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The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 26, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/br0024

 

Tariq Modood’s groundbreaking work on multiculturalism is celebrated in this volume, highlighting his transformative contributions to the field. Through the concepts of “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a sophisticated framework that harmonizes diverse identities with a cohesive sense of national belonging. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, the book tackles pressing challenges such as populism, globalization, and transnationalism, while situating Modood’s legacy within global debates on identity and citizenship. Although the collection’s depth and interdisciplinary scope are impressive, its Western-centric focus somewhat limits its comparative applicability. Nonetheless, this volume is an indispensable resource for advancing multiculturalism as a counter to the populist radical right in both theory and practice.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

The connections between populist radical right ideologies and racism, nativism, nationalism, welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration sentiment, Islamophobia, and anti-minority discourses, actions, and policies are undeniable. One potential countermeasure to this form of homogenizing cultural and racial populism is the establishment of a robust framework for multiculturalism, cultural hybridity, and heterogeneity. This framework should uphold and guarantee individual and collective rights and freedoms, both to and from, for minority groups and peace and comfort for dominant majority culture.

In this context, the contributions of Tariq Modood have garnered significant attention. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) has recognized the relevance of his work and decided to publish a review of the book The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice: Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, this volume explores and celebrates Modood’s influential ideas on multiculturalism and its practical implications in contemporary society.

The book serves as a tribute to Tariq Modood’s substantial contributions to the theory and practice of multiculturalism. It offers a wide-ranging exploration of multiculturalism as a concept that continues to evolve, addressing contemporary issues of identity, inclusion, and diversity in diverse societies. Divided into four thematic sections—philosophical orientations, diversity and inclusion, nationalism and transnationalism, and secularism—the book includes contributions from eminent scholars across these fields.

The chapter “Introduction: Modoodian Multiculturalism,” co-authored by the book’s editors, explores Modood’s influential contributions to multiculturalism, situating his ideas within global debates on identity, citizenship, and diversity. It emphasizes Modood’s interdisciplinary approach, blending political theory with sociology to address evolving multicultural challenges. Contextualizing critiques and the perceived decline of multiculturalism, particularly amid populist narratives, cultural “wars,” and political skepticism, the editors highlight its resilience as both a policy and theoretical framework. They underscore multiculturalism’s relevance in tackling racial and ethnic justice, as reflected in movements like Black Lives Matter and indigenous rights debates.

The chapter delves into Modood’s key contributions, particularly his formulation of “Modoodian multiculturalism,” integrating sociological insights with normative political theory. Central concepts include ethno-religious identities and cultural racism, addressing gaps in traditional anti-racism and secularist paradigms. Modood’s advocacy for plural anti-racism and “multicultural nationalism” is pivotal, proposing an inclusive reshaping of national identities to foster minority belonging. By articulating Modood’s innovative approaches to recognition, inclusion, and national belonging, the chapter situates his work as vital to advancing multiculturalism in theory and practice. It effectively introduces the volume, tracing Modood’s intellectual legacy and global relevance, while setting the stage for thematic explorations of multiculturalism’s enduring significance.

In the chapter “Invoking the Idealist World of Ideas,” David Boucher explores Modood’s intellectual engagement with British idealism, particularly the philosophies of Michael Oakeshott and R.G. Collingwood. Boucher highlights how Modood’s grounding in idealist traditions informs his conception of multicultural citizenship, shaping his interdisciplinary synthesis of political theory and sociology. Boucher argues that Modood’s work embodies a “world of ideas” rooted in Collingwood’s hierarchical and overlapping forms of experience and Oakeshott’s philosophical skepticism toward rigid abstraction. Modood’s rejection of the categorical separation between theory and practice, derived from Collingwood, becomes central to his critique of Oakeshott’s anti-essentialism and his emphasis on identity as dynamic and contextual rather than fixed. This conceptual orientation allows Modood to address the practical challenges of multiculturalism while remaining philosophically rigorous.

Boucher demonstrates how Modood adapts the idealist framework to contemporary issues of multiculturalism, such as identity, cultural continuity, and anti-racism. The author also situates Modood’s contributions within a broader philosophical revival, emphasizing his alignment with the idealist principles of “identity in difference” and “continuity through change.” Ultimately, Boucher’s analysis underscores the enduring influence of British idealism on Modood’s theoretical and practical engagement with multicultural citizenship, offering valuable insights into the philosophical underpinnings of his work.

In chapter titled “Intimating or Iterating? Modood on Contextualism and the Danish Cartoons of Muhammad,” Sune Lægaard critically evaluates Tariq Modood’s iterative contextualist methodology through the lens of the Danish Cartoon Affair. Lægaard examines the tensions between Modood’s stated commitment to contextual sensitivity and the practical application of this methodology in his writings on the controversy. Lægaard acknowledges Modood’s contextualism as a theoretically rich approach, particularly in its sensitivity to local norms and iterative refinement of general principles. However, he raises concerns about the selective nature of Modood’s contextual engagement. For instance, Modood’s interpretation of the cartoons, particularly the “bomb-in-the-turban” cartoon, is critiqued for privileging one interpretation—Muslims as targets of racism—while neglecting the cartoonists’ stated intentions, such as criticizing extremism. Lægaard argues that this selective framing undermines Modood’s broader claim to contextual neutrality.

Further, Lægaard challenges Modood’s use of analogies, such as Holocaust denial laws, to justify restrictions on speech targeting Muslims. He points out inaccuracies in Modood’s application of Danish blasphemy and hate-speech laws, which already protected religious groups, including Muslims, thereby questioning the relevance of Modood’s arguments in this specific case. While Lægaard commends the adaptability of Modood’s contextualism, he highlights methodological inconsistencies that weaken its application. These critiques underscore the challenges of balancing context-sensitive analysis with normative commitments in political theory. Lægaard’s analysis reinforces the need for greater precision in contextual methodologies, even as he acknowledges the enduring value of Modood’s broader theoretical contributions.

Simon Thompson’s chapter, “Tariq Modood and the Politics of Recognition,” provides a critical exploration of the role of recognition in Modood’s theory of multiculturalism. The chapter positions recognition as a cornerstone in Modood’s intellectual framework, especially in understanding and addressing the dynamics of multicultural societies. Thompson organizes his analysis around four themes: equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion. He commends Modood for his dual conception of equality—equal dignity and equal respect—and his emphasis on the interplay between individual and group recognition. Thompson also highlights Modood’s nuanced focus on ethno-religious identities, which distinguishes his work from traditional liberal multiculturalist theories. Further, he underscores Modood’s dynamic understanding of identity as a dialectical process shaped by insider self-ascriptions and outsider perceptions, framing struggles for recognition as central to addressing misrecognition and exclusion.

However, Thompson raises critical concerns about Modood’s framework. He critiques the lack of practical guidance on when and how to apply equal dignity versus equal respect and calls for a more robust metric to navigate this distinction. Additionally, he notes Modood’s relative neglect of socio-economic inequalities, arguing that a comprehensive theory of justice should integrate both multicultural and economic dimensions. Thompson also challenges the ambiguity in Modood’s conceptualization of group recognition, urging greater clarity about whether groups deserve recognition for their intrinsic value or for the sake of their members. Nevertheless, Thompson’s critique is constructive, acknowledging Modood’s valuable contributions while suggesting areas for further refinement. 

In chapter titled “What’s to Be Done? Reuniting the People,” Charles Taylor engages with the divisive impact of exclusionary populism, proposing inclusive frameworks to reconcile societal divisions and foster cohesion. Taylor’s chapter is a robust examination of how modern democracies, fractured by inequalities and identity politics, might navigate towards unity through redefining national identity and embracing multicultural and intercultural narratives. Taylor’s analysis is compelling in its multi-faceted approach, identifying the dual fissures in contemporary democracies: the elite-populist divide and the tensions arising from cultural or ethnic differences. He underscores the need for democracies to craft inclusive political identities that honor both equality and historical narratives of national identity. His advocacy for interculturalism, particularly as a counterpoint to misinterpretations of multiculturalism in Europe, provides a roadmap for societal integration, emphasizing dialogue, collaboration, and a rejection of exclusionary policies. However, the chapter is not without shortcomings. Taylor’s solutions, while idealistic and principled, lack concrete mechanisms for implementation, particularly in polarized contexts where identity politics dominate public discourse. His reliance on examples like Canada and Quebec, while illustrative, may not translate seamlessly to societies with entrenched histories of racial and cultural strife, such as the US or France. Furthermore, his critique of exclusionary populism occasionally underplays the structural forces that sustain such ideologies.

In the chapter titled “The Unfinished Tasks of Multiculturalism: Thinking of Multiculturalism, Thinking with Tariq Modood,” Gurpreet Mahajan presents a thorough exploration of Modood’s contributions to multicultural political theory, with a specific focus on the interplay between multiculturalism, religion, and secularism. Mahajan highlights Modood’s approach to integration, which emphasizes the positive recognition of diverse identities, and his advocacy for reframing secularism as compatible with multicultural principles. This chapter stands out for its systematic articulation of “unfinished tasks” within multicultural discourse, inviting further scholarly and public engagement.

Mahajan effectively foregrounds the complexity of Modood’s argument that religion should be seen as a “public good,” thus challenging rigid secularist frameworks and pushing for inclusive policies that integrate minority religious perspectives into public life. However, this proposition raises critical questions regarding the balance between accommodating religious identities and maintaining secularism’s neutrality, especially in contexts where religious orthodoxy may conflict with liberal values. A notable strength of Mahajan’s analysis is her critique of multiculturalism’s perceived alignment with religious resurgence, which has alienated left-liberal allies. She also underscores the need for deeper engagement with intra-group inequalities and the homogenizing tendencies of identity-based discourses. While Mahajan successfully identifies pressing challenges for multiculturalism—such as inter-minority conflicts and the methodological tensions of de-essentializing communities—the chapter could benefit from more concrete proposals to address these gaps. 

In her chapter titled “From the Race Relations Act 1968 to the Great Repeal Act 2018: Back to Square One in 50 Years?” Maleiha Malik presents a deeply analytical and historically grounded examination of the evolution of race relations in the UK, juxtaposing the promise of legislative progress with the regressive realities that culminated in Brexit. Malik’s work underscores the enduring influence of Britain’s imperial legacy on contemporary racial hierarchies, connecting colonial governance to modern racialized exclusion. Her critique of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1968 reveals its limitations in addressing structural racism, focusing instead on individual acts of discrimination, a pattern that persists through subsequent legal frameworks.

Malik’s critique of Brexit as a racially charged political project is particularly compelling. She argues that populist rhetoric glorifying the British Empire masked the exclusionary nationalism that defined the Leave campaign, fueling a backlash against migrants and minority communities. Her analysis highlights how cultural and religious discrimination—especially Islamophobia—has evolved, amplifying new forms of racialization beyond traditional categories of color or ethnicity. While Malik’s historical framing is powerful, her portrayal of race relations legislation as consistently undermined by nativist anxieties invites further exploration of successful counter-movements. Moreover, her reliance on Brexit as a focal point risks overshadowing broader trends in global populism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Overall, Malik’s chapter is a robust critique of Britain’s struggle to reconcile its imperial past with a truly inclusive multicultural future, urging renewed efforts to combat the structural legacies of racism.

In “Multicultural Nationalism as an Ethics of Social Membership,” Will Kymlicka offers an exploration of the interplay between multiculturalism and nationalism, presenting a potential reconciliation through the concept of “multicultural nationalism.” Drawing from T.H. Marshall’s citizenship framework, Kymlicka contends that national solidarity and multicultural inclusion can coexist by redefining shared societal membership in pluralistic terms. His argument builds on empirical data, highlighting both opportunities and challenges in fostering an inclusive national identity. Kymlicka’s analysis is commendable for addressing the perceived incompatibility between nationalism and multiculturalism. His argument that membership rights can act as a vehicle for inclusivity resonates with Modood’s advocacy for multicultural nationalism. However, the chapter also critically acknowledges the risks inherent in Marshallian politics, particularly its historical tendency to marginalize minorities and reinforce societal hierarchies. The discussion on majority perceptions of minority commitment adds a critical dimension, revealing how perceptions influence support for minority rights. However, this approach risks oversimplifying minority identities and aspirations by framing their inclusion primarily in terms of majority acceptance. Populism surfaces implicitly, as Kymlicka critiques nationalism’s potential for exclusion while emphasizing its capacity for solidarity. 

In chapter titled “Integrating Modood and Kymlicka on National Inclusion,” Geoffrey Brahm Levey undertakes a critical analysis of Modood’s multicultural nationalism and Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism, arguing for a synthesis that leverages the strengths of both approaches to foster inclusive democracies. Levey critiques Kymlicka’s dismissal of significant differences between the two frameworks, as well as Modood’s assertion of the superiority of multicultural nationalism, ultimately advocating for an integrative model. Levey highlights Kymlicka’s recalibration of his cultural rights framework to emphasize minority contributions to society as a means of fostering solidarity. However, he critiques this shift for placing undue responsibility on minorities while neglecting structural adjustments required from majority groups. Similarly, he challenges Modood’s reliance on top-down transformations of national identity, arguing that such efforts often provoke resistance and caricature rather than fostering inclusion. The chapter engages with populism indirectly, critiquing majoritarian tendencies to frame minorities as undeserving or disloyal, which underpins populist rhetoric. Levey’s proposed integration of liberal and multicultural nationalism emphasizes concrete protections for minorities alongside a gradual reshaping of national identity through inclusive symbols and narratives. Levey’s analysis offers valuable insights into multicultural theory, though it underscores the challenges of balancing theoretical ideals with pragmatic strategies for fostering social cohesion.

Riva Kastoryano explores the complexities of transnationalism and its implications for nationalism and multiculturalism in her chapter titled “Transnational Experiences: Redefining Solidarity and Nationalisms.” She critiques state-centric multicultural policies, arguing that transnational belonging fundamentally reconfigures traditional nationalist paradigms by fostering non-territorial solidarities that challenge bounded national identities. Kastoryano draws on historical frameworks, such as Randolph Bourne’s concept of a “transnational America,” to contextualize modern transnational dynamics. She contrasts the civic integration goals of multicultural nationalism, as articulated by Modood, with the deterritorialized identities emerging from transnational networks. This juxtaposition highlights a tension: while multicultural nationalism seeks to integrate diverse groups within a nation-state framework, transnationalism transcends borders, creating new, imagined communities and solidarities based on shared identities or causes.

A key criticism is that state-driven multicultural nationalism may fail to address the non-territorial and fluid identities fostered by globalization. Kastoryano underscores the rise of “diaspora politics,” where states and transnational actors negotiate identities and allegiances, sometimes reinforcing exclusionary or populist discourses. She critiques the resurgence of ethno-cultural nationalism, often rebranded as populism, for exploiting migrants’ transnational solidarities as perceived threats to national sovereignty. Kastoryano’s chapter is a significant contribution to understanding the intersections of globalization, identity, and nationalism. 

Anna Triandafyllidou’s chapter “What Can Migration and National Identity Look Like in the Mid-Twenty-First Century? Transnational Diasporas and Digital Nomads” examines the interplay of migration, digital technologies, and national identity, projecting forward into the mid-21st century. By bridging physical and virtual mobility, she explores how these evolving dynamics redefine notions of belonging, identity, and citizenship. The chapter reflects on theoretical frameworks like Modood’s multicultural nationalism, plural versus neo-tribal nationalism, and everyday nationhood, questioning their applicability in an era shaped by augmented reality and digital nomadism. 

Triandafyllidou identifies a dichotomy between “cosmopolitan nomads,” who navigate globalized systems with ease, and “vagabonds,” marginalized by restrictive migration policies. She underscores the challenge of integrating virtual mobility into theories of migration and identity, noting its potential for both fostering transnational solidarity and amplifying socio-political exclusions. Particularly compelling is her discussion of neo-tribal nationalism, which thrives in the echo chambers of social media, reflecting the populist exploitation of mobility-induced anxieties. While the chapter is innovative in situating digital and physical mobility within broader global transformations, criticisms arise from its speculative tone and lack of empirical substantiation regarding the identity negotiations of digital nomads. Furthermore, the potential environmental and ethical implications of such mobility remain underexplored. Nevertheless, Triandafyllidou’s work opens critical pathways for rethinking nationalism and migration in an increasingly digitized and interconnected world.

Cécile Laborde’s chapter “Rethinking Race and Religion with Rawls and Modood” engages in a critique and synthesis of John Rawls’s and Modood’s perspectives on race and religion, proposing an interpretive framework that seeks to reconcile their divergent approaches. Laborde highlights the limitations of Rawls’s “bifurcated view,” which treats race and religion as separate normative categories rooted in distinct sociopolitical contexts. While Rawls centers religion within his political theory due to its epistemic and moral complexities, he relegates race to the realm of contingent injustice, underestimating its structural and enduring sociopolitical significance. Laborde effectively critiques Rawls for his intellectualist and decontextualized treatment of race, noting its inadequacy in addressing racial inequality and the historical interplay of race and religion.

Conversely, Modood’s integrated view, informed by his British context and the concept of “religio-racial” identity, is presented as a richer framework. Modood’s recognition of the intersectionality between race and religion and his advocacy for extending anti-discrimination protections to Muslims exemplify an inclusive approach to multiculturalism. Laborde deepens this perspective by introducing a dual “First-person” and “Third-person” framework to address individual agency and structural discrimination. While Laborde’s framework is compelling, critics might argue that it remains largely theoretical, with limited engagement with empirical case studies. Furthermore, the application of her dual perspective to real-world conflicts requires further elaboration, particularly in navigating populist discourses targeting religious minorities. Nevertheless, her chapter provides an invaluable contribution to debates on identity, justice, and multiculturalism.

Rajeev Bhargava’s chapter, “On Modood’s Moderate Secularism,” offers a comparative analysis of Modood’s “moderate secularism” and the Indian model of “principled distance,” critically examining their adaptability in addressing religious diversity in modern states. Bhargava acknowledges Modood’s significant contribution in theorizing moderate secularism as a model that accommodates religious pluralism while maintaining the autonomy of political authority. This framework, rooted in European traditions, challenges the rigid binaries of American and French secularism, advocating for an inclusive and multicultural approach.

Bhargava, however, critiques moderate secularism for its limited flexibility, particularly in accommodating deeply diverse societies. He highlights the entrenched biases in European secular frameworks that privilege Christianity, arguing that these models often fail to account for the structural inequities faced by Muslim minorities. Bhargava calls for a shift from mere institutional adjustments to broader conceptual reforms, aligning more closely with the Indian model, which integrates positive and negative engagements with religion to promote equality and mitigate inter- and intra-religious domination. The chapter’s populism-related insights emerge in Bhargava’s critique of European secularism’s inability to counter Islamophobic discourses, exacerbated by populist politics. While his proposal for adapting Indian principles to European contexts is compelling, critics might argue that the complexities of Western secular traditions and socio-political dynamics make such transplantation challenging.

In chapter titled “Secular State: Its Importance and Limits,” Bhikhu Parekh critiques rigid and dogmatic secularism, advocating for a nuanced and pragmatic approach that accommodates the complex interplay of religion and state. He emphasizes the instrumental nature of secularism, whose value lies in fostering liberty, equality, and common belonging in multicultural polities, rather than in adhering to an abstract ideal. Parekh aligns with Modood’s pluralist approach to secularism, commending its flexibility in recognizing religion’s potential contributions to public life. He highlights that secularism must balance the need for separation with the practical realities of mutual influence between religion and state, arguing against an absolutist interpretation. This is particularly significant in multicultural contexts where religion plays a vital role in cultural and communal identity. However, Parekh critiques secularism’s tendency to overreach, potentially alienating religious communities and fostering populist backlash, as seen in the rise of Hindutva politics in India. His critique extends to the failure of rigid secular models, like France’s laïcité, to equitably address diverse religious expressions, suggesting they inadvertently privilege majority traditions. Parekh’s proposal for context-sensitive, relational secularism is compelling, though critics may challenge its reliance on subjective interpretations of cultural and religious practices. 

Tariq Modood’s chapter, “From Then to Now: Some Friendly Responses,” offers a reflective engagement with the contributions to the volume while advancing his key themes of multiculturalism and moderate secularism. This response consolidates Modood’s intellectual trajectory and his pluralist methodology, blending personal narratives with theoretical critiques. Modood adeptly addresses critiques of his contextualism, particularly Sune Lægaard’s challenge regarding its application in the Danish Cartoons affair. While acknowledging the shortcomings in execution, Modood underscores his iterative approach, emphasizing the dialogical and evolving nature of contextual analysis. Similarly, he engages Simon Thompson’s deconstruction of the concept of recognition, embracing its multidimensional framing—equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion—while expanding its relevance to majority identities.

A recurring strength of Modood’s responses lies in his openness to constructive critique. For instance, he engages with Maleiha Malik’s historiography of racial equality in Britain, connecting it to Brexit’s implications for multiculturalism. Yet, Modood avoids reductive binaries, advocating instead for the mutual recognition of majorities and minorities. However, the chapter is not without limitations. Modood’s defense of multiculturalism as a “democratic constellation” is compelling but raises questions about its applicability in non-Western contexts. Similarly, his critique of Charles Taylor’s Quebecan interculturalism as “majoritarian” invites further elaboration on balancing national identity and minority accommodations. Anyway, Modood’s chapter enriches the volume by weaving together critical reflections and advancing his theory of multiculturalism as an inclusive, dialogical framework. It exemplifies a balance of self-critical humility and scholarly rigor, making it an invaluable contribution to the discourse on diversity and inclusion in democratic societies.

Overall, this volume highlights Modood’s transformative contributions to multiculturalism, framing it as a vital and evolving approach to managing diversity in today’s societies. By advocating for “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a cohesive model that balances the recognition of distinct group identities with the promotion of a shared sense of national belonging. The book engages with critiques of multiculturalism, demonstrating its resilience in addressing challenges such as globalization, transnational affiliations, and the rise of populist movements. Modood’s work is contextualized within global debates, showcasing the strength of his framework in uniting diversity and fostering collective identity—a cornerstone of his idea of “multicultural nationalism.”

While the volume stands out for its philosophical depth and theoretical insights, some chapters—particularly those on secularism—are heavily centered on Western contexts, offering limited comparative perspectives on non-Western experiences. Furthermore, its focus on philosophical discourse may leave practitioners seeking more tangible policy recommendations. Despite these limitations, the book is an essential resource for scholars in political theory, sociology, and public policy. It underscores Modood’s groundbreaking role in redefining multiculturalism as a versatile and sustainable framework for diversity and inclusion in pluralistic societies. Beyond commemorating Modood’s legacy, the book fosters meaningful scholarly dialogue, ensuring that his ideas continue to shape and influence the ever-evolving discourse on multiculturalism.


Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi &Nasar Meer (eds.). (2024). The Resilience of Multiculturalism Ideas, Politics, Practice. Edinburgh University Press. 328 pp. Hardcover $110, Paperback  $23,71, ISBN-13: 978-1399537261

Demonstrators of the Austrian Identitarian movement form a guard of honor of flags in Vienna, Austria on June 11, 2016. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right

Sargi, Islam. (2024). “Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0023

 

Teun A. van Dijk’s book explores how radical right parties adapt their discourses to cultural, economic, and historical contexts in Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, van Dijk reveals how nationalism, anti-globalism, and sociocultural backlash drive these narratives. With a focus on populism as a strategic discourse rather than ideology, the book underscores the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup rhetoric and its role in mobilizing support. While highlighting ideological clustering, the work offers valuable insights for scholars of political communication, critical discourse studies, and international relations.

Reviewed by Islam Sargi*

Teon A. van Dijk, a prominent scholar in linguistics, discourse analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is the founder of renowned journals such as Discourse Studies and Discourse and Communication. He also established the Center of Discourse Studies in Barcelona in 2017. Van Dijk’s book, Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right, part of the Critical Discourse Studies series, examines the political ideologies and discourse of radical right parties. It explores how these parties adapt their rhetoric to the unique economic, cultural, and historical contexts of four countries: Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The book bridges the gap between political science and discourse studies, providing a theoretically grounded analysis of radical right ideologies. Highlighting the limited research on the discourse of radical political parties, van Dijk incorporates a theoretical framework linking ideology as a form of social cognition to discourse and social structures.

By examining four cases—Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands—the book highlights the primary configurations, divergent ideologies, contextual impacts, populism, and the significance of national contexts. It argues that each country showcases distinct ideological stances. For example, while abortion is a central theme in the radical right discourse in Chile, it plays a less significant role in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments appear to be common across European contexts.

The author employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses, to investigate election programs from the four countries. Through this lens, the book explores language and discourse, emphasizing ideological positioning and political strategies. The findings reveal reactionary stances against social change, liberalism, and political correctness, framing these as part of a broader cultural backlash.

Through comparative analysis, van Dijk argues that radical right discourse and ideologies are shaped by country-specific contexts. For instance, in Chile, radical right discourse is rooted in Catholic ideologies, emphasizing traditional family values, such as opposition to abortion, and intertwining with the authoritarian historical narratives of the Pinochet era. The radical right in Chile also avoids engaging with the multicultural identities of the Mapuche people in their rhetoric.

In Spain, particularly in the case of the Vox Party, the focus shifts to nationalism, marked by a strict anti-separatist stance opposing the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque regions. This approach also embodies a strong rejection of modern globalist ideologies.

In the Netherlands, one of Europe’s prominent radical right parties, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), centers its discourse on Islamophobia, embedding it within broader national themes. Wilders portrays a struggle against liberal elites, who are perceived as eroding Dutch cultural identity and integrity.

In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) emphasize the preservation of culture, framing it as a social issue linked to crime and immigration. This case exemplifies a broader European pattern, where immigration is associated with security concerns and the preservation of national cultural hegemony.

Van Dijk’s analysis highlights how the radical right adapts its narratives to local contexts while sharing overarching themes such as nationalism, anti-globalism, and opposition to multiculturalism.

The author emphasizes that the electoral strategies of radical right parties in these four countries are shaped by their unique national contexts, cautioning against broadly categorizing them under the blanket term of populism. Populism, as a discursive phenomenon, requires an analysis rooted in discourse strategies rather than mere ideological critiques. This approach encourages a deeper exploration of ideological clustering and its role in fostering the radical right’s broader acceptance and integration within democratic systems.

Regarding the interplay between populism and discourse, the book highlights populism primarily as a strategic use of language by political parties rather than a cohesive ideology. This framework reveals that populist discourse often constructs narratives centered on the dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites.”

Moreover, the book examines the socio-cultural backlash against modern liberal ideologies, demonstrating how the radical right skillfully employs discourse to reassert traditional values. It underscores how radical right narratives leverage this backlash to challenge liberal norms and promote their vision of cultural and societal order, ultimately highlighting the ideological and cultural underpinnings of their discourse strategies.

The book makes a significant contribution to scholarship by offering a fresh perspective on ideological clusters, particularly the interplay of nationalism, racism, and political dynamics within radical right parties. It provides an insightful introduction to understanding how radical right ideologies are constructed, communicated, and situated within broader socio-political contexts, shedding light on their increasing influence.

By integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, the book appeals to those interested in exploring the psychological and linguistic foundations of political ideologies. Scholars and students in political science, sociology, and international relations will find value in the comparative case analyses, which illuminate the global patterns and localized adaptations of radical right parties and their discourses.

The author effectively integrates theories from discourse studies and social context, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding how political ideologies are constructed and communicated. This approach offers valuable insights into the tactics and strategies employed by radical right movements. By embedding his analysis within a well-articulated theory of ideology, van Dijk explores the cognitive foundations of radical right discourse, adding depth to the study and establishing a clear structure for his investigation.

Through comparative analysis, the author demonstrates how these movements adapt their rhetoric to cultural, economic, and historical contexts, offering readers a nuanced understanding of global patterns and local variations. The book sheds light on the pragmatic role of distinct national contexts in shaping political communication strategies, emphasizing how language is used to construct ingroup/outgroup dynamics. These dynamics are crucial for understanding the populist appeal and the ways radical right parties mobilize support locally.

Van Dijk further illustrates the interconnectedness of various ideologies within the radical right framework, showcasing their ideological composition and adaptability. This comprehensive approach underscores the role of language and context in shaping political narratives, making the book a valuable resource for scholars and students of political communication and ideology.

Although the book provides a broad comparative framework, its specific discourse analysis is somewhat limited. A more in-depth linguistic examination of concrete examples could better substantiate claims regarding the effectiveness or variability of discourse strategies. Additionally, the study’s focus on only four countries, while diverse, does not fully capture the global spectrum of radical right discourses or address the dynamics of emerging movements in other regions.

Methodologically, the book would benefit from greater transparency in its approach to discourse analysis. Clearer details on data collection and the analytical process would enhance the replicability and robustness of its findings. While the book persuasively argues that populism should be viewed as a discourse strategy rather than a fixed ideology, it does not thoroughly investigate the practical implications of this distinction in political behavior and communication.

Despite these limitations, van Dijk’s study remains a well-structured and significant contribution to critical discourse studies of radical right ideologies, offering valuable insights into the intersection of language, ideology, and political strategy.


 

(*) Islam Sargi holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Comparative History from the University of Szeged. His doctoral thesis examined the Kurdish question and Turkish modernization. iszeged509@gmail.com

van Dijk, Teon A. (2024). Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 95, Paperback £17.00, Hardback £49.99, ISBN 978-1-009-54993-6 Hardback, ISBN 978-1-009-54991-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009549929, Online ISBN: 9781009549929, Print publication: January 2, 2025.

SummerSchool-D5L1

Summer School 2024 — Brexit and ‘National Conservatism’

Lecturer: Dr. Craig Calhoun (Professor at Arizona State University).

Moderator: Dr. Franco Zappettini (Senior Lecturer at the University of Liverpool).

Professor Craig Calhoun examined Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in the context of populist politics and argued that it stemmed from contingent circumstances, mobilizations, and deeper political shifts, notably influenced by national conservatism and English nationalism prioritizing ethnonationalist identity.

Dr. Craig Calhoun is a Professor at Arizona State University. Craig Calhoun is a comparative and historical sociologist, social theorist, and scholar, known for his interdisciplinary work in anthropology, communications, economics, history, international studies, political science, philosophy, and science and technology studies. His latest book, “Degenerations of Democracy,” co-authored with Charles Taylor and Dilip Gaonkar, was published by Harvard University Press in 2022. He edited “The Green New Deal and the Future of Work” with Benjamin Fong (Columbia University Press, 2022) and has collaborated with former students to create widely used anthologies covering classical and contemporary sociological theory. Calhoun has authored nine books and published over 150 peer-reviewed papers, articles, and chapters.

Calhoun currently serves as the University Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University. Prior to joining ASU, he served as president and director of the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), president of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), and president of the Berggruen Institute. Calhoun has taught at Columbia University, NYU, where he founded the Institute for Public Knowledge, and the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he also served as dean of the graduate school and directed the University Center for International Studies. In addition, he has been a visiting professor at universities and institutes in the U.S. and abroad, including in Asmara, Beijing, Bristol, Khartoum, Oslo, and Paris, and as an Einstein Fellow in Berlin.

Calhoun’s research focuses on contemporary transformations, possible futures, and the political economy of the modern world-system. He is also committed to studying universities and knowledge institutions, democracy, and shifting structures of social solidarity. In his philosophical pursuits, Calhoun explores the relationship between transformation and transcendence in understanding human existence.

Calhoun is actively engaged in advancing political, economic, and social democracy locally, nationally, and internationally. Calhoun serves on the board of the MasterCard Foundation, the American Assembly, the Center for Transcultural Studies, the Pulaski Institution, and Reset Dialogues. Calhoun is also active in speaking and supporting programs for a range of organizations and communities in Arizona, elsewhere in the US, and internationally.

Moderator Dr. Franco Zappettini is a Lecturer in the Department of Communication and Media at the University of Liverpool (where he is also the current Director of the PhD Programme). He previously held the post of Adjunct Professor of English at the Faculty of Education, University of Genoa, Italy and was Honorary Researcher Associate at Royal Holloway, University of London. He is the Book Review Editor at the Journal of Language and Politics edited by John Benjamins Publishing.

Thumbnail MichaelKazin

Professor Kazin: Right-Wing Populism Is a Morbid Symptom of Political Transition

In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Renowned historian and scholar of American politics and social movements, Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, offers a thought-provoking analysis of right-wing populism in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency in a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Framing contemporary politics as an “interregnum”—a period of transition—Professor Kazin draws on Antonio Gramsci’s observation that such times often produce “morbid symptoms,” which he associates with the global rise of right-wing populism. He explores how Trump’s leadership embodies this phenomenon, highlighting its implications for both domestic and international politics.

In the interview, Professor Kazin delves into Trump’s unique ability to sustain a populist movement despite his focus on personal popularity over policy. He discusses how Trump has galvanized his base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism, creating a potent political force that continues to shape American political discourse. Professor Kazin critiques Trump’s approach to governance, describing his first administration as “wretched,” marked by policy ignorance and self-serving actions. However, he acknowledges that Trump’s movement, particularly the MAGA base, has no parallel within the Democratic Party, providing him with a solid foundation of unwavering support.

Professor Kazin also examines the potential global ripple effects of Trump’s second term, noting his alignment with leaders like Viktor Orbán and the admiration he garners from right-wing populist movements in Europe. While Trump’s “America First” stance complicates the formation of international alliances, Professor Kazin suggests that his presidency could embolden far-right leaders worldwide. However, he tempers this with cautious optimism, emphasizing the resilience of American democratic institutions and the structural limits of Trump’s power.

Finally, Professor Kazin explores the broader dynamics of populism, contrasting left- and right-wing variants. He argues that left-wing populism, rooted in economic justice and social democracy, offers a constructive path forward. As global demands for equitable governance grow, Professor Kazin envisions the potential for a revival of progressive populism that challenges elite power while addressing urgent issues like economic inequality and climate change.

The interview with Professor Kazin offers a nuanced perspective on Trump’s presidency, the resilience of democratic institutions, and the evolving role of populism in shaping both domestic and global politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Michael Kazin with some edits.

SummerSchool-D3L3

Summer School 2024 — Populism, Constructive and Destructive

Lecturer: Dr. Louis Kreisberg (Professor Emeritus at Syracuse University).

Moderator: Dr. Alexandra Homolar (Professor at the University of Warwick).

Dr. Louis Kriesberg is the Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies and Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Syracuse University. He has published widely on diverse areas of sociology and social conflicts, including the US-Soviet Cold War, Israeli-Palestinian-Arab relations, non- governmental organizations, and social movements. His recent work focuses on constructive ways of fighting, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution methods. Kriesberg has been highly active in regional, national, and international associations of sociology, conflict resolution, and international peace, for which he has received numerous awards. He was also the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts (PARC) at Syracuse University. He received his PhD in Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1953.

Populism is variously defined. For the purposes of this analysis, it refers to non-governmental people taking direct actions trying to change the conduct of some other resistant group. They are in conflict. In all human societies there are procedures to pursue and settle many such conflicts – the procedures are embodied in legal and political institutions. However, members of one or more contending parties often choose to take actions which are deemed populist. Often, the actions are intended to influence the conduct of members of established institutions. In this presentation, Professor Kriesberg examines the actions of people engaged in conflicts resorting to populist conduct. He discusses cases in the United States, in European states, and in other countries. In accord with work in the field of conflict resolution, he assesses their degree of being constructive or destructive. This is based on his many years of research and publications on this matter. Constructiveness varies in the nature of the inducements employed in a conflict, persuasion, promised benefit, and coercion. Usually all are employed in varying degree over time. Persuasion varies in different degrees of presumed effectiveness. Promised benefits relate to the terms of settlement being sought. Coercion varies in severity and therefore destructiveness, in varying degrees of violence and denial of benefits. Constructiveness also varies by the conception of each side has of itself and of its antagonists. Finally, constructiveness varies with the degree of differences each side has about the terms of a conflict settlement. In addition to assessing varying degrees of constructiveness, I will discuss how conflict destructivity can be reduced.

Moderator Dr. Alexandra Homolar is Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick. Homolar has taught and researched at universities in Germany, the US, and the UK. She currently holds a Leverhulme Research Fellowship for her project ‘Populist FantasylandLink opens in a new window‘ (RF-2021-527/7), and from 2013-2017 she was the Principal Investigator of the ESRC Future Research Leaders project ‘Enemy Addiction‘ (ES/K008684/1). At Warwick, Homolar is the academic lead of Speaking International Security at Warwick (SISAW) and the co-lead of the interdisciplinary Research in Global Governance Network (RiGG NetLink opens in a new window) as well as the organizer of the Annual Masterclass in CSS/IR. She served as Director of Research Degrees and on the PAIS Senior Management Team in 2018-2020. Homolar received her Diplom [BA Hons., MA] in Political Science, Law, History, and Empirical Research Methods as well her Dr. phil [PhD] from J.W. Goethe University Frankfurt.

 

Professor Michael Kazin from Georgetown University, a renowned historian and expert on American politics and social movements.

Professor Kazin: Right-Wing Populism Is a Morbid Symptom of Political Transition

In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Renowned historian and scholar of American politics and social movements, Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, offers a thought-provoking analysis of right-wing populism in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency in a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Framing contemporary politics as an “interregnum”—a period of transition—Professor Kazin draws on Antonio Gramsci’s observation that such times often produce “morbid symptoms,” which he associates with the global rise of right-wing populism. He explores how Trump’s leadership embodies this phenomenon, highlighting its implications for both domestic and international politics.

In the interview, Professor Kazin delves into Trump’s unique ability to sustain a populist movement despite his focus on personal popularity over policy. He discusses how Trump has galvanized his base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism, creating a potent political force that continues to shape American political discourse. Professor Kazin critiques Trump’s approach to governance, describing his first administration as “wretched,” marked by policy ignorance and self-serving actions. However, he acknowledges that Trump’s movement, particularly the MAGA base, has no parallel within the Democratic Party, providing him with a solid foundation of unwavering support.

Professor Kazin also examines the potential global ripple effects of Trump’s second term, noting his alignment with leaders like Viktor Orbán and the admiration he garners from right-wing populist movements in Europe. While Trump’s “America First” stance complicates the formation of international alliances, Professor Kazin suggests that his presidency could embolden far-right leaders worldwide. However, he tempers this with cautious optimism, emphasizing the resilience of American democratic institutions and the structural limits of Trump’s power.

Finally, Professor Kazin explores the broader dynamics of populism, contrasting left- and right-wing variants. He argues that left-wing populism, rooted in economic justice and social democracy, offers a constructive path forward. As global demands for equitable governance grow, Professor Kazin envisions the potential for a revival of progressive populism that challenges elite power while addressing urgent issues like economic inequality and climate change.

The interview with Professor Kazin offers a nuanced perspective on Trump’s presidency, the resilience of democratic institutions, and the evolving role of populism in shaping both domestic and global politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Michael Kazin with some edits.

Populism in America: Bridging or Deepening Divides?

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

Professor Kazin, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your book titled The Populist Persuasion, you discuss how populist rhetoric has evolved in the U.S. What role does populism play in bridging or deepening the divide between cultural and economic grievances today?

Professor Michael Kazin: As you know, populism is both a language and, some would argue, a governing philosophy. I focus on it as a language in American history, with ramifications for populism in other countries, of course. Historically, I think there has been a distinction in the United States—which is really all I can speak about with authority—between left-wing populism and right-wing populism.

Left-wing populism tends to focus on an economic elite—the 1% versus the 99%, the robber barons, the plutocrats, the monopolists. Many terms have been used to critique those with significant wealth and economic power. Left-wing populists aim to unite a large majority, regardless of gender, race, or national origin.

In contrast, right-wing populists in the US—and to some degree in Europe—view “the people” as a broad middle segment of the population, primarily native-born individuals. According to right-wing populists, this group is being exploited and oppressed by two forces: a small elite at the top (both economic and cultural, and sometimes perceived as controlling the state, such as the European Union in Europe or the federal government in the US) and a small but growing group at the bottom, often composed of non-white and immigrant populations.

Historically, this group at the bottom has included Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans. More recently, undocumented or illegal immigrants have been the focus. Right-wing populists argue that these groups are used by the elite to drive down wages and erode the cherished culture of the native-born middle class.

Generally, this is how left-wing and right-wing populists operate in the US, with similar analogs in Europe.

Currently, in American politics, left-wing populists—such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other progressives within and outside the Democratic Party—are striving to emphasize the tradition of left-wing populism. However, they face challenges because Democrats and progressives also prioritize cultural issues, such as more lenient immigration policies, transgender rights, and racial equality. This creates some tension with economic left-wing populists, who prefer to focus narrowly on issues like corporate greed, wealth inequality, and combating the power of the very rich, including figures like Donald Trump.

On the right, as most people are aware, Donald Trump exemplifies the continuity of right-wing populism from the 19th century to today. Right-wing populists argue that a “Hollywood elite” or “woke elite” in universities and cultural institutions seeks to impose its values on the hardworking, native-born majority. Additionally, they claim that undocumented immigrants take jobs from native-born Americans, drive down wages, and increase crime in cities.

This is how the two traditions of left-wing and right-wing populism are playing out in contemporary American politics.

Populist Rhetoric and Its Impact on Economic Inequality and Social Justice

How has populist rhetoric shaped the policy priorities of modern political parties in the US, particularly regarding economic inequality and social justice?​

Professor Michael Kazin: Social justice is a term that’s hard to define. It’s been used by both the left and the right throughout American history, so I’ll set that aside for the moment. In terms of economic inequality, this has been a longstanding issue in American politics, but it has especially risen to prominence as a major concern for both right-wing and left-wing populists since the Great Recession of 2008–2009. Following the well-publicized but relatively small Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011–2012, progressive Democrats have increasingly focused on this issue. They argue that neoliberalism—which many view as the dominant ideology in American politics and economics since the 1970s, especially after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980—has exacerbated economic inequality.

Progressive Democrats have supported programs like those championed by Joe Biden, albeit with moderate success, to help unions organize, provide childcare benefits to all American families, and implement other measures aimed at narrowing economic inequality.

On the other hand, conservative populists, including figures like Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, argue that the primary issue with economic inequality lies with corporations that they claim are “too woke” and favor individuals with the “right” cultural politics over ordinary Americans. Some very conservative Republicans have embraced a form of anti-corporate politics.

For example, Josh Hawley, a Senator from Missouri, has supported the Teamsters Union, one of the largest unions in America. Additionally, some right-wing Catholic thinkers have drawn on the Catholic Church’s social justice tradition, referencing papal encyclicals like Rerum Novarum (1891) and others to argue that unions are essential for improving the lives of ordinary people and to criticize practices like excessive rents and interest rates that harm workers and the poor.

This trend has given rise to a form of “Catholic populism,” which uses these religious principles to legitimize arguments against corporate power. An interesting book on this topic, Tyranny, Inc., by a conservative journalist, critiques corporations for engaging in behavior that harms workers, such as union-busting, charging excessive credit card interest, and denying healthcare coverage.

There is, to some extent, agreement between right-wing and left-wing populists in the US on reducing corporate power and supporting private-sector unions. Currently, only 6% of private-sector workers in the US are unionized—a historically low figure.

However, significant disagreements remain between right-wing and left-wing populists, particularly on cultural issues, which are deeply entrenched and difficult to reconcile. For example, debates over abortion—whether it is a fundamental right for women or equivalent to the killing of babies—highlight how cultural arguments are often intractable and resistant to compromise.

In one of your interviews, you argue that ‘if the political and economic elites in our society and others around the world were more effective at living up to their ideals, populist talkers would likely be less popular.’ What do you mean by ‘ideals of political and economic elites?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Perhaps I should have said the ideals of the nation led by these elites to be more accurate. In the United States, especially—and to varying degrees in Europe—the stated ideals include equality, democracy, majority rule, and a government that promotes the common welfare, as referenced in the preamble to the American Constitution. These ideals are echoed in other historical documents, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man in Europe.

As a social democrat, I would say that if social democracy were practiced more widely and people were guaranteed a decent life in their societies, populism would likely be less popular. For example, in the United States between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s, despite many challenges, it was generally a prosperous time. Unions were very powerful, Social Security was extended to nearly every working American, and the beginnings of health insurance coverage for older and poorer individuals under Medicare and Medicaid were implemented. During that period, populist rhetoric was not particularly influential, and populist movements were relatively subdued. While there were significant social movements, such as the Black freedom movement, they were primarily advocating for the inclusion of an oppressed minority in American life rather than claiming to represent the great majority. Of course, there were radical elements within some movements, but they were not the mainstream.

In my recent book, What It Took to Win: A History of the Democratic Party, I argue that “moral capitalism”—a phrase I borrow from a fellow historian—was the governing promise of the Democratic Party during these years. Democrats were the majority party, and most Americans, including working-class citizens, believed that things were improving. When people believe their lives are getting better, populist leaders and movements struggle to gain traction.

Trump’s Leadership Defined by Self-Interest and Controversy

Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In one of your articles, you characterize Donald Trump’s first administration as ‘one of the most wretched president and administration in living memory.” What factors have contributed to your defining of Trump’s administration as the most wretched?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, of course, “wretched” is a loaded, emotional term, and here I’m speaking from my own preferences. There’s no scholarly objectivity possible in this context. I could also talk about why he won again last November, but first, let me focus on the question.

As a leader, I think Trump is someone primarily interested in his own popularity and not particularly interested in policy. He wants to be the center of attention at all times and is committed to no ideal or policy unless it benefits him personally. He’s also unwilling to take risks, particularly when it comes to policy decisions, which I believe was evident during his first term and will likely remain true during his second term—though, of course, we’ll have to wait and see.

His personal behavior also contributes to this characterization. He has been credibly accused of actions that would be considered rape in many nations, though he wasn’t convicted of rape but rather of defaming someone who accused him. His statements about immigrants and what he referred to as “shithole countries,” among other things, reflect his character. As an individual, I find him to be a rather wretched person—someone I wouldn’t want to associate with or have anyone I know associate with.

That said, his administration itself was more cautious than I expected, in part because he leads a party that still includes more traditional, cautious members. Many corporate executives and traditional Republicans influenced his policies. For instance, his Cabinet included several conventional Republican figures, and the Speaker of the House for much of his term was Paul Ryan, a Reaganite libertarian Republican focused on cutting the size of government rather than pursuing anti-immigrant crusades.

The major accomplishment of his administration aligned with a long-standing conservative Republican agenda: cutting taxes, especially for wealthier Americans, though all Americans received some form of tax cut. This is something Ronald Reagan might also have done.

In that sense, while his administration had the potential to be wretched, it was less so than I expected. However, Trump’s statements and actions on immigration were deeply problematic. His attempt to build a wall across the southern border wasted significant funds and was ultimately easy to evade. This demonstrated not only ignorance about policy but also a lack of genuine concern for it.

Unlike other American presidents, as the leader of the most powerful state in the world, Trump showed very little interest in the actual workings of the state unless they directly benefited him personally. In that sense, I would still describe him as a wretched leader.

You argue that ‘like most adherents of left egalitarian politics, I believe the only path to such a future (the more egalitarian and climate-friendly society) lies in adopting a populist program about jobs, income, health care, and other material necessities, while making a transition to a sustainable economy? What exactly do you mean by ‘populist programs?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, by that, I mean majoritarian—programs that genuinely benefit the majority of people. When governments are popular, that’s typically what they do. So, in this sense, being “popular” and being “populist” can overlap, though they are not always synonymous.

As I mentioned before, I believe an honest social democracy, or what I would call “moral capitalism” in the US, is the best approach. Such programs would include housing allowances, universal health care that is well-administered and provides good working conditions for healthcare workers, unions to protect the majority of people against workplace abuse, and, critically, a vigorous transition to a sustainable economy—because without that, the entire world is in trouble.

Now, using the term “populist” might seem to betray my own definition of populism, which in American history refers primarily to a discourse or rhetoric. But I don’t subscribe to the simplistic view of “populism bad, liberalism good.” As I argue in my book, The Populist Persuasion, populism can be a way for ordinary people—and movements aiming to represent them—to highlight the gap between a society’s stated ideals and the actual performance of its elites, whether cultural, political, or economic.

Populism can play a very positive role by pointing out these shortcomings and harking back to a society’s ideals, including those rooted in religion, like charity and comfort for the afflicted. It doesn’t necessarily demand, as socialism often does, a completely different kind of society—although socialists can also adopt populist rhetoric. Instead, it appeals to the ideals of the existing society, challenging elites to live up to them.

This is why I think populism has an important role in producing a decent society. Unlike some critics, like Jan-Werner Müller, who argue that populism always fuels movements that lead to authoritarian leaders, I believe populism doesn’t have to serve that role. While it certainly has done so in some parts of Europe, where we see leaders with authoritarian tendencies in and out of office, I think left-wing populism can play a vital and constructive role.

Trump’s Second Term: The Future of Populist Politics in the US and Beyond

A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.

How do you explain Donald Trump’s victory for a second term, given his open and aggressive endorsement of populist policies both in the US and globally? Additionally, how might his administration reshape the populist narrative domestically, particularly in aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism?

Professor Michael Kazin: That’s an important question, obviously, and one we won’t really be able to answer until he’s been several years into his term. Let me address the first part of your question.

Again, you’ve probably read, and your viewers have likely heard and read, many analyses of why Trump won. The most important reason he won—and this is usually why anyone unseats an incumbent party in this country, and probably in others as well—is that most Americans believed the performance of the Biden administration, or the Biden-Harris administration, wasn’t good. This perception was based on several factors, including inflation, a more open immigration policy than most Americans preferred, and, I think, Biden himself, who is a very poor communicator.

Biden used to be a mediocre communicator when he was younger, but in the last couple of years, he became very bad at selling his own programs. Some of those programs, I believe, could have been quite popular if Americans had known more about them, but they didn’t.

This was an election that was actually rather close. For instance, if 232,000 voters in three key states—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—had voted differently, with slightly more in Pennsylvania than the other two states, Harris would have been elected, even though she would have won fewer popular votes than Trump. As everyone watching this knows, we don’t have a national popular vote in this country. We have state-by-state elections that determine the presidency.

Trump, on the other hand, is a charismatic figure. While he doesn’t have the majority of Americans on his side, a significant portion—perhaps 30%—strongly supports him. He has a movement, the MAGA movement, which the Democrats don’t have anything comparable to. Even though the Democrats had more people on the ground to get voters to the polls, Trump had more solid support.

As a result, he won somewhat more votes than he did in 2016—about 2 million more popular votes. However, Harris won 10 or 11 million fewer votes than Biden had in 2020. Trump’s victory was largely due to many Democrats deciding not to vote. They were disenchanted enough with the Biden-Harris administration’s performance but not sufficiently motivated by Trump to come out and vote against him.

Now, regarding what Trump will do in terms of reshaping the populist narrative—let me remind myself of the second part of your question here…

How much his administration reshapes the populist narrative domestically.

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, again, it depends on how well he performs, right? This is a question of contingency—how he navigates his role as president during the second term. Trump is a much better politician than he is a policymaker, so he will certainly try to maintain support from both the more traditional Republicans and the cultural populists within his coalition.

On the traditional side, he will aim to keep corporate Republicans on board—those who favor lower taxes, less regulation, and smaller government in general. Simultaneously, he’ll also work to retain the cultural populists who want to drastically cut immigration, both legal and illegal, and who oppose transgender rights and certain aspects of gay and lesbian rights.

Trump will likely attempt to strengthen US manufacturing, pushing for more products to be made domestically. However, this will be challenging given that final manufacturing in the US relies heavily on parts sourced from around the globe. Reducing this dependency and producing those parts domestically, which are currently made more cheaply elsewhere, will be difficult. Nevertheless, he will likely focus on this rhetorically.

As always, much will depend on the state of the economy, the presence or absence of scandals within his administration, and the outcome of the midterm elections. In 2026, Democrats are well-positioned to potentially take back the House of Representatives. If that happens, anything Trump aims to achieve would have to be done through executive actions. While some of these actions may be popular, others might not resonate as well with the public.

Additionally, the 2028 presidential campaign will overshadow the final years of Trump’s term. In fact, the campaign will likely begin even before the 2026 midterm results are fully processed. This means Trump might have only two effective years to accomplish his goals, including efforts to satisfy both the traditional and cultural populists in his coalition.

Trump’s Return: Shaking but Not Breaking American Democracy

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

How concerned are you about the second Trump administration in terms of the resilience of American democratic institutions? There are those pundits who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump term.

Professor Michael Kazin: Here I part ways with some others on the left. I don’t think that American democratic institutions are in serious trouble. I believe they will be shaken—and are already being shaken—by Trump’s reelection and his return to power next month.

First of all, Congress is still fairly evenly divided between the two parties, even though Republicans are in charge. Many large states, such as New York, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois, are governed by Democrats, and most of these states have Democratic majorities in their legislatures as well. These state governments can act and bring cases to court to challenge some of Trump’s policies.

Civil society in the United States remains relatively strong. There are significant non-governmental organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which will likely file lawsuits against some of Trump’s actions—particularly those related to immigration. For example, if he tries to deport children born in the US to immigrant parents (who are American citizens by birthright), the ACLU and others will step in.

Even though the grassroots left is somewhat dormant and exhausted since the election, there are still key groups on the left, including unions like the American Federation of Teachers and the United Auto Workers. These organizations were supportive of Kamala Harris and will mobilize opposition against Trump’s administration.

As always, Trump’s ability to act depends on how popular he remains. If his popularity holds, he will have more freedom to pursue his agenda. However, the court system remains a check on his power. While the Supreme Court leans conservative, with three justices appointed by Trump during his first term, other courts are more balanced, with progressives or liberal judges presiding over lower courts.

I anticipate chaos and turmoil, but that doesn’t necessarily mean democratic institutions are in existential danger.

One area of concern is Trump’s apparent eagerness to sue media organizations he disagrees with. For instance, he already sued ABC News over a comment made by anchor George Stephanopoulos, and ABC settled for several million dollars. He might pursue similar legal actions against other media outlets, particularly legacy institutions like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and major networks. While this could intimidate some of these institutions, he won’t be able to silence the Internet or prevent people from organizing protests.

The military, which served as a check on him during his first term—particularly during the protests of 2020—will likely play a similar role this time. He won’t be able to call on the military to suppress peaceful demonstrations, even if he expresses the desire to do so.

I wouldn’t call myself optimistic, but I am hopeful. Also, as I mentioned earlier, he only has four years in this term and likely only two effective years to implement policies. So, I’m not as fearful as some others I know.

Implications for Global Populism and Far-Right Alliances

And lastly, Professor Kazin, right-wing populism continues to rise across Europe despite the liberal European Union’s success story. How do you think populist parties and movements will be influenced globally after Trump begins his second term? Could his presidency embolden far-right leaders abroad and foster new alliances among far-right populist governments?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, that’s certainly a possibility. As you know, he’s been very close to Viktor Orbán. Orbán has been invited to National Conservative Conferences, and there was even one held in Budapest, which I believe was the first time an American conservative organization hosted its conference overseas. Clearly, right-wing populist leaders, including those of parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, are likely very pleased with Trump’s reelection. This is probably true for right-wing populist parties and movements across the continent.

At the same time, if you emphasize “America First” and express suspicion toward European institutions such as the EU or NATO, it becomes very difficult to form any kind of operationally powerful alliance between Trump and his counterparts in Europe.

Structurally and historically, I believe we’re in what could be described as an interregnum—a period of transition. My friend Gary Gerstle, in his excellent recent book, describes the end of the neoliberal order, which has concluded in many ways and in some places entirely. As the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci famously said, during such an interregnum, “many morbid symptoms appear.” From my perspective, right-wing populism is one such morbid symptom.

However, as demands grow for the state to provide a decent living for a majority of its citizens—and as governments actually fulfill those demands—I think there could be a revival of left-wing populism or social democracy, even if it’s not labeled as such. People will demand that the government deliver on its promises to improve living standards for the majority, ideally in collaboration with private capital.

I am somewhat heartened by the fact that Trump is limited to four years. He cannot serve more than that without a constitutional amendment, which is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in this country—far more so than in many others.

Additionally, most Americans who support Trump are not particularly enthusiastic about alliances between the United States and other countries. They prefer the US to remain independent of such alliances, especially if those alliances are perceived to be costly. So, we’ll have to see how this unfolds.

SummerSchool-D2L2

Summer School 2024 — Populism, Hindu Nationalism and Foreign Policy in India

Lecturer: Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski (Lecturer at Coventry University).

Moderator: Dr Ajay Gudavarthy (Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University).

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski is a Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University. Previously, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the School of Global Affairs, King’s College London. His research interests are foreign policy analysis, populism and the far right, world order, poststructuralist IR and critical security studies. His research has been published or is forthcoming in International Affairs, International Relations, International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Journal of International Relations & Development, among others. He is the author of the books ‘The Inter- and Transnational Politics of Populism: Foreign Policy, Identity and Popular Sovereignty’ (Cham: Palgrave, 2023) and ‘India’s Foreign Policy Discourse and its Conceptions of World Order: The Quest for Power and Identity’ (London: Routledge, 2018).

This lecture discusses the relationship between Populism, Hindu Nationalism and Foreign Policy in India. It unpacks the major ideological themes and issues of Hindu nationalism and outlines the Hindu Nationalist foreign policy outlook. Drawing on discourse-theorical approaches to populism and nationalism, it then shows how populism and nationalism are related and can be used to construct and mobilize collective political identities such as ‘the people’ in the realm of foreign policy. It discusses how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi used foreign policy issues for the purpose of political mobilization and rallying ‘the people’ behind their political project. At the same time, it discusses the impact of Hindu Nationalism and populism on India foreign policy. Finally, the lecture looks at Modi’s outreach to fellow populist radical right politicians in the United States and Europe and sheds light on the rationale and effects of this international collaboration.

Illustration by Lightspring.

Call for Papers & Panels — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

DOWNLOAD CALL for PAPER

Date: July 1-3, 2025

Venue: European Studies Centre, Oxford University 

Deadlines

Abstract Submission: February 28, 2025

Decision Notification: April 7, 2025

Draft Paper Submissions: June 9, 2025

 

Organisers

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

Oxford Democracy Network

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies eroded. During this period, ‘us vs. them’ rhetoric and divisive politics have severely undermined social cohesion. Yet, in some cases, democracy has demonstrated resilience. A crucial factor in the rise and fall of liberal democracies lies in the use and abuse of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either serve to unite civil society or create deep social divisions by pitting “the (true) people” against “the others.” The dichotomy of “the people vs. the others” is a central focus in populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” act as a driving force for democratization or become a tool for majoritarian oppression require further comparative and comprehensive analysis. Understanding this dynamic is critical, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide.

This workshop invites submissions of paper and panel proposals, posters, and artwork on the rise and fall of liberal democracies across different periods and contexts while exploring future implications and potential solutions. By bringing together scholarship from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research, the workshop aims to foster a comprehensive and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic decline and pathways to resilience. Key themes include broader settings and contexts that shape “the people,” influence the human condition, and the building, maintenance, or erosion of democracy, democratic institutions and cultures. Researchers at any career stage, especially early career researchers (PhD students, post-docs, and assistant professors), are encouraged to present completed and ongoing research.  

Potential topics include but are not limited to

– Theories and political philosophy on the people, public, popular and civil/civic, elite, volk, populus, demos, ochlocracy, proletariat, sovereign, human condition, constitutional imagination

-The role and use of “the people” in service of nationalism, racism, populism, or democracy

-The role of civil society in fostering and sustaining democratic systems and creating inclusive and sustainable democratic institutions

-Local, global and civilizational approaches to “us vs. them” & illiberal democracy (majoritarianism, “global elites,” minorities, Orientalist or Occidentalist rhetoric, etc.)

-Political economy and psychology shaping the idea of the people and globalization

-Historical trends, human condition, and future implications for democracy

-Cultures and subcultures of democracy (community building across differences, public spaces, arts and activism)  

-The role of the arts (literature, music, film), new media, and AI in shaping “the people” and the people vs. the others

-Colonial, decolonial, postcolonial, and gendered approaches to the idea of the people

-Political psychology, civil society, and ways to strengthen domestic and international democratic institutes  

-Bottom-up approaches to global governance and democracy 

For submissions, please fill out this form before February 28, 2025: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdgyojykmVYiElqFSAxaiCbjyX6eZNAjYhdNUWDEoQFUGKnug/viewform?vc=0&c=0&w=1&flr=0

For questions, please email Sumeyye Kocaman: skocaman@populismstudies.org  

 

Opening Speech

Janet Royall (Principle of Summerville College, Oxford University and Baroness Royall of Blaisdon).

 

Roundtable Contributions

Naomi Waltham-Smith (Professor, Oxford University, Music Faculty).

Martin Conway (Professor, Oxford University, History Faculty).

Luke Bretherton (Professor, Duke University Divinity School; Oxford University Faculty of Theology and Religion).

Jonathan Wolff (Professor, Oxford University, Blavatnik School and President of the Royal Institute of Philosophy).

David J. Sanders (Professor, Essex University, Department of Government).

Aurelien Mondon (Senior Lecturer, University of Bath).

Angelos Chryssogelos (Reader, London Metropolitan University, Politics & International Relations).

Clare Woodford (Director of CAPPE Critical Theory Strand, Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics, University of Brighton).

 

Editorial Team

Hugo Bonin (Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Jyväskylä).

Heidi Hart (Senior Non-resident Research Fellow, ECPS).

Anne-Margret Wolf (Fellow, All Souls College, University of Oxford).

 

Populism & Politics (P&P), a journal of ECPS, offers publication opportunity for select articles. 


 

Where to Stay: Accommodation Recommendations

For those attending the conference, Oxford colleges are often the most affordable and reliable accommodation option. Many operate as B&Bs, but availability during the summer can be limited due to summer school programs. Below is a list of colleges near our venue. If their websites indicate “no availability,” we recommend emailing them directly and mentioning your attendance at the conference, as this may improve your chances of securing a booking.

Recommended Colleges

Hotels Near Jesus College

For those preferring hotels, here are some options close to Jesus College:

B&B and Self Catering

The Randolph Hotel, by Graduate Hotels

George Oxford Hotel

Vanbrugh House Hotel

Additional Suggestions

Royal Oxford Hotel: Conveniently located near the train station and city centre.

We also recommend comparing prices on various booking platforms such as booking.com, as rates and availability can differ. 

MGP18

Mapping Global Populism – Panel XVIII: Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries

Moderator

Dr. Courtney Freer (Assistant Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, GA).

Speakers

“Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region,” by Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber (Professor, Chairholder, Institute of Political Science, Chair of Middle East Politics and Society, the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg).

“The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC,” by Dr. Gail Buttorff (Associate Director of the Center for Public Policy and Assistant Professor at the Hobby School, University of Houston).

“The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership,” by Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel (Postdoc at Geography Institute, the University of Heidelberg).

“The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies,” by Kardo Kareem Rached (Assistant Professor at University of Human Development, Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region of Iraq).

Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” by Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan (Senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington).

SummerSchool-D4L1

Summer School 2024 — EU’s External Relations: Do Populists Propel It, Or Does It Propel Populists?

Lecturer: Dr. Bertjan Verbeek (Professor at Radboud University Nijmegen Netherlands).

Moderator: Dr. Ana E. Juncos Garcia (Professor at the University of Bristol).

Dr. Bertjan Verbeek is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He publishes on the impact of populism on foreign policy; on crisis decision making; and on the role of intergovernmental organizations in contemporary world politics.

In this seminar we will discuss the interrelationship between populism and the external relations of the EU. On the one hand, the stronger the presence of populists in EU member states governments and the EU’s institutions, the more likely it is that the EU’s external relations are reflecting populists’ foreign policy preferences.  However, this requires us to first discuss whether such a thing as a populist foreign policy preference exists in the first place. On the other hand, the EU’s external relations may have an impact on the position of populist parties within its member states. We will address these topics by focusing on the EU’s worldwide promotion of democracy as well as on the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on populism‘s strength within the EU.

Moderator Dr. Ana E Juncos Garcia is Professor at the University of Bristol. Her primary research interest lies in European foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on the development on the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities and its role in conflict resolution. Her previous research project examined the EU’s intervention in the Western Balkans since the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. This study looked into the coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign policy over time and assessed the EU’s contribution to post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding in Bosnia. In other work, she has examined EU security sector reform and the institutionalisation of EU foreign policy, in particular, in relation to the newly created European External Action Service. Her current research examines EU peacebuilding in the neighbourhood, including the shift towards resilience approaches at the EU level.