This commentary examines how queerness intersects with genocide and international law in the context of Palestine. Ass. Professor Izat El Amoor argues that queer Palestinians confront not only Israel’s genocidal violence but also Western pinkwashing narratives that weaponize queerness to justify oppression. By situating pinkwashing and pinkwatching within broader struggles of decolonization, the piece shows how queer analysis exposes the hypocrisy of Western legal and human rights frameworks while offering new tools for resistance. Linking Israel’s use of pinkwashing to global failures of international law—including the ICJ case brought by South Africa—the essay insists that genocide studies must reckon with queerness as central, not peripheral, to understanding both the violence in Gaza and pathways toward Palestinian liberation.
In the colossal scope of the annihilation of Palestinians since October 7, queerness is not a mere addendum when positioned in the scholarship and legality of genocide. As Palestinians contested Western discourses of international law and genocide for their liberation, queer Palestinians in parallel challenged Western discourses of queerness – pinkwashing[1] – that have been employed as genocidal tools against all Palestinians. Within the larger Palestinian decolonization struggle, a queer analysis reveals additional shortcomings of the current genocide scholarship and legal frameworks that are useful for Palestinian resistance yet might otherwise remain hidden.
Pinkwashing genocide emerged boisterously from within Israel’s toolbox against an increasing diplomatic and legal global isolating pressure. This pressure entailed a string of legal and humanitarian decisions/actions such as UN Security Council votes for Palestinian statehood and membership; UN Human Rights Council resolutions of crimes against humanity; ambassador recalls and severance of diplomatic relations with many countries; states’ recognition of Palestine; state-calls on the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate war crimes against civilians; state-requests for a court opinion on whether Israel’s occupation violates international law. Pinkwatching[2] aims at strengthening this pressure that Israel has been diligently countering via pinkwashing, amongst other schemes. Consequently, pinkwashing and pinkwatching—while contradictory—transpire as instructive of the pretense of Western hypocritical dichotomies tied to human rights, international law, and preventing/ending genocide insofar as Palestinian liberation.
The ICJ Case Through a Queer Lens
Though not obviously connected at first glance, South Africa’s case against Israel at the ICJ—filed on December 29, 2023, regarding Israel’s actions in Gaza and widely considered the most significant diplomatic/legal attempt to isolate Israel—can also be analyzed through this queer framework. South Africa alleged that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, violating the Genocide Convention through 75 years of apartheid, 56 years of occupation, and a 16-year blockade prior to October 7. Specifically in Gaza, South Africa accused Israel of eight “genocidal acts”: killing Palestinians; inflicting serious bodily and mental harm; mass displacement; deprivation of food and water; denial of shelter, clothing, hygiene, and sanitation; blocking medical care; destroying Palestinian life; and imposing measures to prevent births.
On January 11–12, 2024, the Peace Palace in The Hague hosted two days of hearings on South Africa’s request for provisional measures. On January 26, 2024, the Court ordered Israel to take all steps to prevent acts that could qualify as genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention. The Court acknowledged that at least some of South Africa’s claims could fall within the Convention’s scope. However, it did not order Israel to halt its military operations in Gaza, as South Africa requested. Still, both governments declared the ruling a win, each interpreting it as validation of their stance.
Although ICJ rulings carry binding force, they lack enforcement power, and Israel has refused to comply. South Africa’s foreign minister Naledi Pandor emphasized that compliance would be impossible without a ceasefire. On February 26, 2024, Human Rights Watch reported that Israel had not implemented the Court’s provisional measures and had “continued to obstruct the provision of basic services and the entry and distribution within Gaza of fuel and lifesaving aid.” That same day, Amnesty International stated that Israel was “defying” the ICJ ruling. On March 28, 2024, in response to worsening conditions, the ICJ issued additional emergency measures requiring Israel to guarantee basic food supplies to stave off famine. Then, on May 24, 2024 the Court ordered an immediate halt to Israel’s Rafah offensive, which Israel outright rejected.
Because both Israel and South Africa are signatories to the Genocide Convention, jurisdiction is established. South Africa argues that, as a state party, it has a duty to act to prevent genocide and is legally obligated to pursue all necessary measures. The Genocide Convention extends beyond punishment to prevention, recognizing genocide as more than mass killing. South Africa’s petition highlights this obligation, aiming to fulfill the Convention’s purpose. Despite historical precedent of international law failing Palestinians and the slim likelihood of success, the case still carried hope—not only for a ruling in South Africa’s favor but also for a possible end to Israel’s genocidal campaign.
Decolonial Struggles Beyond the Courtroom
Pinkwatching operates on a similar basis of hope for Palestinian collective liberation, even though Israel is unlikely to abandon its pinkwashing efforts. Both South Africa’s ICJ case and pinkwatching contribute to the Palestinian decolonization struggle, offering different tools for globally isolating Israel and its supporters. While pinkwatching may occupy a small place in international legal and political arenas, it nonetheless provides an important pathway for resistance. This resonates with Palestinian scholar Nora Erakat’s (2020) claim that law must work alongside political strategies if it is to meaningfully support Palestine.
Like South Africa’s ICJ case, pinkwatching underscores the divide between legality and morality in international affairs. Western responses to both overlook moral dimensions, thus blocking accountability-based decolonial breakthroughs. Legal efforts are essential to halt genocide, but they remain insufficient to achieve the deeper moral and spiritual transformation necessary in the West to ensure genocide truly stops and does not recur. Treating genocide solely as a legal matter exposes the inadequacy of law when societies, like Israel’s, persist in the immoral conviction of having the right to commit it. Pinkwashers similarly claim false moral authority, reinforcing the Western legal hypocrisy that South Africa challenges. Recognizing this, pinkwatching organizers long ago chose to work outside such flawed structures, rejecting Western queer discourses that cannot deliver Palestinian liberation. Their efforts affirm that a queer-informed path to freedom cannot rely on Western legal or rights-based paradigms.
International law’s stated responsibility to prevent genocide and protect victims has repeatedly faltered due to “realpolitik, the lack of political will, and economic interests,” in the words of scholar Samuel Totten (2011). Historically, Totten says, responses to genocide have been “inconsequential. Nothing that will rock or threaten a [genocidal] government or nation’s well-being. Nothing punitive.” Israel dismissed South Africa’s charges as “baseless,” accusing it of acting as “the legal arm” of Hamas while insisting its actions were self-defense under international law—claims that largely went uncontested.
Pinkwashing, Early Warnings, and the Dynamics of Genocide
A clear example of realpolitik overriding legal and scholarly genocide frameworks came in the US, Germany, and France backing Israel at the ICJ, despite their histories of complicity in past genocides. France declared that accusing Israel of genocide “is to cross a moral threshold.” Germany pledged to defend Israel in light of the Holocaust. The US dismissedthe ICJ case as a distraction from “peace and security.” Beyond a lack of will to prevent genocide, South Africa’s case reveals that failure itself is pursued to serve Western interests.[3] Thus, by undermining their own institutions of “justice” such as international law and the UN, Western powers show themselves not only complicit in but active facilitators[4] of genocide. Their justifications parallel pinkwashing narratives, which weaponize queerness under a veneer of liberal progressivism while disregarding Palestinian lives—queer and non-queer alike.
From a queer perspective, Gaza’s genocide illustrates what scholar Sheri Rosenberg (2013) describes as the “danger of classifications” in genocide prevention. The targeting of queer Palestinians demonstrates that genocide “must be understood as an unfolding process, considered in light of historical, political, and social factors” and recognized as a complex phenomenon rather than reduced to a definition. When genocide is confined to legal definitions “against which unfolding events are to be measured,” it prioritizes “legalism [and] subjects each genocide to a rigid test in order to maintain the integrity of the term and determine criminal culpability.” Seeing genocide in Palestine as dynamic rather than static makes space for analyzing pinkwashing and pinkwatching as integral to genocide studies. Queerness unsettles the field’s fixation on definitional debates and strengthens arguments such as Rosenberg’s for “early warning systems [that] seek to collect, analyze, and communicate information” to identify potential genocides before escalation. For Palestinians, decades of orientalist tropes—including the use of homophobia to dehumanize them—could have served as early warnings had queer experiences been taken seriously.
Beyond South Africa, a queer reading of Gaza’s genocide also pushes genocide studies to destabilize fixed ideas of group identity. Scholars like Lily Nellans (2020) and Patrick Vernon (2021) have noted the Genocide Convention’s failure to recognize groups defined by gender and sexuality. Scholar Matthew Waites (2018) argues that including sexual orientation and gender identity as protected groups allows recognition of violence against queer communities in Nazi Germany, Uganda, and the Gambia as genocidal. Although Israel’s violence in Gaza targets Palestinians indiscriminately, pinkwashing’s use of queerness to normalize genocidal policies highlights how queer identities are manipulated within genocidal contexts. This manipulation, shaped by pinkwashing, differs from past genocides, marking a distinct phenomenon in the Palestinian experience.
Testimonies Erased: Pinkwashing as Justification and Diversion
Scholar Thomas Simon (1996) argues that in the initial legal definitions of genocide, the Convention’s drafters assumed that the groups requiring protection were “permanent, stable, and intractable,” recognizable by all. Because queer Palestinians have historically resisted Western queer visibility politics—centered on recognition, citizenship, and coming out—they cannot be defined as a protected group under this framework. Scholars like Freda Kabatsi (2005) argue that while the drafters treated group existence as a prerequisite for other rights, pinkwashing constructs queer Palestinians as a group only through a savior-like gaze that conditions their rights and protection on Western recognition. By forcibly separating queer Palestinians from the broader society, this group-based framing legitimizes a genocide that in reality indiscriminately targets all Palestinians. This occurs, Kabatsi (2005) says, when the “group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator.” Through pinkwashing, Israel reshapes the definition of the Palestinian collective by isolating its queer members, portraying them as exceptions to the population at large. This narrative enables Israel to justify violence against Palestinians—including queers—while presenting itself as a defender of queer rights.
When examined through pinkwashing and pinkwatching, the instrumentalization of queerness to justify genocide reveals a key distinction between contemporary and historical genocides as studies by Robert Melson (2011) show. While queer people have been killed in earlier genocides, the case in Gaza differs because of the weaponization of both alleged Palestinian heteronormativity and Israel’s homonormativity, the latter being used to claim the role of “savior” of queer Palestinians in the process of ‘othering’ all Palestinians. This demonstrates, to build on Vernon (2021), that both heteronormativity and homonormativity are “relevant to genocidal violence against non-queer people as well as violence against queer people.”
Genocide, therefore, emerges as a behavior rather than a consistent phenomenon across cases. In Palestine, this “comportment of genocide”—which may either define or obscure genocide—takes the form of pinkwashing (Kabatsi, 2005). Here, pinkwashing functions as both a tool of justification and a means of diversion in the genocidal narrative against Palestinians. This may, in fact, represent the first documented instance of such comportment through pinkwashing.
Queering the analysis of genocide in Palestine beyond legal approaches further underscores the importance of listening to victims. In genocidal contexts, as Melson (2011) argues, “testimonies of victims and survivors must be taken into account in order to better understand the motives of the perpetrators and bystanders” and to give victims and survivors a voice in the narrative of destruction. The testimonies of queer Palestinians and the work of pinkwatching activists, however, remain especially marginalized—not only because queer Palestinians, like all Palestinians, are killed in the genocide, but also because pinkwashing depicts them as either nonexistent or limited to experiencing social death in their communities, thus erasing their capacity to provide testimony. This is particularly relevant in light of the ICJ’s order that Israel preserve evidence of genocide and comply with UN investigations. Instead, Israel has systematically destroyed evidence by blocking journalists from entering Gaza, targeting and killing reporters, and denying UN workers access for documentation.
From Exceptionalism to Resistance: Rethinking Genocide Studies
Israel’s reliance on pinkwashing to avoid accountability has broader consequences beyond the devastation in Palestine. By exploiting queer communities in pursuit of ethnonationalist goals, Israel signals to other states that such practices can be adopted with impunity, without fear of consequences. Condemning Israel and the West’s disregard for international law, Irish MEP Clare Daly stated, “the rules-based order is in roaring form.” Israeli exceptionalism reinforces the fact that the West has always applied one standard of international law for its allies and another for the rest of the world. After months of openly discarding international law in Gaza, the collapse of the post–World War II system—built by the US and Europe to maintain global dominance—has become undeniable. Palestinians, including queer Palestinians and their pinkwatching allies, remain steadfast in their resistance to this destructive order.
Pinkwashing and pinkwatching emphasize the need for genocide studies and international law to adopt queer perspectives in documenting, analyzing, and explaining both Israel’s genocide and the international community’s failure to prevent it. Building on the leadership of pinkwatching activists, scholars must foreground the heteronormative and homonormative structures of Zionism, nationalism, colonialism, orientalism, and imperialism as central to understanding genocidal violence in Gaza and beyond. As scholarship continues to evolve, queerness must be acknowledged as an essential contributor to Palestinian liberation, complementing other political strategies. Since legal approaches alone have repeatedly proven insufficient for advancing decolonization, recognizing queerness at the intersection of law and politics is crucial.
(*) Dr. Izat ElAmoor is a self-identified queer Palestinian, and an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Hendrix College studying LGBTQ issues in the Arab world, Palestine included.
References
Erakat, N. (2020). Justice for some: Law and the question of Palestine. Stanford University Press.
Kabatsi, F. (2005). “Defining or diverting genocide: Changing the comportment of genocide.” International Criminal Law Review, 5(4), 387–407.
Melson, R. (2011). “Critique of current genocide studies.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6(3), 279–286.
Nellans, L. (2020). “A queer (er) genocide studies.” Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal, 14(3), 7–16.
Rosenberg, S. P. (2012). “Genocide is a process, not an event.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 7(1), 16–23.
Simon, T. W. (1996). “Defining genocide.” Wisconsin International Law Journal, 15(2), 243–289.
Totten, S. (2011). “The state and future of genocide studies and prevention: An overview and analysis of some key issues.” Genocide Studies and Prevention, 6(3), 211–230.
Vernon, P. (2021). “Queering genocide as a performance of heterosexuality.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 49(2), 248–279.
Waites, M. (2018). “Genocide and global queer politics.” Journal of Genocide Research, 20(1), 44–67.
Footnotes
[1] To pinkwash, Israel exploits queer rights to project a progressive queer friendly image of itself while concealing its occupation and apartheid of Palestinians.
[3] Some signs include the May 6th threatening letter by 12 US republican senators, led by Sen. Tom Cotton, to the ICC chief prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan with sanctions and banning ICC “employees and associates” from entering the US over possible warrants against Israel, saying explicitly, “target Israel and we will target you.” South Africa’s Pandor received the same letter. On May 20th, Khan applied for arrest warrants for Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
[4] The US and Germany, Israel’s top arms supplier, saw their weapon manufacturer corporates directly profit from the genocide as their share prices have exponentially risen since October 7.
Date/Time: Thursday, September 25, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)
Moderator
Dr. Cengiz Aktar (An Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens).
Speakers
“Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe,” by Dr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University).
“Democracy for all: Rethinking a Failed Model,” byDr. Steven Friedman(Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg).
“That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US,” by Dr. Julie Ingersoll(Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida).
“Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time,” by Dr. Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University).
“Combatting Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Larry Diamond(Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University).
The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted a panel titled “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding.”The session gathered distinguished scholars to examine the accelerating erosion of democracy, the potential transition from populism to fascism, and the moral and intellectual duties of those who continue to defend democratic values in dark times.
Selcuk Gultasli, ECPS Chairperson, opened the session by emphasizing the urgency of the theme. He noted that the panel sought not only to analyze the rise of populism but also to confront how authoritarian tendencies may harden into fascism. ECPS, he explained, is committed to making the discussion widely accessible through a detailed report and online recordings, ensuring that policymakers, academics, and engaged citizens can benefit from the insights shared.
Moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, then set the tone by recalling ECPS’s mission: to document and analyze how populism threatens democracy worldwide. He warned that populist leaders are not isolated figures but draw legitimacy from mass support, which, in Arendtian terms, provides the essential condition for fascist governance. Today’s task, Professor Aktar concluded, is no longer about building democracy but about preventing its collapse.
Professor Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University) opened with a comparative analysis of populism in Europe and the United States. She argued that American populism, embodied by Donald Trump, is marked by unpredictability and authoritarian experimentation, untethered from coherent historical anchors. The most dangerous development, she suggested, lies not in street militias but in “social authoritarianism”—elite legal and intellectual projects such as Project 2025 that aim to dismantle democracy from within. The elevation of Charlie Kirk as a martyr, she warned, signals a new form of religious-political mobilization with fascistic overtones.
Professor Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg) challenged the myth of a pristine democracy interrupted by an authoritarian onslaught. He argued that the current model of democracy was already exclusionary before the rise of authoritarianism, and the current Western model itself is failing. By ignoring the dangers of private corporate power and clinging to Eurocentric notions of “consolidation,” democrats have overlooked the deeper roots of disillusionment. For Professor Friedman, the task is to redefine democracy as equal human choice in all decisions that affect people’s lives—a principle that requires confronting both state and private power.
Professor Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida) provided an ethnographic perspective on Christian nationalism in the United States. She mapped three strands—evangelical dominionism, Catholic integralism, and Pentecostal-charismatic movements—that, despite historical rivalries, now converge in rejecting pluralism and democracy. She also highlighted the convergence of these religious forces with secular techno-utopianism and nihilistic online subcultures. The result, she argued, is a coalition oriented toward collapse and accelerationism, united less by theology than by anti-democratic aspirations.
Professor Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University) situated the discussion in a global frame. He argued that democracy was tarnished long before populism’s rise, corrupted by Cold War secrecy, US hypocrisy in international law, and the exploitative logic of capitalism. Populism, in his view, compounds these crises by waging an “epistemological war” against truth and expertise. Facing climate change, nuclear peril, and extreme poverty, Professor Falk urged intellectuals to embrace utopian thinking and even revolutionary transformation, reorienting governance toward the global public good.
Professor Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) concluded with a stark warning about the authoritarian project underway in the United States. Drawing lessons from leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán and Turkey’s Erdoğan, he argued that Trump and his allies are pursuing a systematic strategy of democratic dismantling: media capture, judicial purges, lawfare, and gerrymandering. While fascistic elements are present, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of terminological precision. Resistance, he suggested, requires early mobilization, broad coalitions, and a focus on economic issues that resonate with ordinary voters.
Together, the panelists painted a sobering picture: populism today is no longer merely a style of politics but a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with global reverberations. From Christian nationalism to techno-utopianism, from corporate power to manipulated legal frameworks, the threats are multifaceted. Yet the panel also underscored a common responsibility—that intellectuals must speak with clarity, resist euphemism, and foster new visions of democracy suited to the crises of our age.
Professor Mabel Berezin: “Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe”
People gather at Turning Point USA headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, for a memorial following the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk during his speech at Utah Valley University in Orem. Photo: Dreamstime.
In her presentation, Professor Mabel Berezin delivered a sobering analysis of the current trajectory of democracy in the United States and Europe. Speaking from the vantage point of an academic who has long studied populism and fascism, she situated the discussion within a comparative framework, but with particular urgency regarding developments in the United States since the 2024 presidential election.
Berezin opened with a reflection on the language used to describe contemporary democratic crises. The term “democratic backsliding,” she argued, now feels wholly inadequate for the American case. Since Donald Trump’s return to power, the country has been subject to what she described as a “high-speed wrecking ball” against its democratic institutions. While democratic erosion is a global phenomenon, its forms vary across national contexts, depending on political histories and institutional resilience. This, she suggested, underscores the need for context-specific strategies of intellectual and civic engagement.
European Populism and American Exceptionalism
Berezin revisited an argument she first articulated in 2017 in her essay “Trump is Not a European-Style Populist and That is Our Problem.” In that piece, she observed that while European far-right populists—such as Marine Le Pen in France or Giorgia Meloni in Italy—often ground their appeals in nostalgia for a stronger nation-state and postwar social protections, the American populist right is marked by unpredictability. European populists, she argued, want “more state, not less,” and their grievances frequently revolve around immigration and monetary issues within the European Union framework. By contrast, the American case lacks a coherent historical anchor, and Trump’s political appeal did not fit neatly into established narratives.
For Professor Berezin, this unpredictability made Trump particularly dangerous. While European populists often pursue recognizable policy goals rooted in the past, Trump’s movement was untethered, fueled instead by volatile grievances and charismatic mobilization. The absence of clearly defined political expectations in the US created fertile ground for authoritarian experimentation.
The Rise of Social Authoritarianism
Turning to the US after the 2020 and 2024 elections, Professor Berezin noted the growing academic consensus that Trumpism bears fascist characteristics. However, she argued that the most pressing threats to democracy are not necessarily the paramilitary groups that rallied in Charlottesville or stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Instead, the greater danger lies in what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a project spearheaded by intellectual cadres aligned with institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the Federalist Society, and the architects of “Project 2025.”
These actors, she explained, represent the true intellectual core of the movement. Unlike the visible extremists brandishing weapons, these figures deploy law, language, and bureaucracy as instruments of authoritarian consolidation. By targeting institutions and systematically reshaping the judiciary, they seek to dismantle the so-called “deep state” and restrict fundamental freedoms under the veneer of legality. As Professor Berezin quipped, it is easier to imprison someone who fires an AR-15 than it is to restrain a legal strategist whose weapon is a thesaurus.
The Paramilitary of Jesus
While she downplayed the long-term mobilizing potential of armed militias, Professor Berezin identified a new and alarming development: the posthumous elevation of Charlie Kirk, a conservative media figure assassinated in September 2025. Initially dismissing him as a fringe podcaster, Professor Berezin admitted she was shocked by the scale and spectacle of his memorial service, which she described as a “paramilitary of Jesus with the blessings of the state.” The event drew millions of attendees and viewers, including Trump and much of his cabinet, and revealed a level of organization, youthful enthusiasm, and emotional intensity that Professor Berezin found profoundly unsettling.
What struck her most was the fusion of evangelical symbolism with political mobilization. The service emphasized family, reproduction, and communal solidarity, urging followers to “have more children than you can afford” and to embrace family as one’s central role in society. While the rhetoric appeared religious, Professor Berezin suggested it was in fact a form of secular mobilization—anchored less in theology than in a cultural project of authoritarian belonging.
Kirk’s assassination, she argued, paradoxically strengthened the movement. In death, he was transformed into a martyr, his charisma frozen in time, and his image available for endless appropriation by the MAGA movement. This development, she warned, fills a “missing link” in the analytical framework of American authoritarianism, supplying the movement with an emotionally powerful narrative and a mobilizing force that mainstream democratic actors struggle to match.
Intellectual Responsibilities
The central theme of Professor Berezin’s speech was the intellectual responsibility of scholars in confronting authoritarianism. She acknowledged the limitations of academic writing and debate in the face of mobilized authoritarian forces but insisted that silence or timidity is not an option. Universities, law schools, and other institutions must be willing to say “no” to authoritarian incursions, resisting the erosion of academic freedom and democratic values.
Dialogue, she suggested, remains valuable, but only if understood not as a tool of conversion but as a means of fostering engagement. In her own teaching on fascism and nationalism, Professor Berezin frequently encounters conservative students who seek to talk rather than proselytize. Creating spaces for such conversations, she argued, can generate a deeper understanding of democratic principles across divides.
Yet Professor Berezin also warned against complacency. She noted that the rhetoric of Trump’s movement is saturated with appeals to “freedom,” while democracy itself is rarely mentioned. The gap between these two concepts must be addressed directly. For her, one crucial task is rearticulating what democracy actually means in the public sphere. Many Americans, she lamented, support democracy as an abstract good but lack a concrete understanding of its practices and requirements.
Democracy and Education
Professor Berezin concluded by situating intellectual responsibility within the longer history of democratic education. She invoked John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and the civic initiatives launched in the United States during the onset of World War II, such as the National Foundation for Education and American Citizenship. These historical precedents, she argued, remind us that democracy must be taught, nurtured, and continuously reinforced through education.
For Professor Berezin, the path forward lies not in rhetorical denunciations of fascism but in cultivating a renewed public understanding of democracy itself. Education, both formal and informal, is the most effective channel for resisting the deeply embedded authoritarian forces now at work. If democracy is to be saved—or at least its decline attenuated—scholars, educators, and intellectuals must reclaim their role in shaping civic culture.
Conclusion
Professor Berezin’s presentation offered a bracing assessment of the state of democracy in America and beyond. By contrasting European and American populisms, highlighting the intellectual underpinnings of authoritarianism, and analyzing the symbolic mobilization of figures like Charlie Kirk, she illuminated the complex and evolving threats facing democratic societies. Her call to intellectual responsibility—grounded in education, engagement, and the defense of democratic institutions—underscored the urgent role of scholars in meeting this historical moment.
Professor Steven Friedman: “Democracy for All: Rethinking a Failed Model”
The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.
In his presentation, Professor Steven Friedman offered a provocative and deeply critical re-examination of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Speaking as both a South African scholar and a citizen who lived through apartheid and the democratic transition of 1994, Professor Friedman challenged prevailing assumptions about democracy’s origins, legitimacy, and sustainability. His core argument was clear: the crisis facing democracy today is not merely the product of authoritarian incursions or populist disruption but the collapse of a flawed model of democracy that has dominated global thinking for the past three decades.
The Myth of a Pristine Democratic Past
Professor Friedman began by dismantling what he called the “myth of the pristine democratic environment.” Many observers, he argued, continue to think of democracy as a fully functioning, well-ordered system that has been corrupted by external “barbarians.” While acknowledging the existence of authoritarian challengers, Professor Friedman insisted that this framing misdiagnoses the problem. According to him, democracy has not simply been hijacked; rather, the dominant model itself is failing. To understand today’s crisis, we must interrogate the assumptions underpinning this model.
Democracy as a Western Export
The first of these assumptions, Professor Friedman argued, is the idea that democracy is inherently Western. For decades, he noted, democracy outside North America and Western Europe has been judged by the extent to which it resembles an idealized Western model. This attitude, embedded in the “transition to democracy” scholarship of the late twentieth century, created a hierarchy in which Africa, Asia, and Latin America were cast as perpetual apprentices striving to approximate Western democracies.
He pointed to the academic obsession with “democratic consolidation” as an example. Despite the proliferation of literature on the subject, there has never been a coherent definition of what a “consolidated democracy” actually is. In practice, Professor Friedman argued, the concept functioned as a mirror: if a country looked like Western Europe or North America, it was deemed consolidated; if not, it was considered deficient. This was less a political theory, he suggested, than an ethnic bias.
Today, the irony of this model is stark. The very Western democracies once held up as exemplars are themselves eroding fundamental freedoms. Professor Friedman shared a telling personal anecdote. During apartheid, South Africans envied Western societies for their freedoms of speech and assembly. Yet today, he noted, German academics fear losing their jobs for participating in discussions critical of Israel, and Americans risk detention for political speech. The “boot,” he observed, “is now on the other foot.” Modeling democracy on the West, he concluded, is no longer tenable.
Palestine as a Democracy Problem
Professor Friedman underscored this argument with a pressing contemporary example: Palestine. He contended that the suppression of pro-Palestinian expression in Western democracies represents a profound democratic failure. Citizens in the UK and elsewhere have been arrested for holding signs opposing genocide, while in many countries, calls for boycotts—an elementary form of democratic speech—are criminalized.
Equally troubling, Professor Friedman argued, is the gap between public opinion and elite policy. Surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for a just resolution to the conflict, yet Western governments either ignore this consensus or offer token gestures while maintaining policies that sustain the crisis. This disconnect illustrates how democracy, when treated as a Western possession, erodes its own legitimacy. For Professor Friedman, the Palestine issue is not peripheral but central to understanding democracy’s current global malaise.
Ignoring Private Power
The second flawed assumption of the dominant model, Professor Friedman argued, is its fixation on the state as the sole threat to freedom. According to this view, democracy exists primarily to constrain state power and ensure accountability to citizens. While important, this perspective ignores another crucial reality: private power can be equally oppressive when left unregulated.
Professor Friedman reminded his audience that this insight is hardly radical. Theodore Roosevelt, in the early twentieth century, warned that unregulated commercial power could dominate and oppress citizens just as much as the state. For much of the postwar period, Western democracies acknowledged this reality, regulating corporate influence to safeguard public interests. Yet in the past thirty years, this recognition has disappeared from mainstream democratic theory. Private power is rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarship or policy debates, leaving citizens vulnerable to corporate domination.
He illustrated this point with evidence from the 2024 US elections. Democratic candidates who campaigned on regulating corporate price gouging outperformed their peers by 8–10 percentage points, sometimes winning in unexpected constituencies. This, Professor Friedman argued, underscores the centrality of addressing private power to democratic renewal. Citizens disengage not because they are seduced by authoritarianism, but because they see mainstream parties as unwilling or unable to improve their material conditions.
The Real Crisis: Disillusionment, Not Populism
Professor Friedman pushed back against the notion that democracy’s greatest threat lies in the rise of populist strongmen. The problem, he suggested, is not the growth of the authoritarian right but the erosion of faith among non-right constituencies. In the US, for example, Trump did not dramatically expand his base between 2020 and 2024. Instead, 17 million former Democratic voters simply abstained. Disillusionment, not conversion, handed Trump his victory.
This phenomenon is not unique to the US. Across Western Europe, too, the crisis of democracy stems less from the swelling of the right than from the alienation of citizens who feel their votes no longer matter. When private power goes unregulated and living standards stagnate, democratic participation declines. Professor Friedman emphasized that this structural disillusionment is a more urgent challenge than the electoral gains of right-wing populists.
Redefining Democracy
In concluding, Professor Friedman turned to the question of intellectual responsibility. Scholars, he argued, must abandon the failed model of democracy and reimagine its meaning. For him, democracy is not a set of institutions or a Western inheritance but a principle: every adult human being should have an equal say in every decision that affects them.
He acknowledged that no society has ever fully realized this ideal. But, citing South African theorist Richard Turner’s essay “The Necessity of Utopian Thinking,” Professor Friedman insisted that such standards must serve as guiding measures. Without them, democrats risk losing sight of their goals.
Placing equal human choice at the center of democracy, Professor Friedman argued, has two transformative implications. First, it erases the Western bias by recognizing democracy as a universal entitlement, not a Western export. Second, it compels recognition that private power must be regulated just as much as state power to ensure genuine freedom. Free speech, free assembly, and other democratic rights flow from this foundational principle.
Conclusion
Professor Friedman’s presentation was both a diagnosis and a manifesto. He rejected nostalgic narratives of a lost democratic golden age, instead locating today’s crisis in the flaws of a dominant model that has privileged Western forms and ignored private power. By highlighting the Palestine issue, he demonstrated how democratic principles are being eroded in the very societies that claim to embody them. By pointing to corporate power, he revealed the blind spots of a state-centered understanding of democracy.
Ultimately, Professor Friedman’s call was for a radical rethinking of democracy as a universal system of equal human choice. Only by embracing this vision, he argued, can democrats move beyond disillusionment and resist both authoritarianism and apathy. His intervention offered a powerful reminder that democracy’s renewal depends not on replication of Western models but on confronting the structural inequalities—both public and private—that undermine it.
Professor Julie Ingersoll: “That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US”
Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.
In her presentation, Professor Julie Ingersoll offered a sobering ethnographic analysis of how religious and ostensibly secular movements in the United States have converged into a powerful populist force. Drawing on more than three decades of field-based scholarship on American religion, Professor Ingersoll explained how seemingly disparate strands of Christianity—along with nonreligious ideological currents—have coalesced into a theocratic, anti-democratic vision that underpins the populist movement known as MAGA. Her intervention highlighted the importance of rethinking how scholars conceptualize religion itself, arguing that theological differences often obscure shared cultural and political commitments.
The Ethnographer’s Lens
Professor Ingersoll situated her perspective within her disciplinary background. Unlike scholars who approach populism through theories of democracy or abstract political models, her work is rooted in ethnography and the close study of religious communities over time. Her aim, she explained, is not to prescribe strategies for saving democracy but to document the lived dynamics of religious movements and to clarify what society is up against. This commitment to description and analysis, she argued, is itself a vital intellectual responsibility: to bear witness, to explain, and to equip others with a deeper understanding of the cultural forces reshaping American politics.
Three Streams of Christian Nationalism
Central to Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her mapping of Christian nationalism into three distinct but increasingly interconnected traditions.
Evangelical Protestant Dominionism: The first stream emerges from white conservative evangelical Protestantism, particularly the Reconstructionist movement of the 1950s. These groups believe the Bible speaks to every area of life and advocate a theocratic social order rooted in pro-slavery Southern Presbyterianism. They view pluralism and social equality as heretical and insist that Christians are commanded to exercise “dominion” over the world, a mandate they trace back to Genesis. This dominionist vision has informed generations of evangelical activism, positioning biblical law as the sole legitimate foundation for governance.
Catholic Integralism: The second stream arises from Catholic integralism, a minority tradition within Catholicism that rejects church-state separation and seeks to organize society according to Catholic teaching. Integralists draw inspiration from the historic doctrine of the divine right of kings and today align themselves with efforts to dismantle the administrative state. Professor Ingersoll pointed to Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society’s transformation of the US Supreme Court as evidence of integralist influence. Their promotion of the “unitary executive” doctrine reflects a broader ambition to consolidate political power in ways that erode checks and balances.
Charismatic and Pentecostal Movements: The third stream comes from charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity, particularly the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) that arose in the 1990s. Emphasizing prophecy, apostleship, and spiritual warfare, these groups interpret the world as a literal battlefield between divine and demonic forces. Their “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions Christians seizing control of key spheres of society, from government and business to media and education. Professor Ingersoll warned that this branch of Christian nationalism, with its apocalyptic worldview and demonization of opponents, is especially prone to violence.
While historically divided and even hostile to one another, these three streams have forged common cause within the MAGA movement. Their theological disagreements, Professor Ingersoll argued, often matter less in everyday practice than their shared opposition to pluralism, egalitarianism, and democracy.
Rethinking Religion
A major contribution of Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her challenge to conventional understandings of religion. Too often, she argued, scholars and observers treat religion as a coherent set of theological beliefs derived from sacred texts. In reality, religious communities function as shifting assemblages of practices, narratives, and cultural markers that organize social life, demarcate insiders and outsiders, and legitimate particular hierarchies.
She illustrated this with a simple example for her students: when people choose a church, they often do so based on social comfort and community ties, not doctrinal precision. Over time, their beliefs shift to align with the group. In this sense, theology frequently follows social belonging rather than the other way around. Recognizing this dynamic, she argued, helps explain how divergent Christian traditions can set aside doctrinal disputes to advance a shared political project.
The Blurring of Religious and Secular
Importantly, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that Christian nationalism does not exist in isolation. It converges with ostensibly secular ideological movements, most notably Silicon Valley techno-utopianism. Tech futurists, accelerationists, and advocates of the “Dark Enlightenment” envision the collapse of democracy and its replacement by corporate-style governance, with CEOs and elite boards as rulers. They promote building digital and physical enclaves—whether in the cloud, on artificial islands, or even on Mars—where hierarchy replaces equality.
Despite their secular self-image, these movements align with Christian nationalism on core commitments: hostility to egalitarianism, skepticism toward democracy, and openness to societal collapse as an opportunity for renewal. Together, they form a strange but potent coalition, bound less by shared theology than by shared anti-democratic aspirations.
Professor Ingersoll also pointed to nihilistic online subcultures that defy the left-right binary, particularly those implicated in the assassination of Charlie Kirk. These groups embrace collapse and seek to accelerate it, even if what follows is “nothingness.” Though ideologically incoherent, they reinforce the broader accelerationist impulse uniting religious and secular anti-democratic forces.
Theocratic Visions and Apocalyptic Anticipations
Across these groups—whether dominionist, integralist, Pentecostal, techno-utopian, or nihilist— Professor Ingersoll identified a common conviction that society is in chaos and decline, and that collapse is either inevitable or desirable. Some even imagine themselves as agents accelerating history toward apocalyptic ends. Though they may diverge sharply on what comes after collapse—the Kingdom of God, a Mars colony, or nihilistic nothingness—they are united in their rejection of democracy and equality in the present.
This convergence, she warned, explains why observers have underestimated their power. Analysts often dismissed each strand as fringe or mutually exclusive, missing the cultural work that bound them together. Only by reframing religion not as fixed belief but as lived practice can we see the coherence of this coalition.
Intellectual Responsibilities
Professor Ingersoll concluded by reflecting on the intellectual responsibilities of scholars in this precarious moment. She admitted that offering prescriptive solutions has never been her strength, nor does she claim to have a plan for saving American democracy. What she can do, she insisted, is “stay in her lane”: documenting, explaining, and bearing witness to the forces reshaping society.
She acknowledged the difficulty of gaining perspective within the United States, where daily life remains unchanged for many even as democratic institutions crumble. Yet she argued that democracy has already collapsed in significant ways, and the upcoming 2026 election may already be compromised beyond repair.
For academics, the challenge is compounded by growing pressures to remain silent. Universities, law firms, media organizations, and even independent institutions have faced campaigns to suppress dissent. Faculty—tenured, untenured, and even retired—have been fired or disciplined for their speech, often on the basis of accusations tied to social media. The silencing of intellectual voices, Professor Ingersoll warned, represents not just an attack on individuals but an erosion of democracy itself.
Conclusion
Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation illuminated the deep entanglements of religion, culture, and politics in the rise of American populism. By tracing the convergence of evangelical dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal charismatics, techno-utopians, and nihilist subcultures, she revealed a coalition united not by theology but by anti-democratic commitments. Her insistence on reframing religion as lived practice rather than doctrinal belief opened new avenues for understanding how these disparate groups reinforce one another.
Ultimately, her message was both analytical and cautionary. The coalition she described thrives on visions of collapse and acceleration, rejecting democracy and equality in favor of theocratic or technocratic alternatives. For scholars, the responsibility is to continue speaking, documenting, and explaining—even in the face of silencing. As Professor Ingersoll made clear, the stakes are nothing less than the future of American democracy.
Professor Richard Falk: “Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time”
UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.
In his presentation, Professor Richard Falk offered a sobering international perspective on the decline of democracy, the failures of US leadership, and the urgent need to rethink political responsibility in light of global crises. Speaking as a longtime scholar of international law and global order, Professor Falk situated the challenges of populism and authoritarianism within broader structural failures—of US democracy, capitalism, and the international system established after World War II.
The Tarnishing of Democracy
Professor Falk began by challenging the notion that populism alone is the cause of democratic erosion in the US. Democracy, he argued, was already “badly tarnished” long before the rise of Trumpism. For decades, the United States projected itself as the world’s exemplary democracy, yet in practice it offered citizens only a “choiceless democracy.” The two-party system, constrained by Cold War ideologies, provided little space for fundamental debate on the most pressing issues.
Secrecy further hollowed out democratic practice. The CIA and other US agencies subverted democratic movements abroad—staging coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere—while concealing these actions from the American public under the guise of national security. By normalizing criminal interventions as necessary for security, Professor Falk argued, the US “permanently corrupted the moral sensibilities of the citizenry.” Democracy was reduced to participation in elections that offered no real alternative, fueling disillusionment among the poor, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups whose grievances were consistently dismissed.
The Global Projection of Hypocrisy
Internationally, the United States squandered the opportunity after World War II to construct a just world order. Instead, it entrenched a system that privileged the victors. The United Nations Security Council institutionalized inequality by exempting the five permanent members from compliance with international law. As Professor Falk emphasized, this design elevated geopolitics over morality and law, undermining the credibility of global governance from the start.
The consequences of this hypocrisy are evident today. In conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza, international law is selectively invoked: wielded as a weapon against adversaries while ignored when allies commit violations. This double standard, Professor Falk argued, has transformed the US from a supposed champion of the rule of law into “the champion of moral hypocrisy.” The result is widespread alienation across much of the Global South, where US credibility as a promoter of democracy has eroded.
Capitalism, Populism, and the Assault on Truth
A further obstacle to democratic renewal lies in the current stage of global capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Professor Falk argued, is both exploitative and ecologically destructive. By privileging short-term profits over sustainability, it undermines governments’ ability to act in the public interest. Corporate influence on politics ensures that urgent global challenges—climate change, poverty, and disarmament—are subordinated to private interests.
Within this context, populism becomes not a solution but an amplifier of democratic decay. Trumpism, Professor Falk contended, embodies an “epistemological war against the Enlightenment.” It is hostile to expertise, reason, and evidence, and sanctions those who attempt to tell inconvenient truths. The suppression of international voices speaking out about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, including United Nations officials, is emblematic of this assault on truth. Words such as “genocide” are rendered almost unspeakable, even as atrocities unfold in real time. By eroding the possibility of truth-telling, populist politics undermines responsible citizenship and corrodes the foundations of democratic accountability.
Toward Emancipatory Politics
Against this backdrop, Professor Falk posed the critical question: what does it mean to be a responsible citizen in such dark times? His answer pointed toward the necessity of utopian thinking and, potentially, revolutionary transformation. Incremental reform within existing structures, he argued, is insufficient. The dominant social forces—military-industrial complexes, corporate lobbies, and entrenched elites—must be displaced by actors committed to the global public good.
For Professor Falk, the form of governance is less important than its orientation toward reality. Addressing existential challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, mass poverty—requires political systems that privilege truth, sustainability, and the collective interest over short-term expediency. Intriguingly, he noted, some of the most responsible practices in these areas currently come from China, a state that is highly autocratic and, in many respects, anti-democratic. This paradox raises the possibility that the ecological and geopolitical crises of the twenty-first century may demand post-democratic or post-populist forms of governance if humanity is to survive.
Conclusion
Professor Richard Falk’s presentation was a sweeping indictment of both US democracy and the international order it helped create. He argued that the failures of American democracy—its secrecy, its choicelessness, and its moral corruption—have reverberated globally, eroding trust in the very idea of liberal democracy. Coupled with an ecologically destructive capitalism and a populism hostile to truth, these dynamics leave humanity in a perilous position.
Yet Professor Falk’s talk was not only diagnostic but also prescriptive in spirit. He called for a politics of emancipation grounded in truth-telling, utopian imagination, and global solidarity. Whether through democratic renewal or through new, post-democratic arrangements, he urged that political systems must be reoriented toward the survival and flourishing of the human species. In a dark time, emancipation requires both courage and a willingness to envision radical alternatives.
Professor Larry Diamond:“Combatting Authoritarian Populism”
In his presentation, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a sweeping and sobering assessment of the threats facing democracy in the United States and around the world. Framing his remarks against a backdrop of rising authoritarian populism, Professor Diamond emphasized that the global tide of illiberalism is far from cresting. Instead, the forces of democratic backsliding—anchored in right-wing populism—are accelerating across multiple continents, diffusing strategies and legitimizing authoritarian models. Against this international canvas, he examined the United States as a critical battleground, where Donald Trump’s return to power has raised the prospect of a systematic dismantling of liberal democracy.
A Global Wave of Authoritarian Populism
Professor Diamond began by situating current US dynamics within a global context. Across Latin America, he observed, populist models inspired by both Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele are gaining traction. Chile may soon see a populist restoration, Bolivia and Colombia could follow suit, and Ecuador has already taken a hard turn to the right. These trends reflect a wider diffusion effect: just as democratic activists once drew inspiration from leaders such as Mario Soares in Portugal or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, today’s populist movements model themselves on figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.
Europe, too, faces serious risks. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally stands poised to take power in France, while Nigel Farage has become a plausible candidate for prime minister in the United Kingdom. Germany, traditionally a bulwark of liberal democracy, now contends with dynamics of polarized pluralism reminiscent of interwar Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, right-wing parties are resurgent, with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party threatening hard-won democratic restoration. Taken together, Professor Diamond warned, these developments mark an era of “deeply, dangerously fluid” political polarization.
Trumpism and the Project of Authoritarian Entrenchment
Within this global wave, the United States has reemerged as both a model and a cautionary tale. After returning to the presidency, Trump has pursued a far more methodical strategy to consolidate power, guided by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. This playbook, Professor Diamond explained, echoes Orbán’s transformation of Hungary from a liberal democracy to what he termed an “illiberal non-democracy”—a regime that preserves the appearance of competitive elections while hollowing out checks and balances.
Trump’s project, Professor Diamond warned, has advanced along nearly every step of the authoritarian “12-step program” outlined in his earlier book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. These steps include extreme polarization, demonization of the opposition, systematic attacks on the media, politicization of the courts, and the purge of independent institutions. What distinguishes the current moment, he stressed, is that these efforts are no longer impulsive but deliberate, refined over four years of preparation.
The Assault on Media, Courts, and Institutions
Professor Diamond catalogued the multiple fronts of authoritarian encroachment. Independent media face unprecedented threats from concentrated ownership by Trump-aligned billionaires, such as the Ellison family’s acquisitions of TikTok and Paramount (including CBS News). Once pillars of journalistic independence, these outlets risk being transformed into regime mouthpieces. The trend mirrors patterns in Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, where businessmen allied with ruling parties purchased media outlets to neutralize dissent.
The judiciary has likewise been targeted. Inspectors general across federal agencies were summarily dismissed at the outset of Trump’s new administration. Judge Advocate Generals in the Army, Navy, and Air Force—key advisors on constitutional limits within the military—were purged, raising concerns about the politicization of the armed forces. This, Professor Diamond noted, is a particularly ominous development: authoritarian leaders often seek to secure military loyalty as a safeguard against democratic resistance.
Universities, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations are also under attack. As in Hungary, where Orbán vilified George Soros, Trump’s allies have begun targeting major civil society organizations such as the Open Society Foundations and the Ford Foundation. Lawfare—weaponizing legal mechanisms to intimidate and suppress—has become a defining strategy, extending even to efforts to prosecute political opponents like former FBI director James Comey.
Gerrymandering, Lawfare, and Electoral Manipulation
At the electoral level, Trump’s allies have embraced grotesque gerrymandering to entrench minority rule. By redrawing districts with ruthless precision, they aim to secure durable Republican control of the House of Representatives, even without majority support. Echoing Orbán’s tactics in Hungary, such manipulation risks creating a façade of competition while structurally foreclosing alternation in power.
The broader strategy, Professor Diamond explained, is not to abolish elections but to subvert them—maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy while ensuring outcomes favorable to the regime. This is why vigilance over the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential elections is crucial. Without robust mobilization and institutional safeguards, the US risks sliding into electoral authoritarianism.
Intellectual Responsibilities: Rigor and Precision
Responding to the session’s theme of intellectual responsibility, Professor Diamond underscored the importance of terminological clarity. While Trumpism has fascistic elements—such as the stigmatization of minorities and the elevation of a charismatic leader—he cautioned against prematurely labeling the United States a fascist regime. Misusing charged terms, he argued, risks polarizing discourse further and alienating potential allies in the defense of democracy. Instead, scholars must distinguish carefully between illiberal democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and full-fledged authoritarianism. Intellectual rigor, he insisted, is itself a form of civic responsibility.
Lessons for Resisting Authoritarianism
Professor Diamond concluded with several lessons drawn from global experiences of democratic backsliding.
Mobilize early and vigorously: The sooner authoritarian projects are resisted, the greater the chance of success. Once the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services are stacked with loyalists, reversing course becomes exponentially harder.
Combine institutional and civic strategies:Courts, legislatures, and oversight mechanisms remain critical tools, even if weakened. Judicial rulings can still draw lines, and regaining control of congressional committees would enable investigations into corruption. At the same time, civil society mobilization is indispensable: protests such as “No Kings Day,” which drew millions into the streets, exemplify the power of mass resistance.
Build broad electoral coalitions: Ultimately, authoritarian leaders are most often defeated at the ballot box. Opposition coalitions must transcend class and identity divides, adopting inclusive strategies that resonate beyond traditional partisan bases. Professor Diamond cited Turkey’s municipal elections, in which campaigns of “radical love” forged unlikely alliances, as an instructive model.
Prioritize economic performance: Voters care most about material conditions. Autocrats often mismanage economies due to corruption and cronyism, creating openings for opposition campaigns focused on bread-and-butter issues. As James Carville’s dictum reminds us: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Professor Diamond noted that Trump’s approval ratings are underwater across all policy areas, including crime and immigration, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with his governance.
Conclusion
Professor Larry Diamond’s presentation painted a stark picture of democracy under siege. Around the world, populist leaders are modeling themselves not on democratic icons but on illiberal strongmen. In the United States, Donald Trump’s methodical pursuit of power threatens to transform the country into an electoral authoritarian regime. From media capture and judicial purges to gerrymandering and lawfare, the signs are clear: America is far along the authoritarian pathway.
Yet Professor Diamond also offered hope rooted in historical lessons. Authoritarian regimes often collapse under the weight of their corruption, economic mismanagement, and overreach. Intellectuals must contribute with rigor and clarity, resisting hyperbolic labels while documenting authoritarian encroachments. Civil society must mobilize boldly, institutions must be defended, and electoral coalitions must be broadened.
The struggle, Professor Diamond concluded, is urgent but not lost. The fate of American democracy—and its global influence—will hinge on the ability of citizens, scholars, and leaders to confront authoritarianism with courage, precision, and unity.
Q&A Highlights
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
The Q&A session following the panel underscored the urgency and complexity of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. Questions probed deeply into the militarization of politics, the durability of authoritarian regimes, and the prospects for democratic renewal. The exchange illuminated both the dangers at hand and the intellectual responsibility of scholars to frame these dangers with clarity.
Militarization of Politics in the US
The first question raised the issue of Donald Trump’s overt and covert attempts to draw the military into American politics. Referencing the July 4th military parade and the deployment of the National Guard in major US cities including Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, the questioner asked whether such actions risked militarizing US politics or politicizing the armed forces, with potential implications for other struggling democracies.
Professor Larry Diamond responded with grave concern. He described these moves as “serious, intentional, and very dangerous,” with both symbolic and practical consequences. Beyond rallying an exclusionary nationalism, Trump’s efforts have raised fears of outright constitutional violations. Professor Diamond relayed the warning of a senior retired military officer that Trump might attempt to deploy the National Guard in contested districts during the 2026 congressional elections to interfere with ballot access and recounts. Such maneuvers, he stressed, would mark a decisive step toward authoritarianism, as they seek to build a military apparatus personally loyal to Trump and the MAGA movement.
Professor Julie Ingersoll added another dimension, noting the religious undercurrents in Trump’s ties to figures such as Pete Hegseth, whose deep connections to Christian Reconstructionist networks highlight the fusion of military symbolism with theocratic ideologies. This overlap, she argued, further illustrates the blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and authoritarian aspirations in the US.
Can Authoritarian Regimes Be Reversed?
A second question asked whether history offered examples of authoritarian governments being deposed through democratic means, referencing Armitage’s claim that such reversals are rare. Responding, Professor Diamond acknowledged the difficulty but pointed to Poland as a partial example of democratic restoration, albeit one fraught with constitutional landmines left behind by previous authoritarian-minded governments. He predicted that future reversals would similarly confront dilemmas: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without replicating their illiberal methods.
Professor Diamond rejected the notion that authoritarian projects last indefinitely. Their corruption, failures, and reliance on aging leaders such as Erdoğan, he argued, ultimately erode their viability. New democratic moments do emerge, though they face immense challenges. For the US, the fundamental test will come in the 2026 midterm elections, where the integrity of voting and counting remains the essential condition for democracy.
Concluding Reflections by Professor Cengiz Aktar
In his closing remarks, moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar reflected on the themes of the discussion with a sobering tone. He observed that the global zeitgeist had shifted dramatically: no longer are scholars debating how to build democracy, but rather how to prevent its collapse. Echoing Richard Falk’s notion of “dark times,” Professor Aktar emphasized that naming the threat accurately—calling fascism by its name—is essential. Euphemisms, he argued, obscure the gravity of the crisis.
Professor Aktar pointed to both danger and paradox. While populist and authoritarian leaders draw significant mass support, their rise reveals the gap between freedom and democracy. He recalled Professor Mabel Berezin’s warning that invocations of “freedom” are often decoupled from democratic commitments, enabling libertarian and extremist actors to weaponize speech through digital platforms. At the same time, freedom of expression is selectively curtailed, as seen in the suppression of voices denouncing atrocities such as the Gaza genocide.
Ultimately, Professor Aktar concluded that the world is entering an especially perilous period marked by democratic erosion, mass manipulation, and authoritarian resilience. In this context, he stressed the vital role of intellectual gatherings like this one, noting that the ECPS will likely need to convene further forums to analyze and resist these trends. His remarks closed the session on a sober but mobilizing note: intellectuals, activists, and citizens alike must remain vigilant and engaged in defense of democracy.
Overall Conclusion
The ECPS panel “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding” offered a sobering yet clarifying examination of the forces eroding democracy across the globe. What emerged most clearly is that populism today cannot be dismissed as a passing style of politics or a democratic “correction.” Rather, it increasingly serves as a vehicle for authoritarian entrenchment, exploiting institutions, culture, religion, and technology in ways that carry fascistic echoes.
Professor Mabel Berezin’s analysis highlighted the transformation of US populism into what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a strategy less reliant on militias than on legal, cultural, and intellectual frameworks that dismantle democracy from within. Professor Steven Friedman dismantled the illusion of a pristine democratic past, reminding us that Western models themselves are faltering, especially when they ignore the power of corporate interests and the structural exclusions on which they rest.
Professor Julie Ingersoll exposed the convergence of Christian dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal-charismatics, and techno-utopians into a shared anti-democratic coalition—an unlikely but potent fusion united by hostility to pluralism and democracy. Professor Richard Falk placed these developments in global perspective, underscoring the hypocrisy of US democracy promotion, the corrosive effects of secrecy and capitalism, and the urgent need for emancipatory politics grounded in truth-telling and ecological survival. Finally, Professor Larry Diamond warned of deliberate authoritarian projects in the United States, modeled on Orbán and Erdoğan, that weaponize law, gerrymandering, media capture, and even the military to consolidate power.
The Q&A deepened these concerns, particularly around the militarization of politics under Trump and the fragility of democratic reversals. The possibility of deploying the National Guard for electoral interference, as Professor Diamond relayed, illustrates how quickly democratic norms can collapse.
Moderator Cengiz Aktar closed with a stark reminder: the global zeitgeist has shifted. We are no longer asking how to build democracy but how to prevent its collapse. The panelists converged on a central responsibility—that intellectuals must resist euphemism, call authoritarianism and fascism by their names, and provide frameworks that clarify rather than obscure. In an era marked by disinformation, selective freedoms, and systemic crisis, clarity itself becomes a democratic act.
The challenge, then, is twofold: to defend democracy where it still exists and to reimagine it in forms capable of confronting the structural inequalities, ecological perils, and authoritarian tactics of our age.
In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.
In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.
Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.
Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.
The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.
Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.
Dr. Cengiz Aktar (An Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens).
Speakers
“Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe,” by Dr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University).
“Democracy for all: Rethinking a Failed Model,” byDr. Steven Friedman(Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg).
“That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US,” by Dr. Julie Ingersoll(Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida).
“Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time,” by Dr. Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University).
“Combatting Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Larry Diamond(Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens and a former UN director specializing in asylum policies. A leading advocate of Turkey’s EU integration, he has been active in major civil initiatives, including Istanbul’s European Capital of Culture bid and the “European Movement 2002.” His research focuses on EU integration, refugee law, political centralism, and the politics of memory concerning ethnic and religious minorities.
Speakers
Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe
Dr. Mabel Berezin is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University. A comparative sociologist, her work examines challenges to democracy, nationalism, and populism in Europe and the United States. She is the author of Making the Fascist Self, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, and co-editor of Europe without Borders. Her forthcoming book, The End of Security and the Rise of Populism (Oxford University Press), explores the global resurgence of nationalism and its implications for democratic practice.
Abstract: Democratic backsliding in its various authoritarian forms is a global phenomenon that demands a response in the academy and beyond. This talk will argue that the threat to democracy varies depending on national context and the struggle to overcome these threats will depend on specific political histories.
Democracy For All: Rethinking a Failed Model
Dr. Steven Friedman is Research Professor in the Humanities Faculty at the University of Johannesburg. A political scientist, he has written extensively on South Africa’s transition to democracy and more recently on the relationship between democracy, inequality, and economic growth. He is the author of numerous books and articles on democratic theory and practice and writes Against the Tide, a weekly column in Business Day on current political trends.
Abstract: I will argue that democracy is currently threatened because the model of democracy which has reigned over the past three decades has made the current backlash against it inevitable. While the model has, rightly, insisted on the need for citizens to hold public power to account, it has ignored the need to do the same to private power. This has handed excessive power to the wealthy and has left citizens at their mercy. While proclaiming democracy as a universal system which enables all human beings to exercise choice, it associates democracy with Western-ness. This has weakened its appeal outside the West and left it unable to cope with racial and religious diversity within it. The solution is a democracy which recognises the need to restrain private and public power and is unabashedly universal.
That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US
Dr. Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida. She is a foremost scholar of Christian Reconstructionism, a 20th century movement that underpins much of today’s Chrisitan Nationalism. She is author of Building God’s Kingdom: inside the world of Christian Reconstruction and Evangelical Christian Women:: war stories on the Gender Battles. She has written broadly on religion and politics, religion and violence and related topics.
Abstract: I’ll discuss how seemingly contradictory social movements (both “religious” and “secular” share immediate, earthly concerns, values, and perspectives that have brought them together in the US despite their differences. As factions they have been dismissed as “fringe” groups, but I’ll show why what they share matters more than their differences, and how combined they’ve become a profound threat to democracy.
Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time
Dr. Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and former Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. A leading scholar of international law and global governance, he has served on the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and on the editorial boards of The Nation and The Progressive. He is also Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
Abstract: I will explain briefly why authoritarianism has flourished, and seems trending toward fascism in many parts of the world. My main attempt will be to argue that an emancipatory political future for the Global West seems ‘impossible,’ but that the impossible happens (e.g. Mandela release, Soviet collapse, Arab Spring) and the future unknowable, making it rational for those of democratic and progressive inclination to struggle for what they believe. The alternative of silence in the face of evil in such a convulsive period is as Gramsci put is to nourish ‘monsters.’ I want to insist that at such historical and political crisis ‘angels’ can also emerge.
Combatting Authoritarian Populism
Dr. Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where he leads programs on global democracy, Arab reform, and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. He is founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and a senior consultant at the National Endowment for Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends, challenges, and reforms worldwide. His most recent book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, examines threats to liberal democracy and strategies to defend it.
Abstract: This talk will explain how and why authoritarian populists gain power and seek to expand it to erode or destroy democracy, and how democratic forces can resist this project.
Please cite as: Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118
Abstract
Since January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests against the governments’ plan to restrict the power of the Supreme Court. The government, a coalition between the Likud’s populist party, the Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right announced a legislation package threatening Israel’s institutions’ -limited- liberal constitutionalism, opening the possibility of authoritarianism. Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse, it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
In January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations against the government’s reform plan depicted as a threat to democracy. The government, a coalition between the Likud, Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right parties, one hitherto excluded from coalitions, introduced a legislation package that would, according to its opponents, undermine Israel’s democratic institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, and open the way for authoritarianism. The protestors, who took to the streets in the name of liberal democracy, compared the developments in Israel to those in Hungary and Poland, argued that the government plan would not only undermine Israel’s [already limited] democracy but also threaten civil rights, freedom and gender equality. Not only the threat of authoritarianism but also the potential transformation into a theocracy evoked the protests. Coalition agreements and proposed laws, advocated by the religious parties, would, once legislated, it was argued, undermine secular, LGBTQ+, and women’s rights. The protest involved not only large-scale demonstrations for months, but also roadblocks, economic boycotts, appeals to international leaders and media, and even declarations of army reservists they would not report to duty if the proposed legislation would be completed as planned.
Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
It is impossible to predict whether authoritarianism was curbed, even more so in light of the war in Gaza after Hamas attack in October 2023. Rather, our purpose is more modest, to highlight the inconsistencies within right-wing populism that enable opposition and potentially prevent authoritarianism based on the experience from Israel. Accordingly, we ask, first, looking beyond instrumental benefits, what explains the formation of a coalition between different expressions of radical right and religious fundamentalism? Second, how the anti-liberal and anti-democratic trends and commitment to religious ideas and identities combine and contrast in the government’s plan? And third, how have the anti-liberal and anti-democratic threat of Israeli right-wing populism enabled the opposition?
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.
The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”
These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”
Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”
At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.
Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.
And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.
In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.
In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.
Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.
Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.
The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.
Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Autocrats Still Crave Elections but Tilt the Playing Field
Nested dolls depicting world autocrats Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan on the counter of souvenirs in Moscow
Thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent writings, you stress the fragility of checks against authoritarian drift and note how today’s rulers “raise the cost” for defenders by targeting courts, media, and NGOs. What, in your view, makes this current wave of populist-fueled democratic backsliding distinct from earlier authoritarian surges, particularly in the subtler tactics of regulation, funding, and legal harassment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure it’s completely unique, but clearly autocrats are learning from each other. The current wave is characterized foremost by what you might call electoral authoritarianism. That is, autocratic leaders who still want the legitimacy of an election but use the steps of the autocrat’s handbook to undercut checks and balances on their authority and to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor.
It’s pretty straightforward what they do: they target the various potential checks on their authority—courts, lawyers, journalists, academics, civil society—and use different techniques to undermine their independence. With the media, for example, outlets may be owned by large corporate conglomerates vulnerable to government pressure. We’re seeing that in the United States right now. It could also take the form of regulations that make it harder for civil society to secure funding, particularly from abroad. Sometimes it’s direct attacks, such as withholding funding, which we’re now seeing Trump do with universities.
These are variations on a theme, but the aim is always the same: to stymie and weaken the elements that sustain democracy. Because democracy is not just about elections. It is about the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rule of law that holds leaders accountable to the law and to the rights it embodies. And these autocrats are intent on undercutting those checks. It’s pretty clear.
Coalitions of Democracies Can Overcome Superpower Opposition
You have argued that coalitions of mid-sized states—beyond the West—can sometimes defend human rights more effectively than major powers, urging leverage toward countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and even China. Two decades on, do you still see these “plural centers of pressure” as the backbone of rights defense, or has today’s fractured multilateralism, intensified authoritarian entrenchment, and the rise of populist geopolitics blunted that strategy—and what would an updated map of leverage look like?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I wouldn’t say that coalitions are better than the major powers, but that they can serve as substitutes when the major powers stand in opposition. At this stage, when the US government has essentially stopped promoting human rights, I don’t think we should just throw in the cards and give up. There have been many cases in the past where coalitions of governments have compensated for the absence—or even the opposition—of the US government, not to mention the Soviet or Russian government, or the Chinese government. I describe this in my book Riding Wrongs, where repeatedly, coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting governments, when banded together, have had the moral authority to overcome superpower opposition.
That’s what happened with the treaty to ban landmines. All the major powers opposed it, yet a group of about 60 governments—a coalition that Human Rights Watch and our colleagues helped to build—overcame that opposition. We ended up sharing the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort. Something very similar occurred with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). You may recall the Clinton administration was adamantly opposed to a court that could even theoretically prosecute an American. That was not its idea of justice. Yet in the final vote in Rome in 1998, the US lost overwhelmingly—120 to 7—marking a decisive victory for the rule of law.
More recently, as I describe in my book, despite a lack of any assistance, if not outright opposition, from Washington, a group of governments led by the Netherlands secured oversight from the UN Human Rights Council of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing in Yemen—making a huge difference in terms of saving civilian lives. Another coalition, involving Germany, France, and Turkey, pressured Putin in March 2020 to stop bombing the three million civilians in Idlib province in Syria, the last area at the time held by the armed opposition.
These are just a few among many examples showing how coalitions of governments can effectively defend human rights—not only without Washington, but often despite its opposition.
NGOs Must Be Principled—Apply the Same Standards to All
Since major powers like the US, Russia, and China routinely instrumentalize human rights for geopolitical ends, how should NGOs and the broader rights community rethink their strategy—balancing naming-and-shaming with ally-seeking—while avoiding the slide from principled engagement into complicity in populist or authoritarian projects?
Professor Kenneth Roth: The idea that governments instrumentalize human rights is nothing new. This has always happened. If you just go back historically, there was a tendency during the Cold War to highlight the human rights abuses of one’s opponents and neglect the human rights abuses of one’s allies. So, this has always been a problem. I think the role that NGOs should play is to be principled. That is to say, to ensure that our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe, but that we apply the same standards to everybody. That enhances the capacity to shame, because people understand that when human rights groups condemn somebody, when we spotlight a government’s abuse, we’re not pursuing some geopolitical strategy. We are pursuing a universal, principled effort.
Now, shaming is never the only thing that human rights groups do. We also enlist influential allies to try to put diplomatic or economic pressure on a target government, and I describe this in my book. These are important supplements to the process of shaming.
The fact that governments are selective in their defense of human rights does undermine their credibility, but doesn’t preclude our ability to enlist them, because frankly, nobody is consistent. So, we try to enlist allies where we can, push them to be more principled. But we don’t have a rule that you’ve got to be perfect before we enlist you, because then we’d enlist nobody. We’ve got to be a bit more pragmatic than that and try to maximize pressure on a target government from any credible source that we can find.
This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.
Trump’s open admiration for autocrats such as Putin, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Netanyahu blurs distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism, while also resonating with a global populist style that treats rights as obstacles to “the people’s will.” To what extent has Trump shifted the normative boundaries of US foreign policy on human rights, and what does this mean for the wider contest between populism and rights-based democracy?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, I would not say that Trump is blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. He’s simply embracing authoritarianism. I don’t think anybody believes that because Trump embraces Putin, suddenly Putin is a democrat. That’s absurd. Trump, as an aspiring autocrat, admires leaders who have managed to secure autocratic power for themselves. That’s what he does. And we obviously have to push back against that.
This is a bad period for US foreign policy, but it’s not the first time we’ve seen something like this. Think back to the George W. Bush administration, when the so-called global war on terrorism became an excuse not only to support abusive governments but also to engage in severe human rights abuses by the US government itself—systematic torture and the use of Guantanamo for endless detention without trial.
We have seen this flouting, this unwillingness to abide by human rights standards emanating from Washington before. Our job in the human rights movement is to spotlight complicity in human rights violations, or responsibility for them, when the government behaves inconsistently, and to push for it to be even slightly less inconsistent. Fortunately, the American people—and I think this is also true globally—want a more consistent human rights policy.
That’s why spotlighting inconsistency is valuable, because it forces leaders like Trump to pay a political price. When he is seen as aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza, we can already see the effect on US public opinion. People are turning against Israel; they are upset with the unconditional US support for Israel. We’ve seen Trump react to that somewhat already—not sufficiently—but this effort is worthwhile. Ultimately, this is how we can pressure Trump to do the one thing that would end the genocide: suspend or condition massive US arms sales and military aid to Israel until the genocide stops.
Rulings Mean Little Without Government Backing
You’ve argued that “democracy” without rights is easily gamed by “despots masquerading as democrats.” After the ICJ advisory opinion(s) and an emboldened ICC, can international courts still constrain leaders amid intensified lawfare and sanctions against judges/prosecutors? What insulating reforms (treaty, funding, travel protections) matter most?
Professor Kenneth Roth: There’s a lot in that question, so let me try to dissect it a bit. First, when despots masquerade as democrats, it means they still hold periodic elections, but they tilt the playing field so much that the elections become meaningless. This can be a dangerous endeavor. Take Viktor Orban in Hungary or Erdogan in Turkey: they are classic autocrats who still hold competitive elections but with very severe limitations. Orban today faces a serious challenger in Peter Magyar, who is charismatic and has united the opposition. It may not work for him. Erdogan went so far as to lock up his main opponent because, according to the polls, that opponent was going to win. His party had already won the major mayoral elections in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and elsewhere. The more an autocrat moves toward a zombie election—that is, one with zero credibility—the more they lose the very legitimacy they seek. That’s what Daniel Ortega did in Nicaragua, Museveni in Uganda, Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. They hold electoral charades, but no one is fooled, and they simply become dictators.
I don’t view international courts as particularly effective against these kinds of autocratic attacks on democracy. The courts are more useful in addressing mass atrocities. For example, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) entering the fray in Gaza, and with the ICC charging Putin and four generals for Ukraine, these are important efforts. They may someday lead to actual trials in The Hague. Even short of that, they are incredibly stigmatizing. They mean that these leaders cannot travel to the 125 ICC member states without risking arrest.
Of course, an ICJ judgment or an ICC arrest warrant does not self-execute. They don’t automatically constrain leaders because these Hague-based courts don’t have police forces; they depend on governments for enforcement. That’s always a problem. So, we need governments that claim to uphold the rule of law to act consistently with these rulings. Take the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s endless occupation: governments should now ensure they do nothing to support that occupation. On the ICC, Trump outrageously imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputies, and six judges. It’s important, particularly for the European Union, to use its so-called blocking statute to neutralize those sanctions so that judges and prosecutors can continue to access their bank funds and operate normally.
I would also encourage the prosecutor to examine whether this constitutes obstruction of justice—a violation of Article 70 of the Rome Statute—which I think it clearly does. One option would be to actually charge Trump for this blatant interference with an independent institution of justice. So, there is plenty that still can be done, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves into thinking that international courts, simply by issuing rulings, automatically change the world. They need the backing of governments.
Being a Drug Trafficker Doesn’t Make You a Combatant
In critiquing Trump’s extrajudicial killings of Venezuelan traffickers, you warned of the drift from policing to “war” rules in law enforcement. If such precedents take hold—turning metaphorical wars on drugs or terror into literal grounds for lethal force—what global spillovers do you foresee, and what bright-line doctrines should civil society insist on to prevent their entrenchment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, let me explain the two sets of rules that govern the use of lethal force. In war, you’re allowed to shoot combatants on the other side, and unless they’re surrendering or injured and thus out of combat, you can shoot to kill. There is no duty to detain them. By contrast, in law enforcement situations, it’s almost the opposite: lethal force can be used only as a last resort to meet an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. It is an extremely limited use of lethal force; otherwise, the duty is to arrest and prosecute.
Now, Trump has ignored that distinction. He has declared Venezuelan suspected drug traffickers—people we have no real knowledge about—and has, in three separate incidents, blown up boats and killed those on board, simply on the claim that they were traffickers. But being a drug trafficker does not make you a combatant. There is no war, no armed conflict here. If you believe Trump’s account, these people were committing crimes and should have been arrested and prosecuted. The US Coast Guard is fully capable of interdicting these boats, detaining the suspects, bringing them to Miami or elsewhere, and prosecuting them.
Trump is disregarding the strict law enforcement rules on lethal force by declaring this a “war,” and therefore claiming the right to shoot to kill. That is an incredibly dangerous precedent, because he could label anyone a combatant or terrorist—terms he wrongly uses interchangeably. But even terrorists are criminals who must be prosecuted, not summarily executed. We have to be very careful here, because what’s to stop him from declaring a war on civil society or a war on the political opposition and then justifying killings on that basis?
This is a very dangerous precedent. Even though drug traffickers are unpopular, it is essential to start with the principle: even if they are suspected traffickers, they should not simply be blown up. They have the right to be detained, charged, and prosecuted if the administration’s claims are true. That is why it is crucial not to let metaphorical wars on drugs or terrorism be transformed into literal wars that substitute the narrow rules on lethal force in law enforcement with the much more permissive rules governing armed conflict—which this clearly is not.
How Populist Autocrats Weaponize Minorities to Mask Their Failures
Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve tracked how strongman admiration and majoritarian claims corrode protections for minorities and migrants. Has Trump’s second term normalized an executive theory of unfettered discretion that will outlast him in US foreign policy—and how should allies signal costs early to deter that stickiness?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you’re suggesting in your question, populist autocrats frequently rally support by demonizing some unpopular minority in their country. It could be immigrants, LGBT people, or Muslims—it varies from country to country. It is very important to push back against this. Typically, they resort to such tactics to divert attention from their lack of a political program that could actually address the economic and political needs of their base. Usually, their base is the ethnic majority working class.
When you see leaders demonizing immigrants or LGBT people, you can almost be certain there is no serious program to help the working class. Trump is a perfect example. He loves to demonize immigrants. Then he puts forward a massive economic plan that cuts taxes for his cronies while eliminating healthcare for many who need it. This doesn’t help the working class—it decimates it.
It’s important to expose this sleight of hand—the use of scapegoating unpopular minorities to distract from harmful economic policies. So, what’s the best way to push back? First and foremost, by defending the rights of these minorities. We cannot pretend that an attack on one unpopular group will stop there. In fact, I often view attacks on LGBT people as the canary in the coal mine for broader assaults on civil society. Those almost always follow.
We need to recognize the path populist autocrats are taking and nip it in the bud. We cannot ignore the early stages just because the victims are unpopular. This is a well-trodden path, and it must be stopped at the outset.
Countering Trump’s Flood-the-Zone Strategy
You’ve described Trump’s “flood-the-zone” strategy—overwhelming opponents and institutions with constant shocks—as a hallmark of autocratic playbooks. From the resistance you’ve observed, what lessons proved transferable to other democracies under stress, and which were context-specific wins?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure that Trump’s flood-the-zone strategy is typical. It’s pretty unique to Trump. It especially characterized his first few months in this second term, when there was one outrage after another, day after day, and people were so busy responding to yesterday’s crisis that they didn’t know where to start with today’s. Now it has slowed down a bit, but he continues to use the tactic—finding some new provocation every few days to divert attention from what he had already done.
The key for the targets of these efforts is not to let themselves be overwhelmed but to band together and coordinate their defense. We didn’t always see that in the United States. For example, certain universities, like Columbia, cut deals with the Trump administration, while others have since taken a more principled stand and joined forces. Some big law firms also cut deals, while others chose to fight back in court—and are now winning. Trump has also turned his threats toward civil society, but here too, many large progressive private foundations have banded together, issuing a joint statement declaring that they will not be divided and will fight back collectively.
That kind of collective response—the refusal to let Trump pick off opponents one at a time, as he has done with certain media outlets—is essential. When a powerful government can target one victim at a time, the victims usually lose. But when it faces a coordinated defense, the chances of success rise significantly.
When Sovereignty Becomes Impunity
The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s sanctions on the ICC—aimed at blocking investigations of Israel and US officials—highlight how powerful states can obstruct accountability through jurisdictional caveats and intimidation. What does this precedent mean for the enforceability of international criminal law, and what enforcement pathways remain viable to safeguard prosecutorial independence?
Professor Kenneth Roth: When you say jurisdictional caveats, I think what you’re referring to is that the Trump administration, like the US government for much of the last 20-plus years, has objected to the International Criminal Court’s so-called territorial jurisdiction. That is, the court can prosecute anybody who commits a crime on the territory of a member state. Going back to the Clinton administration, the US government hated that because it meant that American military personnel could theoretically be prosecuted if they committed a crime on the territory of a member state. That’s why the US government was so outraged, in the first Trump administration, when the ICC opened an investigation into Afghanistan—because there was fear that Bush-era torturers, many of whose worst crimes were committed there, might be subject to prosecution. Now, that turned out to be more of a theoretical concern, but that’s the territorial jurisdiction the US government has always objected to.
Ironically, when that same territorial jurisdiction was used by the ICC to charge Putin for crimes committed in Ukraine, everything changed. Biden called it justified. Lindsey Graham, the leading Republican senator who had always opposed the ICC, suddenly said, “I’ve changed my mind, we support the ICC now.” He even pushed through a unanimous resolution, and the Senate upheld what the ICC had done. That remained the case until that same territorial jurisdiction was used to charge Netanyahu for crimes committed in Gaza, in Palestine—a member state. Then suddenly it was back to outrage. The US position has been utterly unprincipled. Fortunately, nobody else accepts that. As I mentioned, the US lost its efforts to block territorial jurisdiction in Rome at the outset by a vote of 120 to 7. This is a losing proposition, and the key is for the 125 member states to reaffirm their support for territorial jurisdiction.
Of course, a state should be able to say, in a time of crisis, if our courts are not working—if we can’t prosecute people who commit crimes on our territory ourselves—we should be able to delegate that power to the ICC. That should be an inherent aspect of sovereignty. For the US to say, “Oh, well, because we’re American, we can commit a crime on your territory with impunity”—that’s crazy. If I, as an American citizen, were to go to Brussels and murder somebody, is it an affront to American sovereignty if Belgium prosecutes me? Obviously not. So why would it be an affront to American sovereignty if, under extreme circumstances, Belgium delegates that prosecutorial power to the ICC? This is normal. But the US insists on American exceptionalism when it comes to the rule of law. Nobody buys that, and governments should find ways to push back.
The Vanity Lever: Using Trump’s Ego to Pressure for Human Rights
You’ve suggested Trump’s transactional ego—the “vanity lever”—can sometimes be used to pressure him on rights. How realistic is it to constrain authoritarian choices through vanity appeals, and where should we draw the ethical line between pragmatism and entrenching cynical politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: What I’ve written about is that if you approach Trump frontally and say, support human rights, he’ll probably look at you and say, what are those? This is not a guy who is going to openly support human rights. But, as I describe in my book, the process of shaming always has to look at the target and figure out what they care about. In Trump’s case, what he cares about is his self-declared reputation as a master negotiator. In his book The Art of the Deal, he defines what he thinks is great about himself.
That gives us some leverage. For one, he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. Fine—you’re not going to get a Nobel Peace Prize by endorsing the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. You’ll get the Nobel Peace Prize by actually securing a just peace, including recognition of a Palestinian state. Another effective strategy is to spotlight how Putin in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Gaza are actually bamboozling Trump. They’re manipulating him, they’re playing games with this supposed master negotiator, and Trump looks naive.
He hates that. This is a guy with a fragile ego who doesn’t like criticism. If people are laughing at him, ridicule is horrible when you’re an autocrat. So, I think that provides an opportunity. We’re already seeing some movement by Trump in Ukraine. He has not yet imposed the so-called severe consequences he promised if Putin continues to obstruct ceasefire negotiations, but his rhetoric has become somewhat tougher. In the case of Gaza, we also see Trump distancing himself in certain ways from Netanyahu—for example, rejecting Netanyahu’s false claim that there is no starvation in Gaza, criticizing him for attacking the Hamas negotiators in Qatar, and twice imposing temporary ceasefires.
So, there is some distance there. I think we just need to keep pushing, with the aim of getting Trump to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I don’t think that’s cynical—it’s simply pragmatic. If that’s what it takes to stop mass atrocities, I’ll do it.
When Ethnic Cleansing Becomes a Defense to Genocide
Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve argued that Israel’s actions in Gaza meet the Genocide Convention through killings and life-destroying conditions, even alongside ethnic-cleansing motives. How do you answer critics who say genocidal intent is unproven, and what evidence most strongly supports its inference under current ICJ standards?
Professor Kenneth Roth: If you look at either the extent of the killing or the imposition of conditions of life designed to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or national group, what’s going on in Gaza is clearly genocide. At this point, the clearest example is the imposition of mass starvation, mass deprivation, and the wholesale destruction—today of Gaza City, but overall of all Gaza. The aim, quite clearly, is to make Gaza unlivable so that it becomes “humane” to then force everybody out into Egypt. The ultimate aim here is ethnic cleansing, a supposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by getting rid of the Palestinians—first in Gaza, and then later in the occupied West Bank. That’s clearly what’s going on.
The only real challenge here—you mentioned the International Court of Justice standards—is that the court ruled in the Croatia v. Serbia case more than a decade ago that if you are going to infer genocidal intent from conduct, it has to be the only possible inference. I think that’s a wrong standard. They are going to have to re-examine it, because in effect what they have said is that the motive of ethnic cleansing becomes a defense to genocide, which makes no sense. To prove genocidal intent, the standard should be absolute: are you clearly demonstrating genocidal intent? The fact that there may be a mixed motive—that there may be genocide in the service of something else—is often how genocide takes place.
So, I do think the ICJ will have to revisit its standards. It will have an opportunity in the Gambia v. Myanmar case concerning the Rohingya, where something very similar occurred. The Myanmar army killed, say, 10,000 Rohingya in order to force 730,000 to flee into Bangladesh. That was genocide as a means to mass ethnic cleansing. I hope the court uses that case, which will come first, to re-examine its standards, to find that the conduct does permit an inference of genocidal intent. That would then also apply positively to the case of Gaza.
Criticism of Israel Is Not Antisemitism
Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve warned that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism both silences accountability and weakens real protections for Jews. What are the dangers of this conflation, and what concrete standards can help distinguish legitimate criticism from antisemitic incitement without suppressing dissent?
Professor Kenneth Roth: That’s an important question. Let me begin by saying that the problem of antisemitism is an acute one today facing Jews around the world, and it has become much more intense since October 7, 2023. So, this is a genuine problem. But what we’ve seen is that Netanyahu, the Israeli government, and some of its supporters are using charges of antisemitism to try to silence criticism of Israel’s genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza.
That’s a very cynical move, because it cheapens a concept that is badly needed. If people come to see claims of antisemitism as just an effort to change the subject and defend Israel’s inexcusable conduct in Gaza, they will become cynical about antisemitism at the very moment we need it to remain a viable concept. In effect, what Netanyahu and his supporters are doing is sacrificing Jews around the world for the benefit of the Israeli government. They’re basically saying: we’re going to throw Jews worldwide under the bus. Who cares if you face antisemitism? Who cares if we’re cheapening the concept? All we care about is defending the Israeli government. That’s a horrible thing to do—but that, in essence, is what the Netanyahu government is doing.
Now, are there standards on antisemitism? Yes. The standard that legitimizes this cynical approach is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The way it’s been interpreted has lent itself to saying that criticism of Israel, or efforts to demonize Israel, are somehow antisemitic.
There are two far superior definitions of antisemitism: the Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document. The reason they are superior is that they make explicit that mere criticism of Israeli misconduct is not antisemitic. They define antisemitism in positive terms similarly, but they also include negative examples to make clear that antisemitism should never be weaponized to shield Israeli misconduct.
So, if the concern is truly antisemitism, people should adopt the Jerusalem Declaration or the Nexus Document. But if the concern is simply defending Israel while throwing Jews around the world to their fate, then go with the IHRA definition.
“Never Again” Means Never Again for All
You argue that Israel’s invocation of “never again” and its Holocaust halo have been weaponized to justify present atrocities. How has this complicated recognition of genocidal conduct, and how can we honor historical victimhood without letting it serve as a blank check—while restoring legal clarity around proportionality and civilian protection?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you suggest, the Israeli government, much like the Rwandan government, cites the Holocaust for Jews and the Rwandan genocide to suggest that the current government is somehow above it all. The logic is: how could the victims of genocide, in turn, commit mass atrocities? Obviously, that’s illogical, but they use the argument implicitly to try to defend the indefensible.
For me, “never again” doesn’t mean never again except for Israel, never again except for Rwanda. It means never again for anybody. Part of the advantage the Israeli government has is that when people think about genocide, they tend to focus on the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, where the aim, after a certain point, was to kill every Jew or every Tutsi that could be found.
But if you read the Genocide Convention—the treaty that defines genocide and that many governments have ratified—genocide can be aimed at destroying a group in whole, as in the Holocaust or Rwanda, or in part. This is where the Holocaust and Rwandan examples can mislead, because it is also genocide if you target part of a group, either for killing or through conditions of life that bring about their partial destruction. That is what defines Gaza today. The Israeli government is not trying to kill every single Palestinian. But it is trying to kill enough Palestinians and deprive them with enough severity that they are forced to flee into Egypt. Genocide with an intent to destroy a group in part is what’s really going on here. The Holocaust leads us astray because that’s not what it was about. So, we need to read the Genocide Convention as written and recognize that the Holocaust alone does not define genocide. There are other forms—such as the one playing out in Gaza today.
Past Genocides Do Not Justify Present Atrocities
And lastly, you’ve drawn parallels between Kagame’s Rwanda and Netanyahu’s Israel in weaponizing past victimhood to justify present crimes. How can the human rights community dismantle such narratives without denying past genocides, and which accountability tools—aid conditionality, arms suspensions, or regional pressure—have proven most effective against such impunity politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As I mentioned, both Netanyahu and Kagame play on past genocide to divert attention from their current mass atrocities—Netanyahu in Gaza, and Kagame through both his repression at home and, most acutely, his invasion of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through his own forces as well as the proxy M23 rebel group.
The goal of the human rights community is obviously not to deny the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These are facts, these are horrific episodes in human history. But the point is to say: “Yes, they happened, but they don’t excuse present abuses.” So, we have to carefully document what’s happening in Congo and in Gaza and press for real pressure to stop it.
That pressure can and should include economic measures. Sadly, the European Union—while many of its members are recognizing a Palestinian state—has yet to suspend Israel’s trade benefits, despite vows from Commission President von der Leyen to do so soon. In eastern Congo, back in 2012, a similar Rwandan invasion via the M23 was stopped in its tracks when the US and British governments told Kagame they would cut off aid unless he withdrew. Within days, the M23 crumbled. Today, that isn’t happening. Trump cut a deal allowing Rwanda to stay and exploit the minerals.
So, we need to look at what has worked in the past, namely intense economic pressure. I would like to see the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which has already acted in part in Gaza—do much more and also extend its action to eastern Congo. It has done so in the past, but not with respect to this current invasion. Plenty of steps remain available to help rein in Kagame and Netanyahu and to stop their misuse of past atrocities as an excuse for committing new ones today.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.
The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”
These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”
Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”
At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.
Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.
And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.
Professor Dinesh Paudel is a Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dinesh Paudel, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Elite Failure, Geopolitics, and Youth Anger Collide
Professor Dinesh Paudel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts describe the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution, yet youth mobilization in Nepal has a long genealogy. From your perspective, what specific social, economic, and political configurations enabled this generation to rupture the cycle of elite reproduction where earlier movements failed—and how do corruption, nepotism, and entrenched elite dominance fit into the deeper structural drivers that made such an eruption possible now?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Thank you for this great question. It’s long overdue. It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time. But the current conjuncture has multiple factors coming together, leading to this eruption.
One factor is the internal political dynamics within the parties. They were not able to understand the new generation’s aspirations. They also failed to govern in a way that allowed the young generation to see themselves in politics and in the future of the nation. That’s one of the main factors—the internal failure of the party system. The internal conjuncture of power dynamics ruptured.
The second important point is geopolitical tension. It is about how the government was overthrown and how the young population began mobilizing their force. It was carried away by other interests, creating a kind of popular imagination of revolution. But in reality, multiple bigger powers were trying to secure their interests in a country that is geopolitically strategic—physically between China and India, at the center of the Himalaya, and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West. India’s relationship with the West is not in the best shape at the moment. Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, and many people anticipated this.
The third point concerns India specifically, which was not happy with the government in Nepal. This discontent started with the promulgation of the constitution 10 years ago. India never wanted Nepal to have that constitution, but the issue escalated when the constitution included part of historical Nepal now controlled by India. Including this in the constitution angered India further.
The fourth point is social media, amplified by intellectual and journalistic voices, which propagated negative perceptions of the governing system. They presented things as not working, and this negativity grew steadily. It spread among the general public, particularly through youth on social media, fostering the belief that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that “something else” was never really thought through.
Finally, development programs, NGOs, and modern aspirations led the public to believe they deserved development in a new way. But this remains controlled by an extremely dependent economic system. A very few elites—primarily Indian, some Chinese, and others—control it. The Nepali market is essentially the Indian market. The production system is crumbling, and deindustrialization has been ongoing for many years. This has produced a particular corporate culture that dominates politics, media, intellectual life, and more. It is a system that fostered extraordinary dependence, out-migration, exploitation, and inequality, particularly between rural and urban areas. All of that came together in a moment when people just burst into action.
But the impact resulted not only from the protests. Other interests also infiltrated and pushed the movement further. That’s the current situation. Basically, it reflects the failure of the political regime to institutionalize its agenda, but it has also been pushed by geopolitical forces seeking to destabilize Nepal and secure a stronger footing in the country.
Nepal’s Youth Caught in a Triple Disjuncture
Nepal’s youth today confront what might be called a triple disjuncture: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. How do these dynamics intersect to produce a new political subjectivity that resists both elite capture and authoritarian closure? In particular, how have structural forces such as economic inequality, chronic youth unemployment, and the dependence on migration shaped the political consciousness and mobilizing capacity of Gen Z in Nepal?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Very good question, and this is exactly that conjuncture of multiple forces you mentioned that resulted in a particular type of economic precarity. Especially young people’s aspiration was to become economically successful, but the opportunities to do so were really decimated. But you cannot just blame the current political structure. You have to go back almost 30 years to understand what produced this. As soon as Nepal entered multi-party democracy in 1990, the government was forced to adopt an open market economy in such a way that the industrial sector basically collapsed in front of Indian and Chinese industrial and corporate power. That led to massive closures of national industries. The frustration from that also fueled the Maoist Revolution, which started in 1996. The Maoist movement, lasting for 10 years, led to massive out-migration from rural areas, while the open market economy that destroyed the national economy pushed people to migrate abroad.
So, Nepal lost two things: national productive capacity—the industrial base—and the labor force. That severely degraded national production. Over the last two and a half decades, this has produced massive unemployment, while national and international forces facilitated a process by which young people migrated to other countries. In effect, they wanted to solve the Maoist problem by exporting young people, so that they would not join the revolution. But then it became systematic: rural populations moved to urban areas, and from urban areas to other countries, primarily Gulf and Middle Eastern states, numbering in the millions. Nepal thus lost not only industrial capacity—in terms of organizing, owning, and mobilizing capital—but also massive labor power, which created a lack of farming in rural areas. In some places, more than 70% of land is uncultivated, which used to be farmed in the past, because there is no labor.
This kind of economic situation continues to create chronic problems for generating opportunities in the country. All of this has reinforced political patronage and historical feudalistic conditions within the party system. That, in turn, made young people extraordinarily frustrated. They were frustrated by the economic situation, frustrated by dependency, and frustrated because they could not realize their dream of being modern and advanced. At the same time, the political structure adopted a feudalistic culture in which young people could not find their space. All this is leading to deep frustration, and the danger is that it will create further problems, because there are no coherent responses. Sometimes I feel it could evolve into a kind of gang politics. I am worried, even though it has not yet reached that point. But if this kind of mob-based, violent politics continues, there is real danger. Yet it seems inevitable, because the political structure has not been able to manage, understand, and maintain its hegemonic order. In other words, this is a failure of elite hegemony.
Even though the elites created these conditions, they have also been unable to preserve the very hegemonic structure that favors them. As a result, ruptures have emerged. I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not. Rather, it forms part of a longer trajectory of revolutions. Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center. But those earlier uprisings were politically led, whereas this one is somewhat different. Still, I would not call it a revolution, because it will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions. Sometimes I describe it instead as a kind of development: a double situation in which the political structure generates upheaval, but the outcome also reinforces the same structure. It will not truly transform the system. That leaves youth aspirations blocked from finding another path. Judging from how events have unfolded so far, it will not reach a transformative point.
The Social Media Ban Was a Trigger, Not the Cause
The ban on social media is often cited as the immediate spark of revolt—yet should this be understood as a mere tactical blunder by Oli’s government, or rather as symptomatic of a deeper authoritarian reflex embedded within Nepal’s ruling elite?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The social media ban… you have to look at it from two perspectives. One is the aspiration of young people and how embedded they are in the social media structure. But at the same time, you have to look at it from the perspective of a smaller country. These social media and multinational companies do not want to recognize, for example, Nepali sovereignty. They do not want to register; they do not want to pay taxes. Even social media companies—Twitter, Yik Yak—officially said that Nepal is a corrupt country, so they cannot register or be taxed. That undermines national pride, nationalism, and everything. We need to understand the positionality of a smaller country. So, people think they must register. Why not? If they registered in India, then they should register in Nepal; it’s the same—a similar sovereignty situation. That’s one aspect of it.
But at that moment, the youth protest against corruption and the demand for good governance was already planned, and social media was used to organize those movements. So yes, it fueled the process, but it was not really the cause. The social media ban did not trigger it. Similar bans had happened in the past as well. They banned TikTok, and TikTok came back, registered, and now pays taxes to the country. But these other companies do not want to do that. Still, there is a Nepali psyche and intellectual understanding that Nepal’s sovereign rights must be respected. Young people support that too, actually. But deeply embedded, long-simmering social frustration, lack of employment, lack of good governance, and systematic corruption—it’s not just the political class, they are part of it. It’s the totality of the system that mobilizes all kinds of power nexuses in building corruption. That is what led to this frustration, and that was the culminating point, rather than it really being about authoritarianism tied to the social media ban.
People haven’t really looked at this. They use the word authoritarianism because they want to make a political point, but in fact, Nepal had been trying to get these companies to register for many years, and that process started long ago. Legislation was passed with 100% support in parliament one year ago, and the government called on these companies regularly to respect the law and comply. I don’t think it was an authoritarian attitude that led to the social media ban. Rather, the ban triggered other frustrations—that’s how I would put it.
Nepo-Babies Symbolize a Feudal Political Structure Still Dominant in Nepal
The viral outrage against “nepo-babies” seems to reveal a moral economy of resentment against elite entitlement. To what extent did the digital spectacle of political heirs flaunting luxury lifestyles crystallize diffuse frustrations into a new form of class politics—one mediated by resentment, spectacle, and digital culture, and distinct from the agrarian or proletarian struggles of earlier eras?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Right. This is a very fundamental part of it. The corrupt kind of system, this nepo-babies idea, is a good instrument to utilize—not only against politicians, but also other kinds of forma and everything. It really helps people understand how the feudal family structure mobilizes the political structure for its benefit. So, it’s real.
But at the same time, it is not really pervasive. Not every politician managed to make their kids that way. And the corruption in Nepal is actually maintained and regulated by a particular type of corporative capitalist—middlemen business structures that mobilize and consolidate power, creating nexuses. These nepo-babies are part of that; they are enrolled into those nexuses and act as mediators in negotiations through karopsana (patronage brokerage / political fixing in Nepalese) and everything.
So, in that sense, it’s a particular agenda in creating a certain kind of populism. “Nepo-babies” is a very easily sellable term. But there is also a reality: it symbolizes that the feudal political structure is still dominant in the country, and that really helps people to grasp it. However, there is a danger in this kind of new generation movement, because it is framed in generational rather than other forms of inequality. Class, gender, caste, and socialist structures are deeply embedded in South Asia and in Nepal. So, this generational framing risks undermining those other dimensions of inequality. That danger is emerging.
There are generational inequalities, yes, but the young generation in Nepal is often better off than the older generation, especially in rural areas. The subsistence farmers live very hard lives and are the ones doing the lowest-level jobs. By contrast, the young generation leading this movement lives better lives than many others. They are urban, educated, and from well-off families. They are not the everyday working people—those are the millions working abroad in the Middle East in factories.
My worry is that the inequality perpetuated in Nepal through pluralistic land structures and a pluralistic political and economic system requires deep class-based analysis, and this generational lens may obscure that. At the same time, there is an oligarchic attitude toward politics: “Okay, this is for me, next is my wife, then that.” This attitude is dominant. It’s not only in Nepal—it’s big in India, Bangladesh, and many other countries. The symptoms were already present in Nepal, too. This revolt has hit hard against that pattern and may disrupt it temporarily. But it will likely reconfigure within the elite structure, and regardless of which elites dominate, the elite-based political structure will continue unless there is massive restructuring of the economic system that maintains this power balance.
Without a national production system and without mobilizing substantial yields toward the national economy, this is not going to change. In Nepali, they call it Bicholia—basically brokers. It is a broker’s-rule political system. These brokers—traders, contractors, suppliers—are the ones who mobilize everything. Unless those structures are directly addressed and transformed, it will be difficult to imagine a different political and economic system emerging in Nepal or the region.
This also requires understanding at the regional level. It is not only Nepal—it is part of an open economic structure. The majority of traders are from India or other countries, with only local agents in Nepal, who manage the political structure from behind the curtain. One therefore needs to understand the local political dynamics and economic structures, but also their relation to regional systems. In that sense, I consider this a necessary, even natural, kind of revolt. But the optimism that it will lead to deeper restructuring of the country is, I think, very minimal.
Corruption in Nepal Is the Governing Logic of Elite Power
The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula
Corruption in Nepal is often framed as administrative weakness, but your work emphasizes its structural role in reproducing elite hegemony. How should we theorize corruption—not as deviation but as a governing logic—in post-monarchical Nepal? Do you see corruption in Nepal primarily as a symptom of weak institutions, or as an intentional system of elite reproduction and authoritarian consolidation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a great question. Corruption is deeply embedded, and I would say it mobilizes both kinds of structures. It reproduces elite dominance, and it’s one way of maintaining elite hegemony in the political-economic system. But it is also systematically introduced at every level of society and governance in such a way that it became a ladder for making political-economic progress, from the local to the national elites.
To understand corruption, we must also look at the massive development projects implemented over decades. Nepal was one of the priority countries for international—especially Western—actors to carry out such programs, along with international investments through banks, the World Bank, and others. Instead of focusing on national priorities, these actors pursued their petty geopolitical or other interests. They mobilized elites to implement their programs and, at every scale—from small to large—channeled resources so that they would have better access to contractors. They could harvest trees, collect sand, build roads, construct buildings, or procure everyday goods. In return, they would always provide some kind of commission—“okay, you do this, then I’ll offer you this.” These practices, sustained over decades, systematically developed an internal, informal institutional system that entrenched corruption in the country.
There are also checks and balances, of course. The public watched and pushed back—it was always there. But at the same time, even at the small municipal level, people, even minor officers, would not act without taking bribes. Over decades, corruption became normalized, and it took a long time for everyone to grasp the root causes. For me, corruption is a symptom of how the pluralistic political structure maintains itself, but it is also the result of the particular form of economic system introduced over the last 30 years—one that required sustaining political power structures through bribes and political payoffs. This allowed the larger corporate world to control the economic system and labor production, supplying laborers cheaply to other countries while selling whatever they wanted by shutting down Nepal’s national production system. Industries collapsed—they could not compete with others, or they were simply bought out.
So, corruption is not something that any politician can fix in Nepal. It requires a systematic overhaul—a restructuring at every level with the introduction of a national production system. Otherwise, it will remain deeply embedded in how the state functions every day, at every level. At the same time, there is widespread understanding among the public that corruption is a big problem and must be eliminated. Any slogan with an anti-corruption agenda will therefore gain strong political support from the public. But those who bring such agendas are themselves part of the same political structure; they are not separate from the economic and political system. For this reason, I do not see corruption disappearing soon, unless Nepal achieves economic independence and builds a self-reliant economic structure—which has now been overtaken by the corporate world and is no longer under Nepal’s control.
Populist Agendas in Nepal Will Not Dismantle the Elite Structure
In your work on ethnic identity politics, you demonstrate how elites instrumentalize social divisions to consolidate authority. Do you see a similar risk with today’s anti-nepotism and anti-corruption discourses—that they could be co-opted by authoritarian populists who reframe them as projects of “purification,” while ultimately reproducing exclusionary politics and elite dominance?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The answer is yes. The danger of populism is that populist agendas have always been propagated to maintain the elite structure. For me, I would consider this almost as a fight between elites. There is no rural poor people’s mobilization, and real thinking toward an egalitarian political structure is not there. So, populism in South Asia—like Hindu nationalism in India, the recent uprising in Bangladesh, similar things in Myanmar, with some exceptions in Sri Lanka, and now in many other places—has taken a very different route. There are some people-centric agendas, but most of the time in the South Asian context, it looks cultural or political, but it ultimately serves elite interests.
In Nepal, too, the populist mobilization around anti-corruption, youth inclusion, and similar issues is important, as in India. But it will not dismantle the elite structure that has dominated for a long period of time. So, my fear is that there was huge damage under this mobilization this time. Nepal lost billions of dollars and many people. It’s a huge damage. But what will it result in? It will not move outside the elitist structure already in place in Nepal.
Nepal Faces More Instability
The unprecedented state violence of September 2025 raises questions about authoritarian consolidation. Should we interpret the crackdown as a desperate last stand of a collapsing elite order, or as evidence of a longer trajectory in which coercion is becoming normalized within Nepal’s democratic institutions?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I would say it’s a degradation of the elite structure, in one sense, which has created these ruptures—and the ruptures are already there. It’s a continuous process along this path, which is an interesting thing. Politics is propagated under these ruptures. But it will also create space for another similar elite-based structure. That’s my fear, and I already see it happening.
So yes, it is a pillar within the elite structure that was maintained through a particular type of political party system. But these political party systems also became vulnerable to external pressure and influence. They were always managed by external forces.
Truly national interest and genuine national decision-making haven’t happened on either side—the rebuilding side or the elite side. Therefore, once mobilized, the elite structure continues to be reproduced. I do not imagine that the elitist structure will go away—that is not a possibility. But the current conjuncture of political elites, especially an older generation of political leaders, is now losing ground and space quite drastically. The danger, however, is that those spaces will be filled in ways that probably create even more instability in the country.
My sense is that Nepal will go through more political instability, and that will harm the region more broadly. That harm may in fact serve the interests of some geopolitical forces, because if the political structure is unstable, they can more easily insert their interests. That is the fate of smaller countries in the Global South in particular.
Without Economic Reform, Nepal Risks Mass Youth Exodus
A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.
Your ethnographic work on the Maoist revolution highlights how rural communities once generated alternative political imaginaries. To what extent do you see continuities—or disjunctures—between those insurgent subjectivities and the digitally mediated agency of Gen Z?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: That’s a very good one. There are some continuities in the sense that Nepali people have always sought alternative imaginaries, but there is also a complete disjuncture between the current generation and the past. The current generation does not really know the rural dynamics. They do not understand the moral economic system. They have no clue about present politics.
So the ideas of alternative imagination are almost opposite. Rural imaginaries were more sober, rooted in production and autonomy, while today’s are more connected to modern lifestyles and jobs, moving away from the traditional economic system. Both are alternative imaginations, but what they are looking for is different.
If they could find some kind of synergy, it could lead to real change in the country. But that synergy requires political negotiation and organizing—and that is not going to happen. Primarily, rural areas are heavily influenced by the traditional structures of political parties, while the urban youth are deeply alienated from them. So, the negotiation between the two will likely not happen anytime soon.
That unnegotiated gray space is where all kinds of interests will grow—and that is the danger for Nepali youth, their aspirations, and their inspiration. I would not be surprised if, in the next few years, out-migration of young people from the country increases massively. Without correcting the economic structure, there will not be more jobs. There will not be much of anything. Simply changing the government will not do it, because deeper structural changes are required.
But young people now have big hopes, and those hopes may soon turn to frustration. Either they will leave the country, or Nepal will face further instability and imbalance. So, the future scenario for the next few years looks extraordinarily volatile.
From Red Revolution to Red Neoliberalism
Given the Maoists’ descent into corruption and clientelism, can their revolutionary legacy still serve as a democratic resource for the present, or has it become a cautionary tale of how emancipatory struggles are absorbed into elite circulation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a wonderful question, because the kind of feudalism and elite-controlled politics was propagated by the Maoists themselves. They became the victims of elitism within their own movement. Yes, they challenged the political conjuncture and elitism of that time, but only to reintroduce their own. So, I would not consider that the old Maoists, in the structures they proposed, were ever going to be non-elitist or truly helpful.
The frustration that young people are expressing today also comes directly from the Maoists. When they entered peaceful politics and the new constitution was introduced, the Maoists became the only party in the country that was always in government—sometimes in coalition with one party, sometimes with another—but their performance was the most miserable.
It is very important to note that while the Maoists had an interesting political vision for the country, they had no vision for the economy. They became victims of the open economic structure, which I call red neoliberalism. They adopted neoliberal policies in such a way that they dismantled national production capacity, especially in industry, and alienated young people. They could not really understand this dynamic, became part of it, and therefore contributed directly to the dissatisfaction we see today.
Young people today have learned some lessons from that history, but they see no real connection to the Maoists’ promises, because they view the Maoists themselves as the problem. The Maoists destabilized rural areas, triggered mass out-migration, and destroyed national productive capacity. So, today’s youth frustration is deeply tied to what the Maoists promised versus what they delivered. And what they delivered was further dependency, out-migration, bad governance, and overall decline.
Crude Nationalism Cannot Satisfy Young People’s Aspirations
Thousands joined a joint morning procession organized by the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress district committees in Inaruwa Bazaar on September 19, 2025, to mark Constitution Day. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula.
Finally, do you see in Nepal’s youth movement the embryonic forms of what might be called a post-elitist or post-authoritarian democracy—an order rooted not in patronage or coercion but in new modes of participatory and inclusive politics?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I do not see that happening right away. But this has raised a lot of questions for the population, the political elites themselves, and others. The country will suffer more through various challenges, but this is the beginning of a different kind of political imagination that is emerging. Probably it will not find success quickly.
This particular episode may do more harm than good. Looking at the last couple of weeks, I can see it in the way they are now appointing ministers, the way they are appointing political elites back into power, and the way they use military force to enforce their agenda—all of which reflect an extraordinarily feudalistic structure in the country.
Given this, the current moment will not do much to change elite hegemony in Nepal. But no matter what happens, young people’s frustration is directed against elitism. What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system. That aspiration is a positive sign toward new possibilities. But this episode alone will not do much other than reintroduce the same elitist structure.
Primarily, young people are not questioning the economic structure. They are not really grasping how the dependent economic system in the country continues to produce an elite-controlled political system. This is similar to Bangladesh, where a major revolt not long ago did little to address the country’s economic situation. A similar pattern is emerging in India, too. Youth-led frustration will continue across South Asia—it will not stop in Nepal. I see big brewing parties emerging in India, which is a major hot spot. I am not sure when it will erupt or in what form, but for decades—almost 70, 80, 100 years—the economic feudalistic structure has not been resolved. I see something coming.
Even though India uses neighboring political instability to its advantage, crude nationalism alone will not satisfy the aspirations of young people, especially amid growing economic inequality. Regional change will happen only if something major occurs in other countries, especially in India and beyond. Still, this is a good symptom: unless elites create space for young people—and some form of inclusive system, even if not fully post-elite—these tensions will persist, not only in Nepal but across the region, for decades to come.
On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On September 18, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the second session of its Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. The session, titled “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” brought together leading scholars to examine the Polish case as a lens into broader struggles over democracy, representation, and rights. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (University of Oxford), the event highlighted Poland’s experience of post-1989 transformation, the contested legacy of Solidarity, constitutional polarization, and ongoing battles over women’s and minority rights.
Following the introduction of the programme and participants by Reka Koleszar on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford) opened by situating the discussion within a wider European context. Reflecting on Britain’s surge of far-right populism, she posed a dilemma: should mass populist movements be regarded as authentic expressions of civic grievance, or as dangerous forces of hatred and violence? She expressed hope that the Polish experience could illuminate how democracies might redirect discontent toward renewal rather than demagoguery.
The first presentation, delivered by Professor Jacek Kurczewski on behalf of his wife, the absent Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), revisited her long-standing work on Polish patriotism. Drawing on the legacy of Solidarity and the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, she argued that inclusive, pluralist patriotism once united workers, intellectuals, and clergy, but that its legacy has since weakened. She warned that today’s exclusionary populism thrives on the failure to sustain that inclusive vision.
Dr. Kamil Jonski (University of Łódź) then addressed Poland’s constitutional polarization. His paper, “Single Text, Clashing Meanings,” traced how the 1997 Constitution, from its inception, was a battleground of rival axiologies. While liberals view it as a rights-based framework, conservatives interpret it through a lens of sovereignty and morality. The 2015 constitutional crisis, resulting in right-wing packing of the Tribunal, offered opportunity to impose one of those visions, and produced a constitutional quagmire with disagreement not only on values, but also legitimacy of institutions (including top judicial bodies).
Professor Malgorzata Fuszara(University of Warsaw) explored the contested trajectory of human rights. She distinguished between broad consensus on universal rights after 1989 and the divisive politics of women’s and minority rights. Abortion restrictions, stalled LGBTQ reforms, and uneven protections illustrate enduring resistance. Yet she also highlighted progress, including the redefinition of rape law and gender quotas in parliament, underscoring the unfinished task of fully integrating women’s and minority rights into Poland’s human rights framework.
Finally, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw) presented his own paper on representation and the rule of law. He challenged populist claims that only elected politicians embody the nation, arguing that judges also represent the nation through law, oath, and culture. Reviving lay participation in justice, he suggested, could counteract populist narratives and strengthen judicial legitimacy.
The discussion was enriched by three international discussants. Dr.Magdalena Solska(University of Fribourg) highlighted the need to revisit the legacy of Solidarity for democratic resilience and probed the paradox of women’s electoral behavior. Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago) compared Poland’s constitutional struggles to US debates, raising questions about the gap between cultural appeals and economic policy. Professor Krzysztof Motyka(Catholic University of Lublin) drew attention to the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, from Father Popiełuszko’s defense of life to the linguistic shift from civic to human rights.
Together, the session illuminated Poland as a microcosm of global struggles: how inclusive traditions are eroded by polarized politics, how constitutions fracture under competing axiologies, and how rights remain contested terrain.