Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 29, 2024. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0059
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated. In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum.
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far-left and far-right of the spectrum. All available data of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s. Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion.
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. The electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues, it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
In this context, the analysis of the European Parliament elections in June 2024 provides a unique opportunity to assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states simultaneously. With elections occurring around the same time, we can examine this wave of pan-European populism more closely and comparatively, assessing its scale, dynamics, and impact on national politics and, ultimately, on the EU. Thus, this report by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing on country-specific analyses by local experts, the report evaluates populist party performance across all EU member states and discusses the challenges populist politics pose for European institutions and the future of Europe.
The ECPS report illustrates the diversity of populism and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. The report see that the modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration, to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36%. Populists came first in the elections in six countries, with radical right populists winning in four countries, while centrist populists topped the polls in another two countries. Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament.
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament. With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Right-wing populists are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR, PfE, and ESN. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-inscrits (NI). Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, the report anticipates a growing influence on political debates and policy decisions in areas such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine. It also foresees more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than cohesive positions and policy proposals. The legitimation of radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and national politics is expected to continue. While the current EP majority may effectively maintain a cordon sanitaire around both the far-right and far-left, an overall shift to the right, in both rhetoric and policy, is already evident.
Each chapter of the report provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.
In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.
In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.
Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.
Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.
Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.
Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System
Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.
So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.
Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode
Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.
In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.
In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.
Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.
Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.
How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?
Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.
Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime
Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.
Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?
Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.
We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.
While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?
Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.
Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.
They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.
Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions
People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.
How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.
From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.
The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.
How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?
Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?
Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.
Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy
How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.
Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.
How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.
What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.
Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.
Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions
The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.
Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.
Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.
The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.
Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.
In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.
The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.
Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”
How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.
These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.
Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.
James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.
However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.
Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical.
In summary:
i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);
ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).
iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.
To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).
The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.
Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.
The Cultural War over the Police State
While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.
Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.
Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.
Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.
Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.
Conclusion
The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.
As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.
Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.
References
Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.
Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.
Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.
Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.
Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.
Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.
Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.
Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.
Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.
Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.
Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.
Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.
In an ECPS interview, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski of Coventry University argues Trump uses foreign policy as a tool to externalize US problems, reframing issues like poverty and unemployment as outcomes of foreign influence. Trump’s “American people vs. Washington establishment” narrative, Wojczewski says, fuels populist-nationalist sentiment by attributing domestic challenges to global elites and immigration, aligning with longstanding US nativist narratives. Wojczewski compares this approach to other populist strategies, contrasting it with left-populists like Bernie Sanders, who emphasize multilateralism and solidarity.
In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, examines how Donald Trump’s foreign policy discourse reframes domestic issues as external threats, solidifying a populist-nationalist coalition. According to Dr. Wojczewski, Trump went beyond the typical “Republicans versus Democrats” divide, framing the political landscape as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This re-framing allowed Trump to attribute societal issues, such as “poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, and crime,” to foreign policy decisions driven by “the ‘globalist’ establishment, immigrants, and foreign nations.” Wojczewski notes that “foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems” in Trump’s rhetoric, attributing America’s domestic challenges to flawed foreign influences.
Dr. Wojczewski also explains that this tactic of externalizing US issues resonates with longstanding nativist narratives, as Trump portrayed foreigners and the “globalist” establishment as key threats to American interests. Trump’s rhetoric, which framed the elites as an existential threat, blended populist anti-establishment sentiments with nationalist elements that particularly appealed to white Americans. “This approach draws on longstanding nativist themes in US history,” Wojczewski remarks, adding that Trump’s discourse taps into the deeply ingrained idea of America as a civic community threatened by outsiders.
Wojczewski further contextualizes this strategy within a broader populist landscape, referencing other populist actors like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN), who similarly emphasize national identity and seek to project foreign influences as detrimental to national well-being. While AfD plays with Euroscepticism, often highlighting Germany as the “stupid paymaster” within the EU, RN frames the EU as a German-dominated project that harms French interests, showing how national narratives shape distinct yet similar populist approaches.
In contrast, left-populists like Spain’s Podemos and Bernie Sanders in the United States offer a more inclusive notion of “the people.” As Wojczewski points out, “Sanders and Podemos criticize the establishment for securitizing migration,” presenting the people as an open, pluralistic group rather than focusing on an ethnocultural identity. This is reflected in Sanders’ appeals to America’s legacy as a “nation of immigrants,” emphasizing solidarity over isolation. Unlike the extreme nationalism seen in Trump or RN, Podemos and Sanders criticize liberal internationalism as masking a militaristic agenda. Sanders, for example, advocates multilateralism, as “issues like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity,” explains Wojczewski, showing a left-wing populist commitment to international cooperation rather than exclusion.
Through these comparisons, Dr. Wojczewski illustrates the diversity in populist foreign policy, noting that populism can vary widely depending on its ideological combination, from extreme nationalism to global solidarity. Trump’s approach, however, clearly leverages external threats to build a populist-nationalist base, setting a precedent that aligns with right-wing populist movements worldwide.
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski with some edits.
Populism and International Relations: A Highly Dynamic Research Field
Professor Wojczewski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you assess the evolution of populist theory in the field of international relations? What is the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: Populism and international relations has become a highly dynamic research field. If we look back about 10 years, there was minimal research on this topic, but in the last 5 or 6 years, numerous studies, books, and edited volumes have emerged, leading to substantial progress in a relatively short period. We now see increasing theoretical pluralism, with different approaches to conceptualizing populism—as an ideology, a style, political logic, or strategy. Research agendas are also varied, ranging from conventional analyses of populism’s impact on foreign policy preferences to examining how populism influences foreign policy-making style, foreign policy as a space for political mobilization, and populist identity construction. Additionally, factors like international relations, global governance, and regional governance have played roles in populism’s rise, resulting in a diverse and multifaceted research agenda.
That said, there are certain limitations. One major limitation, especially in the field of international relations, is that populism is still largely viewed as inherently negative and dangerous. To some extent, this perception is understandable, as populism can indeed pose risks and challenges to liberal democracy—especially when it comes to the populist radical right, which can be quite destructive, as seen in cases like Donald Trump. However, there are also forms of populism that pose no threat to liberal democracy and, in many ways, can even strengthen it. This perception reflects an “establishment bias” in populism research, where populists are seen as the problem and the establishment as the solution. This binary is problematic, as populism can also serve as a positive force. For example, left-wing populists like Podemos or Bernie Sanders offer a very different political vision compared to the populist radical right. Thus, populism should be approached as a more nuanced phenomenon, rather than being seen as purely negative and dangerous.
Another challenge is distinguishing populism from related phenomena such as authoritarianism, nationalism, and the radical right. Often, the boundaries are unclear—where does populism end, and where do these other ideologies or discourses begin? For instance, how can we differentiate between populism and radical right politics?
Regarding the second part of your question on the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences, this is the focus of my most recent paper. I argue that, as Cas Mudde’s terminology suggests, we should concentrate more on the “thick” or host ideology than on populism’s “thin” ideology. To truly understand the populist radical right, we should focus less on populism itself and more on radical or far-right ideology, which has a far more substantial influence on foreign policy preferences and beliefs.
In far-right ideology, a core belief is a strict adherence to a natural order of inequalities, which significantly shapes its foreign policy outlook. A central component is ultranationalism—a form of nationalism that defines the nation primarily in ethnocultural or racial terms and perceives various groups as being inherently in conflict. This worldview is deeply antagonistic, promoting an “us vs. them” mentality where one ethno-culturally or racially defined nation stands in opposition to others. Such a perspective fosters negative attitudes toward regional and global governance institutions and rejects universal norms, as the primacy of national identity, defined in ethno-cultural or racial terms, logically leads to a dismissal of international or universal principles.
Another related aspect is a chauvinistic foreign policy outlook—a relentless pursuit of a nation’s interests, often encapsulated in slogans like “America First,” which prioritize national interests over the rights, concerns, and interests of others. While there are other elements of far-right ideology that influence foreign policy, I believe ultranationalism is the most crucial. Research in populism and international relations would greatly benefit from a deeper examination of far-right nationalism, as I argue that it plays a far more significant role in shaping foreign policy preferences than populism itself.
Populist Securitization Undermines Democratic Institutions and Fosters Authoritarian Tendencies
Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders speaks at Presidential Rally at Springs Preserve Ampitheater evening before Nevada Caucus, Las Vegas, NV on February 21, 2020. Photo: Joseph Sohm.
How do you see the interplay between securitization and populism shaping the legitimacy of democratic institutions, especially when populist leaders present the establishment as a security threat? Could you elaborate on the role of moral and existential threats in populist securitization strategies, and how these might differ when targeting domestic versus foreign “elites”?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think populist securitization—essentially framing elites or the establishment as a security threat—can certainly undermine democratic institutions and foster authoritarian tendencies and policies. Donald Trump is a prominent example using this populist securitization strategy frequently, especially during his 2015–2016 campaign, by presenting the elites and establishment as a security threat.
However, populist securitization is not always harmful. For instance, if we contrast Trump with Bernie Sanders; Sanders also challenged the political establishment or elites. Still, his focus was on the destructive and undemocratic influence of big donors and the billionaire class. He highlighted how large corporations undermine democracy’s core principle of political equality through substantial influence over US politics via campaign donations. This also represents a populist securitization strategy but in a very different way.
We can say that populist securitization is an effective strategy for populist leaders or parties, as it legitimizes them while delegitimizing the establishment. By portraying elites as an existential threat, the populist leader can claim, “I am standing up for you; I am defending democracy and your interests against an elite that no longer represents you.”
Chauvinistic Nationalism in Populist Radical-Right Parties Limits Compromise and Cooperation
How do you assess the interplay between populism and nationalism shaping future cooperation among populist radical-right movements across borders, especially considering their inherently nationalist foundations? Could you elaborate on challenges populist radical-right actors face in building sustained transnational coalitions, given their nationalistic and often anti-globalist stances?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, to some extent, populism can assist the radical right in terms of international cooperation and transnational networking by providing a common enemy. This enemy may take the form of bureaucrats or so-called globalist elites, which helps the radical right mitigate national differences and antagonisms. Particularly in the United States and Europe, the radical right frequently uses the globalist conspiracy theory, suggesting that a globalist elite is disenfranchising ordinary people—an aloof elite disconnected from the common populace. This conspiracy theory is not new; it has existed in far-right discourse for decades and carries a clear anti-Semitic undertone, with “globalists” often serving as a code for Jews. This shared adversary becomes a rallying point that the radical right leverages to build international cooperation. In essence, having a common enemy is essential, and populism, combined with radical-right nationalism, offers this shared target, whether it be globalist elites or Eurocrats.
However, nationalism certainly complicates international cooperation for the radical right. While they may find common ground in shared opposition, significant differences emerge when it comes to proposing comprehensive alternatives, crafting policies, and making concrete policy proposals. This lack of unity is underscored by the fact that there are currently three radical-right factions in the EU Parliament. I would argue that the issue is less about ideology—there are more ideological similarities than differences among Europe’s radical-right groups—and more about national context and political style. Some radical-right parties, such as Italy’s Brothers of Italy (FdI)or France’s Rassemblement National (RN), aim to appear more moderate to attract conservative voters, toning down some of their more radical rhetoric. Meanwhile, Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) is less focused on moderation, which makes other parties hesitant to associate with them, despite few substantive ideological differences.
One challenge, then, is the national differences and the varied political strategies and styles among these movements. Another obstacle is the inherent chauvinistic nationalism within these parties. When parties adopt slogans like “Germany First” or “France First,” they limit their ability to compromise and cooperate, as this mindset prioritizes national interests above all else. This is evident in the contrasting narratives about the EU promoted by Rassemblement National (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). RN depicts the EU as a German-dominated project with Germany as the hegemon, while AfD claims Germany is the “stupid paymaster” subsidizing other EU countries. This clash of narratives creates further barriers to cooperation, as each party mobilizes distinct political strategies based on differing national narratives.
Conflicting Affective Narratives as Powerful Tools in Populist Radical-Right Rhetoric
What is the impact of affective narratives—such as fear, nostalgia, and moral superiority—within populist foreign policy discourses, and how these emotions shape international relations dynamics?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: These affective narratives are absolutely crucial in populist radical-right discourses. Whether we look at figures like Donald Trump, Alternative for Germany (AfD), or others, they all, in some way, evoke fear, anxiety, and resentment. Their messaging often revolves around a perceived loss of control: “We’re being overrun by foreigners,” or as Trump famously put it, “Either we win this election, or we lose our country.” Mobilizing such existential fears is essential to their strategy.
However—and this is the interesting aspect—in addition to invoking negative emotions like fear and anxiety, populist radical-right discourses also promise a better future. While mobilizing existential fears, they simultaneously offer hope: if they gain power, they’ll “restore sovereignty” or “make America great again.” This evokes positive emotions, such as hope and nostalgia for the “good old days,” with promises to reverse multiculturalism, globalization, and restore order, identity, and sovereignty. These conflicting affective narratives—fear and hope, nostalgia and moral superiority—are powerful tools in populist radical-right rhetoric. I would argue that this blend of conflicting emotions and narratives partially explains their broad appeal and success.
AfD’s Populist Radical-Right Stance Is Less Eurosceptic than Germany’s Neo-Nazi NPD
Hundreds of people attend the Summer Festival in the center of the town and listen to Citizens’ dialogue with Björn Höcke in Sömmerda, Germany on August 24, 2024. Photo: Ryan Nash.
How does the foreign policy approach of far-right parties like AfD and NPD reflect broader trends in global far-right movements, particularly regarding their stance on supranational institutions like the EU? What factors contribute to the differences in foreign policy outlooks between populist radical-right parties and extreme-right parties, and how do these distinctions impact their real-world diplomatic strategies?
Professor Thorsten Wojczewski: Alternative for Germany (AfD), as a populist radical-right party, is somewhat less dogmatic and less Eurosceptic than the extreme-right National Democratic Party (NPD), a neo-Nazi party in Germany. To start, AfD does not explicitly call for Germany’s immediate departure from the EU. While they entertain the notion of “Dexit,” it’s not a primary objective. Instead, AfD’s position is to first attempt reforms or implement specific changes within the EU rather than advocating for an outright exit. This approach can be partly explained by divisions within AfD’s voter base on EU membership—about 43% of AfD supporters favor Dexit, indicating that many remain uncertain or opposed to it. This lack of strong support for an immediate exit, even among their own voters, likely informs AfD’s cautious stance, as a significant majority of the broader German electorate also opposes Dexit. This approach reflects a degree of opportunism, with AfD keeping the option open without fully committing to it.
At the same time, AfD advocates for reforming, rather than dismantling, the EU. For instance, they support retaining elements like the customs union, free trade zone, and certain aspects of the common market. Thus, while AfD is highly Eurosceptic, it still views specific EU components as beneficial and worth preserving.
In contrast, the NPD demands Germany’s immediate exit from the EU and offers no defense of EU institutions. The only aspect of European cooperation the NPD promotes is a “Fortress Europe,” envisioning Europe as a racially and ethnically homogenous “living space” for white Europeans. According to the NPD, European states should cooperate solely to prevent mass migration and block other so-called destructive foreign influences, such as US hegemony. Unlike AfD, NPD rejects the common market, customs union, and similar EU structures entirely.
This contrast reflects broader trends among European populist radical-right parties, most of which adopt less extreme positions. They maintain a certain ambivalence, being critical of the EU without advocating for its immediate dismantling or exit, likely to appeal to a broader voter base.
Trump Challenges Bipartisan Consensus on Liberal Internationalism in US Foreign Policy
What are the implications of securitization theory in the populist discourse of Donald Trump? In what ways does Trump’s populist approach to “Othering” differ from traditional forms of nationalism in US foreign policy?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: When we look at Trump’s 2015 campaign, two things stand out: first, the unusually prominent role of foreign policy in a US election; second, Trump’s framing of the entire Washington establishment as a security threat. He famously stated, “They have dragged us into foreign wars that have made us less safe, left our borders wide open at home, and shipped our jobs and wealth to other countries,” with “they” referring to the Washington establishment. Thus, in Trump’s rhetoric, the Washington establishment is cast as an existential security threat.
The difference between a populist mode of ‘othering’ and a nationalist mode of ‘othering’ is that, in populism, it’s often the elites within one’s own country who become the security threat, rather than other states or foreign entities. While immigrants, illegal immigration, and countries like China also figured into Trump’s rhetoric, he notably framed the Washington establishment itself as a primary threat to the American people—a “corrupt elite” no longer representing Americans.
By combining populist and nationalist forms of ‘othering’, Trump sought to rally people behind him and redefine who is “American.” His rhetoric primarily appealed to white Americans of European ancestry, positioning them as “real Americans” under threat from mass migration, among other issues. Through this mode of ‘othering’, he also challenged the bipartisan consensus on liberal internationalism in US foreign policy, claiming that a flawed foreign policy, pursued by elites, was responsible for America’s grievances. This, he argued, was why he should become president—to change course and move away from these flawed policies.
There Is No Singular “Populist Foreign Policy”
How does the framing of “the people” versus “the elite” in left-populist movements differfrom that of right-wing populism, particularly in the context of foreign policy? How does left populism reconcile nationalist elements with international solidarity, particularly in areas like trade, immigration, and global governance? What do the cases of Bernie Sanders and Podemos tell us about the relationship between left-wing populism and foreign policy?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: In my recent co-authored paper with colleagues Emmy Eklund and Frank Stengel, we show that Bernie Sanders and Podemos offer a quite different conception of “the people” compared to the radical right, both in Europe and the United States. Left-wing populist discourses from Sanders and Podemos envision the people as a relatively open, pluralistic, and heterogeneous group. In principle, anyone can be part of this group; it’s not closed or essentialized, nor grounded on ethno-cultural or racial criteria. This is a clear distinction between left-wing populism and the populist radical right, where figures like Trump often incorporate ethno-cultural and racial elements into their definition of “the people.”
Furthermore, both Bernie Sanders and Podemos adopt a decisively pro-immigrant stance. This is significant, as populism is often associated with anti-immigration sentiments. However, Sanders and Podemos instead criticize the establishment for securitizing migration. This is noteworthy because it challenges the assumption that only the far left or far right poses a threat; establishment politics itself often exhibits nativist and authoritarian tendencies. Sanders and Podemos highlight this by exposing the establishment’s own authoritarianism and nativism concerning immigration. Sanders, in particular, draws on the classic American narrative of the United States as a nation of immigrants with a moral responsibility to support others in their pursuit of “the American Dream.” He emphasizes that being American means embracing solidarity, openness, and support for those seeking a better life, rather than building border fences.
Another notable aspect is how both Podemos and Sanders criticize flawed liberal internationalism. Sanders, for example, argues that liberal internationalism, as promoted by the US establishment, often conceals a unilateral, militaristic, and neo-imperialist foreign policy, which has caused significant issues in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. For Sanders, the alternative is clear: multilateralism and international solidarity. This focus on multilateralism may seem counter-intuitive, as populism is often associated with isolationism and opposition to multilateral institutions. Yet, Sanders emphasized that cooperation through coalitions would be central to his foreign policy, believing that global challenges like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity. Both Sanders and Podemos seek to promote progressive change beyond their own countries. They do not wish to abolish the nation-state but believe solidarity should extend beyond borders, demonstrating a commitment to fostering progressive change both domestically and internationally.
In terms of left-wing populism and foreign policy, we can conclude that there is no singular “populist foreign policy.” The foreign policy outlooks of populist movements vary greatly depending on the specific ideology and discourse combined with populism. These outlooks can range from extreme nationalism and isolationism to robust international solidarity. Therefore, we are critical of the term “populist foreign policy,” as it suggests a misleading commonality between vastly different political actors like Bernie Sanders and Trump.
How has the Trumpian discourse used foreign policy in creating a platform for the (re)production and consolidation of a populist-nationalist electoral coalition?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, what Trump did, which was quite interesting, was to extend his discourse beyond the classical political divide of “Republicans versus Democrats,” framing it instead as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This was a key element of his rhetoric, where he attributed poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, crime, and essentially all that was wrong in the United States to flawed foreign policy. In this way, foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems.
Foreign policy played a very prominent role in Trump’s campaigns, as he often attributed domestic problems to the US establishment and its foreign policies—military interventions and free trade agreements, for example. This is the populist element in his approach. He combined this with a nationalist angle by scapegoating immigrants, minorities, and other nations for US issues. This blend of populist and radical-right nationalist ‘othering’ was quite effective in his discourse, with the populist side appealing to a broader audience across US society due to widespread anti-establishment sentiments. Meanwhile, his radical-right nationalism particularly resonated with white Americans.
Trump also externalized America’s problems, presenting them as originating from abroad. In his rhetoric, issues stemmed either from the so-called globalist establishment, which he claimed prioritized foreigners over Americans, from immigrants, or from other nations. This discourse effectively attributed everything wrong to a flawed foreign policy and to “foreigners” broadly defined.
In this way, Trump tapped into deeply rooted nativist discourses that have existed in the United States for centuries. Historically, mass migration has often triggered nativist backlash in the US, with the so-called indigenous population mobilizing against newcomers as perceived threats. Trump’s discourse serves as a reminder that the idea of the United States as a civic community has long been contested. Ethno-cultural and racial constructions of American identity have often co-existed with a more civic and pluralistic American nationalism.
Trump Poses a Real Threat to Democratic Institutions, Minorities, and Migrants
Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud
There are those very concerned experts who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump presidency. Others claim that these concerns are over-blown and American democracy is resilient enough for another possible Trump administration. Where do you stand in this debate?
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think a very diplomatic answer would be that I stand in the middle. I believe American democracy can likely survive another Trump presidency, but it would undoubtedly suffer severe damage to its core institutions. The reason I’m not extremely pessimistic is that the United States is a consolidated liberal democracy with well-established institutions and an active civil society. Democratic backsliding tends to occur in societies where institutions are still underdeveloped or relatively new. The Weimar Republic in Germany, before the Nazis came to power, is an example; often called a “democracy without democrats,” it had an underdeveloped civil society and contested institutions, creating an environment where fascism could rise more easily compared to the US.
That said, Trump poses a real threat not only to democratic institutions but also to minorities and migrants, who would likely bear the brunt of his anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric. His influence would undoubtedly harm US democracy and endanger specific sectors of society. Additionally, Trump fuels political polarization in the US, making it increasingly ungovernable, as the system of checks and balances requires parties to cooperate. With extreme polarization, such cooperation becomes impossible, leading to dysfunction. This polarization could pave the way for an even more radical leader in the future, one who might promise to restore unity and order in an increasingly ungovernable United States.
The silver lining here is Trump’s age. He likely has limited time left to damage US democracy, as this would likely be his last term. His mental and physical state in the next two to three years may also play a role in limiting the damage he could do.
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. October 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0020
In “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries,” authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri argue that Islamist parties, at their core, are political entities that prioritize practical governance over strict ideology when necessary, leaving them vulnerable to voter rejection if they fail to address economic and social issues effectively. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy often takes precedence over Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic contexts. While it occasionally includes a wealth of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach offers a valuable resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism, and democracy on a global scale.
In the book titled Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries, authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri explore the multifaceted strategies of Islamist parties operating within democratic and semi-democratic settings across various Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The book examines how these parties adapt ideologically and pragmatically to maintain influence, highlighting a shift from traditional opposition roles to coalition-building and power-sharing with secular or non-Islamist entities. The authors underscore that while Islamist parties share a religious foundation, their approaches to governance and democracy are diverse, challenging simplistic views that position them solely as anti-democratic.
Yilmaz and Shukri aim to provide a nuanced understanding of how these parties manage power, respond to crises, and navigate issues like minority rights and foreign policy, particularly in today’s globalized and interconnected political landscape. The introduction of the book under the title of “Islamist Parties Operating in Democracies,” sets the stage by examining the multifaceted nature of Islamist movements, defining them as entities aiming to incorporate Islamic principles into political and social realms. The authors clarify that while these groups are often perceived as monolithic, they are, in fact, a “diverse array of voices” with varying ideological and strategic priorities shaped by unique regional contexts.
One key strength of the introduction is its contextual framing of Islamist parties not just as ideological entities but as pragmatic actors responsive to “evolving conditions and societal expectations.” Yilmaz and Shukri discuss how these groups, while rooted in shared religious values, exhibit adaptability by forming coalitions and engaging in “power-sharing and coalition-building” with secular or even oppositional parties, particularly when in governance roles. This approach marks a significant departure from previous literature, as the authors aim to present Islamists as dynamic participants in democratic systems rather than static opponents to democratic principles.
Furthermore, the introduction highlights the book’s comparative methodology, which sets it apart from similar works that typically focus on a single region. By juxtaposing cases from countries like Turkey, Indonesia, and Tunisia, the authors aim to draw broader insights into “the complex dynamics” of Islamist governance. Yilmaz and Shukri suggest that understanding these dynamics is crucial for a “nuanced understanding” of Islamist politics that moves beyond reductive assumptions. Thus, the introduction promises a rich comparative analysis, shedding light on the strategic adaptability of Islamist parties and their potential to balance ideological goals with pragmatic governance in diverse political settings.
Islam and Politics
In Chapter 2 which is titled “Islam and Politics in Democratic Muslim-Majority Countries,” Yilmaz and Shukri present an insightful analysis into the complexities of Islamism and its intersection with democratic politics across diverse Muslim-majority nations. By grounding the discussion in scholarly debate, they explore how Islamist movements navigate between mainstream and extremist strands and examine the adaptive strategies employed by these parties in response to their unique political environments.
The chapter explores a critical dichotomy within Islamism, distinguishing between mainstream Islamists who participate in elections and seek gradual reform through democratic means and more extremist groups that often reject democratic processes. This distinction underlines the authors’ main argument about the adaptability of Islamist parties, emphasizing that while many engage in democratic processes, others lean toward authoritarian tendencies. This adaptation, as the authors argue, is driven by both political and socio-economic pressures, shaping Islamist strategies across different contexts.
Moreover, Yilmaz and Shukri delve into the ideological tensions within Islamist politics, such as the potential for majoritarianism and religious hegemony. They caution that unchecked Islamism could risk eroding minority rights and compromising democratic principles, especially in polarized societies. The authors support this claim by discussing the experience of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), where populist tendencies and majoritarianism have raised concerns about the preservation of democratic institutions.
Finally, the chapter addresses the broader implications of Islamist governance and the complex role of political Islam. By examining case studies in countries like Tunisia, Indonesia, and Morocco, the authors provide a robust framework for understanding how Islamist parties balance religious principles with governance. This nuanced examination makes Chapter 2 a foundational overview for readers, highlighting both the potential and challenges of Islamism within democratic contexts.
PAS and Malaysia
In Chapter 3, Yilmaz and Shukri provide a comprehensive examination of Malaysia’s Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) under the title of “Seven Decades of PAS in Malaysian Politics,” tracing its strategic evolution across the nation’s politically complex landscape. The authors explore PAS’ adaptability and pragmatism within Malaysia’s semi-democratic environment, highlighting how PAS has shifted from conservatism to moderate pluralism and, recently, to ethno-religious populism.
The chapter outlines PAS’ historical journey, from its foundation in 1951 as an offshoot of UMNO, focused on Malay-Muslim identity, to its modern status as a dominant Islamist party. PAS’ relationship with UMNO, marked by both rivalry and cooperation, underscores the party’s flexibility. The authors note that PAS has shifted between opposing UMNO’s secular nationalism and forming alliances under banners of “Muslim unity,” depending on political needs. Yilmaz and Shukri point to PAS’ success in adapting its ideology to suit changing political climates, illustrating its willingness to collaborate across the political spectrum for electoral gains.
According to the book, PAS’ governance of Kelantan since 1990 serves as a case study in implementing an Islamist agenda within a multicultural society. Despite advocating for “shariazation” policies, PAS has shown restraint at the federal level, balancing Islamic values with the realities of Malaysia’s diverse demographics. This pragmatic approach, the authors argue, has allowed PAS to maintain its influence, especially during its brief time in federal power from 2020-2022.
Further, the authors discuss PAS’ strategic response to global and national crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, which bolstered its populist appeal through welfare measures. Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that PAS’ electoral flexibility and populist tactics have solidified its position among conservative Malay-Muslims, marking it as a key player in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The chapter demonstrates how PAS’ resilience and adaptability, despite operating within Malaysia’s semi-authoritarian framework, have contributed to its growing strength in Malaysian politics.
PKS and Indonesia
Chapter 4 of the book offers a nuanced analysis of Islamism within Indonesia’s multiparty political system under the title of “PKS in Indonesia’s Multiparty System,” by spotlighting the evolution of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and its role as a major Islamist party. The chapter contextualizes PKS within Indonesia’s post-1998 democratization efforts, focusing on how the nation’s rich cultural diversity and democratic constitution impact the moderation of Islamist agendas. Yilmaz and Shukri highlight PKS’s pragmatic approach, noting its blend of Islamic values with democratic ideals as it navigates Indonesia’s secular and religious pluralism.
The authors emphasize that PKS has achieved influence without strictly seeking to impose sharia law, contrasting with more radical movements like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). PKS’s stance on social justice, anti-corruption, and minority rights demonstrates a commitment to Indonesia’s Pancasila foundation, balancing Islamic identity with pluralist values. This adaptability has allowed PKS to participate in coalition governments while maintaining a distinct Islamist identity.
The chapter also explores PKS’s responses to regional and global Islamist trends, highlighting that PKS favors a moderate stance on Islamic solidarity, promoting peaceful international relations and opposing extremist ideologies. However, as the authors note, PKS faces rising pressures from conservative Islamic populism, which challenges Indonesia’s secular state model. They point to the complex balancing act of PKS as it negotiates between religious values and national priorities amid Indonesia’s diverse electorate.
Chapter 4 presents PKS as an example of Islamist pragmatism within a democratic framework, stressing its role in maintaining Indonesia’s status as a moderate Muslim-majority nation. The analysis showcases PKS’s strategic positioning within Indonesia’s political landscape, where moderation often proves more sustainable than radicalism.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan
In Chapter 5 of the book, authors Yilmaz and Shukri provide an in-depth exploration of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one of Pakistan’s most influential Islamist parties. This chapter, which is titled “A Faithful Force: Jamaat-E-Islami and Islamist Politics in Pakistan,” examines JI’s evolution from a supporter of military regimes to a unique voice advocating social development within an Islamic framework. Describing JI as a “faithful force,” the authors highlight the party’s struggle to reconcile its foundational principles with the realities of ‘Pakistani democracy,’ illustrating both its successes and limitations in influencing national politics.
Initially, JI supported Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, which advanced the Islamization process in Pakistan. The authors emphasize how JI’s alliance with Zia enabled it to push for Islamic laws, giving JI a rare moment of influence. However, as the chapter reveals, JI’s strict Islamist stance limited its broader appeal, especially as it encountered Pakistan’s diverse political landscape and increasing calls for pluralism.
Yilmaz and Shukri delve into JI’s organizational structure, describing it as both a strength and a “double-edged sword.” JI’s internal hierarchy, according to the authors, deeply rooted in discipline and loyalty, provides a solid foundation, yet its rigid framework hinders adaptability. Despite its “commitment to democratic principles” and holding intra-party elections, JI has struggled to expand its influence beyond its core supporters, often failing to capture significant electoral success on a national level.
The authors explore JI’s stance on the controversial blasphemy law and its impact on Pakistan’s democracy, particularly in relation to minority rights. JI’s call for the law’s strict enforcement has complicated its image, as it aligns the party with hardline interpretations of Islam that conflict with Pakistan’s aspirations for a more inclusive society. While JI advocates for “social justice, anti-corruption, and anti-imperialism,” its approach has been criticized for not sufficiently addressing the needs of Pakistan’s minority communities, a factor that limits its broader political appeal.
In discussing JI’s ideological adaptability, the authors argue that JI has recently shifted towards a “second-generation Islamism,” with an emphasis on social development and community welfare. The chapter notes JI’s active involvement in charitable work through its Al-Khidmat Foundation, an outreach strategy that has helped it maintain influence despite its limited political successes. This evolution highlights JI’s pragmatic side, as it aligns its goals with broader social issues while retaining an Islamic identity.
Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that JI’s trajectory exemplifies Pakistan’s complex relationship with Islam and democracy, where Islamist parties face the challenge of preserving religious identity while adapting to democratic norms. They suggest that while JI has struggled to secure a dominant political position, it remains a potent force due to its strong organizational base and grassroots support. Ultimately, Chapter 5 sheds light on the “delicate balance” between faith-based politics and the realities of Pakistan’s evolving democratic landscape.
PJD and Morocco
In Chapter 6, titled “Islamist PJD and the Monarchy in Morocco,” the authors delve into the dynamics between Morocco’s monarchy and the Justice and Development Party (PJD), focusing on Morocco’s unique Makhzen system. This system, led by the king as emir al-mu’minin or “commander of the faithful,” establishes him as both a secular and religious authority, allowing the monarchy to manage Islam as an integral part of Morocco’s national identity. The chapter emphasizes how this framework has been crucial in tempering “the potency of political Islamism” and limiting the PJD’s influence, even as it formed a government following its 2011 electoral success.
The chapter examines the PJD’s decade in power, a tenure punctuated by moments of compromise and concession. Initially, the party enjoyed significant popular support, riding the wave of Arab Spring reforms that included expanded parliamentary power. However, as the chapter illustrates, the PJD quickly encountered the limits of its influence. The authors highlight how the monarchy’s interventions in key government functions, especially in “sensitive roles and veto powers,” underscored the persistence of monarchical authority, often stifling the PJD’s ability to implement its agenda fully.
The COVID-19 pandemic further strained the PJD’s position, contributing to its electoral decline in 2021 and symbolizing the end of its era of Islamist governance in Morocco. This chapter argues that the monarchy’s symbolic Islamic leadership, combined with its political authority, successfully framed itself as the true custodian of Moroccan identity, relegating the PJD to “a second-generation Islamist party forced to work within the system.” This analysis reveals that the PJD’s journey reflects the complex interplay of religious and political authority in Morocco, where Islam is strategically woven into the fabric of governance, ultimately ensuring that power remains centered in the monarchy.
Ennahda and Tunisia
Chapter 7, titled “Ennahda as Tunisia’s Muslim Democratic Party,” delves into the rise, evolution, and challenges faced by Tunisia’s Ennahda party, highlighting its remarkable adaptability within the country’s political landscape. Initially, Ennahda emerged from Tunisia’s conservative Muslim roots, but, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it evolved into what the authors describe as Tunisia’s “Muslim Democratic Party.” This transformation underscores Ennahda’s pragmatism and its attempt to blend religious principles with democratic ideals. After winning Tunisia’s first democratic elections in 2011, Ennahda adapted its stance to suit a diverse political landscape, opting for “a practical kind of national reconciliation”with secular parties, which became crucial for political stability.
The authors highlight Ennahda’s ideological moderation, particularly when it decided not to impose Sharia as the foundation of the 2014 constitution. This choice, according to Yilmaz and Shukri, reflected Ennahda’s understanding of “the importance of Maqasid al-Sharia over specific rules,” showcasing the party’s evolving position on Islamic law to resonate with a broader national identity. The shift was further reinforced during the 2016 Tenth General Congress, where Ennahda officially prioritized politics over religious preaching, effectively becoming “a conservative political force capable of handling governance.”
The chapter also sheds light on the recent strain in Tunisian democracy, exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which impacted Ennahda’s reputation and led to widespread disapproval. Ennahda’s subsequent absence from the 2023 elections reflects a shift in its strategy, possibly spurred by President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. In sum, Chapter 7 paints a nuanced picture of Ennahda’s transformation and challenges, illustrating its continued struggle between ideological values and the demands of a pragmatic political approach in Tunisia’s ever-shifting political terrain.
AKP and Turkey
Titled “Islamist Populist AKP and Turkey’s Shift Towards Authoritarianism,” Chapter 8 of the book presents an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring its journey from “Muslim democrat” roots to an authoritarian populist regime. Initially, the AKP championed democratization, economic reform, and EU membership; however, its trajectory shifted post-2011, notably after the “Gezi protests of 2013” and the controversial 2016 coup attempt. These events, according to the authors, paved the way for a clampdown on dissent, particularly targeting journalists, activists, and opposition politicians, marking a stark turn towards authoritarianism.
Erdogan’s leadership has progressively consolidated power, transforming Turkey’s democratic infrastructure into what the authors describe as a “competitive authoritarian regime.” With the 2017 constitutional referendum, the office of the prime minister was abolished, granting the president sweeping executive powers, leading one observer to note that “Erdogan [became] the virtually unassailable ruler of Turkey.” By diminishing checks on presidential authority, Erdogan’s AKP harnessed Islam and nationalism to foster a narrative that secures his base while casting opposition voices as foreign-controlled threats to national unity.
In this chapter, Yilmaz and Shukri also examine the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), highlighting its instrumental role in promoting the AKP’s vision of Islam as a component of Turkish identity. This vision extends internationally, where Turkey navigates a complex geopolitical landscape. According to the authors, through selective alliances, including with Russia and China, the AKP leverages religious and nationalist rhetoric to mitigate Western criticism, particularly regarding human rights issues. Yet, its economic policies, based on unorthodox monetary approaches, have led to high inflation and decreased living standards. The authors note that Erdogan’s insistence on low-interest rates, justified by Islamic teachings against usury, has led to what the text calls an “accelerated currency devaluation” that further strains Turkey’s economy.
In sum, Chapter 8 paints the AKP as a party that, while initially promising democratic reform, has instead pursued populist authoritarianism. This has strained Turkey’s democratic structures and polarized its society, positioning Erdogan as a powerful, divisive figure whose policies reflect both the aspirations and challenges of modern Turkish Islamism.
Trajectory of Islamist Parties
In Chapter 9, the authors overview “Trajectory of Islamist Parties” and synthesize the book’s key findings, examining how various Islamist parties navigate the balance between Islamism and democracy. The chapter delves into how Islamist parties, when allowed political participation, engage in governance yet often struggle with the tension between God’s sovereignty and popular sovereignty. This complex relationship has led to a diversity of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian shifts in Turkey under the AKP to democratic engagement in Malaysia, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The authors highlight the significance of “strategic interaction theory,” which suggests that an Islamist party’s moderation is contingent upon its relationships with secular forces and the military. “Credibility of signals sent by the Islamist party” is crucial in establishing trust with non-Islamist actors, although, as in the AKP’s case, prolonged power can erode democratic practices. The chapter notes that the AKP’s “immoderation was the result of dismantling institutional checks and balances” due to political crises like the Gezi protests and the 2016 coup attempt.
Through comparative analysis, the authors argue that some Islamist parties adapt to electoral losses, as seen in Tunisia and Morocco, where they have “accepted defeat albeit with some resistance.” However, once in power, these parties tend to favor pragmatism over strict adherence to religious principles to sustain governance. This adaptability is essential, particularly in Muslim-majority secular states like Indonesia, where the “balance between Islamic identity and democratic diversity” is necessary for political survival.
The authors suggest in brief that Islamist parties are, at their core, political entities that prioritize practical governance over ideology when necessary, making them susceptible to voter rejection if they fail to deliver on economic and social issues. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy outweighs Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic frameworks. While it occasionally includes abundance of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach provides an insightful resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism and democracy on a global scale.
Ihsan Yilmaz & Syaza Shukri. (2024). Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. 313 pp. Hardcover: EUR 139.09. ISBN-10: 9819743427, ISBN-13: 978-9819743421.
Please cite as: Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0060
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
By Gilles Ivaldi*(Sciences Po Paris–CNRS (CEVIPOF), France) & Emilia Zankina* (Temple University, Rome, Italy)
Introduction
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated (Moffit, 2017; De la Torre, 2019). In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum (FEPS, 2024).
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far left and far right of the spectrum (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The PopuList database of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion (Muldoon & Herman, 2018; Schwörer, 2021; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) show, electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021), it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
The analysis of the European Parliament elections of June 2024 thus provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. With European Parliament (EP) elections all taking place at about the same time, we can look more closely and comparatively at the current wave of pan-European populism, its size, dynamics and impact on national polities and, ultimately, on the EU.
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU.
In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
Mapping European populism(s)
Mudde (2004) defines populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ that ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Populist parties champion the cause of the ‘common man’ against what is perceived as a detached and self-serving political elite. While there are other ontological approaches to populism – e.g., political discourse (Laclau, 2005), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), and performance (Ostiguy et al., 2020) – these different traditions of research generally converge towards the same common essential attributes underpinning populism (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Moreover, the ideational approach allows one to connect the supply and demand side of populism and to study the diversity of its manifestations across Europe.
In the European political landscape, populism manifests itself in a variety of parties across the political spectrum, from left to right (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Taggart & Pirro, 2021). In Eastern and Central Europe, populism may also be found across a range of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties located inside and outside the mainstream (Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such diversity is shown in Table 1, which provides an overview of the leading populist parties in the current European political landscape.
Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
On the radical right, populism is typically combined with exclusionary nativism and authoritarianism, whereby the people and the elite are primarily defined along cultural lines (Mudde, 2007). Radical-right populist parties essentialize migration not only in their nativist rhetoric but also portray it with terrorism and crime, and in this way, it is put forward as a security issue, as was the case during the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015–2016 (Mudde, 2019). Such populism is found in parties like France’s National Rally (RN), Lega (formerly Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) in Italy, and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The nativist and authoritarian ideology of the PRR is also found in ‘radicalized’ conservative parties such as Poland’s Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Hungary’s Fidesz, which have turned to a populist radical right strategy over time (Buštíková, 2017: 575).
The populist radical left has, on the other hand, a universalistic profile embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, who are essentially pitted against the economic elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Lisi et al., 2019). In Europe, left-wing populism has been particularly electorally successful in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2020). Economic issues, bailouts, and austerity programs were the main driving forces behind a transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018).Parties such as the Spanish Podemos, SYRIZA in Greece, or Germany’s Die Linke (The Left) are examples of this phenomenon. In those countries, however, there has been a decline in the electoral support for parties of the populist left since 2019 (Ivaldi, 2020).
Finally, in CEE, populism often manifests itself in the form of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties (Učeň, 2007; Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such parties operate in the more volatile party system of the former Communist bloc, where political instability is a long-term phenomenon. They focus on challenging the existing political elite and fighting corruption, and they can be found across the entire political spectrum, both within and outside the ideological mainstream (Engler et al., 2019). This type of populism is found in parties such as Slovakia’s Ordinary People and Independents (OL’aNO), the movement of Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz) in Poland and Change Continues (Prodalzhavame Promyanata, PP) in Bulgaria. Looking more specifically at the Czech Republic, Havlík (2019) sees the rise of the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) as a case of ‘centrist technocratic populism’ based on a denial of political pluralism, anti-partyism, resistance to constitutionalism and the embrace of majoritarianism. In Western Europe, the Italian M5S has been seen as a case of ‘centrist populism’, which does not display the typical ideological profile (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Pirro & Van Kessel, 2018).
The populism-Euroscepticism nexus
Given their inherent anti-elite and anti-established stance, populist parties in the European context are also often Eurosceptic. Kneuer (2018) emphasizes such a ‘tandem’ of populism and Euroscepticism as one unifying feature of all successful populist parties in Europe, reflecting in her view the formation of a new transnational cleavage cross-cutting the traditional left-right axis.
A recent study examining parties in 30 European countries from 2018 to 2024 (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2024) finds 77 parties to be both Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that the growth of European integration and its association with a series of crises, such as migration, the Eurozone, Brexit and COVID-19, has bred discontent that fostered anti-establishment positions and the demonization of the EU. At the same time, the study found clusters of parties that are anti-establishment but not Eurosceptic and parties that are Eurosceptic but not anti-establishment, arguing that the link is not always straightforward.
Meijers and Zaslove (2021) also examine populist parties’ positions towards European integration, similarly arguing for a nuanced picture, with some populist parties rejecting the EU outright while others are taking a reformist position. According to their study, populist parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Golden Dawn in Greece and Lega in Italy are highly Eurosceptic. Populist left parties, on the other hand, tend to be more moderate, with the Five Star Movement (M5S) being moderately Eurosceptic and Podemos and SYRIZA having moderate pro-EU positions.
Similarly, Pirro, Taggart and Kessel (2018) find differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism. Examining the economic and financial crisis (the ‘Great Recession’), the migrant crisis and Brexit, they find left-wing populists attacking the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ agenda and austerity measures, while right-wing populists criticizing the EU on account of increased immigration and multiculturalism. Brexit, on the other hand, is portrayed ‘by various kinds of populist parties as a victory for the ordinary people against unresponsive elites and a rejection of the undemocratic and technocratic decision-making process at the EU level’ (Pirro, Taggart and Van Kessel, 2018). While Euroscepticism is not limited to populist parties alone, neither are all populist parties Eurosceptic. We see a strong correlation between anti-EU positions and populist parties, which is more pronounced to the right than to the left.
More recently, however, there has been a moderating shift in populist Eurosceptic politics both left and right of the spectrum. In the wake of the Brexit referendum of 2016, many populist parties have strategically abandoned their previous plans to drop the Euro or leave the EU altogether, turning to more nuanced or ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration in order to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters, and to collaborate with mainstream parties. As Van Kessel et al. (2020) note, the difficulties in the Brexit process may have dampened public demand for leaving the EU elsewhere in Europe, thus reducing the viability of ‘exit strategies’. Other studies suggest that populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions. Right-wing nationalist populist parties have adopted ‘alt-Europe’ counternarratives reflecting ‘a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European “community of sovereign states”, “strong nations” or “fatherlands”, that abhors the EU’s “centralized” United States of Europe’ (McMahon, 2021: 10). ‘Taking back control from Brussels’ has been observed to be a common stand of radical right-wing populist parties on the way to the 2024 EP elections (Braun & Reinl, 2023).
As McDonnell and Werner (2018) argue, populist radical right parties ‘remain flexible to perform significant shifts’ on the issue of European integration because of its relatively limited salience. The dampening of their Euroscepticism by populist parties may also be associated with office-seeking strategies. As Ivaldi (2018b) suggests, in the case of the French FN, governmental credibility and coalition potential have been two strong incentives for the FN to tone down its Euroscepticism since the 2017 presidential election.
Drivers of populism: structural and short-term factors
The economic crises of the past decade, coupled with the perceived threats posed by globalization and immigration, have created circumstances that allow for a surge in populist sentiments across various European nations. Populism, characterized by a general distrust towards traditional political institutions and an increasing polarization of society, is fuelled by a complex interplay of socioeconomic, cultural and political factors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021).
Different varieties of populism operate on different types of grievances and issues across the economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition, however. Socioeconomic issues have traditionally been identified as critical factors of left-wing populism at both the party and the voter level (Charalambous & Ioannou, 2019) and have become increasingly relevant for right-wing populist parties since the 2008 financial crisis (Ibsen, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021). Immigration has long been identified by research as a critical issue for populist radical right parties, and it is typically associated with authoritarian views of society (Mudde, 2007).
While sharing similar populist attitudes, populist voters diverge when it comes to the host ideologies to which their populism is attached (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Populist radical right voters are primarily concerned with cultural issues of immigration and law and order and show stronger nativist and authoritarian attitudes. Voters on the populist radical left tend to embrace more egalitarian and universalistic values while often supporting a libertarian agenda on social issues. Finally, centrist populist voters exhibit strong anti-establishment attitudes and are primarily characterized by protest voting but do not generally show the nationalist attitudes found in right-wing populism (Ivaldi, 2020; 2021). Such parties in CEE often take an anticorruption stance, making this the focus of their electoral appeal (Haughton, Neudorfer & Zankina, 2024).
As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) demonstrated, the effect of these different sets of long-term, structural determinants is also conditioned by short-term political discontent, most notably when populist parties are in opposition. Such short-term factors are particularly relevant to studying populism in European elections. EP elections are generally considered ‘second-order elections’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). That is, citizens give more weight to national elections than European ones on a range of different variables: political trust, interest in politics, attachment and complexity of politics. In European elections: (a) voters tend to trust national institutions instead of European ones; (b) they have a stronger connection to their own nation rather than the EU, and; (c) they think that European politics is too difficult to grasp and that domestic issues are more compelling than European ones (Braun, 2021).
Looking at party-level data from all European elections between 1979 and 2019, Ehin and Talving (2021) find that the second-order election model continues to wield significant explanatory power, with lower participation rates in EP elections compared with first-order national elections and incumbency being associated with electoral losses in most EP election years.
Because of the increasing politicization of European integration, however, the viability of the second-order election model has been called into question, reflecting the growing salience and resonance of EU-related issues in mass politics and party competition (Hutter et al., 2016). The recent analysis of EU issue voting in the 2019 EP election by Goldberg et al. (2024) concludes that such issues matter for all EP political groups under scrutiny (both mainstream and more radical), which speaks against the idea of conditional mobilization by Eurosceptic parties.
Moreover, while Ehin and Talving (2021) see the ‘second-order type as constituting a base for a fragmented parliament with a strong representation of populist and extremist parties, other studies, such as Wondreys (2023), find only limited evidence for a boost in electoral support for extreme parties in European elections. This finding is particularly salient when considering the size of those parties and their changing role and status in European party systems. As Wondreys (2023: 7) argues: ‘[G]iven the overall increase in size, the role of many extreme parties in their respective party systems may have changed…. Voters already vote for these parties in [first-order elections], and thus have fewer incentives to subsequently vote for them in [second-order elections] as well.’
At the same time, several European countries held elections at multiple levels concurrently from 7–9 June 2024. These included Belgium, which held federal elections alongside European Parliament elections; Bulgaria, which held another early national parliamentary election on the same date as the EP one; and several countries that held local elections alongside the European ones (i.e., Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania). In these cases, we can expect to see European issues merge, rendered secondary or disappear altogether as domestic issues take precedence.
Looking back at the 2019 EP elections
The 2019 EP elections took place in the wake of the migration crisis shaped by an unprecedented refugee flow to European countries, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, which peaked in 2014–2016. The crisis fed into the populist parties’ Eurosceptic, nativist and nationalist narratives, which were even embraced by mainstream parties (Mudde 2019; Capozzi et al., 2023; Rodi et al., 2023). With the associated cultural sensitivities and economic, social and demographic concerns, European public interest has always been high in the political discourses on migration. In this sense, how the EU managed the refugee influx stood at the heart of discussions between 2015 and 2019. In parallel with Eurosceptic and populist concerns around European integration and migration, the economic agenda remained prominent during the 2019 EP election (Braun & Schafer, 2022). Finally, Brexit remained an important issue, serving as a benchmark of evaluation for citizens to reflect on the benefits of European membership to their own countries (Hobolt et al., 2022). In this regard, debates on the legitimacy of supranational governance, as heightened in the framework of sovereignty, were the most exploited narrative by populists against the EU (Ruzza and Pejovic 2019).
However, the predicted surge in support for populism did not fully materialize in the 2019 EP elections (Ivaldi, 2020). Despite a slowdown of economic activity, the economic context was somewhat less favourable to populist mobilization, as unemployment and inflation remained relatively low across much of Europe. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU migration crisis that had fuelled support for right-wing nationalist populists seemed to wane: economic issues dominated the 2019 European election agenda, together with climate change and promoting human rights and democracy, while immigration ranked fifth (European Parliament, 2019).
Moreover, in a context of high political uncertainty, polls showed more substantial support for the EU across member states. In the Spring 2019 Eurobarometer survey, 61% of EU citizens said that EU membership was good for their country, a figure at its highest since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Eurobarometer, 2019). Meanwhile, interest in the election was much higher than in 2014, and voter turnout increased in 20 of the then-28 EU member states, most substantially in countries such as Poland (+22 percentage points), Romania (+19), Spain (+17), Austria (+15), and Hungary (+14).
In the 2019 elections, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their majority for the first time since 1979, securing 182 and 154 seats, respectively. A significant number of voters dissatisfied with Europe’s ruling grand coalition turned to the Greens and Liberals. The Greens won a total of 74 seats, making significant gains in Western European countries such as Germany, France, Ireland and the UK. Pro-EU liberals secured 108 seats, which made Renew Europe the third largest group in the European Parliament.
Meanwhile, populist parties rose to a total of 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament at the time, as opposed to 211 seats (28%) five years earlier. However, the election showed mixed performances for populist party families across EU member states.
The outcome essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist right: together, these parties won 168 seats in 2019 – their best result ever – compared with 131 seats five years earlier. Support for right-wing populist parties significantly rose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Sweden and Belgium and they dominated the polls in countries such as France, Italy and the UK. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega was the big election winner, with 34.3% of the vote compared with only 6.2% in 2014. The National Rally (RN, formerly Front National) topped the polls in France with 23.3% of the vote. In the UK, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party made an impressive breakthrough with 30.5% of the vote, taking over as the main Eurosceptic outfit, a role formerly held by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).
In Eastern Europe, ruling conservative parties consolidated electorally: in Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) won 45.4% of the vote, increasing its previous support by 13.6%; in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz dominated the polls with no less than 52.6%. Smaller, extreme right-wing parties also made gains in Greece and Slovakia. In Greece, Golden Dawn retained two of its previous four seats. In Slovakia, the neo-nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), headed by Marian Kotleba, won 12.2% of the vote and two seats. In Cyprus, the National Popular Front (ELAM) increased its support to 8.3% (+5.6 percentage points) but failed to secure one of the island’s six seats in the European Parliament.
In contrast, there was a significant drop in support for the populist left, from 43 seats in 2014 to 37 in the 2019 election. Left-wing populist parties had made substantial gains in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, particularly in countries such as Greece and Spain, hit hardest by austerity policies (see Kriesi & Pappas, 2015: 23). In the 2014 elections, the populist radical left surged in Greece, Spain and Ireland and such parties made significant inroads in Portugal, Italy and France (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). In 2019, against the backdrop of a timid economic recovery and lower unemployment, these parties lost ground across most EU member states, most notably in countries like Greece, Spain and France. In Eastern and Central Europe, the populist left remained relatively marginal electorally.
Finally, in 2019, centrist populist parties secured 32 of their previous 33 seats. Centrist populists lost momentum in countries of the former Communist bloc, such as Latvia, where Who Owns the State? (KPV) collapsed to less than 1% of the vote, as opposed to their 14.3% showing in the 2018 national elections. In Estonia, the Estonian Centre Party (EK) fell by 8.6%. In the Czech Republic, the governing ANO and its highly controversial leader, Andrej Babiš, took just 21.2% of the vote, down 8.4 percentage points from its previous result. In Bulgaria, electoral support for the ruling GERB fell by 2 percentage points, although Boïko Borissov’s party remained the most potent force in Bulgarian politics with 30.9% of the European election vote. Centrist populist parties also performed badly in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Croatia. In Western Europe, the Five Star Movement (M5S) was the biggest loser of the 2019 Italian EP election, losing 15.6% compared to the 2018 national election.
With a specific reference to Euroscepticism, the 2019 elections were a real success. In almost all member states, except Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Romania, anti-EU movements won seats. The 2019 elections formed a parliament where more than 28% of MEPs belonged to populist or Eurosceptic parties (Treib, 2021: 177).
The context of the 2024 EP elections
The 2024 EP elections were held in a context characterized by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about the EU’s handling of migration and refugee issues, the deteriorating economic situation and inflation crisis in member countries, security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the newly erupted Israeli–Hamas war in the Middle East.
The EU faced unprecedented challenges due to the COVID-19 crisis and is still dealing with its economic and social consequences. It adopted a €750 billion recovery fund called NextGenerationEU to support member states’ recovery efforts. However, the implementation of this fund was delayed by political disputes and legal challenges, potentially fuelling political discontent – an issue that also carried onto the 2024 EP elections.
Concerning migration and asylum policy reform, the EU has been struggling to find a common approach to address the influx of migrants and asylum seekers, especially from Africa and the Middle East. The current system, based on the Dublin Regulation, has been criticized for putting too much pressure on the frontline states, such as Greece, Italy and Spain and for failing to ensure solidarity and responsibility-sharing among member states. To address this, the European Commission proposed a new pact on migration and asylum to create a more balanced and comprehensive framework for managing migration flows (European Commission, 2024). The proposal took a long time to go through the necessary legislative process due to the opposition from some member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Austria, who rejected mandatory relocation quotas and favoured stricter border controls.
Challenges were not limited to domestic issues; the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a litmus test for the common foreign and security policy of the Union. The EU was confronted with a deteriorating security situation in Eastern Europe as Russia intensified its military aggression against Ukraine and threatened to cut off gas supplies to Europe. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia, but disagreement elicited among the member states on the extent of support and related issues like grain imports from Ukraine. The ECPS report on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on populism in Europe concluded that populist radical right parties exploited the war as an opportunity to voice their anti-EU rhetoric with sovereigntist arguments. In this vein, their common stance towards the sanctions had been hesitancy and scepticism, illustrating them as not really in line with economic and security-related national interests (Ivaldi & Zankina, 2023).
Furthermore, the recent terrorist attack of Hamas on Israel and the subsequent outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war bore high risks not only for the Middle East but also for other parts of the world, including Europe. Considering the heavy historical and political baggage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict held, it seemed like a convenient topic to be exploited by populist parties ahead of the elections. Instances such as the terrorist attack in Brussels, in which two Swedish citizens were killed in the days after the start of the war, provided room for populists’ rhetoric in the form of xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-migration.
However, this ‘polycrisis’ was expected to play out differently in each country. The survey by Krastev and Leonard (2024a), which was conducted in September and October 2023 in 11 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), suggests that the crises of the economy, security, health, climate and migration, have created distinct political responses and opinions across Europe. While immigration was the key issue in Germany, France and Denmark, people in other European countries identified climate change as the most important crisis. Italians and Portuguese, in turn, pointed to global economic turmoil, while in Spain, Great Britain and Romania, the COVID-19 pandemic was the principal issue. Estonians, Poles and Danes considered the war in Ukraine to be the most serious of crises.
In such context, the 2024 European elections represented a crucial test for both the EU and national governments, as voters would evaluate their handling of the pandemic and the recovery and how they planned to address the long-term challenges of climate change, digital transformation, and social cohesion (Bassot, 2023).
However, public opinion data showed relatively positive views toward the Union among EU citizens. Trust in the EU has increased by 6 percentage points since 2019 and now stands at 49%. The perception of the situation of the European economy has improved since autumn 2023, with 47% of respondents rating it as ‘good’, the highest level since 2019. Nearly two-thirds (62%) also said they were optimistic about the future of the EU, which is a slight increase (+4 percentage points) compared to five years earlier. Feelings of being ‘citizens of the EU’ dominated for 74% of the respondents, the highest level in over two decades. Meanwhile, a majority of respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (58%) and in the EU (57%) (Eurobarometer, 2024).
An anticipated rise in support for right-wing populists across the EU
Populist parties have gained traction in recent years, reflecting a broader trend of rising populism across the continent. This surge in popularity has been particularly noticeable among right-leaning populist parties (Ivaldi & Torner, 2023). Such rise in support has been exemplified by the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) triumph in regional elections in eastern states of Germany, the remarkable success of Le Pen’s NR in the 2022 French elections, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI breakthrough in the 2022 Italian election, as well as by the performances of the Sweden Democrats and Finns Party in the last parliamentary elections, which all point to a further increase in the representation of right-wing populist parties in the next EP. In Italy, Meloni’s FdI and Salvini’s Lega, respectively part of the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) and Identity and Democracy (ID), were also seen as potentially decisive actors in the alliance formation of the next European Parliament (Massetti, 2023; Maślanka, 2023).
Elsewhere in Europe, right-wing populist parties have become established in countries like Portugal and Spain, and they have topped the polls in Austria and Belgium. In CEE, right-wing populism has been on the rise in Estonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz secured another term in government in the 2022 elections with a clear victory, putting the contested topics between the party and the EU, like the supremacy of the rule of law, immigration, the Russia–Ukraine War, on the agenda of the EP elections. Moreover, Fidezs’s suspension by the EPP and then its departure from this political group has led the party to search for new coalitions after the elections, with talks of joining the ECR group. In Poland, the October 2023 national elections resulted in the opposition parties’ coalition winning over the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) and the new government of pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While such an outcome will undoubtedly improve relations between Poland and the EU, PiS has maintained its support at around 30% of the vote, together with Confederation, a heterogeneous extremist group at about 10% of the vote.
Analysts predicted ‘a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats’ (Krastev & Leonard, 2024b). Anti-European populists were expected ‘to top the polls in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) and come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden)’ (Ibid.)
The European Parliament and party groups
While reflecting the existing balance of strength across national contexts, populist party performances at the EU level may significantly impact the configuration of party groups within the EP, which is a key legislative body of the EU, working alongside the Council of the European Union to adopt European legislation following proposals by the European Commission. The EP comprises 705 members (MEPs) – 720 in the new EP – making it the second-largest democratic electorate in the world. These MEPs are elected every five years by the citizens of the EU through universal suffrage.
The structure and operation of the EP are governed by its Rules of Procedure, and the political bodies, committees, delegations and political groups guide EP activities. The representation of citizens is ‘degressively proportional’, with a minimum threshold of six members per member state and no member state having more than 96 seats. Degressive proportionality means that while seats are allocated based on the population of the member states, more populous member states agree to be under-represented to favour greater representation of less populated ones.
Political groups within the EP can be formed around a single European political party or can include more than one European party as well as national parties and independents. Prior to the 2024 EP elections, the existing political groups in the EP were the EPP, the Progressive Alliance of S&D, Renew Europe (previously ALDE), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), ECR, The Left in the EP (GUE/NGL), and ID.
The outgoing EP was home to both left-wing and right-wing populist parties, that is, while Brothers of Italy (FdI), Vox of Spain, Sweden Democrats, Fidesz of Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) of Poland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), the AfD, the National Rally of France, stood on the right side of the spectrum, Podemos of Spain and SYRIZA of Greece represented left-wing populism in the 2019–2024 EP. Regarding political group membership, right-wing populist parties tend to choose different political groups, preventing them from having a common voice in the EP. After the 2019 elections, however, their seeking of collaboration has become more evident, especially under the umbrella of ID and ECR.
Questions addressed in the report
Under the auspices of the European Center for Populism Studies(ECPS), this report examines the electoral performances and impacts of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Based on a compilation of country-specific analyses by local experts, the report looks at populist party performances across all EU member states, and it discusses the challenges of populist politics for European institutions as well as for the future of Europe.
Each chapter provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump : le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
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Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Conclusion.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism.(eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0087
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics.
This report has examined the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. The collection of country chapters provides a unique source of information to understand the electoral dynamics of populist parties across Europe, highlighting similarities and differences in the economic, social and political context of the European elections in the 27 EU member states. Here, we summarize the main findings from the individual chapters and provide some general conclusions.
The diversity of the European populist scene
The individual country chapters illustrate the diversity of populism in Europe and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The findings in this report corroborate the vast literature on populism, which has long identified the plurality of articulations between the ‘thin’ ideology of populism and the ‘thicker’ host ideologies to which it attaches itself. As suggested in the individual chapters, in Western Europe, populism is essentially found to the left and right of the spectrum, while in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we see a more diverse array of populist actors.
Some individual countries provide a good illustration of such diversity. The Netherlands has long been a breeding ground for populism. Over the years, there has been a succession of populist parties, ranging from right-wing nativist and left-wing populist to agrarian populist. Similarly, Spain has experienced both left and right-wing populism with Podemos and Vox. In Belgium, there are two cases of populist radical parties to the left (PTB–PVDA) and right (VB) of the ideological spectrum. Italy has been described as nothing less than a ‘populist paradise’, hosting a wide range of populist parties. Such diversity is also found in countries like France and, more recently, Germany, with the rise of the BSW to the left of the party spectrum. While in Greece, left–populist parties have been dominant with Syriza and KKE, the populist radical right has long been present with parties such as Golden Dawn and, most recently, with EL and the Democratic Patriotic Movement or ‘Niki’.
There is even more diversity when looking at the populist scene in Central and Eastern Europe. Populists in the centre dominated the elections in Bulgaria, with GERB gaining over 24% of the vote, and in the Czech Republic, with ANO securing 26%. The centrist Prodalzhavame promyanata (PP) and ITN in Bulgaria also registered strong results, with 14% and 6% of the vote, respectively. In Slovakia, it was the left populists of SMER who carried the day, securing 25% of all votes cast. The radical right fared well in all three countries, with Vazrazhdane gaining over 14% in Bulgaria, Hnutie Republika attracting 13% in Slovakia, and Přísaha a Motoristé registering over 10% of the vote in the Czech Republic.
Diversity is also found in the interpretation of populism by populist parties. While populism is still seen as a core feature of the populist right across most cases, there seems to have been a shift away from populist narratives and themes in some parties of the populist left, such as Podemos in Spain, the SP in the Netherlands, and the SF in Denmark. In Spain, for instance, there has been a decline in the use of populist ideas by Podemos, which has turned more clearly to radical-left ones. Moreover, there seems to be less consensus about the populist nature of radical-left parties, as illustrated by Die Linke in Germany, the Left Wing Alliance (VAS) in Finland, the Left Party in Sweden, and the Left Bloc (BE) in Portugal, which may also signal a move away from populism towards a more classic radical-left agenda. The Bulgarian GERB has also significantly moved away from populist narratives, focusing primarily on pro-EU rhetoric. While the Romanian AUR remains Eurosceptic, it has been focusing on specific issues rather than on criticizing the European project itself.
Together with their different locations on the party spectrum, populist parties also diverge in their issue positions. As the country chapters show, this is particularly true of the populist right where substantial differences are found, for instance, in terms of those parties’ economic policies.
In a context marked by rising prices and the inflation crisis, right-wing populist parties have adopted a wide array of economic positions, reflecting diverging economic strategies and the adaptation by populist parties to different contextual opportunities. In France, for example, the RN has significantly moved to the economic left, advocating redistributive policies. In Denmark, the DF combines welfare-chauvinist positions with a good portion of nostalgia. In the Netherlands, the PVV takes a protectionist and welfare-chauvinist position aimed at voters with lower incomes who are most hit by high energy prices. In Cyprus, ELAM supports left-wing economic policies aimed at wealth redistribution and increased state intervention in market regulation. In Estonia, EKRE focuses on economic welfare and regional disparities, as does the EL in Greece, although it combines welfare chauvinism and government interventions with calls for low taxation. Welfare chauvinism and socialist nostalgia have been the trademarks of radical-right populist parties in Bulgaria, but they have also been explored by left populists such as SMER in Slovakia.
In contrast, other right-wing populist parties are found on the economic right. The Dutch FvD, for instance, is more free-market-oriented than the PVV and most other populist radical-right parties in Europe. In Finland, the Finns Party has recently turned to the right on the economy. In Luxembourg, the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR) exhibits a national-conservative profile and generally maintains a distrust of big government. In Greece, Niki is more free market and low taxation than EL. In Romania, AUR has increasingly introduced neoconservative elements.
Finally, the analysis in this report shows that populist parties differ widely with regard to their political status within their respective political systems. Parties such as the French RN and German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are still political pariahs. In Germany, the AfD remains deeply unpopular, and the party has faced strong criticism for its many controversial statements and positions regarding immigration, Islam and the Second World War. In France, despite Marine Le Pen’s de-demonization strategy, the persistence of the RN’s profile as a political pariah was exposed in the 2024 legislative elections where the traditional Republican Front – that is, ad hoc alliances of parties or voters (or both) across the spectrum whenever the RN is likely to win a decisive round – was revitalized. In contrast, Mélenchon’s populist left LFI has managed to establish itself as a coalition partner to the rest of the left. Another case of a cordon sanitaire around the populist radical right is that of Belgium, where leaders of the N-VA continue to close the door to the Vlaams Belang. In Central and Eastern Europe, extreme parties such as Revival in Bulgaria, AUR in Romania or Hnutie Republika in Slovakia are still kept outside mainstream politics despite growing electoral support.
Elsewhere, however, the current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. Such dual process has been well documented in the recent populism literature (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn, 2016; Herman and Muldoon, 2019; Mondon and Winter, 2020; Mudde, 2019) and the country chapters in this report corroborate both the centripetal move by a number of populist parties from the margins to the centre of national politics and the accommodation of populism by mainstream actors.
Populist accommodation by parties of the mainstream is traditionally found in countries such as Italy and Austria. In CEE, such cooperation has been found in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria during the 2017–2019 government. This has more recently been the case, for instance, in the Netherlands, where the change in VVD party leadership has produced a change of strategy towards the PVV, with the new VVD party leader Dilan Yeşilgöz openly suggesting that her party would no longer exclude a government with Wilders. In Sweden, the cordon sanitaire was breached before the 2022 parliamentary election when three of the centre-right parties expressed a more open stance towards the Sweden Democrats. In Cyprus, despite its radical positions and extreme right-wing roots, ELAM has managed to integrate into the political mainstream, collaborating with other parties on specific issues in the House of Representatives since 2016.
Populists against Europe? The strategic moderation of populist Euroscepticism
The modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration. The country chapters illustrate such a dampening of Eurosceptic politics, both left and right of the populist spectrum. In many cases, the analysis shows that populist parties have recently abandoned their previous hard Eurosceptic plans to exit the Euro or the EU, often adopting ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration and a softer tone vis-à-vis the EU. As discussed in the introduction of this report, this represents a strategic move by populists to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
In France, the RN has abandoned its previous policy of “Frexit”, while de-emphasizing European issues to increase its appeal to moderate voters. Like the RN, LFI has toned down its Euroscepticism in recent years, moving away from its previous call to leave the EU and that France should disobey the European treaties. In Sweden, the SD have moderated their Euroscepticism and dropped their demand for a referendum on EU withdrawal. Such a move has also been visible in the Netherlands, where Wilders has successfully presented himself as a more moderate candidate, no longer calling for a Nexit but promising to reform the EU from within. In Portugal, Chega has articulated some soft Euroscepticism in its European election manifesto. In Italy, Fratelli d’Italia advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the European Union. A similar dampening of Eurosceptic policies and themes has been found in the Lega and M5S since 2018. In Finland, the Finns Party has abandoned its long-term goal of withdrawing from the EU. A stronger support for the EU is found in Luxembourg, where the ADR explicitly acknowledges the great advances the EU had given to Europe in terms of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe while praising the positive benefits the EU and immigration have brought to the country. In Greece, the left-populist Syriza put forward a version of soft Euroscepticism, criticizing the EU’s democratic deficit. The right-wing populist EL has been advocating for a Europe made of nation-states, but it has not been openly calling for Grexit, and neither has the other new right-wing populist party, Niki. The FPÖ clearly stated that it would not aim for an ‘Öxit’, although it called for cuts in the EU budget and institutions and a Union based on subsidiarity and federalism.
In Western Europe, the German AfD stands out for its hard Eurosceptic positions. The most radical faction has dominated the AfD since 2017. In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the party initially called for the dissolution of the European Union in its manifesto but dropped this demand from the final manifesto after facing public backlash. The Dutch FvD similarly favours Nexit. In Greece, the communist KKE has similarly maintained a hard Eurosceptic stance (as well as an anti-NATO stance), supporting Greece’s exit from the EU and accusing it of being imperialistic, anti-democratic, capitalist and exploitative.
Populists in Central and Eastern Europe widely vary in their level of Euroscepticism. The Croatian right-populist DL, for example, exhibits a soft Eurosceptic orientation, framing the EU as a confederation of sovereign states and never advocating for closer relations with ‘alternative partners’ in global politics, such as Russia, China or the BRICS. The DL expresses a strong opinion against further EU enlargement due to Serbia’s candidacy status, while the Romanian AUR, on the contrary, advocates for EU memberships for Moldova. By contrast, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane urges for an immediate exit from NATO and the EU, while centrist populist parties in Bulgaria, such as GERB and PP, are ardently pro-European. Czech populists from the centre and the right expressed different levels of criticism towards the EU. ANO, which has been in opposition since 2021, gradually shifted from a mildly pro-European stance towards soft Euroscepticism. The SPD, on the other hand, has sustained its uncompromisingly anti-immigration and hard Eurosceptic rhetoric, describing the EU as a ‘dictatorship in Brussels’ dominated by ‘non-elected bureaucrats’ who produce ‘directives that are against the interests of our state and our people’. Euroscepticism is extremely limited in Estonia, where 77–78% of the population supports EU membership.
Similarly, in Latvia, voters tend to support sober, politically experienced personalities to represent Latvia’s national (rather than party) interests in the European Parliament, leaving little room for Eurosceptic rhetoric. In Romania, AUR has softened its Euroscepticism, while the new SOS prides itself in being the first to advocate for a ‘Ro-exit’. In Slovakia, the ruling SMER claims to support EU membership despite its many shortcomings, while ĽSNS argues that the EU cannot be reformed. Consequently, its party leader promised to ‘lay the groundwork for Slovakia’s exit from the European Union and break the EU from within.’
Populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions, emphasizing an intergovernmental vision of a community of sovereign and independent states, now claiming to reform the EU ‘from within’ while opposing further enlargement of the EU. As the country chapters in this report show, right-wing populist parties across Europe continue to vilify a ‘bureaucratic EU’. ‘Taking back control’ from Brussels has become a common theme of right-wing populist narratives. In Belgium, the VB has been using the ‘taking back control’ tagline while denouncing EU leaders as ‘extremists’, bureaucrats and technocrats. In the Netherlands, the PVV’s European electoral program emphasized the need to reform the EU from within rather than to leave the Union. In Italy, while cooperating with the EU, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI continues to engage in ideological struggles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality and EU constitutional matters. The Danish DF claims the EU needs to be strongly downsized to safeguard national sovereignty, a similar claim to that of the Denmark Democrats, which ask for ‘less EU’ and more national sovereignty.
Were the 2024 EP elections another ‘populist’ moment?
Rather than showing a new wave of populism, the results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2019, taking all groups together, populist parties had won 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36% (see Figure 1, Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. Based on the delineation of populism in the country chapters, no less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament. In June 2024, the largest contingents of populist MEPs came mainly from the populist right in the more populated European countries, in particular from France’s Rassemblement National (30 seats), Fratelli d’Italia (24 seats), the Polish PiS (20 seats), the German AfD (15 seats) and Hungary’s Fidesz (11 seats). In the populist left, the largest contingent came from France’s LFI (9 seats). For centrist populist parties, the largest delegations were elected in Italy with the M5S (8 seats) and in the Czech Republic, where ANO received seven seats.
Asymmetrical populist performances
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe.
The populist right has established its presence in virtually all EU member states – there are no fewer than 50 such parties in Europe. Right-wing populist parties have done particularly well in countries such as France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Netherlands; in many countries, the populist right-wing scene is made up of two, three and sometimes more parties.
There has also been a diversification of the populist right with the emergence of new actors. Alongside the major established players, new parties have emerged, including the Danish Democrats (DD), Latvia First (LPV), Chega in Portugal, the EL and Niki in Greece, the AUR and SOS in Romania, and the Czech Přísaha and PRO. In Lithuania, a populist radical-right politician and his party TSS made a breakthrough, gaining a seat in the EP for the first time.
Other movements have disappeared or been replaced by new populist parties. This is particularly true in Central and Eastern Europe, where party systems traditionally remain more fluid. The Bulgarian Ataka, long represented in the national assembly and the European Parliament, has all but disappeared since 2021, only to be replaced by Vazrazhdane. Golden Dawn, which came third in the 2015 elections in Greece, practically disappeared by 2019 when it failed to enter the national parliament. Its leadership was subsequently imprisoned following a prolonged trial on charges of running a criminal organization. Although the party disappeared, its ideology and electorate were easily picked up by EL, which has been represented since 2019 both in the national and in the European parliaments. Interestingly, small extreme right-wing-wing anti-immigration parties (i.e., the Irish Freedom Party, National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People) have surfaced in a country like Ireland, which has traditionally been more immune to far-right populism in the past, suggesting that the immigration issue has acquired more resonance in Irish politics in recent years.
Altogether, parties of the populist right won 177 seats, making up about a quarter (24%) of all 720 seats in the new European Parliament, an increase on their previous performances in 2019 –168 seats out of 751, that is about 22% (see Figure 1). Amongst the biggest winners were the French RN, the Italian Fratelli d’Italia, the FPÖ in Austria, the VB in Flanders, the Slovenian Democratic Party, the AUR in Romania and the National Alliance in Latvia, which all saw a significant rise in electoral support in the 2024 European elections. Let us also note that the 2024 elections have seen the rise of extreme right-wing nationalist parties across a number of EU member states, as illustrated by the electoral success of Vazrazhdane in Bulgaria, the Confederation in Poland, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, ELAM in Cyprus, and Domovinski Pokret (DP) in Croatia. Altogether, parties that may be classified as ‘extreme right-wing’ won 15 seats in the European Parliament, significantly increasing their presence since the 2019 elections, where the extreme right-wing had received only 4 seats.
Such a wave of support for right-wing populists has been far from uniform, however, as a number of those parties have suffered losses across Europe. In Portugal, Chega lost nearly 783.000 votes from its general election tally, down to 9.8% of the vote. In Spain, while clearly improving its results from the 2019 EP elections, Vox lost significant support when compared with the 2023 general elections. In Sweden, the SD fell far behind the result of the 2022 parliamentary election. Fidesz in Hungary lost 2 seats despite winning the elections, facing a serious challenge by the new opposition party Tisza. Although PiS and Konfederacija collectively attracted almost half of the votes, PiS lost 9 seats in the EP – the biggest reversal in support in its history.
Compared with their right-wing counterparts, the parties of the populist left have been comparatively less successful, although they have somewhat improved their performance from five years ago. As Figure 1 shows, the populist left won a total of 46 seats in the new European Parliament in June, which represented just over 6% of all 720 seats. This result compared with 37 seats (about 5%) in the previous Parliament. As was the case for the populist right, left-wing populist party performances varied substantially across countries.
In countries such as Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain, there was a drop in support for the populist left, reflecting the more general decline in support for those parties since the 2008 financial crisis. In Ireland, Sinn Féin suffered significant losses, seeing much of his previous support going to independent or small-party candidates. In the Netherlands, the SP received a mere 2.2% of the vote, showing a decline since its success in 2014 when it had obtained almost 10% of the vote. The Spanish Podemos only received 3.3% of the vote, compared with 20% in 2016 –in alliance with Izquierda Unida (IU) at the time. In the case of Podemos, such decline reflected a variety of factors, including government participation and the recovery of macroeconomic indicators. In Greece, Syriza lost about 3 percentage points on its score in the June 2023 general election, down to 14.9% of the vote, although EKK maintained its 2 MEP seats, as well as representation in the national parliament.
In countries like Belgium and France, there were mixed performances for the populist left. The progress of the Belgian PTB–PVDA was asymmetrical, with the party making more significant gains on the Dutch-speaking side, almost doubling its score. In France, Mélenchon’s left-wing populist LFI won 9.9% of the vote, which represented a gain of 3.6 percentage points on its previous result in the 2019 EP elections, yet far lower than Mélenchon’s performance at 22% in the 2022 presidential election.
Support for the populist left rose, on the other hand, in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland. The Danish Red-Green Alliance won 7% of the vote (+2 percentage points compared to the legislative elections of November 2022). In Finland, the biggest surprise came from the Left Alliance (VAS), which came in second with 17.3% of the vote and three seats as opposed to one in the previous parliament. In Slovakia, SMER managed to regain political control in the 2023 national elections and increase its representation in the European Parliament from 3 to 5 seats – a major comeback for Robert Fico, who survived an assassination attempt just a month before the EP elections.
Finally, the 2024 European elections have confirmed centrist populism as a relatively marginal political phenomenon, essentially concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe. In June 2024, only 26 seats were won by centrist populist parties, making up just under 4% of all seats in the new European Parliament, which was very close to those parties’ performances five years ago (32 seats representing just over 4%).
While well-established centrist populist parties such as ANO in the Czech Republic and GERB in Bulgaria managed to secure their electoral support from the previous national elections, winning 7 and 5 seats, respectively, other centrist populist parties performed less well. In Bulgaria, PP lost heavily on their previous performance in the April 2023 elections and secured only two seats in the new European Parliament. This was also the case with the Darbo Partija in Lithuania, which lost most of its support from the last general election and failed to capture a single seat in the EP. Other parties’ results oscillated, such as for ‘There is Such a People’ in Bulgaria, which won the July 2021 early national elections, disappeared from the national parliament in the early national elections in 2022 and reappeared in 2023, gaining a single sear in the EP at the 2024 elections. New centrist populist parties, such as the Czech Přísaha, managed to surpass the threshold, sending one MEP to Brussels. Others, such as Stabilitātei! in Latvia and OL’aNO and SaS in Slovakia, failed to pass the threshold at the European Parliament elections despite gaining representation in the national parliaments in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In Italy, the results of the 2024 elections have attested to the continuing electoral decline of the M5S. The party received 10% of the vote and eight seats, significantly losing ground from its previous performances in the 2019 European (17.1% of the vote cast) and 2022 general elections (15.4%).
A regional divide?
As mentioned earlier, the distribution of populism across Europe shows a regional divide (see Table 1). In the 2024 European elections, left-wing populism was primarily found in Western Europe, where 13 of those parties were in competition, as opposed to only 2 in Eastern and Central Europe (i.e., SMER in Slovakia and Levica in Slovenia). Conversely, centrist populism was essentially located in CEE countries, which had nine of those parties, as opposed to only two in Western Europe (i.e., the M5S in Italy and the BBB in the Netherlands). Populist radical-right parties were in the majority, and they were predominantly found in Western European countries (21 as opposed to 12 in CEE). Finally, the regional distribution of populism shows the rise of extreme right-wing parties in countries of the former Soviet Union, with no less than 11 of those parties competing in the 2024 European elections, as opposed to only one (ELAM in Cyprus) in the western part of the EU.
Table 1. Number of parties by populist family across Western and Eastern Europe
Countries
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Total
Eastern
11
2
9
4
12
11
38
Western
15
13
2
2
21
1
39
26
15
11
6
33
12
77
Source:Compiled by the authors based on Rooduijn et al. (2023) and 2024 EP election data.
Such an uneven distribution of populism makes it difficult to accurately evaluate regional differences in populist party electoral support across Western and Central and Eastern Europe. As the country chapters clearly illustrate, there was a significant amount of variation in the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections, both across and within regions. Moreover, no less than 27 populist parties were new parties that had not run in the 2019 European elections, thus rendering the analysis of change in populist party support even more difficult.
Table 2. Average electoral support by populist party family across Western and Eastern Europe
Average % of vote 2024 European elections and change from most recent national election
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Eastern
29.5*
9.36
1.21
14.61
5.65
Change
(+1.1)
(–3.3)
(+0.9)
(+1.4)
(+1.8)
Western
7.28
7.69*
10.67*
11.63
11.19*
Change
(–0.2)
(–2.4)
(+2.0)
(+0.9)
(+4.4)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on 2024 EP election data.
* These results should be interpreted with caution due to the small number of parties (n ≤ 2).
Table 2 shows the mean electoral support for populist parties in the 2024 European elections and the change from the most recent general election. The data are broken down by region and populist party family. Because of such heterogeneity, the data in Table 2 should be taken with caution. These data confirm, however, that centrist and left-wing populist parties have lost ground on average in the 2024 European elections compared with their performances in the last general election in their respective country and that such decline was visible in both Eastern and Western European countries. On average, the populist radical right has made progress across both regions: +1.4 percentage points in CEE countries and +0.9 percentage points in Western Europe, again bearing in mind that there was substantial variation in party performances within each region. Finally, the data show that extreme right-wing ultra-nationalist movements have made gains in Eastern Europe, winning an additional 1.8 percentage points on average on their previous performance in the last general election.
Overall, with all limitations in mind, the data do not show a clear regional divide in terms of populist party performances in the 2024 European elections but rather point to the diversity of populist manifestations and variation of their electoral performances within each region. At the country level, the German case illustrates a more striking regional pattern as all three populist parties were much more successful in the eastern states, reflecting the multi-faceted legacy of the GDR and the political impact of the shock and aftermath of the transformation in the 1990s.
Diverse drivers of populism in the EP elections 2024
Across Europe, the popularity of populist movements is rooted in the ‘polycrisis’ to which EU citizens have been exposed since 2008 – the financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and now the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Fidesz’s electoral slogan, ‘No migration, no gender, no war!’ succinctly captures the division lines not only between populists and non-populists but also among populists from the left, the centre, and the right and even within those subcategories. In Austria, the polycrisis amalgam was perfectly summed up by the FPÖ’s slogan in the run-up to the vote: ‘Stop European chaos, the asylum crisis, climate terror, warmongering and Corona chaos’. In Italy, the multiple crises have led to increased opposition to the EU. In France, since 2012, support for the RN has been fuelled by feelings of economic alienation mediated by cultural concerns over immigration and strong anti-elite sentiments.
However, this polycrisis has played out differently in each country. Belgium illustrates such differences: the political debate in Flanders saw more focus on migration, law and order and public finances, whereas, in French-speaking Belgium, the focus was more on energy, civil rights and work. Immigration issues have become more salient in countries such as Cyprus, which is the first country in the EU to move to per capita applications for asylum. This has led to Euroscepticism and discontent in relation to the EU’s management of immigration. In contrast, in Sweden, immigration was less significant than it had been in both the previous European election and the Riksdag election of 2022. In Greece, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis, with populists both from the right and the left cashing in on economic decline and regional disparities. In Austria, the FPÖ focused on migration, the war in Ukraine, climate change and, notably, the COVID-19 pandemic. Amongst those four, migration was the most important issue in the campaign. In Latvia, populist parties campaigned around the war in Ukraine, the Green Deal and its economic impact, and the defence of traditional family and Christian values, opposing progressive, liberal ideals in Brussels, including LGBTQ+ rights. Opposition to LGBTQ+ rights was typical for most of the radical-right populists, including in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. LGBTQ+ rights were countered with arguments on religion and traditional family values, including criticisms of political correctness and limiting the freedom of speech. By contrast, some left–populist outfits (such as the Greek KKE) have been defenders of LGBTQ+ rights and socially progressive in general.
Economic uncertainty as a common driver of populism
Beyond such variation, the economic context has heavily weighed on public opinion and has fuelled frustration and anger around the rising cost of living in many countries. Economic fears clearly dominated the campaign in France, creating a propitious context for populist politics across the board. The Denmark Democrats have made significant inroads in rural areas where voters feel neglected and left behind. In Germany, the AfD continued to push their core issues — first and foremost immigration, but also the economic impact of the war on Germany, climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. To the left, populist parties have also politicized the economic crisis. In Ireland, support for Sinn Féin rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist approach combined with a strong focus on economic issues. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned strongly on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters.
Luxembourg serves as a counterexample here. Public opinion data show that compared to the EU average, Luxembourgers were far more satisfied with their economic situation and the EU, and they felt much better off economically and also had much higher levels of trust in their national government and the EU. The fact that populists enjoyed more support in rural areas and among the less educated in the Czech Republic and Romania, among others, further indicates the importance of economic uncertainty as a driving factor.
Immigration and refugees
In many cases, the populist radical right has capitalized on insecurities linked to immigration and asylum seekers, which was a key issue in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary, Poland and France. Germany had accepted more than a million Ukrainian refugees after the 2022 attack, which brought the issue of immigration back onto the agenda in 2023 after its salience had been low for several years. In France, next to inflation, immigration emerged as the second most salient issue, followed by law and order. In Flanders, the immigration agenda has been particularly favourable to the populist radical parties such as the VB. Immigration represented a key focus for all right-wing populists (EL, FL, and Niki) in Greece. In Austria, The FPÖ rejected the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum and the mandatory distribution of asylum seekers across the EU, calling instead for a ‘Pact on Re-Migration’. In Italy, the populist governing coalition of FdI, Lega, and Forza Italia prides itself on the migration deal signed with Albania that aims to relocate immigrants arriving in Italy to Italian-operated refugee centres in Albania. The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, has further succeeded in pushing for EU-wide agreements with North African countries that envision limiting the flow of migrants in exchange for financial assistance.
Immigration issues were also prominent in Eastern and Central European countries. In the Czech Republic, populists from the centre and the right framed migration in security terms, rejecting the EU Pact on Migration, highlighting the so-called “no-go zones” where women are at risk and Islamic minorities have brought crime, terrorism and the domination of Sharia law. In Poland, migration has been a major focus of both PiS and Konfederacija. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has provided fertile ground for populist discourses. While the PiS government had initially embraced Ukrainian refugees, the prolonged war and the sheer number of refugees resulted in a backlash with time and fervent opposition against the EU’s Migration Pact, which was labelled the ‘Trojan horse of Europe’. The governing SMER party in Slovakia has similarly criticized the Pact on Migration and Asylum and opposed compulsory relocation schemes, proposing measures in the country of origin instead.
Such rising salience of immigration issues may account for the decline in support for left-wing populism. In Ireland, for example, the 2024 European Parliament elections came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to address such issues despite trying to change its discourse on the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on social services. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the inability of the SP to attract economically left-wing and welfare-chauvinist voters may be seen as a consequence of the party’s lack of commitment to an anti-immigrant stance. In Italy, similarly, M5S has lost support also due to its inability to address the migration problem.
Populist polarization over climate change and the green transition
There has also been a backlash against the European Green Deal, with populist radical-right parties attacking the environmental transition as being “punitive”. Right-wing populist parties’s scepticism about climate change and hostility to low-carbon energy policies has been well documented in the literature (Lockwood and Lockwood, 2022). The recent study by Forchtner and Lubarda (2023) suggests that right-wing populist parties generally claim that climate policies should not harm the economy and jobs and that such parties most effectively perform as defenders of the nation’s economic well-being.
In Flanders, the VB opposes further enlargement and positions itself against the interference of the EU in the national politics of illiberal democracies, as well as against EU policies in terms of climate and agriculture. In Luxembourg, the ADR party has prioritized the preservation of the combustion engine, more generally opposing green politics. The Finns Party has been the Eurosceptic party in Finnish EP elections, promoting an agenda opposed to the EU, immigration and climate change policies. In the Netherlands, the PVV vehemently called for opt-out possibilities for the Netherlands regarding asylum seekers and migration and relaxing obligations with respect to climate change, especially nitrogen. The Austrian FPÖ demands a stop to the European Green Deal, the EU Nature Restoration Law, and the scheduled ban on combustion engines. In Poland, the European Green Deal has been criticized both by PiS and Konfederacija as an ideological project of EU elites aimed against ordinary citizens. Both parties have highlighted the high prices of energy, transport and agriculture to ordinary Poles. The European Green Deal was similarly criticized by right-wing populists in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, to name a few.
In contrast, left-wing populist parties have been taking up environmental issues, and they have endorsed an agenda of green transition (Duina and Zhou 2024). Parties such as LFI in France and Podemos in Spain have placed environmental issues at the core of their political platform while blaming political and economic elites for the environmental crisis. In Italy, Movimento 5 Stelle’s electoral platform emphasizes anti-austerity measures, public healthcare defence, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek. SMER is a notable exception in the left–populist camp, as it has vehemently criticized the Green Dea, labelling it an “extreme environmental initiative” pushed through by “Eurocrats with no accountability” and rejecting the target of reducing emissions by 55% by 2030.
Such a populist divide over climate change is most visible in France, where radical right-wing populist parties such as the RN and Reconquête clearly oppose the European Green Deal and play with climate-sceptic themes to sway voters most affected by the economic cost of the green transition. In contrast, the left-wing populist LFI has adopted an eco-socialist and ambitious green transition agenda, championing the fight against climate change (Chazel and Dain, 2024). We see a similar divide in Italy: Lega’s platform focuses on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. In contrast, the M5S has put environmental protection and green transition policies at the core of its electoral platform. In Denmark, the left-wing populist SF has spearheaded the call to accelerate decarbonization efforts and implement policies to achieve concrete results quickly, given the urgency of the climate crisis. In contrast, the populist right-wing, led by the DF and the Denmark Democrats, opposed environmental regulations, which they believed would harm the competitiveness of Danish agricultural products in the European market.
In Germany, on the other hand, the government’s green transition policies are strongly opposed by populist parties across the board. These parties also sided with large-scale farmers’ protests against some cuts to agrarian subsidies that eventually forced a government U-turn. The AfD continued to push climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. Both AfD and BSW will likely vote against any policies related to the ‘green transformation.’
Finally, the ecological divide is found across other types of populism. In the Netherlands, for example, the BBB typically pits ordinary citizens and farmers against ‘oat milk cappuccino drinking’ city dwellers and unresponsive politicians from the major cities in the west of the country (the so-called Randstad). BBB’s core issues centre around support for farmers and opposition to radical climate policies. Similarly, in Romania, the SOS emphasized the protection of farmers and agriculture workers, criticizing EU product regulations, advocating for Romanians’ rights to continue using traditional energy sources like firewood and natural gas, and demanding the reopening of coal mines. In the Czech Republic, the European Green Deal has been rejected by both the ANO and the SPD. While ANO accused Brussels of committing ritual suicide, the SPD attacked the reduction of combustion engines by placing a former racing driver at the top of its electoral list.
Gaza and the Israel–Hamas war
The Israel–Hamas war and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have provoked diametrically opposed reactions among populists from across the political spectrum. The conflict has featured much more prominently in political discourse in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe, where the war in Ukraine has taken precedence.
France is a good illustration of such a divide. French lead candidates show deep splits over recognition of a Palestinian state. Left-leaning contenders, from the Communists to the social democrats, are clearly in favour of a ‘two-state solution’, while the French far right, in a break with the past, now supports Israel. Marine Le Pen and RN President Jordan Bardella joined pro-Israeli protests, blaming left-leaning forces for allegedly failing to condemn the 7 October attacks. The LFI, by contrast, has taken a pro-Palestinain position, calling for sanctions against the Israeli government, an embargo on the shipping of weaponry and artillery, an end to the 2000 EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. Mélenchon and members of LFI were accused of antisemitism for declining to condemn Hamas as a terrorist group.
Overall, voters of left-wing forces were more concerned about war in Palestine than Ukraine and were more likely to support the Palestinian cause. This concern was particularly visible among Podemos voters, as well as KKE supporters in Greece. Yet, some right-wing populists have also sided with Palestine and not with Israel, including the Belgian PTB–PVDA and the Irish PBP. Romanian SOS leader Șoșoacă has been accused of antisemitism for her controversial remarks. For instance, during a joint session of parliament dedicated to the Day of Solidarity and Friendship between Romania and Israel in May 2024, Șoșoacă complained that this day should serve to commemorate Romanian martyrs from communist prisons, criticizing what she viewed as an incorrect focus on antisemitism. She protested that Romania saved over 400,000 Jews during the Second World War. Vazrazhdane’s leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, has also been highly critical of Israel, although acknowledging the terrorist attack of Hamas and advocating for a two-state solution.
Other right-wing populists have firmly defended Israel. Chega claimed that Netanyahu’s government was entitled to ‘neutralize the threat’ and was the only parliamentary party to decline to join calls for a ceasefire. In Germany, a knife attack by an Afghan man left a police officer dead just days before the election, triggering a fresh debate about immigration, Islamism and the longstanding policy against deportations to Afghanistan. The anti-Islam stance was also important for the Czech SPD, which has been a stalwart defender of Israel.
Ukraine and Russia
The outbreak of the war in Ukraine resulted in diverse responses by populist parties. Many populists on the right, especially in Western Europe, initially distanced themselves from Putin and cooled off their usual pro-Russian stance. Others, on the contrary, became even more pro-Russian (Ivaldi and Zankina, 2023). Such diversity can be explained by specific geostrategic and historical factors, including geographical proximity to Russia, past conflicts, cultural proximity or trade relations.
Some of the most vehement defenders of Russia in the West have been the AfD and FPÖ, which have denounced their respective governments’ support for Kyiv, accusing them of ‘warmongering’. The AfD has a longstanding association with Russia, repeatedly voicing sympathy for Putin and his regime. Although the party toned down its statements immediately after the February 2022 attack, it has since highlighted the economic consequences of the war and the sanctions for Germany, reinventing itself as a party of “peace”, even adopting the classic dove symbol. The BSW took an even more pro-Russian stance than the AfD, with its leader Wagenknecht routinely claiming that the US and the collective Western block a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for reasons of their own. BSW’s 20-page manifesto mentions sanctions 14 times, depicting them as harmful to Germany while having no effect on Russia itself. The FPÖ criticized the EU’s support for Kyiv, calling for an immediate end to financial and military aid to Ukraine and abolishing sanctions against Russia due to their detrimental effects on the economy. The Austrian government, in turn, was criticized for a breach of the country’s constitutional obligation of neutrality. The Dutch FvD has also propagated a pro-Russia and pro-Putin line, as did the Swedish SD. SD’s leader Åkesson stated that there is an upper limit to how much support Sweden should give to Ukraine, while the party’s top candidate, Charlie Weimers, suggested that their own party group, ECR, should be open to cooperating with parties in the ID group, whose stance on Russia has been characterized as relatively friendly. The Irish PBP has taken positions that are less in tune with popular opinion and are often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks.
Putin has enjoyed even more support in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Orbán’s campaign made the war in Ukraine its centrepiece. He used fear-mongering to build a Manichean narrative where anybody failing to vote for Fidesz was part of the ‘pro-war’ camp, accusing the Hungarian opposition of carrying out the demands of its international financiers in Brussels and Washington. Orbán repeatedly blamed the EU for wrongdoing and claimed that because of the incompetent leadership in Brussels, ‘instead of peace, we have war, instead of security we have a rule-of-law ruckus, instead of prosperity we have financial blackmail’. The Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, have been stark defenders of Putin to the extent of reaching comical proportions. Kostadinv is widely known in the country as ‘kopeikin’, referring to the Russian coin currency. His rallies feature more Russian than Bulgarian national flags. He frequently travels to Moscow, and his party is known to be funded by Putin (Zankina, 2024). The Czech SPD has become one of the most vocal anti-Ukrainian voices following Russia’s 2022 invasion, as did the newly emerged SOS in Romania. SOS’s leader Șoșoacă was declared ‘Personality of the Year’ in 2021 by Sputnik. She asserted that Europeans and Americans aim to destroy Russia and argued that Ukraine illegally occupies territories, including some that rightfully belong to Romania. The left–populist SMER in Slovakia, in turn, has called for a halt of all military assistance to Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression and for a more neutral stance toward Russia. SMER blamed the EU for ‘prolonging war in Europe’ by supporting Ukraine.
In contrast to such support for Putin, a number of parties across Europe have adopted a pro-Ukraine position. In Finland, for example, support for Ukraine has been almost unanimous, including by the Finns Party, which has criticized Putin’s Russia, expressing strong support for Ukraine. Similarly, the Danish People’s Party and the Denmark’s Democrats are declaredly pro-Ukraine. In Portugal, Chega also aligned with most mainstream parties, adopting a pro-Ukraine position. The Croatian DP has expressed firm solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, drawing parallels between Croatia’s Homeland War (1991–1991) and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although Sinn Féin has often blamed the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin, with the invasion of Ukraine, the party stood firmly behind Ukraine, although it continued to abstain on aid packages in the EP.
Many parties struggled to take a clear stance, expressing ambiguous positions. The RN, for example, has significantly moderated its attitude. Le Pen said her only ‘red line’ on Ukraine was stopping France from becoming a ‘co-belligerent’ in the conflict via the use of long-range French missiles against targets on Russian soil. French far-right leader Jordan Bardella said he backed Ukraine’s right to defend itself against Russia, but if elected prime minister, he would not provide Kyiv with missiles that would allow it to strike Russia’s territory. He also said he would stand by France’s commitments to NATO if he became prime minister. In Germany, the Left’s manifesto for the European elections also reflected ambiguity.
On the one hand, the document is highly critical of the US and NATO and even claims that the eastern enlargement of NATO has “contributed to the crisis”. On the other, it highlights Ukraine’s right to self-defence, condemns the attack as a war crime, and demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. The Dutch PVV supported the strengthening of defence, however, without singling out Russia as the main threat. Populists in Latvia took similarly ambivalent positions on Russia. S! refused to blame Russia for the invasion, arguing instead for ‘peace’. The LPV initially denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but subsequently softened its stance, advocating for the need for negotiations, peace and the renewal of economic relations with Russia – a position also adopted by SV, which primarily appeals to Russian speakers. The Romanian AUR has taken nuanced positions. While denouncing Russia’s interference as a significant obstacle to unification with Moldova, the party also criticizes Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Romanians.
Multiple Factors of populist performances across EU member states
As the individual chapters illustrate, beyond differences in issue salience across countries, there were a variety of political factors that may account for differences in populist party electoral performances in the 2024 European elections.
National cycle
Such performances may be first related to the location of the EP elections in each country’s national political cycle. The analysis in this report corroborates studies that show that party performances in European elections are mediated by the time of these elections in the national electoral cycle, that government parties lose support in EU elections, especially during the midterm of a national parliamentary cycle, and that opposition parties may benefit from this (Hix and Marsh 2007).
In Germany, the 2024 European election saw devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Liberal Democrats (FDP). The so-called “progressive coalition” and its policies have been deeply unpopular, and the radical-right AfD was the main beneficiary of this discontent. In France, political protest and anti-incumbent sentiments were key to populist voting across the spectrum: over two-thirds of RN voters said they essentially voted to manifest their opposition to the President and the Government, and it was 53% among LFI voters. In the Netherlands, the results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands were intimately related to the fall of the Rutte IV government in the Summer of 2023 and the outcome of the subsequent national elections on 22 November 2023, which saw a rise in support for the PVV. In Poland, the governing coalition, which managed to take power away from PiS in 2023, saw a decline in its support. While PiS lost 12 MEP seats, it did regain some of its support compared to the 2023 national election. In Slovakia, SMER, which managed to take back power from OL’aNO in the 2023 national election, lost some of its support in the EP elections, coming second after the liberal Progressive Slovakia (PS). In Hungary, while Fidesz won the elections, it lost some support and faced an unprecedented challenge by a new political party that reshuffled the power balance in the opposition.
The country chapters also find evidence of another key element of the ‘second order’ model that has been applied to European elections since the early 1980s, which is that voters typically make judgements about national political issues in those elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In many countries, the 2024 European elections were fought over domestic rather than European issues and populist parties often played the national card. In Spain, for example, the number and relevance of ongoing national-level political issues often sidelined European ones during the 2024 campaign. In Portugal, Chega’s manifesto proposals were mostly domestic; European-level proposals were scarce despite a broader media agenda focused on European immigration, defence and EU enlargement. In Germany, domestic actors and attitudes dominated the campaign, with only a minority of populist voters saying that “Europe” was more important for their decision than “Germany”, particularly AfD supporters who were more inward-looking and more Eurosceptic than the BSW’s. In Greece, domestic issues dominated, with election results representing an anti-government protest vote. This was also the case in the Czech Republic, where many voters supported populist parties out of frustration with national politics and the government’s performance.
The European elections further coincided with national and local elections in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania. The 2024 elections in Belgium were a triple election for the European, federal and regional levels. In this context, European elections were clearly second-order elections. In Bulgaria, the elections coincided with early national elections (the sixth in two years). Thus, European issues were subsumed by overall political instability and infighting, polarizing discourse and a record-low voter turnout.
Populists in government
Populists in government have had varying success in the 2024 European elections. While the FdL in Italy managed to maintain its dominance, including within the governing coalition, the Finns Party saw a sharp drop in support due to its participation in government. While Fidesz maintained its grip on power, it was challenged by a new opposition party, losing two seats in the EP.
In Italy, all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, thus enjoying a “honeymoon” period of the government elected two years before, reflecting a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level. Meloni was heavily involved in the European campaign, enabling her party to benefit from her relatively intact popularity as the head of government since September 2022. In Croatia, the right-wing populist DP was already in the position of kingmaker after coming third in the national parliamentary elections in April 2024 and becoming part of the governing coalition. In the EP elections, the DP maintained its support, thus reaffirming its leverage in domestic and European politics.
Elsewhere, populists in government lost ground. In Hungary, despite Fidesz’s victory in the election, a new challenger, Tisza, posed significant challenges, attracting former Fidesz party member Péter Magyar and gaining seven seats in the EP, while Fidesz lost two. Although Fidesz came in first in the EP elections with 44.82% of the votes, the result was considered the party’s worst performance in an EP election. In Finland, the Finns Party paid for its participation in the government and fell back sharply, losing 6 points compared to 2019. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party had supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. In Sweden, the 2024 European Parliament election was the first election in which the Sweden Democrats participated while having formal influence over the government. The party performed the worst in mobilizing voters in the week leading up to the election, and its support for the centre-right government could possibly explain such an electoral setback.
Political discontent as a driver of populist voting
In countries where populists were in the opposition, these parties benefited from political discontent with national governments dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic, the energy and high inflation crisis, and the many political and economic ramifications of the war in Ukraine.
In Spain, Vox’s electoral campaign was essentially framed as a referendum against Sánchez. In France, both the RN and LFI sought to capitalize on political discontent by making the election a referendum for or against Emmanuel Macron and the government. In Belgium, populist radical parties, both left and right, positioned themselves as political outsiders and presented themselves as the alternative vote to an unpopular federal government. In Cyprus, ELAM strongly campaigned against corruption, entering the political scene as the new political force that would hold traditional parties accountable. In Portugal, Chega’s leader, André Ventura, nominated himself as ‘the real leader of the opposition’. In Germany, after the initial rally-round-the-flag effect following Russia’s fresh attack on Ukraine, the government’s popularity began to decline as a result of high inflation and worries about (energy) security, resulting in a protest vote in favour of populist actors such as the AfD and BSW.
Similarly, in Greece, there was a strong anti-government protest vote, with the key message of the election being political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise. In Poland, PiS (now in opposition) criticized the government’s opposing measures to stop illegal migration adopted by the previous PiS government. In Romania, AUR has criticized the government and mainstream parties for being subservient to the EU and betraying national interests. In an interview for a Russian newspaper, the leader of the more radical SOS party declared that Romania is essentially a ‘colony within the EU.’
Populist competition
Another factor of varying populist performances was changes in the populist political scene across Europe and new patterns of competition between populists. The recent wave of populism has seen new parties challenge the more established players (Ivaldi, 2023). Such divisions began to appear in countries such as Austria and France in the late 1990s, and more recently, populist competition has been observed in a number of European countries but in different configurations.
While countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Bulgaria and Italy have a variety of populist actors distributed across the political spectrum, there has also been an increasing fragmentation of the populist right in a number of countries in recent years, with two or three of those parties competing with one another for votes, possibly affecting the balance of forces within that party family.
Such a split of the populist right is illustrated in Spain, which has seen the emergence of a new populist radical-right party, Se Acabó La Fiesta (SALF), competing with Vox, which partly accounts for the latter’s loss of support in the 2024 EP elections when compared with the 2023 general elections. In the Netherlands, there has been an increase in parties competing for the populist vote, forcing these parties to profile themselves not only vis-à-vis mainstream parties but also each other. In Poland, the PiS lost 12 points and 8 seats in five years, suffering from competition from Confederation (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), which established itself at the heart of the Polish right. In Hungary, Orbán’s party is facing competition from the far-right Our Homeland Movement (MHM). In Romania, AUR is competing for votes with the splinter party SOS. France now has two electorally relevant populist radical-right parties competing with one another, namely, Marine Le Pen’s RN and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête! In Germany, the AfD is also facing competition on its left flank from the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) on similar anti-immigration policies. In Denmark, the recently formed Denmark’s Democrats compete directly with the Danish People’s Party. As one final example, in Italy, there has been a clear shift in the balance of power between the Lega and FdI, with Meloni’s party taking over the right-wing bloc.
While populist competition essentially concerns the populist right, Ireland provides an interesting case of populist competition to the left of the political spectrum. As the Irish chapter shows, Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s collapsing coalition, and it did so by calling more clearly for controls on immigration and by opposing the EU migration pact.
Political profile and candidates
Other factors of variations in populist party performances in the 2024 European elections may be found in the political profile of those parties and lead candidates, as well as in specific campaign events that may have dampened or increased support for those parties.
While some of those parties have taken a path towards normalization, others have maintained a more radical ideology and discourse that may alienate moderate voters. In France, while Le Pen’s RN has been continuing its strategy of “de-demonization” in order to achieve governmental credibility and detoxify its far-right reputation, Zemmour’s Reconquête has come closer to the old extreme right. In Bulgaria, GERB has been moderating its populist appeal, while Vazrazhdane has bet on increasing polarization and extreme right-wing and populist rhetoric. In Ireland, Sinn Féin has transitioned to become a more credible party of government, taking more mainstream positions on a number of issues. In Italy, despite their historical roots in the neo-fascist milieu, Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia have successfully achieved their transformation into a party of government, taking over Forza Italia’s role as the dominant party within the right-wing bloc. As discussed earlier, other parties, such as the Dutch PVV and the Sweden Democrats, have recently undergone a modernization process to increase their coalition potential and increasingly win over the moderate electorate.
In countries like Spain and Finland, on the other hand, the campaign of the 2024 European elections was dominated by public concerns over the rise of the far right in Europe and its possible impact on future alliances in the European Parliament. In Finland, in particular, people’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was a salient theme in campaign debates, which may have contributed to diminished electoral support for the Finns Party.
As clearly illustrated in the country chapters, the choice of lead candidates in the 2024 European elections somewhat reflected such variation in the political pedigree of populist parties. In Denmark, for example, the DF nominated hardliner and former MEP Morten Messerschmidt despite his being still under investigation for fraud in the so-called MELD and FELD case concerning the misuse of EU funds. In Germany, the controversies surrounding the party’s ‘re-migration’ project and Maximilian Krah’s statements about the SS clearly outraged some voters. In Italy, the Lega’s campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, known for his homophobic, racist and sexist comments. In Portugal, Chega’s lead candidate, António Tânger Corrêa, was strongly criticized for endorsing conspiracy theories such as the ‘great replacement’ and for his using of antisemitic tropes, like accusing the Mossad of forewarning American Jews of terrorist attacks on 9/11. In Finland, the most successful Finns Party candidate, Sebastian Tynkkynen, represented the provocative and radical faction of the party. Another example of strong populist rhetoric and style is found in Romania, where former AUR leader and now a member of SOS Romania, Diana Șoșoacă, is taking her populist rhetoric to new extremes by using tough homophobic, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and anti-European messages.
Finally, we should mention specific events that may have altered the course of the 2024 elections. One such example is the failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico of SMER, which took place in mid-May 2024, shocking the country and impacting the campaign and elections both directly and indirectly, as both SMER and SNS blamed the opposition and independent media for the attempt, claiming it resulted from a polarized political environment allegedly created by them.
At times, political scandals punctuated the 2024 EP election campaign. In Sweden, the election campaign took a new turn when, about a month prior to the election, it was revealed that the SD’s communications department was hosting a so-called troll factory in which anonymous social media accounts were spreading disinformation and derogatory portrayals of other politicians.
Populist parties and groups in the European Parliament
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased.
The mainstream forces of the European Parliament – the EPP, S&D, and Renew – have maintained a majority with just over 55% of the seats in the new parliament. The conservative right united within the EPP and reaffirmed its dominance within the European institutions, both in the EP and the Council, with 11 seats compared to only 4 for the left and 5 for Renew. Despite the economic crisis, the European left was unable to establish itself as an alternative force during the election. Finally, the Greens and Renew’s liberals emerged as the big losers of the June 2024 elections, with 53 and 77 seats, respectively, a sharp decline compared to 2019 (70 and 98 seats, respectively) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Political groups in the European Parliament as of July 2024
Political groups
Number of seats
Share of seats (%)
EPP–Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
188
26.11
S&D–Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
136
18.89
PfE–Patriots for Europe
84
11.67
ECR–European Conservatives and Reformists Group
78
10.83
Renew Europe–Renew Europe Group
77
10.69
Greens/EFA–Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
53
7.36
The Left–The Left group in the European Parliament–GUE/NGL
Following the elections, the centre of gravity of the new parliament shifted to the right. In addition to the strong performances of conservative parties, the European election results confirmed the anticipated rise of populist and Eurosceptic right-wing parties.
However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament, where they are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR (78 seats), PfE (49), and ESN (25), which have replaced the two previous right-wing populist groups, i.e., ECR and Identity and Democracy. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-attached (NA) (see Table 4).
Table 4. Populist parties by political groups in the 2024 European Parliament
Country
Type
Party
Seats won
% of vote
EP Group
Bulgaria
Centrist
Ima takav narod
ITN
1
6.20
ECR
Croatia
Extreme Right
Domovinski pokret
DP
1
8.84
ECR
Cyprus
Extreme Right
Ethniko Laiko Metopo
ELAM
1
11.19
ECR
Denmark
Radical Right
Danmarksdemokraterne
DD
1
7.39
ECR
Estonia
Radical Right
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond
EKRE
1
14.86
ECR
Finland
Radical Right
Perussuomalaiset/Finns
PS/Finns
1
7.60
ECR
Greece
Radical Right
Elliniki Lysi
EL
2
9.30
ECR
Italy
Radical Right
Fratelli d’Italia
FdI
24
28.76
ECR
Luxembourg
Right
Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party)
ADR
1
11.76
ECR
Poland
Radical Right
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
PiS
20
36.16
ECR
Romania
Radical Right
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor
AUR
6
14.95
ECR
Sweden
Radical Right
Sverigedemokraterna
SD
3
13.19
ECR
Bulgaria
Centrist
Graždani za evropejsko razvitie na Bǎlgarija
GERB
5
24.30
EPP
Italy
Right
Forza Italia
FI
8
9.58
EPP
Netherlands
Centrist
BoerBurgerBeweging
BBB
2
5.40
EPP
Slovenia
Radical Right
Slovenska demokratska stranka
SDS
4
30.65
EPP
Bulgaria
Extreme Right
Vazrazhdane
Vazrazhdane
3
14.40
ESN
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Svoboda a přímá demokracie
SPD
1
5.73
ESN
France
Radical Right
Reconquête!
REC
5
5.46
ESN
Germany
Radical Right
Alternative für Deutschland
AfD
15
15.89
ESN
Hungary
Extreme Right
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom
MHM
1
6.75
ESN
Lithuania
Extreme Right
Tautos ir teisingumo sąjunga (The People and Justice Union)
TTS
1
5.45
ESN
Poland
Extreme Right
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość
Konf
3
3,19
ESN
Slovakia
Extreme Right
Hnutie Republika
Hnutie Republika
2
12.53
ESN
Germany
Left
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht
BSW
6
6.17
NA
Greece
Radical Right
Dimokratikó Patriotikó Kínima
NIKI
1
4.37
NA
Greece
Left
Plefsi Eleftherias
PE
1
3.40
NA
Greece
Left
Kommounistiko Komma Elladas
KKE
2
9.30
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Nowa Nadzieja
Nowa Nadzieja
2
2.79
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Ruch Narodowy
Ruch Narodowy
1
2.57
NA
Romania
Radical Right
S.O.S. România
SOS RO
2
5.04
NA
Slovakia
Left
SMER – sociálna demokracia
SMER-SD
5
24.77
NA
Spain
Radical Right
Se Acabó La Fiesta
SALF
3
4.59
NA
Austria
Radical Right
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FPÖ
6
25.36
PfE
Belgium
Radical Right
Vlaams Belang
VB
3
22.94
PfE
Czech Republic
Centrist
Akce nespokojených občanů
ANO 2011
7
26.14
PfE
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Přísaha a Motoristé
Přísaha a Motoristé
2
10.26
PfE
Denmark
Radical Right
Dansk Folkeparti
DF
1
6.37
PfE
France
Radical Right
Rassemblement national
RN
30
31.47
PfE
Greece
Radical Right
Foni Logikis
FL
1
3.04
PfE
Hungary
Radical Right
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség
Fidesz
11
44.69
PfE
Italy
Radical Right
Lega
Lega
8
8.98
PfE
Latvia
Radical Right
Latvija pirmajā vietā
LPV
1
6.23
PfE
Netherlands
Radical Right
Partij voor de Vrijheid
PVV
6
16.97
PfE
Portugal
Radical Right
Chega
Chega
2
9.79
PfE
Spain
Radical Right
Vox
Vox
6
9.63
PfE
Bulgaria
Centrist
Prodalzhavame Promjanata-Democratichna Bulgaria
PP-BD
2
14.45
Renew(PP)EPP(DB)
Belgium
Left
Parti du Travail de Belgique-Partij van de arbeid
PTB–PVDA
2
11.76
The Left
Denmark
Left
Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne
Enhl., Ø
1
7.04
The Left
France
Left
La France Insoumise
LFI
9
9.87
The Left
Germany
Left
Die Linke
Die Linke
3
2.74
The Left
Greece
Left
Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
SYRIZA
4
14.92
The Left
Ireland
Left
Sinn Féin
SF
2
11.14
The Left
Italy
Centrist
Movimento 5 Stelle
M5S
8
9.98
The Left
Spain
Left
Podemos
Podemos
2
3.28
The Left
Sweden
Left
Vänsterpartiet
V
2
11.04
The Left
Source: Compiled by the authors based on election results data from the European Parliament (https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/). Notes: Blue indicates radical-right populist; pink radical-left populist; and white, centrist populist.
Such a reconfiguration of populist groups in the EP reflects a wide array of factors, from national and geopolitical issues to party strategies and political profiles and mutual populist exclusion. The case of Hungarian Fidesz illustrates such complexity. Despite one of the most significant victories across the EU, Orbán’s party faced the challenge of allying with others on the European scene. Initially, Orbán strived to join Meloni’s ECR but ultimately rejected this option to avoid coalescing with the anti-Hungarian AUR in Romania. Additionally, there was a cleavage on the Russia-Ukraine War with Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński but also smaller members of the ECR from Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, holding diametrically opposed views to Orbán’s. After weeks of negotiations, Orbán succeeded in forming a new coalition based on the former Identity and Democracy group, initially with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Czech ANO, which was ultimately led by the French National Rally (RN). Although the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is the third-largest faction in the European Parliament, it could not secure any significant positions, and thus, Fidesz’s political isolation continues.
Along with the new PfE and previous ECR groups, other right-wing populist parties have found political shelter in the newly formed Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group. These are essentially extreme right-wing parties such as Our Homeland in Hungary, Reconquête! in France, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and Czech SPD. The German AfD leads the group following its expulsion from the former Identity and Democracy faction in the EP in the lead-up to the European elections in May 2024, which was the result of the controversial statements made by the AfD’s lead candidate Maximilian Krah about members of the Nazi SS. The ESN currently has 25 members in the EP.
With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. The Left currently has 46 seats, which represents a slight increase on its previous share of 37 seats in the outgoing parliament. After talks of creating a new group with the German BSW, the Italian M5S has joined the European Left, which, as the country analysis has shown, is consistent with the ideological and strategic move to the left by the party in Italian politics.
Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups. The Czech ANO has joined the new populist radical-right PfE along with Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary and Le Pen’s RN in France. Other centrist populists, such as the Dutch BBB and GERB in Bulgaria, are found in the right-wing conservative EPP, while the Bulgarian ITN has joined Meloni’s ECR. ANO’s decision to leave the liberal Renew group and join the PfE alongside Fidesz and FPÖ poses a curious example. Since the PfE has been excluded from the allocation of posts in the EP committees and subject to cordon sanitaire by the EP majority, ANO is likely to have much less leverage in the new European Parliament.
The impact of populism on EU politics
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, we can expect a growing impact on the political debate and policy decisions. We have already seen such impact in areas such as migration policy, where the ECR and the ID have already left their mark with policies on outsourcing immigration control through a series of agreements with neighbouring nations, particularly in Northern Africa, and with the securitization of the migration debate, framing it as a security threat with a primary focus on border control and deportations, as opposed an effective system of burden-sharing and protection of human rights for refugees and asylum seekers.
Climate change is another area where we may see rollback and obstructionism. Although the Green Deal has been finalized, implementation may be at risk, particularly in areas such as phasing out combustion engines, restoration of nature reserves and green energy investment. Such rollback is likely to impede the ability of the EU to act as a global leader in what is pronouncedly a transnational policy issue.
EU enlargement is another topic that may take the backseat, both when it comes to the Western Balkans, as well as Ukraine. Parties such as PVV, RN, FPÖ and AfD are strongly opposing further enlargement, as are many of the right-wing populists in Central and Eastern Europe. Exceptions are PiS and AUR and their support for EU membership for Ukraine and Moldova, respectively, due to historical and ethnic factors.
Foreign policy is expected to be a point of major contention for the far right in the EP, although the expected impact may be overestimated, at least in the short term. The 19 September 2024 resolution adopted by the European Parliament on lifting the restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory presents a case in point. The resolution was passed with 425 votes in favour, 131 against and 63 abstentions. The EP majority, including the EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe, voted in support, with additional support from many members of the Green/EFA and the ECR. Dissenting voices came from the PfE and the ESN, but also from ECR’s FdI, as well as French leftists and Irish, Austrian and Maltese MEPs across the political spectrum reflecting their countries’ neutral (non-NATO) status.
The impact of the populist left is likely to have a more limited impact, given its modest representation, although there may be issues where we may see the populist left and right coalesce, such as the war in Ukraine, for example, or aspects of welfare policy. The BSW is a good illustration of this merging of left and right populism on specific policy topics.
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics. We have clearly seen this effect in Austria, where after winning the EP elections, the FPÖ increased its support even more, winning the national legislative elections. While the current EP majority may be able to effectively exercise cordon sanitaire over both the far right and the far left, an overall shift to the right, both in terms of rhetoric and policy, is already a reality. This prolonged tendency has the potential to contribute to the future growth of the far right in the subsequent European Parliament, as well as to the continued mainstreaming of far-right policies, as the current majority is trying to push through its priorities. The inclusion of Rafaele Fitto (FdI-ECR) as the Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms in the new European Commission signals such a tendency and is but one instance of attempts to draw the ECR closer.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and thecomparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
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Please cite as: Auers, Daunis. (2024). “Populism and the 2024 European Parliament Election in Latvia.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0076
Populism has been a feature of Latvia’s political landscape since the 1990s. New insurgent parties have utilized increasingly anti-establishment rhetoric, often through intensive and innovative use of social media, to win seats in the Latvian parliament and even join government coalitions. However, European Parliament elections in Latvia have been comparatively free of populism. There are two main reasons for this. First, and most importantly, there is a broad pro-European consensus in Latvia. Membership in the European Union and NATO is central to all three Baltic nations’ security strategy in light of growing threats from Russia. As a result, there is no serious Eurosceptic party in Latvia and no explicitly Eurosceptic politicians have ever been elected to the European Parliament from Latvia. Second, Latvia’s voters tend to support serious, experienced politicians in European elections, believing that they are better placed to support Latvia’s national interests in the European system. Party politics take second place in campaigning, with the focus being on the experience of candidates (after all, Latvia elected just nine MEPs in 2024) rather than policy differences. As a result, populist anti-elite rhetoric has less salience. This chapter will explore the extent to which the 2024 European Parliament election in Latvia has continued these trends.
Keywords: Latvia; populism; European Parliament; Russia–Ukraine War; election campaign
Populism – understood here as a thin ideology magnifying a binary divide between the ‘pure people’ and a ‘corrupt elite’ (see Mudde 2004 and Stanley 2008) – has been a feature of Latvia’s political landscape since the 1990s. Both national parliamentary elections and local government elections have seen a broad bouillabaisse of populist parties campaigning, winning seats and even taking up local and national office. In contrast, European Parliament (EP) elections have been largely free from populist campaigning and few populists have won seats in the EP.
This analysis is divided into four main parts. The first section identifies the key contemporary populist parties in Latvia. The second part drills down on the supply side of the campaign, briefly outlining the nature of EP elections in Latvia, explaining why populists are more marginalized in this vote than in other elections in Latvia, and outlining key policy debates over the course of the campaign. The third section drills down on the electoral results (the demand side) and political manoeuvring following the 8 June poll. The final section reflects on the broader impact of the election on Latvian and European populist politics.
Background
A broad variety of populist actors has populated Latvia’s political stage over the last few decades. Institutional weaknesses, internal feuding as well as a failure to deliver on (often outlandish) populist promises, have contributed to a steady rhythm of party collapse and construction. KPV LV (a Latvian abbreviation for ‘Who Owns the State’?) was formed in the run-up to the 2018 election, ran a fiercely populist anti-establishment campaign, and finished second with a vote share of 14.25% and 16 of 100 parliamentary seats. However, following the established Latvian populist pattern, the party imploded and collapsed within a few months of the election.
By the following parliamentary election in 2022, the populist vacuum had been filled by two new parties that won seats in the legislature. The For Stability! (Stabilitātei, S!) party, founded in 2021, appealed to Latvia’s significant Russian-speaking minority, which makes up around one-quarter of the electorate, while Latvia First (Latvija Pirmā Vietā, LPV) campaigned on a Trumpist national–populist platform that aimed to win both Latvian and Russian-speaking voters. S! finished fifth, with a 6.8% share of the vote and 11 of the Latvian parliament’s 100 seats. LPV also polled above Latvia’s 5% threshold for parliamentary representation with 6.2% of votes and received nine seats.
S! benefitted from the collapse of support for the Harmony Social Democracy (Saskaņa Sociāldemokrātija, SSD) party, which had previously monopolized the Russian-speaking vote in Latvia. However, SSD was quick to speak out against Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which went against the general sentiment of Latvia’s Russian speakers, who were either more uncertain of placing blame for the war on Russia or those having been exposed to Russian state propaganda, were supportive of Russia’s actions. S! was quick to fill the void, walking a rhetorical tightrope of refusing to blame Russia and instead arguing for ‘peace’, as well as focusing on antivaccine and anti-establishment rhetoric.
LPV was founded in 2021 as a platform for Ainārs Šlesers, a serial political entrepreneur who has previously founded and led the New Party (Jaunā Partija, JP), Latvia’s First Party (Latvijas Pirmā Partija, LPP), For a Good Latvia (Par Labu Latviju, PLL), the Šlesera Reform Party (Šlesera Reforma Partija, ŠRP) and United for Latvia (Vienoti Latvijai, VL), and previously served as a former deputy prime minister, economics minister and deputy mayor of the capital city of Rīga. LPV’s 2022 electoral campaign focused on a sharp critique of the incumbent prime minister, Krišjānis Kariņš, and sitting president, Egīls Levits (which they referred to as the ‘Kariņš–Levits regime’), particularly focusing on their COVID-19-era policies and Latvia’s stagnant economy. The party initially denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, even expelling the party’s candidate for president, Jūlija Stepaņenko, from the party ranks after she refused to denounce the war. However, in subsequent years, the party has softened its stance, increasingly talking about the need for negotiations, peace and the renewal of economic relations with Russia.
Both S! and LPV have languished in parliamentary opposition since the 2022 parliamentary election. Latvia has never had a party representing Russian-speaking interests in a government coalition and Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine has made it even more unlikely that the pro-Kremlin S! could break this pattern. While LPV is more mainstream and critical of Russia on the Ukraine war issue, the party’s founder and leader, Ainārs Šlesers, has long been identified as one of Latvia’s three ‘oligarchs’. Centrist parties have erected a cordon sanitaire around LPV. LPV’s aggressive anti-establishment discourse has made it relatively easy for other parties to keep it out of coalition negotiations. The two parties’ status in opposition gave their anti-establishment populist discourse greater authenticity. They dominated the populist part of the EP election campaign. Latvia’s mainstream public and private media focused their debates, interviews and media stories on those parties polling above 2% in public opinion surveys. Thus, S! and LPV were invited to participate in various broadcast debates and interviews, while the five other populist parties in the campaign were largely ignored.
Briefly, these other five populist parties were, first, the Sovereign Power (Suverēnā Vara, SV) party, which also primarily appealed to Russian speakers and was dominated by politicians that had previously been in the more centrist pro-Russian speaker SSD, as well as Jūlija Stepaņenko, who had been expelled from LPV for her refusal to denounce Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. The New Latvian Union (Apvienība Jaunlatvieši, AJ) was a curious combination of experienced populists (such as Aldis Gobzems, who was KPV LV’s prime ministerial candidate in the 2018 election) and failed Russian-speaking populists (such as Glorija Grevcova, who had been elected to parliament on the S! ticket in 2022 but was stripped of her seat in parliament having been found guilty of lying about her education and professional experience). Power and Strength of the Nation (Tautas Varas Spēks, TVS) was a political vehicle for Valentīns Jeremejevs, a Russian-speaking businessman who has long been seeking a place in Latvian politics. The populist Nation, Land, Stateness (Tauta, Zeme, Valstiskums, TZV) party was a minor nationalist outfit that recruited Aleksandrs Kiršteins, a prominent nationalist politician who had been expelled from the National Alliance party after an unsanctioned trip to China. Finally, the Centre Party (Centra Partija, CP) made clear that it was a political vehicle for politicians from more radical pro-Russia parties that had been barred from competing in the election. Despite its name, CP was the only authentically Eurosceptic party in the election, largely down to it featuring a long-running and unsuccessful Eurosceptic Latvian politician – Normunds Grostiņš – on its slate of candidates.
The supply side
Populists have fared badly in Latvia’s EP elections since 2004. There are two major reasons for this. First, Latvia has few seats in the EP – just nine (up from eight, after a reallocation of seats following Brexit) in 2024 – and Latvia’s MEPs have a resultingly high profile in domestic politics. As a result, Latvia’s voters have tended to vote for sober, politically experienced personalities to represent Latvia’s national (rather than party) interests in the EP. This pattern of voter behaviour is a structural weakness for populist parties that might have well-known personalities in their ranks but typically lack the gravitas of government experience that Latvia’s voters seek. Second, Euroscepticism is weak in Latvia. Kārlis Bukovskis (2018) has explained that this was down to the crucial role of the EU (and NATO) in guaranteeing Latvia’s security as well as the visible role of EU funds in Latvia’s economic development since 2004.
LPV was the only populist party participating in this election that was able to mitigate the political personality challenge. It did this by deploying two tactics. First, although the party’s charismatic chairman, Ainārs Šlesers, did not stand for the EP, he appeared in most interviews alongside the lead candidates. Moreover, his surname was on the ballot as his son, Ričards Šlesers, was the third candidate on LPV’s candidate list (although the younger Šlesers refused to take part in interviews or debates in the election campaign). Indeed, the party’s official manifesto opened with the words ‘vote for Šlesers’ team’ (Central Election Commission of Latvia, 2024a). Second, the party’s lead candidate on the electoral list was Vilis Krištopāns, a former prime minister from the 1990s who moved to the US state of Florida in the early 2000s, having labelled Latvia a ‘country of fools!’ (muļķu zeme!).
Populist parties campaigned around three key issues. First, the war in Ukraine, both in military and economic terms, was the dominant theme in the election. A second dimension was mainstream politicians’ supposed incompetence (or ‘selling out’) in defending Latvia’s economic interests in Brussels. This perfidy was typically linked to domestic corruption and incompetence and was frequently accompanied by a criticism of the European Green Deal (particularly its potentially negative impact on Latvia’s economy). A third theme concerned the defence of traditional family / Christian values versus progressive, liberal ideals in Brussels.
Latvia shares a 284-kilometre-long border with Russia and a 173-kilometre-long border with Belarus. As a result, Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine in 2022 inevitably had a significant impact on Latvia’s domestic and international politics. While Latvia’s mainstream parties were united in denouncing Russia’s actions, supporting international sanctions as well as military, humanitarian and financial support for Ukraine and increasing domestic military spending, re-introducing conscription and developing domestic military readiness, populist parties tended to adopt more ambivalent positions.
While LPV’s leaders consistently denounced Russia’s actions in Ukraine, they pushed for a more nuanced approach to Russia, arguing that the sanctions imposed by the EU were too harsh (particularly in their impact on Latvia) and that both Europe and the United States continued to have dealings with Russia – so why shouldn’t Latvia? As to the issue of Ukraine joining the EU, LPV insisted that the high level of corruption in Ukraine meant that membership should be off the table (for the moment). S! insisted that Ukraine needs to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for eligibility before it can be considered a member of the EU. S! also refused to identify Russia as the aggressor in the war, preferring to say both sides were at fault and that if elected to the EP, it would seek to create a new party group based on ‘peace and diplomacy’. Indeed, S! argued that the war was irrelevant to the European Union (stating that it was a NATO issue), that the EU should limit assistance to Ukraine to the humanitarian sphere and generally sought to avoid entering into deeper discussions on the theme. S! even pushed for renewing energy imports from Russia, and its leaders similarly argued that the EU should compensate Latvia for the adverse economic impacts of the war. The smaller populist parties agreed with LPV and S! that the EU should share the costs of policing and securing Latvia’s eastern border with Russia and Belarus. CP went further in stating that it would push for peace in Ukraine and continue the work of former MEP Tatjana Ždanoka (who has been charged with spying for Russia’s FSB security service and was banned from competing in the 2024 elections).
The second major populist theme was a sharp denunciation of Latvia’s MEPs and governing elite for their previous domestic and European economic policies. S! was typically harsh in its criticism, writing in its program that: “As part of the European Union, we have lost our self-esteem, our ability to protect our sovereign rights and our country’s development opportunities. Today’s European Union policy, which directly affects Latvia, is virtually incompatible with our country’s development and prosperous future. The total economic poverty, bankruptcy of entrepreneurs, immigration policy, absence of a children’s program, artificially inflated taxes and prices on energy resources are a direct signal that Latvia’s future is at risk” (Central Election Commission of Latvia, 2024b).
LPV similarly argued that mainstream politicians have not defended Latvia’s interests in Europe. AJ’s program argued that the previous generation of Latvia’s politicians was incompetent and corrupt, making ‘boring’ speeches in Brussels and allowing Latvia to join the EU on unfavourable terms, leading to the destruction of domestic industry and the economy. Indeed, AJ went so far as to argue that Latvia’s underdevelopment was deliberately planned by EU politicians and civil servants alongside colluding national politicians. It stated that it would push for compensation from the EU for the damage done to Latvia, for example, by closing domestic sugar factories. LPV particularly focused on the travails of the Rail Baltica project (a major infrastructure project constructing a north-south European gauge railway axis linking Latvia and the other two Baltic states to Poland). The European Green Deal was similarly criticized as being unrealistic and against Latvia’s economic interests, as the country was already among the greenest and most environmentally clean in Europe.
Finally, the populist block of parties was sharply critical of Europe’s progressive politics, arguing that the EU had been hijacked by pro-LGBTQ+ and Green groups and that they would correct this policy direction by focusing on traditional families (those with a mother and a father) and supporting core Christian values. SV argued that policies should favour traditional families over other forms of family. This issue was also connected to immigration – TZV argued that the EU should not be enlarged with people coming from alien non-Christian cultures. Antivaxxer tropes also appeared, for example, with AJ warning of a planned secret treaty between the EU and the World Health Organization (WHO) that would allow for pandemics to be declared at any time, as well as uncovering an alleged EU plan to destroy printed books in Latvian libraries.
S!’s criticism of the EU ultimately hinted at being open to the idea of Latvia leaving the EU if the conditions of membership were not favourable. When asked during the final pre-election debate on Latvian public television if Latvia should leave the EU and forge a closer relationship with Russia or Belarus, S!’s lead candidate Nikita Piņins answered, ‘Only time will tell’ (Latvian Public Media, 2024) while in an interview with Delfi TV, party leader Rosļikovs stated that ‘if the EU continues to strangle Latvia – what’s the point [of membership]?’ (DelfiTV, 2024). Populist politicians generally adopted a far more aggressive and belligerent tone than their mainstream counterparts. In the Delfi TV interview with LPV leaders, the female moderator repeatedly asked the male politicians to stop shouting and be less aggressive in their speaking style. This approach can be seen as part of the populist performance in Latvia – populists echo ‘the people’s’ anger at the state of politics and the economy, frequently arguing that the mainstream media are in cahoots with the governing parties and are thus institutionally opposed to opposition (populist) parties.
The demand side
The final election results came with few surprises. As surveys had predicted, the mainstream parties won the largest share of votes, and of the populist forces, only LPV won a single seat in the EP (and this was won by a former Latvian prime minister, Vilis Krištopāns, continuing the Latvian trend of electing experienced, proven former political office-holders in European elections) (see Table 1).
Table 1. Results of the 2024 European Parliament election in Latvia
Party (European Parliament group)
Number of seats in EP
Share of vote
Name of elected MEPs
New Unity, JV(European People’s Party, EPP)
2
25.1%
Valdis DombrovskisSandra Kalniete
National Alliance(European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR)
2
22.1%
Roberts ZīleRihards Kols
Latvia’s Development, LA(Renew Europe)
1
9.4%
Ivars Ījabs
United List, AS(European Conservatives and Reformists, ECR)
1
8.2%
Reinis Pozņaks
Progressives, PRO(The Greens / European Free Alliance)
1
7.5%
Mārtiņš Staķis
Harmony Social Democracy, SSD(Socialists and Democrats, S&D)
1
7.1%
Nils Ušakovs
Latvia First, LPV(Patriots For Europe, PfE)
1
6.2%
Vilis Krištopāns
Source: Central Election Commission of Latvia (2024c).
However, after being elected to the European Parliament, LPV’s Vilis Krištopāns found himself without a political home. He was blocked from joining the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group by the National Alliances’s Roberts Zīle (a vice president of the European Parliament and senior figure in the ECR), who stated that LPV’s pro-peace rhetoric on the Russia–Ukraine War made it an unsuitable partner for ECR. Krištopāns eventually joined the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group.
The populist parties’ weak performance in the election was unsurprising. Their position on the Russia–Ukraine War was out of kilter with most ethnic Latvians (who make up three-quarters of the electorate) – a 2023 poll found that 78% of respondents who speak Latvian in their family sympathized with Ukraine, while only 27% of those that speak Russian in their family did so (Krumm, Šukevičs & Zariņš, 2023: 10). A 2024 report found that 58% of respondents who speak Latvian in their family believed that membership of the EU was an advantage in the fulfilment of their dreams, while only 24% of those who speak Russian in their family did so (Ločmele, Zatlers & Krumm, 2024). The core populist ‘peace’ rhetoric and criticism of the EU only had traction with a minority of the population and these votes went to the candidate with the most experienced political CV.
Future perspective
Latvia will now have a major politician in the PfE group, the largest far-right political group in the European Parliament. As a result, LPV will further integrate into the PfE’s network of far-right parties and the party is likely to emerge as the first vocal Euroskeptic force in contemporary Latvia. After all, in a press conference held after returning from Brussels, Krištopāns stated that ‘having got know the European Parliament, the situation is even worse than I thought. The European Parliament has been taken over by left-wingers, pride supporters, climate fanatics and [illegal migrant] Welcomists’! (LPV, 2024).
(*) Daunis Auers is Professor of European Studies at the University of Latvia, a Jean Monnet Chair (2022–2025), Director of the PhD program in Social Sciences and Director of the privately-funded Latvia’s Strategy and Economic Research (LaSER) think tank. He studied at the London School of Economics and defended his PhD at University College London. He has been a Fulbright Scholar at the University of California-Berkeley (2005–2006) and the University of Washington, Seattle (2023–2024) and a Baltic-American Freedom Foundation Scholar at Wayne State University in Detroit (2014). He has published widely on political parties, elections, referendums, populism and the radical right as well as economic competitiveness.
Central Election Commission of Latvia. (2024c). European Parliament elections 2024: Election results. Central Election Commission of Latvia. Retrieved 22 July 2024, from https://epv2024.cvk.lv/velesanu-rezultati
Delfi TV (2024). European Parliament pre-election debates with candidates and parties, DelfiTV, Retrieved 22 July 2024 from https://www.delfi.lv/ep-velesanas-2024
LPV (2024, 11 July). ‘Kā un kāpēc tika izveidota jaunā EP deputātu grupa ‘Patroti Eiropai’? / V.Krištopans LatvijasRadio 1’. [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6W0KUV-52PI
Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. doi:10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Biancalana, Cecilia. (2024). “The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift to the Right.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0075
Italy has historically been one of the strongest proponents of a united Europe. However, recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism within the country, with a notable increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend? Italy features a variety of populist parties, both on the right and on the left, each with different Eurogroup affiliations and varying positions on European integration. As a result, during the 2024 campaign, the parties adopted different strategies. The results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of Fratelli d’Italia, reflecting a sustained support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.
Keywords: populism; Euroscepticism; Fratelli d’Italia; Lega; Forza Italia; Movimento 5 Stelle; European Parliament
By Cecilia Biancalana* (Department of Culture, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Italy)
Populism and Euroscepticism in Italy: Diverse actors and perspectives
Italy is an intriguing case study for examining the role, characteristics and influence of populist parties within the European context. Its relevance is due to two primary reasons related to the role of populism in the country and the attitudes of its citizens and political elites towards Europe.
On the one hand, Italy has been described as a ‘populist paradise’ (Tarchi, 2015) due to the strong presence and variety of populist parties. Indeed, Italy hosts a spectrum of populist movements spanning both right and left ideologies (Biancalana, 2020). This diversity extends to the European stage, where, as we will see, populist parties not only exhibit varying levels of Europhilia and Euroscepticism but also belong to different European groups. Notably, within the centre-right, three Italian parties fit the model of right-wing populism to varying degrees (albeit being quite different from each other): Forza Italia (FI), Lega (officially named Lega per Salvini premier), and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). For instance, in the 2019–2024 legislature, FI was part of the European People’s Party (EPP) group, FdI was a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), presenting a more moderate stance than the Lega, which was part of Identity and Democracy (ID). Moreover, there was also a populist party leaning towards the left, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), standing among the Non-attached (NA) group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who do not belong to any of the recognized political groups.
On the other hand, Italy has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of a united Europe, both at the elite level (Conti, 2017) and among the general populace (Isernia, 2008). However, it has recently become increasingly Eurosceptic (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).
Italy as a populist paradise
Regarding populism, as mentioned, Italy has long been regarded as a testing ground for populism, earning it the designation of the ‘laboratory of populism’ (Tarchi, 2015). Various forms of populism coexist within the country, which we will briefly describe, also considering their relationship with Europe. As anticipated, the leading populist parties today are FdI, Lega, FI and the Movimento 5 Stelle. Collectively, these four parties secured 58.31% (Chamber of Deputies) of the vote in the September 2022 general elections, highlighting the significant electoral strength of populism in contemporary Italy. These parties are characterized by varying degrees and types of both populism and Euroscepticism.
Scholars have categorized FdI in contrasting ways (see Bressanelli & de Candia, 2023 for a comprehensive review): post-fascist, radical-right populist and national conservative. Here, we will consider FdI as a radical right party with elements of populism and Euroscepticism (Donà, 2022). Established in 2012, the party traces its roots to the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), a neo-fascist party founded in 1946 by supporters of former dictator Benito Mussolini. Since 2017, FdI platforms have introduced elements of nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism, along with anti-European Union (EU) stances. FdI made its electoral breakthrough in the 2022 elections, securing 25,98% of the vote and entering government for the first time under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni. The party promotes an extreme right-wing ideology, defending a homogeneous populace against perceived threats, such as LGBTQ+ groups and immigrants, particularly from Muslim-majority countries.
In the international arena, FdI advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the EU (see Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021). FdI is affiliated with the more moderate ECR group in the European Parliament (EP), of which Meloni has been president since 2020. Within the ECR group, FdI actively participates in crucial decisions alongside mainstream political factions, collaborating with them while distinguishing itself from the more radical right and Eurosceptic ID group. However, FdI continues to engage in ideological battles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality, and EU constitutional matters (Bressanelli and di Candia 2023).
The Lega, known as Lega Nord until December 2017, was founded in 1991. Initially, it was a regionalist party (Bulli & Tronconi, 2011) that strongly advocated for Northern Italy’s interests and displayed ethnochauvinism towards Southern Italy, positioning itself against central political institutions. Since Matteo Salvini became party secretary in 2013, the Lega has shifted its focus to hostility towards immigration and European integration. Salvini’s leadership transformed the Lega’s claim and shifted the opposition to central political institutions from Rome to Brussels: the EU is portrayed as an enemy that deprives Italian citizens of resources and the freedom to determine their own destiny (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017). Salvini has forged alliances with other right-wing populist parties, including France’s Rassemblement National (RN), which has been part of the same EP group: previously ID and currently the newly established group Patriots for Europe (PfE). They both held Eurosceptic views and had previously opposed the euro. However, by 2019, the Lega had dropped the idea of Italy exiting the euro, following a similar shift by Marine Le Pen in 2017.
Silvio Berlusconi’s FI was founded in December 1993 following the Tangentopoli corruption scandals. FI participated in the March 1994 general elections, securing 21,01% of the vote, heralding Berlusconi’s emergence as a prominent figure in Italian politics. Berlusconi is frequently cited as an exemplar of right-wing populism (Fella & Ruzza, 2013). As a billionaire media mogul, he entered politics as an outsider, leveraging his television channels to directly appeal to the people, a strategy that foreshadowed figures like Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and Donald Trump in the United States. Historically, FI displayed ambivalent attitudes towards the EU (Conti, 2017) but has shifted towards a more pro-European stance in recent years. This transformation is partly attributed to the leadership change following Berlusconi’s passing in 2023, with Antonio Tajani, a former president of the EP, assuming leadership of the party (Biancalana, Seddone & Gallina, 2024).
The M5S is the newest among Italian populist parties and the only one not positioned on the right (Ivaldi, Lanzone & Woods, 2017; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). Founded in October 2009 by former comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party gained significant electoral momentum in the 2013 general elections, securing 25,56% of the vote (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In the 2018 general election, the M5S further increased its support, capturing 32.68% of the vote and entering a populist coalition government with Salvini’s Lega. After the collapse of the government with the Lega, the party formed a new government in partnership with the leftist Partito Democratico (PD). Between 2021 and 2022, the M5S joined Mario Draghi’s technocratic ‘grand’ coalition government.
The M5S’s relationship with Europe also reflects this fluidity and flexibility. In 2014, following its initial electoral success, the M5S campaigned against the euro, advocating for a referendum on Italy’s exit from the eurozone and rejecting significant EU financial constraints like those imposed by the ‘fiscal compact’. During the electoral campaign for the 2018 general elections, under a new leader, Luigi Di Maio, the M5S moderated its Eurosceptic stance, emphasizing that Italy’s departure from the euro was neither imminent nor planned. Nevertheless, according to Conti, Di Mauro and Memoli’s survey among MPs in 2019, when the M5S was part of a coalition government with the Lega, it could be unequivocally categorized as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, in 2019, the M5S adopted more moderate and ambivalent positions (see Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020).
Following the dissolution of the coalition with the Lega and its subsequent alliance with the PD, the M5S supported Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment as president of the European Commission and endorsed the installation of a pro-European leader like Mario Draghi as Italy’s prime minister in early 2021, signalling a shift towards pro-Europeanism. Indeed, after five years (2014–2019) in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (created by Nigel Farage) and five years in the NA group, after the 2024 elections, it joined the GUE/NGL group, signalling a clear shift towards the left at the European level as well.
Against this backdrop, what were the main issues of the 2024 campaign? How did these parties perform in the 2024 elections? Before addressing these questions, let us analyse Italians’ relationship with Europe.
The Italian case: From Europhilia to Euroscepticism
Regarding the relationship between elites and citizens and Europe, we know that historically, Italy has been a staunch supporter of European integration, with EP elections reflecting a dominant narrative that views Europe as synonymous with peace, prosperity, and political stability (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020). As one of the founding members of the EU, its membership has enjoyed wide support among the political elite and the general public alike. By the early 1990s, nearly all parties shared not only broad support for the integration process but also specific support for the EU. However, the ‘permissive consensus’ supporting EU integration has been replaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the previous narrative has significantly shifted (Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020), and both Italian citizens and political elites have become much more critical toward EU integration (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).
It has been argued that this shift is due to multiple crises, such as the financial and economic crises (including the transition to the single currency and, more recently, the Great Recession and subsequent austerity policies) and migration crises (specifically the so-called refugee crisis in 2015–2016), which have significantly affected Italy and led to increased opposition to the EU. Consequently, a considerable electoral market for Eurosceptic parties has emerged, marking a notable departure from Italy’s post-war Europhile stance and reflecting a more complex and divided perspective on European integration (Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021).
This shift is exemplified by two events: the success of populist Eurosceptic parties in the general elections of March 2018 and the subsequent formation of a government by two Eurosceptic parties, the M5S and the Lega, marking a turning point in Italian history within the EU (Conti, Marangoni, & Verzichelli, 2020). The second event is the result of the 2019 EP elections, which highlighted the growing Euroscepticism within the country. The Eurosceptic Lega Nord, led by Matteo Salvini, won 34.26% of the vote. The M5S, also critical of the EU, especially the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), garnered 17.06%; for their part, FI won 8.78%, and the far-right nationalist party, FdI, received 6.44%. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend?
Populist parties’ campaign and issues
After five years of significant political and economic turbulence, including a general election (2022), three changes in government (the PD–M5S coalition in 2019–2021, the technocratic Draghi government in 2021–2022, and the Meloni administration starting from 2022), and multiple crises in which the EU played a notable role, such as the COVID-19 and energy crises, the 2024 European elections emerge as a crucial indicator of both internal power dynamics within Italy’s party system and within the right-wing governing coalition, as well as their positions on Europe.
Consistent with its nationalist traits, FdI’s program – entitled Con Giorgia l’Italia cambia l’Europa (‘With Giorgia, Italy changes Europe’) – emphasizes defending the identity of European peoples and nations, referencing Europe’s ‘Judeo-Christian roots’. In her final rally, consistent with her sovereigntist traits, the party leader and Prime Minister Meloni stressed that ‘Europe must rediscover its historical role, focus on a few major issues, and leave other matters to national governments that do not need centralization’ (Pinto 2024). Throughout the campaign, Meloni had to balance her dual role as prime minister, which requires international credibility and as a populist party leader, striving to maintain equilibrium between these positions.
Lega’s campaign is markedly more Eurosceptic, echoing the slogan ‘Più Italia, meno Europa’ (‘More Italy, less Europe’), which, interestingly, was previously used by FI in the 2014 European elections. Lega’s platform, Programma elezioni europee 2024, focused on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the European Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. The campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, a very controversial figure who ran as an independent on Lega’s lists. General Vannacci became known for his book Il Mondo al Contrario (‘The world turned upside down’), published in 2023, which sparked significant backlash due to homophobic, racist and sexist content. Despite internal opposition, Vannacci received substantial support, securing over 530,000 preferences and leading in four out of five constituencies.
Forza Italia remains the most pro-European party, presenting a ten-point program – Con noi al centro dell’Europa (‘With us at the heart of Europe’) – that includes goals like ‘building common defence and security’ and ‘reforming European treaties’. On 21 May, at a campaign event, FI’s national secretary Antonio Tajani criticized Lega’s Euroscepticism, remarking, ‘When I hear “Less Europe”, all beautiful things, but with no effectiveness and no logical sense’ (Canepa, 2024), adding that without being part of a broader project, Italy risks being overwhelmed and rendered irrelevant. Interestingly, as mentioned, this slogan was used by FI ten years ago, indicating the party’s softened positions vis-à-vis Europe over time.
In summary, on the right, Lega has sought to radicalize its stance to attract votes from those discontented with Meloni’s institutionalization, whereas FI has positioned itself as the moderate pole.
On the contrary, the Movimento 5 Stelle aimed to attract votes from the left, focusing on peace and opposing arms to Ukraine. Its program, entitled L’Italia che conta. Protagonisti in Europa (‘An Italy that counts: Protagonists in Europe’), emphasized anti-austerity measures, defence of the public healthcare system, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek.
Results: Decreased Turnout and a Shift in the Balance of Power Among Populist Parties
The 2024 European elections in Italy revealed some significant trends. The first one is the decline in voter turnout, which dropped by over 6 percentage points compared to the 2019 European elections (48.3%, down from 54.50%). This decline continues a long-term trend: turnout was 85.65% in 1979, 81.07% in 1989, 69.76% in 1999, and 66.47% in 2009.
Moreover, it is worth noting that in previous years, Italy’s voter turnout in European elections was consistently higher than the EU average. For instance, in 1979, Italy’s turnout was 85.65% compared to the EU average of 61.99%, and this pattern continued through the 1980s and 1990s. By 2019, Italy’s turnout was 54.5%, whereas the EU average was 50.66%. This trend ended in 2024, with Italy’s turnout declining further to 48.31%, while the EU average increased to 51.07%. Nevertheless, despite this increase in abstentionism, the latest Eurobarometer survey (Standard Eurobarometer 101, April–May 2024) indicates that 50% of Italians ‘tend to trust’ the EU, compared to a European average of 49%.
Regarding the performance of populist parties, it is notable that all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, the most recent national election in Italy. This outcome is significant as the ‘honeymoon’ period of the government elected in 2022 could have been expected to wane, and populist parties in office in other countries lost votes. This result marks a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level.
However, it is also worth comparing the 2024 results with those of 2019, the most recent European elections. In this respect, FdI significantly increased its vote share from 6.44% in the 2019 European elections to 28.76% in the 2024 European elections, even improving on its result from the 2022 general election (25.98%). Forza Italia also improved its vote share, rising from 8.78% in the 2019 European elections to 9.59% in the 2024 European elections. This positive outcome under Antonio Tajani, the new leader following Berlusconi’s passing, indicates stable support within the electorate. In contrast, the Lega’s vote share saw a notable change, declining dramatically from 34.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9% in 2024. It is worth noting that in the 2022 general elections, the party scored 8.97%.
Within the right-wing area, we observe a shift in the balance of power between Lega and FdI: Giorgia Meloni’s party has become the strongest, while the Lega has declined. Concerning the 2022 general elections, data from the polling agency SWG (SWG 2024) shows indeed that there has been a shift of votes from other partners within the centre-right coalition towards FdI. While 68% of the votes FdI represent a confirmation of their 2022 vote, 16% come from the centre-right (8% from Lega and 8% from FI), and 16% come from other political areas (7% from other lists and 9% from abstention).
Conversely, the Movimento 5 Stelle experienced its worst performance in a national election in history. Its vote share dropped from 17.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9.98% in 2024. This result continues the decline observed in the 2022 general elections (15.43%). In the analysis of the Five Star Movement electorate conducted by SWG, it is evident that only 40% of those who chose them in 2022 reaffirmed their choice in 2024. The remaining votes were distributed as follows: 13% voted for a centre-left party, 6% for a centre-right party, 6% for another party, and a significant 35% abstained from voting.
This result can be explained by the absence of prominent candidates on the lists, indicating that the Five Star Movement failed to consolidate its political constituency. Additionally, the renewed bipolar competition in Italy between the right and left has significantly diminished the influence of a third party like the M5S. It is to be noted that the M5S shifted to the left over the years. However, left-wing voters likely feel better represented by other leftist parties, such as the PD and the Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra (AVS).
Finally, it is worth asking what the main differences between the populist parties are concerning the characteristics of their electorate. In this respect, a pre-electoral survey conducted by CISE (De Sio, Mannoni & Cataldi 2024) indicates that M5S voters differ from right-wing ones in terms of education. Right-wing parties are more popular among less-educated voters and have less support among university graduates. In contrast, the M5S draws strength from those with a secondary education. The party also receives considerable support from the unemployed, affirming its focus on social issues.
There are also some differences within the centre-right coalition (especially between FdI and Lega, the two parties whose power dynamics have reversed over the last few years), mainly regarding gender and social class. Concerning gender, FdI has a predominantly male profile, while Lega has a more female-oriented electorate. Regarding social class, the Lega is strong among the most disadvantaged classes (a relatively new trend for the Lega), while only 10% of FdI support comes from the lowest class, rising to 36% among the highest class. These figures indicate a strong complementarity between the two parties.
Conclusions
In sum, regarding the impact of populism in these elections, we note that in the 2019 European elections, the combined vote share for the right-wing populist parties – Lega, FdI and FI – was 49.5%. By 2024, this total increased to 51.7%. Including the percentages for the M5S, we see that the total for populist parties was 66.6% in 2019 and slightly decreased to 62.5% in 2024. This figure underscores the growing strength of right-wing populism in Italy and highlights a persistent and possibly deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.
However, looking at the absolute votes, we note an increase in the percentage of votes for populist parties, but not in absolute terms. The votes for right-wing populist parties decreased from about 13 million in 2019 to 11 million in 2024. Including the Movimento 5 Stelle, the votes for populist parties (both right and left) fell from nearly 18 million in 2019 to just over 13 million in 2024. Abstention has also affected these parties, which may no longer be seen as a credible protest alternative to non-voting.
In summary, the results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of right-wing populism, particularly of FdI, within the centre-right coalition. Right-wing populism is increasingly prominent in Italy (at least among those who decide to vote), reflecting a sustained and potentially deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.
Conversely, the steep decline of the M5S marks a critical point for the party, indicating a need for strategic reassessment and potential repositioning within the Italian political landscape. This decline could also indicate a return to bipolarity after the ‘electoral earthquake’ of 2013 (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In this new bipolar system, for the time being, FdI holds the lion’s share of the right-wing representation.
(*) Cecilia Biancalana is an assistant professor in the Department of Culture, Politics and Society at the University of Turin. Her research focuses on political ecology, party change, populism and the relationship between the internet and politics.
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The 2024 European Parliament elections in Ireland came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Although Ireland had seen significant migration in the early to mid-2000s, the large number of migrants at this time had no significant impact on politics or voting. Nor was Ireland a country that saw any significant anti-EU sentiment. Thus, Ireland could be seen as an anomaly in Europe. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sudden rise in the numbers in Ireland seeking international protection (asylum seekers). Most of these came as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and again, Ireland saw a positive reaction to inward migration even though the country accommodated a comparatively high number of Ukrainian refugees per head of population despite the country’s geographic distance. There had previously been ethnonationalist parties on the ballot paper in European and national elections, but they had never really featured. In 2024 none got elected, although some did in the concurrent local elections. The vote for some explicitly populist ethnonationalist parties was greater than ever before. This result occurred partly because Sinn Féin, another populist–nationalist (but not wholly ethnonationalist) party, saw its support drop dramatically. It suggests, however, that Ireland may not remain the anomaly it has been. In all about a third of the voting electorate chose parties or candidates that can be categorized as populist.
Keywords: migration; Ireland; populism; EU Pact on Migration; farmers
By Eoin O’Malley * (School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland)
Introduction
While electorally successful populism has always existed in Irish politics, the 2024 European election campaign and results in Ireland saw the emergence of a type of populism that had not hitherto been seen. Appeals, for instance, to a ‘pure Irish people’ that is distinct from a ‘corrupt elite’ are common not just in contemporary politics but in the nationalist politics on which the Irish state is founded. But there had never been an appetite in Ireland for any sort of ‘othering’ of migrants (or indeed other minorities). Although the results of the 2024 elections generally returned moderate, non-populist politicians, the centre parties’ success belies the emergence of a stronger chauvinistic ethnonationalism, indicating a possible direction of travel towards increased levels of populism. This chapter will outline the existing and emerging populist parties present in Ireland and then set out the context of the rise of migration as an issue since Ireland’s last general election in February 2020. This background leads into a discussion of the 2024 campaign, an outline of the results, and, finally, a discussion of trends.
Populist parties in Ireland
For many years, Ireland was an anomaly in having no electorally successful, hardline-ethnonationalist populist outfit, as most other European countries have. The standard explanation for this absence is that Ireland has an established nationalist–populist party that is left-leaning and explicitly progressive (i.e., pro-migrant rights). In turn the reason for this might be that the narrative of Irish nationalism is ‘small guy nationalism’, given that the Irish ‘story’ is of forced emigration, with no ‘great past’ to which the country might return (O’Malley, 2008). Sinn Féin, an explicitly left–populist party, was directly linked to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), which killed thousands of people during the Troubles from the late 1960s to 1998. While much of that campaign of violence was clearly sectarian (and thus ethnonationalist), following its transition to normal politics in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) in 1998, Sinn Féin has espoused what it called ‘civic nationalism’, although it continues to champion a particular type of cultural nationalism that excludes those living in Northern Ireland who identify as British.
Sinn Féin was largely responsible for suppressing support for conservative ethnonationalism when immigration rose in the mid-2000s to where about 17% of the population in Ireland was foreign born (up from negligible levels in the early 1990s). It opposed a referendum in 2004 to change the origin of citizenship from jus soli to one based on the child’s heritage. Yet it remained outside the mainstream, being ‘Eurocritical’, opposing all new EU treaties, which because of Irish law must be passed by referendum. It was particularly critical of what it saw as the neoliberal bent of EU institutions.
Sinn Féin support rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist line. It adopted the policy approach led by small left-wing parties in opposing water charges, suggesting that the charges were a prelude to privatization designed to benefit elite supporters of the main governing party, Fine Gael. Sinn Féin used populist communications strategies to categorize Fine Gael and the main opposition party at the time, Fianna Fáil, as two sides of the same elite coin. There was some truth to this; these were not parties with strong ideological divisions, and in 2016, Fianna Fáil had signed a confidence and supply agreement to support a new minority Fine Gael government, enabling Fine Gael to remain in power. Shortly before becoming the Sinn Féin leader, Mary Lou McDonald declared that that pact ‘serves only to confirm the political establishment’s indifference and inability to act in the interests of the many’ (An Phoblacht, 2017). Sinn Féin and McDonald have frequently referred to the mainstream party leaders as ‘the lads’ or called them ‘an old boys’ club.’
One of the parties that had led the anti-water charges protests was People Before Profit (PBP), a small, Trotskyite, populist party with four Teachtaí Dála (TDs; MPs in English). It is an electoral front for the Socialist Workers’ Party, although it also forms an alliance with the Socialist Party, whose electoral label is Solidarity. It had no seats in the EP, but Clare Daly of Independents4Change had been a member of Solidarity, leaving because it refused to work with Mick Wallace, who was then an independent TD. Both Daly and Wallace went on to take seats in the European Parliament, sitting with The Left group.
Because of the Irish electoral system, also used in Irish EP elections, many non-party or independent candidates run for elected office, more often than not using populist campaign styles. One such MEP, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan, was first elected to the EP as an independent candidate in 2014 on an explicitly anti-EU and anti-elite platform. His appearance and pronouncements were unconventional and anti-establishment. A member of The Left group in the EP, his voting record suggests he was concerned with protecting farmers’ interests.
Independent Ireland, formed in November 2023 and comprising three TDs, calls for greater control of migration but opposes EU co-operation on migration as well as action to tackle climate change. It might be categorized as a farmers’ party, but it also ran a candidate in Dublin whose main issue was migration. It describes itself as ‘a party that puts our people first … delivering on a program of reform and common-sense solutions’ (Independent Ireland, 2024). Farmers had traditionally been a powerful lobby group in Ireland, with most Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil usually sympathetic to their needs. But the inclusion of the Greens in government since 2020 (as well as some legal requirements from Brussels) saw the government implement policies against the wishes of many farmers. Ireland successfully negotiated an opt-out on a nitrates directive, but that was a small win for farmers.
The other smaller parties that fielded candidates were more clearly of an extreme position. A group of parties ran candidates, all claiming to speak for the Irish people, and most of which subscribe to ‘Great Replacement’ theories. Although they ran as separate parties, many voters would find it difficult to distinguish between the Irish Freedom Party (IFP), the National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People. The IFP’s aim is to re-establish ‘the national independence and sovereignty of Ireland and [restore] its national democracy by leaving the European Union’, no easy task in a country that regularly boasts the highest level of approval for EU membership among all the member states (Irish Freedom Party, 2024). It hoped that it might be able to benefit from migration being a significant issue at the elections, focusing heavily on that issue. IFP is led by Herman Kelly, who had been the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) press officer in Brussels. IFP had fielded candidates in previous elections but with limited success.
The National Party had also fielded candidates before, yet polled miserably. As with most of these parties, it is socially conservative and emerged from the pro-life movement. Comically, it split in two ahead of the elections, with the two factions each running candidates under the same banner. In terms of presentation it appears fascistic, with the diminutive leader almost copying Adolf Hitler in his physical appearance. It displays textbook populism in its stance ‘against the corrupt and amoral establishment who push replacement level immigration which will in time completely destroy Irish nationality’ (National Party, 2024).
Ireland First is a new party, largely a vehicle for Derek Blighe, a self-styled ‘citizen journalist’, who became prominent during the 2023 anti-immigrant protests (detailed further below), including spreading videos that would seem to encourage the rioting in Dublin. It describes itself as centre-right; most observers would see it as conservative nationalist and clearly populist: ‘Career politicians have consistently let us down, and it is time for the people, the true backbone of Ireland, to take matters into their own hands’ (Ireland First, 2024).
The Irish People is the newest of these parties. It presented itself as a loose coalition of independent candidates working under a shared banner and agreed principles, including ‘supporting Family values, advocating for Free Speech, prioritizing Housing for Irish citizens, endorsing Sensible Immigration policies, maintaining Neutrality in international conflicts, ensuring Education is free from indoctrination, and supporting Rural and farming communities’ (The Irish People, 2024). It railed against what it sees as ‘extremist’ policies being implemented by the government using nationalist rhetoric normally reserved for parties such as Sinn Féin.
While it would be hard to identify these parties on a left–right spectrum, another populist party that emerged and was sometimes accused of being ‘far right’ is more clearly on the left economically. Aontú emerged as a splinter group from Sinn Féin over the party’s stance on abortion. The leader of Aontú was a Sinn Féin TD who was disciplined for opposing the repeal of a provision in the Irish constitution banning abortion. The party shares Sinn Féin’s focus on a united Ireland and left-leaning economic policies, which it styles as ‘economic justice’. However, its supporters clearly position themselves on the right of the political spectrum, possibly because of abortion (Red C, 2024).
The 2020 general election and beyond
In the 2019 European elections Sinn Féin lost most of its seats and dropped seven percentage points in a performance that surprised most observers and has never been satisfactorily explained. Within the party the analysis was that it had become too angry and negative and not solutions-focused, but you could have argued it was this anger that saw the party rise in the polls. There seemed to be no obvious change in communications or electoral strategy in the following months. Nevertheless, seven months later, in the general election, the party’s support surged, becoming marginally the most popular in terms of votes, and would have been clearly the most popular in terms of seats except that it had underestimated its likely support and fielded too few candidates to take advantage of its popularity.
Sinn Féin benefited from economic grievances, particularly housing-related ones (Cunningham and Marsh, 2021: 231–4). The party’s increased vote share in 2020 was to a great extent the result of the medium-term strategy of linking Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as the same party using the (somewhat pejorative) ‘FFG’ label mentioned above. So when voters came to think of an alternative to the existing government, it was difficult for Fianna Fáil to present itself as that alternative. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned vigorously on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters. Sinn Féin focused relentlessly on this issue, questioning whether the gains made from the country’s strong economic growth could reach ordinary people. The party also used a strategy of associating Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil with a ‘landlord class’, something with powerful resonance in Ireland due to the country’s nineteenth-century famine.
When the two parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, eventually formed a coalition government (together with the Green Party) in mid-2020, Sinn Féin doubled down on this rhetoric. It used its being the largest party in terms of votes to claim that somehow the party leader, Mary Lou McDonald, was nefariously denied the position of Taoiseach (prime minister). In tweets and other public communications, party supporters and representatives used language to deny that Micheál Martin was the rightful Taoiseach. They used hashtags such as #notmytaoiseach and spoke of McDonald as ‘the people’s choice’. This populist rhetoric was common in the subsequent years in opposition. And it worked. Although Fine Gael received a poll boost from its early handling of COVID-19, of which Sinn Féin was broadly supportive, Sinn Féin clearly became the largest party in voting intentions.
However, Sinn Féin also began to transition to become a more mainstream party, one that might be taken seriously as a prospective party of government. Walking this tightrope between populism and responsible party was to prove divisive for its supporters. Its mainstream position on COVID-19 probably led to the loss of some supporters, although individual party representatives were able to voice what many considered conspiracy theories on this issue without sanction by the party. In the months leading up to the EP elections, the party’s finance spokesman spoke to financiers in London to reassure them that Sinn Féin would not pose a threat to their interests. Mary Lou McDonald made a similar trip to Silicon Valley to reassure investors of her party’s intentions.
While it could have gotten away with this – even if it would have criticized others for doing it – the party also changed or took more mainstream positions on other issues. It dropped plans to immediately implement a wealth tax and instead said it would refer it to a commission on taxation. It opposed the EU Nature Restoration Law, causing some internal party division and criticism from left-wing groups. Sinn Féin supported the government’s referendum proposals to remove references to mothers and protections of marriage in the constitution, replaced instead by the vague concept of ‘durable relationships’. When a groundswell of opposition to the proposed changes led to their defeat, some in Sinn Féin acknowledged that the party was out of step with the people. It also supported legislation on hate crimes, which opponents claimed could limit free speech. The party then changed its mind on the issue, indicating it would oppose in later stages the legislation it had earlier voted for. The party was then criticized for a series of shifts in position and accused of ‘flip-flopping’ by its opponents.
However, it was its position on migration for which Sinn Féin received most opprobrium. The increase in refugees following the Russian invasion of Ukraine put severe pressure on Irish homelessness services. A subsequent spike in migration from other places, the Middle East and North Africa especially, put significant pressure on the ability of the state to accommodate them in the middle of an already-existing housing crisis. In 2023 Ireland saw violent anti-immigrant protests as hotels and other buildings were being used to accommodate the increased numbers of applicants for international protection. The mainstream political reaction, including that of Sinn Féin and the small populist left parties such as PBP, was condemnatory – dismissing those protesting as ‘far right’ or being led by the ‘far right.’
Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to hold together the coalition of supporters it had created since 2020. That coalition might be classified into three groups: anti-British nationalists who are most concerned about a united Ireland, young to middle-aged, less-educated ‘losers from globalisation’, and young left progressives who are most affected by the housing crisis. This coalition held together when the core issue was housing. But when migration was the focus of most media and public attention, the equivocal nature of the Sinn Féin response pleased none of these groups, the first two of which might have preferred to see the party oppose migration more clearly, whereas the last group might have been appalled at such an anti-progressive stance.
Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s faltering coalition. It more clearly called for controls on immigration and opposed the EU migration pact. It had scored some success in its referendum campaign opposing two new proposed amendments, one to redefine the traditional meaning of family and another to remove references to mothers from the constitution. Both were heavily defeated by voters. Aontú claimed to be ‘the only party listening to the people’ and campaigned on this line coming up to the EP elections.
With a riot in Dublin city centre in late 2023 and an increase in the importance of the migration issue, a political response and adverse fallout were inevitable. The minister for justice, Helen McEntee, was seen as ineffectual on the issue. Some media reports showed that Ireland had deported just 100 of the 7,300 failed asylum applicants since 2023. The government slowly started to shift its position, but when Leo Varadkar (Fine Gael leader and Taoiseach) stood down in April 2024, replaced by Simon Harris, there was an expectation that he might shift the government’s position. Certainly the rhetoric from the government changed somewhat, although no specific shift in policy could be identified.
The campaign for the 2024 EP elections
In opinion polls coming up to the EP election campaign migration rose as one of the main issues that respondents felt was important (the others mainly being housing and the cost of living). One of the most notable features of the polls was the fall in support for Sinn Féin. Much of this support appeared to be going to independent or small-party candidates rather than the mainstream parties. As there is a low threshold to get on the ballot, the ballot paper had a large number of candidates in each of the three constituencies (Dublin, 23 candidates for 4 seats; Ireland South, 23 candidates for 5 seats; and Midlands-North West, 26 candidates for 5 seats). The large number of candidates meant that they would inevitably split their vote and reduce their chances of exploiting the new salience of migration among the Irish electorate.
Sinn Féin had been vocally pro-migrant rights, but that message became more equivocal over time as some representatives acknowledged the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on services. It tried to refocus public anger on the government, but its messaging was confused. In the run-up to and during the campaign, Sinn Féin changed its emphasis on migration. It rejected criticism that it was for ‘open borders’, saying it opposed the EU Pact on Migration on the basis that the party ‘firmly believes that Ireland must retain our sovereignty over these matters if we are to have an immigration system that is fair, efficient, and enforced’ (Ó Laoghaire, 2024). This shift was seen as a response to the direct threat from chauvinist nationalism in the form of some microparties, some with fascist overtones and from independent candidates or from Independent Ireland. Anti-immigrant protests increased in scale and number and, at some of them, crowds waving Irish flags shouted: ‘Sinn Féin are traitors!’ These protesters were able to use nationalist rhetoric, which had previously tended to be pro-migrant, by referencing a centuries-old attempt to replace the Catholic native population in a series of ‘Plantations’. These groups then referred to a ‘great replacement’ through a ‘new plantation’. There was a sense that Sinn Féin, once masters of nationalist populism, was now losing to nationalist populism.
On other issues, populist parties such as Sinn Féin and PBP were more in tune with the public mood. All these parties had opposed what it saw as the weakening of Irish neutrality by consecutive governments’ involvement in military partnerships, such as the NATO Partnership for Peace and PESCO, a platform for member state co-operation in European defence. PBP is explicitly anti-EU because of what it sees as the Union’s ‘imperial agenda’ and support for neoliberalism. Both it and Sinn Féin took strong positions on the Israel–Hamas war, including calls for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. On the issue of the Russia–Ukraine War, PBP took positions that were less in tune with popular opinion and often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks. Sinn Féin’s position was more equivocal. Historically it was more aligned with Russia, often blaming the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin. The invasion of Ukraine meant that the party said it was fully behind the smaller country. But it continued to abstain on packages designed to support Ukraine in the EP.
Two of Independent Ireland’s three EP candidates were high-profile broadcasters, one a recently retired regional correspondent for the national broadcaster and another a late-night phone-in-show host – often referred to as a ‘shock jock’. Their high profile immediately made them contenders to take seats. Although some saw Independent Ireland as an extreme right-wing group, it regards itself as centrist (albeit with a conservative bent). Outside Dublin it campaigned on farming issues, being critical of EU regulations and ‘EU overreach’, and also spoke more fervently in favour of greater control of migration than other centrist parties.
No seats for the new extremes, but …
Although Fine Gael (the European People’s Party-aligned governing party) lost vote share and one seat (down to four), it was relatively pleased with the outcome. At 20.8%, its vote share was slightly above the other centrist governing party, the Renew-aligned Fianna Fáil (20.4%), which gained two seats to equal Fine Gael’s four seats. Most pleasing for them was that they both were well ahead of Sinn Féin. The most prominent populist party sitting with The Left group in the EP, Sinn Féin won a seat in two constituencies but lost their only seat in another. It polled just 11% of the first-preference vote, about the same as in 2019, but well down on its polling in the run-up to the elections. It lost most in rural constituencies.
Despite the significant support for independent candidates, two prominent outgoing MEPs lost their seats. Independents4Change MEPs polled almost 5% of the vote, but both Clare Daly and Mick Wallace suffered from splits in the populist, anti-establishment left vote. We can see also in vote transfer patterns that they were also probably hurt by the presence of anti-immigrant candidates customarily considered on the ‘far right’. They also complained of a media campaign against them. The media had indeed been less than friendly to the pair in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion and their pro-Russian analysis of that conflict. On the other hand, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan comfortably retained his seat.
The new party, Independent Ireland, polled well in two of the three constituencies, picking up a seat in Midlands-North West probably at the expense of Sinn Féin. The winning candidate chose to sit with the Renew Europe group in the EP, which caused some annoyance within the party, as Renew was seen as too mainstream. The smaller left and right populist parties mentioned above failed to win representation in the European Parliament, partly because their votes were split between too many candidates. However, parties and candidates that were aggressively anti-immigrant (so, excluding Independent Ireland) polled a collective 7%, higher than ever before. This result suggests that the immigration issue has a resonance at the polling booths in Ireland that was not previously expected.
Discussion and perspectives
The unwinding of the voting coalition that had sustained Sinn Féin’s popularity was the most notable outcome of the EP and local elections in June 2024. The impact on Sinn Féin’s strategic choices is as yet not clear, but it is difficult to see how the party can recover this vote while immigration remains a significant issue. The party admitted that immigration was the issue that had caused it difficulties, and within months of the result, published an immigration policy that was immediately criticized for ‘dog whistle’ politics. A post-election study shows that Sinn Féin voters did not regard migration as one of the top three issues in the European elections (Red C 2024). This is despite it being the second most important issue for voters overall. It suggests that the voters Sinn Féin has lost are those who thought about migration. Even if it ceases to be an issue, the party may have lost some of its anti-establishment reputation among a section of voters. In the EP it has tended to oppose many of the proposals coming from the European Commission, and that is unlikely to change in the medium term. However, the Sinn Féin member elected for Dublin is highly motivated by concern for climate change, and she might shift the party’s direction on issues such as the European Green Deal.
The Independent Ireland member elected to the Renew Europe group, Ciarán Mullooly, is unlikely to feel tied to any whip and will oppose environmental measures that curtail agriculture. The same will be true of ‘Ming’ Flanagan. If the relative success of the mainstream parties was prominent in the post-election analyses, it ignores the fact that Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s combined support is lower than it has ever been. At least 40% of the first-preference vote went to parties or candidates that can be uncontroversially labelled populist.
Moreover, populist sentiment is common in Ireland for those parties identified here as populist. Although attitudes toward migrants split these parties on a clear left–right basis, when it comes to statements such as ‘Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful’, those most likely to agree are supporters of Sinn Féin (74%), PBP-Solidarity (84%), Aontú (71%) and Independent Ireland (78%) compared to 40% for Fianna Fáil voters. Conspiracy theories associated with populism are also more likely to be believed by supporters of these parties; 38% of Sinn Féin supporters and 45% of Independent Ireland’s supporters agreed with the statement ‘A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major decisions in world politics’. Furthermore, when it comes to trust in news sources, supporters of Sinn Féin (25%), PBP-Solidarity (24%), Aontú (13%) and Independent Ireland (25%) have the lowest levels of trust in the state broadcaster RTÉ.
This points to an available market for populist parties, particularly on the right. It seems that the problem is that support is divided between too many parties. However, the emergence of a significant political leader might tie together some of the anti-migrant and anti-European sentiment that is out there to create a significant electoral force in the future.
(*) Eoin O’Malley is Associate Professor of politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. He is author or editor of seven books on Irish politics, and author of over 40 peer-reviewed publications. His research centres mainly on Irish politics, including the party system and political leadership.e-mail: eoin.omalley@dcu.ie
References
An Phoblacht (2017). ‘Fianna Fáil plays at opposing Fine Gael but Fianna Fáil pact with Fine Gael keeps Leo Varadkar in power’ An Phoblacht 18 November, https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/27200
Cunningham, Kevin & Marsh, Michael (2021) ‘Voting Behavious: The Sinn Féin Election’, in M. Gallagher, M. Marsh, & T. Reidy (eds) How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 219–54.
Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
