship suggests that political persuasion operates through social context, emotional cues, memory, and communication form, not simply ideological content.
Rethinking Persuasion: Trust, Media Form, and Democratic Resilience in the Digital Age
That is why the pilot matters for IR as much as for political psychology. It offers a small but important piece of evidence about a much larger problem: how trust is manufactured in mediated politics. If citizens can form more trusting evaluations of a political figure from audiovisual performance even when they do not understand the message itself, then we need to rethink what persuasion means in a digital and internationalized public sphere.
The implications are significant.
First, media literacy needs to move beyond the simple binary of true versus false. Citizens need tools to ask harder questions: Why does this message feel persuasive? Why does this speaker seem credible? What role is tone playing in my judgement? What is the visual format doing to my attention and memory? What impression is being created before I have even evaluated the substance of the claim?
Second, policymakers need to treat communication form as a matter of democratic resilience and national security, not merely as a media issue. If audiovisual style can shape trust independently of content, then strategies to counter misinformation and foreign interference cannot focus only on debunking claims after the fact. They must also address the affective and cognitive mechanisms through which trust is built in the first place. This is particularly relevant in democracies facing sustained information pressure from domestic polarization, transnational propaganda, and digitally enabled authoritarian influence. Democratic resilience is not only about institutional robustness. It is also about how citizens process and evaluate political communication under conditions of emotional and informational strain (Lieberman et al., 2021).
Third, IR needs to take communication psychology more seriously. Strategic narratives are not only elite texts. They are delivered through media systems, performances, visual formats, emotional triggers, and infrastructures of circulation. Sharp power does not only manipulate facts; it manipulates the conditions under which facts are judged, remembered, and trusted. Foreign policy analysis, therefore, needs to pay closer attention to modality, cognition, affect, and platformed attention. A narrative that fails as a written claim may succeed as a clip. A weak argument may become potent when fused with charisma, symbolism, and repetition. In an age of generative AI, synthetic media, and personalized feeds, these questions will only grow more urgent (NED, 2024; Roberts & Oosterom, 2025).
Conclusion: Hidden in Plain Sight
To support democratic resilience, countering disinformation requires more than factchecking. Democracies must address how political messages influence cognition and emotion. Research priorities should include identifying communication formats that increase susceptibility, understanding how trust is shaped by nonverbal and audiovisual cues, and designing interventions that strengthen public resilience without drifting into censorship or paternalism. That is not only a domestic challenge. It is also a foreign policy challenge, because contemporary influence operations work precisely by blurring the line between internal debate and external manipulation.
The key question is no longer simply, “What messages are citizens exposed to?” It is, “How are those messages delivered and processed?”
If we fail to ask that question, we will continue to underestimate how persuasion works in contemporary politics. And if we continue to treat manipulation only as a problem of obvious lies, we will miss the subtler but often more effective techniques that shape trust, memory, and judgement in plain sight.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.
(*) Professor IhsanYilmaz is Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations, Research Chair in Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue, and Deputy Director at the Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Deakin University, Australia. He is a leading scholar of authoritarianism, civilizational populism, digital authoritarianism, political Islam, and transnationalism. His recent research examines the diffusion of authoritarian practices, the weaponization of civilizational narratives, and the emotional and cognitive effects of disinformation in democratic and hybrid regimes.
(**) Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc is an Associate Professor of Social and Political Psychology in the School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law at the University of Dundee. She joined Dundee in 2019 after holding academic positions at Western Sydney University, Monash University, and the University of Sydney. Her research examines the role of social identity in shaping behavior across health, environmental, and socio-political contexts, including collective action, social change, and political polarization. More recently, her work has focused on online communities and digital environments, investigating how collective identities and behaviors are formed, sustained, and transformed through online interaction.
(***) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Information Technology at Monash University, Australia. He specializes in computational modelling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications across the social sciences, health, and industry. His research focuses on understanding complex systems, variability, and resource allocation, and he has contributed to interdisciplinary work on political polarization, online behavior, and agent-based modelling, alongside projects in areas such as medicine and manufacturing.
(****) Dr. Tetsuro Kobayashi is a Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics at Waseda University, Japan. He holds a PhD in Social Psychology from the University of Tokyo. Before joining Waseda University in 2023, he held academic positions at the National Institute of Informatics and City University of Hong Kong and was also a visiting researcher at Stanford University. His research lies at the intersection of political communication, political psychology, and public opinion, with a particular focus on how media environments shape political attitudes and behavior. His work has been published widely in leading journals across political science, communication, and psychology.
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In an era marked by intensifying polarization and electoral fragmentation, France’s 2026 municipal elections offer a revealing lens into the country’s shifting political equilibrium. In this ECPS interview, Professor Philippe Marlière argues that while mainstream parties retain urban strongholds, the populist radical right continues to consolidate its territorial and sociological base. Crucially, he underscores that “polarization… tends to benefit the far right,” enabling the National Rally to advance its normalization strategy within an increasingly conflictual political environment. Beyond electoral outcomes, the interview highlights deeper structural transformations—from cross-class realignment to the erosion of centrist politics—suggesting that France is not experiencing a rupture, but a gradual reconfiguration that may decisively shape the dynamics of the 2027 presidential contest.
Giving an in-depth interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London, offers a nuanced and empirically grounded assessment of France’s evolving political landscape in the wake of the 2026 municipal elections.
Held against the backdrop of an increasingly polarized European political environment, the elections revealed a fragmented yet structurally revealing electoral map. While mainstream parties retained control of major metropolitan centers such as Paris, Marseille, and Lyon, the populist radical right—anchored by the National Rally (RN)—continued to expand its territorial base across smaller municipalities and peripheral regions. Notably, the RN and its allies consolidated support in medium-sized towns and traditional strongholds in northern deindustrialized zones and the Mediterranean southeast, while also making inroads into previously resistant regions such as western France. At the same time, opinion polls suggest that RN candidates remain above the 30 percent threshold ahead of the 2027 presidential race, underscoring their growing electoral competitiveness.
As Professor Marlière emphasizes, these results must be understood through the dual lens of fragmentation and consolidation. “The French electoral landscape is deeply fragmented and also polarized,” he observes, highlighting the coexistence of institutional instability with the strengthening of ideological blocs. Indeed, he notes a “consolidation of the two blocs at the extremes,” with both the far right and the radical left reinforcing their positions without producing a decisive electoral rupture.
At the core of his analysis lies a striking argument captured in the headline insight: polarization itself has become a structural driver of far-right normalization. “This kind of polarization tends to benefit the far right,” Professor Marlière explains, as it enables the RN to position itself as a seemingly “reasonable, ‘moderate’ political force” within an increasingly conflictual political field. In this context, the long-term strategy of dé-diabolisation appears to be advancing, albeit unevenly. While the RN remains constrained in major urban centers, it has become, in Professor Marlière’s words, “a party that is increasingly on course to become normalized.”
Equally significant is the sociological transformation of the far-right electorate. No longer confined to economically marginalized groups, the RN now draws support across a broader cross-class coalition, including professionals and retirees—a shift he identifies as a critical turning point since the 2024 European elections.
Taken together, the 2026 municipal elections do not signal a dramatic rupture but rather a deepening of structural trends. As Professor Marlière cautions, “the tectonic plates… are aligning in a way that looks favorable for the National Rally,”even as electoral uncertainty persists. In this interview, he unpacks the implications of these developments for democratic resilience, party competition, and the high-stakes trajectory toward 2027 presidential elections in France.
Philippe Marlière is a Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Philippe Marlière, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
France’s Electoral Landscape Is Fragmenting While Extremes Consolidate Their Ground
Professor Marlière, welcome, and let me start right away with the first question: The 2026 municipal elections seem to have produced a fragmented but revealing map of French politics; the far right advanced in many provincial towns, mainstream parties held key metropolitan strongholds, and the left remained unevenly competitive. From your perspective, what do these results tell us about the current stage of France’s populist realignment?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I think the main lessons of that local election are, first of all, the very high level of abstention. That confirms that, when it comes to voting, the French are voting less and less. Some would call it civic disengagement. It does not necessarily mean that the French are no longer interested in politics; it simply means that they vote less. Turnout was also lower in 2014, which was the last “normal” local election, as the previous one took place during the COVID pandemic and is therefore not really comparable.
The second point, as you mentioned, is fragmentation. The French electoral landscape is deeply fragmented and also polarized. I think we will return to this later.
Thirdly, there is a form of consolidation of previous electoral trends. I am thinking here of the two major elections in 2024—the general election and the European election. There was no major upset or breakthrough, but rather a continuation of existing dynamics. Notably, as you pointed out, there is a consolidation of the two blocs at the extremes: on the far right with the National Rally, and on the far left—the radical, populist left—with Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s France Insoumise. Both camps can claim gains, and their positions appear to have strengthened.
So, overall, that would be my general assessment of this local election.
The National Rally Consolidates Territorially but Still Struggles in Major Cities
The National Rally expanded its local presence but again struggled to convert momentum into decisive victories in major cities. Should this be read as evidence that the populist radical right is becoming structurally embedded in French politics, or do these results still reveal significant sociological and territorial ceilings to its expansion?
Professor Philippe Marlière: I think for the National Rally it is hard to say that this was a bad election. It is not a fantastic election, because a fantastic result would have meant winning a number of large cities, and in France a big city is one with over 100,000 people. They did not manage to do that. They had hoped to win the city of Toulon. That said, they did win one, and, to be fair, that is at least a good result in Nice, which is, of course, one of the bigger French cities. They won in Nice with Éric Ciotti. Technically, he is not a member of the National Rally, but he is the former leader of Les Républicains, who left the party in 2024 and now runs a small party allied with the National Rally. So that is a significant gain.
Apart from that, however, the election highlighted the weakness of the National Rally in big cities and urban areas, which are now strongholds of the left. My assessment, therefore, is that this was not a breakthrough in terms of winning major cities; it did not achieve that. What it did do, however, is to consolidate its power base in medium-sized cities—places with around 20,000 inhabitants or fewer. It is now a party with a solid and territorially widespread base.
There are also three regions where it is particularly dominant: in the north, especially in former mining areas that were once socialist bastions but are now strongholds of the far right; in the southeast, which has long been a strong area for the National Rally; and in parts of the southwest as well. So I would not describe this as a setback, but neither is it a major victory. It is a party that is increasingly on course to become normalized—people in small towns now vote for the National Rally in ways that were not typical before.
At the same time, when you look at opinion polls—which is what ultimately matters for a presidential election in a year’s time—they are very favorable for the National Rally. Any candidate, whether Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella, is polling well above the 30% threshold, while all other competitors remain significantly behind.
A Weakening Center and Identity-Driven Politics Reshape French Populism
The crowd and supporters with French flags during the campaign meeting (rally) of French presidential candidate Eric Zemmour, on the Trocadero square in Paris, France on March 27, 2022. Photo: Victor Velter.
In your work, you have emphasized that populist projects must be understood in relation to their national political cultures rather than as interchangeable European phenomena. What, in your view, is specifically French about the current configuration of populism and the populist radical right revealed by these municipal elections?
Professor Philippe Marlière: It is an important point to contextualize the rise, or sometimes the setback, of the populist far right across Europe. You cannot compare all situations; they are not entirely similar. However, there are similar trends. There are differences, but also common patterns.
So, while sharing similarities with other national contexts, the French case may be specific in the sense that it exacerbates some of these trends. One example is polarization. The French political landscape is extremely polarized, and that makes a very significant difference. Polarization means that you have left-wing parties, right-wing parties, and a political center, which in France is weakening—Macron’s party did not perform well in this election, which is not a surprise.
When polarization intensifies, it creates a climate of tension in which debates revolve less around economic and social issues and more around personalities and questions of identity. We have seen a great deal of that. In the end, this kind of polarization tends to benefit the far right. The far right has used this climate to position itself as a reasonable, “moderate” political force, in contrast to other parties that have contributed to this polarized environment. I am thinking here in particular of the populist radical left associated with Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
This dynamic becomes a tool that enables the National Rally to present itself—rightly or wrongly—as a more mainstream party. The mainstreaming of the National Rally is still ongoing. It is a process that could potentially enable the party to win the presidential election in a year’s time.
So far, there has been what is often described as a “glass ceiling” in presidential elections: the far right could not win because it was perceived as too extreme, prompting a counter-reaction from voters. This time, however, if the party succeeds in presenting itself as part of the mainstream—regardless of whether that perception is accurate—it may facilitate its path to electoral victory.
From Peripheral Protest to Nationwide Presence, the RN Vote Is Expanding
The far right’s local breakthroughs were especially visible in smaller towns, deindustrialized areas, and parts of Mediterranean France. How far do these results confirm that support for the populist radical right continues to be rooted in a combination of territorial abandonment, social insecurity, and cultural anxiety?
Professor Philippe Marlière: There are aspects of the National Rally vote which clearly underline what you have just said—social insecurity, anxiety, and a feeling of being abandoned by the central state. There are some strong indicators, such as people feeling that when you live, for instance, in a small town, or in a suburban or peri-urban area, you lack many of the things that make life easier, such as good public transport and good public services. There are issues around that, and studies have shown that this feeds and strengthens the National Rally vote in general. So there is clearly that aspect.
But I think what is new, and something which will worry anyone concerned about a major National Rally victory in France in a year’s time, in the presidential election, is that this vote has not only nationalized. You mentioned the three zones of strength of the National Rally in the north, in the southeast, and the southwest—that is true—but it is also present in other parts of France. Think, for instance, of Brittany in the western part of France, a place where traditionally the National Rally would get very few votes. Now, the party can also get very decent scores in that part of France.
So, there is a nationalization of the vote, but it is also a vote that has spread across different social classes. It is no longer only the vote of the young, unemployed, relatively uneducated working class, or the working class in general. It also includes professionals and retired people, which is a new development. The turning point was the European election of 2024, when, for the first time, retired people—who had been the main supporters of Macron—switched en masse to the National Rally. That is a sign of electoral strength, because retired people tend to vote more than younger people, who abstain more.
All in all, the tectonic plates, so to speak, are aligning in a way that looks favorable for the National Rally. That said, I am not suggesting that the presidential election is a foregone conclusion or that the far right will win. A great deal can happen between now and April 2027, notably a last-ditch reaction from French voters who might prefer to vote for another candidate simply to prevent the far right from winning the highest political office in France. Much will also depend on the candidate who faces the National Rally in the second round.
Education and Class Remain Key Barriers to Far-Right Urban Expansion
University teachers, research staff, and students demonstrate against French government reforms to the academic system in Paris, France on April 2, 2009. Photo: Olga Besnard / Dreamstime.
Conversely, the RN’s continuing weakness in many large metropolitan centers suggests that urban France still resists the populist radical right. To what extent is this an effect of class composition, educational attainment, immigration-linked demography, or the continued political toxicity of the far-right label?
Professor Philippe Marlière: There are very strong sociological variables or indicators that explain why some populations and categories of voters support the far right, and why others distrust and resist it. I think there are such sociological variables at play.
Gender is one of them. Women still tend to vote less, in general, than men for the far right. The gender gap has narrowed compared to 20 or 30 years ago, but it remains. Interestingly, among younger voters—the 18–24 age group, for instance—the gender gap is even wider. There is a broader trend, not only in Europe but globally, of young men being more attracted to the far right than young women. Women, in fact, are often put off by the far right and tend to resist it.
The second variable is education, and here again the French case is not particularly unique. It is a pattern observed in many countries. The general sociological rule is that the more educated you are, the more likely you are to vote for the left. Conversely, those with lower levels of education—primary or secondary schooling, possibly the baccalaureate but no university education—are more likely to support the National Rally.
This also applies to younger voters. While Jean-Luc Mélenchon does appeal to the youth, his support is concentrated among more educated young people—those pursuing higher education and living in urban areas—as opposed to young salaried workers who left school early and live in rural areas, who tend to support the National Rally. In this sense, education is an even more decisive factor than age.
This helps explain why France’s major cities are now governed by the left. Paris and Marseille have socialist mayors, while Lyon has re-elected a Green mayor. This reflects the sociological profile of urban electorates, which tend to be more educated and relatively well-off, and therefore more inclined to support left-wing parties. By contrast, in smaller localities across France—where there is a lack of public services and higher unemployment—the National Rally performs more strongly.
The RN’s Normalization Is Aided as Much By Opponents as by Strategy
In light of these municipal results, do you think Marine Le Pen’s long strategy of dé-diabolisation has reached its limits at the local level? Or has it succeeded enough to normalize the RN in parts of France even if it still falls short of full urban legitimacy?
Professor Philippe Marlière: De-demonization is to start with—yes, you are right to stress that—a process. If it is a process, it has been initiated by political forces, and obviously, the forces that want de-demonization to happen are the National Rally, to begin with. Marine Le Pen has been very clear about this in the past. “We have been demonized,” she has said several times, and that has to stop.
So, what do you do about that? You adopt a strategy. First, you try to appear less radical, less far-right in the way you conduct your political activities and in your discourse. You remove the more radical, extremist elements within your party. This has been done.
However, I would say this has mainly been implemented among RN officials—that is, those in elected positions, particularly at the national level. For instance, considerable effort has been made by the National Rally to ensure that, within its group of MPs in the National Assembly, there are no sympathizers of extremist or fascist groups, and that no one makes anti-Semitic or Islamophobic statements. A great deal of work has gone into this. Marine Le Pen herself and Jordan Bardella present a very polished image to the public, unlike Jean-Marie Le Pen, who was repeatedly convicted for racist or anti-Semitic statements. That marks a clear difference.
Nonetheless, there are still, among supporters and even at the local level, elected RN representatives who occasionally—and quite often—make such statements. So the process is not entirely complete. Much has been achieved, but it remains ongoing.
There is also another dimension to de-demonization. It can only succeed if it receives some assistance from opponents, and in France, opponents of the far right have, in fact, contributed to this process. This is not a recent development; it began some time ago. Parties on the center-right and the right have progressively adopted elements of the RN’s discourse, and sometimes even aspects of its policy agenda. By doing so, they contribute to making the RN appear more moderate and more mainstream. If mainstream parties frame issues in similar terms to the far right, then the far right no longer appears as extreme or dangerous.
A certain degree of support has also come from the media. French media, as studies suggest, have shifted to the right. Some private channels, such as CNews, owned by the billionaire Bolloré Family, as well as formerly mainstream radio stations with large audiences, have clearly moved in that direction, if not toward the radical right. In such a context, de-demonization becomes more likely.
However, as you pointed out, there is still resistance, particularly at the grassroots level. We saw this again in 2024. After the first round of the general election, the far right was ahead and appeared on track to secure a possible absolute majority. Then what the French call a “Republican front” emerged, involving significant tactical voting between left-wing parties and also between the left and Macron’s supporters. This tactical coordination led to the defeat of many RN candidates, and in the end, the RN did not win.
So, overall, de-demonization has been underway and has been quite successful for the RN. However, the process is not yet complete. There remains a kind of anti–far-right reflex among the electorate, which has so far prevented the RN from winning major elections.
The Boundary between Mainstream Right and Far Right Is Increasingly Blurred
Photo: Dreamstime.
One of the most striking outcomes of the elections was Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice and the broader sense that parts of the mainstream right are moving closer to the RN. Do you see this as a local anomaly shaped by specific rivalries, or as a more durable sign that the boundary between mainstream conservatism and the populist radical right is eroding?
Professor Philippe Marlière: That is a very important point, and it concerns the future not only of the far right—whether it will eventually win a major election, such as a presidential or general election—but also the future of the mainstream right, the post-Gaullist right, which is what Les Républicains represent, with their legacy of de Gaulle and Chirac. I would say it also concerns the future of French politics in general, because having a far-right president and government would be a major development not only in French politics, but also in European and even global politics.
The mainstream right, notably Les Républicains (LR), plays a pivotal role in this, because figures and studies show that there is a porosity between the LR electorate and the far-right electorate. In some constituencies, voters from both sides support each other’s candidates when needed, for instance in the second round of an election. If the only candidate facing a left-wing contender is from the National Rally, you will often see a significant transfer of votes from LR voters to RN candidates, and vice versa. So it works both ways.
However, the rising and dominant force is not LR. LR is now a shadow of what used to be the dominant party on the right in French politics, particularly until the Sarkozy era. It is a party that has been losing votes and representation with each election.
As a result, LR finds itself in a kind of impossible situation. If it forms an alliance with the far right—which some within the party are now considering—it risks accelerating its own decline. That was Éric Ciotti’s choice in 2024, when he was leader of LR. He argued that the party should form an alliance and work with the far right. This represented a complete break with the tradition of figures like Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Chirac, who were firmly opposed to the far right. When the party rejected this line, Ciotti left, taking with him more than 20 MPs. Yet this has not resolved LR’s dilemma, as there remains a strong temptation among some of its officials and elected representatives to cooperate with the RN.
The problem is that by working closely with the far right, LR further legitimizes it and signals to voters that there is little difference between the two. This could lead to a scenario similar to what happened on the left in the 1970s, when the Socialists, under François Mitterrand, formed an alliance with the Communists and eventually became the dominant force.
In the current context, however, with a de-demonized far right and potentially a figure like Jordan Bardella running a relatively mainstream campaign, not very different from LR on socioeconomic issues, there is a real risk that what remains of the LR electorate could shift further toward the RN.
So, it is a very complex situation for LR. What we may be witnessing is a broader recomposition of the right, with the RN potentially becoming the dominant party and LR relegated to the role of a junior partner. This would represent a complete reversal of the post-war political order, where the far right becomes the main party, and what is considered the mainstream right becomes a junior partner.
The Macronite Center Has Given Way to a Reconfigured Right-Wing Bloc
More broadly, do these elections suggest that the French right is moving toward a process of recomposition in which traditional conservatism, Macronite liberalism, and the populist radical right are being forced into a new and unstable relationship?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Yes, the striking thing about that local election is that it really marks the end—although we already knew this—of the Macronite center. It was, in a way, positioned both on the left and on the right. Macron wanted to strike a balance between the moderate left and the moderate right. That was his project in 2017, when he was first elected. We saw that during his first term there was a shift to the right, and in his second term nothing has changed. The Macron party is now firmly on the right and has been governing with right-wing forces. It has been in power with LR, for instance. So there is no doubt that this marks the end of the attempt to find a kind of centrist position in French politics, where one could combine elements of the center-right and the center-left. That is over. The Macron party is firmly on the right.
Moreover, the local election showed that the electorate of Macron, in general, clearly supports the forces of the right in the second round when their candidate cannot run. So this very original attempt to create a genuine center that synthesizes the moderate left and right has come to an end.
As for the rest of the right, I have already addressed this in my previous answer. LR finds itself between a rock and a hard place. It has tried to cooperate with the Macron party in government, but that has not really helped, as it continues to lose votes. At the same time, it faces the major and direct challenge from the RN. So it is a very complex situation for the right.
Just one more point about LR: it did relatively well in this local election, and the reason is the same as for the Socialist Party—they entered the election from a position of strength. They already governed many cities across France. LR is the party that runs the greatest number of cities. The difference with the Socialist Party is that the latter tends to be strong in large cities with over 100,000 inhabitants, whereas LR is stronger in medium-sized cities with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, where it governs many municipalities. So it has managed to survive this election and perform relatively well.
This illustrates the paradox of French politics. The two parties that dominated French politics from the 1970s until 2017, when Macron was elected—the Socialists and LR—are no longer in a position to win national elections. However, they remain dominant at the local level, where they still have strong territorial bases.
French President Emmanuel Macron at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania on August 24, 2017. Photo: Carol Robert.
Republican Discourse Now Normalizes Formerly Far-Right Themes
Your work on laïcité and the “islamo-gauchisme” controversy has shown how republican language can be reworked in increasingly exclusionary ways. Do you think the municipal campaign confirmed that themes once associated with the far right have now migrated into broader mainstream discourse, thereby indirectly strengthening the populist radical right?
Professor Philippe Marlière: Yes, you are right on that. It is not only the far right, the National Rally, that has been normalized and mainstreamed; a certain type of racist discourse has also become quite mainstream, particularly around Islamophobia. But that is not new. This is part of the debate on so-called Islamo-gauchisme. Islamo-gauchisme was essentially directed at French academics or intellectuals who were allegedly in cahoots with Islamists in France. That was never demonstrated, but nonetheless it became a central claim. And, of course, when such claims are made, they give a significant boost to the far right, because the far right does not even need to intervene in that debate. That debate was largely carried out by the Macron government and by LR. So this is where we are.
What is interesting is that the election also showed that, in some areas—particularly in the outskirts of major cities, including several cities around Paris—mayors from ethnic minorities were elected. They are French citizens, but they come from minority backgrounds. The most notable example is Saint-Denis, a large city of around 150,000 inhabitants. It was traditionally a communist stronghold, then governed by a socialist mayor for one term, and has now been won by a La France Insoumise candidate who is Black. This is very good news for Mélenchon, who has recently advanced the idea of a “new France.”
What does this “new France” represent? It is a multicultural France shaped by immigration. France has long been a country of mass immigration, and the sons and daughters of migrants—born on French soil and holding French citizenship—are now increasingly involved in political life. Some have been elected as mayors, local councillors, and even MPs, which marks an important shift. Twenty years ago, the French political class was overwhelmingly white. While this remains the case for some parties, others—particularly on the left—have increasingly incorporated this diversity.
This is what Mélenchon has gained. He won a number of cities, I believe up to seven, which is a solid result. It is not a major breakthrough, given that La France Insoumise is a relatively young party that started from scratch, but moving from zero to seven is significant. These include important cities such as Saint-Denis, Roubaix, Vénissieux, Vaulx-en-Velin, La Courneuve, and Créteil—places with substantial populations of ethnic minorities.
What La France Insoumise is doing is quite specific. It reflects Mélenchon’s broader strategy of mobilizing young voters—particularly those pursuing higher education and living in urban areas—alongside ethnic minority communities in the banlieues. He believes that by consolidating this electorate, he can position himself to reach the second round of the presidential election.
Without Alliances, the Far Right’s Path to the Second Round Appears Assured
Torn campaign posters of Jean-Luc Mélenchon during the French presidential election in Bordeaux, France on February 19, 2022. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.
And finally, Professor Marlière, looking ahead to the 2027 presidential election, do these municipal results suggest that France is still moving toward a contest structurally shaped by the RN and the populist radical right, or do they also reopen the possibility that broader democratic coalitions—of the mainstream left, center, and moderate right—can still contain that trajectory?
Professor Philippe Marlière: That is an important question. It is also a difficult one to answer, because the situation is so fluid and things can change from one month to another. It will very much depend on the work on the ground by political parties. Can they enter into an alliance? It seems that, if you want to defeat—or to qualify for the second, decisive round of the presidential election, you need to enter into an alliance. If you go it alone, if you do not make an alliance on the left or on the right, you will further split the total vote of your political family. And if you further split the vote, everyone expects the far right to qualify, given how strong it is in the polls.
There are two places in the second round, and it seems that one is already taken by the far right. It used to be a major upset when the far right qualified for the second round; now it would be a major upset if it did not. So, let us assume the far right will be in the second round. The question then becomes: who will face it? I think there are three possible scenarios.
One appears to be a lose-lose scenario, but paradoxically it is quite plausible today. This would be the qualification of Jean-Luc Mélenchon. He is a well-known figure who can appeal to highly mobilized segments of voters—particularly young people and ethnic minorities. In a fragmented electoral landscape, the threshold to qualify for the second round could be relatively low, around 15–17 percent, which he could reach. However, this would be a lose-lose scenario because, despite the de-demonization of the far right, Mélenchon himself has been heavily demonized. According to polls, he is the most disliked political figure in France, even more so than far-right leaders. In such a case, he would likely be defeated, and the far right would have a relatively easy path to victory.
The two other scenarios would involve either a candidate from the center-left or from the right reaching the second round. For the center-left, this would likely require unity, possibly through a primary election to select a common candidate. I am quite pessimistic about this, as the left remains highly fragmented. Some support the idea of a primary, while others oppose it. For instance, former President François Hollande may be considering another run and does not favor a primary.
On the right, a similar question arises: will they unite and organize a primary to choose a candidate? There are significant differences between figures such as Édouard Philippe, a former prime minister under Macron, and Bruno Retailleau, the leader of LR, whose discourse and policies are closer to the RN. So there is a clear gap.
Without such unity, the first scenario remains plausible. In that case, one could say, as a scholar of populism, that the two populisms in France are converging—one on the radical left and the other on the far right. And, unfortunately, it seems that of these two, the one that repels more voters is Mélenchon.
In this ECPS interview, Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen offers an in-depth assessment of Denmark’s 2026 general election, highlighting both continuity and change in one of Europe’s most stable democracies. He characterizes the outcome as “a very poor election for the traditional governing parties,” underscoring the historic decline of established actors alongside the emergence of “a highly fragmented parliament.” While domestic concerns dominated the campaign, Dr. Henriksen emphasizes that strict migration policies have not contained the populist radical right, as evidenced by the resurgence of the Danish People’s Party. At the same time, he cautions against overstating democratic crisis, noting Denmark’s enduring institutional trust. Instead, he points to media fragmentation and digital communication as key forces reshaping political competition and voter alignment.
In the aftermath of Denmark’s closely contested 2026 general election on March 24, the country stands at a critical political juncture—marked by fragmented blocs, the resurgence of the populist radical right, and renewed geopolitical tensions over Greenland. While domestic issues such as the cost-of-living crisis and migration shaped the campaign, deeper transformations in political communication and democratic contestation are also unfolding. Giving an in-depth interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen, a postdoctoral researcher at Roskilde University working at the intersection of politics, media, and digital society, whose research on digital counter-publics, alternative media ecosystems, and anti-systemic populism, offers important insights into these developments.
Reflecting on the election outcome, Dr. Henriksen underscores that “this was a very poor election for the traditional governing parties,” pointing to the historically weak performance of both the Social Democrats and the center-right Venstre. He further highlights that “we now have a highly fragmented parliament,” a development that is likely to render coalition-building both complex and protracted. Indeed, the emergence of multiple competitive actors across the political spectrum has produced what some observers describe as “Dutch conditions” of party fragmentation and even “Belgian conditions” of prolonged government formation.
At the same time, Dr. Henriksen draws attention to the resurgence of the populist radical right, particularly the Danish People’s Party, emphasizing that restrictive policy convergence has not neutralized such forces. As he notes, the Danish case illustrates that strict migration policies do not necessarily diminish the electoral appeal of the radical right, but may instead coincide with renewed voter mobilization around issues of identity, economic anxiety, and national direction.
Beyond electoral dynamics, the interview also engages with the transformation of political communication in digitally mediated environments. While cautious about attributing direct causal effects to alternative media, Dr. Henriksen observes that “it has been very difficult to define” the election in terms of a coherent overarching narrative, suggesting that media fragmentation and hybrid communication systems are reshaping how political competition is structured and understood.
Importantly, despite these shifts, Dr. Henriksen does not interpret recent developments as signaling a systemic crisis of democracy. Denmark, he argues, remains a high-trust society with robust institutional foundations. Yet, it is increasingly “no longer isolated from trends we see elsewhere in Europe,” including fragmentation, anti-incumbent voting, and the growing salience of populist communication.
Taken together, Dr. Henriksen’s reflections situate the Danish election within a broader European trajectory, where established party systems are under pressure, populist actors continue to adapt, and democratic politics is being reshaped by both structural and communicative transformations.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Voters Reward Clearer Political Profiles on Both Sides
Denmark votes in parliamentary elections in Copenhagen, Kastrup, Denmark, on November 1, 2022. Voters head to polling stations to cast their ballots in the general election. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Dr. Henriksen, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin with the electoral outcome itself: How should we interpret the 2026 Danish election results, where both the red and blue blocs fell short of a majority? Does this fragmentation signal a structural transformation of Denmark’s party system?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Thank you for this question—it is a very broad one. I will try to narrow it down to a few key takeaways, and then we can elaborate further during the interview.
The first takeaway is that this was a very poor election for the traditional governing parties. The Social Democrats, for instance, remained the largest party, but they fell to a historic low—their worst result since 1903. The center-right party, Venstre, as it is called in Danish, also suffered a historically weak result.
The second takeaway is that we now have a highly fragmented parliament. This means that coalition-building will be unusually difficult and potentially lengthy—at least, that is what commentators are suggesting at the moment.
The third point is that overall voter turnout was lower than usual, although still high by international standards. I interpret this as a sign that voters have been dissatisfied with the centrist government we have had over the past four years.
The fourth point is that there were clear winners outside the old or established center. The Danish People’s Party, for example, performed strongly with 9.1%, and the Socialist People’s Party on the left became the second-largest party.
Thus, the election did not simply produce fragmentation for its own sake; rather, it suggests that voters rewarded parties with clearer profiles on both sides of the political spectrum. In this sense, the Danish People’s Party can be seen as one of the main winners.
I also heard a commentator suggest that these are “Dutch conditions,” in the sense that we now have many parties represented in parliament. There is a political science measure for the effective number of parties, and it has reportedly never been higher in the Danish parliament. Another commentator added that we may face “Belgian conditions,” meaning that it could take a very long time to form a government with so many parties involved. I find this framing quite insightful.
Regarding whether this signals a structural transformation, I would say it is important to view the situation in light of the decline of the Social Democrats. They have been in government for an extended period—first leading a left-leaning government and then a centrist coalition. This development should therefore be understood in the context of their weakening position, including their time in power during COVID-19. It appears they have struggled to maintain momentum, which is reflected in the election results. At the same time, we do see clear signs of fragmentation—this is quite evident.
We can also observe that centrist parties, such as the Moderates, have become highly important in the coalition-building phase. Although relatively small, both blocs—the left and the right—depend on their mandates to form a government. As a result, they are likely to play a very prominent role.
Finally, this election also points to the growing importance of person-driven politics rather than party-driven politics. For voters, the election itself has been quite fragmented. It is not entirely clear what the main issues have been; instead, individual political figures have played a central role. We can see that some of the key figures, such as Martin Messerschmidt and Lars Løkke Rasmussen, have attracted a significant share of the vote. This indicates a broader shift toward more person-driven politics and person-driven electoral outcomes.
Unpopular Reforms Cost the Social Democrats Voter Support
Denmark’s Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen at a press conference during the COVID-19 crisis, Copenhagen, March 17, 2020. Photo: Francis Dean | Dreamstime.
The Social Democrats emerged as the largest party but recorded one of their weakest results in over a century. To what extent does this outcome reflect voter fatigue with incumbency, and to what extent does it point to deeper shifts in political trust and democratic legitimacy?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: It’s a very good question. There is clearly an incumbency story here. It is important to situate the Social Democrats’ decline in voter support within a broader anti-incumbent mood among voters, which I alluded to, earlier. After nearly seven years in power, the party has been carrying the burdens of office. As we know from political science, this is challenging for governing parties, particularly when they are associated with unpopular reforms. One notable example is the abolition of a national holiday in 2024, known as the Great Prayer Day. This decision appears to have resonated strongly with voters across the political spectrum, and the party has been penalized for it. I think that when the government abolished the holiday, it did not anticipate the extent of its electoral impact. That is an important factor to consider.
At the same time, it would be too narrow to interpret the result solely as voter fatigue. The Social Democrats were squeezed from both sides. Some left-leaning voters felt that the party had become too restrictive on immigration, while some right-leaning voters continued to distrust it on economic issues. In this sense, the outcome reflects both incumbency effects and the limits of a centrist repositioning, which is relatively unusual in the Danish political context. So, while the party remains electorally dominant in relative terms, its broad coalition appears thinner and more fragile than before.
That said, I do not see strong evidence—at least at this stage—of a more generalized crisis of democratic legitimacy. Denmark still has stable political institutions, and the economy is in relatively good shape compared to some other EU countries. Voter turnout also remained relatively high, and the election process was fair. Therefore, framing this as a general crisis of democratic legitimacy may be an overstatement. However, much will depend on what kind of government ultimately emerges.
The Danish People’s Party Re-Emerges as a Major Force
The election saw a notable resurgence of the Danish People’s Party and other anti-immigration actors. How do you explain this revival in light of your research on anti-systemic populism? Does it indicate that such movements have successfully re-entered the electoral mainstream?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: That is a good question. There is clearly a strong case to be made that the Danish People’s Party has re-emerged as a significant force. They moved from around 2–3% to 9.1% of the vote, effectively tripling their support compared to the previous election. They have campaigned on issues such as zero net Muslim migration and cost-of-living concerns, including proposals like abolishing petrol taxes. They have been very successful in doing so, and I would also argue that they have run one of the most effective social media campaigns, which likely contributed to their performance.
This revival suggests that anti-immigration politics have not disappeared; rather, they were partially displaced and fragmented. This election indicates that when economic anxiety, migration, and broader questions about national direction become salient again, these constituencies can be remobilized electorally.
In relation to my own research, I have focused less on elections per se and more on anti-systemic movements and forms of mobilization. From that perspective, the Danish People’s Party has been particularly successful in tapping into this kind of anti-systemic mobilization.
At the same time, we also see another far-right party, the Danish Democrats, led by former minister Inger Støjberg. While they share a similar anti-immigration stance, they have not been as successful in converting this into electoral support. To me, this suggests that additional factors are at play. One key element appears to be the effectiveness of social media campaigning, particularly on the part of the Danish People’s Party and Morten Messerschmidt.
A Key Lesson for Social Democratic Parties in Europe
The Danish case has often been cited as an example of mainstream parties absorbing far-right agendas—particularly on immigration. In light of the latest election results, do you see this strategy as containing or, paradoxically, legitimizing populist radical right discourse within mainstream political competition? Do the election results suggest that this strategy has reached its limits—or even backfired?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Yes, I definitely think this election lends support to the argument that the strategy of normalizing far-right rhetoric and policies within the center and the center-left has its limits—perhaps even backfiring to some extent. For example, Denmark has maintained one of Europe’s toughest migration policies, and yet the Danish People’s Party still achieved a very strong electoral result.
When we examine the data, particularly in comparison to the 2022 election, we also observe one of the largest estimated voter shifts from one party to another—specifically from the Social Democrats to the Danish People’s Party. This is based on the data currently available, although it will require further analysis. At the very least, this suggests that voters are moving from the Social Democrats to the Danish People’s Party, and that this shift is closely linked to the migration issue.
What this indicates is that a strict mainstream migration policy does not automatically neutralize the radical right or the far right in electoral terms. This is an important lesson for other social democratic parties across Europe that are observing the Danish election and seeking to shape their own positions on migration and anti-immigration policies in light of these developments.
Far-Right Digital Counter-Publics Remain Highly Active
Your work emphasizes the role of alternative news media in shaping political perceptions. To what extent do you think digital counter-publics and alternative information environments influenced the electoral performance of populist and radical right actors in this election?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Let me begin with alternative news media. I would say that, in themselves, they do not have a significant impact on electoral outcomes. I have been collecting articles from Danish alternative news media throughout the election, and only one outlet—one that is somewhat close to the Social Democrats, called PUPU—has actively covered the election. I have also followed debates on national television, where at least one editor from a right-leaning outlet was invited to participate in discussions on migration, particularly concerning Muslims and the Danish Muslim population. So, there is certainly something to this, but it is not an impact that we can clearly observe.
When it comes to digital counter-publics connected to alternative news media, it is becoming increasingly difficult for researchers to obtain reliable data from platforms, which makes this question quite challenging to answer. Based on my intuition, however, these counter-publics—especially those associated with the far right and the Danish People’s Party—are highly active. I am quite confident that the Danish People’s Party’s social media strategy has aimed to mobilize some of these digital counter-publics. How successful these efforts have been, and the extent of their overall impact, remains difficult to determine—particularly given the ongoing challenges of accessing data from different platforms.
No Electoral Impact from the Greenland Issue
Election campaign posters featuring Liberal leader and former Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen displayed on a street during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on June 15, 2015. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Despite intense international attention on the Greenland crisis, domestic issues ultimately dominated the campaign. How do you interpret this gap between geopolitical salience and voter priorities? Was the so-called “Greenland effect” electorally significant or overstated?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: As I see it, the only politician who really managed to benefit from the “Greenland effect,” or to gain something from it, was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, from the Moderates. There was a documentary film about the days leading up to and during the crisis, when it was at its peak, and Lars Løkke Rasmussen traveled to Washington to meet with American politicians.
I think he was the only one who really gained something from this in electoral terms, at least. I am not entirely sure why. Mette Frederiksen was certainly in a position to benefit as well, since she played a significant role in managing the situation and coordinating with European counterparts. However, we do not see this reflected in the numbers, at least not in the electoral outcome.
If we consider the Greenland case more broadly, it mattered quite a lot in the run-up to the election. Mette Frederiksen called the election while still benefiting from the visibility and leadership image created by Trump’s pressure over Greenland. During the campaign itself, however, the issue was clearly overshadowed by domestic concerns. These included rising costs of living, the green transition, debates over clean drinking water, healthcare for an aging population, and, of course, immigration. These issues ultimately dominated the campaign. The established parties struggled to mobilize effectively across all of them, although the Social Democrats were more successful on issues such as the green transition and welfare, while the Danish People’s Party mobilized strongly on immigration as well as welfare and healthcare-related concerns.
Potential Spillover into Populist Narratives
At the same time, could the Greenland issue have indirectly shaped the election by reinforcing narratives of sovereignty, external threat, and national unity—particularly within populist communication frames?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: As I mentioned earlier, perhaps—but not to a very strong extent. I think it is, to some degree, a matter of time. We will have to see whether concerns over Greenland spill over into broader, more classic right-wing populist debates regarding border control, security, national cohesion, and immigration. That said, I would still be somewhat hesitant to answer definitively in the affirmative. It is also a question of timing—we will have to see, especially as the formation of a coalition government will likely take a few months, according to some political analyses. These topics could certainly resurface.
Fragmentation Elevates the Moderates to Kingmaker Status
The Moderates, now positioned as a pivotal kingmaker at the political center, occupy a decisive role in post-election coalition building. From your perspective, does this development represent a stabilizing corrective within Danish democracy, or does it instead point to a deeper fragmentation of political representation?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I think it points to a deeper fragmentation of political representation, as you suggest. Today, the left-leaning bloc has chosen the Moderates as the kingmaker, which is entirely new information. However, the left-leaning bloc still needs the mandates from Lars Løkke Rasmussen’s party to succeed, so the most likely scenario is a left-leaning government with the Moderates as part of it—although I would not put my head on the block for that.
It is somewhat striking, because leading up to the election, many expected that Lars Løkke Rasmussen and the Moderates would assume the kingmaker role. However, learning from the last election, the Social Democrats appear to have tried to avoid that situation, as it would have placed considerable pressure on them—even as the largest party—within an increasingly fragmented party system. Time will show what role the Moderates and Lars Løkke Rasmussen—who hold 14 seats in parliament—will ultimately play in forming the government.
One additional point is that Lars Løkke Rasmussen has been the clearest advocate for forming another centrist government. He has maintained this position consistently from the outset. If the government formation process drags on, he may find himself in a particularly strong position, as having a clear and consistent stance can be advantageous in such a fragmented political landscape. There is a great deal at stake, and forming a government will be a difficult political process. It could prove especially interesting for the Moderates.
No Clear Narrative Defines This Election
Various major Danish daily newspapers in Copenhagen, Denmark, on April 17, 2015 displayed on a table. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Your research highlights how digital environments can foster echo chambers and partisan homophily. Do you see evidence that such dynamics contributed to the electoral polarization—or fragmentation—observed in this election? How might these dynamics have influenced voter alignments in this election, particularly regarding contentious issues such as immigration, economic redistribution, and national sovereignty?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: The short answer is no, but I think the fact that it was not possible for either political parties or the media to construct a very clear storyline for this election—for voters, at least—really says a lot. It is something that political commentators across the spectrum agree on: this has been an election that has been very difficult to define. It has been unclear whether the election was about policies related to the green transition, immigration, or other issues. It has been highly fragmented, and none of the parties has been able to set the agenda in a decisive way.
My hypothesis—perhaps also from a researcher’s perspective—is that we are witnessing the long-term effects of media fragmentation. Legacy media and social media together are making it increasingly difficult, within this hybrid media environment, for the media to establish a coherent narrative for voters—one that clearly identifies the main dividing lines between parties and presents the election as a unified communicative and political process. Of course, social media is not new to this election, but we may now be seeing its longer-term effects more clearly.
I do not have a definitive answer as to why it has been so difficult for the media. Denmark still has a high-quality, high-trust media system, with outlets that voters generally trust. So it is somewhat puzzling why it has been so difficult to formulate a cohesive narrative about the election.
European Trends Reshape Danish Politics
Denmark is often described as a high-trust, low-polarization society. Yet your work suggests that even such contexts are not immune to the rise of anti-systemic communication. Do the current election dynamics indicate an erosion of this “Nordic exceptionalism,” or rather its adaptation under new digital conditions?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I think the fact that the far-right party, the New Right—which we have not discussed—entered parliament in the last election is indicative of this—an erosion of Nordic exceptionalism, at least to some extent. They only entered with 2.1% of the vote, so Denmark remains a high-capacity democracy with fairly high turnout, as we have said—a little lower than in the last couple of elections—and there is still broad institutional legitimacy.
On the other hand, one could argue that Denmark is no longer isolated from trends we see elsewhere in Europe. The fragmentation we discussed, anti-incumbent voting patterns, migration-centered competition, and increased pressure on mainstream, established parties all point in that direction.
However, my analysis is that much of the anti-systemic mobilization and communication has been picked up and channeled very successfully by the Danish People’s Party, particularly through social media campaigns. The Danish People’s Party has been one of the parties that has gained the most from this election. So, it has not been a landslide erosion of democratic trust; rather, it is a sign of an increasingly polarized political landscape. We may also be observing some longer-term effects, particularly the difficulties faced by the media system in providing a clear and coherent narrative of the election for voters.
Nativist Strategies Can Backfire Electorally
Pakistani or Indian migrants in Copenhagen, Denmark, September 22, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.
In your view, how does the Danish election contribute to our understanding of populism beyond the traditional left–right spectrum? Do we observe forms of “valence” or “anti-systemic” populism that cut across ideological divides, especially in digitally mediated environments?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: I will have to give a somewhat boring answer to this—and also one that is not particularly favorable for my own research on anti-systemic populism—but I do not see it as the main case here. It is not the central story of this election. There is, however, an interesting argument in how the Social Democrats appropriated a far-right nativist discourse, which appears to have backfired in terms of voter transitions to the Danish People’s Party. I think this is partly because the Danish People’s Party was effective in exploiting the opportunities it was given. What I mean by this is that we do not observe the same voter transition to the Danish Democrats, who did not achieve the electoral success they had anticipated. So, to a large extent, this comes down to the social media campaigning of Morten Messerschmidt and the Danish People’s Party.
Anti-Centrist Voting Defines the Election
The election results indicate gains both for the populist radical right and for certain left-wing actors. Does this suggest that populism in Denmark is increasingly transcending the traditional left–right divide? From a comparative perspective, how does Denmark’s experience relate to broader European trends in populist radical right mobilization? Does the Danish case still represent a distinct model, or is it converging with patterns observed in countries like Germany, Austria, or Sweden?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: First of all, I would not say that the Danish case shows that populism has fully transcended the left–right divide, at least not in a symmetrical sense. What we do see, however, is a clear revolt against the status quo and the established parties. A more accurate formulation is that this represents a kind of anti-centrist voting, spread across the spectrum on both the left and the right.
On the right, we have the Danish People’s Party, whose recovery was clearly tied to classic populist radical right themes such as immigration, national protection, and related issues. They campaigned on zero net Muslim migration and on cost-of-living grievances. On the left, we see the Socialist People’s Party, which mobilized around classic welfare issues and a stronger green profile.
In comparative terms, Social Democrats in countries such as Sweden, Germany, and perhaps the Netherlands are likely looking at this election and drawing lessons from it—particularly that they should avoid adopting strategies that appropriate nativist tropes from far-right parties. I think that would be my answer to this question.
No Strong Cordon Sanitaire in Danish Politics
A Conservative Party election billboard reading “Stop Nazi Islamism” draws public attention and criticism during the campaign period in Copenhagen, Denmark on April 15, 2015.. Photo: Francis Joseph Dean / Dean Pictures / Dreamstime.
Denmark’s far right has historically been constrained by institutional and cultural factors, including elements of a cordon sanitaire. Do recent developments suggest a weakening of these barriers, particularly through digital mainstreaming processes?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: Good question. Historically, when we compare Denmark to Sweden and Germany, for instance, we do not have as strong a cordon sanitaire tradition as we see in the German context, where certain parties, such as the AfD, are very actively and explicitly excluded.
The Danish political scene is characterized by a relatively wide spectrum of voices that are allowed in. So, I do not think that the 2% threshold for entering parliament necessarily prevents a broader range of parties from gaining representation; rather, it allows for what one might call a “long tail” of parties. So, I tend to disagree slightly with that premise.
Regarding whether this relates to digital mainstreaming processes, there has certainly been a mainstreaming of nativist discourse. That is quite clear to me. And, as I mentioned before, it is now up to Social Democrats across Europe to consider whether they want to follow the same path as the Social Democrats in Denmark.
A Left-Leaning Government Is Likely to Emerge
And finally, looking ahead: Based on these election results, what are the key risks and opportunities for Danish democracy? Do you foresee a consolidation of mainstream politics, or further growth of anti-systemic and populist forces in future elections?
Dr. Frederik Møller Henriksen: For this election, and for the government coalition-building process currently underway, I think we will see a left-leaning bloc entering government. As for the long-term effects, this relates more to how difficult it can be to form a centrist government, especially in a political party system that does not have a strong tradition of doing so. I think the three parties that formed the previous government were not very successful in this regard, and we can see that reflected in voter turnout—the voters simply did not like it.
On the other hand, this did not translate into strong anti-systemic mobilization. I think this is more closely related to Denmark being a high-trust society, where people are not concerned about fraud and are not worried about being misinformed by state media, for instance.
I think we need to center our attention on the core pillars of democracy that sustain it, rather than focusing solely on a specific election outcome. Of course, that is also very important, but to understand why we do not see strong anti-systemic mobilization on either the left or the right, we need to look at trust in the media system and the political system.
Please cite as: Al-Sheikh Daoud, Emad Salah & Al-Dahlaki, Khudhair Abbas. (2026). “French Court Ruling Convicting Marine Le Pen: Implications for the Future of the Far Right in France.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0052
Abstract This article examines the political and institutional repercussions of the French court ruling convicting Marine Le Pen, leader of the National Rally, of embezzling public funds and barring her from holding public office. Using a case study approach, the study analyzes how the verdict reshapes the trajectory of the French far right, the internal dynamics of the National Rally, and broader debates on judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. It explores competing interpretations of the ruling—as either a manifestation of rule-of-law accountability or an instance of political targeting—while assessing its impact on public opinion and electoral prospects ahead of the 2027 presidential election. Drawing on polling data and political reactions, the article argues that the ruling may paradoxically reinforce populist narratives of victimhood in the short term, even as it introduces strategic uncertainty for the party’s future leadership. Ultimately, the study highlights the tension between legal accountability and symbolic politics, positioning the case as a critical moment in the evolution of contemporary European populism.
Keywords: French judiciary, National Rally, Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, European Parliament, Populism, Far-right politics, Political polarization, Rule of law
Marine Le Pen, leader of the far-right National Rally party in France, has long been a controversial figure in French and European politics. Since succeeding her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, as party leader, the party has seen its presence grow in the political and media landscape, even making gains in French legislative elections and European Parliament elections. It now holds the largest bloc in the National Assembly (the French lower house), and Marine Le Pen herself reached the second round of the French presidential elections, facing President Emmanuel Macron in both 2017 and 2022.
However, qualification for the second round of the presidential election did not prevent Marine Le Pen and 12 members of her party from being convicted of embezzling public funds by the Paris Criminal Court on March 3, 2025. The total damage was estimated at approximately €2.9 million, relating to funds from the European Parliament that were used to pay individuals who were in fact working for the far-right party. The French judiciary ruled that Le Pen would be barred from running for public office for five years, effectively preventing her from contesting the 2027 presidential election. She was also sentenced to four years in prison, two of which are to be served under electronic monitoring.
The significance of this research lies in its analysis of the repercussions of the French court’s decision to convict Marine Le Pen on France’s social and political landscape. It examines how major judicial rulings shape the trajectory of political parties—particularly the party under study—and how French public opinion responds to such decisions. In doing so, the study adds an important dimension to understanding the relationship between the judiciary and politics in democratic systems.
Research Objective
This research aims to analyze the details of the conviction issued by the French judiciary, its repercussions for the political and personal future of the leader of the National Rally (RN), and to assess the impact of this decision on the party’s popularity and political discourse, particularly in the context of preparations for upcoming elections.
Research Problem
This research seeks to address the central question: “Was the French court’s decision influenced by hidden political pressures, or was it a fully independent judicial ruling based solely on legal evidence?”
To explore this, the study further examines two sub-questions: How independent is the judiciary in cases with clear political dimensions? And how do such decisions shape public trust in judicial institutions?
Research Hypothesis
The main hypothesis of this research is that the popularity of the National Rally will not decline significantly and may even increase among certain groups. This is based on the possibility that the party’s supporters may interpret the decision as part of a “political conspiracy” against them, thereby reinforcing the cohesion of their base and strengthening loyalty to the party and its leadership.
Research Methodology
The topic will be studied using the case study method in dissecting the details of the French court’s decision and its political repercussions.
The Origins and Ideology of the National Rally and Its Political Role
France is the home of the emergence of extreme right-wing movements and parties. One of the repercussions of the French Revolution was the emergence of forces and figures who adopted radical visions, positions and policies accompanied using armed violence and repression against opponents. This led to the division of political forces into a right–left dichotomy, which has persisted and become deeply entrenched in shaping the French political system across all historical periods up to the present.
In this regard, Article (4) of the French Constitution issued on October 4, 1958, specifies the function of political parties: “Political parties and groups participate in the exercise of the right to vote. They are formed and carry out their activities freely. They must respect the principles of national sovereignty and democracy. The laws guarantee the right to express different opinions and the fair participation of political parties and groups in the democratic life of the nation,” (French Constitution, 1958). The freedom of formation and exercise granted to them by the Constitution did not prevent successive governments from banning small local or national extremist parties, whether right-wing or left-wing.
The National Rally, previously known as the National Front, has been—and remains—a controversial and divisive force in the French political scene due to its extreme right-wing ideology, ideas, and programs, as well as the political influence and personal charisma of its founder, the late Jean-Marie Le Pen, and his daughter and successor, party leader Marine Le Pen, along with the political and media discourse they have advanced. Therefore, the party can be regarded as a significant and influential actor in France’s political, social, and cultural landscape.
The National Rally is widely regarded as one of the most successful right-wing populist parties and a source of inspiration for similar movements across Europe, having achieved notable gains both domestically in France and in European Parliament elections. The party has undergone several phases of development and political influence, which can be broadly divided into two main periods. The first is the founding phase, led by its founder Jean-Marie Le Pen, beginning with the party’s establishment in 1972 and lasting until 2011, when leadership passed to his daughter, Marine Le Pen.
This initial period saw significant transformations in the party’s orientation, organizational structure, and political activity, alongside growing electoral success at both national and European levels. Marine Le Pen’s rise to the presidency not only resolved internal leadership questions but also clarified the party’s future direction. Her leadership strengthened the party’s effectiveness, improved its public image, and facilitated its integration into the French political mainstream. Moreover, the party expanded its agenda beyond security and immigration, presenting itself as a credible alternative to governing parties rather than merely a source of political disruption (Ivaldi & Maria Elisabetta, 2016: 138).
Marine Le Pen’s first task after being elected party leader was to implement a “de-demonization” agenda aimed at shedding the party’s far-right image and enhancing its credibility. However, the changes introduced also reflected the continuation of a dynastic model of leadership characterized by strong centralization and hierarchical organization. Marine Le Pen capitalized on this transformation, particularly through media and social media engagement—appearing frequently on television and radio—to reshape the party’s ideological discourse and adopt a more “populist,” or at least “neo-populist,” orientation.
The party increasingly positioned itself as a defender of “the people” against globalization, outsourcing, and mainstream parties such as the Union for a Popular Movement and the Socialist Party, which it accuses of betraying the public (François, 2014: 52–53). At the same time, it has been argued that Marine Le Pen’s populism also reflects resistance to sharing welfare benefits, perceived by supporters as hard-won entitlements (Marcus, 1995: 105).
The ideology, policies, and programs of the National Rally are based on several key principles, most notably:
Emphasis on national identity: The party highlights the perceived existential threat to French identity posed by foreigners and immigrants. This threat is framed as coming from two directions: historically from the east, associated with communist ideology in the former Soviet model, and from the south, associated with what is described as an Islamic threat (Marcus, 1995: 103).
National preference: A fundamental element of its economic doctrine, “national preference” prioritizes French citizens in access to limited state resources such as healthcare, housing, and social welfare benefits (Marcus, 1995: 103).
Foreign and security policy vision: The party’s outlook is grounded in the idea that France has a unique global mission. It advocates restoring national independence and prioritizing French national interests, arguing that relations with European Union should not come at the expense of sovereignty and that ties with the United States should remain balanced.
Rejection of globalization and market liberalization: The party views the ideology of globalization as an embodiment of the hegemony of a global superpower, particularly the United States. At the same time, despite elements of neoliberal rhetoric and some criticism of the welfare state, “the party adopts a pro-market liberal economy and combines traditional left-wing themes of social and economic protectionism and anti-globalization with strong working-class appeal” (Ivaldi & Elisabetta, 2016: 17).
Regarding the electoral performance of the National Rally, since its founding, the party has participated in all elections for the National Assembly (Parliament/Lower House) and the European Parliament, aiming to consolidate its presence on the political scene. However, it was unable to surpass the 5% threshold required for entry into the National Assembly during the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, as it remained in a formative stage, seeking to attract and persuade different segments of French society of its political project and socio-economic program.
At the same time, the French party system was characterized by strong polarization and competition between two major blocs—the right and the moderate left—which by the mid-1980s had shifted toward the ideological center, limiting the party’s electoral gains. The number of seats the party won in the 2017 elections was insufficient to form a parliamentary group, as the rules of the National Assembly require at least fifteen deputies, with groups playing a central role in parliamentary organization and committee formation.
In the 2022 legislative elections, however, the National Rally achieved a major breakthrough, securing 17.30% of the vote and forming, for the first time, a significant parliamentary bloc with 89 seats (Al-Dahlaki, 2024: 250).
In French presidential elections, and in the context of demonstrating the strength and popularity of the party and his ambitions as the party’s leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen participated in several electoral cycles and achieved notable gains. Most prominently, in the 2002 election, he secured an unprecedented result with 16.9% of the vote, advancing to the second round against Jacques Chirac, which he ultimately lost, receiving 17.8% of the total vote. This outcome was described as a political earthquake and a wake-up call for moderate French political forces, underscoring the need to unite against the far right. At the time, many voters resorted to “punitive voting,” supporting Chirac despite reservations (Shields, 2007: 196).
In the 2012 presidential election, opinion polls indicated that Marine Le Pen was a serious contender, though she did not advance to the runoff. She ran again in 2017, reaching the second round, where she faced Emmanuel Macron, who won with 65.82% of the vote compared to her 34.18% (Nordstrom, 2017). In the 2022 presidential election, she once again reached the second round but was defeated by Macron, despite achieving the highest result for a far-right candidate under the Fifth Republic, established in 1958. Macron received 58.5% of the vote, compared to 41.5% for Le Pen (Al-Dahlaki, 2022).
In this regard, we refer to the accusation leveled by President Emmanuel Macron against Marine Le Pen during the televised debate ahead of the 2017 presidential elections, when he accused her of “financial subservience and dependence on Putin’s broader project, and submission to values that are not our own.” This allegation stemmed from a loan Le Pen obtained from the First Czech-Russian Bank, which she denied (Vie Publique, 2017). The National Rally party also reportedly received a loan of eight million euros from Laurent Foucher, a French businessman with investments in the Republic of Congo. These funds were channeled through the UAE-based financial company Noor Capital and deposited into the party’s accounts at the end of June 2017, shortly before being transferred to Le Pen’s presidential campaign account (Laske & Turchi, 2019).
It is also worth noting that French prosecutors questioned billionaire Pierre-Édouard Stérin in June 2024 as part of an ongoing investigation into campaign finance violations linked to the National Rally. According to the Marseille prosecutor’s office, the inquiry concerns loans totaling 1.8 million euros granted to several party candidates for the 2020 municipal and 2021 regional elections, including in major cities such as Lyon and Nice. In parallel, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has opened an investigation into alleged misuse of funds by the now-defunct Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament, of which the National Rally was a member (Goury-Laffont & Solletty, 2025).
It is also worth noting that French prosecutors questioned a French billionaire in June 2024 who was allegedly seeking to use his wealth to promote a radical liberal and anti-immigrant agenda, as part of an ongoing investigation into campaign finance violations involving the National Rally party. The Marseille prosecutor’s office stated that it had questioned Pierre-Edouard Sterin, a media mogul who made his first millions with the gift card company Smartbox.
The questioning formed part of an investigation into loans totaling 1.8 million euros granted to several National Rally candidates to finance campaigns in the 2020 municipal and 2021 regional elections, including in major cities such as Lyon and Nice. In parallel, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office has launched an investigation into alleged misuse of funds by the now-defunct Identity and Democracy group in the European Parliament, of which the National Rally was a member (Goury-Laffont & Solletty, 2025).
Details of the European Funds Embezzlement Case
In a French court ruling considered by political and media circles to be a political earthquake with far-reaching repercussions on the French political scene, and potentially even at the European Union level, the French judiciary issued a verdict convicting Marine Le Pen of embezzling public funds. The court also ruled to disqualify her from running for office, with the sentence to be carried out immediately. Alongside Le Pen, the Paris court convicted eight other members of the European Parliament from her party in connection with the same case. As a result, Le Pen will, most probably, be unable to run in the upcoming presidential elections. The court estimated the total damage at €2.9 million, as the European Parliament was charged with the costs of individuals who were effectively working for the far-right party. Although her seat in the French parliament will not be threatened, Marine Le Pen may be barred from running in the 2027 presidential election. This follows the confirmation of her political disqualification, which will be enforced immediately (Le Monde, 2025).
Le Pen’s National Rally received money from the European Parliament for parliamentary assistants who were working either partially or wholly in favor of the party. These allegations, relating to the years 2004 to 2016, have haunted Marine Le Pen and her party for years. The total number of defendants in the case is 28. The amount of money involved is approximately €7 million ($7.3 million). Le Pen repaid €330,000 to the European Parliament in 2023; however, her party insisted that this was not an admission of wrongdoing.
A conviction for Le Pen would have serious consequences. The prosecutor requested a five-year ban from holding public office if she were found guilty, which would effectively end her hopes of running again in the 2027 presidential election. The prosecution also called for the sentence to be applied immediately, not only after a legally binding ruling from a higher court. The investigation into the case began in 2015, involving the National Rally’s head of personnel along with 24 other members, and extended to contracts for political aides between 2004 and 2016. It also included figures such as an assistant and a secretary of Marine Le Pen who received their salaries from recruitment bonuses under false and fabricated pretexts (Eremnews, 2025).
As part of the campaign targeting the National Rally, on July 9, 2025, French authorities raided the headquarters of the National Rally as part of a major investigation into whether the party violated campaign finance laws during the last election. Prosecutors said the investigation, which began the previous year, is examining whether the party partially financed its campaigns through illegal loans between January 1, 2020, and July 12, 2024.
Party leader Jordan Bardella confirmed this on platform X, stating that the National Rally headquarters, “including the offices of its leaders,” had been searched. Bardella described the raids as “unprecedented” and “a serious attack on pluralism,” although several other party headquarters in France have been raided in recent years, including those of the center-right Republicans and the far-left France Unbowed. He added that “emails, documents, and accounting records belonging to the party” were confiscated, and later claimed in a subsequent post on X that the investigations were based on “a vague, undefined criminal offense” and were politically motivated (Jory-Lafont, 2025).
Echoes and Reactions to the Court’s Decision
Reactions to the French court’s decision varied and were marked by a clear division between those who supported and endorsed the ruling and those who condemned and rejected it, describing it as political targeting aimed at preventing Marine Le Pen from running in the 2027 presidential elections. This division was not confined to the French political and media scene but extended to differing positions among far-right leaders in Europe and the United States, as well as the Russian stance on the matter. We will review these positions as follows:
The Positions of Marine Le Pen and the National Rally
Marine Le Pen appeared in a television interview hours after the verdict, during which she commented on the ruling. Speaking on TF1, she demanded a swift appeal hearing and affirmed that she would not retire from politics, describing the verdict against her as a “political decision.” “I will not allow myself to be eliminated in this way,” she declared, referring to practices she believed were “the preserve of authoritarian regimes.” In a hearing before the National Assembly the following day, she asserted that the judiciary had used a “nuclear bomb” to prevent her from winning the 2027 presidential election.
Jordan Bardella, the leader of the National Rally and a potential replacement for Le Pen in the 2027 presidential election, said the court had “sentenced French democracy to death.” Bardella called for popular protests, stating, “Through our peaceful mobilization, let us show them that the will of the people is stronger.”
The Positions of French Political Actors
Regarding political actors’ positions on the ruling, they were varied and divided between those who considered it a purely judicial decision and others who viewed it as an unprecedented political targeting of a political figure. Sources close to the right-wing French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou reported that he expressed his “displeasure” with the ruling, although his entourage added that he does not intend to comment publicly on the court’s decision. Bayrou had previously been tried for defrauding European Parliament assistants, who were suspected of actually working for the MoDem party, and was acquitted in February 2024.
Former French President Francois Hollande stated that the “only response” to the condemnation of Marine Le Pen was “to respect the independence of the judiciary,” adding that “it is unacceptable in a democratic system to attack judges and the court.” Following Le Pen’s conviction, the Socialist Party issued a press release calling for “respect for the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law” (Henley, 2025).
Jean-Luc Melenchon, leader of the far-left France Unbowed party, stated in a television interview following Marine Le Pen’s conviction: “The decision to dismiss an elected official should be in the hands of the people” (Le Monde, 2025).
External Reactions and Positions
Several leaders and heads of far-right parties in the European Union and the United States have expressed anger and condemnation over the French court’s decision, describing the ruling as politically motivated and personally targeting Marine Le Pen. In any case, the sympathetic and supportive reactions toward Le Pen are likely to remain limited to media appearances, social media posts, and press conferences. Among these reactions are:
Leaders of far-right European parties have declared their support for Marine Le Pen, including Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who expressed his solidarity by writing “Je suis Marine!” on platform X. Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch far-right Party for Freedom (PVV), also expressed his shock at what he described as an extremely harsh sentence (Le Point, 2025). Meanwhile, Matteo Salvini, leader of the far-right League party and Italy’s deputy prime minister, considered the ruling a declaration of war from Brussels and a conspiracy by leaders of EU institutions, stating that “the exclusion of individuals from the political process is particularly troubling in light of the aggressive and corrupt legal battle being waged against President Donald Trump.”
In the United States, billionaire Elon Musk said that the decision to prevent Marine Le Pen from running “will backfire,”adding: “When the radical left cannot win through democratic voting, it uses the judicial system to imprison its opponents. This is how it operates all over the world.”
As for the Russian position, it was reflected in a statement expressing regret over what was described as a violation of democratic standards. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that a growing number of European capitals are moving toward “a violation of democratic standards,” while also describing the ruling as a French internal matter (Mediapart, 2025).
Strategic Options for Marine Le Pen and the National Rally
Marine Le Pen announced that she would not give up and would appeal the decision, while working to garner support from her followers and political forces opposed to the ruling. Simultaneously, she planned a media campaign and public mobilization to pressure the judiciary to reverse its decision. Le Pen reiterated this in her address to the French National Assembly, stating that the French people would not accept the verdict. Indeed, her party organized demonstrations in several French cities.
A potential appeal to the Court of Cassation could be decided within six months. With the presidential elections approaching in mid-April 2027, approximately five to six months would remain. However, the chances of overturning the verdict before the presidential elections are slim. Le Pen’s problem lies in the fact that there is no real guarantee that the Court of Appeal will reach a different conclusion than the lower court. However, theoretically, there are three possible outcomes:
The first option is acquittal on appeal. However, given the well-documented nature of the system in question, achieving this outcome would be difficult. The second, and more plausible, option is that the appeals court reduces the period of ineligibility to one and a half or two years. Since this period would run from the date of the lower court’s decision, it could expire in time for her to meet the eligibility requirements for candidacy. The third option is that the lower court’s ruling is upheld—the likelihood of the appeals judges refraining from imposing ineligibility is low, as, under existing jurisprudence, disqualification from holding office is typically imposed in similar cases (Schmitt-Leonard, 2025).
The Paris Court of Appeal confirmed that it had received three appeals against the decision issued by the Paris Court of Justice and stated that it would examine the case “within a timeframe that allows for a decision in the summer of 2026.” If these deadlines are met, the decision will therefore be issued several months before the 2027 presidential election. The party’s lawyer also announced that he had filed an appeal on behalf of the party and its former treasurer (Wallerand de Saint-Just, 2025).
The Impact of the Decision on Le Pen’s Popularity and Presidential Prospects
Following the French court ruling, there is a possibility of increased public support for the party in the short term. This is because what occurred aligns closely with the National Rally’s narrative that the populist right is a victim of “the system.” It is likely that many of those who voted for the party do not seriously blame Marine Le Pen for the illegal funding of her party with money from the European Parliament, for which she was convicted. It is widely perceived that many French political parties have, at times, resorted to similar practices.
Similarly, her “harsh” punishment—the ban on running for president—may be interpreted as a badge of honor, reinforcing the idea that she is the only one standing up to the establishment. In the long run, however, this level of support may diminish, especially if Marine Le Pen fails to prove her innocence (Schofield, 2025).
The results of polls conducted by various media outlets and polling centers regarding Marine Le Pen’s popularity and chances of running for president varied as follows:
Marine Le Pen tops the list of political figures with whom the French feel the most sympathy, with an approval rating of 37%, according to an Odoxa poll conducted by the Mascaret Institute for the Senate and the regional press. A majority of the French do not believe she received special legal treatment: 53% felt she was treated “like any other person subject to the law,” according to the same poll.
Around 24% of the French (and 25% of National Rally supporters) even view the situation as an opportunity for the party, as it could allow it to turn the page on Le Pen. In this context, Jordan Bardella has entered the race for the Élysée Palace. The young MEP also surpasses Le Pen in popularity: 31% of the French prefer him to Marine Le Pen, a figure that rises to 60% among National Rally supporters.
Nearly one in two French people (49%), a 7-point increase in one month, want Marine Le Pen to be a candidate in the next presidential election, according to a poll conducted by Ifop-Fiducial for Sud Radio. On the other hand, 51% of French people said they do not want the National Rally leader to be able to run for the Élysée Palace, a result that has dropped by 7 points compared to a previous survey conducted at the end of February 2025.
However, according to the same poll, only 37% of French people believe that Marine Le Pen will ultimately be a candidate, a figure that has fallen by approximately 37 points in one month. Only supporters of the Republicans (69%) believe their candidate will be competitive. An overwhelming majority of respondents (79%) consider Marine Le Pen to be far-right, including 76% of supporters of the Republican Party. The poll was conducted via an online self-administered questionnaire among a sample of 1,000 people representative of the French population aged 18 and over (quota sampling method), with a margin of error between 2.8 and 3.1 points (RTBF, 2025).
A poll conducted by the Ifop-Opinion polling institute in early April 2025 predicted that Marine Le Pen, the long-time leader of the French far right, would garner up to 37% of the vote in the 2027 presidential election—more than 22 points higher than in 2022 and 10 points ahead of any other candidate. Frédéric Dabi, the institute’s president, stated that “the page has certainly been turned.” The poll was widely interpreted as confirmation of Le Pen’s successful rebranding strategy in her effort to normalize the far right (Al Jazeera, 2025).
Conclusion
The French court’s decision against Marine Le Pen was a legal and political blow. However, it did not weaken her influence or undermine the credibility of her party. Instead, the trial became a platform for Le Pen to reaffirm her political narrative. Despite the legal condemnation and moral tarnishing, the National Rally maintained its political relevance by framing the verdict as an act of political persecution, and Marine Le Pen proved resilient in the face of public opinion. This resilience is rooted in a post-truth populist strategy that prioritizes narrative over norms and emotional appeal over factual reality. It has been particularly evident among her supporters, who view the ruling as a symbol of political oppression and an attempt to preempt the 2027 election.
If the French judiciary fails to overturn the appeal and instead upholds the verdict against Marine Le Pen, the options available to the National Rally—and its margin for maneuver to remain politically competitive and enhance its candidate’s prospects in the presidential elections—will, in our estimation, be reduced to one of two:
The first option is to nominate Jordan Bardella, the current party leader. Being young, he could help attract younger voters, and the party may present him as a model of youth leadership. He has already played a significant role in increasing support among younger voters in France; within two years, the percentage of 18- to 24-year-olds who voted for the National Rally in parliamentary elections doubled. However, this option may carry risks for the party, given Bardella’s limited political experience and relatively less developed debating and public speaking skills. He may require time and effort to reach the level of Marine Le Pen. At the same time, he holds somewhat different positions on key issues, such as immigration, where he is more hardline, while in economic policy he appears more liberal and supportive of a laissez-faire approach.
The second option is to nominate Marion Marechal, Marine Le Pen’s niece. She left the party a few years ago to join the far-right party led by Eric Zemmour, from which she has recently separated, and she enjoys considerable acceptance and popularity among the party’s voters.
The case of Marine Le Pen and her party members is not merely a corruption case being examined by the judiciary; it is a test of the ability of European institutions and judicial authorities to confront populist rhetoric that thrives on mobilizing the public and fostering an atmosphere of distrust. It is not simply a matter of reframing a single political figure’s conviction as a form of persecution; rather, it is a case study of how the legal process can be transformed into an arena of competing realities shaped by partisan political struggles.
At its core, this case reveals a deeper tension between practical accountability and symbolic politics, and represents a new chapter in the struggle between moderate and more radical forms of populism.
(*) Dr. Emad Salah Al-Sheikh Daoud is a Professor of Public Policy and Sustainable Development, College of Political Science, Al-Nahrain University.
References
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Al-Dahlaki, Khudhair. (2024). The European Populist Right: Vision, Role and Influence. Dar Al-Shamel for Publishing and Distribution, Ramallah, 1st Edition.
François, Stephane. (2014). “Recent developments in the French far right, The Far Right in Europe.” European Summer University for Social Movements, Rosa Luxburg Stiftung Brussels Office.
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Schmitt-Leonard, Charlotte. (2025). “Dictatorship of the Court vs. Will of the people? Marine Le Pen’s Embezzlement Conviction.” Verfassungsblog. April 7, 2025. https://verfassungsblog.de/marine-len-pen-verdict/
Schofield, Hugh. (2025). “Comment l’extrême droite française se présente-t-elle après la condamnation de Marine Le Pen (et qui peut la remplacer en tant que candidate à l’élection présidentielle)?” BBC News Afrique. April 2, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/cvgq3rrgjzvo
Shields, JG. (2007). The Extreme Right in French from Petian to Le Pen, Routledge, London and New York.
In this insightful commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reconceptualizes recurrent flooding in Nigeria as a site of political contestation rather than merely an environmental crisis. Introducing the concept of “everyday environmental populism,” the piece shows how lived experiences of disaster, unequal relief, and institutional failure generate bottom-up political claims that reshape democratic trust. Drawing on case studies from Delta, Anambra, and Niger states, the analysis demonstrates how citizens’ responses—from grassroots mobilization to digital dissent—reconfigure perceptions of state legitimacy. Situated at the intersection of environmental governance and populism studies, this commentary advances a novel framework for understanding how climate-related risks can catalyze political agency and redefine state–society relations in vulnerable democracies.
In Nigeria, recurring floods have moved beyond being environmental disaster to become political events that shape relations between citizens and states and influence democratic trust. In the context of recent floods and uneven relief, this commentary introduces a new political concept-everyday environmental populism-to conceptualize citizens’ bottom-up political claims rooted in everyday experience of environmental hazards, institutional inadequacies, and inequitable disaster relief delivery.
In contrast to elite-driven claims, everyday environmental populism emerges from lived experiences of vulnerability in the face of environmental disasters and from citizen-centered complaints about institutional shortcomings, which in turn generate bottom-up political dynamics. The states of Delta, Anambra, and Niger provide illustrative case studies, showing how floods stimulate civic engagement, trigger institutional critique, and reshape popular evaluations of state legitimacy.
Situated within the broader frameworks of environmental governance, climate security, and democratic legitimacy, this commentary argues that flood disasters are transformative political events that generate bottom-up agency in Nigeria. It also discusses the implications for policy and academia, as well as for community-led resilience in environmentally vulnerable contexts.
Conceptualizing Everyday Environmental Populism
In Nigeria, devastating floods recur, with the 2022 floods alone displacing more than 1.4 million people and wreaking widespread damage to infrastructure, livelihood and housing (Agbiboa, 2024; Solaja et al., 2020). More than mere destruction, they represent the confluence of environmental hazard and political accountability. Political response—how it is delivered, and how resources and infrastructure are distributed and allocated—serves as a barometer of the state’s democratic legitimacy. Existing research has already linked environmental hazards such as recurrent floods to public critique, collective agency, and political attitudes (Obatunde, Akanle, & Solaja, 2025; Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2013).
Populism research has generally focused on elite-led constructions opposing “the people” to “the elite” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Extending this tradition, the concept of everyday environmental populism is introduced here as “citizens’ collective understanding and articulation of political claims shaped by their experiences and interpretations of environmental risk, disaster-relief inequalities, and institutional failures” (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025). While elite populism is framed against political actors/elites, the idea of everyday environmental populism foregrounds ordinary citizens whose everyday experiences of vulnerability lead to complaints and grassroots political action which then fuels the distrust against political figures.
This conception centers on the agency of citizens, as they challenge the political status quo, express their expectations for accountable and equitable disaster responses and seek state actions beyond the traditional structures of politics (Obadare, 2020; Solaja, 2025).
Figure 1: Everyday Environmental Populism: How Flood Catches Political Capital.
This diagram illustrates how floods trigger citizens’ responses and shape political opinions, ultimately influencing levels of public trust in the state and in its policy formulation.
Floods and Democratic Trust in Nigeria
Repeated floods expose critical failings in Nigeria’s disaster response and governance structures, thereby politicizing environmental disasters (Adebayo, 2018; Agbiboa, 2024). More broadly, the scale of such disasters can undermine citizens’ confidence in political institutions (Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2013).
In Nigeria, successive floods have consistently triggered similar public reactions, as affected citizens cope with material losses while evaluating the adequacy of government responses. When state intervention is inconsistent, delayed, or inequitable, declining democratic trust leads citizens to rely on community-based assistance or to express dissent through social media, public meetings, and civil society organizations (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025). Even prior to state involvement, citizens often self-organize, cultivating forms of autonomous political agency that can, in turn, shape public perceptions of state legitimacy (Obatunde, Akanle, & Solaja, 2025).
Citizens’ Response and Political Opinion
As illustrated in Figure 1, community mobilization in the initial stages of a flood event constitutes the foundation of everyday environmental populism, as citizen-led relief and response processes shape public political opinion and perceptions of the state’s democratic credentials. Grassroots relief initiatives often emerge in response to the absence or inadequacy of state intervention. In flood-affected areas, community leaders frequently assume responsibility for organizing shelters, disseminating alerts, and mobilizing local volunteers to assist victims, thereby demonstrating forms of self-reliance in disaster management (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025).
These actions are inherently political, as they prompt evaluations of state responsiveness, challenge governmental priorities, and articulate demands for accountability. The internet serves as a platform where individual grievances coalesce into collective claims, transforming environmental crises into indicators of trust in the democratic system. In this sense, they exemplify everyday environmental populism, with citizens initiating forms of political mobilization from below (Obadare, 2020; Solaja, 2025).
Policy and Governance Challenges
It is crucial to address floods as political problems requiring preventive, equitable, and citizen-oriented governance. Such response mechanisms should include robust early warning systems, as well as transparent processes for the disbursement of funds and the allocation of resources to affected communities (International Rescue Committee & EU, 2025; Barnett, 2001; Solaja et al., 2020). Neglecting governance dimensions of disaster risk management fuels citizen distrust and intensifies public discontent. Conversely, equitable relief and fair governance can reinforce the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Dalby, 2013; Solaja, 2025).
Scholarly and Theoretical Contribution
The contribution of this commentary to populism studies and environmental governance lies in framing environmental disasters as triggers of political contestation. Through the concept of everyday environmental populism, it argues that lived experiences of disaster—driven by environmental threats—can empower citizens with the agency to resist injustice and challenge governmental actions (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020).
The concept calls for further research into how environmental hazards shape citizens’ political attitudes and how such bottom-up agency influences the democratic legitimacy of state structures. Beyond political dynamics, it also intersects with debates on sustainability and the circular economy, opening new avenues for community-based initiatives—such as recycling plastic into productive materials through projects like EcoBalls and other entrepreneurial models (Solaja, 2025).
Conclusion: Politics in the Water
Floods are not merely natural disasters; in Nigeria, they constitute defining political events that shape the relationship between the state and its citizens, as well as perceptions of governmental legitimacy and responsiveness. The way citizens interpret state responses influences their assessment of whether democratic governance can deliver efficient, accountable services and provide support in times of crisis. Everyday environmental populism offers a useful framework for understanding these dynamics, highlighting how citizens’ responses are shaped by their exposure to environmental threats and by perceived inadequacies in governmental management (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020).
There is a need to strengthen anticipatory governance, integrate citizen participation into flood management, and ensure that relief resources reach affected communities without being filtered through partisan interests. From an academic perspective, more extensive research is required to examine the political impacts of environmental hazards on mobilization, citizenship, and the pursuit of democratic accountability in flood-prone societies worldwide (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020; Barnett, 2001).
References
Adebayo, B. (2018). “Nigeria overtakes India in extreme poverty ranking.” CNN.
Agbiboa, D. E. (2024). “Deep waters: Flooding and the climate of suffering in Nigeria.” PS: Political Science & Politics.
Barnett, J. (2001). The meaning of environmental security: Ecological politics and the United Nations. London: Zed Books.
International Rescue Committee & EU. (2025). Strengthening flood preparedness in Nigeria.
Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Obadare, E. (2020). Everyday politics in Africa: Publics, grievances, and popular engagement. Cambridge University Press.
Obatunde, B. A., Akanle, O., & Solaja, O. M. et al. (2025). “Doing sociology in Nigeria.” International Journal of Sociology, 16(1), 14–26. https://doi.org/10.13169/ijs.16.1.0014
Solaja, M.O., Awobona S., & Adekanbi, O.O. (2020). “Knowledge and practice of recycled plastic bottles (RPB) built homes for sustainable community-based housing projects in Nigeria.” Cogent Social Sciences, 6(1), 1778914. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2020.1778914
Solaja, O.M. (2025). “EcoBall as a sport-based intervention for community engagement, behavioural change, and sustainable solutions to plastic pollution.” Discovery Environment, 3, 186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44274-025-00347-y
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a leading scholar of the far right and researcher at the Observatory of Political Radicalities at the Jean Jaurès Foundation in Paris, argues that France’s 2026 municipal elections revealed more than the continued advance of the National Rally (RN): they exposed a deeper reconfiguration of the French right. In this interview with ECPS, Professor Camus shows how the RN’s local gains—57 municipalities and over 3,000 council seats—coexist with persistent weakness in major metropolitan centers. More importantly, he underscores that “the boundary between the mainstream and the radical right is blurring locally,” particularly where segments of Les Républicains and RN voters increasingly converge. The interview offers a nuanced account of electoral realignment, selective republican resistance, and the uncertain road to 2027.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a researcher at the Observatory of Political Radicalities at the Jean Jaurès Foundation in Paris, underscores that France’s 2026 municipal elections reveal not only the continued advance of the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN) but, more importantly, a gradual reconfiguration of the right in which the lines separating mainstream conservatism and radical populism are increasingly porous at the local level.
Reflecting on what he calls a “mixed bag” outcome, Professor Camus notes that the RN has achieved “a substantial gain” by winning 57 municipalities and securing over 3,000 council seats, yet “failed in all major cities and metropolises.” This dual pattern—territorial expansion alongside persistent urban resistance—captures the paradox at the heart of contemporary French politics. While the party has consolidated its presence in “small and medium-sized cities”and in economically distressed regions such as Pas-de-Calais and Moselle, it continues to face structural limits in gentrified metropolitan centers like Paris, where “the extreme right is very weak for obvious sociological reasons.”
Yet, the most consequential development, as Professor Camus emphasizes, lies not simply in where the RN wins or loses, but in how it increasingly interacts with the broader right-wing ecosystem. In several regions, particularly along the Mediterranean corridor, “the core voters of the Conservatives… are very close to voters of the National Rally,”facilitating patterns of vote transfer and informal cooperation. This dynamic signals a shift from the once rigid cordon sanitaire toward what Professor Camus describes as a more “selective” Republican front, contingent on local contexts and strategic calculations.
The significance of Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice further illustrates this transformation. While rooted in the city’s longstanding conservative and post-colonial sociological profile, the result also points to a deeper convergence: “locally… the Republicans and the National Rally have platforms that are very similar.” In this sense, Ciotti’s ascent functions as both a local phenomenon and a symbolic “vitrine,” enabling the RN to present itself as part of a broader conservative continuum rather than an isolated extremist force.
At the national level, however, this convergence remains contested. Professor Camus highlights an unresolved strategic dilemma within Les Républicains, torn between maintaining ideological autonomy and pursuing alignment with the RN. As he cautions, any such coalition would likely be asymmetrical: “the dynamic is on the side of the National Rally… the agenda will be set by the National Rally.”
Taken together, the interview suggests that France is not witnessing a straightforward normalization of the far right, but rather a more complex process of political recomposition. The RN’s rise is embedded in enduring socioeconomic grievances and cultural anxieties, yet its ultimate trajectory will depend on whether the boundaries that once separated it from the mainstream right continue to erode—or are strategically reasserted—in the run-up to 2027.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jean-Yves Camus, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
The RN Has Expanded Locally, but Still Hits a Metropolitan Ceiling
Cyclists and pedestrians take over the Champs-Élysées during Paris Car-Free Day, filling the iconic avenue from the Louvre to the Arc de Triomphe under a clear sky. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, welcome, and let me start right away with the first question: The 2026 municipal elections seem to have produced a paradoxical outcome: the National Rally / Rassemblement National (RN) expanded its local footprint yet failed to secure the kind of major urban victories that would have symbolized full normalization. How should we interpret this mixed result—does it confirm the RN’s structural implantation, or does it reveal enduring sociological and territorial ceilings?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: You’re right to say that the outcome of this election is very much a mixed bag for the Rassemblement National (RN). On the one hand, they significantly increased the number of seats they gained on city councils—up to more than 3,000. They won 57 cities, which is, of course, a substantial gain compared to the 13 cities they secured in 2020. But they failed in all major cities and metropolises, with very significant losses. They expected to win Toulon and secured 42% in the first round, but ultimately did not win. Due to a consolidation of votes against the National Rally, they were also expected to seize Marseille but did not. Paris remains a territory where the extreme right is very weak, for obvious sociological reasons. It is a gentrified city, which is largely alien to the ideology of the party. So, the cities they seized are small and medium-sized. The largest is Perpignan, which they retained in the first round with just over 50%, but this is the only city with more than 100,000 inhabitants that will be in the hands of the Rassemblement National.
So, I would say there is still significant progress to be made. In view of the presidential election, winning 57 cities is a notable achievement, but when it comes to the presidency, you need votes from the main metropolises. It remains to be seen whether, in a presidential contest, the outcome will be more favorable for the party. Let us remember that city council elections are based on proportional representation, which is not the case for presidential elections. These are local votes that rely heavily on the personality of the candidate for mayor, making this a very different mode of voting, with distinct patterns. Most voters in city council elections focus on very local issues, whereas presidential elections operate on an entirely different level.
What I take from this vote is that the party has expanded its reach to many small cities where it already had a number of strongholds. For example, in the département du Pas-de-Calais, one of the former industrial areas in northern France, they were highly successful and captured more than 10 small cities with populations between 3,000 and 10,000—a significant gain. On the other hand, if you look at a department with a similar sociological profile just north of Pas-de-Calais—the département du Nord, at the border with Belgium—they did not seize any towns, contrary to expectations. This suggests that electoral success depends heavily on how well the local branches of the party are organized, the quality and performance of the candidates, and whether there is genuine local momentum.
They also performed very well in the former industrial area of Lorraine, particularly in the département of Moselle, which borders Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. These are areas where unemployment remains high, where we see multiple generations struggling with long-term economic insecurity, and where many people face difficulties maintaining stable and adequately paid employment. Unsurprisingly, the party performs strongly there. They also did well in the Mediterranean belt, from Perpignan at the Spanish border to Menton at the Italian border—an area where the party has long enjoyed support. However, despite failing to win Toulon or Marseille, they made a very significant gain in Nice, a major city with international appeal.
That said, it was not the Rassemblement National itself that won Nice. Rather, it was a smaller party, Les Républicains, led by Éric Ciotti, now the mayor of Nice, who identifies as a Gaullist and is working toward uniting the right ahead of 2027.
Populism in France Is Deeply Rooted, Not a Temporary Surge
You have long argued that right-wing populist parties must be understood through their specific national histories rather than as a perfectly homogeneous European bloc. In the French case, what do these local election results tell us about the specifically French configuration of populism, nationalism, and anti-elite politics in 2026?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: This situation tells us, first of all, that in most cases the Rassemblement National is still unable to build a coalition with the mainstream conservative right. In many cities, Les Républicains, the mainstream conservatives, remain strong. I think the main outcome of this election is that both Les Républicains on the right and the Socialist Party—the Social Democrats on the left—retain most of their strongholds. They are still the most important and relevant parties at the local level.
The National Rally has two options. The first is that of Marine Le Pen, who said after the vote: “My party is neither left nor right. I want to call on all people, regardless of their political affiliation, to vote for us in 2027. So, not left, not right.” The second option is that of Jordan Bardella, the new president and chairman of the party, who argues that, if they want to win in 2027, they must work toward a coalition of the right. But this coalition of the right is still very much contested from within among mainstream conservatives. Some of them, like Xavier Bertrand, chairman of the northern region of France, or Valérie Pécresse, chairperson of the Île-de-France region, argue that if they ally with the National Rally solely to defeat the left, they will probably lose their specificity. If they enter into a coalition with the National Rally, the policies of the National Rally will prevail, and they will not be able to act as the driving force in recovery.
That is a very wise analysis of the situation. If the conservative right enters into a coalition with the National Rally, the dynamic is on the side of the National Rally. Politically, the agenda will be set by the National Rally—by Le Pen or Bardella—and the conservatives will become a second-ranked partner in the coalition.
Another specificity of France is that it has a populist far-right party that has been above the 10% mark since 1984—over 40 years. Contrary to what many analysts have suggested, this is not a short-term political phenomenon. It is a structural part of political life, both at the local and national levels.
This also means that the French right, which until the 1980s had been divided between a liberal wing and a conservative wing, is now divided into three segments: a liberal, center-right one; a mainstream conservative one; and an identitarian, populist, anti-EU family. This is a major challenge.
Finally, there were elections in Denmark yesterday (March 24, 2026), and the outgoing Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen, stated in her acceptance speech that there is a broad consensus on restricting immigration policy in Denmark, which is true. This consensus ranges from the Social Democrats to right-wing populists. In France, however, this is not the case. Immigration and asylum policies remain highly contentious issues, and there is no way the Socialist Party—the Social Democrats—can find common ground even with the mainstream conservative right. Restricting immigration and limiting the rights of asylum seekers is still associated with a small segment of the right wing of the Conservative Party, within Éric Zemmour’s party, which does not perform very well at the local level. Yet this remains central to the ideology of the National Rally. Any coalition, any cohesion of the right for 2027 will therefore have to confront these policy differences on immigration. No agreement, no coordination.
Marine and Jean-Marie Le Pen rallied during the meeting for the celebration of May 1, 2011 in Paris, France. Photo: Frederic Legrand
Blocking the RN Remains Possible, but No Longer Automatic
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella framed the elections as evidence of a historic breakthrough, yet the two-round system once again appeared capable of blocking the far right in key urban contests. Does the municipal vote suggest that the so-called “Republican Front” is weakened, resilient, or merely transforming into more selective and local forms?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The so-called Republican front has become more selective. Obviously, in the southern part of the country, from Perpignan to Menton, the fan base—the core voters of the Conservative Party, the Republicans—are very close to voters of the National Rally. So they tend to transfer their votes to National Rally candidates in the second ballot because they share common ideas: mostly rejection of the left, even when it is moderate, a desire to curb immigration, and a very strong stance against what they call Islamic fundamentalism. Sometimes, the distinction between fighting Islamism and opposing Islam and Muslim immigrants becomes blurred. So, there is considerable cooperation at both the membership level and among voters between the Republicans and the National Rally.
In other cases, such as Toulon, it seems—although it is still too early to say definitively—that one of the reasons why the National Rally did not win is that the local bourgeoisie and business community had concerns about what the city would look like under National Rally governance. This is a very local situation. Toulon was won by the Front National in 1995, and the way the city was governed at the time was widely regarded as dreadful. It was a total failure, both economically and administratively. There may still be lingering negative memories from that period. You must remember that this whole area of France is heavily dependent on foreign investment and tourism, including mass tourism, with foreigners building and buying homes and condominiums, sometimes for retirement and sometimes for vacation. In such a context, how the city is perceived by outsiders—especially from other countries—is extremely important. I believe that the Rassemblement National is still not seen by these foreign investors as a fully normalized party. There remains a fear of what it might do, a fear of the future, and uncertainty about how things would look under its rule.
But this is only one example; Toulon is a very specific case. In Marseille, it was a completely different story. First of all, turnout was much higher in the second round than in the first. Secondly, the candidate from the radical left chose to withdraw, and it appears that a significant portion of his voter base supported the Socialist Party candidate in the second ballot, thereby limiting the National Rally’s chances of winning. This is particularly interesting because voters from the far left seem to have backed the Socialist candidate, despite Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the radical left La France Insoumise, being highly critical of the Socialist Party.
It, therefore, appears that left-wing voters still seek to block the National Rally from winning their cities. They may not like the Socialist Party—they may view it as too moderate, too pro-business, too pro–free market, and too strict on immigration—but when faced with a choice between the National Rally and the left, they ultimately vote for the left.
There is, therefore, still a possibility that in 2027, if Jordan Bardella or Marine Le Pen reach the second round, some form of Republican front will re-emerge to block the National Rally from winning the presidency. Why? Because Marine Le Pen remains associated with an embezzlement case involving funds from the European Parliament, and she is expected to stand trial next June. Jordan Bardella, meanwhile, is a 32-year-old, relatively inexperienced politician who has never been a mayor or a member of the National Assembly. He is a Member of the European Parliament but has never served in the National Assembly.
France still sees itself as one of the world’s major powers. It possesses nuclear weapons and plays a role in numerous international negotiations, as seen in both the Ukraine conflict and the Iran–Israel–United States tensions. Many French people may therefore feel that it is somewhat unwise to entrust such responsibility to someone who, while undoubtedly capable, lacks the necessary experience.
In 2017, France elected the youngest president in its history—Emmanuel Macron—who was only 39. By the end of Macron’s second term, many French citizens may feel that he lacked sufficient experience, as he had not been a Member of Parliament and had only briefly served as a minister. He may be seen as one of those figures from the higher administrative elite with limited experience at the grassroots level—someone who had never previously been elected—and that this, in hindsight, may have been a mistake.
Ciotti’s Victory Signals Convergence Between Republicans and the RN
How significant was Éric Ciotti’s victory in Nice for the broader right-wing ecosystem? Should we read it as an isolated local triumph shaped by personal rivalry, or as a more durable sign that the boundary between the mainstream right and the Le Pen camp is continuing to erode?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: There are two different things here. The first is the Nice election, with Éric Ciotti winning over Christian Estrosi, who had the backing of the center-right and President Macron. And then there is what it represents at the national level.
Nice has always been a very peculiar city. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, the mayor was Jacques Médecin, who was officially a center-right member of the government but was very close to the local extreme right, even before the Front National was founded in 1972. This has traditionally been a stronghold of the arch-conservative right. That was the situation before World War II, and it remained so afterward. The Gaullist movement was never very strong, especially after 1962, when Algeria was granted independence. A large number of what we call repatriés—repatriated people—settled in the area, and they were strongly opposed to de Gaulle for obvious reasons. They were also very right-wing, particularly on the issue of immigration and the Muslim population. That remains an issue to this day.
In addition, Christian Estrosi performed very poorly. You have probably heard about the many controversies that emerged during the campaign, and there are ongoing inquiries into some of them. So he is partly responsible for his own failure.
So, the election of Éric Ciotti aligns very well with the sociology of this city and with expectations for change. It also reflects the fact that, locally, between Nice and Menton, the Republicans and the National Rally have platforms that are very similar, or at least very close to each other.
At the national level, Ciotti’s party is, in a way, a Gaullist formation. Marine Le Pen and Bardella also refer to General de Gaulle when it comes to the idea of France being independent, both from the United States and from other powers. They claim to be Gaullist in their approach to relations with the European Union and in their economic policy, emphasizing a return to strong industry, and so on.
This movement, when it was launched as a splinter group from the Republicans, was both a personal project of Éric Ciotti—he wanted to achieve something he felt he could not achieve within the Republicans—and a reflection of a broader trend within the Gaullist movement to drift toward a more right-wing stance on immigration and on relations with, especially, Muslim immigration.
This group has captured several cities, such as Montauban, Vierzon, and Sablé-sur-Sarthe. These are medium-sized cities. It can serve as what we call in French a vitrine—a kind of showcase demonstrating that there is an ally which is, in fact, part of the mainstream conservative right and not burdened by the controversies that have surrounded the history of the National Front and the National Rally. So Marine Le Pen and Bardella can say: look, we have mayors from a Gaullist party, which shows that we do not belong to the extreme right. We are simply the real conservative right, while the Republicans are no longer truly conservative because they have governed alongside Macron’s ministers and are, ideologically, closer to the center-left than to traditional right-wing ideas.
Republicans Remain Strong Locally but Divided Nationally
Éric Zemmour’s election campaign, meeting in Cannes,France on January 22, 2022. Photo: Macri Roland.
At the same time, Les Républicains retained or regained a number of municipalities. Do these results indicate that the traditional right still possesses a meaningful territorial base independent of the RN, or is it increasingly being forced into a strategic choice between centrism and nationalist realignment?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: Les Républicains retain a significant base at the local level. The controversy within the Republicans concerns the presidential contest.What we have seen after the city council vote is two leaders from the Republicans, Laurent Wauquiez and Bruno Retailleau, expressing opposing views regarding the presidential election. One explanation is that both of them are, in fact, candidates for the presidency. Retailleau argues that if they retain traditional conservative ideology, and perhaps go a little further on the issue of immigration, they can still win the presidency. Wauquiez, by contrast, argues that if they remain alone as Les Républicains, they will not succeed.
So, he suggests that they already have much in common with the National Rally. What, then, are the differences between them? On this basis, he proposes organizing a primary among all right-wing candidates, from Édouard Philippe on the center-right to the National Rally, to Zemmour’s party and its candidate, who will obviously be Sarah Knafo. They would then rally behind whoever wins the primary election.
Retailleau, however, rejects this approach outright. In other words, he insists that they have nothing in common with Zemmour’s party. So, why hold a primary contest with actors who do not share the same platform and ideology?
In other words, part of the center-right does not want to become hostage to the most right-wing parties in the country, especially since Zemmour’s party stands to the right of the National Rally. Zemmour’s party promotes the idea of the “Great Replacement.” It also advances the view that Islam is not compatible with French citizenship and supports the idea of “remigration,” that is, the compulsory return of all non-European immigrants. This is, therefore, a completely different ideological framework.
My view is that this controversy will continue for many months to come, especially since we do not yet know who the National Rally’s candidate will be. As I mentioned earlier, Marine Le Pen will stand trial on appeal next June, and the outcome will be known then. She may be disqualified from running. If that happens, Bardella will carry the colors of the National Rally. This means that, for the time being, the National Rally faces some difficulty in entering the pre-campaign phase, and this gives the Republicans time to take advantage of the situation and clarify their strategy.
Perceived Cultural Loss, Not Just Reality, Drives RN Support
Muslims demonstrating against Islamophobia outside the Grande Mosquée de Paris, France. Photo: Tom Craig.
Your previous work has emphasized the role of cultural insecurity, as well as socioeconomic dislocation, in shaping support for the populist right. Did these local elections confirm that diagnosis, especially in provincial France and smaller towns where the RN performed more strongly than in metropolitan centers?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: It is absolutely true. When we look at the map of the cities won by the National Rally, what we see are many small and medium-sized cities where there is a strong feeling of cultural loss—a perception that there is more immigration, more mosques being built, and more immigrants and refugees arriving. Many people feel very uneasy about this. It is a perception of insecurity, even in cases where there is no actual crime or insecurity. That is very important to understand.
It is not because you live in a safe city that you do not believe immigration is increasing—10, 20, or even 50 kilometers away in a larger city—and that sooner or later immigrants will come to your own town and change its cultural history, what you consider necessary to be truly French, and what you think is required to live in your community.
I think we still have a problem with immigration from former French colonies, whether from North Africa or West Africa. It is as if we have not fully come to terms with our colonial past, and with the fact that we not only accepted these immigrants but actively encouraged them to come. Large industries and major business interests brought them to this country. So, they deserve recognition for what they contributed and for the role they played in building the country’s industrial base. Yet, they remain disadvantaged, and racism and xenophobia persist.
On the other hand, among native French people—those whose families have lived in the country for generations—especially in today’s unstable international context, there is a growing perception of a clash of civilizations between the West and the Muslim world. This perception plays an important role, particularly along the Mediterranean coast, in shaping support for the National Rally.
The social situation is also very important. As I mentioned earlier, in many parts of France, these areas have been deindustrialized since the late 1970s, and there is no realistic prospect that these jobs will return. You may recall that President Trump, during his campaign in Pittsburgh, told steelworkers that their jobs would come back—but they did not. The same is true in northern France: industrial jobs will not return.
In other words, people feel they have no future, no new forms of employment or specialization for younger generations. There is a strong sense of dispossession, alienation, and abandonment. In some small towns, public services are also disappearing. Public services include the post office, the local school, the railway station—everything that signals the presence of the state. This also includes the presence of police or access to hospitals. Many hospitals have been closing in this country, and when people have to travel an hour to reach emergency care, they understandably feel that the state is no longer taking care of them. So, a protest vote in favor of the National Rally emerges in this context.
Major Cities Favor Stability Over Populist Alternatives
Conversely, how do you explain the RN’s continuing difficulty in major cities? Is this primarily a matter of candidate quality, urban demography, coalition arithmetic, class composition, or the party’s still-incomplete process of dédiabolisation?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: In major cities, you have to remember that most of them, including Paris, have become gentrified. A gentrified city means a high proportion of people with higher education, better-paid jobs, and incomes above the average wage. There is also a tendency to reject extremes and to seek stability.
If you look at cities like Marseille, Paris, Lille, Strasbourg, and so on, there is also a significant share of the population that comes from an immigrant background and who, obviously, do not want to vote for the National Rally. So the conditions are in place to prevent the National Rally from winning in the largest cities, such as Lyon, Paris, and Marseille.
This is not the case in small or medium-sized cities. There, the population is different, often with incomes below the average and facing many difficulties, including in rural areas where the National Rally has made very significant inroads.
Moreover, the organizational apparatus of the major parties still retains some hold over the electorate in major cities, whereas the electorate in small and medium-sized cities and rural areas is much more volatile.
Municipal Results Do Not Predict Presidential Outcomes
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.
Finally, Professor Camus, do these municipal elections offer any reliable indication for the presidential race ahead? More specifically, do they suggest that France is still heading toward a Le Pen– or Bardella-centered contest, or do they reopen the possibility that broader coalitions of the mainstream left, center, and moderate right could yet alter the expected scenario?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: First of all, in political science, we know that we cannot infer from city council elections what the outcome of a presidential election will be. These are two very different types of elections, not the same mode of scrutiny, and, of course, a very different context—especially in a country like France, where the presidency is very powerful. We are a semi-presidential system.
Second, I would insist that there is still one year to go until the election. The only thing we know for sure is that Emmanuel Macron is not allowed to seek a third term. As for the other contenders, we know quite a few—especially Édouard Philippe, who retained his mayorship of Le Havre last Sunday and is one of the contenders for the center-right—but there are others, and there are many contenders within the Republican Party. We do not yet know who will be the candidate of the Social Democratic left; there may even be several. The only thing we know for sure is that the candidate of the National Rally will be either Le Pen or Bardella, and we know that the candidate of the radical left will be Jean-Luc Mélenchon. So let us wait until we really know who will stand for president, and then look at the first polls.
What the National Rally expects is a second round between Mélenchon and Bardella. Why? Because opinion surveys show that the dédiabolisation of the National Rally has progressed to such an extent that the radical left is now rejected by a higher proportion of voters than Le Pen or Bardella. This is something we would not have said 10 or even 5 years ago. The rejection level of the radical left is around 60%. Fewer than 50% of French people today say that the National Rally is a threat to democracy—49% still see it as such, but that is no longer a majority. So, the hope of the National Rally is a second round between two candidates from the extremes, which would allow it to win.
On the other hand, what I see emerging is what we call the central bloc—that is, Macron’s majority—playing the card of stability: you do not want to vote for one or another extreme, so let us vote for stability.Maybe you do not agree with everything the center-right has done over the past decade, but if you are faced with the National Rally in the second round, please vote for stability—keeping France a democracy and keeping France within the European Union. This kind of strategy may work.
The only problem is that in 2017 and in 2022, the majority of the French did not vote for Macron because they shared his ideas; they voted for him because they rejected Le Pen. And if, in 2027, we again have to vote for a candidate whose policies we do not truly support, only out of rejection of the National Rally, then I would expect very difficult times. Because voting for a president, at least in the French context, should mean supporting his ideology, his project for the country, what he wants to do, and the kind of legislation he wants to pass. If you vote only to avoid what you perceive as a threat, then democracy is not very solid.
