Anti-government protest organized by Alliance for the Union of Romanians against the increase in energy prices in Bucharest, Romania on October 02, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock.

Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament

Please cite as:

Soare, Sorina. (2024). “Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0081

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON ROMANIA

Abstract

This report examines the landscape of the far right in Romania within the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Two Romanian far-right parties secured seats in the European Parliament: the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and SOS Romania (SOS), receiving 14.9% and 5% of the valid votes, respectively. Both parties emphasize the defence of Romanian sovereignty and promote nativist and authoritarian rhetoric. However, over the past year, the AUR has increasingly incorporated neoconservative elements into its platform. Consequently, the 2024 campaign has revealed notable differences in programs, candidates, styles of political campaigning and alliance strategies.

Keywords: far right; Romania; European Union; conservatism; sovereignty; political alliances

By Sorina Soare* (Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence, Florence, Italy)

Introduction

In the December 2020 legislative elections in Romania, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) performed surprisingly well despite being established only a few months prior, in September 2019. Since then, the AUR has increasingly positioned itself as a significant opposition party, engaging critically with the state of Romanian democracy. Central to its political platform is the defence of Romanian sovereignty. The party utilizes populism to mobilize support, often framing society in stark terms: the pure and genuine Romanian people (‘us’) versus the corrupt elites (‘them’), namely, mainstream political parties, cosmopolitan intellectuals, NGOs and similar entities. This division is further reinforced by nativist rhetoric, which emphasizes the organic nature of the Romanian community and underscores various threats posed by non-native elements. While Western societies often view these threats as originating from migrants, in Romania, ethnic minorities such as Hungarians are frequently singled out in this narrative. As such, the AUR’s ideological stance incorporates nativism, authoritarianism and populism, which aligns with what Mudde (2007) identifies as a populist radical right party.

The AUR’s radical dimension (Pirro, 2023) manifests in its opposition to key features of liberal democracy, particularly aspects related to personal liberties. However, the AUR does not seek to undermine democratic institutions but rather draws an ideological boundary with the liberal pillar of liberal democracy, delineating the frontier between the in-group and the out-group (Kauth & King, 2020). Specifically, the in-group comprises Romanian natives and their families, guided by the Christian faith and traditions (Program of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, 2020).

Political parties are not monolithic entities; they often accommodate multiple political projects within one organization. The AUR exemplifies such diversity, where the original dual leadership represented at least two compatible ideological strands: one primarily oriented towards a unionist platform integrated with populist radical right features; the other focused on conservatism as a cultural, social and political vision opposing cosmopolitan and liberal values, while emphasizing traditional forces such as nature, God, and historical heritage (Drolet & Williams, 2018). A significant convergence point between these strands is their opposition to aspects of the established socio–cultural order characteristic of post-communist liberal democracy. In this context, the European Union (EU) is directly targeted as a source of disruptive values for the Romanian organic community. Criticisms are focused on a wide range of policies and norms perceived to limit national sovereignty, such as the recognition of homosexual families and restrictions on personal liberties like the use of cash.

Beyond the AUR, the landscape of Romanian politics features various actors challenging the status quo. One such prominent figure is Diana Șoșoacă, who emerged as an extremely vocal political leader. Elected on the AUR list in the 2020 legislative elections, Șoșoacă was later expelled and joined SOS Romania, a party whose name viscerally reflects its core narrative: the urgent need to save Romania. Nativist, authoritarian and populist dimensions resonate in her discourse, echoing the need to defend national sovereignty against the EU and other foreign interests. However, there are differences in intensity and content compared to the AUR. Her communication style is characterized by a highly confrontational manner and a narrative of perpetual crisis. Șoșoacă’s unconventional performance serves as a substitute for party organization and autonomous political identity, making both her political style and messages potentially disruptive to the democratic status quo. From this perspective, SOS Romania embodies the potential for extremism.

Romania’s political landscape appears complex in the aftermath of the 2024 European Parliament elections. While it is acknowledged as a bastion of political stability and pro-EU sentiment, with the coalition of mainstream parties – the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) – securing a significant victory with 48.5% of the valid votes (See Table 1 below), there is also notable representation of MEPs from parties advocating radical right stances. This report analyses the historical trajectories of two Romanian parties embodying such views, scrutinizing their campaigns for the EP, evaluating their electoral platforms and profiling their candidates.

The far right strikes back: Romanian insights

Following a period of dormancy in the early 2000s, the far right (Pirro, 2023) made a significant resurgence in Romania’s political landscape. Initially operating outside parliament, the Romanian far right gained considerable momentum following the 2020 legislative elections. While the AUR secured substantial parliamentary representation, it also became a focal point for nativist, authoritarian and populist discourses. In parallel, the AUR has faced several internal challenges, marked by the departure of key figures like Șoșoacă, who has since become the leading figure in the rival SOS Romania party.

Additionally, other members of the AUR have splintered off to establish their own political entities. For example, Smaranda Lup, once influential within the AUR’s Cluj branch, cofounded the RO-EXIT party. This new party explicitly advocates for Romania’s withdrawal not only from the EU but also from organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, despite these developments, the electoral potential of these smaller parties remains relatively limited.

Two projects in one

Founded out of a blend of activism, AUR’s founding leadership focused on two main lines of mobilization associated with the political figures George Simion and Claudiu Târziu, who jointly led the party from 2019 to 2022 (Soare & Tufiș, 2023). Since the early 2000s, George Simion has been deeply engaged in grassroots activism, particularly focusing on anti-communist and pro-union causes. Over time, he emerged as the primary spokesperson for the party. Meanwhile, Claudiu Târziu leveraged his journalism background and connections within right-wing networks. Through his blog, Târziu consistently advocated for preserving Christian conservative values within contemporary Romanian democracy. Simion and Târziu jointly advocated for the defence of Romanian identity, sharply underlining its historical heritage as a bulwark against perceived threats from both domestic and international influences.

These principles were fundamental to the AUR’s platform, which was organized around four conservative pillars: faith, nation, family and liberty. Their platform aimed to counter what they viewed as the erosion of traditional values since the communist era. Integral to their approach was a robust anti-establishment stance and a communication strategy that fostered closeness with the Romanian populace. For instance, AUR voters have been invited to participate in personal milestones such as George Simion’s marriage, which aimed to strengthen their connection with supporters on a personal level.

Against this backdrop, two distinct roles emerged among the AUR’s leading figures. George Simion embodies a functional role akin to a modern tribunus plebis, an elected representative tasked with vocally defending Romanians against corrupt and abusive politicians. Conversely, Claudiu Târziu pursues an intellectual specialization in close collaboration with prominent conservative intellectuals such as Sorin Lavric.

Looking for international/European partners

Târziu’s role as the party’s intellectual leader involved networking with conservative and far-right parties across Europe and globally. This role became pivotal in preparing for the 2024 EP elections, with the AUR strategically targeting membership in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. This strategy received support from grassroots engagements between the AUR extraterritorial branches and local politicians from parties like Vox and Brothers of Italy (Soare & Tufiș, 2023). Concurrently, the party bolstered official political networking efforts, exemplified by George Simion’s participation in Italy’s Atreju festival organized by Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). While some encounters, such as Simion’s reportedly contentious reception at Vox’s Madrid meeting in January 2022 – purportedly due to objections from Fidesz over anti-Hungarian statements – were framed in the media as setbacks, these engagements remained integral to AUR’s strategic outreach.

By October 2022, the AUR had established the Mihai Eminescu Conservative Political Studies Institute in Bucharest. As the institute’s director, Claudiu Târziu expanded its influence through political networking and international conferences. These gatherings hosted a spectrum of international political representatives and intellectuals, providing a platform to articulate conservative visions for Europe and advocate for national sovereignty. One notable event, titled ‘Make Europe Great Again’, took place in Bucharest in April 2024. Explicitly referencing Donald Trump’s ‘MAGA’ slogan, the conference aimed to address concerns about Europe’s perceived decline. It featured prominent intellectuals, politicians, journalists and activists from Europe, Israel, the United States, Canada and Latin America.

Cristian Terheș, a former MEP with the ECR group, played a pivotal role in this context. In December 2023, he joined the Romanian National Conservative Party (PNCR) and soon became its president. The PNCR subsequently forged alliances with the Republican Party of Romania, the Peasant National Alliance, the National Identity Force and the National Renaissance Alliance, forming a coalition with AUR for the European Parliament elections. The gate towards the ECR was definitely open.

The topics of reference

Since its electoral breakthrough in 2020, the AUR has championed the defence of Romania’s political, economic and sociocultural interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the AUR emerged as a prominent advocate for personal liberties, staunchly opposing mandatory vaccination, with some representatives endorsing anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Additionally, the party has criticized European bureaucracy, portraying mainstream parties as subservient to the EU and betraying national interests. AUR has also voiced concerns over EU values, particularly regarding LGBTQ+ rights, advocating for the traditional family as a defence against what they perceive as European intrusions.

Simultaneously, the AUR has consistently emphasized the protection of Romanian communities in neighbouring states and the rights of nonresident economic migrants. Party representatives regularly accuse the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) of being a ‘chauvinistic entity’ that promotes ‘terrorism against Romanians’ while also criticizing mainstream parties for their perceived political subservience (Fati, 2024).

In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the AUR has taken nuanced positions. While denouncing Russia’s interference as a significant obstacle to unification with Moldova, the party also criticizes Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Romanians.

Emerging competitor: The origins of the SOS Romania party

Despite its young age, the AUR has become a fertile breeding ground for more radical and extremist platforms, exemplified in primis by Șoșoacă, a Romanian lawyer whose political career was boosted by her election as a Romanian senator on the AUR lists in 2020. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Șoșoacă became one of the most well-known faces of the antivaccine movement, regularly criticizing the government’s defensive measures (Arun, 2024). More generally, Șoșoacă has pushed populist rhetoric to new extremes with tough homophobic, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and anti-European messages. She proudly presents herself as the first Romanian MP to advocate for a ‘Ro-exit’, stating, “Since we have been in the European Union, we have ruined ourselves! And, under these circumstances, all I can say is RO-Exit! If you relinquish all industry to the European Union, That’s what you did with the PNRR [i.e., National Recovery and Resilience Plan, supported by the EU’s post-COVID-19 recovery fund]! You made fun of all the state companies in Romania! You sacrificed our sovereignty for this! Never! The Romanian Constitution must never be subordinated to EU treaties. Shame on those who have betrayed Romania and its people!” (SOS Romania, 2022).

Her theatrical, patriotic speeches are characterized by aggressive gestures and coarse vocabulary, in which she regularly denounces the ruling parties and emphasizes her proximity to the people. She regularly dresses in traditional popular costumes and voices concerns for Romanian traditions and values at risk of extinction. Șoșoacă has also emerged as one of the most vocal supporters of pro-Russian stances in Romania. She was declared ‘Personality of the Year’ in 2021 by Sputnik, a Russian broadcaster and purportedly sought to promote her messages on Vkontakte, the Russian social media platform (Arun, 2024). In March 2022, Șoșoacă and other MPs paid a high-profile visit to the Russian embassy in Bucharest to present a position of neutrality regarding the ongoing war. One year later, she sparked significant controversy with an interview given to a Russian publication, in which she claimed that Romania is essentially a ‘colony’ within the European Union. She further asserted that Europeans and Americans aim to destroy Russia and argued that Ukraine illegally occupies territories, including some that rightfully belong to Romania (Despa & Vovesz, 2024).

Regarding the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups taking place in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023, Șoșoacă distinguished herself from the establishment by not participating in the pro-Israel rally organized in Bucharest in the aftermath of Hamas’ 7 October attack. Her position was motivated as less connected to foreign policy choices and more about her fear of drawing Romania into the war. Furthermore, media reports have highlighted her controversial remarks, including instances of antisemitism. For instance, during a joint session of parliament dedicated to the Day of Solidarity and Friendship between Romania and Israel in May 2024, Șoșoacă complained that this day should serve to commemorate Romanian martyrs from communist prisons, criticizing what she viewed as an incorrect focus on antisemitism. She protested that Romania saved over 400,000 Jews during the Second World War (Cotidianul, 2024).

The pursuit of consensus for the European Parliament elections

The AUR presented a strong list of 43 candidates for the European Parliament elections in June 2024, with Cristian Terheș and Claudiu Târziu featuring prominently at the top. The list included notable figures such as Gheorghe Piperea, known for bringing large class-action lawsuits against commercial banks over abusive credit contract commissions, and Georgiana Teodorescu, a vocal advocate for traditional family values. Also included were Adrian Axinia, an AUR MP closely associated with George Simion and serving as one of AUR’s vice presidents. The list comprised various AUR members, lawyers, entrepreneurs, Monica Iagăr, a former athlete, the actress Mara Nicolescu and several academics.

Although the extent of its territorial organization within Romania or abroad remains unclear, SOS Romania succeeded in fielding 43 candidates for the European Parliament elections, including lawyers, a journalist, local councillors and other party members. The first two positions on the party list were occupied by Șoșoacă herself, followed by Luis Lazarus, a journalist trained at the TV stations owned by the controversial former journalist and populist politician Dan Diaconescu.

Regarding the mood of Romanian citizens in the context of the European elections, the Parliament’s Spring 2024 Eurobarometer reveals strong interest among Romanian citizens, fully aligned with the European average (EP Spring 2024 Survey). However, Romanian citizens express a more critical and nuanced view towards different aspects of the European arena, particularly concerning the EU’s impact on their daily lives. While almost three-quarters of European citizens state that EU actions impact their daily lives, only 65% of Romanians share this opinion. Similarly, although a large majority of Europeans (71%) agree that their country benefits from EU membership, only 65% of Romanians share this view. On the eve of the election, this indicates that there is a fertile breeding ground for parties voicing concerns and criticisms of the EU.

The AUR’s campaign focus

Since its electoral breakthrough in 2020, the AUR has been an ardent advocate in defence of Romania’s political, economic and sociocultural interests. Unsurprisingly, the party’s campaign for the EP elections emphasized Romania’s Christian identity and safeguarding the family as the cornerstone of society. The party’s platform notably advocated for the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU, viewing it as a strategic step towards uniting the Romanian states. AUR’s 11-point manifesto addressed a wide array of issues, from EU relations to specific sectors such as youth, poverty and environmental policies. Conducted concurrently with the local elections, the AUR’s EP election campaign echoed Euroscepticism, targeting specific policies rather than the EU project itself.

AUR has a dedicated website (https://europarlamentari2024.ro/candidati-aur/) and a Facebook page (Europarlamentari AUR, 2024) to disseminate its message. Central to the AUR’s European vision was a staunch opposition to cosmopolitanism and globalism, advocating instead for European integration rooted in sovereign national identities. The party endorsed Poland’s model of preserving national languages, cultures and traditions as exemplary.

Among its key policy points, AUR emphasized the need to stimulate the return of Romanian migrants by combating poverty and facilitating access to European funds for small rural businesses. A recurrent argument was the reduction of administrative rigidity and an open fight against the double standards that penalize Eastern member states.

During the campaign, AUR candidates urged Romanian voters to choose between defending Romanian sovereignty or succumbing to what they termed ‘Romanian vassalage.’ Symbolically, AUR’s program insisted that politics should reflect the general will, specifically the will of national voters: “Politics in Romania must be done at home, not in Brussels or in Moscow. Although alliances with our strategic partners, both European and international, must be consolidated, AUR wants a different approach, one of alliances for the benefit of the country, not for the interests of the parties” (AUR’s Plan for the European Parliament, 2024).

SOS Romania party’s campaign

SOS Romania’s campaign primarily focused on Șoșoacă, highlighting concrete measures outlined in a very concise program. The program advocated for Romanians’ rights to continue using traditional energy sources like firewood and natural gas, reopening coal mines, and demanded compensation from the European Commission for the costs and side effects associated with COVID-19 vaccines. The program vigorously denounced perceived breaches of national sovereignty and criticized what it viewed as double standards in EU product regulations while emphasizing the protection of Romanian farmers and agriculture.

Aligned with AUR, SOS Romania advocated resisting digital or centralized financial systems (e.g., supporting the continued use of cash for consumer payments) and, in general, supported simpler fiscal regulations from Brussels. Șoșoacă also called for Romania to adopt neutrality in geopolitical matters, opposing the country’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict. The candidate and the party program staunchly defended the supremacy of Romania’s constitution over any international or European institution. SOS Romania also championed Christian values and traditions, opposed imposed globalism and the LGBTQ+ agenda, and advocated for prohibitive measures against gender education, sex change operations and same-sex marriage in Romania.

The electoral results

In the 2024 European Parliamentary elections, the far right emerged as the second political force in Romania, closely trailing the coalition of PSD and PNL (Table 1). Combining the votes for AUR and SOS Romania, these two parties collectively secured almost one-third of the votes. While AUR’s result represents a contraction from the 20% voting intentions registered in the preceding year, SOS Romania’s final outcome came as a surprise. Initial exit polls had placed the party below the threshold, a trend confirmed by early official national results. The turnout among nonresident voters was the decisive factor in overturning the initial forecasts.

Table 1. 2024 European election results for Romania

Party Votes Share of votes (%) MEPs (out of 33) Parliamentary group affiliations (number of MEPs affiliating)
PSD-PNL Alliance 4,341,686 48.5 19 S&D (11)EPP (8)
AUR Alliance 1,334,905 14.9 6 ECR (6)
United Right Alliance 778,901 8.7 3 Renew (2)EPP (1)
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 579,180 6.5 2 EPP (2)
SOS Romania 450,040 5.0 2 NA (2)
Ștefănuță Nicolae Bogdănel (independent) 275,796 3.0 1 Greens/EFA (1)
Sources: Central Electoral Bureau (2024) and European election results (2024).

Interestingly, despite their focus on unification processes, the mobilization of AUR and SOS was notably lower in the Republic of Moldova, particularly in comparison to mainstream parties. Nonresident voters awarded AUR the highest number of votes in five countries with substantial migrant communities: Spain, Belgium, France, Austria and the United States. Șoșoacă’s leadership notably attracted voter support in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy (Central Electoral Bureau, 2024). The election results thereby validated AUR and SOS as the primary opposition forces. SOS Romania secured as many MEPs as the liberal Save Romania Union, while AUR doubled the representation of the United Right Alliance.

Benefiting from extensive pre-election networking efforts and Terheș’ previous affiliation with the ECR, AUR MEPs have joined this group. The official announcement was made ten days after the elections, coinciding with the news that the ECR had become the third-largest group in the new European Parliament. On the same day, Hungary’s Fidesz announced via X that it no longer sought to join the ECR, citing explicit concerns over AUR’s extreme anti-Hungarian positions.

Notably, AUR’s inclusion in the ECR group came with an agreement to support the Ukrainian cause. This agreement is particularly significant given that George Simion has been deemed persona non grata in both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova due to his irredentist views. Șoșoacă and Lazarus, the two SOS MEPs, remained isolated from alliances at the European level. Despite approaching the emerging Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group in the EP, their candidacy was rejected by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the group’s founding member. Șoșoacă’s opposition to conventional politics became visible in her maiden speech in Parliament in July, where she accused the EU of ruining Romania by providing aid to Ukraine and called for stopping the supply of weapons to Kyiv. In a move laden with symbolism, she was eventually escorted out of the Strasbourg chamber after repeatedly disturbing Valerie Hayer during the debate following a speech by the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen. On this occasion, she wore a dog’s muzzle on her face (Starcevic, 2024).

Conclusions

This report has explored the landscape of the far right in Romania against the backdrop of the 2024 EP elections. The emergence of AUR and SOS Romania as significant political players underscores the growing influence of populist narratives in Romanian politics. With its increased emphasis on a conservative platform and Romanian sovereignty, AUR positioned itself within the ECR group, aligning with softer Eurosceptic stances. In contrast, SOS Romania, led by the outspoken Diana Șoșoacă, projected a more confrontational stance, challenging mainstream narratives with outspoken critiques of EU policies and advocating for nationalist agendas, including calls for territorial revisionism.

Despite facing rejection from the main EP groups, SOS Romania’s representation in the European Parliament alongside AUR highlights the diversity of strategies employed by the far right in contemporary politics. Their campaigns resonated with segments of the electorate disillusioned with traditional political parties, including a significant proportion of young voters, capitalizing on issues such as national identity, sovereignty and cultural preservation. Looking forward, the impact of AUR and SOS Romania in shaping Romanian and European Union policies will depend on their ability to navigate internal cohesion challenges and establish meaningful (and stable) alliances within the EP.


 

(*) Sorina Soare is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Florence. She holds a PhD in political science from the Université libre de Bruxelles and previously studied political science at the University of Bucharest. She serves as a co-chair of the Council for European Studies (CES) Network on Political Parties, Party Systems and Elections and is co-editor of the Annual Review of the Journal of Common Market Studies. In addition, she is a co-editor of Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review. Her work focuses on comparative politics, with research interests including political parties and party systems, populism, migrants’ political participation and the role of gender and women in politics. Email: sorinacristina.soare@unifi.it

Acknowledgements: The author would like to express her sincere gratitude to Emilia Zankina, Azize Sargin, and the entire ECPS team for their kind invitation to write this piece and for all their valuable comments and suggestions. A special acknowledgement to Simon P. Watmough for his excellent comments.


 

References

Arun, G. (2024, March 19). Opinie: Care e călcâiul lui Ahile al Dianei Șoșoacă. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/ro/opinie-care-e-c%C4%83lc%C3%A2iul-lui-ahile-al-dianei-%C8%99o%C8%99oac%C4%83/a-68611162

AUR’s Plan for the European Parliament (2024), Planul Aur pentru Parlamentul European. Alegeri Europarlamentare 9 iunie 2024https://europarlamentari2024.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AUR-program-alegeri-Parlamentul-European-2024.pdf

Central Electoral Bureau (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://europarlamentare2024.bec.ro/rezultate

Cotidianul (2024, May 14). Șoșoacă şi Lasca: Ziua trădării naționale! Este inacceptabil. Cotidianul. https://www.cotidianul.ro/sosoaca-14-mai-2024-ziua-tradarii-nationale/

Despa, O., & Vovesz, T. (2024, June 3). România & partidele ei radicale. Ziariști, avocați, profesori, teologi–candidați pentru Bruxelles. Ce se întâmplă în Ungaria și Bulgaria. Deutsche Welle. https://romania.europalibera.org/a/aur-parlament-european/32970598.html

Drolet, J. F., & Williams, M. C. (2018). Radical conservatism and global order. International Theory, 10(3), 285–313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191800012X

EP Spring 2024 Survey. Use your vote–Countdown to the European elections (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3272

European Elections (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/romania

Europarlamentari AUR (2024). Facebook. Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://www.facebook.com/p/Europarlamentari-AUR-100095358306817/

Fati, S. (2024, May 21). Opinie: Cum au rămas ungurii ‘dușmanii’ noștri permanenți? Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/ro/opinie-cum-au-r%C4%83mas-ungurii-du%C8%99manii-no%C8%99tri-permanen%C8%9Bi/a-69136839

Kauth, J. T., & King, D. (2016). Illiberalism. European Journal of Sociology, 61(3), 365–405. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975620000181

Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037

Pirro, A. (2023). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 101–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860

Program of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians. (2020). Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://partidulaur.ro/program/

Soare, S., & Tufiș, C. D. (2023). Saved by the diaspora? The case of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians. European Political Science, 22, 101–118. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-022-00408-3

Sosro.ro. (2022, September 26). Pentru prima data in istorie, un parlamentar a cerut RO-Exit! De cand suntem in Uniunea Europeana! Ne-am Distrus! Nu pot să spun decât RO-Exit!. SOS. https://sosro.ro/pentru-prima-data-in-istorie-un-parlamentar-a-cerut-ro-exit-de-cand-suntem-in-uniunea-europeana-ne-am-distrus-nu-pot-sa-spun-decat-ro-exit-video/

Starcevic, S. (2024, July 17). Far-right MEP vows to have priest rid European Parliament of ‘devils’. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-mep-diana-sosoaca-vows-to-bring-priest-to-cleanse-the-european-parliament-of-devils-romania-sos-party/

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON ROMANIA

Demonstration by the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang in Brussels, Belgium, on May 29, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections

Please cite as:
van Haute, Emilie. (2024). “Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0062

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON BELGIUM

Abstract

In 2024 elections in Belgium were concurrently held for the European, federal and regional levels. For that reason, the European elections were clearly second-order elections. As the main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (Vlaams Belang, VB) and the left (the Workers’ Party of Belgium, PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. From 2019 to 2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues: migration and law and order for the VB, socioeconomic issues and civil liberties and rights for the PTB–PVDA. Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of the reason for this success is that their program matched with voters’ priorities. Their populist, anti-elite rhetoric also permeated public opinion. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed electorally. Moreover, because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined. At the European level, the VB and the PTB–PVDA will likely continue directly pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. They are also likely to have a real indirect contamination effect through mainstream parties and public opinion integrating part of their programmatic positions and priorities.

Keywords: Belgium; radical parties; populism; voting behaviour; European elections

By Emilie van Haute* (Department of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium)

Introduction

The 2024 European elections in Belgium appeared distinctly like the ‘mother of all elections’. Voters were called to cast ballots concurrently in three separate elections (European, federal and regional) held on the same day. Additionally, it had been five years since Belgian voters had faced a single election. Consequently, it was also a test of the balance of power between the numerous parties that form the two separate party systems operating in the country.

Belgium has a highly fragmented multiparty system. Since the split of traditional party families along the linguistic divide, Belgium has been characterized by two party systems operating separately (Table 1): Flemish parties compete in Flanders (the north of the country), whereas Francophone parties compete in Wallonia (in the south). Parties only compete together in Brussels. 

Among these parties, two are clear cases of populist radical parties based on the PopuList categorization (https://popu-list.org): the radical-left Workers’ Party (Parti du Travail de Belgique–Partij van de arbeid, PTB–PVDA), the only relevant national party in Belgium (Delwit, 2014; 2022), and the radical-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, VB), a party that competes only in Flanders and in Brussels (van Haute & Pauwels, 2016). On the French-speaking side, the populist radical-right parties have always had a hard time anchoring themselves structurally in the political landscape (De Jonge, 2021b; Delwit & van Haute, 2021). The present chapter therefore analyses the electoral performance of the PTB–PVDA and the VB at the 2024 EP elections.

Background

After a series of electoral setbacks after 2007 caused by the emergence of an alternative Flemish nationalist vote with the N–VA and internal tensions around the dominance of the party elite from Antwerp (van Haute & Pauwels, 2016), the populist radical-right VB returned to success at the 2019 European, federal and regional elections. The VB won a substantial number of seats: from 3 seats in the House of Representatives at the federal level in 2014 to 18 seats in 2019. More generally, 2019 saw a substantial shift in party preferences towards radical populist parties (Goovaerts et al., 2020) since the PTB–PVDA also won a significant number of seats (from 2 in 2014 to 12 seats in 2019). These results contributed to a fragmented and polarized political landscape, with VB gaining grounds in Flanders and PTB–PVDA winning in Walloon constituencies. These trends also characterized the concurrent European elections (Figures 1 and 2).

The profile of VB and PTB–PVDA voters in 2019 presented similarities. Data from the 2019 Belgian panel survey (Michel et al., 2024) show that both parties attracted a younger, more male voter group with lower levels of education and a protest component, and displaying lower levels of trust and satisfaction with the government, but also higher levels of anger (Gallina et al., 2020; Jacobs et al., 2024). Populist radical parties thus clearly capitalized on voters seeking an alternative. But they also attracted issue-based voting on their core respective issues (Goovaerts et al., 2020; Walgrave et al., 2020).

VB voters position themselves furthest to the right on the left–right axis and PTB–PVDA furthest to the left. For the PTB–PVDA, this positioning reflects the salience of socioeconomic issues for its voters, whereas for the VB, cultural issues are most salient (Pilet et al., 2020). What explains this difference in the success of populist radical parties across the linguistic divide is not so much the differences in attitudes between French- and Dutch-speaking voters. The average position on socioeconomic and migration issues, for instance, are very similar (Walgrave et al., 2019). 

Rather, it is the structure of the party system and the salience of issues that make a difference. The weakness of the radical-right party organizations in French-speaking Belgium is patent (Close & Ognibene, 2021); in contrast to the VB, such parties lack local anchorage, links with civil society organizations and leadership. Partly due to the cordon sanitaire in the French-speaking media (De Jonge, 2021a), radical-right parties are not able to push their issues on top of the political agenda. While migration was the top priority among voters in Flanders in 2019, it only ranked fifth in Wallonia, where socioeconomic issues dominated (Walgrave et al., 2019).

The 2019–2024 legislature was particularly difficult at the federal level. The polarized results of 2019 put centrifugal pressures on parties in the two political sub-systems. Despite the extended period of minority caretaker government after the N–VA withdrew from the federal government in December 2018, the negotiations to form a new government after the 2019 elections quickly stalled. The position of the two main parties on each side of the linguistic border, the N-VA and the PS, proved irreconcilable as they were both pushed by the pressure of their respective radical challengers, the VB and the PTB. In March 2020, the COVID-19 crisis was an accelerator, and the caretaker government was given six months of full power as a minority government. In October 2020, sixteen months after the elections, a full government was finally formed, composed of seven parties: the two liberal parties (OpenVLD and MR), the two socialist parties (Vooruit and PS), the two green parties (Groen and Ecolo), and the Dutch-speaking Christian Democrats (CD&V). The new government had to deal with COVID-19 and its aftermath, as well as Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the consequent influx of refugees, the energy crisis and high inflation. With seven parties around the table, it was very difficult to agree on major reforms.

The challenge made it easy for opposition parties to capitalize on the weakness of the federal government. On the Dutch-speaking side, the main opposition came from the VB, as the N-VA was leading the Flemish regional government, which was also facing difficulties. On the French-speaking side, the main opposition came from the PTB and Les Engagés.

An analysis of the communication of all 13 parties represented in the federal parliament and their leaders on Twitter (now X) between 1 January 2022 and 31 March 2023 (N=16,330 tweets) reveals that populist radical parties were much more active on social media than mainstream parties (Close et al., 2023; see also Delwit & van Haute, 2021).

The content of this communication provides insights into the saliency and ownership of issues. Overall, the public debate in Flanders and French-speaking Belgium revolved around different issues. Flanders saw more focus on migration, law and order issues (crime, justice), and finance, whereas in French-speaking Belgium, the focus was more on energy, civil rights and liberties, and work (Close et al., 2023). Despite the international context, European issues and foreign affairs were not dominant.

This agenda was particularly favourable to the populist radical parties. Close et al. (2023) have shown that the VB positions itself clearly on the most salient issues in Flanders. They come up first in terms of mentions of migration, law and order (including terrorism), but also lifestyle and religion. Interestingly, the party also comes second on EU issues after the Dutch-speaking Liberals (who held the federal prime ministership) and on animal welfare. They come up third in agriculture.

The PTB also position itself also on the most salient issues in Wallonia (Close et al., 2023), especially civil rights and liberties. The difference in discourse between the two branches of the party is striking in that regard. The results also show that the party avoids any mention of migration issues. Conversely, it clearly owns socioeconomic issues. The party ranks first in terms of mentions of employment, work, pensions, finances, and disasters (on the French-speaking side, linked to the floods of 2021). It ranks second on economy and foreign affairs.

Populist radical parties thus approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They occupied the position of outsiders and alternative vote to an unpopular federal government. They owned the most salient issues in their respective polarized political landscapes. In Flanders, the VB was systematically polling first after autumn 2022 (VRT, 2023), and the PVDA was for the first time also showing anchorage in Flanders. In Wallonia, the PTB was polling third from March 2020, and the gap with the first two parties, the Socialists and the Liberals, was closing in after March 2022.

An electoral victory portrayed as a political defeat

The European elections in Belgium were marked by a change in the electoral rules, allowing 16- and 17-year-olds to vote. After a controversy, voting was also made compulsory for this segment of the electorate. More generally, with no elections held in Belgium since 2019, the 2024 electorate comprised more than a million first-time voters, including 268,000 voters aged 16–17 for the EP elections, which had the potential to weigh on the results.

Radical parties performed extremely well electorally on 9 June (see Figures 1 and 2). At the European level, the VB ranked first in the Dutch-speaking group with 22.9% of the votes, representing an increase of almost 4 percentage points. Given the low number of seats allocated to the Dutch-speaking group (13 out of 22 for Belgium), the party failed to gain an additional seat and therefore tied with N-VA. The progress of the PTB–PVDA was asymmetrical. On the Dutch-speaking side, the party almost doubled its vote share, from 4.9% in 2019 to 8.1% in 2024. It allowed the party to get its first seat in the European Parliament in the Dutch-speaking group. On the French-speaking side, the PTB also confirmed progress. With 15.4% of the votes in the French-speaking group, it gained about 1 percentage point and climbed from the fourth (2019) to the third position. Again, given the low number of seats allocated (8), this symbolic progress did not see the party gain any additional representatives, again taking just one seat in the EP in the French-speaking group.

However, these good electoral performances were overshadowed by what happened at the federal and regional levels. On the Dutch-speaking side, even if the VB progressed and the N-VA lost votes and seats, the latter managed to remain the first party at these levels. The VB underperformed compared to expectations based on the pre-election polling, possibly due to the large number of undecided voters, which makes accurate polling difficult (Pilet et al., 2024). Also, politically, Bart De Wever, leader of the N-VA, clearly closed the door to the VB a couple of days before the elections and encouraged voters to vote for the N-VA, saying that a vote for the VB would be a lost vote. This call for strategic voting seems to have paid off, as N-VA remained the first party at the regional and federal levels but not at the European level, where voters had a lower incentive for strategic voting.

Another element that may have weighed is the performance of De Wever in a new popular TV show, ‘Het conclaaf’ (‘The Conclave’), where he spent a weekend locked away with the VB leader Tom Van Grieken. De Wever clearly dominated the exchanges. Finally, together, N–VA and VB did not come out of the elections with a majority of seats in the Flemish parliament, which de facto excluded this only coalition option. Vlaams Belang was thus quickly portrayed as the underperformer; N-VA managed to frame these results as a victory, and VB was excluded from the negotiations for government formation at the regional and federal levels. The PTB–PVDA also gained votes and seats. At the federal level they progressed in Flanders (from three seats in 2019 to six in 2024, now getting at least one seat in each constituency) and in Brussels (from two to three seats). In Brussels, the PTB mainly gained voters from the socialist party PS and came top among first-time voters (Biesemans et al., 2024). However, the party lost seats in the Walloon constituencies (one at the federal level, two at the regional level). It did not manage to steal as many former PS voters, and it did not convince the first-time voters who turned more massively to the Liberals (MR) and the former Christian Democrats (LE) (Close et al., 2024). As for the VB, the party underperformed compared to what the polls had created regarding expectations, which overshadowed its other victories. The leadership of right-wing parties in the negotiations for government formation in Brussels and Wallonia also meant that the party was directly excluded from the equation.

A program and communication in tune with voters’ priorities

Vlaams Belang presented a classic populist radical-right manifesto for the 2024 elections. Titled ‘Flanders Back to Us’ (VB, 2024), the program puts ethnonationalism first, advocating for Flanders’ independence from Belgium, power to the people, a stop to immigration and a strong take on law and order. Socioeconomic, fiscal and cultural issues are framed in ethnonationalistic terms. In a classic welfare chauvinist approach, national preference is portrayed as the solution to poverty and high housing prices and better health care services; independence is painted as the solution to fiscal and budgetary issues, as the party denounces fiscal transfers to French-speaking Belgium and asks for the return of ‘Flemish money in Flemish hands’ (VB, 2024: 10).

Since elections were held concurrently for three levels, more local issues were covered first, while Europe was discussed in detail only on the last two pages of the VB manifesto (VB, 2024: 96–97). The party uses the ‘taking back control’ tagline and denounces EU leaders as ‘extreme’ (and overly bureaucratic/technocratic), hallmarks of a populist radical-right platform. The party opposes further enlargement and positions itself against EU interference in the national politics of illiberal democracies (e.g., Hungary), as well as EU policies on climate, agriculture and migration. The party’s list of specific proposals includes stifling the European Parliament, reducing Belgium’s budget contribution, negotiating a package of opt-outs from certain EU policies and legislation, defending Western values and promoting the subsidiarity principle and member states’ sovereignty. Interestingly, the manifesto avoids concrete topics related to foreign affairs, such as the Russia–Ukraine War and the war in Gaza.

PTB–PVDA also presented a classic populist radical-left program for the 2024 elections. Titled ‘The Choice to Break Away’ (PTB, 2024), the program puts socioeconomic issues first, advocating for fiscal justice, more social policies and purchasing power for households, better jobs, the right to healthcare, the end of political privileges, and a social climate policy. Highly active on university campuses, the party also tailored its message to young people, which was also likely driven by an interest in mobilizing first-time voters. Similarly, the party takes a notably progressive position on rights and liberties, especially racial discrimination, feminism and LGBTQ+ issues.

The concurrent elections also blurred the VB’s specific positions regarding the EU. The party developed a separate program for the European elections, which did not contribute to making it visible. This program reflected the VB’s populist orientation, with an explicit equation of Europe with a distant class of wealthy and privileged elites. Nevertheless, while the VB mobilizes cultural values and identities to underpin its populist rhetoric, the PTB–PVDA mobilizes a socioeconomic discourse that denounces a capitalist Europe imposing austerity on the poor through nondemocratic rules. The party takes a clear stance against austerity, privileges, inequalities, poverty, punitive environmental taxes, social dumping and the logic of profit and the market. It advocates addressing the root causes of migration, such as poverty in the Global South. Regarding external affairs, the party justify its nonalignment and rejection of NATO in terms of a commitment to striving for peace. On the Israel–Hamas war, it takes a clear position in favour of Palestine, denouncing acts of genocide as against international law and human rights.

The parties’ programs were heavily relayed online. Vlaams Belang is the absolute leader in online communication in Belgium. The party spent €1.5 million during the four months preceding the elections (Ryckmans, 2024). PVDA ranked fourth, spending €708,933. While the PTB had been very present during the legislature, it took a step back during the campaign.

The content of their respective communication reveals the saliency of issues they own (Figure 3). The VB clearly made migration the salient issue in its communication during the campaign. More than a quarter of its communication on X is on this issue. The gap with other parties is massive. The party also over-communicated on crime but to a lesser extent. The PTB–PVDA clearly stands out with its focus on finance, the economy, pensions, work and all socioeconomic issues. Europe is not central to these parties; they mention it less than other parties.

While the content reveals the ideological focus of these parties, the tone of their communication connects to their populist core. Both parties heavily rely on attacks as a mode of communication. Previous studies have shown that personal or programmatic attacks represent 26.5% of the total communication of the VB on X (first party in Belgium) and 25% for the PTB–PVDA (Close et al., 2023).

These programmatic priorities match voters’ priorities. The 2024 Belgian voter panel survey asked voters an open-ended question: ‘What is the most important issue in Belgium at the moment?’ The question was asked in wave 2 of the survey during the campaign. Results show that, in Flanders, three issues stand out: budget and finances, as well as migration and political representation, a category that refers to trust, competence, extremism, and populism (Table 2). These issues match populist radical-right demands. In Brussels and Wallonia too, migration and political representation rank high, together with the economy. Crime and Justice, Employment and institutional reforms form a second block of priorities. These priorities match populist demands towards a change in political elites and institutions, as well as the socioeconomic agenda of the radical left. The populist, anti-elite rhetoric of the two parties also permeated public opinion.

Conclusion

The 2024 elections in Belgium saw voters casting ballots for three separate levels: European, federal and regional. In this context, the EU elections were clearly second-order elections. As main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (VB) and the left (PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. During 2019–2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues, among other things, via a robust online presence.

Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of this success is because their programs matched voters’ priorities. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed. And because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined from negotiations at the regional and federal levels. At the European level, the Belgian delegation is limited, and the fragmentation of the party systems leaves the VB and the PTB–PVDA with a very limited number of seats to weigh in on policies. Nevertheless, they are expected to continue pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. As has been the case at the national level in Belgium, their programmatic positions and priorities have contaminated public opinion and the mainstream parties, which feel pressured by their success, something that is a significant source of concern.


 

(*) Emilie van Haute is Francqui Research Professor at SciencePo ULB (Centre d’étude de la vie politique – Cevipol). Her research interests focus on political parties, political participation and representation, elections and democracy. Her work has appeared in numerous international journals, including Comparative European Politics, the European Journal for Political Research, the Journal of Elections, Party Politics, Public Opinion and Parties, Representation and West European Politics. She is the co-editor of Acta Politica. Email: emilie.van.haute@ulb.be


 

References

2024 Belgian voter panel survey (2024). https://notlikeus.be.

Biesemans, R., Delwit, P., Vandeleene, A., & van Haute, E. (2024). Les dynamiques de vote à Bruxelles le 9 juin 2024. Premiers éléments. Note du Centre d’étude de la vie politiquehttps://cevipol.phisoc.ulb.be/fr/les-dynamiques-du-vote-a-bruxelles-le-9-juin-2024-premiers-elements

Close, C., & Ognibene, M. (2021). Les droites radicales en Belgique francophone. In P. Delwit & E. van Haute (eds.), Les partis politique en Belgique. Brussels : Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 4th edition.

Close, C., Delwit, P., Vandeleene, A., & van Haute, E. (2024). Les dynamiques du vote en Wallonie le 9 juin 2024. Premiers éléments. Note du Centre d’étude de la vie politiquehttps://cevipol.phisoc.ulb.be/fr/les-dynamiques-du-vote-en-wallonie-le-9-juin-2024-premiers-elements

Close, C., Kins, L., Kumar, T., & Jacobs, L. (2023). Les partis politiques et leurs president.e.s sur Twitter : quelles tendances un an avant l’élection de 2024?, Social Media Lab @ULB.

Delwit, P. (2014). PTB. Nouvelle gauche, vieille recette. Liège: Luc Pire.

Delwit, P. (2022). The Labor Party of Belgium (PTB–PVDA): A Modern Radical Left Party?, Frontiers in Political Science, 4. doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.862949

Delwit P., & van Haute, E. (eds.) (2021). Les partis politique en Belgique. Brussels : Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 4th edition.

De Jonge, L. (2021a). The Curious Case of Belgium: Why is There No Right-Wing Populism in Wallonia? Government and Opposition, 56(4), 598–614. doi:10.1017/gov.2020.8

De Jonge, L. (2021b). The Success and Failure of Right-Wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries. London: Routledge.

Gallina, M., Baudewyns, P., & Lefevere, J. (2020). Political Sophistication and Populist Party Support. The Case of PTB–PVDA and VB in the 2019 Belgian Elections. Politics of the Low Countries, 2(3), 265–288. doi:10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003003

Goovaerts, I., Kern, A., van Haute, E., & Marien, S. (2020). Drivers of Support for the Populist Radical Left and Populist Radical Right in Belgium. Politics of the Low Countries, 2(3), 228–264. 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003002

Jacobs, L., Close, C., & Pilet, J.-B. (2024). The angry voter? The role of emotions in voting for the radical left and right at the 2019 Belgian elections. International Political Science Review, Online First. doi.org/10.1177/0192512123122452

Michel, E., Feitosa, F., Lefevere, J., Pilet, J.-B., van Erkel, P., & van Haute, E. (2024). Studying Dimensions of Representation: Introducing the Belgian RepResent Panel (2019–2021). European Political Science, 23, 199–217. doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00430-z

Pilet, J., Lefevere, J., Baudewyns, P., & Eck, B. (2024). Analyse de l’enquête du project NotLikeUs: Les électeurs indécis.

PTB (2024). Programme européen. https://www.ptb.be/programme-europeen

Ryckmans, G. (2024). Plus de 7,4 millions d’euros dépensés sur les réseaux sociaux par les partis politiques lors de la campagne, une stratégie payante?’, RTBF Décrypte, 23 juin 2024.

Social Media Lab (2024). Database of parties and party leaders posts on X (01/01/2024 – 15/05/2024). Social Media Lab @ULB.

Van Erkel, P., Lefevere, J., Walgrave, S., Jennart, I., Kern, A., Marien, S., & Baudewyns, P. (2020). Des transferts de voix avant ou pendant la campagne? Une étude sur les transferts électoraux lors des élections 2019 en Belgique. In J.-B. Pilet, P. Baudewyns, K. Deschouwer, A. Kern, & J. Lefevere (Eds.), Les Belges haussent leur voix (pp.29–58). PUL.

Van Haute, E., & Pauwels, T. (2016). The Vlaams Belang: Party Organisation and Party Dynamics. In R. Heinisch, O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Understanding Populist Party Organisation. The Radical Right in Western Europe (pp.49–77). Palgrave.

Vlaams Belang (2024). Vlaanderen weer van ons. Verkiezingsprogramma.

VRT (2023). Sondage en Flandre : Vlaams Belang reste le plus grand parti, Vooruit gagne plus de terrain, le PVDA monte à la 4ème place, https://www.vrt.be/vrtnws/fr/2023/
05/13/sondage-en-flandre-vlaams-belang-reste-le-plus-grand-parti-vo/

Walgrave, S., et al. (2019). Vlamingen and Walen stemden voor verschillende partijen maar verschillen minder van mening over het beleid dat ze willen. Nota op basis van RepResent-studie. http://represent-project.be/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/EOS-nota-attitude-Vlamingen-en-Walen.pdf

Walgrave, S., van Erkel, P., Jennart, I., Lefevere, J., & Baudewyns, P. (2020). How Issue Salience Pushes Voters to the Left or to the Right. Politics of the Low Countries, 2(3), 319–352.

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON BELGIUM

Campaign poster for the Chega party in downtown Lisbon ahead of the national elections on March 9, 2024, in Lisbon, Portugal. Photo: Lars Hoffmann.

The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal

Please cite as:

Biscaia, Afonso & Salgado, Susana. (2024). “The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0080

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON PORTUGAL

Abstract

Unlike previous European elections, the 2024 European election brought the discussion of European issues to the media and political agendas in Portugal, a country where most voters hold a positive image of the EU. Despite managing to elect its first two MEPs, the European election was not fertile terrain for Chega, as it stopped Chega’s continuous electoral growth since 2019 and its objectives were not fully achieved. Poor candidate selection, overambitious goals, a disconnect between Chega’s soft Euroscepticism and its supporters’ mostly enthusiastic view of the EU, ambiguity about which European party group it would join, and intermittent support from its popular leader, André Ventura, were relevant factors influencing Chega’s campaign and ensuing results. A relatively low turnout and overrepresentation of constituencies that are unlikely to vote for the populist radical right compounded the scenario.

Keywords: Portugal; Chega; populism; European elections; António Tânger Corrêa; André Ventura.

By Afonso Biscaia* & Susana Salgado** (University of Lisbon)

Introduction

The 2024 European election represented the first setback for right-wing populist politics in Portugal after five years of growth. Just three months previously, a snap general election gave the largest-ever representation for right-wing populist Chega (Enough). In this context, Chega publicly set its sights on winning the European elections outright, but poor candidate selection, a lacklustre campaign, a lack of clarity about Chega’s preferences regarding European party groups, and a manifesto that did not conform to its own supporters’ preferences contributed to hampering its goals. Thus, on 9 June, the dominant right-wing populist party in Portugal received around 783,000 fewer votes than it had in March while still electing its first two MEPs.

Growth and reorganization of right-wing populist politics in Portugal (2019–2024)

In the 2019 European elections, the National Renovation Party (Partido Nacional Renovador, PNR) and the Basta coalition (‘Basta’ is a synonym of Chega) were the right-wing populist options. PNR is older and more radical, while Basta was a coalition of small conservative parties and movements led by André Ventura, the leader of Chega, then a splinter group from the centre-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD). Both candidacies were unsuccessful, garnering a combined tally of around 65,000 votes.

Nevertheless, 2019 would turn out to be a pivotal year for Portuguese right-wing populism. In the general election held in October, Chega became the first right-wing populist party to achieve a parliamentary breakthrough, attaining 1.29% of the vote. Chega enhanced its position in two subsequent (snap) elections, in 2022 and 2024, increasing its vote share to 7.18% and 18.07%, respectively, becoming the dominant radical right-wing populist party and third largest overall.

Chega’s agenda has focused on typical radical right-wing populist issues, such as corruption, immigration and security (Biscaia & Salgado, 2022; Mendes, 2022), as well as on the rhetorical construction of an in-group of ‘righteous Portuguese’ in opposition to out-groups and the political elite (Biscaia & Salgado, 2022). Foreign policy has not been Chega’s priority. Its stances on the matter are often instrumental. Regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chega adopted a pro-Ukraine position, aligned with most mainstream parties (Biscaia & Salgado, 2023). On the Israel-Palestine conflict, it was clearly pro-Israel, claiming Netanyahu’s government was entitled to ‘neutralize the threat’, and was the only parliamentary party that declined to join calls for a ceasefire (Agência Lusa, 2024a).

The sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s and subsequent austerity policies drove some voters out of the electoral market and cleared the way for smaller parties to make gains by bringing new issues to the fore (Lisi et al., 2020). Chega was the most successful party in capitalizing on these opportunities and managed to mobilize voters who had abstained in previous elections and maintain their vote, but also attracted voters who had previously voted for PSD and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) in previous elections (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024b). Anti-Roma sentiment and welfare chauvinism were key issues in Chega’s growth even before its official founding, as Ventura’s first run for local office, still with PSD, leant heavily on Romaphobia (Bugalho, 2017). Similarly, Afonso (2021) has found that electoral support for the radical right in the 2021 presidential election in Portugal was disproportionately higher in those localities with greater concentrations of Roma populations and welfare beneficiaries. However, as concerns about immigration have intensified in Portugal, with support for restrictive migration policies reaching a slight majority (55%) in 2023–2024 (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024c), migrants – especially Muslims – have become a more prominent target in Chega’s rhetoric (e.g., Matos, 2024).

Other parties tried to emulate Chega’s quick growth. The PNR rebranded as Ergue-te (Rise Up) shortly after Chega’s success in 2019, but the move proved ineffectual, as it received a paltry 0.09% of the vote in the 2024 general election. The Democratic Republican Party (Partido Democrático Republicano, PDR), a centrist populist party (Salgado & Zúquete, 2017), also rebranded, taking on the name Democratic National Alternative (Alternativa Democrática Nacional, ADN) and establishing connections with ultra-conservative Brazilian evangelical groups (Vasco, 2024). The ADN baffled pundits in the 2024 general election by multiplying its previous election tally tenfold and qualifying for state funding despite narrowly failing to elect a single MP; the result was interpreted as a product either of influential political evangelicalism (Henriques, 2024) or confusion between its name and that of the Democratic Alternative (AD), a centre-right coalition composed of the PSD, the CDS–People’s Party and the People’s Monarchist Party (PPM) (Camilo, 2024).

European election: candidates, manifestos and the campaign

Chega’s lead candidate in the European election was António Tânger Corrêa, a party vice president and former diplomat. A month before the election, 71% of poll respondents said they did not know who he was (CESOP Surveys, 2024a), and a few days before the election, 22% of survey respondents who had voted for Chega in March said they were still undecided about the European election (CESOP Surveys, 2024b). The candidate was perceived as eccentric, which was reinforced by his endorsement of conspiracy theories such as ‘the great replacement’ and use of antisemitic tropes, like accusing the Mossad of forewarning American Jews of terrorist attacks on 9/11 (e.g., Chagas, 2024; Malhado, 2024). Ventura, much more popular among Chega supporters, seemed not to prioritize the European election, spending significant time campaigning for regional elections in Madeira; he only joined Tânger Corrêa in the last stretch of the campaign, trying to ensure improved media coverage.

Tânger Corrêa was also ambiguous about Chega’s membership in European political groups, refusing to address the issue and, at one point, saying voters did not need to know how the party would behave in the European Parliament (Oliveira Martins et al., 2024). Nevertheless, Chega had been a member of the Identity and Democracy group (ID) since 2020. Its views on European issues were generally aligned with those expressed on ID’s program, such as its opposition to ‘any supranational construction’ and demand for stricter immigration control (Identity and Democracy Party, n.d.) as well as in drawing a ‘sharp distinction between Europe and the European Union’ and emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, as advocated for in ID’s ‘Declaration of Antwerp’ (Identity and Democracy Party, 2022). However, only 5% of Portuguese Eurobarometer respondents have a negative image of the EU (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 2024), and Chega supporters are only slightly less enthusiastic. On average, they express positive views of EU and Eurozone membership, as well as further European integration. They differ from the mainstream mainly in expressing more disillusionment about the bloc’s democratic nature: 46% of surveyed Chega supporters were ‘reasonably’ or ‘extremely’ satisfied with it, compared to 56% of PS supporters and 67% of those who identify with PSD (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024a).

Aware of the EU’s popularity in Portugal and among its supporters, Chega articulated some soft Euroscepticism in its European election manifesto: ‘A Europa Precisa de uma Limpeza’ (Europe Needs a Clean Up). Thus, the document conceded that EU membership had ‘served the [Portuguese] national interest’ (Chega, 2024: 3) but defined Chega as ‘a deeply sovereigntist, pro-European, and Atlanticist’ party (Chega, 2024: 3) and claims that European institutions have been ‘overtaken by a narrow bureaucratic oligarchy that disregards member states’ identities and history and meddles in practically every dimension of life (Chega, 2024: 3–4). The manifesto envisioned intergovernmental cooperation guided by an ‘uncompromising’ defence of each member state’s national interest as the main policy mechanism and dismissed further integration (Chega, 2024: 6–7). Migration was presented as the foremost policy priority, arguing that it threatened ‘member states’ identity and security’ by pointing at ‘the situation in Germany, Italy, Greece, France, and Sweden’ (Chega, 2024: 7–8). Other stated priorities were expanding member states’ military capabilities to end ‘military reliance on the United States’ (Chega, 2024: 10) while urging that Portugal meet the minimum NATO commitment of 2% of GDP for annual defence spending (Chega, 2024: 10), and fighting corruption.

However, reinforcing the second-order nature of European elections in Portugal, Chega’s manifesto proposals were mostly focused on domestic policy, like abandoning the UN’s Global Compact for Migration, revoking the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) mobility agreement, and establishing stricter rules for Portuguese naturalization. European-level proposals were scarce but included reinforcing the Frontex mechanism (Chega, 2024: 8), ending assistance for ‘NGOs that support illegal immigration’ and, vaguely, the ‘generalized adoption of the [immigration] models the UK has been implementing’ (Chega, 2024: 8). Despite Ventura having called for further sanctions on Russia in the past (Biscaia & Salgado, 2023), no specific course of action was proposed regarding ongoing wars.

Regarding the other populist parties’ lead candidates in the European election, ADN’s lead candidate was Joana Amaral Dias, a well-known former MP of Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE), and Ergue-te selected Rui Fonseca Castro, a controversial former judge. ADN’s European election manifesto articulated what could be described as a denialist ideology. It urged peace between Russia and Ukraine, lamenting the loss of access to ‘cheap Russian energy’ (ADN, 2024: 4) and urging an end to sanctions (ADN, 2024: 25), opposed green transition initiatives as ‘turning science into a dogma’ and ‘making life impossible for European businesses’ (ADN, 2024: 7). ADN castigated ‘the failure of integration’ and demanded restrictive migration policies (ADN, 2024: 39). Ergue-te’s hard Eurosceptic manifesto ‘Libertar a Europa da União Europeia’ (Freeing Europe from the European Union) predicted and advocated for the ‘inevitable implosion’ of the EU (Ergue-te, 2024: 4), but recognized that Portugal’s exit from the bloc was ‘for now, impossible’ (Ergue-te, 2024: 2). It denounced migration, including of ‘so-called refugees’ (Ergue-te, 2024: 5) and proposed the reversal of same-sex marriage laws (Ergue-te, 2024: 7). Regarding national defence, Ergue-te stance is akin to Chega’s, advocating for European ‘military emancipation’ from the United States, through the creation of a more robust defence industry (Ergue-te, 2024: 7).

Debates provided opportunities to set the agenda. In past European election campaigns, the media had been criticized for focusing excessively on domestic issues, but that was not the case in 2024, as debates focused on issues like immigration, defence, EU enlargement, and the potential nomination of the former prime minister, António Costa, as president of the European Council (Ribeiro, 2024; Ribeiro Soares & Martins, 2024). Apart from Costa’s – at the time putative – nomination, the issues roughly corresponded with the electorate’s assessment of the most important issues facing the EU, of which the war in Ukraine, the internal situation, immigration, and the economy came out on top (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 2024). Tânger Corrêa participated in the mainstream televised debates but did not prove appealing to TV audiences, as his appearances were estimated to be the least watched (Borges Ferreira, 2024), and his assertions frequently fact-checked (e.g., Leal, 2024) and derided as too weird. ADN and Ergue-te participated in a single debate between smaller parties without parliamentary representation. However, these parties failed to seize the opportunity to reverse their image as fringe candidates.

The election

In Portugal, as in other member states, European elections are considered second-order elections, and the 2024 European elections came at the uncertain beginning of a new political cycle in Portugal. PS, led by António Costa, had governed since 2015 and remained fairly popular throughout most of its long tenure, but several scandals deteriorated its image, and the AD coalition, led by PSD, narrowly won the 2024 snap general election. Its slim parliamentary plurality – 80 MPs to PS’s 78 and Chega’s 50 – means the new government must negotiate in parliament, including over the state budget. Pointing to similarities between PS and PSD, Ventura designated himself as ‘the real leader of the opposition’ and announced that Chega would not vote AD legislation through (Carrapatoso & Figueiredo, 2024). Tânger Corrêa’s candidacy was launched at this time, which partly explains Ventura’s statement of Chega’s objectives: to win the election, avoid a centrist majority in the European Parliament and Ursula von der Leyen’s re-election, and spearhead a ‘grand European coalition, from Hungary to Lisbon’ (Figueiredo, 2024).

The aftermath of the general election was still an important topic during the European Parliamentary election campaign and despite a slight increase in participation from the previous two elections (2014: 33.84%; 2019: 30.73%), only 36.47% of eligible voters deposited ballots on 9 June, compared to 59.84% in the March general election. Ultimately, PS, whose lead candidate, Marta Temido, owed her popularity to having been health minister during the COVID-19 pandemic, reversed the earlier results, narrowly beating AD, whose list was led by TV pundit Sebastião Bugalho. Both achieved vote shares of around 30% and fewer than 40.000 votes separated them. Similarly, left-wing parties’ results were akin to those in March, and the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP), the BE, and Livre (Free) all tallied at around 4%. However, only the former two managed to elect an MEP.

The most significant differences in results happened on the right: despite lower participation, Liberal Initiative (Iniciativa Liberal, IL) gained nearly 40,000 votes more than in the general election, up to 9.08%, and elected two MEPs. Conversely, Chega lost nearly 783.000 votes from its general election tally despite holding on to third place and also electing two MEPs, with 9.79% of the total vote. Chega’s losses were greater than any other party’s, and, unlike in the general election, it failed to capture first or second place in any electoral district in Portugal. However, it did repeat wins in constituencies abroad, like Switzerland or Brazil.

Chega’s loss can also be partially explained by a more challenging context in this election, namely concerning voter demographics, since older and more educated voters, who are more likely to vote in low-turnout elections and less likely to vote for the right-wing populist party, were estimated to have been overrepresented (Magalhães, 2024). On the night of 9 June, Tânger Corrêa described the day as ‘not good’, and Ventura admitted Chega ‘did not achieve its goals’ but found comfort in obtaining more votes than in 2019 and electing MEPs (Camilo, 2024b). The ADN and Ergue-te failed to elect any MEPs, attaining 1.37% and 0.16% of the total vote, respectively. Despite the ADN’s similar vote share compared to March, it lost nearly half of its votes, reigniting the debate over its previous result. Additionally, Ergue-te’s marginal result seems to confirm its fringe status once again, but also that of hard Euroscepticism.

Conclusion

The 2024 European election capped a cycle of uninterrupted growth for Chega that started at its launch in the 2019 European elections. During that period, Chega managed to go from parliamentary breakthrough to 50 MPs, sparking the reorganization of its area of the political field, namely the rebranding of extant parties that Chega overtook and the appearance of new players interested in replicating its success in mobilizing non-voters. Chega’s expectations were high in the 2024 European elections, and Ventura publicly set the win as Chega’s goal.

Nevertheless, the nomination of the eccentric António Tânger Corrêa and enhanced media scrutiny weakened the campaign. For the first time since its foundation, Chega received fewer votes than in the previous election despite electing its two first MEPs, Tânger Corrêa and Tiago Moreira de Sá. It is too early to predict whether this result will have any lingering effects on the party at the national level, as Ventura’s popularity among Chega supporters and media visibility remain undiminished.

Similarly, it is not straightforward to predict what the Chega MEPs’ main legislative priorities will be. The party joined the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group along with other right-wing populist mainstays like France’s National Rally (RN) and the Freedom Party of Austria (both formerly in ID), as well as Spain’s Vox, part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group until July 2024, and Fidesz, which left the European People’s Party (EPP) in 2021. The new group’s manifesto advocates for similar principles as the ID’s, asserting that the EU has ‘turned against Europeans and now pursues interests contrary to the will of the Nations, Regions, and small communities that constitute our European home’ (Patriots for Europe, n.d.), while pledging to ‘prioritize sovereignty over federalism’ (Patriots for Europe, n.d.). Chega MEPs will likely join initiatives designed to restrict immigration and bolster European military–industrial capacity, as both were presented as priorities in Chega’s manifesto.

However, it is less clear how Tânger Corrêa’s views on the invasion of Ukraine will influence his voting record. On 17 July, he abstained on a resolution recommitting the EU to ongoing support for Ukraine (Antunes & Figueiredo, 2024). However, attempts to block further financial and military aid to Ukraine would put him at odds with Chega’s official position. Regardless, Chega’s MEPs will almost certainly not prove decisive in defining PfE’s priorities. Despite Tânger Corrêa’s nomination as one of its vice presidents, the group looks set to be steered by more influential players in the European right and the radical right-wing populist milieu.


 

(*) Afonso Biscaia is a PhD candidate in Comparative Politics at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais–Universidade de Lisboa. His main research interests include radical right-wing populism and digital political communication.

(**) Susana Salgado (PhD, 2007) is a political communication scholar. She coordinates research projects, teaches, and publishes on democracy, populism, disinformation, hate and online extremism, and political polarization. Salgado is currently Principal Research Fellow at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais–Universidade de Lisboa and the principal investigator of externally funded research projects, including “(The Matrix of) Populist and Denialist Attitudes towards Science” (PTDC/CPO- CPO/4361/2021) and “Depictions and Politicization of the Truth in Democratic Politics (2020.04070.CEECIND/CP1615/CT0007).


 

References

Afonso, A. (2021) Correlates of aggregate support for the radical right in Portugal. Research and Politics, 8(3). DOI: 10.1177/20531680211029416

Agência Lusa (2024a, 27 May) Chega é o único partido português que não pede um cessar-fogo imediato em Gaza. Expressohttps://expresso.pt/politica/eleicoes/europeias-2024/2024-05-27-chega-e-o-unico-partido-portugues-que-nao-pede-um-cessar-fogo-imediato-em-gaza-62daebae

Alternativa Democrática Nacional (2024) Programa Eleitoral–Eleições Parlamento Europeu 2024. Retrieved on 26 June 2024, from: https://adn.com.pt/programa-eleitoral-partido-adn-europeias-2024/

Antunes, R.P., & Figueiredo, I.A. (2024) Parlamento Europeu reafirma apoio à Ucrânia. PCP mantém tradição de ser contra e delegação do Chega divide-se. Observadorhttps://observador.pt/especiais/parlamento-europeu-reafirma-apoio-a-ucrania-pcp-mantem-tradicao-de-ser-contra-e-delegacao-do-chega-divide-se/

Biscaia, A., & Salgado, S. (2022). Placing Portuguese right-wing populism into context: Analogies with France, Italy, and Spain. In D. Palau-Sampaio, G. Lopez Garcia, & L. Ianelli (Eds.), Contemporary politics, communication, and the impact on democracy. (pp. 234–250). IGI Global. DOI: 10.4018/978-1-7998-8057-8.ch013

Biscaia, A., & Salgado, S. (2023) The Ukraine-Russia war and the Far Right in Portugal: Minimal impacts on the rising populist Chega party. In: G. Ivaldi, E. Zankina (eds.) The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). DOI: 10.55271/rp0026

Borges Ferreira, C. (2024, June 6) Cotrim de Figueiredo é o candidato com mais telespectadores nos debates, Tânger Corrêa está em último. Ecohttps://eco.sapo.pt/2024/06/06/cotrim-de-figueiredo-e-o-candidato-com-mais-telespectadores-nos-debates-tanger-correia-esta-em-ultimo/

Bugalho, S. (2017, 17 July) André Ventura. ‘Os ciganos vivem quase exclusivamente de subsídios do Estado’. Solhttps://sol.sapo.pt/2017/07/17/andre-ventura-os-ciganos-vivem-quase-exclusivamente-de-subsidios-do-estado/

Camilo, D. (2024a, 11 March) Enganos nas eleições? Votos no ADN podem ter tirado três deputados à AD. Rádio Renascença. https://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2024/03/11/enganos-nas-eleicoes-votos-no-adn-podem-ter-tirado-tres-deputados-a-ad/370348/

Camilo, D. (2024b, 10 June) Tânger Corrêa assume que ‘não foi bom dia’ para o Chega. ‘Sou o único responsável’, diz Ventura. Rádio Renascençahttps://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2024/06/10/tanger-correa-assume-que-nao-foi-bom-dia-para-o-chega-sou-o-unico-responsavel-diz-ventura/381870/

Carrapatoso, M.S., & Figueiredo, I.A. (2024, 17 May) O ‘jogo virou’ e o choque entre Montenegro e Ventura é ‘irreversível’. Observadorhttps://observador.pt/especiais/o-jogo-virou-e-o-choque-entre-montenegro-e-ventura-e-irreversivel/

CESOP Surveys (2024a) Sondagem de maio de 2024https://www.erc.pt/pt/depositos/depositos-2024/sondagem-maio-2024-cesop/

CESOP Surveys (2024b) Sondagem de maio/junho de 2024https://www.erc.pt/pt/depositos/depositos-2024/sondagem-maio-junho-2024-cesop/

Chagas, T.A. (2024, June 7) Tânger Corrêa alega que há uma ‘substituição da população’ europeia. Rádio Renascençahttps://rr.sapo.pt/noticia/politica/2024/06/07/tanger-correa-alega-que-ha-uma-substituicao-da-populacao-europeia/381662/

Chega (2024) A Europa Precisa de uma Limpeza. Retrieved on 26 June 2024, from: https://partidochega.pt/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Programa_Eleitoral_UE2024_CHEGA.pdf

Ergue-te (2024) Libertar a Europa da União Europeia. Retrieved on June 26, 2024, from: https://www.partidoergue-te.pt/2024/05/programa-do-ergue-te-europeias-2024/

Figueiredo, I.A. (2024, March 25) Tânger Corrêa é o candidato do Chega às europeias. Ventura espera ‘resultado histórico’. Observadorhttps://observador.pt/2024/03/25/tanger-correa-e-o-candidato-do-chega-as-eleicoes-europeias-ventura-espera-resultado-historico/

Henriques, G. (2024, March 14) O voto evangélico chegou a Portugal: ADN tornou-se alvo apetecível para alcançar a ‘bancada evangélica’. Expressohttps://expresso.pt/politica/2024-03-14-O-voto-evangelico-chegou-a-Portugal-ADN-tornou-se-alvo-apetecivel-para-alcancar-a-bancada-evangelica-526ae208

ICS–ISCTE Surveys (2024a) Sondagem maio 2024, parte 1https://sondagens-ics-ul.iscte-iul.pt/category/estudos/

ICS–ISCTE Surveys (2024b) Sondagem maio 2024, parte 2https://sondagens-ics-ul.iscte-iul.pt/category/estudos/

ICS–ISCTE Surveys (2024c) Sondagem janeiro/fevereiro 2024https://sondagens-ics-ul.iscte-iul.pt/category/estudos/

Identity and Democracy Party (n.d.) Program. Retrieved 26 June 2024, from: https://id-party.eu/program

Identity and Democracy Party (2022) Declaration of Antwerp (23 June 2022). Retrieved 26 June 2024, from: https://id-party.eu/program

Leal, S. (2024, 15 May) Debates Europeias. António Tânger Corrêa:’ Aumentou a criminalidade de uma imigração que nós consideramos excelente que são os brasileiros’. Polígrafohttps://poligrafo.sapo.pt/fact-check/antonio-tanger-correa-aumentou-a-criminalidade-de-uma-imigracao-que-nos-consideramos-excelente-que-sao-os-brasileiros/

Lisi, M., Rodrigues Sanches, E., dos Santos Maia, J. (2020) Party System Renewal or Business as Usual? Continuity and Change in Post-Bailout Portugal. South European Society and Politics, 25:2, 179–203. DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2020.1862498

Magalhães, P., & Cancela, J. (2024, 26 January). Political Neglect and Support for the Radical Right: The Case of Rural Portugal. https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/ju4xd

Magalhães, P. (2024, 21 June) As bases sociais do voto nas europeias. [Blog post] https://sondagens-ics-ul.iscte-iul.pt/2024/06/21/as-bases-sociais-do-voto-nas-europeias/

Malhado, A.R. (2024, 22 May) António, o tiro-no-pé, Tânger Corrêa. Sábado.https://www.sabado.pt/portugal/detalhe/antonio-o-tiro-no-pe-tanger-correa

Matos, V. (2024, 6 June) André Ventura radicaliza o discurso contra estrangeiros. Expressohttps://expresso.pt/politica/eleicoes/europeias-2024/2024-06-06-andre-ventura-radicaliza-o-discurso-contra-estrangeiros-e2261463

Mendes, M.S. (2022) ‘Enough’ of What? An Analysis of Chega’s Populist Radical Right Agenda. South European Politics and Society, 26:3, 329–353, DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2022.2043073

Moury, C., De Giorgi, E., Pita Barros, P. (2021) How to Combine Public Spending with Fiscal Rigour? ‘Austerity by Stealth’ in Post-Bailout Portugal. In: E. De Giorgi, J. Santana-Pereira (eds.) The Exceptional Case of Post-Bailout Portugal. London: Routledge.

Oliveira Martins, I., Barreto, F., Mayor, J.S., Paixão, V. (2024, May 2024) Chega considera que não tem de esclarecer o eleitorado sobre família política europeia que vai escolher. SIC Notíciashttps://sicnoticias.pt/especiais/europeias-2024/2024-05-31-video-chega-considera-que-nao-tem-de-esclarecer-o-eleitorado-sobre-familia-politica-europeia-que-vai-escolher-cbfe670d

Patriots for Europe (n.d.) ‘Patriots.eu’ – Manifesto. Retrieved 25 July 2024, from: https://partidochega.pt/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Manifesto.pdf

Public Opinion Monitoring Unit (2024) Standard Eurobarometer 101–Spring 2024. Retrieved on 26 June 2024, from: https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3216

Ribeiro, L. (2024, 13 May) Quem diria? Falou-se mesmo da Europa no primeiro debate das Europeias. Visãohttps://visao.pt/atualidade/eleicoes-europeias/2024-05-13-quem-diria-falou-se-mesmo-da-europa-no-primeiro-debate-das-europeias/

Ribeiro Soares, M., & Martins, A. (2024, 20 May) Candidatos do Chega, Bloco de Esquerda, Livre e PAN em debate. RTPhttps://www.rtp.pt/noticias/politica/candidatos-do-chega-bloco-de-esquerda-livre-e-pan-em-debate_n1571848

Salgado, S., Zúquete, J.P. (2017) Portugal: Discreet populisms amid unfavorable contexts and stigmatization. In: T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reineman, J. Strömbäck, C.H. de Vreese (eds.) Populist Political Communication in Europe. 235–248. Abingdon: Routledge.

Teixeira, D.C. (2024, March 11) €339.149,16: ADN não contava receber tanto dinheiro do Estado mas vai pedir subvenção e até já sabe onde a vai gastar. CNN Portugalhttps://cnnportugal.iol.pt/decisao24/eleicao-legislativas/339-149-16-adn-nao-contava-receber-tanto-dinheiro-do-estado-mas-vai-pedir-a-subvencao-e-ate-ja-sabe-onde-a-vai-gastar/20240311/65ef652ad34e8d13c9b8b953

Vasco, R.S. (2024, March 1) ADN. Quem é partido português apoiado por Jair Bolsonaro e o que explica a entrada na lista com maiores intenções de voto. Sapo 24https://24.sapo.pt/atualidade/artigos/adn-quem-e-o-partido-portugues-apoiado-por-jair-bolsonaro-e-o-que-explica-a-entrada-na-lista-com-maiores-intencao-de-voto

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON PORTUGAL

European Parliamentary election posters of the FPÖ in Vienna, Austria, on May 15, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

The Populist Radical-right Freedom Party in the Austrian 2024 EU elections

Please cite as:

Miklin, Eric. (2024). “The Populist Radical-right Freedom Party in the Austrian 2024 EU elections.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0061

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON AUSTRIA

Abstract

The only competitive populist party running in the 2024 EU elections in Austria, the radical-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) relied on well-proven recipes that have made it one of the most successful populist parties in (Western) Europe for the last 30 years. It called for cutting down the EU’s competences to half the size of its institutions and budget and harshly criticized its policies concerning migration, the war in Ukraine, the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. This criticism was combined with a highly alarmist rhetoric that portrayed political opponents as either corrupt, fanatical or insane. While all this met with uniform criticism by other Austrian parties and large parts of the media, this again allowed the party to present itself as the sole party actually fighting for the Austrian interest against a broken system controlled by a single establishment ‘unity party’ (Einheitspartei). Once more, this strategy paid off and the FPÖ landed in the first place for the first time in a nationwide election.

Keywords: Austria; populist radical right; Euroscepticism; anti-establishment positioning; European Parliament

 

By Eric Miklin*(Department of Political Science, Paris-Lodron University, Salzburg, Austria)

Austrian populism: The radical right Freedom Party

Populism in Austria so far has been confined mainly to parties of the (more or less) radical right. Throughout the years, several of these parties have entered the national and regional parliaments but sooner or later departed the scene. The one exception to this is the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Founded in 1956, it did not start as a populist party but descended from both liberal and German nationalist currents of the nineteenth century. While it managed to enter parliament in 1956 and has stayed there ever since it played a rather marginal role in the Austrian party system for the first three decades. However, this changed in 1987, when Jörg Haider was elected as party leader, transforming the FPÖ into one of the first and most successful populist radical-right parties in Europe (Heinisch 2003). Since then, the party has reached up to 27% of the vote in national elections and has not only participated in regional governments regularly but also entered national government three times (2000–2003, 2003–2005, and 2017–2019) through coalitions with the centre-right Austrian Peoples Party (ÖVP).

The party’s success has been based on a strong focus on opposing migration policies, identity politics and authoritarianism, combined with classical elements of populism as a ‘thin ideology’ (Mudde 2017). Hence, the party holds a critical stance towards liberal elements of democracy like representation, the separation of powers, the protection of minorities and basic rights. Politics, thereby, is seen as a Manichean battle between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ in which the FPÖ portrays itself as the sole defender of the will of the Austrian people against corrupt (political) elites (Wodak 2005). While the fight against migration clearly has remained its core issue, the party has taken highly critical positions on measures aiming at fighting climate change or towards protective measures taken by the Austrian government during the COVID-19 pandemic (Eberl et al. 2021), among others.

Over the years, the FPÖ has gone through major crises, leading to party splits and significant electoral losses (see Figure 1). The party’s successful ‘stock response’ so far has been its further radicalization in terms of its policies and rhetoric (Heinisch & Hauser 2016), but also in terms of its proponents and their contacts with organizations that have been classified as ‘extreme right’ by the Austrian Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution like the Identitarian movement or selected German nationalist fraternities (Bundesministerium für Inneres 2023). By now, the party has also established a quite dense network with other anti-liberal populist actors like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the French National Rally (RN), but also Vladimir Putin’s United Russia, with which the FPÖ even signed a formal partnership agreement in 2016 (i.e., after Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian Crimea; Heinisch & Hofmann 2023).

During the 2024 EU elections, the FPÖ was the only populist party represented in the Austrian parliament. The only other party that might be classified as populist that ran in the elections was the Democratic, Neutral, Authentic (DNA) list led by a former physician and anti-vaccine activist, who played an active role in protests directed against the protective measures taken by the Austrian government during the COVID-19 pandemic. This party, however, was founded just months before the elections, received hardly any media- and public attention, and failed to win a seat, taking just 2.7% of the votes. The following report will therefore restrict its focus to the FPÖ.

The Freedom Party and EU affairs

Due to its German nationalist origins and the resulting denial of an Austrian nation, the FPÖ for decades was quite positive about the country joining the EU as a second-best option given the impossibility of a ‘reunification’ with Germany (Fallend 2008: 2010ff). It was only in 1991 when the party started to take a more critical position – which in the literature has been interpreted less as an ideological repositioning but as driven by electoral considerations of its then-party leader Haider, who in 1988 was still claiming the Austrian nation was an Ideologische Missgeburt or ‘ideological monstrosity’ (Frölich-Steffen 2004). As a result, the right-wing FPÖ, together with the left-wing Green Party, opposed Austria’s EU accession during the campaign for the required constitutional referendum in 1994. However, while the Green Party modified its position soon after the referendum had passed successfully, the FPÖ stuck to its negative position, making itself (for most of the 30 years since then) the only parliamentary party publicly voicing harsh opposition against EU integration.

In line with the FPÖ’s ideological move from German nationalism to Austrian patriotism (Frölich-Steffen 2004), its position became even more critical over time. Until today, the party has never (openly) called for Austria to leave the EU. Still, it hailed the UK’s decision in favour of Brexit and, so far, has never rejected the possibility of a future ‘Öxit’ (Bartlau 2023). Also, the party not only opposes further integration but calls for the renationalization of decision-making powers to unwind purported aberrations evoked by both the Maastricht and the Lisbon Treaties (FPÖ 2017). In its current party manifesto, the FPÖ envisages a ‘Europe of Peoples’, rejecting ‘any artificial synchronisation … through forced multiculturalism, globalization, and mass integration’. In the party’s view, cooperation within the EU must be based on the principles of subsidiarity and federalism and ‘[t]he basic constitutional principles of sovereign member states must have absolute priority over Community law’ (FPÖ 2024a).

The Freedom Party’s 2024 EU campaign

In line with this position, in its 2024 campaign, the FPÖ repeatedly stated that it would not aim for an ‘Öxit’. However, it framed the elections as a ‘referendum’ about Austria’s ‘future’ and as a choice between a ‘centralized state’ on the one hand and ‘sovereignty’ on the other (Kurz, 2024). For this to be achieved, it called for ‘the EU to shed some pounds’ (‘Weg mit dem Speck’) by halving both the size of the EU’s budget and its institutions. As the party’s front runner, Harald Vilimsky, put it: “The smaller the bureaucratic monster in Brussels, the less it is able to intervene in the lives of European citizens with ever more regulations. In contrast to what our opponents claim, we don’t want to destroy anything …. We only want to focus European cooperation on the original idea of ​​the EU, which has long been forgotten: peace, freedom and prosperity” (Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub 2024).

According to its electoral manifesto (FPÖ 2024b), the number of MEPs should be cut by half since even the US Congress functions with fewer members, and that, in any event, the EP does not count as a real parliament (Vilimsky 2023). Moreover, the idea brought by Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán to abolish direct elections in favour of the pre-1979 system of national MPs representing their member states was seen as ‘definitely worth considering’ by Vilismky (Kurier 2024).

Regarding policies, four topics dominated the party’s campaign: migration, the war in Ukraine, Climate change and, notably, the COVID-19 pandemic. Amongst those four, migration was the most important. The FPÖ rejected the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum and generally any mandatory distribution of asylum seekers across the EU. Instead, it called for a ‘Fortress Europe’ based on a ‘Pact on Re-Migration’ that should transform Europe’s human rights framework into a legal system that permits (a) pushbacks at the EU’s internal and external borders, (b) the denial of asylum to refugees stemming from non-European territory and (c) extra-territorial refugee camps, amongst others. While the Israel–Hamas war was scarcely raised as an issue, the party harshly criticized the EU’s activities in the war between Russia and Ukraine. It called for an immediate end to financial and military aid to Ukraine, as well as for the sanctions against Russia to be abolished due to their detrimental effects on the economy. While the EU was criticized for not trying to find a peaceful solution faithfully, the support for its policies by the Austrian government was criticized as a breach of the country’s constitutional obligation of neutrality.

Regarding environmental policy, the FPÖ demanded a stop to the European Green Deal, the EU Nature Restoration Law, and the scheduled ban on combustion engines. Concerning COVID-19, the party called for a ruthless elucidation of the EU’s allegedly questionable role during the pandemic. Amongst others, it demanded the disclosure of text messages sent between Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and the CEO of Pfizer, the pharmaceutical company from which the EU obtained its vaccinations (Vilimsky, 2024a). More generally, the EU’s COVID-19 policies were criticized for unjustified restrictions on individual freedoms and for having been abused to turn the EU into a Schuldenunion or ‘debt union’ (FPÖ 2024b). 

The frames used by the FPÖ when pushing these claims were located mainly on the cultural dimension when it comes to questions of migration and the EU’s future development (see above). Arguments regarding global warming and the war in Ukraine were framed mainly in economic terms. The party called for Klimapolitik mit Augenmaß, namely, climate policies with a ‘sense of proportion’ regarding their economic effect. At the same time, the sanctions against Russia were criticized for hurting Austria and the EU more economically than they hurt Russia.

Generally, however, the party’s campaign was based less on arguments than on evoking negative emotions by using highly alarmist language combined with rhetoric that portrayed its political opponents on the national level – the ÖVP, the Social Democrats (SPÖ), the Greens and the Liberals – as all being part of an Einheitspartei or ‘single political party’ (Vilimsky 2024b), and EU-level actors as either corrupt, fanatical or insane. For example, on an election poster entitled ‘Stop the EU-lunacy’, a dystopic photo montage showed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and Commission President von der Leyen allegedly kissing each other intimately, surrounded by scenes entitled ‘eco-communism’, ‘COVID-19 chaos’, ‘warmongering’ and ‘asylum-crisis’ (Figure 2).

The demand side of the EU: Critical populism in Austria

The FPÖ’s mix of issues and its communicative strategy turned out to be successful (Figure 3). First, it increased its vote share significantly compared to 2019 (it should be noted, however, that the party was hit by a huge scandal – the so-called Ibiza affair – that led to the step-down of the FPÖ’s then-party leader and Austria’s deputy chancellor, Heinz-Christian Strache and the collapse of the then ÖVP–FPÖ governing coalition just eight days before the election). Second, and more importantly, for the first time ever, the FPÖ managed to end up in first place in a nationwide election. According to exit polls, the party won votes mainly from the ÖVP (about 221.000 out of the 891.000 votes for the FPÖ) but also from about 100,000 voters who, perhaps demotivated by the Ibiza affair, did not vote in 2019 (Laumer & Praprotnik 2024). Despite the win, electoral analyses in the media interpreted the result as slightly disappointing for the party, as many polls leading up to the election had predicted an even larger victory and a greater margin over the runner-up, the ÖVP.

There are three possible explanations for this. First, the turnout rates of FPÖ supporters at EU elections have traditionally been lower than in other national elections. Second, FPÖ voters, on average, had decided who they would vote for earlier than supporters of other parties, which might have led to biased polling results. Third, the second ‘populist’ party running for election, DNA, in many regards, focused on similar issues and hence provided an alternative to protest voters who otherwise might have opted for the FPÖ.

Looking at sociodemographic characteristics (Figure 3), the FPÖ somewhat underperformed amongst voters below the age of 30. Regarding education, it was most successful amongst voters who had completed vocational training and least successful amongst high-school and university graduates. Interestingly, and in line with preceding regional elections (Salzburger Nachrichten, 2024), the once significant gender gap has shrunk considerably compared to the elections in 2019. While back then, 26% of men but only 10% of women voted for the FPÖ, this time it was 27% of men compared to 24% of women. Amongst voters holding at least a college degree, the gap even vanished entirely, with 16% of men and 17% of women opting for the FPÖ (Laumer & Praprotnik, 2024). Amongst others, these changes may be a consequence of the position the party took during the COVID-19 pandemic (especially its critique to discriminate restrictions between vaccinated and non-vaccinated citizens) – which was also found among many (also highly-educated) women (Die Presse, 2021).

Looking at voters’ issue preferences shows that, generally, there is quite a significant demand for EU-critical positions within the Austrian electorate. While in the 1994 constitutional referendum on the country’s EU accession, a two-thirds majority voted ‘yes’, approval rates started to drop soon thereafter, and Austrian citizens have ranked amongst the most critical ones across the EU ever since (Fallend, 2008). As Figure 5 shows, in the Eurobarometer from autumn 2023 (European Parliament, 2023), Austria not only recorded the highest share of citizens seeing EU membership as a ‘bad thing’ (22%) but also the lowest share of those seeing it as a ‘good thing’ (42%). 

The FPÖ was very successful in attracting these groups. According to exit polls, 84% of its voters see the EU taking a rather negative development and 63% would even support Austria leaving the EU (Figure 6).

Overall, however, only 4% stated that EU protest was their main reason to vote for the FPÖ, while 40% pointed to the party’s issue positions more generally. Looking at these issues, again, reveals a considerable overlap with the issues the party pushed in its campaign. Among the issues FPÖ voters discussed ‘a lot’ before the elections, ‘migration’ clearly ranks highest (71%), followed by ‘security and war’ (48%), the ‘economy’ (36%), and the ‘Covid pandemic’ (30%), with ‘environment and climate protection’ clearly lagging behind (20%).

Public attention for the elections overall was relatively modest. About eight weeks before the elections, less than 50% of the Austrian electorate reported knowing the parties’ lead candidates, and even more stated that they could not assess their work (Die Presse, 2024). To the extent that the election was an issue, however, the FPÖ and its core issues featured quite prominently in the debates. In the three TV debates that featured all lead candidates, migration and the war between Russia and Ukraine were discussed for the longest time (followed by the climate crisis). Given the singularity of its positions, the FPÖ was criticized by all other parties quite harshly in all these debates. This criticism resulted in the FPÖ receiving by far the most attention and also allowed the party to (once again) present itself as the only ‘real’ alternative vis-à-vis a purported Einheitspartei (‘single political party’), composed of the ÖVP, the Social Democrats (SPÖ), the Greens and the Liberals. A similar phenomenon can be observed regarding general news coverage where, for example, the election poster discussed above met with extensive criticism by journalists both nationally and internationally, pushing attention to the FPÖ itself and its political demands even further (Hammerl, 2024).

Discussion and perspective

Summing up, the populist radical-right Freedom Party’s run for the 2024 EP elections relied on well-proven recipes, which the party has been applying highly successfully throughout the last 30 years. In terms of issues, it focused on culturally framed topics like EU critique and calls against migration, which it combined with other issues that have been highly salient amongst the Austrian electorate and on which the party took a position that was taken by no other (established) Austrian party like an alleged ‘neutral’ position in the Ukrainian war (which de facto would result in strengthening the Russian side), and a highly critical position towards EU-measures to combat the climate crisis. Rhetorically, the party strongly relied on a Manichean frame, portraying its national opponents and EU-level actors/institutions as corrupt elites or members of the de facto Einheitspartei. This strategy seemingly paid off, as the FPÖ landed in the first place for the first time in a nationwide election.

Due to this success, there is little reason to expect the FPÖ to significantly change its strategy or the policies it prioritizes in the coming legislative period. Issues like migration, climate change or even the war in Ukraine are unlikely to vanish soon. And given that EU decisions constitutionally rely on broad centrist compromises, it suggests that whatever policies EU institutions manage to agree on, they will always provide ample room for criticism from a populist, radical-right point of view.

Concerning politics, it will be interesting to see how cooperation with other populist parties will proceed and develop in the coming term. Notably, the FPÖ was one of only two parties of the Identity and Democracy (ID) group that voted against the exclusion of the AfD due to statements of the latter’s lead candidate suggesting sympathy for former members of the national-socialist SS just before the elections. After the elections, the FPÖ left ID and, together with Hungary’s Fidesz (which left the European People’s Party in 2021) and the Czech ANO (formerly of Renew Europe), founded Patriots for Europe (PfE), which most of the other former ID members have subsequently joined. However, negotiations with the AfD to join the group failed, leading to the foundation of another new group – Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN).

It remains to be seen how the FPÖ will position itself in possible future disputes between and within these groups like, for example, when it comes to their position concerning the Russia–Ukraine War, where some parties (like the FPÖ) hold close ties with Russia, while others see Russia as a security threat to their own country. Overall, however, it seems that politics at the EU level play a subordinate role for the party at large. Owing also to its nationalist agenda, the party probably does not see the main purpose of EU-level politics as shaping policies in Brussels but rather leveraging them to increase electoral support at home.


 

(*) Eric Miklin is Associate Professor of Austrian Politics in Comparative European Perspective in the Department of Political Science at the Paris-Lodron University of Salzburg, Austria. His research and publications focus on democracy, party politics and parliamentarism with a special focus on the interplay between the national and the European level. E-mail: eric.miklin@plus.ac.at


 

References

Bundesministerium für Inneres (2023) Verfassungsschutzbericht 2023.https://www.dsn.gv.at/501/files/VSB/180_2024_VSB_2023_V20240517_BF.pdf

Bartlau, C. (2018, 2 February) Freiheitliche Partei Europas: Wie hätt’ ma’s denn gern? Zeit Onlinehttps://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2018-02/freiheitliche-partei-oesterreichs-regierung-opposition-identitaet/komplettansicht

Die Presse (2021, 8 August) Impfung: Frauen sind skeptischerDie Presse https://www.diepresse.com/6018633/impfung-frauen-sind-skeptischer

Die Presse (2024, 22 April) Nicht einmal die Hälfte der Österreicher kennt die EU-Spitzenkandidaten. Die Presse https://www.diepresse.com/18391193/nicht-einmal-die-haelfte-der-oesterreicher-kennt-die-eu-spitzenkandidaten

Eberl, J. M., Huber, R. A., & Greussing, E. (2021) From populism to the ‘plandemic’: Why populists believe in COVID-19 conspiracies. Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties31(sup1), 272–284.

European Parliament (2023) Eurobarometer Data Annex, Parlameter 2023. Directorate General for Communication (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit). file:///C:/Users/miklin/Downloads/EP_Autumn_2023_EB044EP_Results_Annex_en.pdf

Frölich-Steffen, S. (2004). Die Identitätspolitik der FPÖ: Vom Deutschnationalismus zum Österreich-Patriotismus. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft33(3), 281–295.

FPÖ (2017) Österreicher verdienen Fairness. Freiheitliches Wahlprogramm zur Nationalratswahl 2017. (Brochure). https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/Wahlprogramm_8_9_low.pdf

FPÖ (2024a, 10 July) Party Program of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ).https://www.fpoe.at/parteiprogramm/parteiprogramm-englisch/

FPÖ (2024b) Vorhang auf für UNSER Österreich. Frei. Sicher. Neutral. [Brochure]. https://www.fpoe.at/fileadmin/user_upload/www.fpoe.at/Websites/EU-Wahl_2024/Wahlprogramm/Wahlprogramm_20x20_Web.pdf

Fallend, F. (2008). Euroscepticism in Austrian political parties: ideologically rooted or strategically motivated? In: P. Taggart, P., & A. Szczerbiak (eds) Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism. Vol. I: Case Studies and Country Surveys. Szczerbiak, Oxford University Press, 201–220.

Freiheitlicher Parlamentsklub (2024, 10 May) FPÖ – Vilimsky zu EU-Wahlkampfauftakt: ‚Wir wollen die Nummer eins werden!‘ [Press release], https://www.ots.at/presseaussendung/OTS_20240510_OTS0109/fpoe-vilimsky-zu-eu-wahlkampfauftakt-wir-wollen-die-nummer-eins-werden

Hammerl, M. (2024, 7 June) Wie die Kandidaten im EU-Wahlkampf performt haben. Kurierhttps://kurier.at/politik/inland/eu-wahl-kandidaten-analyse-schieder-lopatka-vilimsky-schilling-brandstaetter-performance/402910168

Heinisch, R. (2003) Success in opposition–failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office. West European Politics, 26(3), 91–130.

Heinisch, R. & Hauser, K. (2016) The Mainstreaming of the Austrian Freedom Party: The More Things Change…. In: Tjitske Akkerman, Sarah de Lange, Matthijs Rooduijn (eds) Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? Routledge, 46–62.

Heinisch, R. & Hofmann, D. (2023) The Case of the Austrian Radical Right and Russia During the War in Ukraine. In: Gilles Ivaldi. G & Zankina, E. (eds) The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 33–46.

Kurier (2024, 12 February) FPÖ: Orban-Vorstoß gegen EU-Direktwahl ‚überlegenswert‘ Kurierhttps://kurier.at/politik/inland/fpoe-orban-vorstoss-gegen-eu-direktwahl-ueberlegenswert/402776170

Kurz, H-P (2024, 8 June) Morgen, am 9. Juni geht es um alles. Die #Europawahl2024 ist eine Volksabstimmung über unsere Zukunft. Wir wollen keinen EU-Zentralstaat, sondern unsere #Souveränität zurück. [Post]. X. https://x.com/hpkurz_fpoe/status/1799471451373785220/photo/1

Laumer, D & Praprotnik, K (2024) Europawahl 2024. Wählerstromanalyse und Wahlbefragung. Institut für Strategieanalysen GmbH & FORESIGHT Research Hofinger GmbH.  https://www.foresight.at/fileadmin/user_upload/wahlen/2024_FORESIGHT-ISAWahlbefragung_EUW24-Grafiken.pdf

Mudde, C. (2017) Populism. An Ideational Approach. In: Rovira Kaltwasser, C., Taggart, P., Ochoa Respejo, P. & Ostiguy, P. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Populism, Oxford University Press, 27–47

Obermaier, F. & Obermayer, B. (2019) Die Ibiza-Affäre. Innenansichten eines Skandals, Kiepenheuer & Witsch.

Salzburger Nachrichten (2024, 5 March) Gender Gap: Frauen wählen tendenziell links.

Salzburger Nachrichtenhttps://www.sn.at/politik/innenpolitik/gender-gap-frauen-154507360.

Vilimsky, H. (2023, 17 July) Mit seinen aktuell 705 Abgeordneten ist das Europaparlament schon heute das drittgrößte Parlament der Welt. …. [Post]. X. https://x.com/vilimsky/status/1680822701370294272

Vilimsky, H. (2024a, 24 May) Ein belgisches Gericht hat jetzt die Ermittlungen zu ‚Pfizergate‘, der umstrittenen EU-Impfstoffbeschaffung, auf Dezember verschoben … [Post]. X. https://x.com/vilimsky/status/1794002389063938116

Vilimsky, H. (2024b, 9 June) Liebe Freunde, warum es SO WICHTIG ist, am Sonntag die FPÖ zu wählen… [Post]. X. https://x.com/vilimsky/status/1799639530573647977

Wodak, R. (2005). Populist discourses: the Austrian case. In: Rydgren, J. (ed.) Movements of exclusion: Radical right-wing populism in the Western world. Nova Publishers, 121–145.

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON AUSTRIA

Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift in the Balance of Power on the Right

Please cite as:

Biancalana, Cecilia. (2024). “The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift to the Right.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0075

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON ITALY

Abstract

Italy has historically been one of the strongest proponents of a united Europe. However, recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism within the country, with a notable increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend? Italy features a variety of populist parties, both on the right and on the left, each with different Eurogroup affiliations and varying positions on European integration. As a result, during the 2024 campaign, the parties adopted different strategies. The results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of Fratelli d’Italia, reflecting a sustained support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

Keywords: populism; Euroscepticism; Fratelli d’Italia; Lega; Forza Italia; Movimento 5 Stelle; European Parliament

 

By Cecilia Biancalana* (Department of Culture, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Italy)

Populism and Euroscepticism in Italy: Diverse actors and perspectives

Italy is an intriguing case study for examining the role, characteristics and influence of populist parties within the European context. Its relevance is due to two primary reasons related to the role of populism in the country and the attitudes of its citizens and political elites towards Europe.

On the one hand, Italy has been described as a ‘populist paradise’ (Tarchi, 2015) due to the strong presence and variety of populist parties. Indeed, Italy hosts a spectrum of populist movements spanning both right and left ideologies (Biancalana, 2020). This diversity extends to the European stage, where, as we will see, populist parties not only exhibit varying levels of Europhilia and Euroscepticism but also belong to different European groups. Notably, within the centre-right, three Italian parties fit the model of right-wing populism to varying degrees (albeit being quite different from each other): Forza Italia (FI), Lega (officially named Lega per Salvini premier), and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). For instance, in the 2019–2024 legislature, FI was part of the European People’s Party (EPP) group, FdI was a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), presenting a more moderate stance than the Lega, which was part of Identity and Democracy (ID). Moreover, there was also a populist party leaning towards the left, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), standing among the Non-attached (NA) group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who do not belong to any of the recognized political groups.

On the other hand, Italy has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of a united Europe, both at the elite level (Conti, 2017) and among the general populace (Isernia, 2008). However, it has recently become increasingly Eurosceptic (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).

Italy as a populist paradise

Regarding populism, as mentioned, Italy has long been regarded as a testing ground for populism, earning it the designation of the ‘laboratory of populism’ (Tarchi, 2015). Various forms of populism coexist within the country, which we will briefly describe, also considering their relationship with Europe. As anticipated, the leading populist parties today are FdI, Lega, FI and the Movimento 5 Stelle. Collectively, these four parties secured 58.31% (Chamber of Deputies) of the vote in the September 2022 general elections, highlighting the significant electoral strength of populism in contemporary Italy. These parties are characterized by varying degrees and types of both populism and Euroscepticism.

Scholars have categorized FdI in contrasting ways (see Bressanelli & de Candia, 2023 for a comprehensive review): post-fascist, radical-right populist and national conservative. Here, we will consider FdI as a radical right party with elements of populism and Euroscepticism (Donà, 2022). Established in 2012, the party traces its roots to the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), a neo-fascist party founded in 1946 by supporters of former dictator Benito Mussolini. Since 2017, FdI platforms have introduced elements of nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism, along with anti-European Union (EU) stances. FdI made its electoral breakthrough in the 2022 elections, securing 25,98% of the vote and entering government for the first time under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni. The party promotes an extreme right-wing ideology, defending a homogeneous populace against perceived threats, such as LGBTQ+ groups and immigrants, particularly from Muslim-majority countries.

In the international arena, FdI advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the EU (see Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021). FdI is affiliated with the more moderate ECR group in the European Parliament (EP), of which Meloni has been president since 2020. Within the ECR group, FdI actively participates in crucial decisions alongside mainstream political factions, collaborating with them while distinguishing itself from the more radical right and Eurosceptic ID group. However, FdI continues to engage in ideological battles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality, and EU constitutional matters (Bressanelli and di Candia 2023).

The Lega, known as Lega Nord until December 2017, was founded in 1991. Initially, it was a regionalist party (Bulli & Tronconi, 2011) that strongly advocated for Northern Italy’s interests and displayed ethnochauvinism towards Southern Italy, positioning itself against central political institutions. Since Matteo Salvini became party secretary in 2013, the Lega has shifted its focus to hostility towards immigration and European integration. Salvini’s leadership transformed the Lega’s claim and shifted the opposition to central political institutions from Rome to Brussels: the EU is portrayed as an enemy that deprives Italian citizens of resources and the freedom to determine their own destiny (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017). Salvini has forged alliances with other right-wing populist parties, including France’s Rassemblement National (RN), which has been part of the same EP group: previously ID and currently the newly established group Patriots for Europe (PfE). They both held Eurosceptic views and had previously opposed the euro. However, by 2019, the Lega had dropped the idea of Italy exiting the euro, following a similar shift by Marine Le Pen in 2017.

Silvio Berlusconi’s FI was founded in December 1993 following the Tangentopoli corruption scandals. FI participated in the March 1994 general elections, securing 21,01% of the vote, heralding Berlusconi’s emergence as a prominent figure in Italian politics. Berlusconi is frequently cited as an exemplar of right-wing populism (Fella & Ruzza, 2013). As a billionaire media mogul, he entered politics as an outsider, leveraging his television channels to directly appeal to the people, a strategy that foreshadowed figures like Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and Donald Trump in the United States. Historically, FI displayed ambivalent attitudes towards the EU (Conti, 2017) but has shifted towards a more pro-European stance in recent years. This transformation is partly attributed to the leadership change following Berlusconi’s passing in 2023, with Antonio Tajani, a former president of the EP, assuming leadership of the party (Biancalana, Seddone & Gallina, 2024).

The M5S is the newest among Italian populist parties and the only one not positioned on the right (Ivaldi, Lanzone & Woods, 2017; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). Founded in October 2009 by former comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party gained significant electoral momentum in the 2013 general elections, securing 25,56% of the vote (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In the 2018 general election, the M5S further increased its support, capturing 32.68% of the vote and entering a populist coalition government with Salvini’s Lega. After the collapse of the government with the Lega, the party formed a new government in partnership with the leftist Partito Democratico (PD). Between 2021 and 2022, the M5S joined Mario Draghi’s technocratic ‘grand’ coalition government.

The M5S’s relationship with Europe also reflects this fluidity and flexibility. In 2014, following its initial electoral success, the M5S campaigned against the euro, advocating for a referendum on Italy’s exit from the eurozone and rejecting significant EU financial constraints like those imposed by the ‘fiscal compact’. During the electoral campaign for the 2018 general elections, under a new leader, Luigi Di Maio, the M5S moderated its Eurosceptic stance, emphasizing that Italy’s departure from the euro was neither imminent nor planned. Nevertheless, according to Conti, Di Mauro and Memoli’s survey among MPs in 2019, when the M5S was part of a coalition government with the Lega, it could be unequivocally categorized as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, in 2019, the M5S adopted more moderate and ambivalent positions (see Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020).

Following the dissolution of the coalition with the Lega and its subsequent alliance with the PD, the M5S supported Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment as president of the European Commission and endorsed the installation of a pro-European leader like Mario Draghi as Italy’s prime minister in early 2021, signalling a shift towards pro-Europeanism. Indeed, after five years (2014–2019) in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (created by Nigel Farage) and five years in the NA group, after the 2024 elections, it joined the GUE/NGL group, signalling a clear shift towards the left at the European level as well.

Against this backdrop, what were the main issues of the 2024 campaign? How did these parties perform in the 2024 elections? Before addressing these questions, let us analyse Italians’ relationship with Europe.

The Italian case: From Europhilia to Euroscepticism

Regarding the relationship between elites and citizens and Europe, we know that historically, Italy has been a staunch supporter of European integration, with EP elections reflecting a dominant narrative that views Europe as synonymous with peace, prosperity, and political stability (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020). As one of the founding members of the EU, its membership has enjoyed wide support among the political elite and the general public alike. By the early 1990s, nearly all parties shared not only broad support for the integration process but also specific support for the EU. However, the ‘permissive consensus’ supporting EU integration has been replaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the previous narrative has significantly shifted (Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020), and both Italian citizens and political elites have become much more critical toward EU integration (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).

It has been argued that this shift is due to multiple crises, such as the financial and economic crises (including the transition to the single currency and, more recently, the Great Recession and subsequent austerity policies) and migration crises (specifically the so-called refugee crisis in 2015–2016), which have significantly affected Italy and led to increased opposition to the EU. Consequently, a considerable electoral market for Eurosceptic parties has emerged, marking a notable departure from Italy’s post-war Europhile stance and reflecting a more complex and divided perspective on European integration (Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021).

This shift is exemplified by two events: the success of populist Eurosceptic parties in the general elections of March 2018 and the subsequent formation of a government by two Eurosceptic parties, the M5S and the Lega, marking a turning point in Italian history within the EU (Conti, Marangoni, & Verzichelli, 2020). The second event is the result of the 2019 EP elections, which highlighted the growing Euroscepticism within the country. The Eurosceptic Lega Nord, led by Matteo Salvini, won 34.26% of the vote. The M5S, also critical of the EU, especially the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), garnered 17.06%; for their part, FI won 8.78%, and the far-right nationalist party, FdI, received 6.44%. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend?

Populist parties’ campaign and issues

After five years of significant political and economic turbulence, including a general election (2022), three changes in government (the PD–M5S coalition in 2019–2021, the technocratic Draghi government in 2021–2022, and the Meloni administration starting from 2022), and multiple crises in which the EU played a notable role, such as the COVID-19 and energy crises, the 2024 European elections emerge as a crucial indicator of both internal power dynamics within Italy’s party system and within the right-wing governing coalition, as well as their positions on Europe.

Consistent with its nationalist traits, FdI’s program – entitled Con Giorgia l’Italia cambia l’Europa (‘With Giorgia, Italy changes Europe’) – emphasizes defending the identity of European peoples and nations, referencing Europe’s ‘Judeo-Christian roots’. In her final rally, consistent with her sovereigntist traits, the party leader and Prime Minister Meloni stressed that ‘Europe must rediscover its historical role, focus on a few major issues, and leave other matters to national governments that do not need centralization’ (Pinto 2024). Throughout the campaign, Meloni had to balance her dual role as prime minister, which requires international credibility and as a populist party leader, striving to maintain equilibrium between these positions. 

Lega’s campaign is markedly more Eurosceptic, echoing the slogan ‘Più Italia, meno Europa’ (‘More Italy, less Europe’), which, interestingly, was previously used by FI in the 2014 European elections. Lega’s platform, Programma elezioni europee 2024, focused on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the European Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. The campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, a very controversial figure who ran as an independent on Lega’s lists. General Vannacci became known for his book Il Mondo al Contrario (‘The world turned upside down’), published in 2023, which sparked significant backlash due to homophobic, racist and sexist content. Despite internal opposition, Vannacci received substantial support, securing over 530,000 preferences and leading in four out of five constituencies.

Forza Italia remains the most pro-European party, presenting a ten-point program – Con noi al centro dell’Europa (‘With us at the heart of Europe’) – that includes goals like ‘building common defence and security’ and ‘reforming European treaties’. On 21 May, at a campaign event, FI’s national secretary Antonio Tajani criticized Lega’s Euroscepticism, remarking, ‘When I hear “Less Europe”, all beautiful things, but with no effectiveness and no logical sense’ (Canepa, 2024), adding that without being part of a broader project, Italy risks being overwhelmed and rendered irrelevant. Interestingly, as mentioned, this slogan was used by FI ten years ago, indicating the party’s softened positions vis-à-vis Europe over time.

In summary, on the right, Lega has sought to radicalize its stance to attract votes from those discontented with Meloni’s institutionalization, whereas FI has positioned itself as the moderate pole.

On the contrary, the Movimento 5 Stelle aimed to attract votes from the left, focusing on peace and opposing arms to Ukraine. Its program, entitled L’Italia che conta. Protagonisti in Europa (‘An Italy that counts: Protagonists in Europe’), emphasized anti-austerity measures, defence of the public healthcare system, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek.

Results: Decreased Turnout and a Shift in the Balance of Power Among Populist Parties

The 2024 European elections in Italy revealed some significant trends. The first one is the decline in voter turnout, which dropped by over 6 percentage points compared to the 2019 European elections (48.3%, down from 54.50%). This decline continues a long-term trend: turnout was 85.65% in 1979, 81.07% in 1989, 69.76% in 1999, and 66.47% in 2009.

Moreover, it is worth noting that in previous years, Italy’s voter turnout in European elections was consistently higher than the EU average. For instance, in 1979, Italy’s turnout was 85.65% compared to the EU average of 61.99%, and this pattern continued through the 1980s and 1990s. By 2019, Italy’s turnout was 54.5%, whereas the EU average was 50.66%. This trend ended in 2024, with Italy’s turnout declining further to 48.31%, while the EU average increased to 51.07%. Nevertheless, despite this increase in abstentionism, the latest Eurobarometer survey (Standard Eurobarometer 101, April–May 2024) indicates that 50% of Italians ‘tend to trust’ the EU, compared to a European average of 49%.

Regarding the performance of populist parties, it is notable that all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, the most recent national election in Italy. This outcome is significant as the ‘honeymoon’ period of the government elected in 2022 could have been expected to wane, and populist parties in office in other countries lost votes. This result marks a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level.

However, it is also worth comparing the 2024 results with those of 2019, the most recent European elections. In this respect, FdI significantly increased its vote share from 6.44% in the 2019 European elections to 28.76% in the 2024 European elections, even improving on its result from the 2022 general election (25.98%). Forza Italia also improved its vote share, rising from 8.78% in the 2019 European elections to 9.59% in the 2024 European elections. This positive outcome under Antonio Tajani, the new leader following Berlusconi’s passing, indicates stable support within the electorate. In contrast, the Lega’s vote share saw a notable change, declining dramatically from 34.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9% in 2024. It is worth noting that in the 2022 general elections, the party scored 8.97%.

Within the right-wing area, we observe a shift in the balance of power between Lega and FdI: Giorgia Meloni’s party has become the strongest, while the Lega has declined. Concerning the 2022 general elections, data from the polling agency SWG (SWG 2024) shows indeed that there has been a shift of votes from other partners within the centre-right coalition towards FdI. While 68% of the votes FdI represent a confirmation of their 2022 vote, 16% come from the centre-right (8% from Lega and 8% from FI), and 16% come from other political areas (7% from other lists and 9% from abstention).

Conversely, the Movimento 5 Stelle experienced its worst performance in a national election in history. Its vote share dropped from 17.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9.98% in 2024. This result continues the decline observed in the 2022 general elections (15.43%). In the analysis of the Five Star Movement electorate conducted by SWG, it is evident that only 40% of those who chose them in 2022 reaffirmed their choice in 2024. The remaining votes were distributed as follows: 13% voted for a centre-left party, 6% for a centre-right party, 6% for another party, and a significant 35% abstained from voting.

This result can be explained by the absence of prominent candidates on the lists, indicating that the Five Star Movement failed to consolidate its political constituency. Additionally, the renewed bipolar competition in Italy between the right and left has significantly diminished the influence of a third party like the M5S. It is to be noted that the M5S shifted to the left over the years. However, left-wing voters likely feel better represented by other leftist parties, such as the PD and the Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra (AVS).

 

Finally, it is worth asking what the main differences between the populist parties are concerning the characteristics of their electorate. In this respect, a pre-electoral survey conducted by CISE (De Sio, Mannoni & Cataldi 2024) indicates that M5S voters differ from right-wing ones in terms of education. Right-wing parties are more popular among less-educated voters and have less support among university graduates. In contrast, the M5S draws strength from those with a secondary education. The party also receives considerable support from the unemployed, affirming its focus on social issues.

There are also some differences within the centre-right coalition (especially between FdI and Lega, the two parties whose power dynamics have reversed over the last few years), mainly regarding gender and social class. Concerning gender, FdI has a predominantly male profile, while Lega has a more female-oriented electorate. Regarding social class, the Lega is strong among the most disadvantaged classes (a relatively new trend for the Lega), while only 10% of FdI support comes from the lowest class, rising to 36% among the highest class. These figures indicate a strong complementarity between the two parties.

Conclusions

In sum, regarding the impact of populism in these elections, we note that in the 2019 European elections, the combined vote share for the right-wing populist parties – Lega, FdI and FI – was 49.5%. By 2024, this total increased to 51.7%. Including the percentages for the M5S, we see that the total for populist parties was 66.6% in 2019 and slightly decreased to 62.5% in 2024. This figure underscores the growing strength of right-wing populism in Italy and highlights a persistent and possibly deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

However, looking at the absolute votes, we note an increase in the percentage of votes for populist parties, but not in absolute terms. The votes for right-wing populist parties decreased from about 13 million in 2019 to 11 million in 2024. Including the Movimento 5 Stelle, the votes for populist parties (both right and left) fell from nearly 18 million in 2019 to just over 13 million in 2024. Abstention has also affected these parties, which may no longer be seen as a credible protest alternative to non-voting.

In summary, the results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of right-wing populism, particularly of FdI, within the centre-right coalition. Right-wing populism is increasingly prominent in Italy (at least among those who decide to vote), reflecting a sustained and potentially deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

Conversely, the steep decline of the M5S marks a critical point for the party, indicating a need for strategic reassessment and potential repositioning within the Italian political landscape. This decline could also indicate a return to bipolarity after the ‘electoral earthquake’ of 2013 (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In this new bipolar system, for the time being, FdI holds the lion’s share of the right-wing representation.


 

(*) Cecilia Biancalana is an assistant professor in the Department of Culture, Politics and Society at the University of Turin. Her research focuses on political ecology, party change, populism and the relationship between the internet and politics.


 

References

Albertazzi, D., Giovannini, A., & Seddone, A. (2018). ‘No regionalism please, we are Leghisti!’ The transformation of the Italian Lega Nord under the leadership of Matteo Salvini. Regional & Federal Studies28(5), 645–671.

Biancalana, C. (2019). Four Italian Populisms. In Multiple Populisms (pp. 216–241). Routledge.

Biancalana, C., Seddone, A., & Gallina, M. (2024). Italy: Political Developments and Data in 2023. European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook.

Bressanelli, E., & De Candia, M. (2023). Fratelli d’Italia in the European Parliament: between radicalism and conservatism. Contemporary Italian Politics, 1–20.

Brunazzo, M., & Gilbert, M. (2017). Insurgents against Brussels: Euroscepticism and the right-wing populist turn of the Lega Nord since 2013. Journal of Modern Italian Studies22(5), 624–641.

Brunazzo, M., & Mascitelli, B. (2020). At the origin of Italian Euroscepticism. Australian and New Zealand Journal of European Studies12(2).

Bulli, G., & Tronconi, F. (2011). The Lega Nord. In A. Elias and F. Tronconi (Eds.), From protest to power: Autonomist parties and the challenges of representation (pp. 51–74). Braumüller.

Canepa, C. (2024, 21 May). Tajani dimentica che lo slogan “Meno Europa” era di Forza Italia. Pagella Politica. https://pagellapolitica.it/articoli/tajani-slogan-meno-europa-forza-italia-elezioni-europee

Chiaramonte, A. & De Sio, L. (2014). Terremoto elettorale. Le elezioni politiche del 2014. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Conti, N. (2017). The Italian political elites and Europe: Big move, small change? International Political Science Review38(5), 534–548.

Conti, N., Di Mauro, D., & Memoli, V. (2022). Euroscepticism and populism in Italy among party elites and the public. Italian Journal of Electoral Studies (IJES)85(1), 25–43.

Conti, N., Marangoni, F., & Verzichelli, L. (2020). Euroscepticism in Italy from the Onset of the Crisis: Tired of Europe? South European Society and Politics, 1–26.

De Sio, L., Mannoni, E. & Cataldi, M. (2024, 10 June). Chi ha votato chi? Gruppi sociali e voto. CISE. https://cise.luiss.it/cise/2024/06/10/chi-ha-votato-chi-gruppi-sociali-e-voto/

Donà, A. (2022). The rise of the Radical Right in Italy: the case of Fratelli d’Italia. Journal of Modern Italian Studies27(5), 775–794.

Fella, S., & Ruzza, C. (2013). Populism and the fall of the centre-right in Italy: The end of the Berlusconi model or a new beginning? Journal of Contemporary European Studies21(1), 38–52.

Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2009). A postfunctionalist theory of European integration: From permissive consensus to constraining dissensus. British journal of political science, 39(1), 1–23.

Isernia, P. (2008). Present at creation: Italian mass support for European integration in the formative years. European Journal of Political Research47(3), 383–410.

Ivaldi, G., Lanzone, M. E., & Woods, D. (2017). Varieties of populism across a left‐right spectrum: The case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement. Swiss political science review23(4), 354–376.

Mosca, L., & Tronconi, F. (2021). Beyond left and right: the eclectic populism of the Five Star Movement. In Varieties of Populism in Europe in Times of Crises (pp. 118–143). Routledge.

Pinto, F. (2024, 1 June). Elezioni, Meloni: “Europa non sia più gigante burocratico e nano politico”. Euronews. https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/06/01/elezioni-meloni-europa-non-sia-piu-gigante-burocratico-e-nano-politico

SWG (2024, 10 June). Swg Radar speciale elezioni 2024. Elezioni europee – analisi dei flussi di voto. https://www.swg.it/pa/attachment/6666e60a2e297/Radar_speciale%
20Elezioni%202024,%20Flussi%20di%20voto,%2010%20giugno%202024.pdf

Tarchi, M. (2015). Italia populista. Bologna: Il Mulino.

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON ITALY

Figure 5: Asylum seekers' tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.

Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About

Please cite as:

O’Malley, Eoin. (2024). “Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0074

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON IRELAND

Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament elections in Ireland came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Although Ireland had seen significant migration in the early to mid-2000s, the large number of migrants at this time had no significant impact on politics or voting. Nor was Ireland a country that saw any significant anti-EU sentiment. Thus, Ireland could be seen as an anomaly in Europe. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sudden rise in the numbers in Ireland seeking international protection (asylum seekers). Most of these came as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and again, Ireland saw a positive reaction to inward migration even though the country accommodated a comparatively high number of Ukrainian refugees per head of population despite the country’s geographic distance. There had previously been ethnonationalist parties on the ballot paper in European and national elections, but they had never really featured. In 2024 none got elected, although some did in the concurrent local elections. The vote for some explicitly populist ethnonationalist parties was greater than ever before. This result occurred partly because Sinn Féin, another populist–nationalist (but not wholly ethnonationalist) party, saw its support drop dramatically. It suggests, however, that Ireland may not remain the anomaly it has been. In all about a third of the voting electorate chose parties or candidates that can be categorized as populist.

Keywords: migration; Ireland; populism; EU Pact on Migration; farmers

 

By Eoin O’Malley * (School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland)

Introduction

While electorally successful populism has always existed in Irish politics, the 2024 European election campaign and results in Ireland saw the emergence of a type of populism that had not hitherto been seen. Appeals, for instance, to a ‘pure Irish people’ that is distinct from a ‘corrupt elite’ are common not just in contemporary politics but in the nationalist politics on which the Irish state is founded. But there had never been an appetite in Ireland for any sort of ‘othering’ of migrants (or indeed other minorities). Although the results of the 2024 elections generally returned moderate, non-populist politicians, the centre parties’ success belies the emergence of a stronger chauvinistic ethnonationalism, indicating a possible direction of travel towards increased levels of populism. This chapter will outline the existing and emerging populist parties present in Ireland and then set out the context of the rise of migration as an issue since Ireland’s last general election in February 2020. This background leads into a discussion of the 2024 campaign, an outline of the results, and, finally, a discussion of trends.

Populist parties in Ireland

For many years, Ireland was an anomaly in having no electorally successful, hardline-ethnonationalist populist outfit, as most other European countries have. The standard explanation for this absence is that Ireland has an established nationalist–populist party that is left-leaning and explicitly progressive (i.e., pro-migrant rights). In turn the reason for this might be that the narrative of Irish nationalism is ‘small guy nationalism’, given that the Irish ‘story’ is of forced emigration, with no ‘great past’ to which the country might return (O’Malley, 2008). Sinn Féin, an explicitly left–populist party, was directly linked to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), which killed thousands of people during the Troubles from the late 1960s to 1998. While much of that campaign of violence was clearly sectarian (and thus ethnonationalist), following its transition to normal politics in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) in 1998, Sinn Féin has espoused what it called ‘civic nationalism’, although it continues to champion a particular type of cultural nationalism that excludes those living in Northern Ireland who identify as British.

Sinn Féin was largely responsible for suppressing support for conservative ethnonationalism when immigration rose in the mid-2000s to where about 17% of the population in Ireland was foreign born (up from negligible levels in the early 1990s). It opposed a referendum in 2004 to change the origin of citizenship from jus soli to one based on the child’s heritage. Yet it remained outside the mainstream, being ‘Eurocritical’, opposing all new EU treaties, which because of Irish law must be passed by referendum. It was particularly critical of what it saw as the neoliberal bent of EU institutions.

Sinn Féin support rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist line. It adopted the policy approach led by small left-wing parties in opposing water charges, suggesting that the charges were a prelude to privatization designed to benefit elite supporters of the main governing party, Fine Gael. Sinn Féin used populist communications strategies to categorize Fine Gael and the main opposition party at the time, Fianna Fáil, as two sides of the same elite coin. There was some truth to this; these were not parties with strong ideological divisions, and in 2016, Fianna Fáil had signed a confidence and supply agreement to support a new minority Fine Gael government, enabling Fine Gael to remain in power. Shortly before becoming the Sinn Féin leader, Mary Lou McDonald declared that that pact ‘serves only to confirm the political establishment’s indifference and inability to act in the interests of the many’ (An Phoblacht, 2017). Sinn Féin and McDonald have frequently referred to the mainstream party leaders as ‘the lads’ or called them ‘an old boys’ club.’

One of the parties that had led the anti-water charges protests was People Before Profit (PBP), a small, Trotskyite, populist party with four Teachtaí Dála (TDs; MPs in English). It is an electoral front for the Socialist Workers’ Party, although it also forms an alliance with the Socialist Party, whose electoral label is Solidarity. It had no seats in the EP, but Clare Daly of Independents4Change had been a member of Solidarity, leaving because it refused to work with Mick Wallace, who was then an independent TD. Both Daly and Wallace went on to take seats in the European Parliament, sitting with The Left group.

Because of the Irish electoral system, also used in Irish EP elections, many non-party or independent candidates run for elected office, more often than not using populist campaign styles. One such MEP, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan, was first elected to the EP as an independent candidate in 2014 on an explicitly anti-EU and anti-elite platform. His appearance and pronouncements were unconventional and anti-establishment. A member of The Left group in the EP, his voting record suggests he was concerned with protecting farmers’ interests.

Independent Ireland, formed in November 2023 and comprising three TDs, calls for greater control of migration but opposes EU co-operation on migration as well as action to tackle climate change. It might be categorized as a farmers’ party, but it also ran a candidate in Dublin whose main issue was migration. It describes itself as ‘a party that puts our people first … delivering on a program of reform and common-sense solutions’ (Independent Ireland, 2024). Farmers had traditionally been a powerful lobby group in Ireland, with most Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil usually sympathetic to their needs. But the inclusion of the Greens in government since 2020 (as well as some legal requirements from Brussels) saw the government implement policies against the wishes of many farmers. Ireland successfully negotiated an opt-out on a nitrates directive, but that was a small win for farmers.

The other smaller parties that fielded candidates were more clearly of an extreme position. A group of parties ran candidates, all claiming to speak for the Irish people, and most of which subscribe to ‘Great Replacement’ theories. Although they ran as separate parties, many voters would find it difficult to distinguish between the Irish Freedom Party (IFP), the National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People. The IFP’s aim is to re-establish ‘the national independence and sovereignty of Ireland and [restore] its national democracy by leaving the European Union’, no easy task in a country that regularly boasts the highest level of approval for EU membership among all the member states (Irish Freedom Party, 2024). It hoped that it might be able to benefit from migration being a significant issue at the elections, focusing heavily on that issue. IFP is led by Herman Kelly, who had been the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) press officer in Brussels. IFP had fielded candidates in previous elections but with limited success.

The National Party had also fielded candidates before, yet polled miserably. As with most of these parties, it is socially conservative and emerged from the pro-life movement. Comically, it split in two ahead of the elections, with the two factions each running candidates under the same banner. In terms of presentation it appears fascistic, with the diminutive leader almost copying Adolf Hitler in his physical appearance. It displays textbook populism in its stance ‘against the corrupt and amoral establishment who push replacement level immigration which will in time completely destroy Irish nationality’ (National Party, 2024).

Ireland First is a new party, largely a vehicle for Derek Blighe, a self-styled ‘citizen journalist’, who became prominent during the 2023 anti-immigrant protests (detailed further below), including spreading videos that would seem to encourage the rioting in Dublin. It describes itself as centre-right; most observers would see it as conservative nationalist and clearly populist: ‘Career politicians have consistently let us down, and it is time for the people, the true backbone of Ireland, to take matters into their own hands’ (Ireland First, 2024).

The Irish People is the newest of these parties. It presented itself as a loose coalition of independent candidates working under a shared banner and agreed principles, including ‘supporting Family values, advocating for Free Speech, prioritizing Housing for Irish citizens, endorsing Sensible Immigration policies, maintaining Neutrality in international conflicts, ensuring Education is free from indoctrination, and supporting Rural and farming communities’ (The Irish People, 2024). It railed against what it sees as ‘extremist’ policies being implemented by the government using nationalist rhetoric normally reserved for parties such as Sinn Féin.

While it would be hard to identify these parties on a left–right spectrum, another populist party that emerged and was sometimes accused of being ‘far right’ is more clearly on the left economically. Aontú emerged as a splinter group from Sinn Féin over the party’s stance on abortion. The leader of Aontú was a Sinn Féin TD who was disciplined for opposing the repeal of a provision in the Irish constitution banning abortion. The party shares Sinn Féin’s focus on a united Ireland and left-leaning economic policies, which it styles as ‘economic justice’. However, its supporters clearly position themselves on the right of the political spectrum, possibly because of abortion (Red C, 2024).

The 2020 general election and beyond

In the 2019 European elections Sinn Féin lost most of its seats and dropped seven percentage points in a performance that surprised most observers and has never been satisfactorily explained. Within the party the analysis was that it had become too angry and negative and not solutions-focused, but you could have argued it was this anger that saw the party rise in the polls. There seemed to be no obvious change in communications or electoral strategy in the following months. Nevertheless, seven months later, in the general election, the party’s support surged, becoming marginally the most popular in terms of votes, and would have been clearly the most popular in terms of seats except that it had underestimated its likely support and fielded too few candidates to take advantage of its popularity.

Sinn Féin benefited from economic grievances, particularly housing-related ones (Cunningham and Marsh, 2021: 231–4). The party’s increased vote share in 2020 was to a great extent the result of the medium-term strategy of linking Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as the same party using the (somewhat pejorative) ‘FFG’ label mentioned above. So when voters came to think of an alternative to the existing government, it was difficult for Fianna Fáil to present itself as that alternative. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned vigorously on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters. Sinn Féin focused relentlessly on this issue, questioning whether the gains made from the country’s strong economic growth could reach ordinary people. The party also used a strategy of associating Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil with a ‘landlord class’, something with powerful resonance in Ireland due to the country’s nineteenth-century famine.

When the two parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, eventually formed a coalition government (together with the Green Party) in mid-2020, Sinn Féin doubled down on this rhetoric. It used its being the largest party in terms of votes to claim that somehow the party leader, Mary Lou McDonald, was nefariously denied the position of Taoiseach (prime minister). In tweets and other public communications, party supporters and representatives used language to deny that Micheál Martin was the rightful Taoiseach. They used hashtags such as #notmytaoiseach and spoke of McDonald as ‘the people’s choice’. This populist rhetoric was common in the subsequent years in opposition. And it worked. Although Fine Gael received a poll boost from its early handling of COVID-19, of which Sinn Féin was broadly supportive, Sinn Féin clearly became the largest party in voting intentions.

However, Sinn Féin also began to transition to become a more mainstream party, one that might be taken seriously as a prospective party of government. Walking this tightrope between populism and responsible party was to prove divisive for its supporters. Its mainstream position on COVID-19 probably led to the loss of some supporters, although individual party representatives were able to voice what many considered conspiracy theories on this issue without sanction by the party. In the months leading up to the EP elections, the party’s finance spokesman spoke to financiers in London to reassure them that Sinn Féin would not pose a threat to their interests. Mary Lou McDonald made a similar trip to Silicon Valley to reassure investors of her party’s intentions.

While it could have gotten away with this – even if it would have criticized others for doing it – the party also changed or took more mainstream positions on other issues. It dropped plans to immediately implement a wealth tax and instead said it would refer it to a commission on taxation. It opposed the EU Nature Restoration Law, causing some internal party division and criticism from left-wing groups. Sinn Féin supported the government’s referendum proposals to remove references to mothers and protections of marriage in the constitution, replaced instead by the vague concept of ‘durable relationships’. When a groundswell of opposition to the proposed changes led to their defeat, some in Sinn Féin acknowledged that the party was out of step with the people. It also supported legislation on hate crimes, which opponents claimed could limit free speech. The party then changed its mind on the issue, indicating it would oppose in later stages the legislation it had earlier voted for. The party was then criticized for a series of shifts in position and accused of ‘flip-flopping’ by its opponents.

However, it was its position on migration for which Sinn Féin received most opprobrium. The increase in refugees following the Russian invasion of Ukraine put severe pressure on Irish homelessness services. A subsequent spike in migration from other places, the Middle East and North Africa especially, put significant pressure on the ability of the state to accommodate them in the middle of an already-existing housing crisis. In 2023 Ireland saw violent anti-immigrant protests as hotels and other buildings were being used to accommodate the increased numbers of applicants for international protection. The mainstream political reaction, including that of Sinn Féin and the small populist left parties such as PBP, was condemnatory – dismissing those protesting as ‘far right’ or being led by the ‘far right.’

Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to hold together the coalition of supporters it had created since 2020. That coalition might be classified into three groups: anti-British nationalists who are most concerned about a united Ireland, young to middle-aged, less-educated ‘losers from globalisation’, and young left progressives who are most affected by the housing crisis. This coalition held together when the core issue was housing. But when migration was the focus of most media and public attention, the equivocal nature of the Sinn Féin response pleased none of these groups, the first two of which might have preferred to see the party oppose migration more clearly, whereas the last group might have been appalled at such an anti-progressive stance.

Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s faltering coalition. It more clearly called for controls on immigration and opposed the EU migration pact. It had scored some success in its referendum campaign opposing two new proposed amendments, one to redefine the traditional meaning of family and another to remove references to mothers from the constitution. Both were heavily defeated by voters. Aontú claimed to be ‘the only party listening to the people’ and campaigned on this line coming up to the EP elections.

With a riot in Dublin city centre in late 2023 and an increase in the importance of the migration issue, a political response and adverse fallout were inevitable. The minister for justice, Helen McEntee, was seen as ineffectual on the issue. Some media reports showed that Ireland had deported just 100 of the 7,300 failed asylum applicants since 2023. The government slowly started to shift its position, but when Leo Varadkar (Fine Gael leader and Taoiseach) stood down in April 2024, replaced by Simon Harris, there was an expectation that he might shift the government’s position. Certainly the rhetoric from the government changed somewhat, although no specific shift in policy could be identified.

The campaign for the 2024 EP elections

In opinion polls coming up to the EP election campaign migration rose as one of the main issues that respondents felt was important (the others mainly being housing and the cost of living). One of the most notable features of the polls was the fall in support for Sinn Féin. Much of this support appeared to be going to independent or small-party candidates rather than the mainstream parties. As there is a low threshold to get on the ballot, the ballot paper had a large number of candidates in each of the three constituencies (Dublin, 23 candidates for 4 seats; Ireland South, 23 candidates for 5 seats; and Midlands-North West, 26 candidates for 5 seats). The large number of candidates meant that they would inevitably split their vote and reduce their chances of exploiting the new salience of migration among the Irish electorate.

Sinn Féin had been vocally pro-migrant rights, but that message became more equivocal over time as some representatives acknowledged the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on services. It tried to refocus public anger on the government, but its messaging was confused. In the run-up to and during the campaign, Sinn Féin changed its emphasis on migration. It rejected criticism that it was for ‘open borders’, saying it opposed the EU Pact on Migration on the basis that the party ‘firmly believes that Ireland must retain our sovereignty over these matters if we are to have an immigration system that is fair, efficient, and enforced’ (Ó Laoghaire, 2024). This shift was seen as a response to the direct threat from chauvinist nationalism in the form of some microparties, some with fascist overtones and from independent candidates or from Independent Ireland. Anti-immigrant protests increased in scale and number and, at some of them, crowds waving Irish flags shouted: ‘Sinn Féin are traitors!’ These protesters were able to use nationalist rhetoric, which had previously tended to be pro-migrant, by referencing a centuries-old attempt to replace the Catholic native population in a series of ‘Plantations’. These groups then referred to a ‘great replacement’ through a ‘new plantation’. There was a sense that Sinn Féin, once masters of nationalist populism, was now losing to nationalist populism.

On other issues, populist parties such as Sinn Féin and PBP were more in tune with the public mood. All these parties had opposed what it saw as the weakening of Irish neutrality by consecutive governments’ involvement in military partnerships, such as the NATO Partnership for Peace and PESCO, a platform for member state co-operation in European defence. PBP is explicitly anti-EU because of what it sees as the Union’s ‘imperial agenda’ and support for neoliberalism. Both it and Sinn Féin took strong positions on the Israel–Hamas war, including calls for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. On the issue of the Russia–Ukraine War, PBP took positions that were less in tune with popular opinion and often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks. Sinn Féin’s position was more equivocal. Historically it was more aligned with Russia, often blaming the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin. The invasion of Ukraine meant that the party said it was fully behind the smaller country. But it continued to abstain on packages designed to support Ukraine in the EP.

Two of Independent Ireland’s three EP candidates were high-profile broadcasters, one a recently retired regional correspondent for the national broadcaster and another a late-night phone-in-show host – often referred to as a ‘shock jock’. Their high profile immediately made them contenders to take seats. Although some saw Independent Ireland as an extreme right-wing group, it regards itself as centrist (albeit with a conservative bent). Outside Dublin it campaigned on farming issues, being critical of EU regulations and ‘EU overreach’, and also spoke more fervently in favour of greater control of migration than other centrist parties.

No seats for the new extremes, but …

Although Fine Gael (the European People’s Party-aligned governing party) lost vote share and one seat (down to four), it was relatively pleased with the outcome. At 20.8%, its vote share was slightly above the other centrist governing party, the Renew-aligned Fianna Fáil (20.4%), which gained two seats to equal Fine Gael’s four seats. Most pleasing for them was that they both were well ahead of Sinn Féin. The most prominent populist party sitting with The Left group in the EP, Sinn Féin won a seat in two constituencies but lost their only seat in another. It polled just 11% of the first-preference vote, about the same as in 2019, but well down on its polling in the run-up to the elections. It lost most in rural constituencies.

Despite the significant support for independent candidates, two prominent outgoing MEPs lost their seats. Independents4Change MEPs polled almost 5% of the vote, but both Clare Daly and Mick Wallace suffered from splits in the populist, anti-establishment left vote. We can see also in vote transfer patterns that they were also probably hurt by the presence of anti-immigrant candidates customarily considered on the ‘far right’. They also complained of a media campaign against them. The media had indeed been less than friendly to the pair in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion and their pro-Russian analysis of that conflict. On the other hand, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan comfortably retained his seat.

The new party, Independent Ireland, polled well in two of the three constituencies, picking up a seat in Midlands-North West probably at the expense of Sinn Féin. The winning candidate chose to sit with the Renew Europe group in the EP, which caused some annoyance within the party, as Renew was seen as too mainstream. The smaller left and right populist parties mentioned above failed to win representation in the European Parliament, partly because their votes were split between too many candidates. However, parties and candidates that were aggressively anti-immigrant (so, excluding Independent Ireland) polled a collective 7%, higher than ever before. This result suggests that the immigration issue has a resonance at the polling booths in Ireland that was not previously expected.

Discussion and perspectives

The unwinding of the voting coalition that had sustained Sinn Féin’s popularity was the most notable outcome of the EP and local elections in June 2024. The impact on Sinn Féin’s strategic choices is as yet not clear, but it is difficult to see how the party can recover this vote while immigration remains a significant issue. The party admitted that immigration was the issue that had caused it difficulties, and within months of the result, published an immigration policy that was immediately criticized for ‘dog whistle’ politics. A post-election study shows that Sinn Féin voters did not regard migration as one of the top three issues in the European elections (Red C 2024). This is despite it being the second most important issue for voters overall. It suggests that the voters Sinn Féin has lost are those who thought about migration. Even if it ceases to be an issue, the party may have lost some of its anti-establishment reputation among a section of voters. In the EP it has tended to oppose many of the proposals coming from the European Commission, and that is unlikely to change in the medium term. However, the Sinn Féin member elected for Dublin is highly motivated by concern for climate change, and she might shift the party’s direction on issues such as the European Green Deal.

The Independent Ireland member elected to the Renew Europe group, Ciarán Mullooly, is unlikely to feel tied to any whip and will oppose environmental measures that curtail agriculture. The same will be true of ‘Ming’ Flanagan. If the relative success of the mainstream parties was prominent in the post-election analyses, it ignores the fact that Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s combined support is lower than it has ever been. At least 40% of the first-preference vote went to parties or candidates that can be uncontroversially labelled populist.

Moreover, populist sentiment is common in Ireland for those parties identified here as populist. Although attitudes toward migrants split these parties on a clear left–right basis, when it comes to statements such as ‘Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful’, those most likely to agree are supporters of Sinn Féin (74%), PBP-Solidarity (84%), Aontú (71%) and Independent Ireland (78%) compared to 40% for Fianna Fáil voters. Conspiracy theories associated with populism are also more likely to be believed by supporters of these parties; 38% of Sinn Féin supporters and 45% of Independent Ireland’s supporters agreed with the statement ‘A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major decisions in world politics’. Furthermore, when it comes to trust in news sources, supporters of Sinn Féin (25%), PBP-Solidarity (24%), Aontú (13%) and Independent Ireland (25%) have the lowest levels of trust in the state broadcaster RTÉ.

This points to an available market for populist parties, particularly on the right. It seems that the problem is that support is divided between too many parties. However, the emergence of a significant political leader might tie together some of the anti-migrant and anti-European sentiment that is out there to create a significant electoral force in the future.


 

(*) Eoin O’Malley is Associate Professor of politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. He is author or editor of seven books on Irish politics, and author of over 40 peer-reviewed publications. His research centres mainly on Irish politics, including the party system and political leadership. e-mail: eoin.omalley@dcu.ie


 

References

An Phoblacht (2017). ‘Fianna Fáil plays at opposing Fine Gael but Fianna Fáil pact with Fine Gael keeps Leo Varadkar in power’ An Phoblacht 18 November, https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/27200

Cunningham, Kevin & Marsh, Michael (2021) ‘Voting Behavious: The Sinn Féin Election’, in M. Gallagher, M. Marsh, & T. Reidy (eds) How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 219–54.

Independent Ireland (2024) party website at https://www.independentireland.ie/

Ireland First (2024) party website at https://ireland-first.ie/

Irish Freedom Party (2024) party website at https://www.irishfreedom.ie/

Irish People, The (2024) party website at https://www.irishpeople.org/

National Party (2024) party website at https://nationalparty.ie/

Ó Laoghaire, Donnacha (2024). Dáil Éireann Debate, 1 May 2024, Vol. 1053 No. 3.

O’Malley, Eoin (2008). Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland? West European Politics, 31(5), 960–977.

People Before Profit (2024). ‘Vote Left, Transfer Left’ https://www.pbp.ie/vote-left-transfer-left/

Red C (2024). ‘Post Local & European Elections Study – Data Report 2024’ available from https://neds.ie/reports/NEDS-2024-local-european-elections-report.pdf

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON IRELAND

Viktor Orbán, Hungary's Prime Minister, arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium, on June 22, 2017. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary

Please cite as:
Csehi, Robert. (2024). “A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0073

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON HUNGARY

Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections have produced tectonic shifts in the Hungarian political landscape. While the populist governing party, Fidesz, secured first place in the elections, it lost two seats in the EP, and a new political force emerged that has reshuffled the power balance in Hungary’s opposition. Additionally, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party, along with the pro-government media and social media outlets, spent huge amounts to deliver the government’s campaign messages, and the party reportedly broke mobilization records before the election. Orbán’s campaign returned to the themes of the 2022 national parliamentary election and made the war in Ukraine its centrepiece. Although the initial campaign slogan was ‘no migration, no gender, no war’ and all three elements resonated with Fidesz voters the most, the last component has eclipsed the other two. Orbán used fear-mongering and built a Manichean narrative where anybody failing to vote for Fidesz was part of the ‘pro-war’ camp. He labelled all his domestic and international political opponents ‘pro-war’ and even claimed that the Hungarian opposition was carrying out the demands of its international financiers in Brussels and Washington. The radical right-wing Our Homeland (OH) focused more on the municipal election yet led a negative campaign against the EU, claiming that Brussels has fallen under the influence of globalists and international interest groups and seeks to build a federal superstate. OH also managed to send one MEP to Strasbourg. Overall, while both Fidesz and OH have joined separate, rebranded, right-wing Eurosceptic groups, their political isolation within the EP remains a challenge.

Keywords: right-wing populism; Russia–Ukraine War; migration; gender; elites; Brussels; Soros

 

By Robert Csehi* (Department of Political Science, Institute of Social and Political Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Background

In January 2024, it seemed that elections for the European Parliament (EP) would not hold any great surprises. Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán and his populist Fidesz party were expected to gain a majority of the votes, potentially repeating their electoral success from five years before and securing the party a majority of Hungary’s 21 EP seats. Also, it was expected that the radical right-wing populist Our Homeland (OH) party would potentially manage to send one representative to Strasbourg, given the historical success of radical Hungarian parties in European elections. After their defeat in the 2022 national parliamentary elections, opposition parties were still trying to come up with effective strategies to challenge Orbán’s government, yet most struggled even to influence the political agenda. Given their repeated losses to Orbán’s Fidesz, a growing number of the electorate became disillusioned with them and questioned their political credibility and capabilities. It was in this relative political tranquillity that a political scandal erupted, which eventually led to the emergence of a new political force that redrew the electoral map for Hungary.

In early February 2024 Katalin Novák, the president of the republic, found herself in a clemency scandal. The year before, she had granted a presidential pardon to someone who had helped cover up his superior’s paedophile crimes by forcing one of the victims to withdraw his confession. The issue was extremely sensitive given the Orbán government’s ongoing ‘protect our children’ campaign, which was used to mobilize against Hungary’s LGBTQ+ community. Although President Novák resigned, as did the former justice minister, Judit Varga, who was supposed to lead the Fidesz party list in the EP elections and who also had to sign off on the pardon, the public never received a justification for the pardon and never got to know the person who initiated the process. After Varga resigned from leading the party in the EP elections, her former husband, Péter Magyar, began posting on social media about the alleged involvement of the government in the matter and criticized them for being too cowardly to sacrifice his former wife instead of those who were truly responsible. Although he initially denied any ambition to become a politician, his first interview on the YouTube channel, Partizán, received so much attention (in the interview, he revealed much of his insider experience as part of the government) that he eventually decided to venture into politics, and established a new party, Respect and Freedom (Tisza). Within a few months, he was touring around the country making speeches and decided to run in the EP elections, where candidates of the party were selected through online voting. Given Magyar’s previous involvement with Fidesz, the governing party had a hard time finding a political antidote to his challenge. For their part, the established opposition parties were caught in a bind as Magyar lacked the kind of credibility challenges vis-à-vis voters they themselves laboured under.

In the end, although Fidesz came in first in the EP elections with 44.82% of the votes, this result is the party’s worst performance in an EP election. Pro-government commentators were quick to emphasize that the party received over 2 million votes, more than it had ever achieved before. This increase is largely attributed to the higher-than-average turnout, as the EP elections were held alongside municipal elections. However, this does not change the fact that the governing party (or coalition) has lost 2 seats in the EP and sent only 11 MEPs to Strasbourg. Magyar’s Tisza received 29.6% of the votes and sent seven representatives to the EP. The leftist environmentalist coalition (DK–MSZP–P) managed to secure only two seats compared to their previous five (the DK had four, and the MSZP–P had one MEP). In the 2019 EP election, DK received 16.05% of the votes, whereas in 2024, the coalition managed to gain only 8.03%.

While the leftist coalition survived Tisza’s challenge, the liberal Momentum did not. The party only received 3.7% of the votes and thus lost its two mandates in the EP. The radical right-wing populist OH doubled its support compared to 2019 and managed to secure one seat in the EP with a vote share of 6.71%. While 11 parties were competing for mandates, in the end, only 4 parties (or party coalitions) will represent the Hungarian people in Strasbourg.

The supply side: Populist tropes featuring war and peace

The governing party, Fidesz (in coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party or KDNP), started its EP campaign with Orbán’s 15 March commemoration speech. There, he relied on his usual Eurosceptic populist tropes and claimed that ‘Brussels has abandoned Europeans, and even turned against them’ (Orbán, 2024) and that ‘the people of Europe fear for their freedom in the face of Brussels’ (Ibid.). He blamed the EU for wrongdoing and claimed that because of the incompetent leadership in Brussels, ‘instead of peace, we have war, instead of security we have a rule-of-law ruckus, instead of prosperity we have financial blackmail’ (Ibid.).

Later, Tamás Deutsch, a Fidesz MEP, summarized the party’s criticism against ‘Brussels’ in ten points (Fidesz, 2 April 2024): its failure to manage the COVID-19 crisis; its incompetence in bringing a quick end to the Russia–Ukraine War, and its war-mongering; the European Green Deal; its position on and failure to curb illegal migration; a ‘gender ideology’ it imposes on member states; its failure to prevent Brexit; its rule-of-law ‘jihad’ against certain member states; incompetence that led to the collapse of the distribution of EU funds; pushing member states into debt, and; the Hungarian left that acts against the country in Brussels. Although Deutsch criticized the EU on its economic policies, its ‘gender agenda’, its rule-of-law procedures and migration policies occasionally during the campaign, the party’s fundamental message was summarized in the campaign slogan: ‘no migration, no gender, no war’. It was repeated so often at the beginning of the campaign that the mayor of a small village even posted it as a ‘welcome sign’ at the entrance to the village.

The slogan was supposed to reflect the various dimensions of the antagonistic relationship between the position of Fidesz and that of ‘Brussels’. As Orbán put it: “They [i.e., Brussels] want to press us into a war, they want to saddle us with migrants, they want to re-educate our children. But we shall not go to war, we shall not let in migrants, and we shall not hand over our children” (Orbán, 2024).

Orbán claimed to stop illegal migration into Hungary despite the EU’s alleged liberal policies and called for ‘resistance’ to ‘gender ideology’ in the name of safeguarding Hungarian children against the alleged LGBTQ+ propaganda. Tamás Menczer, the party’s communication officer, even argued that ‘we shall never forget that the Hungarian left would destroy the peace and security of Hungary. They would bring us into the war, they would let migrants in, and they would let the gender propaganda loose’ (Fidesz, 6 April 2024). While the first two elements of the campaign slogan featured in the social media messages of the governing party in the beginning, the third message, ‘no war’, gained ever-increasing attention in the party’s campaign and ultimately eclipsed the other two. Pro-government social media influencers even went so far as to discuss the implications of a potential nuclear bomb in Budapest as a result of the war psychosis in Brussels and the West in general.

Orbán employed a pro-war versus pro-peace distinction, essentially a form of the Manichean division often utilized by populists. He applied this moral dichotomy not only to European politics but also to the Hungarian political scene. On the one hand, he claimed that: “Brussels is actually a prisoner of George Soros’s network … the Soros network is embedded in the European institutions – so much so that the European institutions are giving them money for their operations … [T]hey’re present within the Commission, they’re in the European Parliament, and quite a few prime ministers are clearly Soros-backed people” (Fidesz, 22 March 2024a).

Additionally, he also argued that ‘the pro-war governments, the bureaucrats in Brussels [and] George Soros’ network, are sending millions of dollars to the pro-war left in Budapest’ (Fidesz, 19 April 2024). Deploying a typical populist narrative frame, Orbán not only criticized the EU for failing to listen to the people but also linked his domestic opposition with a malevolent elite. He and his party often pictured members of the different opposition parties conspiring with Brussels against Hungary, who were trying to push Hungary into the Ukraine–Russia War. In fact, most party figures who participated in the campaign actually claimed that the Hungarian opposition would enter the war because that is what ‘their financiers’ (Fidesz, 30 April 2024) are expecting from them. Among others, they claimed that ‘the feeding channel, the umbilical cord of the Hungarian left is here in Brussels and America, so they are fed from here, financed from here, bought by the kilo’ (Fidesz, 22 March 2024b). They often referred to Brussels and Washington as ‘the paymasters of the Hungarian left’ (Fidesz, 19 April 2024). Fidesz’s messages frequently depicted prominent European politicians, from Emmanuel Macron to Manfred Weber and Ursula von der Leyen, as warmongers. These messages also highlighted their alleged Hungarian allies, including key opposition figures such as former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, MEPs Klára Dobrev, Anna Donáth, Katalin Cseh and the new political actor, Péter Magyar. The claims about a pro-war Hungarian left were also repeated by Tamás Deutsch, Fidesz MEP, in the only televised debate where each party list leader of the EP election (altogether 11 parties) had 8 minutes to ‘debate’ with one another. Interestingly, the TikTok campaign of the governing party has never mentioned Russia as a responsible actor for the war in Ukraine, instead blaming European actors and NATO for escalating the conflict by supporting Ukraine with money and weapons. Throughout the campaign, it was unclear what Orbán and his party meant by ‘peace’ and how they would achieve it once their candidates appeared in the EP.

The campaign of the governing party appealed to the most basic fear of the population and constantly pictured the European Parliamentary elections as a decisive battle where people had to decide about war or peace, life or death, whether one was willing to send his/her sons, grandchildren into the war. Although the social media campaign has built heavily on Orbán – who also toured the country himself, appearing unannounced in different places where he would talk to a selected audience – and his speeches and interviews, other party members also participated in the campaign. Most importantly, Deutsch and another MEP, András László, were quite active in conveying the party messages to the people, mainly about the war. Billboards were also widely used that featured the word ‘war’ made out of pictures of their domestic political opponents and George Soros. In contrast, they also had a billboard with the word ‘peace’ featuring Orbán in the background.

Overall, Orbán and Fidesz have crafted a populist narrative that positions themselves as the voice of peace, claiming to represent the people’s true interests. This narrative sharply contrasts them with all other domestic political actors and their supposed financiers in Brussels. The governmental parties, along with the pro-government social media influencer group Megafon, spent an enormous amount on social media campaigns—more than any other political force in Europe (Portfolio, 2024). In addition, at the ‘Peace March’ held a week before the election, Orbán promised a record-breaking mobilization, which he referred to as ‘the day of one million encounters’ (Fidesz, 5 June 2024).

Although the radical right-wing, populist OH party did not have a specific EP election manifesto, it campaigned with negative messages about the EU. László Toroczkai, the party head, blamed the EU for its undemocratic nature, its globalist agenda, its pursuit of a federal superstate, and its corrupt dealings. The party’s main message centred on the idea that Brussels had been captured by globalist, international interest groups. Interestingly, food safety was frequently highlighted in the party’s social media campaigns. While their primary focus was on the ‘state capture’ accusation against the EU, the party also emphasized issues related to migration into the EU, particularly stressing the security aspect. Their domestic political messages highlighted labour migration as a significant issue, with the party’s MP, Dóra Dúró, advocating for higher wages instead of relying on guest workers and criticizing the government’s strategy to build battery factories. The party’s emphasis on domestic issues was partly due to their greater focus on municipal elections rather than the EP election. With much more limited financial resources than Fidesz, their message distribution was also more restricted.

The demand side: Older, less educated and rural populations as the mainstay of right-wing populism

As pointed out, Fidesz came out on top in the EP elections, even though it secured its worst result ever and effectively lost two mandates compared to 2019. In the capital, Budapest, the difference between the party and its primary challenger, Tisza, was 0.31%, yet in 9 out of 23 electoral districts, Magyar’s party won. Within the counties, the relative dominance of Fidesz was more traceable: they won in each of the 19 counties, and their winning margin fluctuated between 27.67% (in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county) and 9.29% (in Pest county). Overall, there were 60 municipalities where Tisza received more votes than the governing party (Bódi and Kovalcsik, 2024), which must not be overstated, given that there are over 3,000 municipalities in the country. Interestingly, while OH came in second place in 17 of the 19 counties in the municipal elections, their vote share for the EP elections per county was much lower. Yet, compared to the party’s 2019 results, they managed to double their vote share in every settlement size category.

Initial studies on the demographic composition of Fidesz voters have started to emerge. One analysis reveals a clear pattern: the lower the percentage of high school graduates in a municipality, the higher the vote share for Fidesz (Hajdu, 2024). This correlation between education level and support for the governing party is deeply rooted in broader socioeconomic conditions: areas with lower educational attainment typically have lower wages, leading to greater reliance on welfare programs. Another poll highlighted that 63% of Fidesz voters are aged 50 or older, compared to just 29% of Tisza voters in the same age group (Propeller, 2024). Additionally, 34% of Fidesz voters are 65 or older, indicating that a significant portion of the voting base is in retirement, reflecting their increased dependence on state support. This is consistent with Orbán’s policies, which are consistently favourable towards pensioners.

Given that Fidesz’s campaign revolved around the notion of war and peace, it is worth looking into how much this message was successfully distributed. Poll data suggests that the governing party was once again successful in creating a cleavage: while 77% of Fidesz voters would not have sent any assistance to Ukraine, only 29% of Tisza voters would have done the same (Molnár, 2024). This survey, unsurprisingly, also suggested a positive correlation between the level of schooling and readiness to send assistance to Ukraine.

Another poll focused on support for Hungary’s EU membership just before the EP elections, aiming to assess the impact of Eurosceptic populist messages on public opinion regarding the country’s role in the EU. The results showed that 51% supported and 32% somewhat supported EU membership overall. However, Fidesz voters were the least supportive: only 25% fully supported EU membership, with another 46% somewhat supportive. In contrast, Tisza voters overwhelmingly backed EU membership, with 83% fully supportive and 13% somewhat supportive (Király, 2024). The same poll also asked about the most pressing issues facing the EU. Unsurprisingly, given the campaign context, 65% of respondents identified the war as the most serious issue, overshadowing concerns like migration, climate change, economic disparities among member states, and an ageing population. Regarding migration, 65% of Fidesz voters saw migration into Hungary as a significant problem, while 81% of Tisza voters viewed emigration from Hungary as a more significant issue.

While no new polls have been conducted on public views regarding migration or gender – the other two main campaign themes of Fidesz – a 2022 poll revealed that Fidesz voters rated the seriousness of these issues at 4.4 and 4.0 on a 1–5 scale, respectively (D. Kovács and Bita, 2022). These scores were above the national average, indicating that pro-government voters were more sensitive to these messages.

Overall, the data suggests that Fidesz voters tend to be older, less educated and rural residents. They are also more receptive to Eurosceptic rhetoric and resonate more strongly with issues related to migration, gender and the war in Ukraine.

Conclusion and discussion

Despite the electoral success of Fidesz, this victory was essentially pyrrhic. Not only did the party record its worst performance in the history of EP elections in Hungary, but it only secured its ‘victory’ at great cost (money spent on social media, billboards, and the like) and ostensibly with a massive mobilization campaign. In comparison, Tisza did not spend much on social media, had no billboards, and lacked any mobilization strategy given the early phase of its party building (the party was effectively created a couple of months before the EP elections).

Furthermore, despite one of the most significant victories across the EU, Orbán’s party faced the challenge of allying with others on the European scene. Initially, the governing parties strived to join the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group led by Italy’s prime minister, Georgia Meloni. Ultimately, Orbán rejected this option because he did not want to sit with the anti-Hungarian Romanian party, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians. Additionally, there was a cleavage on the Russia–Ukraine War: not only Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński but also smaller members of the ECR from Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, held diametrically opposed views to Orbán’s on the matter. Most of these parties overwhelmingly supported financial assistance to Ukraine.

After weeks of negotiations, Orbán succeeded in forming a new coalition based on the former Identity and Democracy group, initially with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Czech ANO, which was ultimately led by the French National Rally (RN). Although the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is the third-largest faction in the EP, it could not secure any significant positions, and thus, Fidesz’s political isolation continues.

Little about the party’s objectives is known: a smaller European Parliament and correspondingly greater sovereignty for member states, a revision of the European Green Deal, and a more robust fight against illegal migration. Given that Hungary assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2024, Fidesz is expected to pursue these objectives by putting them on the EU agenda. The extent to which Hungary can deliver on Fidesz’s objectives is yet another question, although Orbán’s international diplomatic meetings in the first weeks of July 2024 signalled his dedication to focusing on international matters. It is worth mentioning that Magyar’s Tisza has joined the European People’s Party (EPP). As a result, KDNP, Fidesz’s coalition partner, which remained in the EPP after Fidesz left the centre-right bloc in 2021, announced that they would also leave the EPP.

The far-right OH joined a new faction led by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), whose leader visited his Hungarian counterpart, László Torockai, before the election. The Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) only has 25 MEPs, so their influence, along with that of OH, remains marginal.


 

(*) Robert Csehi is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at Corvinus University of Budapest. His research focuses on comparative and European politics. More specifically, he studies populism and Euroscepticism in the Central and Eastern European region, the institutional development of the EU in general, and its economic governance framework in particular. His previous work appeared in Democratization, the Journal of European Public Policy, West European Politics, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Politics & Governance, and European Politics and Society. His book, The Politics of Populism in Hungary, was published by Routledge in 2022. E-mail: robert.csehi@uni-corvinus.hu


 

References

Bódi, Mátyás and Kovalcsik Tamás (2024). Térképen mutatjuk, hol verte meg a Tisza Párt a Fidesz-KDNP-t. https://telex.hu/valasztasi-foldrajz/2024/06/12/terkep-tisza-part-fidesz-magyar-peter-nagyobb-tamogatottsag

D. Kovács, Ildikó and Bita Dániel (2022). A Fidesz-szavazók nagyobb problémának tartják a genderlobbit, mint az inflációt és az egészségügy állapotát. https://24.hu/belfold/2022/03/25/magyarorszag-problematerkep-inflacio-egeszsegugy-gender-migracio-kozvelemeny-kutatas-zavecz/

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (22 March 2024a). 3. RÉSZ – Orbán Viktor a Kossuth rádióban. Jó néhány európai miniszterelnök is Soros embere. #orbanviktor #magyarorszag #radio https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7349104473341463840. TikTok.

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (22 March 2024b) 5. RÉSZ–Orbán Viktor a Kossuth rádióban. A baloldalt Brüsszelből és Amerikából etetik. #orbanviktor

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7349104473341529376. TikTok.

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (2 April 2024) Miért kell változás Brüsszelben? – Deutsch Tamás 10 pontja. https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7353264916117212448. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (6 April 2024) A baloldal háborúba vinné Magyarországot.
Védjük meg Magyarország békéjét és biztonságát! #magyarorszag #beke #biztonsag

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7354766116100623648. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (19 April 2024) Ne hagyjuk Magyarországot!
Harcolnunk kell, meg kell védeni a magyar emberek békéjét és biztonságát, meg kell védeni a gazdasági eredményeinket, meg kell védeni a családjainkat és különösen is a gyerekeinket! #orbanviktor #kampany #magyarorszaghttps://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7359584736945179936. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (30 April 2024) Amikor azt gondoltuk, hogy nem lehet már rosszabb, akkor megkaptuk a nyakunkba a háborúpárti dollárbaloldalt és a háborúpárti Brüsszelt is. Nem kérünk belőlük! #menczertamas #baloldal #brusszelhttps://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7363691186420223264. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (5 June 2024) Szombaton jön az Egymillió Találkozás Napja!
A választás előtti 24 órában, 50 ezer aktivistánk egyetlen nap alatt egymillió embert fog személyesen a választásra buzdítani. #fidesz

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7377030865337027872. TikTok

Hajdu, Miklós (2024). Nincs fideszes többség, ahol a lakosság legalább 60 százaléka érettségizett. https://g7.hu/adat/20240612/nincs-fideszes-tobbseg-ahol-a-lakossag-legalabb-60-szazaleka-erettsegizett/

Király, András (2024). Hiába sulykolja a kormány, hogy háborúban állunk Brüsszellel, a magyarok elsöprő többsége még mindig EU-párti. https://telex.hu/kulfold/2024/06/05/eu-ep-median-kozvelemeny-kutatas-tisza-part

Molnár, Gergő (2024). Závecz Research: kettéosztja Magyarországot Ukrajna EU-s támogatása. https://index.hu/belfold/2024/05/31/europai-unio-ukrajna-haboru-tamogatas-segitseg-felmeres-kozvelemeny-kutatas-partok-kormany-ellenzek/

Orbán, Viktor (2024). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 176th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-176th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849

Portfolio (2024). Duplaannyit költöttek a magyar kormánypártok hirdetésekre, mint Európában bármelyik másik erő. https://www.portfolio.hu/unios-forrasok/20240603/duplaannyit-koltottek-a-magyar-kormanypartok-hirdetesekre-mint-europaban-barmelyik-masik-ero-689779

Propeller (2024). Itt vannak az adatok: kiderült, hogy kik szavaztak a Fideszre és kik Magyar Péterre. https://propeller.hu/itthon/4038304-magyar-peter-fidesz-kdnp-szavazok-eletkor

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON HUNGARY

Leader of the Syriza party, Alexis Tsipras, delivers a speech during a pre-election campaign event in Thessaloniki, Greece, on May 16, 2023. Photo: Giannis Papanikos.

Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece

Please cite as:

Vasilopoulou, Sofia. (2024). “Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0072

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON GREECE

Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament (EP) election in Greece was held against a background of geopolitical instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. However, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis. The electoral results were primarily an anti-government protest vote and confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation across the political spectrum. On the right, three relatively new far-right populist parties received parliamentary representation, i.e., the Greek Solution, Victory and the Voice of Reason. On the left, SYRIZA–PA maintained its second place, although its support declined substantively compared to the previous EP election. Course of Freedom and the KKE, on the other hand, were key electoral beneficiaries in the left-wing space. Younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were more likely to support New Democracy. That said, far-right parties also received votes from younger generations. Geographically, the far right is more successful in the north of Greece. The key message of this election was political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise posing dilemmas across the political spectrum.

Keywords: elections; public opinion; populism; the left; the right; Greece

 

By Sofia Vasilopoulou* (King’s College London)

Introduction

Greeks went to the polls on Sunday, 9 June 2024, to elect 21 Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). Although a total of 31 parties competed for Greek citizens’ votes, only eight received enough votes to reach the 3% electoral threshold for parliamentary representation. The elections were held against a background of geopolitical instability with the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza. Yet, domestic questions, such as the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis, influenced the vote.

The electoral results confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation on both the left and right ends of the politicalspectrum despite the centre-right New Democracy retaining first place. On the right, three far-right parties with populist agendas, including Greek Solution, Victory and Voice of Reason, elected four MEPs in total. The substantive policies of these parties share several similarities, and their narratives are all based on a similar populist logic. However, their 2024 EP election campaigns prioritized different issues. Whereas Greek Solution talked more about its economic agenda and the cost-of-living crisis, Victory focused on religion and family, and Voice of Reason placed emphasis on Islam and the so-called ‘woke culture’.

On the left, the Coalition of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA–PA) came second with approximately 15% of the vote, translating into four EP seats. The Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Course of Freedom secured two and one seats, respectively. These parties vary substantively in their policies. SYRIZA–PA put forward a centre-left agenda, Course of Freedom continued its anti-establishment rhetoric, and KKE maintained its communist agenda.

In what follows, I first analyse the policies of Greek populist parties on domestic and international issues. I then proceed to examine the electoral results, offering a glimpse into some socio-demographic and geographic patterns of the vote. I will finally conclude with some thoughts about the dilemmas presented to parties following the electoral results.

The ‘supply-side’ of Greek populism in the 2024 EP election

Greece has been characterized as a populist democracy (Pappas, 2014), in which populism tends to be observed across the party system and is expressed through blame-shifting and exclusivist narratives (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). Greek populism cuts across the left–right dimension and is generally concentrated among the political parties that reject the mainstream politics of the ‘old two-party system’ associated with the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (Tsatsanis et al., 2018). Based on this distinction, this section discusses the ideologies and positions of six populist parties in Greece in the run-up to the 2024 EP election in Greece.

Right-wing populism

Greek Solution (Ελληνική Λύση) – EP group: European Conservatives and Reformists

The far-right populist Greek Solution was founded in 2016 by Kyriakos Velopoulos, a former member of the far-right Popular Orthodox Rally (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός) and the centre-right New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία).

The party rose to prominence amid Greek protests against the Prespa Agreement signed between Greece and North Macedonia to settle an enduring dispute between the two nations. During that time, other far-right parties in Greece were experiencing electoral decline, which favoured Greek Solution. For example, members of the Golden Dawn (Χρυσή Αυγή), an extreme right-wing party (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2015) were being indicted for running a criminal organization, and the Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες) had lost credibility among their voters for participating in an electoral coalition with the left-wing SYRIZA (Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς).

Greek Solution has a prominent anti-establishment narrative glorifying the ‘pure’ Greek people against the ‘evil’ and ‘corrupt’ Greek political elites. Its populist message is combined with an ethnonationalist rhetoric, which is said to derive its strength from ‘Hellenism’. The party’s core beliefs may be summarized by its focus on ‘Greece, religion, family’. During the 2024 EP election campaign, the party leader professed to ‘make Greece and Greeks proud again’, arguing that Greek Solution has ‘clean hands and clean ideas’ (Greek Solution, 2024a).

On the cultural dimension, Greek Solution is critical of immigration, and what it calls ‘the language of rights’ and ‘imposed’ multiculturalism (Greek Solution, 2024b). It is pro-Russian (Dimitropoulos 2022; Wondreys, 2023) and against compulsory vaccinations (in.gr, 2021). While not openly calling for a Greek exit from the European Union (EU), Greek Solution has a vision for a Europe of nation-states extending from Lisbon to Siberia that is Christian and includes Russia, i.e., what the party calls a ‘European Europe’ that gives veto power to all member states (Greek Solution, 2024c). Despite its Eurosceptic position, the leader of Greek Solution argued that EP elections are very important because nine out of ten decisions made in the Greek Parliament derive from EU legislation and that, therefore, abstention would mean support for the national government (Greek Solution, 2024d).

On the economic dimension, the party offers a somewhat blurred policy combination of low taxation mixed with economic intervention and welfare chauvinism (Georgiadou & Mavropoulou, 2022). The party’s EP election campaign primarily focused on the ‘cost-of-living crisis’ framed with a robust anti-establishment narrative. For example, they castigated the government, declaring that ‘Greeks are hungry and poor, but politicians are rich’. In its pre-electoral campaign, the party also focused on the expressed needs and priorities of the primary economic sector, specifically agriculture. Its economic plan consisted of reducing food production costs to support farmers by removing fuel duty, flat taxes and investment in mining to subsidize free schemes for energy self-sufficiency across Greece. Interestingly, and contrary to the cultural model of far-right voting behaviour (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), Greek Solution’s party leader attributes the rise of far-right parties to economic reasons, such as poverty, unemployment and the cost-of-living crisis (Greek Solution, 2024b).

Democratic Patriotic Movement–Victory (Δημοκρατικό Πατριωτικό Κίνημα–Νίκη) – EP group: Non-Attached

The far-right Victory was founded in 2019, shortly after the signing of the Prespa Agreement, which, it argues, has been a betrayal to the Greek people considering that there is only ‘one’ Macedonia, which is ‘only Greek’ (Victory, 2024). The party first competed in the 2023 general election and gained ten seats. It puts forward an ultra-conservative religious narrative premised on an ethnic conception of Greek national identity and a belief in the primacy of the church over the state.

Victory makes populist appeals differentiating between the ‘good’ Greek people (who are equated to the Greek nation) and the elites presented as ‘gangs’ that place their partisan interests over the ‘sacred’ national interest (Victory, 2024). The party rejects left–right ideology, suggests that parties have colluded against the Greek people and the Greek nation, and promises to ‘free’ Greece from these partisan interests. It calls for binding referendums on important questions, the removal of the electoral threshold, and the reduction of the size of the Greek Parliament from 350 to 200 deputies.

On the cultural dimension, the party opposes liberal values, is against minority rights, and talks about Greece’s ‘spiritual, biological and territorial self-destruction’ (Victory, 2020). Its ideology is premised on a strong belief in the Orthodox Christian religious tradition. The party is careful to avoid criticisms that it strategically employs religion in its discourse and argues that ‘We do not have a religion, we have faith’. Victory is firmly against LGBTQ+ rights and abortion, arguing that ‘nature is law’, and proposes to establish a ‘Ministry of National Demographic Growth’ that would ‘ensure the biological future of the Greek nation in our ancestral land’ (Victory, 2020b) and address issues related to family, childbirth, immigration and repatriation. To that end, the party promises birth subsidies, benefits for stay-at-home mothers with two or more children, and tax reductions for families. The party is prone to conspiracy theories, for example, arguing that LGBTQ+ Pride events are supported and subsidized by the US embassy, George Soros and international lobbies (Victory, 2024b). It is also against vaccinations (Newsbeast, 2023).

Victory’s position towards the EU is rather blurry. The party appears to support a Greek exit from the EU so the country is ‘free from its guardians’, but it does not openly advocate for it. It suggests that Greece needs to focus first on being socially and economically stronger and praises the Visegrad countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) for promoting their national interests within the EU (Victory, 2020c). It is noticeable, however, that the EU was not a salient issue in the party’s 2024 European manifesto, which focuses primarily on domestic issues, including measures to support family, population growth, cheap energy and rural communities. Victory is pro-Russian and criticizes Greece’s support for Ukraine in the ongoing conflict.

The party has a staunch anti-globalization agenda, supports strategic investment in agriculture and Greek self-sufficiency in food and energy. While it supports low taxation for both businesses and households, it proposes tax increases on banks and multinational corporations as well as on money transfers to other countries.

Voice of Reason (Φωνή Λογικής) – EP group: Patriots for Europe

Voice of Reason is a relatively new far-right party founded in 2023 by Afroditi Latinopoulou, a former New Democracy candidate. The party describes itself as a contemporary patriotic movement that serves Greek identity and values, such as ‘Homeland, religion, family.’ Like Greek Solution and Victory, it portrays Greece in decline and seeks to appeal to the ‘ordinary Greek’ against the corrupt establishment. The party is against ‘political correctness’ and portrays itself as being censored from Greek media (Latinopoulou, 2024). Interestingly, although the party does not have any known links to the Spartans or the Golden Dawn, Latinopoulou criticized as anti-democratic the decision of the Greek Supreme Court to ban the Spartans from running in the 2024 EP election on suspicion they were being led by Ilias Kasidiaris, a former Golden Dawn member of the Greek Parliament currently serving a prison sentence for directing a criminal organization (Newsbreak, 2024).

The ideology of Voice of Reason draws inspiration from the so-called ‘Great Replacement’ theory. It argues that globalization, atheism, Muslim immigration and a rights discourse are replacing Greek culture and Christianity. It maintains that ‘Brussels’ is a pro-globalization entity whose decisions support global financial interests. The leader claims that she is in favour of a ‘Europe of nations, not a Europe of illegal immigrants and rights’ activists’ (Danikas, 2024). According to the party, migration policy and the so-called ‘woke culture’ were at stake in the 2024 EP election (Voice of Reason, 2024). The party warns about the ‘Islamization of Greece and Europe’. Its policy solutions consist of the deportation of illegal immigrants, the closing of Greek borders, and the relocation of reception centres for migrants outside Greece. The party is staunchly against the acceptance of non-heterosexual sexual orientations, same-sex marriage and adoption rights. It prioritizes demographic growth through measures that support the ‘Greek’ family.

Left-wing populism

Coalition of the Radical Left–Progressive Alliance (Συνασπισμός της Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς – Προοδευτική Συμμαχία, SYRIZA–PA) – EP group: The Left

SYRIZA has been the main opposition party in Greece since 2019. The party was founded in 2004 and remained at the margins of the Greek party system until it rose to power during the Greek crisis. SYRIZA is a radical left populist party that critiques international capitalism and attempts to provide a socially just alternative to it. It is socially progressive, committed to equality and rights, and has historically put forward a version of soft Euroscepticism, criticizing the EU’s democratic deficit. During the Greek crisis, it adopted a fervent populist rhetoric blaming domestic and international elites for the Greek crisis (Vasilopoulou et al., 2014). It embraced an anti-establishment protest strategy, arguing that a different – anti-neoliberal – path was possible to take Greeks out of poverty and social exclusion.

After SYRIZA-PA’s defeat in the 2023 national election, the party elected a new leader, Stefanos Kasselakis, a relatively unknown politician and a former banker. Kasselakis was elected on a ticket prioritizing transparency, justice, labour rights, progressive taxation, and LGBTQ+ rights. The transformation of the party following its new leadership remains to be seen, especially considering that it has led to ongoing debates and factional splits within the party. During the 2024 EP election campaign, the party refrained from strong anti-neoliberal rhetoric and instead talked about a ‘progressive’ political space. The party had a positive message asking Greeks to opt for SYRIZA-PA at the ballot box: ‘For a better life, now’. Instead of an anti-establishment agenda, SYRIZA-PA talked about social protection, security and opportunities for all.

Course of Freedom (Πλεύση Ελευθερίας) – EP group: Non-attached

Course of Freedom is an anti-establishment political party founded in 2016 by former President of the Greek Parliament and SYRIZA MP Zoe Konstantopoulou. Its policy proposals are mixed, making it difficult to firmly place the party on the left–right spectrum. The leader explicitly argues: ‘We look neither right nor left. We look forward’ (CNN, 2024).

On the cultural dimension, the party puts forward an equality and inclusion agenda that tolerates differences and supports human, minority and LGBTQ+ rights (Course of Freedom, 2024b). It supports same-sex marriage and is pro-Palestinian (Chatzikonstantinou, 2024). At the same time, the party adopts a strong sovereigntist narrative seeking to appeal to ‘popular conscience’ with emotive language. For example, it demands reparations from Germany for the Second World War and seeks to ‘shake off the yoke of the memorandum despotism, the totalitarianism of the Eurobureaucracy, the debtocracy, the bankocracy and the interests and oligarchies that support, feed and benefit from this anti-democratic regime’ (Course of Freedom, 2024a). Course of Freedom has also been critical of the Prespa Agreement, appealing to nationalist voters opposed to austerity.

Communist Party of Greece (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, KKE) – EP group: Non-attached

The KKE was founded in 1918 and is considered an orthodox communist party guided by the ‘revolutionary worldview of Marxism–Leninism’ (KKE, 2013). It is among the few parties in Europe with such an ideological agenda that has maintained a persistent level of electoral success. In line with its communist ideology, the party rejects ‘bourgeois democracy’ and seeks to overthrow capitalism.

The KKE employs populism in its discourse (Hawkins et al., 2020). It has an anti-elite rhetoric arguing that Greek mainstream parties ‘blackmail the people’ and that New Democracy should be ‘afraid of the people’ (902.gr, 2024). On the cultural dimension, whereas KKE is tolerant of immigration, it is fervently against the decriminalization of drug use and exhibits culturally conservative attitudes towards LGBTQ+ rights, including same-sex marriage and adoption (Naftemporiki, 2024).

The party has a hard Eurosceptic stance, supporting Greece’s exit from the EU. It views the EU as imperialistic, anti-democratic, capitalist and exploitative. It perceives the EU’s impact on national sovereignty to be adverse and an impediment to social justice. In his pre-electoral speech, the party leader called the workers and the people to use their vote in order to ‘raise a red flag against the EU, SYRIZA and PASOK’, arguing that these parties satisfy the wishes of their ‘exploiters’ under the ‘delusion’ of social democracy (902.gr, 2024).

The KKE is also anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-EU. It is pro-Palestinian yet views the war in Ukraine as an imperialistic conflict between the ‘bourgeois powers’, i.e., the EU, NATO and the US, and ‘capitalist Russia’ (KKE, 2023). Economically, it proposes the nationalization of all industries and a centrally planned economy.

The campaign context

The 2024 EP election occurred against the backdrop of public dissatisfaction with domestic politics. Based on a Pew Research Centre (2024) opinion poll conducted between January and March 2024, 53 % of Greek respondents reported an unfavourable view towards the EU, which was 3 percentage points higher compared to 2023 and the largest group across the European countries surveyed. The same poll reported that in Greece, in contrast to other EU member states, public Euroscepticism derives primarily from left-leaning citizens. In addition, satisfaction with democracy had dropped from 32 % in 2021 to 22 % in 2024 (Pew Research Centre, 2024b) and was – not for the first time – the lowest across the sample of European countries. It is therefore no surprise that citizen dissatisfaction with the government was prominent among the public. For example, only 35% of respondents thought that their vote in the EP election would change things in Greece, 48% saw it as an opportunity to express protest (Alco, 2024), and 60% as a chance to vote against the government (To Vima, 2024).

Although public interest in the EP election was relatively high at 56% (Alco, 2024), national issues dominated the campaigns and were core to citizens’ decision-making. When presented with a list of issues that would influence their vote in the 2024 EP elections, 53.4 % of respondents answered the cost-of-living crisis and the economy. Other issues included European issues (8.2%), security (7.8%), health (7.6%), foreign policy (6.9%), the Tempi train crash (a deadly head-on collision between two trains in the Thessaly region in 2023) (6.5%), education (2.9%) and same-sex marriage (2.9%) (To Vima, 2024). These responses reflected a feeling of general economic malaise. For example, according to a Metron Analysis survey conducted in May 2024, the top two most important issues facing the country included the cost-of-living crisis (40%) and the economy (27%) (Kathimerini, 2024a). Most parties also devoted their campaigns to national issues. Although there was no official pre-electoral TV debate, on 24 May 2024, there was an informal debate in the Greek Parliament during its last session prior to the EP election, where questions of inflation and the cost-of-living crisis also dominated.

Interestingly, according to the Youth and Democracy Eurobarometer (2024) survey, the top priority for young Greeks is fighting poverty and economic and social inequalities (45%, 9 percentage points above the EU average). This is followed by preserving peace, reinforcing international security and promoting international cooperation (35%), and promoting human rights, democracy and common European values (31%).

Electoral results

Confirming the ‘second-order’ character of EP elections, only 41.39% of the electorate turned out to vote (table 1). Although this followed a general trend of declining turnout (Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2012), turnout was particularly low in 2024, i.e., over 12 percentage points lower than the 2023 national election and over 17 percentage points lower than the 2019 EP election.

Prior to the election, New Democracy and SYRIZA-PA had set themselves specific goals. On the one hand, the leader of New Democracy claimed that he was aiming for the same electoral result as in 2019 (Reporter, 2024). On the other hand, SYRIZA-PA’s Kasselakis claimed that he would be satisfied if his party gained over 20% of the vote (EFSYN, 2024). Both leaders’ claims failed to materialize, as the electoral result was overall one of electoral fragmentation both on the right and the left.

On the left, SYRIZA-PA’s electoral result dropped compared to the previous national and EP elections to just under 15%. The KKE received 9.25% of the vote, translating into two MEPs. Lastly, Course of Freedom received 3.4% of the vote, remaining relatively stable compared to the 2023 national election. On the right, three political parties received parliamentary representation, including Greek Solution with 9.3 %, Victory with 4.37 % and Voice of Reason with 3.04%. Together these parties elected 4 out of 21 MEPs.

The socio-demographics of the vote

There were no clear socio-demographic patterns of support for populist parties as defined by age and employment (Tables 2 and 3). Based on the exit poll (Kathimerini, 2024b), younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were much more likely to support New Democracy. Course of Freedom benefited electorally from the youngest 17–24 age group. Young Greeks also opted for the far right going against the perception that these parties’ strongholds are among the older generations. In fact, older people voted primarily for New Democracy. Whereas Greek Solution received the least votes from the 17–24 age group, Voice of Reason received its second-best outcome in the same group. In addition, Greek Solution was the third most preferred party among the 25–34 age group.

In terms of employment status, SYRIZA–PA attracted support from public and private sector employees as well as pensioners. KKE was mostly successful among private sector employees and farmers. On the right, Greek Solution received significant support from farmers, which is consistent with the party’s strategy to add to its ballot a female farmer from the north of Greece, Galato Alexandraki, who was elected as an MEP. Farmers, nonetheless, were quite fragmented in their political preferences also supporting the left-wing populist Course of Freedom. Pensioners were much less likely to opt for Greek Solution, Victory or Voice of Freedom. Victory was very successful among public sector employees, whereas private sector employees were the top group for Voice of Reason.

There is also an interesting geographic dimension to the far-right populist vote (for a European perspective, see also Ejrnæs et al., 2024). In many districts in Northern Greece, these parties received above-average results. Specifically, Greek Solution came second in six electoral districts of the north, including Imathia (18.42%), Pella (17.28%), Kilkis (16.54%), Thessaloniki B (15.82%), Serres (15.64%), and Drama (15.52%).

Conclusion

The key message of this election is political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise. Citizen protest against the government and domestic issues, such as inflation, the economy and the cost-of-living crisis, dominated the 2024 EP election in Greece. The results confirmed a trend of fragmentation across the political spectrum, which poses dilemmas both on the right and the left. On the right, the strength of the populist far right limits the electoral potential of a centrist strategy for the centre-right New Democracy. If New Democracy were to move towards the centre, multiple contenders would likely contest for the political space to its right. At the same time the far right is also divided, and it is not clear whether these parties are willing to work together. On the left, there is a discussion on the possibility of SYRIZA–PA joining forces in order to be able to challenge New Democracy. This strategy is also not without complexity: for SYRIZA–PA, it might entail that the party fully loses its radical and populist appeal, whereas PASOK might be seen as disloyal towards its core voters.


 

(*) Sofia Vasilopoulou (PhD LSE) is Professor of European Politics at King’s College London, UK. Her research and teaching interests lie in Comparative Politics, Political Behaviour, Party Politics and European Union Politics. Her work examines the causes and consequences of political dissatisfaction among the public and the ways in which this is channelled through party strategies and party competition. Specific themes include Euroscepticism and far-right politics. She has published articles in leading international peer-reviewed journals, including the European Journal of Political Research, Political Behavior, European Union Politics, the Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy and West European Politics. She is the author of Far-Right Parties and Euroscepticism: Patterns of Opposition (ECPR Press and Rowman & Littlefield 2018) and The Golden Dawn’s Nationalist Solution: Explaining the Rise of the Far Right in Greece (Palgrave Macmillan 2015 with Daphne Halikiopoulou). She is Joint Editor in Chief of the European Journal of Political Research.


 

References

902.gr (2024, May 22) Ομιλία του Δ. Κουτσούμπα σε συγκέντρωση στο Περιστέρι (LIVE) https://www.902.gr/eidisi/politiki/364936/omilia-toy-d-koytsoympa-se-sygkentrosi-sto-peristeri-live 

Alco (2024). Ερευνα APLHA 2–6 Ιουνίου. Alcopolls. http://alcopolls.gr/portfolio/%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%B5%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%B1-aplha-2-6-%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%85%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%85

Chatzikonstantinou, M. (2024, May 23) Αναγνώριση του παλαιστινιακού κράτους και από την Ελλάδα ζητά η αντιπολίτευσηhttps://www.naftemporiki.gr/politics/1669023/anagnorisi-toy-palaistiniakoy-kratoys-kai-apo-tin-ellada-zita-i-antipoliteysi/

CNN (2024, May 23) «Θέλεις Ζωή και στην Ευρωβουλή;»: Το σποτ της Κωνσταντοπούλου για τις ευρωεκλογέςhttps://www.cnn.gr/politiki/story/420745/theleis-zoi-kai-stin-evrovouli-to-spot-tis-konstantopoylou-gia-tis-evroekloges

Course of Freedom (2024a) Ιδρυτική Διακήρυξη https://www.plefsieleftherias.gr/idrytiki-diakiryxi/

Course of Freedom (2024b, June 17) Post on X. https://x.com/pl_eleftherias/status/1802612195508769248

Danikas, D. (2024, May 20) Αφροδίτη Λατινοπούλου στον Δανίκα: «Εγώ είμαι με τη Μελόνι και τη Λεπέν που είναι κεντροδεξιές» https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/1499187/afroditi-latinopoulou-ston-danika-ego-eimai-me-ti-meloni-kai-ti-lepen-pou-einai-kedrodexies/ 

Dimitropoulos, G. (2022, February 24) Ελληνική Λύση: Τι λέει για την εισβολή της Ρωσίας στην Ουκρανίαhttps://www.flash.gr/elliniki-lysi-ti-leei-gia-tin-eisvoli-tis-rosias-stin-oukrania-842357

EFSYN (2024). Κασσελάκης: Θα είμαι ικανοποιημένος με ποσοστό πάνω από 20%. Efsyn.https://www.efsyn.gr/politiki/antipoliteysi/433749_kasselakis-tha-eimai-ikanopoiimenos-me-pososto-pano-apo-20

Ejrnæs, A., Jensen, M. D., Schraff, D., & Vasilopoulou, S. (2024). Introduction: Regional inequality and political discontent in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 31(6), 1465–1493. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2024.2333850

Eurobarometer (2024). Youth and Democracy. Europa. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3181

Georgiadou, V., Mavropoulou, J. (2022). Greek Solution, Populism in Europe – a comparative study of nine populist parties. Athens: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. https://athens.fes.de/projekte/populism-in-europe

Greek Solution (2024a) Προεκλογικό σποτ της Ελληνικής Λύσης – Ευρωεκλογές 2024 https://elliniki-lisi.gr/proeklogiko-spot-ellinikis-lysis-efroekloges-2024-2

Greek Solution (2024b) Το πρώτο δεκάλεπτο σποτ της Ελληνικής Λύσης για τις Ευρωεκλογές 2024 https://elliniki-lisi.gr/to-proto-dekalepto-spot-tis-ellinikis-lysis-gia-tis-efroekloges-2024

Greek Solution (2024c) Δεκάλεπτο σποτ της Ελληνικής Λύσης για τις Ευρωεκλογές 2024 https://elliniki-lisi.gr/dekalepto-spot-tis-ellinikis-lysis-gia-tis-evroekloges-2024

Greek Solution (2024d) Σαρανταπεντάλεπτο σποτ της Ελληνικής Λύσης για τις Ευρωεκλογές 2024 https://elliniki-lisi.gr/to-sarantapentalepto-tis-ellinikis-lysis-evroekloges-2024

Hawkins, K. A., Rovira Kaltwasser, C., & Andreadis, I. (2020). The Activation of Populist Attitudes. Government and Opposition, 55(2), 283–307. doi:10.1017/gov.2018.23

In.gr (2021, July 1) Ο Βελόπουλος που πουλούσε αλοιφές για τον κοροναϊό, ζητά τα πιστοποιητικά εμβολιασμού των βουλευτών https://www.in.gr/2021/07/01/politics/paraskinio/o-velopoulos-pou-poulouse-aloifes-gia-ton-koronaio-zita-ta-pistopoiitika-emvoliasmou-ton-vouleyton/#google_vignette

Kathimerini (2024a). Δημοσκόπηση: 4 κόμματα στη μάχη του 3% – Τα 5 σημαντικότερα προβλήματα για τους πολίτες. Kathimerini.  https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/563047735/dimoskopisi-4-kommata-sti-machi-toy-3-ta-5-simantikotera-provlimata-gia-toys-polites/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=editors_pick&pnespid=D7Is70cC7HoDk1uM5pzfF0Ubrhkiyblztw9AHKRYI4HKP03HW5.wxqL1jbnlOmyh_c5VeSvEaw

Kathimerini (2024b). Ευρωεκλογές 2024: Η ακτινογραφία της κάλπης της Κυριακής.

Kathimerini. https://www.kathimerini.gr/politics/563073946/eyroekloges-2024-i-aktinografia-tis-kalpis-tis-kyriakis/

KKE (2013) Το Πρόγραμμα του ΚΚΕ https://www.kke.gr/arxes-stoxoi/programma/

KKE (2023, March 27) On the one year since the imperialist war in Ukraine https://inter.kke.gr/en/articles/ON-THE-ONE-YEAR-SINCE-THE-IMPERIALIST-WAR-IN-UKRAINE/

Latinopoulou, A. (2024, June 4) Post on X https://x.com/latinopoulou/status/1798019604637417943

Naftemporiki (2024, January 29) ΚΚΕ: Γιατί λέμε όχι στον γάμο των ομόφυλων ζευγαριών – Αναλυτικά το σκεπτικόhttps://www.naftemporiki.gr/politics/1578537/kke-giati-leme-ochi-ston-gamo-ton-omofylon-zeygarion-analytika-to-skeptiko/

Newsbeast (2023, November 27) «Να σταματήσει η παραπλανητική προπαγάνδα κατά του εμβολιασμού για την Covid-19» λέει η υφυπουργός Υγείας Ειρήνη Αγαπηδάκη https://www.newsbeast.gr/politiki/arthro/10263186/na-stamatisei-i-paraplanitiki-propaganda-kata-tou-emvoliasmou-gia-tin-covid-19-leei-i-yfypourgos-ygeias-eirini-agapidaki

Newsbreak (2024, April 25) Η Αφροδίτη Λατινοπούλου για το «μπλόκο» στους «Σπαρτιάτες» στις Ευρωεκλογέςhttps://www.newsbreak.gr/politiki/589036/i-afroditi-latinopoyloy-gia-ton-mploko-stoys-spartiates-stis-eyroekloges/

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism (1st ed.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841

Pappas, T.S. (2014). ‘Populist Democracies: Post-Authoritarian Greece and Post-Communist Hungary’, Government and Opposition, 49(1), 1–23. doi:10.1017/gov.2013.21.

Pew Research Centre (2024a). Ratings of the EU remain broadly positive in member countries, but have gone down slightly since 2022. Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/06/03/ratings-of-the-eu-remain-broadly-positive-in-member-countries-but-have-gone-down-slightly-since-2022/

Pew Research Centre (2024b). Satisfaction with democracy has declined in recent years in high-income nations. Pew Research Centre. https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2024/06/18/satisfaction-with-democracy-has-declined-in-recent-years-in-high-income-nations/

Reporter (2024). Γιατί έβαλε ο Μητσοτάκης το όριο της επιτυχίας στο 33%; Reporter.https://www.reporter.gr/Apopseis/Anemodeikths/602265-Giati-ebale-o-Mhtsotakhs-to-orio-ths-epitychias-sto-33

To Vima (2024). Δημοσκόπηση GPO: Η ακρίβεια, η αντιπολίτευση του «κανένα» και τα φαβορί για την Ευρωβουλή. To Vima.  https://www.tovima.gr/2024/05/30/politics/dimoskopisi-gpo-i-akriveia-i-antipoliteysi-tou-kanena-kai-ta-favori-gia-tin-eyrovouli/

Tsatsanis, E., Andreadis, I., & Teperoglou, E. (2018). Populism from Below: Socio-economic and Ideological Correlates of Mass Attitudes in Greece. South European Society and Politics, 23(4), 429–450. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1510635

Vasilopoulou, Sofia & Daphne Halikiopoulou (2013). In the Shadow of Grexit: The Greek Election of 17 June 2012, South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 523–542, DOI:10.1080/13608746.2013.779784

Vasilopoulou, S., & Halikiopoulou, D. (2015). The Golden Dawn’s nationalist solution: Explaining the rise of the far right in Greece. Palgrave.

Vasilopoulou, S., Halikiopoulou, D. and Exadaktylos, T. (2014). Greece in crisis: Austerity, Populism and the Politics of Blame. Journal of Common Market Studies, 52: 388–402. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12093

Victory (2020a, September 2) Πολιτική Διακήρυξη https://nikh.gr/i-niki

Victory (2020b) Εθνικό Ολοκληρωμένο Πρόγραμμα για το Δημογραφικό https://nikh.gr/theseis/dimografiko/2-ethniko-olokliromeno-programma-gia-to-dimografiko

Victory (2020c, September 4) Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και Ευρώ https://nikh.gr/theseis/oikonomia/2-evropaiki-enosi-kai-evro

Victory (2024a) Ευρωεκλογές 2024 https://nikh.gr/euroekloges2024

Victory (2024b, June 2015) Victory post on X https://x.com/nikhgreece/status/1802109732531913130

Voice of Reason (2024) Letter of the leader https://fonilogikis.gr/

Wondreys, J. (2023). Putin’s puppets in the West? The far right’s reaction to the 2022 Russian (re)invasion of Ukraine. Party Politics, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/13540688231210502

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON GREECE

Election poster of Björn Höcke for the AfD party with the slogan roughly translating to "forbidden good" in Sonneberg, Thuringia, Germany, on August 4, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition

Please cite as:

Arzheimer, Kai. (2024). “Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0071

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON GERMANY

Abstract

The 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany marked a significant shift in the political landscape, with devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD and the Greens experienced substantial losses, while the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) saw a modest increase in their vote share. The most notable gains were made by the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly formed left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a breakaway from the Left (Die Linke), highlighting a growing demand for populist politics in Germany. The Left itself suffered heavy losses. Despite internal scandals and controversies that contributed to a considerable drop in support in pre-election polls, the AfD leveraged anti-immigration sentiments and economic concerns to gain substantial support. The BSW capitalized on left–authoritarian positions, emphasizing welfare and anti-immigration policies. Both parties also criticized Germany’s support for Ukraine and styled themselves as agents of ‘peace.’ The election results underscored the unpopularity of the ‘progressive coalition’ in Germany and reflected the impact of high inflation, energy security concerns and contentious climate policies on voter behaviour. Voter turnout was the highest since 1979, indicating heightened political engagement. Like in previous elections, populist parties were much more successful in the post-communist eastern states. While its impact on the European level is limited, the election sent shock waves through Germany, suggesting a shift in future policy directions, particularly concerning the green transformation and relations with Russia.

Keywords: Alternative for Germany (AfD); Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW); Germany; Russia; Ukraine; east–west differences

 

By Kai Arzheimer* (Institute for Political Science, University of Mainz)

Introduction and background

The result of the 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany was devastating for the governing three-party coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD lost 2 percentage points compared to the 2019 EP election, polling just 13.9%, the worst result for the party in any national election since the Second World War. The Greens, which had done exceedingly well in the 2019 ‘green wave’, lost nearly half their votes and fell back to 11.9%. The Liberals lost only 0.2 percentage points, but their result of 5.2% put them precariously close to the electoral threshold that applies in national elections (although not in European ones).

Conversely, the main opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) polled a combined 30%, a modest 1.1-percentage-point improvement on their 2019 result. While the result ensures they are the strongest party, it is low given both historical standards (they won 44.5% just 20 years ago) and the abysmal approval ratings of the government parties.

The combined vote share of these mainstream parties was just 61%. At least as far as perceptions were concerned, the big winner in these elections was the populist radical-right ‘Alternative for Germany’ (AfD, 15.9%), followed by the new left-wing populist ‘Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance’ (BSW, 6.2%). An additional 17% of the vote went to smaller parties, including the arguably populist ‘Left’ (2.7%), the arguably right-wing populist ‘Free Voters’ (FW, 2.7%), and ‘The Party’ (1.9%), a satirical outfit.

These results were almost perfectly in line with pre-election polls. The so-called ‘progressive coalition’ and its policies have been deeply unpopular almost from the get-go (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, n.d.), and the radical-right AfD has been the main beneficiary of this discontent. More specifically, after the initial rally-round-the-flag effect following Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the government’s popularity began to decline due to high inflation and worries about (energy) security.

In 2023, things went from bad to worse for the government and have not improved since. The coalition had planned to re-purpose unused special credit lines enacted during the pandemic to fund their programs for a green transformation of Germany’s economy. The intention was to reconcile the Greens’ ambitious plans for climate protection with the SPD’s interest in expanding welfare and the FDP’s insistence on not declaring a ‘budgetary emergency’ for 2024. While such a declaration would have allowed the government to suspend the constitutional ‘debt brake’, abusing the older credit allowances to notionally comply with the deficit rules was a dubious move at best. Following a complaint by the Christian Democrats, Germany’s Constitutional Court declared the federal budget unconstitutional and void, throwing the coalition in disarray just six months before the election (Kinkartz, 2023). With no money left to paper over them, the fundamental conflicts within the coalition were laid bare.

Early in 2023, the Christian Democrats, alongside much of the media, had also launched a campaign against a government flagship policy aimed at reducing Germany’s CO2 emissions by accelerating the phasing out of older oil and natural gas heating systems. Subsequently, all of the opposition parties and much of the media framed this policy as ideological and removed from the lives of ordinary people, making heat pumps a part of the culture wars and forcing the government to water down its proposals.

As previous Christian Democrat-led governments had signed up to the relevant European and international rules and agreements and had enshrined in German law the very climate targets the policy was designed to meet, this was arguably a populist (in a broader sense) move by the main opposition, one that was happily supported by smaller opposition parties and even by some FDP MPs. Both mainstream and populist opposition parties also sided with large-scale farmers’ protests against some cuts to agrarian subsidies that eventually forced another government U-turn (Arzheimer, 2024).

Finally, Germany accepted more than a million Ukrainian refugees after Russia’s 2022 invasion. While this caused few large-scale problems, an ongoing and very public conflict over funding between the federal government, the state governments and the municipalities, as well as the Christian Democrats’ constant push for harsher rules and stricter enforcement, helped to bring the issue of immigration back onto the agenda in 2023, after its salience had been low for several years (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen n.d.). The Israel–Hamas war played only a minor role in the campaign, but a knife attack by an Afghan man on an anti-Islam activist that left a police officer dead just days before the election triggered a fresh debate about immigration, Islamism and the longstanding policy against deportations to Afghanistan (Deutsche Welle, 2024c).

Against this background, the result of the European elections was hardly surprising. Nonetheless, it sent shock waves through the German polity that still reverberate.

The supply side: populist parties in the ascendancy

Alternative for Germany

The AfD was founded in 2013 as a right-of-centre, soft-Eurosceptic outfit that presented an ‘alternative’ to the bailout policies that followed the 2010–2011 Eurozone crisis (Arzheimer 2015). It quickly transformed into a characteristic radical-right populist party that attracted the prototypical electorate (Arzheimer & Berning, 2019). While many radical-right parties are striving to soften their public image, the most radical faction has dominated the AfD since 2017 (Pytlas & Biehler, 2023), and the AfD embraces openly extremist actors both within and outside the party (Arzheimer, 2019). As a consequence, the party as a whole is under surveillance by the domestic intelligence agency, and its youth wing, as well as several state branches, have already been classified as right-wing extremist. Like many other far-right parties in Europe, the AfD also has a longstanding association with Russia and has repeatedly voiced sympathy for Putin and his regime. Although the party toned down its statements immediately after the February 2022 invasion, it has since highlighted the economic consequences of the war and the sanctions for Germany and re-invented itself as a party of ‘peace’ (Arzheimer, 2023), even adopting the classic dove symbol in some of its publicity materials.

In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the party floated the idea of including a call for the dissolution of the European Union in its manifesto, dropping this idea from the final version after a public backlash. However, the selection of candidates was strongly influenced by the most radical elements within the party. The top spot of the list went to Maximilian Krah, a sitting MEP with well-documented connections to German right-wing extremists, Russia and particularly China. Krah’s membership in the Identity and Democracy (ID) group had previously been suspended over allegations of fraud (Dahm, 2023). Petr Bystron, the second on the list, was a sitting MP in Germany’s Bundestag, known both for his extreme views, his fondness of conspiracy myths, and his support for Putin’s Russia. Asked why he would give up his seat in the Bundestag to become an MEP, he said he needed to get to ‘the source of the poison’ (Fiedler, 2023).

In January 2024, the AfD’s campaign got in trouble even before its official start. Investigative journalists reported on a meeting between representatives of the AfD, members of the extremist ‘Identitarian movement’, and potential donors. At the meeting, the participants had discussed plans for a ‘remigration’ – a euphemism for the expulsion of millions of immigrant-origin Germans. This story triggered a large-scale countermobilization, with hundreds of thousands of Germans taking to the streets to protest the AfD (Deutsche Welle, 2024a). These events contributed to a relative decline of AfD support in the polls, which had risen to an unprecedented 22% in December 2023 but dropped to around 17% over the next six weeks or so. It also negatively affected the relationship between the AfD and Marine Le Pen, who dominates the ID group in the European Parliament.

But his was just the beginning of the campaign’s woes. Two months before the election, a Czech newspaper published audio files that strongly suggested that Bystron had received at least 20,000 euros from the Russian propaganda portal ‘Voice of Europe’. As Bystron was a German MP at the time and vote buying is illegal in Germany, he quickly became the object of a full criminal investigation, which is still ongoing. Just a couple of days later, Krah’s parliamentary offices were searched by the police, and one of his aides was arrested as an alleged Chinese spy. While Krah himself has not been charged so far, a preliminary probe into allegations that he sold his vote to China and Russia is still underway (Deutsche Welle, 2024b).

Things came to a head in mid-May when Krah played down the atrocities committed by the Waffen SS in countries occupied by Nazi Germany in an interview with an Italian journalist. In response, the whole AfD delegation in the EP was excluded from the ID group (Reuters, 2024). Krah resigned his seat on the AfD’s national executive and was formally barred from speaking on the stump by the leadership, leading to the paradoxical situation that the campaign rolled on without the two top candidates.

As much of the AfD’s activities are social media-centric anyway, it probably did not matter too much. The AfD continued to push their core issues – first and foremost immigration, but also the economic impact of the war on Germany, climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism – without too much regard for their invisible candidates.

The Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance

The Left party is the product of a merger between the (primarily eastern) PDS, itself the successor of the GDR’s former state party, and the WASG, a mostly western group that broke away from the SPD over welfare reforms enacted in the early 2000s (Hough, Koß & Olsen, 2007). It is considered far left and populist (Rooduijn et al., 2023), although many in the party take a rather pragmatic approach to politics, especially at the local and regional levels.

Sahra Wagenknecht was arguably the party’s most prominent, controversial and charismatic politician. She started out as an orthodox communist in the early 1990s, a position that left her isolated within a decidedly post-communist party even after she changed her views. She gladly embraced the role of the outsider. As a gifted and very telegenic public speaker, she has been one of the most frequently invited guests on political talk shows for decades, although she stands for minority positions within a minor party.

During the so-called immigration crisis of 2015–2016, Wagenknecht became a (moderate) immigration sceptic. In 2018, she helped launch a leftist network that brought together tens of thousands of supporters but collapsed when she abandoned it the following year instead of turning it into a personal party, as many had expected. Wagenknecht was also critical of the anti-COVID measures and began cultivating a sizeable audience on social media during the pandemic (MDR, 2024).

In 2021, Wagenknecht published a book that was widely seen as the manifesto of an upcoming political project. In it, she accused her party of pandering to a ‘lifestyle left’ while ignoring the concerns of true working-class voters: welfare and immigration.

The Left’s reaction to Russia’s attack then provided the final straw. The 2011 basic program stresses the party’s links to the peace movement, highlights its ‘internationalist’ credentials and calls for the dissolution of NATO and a ‘common security architecture’ that would include Russia. However, the sheer scale of human suffering in Ukraine has led many in the Left to reconsider these positions. The Left’s manifesto for the European elections reflects this ambiguity. On the one hand, the document is highly critical of the US and NATO and even claims that the eastern enlargement of NATO has ‘contributed to the crisis’ (Die Linke n.d., 65). On the other, it highlights Ukraine’s right to self-defence, condemns the attack as a war crime, and demands that Russia withdraw its troops from Ukrainian territory (without specifying whether that includes Crimea). Wagenknecht, however, took a more clearly pro-Russian stance. She routinely claims that the US and the collective West are blocking a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for reasons of their own.

In September 2023, Wagenknecht and her supporters in the Left’s parliamentary registered the ‘Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance — Reason and Justice’ (BSW), which legally became a political party on 8 January 2024. Ten of the Left’s 38 MPs in the Bundestag eventually joined the new group. Amongst state-level MPs and the rank-and-file, the rate of defections was much lower.

This new party created much interest amongst political observers even before it was formally founded because it was assumed that it would cater to the so-far neglected demand for left–authoritarian (i.e., pro-welfare but anti-immigrant) politics in Germany (Wagner, Wurthmann, & Thomeczek, 2023). The EP election manifesto published in April 2024 (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024) offers precisely that, dressed up in a populist fashion. The preamble blames politicians and EU elites for broken promises and ignoring the problems of ordinary citizens. The BSW wants to shrink the bureaucracy and, more importantly, the scope of the European Union by shifting back competencies to the member states.

At the same time and somewhat contradictory, they want the EU to enact higher minimum wages, higher corporate tax rates, stricter rules against money laundering, and limits on financial transactions. The BSW also demands new policies that would allegedly strengthen Europe’s industrial base through a ‘reasonable’ approach to climate protection and securing access to cheap energy and raw materials. This policy is framed as a precondition for expanding welfare. The BSW also rejects future enlargements and wants to curb not just illegal migration but also the recruitment of qualified workers from outside the EU. Instead, the party wants to reduce the ‘push factors’ for immigration by creating more equitable conditions globally. While the rejection of Islam is more muted than in the AfD’s statements, and while the AfD in turn keeps their most radical demands out of their manifesto, this is quite similar to the policies that the AfD offers.

However, the highest degree of overlap with the AfD can be seen in the BSW’s approach to Russia’s war on Ukraine. The sanctions, which are mentioned 14 times in a manifesto of 20 pages, are painted as harmful for Germany while having no effect on Russia itself. For the BSW, the attack on Ukraine is a ‘proxy war’ between the US and Russia (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024: 14) that was ‘started on a military level by Russia’ but ‘could have been prevented and stopped by the West’ (Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht, 2024: 17). The only (alleged) violations of international law that the manifesto addresses are the Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria (Ibid.). The BSW even adopts an idea that the AfD previously launched in parliament (AfD Fraktion im Bundestag, 2023: 3) – making support for Ukraine conditional on Kyiv’s willingness to enter negotiations with Russia – albeit with a twist. It would incentivize Russia by offering to stop all military aid for Ukraine immediately should Russia agree to negotiate.

Demand for populism in Germany

Taken together, the AfD (15.9%), Left (2.7%), and BSW (6.2%) achieved a significant (nearly 25%) share of the vote. Moreover, at 64.8%, turnout was the highest since the EP’s first direct election in 1979, which suggests a high degree of interest and political involvement. Put differently, there is considerable demand for populist politics in Germany, even if the level is still lower than in France or Italy.

In line with second-order-election theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980), domestic actors and attitudes (the unpopularity of the federal government in particular) dominated the campaign. In a post-election poll (see ZDF Heute, 2024), just 10% of the AfD’s voters, 38% of the BSW’s voters, but a massive 85% of the Left’s remaining voters said that ‘Europe’ was more important for their decision than ‘Germany’. This poll result suggests that AfD voters are (even) more inward-looking and fundamentally Eurosceptic than the BSW’s. The average across all parties was 47%.

However, the issues at stake (immigration, Russia’s war against Ukraine, social and economic transformations) are international by nature and were often presented within a European frame of reference by the parties. Moreover, the AfD’s ouster from the ID group, as well the overtures of the (German) president of the commission towards Giorgia Meloni and her European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, helped to make this one of the most Europeanized EP elections ever.

Nonetheless, support for all three populist parties showed a striking geographical pattern that is very specific to German politics: they are much more successful in the eastern states (i.e., the territory of the former German Democratic Republic). Outside some university towns and the Berlin/Potsdam region, the AfD became the strongest party in all eastern districts and states, with state-wide results varying between 27.5% in Brandenburg and 31.8% in Saxony. In their heartlands in rural Saxony, they won up to 40% of the vote. Conversely, their best results in the western states were 14.7% in Baden-Württemberg and 15.7% in Saarland. There is no western district where they won more than 21%.

These lopsided results are hardly surprising: the multi-faceted legacy of the GDR, the shock and aftermath of the transformation in the 1990s and specific patterns of outmigration have led to a situation where individual levels of populism, nativism and place resentment — the feeling that one’s locale does not get the recognition and resources it deserves — are substantively higher in the eastern states than in the west even decades after unification (Arzheimer and Bernemann 2024). It is, however, important to note that AfD has made considerable inroads in the west of Germany, particularly in regions and even neighbourhoods that could be described as ‘left behind.’

The AfD also drew more support from men (19%) than women (12%), a gender gap that has been stable since 2014, whereas gender differences for the Left and BSW were within the margin of error. For a decade, the AfD was a party of middle-aged voters that struggled to mobilize the very young and the elderly. The latter is still true, but for the first time, AfD support amongst the under-30s is now (just) above average. The Left remains somewhat more popular (6%) in this group than with older voters, while BSW support hardly varies with age.

In socio-structural terms, workers (25%) and voters with medium levels of education (23%) had the highest propensity to vote for the AfD. For the Left and the BSW, there are no clear patterns, but one must bear in mind that in national polls, relatively few of their voters are sampled. Exit polls also suggest that 29% of the BSW’s voters had previously voted for the SPD and another 24% for the Left, while less than 10% were former AfD voters (Palzer, 2024). However, such transition analyses are fraught with methodological problems.

Across all respondents, the AfD remains deeply unpopular, with an average rating of –2.9 on a scale running from –5 to +5. The average values for the Left and BSW are –1.7 and –1.2, respectively. For comparison, the Greens, which have a smaller voter base than the AfD and are the least popular government party, receive a rating of –0.9. This suggests a considerable level of polarization between populist (and particularly radical-right) voters on the one hand and the voters of non-populist parties on the other.

Discussion and perspectives

Both the AfD and the BSW are nationalist parties, and the BSW, in particular, saw the EP election chiefly as an opportunity to gain media attention and access to public funds in preparation for the upcoming state elections. The AfD is still not welcome in the renamed ID (now Patriots for Europe, PfE) group and was forced to team up with a motley crew of fringe MEPs to reach the requisite number for forming a ‘Europe of Sovereign Nations’ group that gives them access to proper funding. BSW has not managed even that, and their MEPs are now sitting as Non-attached (NA). Nonetheless, both the AfD and the BSW will likely vote against any policies related to the green transformation or support for Ukraine and will push for ‘negotiations’ with – and closer economic ties to – Russia.

At least in the short term, however, their most significant impact will be on German politics. If they end up as the strongest or second-strongest party in one or more of the eastern states that go to the polls in autumn, that will have dramatic consequences not just for the Länder in question but for Germany’s system of decentralized and consensual policymaking, which could leave the country in uncharted waters.


 

(*) Kai Arzheimer is Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the University of Mainz. He works in the field of political behaviour, broadly defined and is particularly interested in far-right parties and their voters.


 

References

AfD Fraktion im Bundestag (2023). ‘BT Drucksache 20/5551’. Der Deutsche Bundestag. https://dserver.bundestag.de/btd/20/055/2005551.pdf

Arzheimer, Kai (2015). ‘The AfD: Finally a Successful Right-Wing Populist Eurosceptic Party for Germany?’ West European Politics 38: 535–56, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2015.1004230

——— (2019). ‘Don’t Mention the War! How Populist Right-Wing Radicalism Became (Almost) Normal in Germany’. Journal of Common Market Studies 57 (S1): 90–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12920

——— (2023). ‘To Russia with Love? German Populist Actors’ Positions Vis-a-Vis the Kremlin’. In The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, edited by Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina, 156–67. Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0020

——— (2024). ‘The Far-Right Is Piggybacking on the German Farmers’. Euobserver, 11 January, https://euobserver.com/eu-political/arc8e852f9

Arzheimer, Kai and Theresa Bernemann (2024). ‘“Place” Does Matter for Populist Radical Right Sentiment, but How? Evidence from Germany’. European Political Science Review 16 (2): 167–86. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773923000279

Arzheimer, Kai and Carl Berning (2019). ‘How the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Their Voters Veered to the Radical Right, 2013-2017’. Electoral Studies 60: online first. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2019.04.004

Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (2024). ‘Programm Für Die Europwahl 2024’. https://bsw-vg.de/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/BSW_Europawahlprogramm_2024.pdf

Dahm, Julia (2023). ‘German Far-Right Led into European Elections by Anti-EU Hardliner’. Euractiv, 31 July 2023. https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/german-far-right-led-into-european-elections-by-anti-eu-hardliner/

Deutsche Welle (2024a, 3 February). ‘Germany: Tens of Thousands in Berlin Protest Far Right’. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-tens-of-thousands-in-berlin-protest-far-right/a-68164252

——— (2024b, 16 May). ‘Germany: Money-Laundering Probe into Far-Right AfD Lawmaker’. https://www.dw.com/en/germany-money-laundering-probe-into-far-right-afd-lawmaker/a-69094119

——— (2024c, 4 June). ‘Mannheim Knife Attack: Authorities Suspect Islamist Motive’. https://www.dw.com/en/mannheim-knife-attack-authorities-suspect-islamist-motive/a-69259747

Die Linke (n.d.) ‘Zeit Für Gerechtigkeit. Zeit Für Haltung. Zeit Für Frieden’. Accessed 21 June 2024. https://www.die-linke.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Europawahlprogramm.pdf

Fiedler, Maria (2023). ‘Extrem, Rechts Und Bald in Brüssel: Wen Die AfD Ins Europaparlament Schicken Will’. Tagesspiegel, 29 July, https://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/extrem-rechts-und-bald-in-brussel-wen-die-afd-ins-europaparlament-schicken-will-10233988.html

Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (n.d.) ‘Politik II: Langzeitentwicklung Wichtiger Trends Aus Dem Politbarometer Zu Politischen Themen’. Accessed 2 July 2024. https://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Langzeitentwicklung_-_Themen_im_Ueberblick/Politik_II/

Hough, Dan, Michael Koß, and Jonathan Olsen (2007). The Left Party in Contemporary German Politics. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kinkartz, Sabine (2023). ‘What Is Germany’s Debt Brake?’ Deutsche Welle, 23 November. https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-germanys-debt-brake/a-67587332

MDR (2024, 13 June). Sahra Wagenknecht: from outsider to left-wing icon and party founder, MDR, https://www.mdr.de/nachrichten/deutschland/politik/sahra-wagenknecht-partei-bsw-biografie-100.html

Palzer, Kerstin (2024). ‘Aus dem Stand auf 6,2 Prozent’ Tagesschau, 10 June 2024, https://www.tagesschau.de/europawahl/bsw-linkspartei-100.html

Pytlas, Bartek, and Jan Biehler (2023). ‘The AfD Within the AfD: Radical Right Intra-Party Competition and Ideational Change’. Government and Opposition, online first. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2023.13

Reif, Karlheinz, and Hermann Schmitt (1980). ‘Nine National Second-Order Elections: A Systematic Framework for the Analysis of European Elections Results’. European Journal of Political Research 8: 3–44.

Reuters (2024, 23 May). ‘European Parliament’s Far-Right Group Expels Germany’s AfD After SS Remark’. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/far-right-european-parliament-group-expels-germanys-afd-after-ss-remark-2024-05-23/

Rooduijn, Matthijs, et. al. (2023). ‘The PopuList 3.0’. https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/2EWKQ

Wagner, Sarah, L. Constantin Wurthmann, and Jan Philipp Thomeczek (2023). ‘Bridging Left and Right? How Sahra Wagenknecht Could Change the German Party Landscape’. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 64: 621–36.

ZDF Heute (2024, 10 June). ‘Europawahl 2024’. https://www.zdf.de/nachrichten/
thema/europawahl-142.html

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON GERMANY

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the conclusion of a political meeting for the Rassemblement National party in Marseille on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France

Please cite as:
Ivaldi, Gilles. (2024). “A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0070

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON FRANCE

Abstract

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of an economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerged as the big winner with 31.4% of the vote, while Macron’s Renaissance list trailed far behind at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing populist La France Insoumise (LFI) won 9.9%, reflecting current internal dissent within the party and deep ideological divisions exposed by the Israel–Hamas war. National issues dominated the electoral agenda in June. Populist voting across both sides of the political spectrum was strongly fuelled by political discontent with Macron, making the 2024 European elections primarily a ‘second-order’ national election. A crucial test for Emmanuel Macron, the outcome of the European election led to the decision by the incumbent president to call a snap legislative election. The election confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the Republican Front against the far right, which blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering instead a hung parliament split into three blocks.

Keywords: European elections; populism; France; Le Pen; Zemmour; Mélenchon

 

By Gilles Ivaldi(Sciences Po Paris-CNRS (CEVIPOF))

Background

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of the economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron.

The European election showed substantial gains by populist parties, particularly on the right of the political axis, with Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerging as the big winner at 31.4% of the vote. The outcome of the European election led to the decision by Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the National Assembly. The snap election that immediately followed confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the traditional Republican Front (Front Républicain) against the far right by both parties and voters, which had been significantly weakened in the 2022 legislative election. This revival blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering a hung parliament split into three blocks, which more generally reflected the shape and increasing polarization of the French party system since 2017.

This chapter examines the strategies and performances of populist parties and the array of economic, cultural and political factors behind the rise in support for populism in France, particularly on the right of the political spectrum. Based on survey data, the analysis suggests that the 2024 French European election was primarily a ‘second-order’ national election fought on domestic issues, in which voters on both sides of the populist spectrum essentially expressed their political dissatisfaction with the incumbent president.

A topography of populism in France

In Western Europe, populism is predominantly found in the radical left and radical right (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Reflecting such diversity, three main parties currently dominate the populist scene in France, namely Marine Le Pen’s RN and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête on the right of the political spectrum, and Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s La France Insoumise (LFI) on the left.

The RN exemplifies the typical radical right-wing variant of populism, operating on its core defining features of nativism and authoritarianism (Mudde, 2007; Pirro, 2022). The 2024 European campaign led by its popular young leader Jordan Bardella emphasized typical RN nativist policies calling for a ‘stop to the immigration flood by controlling borders and expelling illegal immigrants’ and for ‘defence of the security and civilizational values of the French through zero tolerance and the deportation of foreign delinquents and Islamists.’

Under the leadership of Marine Le Pen, the RN has embraced ‘social populism’, namely, a mix of egalitarian social protection and economic nationalism (Ivaldi 2023a). In the 2022 presidential election, this move allowed her to exploit the Russia–Ukraine War-related issues of energy and rising prices among working- and lower-middle-class voters most hit by the crisis (Ivaldi 2023b). The cost of living was again a key issue in the RN’s communication strategy in the 2024 European election, where the party pledged to ‘lower electricity bills’ and ‘reject all European taxes on energy’. Meanwhile, the party continued its economic nationalist agenda, declaring it would ‘prioritize French companies in public procurement’. Riding the wave of discontent among French farmers, the RN also pledged to ‘put an end to punitive ecological policies and fight unfair competition’ to protect farmers’ interests.

Euroscepticism has been a central feature of the FN/RN in France since the mid-1990s (Hainsworth et al., 2004), tapping into a wide range of institutional, economic and cultural issues (Ivaldi, 2018a). Since 2017, the RN has moderated its positions and abandoned its previous policy of ‘Frexit’, adopting, however, a more ambiguous stance vis-à-vis the EU and de-emphasizing European issues to increase its appeal to moderate voters. The RN’s 2024 campaign reiterated the call for ‘a Europe of nations against Macron’s Europe’ while pledging to ‘put an end to European Union enlargement’ and preserve France’s ‘sovereignty and right of veto’ so that ‘no decisions could be made contrary to France’s vital interests.’

Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête shows a populist radical-right profile similar to the RN’s (Ivaldi, 2023a). A well-known political commentator, columnist and author, Zemmour entered national politics at the 2022 presidential election, making nativism and anti-Muslim rhetoric a centrepiece of his presidential bid. In 2024, the Reconquête campaign led by Marion Maréchal, a former member of the RN and Marine Le Pen’s niece, exhibited the central ideological tenets of nativism and authoritarianism alongside populism and Euroscepticism. The manifesto called for a halt to ‘the Islamization of Europe’ and pledged to erect a ‘naval blockade against immigration in the Mediterranean’ while explicitly endorsing the extreme right-wing idea of ‘remigration’ by promising to deport all illegal immigrants, criminals and ‘foreign Islamists.’ Reconquête’s 2024 campaign was significantly hampered, however, by growing disagreement between Zemmour and Maréchal over party strategy and a possible rapprochement with the RN.

On the other hand, Mélenchon’s populist radical left LFI presents a universalistic profile, embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, which is essentially pitted against economic and political elites (Ivaldi, 2018b). LFI shows strong anti-establishment features, and its discourse and ideology illustrate radical left populist mobilization, which seeks to offer an alternative to the neoliberal hegemony. In June 2024, the campaign led by the party’s young leader, Manon Aubry, strongly opposed austerity and advocated economic redistribution and public spending.

LFI’s economic policies included higher taxes on capital, the expansion of public services, nationalizing the banking sector to fight speculation, raising the minimum wage and abolishing the 2023 pension reform to return the retirement age to 60. Additionally, the 2024 platform emphasized environmental issues and ecological transition policies, attesting to the more general ‘greening’ of the populist radical left in France since 2017. Like the RN, LFI has toned down its Euroscepticism in recent years, moving away from its previous call to leave the EU and that France should ‘disobey’ the European treaties to ‘preserve the national sovereignty of the French people’ (Ivaldi, 2018b).

LFI took a more radical course in the months before the election, however, reflecting Mélenchon’s ‘revolutionary’ strategy and the controversial stances taken by the party’s leadership concerning the Israel–Hamas war. Following the October 2023 attacks, Mélenchon came under fierce criticism for what was perceived as his ambiguous reaction to the events in Israel, declining to condemn Hamas as a terrorist group and adopting aggressive pro-Palestinian positions. Mélenchon and members of LFI were later accused of antisemitism and of fuelling political anger at Macron and the government while also targeting some of their allies in the newly formed left-wing alliance (New Ecological and Social People’s Union, NUPES) in parliament. Mélenchon’s strategy of radicalization caused enormous turmoil inside the party as prominent leaders such as François Ruffin openly expressed their criticism.

All three populist parties have made significant gains in recent national elections. The April 2022 presidential election saw a surge in electoral support for populism across the political spectrum (Perrineau, 2022). Le Pen won 23.2% of the presidential vote, coming in second place behind incumbent centrist President Emmanuel Macron (at 27.9%), progressing into the run-off where she received a record high 41.5%. In the first round, Zemmour made a significant breakthrough at 7% of the total votes cast. Finally, Mélenchon came in third place with 22% of the vote, taking the lead on the left from the once-dominant Socialist Party (PS).

In the subsequent legislative election of June 2022, the RN received 18.7% of the vote and 89 seats, by far the best result ever achieved by the far right in France, making the RN the largest parliamentary opposition. Mélenchon’s LFI was the dominant player within NUPES, which won a total of 26% of the vote and 157 seats, 75 of which were taken by the LFI.

The context of the 2024 EP elections in France

The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of the economic crisis and the rising cost of living in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron.

Politically, the European elections were located halfway through Macron’s second presidency since April 2022, which had been significantly weakened by the loss of its absolute majority in the 2022 legislative election. Between 2022 and 2024, minority governments led by Élisabeth Borne and Gabriel Attal struggled to find agreements to pass legislation in an increasingly ideologically polarized parliament dominated by LFI and the RN. The Borne government was strongly criticized for repeatedly using the provisions of Article 49(3) of the Constitution, which allows bills to be passed without a vote. Political unrest culminated in March 2023 after the government used Article 49(3) to pass a highly unpopular law raising the retirement age from 62 to 64. Both LFI and the RN opposed the reform, which was overwhelmingly rejected by the French, resulting in mass demonstrations and strikes.

The new Attal government and Emmanuel Macron entered the 2024 election with low popularity ratings: in June, less than a quarter (24%) of the French said they ‘trusted the president to handle the country’s biggest problems’; the comparable figure for Prime Minister Attal was 29% (Elabe, 2024). The European election campaigns of both the RN and LFI tried and capitalized on such political discontent by making the election a referendum for or against Emmanuel Macron and the government, essentially emphasizing domestic concerns over European issues.

Economic fears clearly dominated the campaign, creating a propitious context for populist politics across the board. According to polls, no fewer than 54% of French voters said the cost of living and purchasing power would be important to their vote. Meanwhile, immigration emerged as a salient issue for another 44%, followed by law and order at 26% (CEVIPOF, 2024a). This salience reflected growing public concerns over Islamist terrorism and debates surrounding immigrant integration in France following the urban riots of summer 2023 throughout the country. In December 2023, a vote for a new restrictive immigration law marked a significant shift to the right by the government. The law was widely seen as emulating the nativist policies of the RN, some of which had been brought into the draft bill by the mainstream right, attesting to the radical right turn of the Républicains (LR) under the leadership of Éric Ciotti (Ivaldi, 2024).

Populist voting in the 2024 EP elections

The 2024 French European election saw a rise in electoral support for far-right populism. Turnout was 51.5%, representing a mere increase of about 1.4 points compared to five years earlier and very close to the European average (51.1%). Le Pen and Bardella’s RN emerged as the big winner at 31.4% of the vote (up 8 percentage points compared to 2019), taking 30 of France’s 81 seats in the European Parliament. Macron’s Renaissance list came in a distant second at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Mélenchon’s left-wing populist LFI won 9.9%, a gain of 3.6 percentage points on its previous result in the 2019 EP elections, which was, however, far lower than Mélenchon’s performance in the 2022 presidential election. To the left, LFI was outperformed by the socialist list led by MEP Raphaël Glucksmann in alliance with his Place Publique movement, which came third with 13.8%. Finally, the Reconquête list led by Maréchal received 5.5% of the vote and five seats, making its first entry into the European Parliament.

Polling data confirm that the mix of economic insecurity, immigration fears, and political discontent with Macron may have created a ‘perfect storm’ for far-right populism in the 2024 French European election. Economic grievances and issues have been important factors in the electoral revitalization of far-right populism in France since the early 2010s. Support for the FN has been fuelled by feelings of economic alienation mediated by cultural concerns over immigration and strong anti-elite sentiments (Ivaldi, 2022). In the 2024 EP election, support for the RN was primarily motivated by immigration (77%), the cost of living (67%), and law and order (40%). Similarly, immigration (89%) and security issues (58%) were paramount to Reconquête voters, reflecting the typical far-right agenda. In contrast, LFI voters said they were primarily concerned with the cost of living (61%), social inequalities (49%), and the environment (34%) (CEVIPOF, 2024a).

Polls indicate that the 2024 European election served as a referendum on Macron and the Attal government. Political protest and anti-incumbent sentiments were key to populist voting across the spectrum. While 39% of the French (36% in 2019) said they essentially voted to manifest their opposition to the president and the government, it was 53% among LFI voters, 54% in Reconquête, and no less than 68% among those who had turned to the RN (IPSOS, 2024a). Finally, polls showed a different trade-off between domestic and European issues across voters. Overall, 45% of the electorate said they voted based on domestic concerns, a proportion like the one observed in 2019 (43%). To the left, LFI voters were like the national average at 45%. On the other hand, national issues clearly dominated the electoral agenda of far-right populist voters, with 62% of Reconquête voters and nearly three-quarters (73%) of RN voters saying these issues had been decisive at the ballot box. In contrast, European concerns were paramount to over 80% of Renaissance, socialist, and ecologist voters (IPSOS, 2024a).

Such differences were reflected in attitudes towards Europe, which varied significantly across parties. Overall, only 22% of the French said they opposed European integration, with a majority (57%) saying they supported Europe but would like it to take a different course. Opposition to the EU was substantially stronger among Reconquête (42%) and RN (43%) voters. On the other hand, LFI voters showed more positive views of Europe, with only 16% expressing opposition to further integration (CEVIPOF 2024b).

With nearly a third of the vote, the RN list managed to attract voters across most socio-demographic groups. As in 2022, the RN closed the traditional radical-right gender gap (Durovic & Mayer, 2022), winning 32% and 30% of the vote among men and women, respectively. The Bardella list also did significantly better than the other parties among young voters under 25 years (25%). While consolidating its traditional working- and lower-middle-class constituencies – with no less than 54% of the vote among workers and 40% among white collars – the RN further widened its electoral base by making significant inroads in other occupational groups, winning 29% of the vote among technicians and associate professionals while also going neck-and-neck with the socialists among managers and professionals at 20% of the vote. Finally, the RN won no less than 29% of the vote among pensioners – up to 36% among those from a lower social strata background – thus making significant gains in a group traditionally more resilient to far-right populism in France (IPSOS, 2024b).

To the left, the LFI list led by Manon Aubry essentially overperformed among young voters, receiving a third of the vote (33%) among those aged 18–24 years and 20% among those aged 25–34 years. This result may reflect the strong position taken by LFI on the war in Gaza, which emerged as one of the main concerns in those age groups (IPSOS, 2024b). The salience of the Israel–Hamas conflict was also confirmed by the extremely high level of support (64%) for LFI among the small group of self-declared Muslims in polls (CEVIPOF, 2024a), in line with Mélenchon’s appeal to voters from an immigrant background. More generally, LFI voters showed higher average educational attainment than their RN counterparts, and Aubry’s list achieved a higher level of support amongst voters with a university degree (15%).

The snap legislative election

The outcome of the European election led to the unexpected decision by Emmanuel Macron to dissolve the National Assembly and call a snap election within three weeks despite anticipations of an RN victory and forecasts of a far-right absolute majority. Macron’s political gamble was seen as a strategic move to make parties and voters both face up to their own responsibilities in the event of an RN majority in parliament while also exposing the RN’s unpreparedness for government. Macron called upon the ‘silent majority of voters’ against the ‘disorder’ caused by radical parties (AFP, 2024), hoping to form a new centrist majority by aggregating the centre-left and centre-right against the immediate and tangible threat of the far right gaining power.

Within the extremely short pre-election period, tactical alliances were built across both sides of the political spectrum. Most notably, despite diverging positions on Europe, Gaza and Ukraine, the major parties of the left agreed to form a broad coalition dubbed the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP), bringing together LFI, the Communist Party, the Greens and the Socialists together with Glucksmann’s Place Publique. While they had all competed individually in the European elections, the NFP member parties agreed to select single candidates (i.e., avoid running against one another) in almost all of France’s 577 constituencies, and there were few dissident left-wing candidates. The breakdown of NFP candidates showed that LFI remained the dominant force (229 candidates), followed by the socialists (175) and the Greens (92).

At the centre, Macron’s Renaissance movement rallied its previous allies in the outgoing parliament inside his Ensemble coalition, i.e., François Bayrou’s centrist Mouvement démocrate (MoDem) and Édouard Philippe’s centre-right Horizons. Further to the right, the 2024 legislative election saw a notable reshuffling of the sub-party system. Éric Ciotti, head of the Republicans, struck an electoral pact with the RN, eventually running a total of 62 candidates with the far right under the new À Droite (To the Right) banner. Other LR leaders vehemently opposed such a decision, including Laurent Wauquiez, a close ally of Ciotti and hardliner within the party. This resulted in bitter infighting and the attempt by LR to expel Ciotti, which was overturned by a Paris court before the election. The Republicans entered the legislative election significantly divided and weakened, running candidates in 305 constituencies.

The results of the first round of the June legislative election showed a surge in voter turnout (to 66.7%), a substantial increase (about 19 percentage points) from the previous 2022 election, reflecting both voter desire for change after seven years of Macron’s presidency, and growing fears of the far right getting closer to power. On election night, the RN was again the big winner, receiving 29.3 % of the vote – its best performance ever in a legislative election – to which one must add the 4% received by Ciotti’s À Droite candidates, giving a total of about a third of the total vote cast for the far right. RN candidates topped the polls in 297 out of 577 constituencies, and they could progress to nearly all the second-round run-offs. This result confirmed the geographical spread of the RN vote across all regions of France, which had already been observed in the European election.

Further to the right, the results of the snap election showed the electoral marginalization of Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête, reflecting growing intra-party dissent and disagreement over party strategy between Zemmour and Maréchal. Ahead of the first round, Maréchal was expelled from the party together with two other vice presidents – Guillaume Peltier and Nicolas Bay – after she had initiated talks with the RN leadership and had publicly called for a union of the two far-right parties. Reconquête entered the election independently and fielded 330 candidates who collectively polled a mere 0.75 % of the vote in the first round, making Zemmour’s party politically irrelevant. To the left, the newly formed NFP came second at 28.5% and took the lead in 159 constituencies. Macron’s Ensemble coalition finished third with 21.8% of the vote cast, topping the polls in 70 constituencies, essentially in the western part of the country and the more bourgeois areas inside and around Paris.

Legislative run-offs were fought in the 501 constituencies where two or more candidates had surpassed the institutional threshold of 12.5% of registered voters to be allowed to progress into the second round. Between the two rounds, the traditional Republican Front – that is, the ad hoc alliances of parties and voters across the spectrum that coalesce whenever the RN is likely to win a decisive round – was revitalized, resulting in 217 candidates withdrawing from three-way races in their constituencies to reduce the chances of an RN victory.

The second round attested to the mobilization of voters against the far right. At 66.6%, voter participation rose to the highest level since the 1997 legislative elections (up from 53.8% in 2022). Between the two rounds, mass protests against the RN were a strong sign of growing public concern about the far right getting into power in France. The second round delivered a hung parliament divided into three blocks. The left-wing NFP secured the most seats after the second round, winning a total of 180, falling short, however, of the 289 seats needed for an overall majority. LFI lost its predominance inside the broad left-wing coalition, taking 72 seats, as opposed to 66 for the socialists and 38 for the Greens. Macron’s centrist Ensemble alliance came third with 163 seats, down 87 seats from the already relative majority it had secured in the 2022 election.

The 2024 legislative election came as a disappointment for the RN after its historical first-round performance and the presence of its candidates in most second-round run-offs. With a total of 143 seats (including Ciotti’s À Droite MPs), Le Pen’s party fell well short of the absolute majority needed to form a government, although this represented a substantial increase in the total number of RN seats compared with 89 in the 2022 elections. Because of the Republican Front put forward by mainstream parties, the number of three-way run-offs featuring the RN and two other parties was reduced from 306 to 89, significantly impacting the outcome for the far right: the RN lost no fewer than 154 constituencies where it had taken the lead in the first round.

Other factors contributing to the RN’s electoral setback included the party’s poor credentials for government and the extreme right-wing profile of its candidates. The campaign exposed the RN’s unpreparedness for the government despite the Matignon Plan – essentially a list of candidates for all 577 constituencies in the National Assembly – put forward in haste by Bardella just before the first round. The election was punctuated with hesitations and U-turns on some of the party’s key economic and immigration policies, such as lowering the retirement age back to 60 and restricting access to public jobs for people with dual citizenship. Meanwhile, the media revealed that many of the RN candidates hastily brought to the campaign from the party rank-and-file had repeatedly posted racist, homophobic, pro-Putin, COVID-19 denial and anti-Semitic comments on social media, casting doubt about Le Pen’s claim that she had detoxified her party. Additionally, some RN candidates had links with violent ultra-nationalist organizations in France, and one of them was found to have a criminal record for armed robbery.

Discussion and perspectives

The 2024 legislative election has left France in a political deadlock, delivering a hung parliament split into three blocks. The outcome of the 2024 European and legislative elections have more generally reflected the shape and increasing polarization of French politics since 2017; that is, a weakened yet still resilient centrist block squeezed between two radical alternatives on the left (LFI) and right (RN) of the party system. While parties of the left have managed to somewhat overcome their ideological and policy divergences, electoral support for the left remains relatively low, casting doubt about the possibility of a credible left-wing alternative while also attesting to the shift to the right that has taken place in French politics, a trend seen in many other European countries.

With an ever more fragmented parliament and no stable government in sight, the outcome of the 2024 elections will undoubtedly prolong uncertainty and political instability in a context marked by social unrest, growing economic anxiety and public debt and deficit. Such uncertainty will likely fuel electoral support for populism across the political spectrum in the forthcoming months, as economic and cultural fears will continue to top the political agenda. Macron and his centrist party face the challenge of building ad hoc alliances across ideologically diverse parties to pass legislation to address such concerns. Meanwhile, both LFI and the RN will need to work on their policy credibility, organization and membership to try and establish themselves as viable alternatives in the 2027 presidential election.


 

(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation? 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.


 

References

AFP (2024) Macron defends surprise snap-election call as ‘most responsible solution’, 18 June, https://www.france24.com/en/france/20240618-macron-defends-surprise-snap-election-call-most-responsible-solution-france

CEVIPOF (2024a) Enquête électorale française Élections européennes – vague 6, Ipsos, Le Monde, Fondation Jean Jaurès et Institut Montaigne, June.

CEVIPOF (2024b) Enquête électorale française Élections européennes – vague 5, Ipsos, Le Monde, Fondation Jean Jaurès et Institut Montaigne, May.

Durovic, A. & Mayer, N. (2022) Wind of change? The reconfiguration of gender gaps in the 2022 French presidential election: The reconfiguration of gender gaps in the 2022 French presidential election. Revue française de science politique, 72, 463–484. https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.724.0463

ELABE (2024) Baromètre ELABE pour Les Échos, 13 June. https://elabe.fr/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/20240613_les_echos_observatoire-politique.pdf

IPSOS (2024a) Comprendre le vote des Français, Enquête Ipsos pour France Télévisions, Radio France, France24/RFI, Public Sénat/LCP Assemblée Nationale, 6–7 June.

Ivaldi, G. (2018a) Contesting the EU in Times of Crisis: The Front National and Politics of Euroscepticism in France, Politics, 38(3): 278–294.

Ivaldi, G. (2018b) Populism in France, in Daniel Stockemer (ed.) Populism around the world: A Comparative Perspective, Cham: Springer, pp.27–48.

Ivaldi, G. (2022) Le vote Le Pen, in Perrineau, Pascal (dir.) Le Vote clivé. Les élections présidentielle et législatives d’avril et juin 2022, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble/UGA éditions, pp.153–164.

Ivaldi, G. (2023a) When far right parties compete: a case study of Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen in the 2022 French presidential election, French Politics, online first 13 July 2023.

Ivaldi, G. (2023b) The impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on right-wing populism in France, in Ivaldi, Gilles and Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2023) The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). 8 March 2023. Brussels, p.141–154.

Ivaldi, G., Torner, A. (2023) From France to Italy, Hungary to Sweden, voting intentions track the far-right’s rise in Europe, The Conversation, 4 October, https://theconversation.com/from-france-to-italy-hungary-to-sweden-voting-intentions-track-the-far-rights-rise-in-europe-214702

Ivaldi, G. (2024) The Populist Radical Right Turn of the Mainstream Right in France, in The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on (social) democracy, Policy Study, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), April, pp.80–93.

Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press.

Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018) Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. Comparative Political Studies, 51(13), 1667–1693.

Perrineau, P. (2022) Le Vote clivé: Les élections présidentielle et législatives d’avril et mai 2022. Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

Pirro, A.L.P. (2022). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 101–12. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860

 

DOWNLOAD REPORT ON FRANCE