Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040
Abstract
This paper explores the dynamic interplay of victimhood narratives, populism, and civilizational rhetoric in Turkish Islamist politics, centering on the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tracing the historical trajectory of Islamist victimhood and its evolution, the study reveals how the AKP strategically fused domestic victimhood politics with Islamist civilizational populism. These narrative positions the AKP as the advocate for the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation against a perceived pro-Western, secular, and corrupt elite. This narrative extends beyond the national level, portraying the AKP as the defender of the Muslim ummah against alleged Western conspiracies. Challenging existing literature that characterizes the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a mere continuation of its Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, this paper argues for its significant evolution. It introduces two additional layers constituting a ‘new’ victimhood: 1) a national victimhood discourse and 2) manufactured victimhood. In the post-Gezi Protests era, the AKP not only revisits its Islamist victimhood mindset, inclusive of anti-Western conspiracies, but also adopts a nationalist victimhood discourse through a mimetic process, seamlessly integrating it with its existing Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative. Furthermore, with the AKP’s rise to hegemonic status, the party strategically manufactures a novel victimhood narrative, rooted in conspiracy theories alleging Western opposition to the leader of the Muslim World, Turkey. This narrative strategy enables the AKP to deflect criticism, legitimize crackdowns, and solidify its grip on power. By unpacking these layers of victimhood, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the AKP’s evolving narrative strategy and its implications for the political landscape in Turkey.
Within Turkish politics, the fusion of populist victimhood narratives has emerged as a potent force, catalyzing shifts in ideologies, political strategies, and societal perceptions. This paper embarks on a multifaceted exploration of these developments, by dissecting the evolution and strategic amalgamation of victimhood discourses, populism, and civilizational rhetoric within Turkish Islamist politics. Central to this study is an in-depth analysis of these narratives, with a particular focus on their manifestation and transformation during the AKP’s tenure. Historical grievances, intertwined with conspiratorial narratives and appeals to the victimhood of the Sunni Muslim Turkish nation, form the bedrock of these ideologies.
Beginning with a historical exposition of perceived injustices and pivotal events that sowed the seeds of Turkish Islamist victimhood, this paper navigates the roots of these victimhood narratives. Within these, segments of conservative society are portrayed as historically oppressed under the Kemalist elite, casting the AKP as the sole and genuine representative of the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation. Moreover, this study illuminates the confluence of victimhood with populist rhetoric, epitomized by the AKP’s portrayal of itself as the champion of the people against a corrupt and oppressive elite. Furthermore, the analysis delves into civilizational populism, where the AKP constructs itself as the guardian of Turkish identity, fending off alleged Western conspiracies and positioning Turkey as a bulwark against external threats. Importantly, this analysis demonstrates how these narratives have transitioned victimhood from a solely national to a transnational experience by framing the ummah as under threat – and Turkey as its savior.
In societies entrenched in prolonged and unresolved conflicts, perceptions of victimhood emerge as integral within the narratives of populist political parties. Members of the in-group engage in a subjective process of branding the out-group as morally unjust and assigning blame to the group for perceived and actual harms. In contrast, the members of the in-group are presented as the sole victims of these supposed internal and external threats. This subjective process is associated with a higher degree of conspirational thinking. A strong correlation has been identified between a sense of victimhood and a propensity to embrace conspiracy theories. Collective experiences of perceived victimization, in particular, heighten susceptibility to adopting conspiracy stereotypes (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015).
Following instances of perceived discrimination, disadvantage, or being targeted by crime or violence, groups may formulate theories that allege certain out-groups are conspiring against the in-group. Victimhood tends to generate its own moral framework, which legitimizes the actions and potential revenge of the victims. It also encourages the victim to identify scapegoats and attribute blame to them. Scapegoating solidifies the identity of an enemy and their negative characteristics, helping victims avoid feelings of ambiguity or moral doubt. (Tepeli & Demirok, 2014; Parlak & Uz, 2015). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has effectively utilized scapegoating and conspiracy theories to achieve his goals (Yabanci, 2016).
Narratives of victimhood play a pivotal role within Turkey’s national discourse, yet the absence of dialogue about its diverse victimhood narratives presents a notable gap in Turkish political history research. Accordingly, the inadequate analysis of various victimhood claims has hindered a thorough understanding of the AKP’s recent authoritarian shift. Existing literature tends to perceive the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a continuum of earlier Islamist victimhood narratives, overlooking its evolution which has seen the addition of two additional layers. These new layers, ‘national victimhood discourse/victimhood nationalism’ and ‘manufactured victimhood’, have helped create a distinct form of victimhood prevalent in contemporary Turkey.
This paper primarily examines the AKP’s use of victimhood discourses since 2002. Initially, these discourses gained momentum following tangible events such as ‘the February 28 post-modern coup process,’ headscarf ban, and discrimination against minorities. However, with the AKP’s third election victory and Gezi Park protests in 2013 (which led to anti-government mobilization), the party shifted to manufacturing victimhood narratives and employing anti-Western conspiracy theories to deflect failures. This manufactured victimhood, now centralized in official discourse and campaigning, aided in contradicting and distancing the party from its true status as the dominant national power. This paper highlights a shift from genuine to manufactured victimhood discourses by first exploring the historical development of victimhood in Turkey, then delving into its discursive evolution and its impact on Turkish politics.
The Vertical and Horizontal Dimension of Erdogan’s Populism
Numerous scholars concur that populism constitutes a distinct set of core ideas, often referred to as a thin ideology, rather than a comprehensive belief system with explicit guidelines addressing social, political, and economic issues, such as liberalism, social democracy, and communism. This thin ideology revolves around two central elements: (i) the antagonism between ‘the pure people’ and the elites, and (ii) the moral and normative supremacy of popular will (Mudde, 2004: 543). Populists interpret the concept of ‘the people’ in a manner that aligns with their political agenda. They assert that it is they alone that can represent the people against a perceived ‘corrupt’ elite seeking to exclude them from power. It’s important to note that this ‘unified and virtuous people’ represents an exclusionary political project and does not encompass the entire population of a given country (Lefort, 1988).
Populism manifests itself in two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). The vertical dimension revolves around a binary of the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt, evil elite’, while the horizontal dimension involves a binary opposition between insiders and outsiders. The outsiders, who curiously may be citizens, are nevertheless perceived as foreigners or internal enemies based on their identities (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). Within the ‘people,’ there exists a distinction between ‘people like us’ and those outside ‘our’ group, who are seen as threats to ‘our’ way of life. Across various political and social contexts, populism tends to designate certain out-groups, such as minorities, migrants, dissidents, and opposition parties and politicians, as scapegoats. In this regard, populism adopts a Manichean perspective, dividing society into opposing poles of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ or ‘friends’ versus ‘enemies.’ (Mudde, 2004: 543).
A recent study (Lewis et al., 2019) highlighted that Erdogan is the only right-wing leader who can be labelled as being ‘very populist.’ Since working in the National Outlook (Milli Gorus) years during the 1970s and 1980s, Erdogan’s worldview consistently featured Islamist populist elements, framing himself and practicing Muslims as the true owners of the homeland, who had been victims of the oppressive Kemalist establishment. Erdogan’s populism has intensified significantly in recent years and has become a core feature of his political narrative (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This intensification was particularly noticeable following key political moments such as the nation’s economic challenges in 2009 and the Gezi protests in 2013. Post-Gezi, Erdogan’s populism merged with a revived Islamist ideology, marked by strong anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This ideological shift is rooted in former Prime Minister’s Erbakan’s National Outlook Islamism and the totalitarian ideology of Erdogan’s influential role model, Necip Fazil Kisakurek. Together, these elements provide a strong religio-moral component, asserting that ‘the people’ they represent include not only those who were exploited, excluded, oppressed, and victimized but also practicing Muslims who are regarded as morally superior (Tugal, 2002).
In Erdoğan’s populist vision, the Kemalist elite, along with non-Kemalist secular Turks—including leftists, liberals, democrats, and many urban-educated individuals—constitutes the vertical dimension of populism. These are often portrayed as ‘elites’ (referred to as Beyaz Turkler or White Turks) who are perceived as disconnected from the ‘real’ and authentic values of ‘the people.’ They are frequently caricatured as sipping whisky by the Bosporus while the ‘real Turks’ endure hardships. They are typically accused of imposing historical traumas on ordinary people in the name of Westernization or progress. Turkish-Islamist media intellectuals have particularly popularized the pejorative figure of the White Turk, depicting them as arrogant, elitist, and anti-Islamist. The White Turk is constructed as someone who views practicing Muslims as provincial, lower class, and ignorant to define their own (secular, civilized, and Westernized) identity and justify their authority. In the Erdoganist narrative, the White Turks are held responsible for any issues in the country, with the specter of the past Kemalist regime playing a crucial role in illustrating the potential consequences for ‘the people’ if Erdogan were to lose power (Yilmaz, 2021).
The horizontal dimension is also significant in Erdogan’s populism, and his policies aimed at fostering a pious in-group. This is particularly the case in the recent manifestation of victimhood, which poses that the AKP, Erdogan and the in-group are being threatened and attacked by a range of conspiring internal and external enemies. Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, liberals, and notably, the Gulen movement became targets within this resurrected discourse, fueling the ‘resentment/revenge of the Sunni constituency against the Westernized elite and citizens practicing a Western lifestyle, perceived as responsible for the banishment of religion itself’ (Yilmaz et al., 2023).
Erdoganist Victimhood and Resentment: Kemalists as the Oppressors
Turkish victimhood discourse has been shaped by several key narrative themes. These themes provide shape to claims of victimhood by describing who the oppressors are, who is being threatened (victimized), and how historical, political or other contextual factors justify and legitimize these narratives.
Turkish victimhood has a long history in the national political arena and there is a degree of continuity between earlier Islamist victimhood, Kemalist victimhood and contemporary Erdoganist victimhood. The insecurities, anxieties, and fears within Erdoganism bear a striking resemblance to those found in Kemalism. Much like their Kemalist counterparts, Turkey’s Islamists harbor their own insecurities, feelings of victimhood, fears, and a siege mentality towards the West. They attribute the decline of revered institutions, namely the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, to the West, as documented by Akkoyunlu and Oktem (2016: 510). However, in the Islamist and Erdoganist narrative, Kemalists are viewed as products of Western cultural imperialism—self-colonizing pawns of the godless West fixated on eroding Turkey’s Islamic identity and threatening its Muslim population (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 510). Thus, Erdogan’s populism finds its roots in Turkish Islamist victimhood. It positions itself against the Kemalist hegemony by purporting to represent the demands, interests, victimhood, resentments, and frustrations of practicing Muslims, whom Erdogan frames as the true owners of the country. In this context, the potential for democratization of Turkey only exists if democracy is conceived as the ‘power of the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ (Yilmaz, 2021).
Historically, victimhood discourses have held a central place in Islamist ideology in Turkey. The Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse argues that Islamists have been the true victims of the modernization process in Turkey (Yilmaz Z., 2017: 483). At the core of the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative lies the transformative events of 1923, involving the destruction of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the secular Republic. Kemalist reforms in education, social interactions, and politics dealt a severe blow to the status and wealth of the Islamic establishment.
Consequently, the Kemalists, particularly represented by the Republican People Party (CHP) in political life, became the primary oppressor and threat in Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse. The persecution of leading Islamist intellectuals like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Said Nursi, and Sezai Karakoc, made possible by new laws, generated deep resentment and disillusionment among intellectuals and their followers toward the existing political order in Turkey. These intellectuals perceived themselves as “alienated in their own country,” forced into “estrangement,” and cast as “pariahs” (Aktay, 2003; see also Singer, 2013). In this Islamist imagination, the history of modern Turkey is entirely framed as the “victimhood of devout Muslims” (Yilmaz Z., 20174: 87).
The Kemalist animosity towards Islamists during the Kemalist decades, exemplified by the Constitutional Court’s frequent closure of Erbakan’s political parties, the “Republican Rally” in 2007, headscarf bans at universities, and continuous demonization of Islamist figures in the media, served to solidify Islamists’ perception of Kemalists as adversaries. This has cultivated a sense of “resentment and victimhood” among Islamists (Yılmaz Z., 2017).
The conspiratorial anxieties and resentments of pro-Erdoganists related to the authoritarian secularism of Kemalism were not entirely unfounded. However, Erdogan’s discourse successfully manipulated these anxieties, fears, and resentments and leveraged them in sweeping narratives of the threat they posed to the fate of the nation and, more broadly, to the Muslim world. These narratives gained intense traction following the Gezi Protests in 2013 and, most prominently, the 2016 coup attempt. In Turkey’s current socio-political climate, even the slightest criticism is now framed as a terrorist activity masterminded by external enemies determined to destroy Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World.
Islamist Civilizational Populism: Framing the EU and West as Civilizational Enemies
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ali Erbas, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is seen during a public rally in Istanbul on the second anniversary of failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.
While civilizationism has been interpreted as a form of nationalism, the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ undergo a reconceptualization when framed in civilizational terms. This perspective presents an alternative to nationalism, wherein the imagined community or nostalgic utopia is situated at a different level of cultural and political space compared to national discourse. It’s crucial to note that civilizationism doesn’t replace nationalism; instead, it becomes intertwined with nationalism (Brubaker, 2017: 1211).
‘Civilizational populism’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023) is defined as a set of ideas that asserts politics should reflect the “volonté générale” (general will) of the people. It posits that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ who collaborate with dangerous outsiders from other civilizations. These outsiders are portrayed as hostile and a direct threat to the people’s civilization and way of life (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023).
A civilisational populist perspective became prevalent in AKP politics following the decline of pro-European Union (EU) reforms and a weakening of ties with the EU. Firstly, it moved away from the prioritization of Westernization and relations-building with the West but, more significantly, it also placed a civilizational perspective at the core of Turkey’s interactions with the EU. This perspective framed Islamic civilization as being fundamentally opposed to Western civilization (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).
The AKP’s Islamist victimhood narrative portrays a vision of a united Muslim world (the Ummah) threatened by conspiracies orchestrated by “the Crusader West.” This narrative not only designates the ruling Islamist regime as a victim but also frames Turkey as a nation and country under threat. The concept of Islamist victimhood enables the AKP to present itself simultaneously as a target of Western conspiracies and as the foremost defender of Turkey and the entire Muslim world against these perceived conspiracies. This has led to the AKP adopting a transactionalist foreign policy approach towards the EU, stripping away the former ideational or identity-related significance of Turkey-EU relations (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).
The Arab Spring also presented a crucial opportunity for the AKP, as it offered hope regarding the fall of pro-Western authoritarian regimes, allowing Islamist forces to rise and potentially restore Islamic national identities. In response to the Arab Spring, the AKP identified a strategic window and began defining its civilizational identity in starkly anti-Western terms. This move aimed to address and appeal to anxieties, insecurities, and fears regarding Western retaliation. The AKP embraced its civilizational discourse more vehemently, categorizing the West and Islam as mutually exclusive and antagonistic enemies. Erdogan and his party increasingly employed a civilizational discourse that depicted Turkey as an exclusively Muslim nation. While presenting themselves and their supporters (AKP voters) as native and national, they categorized other political classes and their constituents as non-native due to their allegedly “alien” Western paradigms. Simultaneously, anti-Westernism escalated, with the AKP denouncing the EU/West for undermining Turkey’s alleged rise under AKP rule.
Religio-nationalist Victimhood
Another layer of the AKP’s victimhood discourse converges with the Kemalist national victimhood discourse that portrays Turkey as the prime target of Western powers and their local collaborators. The notion of a national victimhood discourse is deeply ingrained in the Turkish national psyche, emphasizing collective victimhood experienced by the Turkish people, especially at the hands of Western imperialist forces. This narrative, rooted in events dating back to 1908 and exacerbated during WWI, is also propagated through institutional mechanisms like the national curriculum.
Central to Turkey’s victimhood nationalism is what has been termed the Sevres Syndrome – a collective victimhood and siege mentality with roots in the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This treaty marked the gradual and tumultuous collapse of the Ottoman State. Over time, the memory of this treaty and its associated fears and losses metamorphosed into Sevres Syndrome, giving rise to numerous anti-Western conspiracy theories grounded in nationalism and anti-imperialism. Scholars suggest that the perception of unique in-group victimhood, such as that developed in the Sevres Syndrome, often solidifies national identities, fostering a siege mentality in which certain nations perceive the world as inherently against them.
Both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic grappled with the need to rationalize their defeats and challenges, resorting to a narrative involving external forces and internal adversaries. In the late Ottoman Empire, adversaries included Greece, Armenia, Russia, and the UK. Over time, this narrative evolved to include Kurds, Jews, communists, and Christians as victims of an enduring demonization campaign. Despite changing actors, the narrative has remained fundamentally consistent. Identifying enemies and incorporating conspiracy theories has become an ingrained aspect of the collective mindset, observed among both secularist and Islamist factions within Turkish society (Yilmaz, 2021).
National Victimhood Discourse
Interpreting the world through the narrative lens described above provides both secular and Muslim Turks with a framework that absolves them from extending empathy to other victimized groups, such as the Armenians. Combined with the Sevres Syndrome, it also allows them to present themselves unequivocally as the true victims of historical events. For instance, rather than confronting the reality of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish state projected Turks as historical victims, portraying them as targets of both murderous Armenians and the depredations of imperial powers. This framework is what we term the national victimhood discourse.
The national victimhood discourse has typically been (ab)used by the ruling elite within Turkish politics. This stands in contrast to the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, which emerged as an oppositional underdog narrative. The distinction lies in the requirement of victimhood nationalism for the claimant to represent both the nation and the state, necessitating a position of power to do so. The nation and state are the primary targets of victimization in this context, diverging from Turkish Islamist victimhood, where Islamists and their conservative constituents are the focus. Consequently, those invoking Turkish Islamist victimhood should ideally only speak on behalf of these particular segments.
Victimhood Narratives – and Their Evolution – During the AKP’s Rising Hegemony
Erdogan supporters are seen during the commemorations for the second anniversary of the 2016 coup attempt in Istanbul on July 15, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
The discussion above briefly outlined the key actors held responsible in AKP’s victimhood discourse, and the key influential factors that have shaped its narratives. In the following section, the content of these narratives and their evolution will be analyzed, investigating the initial articulations of victimization which were primarily in response to various socio-political and historical events. It will then examine their transformation and adoption of manufactured narratives and an increased reliance on conspiracy theories, which have been necessary to maintain a victimhood status—even as the AKP has become the most powerful hegemon in contemporary Turkey.
The evolution of the AKP’s contemporary victimhood narrative is marked by the integration of victimhoods associated with religio-nationalism, Turkish nationalism and Islamist populism. The party positions itself as a victimized yet conversely hegemonic entity speaking on behalf of the entire nation and, in an imagined sense, the Ummah. The contemporary manifestation of their claim to victimhood goes beyond these components to encompass an additional discursive layer of manufactured victimhood.
The AKP’s narrative of victimhood persists despite governing the country for twenty-one uninterrupted years and having acquired extensive political powers. When faced with challenges like economic downturns due to its policies or evidence of corruption, the party resorts to blaming external entities, such as foreign forces or interest lobbies, deflecting responsibility.
Initial Era of Victimhood Narratives: Predominantly Anti-Kemalist
The AKP’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections marked a significant departure from the long-standing dominance of Kemalists in Turkish politics. Utilizing the discontent of pious Muslims and broader dissatisfaction stemming from economic challenges, the AKP employed a potent populist discourse that perpetuated the belief that the majority were victims of the established order.
In the early 2000s, the AKP successfully portrayed itself as the victim of the ‘White Turks,’ referencing the Kemalist hegemony and military tutelage that discriminated against conservative segments of society. Turkish Islamists described themselves as the ‘Black Turks’ (Bilici, 2009; Demiralp, 2012; Arat-Koc, 2018), claiming to have endured oppression at the hands of the Kemalist hegemony since the establishment of the Republic. In constructing this opposition (Black Turks vs White Turks), the AKP was able to portray themselves as the voice of the Black Turks. Erdogan consistently asserted his identity as a ‘Black Turk,’ for instance stating on one occasion, “In this country, there is a segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks.” On another occasion, he expressed, “I am honored to be a Black Turk” (Sabah, 2015).
During its two initial terms, the AKP’s victimhood discourses effectively highlighted Kemalist-era policies, including the February 28, 1997 “post-moder coup,” the headscarf ban, and discrimination in bureaucratic and military sectors. This political period saw a distancing from overtly Islamist victimhood references, and it was during this time that Erdogan famously stated the party had shed the garment of Islamism.
In its initial phase of governance, the AKP maintained a pro-Western stance while focusing on its primary objective of challenging the Kemalist establishment. The primary resentment of Turkish-Islamist subjects was initially directed at White Turks, Kemalist elites, and CHP cadres. It persistently asserted that its struggle against the establishment was fundamentally a fight for democracy and human rights—a strategic move, considering the fate of its predecessors. The victimization under the Kemalist regime extended beyond conservative Muslims, encompassing Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, liberals, and socialists to varying degrees throughout the Republican period.
Around the turn of the millennium, especially within the context of a military tutelage system, it became evident that a broader community needed to unite around a general democratization agenda. This unity was crucial for the AKP to address specific demands and gain power, resulting in the AKP and various victimized segments of society becoming mutually dependent in challenging the Kemalist tutelage regime. To garner support and demonstrate inclusivity, the AKP invited a broad spectrum of political actors, predominantly from center-right and liberal backgrounds, to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. Their narratives of Turkish victimhood incorporated discourses addressing long-standing issues faced by minorities under the Kemalist reign (Acikel, 1996; Demiralp, 2012; Yılmaz Z., 2017; Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018). This discursive period of victimhood was grounded in real events and did not rely on conspiracy theories.
Aligning with its conservative democratic discourse, the AKP did not focus solely on expressing Muslim resentment but sought to empathize with other victimhood narratives and attempted to build a coalition among various marginalized groups. The party collaborated with actors such as the Gulen movement, religious Kurds, some Alevis, and the liberal democratic segments of society. These groups consistently supported the AKP, at least until the Gezi events in 2013, and benefited from the opportunity structures that emerged following the AKP’s election in 2002
Articulating Narratives of Human Rights Abuses
The AKP government responded to the demands of their coalition of victims by implementing reforms aimed at safeguarding human rights, especially in minority affairs. Between 2004 and 2013, significant openings were created in response to non-Muslim, Kurdish, and Alevi issues. Erdogan – the leader of this coalition of victims – opportunistically attempted to redirect the resentments of the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis toward blame attribution towards the CHP and Kemalism.
The AKP strategically anchored its victimhood claims in human rights discourses during the pre-Gezi period. Articulations of human rights (and human rights abuses) became a crucial tool for the AKP to assert and maintain its victimhood status. In a domestic political context, human rights arguments can be powerful in evoking a sense of ‘victimhood,’ portraying the state as an all-encompassing hegemon inflicting pain on less powerful groups. The AKP effectively utilized this argument, leveraging the balance of power in Turkish politics and events under the Kemalist regime, such as party closure cases, the headscarf ban, Erdogan’s short-term imprisonment, and the military’s rejection of Abdullah Gul’s presidential election due to his wife’s headscarf, which lent legitimacy to their rhetoric (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018: 299).
Victimhood Claims Taking on New Dimensions in Response to Key Political Events
In the pre-Gezi period, Turkish Islamist victimhood was primarily domestic, focusing on its underdog status against the Kemalists. However, the government response to the 2013 Gezi protests marked a significant departure from the predominantly anti-Kemalist and victimhood narratives that the AKP had been disseminating since coming into power. Erdogan perceived and presented the Gezi protests as a severe threat to his personal power, prompting a desperate need for new rhetoric to counter the peaceful civil protests. As Kemalist-centric victimhood narratives lost appeal, the AKP sought a new political discourse to reassert its victimhood status. During the Gezi protests, Erdogan resorted to civilisationist Islamist rhetoric, portraying not only the government but Turkey in its entirety as a victim of an international conspiracy orchestrated by the West and its local allies. This narrative amalgamated elements of ‘national victimhood discourse’ and ‘Turkish Islamist victimhood’ and positioned itself as a perpetual victim of various groups, countries, and interests, including Germany, the US, the UK, and media outlets Otpor! and CNN. The AKP also deployed a discourse of needing to protect itself and the ummah against imaginary enemies, including the ‘supreme intelligence,’ ‘interest rate lobbies,’ and foreign adversaries (Yilmaz, 2021).
In the same year as the Gezi Protests, the 2013 military coup in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood-supported presidency of Mohammad Morsi dealt both a geopolitical and psychological blow to the AKP leadership (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518). The fall of a crucial Islamist ally and the imprisonment of its elected leader undermined the AKP’s regional aspirations, contributing to a deeper level of insecurity and an alarmist reading of domestic and regional dynamics. Importantly, the event validated Turkish Islamist’s deep mistrust and resentment towards the West. They perceived the muted response of Western media and governments to the coup, compared to the extensive attention given to the Gezi Protests, and the swift endorsement of the military-backed regime in Egypt, as proof of its double standards regarding democracy in the Muslim world (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518).
The controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was also a traumatizing event for millions of Erdoganists (Adisonmez & Onursal, 2020: 298). Erdogan adeptly turned the failed coup attempt into an extraordinary source of popular support, using the event as a rallying and mobilizing opportunity. More importantly, he gained the unwavering support of conservative religious and nationalist segments of society by articulating a discourse that instilled fear and anxiety, portraying all opposition and criticism as detrimental to their interests, lifestyles, and even to their existence (Ozen, 2020: 1-3). He consistently used a discourse of securitization to maintain this anxiety and fear, framing opposition to his government as an attack against Islam, the nation’s unity, the flag, and all sacred national values.
Islamist Populism and Historical Islamist Victimhood
The political events detailed in the previous section have contributed significantly to the victimhood narratives propagated by Erdogan and the AKP. Although these events intersect with religious populism, there is also a distinct layer of victimhood that stems directly from Islamism and historical Islamist victimhood and addresses the perceived victimization of Muslims at the hands of various oppressors. Victimhood accounts within Turkish Islamism assert that Islamists have been the true casualties of Turkey’s modernization process, with a particular focus on the demise of the Ottoman State and the subsequent establishment of the secular Republic in 1923. Islamist populism plays a significant role in shaping AKP’s key narratives about friends and foes, and victims and victimizers. It has also allowed Erdogan and his party to create a victimhood discourse that connects to broader and transnational Muslim victimhood themes and narratives.
Turkish Islamist victimhood is rooted in historical experiences of victimization, stretching back to the early Republican period and, for the AKP, encompassing party closures, military coups, detainment, and headscarf bans. At the core of this victimhood narrative lies the profound impact of secular Kemalist reforms in education, social structures, and politics, which dealt a severe blow to the prior status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. The oversight of all religious education and preaching was centralized under the state-affiliated Diyanet, and numerous religious institutions, including dervish lodges and Islamic charities, were prohibited or abolished. The new Turkish Criminal Code criminalized almost all forms of non-state (non-Diyanet) religious dissemination, leading to the persecution of various religious groups.
While certain historical events during the Kemalist era did disadvantage Islamists, the core of Islamist ‘victimhood’ in the Turkish case is primarily grounded in an ‘imaginary’ context. The articulation of these victimizations powerfully combines factual events with imaginary elements. This blending serves to amplify and sanctify their significance, contributing to narratives of victimhood that resonate emotionally and symbolically within the broader Islamist community. Within this Islamist imagination, modern Turkish history is framed as witnessing the ‘victimhood of devout Muslims.’ This framing is deeply embedded within the political imagination of Islamists, existing in a realm where the boundaries between reality and fiction are blurred, and encompasses material practices, emotions, symbolic efficacy, performances, and dramatizations.
Although neither the AKP nor Turkey are officially the leader of the Muslim world, the Turkish Islamist imaginary envisions them as such (Cinar, 2018; Sezal & Sezal, 2017). Consequently, attacks against Turkish Islamists are portrayed as direct attacks against the Muslim world. President Erdogan, considered by many as the ‘heir presumptive’ of the caliphate and the leader of the Muslim world, plays a central role in legitimizing and disseminating this idea. In his famous balcony speeches following election victories, Erdogan claimed “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, [and] Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir” (Phillips, 2017: 29). This suggests that his political victory in Turkey is a success for all Muslim lands. In this narrative, even minor losses for the AKP are construed as significant blows to the Muslim world.
Transitioning to a Manufactured Victimhood
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.
While Turkish Islamist victimhood encompasses both real and imagined accounts of events, it is important to note that this perception is not necessarily deliberate. It is a product of how Islamists interpret their political environment. In contrast, manufactured victimhood strategically combines the imagined Turkish Islamist victimhood with deliberately constructed falsehoods. Unlike Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood narratives, which originate from real events and their dramatizations, manufactured victimhood deliberately fabricates narratives—often in stark contradiction to the AKP’s hegemonic status—to create a sense of victimhood where none exists.
Despite the persuasiveness of the AKP’s victimhood claims, during its first decade in power, its overreliance on them eventually took its toll. Since their 2011 election victory, the AKP’s own supporters found it difficult to consolidate victimhood narratives that claimed the party was an underdog in Turkish politics. Regardless, even in 2014, the AKP continued to depict itself “as the oppressed blacks” and “eternal underdogs of Turkish society” (Yilmaz, 2021). Eventually, though, AKP’s Islamist victimhood vis-à-vis the Kemalists, which relied on human rights discourses, ceased to yield favorable political results.
The persuasiveness of this messaging took an even steeper dive after 2016, when the AKP became the nation’s primary hegemonic power in Turkish politics and succeeded in marginalizing the Kemalist tutelage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). At this juncture, the AKP needed a new ‘anchor’ to re-establish itself as a victim, which it found in anti-Western conspiracy theories. The AKP no longer required the support of the EU, as the pressure for democratization, anti-corruption measures, and transparency had become burdensome. By this point, the AKP deemed transactional relations with the EU to be sufficient (for a detailed analysis, see Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020).
It was during this time that the AKP’s victimhood acquired more imaginary dimensions, and the party began constructing an imaginary victimhood narrative combined with Islamist civilizationism. These narratives rely on perpetuating anti-Western conspiracy theories to rationalize its problems, failures, and inefficiencies. This narrative shift allows the AKP to deflect criticism, attribute internal challenges to external actors, and maintain a sense of being besieged, despite holding significant political power. For the AKP, the West became a convenient rhetorical foil against which it sought to define the struggle of the faithful and the “national will” (Hoffman et al., 2018: 5).
Erdogan played a crucial role in creating momentum for this discursive shift in victimhood. As the leader acquired significant power, he shifted blame away from himself, propagated the belief that the AKP was being threatened or attacked by internal and external enemies, and disseminated securitization narratives (Lancaster, 2014: 1684). These narratives became more entrenched in the years that followed. For instance, on July 21, 2020, while reflecting on the second anniversary of the new presidential system, he passionately declared: “The Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey are undergoing a historical period. In this period, there are all kinds of traps, attacks, conspiracies, betrayal, pain, and trouble. The Turkish Nation, with its citizens and security forces, is carrying out its struggle for independence and future, step by step to victory. We are determined to continue this struggle forever for the future of all our friends and brothers (the Muslim World) … Yes, we, as a nation that shed our sweat and blood, when necessary, believe that we will be gifted with God’s good tidings. We are well aware that the attacks that we have been experiencing for the last 7 years have aimed at our belief, history, culture, unity, togetherness, ezan (call to prayer), flag, and all our sacred values. We have no doubt that from the turmoil in the streets to the coup attempts, each attack meant shotgun shots for the same target. Our nation with its wisdom acquired through a thousand years of experience has seen this reality and has decided to join the ranks of its future and independence. It is our duty to pay our debt against this sacrifice of our nation by working with sacrifice, diligence and perseverance that will spoil all the conspiracies” (Erdogan, 2020: 2, 7).
Manufactured victimhood encompasses multiple layers, incorporating not only its own manufactured narratives but also elements of Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood. Major events like the Gezi Protests and the attempted coup illustrate the utilization of all three layers within different arguments presented by the AKP. This multifaceted approach serves to perpetuate the victimhood narrative, projecting the party as simultaneously oppressed despite wielding significant power. The strategic use of manufactured victimhood allows the AKP to shape public perception, maintain a sense of solidarity among its supporters, and deflect attention from internal challenges or criticisms.
The above discussion highlights how the AKP’s strategic move to adopt anti-Western conspiracy theories navigates the changing dynamics of Turkish politics. This new narrative angle resonates with a segment of its support base, explaining economic challenges, international scrutiny, and internal dissent. This new narrative anchor helps sustain victimhood rhetoric, even as the AKP’s political landscape and power dynamics undergo significant transformations.
Conclusion
To trace the trajectory of the AKP’s discourse of victimhood, it is essential to first acknowledge its roots in the broader historical context of Turkish Islamist ideology. For decades, Islamist discourse depicted its adherents as the oppressed ‘Black Turks,’ enduring discrimination under Kemalist rule since the Republic’s founding. Discriminatory practices in public service recruitment, the disapproval of conservative traditions by Kemalist leaders, and pivotal events like the February 28 process, the headscarf ban, and Erdogan’s imprisonment collectively fueled and solidified the Islamist victimhood narrative by the turn of the millennium.
The AKP’s electoral triumphs have been intricately linked to the strategic deployment of victimhood discourses, casting its opposition as antagonists while presenting the party and its support base as victims. Initially directed at Kemalists, particularly the main opposition CHP, the AKP’s victimhood narrative evolved into a multi-layered framework post-Gezi, seamlessly and concurrently adopting anti-Western conspiracy theories. Notably, the party expanded its narratives of victimization beyond domestic boundaries, aligning its fate with the Muslim Ummah and employing victimhood to legitimize crackdowns on domestic opposition. This narrative shielded the AKP from criticism and effectively stifled dissent, especially in the face of corruption scandals.
An intriguing aspect of the AKP’s narrative is its dual portrayal, presenting itself as a domestic hegemon and protector of the nation, while simultaneously depicting itself as an underdog and target in global politics against the West. The adept utilization of conspiracy theories is an attempt to maintain the AKP’s image as the sole representative of Turkey and casting the West as an omnipotent hegemon in the geopolitical arena.
The multifaceted functions of victimhood claims within the political sphere are evident in the AKP’s narrative. Pre-Gezi, victimhood, coupled with human rights discourse, bolstered the AKP’s moral standing against Kemalists and the West. This narrative not only resonated with the conservative masses but also justified the party’s crackdowns on opposition, both internally and externally. The narrative’s evolution into an internationalized victimhood, seamlessly merging historical grievances with contemporary political maneuvering, showcases the adaptability and resilience of the AKP’s discursive strategy within the ever-shifting landscape of Turkish politics.
The political benefits of claiming victimhood—providing moral superiority, absolving guilt and shame, justifying misdeeds, enabling unfair behavior, and evading responsibility—is evident in the political sphere, as seen in the AKP’s narrative.
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Abstract
This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections.
Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections
On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.
Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.
Historical Context of Sinn Féin
It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168).
Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).
Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).
Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441).
A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).
Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10).
This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).
Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).
Methodology
Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).
Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).
In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).
We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.
When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.).
STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil.
The Popular Populist Leftist Party
Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”
Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).
Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)
Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:
Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland
Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).
On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020).
Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).
Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?
In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020).
The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election?
The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.
Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024
Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).
By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”
The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’
Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this:
Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).
One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?
In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024).
During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).
Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.
Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.
However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).
Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.
The Alternative to the Alternative Vote
Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.).
Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024).
Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).
As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024).
However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.
Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos
2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.”
4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.”
5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.”
5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.”
5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.”
7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.”
7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.”
10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.”
10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.”
11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.”
11
2020 General Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.”
3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.”
4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.”
4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.”
13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.”
25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.”
30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.”
44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.”
44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.”
44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.”
69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.”
71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.”
91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.”
96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.”
96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.”
104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.”
105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.”
105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.”
105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.”
106
2024 European Parliament Manifesto
Quote
Page
“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.”
5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.”
13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.”
— (2011). “The Case Against the Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join.” Irish Left Archive. January 24, 2011. https://www.leftarchive.ie/document/408/ (accessed on July 13, 2024).
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin.
— (2020b). “Irish election: Sinn Féin criticises ‘disgraceful’ Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.” BBC. February 14, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51508380 (accessed on July 27, 2024).
— (2024). “Homelessness hits record high of 14,000! Voting for Sinn Féin in the Local and European elections is the first step to getting a change of government that will fix this housing disaster. Because the longer Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Greens stay in government the worse this is going to get.” Sinn Féin. May 31, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/reel/1171661350920330 (accessed on July 13, 2024).
Aytac S. E.; Carkoglu A. & Elci E. (2024). “Populist Appeals, Emotions, and Political Mobilization.” American Behavioral Scientist, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241240343
de Bromhead, A.; Fernihough, A. & Hargaden, E. (2020). “Representation of the People: Franchise Extension and the ‘Sinn Féin Election’ in Ireland, 1918.” The Journal of Economic History. 80(3), pp. 886-925. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000376
Murphy M.C. (2021). “Brexit and the Election: The Issue That Wasn’t.” In: Gallagher M., Marsh M., & Reidy T. (ed.). How Ireland Voted 2020: End of an Era. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland.
Ní Aodha, G. (2020). “How did they do it? Sinn Féin’s historic 24% win was built on learnt lessons and a fed-up electorate.” The Journal. February 12, 2020. https://www.thejournal.ie/sinn-fein-comeback-5001379-Feb2020/ (accessed on July 24, 2024).
Rico, G.; Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017). “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes.” Swiss Political Science Review. 23(4), 444–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin. https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2019/EU_Manifesto1.pdf
Please cite as: Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038
Abstract
Blame avoidance, a strategic distancing from culpability following events resulting in the deaths of citizens of a country, has often been studied in democratic contexts, yet its manifestation in authoritarian scenarios remains understudied. This study addresses this gap by scrutinizing empirical data derived from Turkey’s party in power, the AKP, and their political narratives and policies concerning these fatalities. Synthesizing the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics, it investigates how Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party uses blame-shifting strategies to account for deaths resulting from negligence. Employing a conceptualization of martyrdom intertwined with religious populism, the party appeals to both religious and nationalistic sentiments and succeeds in sidestepping responsibility and accountability for these tragic incidents.
Accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities have a profound impact on individuals, communities, and societies, especially when these tragedies are linked to government failure or negligence. Such events often provoke significant criticism and challenge the government’s legitimacy. To manage the fallout and sustain their position, incumbents typically employ several strategies: controlling the media, calling for national unity, appealing to patriotism, using nationalistic rhetoric, promoting solidarity, implementing censorship, or putting the blame on others and so on. These methods are used to deflect criticism, manage public perception, and maintain authority in the face of government shortcomings, a practice commonly known as blame avoidance.
Blame avoidance generally refers to any actions taken by leaders and officials to distance themselves from situations that could result in blame or jeopardize their objectives (Hinterleitner, 2017: 243). This behavior can be observed across various levels, ranging from national governance to community leadership (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017; Li et al., 2021). Numerous studies have analyzed blame avoidance behaviors and strategies in both democratic and authoritarian or competitive authoritarian contexts, particularly during administrative, financial, security, or electoral crises (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002, 2011; Hood et al., 2015; Ellis, 1994; Mortensen, 2012). This strategy is important because it helps leaders—whether autocrats or democrats—deflect public criticism, ease social tensions, and legitimize their prolonged rule, ultimately turning such crises to their advantage. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding how autocrats use necropolitics, martyrdom, and religious populism narratives as a strategy of blame avoidance in response to nationwide accidents, catastrophes, and conflicts resulting in fatalities.
Specifically, while blame avoidance has emerged as a strategic tool frequently employed by Turkey’s competitive authoritarian ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), limited attention has been given to this phenomenon within the Turkish context. Only a handful of studies, such as those by Aytac (2021) and Soylemez & Angin (2023), have examined blame avoidance, focusing on economic and financial crises. Zahariadis, on the other hand, analyzed its role during the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating how leaders deflected government responsibilities (Zahariadis et al., 2020; Aytac, 2021; Soylemez-Karakoc & Angin, 2023). While necropolitics has been studied independently within the Turkish political landscape (Bargu, 2016; Akinci, 2018; Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Islekel, 2017), its intersection with blame avoidance remains underexplored.
In this research, we will focus on how autocrats use necropolitics and religious martyrdom narratives alongside blame avoidance to navigate nationwide calamities, such as accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities, to shape public perceptions and deflect government accountability. This article aims to bridge this gap by examining empirical data derived from the political populist narratives and policies of Turkey’s current leadership. By integrating the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics and applying this combined framework to the data, the paper reveals the strategies used by Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party, the AKP. It assesses the extent to which these strategies are effective in a competitive authoritarian context and explores how the party seeks to avoid blame, evade responsibility, and deflect accountability for fatalities resulting directly from its negligence.
Turkey’s political trajectory under the ruling AKP has witnessed a notable shift from undemocratic responses to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 towards what many scholars now characterize as an Islamist populist competitive authoritarian regime (Yilmaz, 2018; 2021a). Scholars have given an understanding of the role of religion in shaping the party’s populist appeal, evident in analyses of Friday sermons and the strategic mobilization of diverse populist movements. These academic works insightfully map out Turkey’s socio-political landscape, particularly scrutinizing the dynamics within Erdogan’s tenure. By fusing elements of personal identity, political leadership, and national and religious affiliation, Erdogan orchestrates a narrative wherein allegiance to his policies is associated with religious devotion. This elevates Erdogan beyond the realms of conventional political figures, positioning him as a symbolic embodiment of Turkish identity itself. The mix of political leadership and religious identity engenders a transformative shift, fundamentally altering the contours of Turkish identity and governance. This recalibration fosters a symbiotic relationship between political allegiance and religious identity (Yilmaz, 2021a; Yilmaz, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021a).
In this article, we argue that the incumbent party adopts a strategic approach by framing deaths from accidents, clearly under its own responsibility, as acts of martyrdom, thereby deflecting accountability while appealing to both the religious and nationalistic sentiments of the Turkish populace. This tactic serves to deflect blame by recontextualizing fatalities as acts of martyrdom, intertwining them with religious and patriotic ideologies. In doing so, the party attempts to distance itself from culpability and obfuscate its accountability for these incidents. Through this lens of blame avoidance and the incorporation of necropolitics, the article sheds light on the strategies employed by the incumbent party to navigate and manipulate public perceptions surrounding these sensitive and politically charged events.
A structured approach is used in this paper to illustrate this argument. Initially, we look at the realms of the blame avoidance theory, establishing the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding our exploration. This foundation serves as a crucial backdrop for the subsequent analysis. Moving forward, the focus shifts to a comprehensive explanation of necropolitics and martyrdom, focusing on the definitions, characteristics and scholarly discourse surrounding these concepts. We add depth to this analysis by offering a brief yet impactful examination of martyrdom’s significance within Islam and its historical utilization by political figures in the Turkish context.
In the empirical analysis section, we focus our attention on evaluating how the AKP strategically integrates necropolitics with two pivotal blame avoidance strategies in incidents that result in fatalities. First, we delve into the AKP’s utilization of the presentational strategy, elucidating how they manipulate narrative presentation to deflect culpability and evade accountability. We then shed light on the AKP’s engagement in bargaining via rewards as another tactic employed to circumvent blame, showcasing how the party navigates and manages public perception amidst tragic events leading to fatalities. Through this empirical examination, we aim to provide concrete examples and critical insights into the AKP’s strategic maneuvering to avoid blame, supporting our argument regarding the convergence of necropolitics and blame avoidance strategies used in the Turkish political landscape.
Blame Avoidance Theory and Necropolitics
Politicians opportunistically highlight their successful policies to gain or maintain favor. However, they also often attempt to deflect blame when their failures come under scrutiny, especially in regimes with competitive but flawed electoral processes. This strategy is crucial for politicians, as voters are more likely to remember experiences of loss and suffering than instances of progress or success (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002; 2011). This is described in psychological studies which indicate a human inclination towards remembering adverse, harmful, or traumatic events over positive ones, a phenomenon commonly termed as negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Kanouse & Hanson, 1987). For those in office, shouldering blame can lead to significant political setbacks and, especially in contexts with multiple competing political parties, could even result in a loss of power (Hansson, 2015).
In his seminal work, The Politics of Blame Avoidance (1986), Weaver identifies eight strategic approaches that politicians utilize to evade responsibility in the face of potential blame. These strategies encompass agendalimitation, issue redefinition, resource investment after failure, delegation of blame-inducing decisions, scapegoating, aligning with popular alternatives, diffusing blame among multiple actors, and persisting in harmful actions despite recognition of their detrimental consequences.
First, agenda limitation serves as an attempt by policymakers to suppress blame-generating issues from gaining prominence in public discourse. However, when such issues cannot be entirely suppressed, issue redefinition becomes a secondary strategy, where policymakers introduce new policy narratives that obscure potential political damage. In scenarios where attempts to avoid loss have already failed, the strategy of “throwing good money after bad” is employed, whereby policymakers inject further resources into problematic situations in an effort to offset negative outcomes.
Moreover, when facing blame for undesirable outcomes, political leaders often seek to delegate decision-making authorityfor controversial matters to other actors, thereby distancing themselves from accountability. In cases where delegation is not feasible, they may resort to scapegoating—shifting the blame onto individuals or groups perceived as responsible. Another tactic commonly observed is blame diffusion, which involves dispersing accountability across multiple actors, thereby diluting personal culpability.
Finally, despite recognizing the wrongful nature of certain actions, policymakers may choose to persist in their course of action to avoid publicly acknowledging their mistakes. These interrelated strategies illustrate the multifaceted nature of blame avoidance and underscore the lengths to which political leaders will go to maintain their standing by deflecting or mitigating accountability in politically sensitive situations (Weaver, 1986).
Christopher Hood’s concept of the presentational strategy adds another dimension to the array of techniques political actors employ to navigate blame avoidance. This strategy revolves around the deliberate manipulation of information, spin, and persuasive rhetoric to deflect responsibility for blameworthy outcomes (Hood, 2011). As studied by some other scholars, these presentational strategies serve as crafty tools wielded by policymakers to manipulate the public narrative in several ways. Firstly, they succeed in redefining, reshaping, and spinning issues, working to divert public attention away from the heart of the matter. These strategies delve deeper into the realms of information control and manipulation, where policymakers impose restrictive measures on dissenting voices within the media landscape, effectively diminishing oppositional views and reinforcing the government’s narrative. Often, they craft narratives that border on fabrication, using these persuasive stories to evade responsibility (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428). Alternatively, storytelling can be employed to portray governmental actions or responses as commendable or necessary, with the acceptance of blame serving as a strategic move to maintain political legitimacy or rationalize policy decisions (Hood, 2011: 47–49; Weaver, 1986: 385–86).
In authoritarian regimes, presentational strategies often hinge on secrecy, involving the restriction of information flow and stringent control over media outlets to influence how incidents are accessed and perceived. In contrast, in democratic settings, these strategies may manifest through media priming, where incumbents manipulate public perception by leveraging media platforms to frame issues favorably (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428).
The presentational strategy aims to reframe what might be perceived as a blameworthy issue into a strategic advantage—for instance, by portraying short-term crises as catalysts for long-term benefits (Hood, 2011: 17). Particularly in authoritarian regimes, incumbents often suppress oppositional voices and control the narrative surrounding incidents, transforming situations that might otherwise attract blame into justifications for their continued political rule (Hood, 2011: 18). Through these efforts, political actors shape public perceptions and influence how blame is assigned, ultimately using these strategies to safeguard their legitimacy and maintain control in the face of political adversity.
Building on this literature, our exploration reveals the AKP’s concerted efforts to intertwine necropolitics with two primary strategies in evading blame amid incidents that have resulted in fatalities: First, the presentational strategy and second, the technique of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards (an extension of Weaver’s ‘throwing good money’ after a bad situation). Before establishing these strategies empirically, it’s crucial to first establish a foundational understanding of necropolitics and martyrdom. Necropolitics, a concept that intertwines governance and death, demands comprehensive exploration. This theoretical framework demonstrates how power structures manifest in controlling not just lives of the citizenry, but also the circumstances of death, and how this can be wielded as a tool for political agendas.
Moreover, within the context of Islam, martyrdom holds profound significance, deeply embedded in religious narratives and revered as a noble sacrifice. Historically, martyrdom has resonated within Islamic cultures, serving as a powerful symbol to unite and galvanize communities. In modern times, however, martyrdom has been popularized primarily by violent Islamic groups in their armed struggles at both local and global levels, often within a jihadist framework. This contemporary use emphasizes the sacrifice of the self, devaluing life while highlighting the rewards of the afterlife. Understanding its significance within Islamic faith, alongside its current pro-Sharia and jihadi associations (Yilmaz, 2019a; 2019b; 2021b; Yilmaz et al., 2023), is crucial to grasping its utilization by AKP politicians in Turkey, given their historically close ideological and organic ties with these movements (See Erturk, 2002; 2023). Politicians in Turkey, aware of the emotional and ideological power of martyrdom, have strategically harnessed its symbolism to reinforce their narratives, influence public opinion and attack the opposition (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). This practice intertwines religious sentiments with political aims, leveraging the reverence for martyrs within society to consolidate power and garner support.
Necropolitical Use of Martyrdom by the AKP and Popularization of Death
Necropolitics, as defined by Mbembe (2003; 2019), refers to the sovereign’s authority to control both the lives and deaths of individuals, encompassing the power to decide who lives and who dies. This concept has found application in various contexts, notably within the Turkish landscape, as described in works by Ahmetbeyzade (2008), Bargu (2016; 2019), Zengin (2016), and Islekel (2017). These contributions have broadened the understanding of necropolitics, introducing novel dimensions that demonstrate its complexity and influence in contemporary political landscapes (Bargu, 2019: 5-6).
Within the realm of Turkish politics, the AKP has strategically harnessed martyrdom narratives, employing them as powerful tools that normalize and celebrate death when the deaths are perceived or explained as being on behalf of the masses (Carney, 2018; Bakiner, 2019; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; 2021b; 2023). In the AKP’s discursive and representational necropolitics, the notion of death for the nation – epitomized through martyrdom – is elevated to a fetishized status (Carney, 2018: 94, 101). This fusion of necropolitical discourse with martyrdom narratives by the AKP indicates a calculated effort to both celebrate and sanctify the notion of death, evoking profound emotional responses within the populace, and intertwining cases of death with nationalist and religious fervor.
The Evolution of Martyrdom and Its Contemporary Application by the AKP
Funeral of a Turkish soldier killed by PKK militants on December 12, 2009, in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.
The concept of martyrdom has a rich etymological and cultural history, with roots that trace back to the Greek word “martus” or “martyr,” meaning “witness.” While the term initially held a broader significance, it gradually acquired a religious connotation, coming to represent the act of sacrificing one’s life for God, especially within Christianity and Judaism (Freamon, 2003: 319). In the Islamic tradition, this concept is mirrored by the Arabic term “shahadah,” which also translates to “to witness.” The individual who carries out this act is known as a “shahid,” a title bestowed not just in Arabic but in many non-Arab Muslim societies as well (Hatina, 2014: 19). This evolution of the term across linguistic and religious boundaries highlights the profound and universal significance of martyrdom as a symbol of ultimate commitment to faith and principles.
Historically, martyrdom is deeply rooted in ancient civilizations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece, evolving across religious and cultural landscapes throughout time. This archetype of the warrior-hero finds expression in diverse ideologies and conflicts, from kamikaze pilots in World War II to self-immolating Buddhist monks protesting the American occupation of Vietnam, and from Irish Republican Army (IRA) hunger strikers to freedom fighters in Middle Eastern liberation movements (Hatina, 2014: 2). Christianity and Islam significantly shaped the archetype of the martyr, offering promises of immortality, absolution, exemption from Judgment Day, and even direct communication with prophets as rewards for their sacrifice (Hatina, 2014: 2). These religious incentives imbue martyrdom with powerful emotional and spiritual weight, further solidifying its role in political and military narratives.
Scholars across disciplines have examined martyrdom’s global manifestations, emphasizing how this concept transcends cultural and religious boundaries. Martyrdom serves as a powerful mythological figure, often invoking revolutionary goals and legitimizing struggles, both secular and religious (Hatina, 2014: 7; Szyska, 2004). The adaptability of martyrdom across diverse contexts is particularly significant—it functions not only as a religious ideal but also as an emotional and motivational resource in secular struggles, helping individuals endure sacrifice for nationalistic or political causes (Sluka, 2000: 49; Anderson, 1983: 15). Whether in national liberation movements, ideological conflicts, or religious wars, martyrdom emerges as a central narrative that justifies extreme sacrifice.
In the Turkish context, martyrdom assumes a multifaceted role. It serves as a tool for mythmaking, helping to shape collective memory, ignite religious populism and nationalistic fervor, promote militarism, and facilitate collective mobilization (Altinay, 2006; Azak, 2007; Degirmencioglu, 2014a; 2014b). In particular, as our research explores, the ruling AKP has employed the concept of martyrdom as a form of blame avoidance. By assigning martyrdom to deaths that occur under contentious circumstances—such as accidents or conflicts—the AKP not only deflects blame but also reframes these tragedies as noble sacrifices for the nation or religion.
This paper establishes that assigning martyrdom also provides the AKP with an opportunity to manipulate public narratives and shift accountability, thus enhancing its political legitimacy. By intertwining religious symbolism with political agendas, the AKP leverages the revered status of martyrs in Turkish society to maintain public support and consolidate power in times of crisis. This rhetorical maneuver serves to bolster the regime’s legitimacy, blending religious sentiment with political strategy to maintain public support in the face of adversity.
The Co-optation of Religion by the Secular State
Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
Despite its officially secular stance, the leadership of Turkey has long intertwined Islam with state operations at multiple levels since its foundation (Cagaptay, 2006; Yegen, 2007; Sakallioglu, 1996; Kaplan, 2002: 665; Yilmaz, 2021a). A key example of this is the state’s efforts to cultivate a devout and patriotic military force, which might seem contradictory to the secular image of the state (Kemerli, 2015: 282; Kaplan, 2002; Gurbey, 2009).
Rather than discarding the historical religious associations tied to soldiering, the Turkish state has effectively co-opted Islamic notions such as jihad and martyrdom to foster a sense of duty and militarism within society (Yilmaz, 2021a). These religious concepts have been reinterpreted to serve the goals of secular nationalism (Kemerli, 2015: 282), and more recently, have been redirected towards advancing an Islamist populist agenda. During times of national crisis, even secular leadership has sporadically invoked religious discourse to bolster public support. For instance, during the Cypriot intervention of 1974, the use of Islamic terminology such as “jihad,” “mujahids,” and “martyrs” revealed how religion could be tactically deployed to legitimize military actions. This paradoxical use of religious language by a state that claims to uphold secularism has conferred substantial religious legitimacy on the Turkish military, traditionally regarded as the staunch protector of secularism. Furthermore, since the 1980s, this religious rhetoric has also bolstered public support for conscription, even amid the protracted Turkish-Kurdish conflict, where significant loss of life continues to be a reality (Kemerli, 2015: 282). The integration of religion into state affairs—especially in the military sphere—demonstrates how the Turkish state has consistently navigated the tension between secularism and religious symbolism to achieve political and military objectives.
Beyond the historical military context, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strategically re-focused its discourse on martyrdom, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. During this period, martyrdom became not only a symbol of national and religious sacrifice but also a powerful political tool to legitimize authoritarian populist and repressive measures and consolidate the ruling party’s authority (Yanik & Hisarlioglu, 2019: 57; Baykan et al., 2021). Erdogan and the AKP capitalized on the emotionally charged symbolism of martyrdom, aligning it with their broader political objectives, which allowed them to reframe public perceptions around death in a manner that reinforced their narrative of religious populism, resilience and divine purpose.
Building upon this shift, the AKP expanded the traditional understanding of martyrdom beyond the military realm, reimagining it to encompass civilian spheres. The party’s redefinition of martyrdom demonstrates a broader and more calculated approach to managing social and political realities. As Bakiner (2019) outlines, the AKP has employed four distinct strategies in controlling the narrative surrounding death. First, the party broadened the scope of martyrdom, extending its definition to include civilian deaths, with material benefits being provided to survivors through both formal laws and informal state mechanisms. Second, they normalized untimely deaths by framing them as natural consequences of citizens’ occupational, socioeconomic, or gender positions, thereby reducing the likelihood of public dissent. Third, the AKP actively depoliticized death to suppress any mobilization of opposition, particularly in the wake of state-linked fatal incidents. Finally, the party tightly controlled public discourse, ensuring that the narrative surrounding martyrdom remained aligned with the AKP’s ideological objectives and reinforced its discursive dominance (Bakiner, 2019).
Category One: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Redefining, Reshaping, Spinning, and Manipulating Death-Related Incidents
A coal mine in the Soma district of Manisa province, Turkey, exploded on May 13, 2014. This disaster remains the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, claiming the lives of 301 miners. Photo: F. Polat.
The AKP’s initial reaction to tragic incidents resulting in loss of life typically involves absorbing the immediate shock within society, followed by a narrative that attempts to normalize such events. The Soma mining disaster in Manisa on May 13, 2014, stands as a poignant example, marking the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, which claimed the lives of 301 miners. Revelations surrounding the incident indicated the role of governmental corruption within the AKP, with media reports highlighting close ties between the mining company’s owners and the AKP, along with documented safety concerns that had been circumvented by the company (Yetkin, 2014). Instead of assuming responsibility, Erdogan attempted to downplay the incident’s severity by characterizing the catastrophe as a typical ‘work accident,’ and ‘the nature of the work’ by asserting that mine explosions are common throughout the world (Cumhuriyet, 2014; Daloglu, 2014). This strategy aimed to evade liability and minimize the government’s role in the disaster in the eyes of the public.
The AKP adopted a similar presentational blame avoidance strategy following the tragic Aladag boarding girls’ Qur’anic school fire in 2016, which resulted in the deaths of eleven students and a teacher. Revelations indicated that the dormitory had not been subjected to the required comprehensive inspections, primarily due to its management by a pro-AKP religious community. The AKP again sought to diminish its responsibility, by labelling the catastrophe as an ‘act of fate’ (Shafak, 2016). This narrative tactic attempted to deflect accountability by framing the incident as an unforeseeable and uncontrollable occurrence, to sidestep the deeper scrutiny of the regulatory oversights or negligence that might have contributed to the tragedy.
The AKP once again employed a blame avoidance strategy in the aftermath of two Turkish soldiers losing their lives in 2018. The soldiers died due to freezing conditions in the eastern province of Tunceli (Dersim), a situation that occurred outside of wartime and sparked extensive debate and media coverage within Turkish politics. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of main opposition Republican People Party (CHP), demanded the responsibility of ruling party officials and bureaucrats for this failure, prompting criminal complaints alleging negligence against top government figures including President Erdogan and other key ministers (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018).
In response, Erdogan employed the presentational strategy to deflect accountability for the government’s shortcomings in safeguarding these soldiers’ lives. He sought to normalize the soldiers’ deaths caused by hypothermia by equating it with the risks faced in martyrdom, remarking that “in martyrdom, there are bullets to be taken, as well as freezing” (Erdogan, 2018). To justify this narrative, Erdogan referenced his grandfather’s freezing to death during World War I, attempting to craft a narrative that would diminish the significance of soldiers succumbing to freezing temperatures (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). These comments demonstrate a discursive effort to reshape the narrative about these tragic deaths. They dilute the government’s accountability by placing the deaths within the context of martyrdom and divert attention from any potential governmental oversights or failures in safeguarding soldiers’ safety.
Erdogan also invoked the concept of martyrdom to undermine the credibility of the main opposition leader, Kilicdaroglu, and to discredit his criticism. Erdogan accused Kilicdaroglu of not believing in martyrdom and publicly chastised him, stating, “You have no right to devalue this nation and this country. You already lack any belief in martyrdom. But the families [of the fallen soldiers] believed in martyrdom. You, however, have no such sense” (BBC, 2018).
The case of the captured, tortured, and then murdered soldiers by ISIS terrorists in 2016 provides another example of how the AKP’s blame avoidance strategy. In this case, instead of taking any responsibility for its failure to save the two soldiers or providing details of any efforts to save them, the AKP manipulated (‘spun’) how the event was communicated to the public on social media and conventional media, which is under its control. After ISIS streamed the video of killing the soldiers, the AKP immediately restricted access to social media and related news. After, the AKP proclaimed that the footage was fabricated (Sputnik, 2016; Hurtas, 2017). An AKP lawmaker, Samil Tayyar, also declared that the murdered soldiers were members of ISIS, and they had voluntarily joined the group (Sputnik, 2016). Almost a year later, the AKP informed the murdered soldiers’ fathers they would be rewarded with martyrdom privileges and their murdered sons would be bestowed with official martyrdom status.
As part of its presentational strategy, the AKP government promptly enforces media bans and restricts news that could potentially incite dissent, opposition, or mass protests. In the incidents described above, journalistic reporting was prohibited with the government reasoning that coverage might incite disruptive acts and protests, posing threats to the peace, safety, and public order throughout the country (BBC Turkce, 2016).
The restriction of opposing voices was highlighted again following the tragic deaths of high-ranking Turkish Air Force (TAF) officers, including two intelligence officers, in Libya. Traditionally, in situations where blame is attributed to groups like the PKK, the AKP government orchestrates official funeral ceremonies. These ceremonies often draw the upper echelons of military and political power, who strategically deliver speeches that transform the funeral into a moment of national credit and sympathy, and then broadcast live on television for public viewing. However, in this instance, the bodies of the officers were clandestinely interred without any public funeral rites.
Adding to the clandestine nature of this burial, journalists who reported on this event faced immediate repercussions. They were swiftly arrested the day after the incident, and their homes were raided in early morning police operations, severely restricting the ability to disseminate news regarding the incident (BBC Turkce, 2020). Media outlets critical of the government were branded disloyal and treasonous by pro-AKP media (Sabah, 2020). When details of the deaths eventually surfaced in the media, widespread complaints and criticisms targeting the AKP government ensued. The public discourse questioned the fundamental reason for Turkish soldiers’ involvement in Libya, labelling it ‘unnecessary’ and ‘adventurous’ (Euronews, 2020).
In response to the mounting criticisms, President Erdogan again instrumentalized martyrdom, acknowledging the fatalities by stating, “We have a few martyrs [in Libya]” (Euronews, 2020). He also attempted to normalize the deaths in his comment, “My brothers and sisters, we should never forget that the martyrs’ hill (cemetery) will not be empty” (Euronews, 2020). Contextualizing the fatalities through the language of martyrdom represents an attempt to shift public perception away from scrutiny and critique of the government’s decisions and actions by elevating the status of the deaths and assigning them with religious significance.
The night of July 15, 2016, marked a pivotal political moment as the AKP was targeted during the attempted coup, ostensibly becoming its victim. However, opposition parties raised pertinent questions about the neglectful stance and actions of the AKP government both preceding and following the event. The suspicion surrounding the coup led the leader of the main opposition to characterize it as a ‘controlled coup,’ insinuating that Erdogan and a select few, including the Head of National Intelligence Service (MIT) and the Chief of General Staff, were aware of the attempt and instead of thwarting it, orchestrated it in a manner to derive maximum advantage. The AKP hindered a comprehensive investigation into the coup attempt, barring the Head of MIT and the Chief of General Staff from testifying before the parliamentary committee, and withheld the committee’s report from publication, despite AKP lawmakers forming the majority and chairing the committee. The opposition contends that Erdogan and his close circle knowingly permitted the coup attempt, resulting in civilian casualties that night (Tas, 2018).
Moreover, rather than engaging with critical inquiries or allowing an open, thorough investigation, the AKP consistently employs these narratives to steer attention away from potential negligence or failures. This tactic serves to not only evade responsibility but also to maintain a strong grip on the public discourse, framing the narrative in a manner that aligns with the party’s interests and political survival.
In the subsequent section, we will examine how religious narratives and strategic blame avoidance are leveraged not only to deflect blame but also to transform it into a form of political credit. Building on Weaver’s and Hood’s theories, we will explore how these strategies are integrated into the broader context of necropolitics and martyrdom. This analysis will reveal how the AKP employs religious and political narratives to shift public perception, turning criticisms into affirmations of political legitimacy. Additionally, we will delve into how these narratives are coupled with mechanisms of bargaining and rewards, further extending traditional theories of blame avoidance. This exploration will provide insight into the complex interplay between religious symbolism and political strategy in the AKP’s approach to maintaining power amidst crises.
Category Two: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Transforming Blame into Credit and Bargaining via Rewards
Turkish soldiers on patrol during winter on January 3, 2017. Photo credit: Shutterstock.
The second category of strategies explored in this article delves into how the AKP transforms blame into credit and leverages bargaining rewards through religious narratives. A key tactic involves the use of martyrdom to reshape public perceptions of fatal incidents for which the government is solely responsible. By elevating certain deaths to the status of martyrdom—a revered religious honor—the AKP reframes these tragedies as symbols of triumph and honor, effectively turning blame into a form of credit.
This approach not only alters the narrative surrounding the victims but also influences how society and the victims’ families perceive these events. The popularization and necropolitical use of martyrdom make the results of these incidents more palatable to the public, allowing them to digest and accept the government’s role in these events. Instead of addressing criticisms or facilitating impartial investigations, the AKP employs a strategic discourse to deflect blame, suppress opposition, and galvanize support. By embedding martyrdom narratives into the political and social fabric, the AKP consolidates its legitimacy and mitigates dissent.
The transformation of blame into credit was evident in the case of the death of Eren Bulbul. In August 2017, the local 15-year-old boy lost his life at the hands of the outlawed PKK while in the presence of Turkish military officers, who had reportedly employed him as an informant. The boy’s grieving mother publicly declared the responsibility to belong to the government, prime minister, ministers, and other authorities for the tragic loss of life (Gazete Duvar, 2017). In response to the outcry, President Erdogan publicly praised Bulbul’s mother during a mass gathering and praised her for mothering thirteen children: “You have fulfilled the order of Allah and His messenger [by giving birth to many Muslims]. What a beautiful mother you are!” (Beyazgazete, 2017). This praise, steeped in religious and moral overtones, demonstrated a clear attempt to pacify the mother and to create a public perception of unity between the leader and the grieving mother.
Erdogan also drew on martyrdom, communicating to Bulbul’s mother that she possessed greatness due to her son’s status as a ‘martyr’: “Thanks to the ‘martyr’ Eren, you are guaranteed to enter Heaven together with your thirteen children”(Beyazgazete, 2017). This rhetoric served to divert attention from the failure to protect the boy, reframing the tragedy as a sacrifice for a higher cause and transforming the mourning mother into a figure of honor within a religious context.
In another instance, Erdogan conveyed to the mother of a soldier, captured and killed during a rescue operation, that she had attained an exceptional honor: “Not every mother can have such an honor, but you have this honor now as a neighbor of the Prophet and the martyrs in the hereafter” (Sozcu, 2021). This religious rhetoric attempts to transform the loss into a revered status, offering solace through the lens of martyrdom.
The AKP’s prolonged dissemination of martyr stories serves as a deliberate effort to embed a specific narrative within the public consciousness. This has allowed the party to solidify its political stance while strategically mitigating any potential scrutiny or dissenting views. It also serves to leverage emotional connections to nationalistic sentiments and a reverence for sacrifice.
By emphasizing the martyrs’ sacrifices and portraying their deaths in a manner that exalts their devotion to the nation, the AKP manipulates the collective memory and perception of these events. This deliberate and ongoing narrative construction aims to create a shield against any potential scrutiny or doubts about the party’s actions or policies.
Co-optation and Cooperation in Blame Avoidance: Bargaining via Rewards
In this segment, we delve into the AKP’s necropolitical strategy of deflecting blame through a technique we term “bargaining via rewards,” an extension of Weaver’s “throw good money after a bad situation” approach. This strategy involves the strategic use of various incentives—referred to as carrots—to co-opt the families of victims and bolster the party’s narrative. The AKP strategically employs these incentives, which include financial aid, assurances, privileges, and promises of elevated social standing, to align with its broader necropolitical agenda.
A notable element of this strategy is the official designation of martyrdom. This status is often conferred upon civilians whose deaths occur in incidents where the government is implicated in preventing such tragedies. By granting martyrdom status, the AKP not only elevates the victims’ families with unique material rewards but also integrates these incidents into a revered national narrative. This designation serves to mollify and placate the affected families, while simultaneously deflecting criticism and managing public perception, thereby reinforcing the government’s position and mitigating the fallout from its actions.
In the Turkish legal framework, the designation of ‘martyrdom’ (şehitlik) lacks an explicit definition or criteria for who qualifies as a ‘martyr’ (şehit). The Turkish Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 outlines specific guidelines that primarily pertain to support for the families of individuals (both military and civilian servants) who have been wounded or lost their lives due to terrorist acts. The authority to declare someone officially a martyr typically resides with the Turkish Armed Forces or the Turkish Judiciary (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).
During the AKP’s tenure, this authority appears to have been utilized more liberally. Notably, in 2012, the AKP government revised the regulations related to martyrdom, allowing civilians who lost their lives due to terrorist attacks to be classified as martyrs. This definition was subsequently expanded by the AKP to encompass victims of natural disasters, large-scale incidents resulting in fatalities, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).
An illustrative instance was observed following the Soma mining accident, where an immediate announcement declared the deceased as ‘civil martyrs’ or ‘martyrs of the mine.’ Their direct relatives were then granted the benefits outlined in Terror Law No. 3713, entailing financial support, employment opportunities, and educational scholarships. In another instance, President Erdogan announced that the annual proceeds from the newly inaugurated Eurasia Tunnel would be directed to the families of the martyrs, exemplifying the government’s priority towards supplying financial benefits to these families.
It is crucial to recognize the selective application of this law in the Turkish context. Law 3713 was not invoked uniformly for families of mining incident victims. Instead, the AKP selectively used the legal framework in those incidents which garnered widespread public attention. This emphasizes the AKP’s propensity to utilize the notion of martyrdom for specific populist purposes, rather than as a consistent response to the death of Turkish employees.
The mechanisms overseeing financial aid, and its allocation predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. Under the AKP’s tenure, there has been a noticeable elevation in the stature of the Presidency of Relatives of Martyrs and Veterans, which was upgraded to the status of a General Directorate. Minister Zehra Zumrut Selcuk highlighted a significant surge in employment, revealing that as of December 2020, the ministry had provided jobs for 44,781relatives in the civil service, a substantial increase from the 6,315 recorded before the AKP assumed office in 2002 (Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanligi, 2020).
In addition to the customary rewards associated with legal martyrdom, policymakers have gone so far as to pledge homes to these families. Shockingly, reports emerged revealing instances where veterans and martyr families signed documents and petitions relinquishing the pursuit of compensation cases against the government in exchange for these promised residences. This unsettling revelation underscores how the assurance of housing was leveraged to dissuade families from seeking rightful recourse through legal avenues.
Bargaining via rewards thus emerges as a deliberate strategy employed by the government to publicly reward the families of ‘martyrs’. The term ‘martyrdom’ itself holds significant weight, not merely as a religious attribution but as a symbol bolstered by official and tangible assurances. Without material guarantees, martyrdom alone may not suffice for these families. Therefore, policymakers reinforce the revered status of martyrdom with a rewarding strategy, offering substantial monetary or material resources. This serves multiple aims including appeasing the affected families, fostering or solidifying their allegiance to the ruling authority, and pre-empting any potential dissent they may express online, via the media, or by aligning with oppositional political parties.
These endeavors underscore how necropolitical blame avoidance is reinforced by financial provisions, rewards, and the bestowment of privileged status, effectively elevating the status of victims’ families within societal ranks. This strategic utilization of martyrdom and its accompanying rewards serves as a mechanism through which families absorb blame in a way that diminishes blame toward the government. This bargaining process is often conducted in a public setting, frequently covered by the media, and broadcast on television. By presenting these ‘bargaining’ exchanges as transparent, equitable, and mutually agreed upon between the government and the affected families, it is possible for public blame to be neutralized, and criticism deflected.
Combined, the strategy of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards sees the AKP not only absolving itself of direct responsibility but also maneuvering the narrative by portraying these losses as emblematic of sacrifice for the nation’s greater good. By offering these rewards and privileges, particularly the esteemed status of martyrdom, the government aims to forge an emotional connection with the affected families while simultaneously solidifying its narrative in the eyes of the public. This strategy effectively co-opts the victims’ families, aligning their sentiments with the AKP’s narrative, thereby furthering the party’s blame avoidance tactics.
Conclusion
This study explores the underexamined dynamics of blame avoidance in political contexts marked by fatal incidents, using the Turkish incumbent government as a case study. It addresses the gap in scholarly attention regarding governmental responses to deaths, focusing on how the ruling competitive authoritarian party employs strategic blame avoidance tactics within an authoritarian setting.
Our findings reveal that in a Muslim-majority country, a populist electoral authoritarian Islamist party can effectively use religious elements—such as martyrdom, belief in the hereafter, and the devaluation of worldly life—to craft compelling narratives that bolster its blame avoidance strategies. The Turkish ruling party strategically combines these religious concepts with Weaver’s and Hood’s presentational strategies, including redefinition, reshaping, spinning, manipulation, and rewarding victims’ families. By bestowing martyrdom status and offering material rewards such as financial aid, social privileges, and promises of elevated standing, the AKP transforms blame into credit, deflecting responsibility for fatal incidents.
This approach not only mitigates the emotional and political implications of blame but also strengthens the party’s political legitimacy amidst crises. The AKP’s tactic of “bargaining via rewards” aligns with necropolitical principles, offering incentives to victims’ families to suppress dissent and deflect calls for accountability. This strategic use of religious and material rewards serves to shift public perception, making government-induced fatalities more palatable to the public.
This research bridges existing literature by applying blame avoidance theories to authoritarian regimes and integrating them with necropolitical and martyrdom discourses. It uncovers deliberate strategies employed by the Turkish ruling party to evade accountability for deaths caused by government negligence, highlighting how authoritarian and populist strategies can exploit religious elements and rewards to maintain power and legitimacy in the face of fatal crises.
(*) Omer Erturk is working as an Independent Researcher in Berlin, Germany with interests in Turkish politics, Islamist movements in Turkey, relations between politics and religion, radicalism, and autocracy.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the entanglement of religious authority, religious populism, political narratives, and societal transformation within the complex terrain of Turkish politics, through the influential role of Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamist scholar closely aligned with the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through various media channels, have significantly impacted AKP supporters, fostering a radicalization that manifests in hate speech, intimidation, and reported acts of aggression toward political dissenters. The fusion of religious interpretations with political discourse has been crucial in legitimizing controversial governmental actions and policies, extending beyond domestic issues to global dynamics and defense strategies, including Karaman’s advocacy for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
Introduction:AKP’s Religious Populism and Radicalization
Recent scholarly works have explored the convergence of authoritarianism, democracy, and Islamic movements across diverse regions. These studies delve into religious and pro-violence populism and assess the societal impacts of various far-right Islamist movements. Additionally, there’s a significant emphasis on the collaboration between Islamist populist parties and secularist far-right parties, examining how these partnerships influence and shape political landscapes. Further academic investigations have probed the relationship between populism, violence, and the stability of authoritarian regimes, including consideration of the concept of necropolitics within specific national contexts. Studies also dissect the role of religion in generating populist appeal, examining, for instance, the impact of the Friday sermons and the utilization of diverse populist narratives for political mobilization (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b).
The Erdogan regime has cultivated a parallel legal system underpinned by unofficial and clandestine fatwas. To appease its religious constituents, the regime seeks validation for its actions from Islamist legal scholars. This article uses the case study of one such scholar, Hayrettin Karaman, to demonstrate how these Islamist figures can generate an ideological defense and validation for repressive Erdoganist policies, appeals and practices.
The Legitimizing Role of Hayrettin Karaman for the AKP
Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic Law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting the Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman serves as an Islamist authority issuing fatwas which often legitimize illicit and corrupt practices among Islamist politicians and businessmen. These fatwas are connected to a range of political and social agendas, such as obtaining interest-based credit from banks and funneling substantial donations to politicians’ charities in exchange for lucrative public tenders and contracts.
Aligned with Karaman, numerous pro-Erdogan Islamist preachers espouse the belief that Turkey exists within a dar al-harb, an un-Islamic territory where their activities are considered jihad. In light of this argument, they argue for the circumvention of Islamic rules out of necessity, and they disregard official laws, which they perceive as products of the “infidel West.” They assert that the Erdogan’s AKP is the sole political representation of Islam in Turkey, and argue it is a religious duty for Muslims to vote for the party to prevent the division (fitnah, tafriqa) of the ummah, which is seen as being a graver offence than killing a fellow Muslim. The preachers propagate the idea that winning elections is akin to winning a jihad.
Political observers recognize the significant influence of figures like Karaman and the preachers supporting him within the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle. His fatwas and policy recommendations are perceived as authoritative in Islamic contexts, giving his statements substantial weight and warranting serious consideration. The remainder of this article presents and analyzes various statements, fatwas, and opinions provided by Karaman, which have helped legitimize and entrench Islamist ideas in Turkish society and support the Islamist populist agenda of the ruling AKP and authoritarian Erdogan regime.
Karaman’s support for the AKP and Erdogan extends to justifying even their controversial or morally contested actions, using interpretations of Islamic principles that benefit the ruling party. An illustrative instance is the 2010 incident involving Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, Republican People Party (CHP), and the release of a purportedly scandalous sex video he participated in. The surfacing of this scandal provoked reactions and criticisms from both sides, but significantly from those with the view that prying into an individual’s private life contradicts Islamic values.
The AKP and Erdogan defended the video’s release and were interestingly supported by Karaman, who stepped in to provide religious legitimacy to their defense. Karaman’s argument revolved around the idea of prioritizing the state’s interests over individual rights to privacy, aligning with the AKP’s stance that the exposure of such scandalous content was warranted for the greater good. Karaman wrote in his column:
“If one committing a sin in secret is a public office holder or trying to be one, in this case, ‘the duty of protecting people from its harm’ forestalls the duty of concealing of dishonor. The related people should be informed regarding the scandal. This sin and dishonor should not be concealed. If the law, without permission, forbids the prying and recording of the private activity, this law must be respected, unless there is no state of necessity (zaruret). According to Islamic ethic, it is also forbidden to attempt for prying and disclosing the secret behaviors of the individuals. However, if the concealed sin and misconduct bear upon the public and the act of concealing harms the public, the state of necessity becomes effective. In this case, this sin or misconduct can be released and publicized within the limits of the state of necessity allows” (Karaman, 2011).
His interpretation offered religious legitimacy by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values within the context of governance and the political landscape.
Karaman’s Defense for the AKP During the 2013 Corruption Probe
Hundreds protest in Istanbul on December 22, 2013, against the country’s worst corruption scandal in years, which was linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Sadık Gulec.
During the notorious corruption probe of December 17-25, 2013 Karaman staunchly supported Erdogan and the AKP, fabricating religious fatwas in favor of the party’s politicians (Karaman, 2014a). Under this proposed system, elected Islamist officials may receive bribes, such as a 10—or 20 percent commission on billion-dollar public tenders from construction contractors, a practice Karaman likens to the share of “alms collectors” in the early days of Islamic civilization.
Karaman’s articles following the December 17-25, 2013, graft and bribery investigations take an intriguing turn, openly addressing the bribery and corruption associated with Erdogan. In an apparent effort to sway religious Erdogan supporters, Karaman endeavored to portray these actions not as personal misconduct but as contributions to the Islamic cause – a form of dawah and jihad, ostensibly carried out for the Islamist movement rather than Erdogan’s personal gain. Karaman defended the AKP’s actions in his minimizing statement that “corruption is not theft” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).
Karaman’s Framing of the 2017 Referendum as a Religious Obligation
Intensifying his explicit support for the AKP and Erdogan, Karaman was also notably involved in discriminating against voters based on their political choices before the April 2017 referendum on Turkey’s Constitution, which facilitated the shift to an executive presidential system. His statements aligned voters’ preferences with fatwas, adding a religious connotation to the political decision. Karaman disseminated the view that casting a “yes vote” was not just a political act but also an Islamic obligation, intertwining religious obligation with the referendum. In another article, he openly states that Naysayers are those who are standing against the Islam (Karaman, 2017f).
This stance concurred with that of Erdogan and his affiliated media outlets, who emphatically emphasized that a devout Muslim should support the “Yes” vote, and that “No voters will go to hell.” The entanglement of religious authority and political discourse was crucial to the public debate, with religious rhetoric explicitly influencing the referendum’s outcome (Yayla, 2017). According to Karaman, since Erdogan’s actions are aimed at fulfilling a religious obligation (to form an Islamic state), “every action that brings us closer to this goal is a religious obligation (fardh), including a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.”
Karaman as a Key Agitator Against the West
Karaman has been outspoken in his disdain and distrust towards the West. Karaman utilizes his platform to critique the behavior of Western countries, particularly regarding their interactions with Turkey under Erdogan regime, and has become an important figure in broader discussions on international relations and perceptions of Turkey within global contexts (O’Brien, 2017).
In a statement attributed to the scholar, Karaman blames the US for employing strategies that contradict conscience, religious values, and legal principles (Karaman, 2017b). He reflects on the perceived intentions and actions of the US in the Middle East and globally, suggesting that the US sought dominance over the Middle East and the entire world, driven by insatiable interests. Karaman implies that any entity attempting to challenge or impede US interests faced coercion, manipulation, and subjugation through various, potentially unethical means (Karaman, 2017b). He accuses the US of using alliances and collaborations within different countries to incite unrest, create chaos, provoke conflicts, propagate terrorism, and manipulate perceptions to serve its agenda (Karaman, 2017b).
Karaman is also a vocal critic of Western countries, particularly in Europe, for their negative attitudes towards Turkey and Islam. In an online post for instance, Karaman addressed Christian countries in the West, accusing them of egotism and racism and claiming their negative sentiments towards Turkey have been rapidly escalating (O’Brien, 2017). In another statement, Karaman (2017a) shares his perspective on Europe’s attitude toward religion, particularly Islam, and the economic aspects associated with it. He portrays Europe as a continent disconnected from a fulfilling religion that guides human life in both this world and the afterlife. He criticizes Europe for rejecting its original religion, conforming religious beliefs to fit personal desires, and even embracing atheism when conformity fails.
Karaman also alleges that Europe does not welcome Islam as a potential replacement for this void in religious guidance. He draws parallels between historical exploitation, mentioning the use of workers from Muslim countries for labor-intensive jobs, and a contemporary narrative where Europe, facing economic decline, turns its attention to the assets of Muslims residing in the continent (Karaman, 2017a).
Pushing an Islamist Agenda for Turkey, the Muslim World and the Ummah
Karaman has also disseminated a range of Islamist ideas that often align with or presumably generate interest in Erdoganist Islamist populism. He portrays Turkey under Erdogan rule as representing an Islamic movement that can liberate the Ummah from various forms of perceived oppression and take a stance against exploitation and subjugation (Karaman, 2017b). Karaman has also made statements that deepen religio-political tensions in society, such as in his writing about the Gulen movement, when he insinuated that the movement acts against the state’s interests, fostering division (fitnah), thus legitimizing state intervention to counter it (Yilmaz, 2015b).
Moreover, a sense of Islamist victimhood is identifiable in the scholar’s statements. His statements evoke a sense of crisis, which helps justify the Islamist agenda in Turkish politics and beyond. In one statement, for example, he claims, “the opposition and enmity that began when our prophet openly started to invite people to Islam in Mecca, has, to date, found members from almost all corners of the world, and their destructive activities are ongoing. They have tried everything to destroy Islam and Muslims or to deviate the religion from its original form to achieve their aims. One of their methods was to divide Muslims and ensure that the divided parts consume each other” (Karaman, 2017d).
Promoting the View that Turkey Should Strengthen Its Military and Acquire WMDs
The Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army operated in Afrin, Syria, on February 23, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
Karaman’s discourse reflects a strong belief in the need for Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. He underscores the necessity for Turkey to maintain comprehensive power, including a robust military, to safeguard its interests. Karaman expresses hope that Turkey will become powerful across various domains, emphasizing the importance of strength in addressing geopolitical challenges (Karaman, 2017c).
Karaman pushes his view that Turkey needs to achieve a balance with the Western and non-Muslim world, and this will be achieved in part by matching or attaining comparable weaponry to counter potential adversaries (Karaman, 2017c). He envisions the unification of all Muslims, the ‘ummah,’ as a force to deter external threats, particularly those stemming from the West (Karaman, 2017c).
Concerningly, the Islamist scholar has expressed a deep interest in Turkey acquiring nuclear capabilities, which he positions a a means of establishing a balance of power against imperialist forces and as a deterrent against oppression (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman’s stance, as articulated in the Yeni Safak daily, strongly advocates for Turkey’s acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear arms, to counter the perceived dominance of Western powers (Karaman, 2017c). He emphasizes the need for Turkey to consider creating these weapons autonomously, disregarding any opposition or constraints from Western entities (Karaman, 2017c).
In a notable example, Karaman not only sanctioned the government’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also urged Turkish leadership to pursue this path. The gravity of his statements shouldn’t be underestimated, considering their potential impact on policy directions, especially concerning the alarming proposal for WMDs (Bozkurt, 2017).
Karaman justifies this perspective by advocating for a realist approach in world politics, suggesting that smaller states with nuclear arsenals can exert considerable influence over larger populations (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman claims that the US and the West have attempted to control or restrict Muslim nations like Pakistan (possessing nuclear weapons) and have concerns about Iran acquiring similar capabilities. However, Karaman highlights a perceived shift in Turkey’s approach under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He presents Erdogan as a determined leader who seeks to resist oppression and support the oppressed. Indeed, in 2018 President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s initiative in producing similar military capabilities as Western nations (El, 2018).
Conclusion
The context of Turkey’s political landscape involves a multifaceted interplay between religious authority, political narratives, and societal dynamics. Hayrettin Karaman’s influential role as an Islamist scholar and his ideological alignment with the AKP government under Islamist authoritarian populist Erdogan underscore a significant fusion of religious interpretation and political discourse. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through media channels, have wielded substantial influence, particularly among the supporters of the Erdogan regime.
The influence of excommunicative fatwas and the narratives propagated by Islamist figures like Karaman within the media have had a notable impact on AKP/Erdogan followers. Karaman’s interpretations have bolstered the Erdogan regime’s stance on contentious issues and contributed to a radicalization of AKP/Erdogan followers. This radicalization is evident in the propagation of hate speech, intimidation tactics, and reported instances of physical aggression toward those holding opposing political affiliations.
Furthermore, Karaman’s narratives have extended beyond domestic matters, delving into geopolitical dynamics, defense strategies, and international relations. His assertions advocating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and narratives concerning global powers highlight a vision of Turkey reliant on a robust stance against perceived adversaries.
The significance and widespread impact of Karaman’s controversial religious fatwas and recommendations within Islamist circles in Turkey and among Muslims should not be underestimated. They also have the potential to influence Turkey’s foreign policy and its relationships with other nations, particularly in defense and regional dynamics.
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Abstract
Populism, especially “radical right-wing populism,” and the Extreme Right are often explicitly or implicitly conflated or at least observed together (see Ignazi, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Rydgren, 2005; Carter, 2005; Griffin, 2018; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). While this contribution acknowledges that these two sets of ideas may occasionally overlap, they should still be understood as distinct concepts. Therefore, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political histories, or traditions is usually misleading and inappropriate. Although many political scientists have recently attempted to clearly distinguish between the two phenomena by proposing separate definitions, some still suggest that populism and the extreme right are essentially two sides of the same coin (see Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). To shed more light on this issue (or “war of words,” as Cas Mudde once called it) and to provide a better understanding of these two important ideologies—one that has greatly impacted the last century and another that will likely continue to influence the current one—this article will compare and contrast right-wing populism and the extreme right from an entirely ideational perspective. This will be done by borrowing from a theoretical framework originally adopted by senior scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) and taking his approach one step further by empirically testing his theories through discourse and manifesto analysis of two contemporary European parties—one supposedly belonging to the populist (or “neopopulist”) party family and the other to the extreme right (or “neofascist”) family. Specifically, the positions of the French Rassemblement National (“National Rally” – RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (“New Force” – FN) will be examined to determine whether there are more similarities or differences between the two ideologies. The analysis will focus on the RN’s and FN’s discourse and policies related to the role of the people, the nation, the state, society, the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market.
By Amedeo Varriale*
Introduction: Generic Reflections, Theoretical Framework, and Method
Generic Reflections
In 1992, the academic experts Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal (1992) wrote that the Italian MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Italian Social Movement) and the French Front National (National Front) “are the most significant parties of the extreme right in Europe” (Ignazi & Ysmal, 1992: 101). At the time, this was not only an accurate statement, but it was also an incredibly important and influential one for the field of political science, as it provided scholars with two archetypal case studies that could be empirically treated for reference. Today, this claim would be – to say the least – contentious. One issue is that the MSI no longer exists, and its direct successor(s) AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance) and FDI (Fratelli d’Italia – FDI) can hardly be categorized as “extreme right” parties. In 2003, AN’s leader, Gianfranco Fini, visited Yad Vashem in Israel and repeatedly declared that fascism as an ideology was “an absolute evil in history” (Corriere della Sera, 24 November 2003; Caretto, 2022). Whereas, more recently, FDI’s leader, Giorgia Meloni (currently Italian Prime Minister) has clearly stated that her party is incompatible with anyone nostalgic of the fascist regime (also calling them “useful idiots for the Left”) and that she is committed to not only democracy but pro-Western, anti-authoritarian, liberal conservatism[1] (Bracalini, 2021; Farrell, 2022). Taking this into account, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, some of the “old guards” of the MSI gradually developed neofascist movements relying on the political vacuum left by the defunct MSI giving birth to much more extreme subjects (see Broder, 2023: 118-141) such as Fiamma Tricolore, CasaPound, and of course – FN (Forza Nuova – FN) which will be later examined in-depth. I shall return to this point in the following sections.
The same argument can be made regarding the French Front National. This party no longer exists under that banner, as it has been recently renamed RN (Rassemblement National – RN) in an open effort from Marine Le Pen to “detoxify” (and expel extremists) from what use to be an extreme right party, in order to turn it into a more respectable “right-wing” populist force (Gaffney, 2012). In fact, some popular commentators argue she has (to some extent) successfully managed this operation (see Murray, 2017). Therefore, not only are the parties Ignazi and Ysmal mentioned and studied no longer existent, but their heirs are usually no longer considered as full-fledged extreme right parties. Not to mention, in Europe there are very few (if any) truly extreme right/neofascist parties that are electorally relevant to this day – the German Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) perhaps being an exception.
Another factor that might challenge Ignazi’s and Ysmal’s claim, if reconsidered today and applied to the successors of the MSI and Front National by scholars of radical parties, is the emergence of a new populist zeitgeist over the last twenty to thirty years (see Mudde, 2004). This public mood of disenchantment with traditional politics has contributed to the success of several parties that were originally isolated on the fringes of the spectrum. Almost suddenly, once marginalized groups such as the Lega Nord,FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats, became electorally relevant and more mainstream (Tarchi, 2002). Their “mainstreaming” makes it considerably more difficult for the “extreme” label to be attached to them. Moreover, not all parties that once belonged to the extreme right can be considered exclusively “right-wing” today; some, like Jobbik, have adopted syncretic populist positions. As the Italian scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) contends, their current populist forma mentis often takes them ideologically beyond the Right-Left dichotomy (Tarchi, 2015: 52). Nonetheless, casting aside those organizations that Luke March (2008: 3-4) classifies as “social populist” or “socialist populist,” many of these newly successful parties or rising movements are said to be either populist, or extreme right, or both at the same time (e.g. Backes, 1991; Betz, 1994; Ignazi 2000; Carter 2005; Mudde, 2000; Griffin, 2018).
Taking this into account, it is precisely this ambiguous conflation that has become a problem. In fact, as Mudde (2000) states: “All in all, most definitions of (whatever) populism do not differ that much in content from the definitions of right-wing extremism…with the various terms often used synonymously and without any clear intention” (Mudde, 2000: 13). While extreme right parties that are unequivocally neofascist are largely being ignored in scholarly literature, a growing number of scholars are erroneously labeling populist right parties as “extreme right” parties (for example, see Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). In any event, the objective of this article is not to engage in an exhaustive – and sometimes counter-productive – debate originating from academic circles which Cas Mudde (1996) famously termed the “war of words.” This complex debate has aimed to describe the various political subjects that have monopolized the political space to the right of liberal-conservative forces and to especially determine the most appropriate term to define these “new” populist parties (Mudde, 2000: 11-16). Some of the terms proposed in the past include “progress-hostile forces” (Hartmann et al., 1985), “right-wing extremism” (Macridis, 1989; Mudde; 1995; 2000); “right-wing radicalism” (Oswalt, 1991; Weinberg, 1993), “radical-right” (Sprinzak, 1991), “radical right-wing populism” (Betz, 1993; Mudde, 2007), “post-industrial extreme right” (Ignazi, 2000), “New Populism” (Taggart, 1996), “neopopulism” (Yoshikazu, 2018), “national populism” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), and finally, the most misleading of all – “extreme right-wing populism” (Rydgren, 2005; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). If all those terms were utilized to label different parties, such as either the ones that have a substantially populist core ideology and the ones that have a substantially fascist (or neofascist) one, this would by now be a non-substantive issue or a false dilemma. However, over the course of the last decades, all those terms have been applied to the same or a remarkably similar set of parties in Western Europe and the Americas, when in reality populism and extreme right (neofascism) are – ideologically speaking – mutually exclusive (Tarchi, 2015: 117-126). New academic research should instead be dedicated to distinguishing between the parties that belong to either one party family (e.g. the “populist” one) or the other (the “extreme right” one).
Regardless, the objective of this article is to compare the positions of the French Rassemblement National (RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (FN) from an entirely ideational perspective and offer comprehensive insight on the key differences between the two ideologies. To maintain clarity, I shall utilize the words populism (but I also use “right-wing populism” or “populist right” for the RN interchangeably), and extreme right (but I also use “right-wing extremism” or “neofascism” for the FN interchangeably) to describe two distinct ideological phenomena. A full-fledged and in-depth analysis of the populist and extreme right ideological positions will be present in the second part of the contribution; however, I will first provide some generic preliminary information that is equally important.
In essence, populism (or even “right-wing populism”) and right-wing extremism are not identical. In fact, it has already been recognized that they substantially differ in a number of ways (Taggart, 1996: 35). As a primary example, Paul Taggart (1996) has argued that neofascist parties “tend to have some direct link to the fascist parties of the previous era while New Populist parties appear to lack such a historical link” (Taggart, 1996: 35). This is especially true for active extreme right organizations in countries like Britain, France, Spain, Greece and elsewhere in Europe. For instance, in Britain, the contemporary National Front (NF) is a result of a gradual political evolution that saw the party come into being after a merger of two older extremist factions – the neo-Nazi British National Party (BNP) active in 1960 and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). The BNP and LEL were themselves preceded by movements that revolved around pre-war (and post-war) fascist leaders like Sir Oswald Mosley and A.K. Chesterton. Another example relating to the differences between populism (or “New Populism” as Taggart calls it) and neofascism regards the issue of immigration (Taggart, 1996: 36). Certainly, both the populist right and the extremist right are anti-immigration(-ist), however, the former are not as fixated with the issue as the latter (Taggart, 1996: 36). Populists rarely (if ever) resort to ultra-authoritarian policies that may lead to ethnic cleansing or political violence through paramilitarism (Finchelstein, 2019: 45; Eatwell, 2017: 365). Parties like the Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy serve as a perfect example of this non-violent attitude as they have a vast program that (apart from anti-immigration) also comprises fiscal federalism, anti-tax measures for small business, and the legalization of prostitution (Programma di Governo Salvini Premier, 2018). These are all issues completely unrelated to immigration. Hence, whilst this contribution acknowledges that the two sets of ideas may occasionally appear alike[2] – as scholars like Taggart (1996: 36) recognize – the two should still be understood as overall distinct concepts. Thus, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political history, or tradition is per se usuallymisleading and inappropriate.
Theoretical Framework and Method
The most appropriate way to differentiate between (right-wing) populism and extreme right is not by merely providing the most popular definitions of the two ideologies by the most prominent academics. Instead, it is to carefully observe the distinct views both ideologies maintain of politics overall. Disregarding the fact that populism is rather “unpolitical” (refer to Taggart’s reflections on unpolitics[3]) and extreme right/neofascism is highly political by design, populist parties (in this case the RN) and extreme right parties (in this case FN) hold specific views on the people, the nation, the state, society, the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market that make the two ideologies – as we shall see – more incompatible than compatible (Tarchi, 2015: 125). The specifics of this theoretical framework, which were originally put forward in a seminal text on populism by Tarchi (2015), will be discussed throughout the next section. Taking this into consideration, after briefly touching upon the generic issues surrounding the academic definitions of populism and extreme right and providing a short historical account of both parties under scrutiny, the core of this article will focus on a discourse and manifesto analysis (which will occur concomitantly) of the RN and FN parties, respectively. Subsequently, all findings will be discussed conjunctly, to produce conclusive statements on both populism and extreme right.
For the RN, as for the FN party, the discourse analysis will include statements made by their leaders (Marine Le Pen and Roberto Fiore, respectively) over the course of the last five to ten years. The reason for this is that populist and extremist parties of the right are often structured in a highly centralized manner with a pre-eminence of key individuals (Taggart, 2003: 6), therefore it makes sense to give higher relevance to the statements and opinions of those directly in charge. Regarding the manifesto analysis, the manifestos chosen for analysis are the ones obtainable through the RN’s and FN’s websites (rassemblementnational.fr and forzanuova1997.it, respectively) as they can easily be located by the reader, and this is beneficial for transparency. Even if they have been released over a year ago, they still largely reflect their current positions. In any event, the RN’s manifesto is simply named “Les 22 Mesures” (“22 Measures”) whilst FN’s one is called “8 punti” (“8 points”). However, as FN’s manifesto is much shorter, during the analysis sporadic mention is also made to the party’s older political program for the important (post-debt crisis) Italian general election that took place in February 2013. This document (also easily accessible online) was named “Programma Per Le Elezioni Politiche 2013 Di Forza Nuova E Di Nomina Del Capo” (“Program for The Political Elections of 2013 of Forza Nuova and Its Appointed Head”). For clarity, each time I refer to this above-mentioned document using in-text citations I shall refer to it simply as: “FN general elections program, 2013.” Overall, the manifesto analysis occupies a dominant position in relation to the discourse analysis, this is because party programs and manifestos in general are “considered to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party” (Borg, 1966: 97; see also Anckar & Ramsted Silén, 1981). Fundamentally, not only are manifestos or programs (the second are generally more detailed and promoted before an election) officially endorsed by the members of a party – as Mudde reminds us – but are also widely utilized in academia as a form of data to determine party ideology (Mudde, 2000: 20).
Defining Populism and Extreme Right
Populism
Photo: Shutterstock.
Objectively defining this protean and unusual concept commonly known as “populism” has never been simple. To this day, scholars disagree on whether it is a political strategy, a form of discourse/performance or effectively an ideology (Moffitt, 2020: 25-26), thus, let alone do they agree on a fixed definition. To add to the confusion, some scholars state that “populism has many of the attributes of an ideology, but not all of them” (Taggart, 2000: 1). Notwithstanding, it must be recognized that lately the so-called ideational approach has garnered a significant amount of traction in academia to the point of replacing old economic notions (e.g. populism as state intervention, “overspending,” or a set of neoliberal financial policies) of the phenomenon that 20th century scholars (especially in the Latin American cases) insisted upon (Weyland: 2017: 51). This is why Taggart (2018) argues that today the ideational approach is “winning” from a theoretical standpoint (Taggart, 2018a).
One of the foremost pioneers of the ideational approach is the prominent Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2004) who defines populism “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale(general will) of the people”(Mudde, 2004: 543). Whilst it must be acknowledged that this definition is fundamental to any in-depth and scientific understanding of modern populism, in this contribution abiding by a generic definition of the phenomenon per se is not as important as considering specific aspects of populism which make it a distinct ideology possessing its very own weltanschauung. After all, considering diverse cases globally, contemporary populism appears to have both a comprehensive program of political change and “staying power,” making it effectively resemble other “thick”[4] ideologies founded in past centuries (e.g. liberalism, communism, fascism) (Schroeder, 2020: 13, 27-28). Taking this into account, instead of focusing on the ideational approach’s concepts of “the people,” “the elite,” and “general will” alone, we encompass – as mentioned earlier – other elements of its ideological repertoire that go beyond those three.
In summary, at this point in history, Tarchi (2002) contents that populism represents an entirely “alternative model” to the extreme right. According to Tarchi, in populist ideology, the people represent a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas the nation is the product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Instead, when it comes to the conceptualization of the state,this is understood to be the administrator of the public interest subordinated to the will of the people who must control its action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moreover, for populists, society itself is nothing more than the natural context in which the life of the people unfolds, it is autonomous from the state and is prioritized in respect to it (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Populists also have a specific view of the individual, as they believe this is the cornerstone of social life whichfinds the natural context of its needs within the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas in populist ideology the leader is perceived as a spokesperson for the people, an interpreter of their needs, endowed with ordinary qualities in extraordinary measures (Tarchi, 2015: 125). At the same time, the elite is (as expected) negatively regarded as a power block that must be kept under control by the people to protect their rights (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, populists hold a definite opinion of democracy, where democracy is considered anideal regime to be implemented entirely through tools of direct popular expression and without institutional mediation (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Ultimately, the conceptualization of the market is that of somethingpositive, to be tempered through protective measures reserved for the indigenous population – essentially, welfare chauvinism (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Subsequently, it will become clearer how all these concepts directly related to populism will apply to a right-wing populist party like the RN but not to a right-wing extremist party like FN.
Extreme Right
Demonstration of the political movement called “Forza Nuova” held in Rome in the EUR zone on November 4, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.
In academic discourse, the term “extreme right” is frequently employed to describe parties or movements encompassing a range of political orientations, which renders the study of this subject particularly complex and nuanced. For instance, scholars – who have observed the phenomenon consistently – such as Elisabeth Carter (2005; 2018), provide a useful minimal definition of the term but are too inclusive (regarding classification), and tend to include subjects that are neither “extreme” nor truly “right-wing” in the party family. To exacerbate the ambiguity, even if only as a secondary element, Carter adds populism in the mix as an element to consider when describing extreme right ideology (see Carter, 2005: 21-23, 56-60). Given the circumstances, the definition Carter provides is an optimal starting point to understand the key features of extreme right ideology – authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism(Carter, 2018: 157). However, if one abides by this definition, it already becomes clear that extreme right politics are not all that similar to populist politics, given the latter does not reject democracy altogether, and does not necessarily have to be authoritarian or exclusionary in terms of nationalism. In simple terms, “populism is pro-democracy but anti-liberal democracy” (Mudde, 2021: 579). Historically, we have witnessed the rise of “liberal” or libertarian populist parties (as well as socialistic ones, see March, 2007) that are only civically nationalist and view forms of plebiscitarian (direct) democracy as a real promise (e.g. PDL in Italy, and Lijst Dedecker in the Netherlands).
More specifically, excessive breadth given to the terminology certainly becomes an issue when you group together (under the same umbrella term “extreme right”) parties that outrightly reject the democratic system (e.g. NPD, now renamed Die Heimat) with parties that accept the rules of democracy but want to reform it by making it either more democratic and less statist (e.g. Lega dei Ticinesi, Lega Nord) or less democratic and more statist (e.g. Vlaams Blok, now renamed Vlaams Belang) (see Carter, 2005: 45). Ideally the parties that are anti-democratic and illiberal cannot be part of the same family as those that are illiberal but at the same time still democratic. Also, it is a problem to cluster ultra-authoritarian Neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties with others that are simply neoliberal (but still xenophobic and anti-immigrant, according to Carter) or “neo-liberal populist” that do not adhere to any form of biological or cultural racism but are – in Carter’s own words – “not racist” whatsoever (Carter, 2005: 50-51).
Carter is not the only author who associates the neofascist extreme right with (elements of) populism. Indeed, one of the most renowned scholars of fascism, Roger Griffin (2018), explicitly identifies populism as a distinctive feature of the ideology, defining fascism as a “political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism” (Griffin, 2018: 46). Although Griffin embraces populism in his definition of fascism, he is more careful to not narrow the gap between fascist or neofascist parties and populist parties in his work. Notwithstanding, the distinction to be made between populism and extreme right is an essential one, because although populism is today more often associated with the political right, it is not inherently right-wing but is chameleonic (Taggart, 2003: 9) to the point that it can also manifest itself alongside left-wing ideologies (Hudson & Shah, 2022).
Using Tarchi’s theoretical scheme, it has been established in the section above what the generic views of populism are in relation to important aspects of society, such as the role of the state, the role of the elites and so forth. Unlike in populist ideology, in the extreme right the general (elitist) view of “the people” is more negative than positive (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, the people are a mass to be educated under the guidance of the elite and merged with the nation and the nation itself is a spiritual community that has the task of forming and directing the people by assigning them a common destiny (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, according to extreme right neofascist ideology, the state represents the embodiment of the principle of authority, the fundamental principle of social organization superordinate to both the people and nation (Tarchi, 2015: 125).Uncoincidentally, it was the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini himself who famously stressed “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State!” (Delzell, 1988: 127). This would be the exact opposite worldview to that of some neoliberal (pro-capitalism and pro-market) right-wing populist parties present in the European political sphere during the last decades (see Taggart, 1996: 34).
Beyond the state, society is according to right-wing extremists a raw material that must be formed, controlled, and guided by the state to which it is subordinated (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When compared to populism, the extreme right also has a much more negative or pessimistic view of the individual – which is merely considered a component of the nation whose needs must conform to avoid manifesting selfish interests (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In regard to the central ideological tenet of the leader right-wing extremists believe this figure to be the guide of the people and of the nation, to whom he indicates the destiny, and is endowed with extraordinary and charismatic qualities (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When it comes to how they view the elite, it said that these extremists believe the elite is a spiritual aristocracy that supervises the people and directs them to fulfill their duties (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moving on to their conceptualization of democracy,Tarchi posits that they believe it is a regime that is criticizable because it reverses the principle of authority and is subject to the fickleness of the masses (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Last but not least, the market is deemed as something negative that must be subordinated to the needs of the nation and controlled through nationalizations or state-guided corporatism (Tarchi, 2015: 125).
Rassemblement National (RN): A History
Jean-Marie Le Pen during the meeting of his daughter Marine Le Pen for the celebration of May 1, 2011 in Paris, France. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
The Beginnings (1970s)
The history of the RN is complex. Or better, the history of the RN’s directly related predecessor (Front National) is both long and complex. Nevertheless, it is essential to outline this party’s historical background in order to comprehend why today it is more often treated as a “right-wing” populist party rather than an extreme right one by scholars (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022; Genga, 2017; Stockemer & Barisione 2016; Tarchi & De Feudis, 2015). Undeniably, the old Front Nationalwas an extreme right party (Tarchi, 2022: 12) – which occasionally even made use of esoteric fascist propaganda; symbols[5], myths, and imagery (Eatwell, 2017: 365). The party was born out of marginalized (and neofascist) Ordre Nouveau movement, when on October 5, 1972 its Mussolini-sympathizing leader Alain Robert joined forces with former Poujadist[6] MP and Algeria War veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen to form what became officially known as the Front National pour l’Unité Française. As Le Pen had more institutional experience and was perceived as more “moderate” by the public, he would eventually become the sole leader of the political group (Stockemer, 2017: 10). This early Front National was a haven for the whole French extreme right, from miscellaneous nationalists (of Bonapartist, Boulangist, Petainist, Poujadist or even Tixierist[7] extraction) to ex pro-French Algeria “freedom fighters” and anti-system extremists (from the movements Occident, Europe-Action, Jeunesses Patriotes, etc.) who idolized a form of internationalist or Europeanist “new fascism” (Stockemer, 2017: 8-11; Ignazi, 2000: 180-186).
The more than 50-year-old history of the Front National/Rassemblement National can essentially be divided into six phases (which sometimes overlap) – The Beginnings (1970s), The Minor Successes Phase (1980s), The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993), The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s), The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002) and the Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front’ Phase (2012-). In the first phase, during the whole of the 1970s, the Front was completely marginalized and trapped in what Kurt Weyland (2017) would define as the extreme right “ideological ghetto” (Weyland, 2017: 62-63). In fact, no real electoral gains were made by the early “Le Penist” Front (Ignazi, 2000: 186-190). The 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential elections were a complete failure, with the party counting less than 300 members and never even achieving one percent of the vote. In the 1978 legislative ones, a similar trend recurred, with a mere 0.33% obtained in the first round (Genga, 2017: 36). Throughout the 1970s, the Front only manifested “an ideology that included racism, militarism, anti-democracy[8], and virulent anti-communism” (Stockemer, 2017: 12). Taking this into account, Le Pen was mainly interested in the small businessmen and craftsmen vote, therefore he combined authoritarian policies on crime, state security, and immigration with a more flexible (not typically neofascist) anti-tax approach on the economy.
The Minor Successes Phase (1980s)
Only in the 1980s, during the second phase, did Le Pen’s mixed political positions begin to bear fruit. De facto, in 1983 (more than 10 years after its formation) the Front performed positively in supplementary local elections achieving more than 16% in certain municipalities of northern France (such as Dreux) and as far as 12% in others in a nearby region (Genga, 2017; 38-38). One year later, in 1984, another electoral breakthrough occurred, as Le Pen’s party achieved 11% in the European elections (Stockemer, 2017: 16). This was an “outstanding” result for an extreme right fringe party. Some scholars attribute the (minor) successes of the Front in the 1980s (from 1982-83 onwards) to the bad decision-making of D’Estaing’s and Mitterrand’s – respectively centrist and socialist governments – on law-and-order (e.g. the unpopular amnesty reforms), a spike in immigration, alongside a heightened sensitivity against Islam and an economic crisis (two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979) that included an increase in unemployment, public debt, and inflation (see Perrineau, 1996; 1997; Genga, 2017). All of these issues, in tandem with Le Pen’s recurring invitations to speak on television[9], helped the Front to reach out to a wider (and less ideologically motivated) audience. By the late 1980s, Le Pen could finally cast himself as the politician to represent the working and middle classes who felt France was changing for the worse. Also, in 1987 Le Pen publicly stated that “gas chambers were a minor detail in the second world war” (Genga, 2017: 55). Surprisingly, this highly controversial statement did not backfire on him at all, but perhaps attracted even more attention and votes from the angry and disillusioned electorate (Genga, 2017: 55-56). Ultimately, in the important 1988 presidential elections Le Pen garnered almost 14.38 % of the vote in the first-round alone (Stockemer, 2017; Genga, 2017).
The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993)
It must be noted that between 1982 (after the VI party congress) and 1993, Le Pen began to take a different approach towards fiscal policy, setting aside the state interventionism, economic nationalism, and protectionism that had been ever present within the Front to incorporate laissez faire positions that are alien to the neofascist corporatist and dirigiste tradition (Genga, 2015: 95). The expert Nicola Genga (2015) summarizes Le Pen’s views during this period as favorable to a “natural order based on inequality, which justifies the existence of a capitalist system of production” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). During the Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase – which partially overlapped with the 1980s Minor Successes Phase – Le Pen self-described his party as “socially left-wing but economically right-wing” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). Notwithstanding this peculiar (and contradictory) statement, it is evident that this shift was more tactical than ideological given during this period the best way for the Front to succeed was to present itself as a direct alternative to the socialists/communists in power (Genga & Algisi, 2015). To be sure, Le Pen’s picture taken with US President Ronald Reagan perfectly encapsulates this neoliberal phase (Tarchi, 2015). Within scholarship, the consensus is that this phase came to an end abruptly in 1993 when Le Pen turned his back on economic liberalism, in order to return to more welfare chauvinist and statist policies (Genga, 2017: 97) that resemble those of his daughter Marine Le Pen today (some go as far as suggesting Marine is a “social populist,” see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022).
The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s)
In the fourth phase, the Front found itself at a crossroads due to internal squabbles (see Déze, 2012: 125). The (almost) unquestioned chief Le Pen was challenged by the “moderate” wing of the party led by the delegate Bruno Megret (Taggart, 2002: 78, 87). This politician had an alternative and opposite vision for the future of the party, and convinced part of the membership that the only way forward to achieve serious electoral relevance was to leave the “ideological ghetto” and marginalization once and for all (Stockemer, 2017: 21). Essentially, Mégret argued that only by shifting its attitudes on most issues the Front would become a respectable center-right party that could form alliances with other parties – especially the neo-Gaullists (Stockemer, 2017: 21). As a result, Mégret and other MPs who backed him, were thrown out by Le Pen, and forced to form a smaller party that had no real leverage (Whitney, 1998; Stockemer, 2017: 22).
The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002)
This takes us to the Apex Phase. In April 2002, by softening some of his positions temporarily, and concomitantly reworking his discursive patterns through more populistic and “inclusive” appeals to French people “of all socio-economic backgrounds,” “of all religions,” and “of all skin colors,” Le Pen made it to the run-off of the presidential election (Tarchi, 2015: 135). By this point, he was perceived by the public as the only real anti-establishment candidate who had a chance at the presidency. Strikingly, he managed to obtain nearly 18% of the vote. Although incumbent President Jacques Chirac refused to share a platform with the Front’s leader and to officially debate him (see Henley, 2002) he still beat Le Pen. Nevertheless, the year 2002 marked the highest point for Le Pen and his extreme right party.
The Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front’ Phase (2011 –)
After subsequent years of worse performances, in January 2011 during the Front’s Congress of Tours Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine Le Pen is finally confirmed as official president of the party after beating her opponent (who was also close to her father) Bruno Gollnisch (Genga, 2017). From thereafter the dédiabolisation era begins, this culminates with Jean-Marie being expelled from the party by M. Le Pen herself after making inappropriate comments regarding the holocaust and WW2 (Genga, 2017: 171; BBC News, 20 August 2015). Synchronously, many more extremist figures (especially deriving from the youth wing) are distanced from the party in the hope to build a new moderate image (Genga, 2017). As M. Le Pen’s favorite advisor – the libertarian crypto-technocrat Florian Philippot – had anticipated, this major repositioning proved to be electorally successful (Genga, 2017: 175). Although some (such as political advisor and analyst Patrick Buisson) argue the brand of Marine’s party is still far too “toxic” to rule the country (Samuel, 2016), she has still come closer than her father when it comes to winning the presidency. Her electoral result at the 2022 Presidential elections was overall regarded as positive by her supporters, because even if she lost to Emmanuel Macron for the second time consecutively, in the second round she garnered 31.7 % of the vote (Voce & Clarke, 2022). Prior to that, in the run-off of the 2017 Presidential elections she had performed even better, given she obtained 33.9% of the vote against the same opponent (Statista Research Department, March 11, 2024).
Under M. Le Pen, the party’spolitical project took shape as a means to provide French voters with an ideological alternative to the “mainstream parties” – namely (the neo-Gaullist) Les Républicains, the Socialist Party, President Macron’s En Marche! (subsequently Renaissance party), and the radical left/green groupings. Whereas some scholars highlight that there has been a degree of continuity between this new party and her father’s old Front National (see Mammone, 2015; Stockemer, 2017), others argue there has been a clear philosophical demarcation of the “new Front” from its extreme right past (see Gaffney, 2012; Genga, 2017; Tarchi, 2022). For instance, the specialist on lepénismeDaniel Stockemer (2017) explains that there are specifically three aspects that have improved (or “softened”) the party’s image as M. Le Pen took over its leadership (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). First, she has regularly repudiated the “extreme right” label (Stockemer, 2017: 39). The evidence suggests that all intellectual references to thinkers like MauriceBarrès, Charles Maurras, Robert Brasillach and others have suddenly disappeared from the party’s discourse (Stockemer, 2017: 39). Second, any comments made by her father that could be deemed as intolerant, antisemitic, or generically racist, have also been instantly disavowed with fervor (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). When it comes to antisemitism particularly, M. Le Pen’s discreet realignment in favor of Israel on foreign policy speaks volumes about the party’s moderation (Abboud, 2023). Third, she has embraced a traditional(-ist) form of French republicanism (a French version of neo-conservative American exceptionalism) that has its intellectual foundations in post-1789 universalist, liberal (although M. Le Pen opposes economic liberalism) and secular thought (Stockemer, 2017: 40). This approach is philosophically distant from the anti-intellectualist and anti-bourgeois ideological mapping of fascism and neofascism that often pushed for a return to pre-French revolution moral codes (see Paxton, 2005; Dagnino, 2016). Amid 2018, the party was officially renamed Rassemblement National in a move to put the organization’s distant past and father’s legacy behind once and for all.
Rassemblement National (RN): Ideological Profile
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.
Populist, “right-wing” or both?
M. Le Pen’s party has a comprehensible ideological profile. Whilst the RN still fails to meet the criteria to be evaluated as a (classical) “center-right” party – as it is not Atlanticist enough nor does it abide to the values of free-market capitalism or consider the liberal rule of law one of its core tenets (see Trippenbach & Johannès, 2022) – the party can instead be classified as “right-wing” populist. If the primary (and paramount) ingredient in the RN’s political cocktail is populism, the secondary one is a form of nationalist social conservatism. On one hand, at the center of its ideology and discourse we first find a commitment to popular sovereignty (the will of the people, volonté générale) inextricably linked to a heavy critique of national and international – both political and financial – “corrupt elites.” On the other hand, adjacent[10] to its anti-elitist ethos, we also find a strong nationalist rhetoric (although state nationalist[11] instead of ethnic nationalist[12]) that can be simplified by the slogan “Les Français d’abord!” (“The French First!”) (see Fraser, 2011). This slogan alone explains the RN’s positions against mass immigration and in favor of a strong interventionist state that regularly distributes resources (but to the native French only) in the name of an inter-classist welfare chauvinism.
If one considers the definition Norberto Bobbio (1994) confers to the political right, where he suggests right-wing movements (unlike leftist ones) accept the existence of societal hierarchies and inequalities and may even consider them as positive, both as a premise and as a natural outcome to social and economic competition, then we can deduce that the RN is only partially “right-wing.” After all, many of M. Le Pen’s statist-interventionist policies (anathema to center-right liberal-conservatives) are quintessential of populist formations with a social conscience that aim to foremostly represent the lower classes and ameliorate living and working conditions for them through redistribution (Moffitt, 2020). This is where the welfare chauvinism derives from a complex ideological synthesis between nationalist populism, cultural conservatism, and economic socialism (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022). It is no coincidence that M. Le Pen once said: “we are absolutely not a rightist party; those who believe it make a colossal interpretation error” (Le Pen as cited in Stockemer, 2017: 39).
The People and the Elite
In any event, the RN’s populist weltanschauung becomes evident if we consider the nine important aspects from Tarchi’s theoretical framework. As explained above, populists view “the people” as a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action. This view is coherently reflected in the RN’s party manifesto (the “22 Measures” on its website), given we find within it not only the promotion of private property (essentially “facilitation of access” to it), but also that of social housing for French citizens – excluding immigrants (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Government action is justified on the basis that large infrastructure developments, and the construction of 100,000 (plus 20,000 for young people) new social housing units, will only be provided for those struggling citizens who are legally French (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Under these circumstances, immigrants/foreigners are not a priority, as they are considered to be part of an “outgroup”[13] that is neither “cohesive” (as migrants in France may originate from distinct “non-homogeneous” countries) nor “virtuous” (as populists perceive them as a burden to the public resources system). The idea is that regarding economic state protection they do not deserve to have the same rights of the French, who are part of an “organic community” (Zanatta, 2016: 65-80), thus supposedly both cohesive and virtuous at the same time. Moreover, even if M. Le Pen states that she “has nothing against foreigners,” her party clearly opposes free education to the children of illegal immigrants (The Guardian, December 8, 2016). Supposedly under foreign influence, French elites (the “UMPS[14] system”) have disproportionately provided privileges (such as social housing) to immigrants that should have never been welcomed into France initially (Dézé, 2014: 24).
This takes us to the negative view of the elite these right-wing populists hold. According to M. Le Pen, it is “time to free the French people from arrogant elites” (see Acton, 2017). Even though the RN’s manifesto currently lacks explicitly anti-EU statements—aside from the aim to “protect the economy” from “unfair competition” and to revise EU trade agreements—one of its major immigration policies is tied to the inherently anti-elitist principle of direct democracy. Through constant referendums, “the people” will be able to put an end to “settlement immigration/reunification” (of immigrant families), scrap residence permits for those who have not worked for a year and decide whether the processing of asylum applications should (or should not) occur in French territory (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1). In summary, for the RN, anti-elitism primarily involves “giving people a voice.” While the manifesto conveys a positive view of popular decision-making, it simultaneously portrays professional politicians and technocratic elites in a very negative light. As previously mentioned, in populism, elites are seen as a dangerous power bloc that must be kept in check by the people through instruments of direct democracy (Tarchi, 2015: 125).
The Nation and the State
As Tarchi argues (and as we already know), in populist ideology the concept of people and nation are inextricably interconnected though the nation comes after the people (both as “hard-working” individuals and as a “homogenous” collective) given the nation is simply product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity(Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, it is the people and their cultural traditions that form the nation and not vice-versa. Interestingly, in the RN’s latest manifesto the concept of nation becomes conveniently – but also ideologically – almost indistinguishably linked and blurred with that of the state. As outlined earlier, the state is understood as nothing more an administrator of public interest that is entirely subordinate to the will of the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, within the manifesto it is the state that works for the nation because a virtuous homogenous community composes the nation: theFrench people. Thus, the RN’s ideal state is people centric. Similarly to the American proto-populist Gettysburg Address – “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” This longing for an active and interventionist state becomes apparent in the RN’s policies regarding Islam. In the manifesto, a new strict law is proposed to combat Islamism (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 2). Islam itself is not regarded as French but is instead perceived as alien to the “cultural tradition” of French secular Republicanism (in the sense that this religion cannot be assimilated within it), and therefore is also an enemy to the nation-state (Genga, 2017). Nor is Islam regarded as something able to provide a “stable identity,” given populists suspect the presence of Muslims and Christians (as well as atheists) within the country concomitantly may stir religious and racial tensions among the populace. From a populist perspective, a populace should be monolithic and homogenous (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2019: 22).
Proceeding to economic matters, all the anti-tax proposals the RN includes in its 22-point manifesto are aimed at French businesses owned by French businessmen (rassemblementnational.fr, Measures 4, 5, 8, and 12). The RN’s pledge to “support French families” through the removal of inheritance tax for low-middle income families (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), as well as its proposals to increase welfare support for French mothers with one or more children (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), is particularly symbolic of a strong state (that intervenes to improve people’s lives) for two reasons. The first has to do directly with populism and the second with social conservatism. Firstly, the RN wishes to present itself as a populist party therefore is required to pursue economic policies (such as subsidies and tax cuts) that favor the petite bourgeoisie and especially the working-class (see Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Although the old Front National (like its successor today) was overall an inter-classist party, experts such as Nonna Mayer (1998) have pointed out that the vote for Le Pen in the 1995 Presidential elections was effectively a “class vote” – with several youngsters moving away from the PCF[15] towards the Front’s pseudo-socialist nationalism (Surel, 2002: 143-144). This author later coined the term “worker Le Penism” (Mayer, 1994). Following the same conceptual lead, Pascal Perrineau (1995) referred to this same phenomenon as “left Le Penism” (Perrineau, 1995: 243-261). These observations remain relevant today, as M. Le Pen enjoys broad consensus among the working classes from whom she consistently courts political support. Secondly, the RN is also inherently socially conservative (partially right-wing) and is therefore expected to financially assist single-mothers or larger families with children to promote a “battle for births”[16], which is allegedly necessary to demographically boost the so-called “pure people” (term borrowed from Cas Mudde) of France.
Society, the Individual, and the Leader
Moving on from the populist view of nation intertwined with that of state to that of society, it must be stressed that the RN’s positions on this matter are rather specific. M. Le Pen herself has notoriously stated that “multi-cultural societies are multi-conflict societies” (see Viscusi, 2017). This party is known to take a more (typically populist) exclusionary than inclusionary stance when it comes to society and its collectivist communitarian features. Parties like the RN view their country, its rural towns, metropolitan districts, provinces, and regions, as essentially constituting not only a sacred homeland, but also something of a heartland. Taggart defines a heartland as “a territory of the imagination…the heartland is that place, embodying the positive aspects of everyday life” (Taggart, 2002: 95). It is self-evident who belongs and who does not belong to this heartland (and society) (Taggart, 2002: 96-98). In this case, immigrants, religious fanatics, career politicians (M. Le Pen was a lawyer before entering politics), left-wing (anti-RN) activists, plutocrats with internationalist vocations, fifth columnists and foreign bodies, are certainly not part of the populist heartland (Taggart, 2002: 94). As a result, they are not included in the broader vision for French society that the RN upholds.
However, paradoxically, by observing the party’s manifesto for an ideal society we are also confronted with a more “liberal” or libertarian aspect of populist ideology. For example, populists recognize that people’s lives should often come before politics and the state. People are allowed to flourish economically and intellectually, to unleash their individual potential – “Voila, we’re all molded by our personal paths, which forge our sensibilities” argues the RN’s leader (see Gourevitch, 2015). M. Le Pen is supposedly pro-abortion (as long as it occurs within 14 weeks of pregnancy), pro-divorce, and pro-gay rights (as long as civil unions do not become marriage) (see Poirer, 2017). Contrastingly, she has also spoken out against a purely consumerist neoliberal individualism from an economic standpoint: “Our project is based on rejecting individualism and the power of money” (Smith, 2018).
Furthermore, closely observing the RN, one can deduce that the party acknowledges individuals are the cornerstone of social life. M. Le Pen ardently defends the civil individual rights of the French people. For instance, unlike Jean-Marie’s old Front, the RN’s positions are now – to a limited extent – sometimes feminist (see Schurts, 2024). On one occasion, the RN’s leader expressed that utilizing a headscarf to meet an Islamic leader (the Grand Mufti of Lebanon) would be in conflict with the values of French republicanism and those of a free (liberal egalitarian) society, where both sexes enjoy equal rights (see Balkiz & Masters, 2017). “I will not cover myself up” M. Le Pen stressed while referring to her meeting, which eventually was cancelled (Balkiz & Masters, 2017). For the same reasons, she proposes a complete ban on headscarves and burkas in public spaces (see France24, April 7, 2022). Populist crypto-individualism also played a role in her decision to not support a ban on abortion – any mention to this issue is absent in her “22-measures” as well as in her self-authored books (Tarchi, 2022: 13). Also, M. Le Pen unequivocally condemned those religious fundamentalists who despise gay people (Wildman, 2017).
Taking this into account, to cast herself as a spokesperson and interpreter of the needs of the people, her leadership style embodies the populist ideal. The policies outlined for the RN not only position her as a leader close to the people, but her personal traits, which emphasize “ordinary qualities” like “common sense” and a “strong work ethic” (see Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 1), also resonate positively with the populace. Moreover, in order to appeal to a more moderate base of working-class conservative supporters, she often reiterates that she is (like many others in France) a woman and a mother (Geva, 2020: 13-14). In the eyes of the many, M. Le Pen has become a “woman in a captain’s suit,” just as popular as Margaret Thatcher and Evita Peron in the past (Geva, 2020: 6,14). In a typically populist fashion, this female politician wants to demonstrate that she has both ordinary and extraordinary qualities that can both represent and lead the populace at the same time. As a natural guide, it is common for her to remind her potential voters that “Peuple de France, l’heure est venue de te lever” (Le Pen, April 21, 2022, Twitter). This is an invitation for “the people” of the French nation to rise-up. To rise not only against the neoliberal elite in France, but also against the diktats of the elite-backed European Union that are supposedly promoting and funding mass immigration, and finally against the traditional parties (neo-Gaullists, socialists, and communists) that are engaged in destroying the social fabric of the “homogenous” French nation.
Democracy and the Market
Marion Marechal Le Pen at the European election campaign launch meeting of the far-right “Reconquete” party in Paris, France, on March 10, 2024. Photo: Victor Velter.
To conclude this section, the relationship that M. Le Pen’s party has with democracy and the market is ambiguous, to say the least. Like all populists, the RN has an impatience with checks and balances (the formalities of liberal constitutionalism – e.g., political mediation and procedural legitimacy) that are an essential aspect of liberal democracy (see Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017: 327). Nevertheless, this party does not reject representative democracy overall. The RN’s view of democracy is simply of one that is direct and majoritarian. In its manifesto, referendums and plebiscites occupy the first position (in terms of “22 measures” to be taken). Accordingly, people will be able to decide on issues that affect their lives, ranging all the way from immigration to social housing and labor regulation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1).
Regarding the market, the sociologist Lorenzo Cattani (2017) has appropriately suggested that M. Le Pen’s party is a “bearer of neoliberal values regarding the national economy but at the same time also strongly critical of globalization and the more internationalist principles of neoliberalism.” Following this logic, it can be assumed that even though M. Le Pen’s technically opposes both unrestricted free trade and autarky, she still considers the market an overall as “somethingpositive”and therefore advocates for protectionism as a middle-way (Cattani, 2017). Her economic positions have been significantly influenced by the French Eurosceptic economist Maurice Allais (1911-2010), which explains her past critique of the single currency, European integration, and the European constitution. Similarly, M. Le Pen’s niece and (now former) important party representative, Marion-Maréchal Le Pen, has very clearly expressed that “a form of protectionism should be enforced at a national level, at least on strategic areas such as agriculture” (The Sydney Morning Herald, August 3, 2013).
The RN accepts (and even welcomes) the existence of private property, entrepreneurship, and a social-market economy, given the party is not fully anti-capitalist. Notwithstanding, the core idea is that small and medium businesses should be taxed much less and allowed to operate under a diminished amount of bureaucracy and regulation (especially EU regulation) whereas large, delocalized business (especially multinationals, a product of so-called “rootless capitalism”) should be increasingly taxed and monitored by the state (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18; see also Cattani, 2017). The latter are suspected to conspire against the interests of the working people (and their small-medium businesses) and the French nation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18). In the RN’s rhetoric, the evils of globalized capitalism are juxtaposed to the virtues of national-capitalism (Cattani, 2017), practiced day-to-day by the petite bourgeoisie – mainly craftsmen, tradesmen, fishermen, landowning farmers, and smaller-scale (local) entrepreneurs. They are ultimately considered to be the only “pure people” (to borrow Mudde’s term once more) of the nation.
Forza Nuova (FN): A History
Anti-fascist demonstration against the Candidate in the Primaries of the fascist part of Forza Nuova in Turin, Italy on March 1, 2018. Photo: Stefano Guidi.
The Early Years
Unlike the French populists, the extreme right party Forza Nuova (FN) does not have a particularly long or complex history. True to its name, this party can be considered a “new force” with a relatively brief history. This history is deeply embedded in the tradition of Italian Fascism and appears quite transparent and straightforward to external observers. However, the brevity of its history does not make it unremarkable. On the contrary, being an organization founded by two alleged “terrorists”—Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello (also a musician alongside his political activism)—FN has attracted significant interest from journalists and political analysts who study the European extreme right. In 1980, both Fiore and Morsello fled Italy to seek political asylum in Britain as they were being investigated for the Bologna Massacre (August 2, 1980, which resulted in 85 deaths and 200 injuries), one of the darkest moments in the political history of the Italian Republic (Corriere della Sera, October 10, 2021; Nazzi, 2021).
In London, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Fiore had the opportunity to develop political and economic networks with British neofascist groups, supposedly with the help of BNP frontman Nick Griffin, and to establish successful businesses in the hospitality sector before returning to Italy without facing prosecution (Biondani et al., 2017). Due to these factors, along with the fact that the organization and its leader, Fiore, are openly fascist, FN represents an atypical example of an extreme right party. Founded in late September 1997, on the feast day of St. Michael the Archangel (Nazzi, 2017), FN aimed to reflect a niche form of Italian neofascism that was clerical (and fervently Roman Catholic) rather than secular (unlike CasaPound, another Italian neofascist movement) and traditionalist rather than futurist (Albanese, 2022: 317-318). Thus, ideologically, FN can be unequivocally placed on the ultra-authoritarian extreme right. More importantly, since its inception, FN has refused to adopt the ideological syncretism and flexibility of other 1990s Italian neofascist movements, such as Pino Rauti’s Fiamma Tricolore. This is why it positions itself on the far right of the artificial spectrum of Italian neofascism, which, as writer Giano Accame (1990) argues, includes both “right-wing” and “left-wing” elements. In any case, with FN, both Fiore and Morsello—who “cut their teeth” during the dark days of the Anni di Piombo through participation in violent actions of extra-parliamentary groups like Terza Posizione (“Third Position”) and the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (“Armed Revolutionary Nuclei” – NAR)—aimed to project fascism into the third millennium (Nazzi, 2017; Albanese, 2022: 317).
First Set of Elections: Failure in Pursuit
Like many European neofascists who wish to compete electorally, their primary objective was (and still is, as Fiore is alive, unlike Morsello) to turn their ideology in an “incubator for a new political model based on an old-fashioned design” – as the scholar Matteo Albanese (2002: 321) posits. However, if we solely consider FN’s electoral results, and compare them to other contemporary parties who have instead evolved from extreme right to moderate right (such as Alleanza Nazionale or FDI in the recent past) FN failed miserably. The only times it competed at a national level (in 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018) it merely achieved less than one percent (the highest score was in 2006 with 0.67% in the Chamber of Deputies of Italy) with none of its candidates ever entering parliament (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Only in the 2004 European elections, by presenting a joint list of candidates alongside Alessandra Mussolini’s (the granddaughter of the Duce) Alternativa Sociale did FN perform slightly better, managing to obtain 1.23% (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Notwithstanding, the only seat available in the EU Parliament went to the most prominent figure from the grouping – Mussolini herself.
Alliances, Assaults, and Attempts
However, Fiore eventually managed to become a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) through FN and its alliances, serving in Brussels and Strasbourg from May 2008 to July 2009. Fiore’s activism at a supranational level involved consolidating his ties with other European neofascists within the EU Parliament. Together with the notorious Nick Griffin, he founded an ultra-nationalist group called the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), which was also pan-European and “anti-Zionist.” The APF included the extreme right United Romania Party, the Romanian-Moldovan Noua Dreaptă (New Right), several Spanish Falangist parties, and Neo-Nazi organizations from Germany, Greece, Czechia, and Slovakia (see www.memri.org, April 18, 2024).
Nonetheless, throughout the 2010s, FN remained on the fringes of Italian and European politics. However, the party gained attention after some of its members, including Fiore, were involved in violent acts, such as the assault on the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the country’s oldest and most important trade union, on October 9, 2021. This incident brought FN back into the spotlight, drawing scrutiny from the public, media, police, judiciary, and other authorities (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). As a result, in the winter of 2023, Fiore and others involved were sentenced to over eight years in prison, though FN itself was not disbanded (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023; Girardi, 2022). In an interview following a small political gathering in Isernia, Molise, where he was praised by supporters, Fiore stated that despite his criminal charges, FN would attempt to participate in the 2024 European Elections (Fiore, TVI Molise, December 23, 2023). He emphasized the importance of this period for Italy, possibly hinting at a resurgence of fascism with a pseudo-populist tone (Fiore, TeleRegione TV, December 23, 2023). However, FN failed to gather enough preliminary signatures to present a candidates list for the EU elections in June 2024. With Fiore’s sentencing, the future of FN and Italian militant neofascism remains uncertain.
Forza Nuova (FN): Ideological Profile
Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.
Marginal and Controversial, but not Irrelevant
Forza Nuova (FN) is an extreme right party that is both marginal and controversial in Italian politics. It is marginal because, despite consistently participating in Italian general elections since 1997, FN has never reached the four percent threshold required to enter parliament. It is controversial due to its semi-personalist leadership and historical ties to the militant, violent, and subversive Italian neofascist movement active during the “Anni di piombo” (“Years of Lead”) (Biondani et al., 2017). Fiore, the party’s leader, openly expresses admiration for Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship and the Italian Social Republic (RSI), as well as for other authoritarian leaders like Juan Perón in Argentina (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). In a 2012 television appearance discussing fascism and neofascism, Fiore admitted, “I’ve always defended fascism; every time I was asked whether I would have sided with the Americans or the RSI (during WWII), I’ve always responded – with the RSI” (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). Despite differentiating his ideology from National Socialism, he also refused to distance himself from Neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn when questioned during the same show (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).
Taking all of this into account, FN’s electoral marginality does not render it irrelevant in the political arena or diminish its potential threat to a liberal-democratic polity. First and foremost, some party members have engaged in premeditated attacks on immigrants over the years—between November 2012 and November 2013, there were more than fifty racially motivated assaults (Fiano and redazione Roma Online, 2016). Second, in addition to Fiore, two key FN representatives—Giuliano Castellino and Luca Castellini—along with five other extreme right activists indirectly connected to the party, were officially charged for their violent assault on the CGIL in October 2021 (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). This incident was taken very seriously by Italian public opinion, politicians, the judiciary, and other state authorities. Graphic images of the violent protest circulated in the press, raising concerns among parts of the population about a possible resurgence of neofascism, even if on a limited scale.
Authoritarian, Anti-democracy, and Nationalist?
If we reconsider the three/four elements that Carter (2005) argues constitute the ideological core of the extreme right, it becomes clear that FN is unequivocally an extreme right party, as these elements are integral to its ideological repertoire. First, FN is explicitly authoritarian, advocating for the forced repatriation of all immigrants, regardless of their legal status in Italy (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). Second, it is anti-democratic because the majority of its policies are impossible to implement within a rule-of-law system upheld by Italian (anti-fascist) constitutionalism, where the parliament plays a crucial role. Third, FN embraces both exclusionary and holistic nationalism. Its recurring propaganda posters, which depict black people as “rapists” or sub-human, exemplify exclusionary nationalism (see Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 2, 2017). In contrast, its calls for an “organic state”—a statist and corporatist model where the state, nation, religion, people, and “blood and soil” are so interwoven that they cannot be separated—demonstrate holistic nationalism (see Vercelli, 2018). Any reformulation that separates the Italian nation-state from its people’s religion, culture, territory, and biological characteristics would, in FN’s view, lead to the decay and eventual death of the nation. After all, fascists have always been obsessed not only with the idea of palingenesis (see Griffin, 1996) but also with that of decay or decadence (for a full account, see Schulman, 2006). Moreover, when adapting FN’s manifesto and discourse (primarily that of leader Fiore) to Tarchi’s (2015: 125) comprehensive scheme that examines nine aspects of party ideology—such as the people, nation, state, and society—it becomes undeniably clear where Fiore’s organization stands politically.
The People, the Nation, and the State
To begin this party’s analysis by observing its view of the people, it should be noted that – as a party influenced by fascism – FN unsurprisingly does not hold a particularly optimistic perspective of human nature or the masses per se. In Mussolini’s words: “The Fascist conception of the State is all embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value…the Fascist State – interprets, develops, and empowers the whole life of a people” (Mussolini & Gentile, 1932: 847). In FN’s case, although people are functional to its long-term statist political aspirations, unless they are forcefully guided, either by a charismatic leader or a strong state’s elite, they can never be trusted to willingly find their path or positively serve the country. Ironically, it was the proto-liberal Rousseau (in 1762) and not a fascist intellectual that stated, “people need to be forced to be free,” still this appears to be FN’s idea if we observe its policies such as the nationalization of banks (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 5). If such policy is carried forward, the forzanovisti[17] insist that “all the people of the earth can be free from their usurpers” (Ibid). This phrase is present in their online manifesto and appears to contain an implicit reference to the centenarian Jewish world-domination conspiracy theory. A much more explicit reference can, however, be found in a 2019 la7 (private television network) interview provided from FN’s “National Vice-Secretary” Luca Castellini who claims that “they control the world” when Jews are mentioned in relation to a rise in antisemitism (Castellini, La7, October 18, 2019).
Another conception of the people that FN’s appears to have is that all European nations (hence also Italian people) should be freed from the shackles of the European Union (EU), which is to be replaced with a much more authoritarian confederation loosely based around the ethics of Blut und Boden (“Blood and Territory”) but also with inspiration from the Romano-Greek classical model (Fiore, Forza Nuova, YouTube, March 9, 2011). As a proud fascist, Fiore inevitably sees Italy as a direct cultural (and perhaps even political) product of that millenarian historic tradition and perceives Italians as the direct descendants of Ancient Romans and Ancient Greeks (Ibid). In essence, FN’s ideal Europe is a “Europe of free peoples” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). He goes into more detail throughout an interview closely preceding the 2019 European elections where he states that “we cannot have a liberal-masonic Europe with no values at the heart of it…we cannot have a neo-internationalism which is a re-formulation of Marxism in a European form, we need patriotism, we need religious values, but more importantly: we cannot destroy the family because family is the primary cell for the national and European re-construction” (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 16 2019).
FN’s idea of a (culturally, morally, spiritually and perhaps racially) purified and independent nation explains its decades-old anti-globalist campaign. According to FN, leaving the EU, NATO, the UN, and other strategic alliances and international bodies means liberating Italy from the influence of inimical foreign powers that do not share the same destiny with Italy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). Not merely the Germans and the French who supposedly run the neoliberal and market-oriented EU, but especially the Americans (sworn enemies of the fascists since WW2) who serve the interests of their own military-industrial complex (FN rejects US-led war campaigns abroad) but also prone to the whims of big capitalists (e.g. Wall Street) who are – following an antisemitic conspiratorial “logic” – mostly Jewish (Fiore, ANSA,January 20, 2024; Berizzi, 2023). Nevertheless, a monist homogenous nation cannot exist without a strong authoritative state. FN unapologetically supports corporatism (in all areas of the economy) to “defend workers” (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). Also, protectionist measures and economic nationalism in general are recommended by the forzanovisti and its leadership. FN is averse to neoliberalism (both cultural and economic) and condemns the EU for embracing several aspects of the neoliberal economy, especially the third sector which is not regarded as highly as the first (raw materials, agriculture) and second (manufacturing) sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 12).
Society: “God, Homeland, and Family”
Regarding society,the societal vision of FN encompasses the “God, Homeland, and Family” value triad (Berizzi, 2019). This was popularized under Mussolini’s regime however the slogan itself is much older as it was coined by the philosopher-activist Giuseppe Mazzini as he and his men forged Italy as one nation (Gnocchi, 2022). God as FN was founded under the supposed protection of St. Michael the Archangel (on the day of the recurring religious feast) with the intent of being a party with a robust attachment to Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church (Albanese, 2022: 317; Il Cittadino, September 30, 2017). FN’s online manifesto includes a restoration of the Concordat between Catholic Church and Italian State, where Church and State are not entirely divided, and the former serves the purpose of positively influencing future generations (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). In such context, Christianity itself is presented as something identitarian (rather than purely religious) as it is the unifying trait of this morally pure “Europe of the free people.” It serves the person of uniting[18] (white) Europeans for a new crusade against everything deemed “Un-European” (see Albanese, 2022: 321). Currently, particularly Islam, but also Judaism. More specifically, Fiore considers Islam excessively “archaic and fundamentalist” (Fiore, Forza Nuova YouTube, March 10, 2011). Homeland is also included in the triad becauseFN strongly believes that the primary purpose of any Italian political party should be that of fostering Italian culture and defending the rights and access to state resources of all native Italians (viewed as more important and perhaps even “superior”[19]) when juxtaposed to (non-European) foreigners (La Gazzetta di San Severo, May 6, 2017).
Last but not least, family occupies an important position in FN’s ideology as it is clearly tied to the fascist obsession with national rebirth (see Griffin, 1995). In fact, the term “national rebirth” unequivocally appears in FN’s manifesto (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2). In the forzanovisti mindset, like in the animal kingdom, a people’s (or species’) survival (and “civilizational greatness”) depends on its ability of reproduction and survival. The Darwinian conception at the core of fascist ideology (see Hawkins, 2009) equates human society with the animal kingdom, where the strong prey upon the weak, and only the fittest survive. This “survival of the fittest” notion was even more pronounced in German National Socialism than in Italian Fascism (see Menton, 1994). In fact, 19th-century Prussian proto-fascists like Friedrich von Bernhardi argued that war was a “biological necessity” (Menton, 1994). As history unfolded, the Nazis began to idolize societies like Sparta, which strictly regulated births (favoring males while rejecting those with congenital defects) and was effectively a war-oriented society—a model admired by Nazi Joseph Goebbels (see Roche, 2013; Sciarri, 2020). Spartans were always ready to defend themselves but were also prone to clash with other civilizations. Similarly, the traditionalist society that FN envisions is one with rigid hierarchies, modeled after the nuclear family unit, where a woman’s role is confined to household chores, reproduction, and motherhood (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2).
The Individual and the Leader
Moving on from society to the individual, it is certain that FN sees consumerism, hedonism, and egotistic individualism (supposedly encouraged by multi-cultural societies like the US) as abnormal and decadent (for an account of FN’s “anti-Americanism,” see Centin, 2020). Unsurprisingly, from this perspective, homosexuality is also considered abnormal and should be rebuked. One FN local propaganda poster from a small town in Tuscany (Lajatico) reads: “Lajatico needs children, not homosexuals” (La Nazione, February 28, 2023). Moreover, to protect a presumed social “order against chaos” (as another propaganda leaflet states) a country where there is a strong state that limits excess freedoms (especially of those considered abnormal) and individual rights is envisaged (Bologna Today, September 24, 2015). For instance, FN argues that abortions in all circumstances should be banned (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 1). Fiore himself is a devout Catholic and a father to 11 children (Fiore, as cited in Madron, 2015).
This takes us to FN’s fascistic idea that, regardless of what the circumstances are, a nation revolves around its leader. In a Weberian sense, as far as his supporters are concerned, Fiore is semi-charismatic. In a British documentary[20] he was defined as “highly charismatic” by British neofascists who knew him personally. He is generally perceived as a virile and stereotypically Mediterranean man who contributed to the national cause by fighting for a “third way” (Eatwell, 2017: 372-374; Bhen-Ghiat, 1996: 293) and a “new state” (a fascist one, purified from the sins of post-war capitalism and communism) and also by producing many offspring. Also, notwithstanding his age, Fiore has shown dedication to his militant street squads as he actively participates in the anti-globalist protests hosted by FN where clashes with groups of anti-fascists (the Italian branch of “Antifa”) and the police are expected (Journeyman Pictures, YouTube, December 10, 2018). Naturally, there is a fascistic aesthetic of violence in these demonstrations as FN’s representatives like Castellino claim that they use their “bodies as shields” against the political enemy (Castellino, La7, October 17, 2021), namely anti-fascists, communists, but also the Italian police working for the institutions neofascists repudiate.
Democracy and the Market
Given FN’s stance on democracy, it’s unsurprising that such a relationship is essentially nonexistent. Although FN participates in elections (unlike Fiore’s earlier subversive movement Terza Posizione), its leader has publicly stated, “we respect fascism” (Fiore, YouTube, February 19, 2018). This explains the manifesto’s policies, which are permeated with nostalgia for dictatorship and aim to eliminate the anti-fascist Scelba and Mancino Laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7). The Scelba Law, established in 1952, was designed to constitutionally prevent the formation of a new fascist party that might attempt to reestablish Mussolini’s Partito Fascista Nazionale (PNF) and instill a dictatorship through revolutionary and violent means. The Mancino Law (1993) is broader, condemning any incitement of hatred based on racial, religious, or sexual discrimination. For evident reasons, FN opposes both laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7).
Remaining on the issue of democracy, it’s notable that direct democracy and referendums are not mentioned even once in FN’s recent party manifestos (see forzanuova1997.it; FN general elections program, 2013). Furthermore, it’s evident that the Forzanovisti view freedom of association with suspicion. The manifesto outlines FN’s plan to ban all secret societies or sects, particularly those of a Masonic nature (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 4). These groups are seen as being in collusion with internationalist interests, ranging from Jewish financiers to high-end magnates like Carlo De Benedetti and George Soros, and other so-called “corrupt” (anti-Italian) elite groups—labeled as the “traitors of the homeland” (La Voce Del Trentino, August 26, 2022). Despite this, FN, as (neo-)fascists, aim to forge a “new man” and a new elite (Eatwell, 2010). This spiritual aristocracy, based on the theories of the reactionary intellectual Julius Evola, is expected to emerge from Fiore’s small but loyal group of supporters, including his close associates Castellino, Cabras, and Taormina (Berizzi, 2021). In fact, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, FN’s alarming plan was to form an emergency “shadow government for national liberation,” with Fiore as “Foreign Secretary,” to replace the elite from the Giuseppe Conte government and potentially put on trial those politicians (mainly left-leaning) who served in it (Berizzi, 2021).
Ultimately, when it comes to the market, FN’s positions are – as mentioned earlier – fully protectionist. According to this party, free markets are dangerous, since they are prone to the control of neoliberal elite interests and of the US, through Wall-Street (Fiore, Il Sole 24 Ore, January 20, 2024). Of course, alongside the US, Israel is also a sworn enemy (Berizzi, 2023). These anti-market tendencies are also displayed in FN’s 2013 program where it is postulated that there should be a “special court for crimes of financial (banking) nature” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 6). FN’s affinity for the concept of economic sovereignty emerges from their anti-ECB, anti-IMF, and anti-international “debt collectors” positions (forzanuova1997.it, point 5). The older 2013 program also states that there should be full state “control of the strategic sectors of the economy” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 4). However, even whilst FN is a pro-state illiberal party that yearns to control the Italian economy thoroughly, it does include in its agenda measures to tackle excessive bureaucracy to please the (national) small-medium businesses belonging to the first two sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, points 2, 14). Hypothetically, these anti-bureaucracy and anti-tax policies are listed in the hope of attracting a minority of lower-middle-class voters who remain nostalgic for fascism and the era when the trains supposedly “ran on time.”
Discussion and Conclusion: Why Populism and Extreme Right Differ
Discussion
As the emeritus professor Roger Eatwell (2017) appropriately argues “of all the major ‘-isms’, fascism and populism are the most elusive” (Eatwell, 2017: 363). Taking this into account, both are not elusive to the point that scholars would not be able to discern their distinctive and incongruous features. Specifically, as it has been demonstrated in previous paragraphs, even if the RN and FN do hold minor ideological similarities, the two parties have major conflicting views on how the state, society, and other aspects of politics per se should function. For the RN, the people are a cohesive group of free individuals who should always be given a voice, given they are considered to be at the center of political decision-making processes, regardless of whether such processes take place at a national or supranational (e.g. the EU) level. The direct democracy ideal that M. Le Pen’s party promotes (see Quencez and Michelot, 2017: 6) is an evident demonstration of the French populist’s attachment to a majoritarian form of popular sovereignty and traditional republican principles. “Direct democracy permits a true exercise of democracy itself” is what M. Le Pen exclaimed on one occasion (Finchelstein, 2017). In essence, as right-wing populists harbor a positive sentiment towards the populace, they believe people can be vertically integrated into the legislative and executive spheres of governance (see Mohrenberg et al., 2019). The people are trusted to make the correct (“common-sense”) decisions when asked to vote on critical issues concerning the EU, immigration policy, and/or taxes.
Contrastingly, being clearly located on the extreme right fringe of the spectrum, Fiore’s FN does not give the same amount of attention to popular sovereignty. In this Italian case, the people are not a primary aspect of politics and are overall viewed in a subtly more negative light. References to direct democracy practices are not present in FN’s discourse and electoral manifesto(s). In a classical fascist (but also neofascist) worldview, people (as an indifferent, “plebian and insubordinate mass”) can rarely be trusted to make the correct decisions (see Landa, 2018). Fully statist, authoritarian measures, from the “top-down” are usually preferred to the “bottom-up” instruments of direct democracy on a regular basis. It is no coincidence that historically fascists used to ban elections rather than expand them through referenda (Finchelstein, 2017). However, on rare occasions, fascist regimes did support plebiscites when popular consensus was already on their side, in order to further consolidate their power, when in reality important political decisions had already been made from a nationalist elite at the top (Finchelstein, 2017; Ben-Ghiat, 2023). This explains Fiore’s intentions to put in place an unelected “emergency government” (with a pre-defined elite taken from FN’s ranks) to set the country’s direction.
In fact, theelite is fundamental to the extreme right’s long-term political project, as it must dictate the correct path for the masses. Unlike right-wing populists, right-wing extremists do not aim to replace the elite with popular rule and tend to despise any form (primitive or modern) of ochlocracy (Landa, 2018). Naturally, from this perspective, both direct democracy and representative democracy are viewed as dangerous and decadent liberal (post-French revolution) bourgeois inventions. In the past, scholars like Mudde have argued that there are two opposites to populism: pluralism and elitism (Mudde, 2017: 34). For obvious reasons, the extreme right is not pluralist (and under this specific aspect it is similar to populism), but it is instead elitist (Mudde, 2015), and this is where right-wing extremism diverges from right-wing populism.
Furthermore, although it may appear that RN’s and FN’s idea of nation is similar, as both promote a homogenous community with a stable cultural identity that resists the fast-paced changes of modernity brought about by neoliberalism, multi-culturalism, and social progressivism, even on this matter FN’s positions are more extreme. M. Le Pen’s party is opposed to multi-culturalism as accordingly there should only be one defining culture in France shared by all French people, and this should directly derive from the country’s historical republican tradition (Genga, 2017). Such tradition may be old-fashioned or partially conservative but is also distinctly democratic and anti-fascist. Thus, the cultural traditions of the people occupy a paramount position in the idea of what the French nation should appear like. Instead, FN’s vision of nation is necessarily minoritarian, mainly because fascism in Italy (unlike republicanism in France) is not embraced by the majority of the populace, but merely by a small authoritarian minority of dictatorship nostalgics (Senatore, YouTrend, March 24, 2018). Constitutionally, with its many checks and balances,Italy remains a staunchly anti-fascist country (D’Ascenzo, 2018).
Regarding the RN, the “Français d’abord!” slogan essentially implies that second and third generation immigrants who were born in France are effectively part of “the people” and community (or heartland) hence it is not required of them to leave (see Lesueur, 2024). Additionally, whilst under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s management the party’s principal slogan was “France belongs to the French!” it appears that under M. Le Pen another slogan has become predominant (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). This would be the more moderate (and somewhat neo-Gaullist) motto “France belongs to those who love it!” (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). Interestingly, under this aspect the FN differs from the RN as well. It transpires from the agenda and discourse of the former party that even those who were born in Italy to foreign parents should be repatriated, as they are not considered Italian due to their ethnicity (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). One can deduce that while right-wing populist parties (as the RN) oppose multi-culturalism but not necessarily multi-racialism(e.g. someone with foreign parents but who is born in France is considered French), extreme right parties (as FN) object to both multi-culturalism and multi-racialism (see Berizzi, 2017). Uncoincidentally, Fiore’s party campaigned against the Ius Soli[21] and is only in favor of the Ius Sanguinis[22]when it comes to citizenship (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013). Slogans and posters of FN (such as those where African males are seen raping women) do not exist in the propaganda of M. Le Pen’s RN as this party does not stand for biological racism. Whilst right-wing populists may be “culturist” (see Taguieff, 1993: 101), and believe that some cultures (supposedly Western democratic liberalism) are “superior” to others, unlike right-wing extremists they will rarely ever express that certain races are (genetically) superior to others. Nevertheless, FN appears less concerned about immigration from white-majority Christian countries perceived to be similar to Italy (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013).
According to the RN’s ideology, the state occupies an important position and should intervene where and whenever necessary. However, in its populist (and “non-fascist”) conception, the state is always subordinate to the volonté générale (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, the state should only mediate to ameliorate the living and working conditions of the people (especially working class and lower-middle class citizens) when free market fails to do so. This occurs through “social-populist” measures such as state-funded healthcare programs, public welfare benefits, and state subsidies or tax cuts for poorer families and individuals. Like the RN, FN envisions an actively interventionist state. However, FN takes this concept further, as fascists see the state as superordinate to both the people and the nation. In other words, the state shapes the nation, even artificially, if necessary, as historically seen in classical fascism, and grants the people only a limited set of rights. This is different from populist ideology as in populism the existence of people’s rights precedes that of the formation of a state. Unlike in populism – where individuals are expected to remain unpolitical and “get on with their lives” – in fascist ideology the individual (both men and women, in distinct ways) is expected to participate in politics and public life. In fact, Italian fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who wrote one of fascism’s foundational texts alongside Mussolini, spoke of an ethical state to “teach core values to the new man, unlike the liberal state with its relativist distinction between private and public spheres” (Eatwell, 2017: 372).
The neofascists of the FN want a corporatist state that controls most (if not all) areas of the economy. Whereas the populists of the RN expect the state to control only certain strategic sectors and support interventionism (under the form of protectionism) in areas such as agriculture supposedly under threat from the EU’s bureaucratic regulation. This RN outlook may be considered authoritarian but is not as authoritarian as FN’s. After all, as one historian wrote, populism awkwardly lies “between democracy and dictatorship” but is still not dictatorial (Finchelstein, 2017: 175). To be sure, FN does not support globalization and free markets at all. In relation to the market, it takes on a crypto-autarchic (Fiore’s admiration for Iceland’s economy speaks volumes) and corporatist tradition of economic self-sufficiency (especially in terms of agriculture, construction, manufacturing) that is inspired by classical fascism (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 29, 2009). As shown before, FN is extremely critical of internationalist capitalism. Instead, the RN’s position towards free markets and trade is more flexible and less negative than FN’s. However, in similar fashion to FN it does advocate for protectionism and state dirigisme in certain strategic areas of the economy, principally the first sector. Nonetheless, both right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties believe in forms of taxation that cannot be considered fully socialist.
Overall, right-wing populists and right-wing extremists also hold different views when it comes to society. The society RN envisions is more liberal than FN’s. Even critiques to immigration (particularly Islamic immigration) derive from a universalist, republican, and partially liberalist standpoint (Genga, 2017; see also Brubaker, 2017, who defines this stance “civilizationism”). For example, the defense of women’s rights and those of the “LGBTQ+” community occupies a relevant position in the RN’s political-societal agenda. The same thing cannot be said about FN, a party that – unlike the RN – is not at all secular and is openly hostile to homosexuality. In fact, it is interesting to note that apart from sporadic statements claiming certain aspects of Islam are “archaic” the Italian neofascists do not give much attention to Islam or criticize it excessively. One hypothesis is that they derive this attitude directly from classical fascist ideology. It is known that Mussolini self-proclaimed himself the “protector of Islam” after he was granted a sword from the chief of a Libyan Berber tribe (Alpozzi, 2017). Although there were Muslims detained in Nazi Germany’s concentration camps (see Starr, 2020), Hitler, too, was not always Islamophobic, and allowed many Muslim soldiers to be recruited in the Waffen-SS(Trigg, 2012; Bougarel, 2017). In more recent times, FN and Fiore have been strong supporters of not only the pro-Palestine movement (also unapologetically defending Hamas, see Berizzi, 2023) but have also championed countries that are Arabic and Islamic (e.g. Assad’s Syria) or not Arabic but still Islamic (e.g. Iran), as they see them as potential allies in the struggle against Americanism and Zionism (Strickland, 2018). In any case, paradoxically, this does not mean that the forzanovisti welcome immigration from Muslim countries (Il Fatto Quotidiano, January 10, 2015). Fiore’s FN is vehemently anti-Atlanticist, whilst under M. Le Pen the RN has undergone an ideological mutation becoming less hostile to the Atlantic alliance compared to her father, who supported Reagan’s domestic policy (Tarchi, 2015: 123) but not US foreign policy.
Based on the analysis, we can also infer that whilst populism is understood to be a much more communitarian (and sometimes even collectivist) ideology rather than an individualistic one (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: Chapter 1). Populists do not expect to control individuals through the state and acknowledge the fact that party and politics should not be involved in all aspects of private life (Taggart, 2002: 97; 2018). As already mentioned, as a peculiar populist party, the RN tolerates abortion, divorce, homosexuality (to some degree) and certain feminist positions (for an account of M. Le Pen’s “new feminism” see Shurts, 2024). Instead, as an extreme right and/or neofascist party, the FN accepts none of those things. FN’s ideological attachment to the ultra-conservative “God, Homeland, and Family” triad means that if individuals do not actively practice their Christian religion, serve their nation, and engage in heterosexual relationships that through social conformism lead to the birth of children, they cannot ever be a positive “component of the nation.” Therefore, they automatically become part of an (unwanted and unnecessary) “outgroup.”
When it comes to leadership, both the right-wing populist RN and right-wing extremist FN have semi-charismatic leaders. Evidently, without M. Le Pen in charge, the RN would be a very different party reflecting different positions. It is possible (or even likely) that having a divorced female and mother as leader, the RN has been able to expand its message to attract the votes of French women, but also of those segments of the electorate that do not identify as “right-wing” but are not located on the left either. With her semi-personalist leadership (but also relying on the advice of loyal subordinates like Bardella and Philippot) holds a firm grip on her party (governing with an “iron fist”) and determines most of its policies (Stockemer, 2017: 47-48). Currently, she faces almost no challenge from the minoritarian Catholic-Conservative faction of the party that feels closer to her niece Marion-Maréchal Le Pen (Genga, 2017: 209), as since May 2017 Marion has not been part of the RN but has lately joined a rival party on the right called Reconquête! (Darmanin, 2022).
Similarly, within FN Fiore faces no internal competition, and is considered to be (as one of the veterans of the 1970s neofascist militias) the only one able to guide the Italian nation and put an end to its (supposed) cultural and economic decay. However, there is an important distinction to be made, M. Le Pen is understood to be herself part of the ordinary people who as well as possessing ordinary qualities (such as being a mother to three children) is also blessed with the gift of being able to be a political animal and influence France’s current affairs – by being a bulwark against the elitist neo-Gaullist and socialist parties. Contrastingly, non-populist extreme right parties like FN are generally unable to attract a large number of followers, therefore rely only on winning over “converts” or “fervid disciples” (see Weyland, 2017: 63-65). Within his organization Fiore (who is understood to possess fascist extraordinary qualities, rather than populist ordinary ones) plays essentially the same role Mussolini played within the 1920s PNF. He is expected to spiritually inspire and guide both the nation and the people to indicate a common destiny for all Italians. A destiny that according to the FN’s leader will have to necessarily lie outside the boundaries of the EU and the American (NATO) sphere of influence (Fiore, ANSA, January 20, 2024).
Conclusion
In this contribution, Tarchi’s theoretical framework, along with a manifesto and discourse analysis methodology, was utilized to compare the ideological positions of a French populist party and an Italian extreme right party. Results of the manifesto and discourse analysis palpably show that while Forza Nuova (FN) is unequivocally a neofascist party belonging to the extreme right, the position of the Rassemblement National (RN) on the political spectrum is slightly more difficult to discern. While the RN certainly embraces a radical understanding of politics – incompatible with center-right neoliberal and center-left social-democratic parties – it is also undeniably more moderate ideologically compared to the Italian FN. In all circumstances, when it comes to specific attitudes towards the people, the nation, the state, society,the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market, “right-wing” populism is less extreme than “right-wing” neofascism. De facto, Mudde recently highlighted that populism may simply be “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism” (Mudde, 2021: 5).
Thus, we can deduce that even if some of the RN’s political positions may theoretically be “illiberal” and authoritative (or even semi-authoritarian, particularly on immigrant rights), they are not altogether undemocratic. In contrast, FN is not only illiberal and resolutely authoritarian but also undemocratic. This comes as no surprise, as fascism and neofascism are inherently undemocratic. Nonetheless, under M. Le Pen’s leadership, the RN has transformed from an extreme right party to a populist right party in an attempt to become more moderate, even embracing the universalist values of republicanism and democratic conservatism, as stressed by Genga (2017: 176-180). The RN is embarrassed by its “toxic” past and wants to gradually overcome it. On the other hand, under Fiore, FN has maintained an ideological attachment to the political history, culture, myths, and symbols of Italian Fascism, proudly emphasizing its links to the Republic of Salò and Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship.
It is apparent that M. Le Pen’s party occupies a middle position peculiarly between those European parties like FN on the extreme right and those much more liberal-oriented on the center-right. This relatively new and complex position on the spectrum should today be understood as “right-wing populism” or “radical right-wing populism” (for those who prefer a slightly older or more precise academic terminology) and is occupied not only by M. Le Pen’s RN but also by many other parties on the European political landscape, such as the FPÖ, Lega Nord, PVV, Reform UK, Fidesz, and many others. All the parties mentioned are significantly more ideologically “moderate” compared to parties from the extreme (neofascist) right-wing family, such as FN itself, as well as CasaPound, España 2000, the NPD (now called Die Heimat), the BNP, Golden Dawn, Ergue-te and the “National Bolshevik” neo-Nazi groups present in modern-day Russia.
In conclusion, to comprehend the implications for liberal-democratic settings worldwide during and after this new wave of populism, it is crucial to first distinguish how populism differs from its outdated (and more revolutionary) “predecessor,” fascism. Future comparative studies ideally could involve detailed analysis of how populist parties and extreme right parties similarly or distinctly affect a democratic country’s rule of law and individual rights when in power.
(*) DR. AMEDEO VARRIALE earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. He previously obtained a Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Politics and International Relations from Kingston University in 2016 and a Master of Arts from the University of Westminster. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled “The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries
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Footnotes
[1] In fact, she has often expressed affinity for Anglo-Saxon versions of liberal-conservatism, particularly Sir Roger Scruton and G.K Chesterton in her speeches (see Esposito for la Repubblica in October 2002).
[2] Tarchi (2015: 122) has even argued that there have been so-called borderline cases (such as the old Front National, the British National Party, and the old Vlaams Blok) where it has not been clear whether the parties in question were ultimately populist or extreme right. This is a debatable but also plausible argument.
[3] Taggart (2018b) asserts that unpolitics is “the repudiation of politics as the process for resolving conflict” (Taggart, 2018b: 3)
[4] The opposite argument would be found in Mudde’s work (2017; 2021). The Dutch scholar argues that populism is actually a “thin-centered ideology” (Mudde, 2021: 578) and very much unlike other 19th and 20th century ideologies (liberalism, socialism, etc.) given it cannot exist by itself and is dependent upon a combination of its people-centric anti-elitism with other more sophisticated “…normative and normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society” (see also Sainsbury, 1980: 8).
[5] The party’s logo itself reflects the tricolor flame (with the colors of the French flag), but the idea was copied from the MSI in neighboring Italy (Kauffmann, 2016). This esoteric symbol was chosen purposely as it was meant to represent the idea of rebirth or “palingenesis,” the flame of fascism which either never fully extinguishes itself or a new fascism that rises from the ashes (for an account of fascism and the idea of rebirth, see Griffin, 1996).
[6] Pierre Poujade’s populist party (active in the 1950s) was called L’Union de défense des commerçants et artisans (UDCA).
[7] “Tixierist” as in pertaining to the politics of the former Parisian lawyer (and right-wing firebrand) Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour.
[8] This is the “anti-democracy” of the extreme right which is clearly distinct from the “illiberal (and direct) democracy” of the populist right (see Mudde, 2018).
[9] On February 13, 1984, Jean-Marie Le Pen made his official debut on French public television. He was invited by the political debating show L’Heure de Vérité after President François Mitterrand put pressure on the Communications Minister to give Le Pen some airtime. In this context, Mitterrand’s behavior was influenced both by an ideological attachment to liberalism (particularly to freedom of speech) and a broader political strategy to destabilize and divide the national right-wing vote (between the neo-Gaullists and Le Penists) so the French left could win.
[10] This is an indirect reference to Michael Freeden’s (1996) famous theoretical approach where ideologies are considered to function through “core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts.”
[11]State nationalist: “Within a state nationalist view the state precedes the ethnic community (they generally use the term ‘nation’), in the sense that the nation is not a fixed entity. One can either be born into it, by being born on the territory of the state or by having two (or one) parents with that nationality, or one can become a member of the nation” (Mudde, 2000: 131).
[12]Ethnic nationalist: “As is typical for ethnic nationalists, the ethnic community is placed over the state: the state should serve the interests of the ethnic community and not the other way around” (Mudde, 2000: 96).
[13] For the concepts of “ingroups” and “outgroups” in sociology (but still applicable to political science) refer to Howard Giles and Jane Giles (2013).
[14] Historically, both Jean-Marie Le Pen and M. Le Pen frequently criticized the traditional political establishment in France by referring to the “UMPS,” implying that both the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and the Socialist Party are indistinguishable in their policies and governance. However, this critique has been more difficult to make since 2015, as the UMP was succeeded (hence changed its name) by les Républicains (LR).
[15] This is an abbreviation for the French Communist Party (PCF).
[16] The “battle for births” was a government sponsored pro-natalist campaign in Mussolini’s Fascist Italy during the 1920s and 1930s (see Forcucci, 2010). However, similar pro-natalist efforts have been carried forward more recently not only by right-wing dictatorships but also by conservative governments working within the sphere of liberal democracy.
[17]Forzanovisti is an Italian term used to refer to Forza Nuova’s members, supporters, or active militants.
[18] This is also why FN maintains strong links with other European neofascists, and in Poland rallied in the company of Eastern European Neo-Nazis carrying flags with Celtic crosses, swastikas, and other political symbols as they protested against the status quo (see La7 Attualità, YouTube, November 26, 2017).
[19] Although Fiore rejects this proposition, articulating that the difference between fascists and nazis is exactly linked to this idea of racial superiority that parties like FN apparently deny (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).
[21]Ius Soli: “in legal theory, the rule of law that provides that cirtizenship is acquired by birth within the territory of the state, regardless of parental citizenship” (Rafferty, 2024).
[22]Ius Sanguinis: “right of blood, which grants citizenship on the basis of the citizenship possessed by one’s parent or parents” (Rafferty, 2024).
European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Belgium
European Studies Centre (ESC), University of Oxford, UK
Oxford Democracy Network, University of Oxford, UK
Organizers
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre, University of Oxford).
Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Oxford and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).
George Hadjipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area StudiesandResearch Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).
Hosts
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Venue
European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR
Populism & Politics (P&P) is a digital journal dedicated to advancing the study and understanding of populism-related phenomena and populist challenges in historical and contemporary contexts.
Migration, with its multifaceted socio-economic and political implications on voting behavior, stands at the nexus of the factors that have fueled the demand for populism in Europe and beyond. As the 2024 European Parliamentary elections approach, comprehending the trends in voting behavior and the role of immigration-related populism necessitates an interdisciplinary approach.
The central theme of the workshop revolves around elections and anti-immigration populism in the European context. This two-day workshop will be held in hybrid format and will bring leading scholars and researchers in the field of populism and migration to discuss the interplay between populism and migration and their socio-economic and political repercussions.
Some of the papers that will be presented at the workshop will be looking at:
-Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes.
-Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values.
-Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.
-The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary.
-Migration Challenge and Populist Responses: A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey.
-Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement.
-Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses.
-Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives.
-Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism.
-The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey.
-The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983.
-European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.
-Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design.
Editorial TeamforSpecial Issue of Populism & Politics (P&P) on Migration
Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
Dr. Ilhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).
Timor Landherr (PhD Candidate in Politics and International Relations, Queen Mary University, London).
Iuliana Nyerges (MPhil Candidate, Politics and International Relations, Balliol College, University of Oxford).
Maria Christofidis (MPhil Candidate, Philosophy, Mansfield College, University of Oxford).
Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Panel 1 – Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism and Xenophobia
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 09:00-10:45 (UK Time)
Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR
Chair
Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Discussant
Dr.William L. Allen (British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Nuffield College, University of Oxford).
Papers
“Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes,” by Dr. Filipa Figueira (Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London) & George Hajipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area Studies and Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).
“Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values,” by Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (PhD Candidate in Politics at Kingston University).
“In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands,” by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, Equal Strength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).
Panel 2: Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections and Diaspora
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 11:00-13:00 (UK Time)
Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR
Dr.Othon Anastasakis (Director, European Studies Centre, Oxford University).
Discussant
Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).
Papers
“You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore” – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary,” by Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University) & Dr.Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).
“Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey,” by Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
“Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement,” by Judit Molnar (DPhil Candidate in Anthropology at the University of Oxford).
Panel 3 – Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe
Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 14:30-16:30 (UK Time)
Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR
Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).
Discussants
Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).
Papers
“Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses,” by Luca Venga (Post-graduate Student at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).
“Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism,” by Priscilla Otero Guerra (Postgraduate Student at the University of Oxford).
“Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives,” by Arunima Cheruvathoor (MPhil in Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).
Concluding Remarks
Time: 16:30-17:00 (UK Time)
Venue: European Studies Centre, 70 Woodstock Rd, Oxford OX2 6HR
Dr.Ilkhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Language and Communication Studies, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).
Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).
Discussants
Dr. Simon Watmough (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).
Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).
Papers
“The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey,” by Dr. Ezgi Irgil(Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – UI) & Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
“Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’,” by Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University) & Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).
“‘The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth,” by Dr. Avdi Smajljaj(Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
“Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983,” by Simon Ahrens (MPhil in Development Studies, University of Oxford).
Panel 5 – The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self
Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 12:30-14:30 (UK Time)
Venue: European Center for Populism Studies (Virtual)
Dr. Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
Dr. Marieke van Houte(Assistant Professor for Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University).
Papers
“Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe,” by Dr. Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).
“Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis,” by Nazmul Hasan (PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).
“Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe,” by Sulagna Pal (PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).
“A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualisations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings,” by Basma Doukhi (PhD Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent).
Panel 6 – Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe
Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (UK Time)
Venue: European Center for Populism Studies (Virtual)
Dr. Tamirace Fakhoury(Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict, Fletcher School, Tufts University).
Dr. Zeynep Sahin-Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
Discussants
Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Papers
“Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism,” by Dr.Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).
“Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design,” by Melle Scholten (PhD Candidate at the University of Virginia).
“Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).
“The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).
Concluding Remarks & Thanks
Time: 17:00-17:30(UK Time)
Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).
Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle East Studies and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).
Abstracts and Brief Biographies
Panel 1
Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism, and Social Media
Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes
Filipa Figueira (The School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London).
George Hajipavli (Southeast European Studies at Oxford).
This article applies the concept of dual thinking to understand the psychological mechanisms driving demand for populism. Dual thinking theories posit that human thinking can take two forms: Type 1 – fast, intuitive, and emotional, and Type 2 – slow, considered, and elaborate. Through a behavioral experiment, we examine whether, when prompted to adopt Type 1 thinking, respondents display greater attraction to populism than when prompted to adopt Type 2 thinking.
Following Reinhard’s typology, we test four types of populism that adhere to the minimalist definition of populism as ‘the people’ versus ‘the others.’ These are populism as a reaction to a) the psychological inability to adapt to rapid change (‘the people versus the transnational elite driving globalization’); b) the perceived overreach of the ‘administrative’ state and the corrupt and arrogant elite (e.g., the out-of-touch elite ‘Remainers’); c) an experience or fear of decline (e.g., Trump’s ‘Make America Great Again’), and d) a threat to their identity through immigration (‘the people versus the immigrants’). This approach further enables us to test for correlation between the various populist groups as posited in theory. This is of additional utility given the topic of the workshop, as it will enable us to gauge both whether psychological mechanisms are applicable to migration-driven populism, and whether migration-driven populism is a unique phenomenon or forms part of a broader cluster of populist dynamics. In our experiments, we control for alternative explanations to populist party support, such as cross-national cultural differentials, factors pertinent to migration (perceptions of and exposure to migratory flows), personality types, the role of ideology, trust in political institutions, standard socio-economic and demographic controls, and the ‘need for chaos’ variable.
By considering the link between intuitive thinking and attraction to populism, our findings carry significant implications for our understanding of the psychological processes behind the phenomenon of populism. Overall, this novel approach will significantly inform our understanding of the mechanism behind migration-driven populism, and how it relates to broader anti-establishment and populist attitudes. Consequently, gaining a better understanding of the psychological processes behind the phenomenon will enable us to counter migration-driven populism through carefully tailored approaches with the help of mass and social media ahead of a critical election year.
Filipa Figueira is a Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES) at University College London (UCL). Her main areas of expertise are the European Union and public policy. She is particularly interested in bounded rationality and the effectiveness of EU policymaking, EU governance and the allocation of policy competencies between the EU and the national level, and populism/Brexit. Her interdisciplinary research aims to offer novel combinations of political and economic theoretical frameworks. She is also a Senior Adjunct Researcher at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB), within the Brussels School of Governance (BSoG), and a Senior Member of the SSEES-based Centre for New Economic Transitions (CNET). She has contributed to many high-impact journals, such as European Review, British Politics, the Journal of European Public Policy, and the European Journal of Government and Economics.
George Hajipavli is a Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) based in St Antony’s College, Oxford. George’s research interests primarily lie in area studies and political sociology. He has recently written on public opinion, such as the electoral attitudes underpinning the paradoxical relationship between the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Russian Orthodox Church, and the determinants of Orthodox Church support in contemporary Russia, with a particular emphasis on the aspect of communist legacies and the secularization thesis. He has presented at conferences, such as the annual conferences of the University Association for Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the World Association of Public Opinion Research (WAPOR), and the British Association of Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES). His interest in the present topic derives from his curiosity about the psychological determinants of public opinion and his doctoral research on the impact of religious identities on political outcomes. George enjoys complementing his academic research with his prior experiences in policymaking, which included stints in the European Parliament, and the Cypriot House of Representatives.
Recalibration, not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values
Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (Kingston University).
This paper challenges the idea that the effectiveness of welfare states should be measured solely based on their universality of provision. The author argues that focusing on universality conceals issues with the workings of welfare states. The paper also suggests that welfare states are undergoing recalibration, not retrenchment and that abandoning the aim for universality is essential to protect those who need it the most. Overall, the paper highlights the importance of welfare states in protecting vulnerable populations and argues for a more nuanced approach to measuring their effectiveness.
Jellen Olivares-Jirsell is a doctoral candidate in Politics at Kingston University, UK. Before joining Swansea University (Wales) as a Research Assistant, she was engaged in research projects at the Technical University of Munich (Germany) and Malmo University (Sweden). Scholarly contributions include publications in Global Affairs and Populism journals. Her research interests encompass politics, norms, and ideologies, focusing on populism, neoliberalism, welfare states, trust, liberalism, and polarization.
In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands
Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).
Populist Radical Right Parties’ (PRRP) politicians and supporters often claim ethnic minorities vote for their parties, possibly in an effort to legitimize their parties’ policy positions. In mainland Europe, where gathering quantitative data on ethnic minorities poses challenges, it is very difficult to disprove such statements. Do ethnic minorities and majorities tend to vote for PRRP and what dimensions of ethnocentrism explain their (lack of) support? I surveyed voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands and ask them about their propensity to vote for Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands. Thanks to a novel oversampling method, I can compare ethnic minority and majority groups. The findings clearly state that ethnic minority voters are very unlikely to vote for PRRP, with the exception of Dutch Hindustani Surinamese voters and German voters with a migration background in the Former Soviet Union. Besides these two exceptions, the French Maghrebi, French Black and French Turkish, German Turkish, Dutch Turkish, Dutch Moroccan and Dutch non-Hindustani Surinamese voters are very unlikely to vote for PRRP. Ethnic majorities are much more likely to vote for PRRP. I find in-group love explains their support to a much larger extent than out-group hate. Though immigration attitudes predict PRRP voting in all three countries, in-group love explanations explain PRRP voting much more. In France, PRRP voting is driven the most by a preference for putting French interests first. In Germany, it is a preference for not mixing with other groups. In the Netherlands, it is the feeling of not being accepted as belonging in the Netherlands that predicts voting the most. These indicators of in-group love explain PRRP voting amongst majority groups much more than immigration attitudes, attitudes towards Islam, gender equality, LGB rights, green policies, or economic redistribution. Feeling close or distant towards ethnic in- or out-groups does not predict PRRP voting in any of the cases. These findings contribute to our understanding of PRRP voting in Europe.
Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a political scientist interested in the impact of anti-Muslim racism in politics and society. She is an expert on anti-Muslim narratives and policies in post-9/11 societal debates, the political representation of Muslim politicians in European parliaments, the electoral implications of anti-Muslim discrimination, and voter discrimination against Muslim politicians. Dr. van Ossten is completing her PhD in political science at the University of Amsterdam, where she taught and researched the role of Muslims in politics. Her current research focuses on discrimination against minorities by employers, landlords, and childcare facilitators and the resultant impact on the well-being and identification of these minorities. This research is part of the Horizon 2020 project EqualStrength. Her work has been published in journals such as Legislative Studies, Electoral Studies, and Acta Politica. https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/people/sanne-van-oosten
Panel 2
Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections, and Diaspora
‘You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore’ – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary
Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).
Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).
In this paper, we aim to show how the moral panic button contributed to the incumbent party, Orbán Viktor’s Fidesz, a landslide electoral victory in Hungary in 2022. The moral panic button is a concept based on Stanley Cohen’s idea of ‘moral panic.’ However, instead of a single event, the moral panic button is viewed as a governance technology typical of populist and autocratzing governments. The moral panic button aims to increase the cohesion of the voter base, applying a mode of political communication based on threats and enemy images. In Hungary, the moral panic button was triggered by portraying immigration and immigrants as an existential threat to the ‘Hungarian Nation’ following the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 2015. Since then, it has served as a central issue for the propaganda machine of Fidesz.
This paper will show how the Fidesz electoral bloc was “made.” We use the data from four population surveys conducted between 2017 and 2021 to demonstrate how the Fidesz propaganda machine secured the number of voters needed to win the 2022 elections almost independently of the current campaign themes and messages. A central theme in our surveys is the portrayal of terrorism and immigration as an existential threat and immigrants as enemies, along with other threats and enemies (as George Soros, the European Union’s Bureaucrats, or the opposition). In this analysis, we use binomial regression analysis to examine how strongly agreement or disagreement with the variables associated with framing the moral panic button affects the likelihood of belonging to the Fidesz, or oppositional constituency.
The analysis will show the importance of the moral panic button as the leading tool for creating and maintaining the Fidesz bloc, leading to the increasing polarization of society. First, the constant maintenance of moral panic helps to develop and ‘maintain’ a constituency based on loyalty and identification with the leader. Second, the Fidesz world is created amorphous in terms of social background but homogeneous in terms of political behavior, whose members primarily – if not exclusively – enforce the aspects of belonging to the camp in their political identity and behavior.
Endre Sik is a Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences (TK) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence (MTA), and professor emeritus at Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest. He has a Ph.D. (1985) and a Doctor of Sciences (2006) in Sociology from the MTA. He was also Deputy Chair of the Committee of Sociology at MTA and President of the Hungarian Sociological Association. He has lectured at the University of Toronto, Notre Dame University, the Central European University in Prague, and the Global Camps of Human Rights in Venice. He is a member of IMISCOE’s Maria Baganha Committee. He is the head of research of several projects funded by TK and the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund. He has participated in EU-funded projects such as CEASEVAL, STYLE, Concordia Discourse, Euborderegions, and Workcare Synergy. His interests include migration, xenophobia, border studies, network and content analysis, and economic sociology.
Márton Gerő is a Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Centre for Social Sciences (TK) of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence (MTA). He is also an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University. His main research interests include civil society, social movements, and political integration processes. He has published in the Journal of Civil Society, Central and East European Politics and Society and Czech Political Science Review. Currently, he is developing a postdoctoral project on ‘Civil Society, enemy images and redistribution: The interplay between structural factors and political action in the process of de-democratization (NKFIH – 132768) and serves as a principal investigator of the project titled ‘(De-) democratization and the trajectories of civil society’ at TK.
Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey
Tamas Dudlak (The Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
Over the last decade, there has been a growing interest in issues related to illiberal governance systems, primarily referring to Hungary and Turkey. Beyond superficial comparisons, however, the similarities of the trajectories and policies followed by the lengthy political career of Viktor Orbán and Recep Tayyip Erdogan and their respective political systems generally have not gained much academic attention. Similarly, investigations are missing from the literature to understand the relationship between the Hungarian and Turkish migration policy. To fill this gap, this research assesses the circumstances and motivations that shaped the Fidesz and the AKP governments’ policies and discourse on immigration during the last electoral campaigns (in 2022 and 2023, respectively).
While Hungary and Turkey are relatively distant countries, their cases are comparable as they constitute stable populist regimes in the periphery of the European Union and have intensive and direct contact with significant migration and trafficking routes. They are situated next to unstable regions (such as the Balkans and Ukraine in the case of Hungary and Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan in the case of Turkey) and accept refugees in large numbers.
Although populism can be defined as a political practice, a discursive strategy, or an ideology in ‘mainstream’ research, it is primarily associated with a country’s domestic politics. Populism’s connection to migration policy is still undertheorized in social sciences. Exceptionally rare is research that examines how populism can be connected to the political and discursive practices of different Middle Eastern actors. Despite a growing literature on populism, illiberalism, and authoritarian tendencies in the ‘Western periphery,’ there is a lack of context-sensitive analysis of how Erdogan and Orbán use migration discourse to seek alternative identity formations in their political pursuit of the Syrian and Ukrainian refugee crises. This circumstance prompts the researcher to utilize a new, migration-specific reading of the existing primary and secondary sources.
Generally, or theoretically, this paper seeks the reference points (the narrative background) of the two governments in migration-related issues. In this respect, I am particularly interested in the governmental framing of securitization, sovereignty, humanitarianism, and bordering. The goal of this article is to understand how migration policies have been formulated in Hungary and Turkey during the last parliamentary elections, what are the current circumstances that shape the outcome of governmental decisions (political practice), and discourses (political theory) on how to deal with the mass movement of peoples in these countries.
The underlying narratives are examined by discourse and content analysis. For this purpose, I focus on the official statements and speeches of the two leaders. The analysis seeks to understand the logic of cooperation and similarities between illiberal populist regimes. All in all, explaining the differences and similarities might shed light on the workings of these populist systems and theorize how illiberal populist governments design their migration policies and how their ideological background (internal constraints) and Europeanization (external constraints) limit or extend their political maneuverability.
Tamas Dudlak is a Doctor of International Relations based in Budapest, Hungary and affiliated with the ELTE Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest as a researcher in the Contemporary Arab World Center. He previously received degrees in History, Arabic, and Turkish and studied geopolitics. His main research interest lies in the Middle East; he analyses contemporary Turkish politics from a comparative perspective. He focuses on the similarities and differences betweenTurkey and Hungary in various fields, such as migration policies, the characteristics of the populist regimes, electoral strategies of the incumbents and the oppositions, and the role of religion and civilizational discourse as the underlying ideologies of the Hungarian and Turkish governments.
Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement
Judit Molnar (The University of Oxford).
“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians living outside the borders,” reported the InfoStart online portal after the 2022 elections in Hungary. The statistics might come as highly surprising, looking at the character of recent emigration from the country. As a response to the autocratic and populist government, which growingly infringes on the principles of democracy, migrants have been documented to increasingly ‘vote with their feet’ (Somin, 2011; Meardi, 2012; Triandafyllidou & Gropas, 2014), with politically motivated emigration slowly and steadily replacing the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 economic crisis. Hallmarked by events like the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like the Central European University, the aggressive campaign to push women into traditional childbearing roles, and the severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ+ community, many people have opted for a more liberal atmosphere when deciding to start a new life outside the country.
Therefore, it is important to understand who these voters are. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that emerge by people crossing boundaries and those that are formed by boundaries crossing people. When the treaty of Trianon detached two thirds of Hungary’s territory in 1921, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves outside the borders overnight. According to Waterbury (2010), the loss was especially acute as some of the lost territories were perceived as the cradle of Hungarian civilization and their inhabitants the carriers of the most authentic form of Hungarian culture. Trianon has stayed framed as a national trauma by Hungarian politics and motivated by an ethnic approach to the nation, since 1989, a plethora of schemes have been set up to tie the Hungarian population of these territories to Hungary. The experience of being removed from Hungary despite a strong consciousness as Hungarians made this group keen to embrace the state’s call and to support the Fidesz’s nationalist agenda.
In Fidesz’s discourse, kin-state minorities are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that all emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, work-shy rabble” (Kunz 1985:102) in 50s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), kin-state minorities have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Therefore, ever since diaspora outreach schemes aimed at emigrants were first devised by Hungarian state in 2010 in the hope of reconnecting them to the homeland to tap them for brain gain, remittance and political lobby potential, kin-state minorities have been involved as key players. For example, 60-70% of the facilitators sent to diasporas through the Kőrösi programme, the flagship scheme of diaspora engagement, have been from pre-Trianon territories of Hungary. Their role is to reconnect emigrant communities to Hungary by organizing emigrants around a shared Hungarian culture and language and boosting the preservation of traditions even though some have never lived in Hungary.
In my paper, I would like to explore how these two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the long-lost historic nation. Furthermore, relying on the framework of state-led transnationalism, I set out to investigate how such narratives impact the dynamics of the Hungarian emigrant diaspora and, ultimately, whether trying to fit the emigrant population into the kin-state minority mold can be productive to align emigrant citizens with Fidesz’s ideology. To answer these questions, I will rely on the ethnographic data from my recently completed one-year fieldwork in London, the United Kingdom, and reflections on similar research projects in Ireland and Argentina.
Judit Molnar is a DPhil candidate of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, with an interest in migration, diasporas, transnationalism, and the anthropology of the state. Her doctoral research investigates the correlations between home-state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity through ethnographic case studies of Hungarian and Venezuelan migrant communities in London. Prior to coming to Oxford, Molnar worked for the Hungarian State Secretary for Nation Policy as a cultural facilitator delegate to the Hungarian diaspora in Argentina and completed a traineeship at the Cabinet of Education, Culture, Youth and Sport of the European Commission. She holds an MLitt in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews and an MA in Anthropology from the University of Vienna.
Panel 3
Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe
Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses
Luca Venga (St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).
The fall of the Berlin Wall lulled a majority of Europeans into thinking they had consigned nationalism and war to the dustbin of history. The ascent of the EU seemed to have ushered in an era of rational, peaceful dialogue based on universal values and on tolerance for differences. Nationalism, tainted by the World Wars, had been discredited as a serious political philosophy, becoming little more than a fringe view or a touristic attraction.
But autocratic tensions, Brexit, and the return of war on the continent have demonstrated that nationalism is more alive than ever, and it is already reshaping our societies and our institutions. Nationalist narratives, above all else, have caused a discernible shift in attitudes towards migrants, contributing to the rise of anti-immigration sentiment across the continent and stoking the fires of xenophobia and racism.
This paper critically examines the dynamic interplay between the creation and reinterpretation of nationalist myths and the emergence of anti-immigration discourses within the European context. By analyzing the construction of invented histories, contemporary retellings and ahistorical myths, this study elucidates the processes through which these discourses have shaped public perceptions and policy responses toward immigration.
Drawing on a comprehensive review of historical and contemporary literature, this paper underscores how ambitious and unscrupulous politicians have utilized certain actors (think tanks, political parties, media organizations) to deliberately construct and revise nationalist myths. This re-writing of history has allowed them to present themselves as scions of holy dynasties, saviors of the fatherlands, or redeemers and avengers.
In their quest to gain the favor of public opinion by reasserting a sense of collective identity and cultural superiority predicated on the exclusion of ‘The Other,’ however, these political figures have caused old and new cleavages to spread across societal divides, contributing to a climate of polarization and intolerance.
Through the selective commemoration of historical events, figures, and symbols, nationalist narratives have fostered a sense of cultural exceptionalism and entitlement, positioning the foreign as a threat to the national fabric. This narrative framing has, most evidently, caused a reduction of the options available when confronting the question of immigration, as certain courses of action have become politically radioactive.
My essay will then delve deeply into the multifaceted ways in which the reinterpretation of nationalist myths has been instrumental in shaping the rhetoric of exclusion and securitization within public discourse and policy-making processes. The selective deployment of historical narratives to construct narratives of victimhood, cultural purity, and national resurgence has facilitated the normalization of anti-immigration rhetoric but needs to be understood in the context of economic uncertainty, cultural anxieties, and the impacts of globalization. Thus, this study will also touch upon the ways in which nationalist myths have been harnessed as a reactionary response to socioeconomic insecurities and the fast pace of change that has invested most societies.
In conclusion, this study provides a comprehensive analysis of the intricate nexus between the construction and reinterpretation of nationalist myths and the rise of anti-immigration sentiments in Europe. This will be achieved by illuminating the ways in which nationalist narratives have shaped public attitudes and policy responses toward immigration, while also considering the myriad other forces that shape and mold public opinion. Finally, this research proposes as a partial solution the recuperation and galvanization of a different set of myths, which are based on inclusion, on cross-cultural contamination, and on the richness of human experience, as a way to bring about closer integration and stem the rising, worldwide tide of intolerance that will truly and finally reject nationalism.
Luca Venga isa postgraduate student at St. Antony’s College, Oxford. He have lived in Italy, the United States and Germany, before moving to England where he obtained his Bachelor’s degree in Politics and International Relations from the University of Manchester with a comparative thesis on the relative strengths and weaknesses of various multilateral institutions. Having always been extremely interested in Latin America, its cultures and its people, he decided to expand his knowledge and enrich his understanding of this wonderful region through the MPhil in Latin American studies at the University of Oxford. At Oxford he has had the chance to explore a variety of themes and trends that span the continent, while designing and carrying out his own independent research geared towards the completion of a 30,000-word thesis. This original contribution to the scholarly literature has been enriched by a multi-month period of fieldwork in Mexico, during which he collected dozens of hours of interviews and ethnographic observation.
Venga is particularly interested in questions of nationalism, political participation, authority and security, and he is committed to exploring these issues through a variety of means, both within and beyond academia. He collaborated with Italian think-tank IARI (Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali) as Editor in Chief of the Latin American Desk, publishing a number of accessible articles in collaboration with other scholars. More recently, he has joined AKE International as part of a team focusing on political and personal risk in Latin America, providing detailed and relevant analyses to business leaders, policymakers and other stakeholders. An avid reader, sports enthusiast, and traveler, he is always looking forward to the next adventure, such as rowing for his college or beginning a Portuguese language course.
Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism
Priscilla Otero Guerra (University of Oxford).
This article examines the impact populist parties have had on health policies and health social issues of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland). This is important, given the rise of immigration in the past decade. How do populist attitudes shape health policies? Does health governance change significantly? I highlight the importance of government support for globalization regarding health, interconnecting the Nordic Model to populist parties, ideology, and practice. Health governance, a crucial topic in the politics of migration, is at the intersection of the welfare state and capitalism; thus, the right and left support nationalist and populist attitudes that shape health politics.
Scandinavian countries have a robust history of nationalism. The Nordic region is familiar with political extremism in its right-wing strains. The countries selected and discussed in this paper have historically supported political institutions with ideologies that have espoused the natural genetic superiority of individuals of Nordic descent. So much so that presently, the region has been experiencing a robust rise in far-right political support in the past decade. Since 2016, several of these far-right organizations have been documented by international human rights groups to be of substantial Nazi influence. The establishment of the Nordic paramilitary group Nordic Strength of Sweden in 2019 of the cross-country Nordic Resistance Movement is a nationalist reflection of the most extreme ideas against inward non-Nordic migration.
To understand the rise of far-right extremism, we need to unfold sentimental and practical roots for the domestic support for populist political parties. Populism is not a novel occurrence in Scandinavia. The working classes have traditionally supported political beliefs that are of populist dimensions. The success of socialist policies is a common characteristic of the region. Left-oriented policies would not have been established if not for the organization of the working classes against the perceived economic elites.
The Nordic Model combines features of capitalism with social benefits. Immigration, populism, and political parties with ideologies that are pro-welfare have traditionally been supported. Globalization was once supported in the region, and support for globalist policies has been drastically declining. There is a sharp contrast in the region’s support of left-supportive policies as decreased disgruntled members of the working classes change their political orientations. As exemplified in The Battle Over Working-Class Voters (2021) by Sanna Salo and Jens Rydgre, generations of capitalism have created a sentiment of discord and dissatisfaction.
To conclude, this article attempts to document and analyze the evolution of the working classes of Scandinavian countries. Whilst the working classes once supported left ideologies, the rise of immigration from non-Nordic countries has increased support for anti-globalist, nationalist, and anti-immigration policies tied to nationalist nativist rhetoric.
Priscilla Otero Guerra is a postgraduate student at the University of Oxford. She is a member of St. Antony’s College, Oxford and is interested in state-society relations, political violence, geopolitics, and the politics of development. Her research interests include political regimes, state capacity, political parties, and socio-political determinants of development. Priscilla’s additional interests in political/economic history and philosophy navigate topics that intersect comparative and international affairs disciplines, analyzing liberties, policies, and strategies. She obtained her bachelor’s degree in political science and philosophy from Gustavus Adolphus College with high honors and distinctions. Her regions of specialization include the United States, Latin America, and Europe. Priscilla is working on a book on philosophy of mind and a project on Latin American affairs.
Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed Within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives
Arunima Cheruvathoor (Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
The Israel-Palestine issue has emerged as central to the geopolitical foci of candidates contesting the 2024 European Parliament Elections. Historically, the representatives of the 27 states in the Parliament have struggled to find a common stance on the decades-long issue. The five major political groups within the Parliament articulate distinct objectives they seek to advance concerning the treatment of Palestinians and more recently, schisms in geopolitical ‘goal’ alignment were noted in the responses given by parliamentarians in the face of the increasing violence in Gaza since October 7, 2023. More intriguingly, the discourses on the treatment of Palestinian civilians, with its multiple variations in the European Parliament, have been non-uniform in many respects except one: the construction and simultaneous imposition of an assumed (and indeed, uninterrogated) gendered performance upon Palestinian female civilians, who are framed solely as victims, within the European Parliamentarians’ narratives.
This paper utilizes Van Dijk’s (2005) methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to examine statements and press releases issued by political groups within the European Parliament and Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from October 7, 2023. The primary aim of this paper is to discern the conceptualizations of Palestinian female subjectivities within these discourses, whilst simultaneously comparing it to the discoursal subject-positions of (other, non-Palestinian) Arab female refugees in Europe. Contributing to the existing academic literature on the gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within European state discourses (building upon the works of Yuval-Davis, 2007; Abu-Lughod, 2015; Spijkerboer, 2017 and others), this paper highlights and timely addresses an academic lacuna by delving into the intricate ways in which the recent discourses of MEPs and political groups construct Palestinian female subjectivities—which has largely been academically unexplored— and how these discoursal constructs intersect with the prevailing gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within parliamentarian narratives.
Building upon the works of decolonial scholars such as Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000), Saba Mahmood (2005), and Gayatri Spivak (2009 and 2023), among others, this paper excavates how within the heterogeneous opinions of MEPs, the uninterrogated and continually evoked gendered Palestinian identities, has resulted in the surfacing of the female Palestinian body as a discoursal vacuum upon which expected performances of victimhood are interpellated, framing her solely in terms of her perceived vulnerability. Postulating that the uninterrogated conceptions of Palestinian gendered citizenship within parliamentarian discourses simultaneously parallels the discoursal subject-positions of Arab refugees in Europe, this paper forwards the argument that largely, Arab women are seen solely as victims that need to be saved by European state intervention, ultimately diminishing Arab women’s self-expression, who are then framed solely as victims of (masculine) state and non-state actions. Furthermore, this paper will evidence how, within discourses of the European Parliament, narrative-building on the Israel-Palestine conflict actively utilizes controlled constructs of Palestinian female identity to secure consensus on geo-political intervention whilst perpetuating similarly constructed (and uninterrogated) gendered conceptualizations of Arab refugees in Europe within discourses about the refugee crises in the European Union.
Arunima Cheruvathoor is a young researcher with a Master of Philosophy in Global and Area Studies (2023) from the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies, University of Oxford. She also has a Bachelor of Arts (Honors) in Political Science (2021) and a diploma in Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding (2021) from Lady Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi. Her MPhil thesis, titled ‘Masculinization of Politics: Gendering India and China’ used Van Dijik’s methodological framework of Critical Discourse Analysis to examine the construction of female identities within the nationalist narratives of Chinese General Secretary Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, based on a constructed database of 577 Mandarin, English, and Hindi videos, as well as several keynote speeches and press releases by the political leaders. She has previously worked with think-tanks, government organizations, and NGOs in India, Bangladesh and the United Kingdom. Her area of academic expertise is the interpellation of nationalism and gender in elite political discourses. She continues writing academically whilst currently employed as a Program Officer for the Rhodes Trust, whilst also working as a Project Assistant for Dr Jane Gingrich.
Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm
Ayshan Mammadzada (The University of Ottawa).
This study delves into how digital platforms are vital for skilled immigrant women in Ottawa, Canada, and Stockholm, Sweden, to engage in political discourse and counter populist narratives. Ottawa and Stockholm are chosen for their unique positions in the global landscape of immigration and digital innovation and their encounters with populist movements.
Ottawa, as Canada’s capital, is not only the political heart of the country but also a burgeoning tech hub. It boasts a significant number of tech firms and start-ups, contributing to a vibrant digital economy. The city’s immigration policy is one of the most progressive, with Canada welcoming over 300,000 immigrants annually, fostering a multicultural environment where skilled immigrants play a crucial role in the socio-economic fabric. Despite this openness, Canada has not been immune to the global rise of populism, with increasing debates on immigration policy and national identity affecting political discourse.
Stockholm, on the other hand, stands as a beacon of innovation in Europe, home to numerous tech unicorns such as Spotify and Skype. Sweden’s immigration policy has been notably generous, particularly in response to the Syrian refugee crisis, positioning Stockholm as a key destination for skilled and asylum-seeking immigrants alike. However, like Ottawa, Stockholm has witnessed the growth of populist sentiments that challenged the country’s immigration stance and contributed to a polarized political climate.
The selection of Ottawa and Stockholm for this study is rooted in their similarities as progressive, tech-savvy cities with robust immigrant populations, and their differences in handling the challenges posed by populist politics. Both cities offer a rich context for exploring how skilled immigrant women leverage digital platforms for political engagement. For example, initiatives like Ottawa’s Digital Inclusion Strategy aim to bridge the digital divide, a crucial step for ensuring equitable access to digital platforms for political activism. Similarly, Stockholm’s innovative public-private partnerships in digital infrastructure provide fertile ground for political engagement among immigrants.
By employing a mixed-methods approach, this research aims to uncover the strategies skilled immigrant women in these cities use to navigate digital platforms for political activism, their challenges, and their successes. This includes examining the role of social media campaigns, digital forums, and online communities in shaping political participation and countering populist narratives.
The expected outcomes include a deeper understanding of digital engagement’s role in empowering skilled immigrant women politically, offering insights into the broader implications for democratic participation and policymaking in the face of rising populism. This comparative analysis between Ottawa and Stockholm will highlight effective practices and potential barriers to digital political engagement, providing a blueprint for leveraging technology to enhance democratic inclusion and resilience against populist challenges.
In conclusion, Ottawa and Stockholm serve as compelling case studies for examining the intersections of immigration, digital engagement, and political activism. This research not only contributes to the academic discourse on digital democracy and immigration but also offers practical insights for policymakers, activists, and community organizers aiming to foster inclusive political environments.
Ayshan Mammadzada is a PhD candidate in Geography, specializing in Canadian Studies at the University of Ottawa. Her thesis examines the resilience of skilled immigrants in Ottawa: the role of gender, occupation, and place of settlement. She serves as a Data, Research, and Policy Analyst at the Ottawa Local Immigration Partnership, working on improving immigrant integration and policy development. With over 12 years of experience in different sectors of Canada, the USA, China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, she also worked as a consultant at immigrant-based companies to localize their businesses. Fluent in Azerbaijani and English, proficient in Russian and Turkish, and with reading knowledge in French learning, her research reflects her interdisciplinary and international background. Addressing the challenges skilled immigrants face and contributing to creating more equitable and inclusive societies motivates her research on immigration.
Panel 4
Intersection of Populist Politics, Far Right and Asylum Policies
The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey
Ezgi Irgil (Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs).
Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Ph.D., Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
This paper delves into the intricate interplay between immigration-related populism and political dynamics in Turkey, specifically focusing on the Victory Party. Established in 2021, the party became quite vocal during the 2023 national election campaign as a purely anti-immigrant and populist political party. Although the party’s share of the vote remained tiny, it propelled the anti-refugee narrative and pushed other parties to embrace more radical discourses and seek alliances with them in the second round of the 2023 election. Given this context, the study scrutinises the multifaceted relationship between asylum policies and populist rhetoric aiming to influence public opinion. By analysing the discourse surrounding refugees, the research seeks to unravel the complex web of influences that shape public sentiment and anti-immigrant and pro-repatriation discourse in Turkey’s political agenda through the rise of the Victory Party.
Existing studies that analyse immigration-related populism and political parties focus either on the national level refugee politics in countries hosting larger numbers like Egypt, Pakistan, Colombia, Lebanon (Ahmad, 2017; Fakhoury, 2021; Freier & Parent, 2019; Nassar & Stel 2019; Norman, 2019, 2020; Tsourapas, 2017), or the populist political parties’ influence in domestic politics that adopt anti-immigrant discourse in the Western contexts (Dennison & Geddes, 2019; Hameleers, 2019; Norris, 2019; Stetka et al., 2021; Wodak, 2019). Yet, what has been overlooked is the domestic political impact of refugee rentierism as an issue through anti-immigrant political party discourse and how it is used to influence the domestic political agenda through populist rhetoric in a country with a protracted refugee situation. Thus, in this paper, we ask: how does a newly emerged populist party influence the domestic political agenda and discourse in Turkey? What does this interplay tell us about the refugee rentierism’s dynamics in domestic politics?
To answer this question, we use discourse analysis of the media speeches (or broader media coverage) of the party leader, focusing on the period after the foundation of the Victory Party and until the elections (2021-2023). Thus, we demonstrate the extent to which factors contribute to shaping the political agendas of various parties, with a spotlight on the strategies employed by analysing the Victory Party within the context of refugee rentierism and how this rentierism manifests itself as an outcome in domestic politics. We argue that the Victory Party uses the issue of refugee commodification in domestic politics through populist discourses to obtain and create a platform for anti-refugee political strategies as a means to extract votes regardless of if the party secure seats in the parliament or not. Hence, we further argue that the Victory Party uses refugee commodification as a bargaining chip within domestic politics, either using the existing one or creating a new one, through three ways: (1) by becoming an agenda-setter on populist narratives and debates over refugees, (2) by enabling other political parties to adopt anti-refugee rhetoric and shape other political parties’ agendas on the refugee issue, and (3) by making use of the institutional context in anti-refugee rhetoric.
Overall, the findings aim to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics shaping immigration-related policies and their implications on political strategies in migration studies and populism studies, which may be generalisable to the cases in similar contexts. Although refugee commodification/rentierism is often addressed in relation to foreign policy and aid, the study indicates its relevance in domestic politics, particularly with election times, further elaborating the link between refugee rentierism and domestic politics.
Ezgi Irgil is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI). Her work lies at the intersection of politics and forced migration, particularly focusing on migration diplomacy and migration management in the Middle East and the European Union and everyday politics of forced migration. She is a member of EuroMeSCo Euro-Mediterranean Research, Dialogue, Advocacy Network and IN2PREV Project’s Frontline Practitioners Network. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, her MA in International Affairs from the George Washington University, Washington, DC, and her BA in Political Science and International Relations from Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, Turkey.
Zeynep Sahin Mencutek is currently Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies (BICC). She co-leads a Horizon Europe project, called GAPs on migrant returns and return policies with Uppsala University. She is also Research Affiliate with Canadian Excellence Research Chair in Migration and Integration, Toronto Metropolitan University and conducts joint research on the thematic area of Governance of Migration in a Globalizing World. She held the prestigious Alexander von Humboldt Research Fellowship for Experienced Researchers (June 2020–May 2021) and an international fellowship at the Centre for Global Cooperation Research in Duisburg (2019–2020). She also served as Senior Researcher for the Horizon 2020 project RESPOND: Multilevel Governance of Mass Migration in Europe and Beyond. Previously, she worked as an Assistant Professor in Turkey, and in 2018, she achieved the rank of Docent in international relations.
Dr. Mencutek received her PhD in politics and international relations from the University of Southern California in 2011. Her research interests include politics of migration, migration governance, diaspora studies and return migration. She has published in a wide variety of international peer-reviewed journals in the area of migration, such as the Journal of Refugee Studies and Comparative Migration Studies, as well as journals in the area of international politics, including Geopolitics, Journal of Global Security Studies, and International Studies Review. Besides dozens of book chapters, she published a monograph, Refugee Governance, State and Politics in the Middle East (Routledge 2018). Sherecently co-authored a book, Syrian Refugees in Turkey (IMISCOE Series, 2023).
Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’
Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University).
Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).
Migration is a highly politicized phenomenon. It is one of the favourite topics of populists who create crises with their discourses about it, which they instrumentalise for their own gain. The Bulgarian case is particularly interesting. A country of immigrants, with an acute demographic problem, whose politicians (re)discover immigrants and turn them into the most convenient other. The lack of experience with “visible” immigrant communities and the (mis)presentation of immigration processes as a national catastrophe in the poorest of the EU member states, against the background of dominant populist discourses, lead to negative public attitudes towards asylum seekers. Political anti-immigrant discourse is translated into policies or lack thereof, creating a crisis in both cases. This article focuses on one of the most vivid periods not only in the Bulgarian migration experience but also in the European one, which goes down in history as the ‘Long Summer of Migration’ (Kasparek & Spear, 2015). The analysis illustrates the politicization of migration in Bulgaria during this particular period. This process was internalized at the time but was a turning point in policymaking and public opinion for a long period.
Ildiko Otova is an Assistant Professor of international migration at New Bulgarian University. Dr Otova holds a PhD in Political science from the New Bulgarian University and is a laureate of the Mozer Scholarship for Excellence in Political Science and Civil Courage. Her main academic and scientific interests are migration and refugee issues, integration, urban policies, (е)citizenship, far right and populism, and current forms of antisemitism. ORCID ID: 0000-0002-3620-3067
Evelina Staykova is Associate Professor in political sciences at New Bulgarian University. She is head of the Department of Political Sciences and coordinator of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies). Her teaching and research interests include migration and urban studies, citizenship and e-democracy, populism, and far-right extremism. Dr. Staykova is experienced in coordinating and participating in various national and international projects on the quality of democracy, integration of migrants and refugees, development of city policies, populist strategies, and counter-movements. Her last projects are “MATILDE – Migration Impact Assessment to Enhance Integration and Local Development in European Rural and Mountain Regions” (Horizon 2020), “ReCriRe – Representations of the Crisis and Crisis of Representation” (Horizon 2020); “CEASEVAL – Evaluation of the common European asylum system under pressure and recommendations for further development” (Horizon 2020). She has publications in English, French, Russian and Bulgarian languages. Her last book is Migration and Populism in Bulgaria. Routledge, 2022. ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9155-3169
The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth
Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
Recently there has been an increased likelihood of significant neo-Nazi leaning of the electorate in Germany. This is best proved by the continuous increase of the number of votes Alternative für Deutschland / Alternative for Germany (AfD) is getting, not just in Eastern Germany but country wide. The growth of AfD is being consistently driven by migration waves, especially the one in 2015 and later. AfD started against the Euro as a single-issue political party, to switch to an anti-migration and Eurosceptic political party after the Euro crisis was managed successfully. The paper will look at migration’s role in the development and expansion of the AfD. How does AfD use migration as a tool for increasing electoral support? What is the AfD approach toward migration? And how does the AfD populist party impact the party politics and democracy in Germany and broader at the EU level?
Avdi Smajljaj is an Assistant Professor and a lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania. His research interests include political parties, electoral systems, EU integration, public policy, political theory, democracy, and democratization. His latest publications evaluated populism in the Balkans.
Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983.
Simon Ahrens (The University of Oxford).
This paper offers a rare historical account of the interplay between populist politics and migration in Germany. It traces how national identity discourses among political parties in West Germany shaped an increasingly populist immigration and foreigner policy between 1973 and 1983. After World War II, West Germany became one of the world’s largest migrant-receiving countries. In addition to ethnic German war refugees, expellees and East German refugees, the government recruited fourteen million guest workers between 1955 and 1973, predominantly from Italy, Turkey, Spain, Greece, and Yugoslavia. This labour migration was meant to ameliorate the recovering economy’s labour shortages temporarily. Yet it inadvertently laid the groundwork for the permanent settlement of three million guest workers and their families.
Drawing on Critical International Relations theory, this paper argues that guest worker immigration blurred West Germany’s national boundaries of belonging. Most political parties denied the young Federal Republic’s status as a country of immigration. They mobilised populist narratives to construct guest workers as a foreign ‘Other’ in relation to an ethnically defined national ‘Self’. From the guest worker recruitment stop in 1973 to the federal elections of 1983, national identity discourses turned immigration policy vis-a-vis the ‘new ethnic minorities’ into a political battlefield on which the future of the nation-state was negotiated. Controversial parliamentary debates on sovereignty and citizenship initially neglected and then aggressively politicised and securitised the national membership of guest workers.
Existing research has emphasised the economic outcomes of West German guest worker policies rather than their populist origins. By highlighting party-political debates on immigration, this paper fills this gap. It explores how and why particular concepts of nationhood affected policymaking once the permanent settlement of guest workers dominated German ‘high politics’ after 1973. Through a discourse analysis of immigration and foreigner laws, party programmes, and parliamentary speeches, I identify three critical junctures of emerging populist migration politics: the recruitment stop in 1973, the Kuehn Memorandum in 1979, and the federal elections in 1983. These critical junctures, in turn, expose three hegemonic national identity discourses, which powerfully shaped immigration and foreigner policies: economic, humanitarian, and ethnocentric.
The recruitment stops of guest workers in 1973 marked a transition from economic ‘cost-benefit’ discourses on immigration to political portrayals of the immigrant ‘Other’ as a harbinger of social instability. A humanitarian discourse of Gastfreundschaft (hospitality) in the SPD-sponsored Kuehn Memorandum of 1979 demanded the liberalisation of immigration policy by emphasising foreigners’ post-national membership rights. The backlash of an ethnocentric discourse reinvigorated the ethno-culturalist identity politics of Überfremdung (foreign infiltration) during the federal election campaign of 1983. As permanent multiculturalism became inevitable, the CDU/CSU-led government framed guest workers as a security threat from within the nation. Post-war debates on immigration signalled a partial restoration of Germany’s ethnocentric past rather than a comprehensive introduction of a new national identity oriented at the country’s multicultural future.
The nexus between national identity discourses and immigration policy between 1973 and 1983 had a long-term impact on populist migration politics in Germany. Despite political recognitions of Germany’s status as a country of immigration and changes to citizenship and migration laws in the early 2000s, decades of reform hesitancy by conservative governments entrenched ethnocentric conceptions of nationhood and rendered them vulnerable to populist mobilization. Since the European refugee ‘crisis’ of 2015, the increasingly popular Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has rooted its anti-immigration rhetoric in the alleged erosion of German sovereignty during the guest worker period. To make sense of this resurging ethnocentrism ahead of the European Parliament elections in 2024, this paper provides a starting point for more systematic research on historical constructions of the ‘foreigner problem’ in Germany and beyond.
SimonAhrens has recently graduated with an MPhil in Development Studies (Distinction) from the University of Oxford as a Clarendon Scholar. In his thesis, he conducted fieldwork in Botswana’s Ministry of Education. Using elite interviews and document analysis, he explored how civil servants reflect on nationhood, particularly the construction of official nationalisms through curriculum development and language policymaking in education.
Panel 5
The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self
Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe
Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).
Europe has experienced an extraordinary inflow of refugees since 2015, which raised many questions regarding the inefficiency of the region as a whole in tackling the crisis and changing the region’s political consciousness. There were debates among countries that polarized the region regarding accepting refugees as it would allocate sufficient resources to the new entrants. Although the pressure of the influx of refugees has lessened over the years, the region has been polarized into three zones- the liberal countries of Western Europe, the moderate countries of the Mediterranean region and the erstwhile communist countries of Eastern Europe.
A visible securitization of the region proves the tensions created due to the large influx of refugees in the region. The tensions and xenophobic tendencies against the arrival of refugees can be reflected in the sudden rise of right-wing populist parties throughout the European region. The sudden surge has led to a shift in the choices and perceptions of the voters in many countries, including both Eastern and Western Europe. Eurosceptic right-wing parties indulge in negative, uncivil campaigns that result in fearmongering among people towards a particular issue or a community. The issue of refugees from Middle Eastern and North African countries in the last decade has been the biggest issue dividing the Eurosceptic and Europhile parties and electoral campaigns, especially by the far-right parties. While each of these parties has different policies and their electoral campaigns vary, the prime issue in their agenda remains the influx of refugees having a different ethnicity from the Middle Eastern and North African countries, which has resulted in the loss of homogenous stability in Europe.
Many people have been echoing the populist opinions and extreme ideas of the right-wingers regarding the influx of refugees. Reference can be provided to the infamous speeches of the Hungarian and Dutch leaders who openly spoke about their fear of refugees altering the homogenous structure of Europe. Political parties have played a pivotal role in provoking the citizens against the reception of refugees in Europe. In this scenario, the research wants to highlight the rise of Euroscepticism among the member countries fueled by the right-wing parties. It will further try to analyze the effect of Euroscepticism on the youth of these countries and how far it affects the elective behavior of these young voters. Additionally, the research wants to examine the changes that have taken place in the political landscape of Europe.
Amrita Purkayastha is an Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India and an independent researcher. Her research interest includes areas like refugee laws, migration, and European regional affairs. After completing her doctorate degree from Jawaharlal Nehru University, Amrita is currently working as a freelance “Academic Writer” for two companies. Previously, she worked as a content writer and translator before starting her present jobs. She has three peer-reviewed publications centering on different issues of refugees around the world.
Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis
Nazmul Hasan (Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).
Discourse theory emerged in the late 1970s as a response to the challenges of mainstream theory following critiques of structuralist language, culture, and the crisis of Marxism amid the rise of neoliberal and neoconservative ideologies. Discourse theory didn’t aim to provide a new fixed theoretical framework but offered a flexible analytical perspective. It focused on the rules and meanings shaping social, political, and cultural identity construction.
There is a recognition of the social nature of identity, particularly within modernity, where human identity is inherently social. This entails an understanding of identity as socially constructed. From a discourse theory perspective, the issue of identity is not about actively constructing it. The rejection of the obviousness and essentialism of social identities brings attention to the political dimension of identity formation, emphasizing its reliance on contingent hegemonic struggles and processes of inclusion or exclusion. It also reveals that the ongoing political construction of social identities never leads to a closed, self-contained, and absolute identity. According to Ernesto Laclau, understanding this process is the psychoanalytic category of identification. This concept explicitly posits a lack at the root of any identity with something such as a political ideology or ethnic group because there is an inherent and insurmountable lack of identity. The act of identification arises from a fundamental absence or incompleteness in one’s sense of self. This psychoanalytic perspective helps shed light on the dynamics of identity construction in both personal and political realms.
Exploring Freud’s insights on identification and group formation can contribute to understanding questions related to collective identity. Freud suggests that the cohesive power of groups, as seen in examples like the church and the army, is rooted in symbolic meaning and discourse and the libidinal organization of groups. In collective identification, individuals are bound by libidinal ties to both the leader and other group members.
Lacan builds on Freud’s focus on the affective side of identification, redirecting it to the paths of enjoyment (jouissance). In Lacan’s framework, jouissance, an excessive and charged satisfaction bordering on pain, aligns with Freud’s concept of libido. Lacan reconceptualizes sexual energy in terms of jouissance, distinguishing between the symbolic (representation and discourse) and the real (jouissance), the subject of representation is associated with unconscious desire, while the subject of affect or the ‘enjoyment subject’ is linked to jouissance. So, identification operates on both discursive structural or representation and jouissance.
Ole Waever employs poststructuralist discourse theory to analyze how major European powers, particularly Germany and France, construct distinct ‘we’ – identities. This construction involves integrating notions of ‘state’, ‘nation’, and ‘Europe’ into their self-defining narratives. Yannis Stavrakakis supplements discourse theory with Lacanian insights to delve into the contemporary paradoxes and dilemmas surrounding constructing a European identity.
This article explores what contributes to the appeal of identity construction, why people collectively identify with specific formations and the implications of such identification. The goal is to pave the way for a more sophisticated discussion of identity formation, particularly in the context of European identity. The article emphasizes the incorporation of psychoanalytic considerations, particularly the problem of enjoyment, to enrich the discourse-theoretical account of identification. This includes not only formal or discursive but also substantive or affective identification conditions, termed as ‘obscene dimension’.
Nazmul Hasan has a post-graduate degree in Philosophy. He is a doctoral researcher in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India. His area of research interest is mainly political philosophy. His current research project is titled Populist Reason: A Philosophical Enquiry. He published papers on political activism, democracy, and populism in India.
Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe
Sulagna Pal(PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).
This study attempts to demonstrate how trajectories of nationalism and anti-immigration sentimentalism in Europe are seen through the philosophical ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder, Rabindranath Tagore, David Miller, Kieran Oberman and others. While Herder’s idea of nationalism was rooted in cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities, Tagore was keen on challenging what he called ‘narrow-centric’ nationalism and racism. Tagore’s cosmopolitan and universal humanistic values sought to transcend narrow parochial boundaries in favour of a broader understanding of humanity. His legendary short story Kabuliwala, written in 1892, depicts the life of a migrant from Afghanistan who chose to live in Calcutta for social and economic reasons (Eggel et al., 2007; Panjabi et al., 2023). This study suggests that Herder’s ‘brotherhood of humanity,’ Tagore’s pro-migration Kabuliwala narrative and Oberman’s classical liberal principles of freedom of movement and anti-coercion might help combat the growing anti-immigration sentimentalism in Europe in nuanced ways.
Keywords: Anti-Immigration, David Miller, Johann Gottfried Herder, Kieran Oberman, Kabuliwala, Nationalism, Rabindranath Tagore
Sulagna Pal is a PhD candidate in the Philosophy Department of the University of Delhi. She worked as an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Janki Devi Memorial College, University of Delhi, from July 2017 to March 2023. She has an M.Phil. in Philosophy in Environmental Ethics from Delhi University in 2016. Following are her areas of interest: Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, Buddhism, and Philosophy of Religion. She was a part of the International Conference of Philosophy, held in the Philosophy Department, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, EU, in 2013, funded by a Travel and Maintenance Grant from the Indian Council of Social Science Research, New Delhi. She was part of a Buddhist Conference held in Sri Lanka in 2013. She has many papers published in various journals and a book on the gendered body and environmental pluralism published by the Lambert Academic Publishing House, Germany.
A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualizations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings
Basma Doukhi (The University of Kent).
This paper applies a postcolonial approach to contest Eurocentric ways of thinking and approaches the contemporary phenomenon of mass displacement, tracing the origins of this thinking to history, power, and colonization (Said, 1993). This approach allows for a critical understanding of social cohesion as a Western construct, which can be challenged by examining the concept’s application in diverse contexts (Lemberg-Pedersen et al., 2022). Mainstream social cohesion is a politically and socially contested concept that has been deployed by scholars, policymakers, and practitioners to define, and can be operationalized in two distinct discourses. The first is an academic and theoretical discourse which has emerged in sociology and social psychology fields (Norton & de Haan, 2013). The second is a policy-oriented discourse, which offers a Western top-down and problem-driven perspective to examine solutions to diverse challenges undermining social cohesion (Norton & de Haan, 2013). Bernard (2000: 2-3) commented on social cohesion’s deployment within these two discourses by defining it as a ‘quasi-concept’ or ‘concept of convenience’ that is “flexible enough to allow the meanderings and necessities of political action from day to day.” This flexibility has allowed the promotion of social cohesion as an agenda within these discourses leading to “…a move away from multiculturalism to a social cohesion agenda” (Gozdecka et al., 2014: 56).
This paper is a critical review that contests Western conceptualizations of social cohesion across Western and English-speaking policy and academic contexts including North America and Europe (Jenson, 1998; Markus, 2010; de Berry & Roberts, 2018; Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020). It argues that the concept, as presented in the discourses above, is rooted in Western sociology and follows a Western framework (Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020). Reviewing literature, it shows how limited knowledge about social cohesion’s application is limited and undermined in refugee contexts and argues how understanding the practices of community from the perspectives of displaced people, beyond achieving social cohesion as defined in Western academic and policy discourses, should be a priority (Delhey et al., 2018).
Discussions and understanding of social cohesion by refugees in a refugee setting have been under-researched (Delhey et al., 2018, Fiddian- Qasmiyeh et al., 2022). Instead, social cohesion has become an elastic term co-opted into a buzzword for the institutions of the Global North within academic and policy discourses, rather than as a concept to understand the lived experiences of the people at the forefront (Seyidov, 2021). Looking beyond these discourses, the paper examines possible context-aware alternative conceptualizations of the concept, such as ”harmonization,’ that have been explored by researchers on refugee integration in Türkiye (Hoffmann & Samuk 2016: 10). Exploring Türkiye highlights how this Western understanding of social cohesion has contributed to limited applicability, measurements, relevance, and vagueness in low and middle-income countries (Gray Meral & Both, 2021) and to new forced displacement and migration, conflict-affected and refugee contexts (Ozcurumez & Hoxha, 2020; Finn, 2017; de Berry & Roberts, 2018), ‘risk[ing] the effectiveness of the word – and the outcome – altogether’ (Mookherjee & Easton-Calabria, 2017).
Basma Doukhi is a Ph.D. Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent. She is a Palestinian academic, human rights activist, and humanitarian practitioner. She worked for more than fourteen years in humanitarian and development with displaced people with UN agencies and international NGOs in the MENA and the UK. Basma was raised and lived in Al Rashideh Palestinian Refugee Camp in the South of Lebanon and is currently based in Canterbury, UK. Basma obtained a Chevening Scholarship to pursue a master’s degree in the Development and Emergency Practice at Oxford Brookes University, and She is recently pursuing her PhD in Migration Studies at the University of Kent as the first Palestinian refugee woman specialized in this topic from the camps in the MENA. Her Ph.D. explores the role of Refugee-Led Organizations in providing protection and assistance for displaced communities in Turkey. She published the first chapter, under the title, “The Moment We Arrived to Saida [City in the South of Lebanon] in the Afternoon, We Became Refugees’ – (Kanafani, 2015: 75) ” about the resilience and power of Palestinian Refugee women in the camps of Lebanon. Basma is also a Dabke dancer and a founder of Roouh social enterprise, which is a platform for female refugee artisans to tell their stories in their own words through their craft, and it is addressed to UK audiences to listen to these stories in the way that they want to be told.
Panel 6
Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe
Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism
Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).
Despite the apparently undeniable impact of regional integration on domestic politics, national societies and the European party systems, scholars have engaged in lengthy debates on the levels, limits, and importance of such an impact (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992; Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 2007; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996). Taggart (1998), Marks et al. (2002) and Marks et al. (2006) found evidence that national political parties’ position on the regional integration process in Europe is a variable that explains voter preferences. Along the same lines, Stefano Bartolini (2007) sustained that no other issue in “post-war electoral history” has had the same broad and standardizing effects across the European party system as the regional integration process. The authors examine voter preferences in national elections based on the level of support for regional integration. In a disaggregated manner, the authors rate the ideological and party positions according to the level of support for integration in the economic and political spheres. The emergence of issues related to identity, sovereignty, safety, etc. – that is, “non-material” issues in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters.
Since the early 2000s, it became remarkable that criticisms of economic integration that strongly opposed economic integration, such as the far-left political parties, did not see significant popularity among voters. Criticisms of the liberal model for a single market did not create obvious costs or harm for citizens distant from the integration process and did not perceive any economic losses. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, countries most affected by the 2008 financial crisis benefitted from the transfers of European resources from the European Structural Funds. A similar situation happened after the COVID-19 pandemic, resulting in an unprecedented economic contraction in 2020.
In the two cases, the EU’s response to transfer benefits, policies, and funds was fast, forceful, and well-coordinated at all levels.
We cannot say the same about the social and political integration contestants once the migration crises appeared as a yeast to make intolerance grow in the region, on the one hand, and populism on the other. In the context of the European migration crisis that began in 2015, it is possible to notice a considerable increase in the politicization of the issue of defending national identity and culture, especially by new far-right political parties (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019; Halikioupolou & Vlandas, 2020).
Despite the ambiguities of populism (Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2012), we seek to analyze the dimensions and consequences of Euroscepticism by classifying populist political parties and examining electoral data. For this article, we use the national electoral results for extremist political parties over the period when the European new extreme right emerged in the 1980s to 2022.
By identifying differences between countries and in the range of ideological positions from the right to the left in the EU-15, it will be possible to conclude the EU crises’ impacts on support for new populist ideologies. We use data on electoral support and the analysis of far-right and far-left parties, their political platforms, and strategies as our object of investigation to gain a better perspective on the current state of Euroscepticism in the region. Finally, we hope to confirm that even though the dimensions of diffuse or specific Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002) may be complementary at times, we see that the difference between the two is reproduced in the Eurosceptic ideological positions defended by the left and those defended by the right.
Ana Paula Tostes is Jean Monnet Chair (Project: 101127443 EUgac) and Professor at the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Studies of the State University of Rio de Janeiro (IESP-UERJ) and Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI). She holds a PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ, currently IESP) and Postdoc at University of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting researcher (2016-2017) at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) and Professor at Michigan State University (MSU). Currently holds Productivity Scholarships from FAPERJ (Prociência/UERJ) and CNPq (n.316785/2021-0), and she is coordinator of Program for International Cooperation (PROBRAL CAPES/DAAD Edital n. 9/2023) between IESP/UERJ and the German Institute for Global Studies and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany.
Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design
Melle Scholten (The University of Virginia).
How does large-scale emigration affect politics in the peripheral states of the European Union? While a large amount of literature looks at the political consequences of immigration in the more affluent Western and Northern member states, comparatively few scholars have taken up the mantle of examining the political effects of large-scale emigration in Central and Eastern Europe. Since emigration ranks higher among the concerns of non-migrants in these countries than immigration, this question is not without import. It could potentially help explain democratic backsliding in the Union. From a political economy perspective, high levels of emigration, concentrated in the younger, more progressive parts of society, change the makeup of the electorate. This project investigates how emigration, and its associated economic and political consequences affect policymaking and politics in CEE countries. Evidence is provided from panel data and a generalized difference-in-differences estimator. The findings presented here matter for the future of democracy in what is arguably the international organization most concerned with promoting democracy among its members. They also contribute to the study of the political economy of the Single Market and intra-European migration.
Melle Scholten is a PhD candidate at the University of Virginia (UVA). His research projects examine international and comparative political economy, primarily focusing on the effects of migration and remittances on migrant-sending societies, employing quantitative methods and causal inference.
The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe
Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).
This research critically examines how populism in Europe impacts the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants, considering the rise of populist movements and their influence on political discourse, policies, and societal attitudes. The study aims to unravel the intricate ways in which populist ideologies shape the treatment of migrants in European societies, focusing on citizenship redefinition and social inclusion challenges. The literature review explores historical and theoretical aspects of populism in Europe, emphasizing how populist leaders leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to frame migrants as threats to national identity. The mixed-methods approach integrates qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, providing rich insights into subjective experiences. Quantitative data from national surveys complements qualitative findings, offering a broader understanding of trends.
The research delves into citizenship redefinition, analyzing changes in laws and rhetoric under populist influence, especially regarding jus soli and jus sanguinis principles. Social inclusion challenges are scrutinized, considering populist narratives portraying migrants as cultural threats and their impact on public perceptions, media representations, and policy measures affecting integration in education, employment, and healthcare.
Case studies from select European countries showcase variations in populist influence on citizenship and social inclusion policies, considering historical context, economic conditions, and populist movement strength. The research concludes with policy implications, recommending strategies to address challenges posed by populism to migrant populations. The study aims to contribute valuable insights for policymakers, scholars, and advocates working towards a more inclusive and equitable European society amid populist challenges.
Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer-researcher at the University of Yaoundé, holding a PhD in political science. A specialist in international relations and strategic studies, he has authored over thirty publications, including ten books. His expertise covers security, defense, and geopolitics, with a particular interest in issues related to state fragility, violent extremism, and terroris
Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat & Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Use of Informal Sharia Law for Civilizational Populist Mobilization in the 2024 Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0035
Abstract
The Defenders Front of Islam or the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is an Islamist civilizational populist movement in Indonesia. Its religious and political blueprints have been a challenge to the elites in power. In 2017 and 2019, it was involved in the contest of electoral politics to fight against the elites by implementing the populist politics that tends to undermine the democratic process. As a result, it was banned in 2020 but re-established a year later. In 2024 elections, it supports for Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar to compete against Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD. The findings suggest that by applying the Islamist civilizational populism, the FPI instrumentalizes the informal religious law to support its political mobilization. It emphasizes the legal-centric perspective of “sharia,” which gives the FPI’s activists and its wider audience only one imperative option to solve the problem: join in the populism. We arguably state that the informal religious law can contribute to the process of Islamist civilizational populist mobilization.
The Defenders Front of Islam or the Front Pembela Islam (FPI) is an Islamist civilizational populist movement in Indonesia (Barton et al., 2021; Yilmaz et al., 2022). It was born on August 17, 1998, in Jakarta when the country was undergoing political reform and transition from authoritarian to democracy. The FPI emerged as an Islamist movement that upholds the mission of fighting against immorality such as thuggery, prostitution, alcohols, drugs, gambling, and other street evils, while other Muslim organizations did not spread the Islamic messages in this level (Facal, 2020). In addition, when immorality tended to increase crime during the Reformasi, the police were seen as unable to solve the social problem (Jahroni, 2004: 222-227). To carry out its religious mission, the FPI has frequently implemented violent and vigilante methods to ensure the safety of society.
The FPI wants to Islamize state and society. It desires Indonesia to be a modern state based on the Islamic sharia. It’s ideal, similar to that of the Islamist party Masyumi (1943-1960), is to install the Islamist phrases in the first principles of the state, Pancasila. The FPI wants to transform the principle of “Belief in one Almighty God” (Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa) to become “Belief in one Almighty God with the obligation to carry out the sharia Islam for its adherents.” In 2002, the FPI attempted to transform (Islamize) constitution, but failed (Wilson, 2015). However, it has maintained its ideal persistently by implementing the Islamization of society. In 2012, its top leader, Muhammad Rizieq Shihab published his book “Wawasan Kebangsaan Menuju NKRI Bersyariah” (The National State of Mind towards the Shariatized NKRI/Indonesia). This book presents the FPI’s thoughts on Islamist politics, suggesting that the Islamist struggle is crucial to establishing a religious society. Accordingly, some scholars identify the FPI as the Islamist populist movement (Hadiz, 2016; Hadiz and Robison, 2017; Hadiz, 2018; Mietzner, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019; Mietzner, 2020).
The FPI’s Islamist da’wa blueprints have been a challenge to the government. In 2016, the FPI was involved in the cross-class alliances of the populist rally that brought together more than five hundred thousand masses to oust Ahok (a Hakka name for Basuki Tjahaya Purnama) a Chinese-Christian governor of Jakarta. At the time, Rizieq was hailed by the populists as their “Grand Imam” (Imam Besar), leading the pure people in their fight against the corrupt elites. As a result, the FPI’s chosen leader, Anies Baswedan had won the chairmanship of the capital in the 2017 gubernatorial election (Bachtiar, 2023a). With Ahok having the backing of President Jokowi, the FPI was also forging a message that the central government is the next target to be overthrown. In the 2019 election, the FPI endorsed Jokowi’s rival, a retired Indonesia special forces general, Prabowo.
The government banned the FPI in 2020 because of the issue of its relationship with the Islamist extremist groups and its radical campaign to Islamize the republic (Yilmaz et al., 2022; Yilmaz, 2023). In addition, its leader, Rizieq was imprisoned for violating the health quarantine during the Covid-19 pandemic, although he was released on parole in July 2022. Since then, the police have continued to prohibit the FPI’s political actions both in the public sphere and the cyber space. In January 2021, however, the neo-FPI was reborn, changing its name to the Front of Islamic Brotherhood or Front Persaudaraan Islam (FPI) (Tsauro & Taufiq, 2023; Taufiq & Tsauro, 2024). In this new form, Rizieq handed over leadership to his son-in-law, a young and charismatic Muslim preacher, Muhammad Husein al-Attas. In the 2024 Indonesian elections, the FPI backed Anies to run as one of the presidential candidates. Even after its dissolution, the FPI still can play a crucial role in the country’s electoral politics.
This paper aims to analyze the role of the FPI in the context of the 2024 elections in Indonesia. We argue that by implementing the Islamist civilizational populism, the FPI is instrumentalizing the informal religious law to support its populist political mobilization. It emphasizes the legal-centric perspective of sharia, which gives the FPI’s supporters and the public only one imperative option to solve the problem: join in the populism. It is in line with the populist promise that populism is the only solution to the crises. The subsequent section discusses the theory of Islamist civilizational populism and informal religious law. It is followed by the context of the 2024 elections in Indonesia, the FPI’s Islamist civilizational populism, and the FPI’s instrumentalization of the informal religious law in its Islamist civilizational populist mobilization.
Islamist Civilizational Populism and Informal Religious Law
The mass demonstration “Jogja Bergerak untuk Keadilan dan HAM” in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, on December 18, 2020, demands the release of Rizieq Shihab and an investigation into the shooting incident involving FPI members. Photo: Hariyanto Surbakti.
Populism, theoretically, is non-monolithic. There are many definitions of it. In this paper, however, we use the minimal definition of populism that is developed further by Yilmaz and Morieson (2023) which includes not only the vertical element of populism but also its horizontal element so-called civilizationism as a thicker ideology that contributes to the populist identification of ‘self’ and ‘the other.’ They define civilizational populism as a set of ideas that collectively hold that politics must serve the people’s general will, and that “society is ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ who collaborate with the ‘dangerous others’ belonging to other civilizations and who pose a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people” (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023: 4).
In civilizational populism, the role of religion is crucial. It is because civilizationism highly frequently includes religious aspects such as particularly informal religious law (Yilmaz, 2022). It is the law that the religious society has implemented in an informal way beyond the legal system of the state. Accordingly, we define this informal religious law “as a legal entity outside the formal legal system of a state, and the people of that state uphold and respect this law as it governs all aspects of their lives.” In the context of Muslim society, this informal religious law can be sharia and the other legal entities derived from it such as fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and fatwa (Islamic legal opinion), as the sharia is considered the most significant source of guidance for the lives of Muslims (Yilmaz, 2022: 20). Sharia also contributes significantly to shaping the legal centric perspective among Muslims (Said, 1994).
The Context of the 2024 Elections in Indonesia
There are three pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates for the 2024 elections in Indonesia. The first is Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (AMIN), while the second and the third are Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabuming Raka and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD respectively.
In the 2019 elections, the FPI supported Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno to compete against Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin. At that time, Prabowo-Sandi was defeated. However, after the FPI experienced political difficulties – the dissolution of the organization, the imprisonment of its leader, the death of its six laskars – Prabowo accepted the Jokowi’s offer to join his cabinets. Prabowo was appointed Defense Minister. This led the FPI to perceive Prabowo as betraying the ummah including in the context of the 2024 elections.
Prabowo’s running mate, Gibran, is the son of Jokowi. Ganjar Pranowo, a member of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), backed Jokowi in both the 2014 and 2019 elections. Mahfud MD, Jokowi’s Coordinating Minister for Politics, Legal, and Security Affairs, has aligned with Ganjar’s candidacy. Despite their prior support for Jokowi’s administration, Ganjar and Mahfud oppose the Prabowo-Gibran ticket because they perceive Jokowi’s endorsement of his son’s candidacy as a bid to extend his political influence (Bachtiar, 2023b).
The FPI’s support for AMIN is strengthened by the political frauds allegedly committed by the Prabowo-Gibran camp, especially through Jokowi’s political power. These include the perpetuation of Jokowi’s political dynasty, legal manipulation by the Constitutional Court, abuse of authority and power as a state official, and vote counting fraud (Yilmaz et al., 2024a; Yilmaz et al., 2024b; Slater, 2024).
The FPI’s Islamist Civilizational Populism
The FPI is an Islamist civilizational populist movement that is considered still influential in shaping the political dynamics of the Indonesia’s 2024 election. This movement plays a crucial role in supporting one of the pairs of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates, Anies Baswedan and Muhaimin Iskandar (AMIN), who are competing with Ganjar Pranowo and Mahfud MD, and mainly Prabowo Subianto and Gibran Rakabuming Raka.
Although all the candidates tend to build their image as pro-diversity nationalists, the FPI helps promote AMIN as the pious leaders of the ummah. The FPI’s image-building of AMIN purposes at retaining the Islamist voters and attracting the public attention, as most of the country’s population is Muslim.
By supporting AMIN, the FPI produces Islamist civilizational populist narratives and rhetoric that guarantee its populist identification of “the self” and “the other” to distinguish those who are on the side of the ummah from those who are not. Accordingly, the FPI defines certain boundaries between those who can be identified as Islamist civilizational populists and those who are their adversaries.
The FPI perceives that AMIN’s opponents are its populist enemies. They are the other electoral candidates that have been supported by “corrupt elites.” The FPI directs its identification towards Ganjar-Mahfud, Prabowo-Gibran, and their backers. Ganjar-Mahfud has been proposed by the winning political party in the last election, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP), which is also a political force that recommended the banning of the FPI. Meanwhile, Prabowo-Gibran has been supported by incumbent president Jokowi, who backed Ahok, the FPI’s most hated political figure in the 2017 gubernatorial election (Yilmaz et al., 2024a; Yilmaz et al., 2024b).
The two enemies of the FPI, the PDIP politicians and Jokowi, had been working together in the context of the 2019 elections. The FPI perceives them as the corrupt elites who have invited foreign powers such as the West and China to participate in the exploitation of the country’s natural resources (Yilmaz et al., 2022). Those powers, as the FPI claimed, are categorized as the dangerous others.
The FPI’s view of the corrupt elites and its civilizational enemies is reflected in a statement by one of its leaders, Munarman: “Currently, we are witnessing that those who are in power, are those who are anti-Islam, anti-Islamic teachings, anti-Muslims, and even accuse the teachings of Islam of being a lie. In terms of global geopolitics, we should not hope for anyone, because it is precisely the power of the White Wolf (the West) that has been a place of dependence for compradors, foreign accomplices. Indonesia has been in contact with the White Wolf. Now the compradors are also accomplices of the Red Dragon (China)” (Munarman, 2016).
Since then, as well as in the context of the 2024 elections, according to the FPI, the elites have involved the Muslim ummah’s civilizational enemies (the dangerous others) in the social, cultural, political, and economic destructiveness, primarily in a way of undermining the ummah’s general will. The FPI claims that because of the civilizational threats of foreign forces, the ummah have remained marginalized with no access to economic resources or social welfare.
FPI’s Instrumentalization of the Informal Religious Law in Its Islamist Civilizational Populist Mobilization
The Grand Imam of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), Habib Rizieq Shihab, upon his arrival in Jakarta on November 10, 2020. Photo: Angga Budhiyanto.
In its mission to combat perceived threats against the ummah, the FPI actively urges its activists and the public to participate in its populist agenda. The FPI frames this mission as a religious obligation, asserting that it is incumbent (wajib) upon Muslims to engage in it. We contend that the FPI strategically utilizes informal religious laws such as sharia, fiqh, and fatwa to ensure the success of its Islamist populist mobilization efforts.
The FPI employs informal religious law through three primary methods: Firstly, it implements a legal-centric perspective in applying its Islamist doctrine of “commanding good and forbidding evil” (amar ma’ruf nahi munkar), particularly in its populist political struggle. Additionally, the FPI mobilizes the masses by advocating adherence to Sharia principles in electing leaders, often based on outcomes from deliberative consultations (musyawarah) among Ijtima’ Ulama. Lastly, the FPI rallies its supporters and the public to combat alleged political fraud perpetrated by its adversaries.
First, the FPI perceives politics as the arena for its religious struggle in which this Islamist civilizational populist movement must implement its Islamist doctrine of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar. This doctrine urges Muslims to command good and at the same time to forbid evil. It is rooted in the Islamic scripture, Surah Ali Imran verse 104, “And let there be among you a group of people who call to virtue, commanding the good and forbidding the evil; they are the fortunate ones.” Other verses such as Ali Imran 110 and 114, Al-Araf 157, Al-Taubah 71, Al-Haj 41, and Al-Luqman 17 substantively also emphasize this doctrine. According to the FPI’s top leader, Rizieq Shihab, the level of obligation to implement amar ma’ruf nahi munkar is fardu ‘ain (individual obligation) for those in authority, and fardu kifayah(communal obligation) for those who are not (Shihab, 2024). When the authority undermines his or her obligation, however, it becomes the duty of everyone in the Muslim community, including the FPI, to conduct the amar ma’ruf nahi munkar. Therefore, in order to implement it, it is imperative to emphasize the fight against the populist enemies in the context of the electoral politics.
Second, the FPI trusts the informal religious institution that enables “Islamist” scholars (ulama) from across the country to engage in the collective Islamic legal reasoning (ijtihad) to find a solution to the political problem and select the best leaders from among the available candidates. On November 18, 2023, in the Adz Dzikro Mosque, Sentul, Bogor, West Java, the Ijtima’ Ulama concluded their ijtihad and decided that AMIN was the candidate to vote for (Faktakini, 2023). Rizieq Shihab claims that the result of the Ijtima’ Ulama is based on the Islamic practice of deliberative consultation (musyawarah) which is commanded by God. At length, he expresses his thought that:
“In matters of struggle, including social and political matters, we have upheld musyawarah. First of all, musyawarah is a command from Allah in the Qur’an. Allah says, ‘wa shawirhum fi al-amri,’ inviting them to deliberate on important matters, especially for the benefit of many people. In another verse, Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala makes deliberation the identity of the believers. Allah says, ‘wa amruhum shura’ bainahum,’ meaning that the affairs of the believers are discussed among themselves. …So, decisions made by musyawarah, that’s the advantage, Insha Allah, will be much better than personal decisions because many opinions are taken into account. And that’s not all. Decisions made through musyawarah become a shared responsibility. So, even if there are mistakes or shortcomings in the future, we won’t point fingers (not blame anyone). But if it’s a personal decision, it can be pointed at (personally blamed). That’s the advantage of reflection. And musyawarah is because of Allah’s command, if we carry it out, it will be blessed. Well, a blessed decision, God willing, is not wrong. That is why many people have asked me, what is our attitude towards the 2024 presidential elections? I have answered that I am waiting for the decision of the Ijtima’ Ulama,” (Shihab 2023).
Based on this FPI’s informal religious law, one of its leaders, Hanif Alatas had mobilized the FPI supporters and the public in various religious assemblies across the country. He strongly promoted the Ijtima’ Ulama’s decision to vote for AMIN. He stated that: “Are you ready to follow the command of the ulama? Are you ready to follow the ulama who are highly consistent (istiqamah)? Are you ready to follow the direction of the Ijtima’ Ulama? We obey the Ijtima’ Ulama! 2024, Anies becomes the president. Takbir!!!” (Alatas, 2024). Ultimately, the FPI organized the massive religious gathering (Istighotsah Kubro) at Benyamin Suaeb Stadium, Kemayoran, Central Jakarta on February 8, 2024, to mobilize Islamist masses to vote for AMIN.
Third, by using the informal religious law, the FPI mobilizes its supporters and the public to fight against its enemies that who are allegedly involved in political fraud. Rizieq Shihab calls on the masses to fight the political fraud that is taking place, while at the same time building mass confidence that the pure ummah can win against Ahok in the 2017 gubernatorial election, despite not being supported by a large political force. According to Rizieq Shihab, the FPI’s resistance to political fraud and confidence in implementing amar ma’ruf nahi munkar is part of an effort to uphold the sharia. He said:
“Well, because of that, if you want AMIN (Anies-Muhaimin) to win, that’s why I invite you, let’s fight fraud. …Don’t be afraid if there are other candidates supported by economic power, political power… We have experience in Jakarta. In Jakarta, when we fought Ahok, what did we have? …Ahok was supported by the President, supported by the Chief of Police, supported by the TNI Commander, supported by all mainstream TV media, supported by major parties, supported by Taipan conglomerates, supported by the Nine Dragons, supported by survey institutions, brothers. … Those who supported Anis at that time were only parties, brother, whose votes were actually not as big as the parties that supported Ahok. Ahok was backed by foreign powers, brother. On paper, Ahok won. But what happened after that? It turned out that God’s will was different. …Allah Subhanahu wa taala still forced Ahok to resign. The Muslims won, brother. Right? Takbir!!! If we obey Allah, we don’t have to worry. ‘Intansurullah, yansurkum.’ If you defend Allah, uphold His law, uphold His sharia, ‘yansurkum,’ surely Allah will win you all this. Allah’s promise is sure to be true, Allah’s promise is impossible to miss, ya Ikhwan!” (Shihab, 2024b).
The FPI accused the Prabowo-Gibran political carriage of fraud because they are backed by Jokowi who has committed abuses of power as a state official. Gibran, Jokowi’s son, does not actually meet the requirements of the election law to run for vice-president, mainly because he is under 40. As a result, the Prabowo-Gibran political force filed a judicial review with the Constitutional Court to change the age for vice-presidential candidacy. They managed to change this requirement, especially as the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court is Anwar Usman, Jokowi’s brother-in-law. Their success is suspected to have been due to a collusive and nepotistic practice that manipulated the country’s highest judicial system. In addition, according to the FPI, Jokowi used his social, political, and economic resources to support his son. Jokowi ordered his ministers, police and military chiefs and other officials to mobilize the masses to ensure they voted for Prabowo-Gibran. In addition, they (state officials) were also mobilized to distribute social aid to society, which certainly contained certain political messages in favor of Prabowo-Gibran’s victory.
Conclusion
Despite its disbandment in 2020, the FPI underwent a resurgence as a similar Islamist civilizational populist movement in early 2021, emerging as a significant extra-parliamentary force in Indonesia’s 2024 elections. Endorsing Anies Baswedan-Muhaimin Iskandar (AMIN) as the presidential and vice-presidential candidates against Prabowo Subianto-Gibran Rakabumin and Ganjar Pranowo-Mahfud MD, the FPI positioned itself prominently. Its support for AMIN stems from its perception of the other candidates and their supporters as populist political adversaries. Specifically, the FPI identifies the Prabowo-Gibran political alliance, endorsed by Jokowi, as representing corrupt elites who allegedly align with dangerous external influences, particularly Western powers and China, posing a threat to the ummah’s civilization.
We contend that in mobilizing its supporters during the 2024 elections, the FPI utilized informal religious law, encompassing sharia, fiqh, and fatwa. The FPI employed this legal framework in three keyways: Firstly, it adopted a law-centric approach in applying the principle of amar ma’ruf nahi munkar, particularly within its political activism. Secondly, the FPI mobilized the masses by advocating adherence to Sharia principles in selecting leaders, often guided by deliberative consultations (musyawarah) among Ulama during Ijtima’ gatherings. Thirdly, the FPI rallied its supporters and the public to combat alleged political fraud perpetrated by its adversaries.
We also arguably state that the FPI uses informal religious law as an ideological expression that helps its populist mobilization. This has to do with the legalistic nature of sharia law, which has nuances of halal (permissible) and haram(forbidden) or black and white. Furthermore, according to the FPI’s sharia-centric perspective, politics tends to be positioned as a field of da’wah (religious proselytization). Thus, for the FPI, politics must have a religious mission. If there is a concept of Islamic politics, then in this context it is sharia-based populist politics.
So far, in the case of the FPI in Indonesia, we have seen this as part and parcel of Islamist civilizational populism. However, is this also the case for other civilizational populist movements elsewhere in the world?
Funding: We acknowledge that this research is supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) the Discovery Project – DP220100829, titled “Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation: Civilisationism in Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan” (2022-2025).
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Abstract
Observers widely acknowledged the lack of divisive Islamist populism in Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Elections. This was in stark contrast to the 2019 elections in which Prabowo Subianto, the case study of this article and new leader of Indonesia, led a campaign that overtly supported Islamist interests and actors, and deepened religio-ethnic tensions in society. Despite this acknowledgement, it remains unclear if religion was still operationalized – albeit differently – in his most recent campaigning efforts. This article therefore seeks to examine if religion was politicized and performed by Prabowo in 2024 and contrast the findings with 2019 to address how and why his instrumentalization of religion varied significantly. Applying a discursive-performative lens, discourse analysis will be used to determine if and how religion featured in a sample of Prabowo Subianto’s speeches (six speeches in total, three from each election campaign). Specifically, this analysis will explore how references to religion and a religious community reflect a) his political goals and b) the political community he is attempting to engage. It will also discuss these findings in the context of contemporary populism studies.
Although there has been significant progress in recent years, the study of religious populism in non-Western democratic campaigning remains underdeveloped (Sumiala et al., 2023; Zuquete, 2017; Beuter et al, 2023). This is an important gap to address, because understanding the role of religion in electoral politics is important when religion and religious majoritarianism are tightly entangled in national identity, culture, and society and resulting in an inherently more complex phenomenon (Yabanci, 2020: 93; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).
Electoral campaigns in these countries may feature both exclusionary populist appeals in which the religiously defined in-group is often used as a juxtaposition with ‘evil’ elites and ‘others’ (DeHanas & Shterin, 2018). What has been examined less, particularly in empirical research, is the politicization of religion to link together and homogenize a range of interests and identities (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001), influence the perception of the leader, and create enthusiasm for their political mission.
Indonesia’s 2024 presidential election – and its winner – provides a fascinating account of the instrumentalization of religion in political campaigning. To better understand Indonesia’s new leader and how he may command over the county’s religio-political space, this article considers Prabowo Subianto’s populist orientation toward Islamism in 2019 and compares it with his use of religion in 2024’s campaign, when Islamist rhetoric was notably absent. This has not yet been addressed adequately, nor supported by empirical research, although the change has been widely observed in political commentaries of the recent election (Ismail & Koh, 2024; Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Rozy, 2024).
A Brief Note on Indonesia’s Recent Religious-Political Context
In cases of Islamist populism, researchers have found that ‘the people’ are a collectivized identity group (‘pious Muslims’) consisting of a range of Muslim identities and interests that are grouped together and politicized (Susanto, 2019; Hadiz, 2018). In Indonesia, the literature indicates that in recent history, a range of actors have interacted with or influenced religious populism in Indonesia: from politicians and parties, social media influencers and online preachers, through to grassroots movements and organizations (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Barton et al., 2021; Kayane, 2020; Widian et al., 2022).
In 2019, Prabowo Subianto constructed his political image, narratives, and performances in response to the socio-political tensions that had been heightening for some time in Indonesia. Although beyond the limitations of this article to explain in detail, it is suffice to note here that polarization in recent years had been exacerbated by various populist and extreme actors who used religion to inflame tensions, push for social and political change, and destabilize conditions for religious minorities (Mietzner, 2020; Widian et al., 2022; Temby, 2019).
The most notable period of intensification occurred during the ‘anti-Ahok’ mass protest movement, born in the lead up to the 2017 gubernational elections. The then Christian-Chinese governor of Jakarta, Busaki Tjahaja Purnama (‘Ahok’) was accused of blasphemy after citing a single verse from the Qur’an, and this shared grievance brought together a range of Islamist actors and many Indonesians in a significant period of populist mobilization (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018; Jaffrey, 2021: 224-225). Mietzner (2020) notes that Prabowo attached himself to this mobilization event, and incorporated Islamist populism and Islamist actors into his campaigning effort. Operationalizing religious populism in his election campaign, Prabowo became a highly influential player in one of the most divisive political contestations in Indonesia’s history (Ismail & Koh, 2024).
This article contributes to the developing field of religious populism by studying its manifestation in the discourses and performances of Prabowo Subianto in the last two Indonesian elections (2019 and 2024). In both election cycles, Prabowo makes references to religion and conveys religious meaning to the audience he is seeking support from. Yet, scholars widely agree that in 2019, Prabowo used Islamist populism to further his political agenda, mobilize supporters and exploit religio-ethnic tensions in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2020; Hadiz, 2018; Barton et al., 2021). In 2024 however, observers noted that Prabowo refrained from religious populism’s polarizing and antagonistic accounts of people in society (Ismail & Koh, 2024; Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Rozy, 2024), although there is little written about his broader incorporation – or eradication – of religion in his most recent political performances.
Equally, by using Indonesia as a case study, this article underlines how religious populism in the socio-political context of more religious societies usually presents quite differently from democracies of the secularized Western variety (Wawrzynski & Marszalek-Kawa, 2022: 2; Falki, 2022: 227).
Methodology
This research employs a deductive qualitative approach, in which the theoretical framework of this paper will guide the analysis of collected data (Widian et al., 2022: 354). Discourse analysis will be used to identify and compare the rhetorical religious elements of a sample of Prabowo’s communications.
The article will ultimately explore how Prabowo’s political style has pivoted away from an exclusionary religious populist style – and what it can teach us about the under-studied role of religion in electoral campaigning.
Sample Data Collection
This article will use a sample of Prabowo’s campaign speeches which were selected based on a number of considerations, including: Prabowo discussing his campaign and policies, the length of the speech – longer speeches were favored because they provided more data to analyze, and speeches that occurred shortly (in the three months maximum prior) before the election when a leader is likely to most powerfully perform their political persona.
Sample 1: Prabowo’s official national speech, ‘Indonesia Menang’ at the Jakarta Convention Center, Jakarta, 2019.
Sample 2: Opening campaign speech in Kotabaru, Gondokusuman – Yogyakarta, 2019.
Sample 3: Prabowo. CNN Indonesia. Pidato Berapi-Api GBK, 2019.
Sample 4: Prabowo’s political speech in Stadion Gelora Bandung, Bandung, West Java, on February 8, 2024.
Sample 5: The People Party for the Progress of Indonesia (Pesta Rakyat untuk Indonesia Maju) in Gelora Bung Karno (GBK) Stadium, Senayan, Jakarta, February 10, 2024.
Sample 6: Prabowo Subianto’s speech at a volunteer consolidation event at the Pekanbaru Youth Center, Riau, 2024.
Data Analysis
Each author contributing to this research is familiar with and currently undertaking scholarship into the context of Indonesia and Indonesian politics, and religious populism. Our analyses have been guided by our understanding of the socio-political context these speeches have been presented in. One contributor is a native Indonesian and has assisted in ensuring the integrity of the transcribed and translated speeches.
The four speeches were read in full several times before selecting the passages that have been used for the following analyses. These passages were selected based on their relationship with key themes of religion, religious populism, and religious association. This process resulted in the identification of certain key narrative themes, which the passages have been categorized under below.
References to God, Prophet Muhammad, and Religion
Prabowo Subianto gives a speech about the vision and mission of the 2019 Indonesian presidential candidate in front of a crowd of supporters on the campaign in Yogyakarta, Indonesia on April 8, 2019. Photo: Aidil Akbar.
In all sets of 2019 and 2024 speeches, Prabowo references Islam as a shared religion with the Indonesian people, and in each case, he opens with an Islamic greeting to the crowd.
In the 2019 speeches, Prabowo drew attention to his personal affinity with God and religion. In sample one (2019), he frames his concluding comments by declaring himself “a proud son of the nation and of Islam.” Similarly, in sample two (2019), he greets the crowd and immediately declares himself a Muslim:
“I pray that Yogyakarta is in a state of health and well-being. As a Muslim, let us send prayers and peace to our beloved Prophet Muhammad, who has enlightened us all.”
Populism often involves the personalization of politics, where voters connect with a political actor and their representation rather than strictly the set of policies and party affiliation they have (Soare, 2017; Weyland, 2017). In the above examples, Prabowo is drawing attention to himself as a Muslim and son of Islam, which supports his attempts at presenting himself as a pious religious figure throughout the 2019 campaign, and as will be demonstrated below, the savior of Indonesia.
In sample 3 (2019) Prabowo demonstrates this personalization again and links his happiness with serving the Indonesian people. He owes this to God for providing him with the opportunity to serve:
“And I invite all my friends to do the same. We are devoted, we serve the state and the nation and the people. And I am already 68 years old. The Almighty has given me too much. I am determined. The rest of my life is for the people of Indonesia. My happiness, my joy, if I can see the wealth of Indonesia returning to the people of Indonesia. I am happy.”
In one of the 2024 sample speeches (sample 4), Prabowo ends his speech with a prayer:
“I close my remarks with my prayer, I pray for the presence of Allah, subhanahu wa taala, God the Great, God the Almighty, who rules all the worlds. It is only to You that we pray, only to You that we ask for help. O Allah, O Lord, give us strength, amen, so that we are strong to receive the mandate from the people of Indonesia, so that we have the ability, wisdom, intelligence, courage, honesty, sincerity to protect the people of Indonesia … O Allah, give us the strength, give us the power to continue to be loyal to the nation and the people of Indonesia, amen. Thank you, O Allah, thank you for everything you have given, thank you for your favor, thank you for all the gifts you have given. Thank you. Wassalamualaikum warahmatullahi wabarakatuh.”
This prayer frames the Prabowo and the audience as collective Muslims who are seeking the right direction for Indonesia from God. While the sincerity of this prayer is not for our judgement, we can comment that religion is politicized to create unity and to frame Prabowo’s seeking of power as a holy and pious mission.
In sample 6 (2024) Prabowo expresses moral absolutisms of right, wrong and evil to highlight the virtuous path he is on:
“I got teachings from my ustaz-ustaz, from my kiai-kiai, from my teachers. If you are insulted, if you are mocked, if you are slandered, return it to the almighty. I believe that right is right, wrong is wrong, evil is evil, I continue on the right path, I have no doubt, O God, O Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala.”
The Discursive Construction of Crisis, Breakdown, and Threat
The sample speeches show Prabowo constructing a rhetorical crisis to a much greater degree in 2019 than he did in 2024 campaigning. Although these passages are not always inherently related to religion, the analysis will demonstrate how these crises can be used to augment an image of saviorhood by the political actor from ‘evil’ elites, which tends to lean on religious ideals and association.
A key narrative theme in the 2019 samples is that Indonesia is weak, threatened and at a crucial crossroads for its survival. This is most pronounced in the first sample, in which he shares a tragic story of a farm laborer and father who died by suicide because of the burden of his debts, and of the one in three Indonesian children who are malnourished, the ordinary people who can’t afford to live, and the debt Indonesia keeps accruing on a global scale. In the second sample, Prabowo evocatively claims that “our country is sick” and “Mother Earth is being raped” and “the rights of people are being trampled on.”
This state of crisis is attributed to the “handful of elites in Jakarta” that “do as they please.” Prabowo personalizes this state of crisis such as in sample 2 (2019) when he declares:
“I speak what’s in my heart. I’m fed up, fed up with the antics of the evil elite in Jakarta. Fed up. Always lying, always lying, lying, lying. Lying to the people.”
Religious populism is often used, as it has been here, to create moral distinctions between the ‘good’ people and the ‘evil’ others (e.g. DeHanas and Shterin, 2018).
The perpetuation of crisis, threat and blame was almost absent in the most recent election. In a significant pivot in 2024, Prabowo became allies with and endorsed by his former opposition President Jokowi, despite Prabowo having spread unfounded rumors about Jokowi secretly being a Chinese Christian who was selling out Indonesia in the former election (Lam, 2023). This consequently saw a change in Prabowo’s rhetoric, in which he stopped performing a state of despair when discussing Indonesia and blaming the political elites and government. For example, in sample 3 (2024), Prabowo claimed that Indonesia will become great and prosperous:
“Brothers and sisters, on the 14th of February, all of us, brothers and sisters, will determine the future of your children and grandchildren, brothers and sisters. We are now at a crossroads. Do we want to improve, do we want to progress, do we want to become a prosperous country, or do we want to become a mediocre country? Ladies and gentlemen, Prabowo Gibran and Koalisi Indonesia Maju, we are determined to continue all the foundations that have been built.”
In sample 4 (2024) Prabowo again optimistically describes Indonesia and the state of the country left by President Jokowi:
“We are also grateful to President Joko Widodo, ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, ladies and gentlemen, the Indonesian nation is a great nation, not just a great territory, not just a great population, but a great heart, a great soul, a great character, ladies and gentlemen.”
We can see a clear change in Prabowo’s strategy from the above passages, from claiming that Indonesia is facing imminent threats from internal and external factors and urgently needing a leader to save the country and its people, to portraying Indonesia as being on the right track but needing a leader to lead it to greatness.
Prabowo as the Savior of Indonesia
Former Minister of Defense and winner of the February 14, 2024, Presidential election, Prabowo Subianto, pictured at the 77th-anniversary celebration of the Indonesian Air Force in Jakarta on April 9, 2023. Photo: Donny Hery.
Political actors using a populist style generally rely on constructing a state of crisis, and then portraying themselves as the one – perhaps the only one – that can lead the people through the crisis or breakdown (Moffitt, 2016; Moffitt, 2020).
When religion is incorporated into this rhetoric, it can enhance and add credibility to these claims by sacralizing the leader (as the ‘savior’) and consequently, their politics take on a transcendent nature (Zuquete, 2017; Yilmaz, Morieson & Demir, 2021; Yabanci, 2020). Furthermore, when a leader references the majority religion, and appeals to the religious community, they are lending legitimacy and authenticity to their political agenda. We can see this in sample 1 (2019) when Prabowo ends his speech with:
“As a proud son of the nation and of Islam, allow me to proclaim the takbir, ‘Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Allahu Akbar! Independence! Independence!’ ‘Good luck fighting, together for a victorious Indonesia’.”
In this passage, Prabowo is creating a connection between himself (a son of Islam), God and religion of ‘the people’ (Allahu Akbar! God is Greatest!) and Indonesia’s independence (exclaiming and repeating Independence! following the takbir). Prabowo concludes his address in sample 2 (2019) in similar terms:
“Then, after voting, guard the counting until it’s finished. God willing, the people will win, Indonesia will win. Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Allahu Akbar, Independence, Independence, Independence. Thank you.”
In sample 3 (2019) Prabowo once again portrays his political career as a sacred mission that has been granted by God. This example highlights his perceived role as fighting for justice and against those he opposes (the elite government):
“I am grateful. I am grateful. To God Almighty. God is great. Thank you, God. You gave me the opportunity. To defend the people. Danio. You gave me a chance. With these noble figures. You gave me a chance. To stand up for truth and justice. Thank you, Lord. You gave me the opportunity. To fight against the budget of wrath. To fight against injustice. To fight against leaders who deceive their own people.”
Interestingly, while Prabowo’s 2024 speeches did not construct a vision of Indonesia in crisis like they did in 2019, the most pronounced instance of Prabowo performing as the savior of Indonesia came from one of the 2024 campaign speeches (sample 3). In this example, Prabowo narrates to the crowd:
“Ladies and gentlemen, from the young age of 18, I have pledged that I am ready to die for the nation and people of Indonesia. Ladies and gentlemen, my ustaz, my kiai, taught me, ‘Prabowo, as a Muslim, before you spend your last breath, you must say two sentences of shahada.’ And I have said it in my life, because I should have been called by God. It turns out that God still gives, Allah subhanahu wa ta’ala still gives me breath, still gives me strength, still gives me health. That means I have to fulfil my duty to the nation and the people of Indonesia. And I, at this moment, after I have risked my life for decades for this republic, I am not willing to still see poor people in Indonesia.”
In this passage, Prabowo describes his political career as a sacred mission. Claiming that he is ready to die for the nation to fulfil this religious duty from God, Prabowo is making a passionate appeal to the emotions of the audience.
This is an interesting finding. It is quite evident that Prabowo was operationalizing exclusionary religious populism in 2019 to engage with the surging popularity of Islamist sentiment at the time. Yet in 2024, the above examples highlight Prabowo performatively and discursively communicating his religious identity and appealing to the religious identity of his audience.
Support for Islamist Actors and Collectives
Across the two election cycles, Prabowo expressed his support for very different political and social actors. In 2019 Prabowo clearly signaled to and supported to Islamist influences in Indonesian society. In sample 2 (2019) for example, Prabowo directly endorses the National Movement to Guard Ulama’s Religious Edicts (GNPF Uluma) and the populist Islamist group the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI):
“Ladies and gentlemen, thank you GNPF, thank you 212, thank you FPI. They want to accuse you of being radical. I say you are not radical. Why, do they want to pit Islam against Nationalism? Why do they want to pit Islam against Pancasila? Islamic leaders who participated in the birth of Pancasila, ladies and gentlemen.”
This quote demonstrates how Prabowo aligned himself with Islamist groups and movements that were widely acknowledged as accelerating religio-ethnic tensions and hostilities in Indonesian society, particularly against ethnic Chinese Christians. However, in this passage, Prabowo is implying that ‘they’ (the ‘others’) are responsible for these tensions by pitting Islam (Islamists) against the state and its ideology. Later in the speech, he directly places himself in the Islamist camp, stating:
“To say we are radical Islamists is an overstatement; we respect and protect all religions, all ethnic groups, and ethnicities.”
Although Prabowo is attempting to portray his mission as one of inclusivity, in this same statement he is also drawing attention to his association with the populist Islamist movement and the figures attached to it. As pointed out above, these figures are known to work against various types of pluralism in society.
In sample 3 (2019), Prabowo once again casts a blurry shadow of his position towards Islamism, which likely reflects an attempt to appeal to a broader support base. We also note an attempt to minimize negative perceptions of the Islamist actors he has associated with:
“Ladies and gentlemen. I am with Sandiaga Uno. We have no intention. We have no intention. Apart from working, serving, and devoting to all the people of Indonesia. Some say Prabowo-Sandi, the Coalition of Indonesia Adil Makmur, will change the Pancasila state. Lies! We will establish a khilafah state. Lies! This I say is slander. Cruel slander. Cruel slander. Cruel slander. But it doesn’t sell. The Indonesian people will not be affected, brothers and sisters. That’s right. That’s right. Our Ustadz-ustadz, our kiai-kiai, always teach that Indonesian Islam is Islam rahmatan lil alamin. Our Islam, peaceful Islam.”
By the 2024 election, Prabowo had publicly cut all ties with Islamist figures and instead allied himself with more moderate religious figures and organizations, including the leadership of one of Indonesia’s largest Islamic organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024; Lam, 2023). As demonstrated in earlier passages analyzed, he redirected his support to the mainstream and became a vocal supporter of his predecessor – and former opponent – President Jokowi.
Calling for Unity and Inclusivity
Instead of the polarizing religious rhetoric Prabowo became known for in his 2019 campaigning, 2024 saw the leader operationalize religion to strengthen his new political agenda of unity and inclusion. For instance, in sample 3 (2024), he claimed:
“Prabowo, Prabowo, Prabowo, ladies and gentlemen, our ustadz-ustadz, our kiai-kiai, our religious leaders, teach us, religious people, pious people, you can’t demonize others, you can’t insult others, you can’t slander others, you can’t fight against each other, right, ladies and gentlemen…”
Prabowo is still displaying a people-centeredness here, and addressing those who follow and study Islam. Religion here becomes a driver for Prabowo’s new agenda for the de-polarization of Indonesian society (Arifianto & Budiatri, 2024). In sample 4 (2024), Prabowo expresses a similar desire and need for peace and the unification of the Indonesian people, although he steers away from using religious justifications:
“The condition is that we must get along, we must unite, we must be peaceful, we must not fight anymore, we must not divide, we must not suspect each other, demonize each other, ridicule each other, slander each other. No, we must unite so that we become a great country, our people prosper, we eliminate poverty from the land of Indonesia, ladies, and gentlemen.”
In sample 4 (2024) we also see Prabowo making a rhetorical effort to include the ethnic Chinese Christians he had vilified in the past. Although staying away from religious categorization, he stated:
“Firstly, I would like to congratulate all Muslims for celebrating the great day of Isra Mikraj, and also to wish our brothers and sisters of Chinese ethnicity who are celebrating the Lunar New Year. If I am not mistaken, today is exactly the Lunar New Year for the Chinese ethnic group, ladies, and gentlemen.”
These samples are a clear demonstration of Prabowo’s decision to move away from polarizing and antagonistic discourses and performances. There are several reasons why he has changed his strategy (Yilmaz et al., 2024 discuss these in their recent work) but this discourse analysis has also demonstrated that he continues to rely on the mobilizing and legitimizing power of religion in addressing and collectivizing ‘the people’ and connecting his political agenda with the beliefs and culture of the majority religion.
Concluding Remarks and Future Research
Whether or not Prabowo will return to a religious populist style that antagonizes ‘elites’ and ‘others’ and aligns itself with Islamist actors and ideals cannot yet be determined. What we can identify is that his political style in the most recent election was distinctly flavored by a characteristically populist effort to appeal to ‘the people,’ achieved by communicative strategies that sought the approval of various segments of society (see Yilmaz et al., 2024). Most relevant to this article was Prabowo’s use of religious rhetoric which, as this discourse analysis highlighted, continues to play a central role in his campaign speeches and efforts and showed a distinct effort to appeal to a (shared) collective Muslim identity. With recent polling showing that religious affiliations and identities continue to inform how many Indonesians vote (Chaplin & Jurdi, 2024), this undoubtedly contributed to his electoral success.
Ultimately, we note a shift from Islamist mobilization to a mobilization directed towards Indonesian Muslims. Like other politicized religions, Islamist ideals are often far removed from the religion it is associated with. Islamist movements and parties have developed their ideologies based on a range of factors such as the political, institutional, and historical legacies of colonialism and nation-building, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism, and in response to authoritarian regimes (Cesari, 2021).
Funding: We acknowledge that this research is supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC) the Discovery Project – DP220100829, titled “Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation: Civilisationism in Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan” (2022-2025).
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Abstract
This paper comparatively analyses the phenomenon of civilizationalism within the discourse of authoritarian populism in four distinct political contexts: Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, India under Narendra Modi, China under Xi Jinping, and Russia under Vladimir Putin. We find that “authoritarian civilizational populism” has become a prominent feature in the discourses of leaders and ruling parties across China, Russia, India, and Turkey, serving as a multifunctional tool to construct national identity, delegitimize domestic opposition, and challenge Western hegemony. Across these nations, ‘the West’ is uniformly depicted as a civilizational ‘other’ that subaltern peoples must overcome to rejuvenate their respective civilizations. Also, civilizationalist discourses serve as a legitimizing tool for domestic authoritarianism and aggressive foreign policies. We also find while religion plays a central role in distinguishing ‘the people’ from ‘others’ in India and Turkey, and in grounding the cultural identity of ethnic Russians in Russia, China’s officially atheistic state utilizes a more syncretistic approach, emphasizing traditional beliefs while marginalizing ‘foreign’ religions perceived as threats to the Communist Party’s ideology.
The 21st century witnesses the rise of authoritarian regimes that claim to speak, not merely for citizens of their own nations, but for a broader transnational ‘people’ bound together through the common bonds of civilization. In Russia – where elections are held but opposition candidates regularly prevented from running and, in some cases, imprisoned and murdered – Vladimir Putin portrays his nation as a multi-cultural empire and a civilization deeply at odds with the liberal West. Putin himself claims to uniquely interpret the will of the Russian people, and to be their champion in a dangerous world dominated by the United States, a nation he claims that desires nothing more than the erasure of Russia’s traditional Christian values.
In China, since coming to power in 2013, Xi Jinping has portrayed himself as a simple man of the people fighting the corruption of Communist Party ‘princelings’ and ‘tigers,’ and moreover as a fatherly figure dedicated to protecting the Chinese people from both internal and external threats. Key to understanding China under Xi’s rule is his claim to be rejuvenating the great Chinese nation (or alternatively ‘race’), a nation that, according to Xi, incorporates so-called overseas Chinese and excludes some Chinese citizens, particularly Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang province.
In semi-democratic yet increasingly authoritarian Turkey and India, ruling populist leaders claim that their respective nations are contemporary manifestations of great religion-defined civilizations, and that the key to making their nations great is to return to the principles and values that made their respective civilizations powerful. At the same time, populist leaders portray certain religious and ethnic minorities as obstacles on the road to national and civilizational rejuvenation.
There is thus an intrinsic link between populism and civilizationalism in the respective discourses of ruling populists in China, India, Russia, and Turkey, insofar as the leader claims to represent the will of the people and therefore be above petty checks and balances on their power and democratic norms such as observing term limits, and further claim that ‘the people’ are not merely contained within the nation, but incorporate all peoples who belong to Chinese, Hindu, Russian (Christian Orthodox), and Ottoman (Islamic) civilization respectively.
In this article, then, we examine civilizationalism in authoritarian populism in four polities: Turkey and India, where authoritarian populism is emerging, and China and Russia, which have long been authoritarian but more recently turned toward populism under Xi and Putin respectively.
Populism and Authoritarianism
We may not ordinarily think of populism as a phenomenon occurring in non-democratic societies, or itself a non-democratic or at least non-electoral democratic phenomenon. However, since scholars began to identify political parties, movements, and leaders as ‘populist,’ authoritarian leaders and regimes have been identified as ‘populist.’ For example, Isaiah Berlin (1967: 14), reflecting on what he heard from other scholars, at the famous 1967 LSE populism conference admits that there exists a form of populism that “believes in using elites for the purpose of a non-elitist society,” and a type of populist “who has a ferocious contempt for his clients, the kind of doctor who has profound contempt for the character of the patient whom he is going to cure by violent means which the patient will certainly resist, but which will have to be applied to him in some very coercive fashion,” and who is in this way “on the whole ideologically nearer to an elitist, Fascist, Communist etc. ideology than he is to what might be called the central core of populism.”
Authoritarian populism was later discussed by Dix (1985), who found it in Latin American parties such as the National Popular Alliance in Columbia, and in Peronism in Argentina. Dix argued that it was possible to discern ‘democratic populism’ from ‘authoritarian populism.’ Authoritarian populism was led by military and/or the upper classes, drew support not from intellectuals or organized labour, but rather from the great mass of people. Moreover, it “mildly anti-imperialist” and was dependent on a single leader and the “leader’s myth.” Democratic populism was supported by intellectuals and organized labour, had less of a need for a single god-like leader, and possessed a strong ideology that was “well-articulated” (Dix, 1985: 47).
The concept of authoritarian populism fell largely into disuse outside of Latin America in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the concept has re-emerged and is today used to refer to “political phenomena in hybrid regimes and emerging democracies that share the core tenets of populism (namely, the construction of “the people”) while describing idiosyncratic trajectories distinct from that of populism in fully realized Western democracies (Guan & Yang, 2021). Mamonova (2019: 562), for example, argues that authoritarian populism combines “a coercive, disciplinary state, a rhetoric of national interests, populist unity between ‘the people’ and an authoritarian leader, nostalgia for ‘past glories’ and confrontations with ‘others’ at home and/or abroad.”
Other scholars, although observing key differences between populisms argue that all populisms are “susceptible to authoritarian tendencies over time,” a problem that “becomes apparent and radical when a populist movement takes state power and must navigate groups of influence among classes and balance the two basic and often contradictory state functions of capital accumulation and political legitimacy (McKay & Colque, 2021). Be this as it may, it remains possible to differentiate between democratic populism and authoritarian populism, and the latter is now an increasingly important concept in political science. For example, Guan and Yang (2021) observe that both Mamonova (2019) and Oliker (2017) “utilized the core definitions of authoritarian populism to deconstruct the popular support of the current Putin regime; namely, a powerful state, authoritarian leadership, nostalgia for past glories, and a rhetoric of “us versus them.” The Communist Party of China, led by the increasingly powerfull Xi Jinping, has also been described as ‘authoritarian populist’ (Tang, 2016), and indeed populism has a long history in China, rooted in Maoism if not in earlier rebellions of ‘the people’ against elites.
Based on Mamonova’s (2019) definition of authoritarian populism, and bearing in mind the tendency of populists to turn authoritarian once in power, it is possible to surmise that once democratic India and Turkey are in the process of turning toward authoritarian populism – a process that might be reversed – and that China and Russia are led by authoritarian populist regimes.
However, we argue that something else important unites these populisms in Turkey, India, China, and Russia: civilizationalism, or the belief that there are multiple world civilizations with incompatible values, and which often clash with one another (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023a; Yilmaz & Morieson 2023b). We have previously defined civilizational populism as a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022: 19; 2023a: 5), a definition we apply here.
Civilizationalism is a component, though one not always recognized, of the authoritarian populisms of India, Turkey, Russia, and China. This is not merely because Russia and China, in particular, have sometimes been described as ‘civilization states,’ and at times wish to be perceived in this manner (Bajpai, 2024; Blackburn, 2021; Therborn, 2021; Acharya, 2020). Rather, it is because the type of authoritarian populism practised in each respective polity draws on nostalgia for a ‘golden age’ of ‘our’ civilization, and on claims that to become great again ‘our’ nation must return to the values of this golden age, to justify itself and because they each apply a civilizational categorization of peoples in order to determine ingroup from outgroup, and ‘the people’ from the ‘elite,’ or the betrayers of ‘our’ civilization.
Turkey
President Erdogan greeted the citizens who showed great interest after the Friday prayer in Istanbul, Turkey on April 14, 2019. Photo: Mehmet Ali Poyraz.
Perhaps the most studied example of civilizationalism in authoritarian populism is the President Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey (Yilmaz, 2021; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023c; Uzer, 2020; Hazir, 2022). The AKP – under the guise of liberating ‘the people’ from elite misrule – set about dismantling Kemalist control over institutions such as the judiciary, bureaucracy and military, and following this installed their own supporters and allies within them. Çınar (2018) makes an interesting observation, noting that even in the first decade of its rule, the AKP possessed a civilizational perspective on international relations, and framed “Turkey’s integration with the EU in terms of a ‘reconciliation of civilizations’” (see also Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020). In this way, the AKP “had from the very beginning identified Turkey with an unnamed non-Western civilization, but without explicitly rejecting the liberal political norms of European democracy” (Çınar, 2018).
A turning point came in 2013 when Erdogan began to lose popular support and AKP rule was challenged by mass protests. “When young people began to protest against a development planned for Gezi Park in Istanbul,” Erdogan “crushed the protests with violent force and demonized the protestors as anti-Muslim” and working with Western interests to subjugate Turkey (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023a). And even greater turning point came in 2016 when a mysterious military coup attempt, plotted (according to the AKP and its allies) by the Gulen Movement – an ally (2002-2012) of Erdogan turned opponent – failed to remove Erdogan from power (Tas, 2018). In response, AKP officials claimed that the movement was not the sole mastermind behind the coup, but that the United States and broader Western world was ultimately responsible (Kotsev & Dyer, 2016).
Then, the AKP has increasingly implemented a strategy described by Yilmaz and Bashirov (2018: 1812) as “electoral authoritarianism as the electoral system, neopatrimonialism as the economic system, populism as the political strategy, and Islamism as the political ideology” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018: 1812). This strategy also portrayed Turkey as “the legitimate inheritor of Ottoman legacies and power, the leader of the Islamic world, and the protector of Palestine” (Hintz, 2018: 37, 113). As his government pivoted toward Islamism, Erdogan began to present himself as the leader of all Muslims globally in their fight against the West, and in this way transnationalized and externalized his populism, making ‘the West’ the ultimate ‘elite’ and all Sunni Muslims the downtrodden ‘people’ requiring a champion to defend their interests (Yilmaz & Demir, 2023). As part of this strategy, the AKP attempts to construct a new ‘desired citizen,’ termed “Homo Erdoganistus” by Yilmaz (2021: 165), and described by him as “a practicing Sunni Muslim, believes in absolute authority, sees the Ottoman rule as the greatest era, believes their social purpose is to spread Islam in the public sphere, to provide aid to and deepen ties with Muslim and former Ottoman peoples and to regain Ottoman glory” (Yilmaz, 2021: 165).
Erdogan’s civilizational restoration efforts resulted in the politicizing of Turkish foreign policy by constructing foreign threats (Taş, 2022a; 2022b). Turkey’s foreign policy efforts are justified on the basis that Turkey is heir to the Ottoman legacy and thus the leader of the ummah, and therefore ought to act to ‘defend’ Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa (Dogan, 2020; Özkan, 2015).
The AKP’s foreign and domestic policies thus reflect its civilizational populism. Erdogan and his party justify growing authoritarianism through claims that their marginalization of rivals and religious minorities as necessary to ‘protect’ the ummah from Western threats to Turkey and Islam, and as part of a civilization restoration project that promises to rejuvenate Ottoman civilization. Equally, they legitimize their bellicosity and imperialism abroad through claims that Erdogan is the leader of the global ‘ummah’ and Turkey heir to the Ottoman Empire and thus responsible for protecting the global ummah from Western aggression.
India
India’s Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi visits Gurdwara Rakabganj Sahib to pay tribute to Guru Teg Bahadur in New Delhi on December 20, 2020. Photo: Shutterstuck.
Following their election victory in 2014, India’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has set about transforming India, de-secularizing and Hinduizing the nation, removing checks and balances on government power, replacing the old secular Congress Party-aligned ‘elite’ from the bureaucracy with BJP supporters and allies, and reaching out to Hindus globally to create closer ties between them and India’s government and people. The result is a less democratic, less plural, and more authoritarian and aggressively ‘Hindu’ India.
BJP’s ideology, Hindutva, proposes that India belongs to the Hindu people, who are defined in ethnic and cultural terms rather than as followers of a particular religious code. Hindutva defines “Indianness exclusively in religious terms: an Indian is someone who considers India as their holy land” (Ahmad, 2007).
Leidig (2020) argues that “Hindutva was not truly ‘mainstreamed’ until the [2014] election victory of the BJP and current prime minister Narendra Modi. Modi’s populism and ability to create a mass movement are based on exploiting ressentiment and anger toward the Hindu people’s historical oppressors (Muslims, the British) and promising to revive and rejuvenate Hindu civilization (McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019). Modi styled himself as a man of the people, the son of a chai wallah, and a pious Hindu. Moreover, Modi won power by promising to end the allegedly corrupt role of the secular Congress Party, to fast-track India’s economic development, and to govern in the interest of ‘the people’ (Saleem, 2021; McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019). Modi’s conception of ‘the people’ did not include certain non-Hindu groups, including Muslims – 200 millions of whom live in India. Indeed, the party regards Muslims and secularists, in particular, as threats to their civilizational rejuvenation project (Saleem, 2021; McDonnell & Cabrera, 2019; Tepe & Chekirova, 2022).
Perceived as a threat to Hindu cultural hegemony on the basis that they belong to a foreign civilization that once dominated the Hindu majority, the BJP and their allies in the Hindutva movement encourage Hindus to fear and despise Muslims, demonizing them through accusations that they are waging “Jihad” against Hindus, including a ‘love Jihad’ in which Muslim men supposedly marry Hindu women to forcefully convert them to Islam, and for “spreading the coronavirus, for buying land, for selling vegetables (“Corona Jihad,” “Land Jihad,” “Vegetable Seller Jihad”) (Kaul, 2023). Secularists, too, have suffered under the BJP’s authoritarian populism, particularly perceived members of the old ‘elite’ (Ellis-Petersen, 2023).
The BJP conflates “westernized Indian elites and foreign others” (Hulu, 2022), who together pose a “collaborative threat to ‘the people’” and stand in the way of ‘the realization of a strong and monolithic Hindu identity” (Wojczewski, 2019; Plagemann & Destradi, 2019). The belief that Western ideas should be purged from India led the BJP to “saffronize” the foreign service, a process in which India’s political institutions are refashioned “to reflect [Hindu] majoritarian ideals” and civilizationalism, forcing ‘elite’ diplomats to either abandoned their attachments to ‘foreign’ ideas such as secularism and pluralism and conform to Hindutva ideals or leave the service (Huju, 2022: 423).
Journalists who dare to criticize Modi’s government have also been attacked by the BJP. The party has increasingly sought to intimidate domestic and international media operating in India, including the BBC, which the BJP accused of having a “colonial mindset” (The Guardian, 2023). Thus, journalists are portrayed as a part of a cultural ‘elite,’ or in the case of Muslim journalists as a dangerous ‘other’ that is either opposed to Hindu nationalism or insufficiently supportive of Modi’s civilization restoration project and are therefore subjected to campaigns of abuse intended to silence them. These acts are legitimized – as in many other cases – by the BJP’s Hindu Nationalist ideology, and the party’s claims that Muslims and secularists are preventing the nation from restoring itself to its former glory.
The BJP’s civilizational populism thus helps the party to frame its opponents as belonging to threatening foreign civilizations – whether Islam or the neo-colonial West, or even China – and to portray Modi as a protective and powerful leader who will stand up for the interests of Hindu ethnic Indians globally and within India.
Russia
The head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Patriarch Kirill and Russian President Vladimir Putin as they attended a ceremony celebrating the 1025 anniversary of the Baptism of Kievan Rus in Kiev, Ukraine on July, 27, 2013. Photo: Shutterstock.
Since 2012, the Putin regime in Russia has increasingly sought to identify the nation as a civilization-state (Blackburn, 2021; Marten, 2014; Teper, 2015). Putin portrays Russia as a state that is also heir to two multi-ethnic, multi-religious empires (i.e. the Russian Empire and Soviet Union) that accommodated minorities. Moreover, he portrays Russia as a civilization distinct from the Western civilization, yet not wholly Eastern. Putin’s imagined Russia is multicultural, but not liberal, conservative in its values, respectful of all religions and cultures within its boundaries, but faces implacable hostility from the liberal West. The liberal West is Russia’s key enemy, especially insofar as it is bent on pushing liberal values onto Russia and invading its sphere of influence, for example by expanding NATO to incorporate former Soviet territories and previously neutral nations.
Although there is debate over whether Putin ought to be called a populist, even critics of labelling Putin a populist admit that he at times performs as a populist. For example, March (2023), who considers it misleading to call Putin a populist, admits that the Russian President uses populist rhetoric when he wishes to present himself – most often disingenuously – as a ‘man of the people’ fighting corrupt elites, and in order to draw support from different elements within Russian society who share little but a common resentment towards the oligarchs (March, 2023). Putin also portrayed himself – like other populists – as the savior of the nation and its people, and as a powerful, masculine leader who would restore Russia’s prestige following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Eksi & Wood, 2019).
As Western liberal democracy became increasingly cited by Putin as the enemy of the Russian people and their traditional Orthodox Christian culture, so too did the notion that Russia was separate from the West – and perhaps its own particular civilization – become an important element in Putin’s populist discourse. Once Putin had established himself in power and destroyed the influence of his oligarchic enemies (he permitted, of course, the existence of tamed oligarchs who supported his rule), he leaned heavily on a new populist discourse: dividing society between authentic Russians and the pro-Western liberals who sought to undermine traditional culture and impose Western culture on the Russian people. In a related development, Blackburn (2021) observes a turn in Putin discourse in 2012, after which the Russian president became enamored with the notion of Russia as a ‘civilization state’ distinct from the West, and that possesses certain values that are inherently at odds with Western liberal values (Novitskaya, 2017; Edenborg, 2019). As a result, “Russian foreign policy was recalibrated” to portray Russia not as “a potential partner of the West,” as it had been previously, but as “an independent, revisionist Eurasian power” (Blackburn, 2021; Newton, 2010; Trenin, 2015). Moreover, “concepts of civilizations in competition and multipolarity were soon promoted to explain this new direction” (Blackburn, 2021; Verkhovsky & Pain 2012; Pain, 2016; Laruelle, 2017; Ponarin & Komin, 2018).
Putin’s ‘state-civilization’ thus encourages Russians to feel a kinship with one another “without forced Russification or reduction of ethnic and cultural diversity” (Blackburn, 2021) and loyalty toward the state and Putin, and to perceive this unity and loyalty as part of Russia’s traditional values and indeed part of its imperial and Soviet History (despite many examples to the contrary, and in which minorities were persecuted). The ’state-civilization’ discourse is useful for Putin and is easily incorporated into his wider populist discourse. Putin’s rhetoric on the Russia-Ukraine war provides a demonstration of Putin’s populist use of the state-civilization discourse. In 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Shortly before the war, Putin claimed that Ukraine was part of Russia, and that Ukrainians and Russians were “one people” with “spiritual” and “civilizational ties” (Putin, 2021). Explaining this assertion, Putin (2021) looked back at the history of Slavic peoples and claimed that “Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory – from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov – were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik Dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith. …The Tale of Bygone Years captured for posterity the words of Oleg the Prophet about Kiev, ‘Let it be the mother of all Russian cities.’”
In 2023, Putin gave a speech to the Valdai discussion club specifically on the concept of civilization and took questions from the audience on the topic. It is very revealing of Putin’s thoughts on the matter, and why he believes civilization-states will determine the political future of the globe (Putin, 2023). According to Putin, “relying on your civilization is a necessary condition for success in the modern world” insofar as “humanity is not moving towards fragmentation into rivalling segments, a new confrontation of blocs, whatever their motives, or a soulless universalism of a new globalization. On the contrary, the world is on its way to a synergy of civilization-states, large spaces, communities identifying as such” (Putin, 2023). Rejecting any notion of universal values, Putin claimed that “civilization is not a universal construct, one for all – there is no such thing. Each civilization is different, each is culturally self-sufficient, drawing on its own history and traditions for ideological principles and values” (Putin, 2023).
Putin portrays himself as a defender of Russian civilization and the Russian people. At the same time, he portrays the West as the manipular of Ukrainian elites, and an increasingly godless and decadent society that not only turned its back on its traditional Christian values but refuses to respect other civilizations. Portraying ‘the people’ as ‘pure’ is a part of populism, and Putin’s populism is no different to other populisms in this respect, even as its focus on portraying Russia as a multi-ethnic, multi-religious civilization respectful of other civilizations and of the diverse peoples within its borders – with the ethnic Russian Orthodox Christian people as its core, defining group – and lack of anti-immigration rhetoric sets it apart from similar right-wing populisms in Europe and North America.
China
President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping during the G20 summit in Hangzhou, China on May 9, 2016. Photo: Gil Corzo.
Scholars have observed how Chinese conceptions of democracy have often been essentially populist, insofar as if the government is perceived to serve the will or interests of the people it is classed as democratic, regardless of whether elections are held. Populist understandings of democracy are so ingrained in Chinese, some scholars argue, that even the pro-democracy campaigners of the 1980s conceived of democracy largely in a populist manner and were less interested in holding elections than in forcing the government to serve the authentic interests of the people. Scholars have also identified two key forms of populism operating in China. Both incorporate nationalism (Li, 2021; Miao, 2020; Guo, 2018, Eaton & Müller, 2024) and grievances related to China’s growing economic inequality (Eaton & Müller, 2024; Li, 2021; Miao, 2020; Guan & Yang, 2021). However, according to Guan and Yang (2021) a key difference between populisms in China lies in their relationship to the government. One type of populism, they argue (Guan & Yang, 2021) is essentially top-down and “pro-system” and presents the CCP as the people’s champion and defender against their enemies, while another is “anti-system,” largely online, and is the product of anger toward the CCP’s due to the party’s corruption and the economic inequality its permits to increase.
Eaton and Müller (2024) point out that other scholars have also come to a similar conclusion that multiple populisms operate in China, including He & Broersma (2021: 3015) who argue that a form of ‘classical communist populism’ …coexists with an online “bottom-up populism” which ‘highlights antagonism between the people and corrupt elites’.” Undoubtedly, the most pervasive and important form of populism in China is the top-down, pro-system form associated with Xi Jinping, who presents himself as a man of the people fighting a corrupt elite within the party, but also as a loyal Communist Party member fighting on behalf of the entire Chinese people – globally – and against American hegemony.
Populism is not new to China. Indeed, some scholars refer to Communist China as a society dominated by “populist authoritarianism” (Tang, 2016). Under Mao’s long rule (1949-1976) populist conceptions of democracy were employed alongside a cult of personality centered on Mao, which presented him as the Great Helmsman (Chinese: 伟大的舵手; pinyin: Wěidà de duòshǒu) who had the unique ability to unite the Chinese people and govern them accordance with their interests. Mao’s political legitimacy was thus not conferred on him via elections, but rather through his ability to know the will of the people and fight for their interests against the Chinese ‘elite’ (e.g. landowners, businesspeople, Kuomintang (Nationalist Party) leaders and supporters, educated people in cities). Mao, of course, was following an authoritarian populist model set by Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union, who similarly argued that legitimacy was conferred upon their regimes not through elections but insofar as they represented the interests of ‘the people,’ (e.g. the proletariat, intellectuals who supported the revolution) and sought to eliminate or re-educate their ‘elite’ enemies (i.e. White Russians, landowners, the merchant class, Kulaks, business people). These authoritarian populists sought to discipline their societies and educate ‘the people’ to become good citizens in a workers’ state, often using violent coercion to achieve these goals. Mao’s acts of coercion during the Great Leap Forward and the chaotic violence he unleashed during the Cultural Revolution – a form of top-down populist mobilization – are extreme examples of the violence he encouraged in order to ‘complete’ his revolution.
Mao described the ‘new’ form of democracy he was creating in China as a “people’s democratic dictatorship.” Mao’s concept is inherently populist, insofar as in his people’s democratic dictatorship the people live in a democracy (i.e. the government does the will of the people), but the ‘others’ live in a dictatorship in which they are subject to violence and extreme forms of discipline unless they accept the dictatorship of the people. Of course, the people in Mao’s China did not directly rule. Rather, as in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party substituted itself for ‘the people’ and then a single leader – Mao – substituted himself for the Communist Party, essentially ruling as a dictator although always in the name of the people.
Following Mao’s death and a brief leadership struggle, Deng Xiaoping emerged as paramount leader and – among his many economic and political reforms – sought to ensure that no future party leader could establish a personality cult and rule with arbitrary power, that the educated and merchant class ‘elites’ repressed by Mao would now be encouraged to become entrepreneurs in the new capitalist China, and that a kind of deliberate democracy might exist within the Communist Party in order to prevent leaders from making foolish decisions. Deng might be understood as attempting to turn China away from authoritarian populism and towards a kind of authoritarian, meritocratic, and development focused technocracy ruled by a ‘wise’ elite in which – to use his famous dictum – it didn’t matter whether a cat was black or white, only whether it could catch mice. However, Tang (2016) argues that the CCP has remained as a “populist authoritarian” party due to its Mao era concept of the “mass line” (群众路线), an organizational and ideological principle that insists that the CCP must listen to ‘the people,’ pool their wisdom, and formulate theories and then policies based on their demands (Lin, 2006: 142, 144, 147). The ‘mass line’ insists to the party leaders that the people, although inarticulate, have innate wisdom that must be listened to and to which the party must attend, an idea which Shils (1956: 101) identified in populist discourses when he observed that populism was “tinged” with the idea that in certain respects the people were superior to their rulers.
Although in the Deng era the ‘mass line’ ideology was de-emphasized, under Xi Jinping’s leadership the concept has returned to prominence, and the CCP has arguably returned to authoritarian populist rule. Indeed, while Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao conformed largely to the rules set in place by Deng and governed as authoritarian technocrats, Xi Jinping has in certain respects re-oriented China towards authoritarian populism while increasing emphasis on the civilizational identity of the Chinese ‘people’ and their opponents. Under Xi’s rule, according to Guan and Yang (2021: 463), the ‘mass line’ has grown in importance, and now serves a discourse that “glorifies the contribution of ordinary people to modern Chinese history in order to create a unified ‘great Chinese identity’.”
The return of the mass line is part of a wider return to authoritarian populism under the rule of Xi Jinping since 2013. Following an internal election which saw him become CCP General Secretary and national leader in 2013, Xi declared the importance of the ‘mass line’ and his intention to listen to ‘the people’ and represent their interests. Xi presented himself as a man of the people from humble beginnings (despite his own father being a high-ranking CCP official, albeit one who fell afoul of the regime and was sent down to the countryside to live as a peasant) and who would fight against ‘elites’ within the CCP in order to protect the people.
For example, as national leader, Xi demanded the “purification” of the CCP, often interpreted as an attack on the extravagance of the hedonistic and corrupt party ‘elite.’ Xi himself called for party members to live more Spartan lifestyles, and punished thousands party officials who were seen to be wasting public money or acting corruptly and illegally. In this way, Xi appeared to be sincerely fighting against their avarice of the ‘elite’ that had gained power during the post-Mao period and attempting to return the nation to the authoritarian populist ‘democracy’ it had been under Mao.
Xi increasingly gained power within the CCP by presenting himself as the people’s savior and his enemies within the party as ‘tigers’ such as Bo Xilai alleged to have illegitimately gained power and who did not serve the interests of ‘the people.’ Although it may appear that Xi was sincere in his attempts to end avarice and corruption, he appears to be corrupt himself, and he largely targeted opponents and rivals within the CCP, ignoring the corruption of his allies. Thus, populism was thus a useful means through which Xi could establish himself in power and destroy potential political rivals from within his own party.
A key element of Xi’s populism is the increased emphasis he places on restoring Chinese civilization and the Chinese (Han) people to their rightful place at the center of world affairs. Indeed, as we shall see, Xi’s civilizational narrative has a populist element insofar as he portrays himself and the CCP as rejuvenating the Chinese people via an agenda that stresses the long civilizational history of the Chinese people, the superiority of this tradition to the far newer civilization of the West, and amid claims that the West is waging a civilizational war on China by refusing to permit China’s peaceful rise to hegemon in Asia. In this narrative the Chinese people are the Han people globally and tolerated minorities within China’s borders, and the enemy ‘elites’ are largely external, and consist of the United States, the broader West, and Japan – or the global powers that support American hegemony and try to keep China from displacing the United States as global hegemon. The civilization narrative not only defines the character of the Chinese people and their global enemies, but it legitimizes Xi’s authoritarianism at home and his bellicosity abroad, insofar as he portrays himself as the democratic instrument of the will of the Chinese people, and his repression of domestic minority groups and aggression toward foreign nations as necessary for China’s civilizational rejuvenation and to defend the Chinese people from the hostile West and Japan.
The CCP has a complex relationship with China’s cultural heritage, and with what we might call ‘Chinese civilization.’ As historian C. P. Fitzgerald (1977) observed, although Mao transformed China by destroying not merely the capitalist republican regime and its nationalist (Kuomintang) government, but also by attempted to destroy the element of Chinese culture which he thought most pernicious: Confucianism. Thus Mao, according to Fitzgerald (1971: 483), was not aiming to destroy Chinese civilization and culture (wen hua) – elements of which he admired. At the same time, Mao encouraged archaeological excavations which he used to glorify Chinese civilization and show that Communists were not indifferent to art and beauty (Fitzgerald, 1971: 489) and “shared the opinion of the mass of Chinese that the long duration and continuity of Chinese civilization, proved by its magnificent and unbroken historical records, was a clear proof of superiority” (Fitzgerald, 1971: 490-491).
The revival and rehabilitation of Confucianism following Mao’s death and accelerating and transforming into a civilizational ethos under Xi, is perhaps a demonstration of the failure of Mao’s attacks on Confucianism, as is, perhaps, Samuel P. Huntington’s description of China belonging to “Confucian civilization” (Huntington, 1993). Deng Xiaoping and his successors, recognizing the failure of Maoism to develop China, turned the nation sharply away from Maoism and drew on Confucianism and its focus on social harmony, order and tradition in order to construct a new national ideology, which later became known as “Socialism with Chinese characteristics.” Where Mao though that Chinese civilization had fallen low due to the backward-looking nature of Confucianism, Deng saw positive things in Confucianism. Indeed, Prosekov (2018) describes – arguably in a somewhat exaggerated manner – contemporary China as “a socialist state in which Marxism-Leninism as an ideology is harmoniously combined with the traditional philosophical doctrine – Confucianism.” The ‘new’ Confucianism became part of the identity of the Chinese people, binding them to China’s grand history and, to a degree, also provided them with a moral system – something lacking in Maoism. Instead of marking a radical break, Deng’s and his successors’ adding of Confucianism into Chinese state ideology meant the Communist revolution became another development of Chinese civilization, one which would ensure China would again be a powerful state.
Under Xi, the term “has undergone both a promotion and a facelift” insofar as Xi stresses “the uniqueness of the Chinese civilization and the notion of proud nation framework-building” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). The spiritual civilization Xi is building is uniquely Chinese. He dismisses Western values as non-universal and thus unsuitable for China (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Thus, Xi’s concept of ‘spiritual civilization’ represents an attempt to contribute an indigenous Chinese alternative to Western liberal democracy and capitalism and mixes traditional culture (especially ideas drawn from Confucianism) “with Socialist ethos-in-transition, known as the Socialist core value outlook (shehui hexin jiazhiguan)” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).
In a narrative that demonstrates Xi’s ability “to adopt traditional culture,” borrowing “the Confucian family-country parallel” and merging it into Chinese socialism, he claims that in order to construct this “spiritual civilization” the Chinese people, according to Xi, must have “faith” so that China may have “hope” and that this faith and hope will lead to the nation possessing great “power” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Global power can thus only “be achieved by constructing a spiritual civilization, spreading ‘excellent Chinese traditional culture’ (Zhongguo youxiu chuantong wenhua) and core Socialist values” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).
This is just one example of a trend occurring under Xi’s leadership of the CCP, namely, the growing emphasis placed on the long history of Chinese civilization, the invocation of its “five thousand years of continuous civilization,” and the inherently civil and cultured (wenming) nature of its people in order to counter the notion that China is “backward and undeveloped” (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). The notion of five thousand unbroken years of history is useful for Xi insofar as it proves that Chinese civilization is superior to all others due to its longevity. It also legitimizes the CCP by portraying the party as leading Chinese people – and thus Chinese civilization – toward the zenith of its power and influence. Equally, by describing China as a civilization and not merely a nation-state, Xi is able to include all Han people globally within China. The Chinese diaspora has been very important post-Mao to China’s economic development. However, Xi also seeks to mobilize Han Chinese globally to intimidate China’s critics, to commit acts of espionage, and to influence foreign governments.
China’s development and increasing international influence – and at times bellicosity – is framed in civilizational terms by Xi, and as ‘the great rejuvenation of the Chinese people’ (i.e. the Han people). However, Xi Jinping does not discuss at length, as in the manner of Putin, the nature of civilizations and the exact nature of Chinese civilization. Rather, he discusses the importance of “harmony” between civilizations and criticizes the West for not respecting civilizational differences and behaving in an antagonistic manner toward China (Xinhua, 2021). Moreover, Xi warns that conflict will ensue if the United States and its allies (i.e., the West and Japan) intervene should China invade Taiwan, and he encourages the Chinese people to resist “foreign, imperialist influence.” Xi, thus, tells the Chinese people that they are in a civilizational conflict with the West in which China is the rising power determined to break free of constraints and take back a central role of global affairs and reunite the two Chinas (i.e. the PRC and Taiwan) and the West – particularly the United States – is attempting to prevent China’s rise to regional if not global hegemon.
Like Putin, Xi does not consider China only the property of a single ethnic group. China’s occupation of Tibet was justified on the basis that the region was part of historical Chinese civilization, and that therefore by invading the territory China was liberating Tibetans (Sen, 1951: 112). If Tibetans do not wish to be part of China, the CCP perceives their acts of rebellion as illegitimate insofar as their lands are an intrinsic part of China. Ethnic minorities that seek independence are punished by the CCP, which moves large numbers of Han Chinese into those regions in an attempt to make the inhabitants a minority and the Han the majority, and in the case of Xinjiang province, through large-scale so-called re-education campaigns sometimes involving concentration camps.
Conclusion
The notion that the world can be divided into several distinct civilizations, and that these civilizations often clash with each other due to possessing opposing values, is present in the discourses of authoritarian populists in non-democratic China and Russia, as well as in competitive authoritarian India and Turkey. Civilizationalism is, therefore, a key element in state discourses in the two largest nations on earth (China and India), in major power Russia, and regional power Turkey, where it plays several important roles.
First, civilizationalism helps authoritarian populists to construct a ‘people’ and their ‘elite’ enemies, as well as ‘dangerous others.’ We find that religion plays an important but not always decisive role in civilizational populist identity making. In Turkey and India, religion plays the key role in distinguishing ‘the people’ from ‘others,’ but also from the domestic secular ‘elites’ who abandoned the authentic religion of their civilization and allied themselves with foreigners, and thus betrayed ‘the people.’ Although Putin claims that Russian is a multi-religious civilization, Russian Orthodoxy is a key element in the cultural identification of ‘the core people of Russian civilization,’ the ethnic Russians. In China, where the state is officially atheist, the typically syncretistic beliefs of the Chinese people are tolerated insofar as they are considered traditional and indigenous to China, Confucianism (not a religion per se, but an ideology that condones Daoist and Chinese folk religion, religious worship) is encouraged, and ‘foreign’ religions Islam and Christianity, along with religious movements perceived to be hostile toward the CCP and/or communism, marginalized and sometimes outlawed.
In all cases ‘the West’ is considered a civilizational ‘other’ and it is only in India where the domestic Muslim population is the ultimate ‘other’ rather than the West. The West represents, in the international sphere, the ‘elite’ power that the subaltern peoples must overcome in order to return their respective civilizations to greatness. Thus, we witness the formation of a loose alliance among non-liberal, predominantly non-Western regimes. They assert that supposed ‘universal values’ are actually specific Western values, arguing that concepts such as liberalism and cosmopolitanism are ill-suited for non-Western societies. They contend that the adoption of these values by non-Western societies inhibits the revitalization of non-Western civilizations. Consequently, we observe Erdogan advocating for a ‘war of liberation’ against the dominant West, while China and Russia seek to challenge Western liberal hegemony wherever possible. Indeed, leaders such as Putin, Xi, Modi, and Erdogan aspire to liberate their societies from ‘universal values’ and to revive the values that historically empowered their respective civilizations.
Second, civilizational populist discourses are used by authoritarian leaders to legitimize authoritarianism at home and bellicosity abroad. In Modi’s India, the repression of Muslims is framed as necessary to protect Hindu cultural and political hegemony, and the removing of the old secular elite is framed as decolonization, and thus the liberating of Hindus from Western imperialism, an act that allegedly leaves Hindus free to restore the greatness of Hindu civilization.
In Xi’s China, minorities and dissidents are ‘re-educated’ in brutal conditions, and neighboring countries are threatened with China’s military might, to defend Han-Chinese cultural hegemony and to rejuvenate Chinese civilization, including the recovery of territories supposedly possessed by China during its imperial period, and before the so-called century of humiliation. Non-Chinese religions are suppressed and depicted as foreign imperialist impositions on China or as non-indigenous and therefore inferior forms of state organization.
Putin’s repression of sexual minorities and his invasion of Ukraine are presented by the Russian leader as necessary acts to protect the Russian people from ‘the West’ and its corrosive liberal ideology. Erdogan portrays repression of dissidents, people associated with the Gulen Movement, and marginalization of non-Sunni Muslims, non-Muslims, and the old secular-nationalist (Kemalist) governing elite as necessary to protect Turkey from the foreign and domestic forces that wish to dismember the nation and to “liberate” the nation from Western ideologies and return it to the greatness of the Ottoman period by embracing Islamist nationalism.
Finally, of the four leaders discussed in this article, only Putin explicitly challenges the nation-state paradigm, while the others merely conflate state and civilization and remain nationalist. Moreover, only Putin speaks at length about the concept of civilization states, which he alone claims will dominate the future of global politics. Be this as it may, the fact that regimes in India, Russia, Turkey, and China, use authoritarian civilizational populist discourses – discourses that are inherently anti-Western and anti-liberal – tell important things about the shape global politics is likely to take in the future. The rise of authoritarian regimes using civilizational populist discourses suggests that the concept of universal values is likely to come under further pressure, as non-Western civilization states or nation states that also identify as heirs to particular civilizations, increasingly challenge Western hegemony and liberal democratic norms both domestically and in the international sphere. The close relationship between China and Russia suggests a joint front of two authoritarian and civilizational populist regimes against a shared enemy: The liberal democratic West.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation.
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Abstract
While it’s typical to associate right-wing populism in Western Europe with the narrative of Islam versus the Judeo-Christian West, there’s a nuanced and emerging form of civilisationalism that we term “anti-Western civilizational populism.” This paper argues that anti-Western civilizational populism is present in the discourse of not only Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan but also Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and may be emerging in Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The article finds two key features common to these three different expressions of anti-Western populism across three different religions: The blaming of ‘the West’ for domestic problems is often the result of poor domestic governance, and an accompanying authoritarian, anti-liberal turn justified by the necessity of protecting ‘the people’ from the ‘liberal’ Western powers and defending and/or rejuvenating ‘our’ civilization. As liberalism promotes global cosmopolitanism and religious diversity, non-liberal states perceive it as a threat to their sovereignty and traditional values. Consequently, they push back against Western cultural hegemony, potentially forming an anti-liberal, authoritarian discursive bloc.
When we think of the role that civilization, and the idea of clashes between civilizations, plays in populist politics, we might first think of how right-wing populist parties in Western Europe claim that Islam and the Judeo-Christian West are implacable enemies, and draw support from fearful Europeans by claiming to be defenders of Judeo-Christian civilization from the menace of Islam. However, there is evidence of a different, and perhaps new, kind of civilizationism emerging among populists globally, what we call “anti-Western civilizational populism.” This phenomenon is not merely present, as one might imagine, in Russia, China, and in Muslim majority democracies such as Turkey. Rather, we argue that anti-Western civilizational populism is also present in the discourse of the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and may be emerging in Israel under the leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
In this article, we discuss three cases of anti-Western civilizational populism: in the discourse of Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The article finds two key features common to different expressions of anti-Western populism: the blaming of ‘the west’ for domestic problems often the result of poor domestic governance, and an accompanying authoritarian, anti-liberal turn justified by the necessity of protecting ‘the people’ from the ‘liberal’ Western powers and defending and/or rejuvenating ‘our’ civilization.
The definition of civilisational populism used here is as follows: it is “a group of ideas that together considers that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people, and society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ who collaborate with the dangerous others belonging to other civilizations that are hostile and present a clear and present danger to the civilization and way of life of the pure people” (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2022: 19; 2023a: 5)
Anti-Western Civilizational Populism in Turkey
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Shutterstock.
Among the clearest examples of anti-Western civilizational populism is the one that emerged in Turkey under the AKP rule. AKP ideology “combines Turkish nationalism with Islamism and neo-Ottomanism” and argues that Muslim peoples “ought to come together, for mutual protection against an aggressive West, as a civilizational bloc led by Turkey and its President, Erdogan” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b). In other words, Erdogan and his party possess a fundamentally civilizational ideology, which posits that Muslims – and not merely within Turkey but also globally (Yilmaz and Demir, 2023)– are oppressed by the West, and that Erdogan alone can stand up on their behalf. He “has recurrently proclaimed that he is the continuation, and the contemporary expression, of a major historical struggle, a common religious cause (dava), where the antagonists are the Westernizing secularizing Kemalist actors and their puppeteers – the West” (Yilmaz, 2021: 138).
The AKP did not come to power promising Islamism and authoritarian government. Rather, they first portrayed themselves as populist Muslim democrats who would return power to ‘the people’ by ending secular authoritarian rule, introducing greater religious pluralism, and seeking European Union membership for Turkey (Ozel, 2003; Nasr, 2005; Yilmaz, 2009; 2021). However, the AKP grew intolerant of dissent over time. Responding to growing opposition to their rule, the party increasingly centralized power and embraced authoritarian forms of governance, including by demonizing ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey, claiming Western powers were bent on dismembering Turkey – a claim that played on the painful memory of the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire – and by encouraging Turkish nationalism and a kind of Islamist politics that portrays Turkey as the “continuation of the Ottoman Empire” and thus leader of Islamic civilization (Moudouros, 2022: 175; Hazir, 2022; Uzer, 2020; Yilmaz and Morieson, 2022).
The AKP engaged in an “imperial civilizational restoration” effort designed to restore the power of the Turkish people and protect Islam, and which necessitated the “centralization of executive power …as a natural result of the restoration of the Ottoman imperial legacy” Moudouros (2022: 157). As a result of this effort, the AKP increasingly “politicized Turkish foreign policy by constructing foreign threats” often involving US and “Zionist international conspiracies” to weaken Turkey and Muslim power globally (Destradi et al., 2022: 488). Erdogan portrays “Turkey as a victim of malign foreign forces” including George Soros, the “interest rate lobby,” Zionists, and the West, against whom, he says, the Turkish people must wage a “war of liberation” (Destradi et al., 2022). Thus, when in 2013 protestors took to the streets of Istanbul to protest the destruction of Gezi Park, Erdogan responded by claiming that Western powers were behind the protests (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b). Equally, when a mysterious coup attempt – The Erdogan regime has alleged that it is the work of the Gulen movement– failed to expel Erdogan from office in 2016, the AKP sought to lay ultimate blame on the United States, claiming that the Gulenists were working with “crusader” powers (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b). In both cases, Erdogan portrayed himself as a pious Muslim and champion of the Turkish Muslim people, whom he was defending from Western ‘crusaders’ who sought to dismember Turkey, just as Western powers had dismembered the Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the First World War.
The AKP has also sought to deflect blame for its economic policy failures by blaming Turkey’s monetary problems on the West. The West proved to be a useful scapegoat when Erdogan’s decision to personally take control of monetary policy in Turkey backfired, resulting in low interest rates that devalued the Turkish lira. Rather than admit fault Erdogan portrayed himself as a populist champion defending his ‘people’ from external foes, telling supporters that the United States and other Western powers were trying to bring “Turkey and its people to their knees” (Dettmer, 2018), and later claimed that his decisions were designed to protect Turkey from “foreign financial tools that can disrupt the financial system” and that foreigners were behind “the swelling inflation” which was “not in line with the realities of our country” (Reid, 2018). Thus, for Erdogan and the AKP, claiming that ‘the West’ and ‘global elites’ are responsible for Turkey’s internal problems is not merely a way of deflecting blame for its failed policies. Rather, it is also a way of justifying Erdogan’s growing authoritarianism and his Ottoman imperial civilization rejuvenation project, which is predicated on the notion that to protect the Turkish people a powerful Muslim civilizational bloc must be formed, with Erdogan as its leader.
Anti-Western Civilizational Populism in Hungary
Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
Contemporary Hungary presents an interesting case of anti-Western civilizational populism. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, whose Fidesz party has governed Hungary uninterrupted since 2010 – is a populist leader who won power on a conservative and anti-corruption platform. Since 2010 his party has steadily consolidated its rule, establishing hegemonic power over Hungary’s media, bureaucracy, and judiciary, and has used referenda to establish a new constitution that gave greater power to the executive branch.
Orbán is known for his anti-Islam discourse and opposition to allowing Muslims to immigrate to Hungary. However, a closer look at Orbán’s discourse shows that he regards the liberal West – not Muslim immigrants – as a greater threat to the ‘Judeo-Christian’ people of Hungary. For example, Fidesz’ populist 2010 election campaign was centered on the claim that the people of Hungary were threatened – not by Muslims — but by a corrupt national elite, but also by external elites including “the European Union (‘Brussels’), multinational corporations, international financial institutions, the western ‘liberal’ press, the ‘international left’” and “the domestic opposition and several Hungarian watchdog non-governmental organizations (NGOs)” (Bocskor, 2018). Fidesz’s attacks on the European Union were not purposed towards dismantling or removing Hungary from the body but were “a form of anti-politics that challenges liberal and cosmopolitan understandings of European Union” (Scott 2020: 659), and which assisted the party in defining the boundaries between the nationalist Hungarian self and the liberal and cosmopolitan EU ‘other.’
Later, during the 2015-2016 migrant crisis Orbán refused to permit Muslim migrants to enter Hungary, claiming that they presented an existential threat to his nation’s – and Europe’s – Judeo-Christian culture, or rather the cultural hegemony of Judeo-Christianity. However, Orbán also presented himself as the protector of the Christian Hungarian people, who stood up to ‘elites’ in Brussels and elsewhere who care little if Islam were to overtake Christianity as the most widely followed religion across Europe (Éltetö et al., 2022; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b; Mendelski, 2019; Balogh, 2022). Moreover, Orbán is a critic of the ideology to which ‘elites’ throughout the Western world are beholden: liberalism.
Orbán is nothing if not honest about his intentions. He has promised to remove the liberal elite that held power within government, bureaucracy, and within other institutions of state, and replace it with a new elite that will support his party in their effort to transform Hungary into an illiberal ‘Christian democracy’ (Lamour, 2022). His chief problem with Western ‘elites’ is that they have abandoned the traditional Judeo-Christian values that made the West a powerful civilization, and instead embraced liberalism. Contemporary liberal democracy, according to Orbán, is no longer democratic but simply liberal, and thus the liberal ‘elite’ in the West no longer cares about the interests of the people, but rather seeks to advance liberal ways of thinking and living everywhere. This elite, personified by Orbán’s bête noir George Soros – a Hungarian American financier and philanthropist – is according to Orbán utterly intolerant of Christian values and uses Muslim immigrants as a tool to break the hegemonic power of Christian Europeans.
George Soros is, within Orbán’s discourse, the personification of the liberal global elite and thus Orbán’s most prominent enemy (Langer, 2021). Indeed, Orbán portrays Soros as a mastermind behind who controls the EU, NGOs and multinational corporations, and is bent on forcing liberalism on the Hungarian people, de-Christianizing Europe, and replacing Europeans with Muslim from the Middle East and North Africa (Langer, 2021). On the other hand, Orbán portrays himself and his party as standing “in the way” of Soros’ “plan which seeks to eliminate nations and seeks to create a Europe with a mixed population” (Scheppele 2019). Fidesz, he claims, stands “in the way of a financial and political empire which seeks to implement this plan—at whatever cost” (Scheppele, 2019). Western liberal elite, according to Orbán, are invested in the Soros plan, and “across the whole of Europe …want to sweep away governments which represent national interests – including ours” (Scheppele, 2019).
Soros and the liberal Western ‘elite’ are useful to Orbán insofar as he uses them to deflect blame when his economic and foreign policies fail or become unpopular. For example, Orbán has deflected criticism of his ambivalent position on the Russia-Ukraine conflict by blaming Soros for starting the conflict in order to destroy Russia, and on the grounds that Russia is an anti-liberal, Christian power. Orbán falsely claimed that, in the 1990s, Soros wrote that “since the Western democracies resent having their citizens dying in a war in a remote place, it will be the Central Europeans who will have to be sent in, thrown in, persuaded, recruited, and Russia will have to be defeated with their blood and through their sacrifice” (Máté, 2023).
He also blamed Soros for the war’s prolonging, claiming that Western businesses “with perhaps George Soros at the forefront …have always dreamed about gaining a foothold in Ukraine and gain[ing] access to the natural resources Russia has to offer (Bráder, 2023). Equally, Orbán claimed on Hír TV that Hungary was experiencing financial troubles because the European Commission was withholding “32 billion Euros,” and that this was occurring due to “George Soros” and his “people in the European Parliament” who instead wished to give this money to Ukraine (Miniszterelnok, 2023).
Although it may be tempting to view Orbán’s anti-Soros rhetoric as motivated by anti-Semitism, Orbán is himself a friend and open admirer of Israel and condemns anti-Semitism. Orbán’s true enemies, he claims, are within Western civilization, not outside of it. For example, in August 2022 Orbán spoke at the Dallas Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC). There Orbán “attacked the Democratic Party and President Obama, calling them globalists who sought to undermine” ‘Christian and [Hungarian] national values,’ and remarked “that he, Orbán, was fighting the same enemies as his Republican allies – Brussels and Washington – and further claimed that ‘these two locations will define the two fronts in the battle being fought for western civilization’” (Morieson, 2022: 176).
Orbán thus argues that there is a battle taking place for Western civilization. On one side are the politically and culturally dominant liberal elites (represented by Washington and Brussels) who are happy to see their societies decline into childless economic zones populated by LGBTQ people, and which will eventually be transformed into mixed-race majority Muslim states. On the other side are Orbán and his allies – including post-liberal conservative American intellectuals (Morieson, 2022) – who perceive themselves to be protectors of the authentic culture of Western civilization. For example, in his July 2023 speech at the Bálványos Free Summer University and Student Camp in Tusnádfürdő, Orbán described the European Union as an “elite” “political class” that “has no democratic or Christian convictions,” and called upon Hungarians to help him “defend … at all costs” their “Hungarian culture” (Visegrad Post, 2023). The EU and the liberal elite that dominate the body, according to Orbán, was uninterested in preventing the extinction of European culture, but was rather “managing population replacement through migration, and …waging an LGBTQ offensive against family-friendly European nations” (Visegrad Post, 2023), an offensive that would ultimately end in the destruction of the distinct and Christian-based European cultures of Europe.
According to Orbán, the EU and, particularly, the United States were so bent on forcing liberal culture on the world that they were inextricably moving all nations towards civilizational conflict: a conflict between the liberal West and “civilization states” that refused to liberalize such as China and Russia. (Visegrad Post, 2023). This conflict, Orbán argues, will decide the future of the world, and the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose “universal values” upon them in an effort to prevent war (Visegrad Post, 2023). Orbán thus sees liberalism as a poisonous ideology that undermines traditional values and will ultimately weaken nations by dissolving the religious and cultural bonds that hold peoples together. Thus, his government has drawn itself closer to China and Russia, anti-liberal, anti-Western powers, and nations which Orbán believes will survive into the future – unlike Europe’s nations – because they reject the corrosive ideology of liberalism and instead remain true to their traditional, civilizational values.
Anti-Western Civilizational Populism in Israel
Israelis protest in Tel Aviv, Israel on July 18, 2023, against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup as a bill to erase judicial ‘reasonableness clause’ is expected to pass despite 27,676 reservations. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the ruling right-wing populist Likud party and the most electorally successful politician of his generation in Israel, has often invoked the concept of civilization is his public remarks. The notion that the world is divided into different and often clashing civilizations plays an important role in Netanyahu’s populist discourse, which divides people into three categories: ‘the people’ or all the Jewish people; ‘elites’ or the Israeli centrist and left-wing opposition parties and their supporters who Netanyahu charges with refusing to defend Israel from its enemies; and ‘others’ or the Muslim Arabs (especially Palestinians) who are fundamentally uncivilized and barbaric and seek Israel’s destruction. Indeed, according to Netanyahu, Israel is “the protective wall of Western civilization” – and at times as the protector of civilization itself – against ‘barbarism’ or in this case the alleged barbarism of the Arab-Muslims (EFE, 2016). Netanyahu draws on this notion regularly, and on the broader notion that the Jewish people – like Europeans – are civilized and brought civilization to a barbarous land, when he wishes to convince European and American leaders to take action against Israel’s enemies.
For example, when a violent Islamist murdered four Jewish people in a French Kosher supermarket Netanyahu called on France to take action to protect “our common civilization” from Islamism (The New York Times, 2015). He also uses this discourse to draw Western support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians, and to portray Israel as a civilized Western nation, and the Palestinian Arabs as a largely uncivilized people. At the same time, Netanyahu has also called for European Jews to move to Israel on the basis that most European governments are unwilling to protect Jews from Islamists, suggesting perhaps that Jews are, in the end, not of the West at all. Or as political economist and commentator Bernard Avishai puts it, Netanyahu calls for Jews to “self-segregate: affirm, in principle, the liberal values of the West, but deny that they ever worked well enough for diaspora Jews; insist that we fight for our freedoms from our own ground” (The New York Times, 2015). It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that Netanyahu has formed a good relationship with Viktor Orbán, who shares his antipathy toward both Muslims and the Western liberals who they believe permit the Islamization of the West.
Netanyahu’s claim that Israel is a protective wall for Western civilization appears increasingly dubious following Israel’s indiscriminately violent response to Hamas’ murderous rampage against Israeli civilians on October 7, 2023. The Hamas attacks marked the most significant massacre of Jews since the Holocaust, claiming 1400 lives and resulting in the abduction of 240 Israelis. Exactly what Hamas expected to occur following their brutal acts is not known. Whatever their aims, their terrorism – as it so often does – backfired against the Palestinian people Hamas claim to represent. Whereas in the past Israel has responded to hostage taking by negotiating a return, often exchanging several imprisoned Palestinians for each Israeli hostage, perhaps as a result of the sheer scale of the October 7 attacks Netanyahu did not make serious attempts to negotiate the return of hostages. Instead, his government attempted to utterly destroy Hamas. In the process, an unknown number of Israeli hostages have died, and it appears increasingly remote that the majority of hostages will be returned alive to Israel. In other words, Netanyahu’s Likud government chose to attempt to annihilate Hamas rather than seek to save Jewish lives, a controversial act which – as we write – is becoming increasingly unpopular in Israel and causing mass protests calling for Netanyahu to resign.
However, domestic unrest is not Netanyahu’s only problem. Rather, Israel’s indiscriminate attacks on Palestinians, causing the deaths of over 30,000 people – perhaps two thirds of them civilians and thousands of children – and indeed remote nature of a complete Israeli victory, has led to Western nations withdrawing support for Israel’s war in Gaza. The Biden Administration’s increasing anger towards Netanyahu – which now includes Senate Majority leader Chuck Schumer calling for the Israeli Prime Minister to step down – is a particular problem for Israel, which relies heavily on American military and diplomatic support (The Wall Street Journal, 2024)
Following the Hamas attacks, Western nations largely supported Israel and its right to retaliate against its attacker. However, the length and brutal nature of Israel’s war has made it increasingly difficult for Western states to continue to support Israel, and not merely because Western publics are disturbed by the amount of killing of civilians and destruction of entire neighborhoods occurring. Indeed, demographic, generational and cultural change within many Western nations has led to a drop-in support for Israel and an increasing about of sympathy for the Palestinians. The re-election of George Galloway to British parliament on a pro-Muslim, anti-Zionist platform in a recent election demonstrates the increasing importance of Muslim votes in the West, votes a party that supports Israel’s war in Gaza is unlikely to receive (The Conversation, 2024).
Equally, the unpopularity of Israel’s war in the Middle East and North Africa has caused a rift between Western nations and Muslim majority nations, leading Western politicians to begin considering whether supporting Israel’s war is in their respective nations’ national interests. The Biden Administration appears to have concluded that the war in Gaza ought to end, and that prolonging the war is not in America’s national interest. The loss of American support leaves Israel alienated and in a difficult position in the United Nations where – without an American veto – it is exposed to sanctions placed on it by other nations. Netanyahu, however, has vowed to continue the war, which he claims is “a war between barbarism and civilization” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023). This is the message Netanyahu has taken directly to European and American leaders, including telling French President Macron, whom he attempted to emotionally blackmail by claiming that “Hamas are the new Nazis” and that Hamas barbarism not only threatens the Jews, but it also threatens the Middle East, it threatens the region, it threatens Europe, it threatens the world. Hamas is the test case of civilization against barbarism” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).
In order to maintain his position as Prime Minister amid growing domestic and international pressure for him to resign, Netanyahu has sought to deflect blame for his failure to return the hostages or defeat Hamas without mass Palestinian casualties, and moreover deflect blame for decades of failed Israeli policies on the Palestinian issue. To do this, Netanyahu has crafted a populist political narrative in which he and his government are protecting the ‘civilized’ people of Israel against the barbarism of Hamas, but also standing up to the West, which is allegedly attempting to prevent Israel from defending itself and instead wants to construct a state for Israel’s enemies. Or as former Israeli consul general in New York, Alon Pinkas (The Guardian, 2024), puts it, according to Netanyahu’s narrative “only a heroic Netanyahu can stand up to the US, defy an American president and prevent this travesty” (i.e. the forced ending of the Gaza War and construction of a Palestinian state) (The Guardian, 2024). Thus, Netanyahu is “setting up Biden as the scapegoat” for his “failure to achieve ‘total victory’” or ‘the eradication of Hamas’ (The Guardian, 2024). In this way, Netanyahu is no longer treating the United States as an ally but treating it and other Western nations that seek to create a Palestinian state following the Gaza war as enemies of ‘civilizations’ and implying that they are aiding the rise of barbarism.
It is possible to perceive a change in tone and narrative in Netanyahu’s civilizational rhetoric post-October 7. Considered in the light of Netanyahu’s democratic backsliding, his anti-liberal populism that increasingly attacked the norms and checks and balances on executive power in Israel, his sympathy for Viktor Orbán’s anti-West civilizational populism, his attempts to deflect blame for his failed policies onto the United States, and his portrayal of Western nations as failing to defend ‘civilization’ by pushing for a Palestinian state, we find that the Israeli Prime minister is becoming increasingly anti-Western in his discourse. In his emerging civilizational narrative, Netanyahu is the leader of the ‘civilized world’ and the West is – at best – unwilling to confront the barbarism of the Muslim Arabs, and to see the Palestinians as a savage people that must be utterly defeated and prevented from establishing a state of their own. In this emerging narrative – parts of which were of course already present – Israel may no longer be a wall protecting the West from barbarism; rather, Western nations such as the United States are increasingly helping the barbarians threaten civilization in Israel, and only Netanyahu has the strength to stand up to the twin threats of Arab-Muslim barbarism and the West’s inability to stand up for civilization.
Conclusion
In AKP-ruled Turkey, Fidesz-ruled Hungary, and in the Likud-dominated Israeli government, we find a similar pattern in which the notion of civilizational belonging is weaponized by a populist right-wing government. In each case, a populist leader claims to be standing up for ‘our’ civilization and against inferior people from other civilizations or in the case of Netanyahu, standing against entirely uncivilized people. Equally, this narrative is used in each case to deflect blame for regime policy failure, and to convince the voting public that external forces – not domestic policy failure – are preventing their flourishing or their ability to live in peace and safety. Most importantly, in each case, it is the West that is blamed for domestic policy failure and described as the enemy of ‘our civilization.’ This may seem bizarre, given that Hungary and Israel and most often considered – and in Israel’s case by both its supporters and detractors – Western nations.
However, as Hungary and Israel – like Turkey – transform into illiberal nations, relations with the liberal West, which remains the dominant political force in the world, become more fraught, and claims that the West is attempting to erode traditional values rooted in ancient civilizations become ever more useful ways of justifying authoritarian and anti-liberal politics. Indeed, as Western liberals seek to increase religious diversity and encourage a cosmopolitan atmosphere globally, non-liberal states that view cosmopolitan liberalism as a threat to their sovereignty and traditional values are likely to increasing pushing back and may one day even form as loose bloc of anti-liberal, authoritarian nations that band together to resist liberal Western cultural hegemony.
These cases show that civilizational populism is not merely something that occurs in Europe and is purposed toward excluding Muslims from Western society on the grounds that they are insufficiently secular and liberal. Instead, the liberal and secular West can itself become a target for civilizational populists, demonized and scapegoated by populist regimes as the source of domestic problems created by populist regimes.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.
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