Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies.

Professor Mounk: Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than His First

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Professor Yascha Mounk observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presents two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5. On one hand, he notes that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Tuesday, Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies—delivers a compelling analysis of the rise of populism and its implications for the future of democracy. Professor Mounk identifies three key drivers that have contributed to the rise of populism in the United States: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens, rapid cultural and demographic transformations, and the rise of the internet and social media. These factors, he argues, have collectively fueled a sense of disillusionment and alienation among significant segments of the population, creating fertile ground for populist leaders like Trump to thrive.

As the November 5, 2024, US presidential election approaches, the stakes have never been higher. With Donald Trump’s re-election campaign gaining momentum, Professor Mounk states that ‘there are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016’. He also offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the United States. He reflects on the evolution of Trump’s political influence, noting that “Trump now has about a 45% chance, according to betting markets, of regaining power,” highlighting the tight race and the potential consequences of his victory. Touching on the potential consequences of a second Trump presidency, Professor Mounk warns that while Trump’s first term was damaging, his probable second term could be even more dangerous given his increased experience, a loyal base within the Republican Party and a desire for retribution against institutions he believes hindered his first administration. The risks to American democracy, Professor Mounk suggests, are substantial, and the outcome of the 2024 election could have long-lasting implications for the country’s political landscape.

Reflecting on the broader debate about the resilience of democracies in the face of populist threats Professor Mounk acknowledges the strengths that have allowed American democracy to endure, while he also cautions against complacency, noting that the challenges posed by populism are far from over. Mounk points out that Trump’s four years in office, while chaotic, were mitigated by the resilience of American institutions, including the federal system and the economy. 

One of the central themes of the discussion in the interview is the impact of the changing demographic landscape on American politics. Professor Mounk notes that while immigration and demographic change are related, they are conceptually distinct phenomena. He argues that frustration over perceived loss of control—over borders and the cultural direction of the country—has been a significant driver of populist sentiment. This has been particularly evident in the case of Trump, whose appeal to voters is deeply rooted in cultural identity politics rather than purely economic concerns. Professor Mounk explains that Democrats had once banked on demographic shifts securing their electoral future, assuming that as the number of non-white voters increased, so too would their dominance. However, this assumption has not played out as expected. “The leftward drift of the Democratic Party has pushed many of these voters away,” Professor Mounk notes, underscoring the complex dynamics that have kept Trump competitive.

Professor Mounk also delves into the evolving media landscape, highlighting the profound shift from traditional broadcast networks to a more fragmented and polarized media environment dominated by social media, podcasts and independent platforms. He expresses concern over the term “misinformation” and how it has been used to suppress certain viewpoints, urging a more nuanced approach to the concept in public discourse. Professor Mounk’s insights provide a timely and critical perspective on the future of democracy in the United States and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Yascha Mounk with some edits.

There Are Broad Commonalities in the Rise of Populism Across the World

Professor Mounk, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me dive right in with the first question. In your analysis, what are the key historical events that have contributed to the rise of populism in the US and how do they compare it to similar movements in other democracies?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I think the best way to approach this topic is by comparing different countries. While different factors play varying roles in different places, there are broad commonalities. In my book The People versus Democracy, published in 2018, I focused on three key factors.

First, there is the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens in many democracies, particularly in Western Europe and North America. In the immediate post-war era, people in these democracies felt that their life opportunities were vastly different from those of their parents. That sense of progress is no longer true for most citizens today.

Second, I highlighted the rapid cultural and demographic transformations in many of these countries. This includes ethnic diversification and, for example, the significantly larger role of women in society and greater acceptance of sexual minorities. While these are positive developments, they have also triggered fears among some segments of the population who feel that their social status has declined—they can no longer take for granted the status they once enjoyed.

Third, I discussed the rise of the internet and social media, which has made it easier for populist parties and candidates to build political movements. Social media has also shifted public opinion by making it easier to spread hatred and misinformation.

Today, I would add a fourth factor, which is partially mediated by social media but also relates to a deterioration in governance. This is the perceived distance between ordinary people and the elite. Many citizens feel that elites are not only corrupt in some places but also culturally distant. They live in separate circles and seem to look down on average citizens. This is a factor I didn’t emphasize as much initially, but now I would give it greater weight.

You’ve written extensively about the erosion of democratic norms. How has the US’s unique political culture contributed to the vulnerability of its institutions to populist movements?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, again, this is something we’re witnessing in many different countries at the same time, which suggests that a universally relevant factor—social media—plays a significant role. The ability to reach voters directly through social media platforms and make emotional, polarizing appeals has largely contributed to the breakdown of democratic norms. Social media platforms have been instrumental in this process.

When we look specifically at the United States, polarization plays a significant role. The primary system, in particular, makes most Congress members and many Senators more dependent on keeping the goodwill of the 5 to 10% of the population that are decisive in primary elections, rather than appealing to the median voter who decides elections in closely contested seats or states, of which there are not many. This has had a significant impact as well.

Economic inequality is often cited as a driver of populism. To what extent do you believe the economic policies of the last few decades have fueled populist sentiments in the US?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, the economy plays a role. As I mentioned earlier, it helps explain the erosion of what political scientists call “output legitimacy.” In the past, people might have said, “I don’t fully understand or trust politicians, but they seem to be delivering for us.” Now, many people feel that politicians are not delivering, leading them to question why they should trust them and consider trying something new. The sentiment of “how bad could things get?” is increasingly common.

However, I believe cultural factors likely play a bigger role than economic ones. If economic factors were the primary drivers, you would expect people to vote for populist parties that focus mainly on the economy, perhaps even those on the left. We’ve seen this in Greece with Syriza, where economic concerns were paramount and more recently in Argentina with Javier Milei, where hyperinflation fueled the rise of a right-wing populist movement.

But for the most part, this isn’t the case with leaders like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Narendra Modi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While they do talk about the economy and make economic promises, their primary appeal is cultural. They position themselves as defenders of the moral and religious traditions of a supposed majority—often a real majority—that feels sidelined and believes its preferences haven’t sufficiently shaped the public culture of the country.

Democrats Hold False Assumptions About Demographic Groups in the US

A Trump supporter engages in conversation with a pedestrian at Columbus Circle on October 17, 2020, in New York City. Photo: Ron Adar.

How has the changing demographic landscape in the US influenced the rise of populism and what role does identity politics play in this phenomenon?

Professor Yascha Mounk: We need to distinguish between immigration and demographic change. Immigration plays a significant role in the United States, as well as in many European countries. Most Americans and Europeans are willing to see the benefits of migration and recognize that countries need highly qualified migrants for economic reasons, acknowledging the real benefits they bring. However, opinion polls have shown that, for several decades now, majorities in these populations have preferred less, rather than more, migration. They feel that moderate and established political parties have ignored this preference. The frustration isn’t necessarily with the presence of immigrants but with the sense of having no control over who enters the country and no control over borders. This sentiment has been a big part of Donald Trump’s appeal. In the US, Trump is currently building his case for re-election not only on inflation during the Biden administration but also on the inflow of migrants in recent years. This is a real vulnerability for moderate political parties and a significant reason they’ve lost credibility among ordinary voters.

Demographic change is, of course, related to immigration, but it is conceptually distinct. Here, I would say the problem for moderate political parties, particularly the left in the US, has been a more roundabout one. Democrats had a very demographic view of the electorate, especially during the years when George W. Bush seemed dominant. They latched onto the hope that as the demographic balance in the country shifted, with the number of white voters declining and non-white voters growing, this would ensure inevitable electoral victories for them. However, this hasn’t turned out as expected. It was supposed to secure Hillary Clinton’s win in 2016, yet Donald Trump won the electoral college, even if he didn’t win the popular vote. The same assumption was expected to shift the electorate towards Biden in 2020. While Biden did improve his share of the white vote, Trump significantly increased his share among non-white voters, particularly among Latinos.

This false assumption—that victory was just going to fall into their lap—has been a real strategic problem for Democrats. They believed they could avoid making difficult trade-offs, thinking non-white voters were their base and were very progressive, which led them to think they didn’t need to moderate on any unpopular issues to win. However, this failed to recognize that historically, non-white voters in the Democratic electorate have been more moderate or even conservative than white voters. For instance, conservative white voters likely supported Republicans, but conservative Black or Latino voters often supported Democrats because they didn’t feel welcome in the Republican party. The leftward drift of the Democratic party has pushed many of these voters away and the anticipated demographic majority has not materialized. In fact, many working-class Latinos, some working-class Asian Americans and an increasing number of working-class African Americans are now tempted to vote for the Republican party, which is one of the reasons why Trump continues to be competitive.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to the US. In Brazil, for example, which is majority non-white, if non-white voters systematically refused to vote for Jair Bolsonaro, he would never have won the presidential election. His competitiveness was partly due to strong backing from evangelical non-white voters, including some of the less affluent segments of Brazilian society.

The Term ‘Misinformation’ Should Be Treated with More Skepticism

In your writings, you discuss the role of misinformation and media in the spread of populist ideas. How has the US media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, impacted the populist narrative?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, there’s been a significant structural transformation in the media landscape, particularly with the diversification of media sources. Fifty or sixty years ago, there were just a few major broadcast networks and most people got their news from them. Then came the introduction of cable news, which began to polarize information sources and made it much easier to broadcast purely partisan opinion programs. This was an important shift.

Then, of course, we saw the rise of social media, podcasts, YouTube channels and even talk radio, which really grew in importance. Today, Fox News isn’t as dominant as it once was. For example, in prime time, Fox News might have an audience of 300,000 to 400,000 viewers, whereas the Joe Rogan podcast can reach 5 to 6 million listeners per episode. Tucker Carlson appears to have even increased his audience since leaving Fox News and distributing his show independently on platforms like YouTube and X (formerly Twitter). This shift helps explain the irresponsible and partisan nature of much of our media today.

At the same time, I’m concerned about the profligate use of the term “misinformation.” Often, we refer to something as misinformation simply because it presents a worldview we disagree with or have misgivings about. Some positions that were censored as misinformation in recent years have turned out to have some truth to them, or at least some plausibility. For example, during the pandemic, scientists who speculated about the possibility that COVID originated from gain-of-function research in labs, potentially due to an inadvertent lab leak, were heavily censored. Now, this theory is taken seriously by mainstream news outlets and many federal agencies in the United States. This was perhaps the most prominent instance where the term “misinformation” was used to shut down a debate, and it should make us more self-critical about how we define and apply the term.

I believe we would benefit from treating the term “misinformation” with more skepticism than it currently receives.

Populism in the US has been linked to a growing distrust in traditional institutions. What socio-political factors do you believe are most responsible for this erosion of trust?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, we’ve touched on this issue throughout our discussion. It ties back to several key factors. First, there’s the lack of output performance—people feel that institutions are no longer delivering the results they expect. Then there’s the sense among some segments of the population that they’ve been deprived of the social status they once had and believe they naturally deserve.

Social media also plays a significant role. It’s now easier to highlight the actual failings of governing elites, who have always been imperfect, but whose flaws are much more visible now than in the past. Additionally, social media makes it easier for irresponsible actors to gain influence, to distort the failings of institutions, or to take decisions out of context, making them appear horrendous or obviously incompetent when there might be valid reasons for those actions.

In essence, the factors contributing to the loss of trust in institutions are the same as those driving the rise of populism.

Liberal Democracy Is Still the Only Legitimate Regime

In your article, “The End of History Revisited,” you argue in the conclusion, “It follows that the tempting phrase ‘the end of the end of history’ is, for now, premature.” It seems that you give credit to the thesis of The End of History, do you think the thesis is still valid?

Professor Yascha Mounk: In that article, I argue that it’s important to distinguish between two claims made in Francis Fukuyama’s seminal work. The first claim is that, during the mid-20th century, genuine ideological competitors to liberal democracy existed—namely fascism and communism. Each, in its own way, posed a serious challenge to liberal democracy and presented a consciously articulated alternative vision for legitimate governance. However, these alternatives ultimately failed and they failed catastrophically. By the time Fukuyama was writing, he argued that the only remaining grand theory of legitimate government with genuine international appeal was liberal democracy. This, for him, was the “end of history.” The second, more implicit claim was that liberal democracies would be particularly adept at solving their internal problems and would, therefore, prove to be more stable than those alternative regime forms.

On the first point, I think Fukuyama has largely been proven right—at least so far. I can’t say with certainty that we’ll never see another regime form that can genuinely compete with liberal democracy, but when we look around the world today, it’s clear that liberal democracy remains the only genuinely legitimate regime form. The alternatives each have significant limitations. For example, you have a form of Shia theocracy in Iran, but that doesn’t appeal to anyone outside of the Muslim world, or even outside of the Shia world, and it’s facing significant trouble even within Iran.

You also have strongman leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, who might appeal to some authoritarian-leaning individuals around the world, but there’s no global movement to adopt a “Russian model” of governance. Similarly, China is a genuine geopolitical and economic competitor to the West and perhaps a cultural one at some point. However, while the Chinese model might work well in theory, it’s a mess in practice and it’s entirely unclear how it could ever be exported. For instance, would people in Zimbabwe agree to be governed the way China is governed if it meant achieving the same level of wealth and development? Probably yes. But would they agree to let their leaders implement the Chinese model? Likely not, because it’s unclear what that would entail. While they might trust their leaders to centralize power in the way the CCP has in Beijing, they wouldn’t trust them to deliver the same results.

The Chinese model is built on 3,000 years of Mandarin meritocracy, 100 years of a centralized Communist Party and 30 years of a peculiar form of capitalism that claims to be socialist or communist while actually marketizing everything, including retirement and healthcare. It’s entirely unclear what it would mean to replicate this model elsewhere.

This situation highlights the continuing legitimacy of liberal democracy, as even clearly non-liberal and non-democratic regimes often pretend to embody both. There’s currently a lot of intellectual effort in China to argue why China is the true democracy, which you wouldn’t see if there were a self-conscious ideological alternative to the prevailing liberal democratic paradigm.

Where Fukuyama might have been overly optimistic, however, is in his predictions about the stability of liberal democracy at home. While liberal democracy remains the only legitimate regime form with genuine mass appeal worldwide, it is much more embattled and less popular domestically than it was in the past. This, I think, helps explain some of the chaos and uncertainty we are experiencing in our political moment.

In the same article you underline that “While there has of late been extensive speculation about the future of liberal democracies, there has been far less reflection on how dictatorships that issue from populism may fare in the long run.” In the year 2024 where populist movements all over Europe are on the rise, do you think we can now predict the future of populist parties more accurately or is it still very difficult?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, it’s clear that populism has become one of the dominant modes of politics today. Populist political parties, particularly those on the right, are now some of the largest political families around the world. In the European Parliament, for example, various incarnations of right-wing populism form a significant bloc and this is mirrored in national parliaments, which are even more consequential.

The critical question is what happens when populists actually win elections and begin to govern. Over the past decades, we’ve seen very different paths in different countries. On one side, you have countries like Venezuela and perhaps Turkey, where populist leaders have undermined democratic institutions to such an extent that free and fair elections are either nonexistent, as in Venezuela, or are in serious doubt, as in Turkey, where it’s questionable whether the opposition can still oust the sitting leader by democratic means.

Secondly, there are countries where populist movements have significantly damaged democratic institutions—limiting free speech, decimating independent institutions—but where elections remain meaningful, though perhaps no longer entirely fair. India, the world’s largest democracy, might be an example of this.

Lastly, there are countries where populists have, at least for now, failed to maintain power. Despite efforts to handicap the opposition, the opposition was able to remove them through elections. This has been the case in Brazil, in Poland and, at least in 2020, in the United States. However, as the American case indicates, this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the end of the story. For example, betting markets currently give Trump about a 45% chance of regaining power through the ballot box.

So, what we need to recognize is that there is a large variance in outcomes when populists take over. We also need to move away from thinking of democracy in binary terms—either perfect or completely destroyed. Populist victories don’t necessarily mean the imminent death of democracy, but they do often cause serious damage. The extent and lasting impact of that damage depend on a variety of complex social factors.

In your article written back in 2017, “European Disunion- What the rise of populist movements means for democracy,” you argue: “We’ve made real progress in understanding the nature of populism, moderate progress in analyzing its causes, and barely any progress in identifying its potential remedies.” In the year 2024, do you think we now have some remedies or are we at a total loss?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I don’t remember writing that article or that specific line, but I stand by it a hundred percent. Unfortunately, I don’t think much has changed since 2017.

Many Americans Feel the Democratic Party Is Out of Touch with the Mainstream

Before the presidential debate last Tuesday, you wrote that “Americans view Harris as too progressive. Tonight, may be her last best chance to course correct…Harris is on track to lose the election.” What do you think now, after the debate? Will she win the elections or lose it?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, as I mentioned earlier, betting markets, the last time I checked, gave Trump about a 45% chance of winning and Harris about a 55% chance. Harris did quite well in the debate. It always helps to remind the American electorate of just how irresponsible and chaotic Donald Trump can be. While he still has a base of supporters, most Americans do not like that approach.

Kamala Harris came across as competent and composed, while Trump made a series of outrageous claims, lost his temper and didn’t control himself well. This certainly helped her significantly. However, the election remains very close and I still believe there are actions Harris and the Democrats could take to increase their chances of victory in November. 

More importantly, to put an end to Donald Trump’s political career and the broader danger posed by his MAGA-inspired politics, we need to build a much broader electoral coalition. This coalition must be strong enough to win a series of elections decisively, forcing the Republican Party to transform itself. And the same is true inversely—if Republicans move to a more moderate stance, they could push Democrats to do the same.

I think it’s fine for Democrats to lean somewhat to the left on economic issues. Most Americans, like most Europeans, want a robust welfare state and policies that ensure wage growth for lower earners, even as they also believe in a market economy and care about economic growth. These priorities can be combined.

However, on cultural issues, it’s clear that many Americans feel the Democratic Party is out of sync with the mainstream. While I don’t personally share that opinion, more Americans believe Kamala Harris is too progressive than think Donald Trump is too conservative. To address this, Democrats, I believe, need to champion the values of inclusion and tolerance, which are non-negotiable. However, they should also make some cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails.

A Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than the First

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

What will happen to American democracy if Donald Trump is re-elected on November 5?

Professor Yascha Mounk: There are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016. America has certain strengths compared to other democracies, such as the federal system, which distributes power to governors—many of whom would still be Democrats. The system also includes numerous veto points in the legislative process, which made it possible for Democrats, especially after the 2018 midterm elections, to block much of what Trump wanted to do. Additionally, the US economy is sufficiently robust and the media landscape is developed enough that it’s difficult for the state to fully capture it, reducing the incentives to comply with the executive’s dictates. These strengths would likely remain in place.

However, there are also ways in which Trump could be more dangerous now than he was in 2016. Back then, he had no political experience, lacked a trusted team of people who shared his worldview and had limited control over the Republican Party, which at the time included many representatives and senators who were publicly ambivalent and privately disdainful of him. Moreover, Trump did not have a clear sense of the institutional changes he wanted to make.

Now, things are different. He has four years of experience in the executive office, has built a deep bench of loyalists willing to do his bidding from day one and the Republican Party has transformed itself. Many of the people currently in the House of Representatives and a significant number in the Senate ran as Trump Republicans and are much more aligned with his political agenda. Those who weren’t initially aligned have often made a political turn toward him, as it has become a necessity for survival in Republican politics. Trump also has loyalists who served with him in lower positions and now understand how the federal bureaucracy works. Lastly, Trump is out for revenge—he believes the institutions hampered his efforts during his first term and targeted him after he left office. He may now aim to dismantle those institutions to ensure that what he calls the “deep state” can no longer contain him.

These factors suggest that a second Trump presidency could be more dangerous than the first. How much damage he might manage to inflict is difficult to predict and could ultimately depend on various circumstances, including how much discipline he applies to transforming the system—something that, thankfully, remains uncertain.

Academicians like Steven Levitsky and Kurt Weyland argue that democracies have shown, time and again, resilience on the face of populist threat however institutions like V-Dem strongly argue that democracy is under serious threat. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Perhaps somewhere in between. It’s interesting to note that some objective metrics for measuring how democratic a country is seem to be holding up better than subjective ratings from institutions like V-Dem or Freedom House. For instance, if you look at how many journalists are in jail, the duration of governments in office, or how often term limits have been repealed, there doesn’t appear to be a significant change. The best research on this topic, in my view, comes from political scientists like Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev.

However, these statistics might not fully capture the extent of polarization, the breakdown of informal political norms, or the potential dangers on the horizon. In a country like the United States, for example, we’re certainly not at the point where journalists are being jailed, but we might be two or three steps away from a scenario where newspapers start to fall in line with more authoritarian tendencies.

This recent research provides a necessary and helpful corrective to some of the pessimism in the field, encouraging us to analyze the situation more carefully and perhaps with a bit more optimism that we can navigate through this moment. However, it’s certainly not a reason to stop being alarmed altogether.

US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Photo: Shutterstock.

Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America*

by EconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHomePolicy Papers

DOWNLOAD POLICY PAPER

Please cite as:

Ronco, Massimo & Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 16, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0003

 

Abstract 

This paper revisits the legacy of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with a particular focus on economic policies and their long-term impact. It argues that Trump’s policies eroded US soft power in the region and failed to adequately address China’s expanding influence. Although the Joe Biden administration sought to reset US relations with LAC, it retained the bulk of Trump’s protectionist policies, perpetuating ongoing trade volatility and regional instability. This paper emphasizes the need for a revised US economic strategy in Latin America that both counters China’s influence and fosters deeper economic integration across the region. The authors propose three policy scenarios for the future: a more aggressive protectionist stance under a second Trump administration, a continuation of Biden-era policies under potential future Democratic leadership, or a more integrative approach that enhances regional cooperation and infrastructure development.

 

Authored by Massimo Ronco & Christo Pretorius

Edited by Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins

Introduction 

Although the US influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been undermined by a lack of targeted engagement following the Cold War (McKinley, 2023), at the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency, US policy choices in LAC rapidly eroded American soft power and compromised the US’s regional interests by inadequately addressing China’s growing regional influence. The paper intends to outline the features of a revised American foreign policy towards LAC by focusing on the economic policies enacted by Trump. The aim of this brief is to provide recommendations on how to develop a strategy to rebuild trust with Latin American countries and prevent China from further increasing its influence on the continent. While the focus is on Trump’s policies, this paper remains highly relevant, as much of the former president’s foreign policy has been maintained by President Joe Biden. Many protectionist policies remain in place – and some tariff barriers and subsidies to national companies have even increased. The paper argues that any responsible economic policy launched in the region should be integrated into a comprehensive strategy which acknowledges that the main obstacle to unlocking the region’s potential as a partner remains the trade volatility between North and Global South economies, in this case, between the US and the LAC. 

The paper’s focus on economic policies is warranted by three considerations. The first is that trade constitutes the foundation for future, deeper cooperation and the conditions for developing political and strategic partnerships (Kehonane & Nye, 2011; Haas, 1964). Second, economic agreements are more palatable to foreign allies. Against the backdrop of Trump’s rhetorical resort to the Monroe Doctrine (PBS NewsHour, 2018), economic policy is perceived as less damaging to state sovereignty than agreements of a political, military or strategic nature. The third reason has to do with the nature of the regimes of some countries in Latin America, which display some socialist tendencies and may offer reduced margins for cooperation in the political or military fields. This paper also emphasizes the connection between the economic policies enacted in the region under Trump and the populist character of the broader strategy from which they emerged, which approaches foreign policy issues as opportunities to appeal to the domestic base (Cadier, 2024; Hall, 2021). 

Revising Trump’s Economic Policy

Although outspoken about how the US would ‘reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere’ during his 2018 address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),  the Trump administration’s general approach to Central and Latin America was marked by a blend of strategic disinterest in the region and isolationist closure, as exemplified by the barriers established at the border with Mexico in 2018 or by Trump’s stated intention of withdrawing from the NAFTA (PBS NewsHour, 2018). The US’s relative indifference to the LAC region is to be contextualized within a progressive loss of appeal following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Campos & Prevost, 2019: 22; Gurtov, 2021), which originally comprised three components: free trade and economic liberalization, democracy and governance, and security. Trump’s rise to power meant the restructuring of such a triad and a weakening of the first two pillars. The economic policy choices made by Trump’s administration were mainly motivated by the desire to correct the terms of trade relations that were considered detrimental to US interests and American workers and to curb the expansion of China’s influence on the continent. 

This paper proposes to revise and mitigate some populist elements of Trump’s foreign policy in the region, which are considered counterproductive and weakening the US influence. 

The first amendable element is the transactional and short-term approach to dealing with trade agreements and, more broadly, the economic issues of the continent. The promise to withdraw from NAFTA and the imposition of tariffs on items like steel and aluminum resulted in negative consequences, as the volatility of Latin American countries’ markets increased due to the uncertainty of access to the US market or aid assistance, Latin American countries became more vulnerable to the Chinese debt trap and, finally, during Trump’s tenure China became Latin America’s largest trading partner, with the exception of Mexico. (Stuenkel, 2020; Roy, 2023). 

The second element worthy of scrutiny is the Trump presidency’s anti-globalist rhetoric and adoption of old-style protectionist policies. Trump’s economic policies were guided by the objective of reducing US dependency on other productive economies, such as China and South Korea, without fully taking into account that reducing dependency does not necessarily translate into autonomy because value chains still have an important global dimension. The result of this approach was a substantial blow to US credibility in the eyes of Latin American countries, even those considered more aligned, such as Brazil. In fact, despite former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s anti-Chinese stance and ideological affinities with Trump, the US president still imposed barriers on products and metals from Brazil, such as steel and aluminum (Gilardi, 2019).

Assessing Three Policy Options

At the moment of the writing, three policy scenarios can be envisaged: 

The first policy option, likely to be implemented if Trump is elected in the 2024 US presidential elections on November 5, will consist of putting pressure on Mexico to review the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in view of its renegotiation scheduled for 2026. In this case, further restrictions on rules of origin would be included with the intention both to bar China from accessing the Mexican market and to continue to shrink trade deflection, which would otherwise allow some imported goods from non-USCMA countries to enter the US market via Mexico without paying tariffs. 

Furthermore, Trump may engage in a trade war with some other countries in the region. He may suspend the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Nicaragua if its policies towards illegal migration do not change, while relations with Colombia, the US’s closest partner in the region, which in 2022 saw the first leftist government of the country’s modern history, may cool due to ideological divergences. Likely, the result of the will to impose tariff barriers, introduce reinforced rules of origin and subside the American national industry would damage US interests by precipitating higher domestic inflation, reallocation of market shares towards less efficient domestic producers, lower capital investment, the decline of the demand for domestic goods, and a loss of jobs in the USMCA area.

The second option would be to multiply the number of economic agreements and partnerships in the region while maintaining or doubling down on protectionist policies. This scenario would be most likely in the case of Democratic nominee Kamala Harris’ victory in the presidential elections. As Biden’s vice president with limited previous experience in foreign policy (Ashford & Kroenig, 2024) and with not a dominating character (Jenkins, 2024), Harris may seek to preserve some of Biden’s economic policies in the region, founded on subsidies to national industry, tariffs and “Buy American” rules (White House, 2021). For instance, the new partnerships negotiated by the Democratic presidency, such as the “Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity” (APEP), did not foresee provisions of preferential access to the US market, thus denying the eleven Latin American countries who signed the pact to benefit from a reduction of tariffs or a significant increase in trade flow (Hufbauer & Hoogan, 2021). If, on the one hand, Biden rejected the populist character of his predecessor’s strategy, on the other hand, he did not substantially change the US’s economic approach, including towards Latin America. Closer economic cooperation between the US and Latin America ties into supranationalist and intergovernmentalist theories of integration, reinforcing regional ties whilst maintaining peace and stability (Leuffen et al., 2022).

The third option, recommended by the writers of this paper, is to implement a set of measures which would aim to offset the disparity of trade relations between Northern and Global South economies. Indeed, in 2023, the relations between the US and Latin American countries were characterized by low levels of trade in comparison with those between the US and other advanced economies, such as European countries or Japan. In other words, Northern American countries record a higher level of economic integration (EI) than Latin American countries. This third scenario would entail a mitigation process of the dragging effect of the protectionist policies enacted by the last two presidencies with the aim of gaining the trust of Latin American countries. One step in this direction would be the enlargement of the USCM, an FTA to which the US, Mexico, and Canada are already signatories, to other Latin American countries (de la Calle, 2023). The USMCA could be extended to Chile, which has a solid market-oriented economy and stable democratic institutions; Panama, which constitutes a major distribution center for goods moving between North and South America; and Costa Rica, given its economic stability, strong regulatory alignment, and existing close ties with the US and Canada. The enlargement of the market would allow Mexico to offset the economic loss derived from the imports coming from extra-USCMA countries, especially the EU and China, by exporting to the FTA products with a higher level of foreign backward participation originating from Costa Rica and Panama.

Secondly, the US should support a modification of the economic agreement, which will discipline the expansion of the free trade area in order to reduce the instability of preferential market access. The targets of the amendments should concern three provisions of the current agreement. The first is the sunset clause, which foresees the agreement’s expiration after sixteen years since its entry into force and a review period after six years, weakening the investors’ trust for long-term investments. Regarding this point, the US should introduce automatic renewal mechanisms and extend review periods to create stability in the markets and members of the USMCA. The second provision concerns the limitation of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) to only certain sectors with high upfront costs, including oil and gas. In future negotiations, the US should consider extending the protection to a higher number of economic sectors to provide more guarantees to investors. 

Finally, the third provision established three new rules concerning automotive rules of origin: the extension of the Regional Value Contents (RVCs) to core parts of vehicles, the requirement that 70% of a vehicle’s steel be sourced from North America and, finally, the requirement that the production of 40/45% of a vehicle or a truck occur in factory plants where the Mexican workers’ wage is five to eight times higher than average (Ludovic, 2023: 365). These measures contributed to a decline in investments and a 0.971% reduction in Mexico’s annual real GDP in 2020, other than an estimated loss of US GDP of 0.12% compared to NAFTA (Manak, 2020). There is evidence to suggest the objective of strengthening the North American value chains was not achieved, as, between 2019 and 2022, imports from the USMCA area (29%) rose less than imports from the rest of the world (32%) (Sarukhán et al., 2023). To counter the negative impact of the tightening of the rules of origin, the US should negotiate an enlargement of the USMCA with Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama, as already mentioned above, and provide incentives to small and medium-sized companies of the members of the expanded USMCA.

Thirdly, the US should launch a long-term program of targeted investments in the construction and improvement of infrastructure in Latin American countries. The construction of ports, airports, canals and highways is an essential condition for reaching the objective of offsetting the structural volatility of trade relations between the US and Latin American countries, but also within Latin America. Investments in the infrastructure field would equip Latin American countries with the appropriate platforms, hubs and roads to increase the trade flows within the continent. 

Conclusion

The paper tackled not only the economic policy choices towards Latin America undertaken during Trump’s presidency but, by embracing a broader timeline, analyzed the more problematic subject of the legacy of Trump’s foreign policy in Latin America. Despite Biden’s entry into office and the current president’s stated intention to reset relations with Latin American countries and increase cooperation, relatively scarce attention has been given to the Latin American strategic quadrant in the past four years. 

The fact that after the first six months of the Democratic administration, the position of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs was still vacant indicates what little priority Latin America has for current US policymakers. As the Western Hemisphere can be considered the US’s “backyard,” it is a region in which the emergence of a hegemonic country – like China- cannot be tolerated, and current US foreign policy does not seem suited to address this challenge. 

This paper emphasized the cruciality of the Latin American strategic quadrant for the US’ interests by recommending a set of economic policy measures which should respond to an organic and coherent economic-strategic logic, aimed at increasing trade flows and boosting regional economic integration. Since the 1950s, scholars have tried to find a solution for the trade volatility between LAC countries and industrialized countries, such as the US or EU. They proposed implementing measures aimed at privileging intra-regional trade and building a regional integration process (Goodman & Schneider, 2023).

Nonetheless, the failure of economic integration from the inside should make the US consider how it can foster both trade flows with LAC countries and favorable conditions for building a regional integration process. Such a strategy would also counter China’s growing influence, derived from their FTAs already negotiated with four countries and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) (Duckworth, 2023). Chinese funding for infrastructure projects leveraged LAC countries’ structural need to build a regional integration space to face the low levels of trade with more advanced economies such as the US and EU and the uncertainty of access to their markets. 

 

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Andrea Sanchez, Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins, Christo Pretorius, Massimo Ronco, and Muhmmed Sihabudheen during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024. 

 

Authors’ Biographies

Massimo Ronco is a Researcher and International Policy Analyst with a master’s degree in international studies from Turin and a master’s degree in EU external relations from the Brussels School of International Studies of Kent. He is currently working in Brussels in the field of EU research and project management. In 2023, he became a member of the “German-Italian Young Leaders Dialogue,” a forum promoted by the Italian and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Also, in 2023, he obtained a diploma in Geopolitics at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. His areas of interest and research are geopolitics, US foreign policy, European security, Russian foreign policy, politics and culture of the Middle East, and political philosophy.

Christo Pretorius graduated with an MSc in International Public Policy and Diplomacy from University College Cork and was the first student to receive a postgraduate “Student of the Year” award from the Department of Government. His dissertation was published and acquired by the Bar of Ireland’s Law Library and has gone on to support Irish policymakers. Stemming from his undergraduate degree in Ancient and Medieval History and Culture from Trinity College Dublin, his research interests include the mechanisms for authoritarian power and control, as well as democratic backsliding, particularly when viewed from a historical lens. 

Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins is a second-year Ph.D. researcher at the University of Oxford. Her research primarily concerns studies of masculinity and elite culture in post-WWII Italy. By examining a number of clusters of upper-middle-class male networks of solidarity from 1945 to the mid-1970s, she hopes to understand the fabric of the post-war democratic ‘classe dirigente.’ While working on her thesis, she also continues to research the development of Christian Democratic politics in the 20th century and remains broadly interested in the history of gender, the history of friendship, and – when time allows — 19th and 20th-century art history.

 

References

— (2018). “Watch: President Donald Trump’s full address to the United Nations General Assembly.” PBS NewsHour.September 25, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGK4DPn2R58 (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Arnaud, L. (2024). “From NAFTA to USMCA: revisiting the market access – policy space trade-off.” New Political Economy. 29(3), 356–369. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2260986

Ashford E. & Kroenig M. (2024). “Does Harris Have a Foreign Policy?” Foreign Policy. August 30, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/30/harris-ukraine-gaza-israel-lebanon-dnc-hezbollah-foreign-policy/ (accessed on August 10, 2024).

Cadier, D. (2023). “Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means: Pathways and Patterns of Populist Politicization.” Foreign Policy Analysis. 20(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad035

Campos, C. O. & Prevost, G. (2019). “The Trump Administration in Latin America: Continuity and Change.” The International Journal of Cuban Studies. 11(1), 13–23. https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.11.1.0013

De la Calle, L. (2023). “Time to Analyze Expansion of USMCA? Costa Rica and Uruguay Would Be Potential Candidates.” Wilson Center. January 12, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/time-analyze-expansion-usmca-costa-rica-and-uruguay-would-be-potential-candidates (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Duckworth, E. (2023). “Latin American and Caribbean Participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Cornell International Affairs Review. 16(1), 115–161. https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v16i1.710

Gilardi, J. (2019). “Brazil and Argentina Surprised by Tariff Announcement: What Comes Next?” Atlantic Council. December 3, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brazil-and-argentina-surprised-by-tariff-announcement-what-comes-next/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Goodman, L.W. & A. Schneider. (2023). “Conflict, Competition, or Collaboration? China and the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In: Schneider A. & Teixeira A.G. (eds.) China, Latin America, and the Global Economy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.  pp 163–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18026-2_8

Gurtov, M. (2021). America in Retreat. Foreign Policy under Trump. Rowman & Littlefield. 

Haas, E.B. (1964). Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hall, J. (2021). “In search of enemies: Donald Trump’s populist foreign policy rhetoric.” Politics (Manchester, England). 41(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720935377

Hufbauer, G.C. & Hogan, M. (2023). “Biden Embraces Buy America, Doubles Down on Trade Protection.” Promarket.February 21, 2023. https://www.promarket.org/2023/02/21/biden-embraces-buy-america-doubles-down-on-trade-protection/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Jensens, S. (2024). “Kamala Harris is no dominating leader – and that may be her biggest strength.” The Guardian. July 22, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jul/22/kamala-harris-democrats-us-presidential-election-donald-trump (accessed on August 8, 2024).

Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1987). “Power and Interdependence revisited.” International Organization. 41(4), 725–753. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027661

Leuffen, D., Rittberger B., & Schimmelfennig F. (2022). “Supranationalism.” In: Integration and Differentiation in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland, (pp.89-116). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76677-1_4  

Manak, I. (2020). “Canada Evaluates USMCA, Raises More Questions than Answers.” CATO Institute. February 28. 2020. https://www.cato.org/blog/canada-evaluates-usmca-raises-more-questions-answers#:~:text=Howe%20Institute%2C%20a%20Canadian%20think,0.097%25%20for%20the%20United%20States. (accessed on August 9, 2024).

McKinley P.M. (2023). “Inflection Point: The Challenges Facing Latin America and U.S. Policy in the Region”. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.cato.org/blog/canada-evaluates-usmca-raises-more-questions-answers#:~:text=Canada%20Evaluates%20USMCA%2C%20Raises%20More%20Questions%20than%20Answers,-By%20Inu%20Manak&text=This%20week%2C%20Canada%20released%20its,referred%20to%20in%20Canada%2C%20CUSMA (accessed on August 10, 2024).

Roy, D. (2023). “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America, Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations. June 15, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Sarukhán, A.; Rangel, B.; McCoy, M.; Ciuriak, D. & Huenemann, J.E. (2023). “How Well Is the USMCA Working After Three Years.” The Dialogue. June 22, 2023. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/how-well-is-the-usmca-working-after-three-years/#:~:text=Formal%20analysis%20of%20the%20USMCA’s,percent%20compared%20to%20the%20NAFTA (accessed on August 9, 2024). 

Stuenkel, O. (2020). “Trump Drove Latin America Into China’s Arms.” Foreign Affairs, November 13. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2020-11-13/trump-drove-latin-america-chinas-arms (accessed on August 9, 2024).

White House. (2021). Biden-⁠Harris Administration Issues Proposed Buy American Rule, Advancing the President’s Commitment to Ensuring the Future of America is Made in America by All of America’s Workers, July 28, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/28/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-issues-proposed-buy-american-rule-advancing-the-presidents-commitment-to-ensuring-the-future-of-america-is-made-in-america-by-all-of-americas/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Further Reading

— (2024). Text – S.3878 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Americas Act. Congress. March 6, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/3878/text/is (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Cheng, D. (2023). “U.S. Needs to Invest More in Latin America to Counteract China in the Region.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/us-needs-invest-more-latin-america-counteract-china-region (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Marczak, J.; Bozmoski, M.F. & Kroenig, M. (2024). Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era. Atlantic Council. February 26, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/redefining-us-strategy-with-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-for-a-new-era/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Meltzer, J.P. (2021). Developing a roadmap for USMCA success. Brooking’s Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Developing-roadmap-USMCA.pdf (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ali Erbas, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is seen during a public rally in Istanbul on the second anniversary of failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

Digital Authoritarianism and Religious Populism in Turkey

by ArticlesAuthoritarianismDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomePopulism & Politics (P&P)

DOWNLOAD PDF

Please cite as:
Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan.(2024). “Digital Authoritarianism and Religious Populism in Turkey.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0042

 

Abstract

This article explores the interplay between religious populism, religious justification and the systematic attempts to control cyberspace by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey. Drawing from an array of scholarly sources, media reports, and legislative developments, the study unravels the multifaceted strategies employed by the ruling AKP to monopolize digital media spaces and control the information published, consumed and shared within these spaces. The narrative navigates the evolution of the AKP’s tactics, spotlighting the fusion of religious discourse with state policies to legitimize stringent control mechanisms within the digital sphere. Emphasizing the entwinement of Islamist populism with digital authoritarianism, the article provides evidence of the strategic utilization of religious platforms, figures, and media outlets to reinforce the narrative of digital authoritarianism as a protector of Islamic values and societal morality. Key focal points include the instrumentalization of state-controlled mosques and religious institutions to propagate government narratives on digital media censorship, alongside the co-option of religious leaders to endorse control policies. The article traces the rise of pro-AKP media entities and the coercive tactics used to stifle dissent, culminating in the domination of digital spaces by government-aligned voices. Furthermore, the analysis elucidates recent legislative endeavors aimed at further tightening the government’s grip on social media platforms, exploring the potential implications for free speech and democratic discourse in the digital realm. 

Keywords: Digital Authoritarianism, Religious Populism, Media Control, Islamism, Digital Governance, Cyberspace, Fatwas, Sermons

 

By Bulent Kenes & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction

The rise of religious populism and authoritarianism marks Turkey’s political trajectory under Erdoganism, in which the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has transformed the nation’s governance since 2002. The aftermath of Kemalism brought with it a paradoxical quest for modernization within a less-than-democratic framework. The AKP’s ascent heralded a shift, initially portraying pro-democratic sentiments, but is now defined by authoritarian leanings akin to those of the Kemalist regime. This metamorphosis mirrors global trends that have witnessed authoritarian governance seeping into democratic systems.

The distinctiveness of Erdoganism lies in its merging of Islamist populism into Turkey’s political fabric, fostering electoral authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, and populism. AKP leader and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s centralized authority converges the Turkish state, society, and governmental institutions, perpetuating a widespread sense of uncertainty, fear, and trust in a strong leader that bolsters authoritarianism. The dynamics of religion, state, and identity construction redefine Turkey’s sociopolitical landscape, with governmental activities aimed at constructing a ‘pious generation’ while diminishing voices of dissent (Yabanci, 2019).

The political landscape in Turkey, particularly under the rule of the AKP, has witnessed a discernible shift marked by increasingly stringent measures against various segments of society. This trend notably encompasses a wide spectrum of individuals, including political opposition factions, minority groups, human rights advocates, academics, journalists, and dissenting voices within civil society (Westendarp, 2021; BBC News, 2020; BBC News, 2017a; Homberg et al., 2017).

Statistics paint a stark picture of the government’s crackdown: alarmingly, more than 150 thousand individuals have faced dismissals from their positions, while over 2 million people have become subjects of “terrorism investigations” following a coup attempt in the country in 2016 (Turkish Minute, 2022). Furthermore, approximately 100 thousand arrests have been documented since the onset of these measures in 2016. The widespread erasure of oppositional or critical voices – real or potential – extends beyond the targeting of individuals and encompasses entire institutions. Academic institutions have borne the brunt of this oppressive regime, resulting in the closure of more than 3 thousand educational establishments, and the dismissal of 6 thousand scholars. The media sector has also suffered a significant blow, with 319 journalists arrested and 189 media outlets forcefully shut down, signaling a profound attack on free speech and the press. The legal profession has also faced targeting, witnessing the loss of 4 and a half thousand legal professionals (Turkey Purge 2019).

Moreover, the AKP’s influence has transcended national borders, impacting Turkish citizens living in diasporas around the world. Instances of extradition of members of the Turkish diaspora on charges related to terrorism or alleged connections to security threats have been reported, highlighting the government’s efforts to exert control beyond its territorial boundaries. This phenomenon has led to the perception of the government as possessing “long arms,” capable of reaching, influencing, and punishing individuals even when living outside the country (Edwards, 2018).

The evolution of Turkey’s digital landscape since 2016 reveals a pronounced shift marked by intensified security protocols and offline repressions. A critical assessment conducted by Freedom House, evaluating global internet freedom between 2016 and 2020, highlights a concerning and tangible decline in internet freedom in Turkey, which significantly intensified following the failed coup attempt in 2016. Notably, the classification of internet freedom as being “not free” underscores the severity of limitations imposed during these years (Daily Sabah, 2021a, 2021b; World Bank, 2021).

Pervasive Online Presence of Turkish Citizens

Despite this lack of freedom, statistics highlight the pervasive influence of the internet within Turkish society (World Bank, 2021). A study from the initial quarter of 2021 indicated that over 80 percent of internet users were consistently active online during these three months, highlighting the integral role the internet plays in the lives of citizens (Daily Sabah, 2021). Data reports tracking internet usage of Turkish citizens suggest that in early 2024, internet penetration in Turkey was at its highest level at 86.5 percent (Kemp, 2024). These findings demonstrate a picture of sustained and pervasive digital engagement within the populace.

Social media findings further underscore the influence of internet usage, revealing an average daily duration of 7 hours and 29 minutes per individual (Bianet, 2020). By January 2024, the number of social media users in the country stands at 57.5 million users, or nearly 70 percent of the total population (Kemp, 2024). Social media platforms, including Facebook, YouTube, WhatsApp, Instagram, TikTok, Snapchat, and Twitter, account for this considerable online presence (Bianet 2020). 

Crucially for this discussion, this digital landscape has become a vital arena for dissenting voices, particularly as traditional media outlets witness declining audience numbers.

Consequently, the internet has emerged as a potent tool for voices of opposition within Turkey. In response to the increased possibilities for these voices in an increasingly online society, the AKP government has initiated various regulatory and surveillance measures aimed at controlling and monitoring the digital sphere, reflecting efforts to suppress dissenting narratives and oppositional voices (Bellut, 2021). Their efforts at digital governance reflect and intensify the government’s broader strategy of curtailing dissent across various levels of society.

The AKP’s Use of Religion to Legitimize a Digital Authoritarian Agenda

The intertwining of religion and state under the AKP’s governance has legitimized and fortified its digital authoritarianism. For example, a recent trend reveals the government’s adept use of Islamic discourse to rationalize the imposition of censorship and crackdowns on online opposition, portraying control over digital technology as a safeguard for Turkish values and moral rectitude. The strategic operationalization of religious values as a legitimizing force for digital authoritarianism is highly indicative of the AKP government’s efforts at consolidating power and suppressing opposition within the online sphere, profoundly shaping the contours of digital discourse and expression in Turkey.

Central to this strategy is the dissemination of Islamic values through state-managed religious institutions, traditional media, and social media platforms, all serving as conduits for aligning public sentiment with the government’s digital autocratic agenda. The propagation of Islamic tenets has been instrumental in molding public opinion to favor the government’s stringent and increasingly authoritarian approach to digital governance. In an effort to increase legitimacy and garner wider support, religious leaders and organizations have been strategically co-opted to support the government’s digital authoritarian agenda.

The cumulative effect of the integration of religion and digital governance has created a pervasive climate of censorship and self-censorship online. Individuals are discouraged from expressing dissenting views or disseminating information that could be perceived as contradictory to religious principles. This climate of caution and apprehension consequently serves to inhibit free expression and discourse within the digital realm, by not only fortifying the government’s authoritarian stance but also influencing the behavioral patterns of online users, curtailing the free flow of information and divergent opinions.

By adopting an interdisciplinary approach encompassing political science, religious studies, media analysis, and socio-political discourse, the paper aims to provide a comprehensive and empirically informed understanding of how religious justification has been systematically employed to legitimize methods of controlling voices of dissent online and foster a pro-AKP narrative in Turkey’s digital governance landscape.

This analysis will contribute to a deeper comprehension of the complex interplay between religion, politics, and digital authoritarianism in contemporary Turkey. This study will highlight how the ruling AKP fuse religion with the state’s digital agenda. It will also demonstrate their reliance on a network of religious platforms, figures, and media to reinforce the narrative of digital authoritarianism as a means of upholding Islamic values and protecting societal morality. The confluence of religious influence and governmental objectives, it will be argued, serves to shape public opinion and garner support for stringent control measures within the digital realm.

Religious Populism of Erdoganism and the AKP’s Authoritarianism

Since the country’s formation in 1923, Turkey has never been perceived as a highly democratic country from the perspective of Western libertarianism. Its initial phase featured a sort of national reconstruction from the worn-out centuries of the Ottoman Empire, which had faced a humiliating defeat at the hands of the Allied forces in World War One (WWI) towards the Republic. The Young Turks, who later became the Kemalists, set the country on a path of reformation with paradoxical ideas of modernization. While the country moved from a centuries-old monarchy to a parliamentary system, it remained far from democratic (Yilmaz’ 2021a). Between 1923 and 1946, Turkey was ruled by the Kemalist Republican People’s Party (CHP) alone. Even following the commencement of multi-party elections, the Turkish political and institutional landscape continued to be dominated by Kemalists until the AKP rose to power. The only exception was a brief period between 1996 and 1997 when Necmettin Erbakan and his right-wing Milli Gorus’s (National View) inspired Welfare Party (RP) held office (Yildiz, 2003). 

The transition from Kemalism to Erdoganism, President Erdogan’s political ideology, was meticulously orchestrated, consolidating the state narrative and silencing opposing voices. The AKP initiated significant constitutional changes, starting with a referendum aimed at removing the Kemalist judiciary from power, and the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials which targeted key Kemalist military figures (Kuru, 2012: 51). Although these trials did not conclusively prove the accused’s ‘anti-state’ intentions, they significantly swayed public opinion against Kemalist control of the judiciary and military.

The 2010 Turkish Constitutional Referendum overwhelmingly favored the AKP, seeking increased control over the judiciary and military (Kalaycioglu, 2011). As a result, the outcome expanded parliamentary and presidential authority over appointments to the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), enabling the AKP government to install its own appointees. This marked the end of Kemalist dominance in these institutions and paved the way for AKP influence – and an increasingly authoritarian agenda.

The AKP’s authoritarianism is distinguished from Kemalism by its adept blending of Islamist populism into its political discourse and agenda. While Kemalists championed secularism and Turkish nationalism, Erdoganists espouse an iron-fisted Islamist ideology rooted in the legacy of the Ottoman Empire. This has birthed a new form of autocracy known as “Erdoganism” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018), characterized by four pivotal elements: electoral authoritarianism, neopatrimonialism, populism, and Islamism. (Yilmaz & Turner, 2019; Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

The socio-political landscape of Turkey has experienced a rapid decline, from an initially promising image of democratization to an authoritarian posture of governance with the ascent of AKP in 2002. The AKP’s transition from a seemingly pro-democracy to an authoritarian party has come to resemble the Kemalist tradition of violating democratic freedoms and rights (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). Today, the public presence of the military, arbitrary crackdowns and arrests are now normalized activities of the Turkish state.

Erdogan’s dominant persona has resulted in the centralization of power around his leadership. This was particularly evident following the 2017 Constitutional Referendum, which transitioned the country into a Presidential system. Under this concentration of power, Erdoganism brought about an assimilation of the Turkish nation, state, and its economic, social, and political institutions (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). By positioning himself as a referent object, Erdogan reinforces his grip on power while redefining the contours of Turkish identity, politics, and, as will be developed in this paper, the relationship between religion and the state (Yilmaz, 2000; Yilmaz, 2008, Yilmaz et al., 2021a; Yilmaz & Erturk 2022, 2021; Yilmaz et al., 2021b).

Co-opting of Religious Authorities and the Diyanet to Support AKP’s Authoritarian Agenda

President Erdogan has solidified the politicoreligious ideology of Erdoganism by fostering a close alliance with Turkey’s official religious authority, the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). Initially established in 1924 by the Kemalist regime to centralize religious activities and advocate for a ‘secular’ form of Turkish Islam, Diyanet’s role has significantly expanded since the ascent of the AKP and has transformed to accommodate the party’s political Islamist identity.

This relationship is reflected in the increased budget allocation to the religious authority. The Turkish government’s 2023 budget proposal notably elevated Diyanet’s budget by 117 percent (Duvar, 2022). This influenced a substantial increase in funding grants, financial incentives and the heightened prestige of religious leaders and prominent imams. In return, Diyanet extends its loyalty and political support, including aligning with the AKP on digital policy and governance. President Erdogan strategically appoints pro-government religious figures such as Ali Erbas now President of Diyanet, to influential positions. Erbas, recognized for his religious conservatism, has cultivated a close relationship with President Erdogan and endorsed his call for a new Constitution (Martin, 2021).

Erbas’ conspicuous presence in public and political affairs underscores the intimate rapport between him and Erdogan. For instance, during the inauguration of the new Court of Cassation building, attended by President Erdogan, Erbas led a prayer praising its new location (Duvar, 2021). Additionally, Erbas represented President Erdogan at the funeral of Islamic cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a supporter of Erdogan and the Muslim Brotherhood, in 2022 (Nordic Monitor, 2022). The building of ties between members of the government and the religious organization strengthens Diyanet’s role not just as a religious institution but also as a significant political force.

The Erdogan/AKP government has harnessed religious institutions, in particular mosques, to disseminate its positions and policies to the broader public through sermons, religious teachings, and various activities. A content analysis spanning from 2010 to 2021 reveals that Diyanet-run Friday sermons mirror the political stance of the AKP. These sermons were found to support Turkey’s involvement in the Syrian conflict, while vilifying ‘FETOists’—referring to the Gulen movement accused of terrorism. This analysis showcases how Diyanet employs affective religious rhetoric to endorse Erdogan’s decisions, discourage opposition, vilify perceived adversaries, propagate fear and conspiracies, and divert attention from the government’s shortcomings in areas spanning foreign policy, economics, and beyond (Yilmaz & Albayrak, 2022; Rogenhofer & Panievsky, 2020).

The Diyanet, has significantly expanded its media presence since 2010, operating television and radio channels, with an escalating expenditure on publicity. The organization and its leader Erbas also have an active presence and significant following on social media platforms such as YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook (Yilmaz & Albayrak, 2022). This heightened outreach has effectively filled the void created by the purge of groups like the Gulen movement and critical academic voices, both in the digital sphere and beyond (Yilmaz & Albayrak, 2022; Andi et al., 2020; Parkinson et al., 2014).

The close alliance between the Diyanet and the AKP has seen the past two heads of the organization employing faith-based justifications to support Erdogan’s moral campaign against perceived ‘internal’ and ‘external’ adversaries (Andi et al., 2020; Parkinson, et al., 2014). The increasingly stringent control over the digital sphere is justified by Diyanet with Islamic framing and justification. Thus, the emotionally charged narratives instrumentalized by the AKP (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018) have become directly intertwined with the religious directives and stances of the Diyanet (Yilmaz & Albayrak, 2022; Yilmaz et al., 2021a; Rogenhofer & Panievsky, 2020). Diyanet extends its influence not only within Turkish territories but also among the Turkish diaspora, functioning as an advisor for the AKP in diaspora communities. Consequently, through the transnational reach of the religious organization, the AKP’s authoritarian agenda has transcended national borders.

The Diyanet’s Moral Stance Against Social Media

Under the Presidential system, the President of Diyanet, appointed by Erdogan, wields significant influence as the centralized religious authority in Turkey and globally through its network of mosques (Danforth, 2020). Former President of Diyanet, Mehmet Gormez, openly criticized social media, attributing various societal harms to it. In 2016, Diyanet organized a forum titled “Social Media and the Family in the Context of Privacy,” aligning with the government’s calls for social media control. The forum aimed to emphasize traditional family values and discuss the perceived negative impact of social media on privacy and marriage. Gormez advocated for Diyanet to create a social media catechism, reinforcing the ideological harmony between Diyanet and Erdogan’s regime, consolidating authoritarianism both online and offline (Yilmaz & Albayrak, 2022; Yilmaz et al., 2021a; Danforth, 2020).

Diyanet has also actively engaged in efforts to exert stronger control over social media by publishing a booklet titled “Social Media Ethics,” using Islam as a guiding principle for this framework (Duvar, 2021). In the preface he personally authored, top imam Ali Erbas cautioned readers about the omnipotent governance of God extending to social media activities under Islamic law. Additionally, believers were alerted to the perils of “fake news” and urged to create a “world of truth” (Duvar, 2021; Turkish Minute, 2021).

Moreover, Diyanet’s Friday sermons have increasingly addressed themes related to social media, technology, and morality. On January 17, 2020, a sermon titled ‘Technology Addiction and Social Media Ethics’ was circulated by Diyanet, cautioning people about the dangers of the Internet violating the five fundamental values of Islam. It highlighted that the indiscriminate use of technology poses threats to human health, causes financial losses, erodes human dignity through unethical behaviors, undermines human faith with radical ideologies, and impairs cognitive abilities (Diyanet, 2020).

The Role of Islamic Scholars in Legitimizing the AKP Digital Authoritarian Agenda

Within academia, several pro-AKP Islamic scholars have aligned themselves with the government’s digital authoritarian agenda. Figures like Nihat Hatipoglu and Hayrettin Karaman (Kenes, 2018), associated with the AKP, believe that social media spreads misinformation targeting Turkish national interests and could mislead youth. Since 2016, Karaman, who has advised Erdogan on creating a more Islamist – and less tolerant – society has frequently accused social media of being used by “anti-Turkey” groups to spread lies (Yeni Safak, 2013). He highlights the dangers of false information being spread on these platforms, claiming that there’s no room for rebuttal (Yeni Safak, 2021). A poem written by Karaman supports AKP’s stance on social media, advocating for increased control to cultivate a “pious youth” and suppress critical remarks aimed at the AKP (Yeni Safak, 2020).

Nihat Hatipoglu, a prominent pro-AKP Turkish academic and theologian, has utilized his ATV show to issue fatwas, cautioning viewers about the potential sins associated with social media usage. For instance, he warns that engaging with “questionable” individuals on these platforms can lead to false rumors and sin, and accountability will come in the afterlife (Akyol, 2016). His messaging is potent in digital governance because it moves beyond conventional vices like alcohol or adultery and highlights the significance of sins associated with online behaviors and consumption, such as false testimonies and envy.

Furthermore, both Karaman and Hatipoglu are openly critical of “Western” media and social platforms, and advocate for Islamic content. Together, they represent a prevalent viewpoint supporting AKP discourse that emphasizes caution and adherence to Islamic principles while engaging with digital platforms.

Digital Authoritarian Measures Against the LQBTQ+ Community

The intersection of religion, politics, and social media in Turkey has also created a complex landscape where certain communities, particularly LGBTQ+ groups, have faced significant challenges. Religious leaders and government officials have used their platforms to vilify LGBTQ+ activists and communities, contributing to a hostile environment for these individuals (Greenhalgh, 2020).

This hostility has significantly deepened with anti-LQBTQ+ messaging from Turkish leadership. President Erdogan’s agenda has consistently focused on promoting a “pious youth” while openly expressing disapproval of atheists and LGBTQ+ identities as threats to societal and religious values (Gall, 2018). His party has employed rhetoric targeting Western values and certain youth groups, framing them as corruptive influences on Turkey’s future.

Although identifying as LGBTQ+ is not illegal in Turkey, the government has taken steps to restrict LGBTQ+ content and activism online (Woodward, 2019). This included censoring LGBTQ+ content on platforms like TikTok and imposing restrictions on advertising across social media channels to suppress opposition groups (Euronews, 2021).

Moreover, there have been instances of attempts to ban LGBTQ+ content, such as Netflix being prohibited from airing a movie with an LGBTQ+ storyline, and the mobilization of hashtags advocating for bans on LGBTQ+ content such as #LGBTfilmgunleriyasaklansin (#BanLGBTFilmDays); #İstiklalimizeKaraLeke (#StainOnOurIndependence) (Banka, 2020; Sari, 2018). These actions reflect the charged anti-LGBTQ+ sentiment prevalent in certain spheres of Turkish society and the state’s efforts to curtail LGBTQ+ visibility in the media and online discourse.

Government efforts at controlling and silencing LGBTQ+ members have clear repercussions in society. For example, influencing the demonization of LGBTQ+ youth during the Bogazici University protests in 2021 and subsequent limitations on LGBTQ+ content across various platforms (Kucukgocmen, 2021; Woodward, 2019; Euronews, 2021).

AKP’s Digital Network Control, Restrictions, and Bans

The Gezi Park protests in 2013 marked a turning point for the Turkish government’s efforts at controlling the digital landscape. During this period, civil society groups and activists turned to social media to coordinate the protests, prompting the government to denounce Twitter as a significant threat to society. Internet governance subsequently tightened, and internet blackouts were orchestrated by the newly established Telecommunication Technologies Authority (BTK) under government directives. While the government justified these internet restrictions as anti-terrorism measures, their political motives were evident. 

The pinnacle of Turkish government internet shutdowns occurred between 2015 and 2017. This was facilitated by Internet Law No. 5651, introduced in 2007, permitting website blocking on multiple grounds, including for terrorism-related content. The broadened definition of “terrorism” that had been enacted by the Erdogan regime was manipulated to silence dissenting voices and serve the interests of the ruling power. Gradually, the scope of a “terrorist” in Turkey expanded to encompass peaceful protesters from events like the Gezi Park protests, anti-government activists labelled as “FETOists,” and students involved in activism during Istanbul’s Bogazici University events in 2021 (Wilks, 2021; Yesil et al., 2017).

Internet Law 5651 thus became a tool to marginalize digital spaces for non-AKP or critical groups, using the power of the TIB (Telecommunication and Information Technology Authority) and imposing additional responsibilities on hosting services and intermediaries. The 2014 amendment to the Law on State Intelligence Services granted the National Intelligence Service (MIT) authority to gather, record, and analyze public and private data, compelling intermediaries to comply with MIT’s requests under the threat of incarceration (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

The eastern regions of Turkey, particularly areas with strong Kurdish resistance, bore the brunt of internet and cellular shutdowns during critical events like the 2015 Suruc suicide bombing and the 2016 Ataturk Airport bombing. These shutdowns were often localized and imposed during high-risk security incidents. The government’s increasingly authoritarian approach leveraged digital anti-terrorism laws to target marginalized groups, particularly the Kurds. It is noteworthy that most shutdowns occurred in the southeast, where political activities are more prevalent. For instance, the 2016 closure of internet and landlines in 11 cities following the arrests of Diyarbakir’s mayor and co-mayor sparked protests and incurred significant economic costs for Turkey (Yackley, 2016).

Although internet shutdowns decreased from six in 2016 to one in 2020, the financial toll remains substantial, reaching $51 million in 2020 (Buchholz, 2021). While the precise role of religious justification and religious organizations in legitimizing comprehensive network governance remains unclear, their collaboration remains crucial to the government. It also plays a significant role in legitimizing various forms of digital governance and actions taken by the government – such as these internet shutdowns – that undermine democratic and digital freedom principles.

Digital Oppression Through the ‘Safe Use of the Internet’ Campaign

The 2011 “Safe Use of the Internet” campaign initiated by the Telecommunication Technologies Authority (BTK) promoted a Turkish-built filter called the ‘family filter.’ However, despite its name, the campaign primarily focused on regulating internet access in public spaces like cafes and libraries, rather than imposing ‘safe’ restrictions within domestic settings. The campaign purported to protect children from accessing non-age-appropriate content by blocking adult websites, both foreign and domestic. Interestingly, this campaign didn’t enforce mandatory installation of the ‘family filter’ at home, seemingly placing the responsibility on parents to supervise their children’s internet use. Discussions about children’s privacy were also notably absent from the campaign despite the stated objective (Hurriyet Daily News, 2014; Brunwasser, 2011).

Over time, concerns have emerged regarding the broader implications of the ‘family filter.’ Many speculate that this initiative, while supposedly aimed at blocking pornographic content, also serves as a tool for the state to censor critical voices within the digital space (Yesil et al., 2017). The criteria for blacklisting websites remain ambiguous, granting significant power to state authorities. By 2017, approximately 1.5 million websites had been blocked, particularly in public areas like cafes. The BTK has concerningly refrained from disclosing the list of websites it restricts (Yesil et al., 2017). The lack of transparency has contributed to concerns about digital oppression and censorship orchestrated by the AKP through the guise of protecting children and youth online. 

AKP’s Digital Authoritarianism: Sub-Network, Website and Platform Level

The Internet Law (No. 5651) described above has facilitated the monitoring and blocking of webpages and websites in Turkey. Despite amendments, the law remains problematic due to its arbitrary and vague provisions. Internet governance institutions hold broad discretion in determining acceptable versus unacceptable content. According to Freedom House’s latest report, internet freedoms in Turkey have been increasingly restricted in recent years (Freedom House, 2021). 

In 2006, prior to the introduction of the Internet Law, only four websites were blocked in Turkey. However, by 2008, this number had escalated to 1,014, reaching a staggering 27,812 in 2015. Government decisions using this law lack transparency and accountability, as blocking orders, often issued by the BTK, lack clear justifications, leaving website owners with limited recourse for appeal. Suspicion and precautionary measures are sometimes the sole reasons cited for blocking a website.

Following the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, websites related to the Gulen movement, Gezi Protests, corruption allegations, and terrorism charges were blocked or taken down (Ergun, 2018). Government actions also targeted websites advocating opposition, Kurdish rights, LGBTQ+ rights, and pornography. Several news outlets, including Zaman and Today’s Zaman, were shut down in 2016. Websites promoting atheism, such as the Atheism Association, were also blocked under Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Law, which prohibits actions inciting hatred or enmity among people (Hurriyet Daily News, 2015).

Digital Control at the Proxy or Corporation Level

The politicization and framing of the July 2016 events by Erdogan and the AKP as an assault on Turkish sovereignty triggered severe digital restrictions. The disbandment of the TIB over alleged pro-Gulenist ties led to the transfer of its powers to the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK). Consequently, approximately 150 online and traditional media outlets were completely shut down, resulting in the loss of jobs for 2,700 Turkish journalists (Kocer & Bozdag, 2020). The legal framework governing digital spaces in Turkey has been wielded against opposition and civil society voices while favoring AKP and pro-AKP groups.

Social media intermediaries operating in Turkey have faced various restrictions. According to the Internet Law, they are required to comply with the Turkish government’s requests or face bans. During a period of heightened discontent against the AKP in 2014, the TIB pressured Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook to remove critical content damaging to the ruling party. While Facebook swiftly complied, Twitter and YouTube faced national blockades for several hours before eventually complying with the requests (Yesil et al., 2017). In 2016, Google also adhered to thousands of content removal requests from the Turkish state (Yesil et al., 2017).

The 2019 Transparency Reports from Twitter and Facebook shed light on Turkey’s extensive governmental demands for information and content removals. Twitter was issued with 350 information requests involving 596 accounts, and 6,073 removal requests affecting 8,993 accounts. The report indicated a compliance rate of 5 percent. Turkey was number one on the list for the highest number of legal demands for removals. Meanwhile, Facebook received 2,060 legal requests and 2,537 user information requests, complying with 73 percent of these requests (Freedom House, 2021).

Adding to this overall picture of digital surveillance and control, Turkey has imposed bans on approximately 450,000 domains, 140,000 URLs, and 42,000 tweets (Timuçin, 2021). IFOD announced on August 7, 2024, that by the end of the first quarter of that year, a total of 1,043,312 websites and domain names had been blocked in Turkey, based on 892,951 decisions from 833 different institutions and courts. The organization highlighted that this number could rise as more domain names are identified (IFOD, 2024). Furthermore, in 2017, Wikipedia was banned in Turkey following a ruling from Ankara’s first Criminal Court, linking certain articles to terror organizations. The court mandated edits to the articles before allowing the website to resume being accessible in the country in 2020 (Hurriyet Daily News, 2020; The Guardian, 2017).

The Turkish government’s manipulation of news and entertainment content distribution is a well-documented strategy, implemented through its control over media outlets both locally and internationally. Beyond influencing social media and restricting local websites, additional methods of control are exercised over television, streaming and various over-the-top media services (OTTs). In 2019, the government empowered the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTUK) to issue licenses and make them mandatory to access content streaming in Turkey (Pearce, 2019; Yerlikaya, 2019).

The Turkish government has also employed various financial penalties, including fines and heavy taxes, to curb critical voices and hinder their independent operations. These tactics have forced many critical media outlets out of business, enabling pro-government entities to acquire their assets. For instance, the pro-government Demiroren Group acquired the Dogan Media Group following high taxes imposed by the government. Anadolu Ajansi (AA), enjoying government support, has significantly increased its backing for the AKP government by 545 percent since 2002, with 91.1 percent of its Twitter coverage found to favor the government. The government’s informal means of bolstering pro-government content include shutting down anti-government entities and transferring or selling their outlets or platforms to pro-government supporters, establishing a clientelist relationship between the state and media (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). For example, during the state of emergency in 2016, the Gulen-linked Samanyolu Group, Koza Ipek Group, and Feza Publications were seized and redistributed to President Erdogan’s loyalists (Timucin, 2021; BBC News, 2016; Yackley, 2016).

Digital Authoritarianism at the Network-Node or Individual Level

The Turkish government has intensified its crackdown on individual social media and online activities, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt. The Ministry of Interior, for example, reported investigations on over ten thousand individuals for their online engagements, resulting in legal action against over 3,700 and the arrest of more than 1,600 people. Within a two-month span between January and March 2018, over 6,000 social media accounts were probed, leading to legal consequences for over 2,000 individuals. Freedom House’s 2021 assessment further revealed that between 2013 and 2018, the government initiated over 20,000 legal cases against citizens due to their social media activities (Ergun, 2018).

A climate of self-censorship among Turkish internet users has become entrenched. This is owing to multiple actions and crackdowns taken by the government in recent years. Following the coup attempt, for example, academics and civil society voices were targeted by pro-AKP media outlets that alleged their involvement in “terrorism” (GIT North America, 2016). Journalists have faced a diminished space to express dissenting opinions and face being accused of or charged with terrorism under various legal articles, including Article 314/2, related to association with armed organizations, and Article 147 and Article 5, concerning crimes associated with terrorist intent and groups (Sahinkaya, 2021). The restriction of anti-AKP voices has heavily tilted mainstream conversation in favor of pro-AKP narratives, dominating both online and offline domains.

The Turkish government actively suppresses dissent on social media, resorting to threats and arrests against individuals. In a 2014 incident, a Turkish court ordered Facebook to block pages and individuals engaging with content from Charlie Hebdo, a French magazine that published a cartoon insulting Prophet Muhammad (Johnston, 2015). The Director of Communications of the Presidency warned citizens in May 2020 that even liking or sharing a post deemed unacceptable by the government could lead to trouble. Journalists, scholars, opposition figures, and civil society leaders critical of the government are increasingly vulnerable to prosecution.

The AKP’s influence in the digital public sphere is also notable in its internet trolling and online harassment campaigns, which are aimed at shaping narratives in favor of the party and against the opposition. Critics of the AKP, including journalists, academics, and artists, face a culture of “digital lynching and censorship” perpetrated by an army of party-affiliated trolls (Bulut & Yoruk, 2017). Post-2016, this situation has worsened, subjecting critical voices to intensified cyberbullying and making their persecution more challenging (Shearlaw, 2016). Many of these trolls are graduates of pro-AKP Imam Hatip schools and reportedly receive a payment. Successful trolls likely receive additional benefits from pro-AKP networks, including the TRT and Turkcell (Bulut & Yoruk, 2017). In addition to employing trolls, the AKP also uses automated bots to amplify its presence in the digital space, disproportionately projecting their narrative across platforms (Irak & Ozturk, 2018). 

The manipulation of social media platforms across the globe has become a significant concern, and this is particularly the case in Turkey. In 2020, Twitter’s deletion of a substantial number of accounts from China, Russia, and Turkey revealed the extent of propaganda spread by these accounts. Many were focused on supporting President Erdogan, attacking opposition parties, and advocating for undemocratic reforms (Twitter Safety, 2020). The proliferation of fake accounts and bots, and the significant portion of posts originating from these accounts, has skewed the representation of daily Twitter (renamed as X) trends, and consequently affected political discourse.

Disturbingly, instances of online harassment and hate speech targeting individuals based on their political stance or ethnic background have been observed without effective intervention. For instance, Garo Paylan, an HDP deputy with Turkish-Armenian heritage, faced online harassment for his political stance during the Azerbaijan-Armenian skirmish in 2020 (Briar, 2020). Meanwhile, controversial statements, such as Ibrahim Karagul’s suggestion of ‘accidentally’ bombing Armenians, didn’t receive the same scrutiny for hate speech (Barsoumian, 2020). 

Conclusion

The merging of religion and the state’s digital authoritarian agenda serves as a potent tool for steering public opinion, validating control mechanisms, and fortifying the government’s authority. It exemplifies how the discourse of upholding Islamic values and societal morality can be strategically harnessed to garner support for stringent digital control measures, influencing public perception and behavior within the digital landscape. 

This article identifies numerous ways the AKP and its leader, administer their authority over the digital realm in Turkey. Voices of dissent and opposition are silenced through the enactment of a range of legislative and strategic measures, such as Internet Law No.5651, the “Safe Use of the Internet” campaign, and online trolling and harassment practices that directly target critics of the government. Additionally, the AKP make considerable attempts at controlling the online content its citizenry can or want to access; the discussion highlights the internet lockdowns, blacklisting of websites, and issuing warnings to Turkish citizens of the consequences of engaging with certain (oppositional) content.

The above measures are supported and legitimized by the AKP and Erdogan’s religious discourse, and through its network of pro-AKP religious authorities including the Diyanet, Islamic scholars and preachers. By aligning digital control measures with Islamic values and societal morality, the government can justify its actions as essential for preserving the ethical fabric of society. This moral grounding lends an air of legitimacy and righteousness to measures that might otherwise be viewed as intrusive or oppressive.

The fusion of religious rhetoric with digital governance acts as a deterrent to dissent. The government discourages dissenting voices by associating opposition to these measures with a departure from religious principles, fostering a climate of self-censorship and compliance within the digital sphere.

Religious institutions, particularly Diyanet, are heavily influential in conversations about social media ethics and endorsing greater control over digital spaces, leading to an Islamization of digital spaces. Strict limitations on blasphemy and criticism of Islamic beliefs curtail freedom of expression online.

Ultimately, the combination of information and content control, legal measures, religious influence, and online manipulation creates a challenging scenario for digital governance in Turkey. These various elements work together to shape narratives, control dissent, create a pervasive environment of censorship and self-censorship, and restrict freedoms in the digital realm, impacting the country’s broader socio-political landscape.

References

— (2014). “Turkey: Spy Agency Law Opens Door to Abuse.” Human Rights Watch (HRW). April 29, 2014. https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/29/turkey-spy-agency-law-opens-door-abuse (accessed on August 17, 2024).

— (2014). “’Turkey’s new Internet law is the first step toward surveillance society,’ says cyberlaw expert.” Hurriyet Daily News. February. 24, 2014 https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkeys-new-internet-law-is-the-first-step-toward-surveillance-society-says-cyberlaw-expert-62815 (accessed on August 27, 2024).

— (2015). “Turkey Blocks Website of Its First Atheist Association.” Hurriyet Daily News. March 4, 2015. https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-blocks-website-of-its-first-atheist-association-79163 (accessed on August 22, 2024).

— (2016). “Zaman newspaper: Seized Turkish daily ‘now pro-government’.” BBC News. March 6, 2016. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35739547 (accessed on August 18, 2024).

— (2017). “Turkey blocks Wikipedia under law designed to protect national security.” The Guardian. April 30, 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/29/turkey-blocks-wikipedia-under-law-designed-to-protect-national-security (accessed on August 21, 2024).

— (2017). “Turkey reverses female army officers’ headscarf ban.” BBC News. February 22, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39053064 (accessed on August 18, 2024).

— (2017a). “Turkey arrests 1,000 in raids targeting Gulen suspects.” BBC News. April 26, 2017.  https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-39716631 (accessed on August 18, 2024).

— (2019). “Turkey’s post-coup crackdown.” Turkey Purge. https://turkeypurge.com/

— (2020). “Disclosing networks of state-linked information operations we’ve removed.” Twitter Safety. June 12, 2020.  https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/information-operations-june-2020 (accessed on October 21, 2023).

— (2020). “Turkey court jails hundreds for life for 2016 coup plot against Erdogan.” BBC News. November 26, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-55083955 (accessed on August 18, 2024).

— (2020). “Wikipedia ban lifted after top court ruling issued.” Hurriyet Daily News. January 15, 2020.https://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/wikipedia-ban-lifted-after-top-court-ruling-issued-150993 (accessed on August 12, 2024).

— (2020). “There are 54 million social media users in Turkey.” Bianet. July 2, 2020.  https://m.bianet.org/english/society/226764-there-are-54-million-social-media-users-in-turkey (accessed on August 17, 2024).

— (2020). “Technology Addiction and Social Media Ethics.” Diyanet. January 17, 2020.  https://dinhizmetleri.diyanet.gov.tr/Documents/Technology%20Addiction%20and%20Social%20Media%20Ethics.doc

— (2020). “Turkey.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-net/2020 (accessed on August 14, 2024).

— (2021). “Individuals using the Internet (% of population).” World Bank Data Bank.  https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS?locations=TR (accessed on August 15, 2024).

— (2021). “Turkey’s top imam calls for social media regulation amid discussions on new gov’t body.” Turkish Minute.September 7, 2021. https://www.turkishminute.com/2021/09/07/rkeys-top-imam-calls-for-social-media-regulation-amid-discussions-on-new-government-body/ (accessed on October 21, 2023).

— (2021). “Turkey: Events of 2020.” Human Rights Watch (HRW).  https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/turkey#8e519f (accessed on August 17, 2024).

— (2021). “Turkey bans advertising on Twitter and Pinterest under social media law.” Euronews. January 19, 2021. https://www.euronews.com/2021/01/19/turkey-bans-advertising-on-twitter-and-pinterest-under-social-media-law (accessed on August 14, 2024).

— (2021). “Turkish religious authority recommends Islamic jurisprudence to curb social media in new book.” Duvar.September 7, 2021. https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-religious-authority-recommends-islamic-jurisprudence-to-curb-social-media-in-new-book-news-58737 (accessed on August 12, 2024).

— (2021). “Turkish Parliament to create ‘digital map’ of country.” Daily Sabah. May 24, 2021. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/legislation/turkish-parliament-to-create-digital-map-of-country (accessed on August 23, 2024).

— (2021a). “Turkey to open social media directorate.” Daily Sabah. August 23, 2021. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/legislation/turkey-to-open-social-media-directorate (accessed on August 23, 2024).

— (2021b). “Rate of internet users in Turkey rises to 82.6%.” Daily Sabah. August 26, 2021. https://www.dailysabah.com/turkey/rate-of-internet-users-in-turkey-rises-to-826/news (accessed on August 23, 2024).

— (2022). “More than 2 million terrorism investigations launched in Turkey following failed coup: official data.” Turkish Minute. December 13, 2022. https://www.turkishminute.com/2022/12/13/e-than-2-million-terrorism-investigations-launched-in-turkey-following-failed-coup-official-data/ (accessed on August 29, 2024).

— (2022). “Erdoğan sent his chief imam to the funeral of cleric who endorsed suicide bombings.” Nordic Monitor.October 3, 2022. https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/09/erdogan-sent-his-chief-imam-to-the-funeral-of-cleric-who-endorsed-suicide-bombings/ (accessed on August 7, 2024).

— (2024). “1 Milyondan Fazla Alan Adı Erişime Engelli.” IFOD. August 7, 2024. https://ifade.org.tr/engelliweb/1-milyondan-fazla-alan-adi-erisime-engelli/ (accessed on August 9, 2024). 

Akyol, A.R. (2016). “Iranian film about Prophet Muhammad causes stir in Turkey”. Al Monitor. November 15, 2016. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2016/11/turkey-iranian-movie-about-prophet-causes-stir.html#ixzz7BczW8uvz (accessed on August 19, 2024).

Andi, S.S.; Erdem A. & Carkoglu, A. (2020). “Internet and social media use and political knowledge: Evidence from Turkey.” Mediterranean Politics (Frank Cass & Co.). 25(5), 579–599. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2019.1635816

Banka, N. (2019). “Why Netflix cancelled a Turkish drama after row over an LGBTQ character.” Indian Express. July 22, 2019. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-why-netflix-cancelled-a-turkish-drama-after-row-over-an-lgbtq-character-6518401/# (accessed on August 11, 2024). 

Barsoumian, Nanore. (2020). “Sharp Rise in Hate Speech Threatens Turkey’s Armenians.” Armenian Weekly. October 8, 2020.  https://armenianweekly.com/2020/10/08/sharp-rise-in-hate-speech-threatens-turkeys-armenians/ (accessed on August 18, 2024). 

Bellut, D. (2021). “Turkish government increases pressure on social media.” DW. September 9, 2021. https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-government-increases-pressure-on-social-media/a-59134848 (accessed on August 13, 2024).

Briar, N. (2020). “Negligent Social Media Platforms Breeding Grounds for Turkish Nationalism, Hate Speech.” The Armenian Weekly. October 29, 2020. 2020https://armenianweekly.com/2020/10/29/negligent-social-media-platforms-breeding-grounds-for-turkish-nationalism-hate-speech/ (accessed on August 23, 2024).

Brunwasser, M. (2011). “Turkish Internet filter to block free access to information.” DW. January 6, 2011. https://www.dw.com/en/turkish-internet-filter-to-block-free-access-to-information/a-15123910 (accessed on August 30, 2024).

Buchholz, K. (2021). “The Cost of Internet Shutdowns.” Statista. January 6, 2021. https://www.statista.com/chart/23864/estimated-cost-of-internet-shutdowns-by-country/ (accessed on August 28, 2024).

Bulut, E. & Yoruk, E. 2017. “Digital Populism: Trolls and Political Polarization of Twitter in Turkey.” International Journal of Communication. 11, 4093–4117.

Conditt, Jessica. (2016). “Turkey shuts off internet service in 11 Kurdish cities.” Engadget. October 27, 2016. https://www.engadget.com/2016-10-27-turkey-internet-shutdown-kurdish-cities.html (accessed on August 22, 2024).

Danforth, N. (2020). “The Outlook for Turkish Democracy: 2023 and Beyond.” Washington Institute for Near East Policy. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/632 (accessed on August 12, 2024).

Colborne, Michael & Edwards, Maxim. (2018). “Erdogan’s Long Arm: The Turkish Dissidents Kidnapped from Europe.” Haaretz. August 30, 2018. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/turkey/.premium-erdogan-s-long-arm-the-turkish-nationals-kidnapped-from-europe-1.6428298 (accessed on August 13, 2024).

Elmas, Tugrulcan. (2023). “Analyzing Activity and Suspension Patterns of Twitter Bots Attacking Turkish Twitter Trends by a Longitudinal Dataset.” ArXiv. April 16, 2023. https://arxiv.org/abs/2304.07907 (accessed on August 23, 2024).

Ergun, D. (2018). “National Security vs. Online Rights and Freedoms in Turkey: Moving Beyond the Dichotomy.” Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM). https://edam.org.tr/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/TurkeyNational-Security-vs-Online-Rights.pdf

Gall, C. (2018). “Erdogan’s Plan to Raise a ‘Pious Generation’ Divides Parents in Turkey.” The New York Times. June 18, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/18/world/europe/erdogan-turkey-election-religious-schools.html (accessed on August 3, 2024).

GIT North America. (2016). “Pro-AKP Media Figures Continue to Target Academics for Peace.” Jadaliyya. April 27, 2016. https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/33208 (accessed on August 23, 2024).

Greenhalgh, Hugo. (2020). “Hundreds of global faith leaders call for ban on LGBT+ conversion therapy.” Reuters.December 16, 2020. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/hundreds-of-global-faith-leaders-call-for-ban-on-lgbt-conversion-therapy-idUSKBN28Q00T/ (accessed on August 22, 2024).

Homberg, J.; Said-Moorhouse, L. & Fox, K. (2017). “47,155 arrests: Turkey’s post-coup crackdown by the numbers.” CNN. April 15, 2017. https://edition.cnn.com/2017/04/14/europe/turkey-failed-coup-arrests-detained/index.html (accessed on August 27, 2024).

Irak, D. & Ozturk, A. E. (2018). “Redefinition of State Apparatuses: AKP’s Formal-Informal Networks in the Online Realm.” Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies. 20(5), 439–458. https://doi.org/10.1080/19448953.2018.1385935

Johnston, C. (2015). “Facebook Blocks Turkish Page That ‘Insults Prophet Muhammad’.” The Guardian. January 27, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/27/facebook-blocks-turkish-page-insults-prophet-muhammad (accessed on August 27, 2024).

Kalaycioglu, E. (2012). “Kulturkampf in Turkey: The Constitutional Referendum of 12 September 2010.” South European Society & Politics. 17(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2011.600555

Karaman, Hayreddin. (2013). “Çoğunluğu kale almamak.” Yeni Safak. November 7, 2013. https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettin-karaman/cogunlugu-kale-almamak-40566 (accessed on September 1, 2024). 

Karaman, Hayreddin. (2020). “İnternet deryası ve pazarı.” Yeni Safak. October 25, 2020. https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettin-karaman/internet-deryasi-ve-pazari-2056600 (accessed on September 1, 2024).

Karaman, Hayreddin. (2021). “Sosyal medya yalanları.” Yeni Safak. October 10, 2021. https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayrettin-karaman/sosyal-medya-yalanlari-2059831 (accessed on September 1, 2024).

Kemp, S. (2024). “Digital 2024: Turkey.” Datareportal. February 23, 2024. https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2024-turkey (accessed on August 18, 2024).

Kenes, Bulent. (2018). “Instrumentalization of Islam: Hayrettin Karaman’s Role in Erdogan’s Despotism.” Politurco.May 30, 2018. https://politurco.com/instrumentalization-of-islam-hayrettin-karamans-role-in-erdogans-despotism.html (accessed on September 1, 2024).

Kocer, S. & Bozdag, C. (2020). “News-Sharing Repertoires on Social Media in the Context of Networked Authoritarianism: The Case of Turkey.” International Journal of Communication. 14: 5292-5310. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/13134

Kuru, A.T. (2012). “The Rise and Fall of Military Tutelage in Turkey: Fears of Islamism, Kurdism, and Communism.” Insight Turkey. 14(2): 37–57.

Kucukgocmen, A. (2021). “Twitter labels Turkish minister’s LGBT post hateful as students protest.” Reuters. February 2, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/turkey-security-bogazici-int-idUSKBN2A21C1 (accessed on August 21, 2024).

Martin, Jose Maria. (2021). “Turkey’s judiciary calls on Ali Erbas to tone it down.” Atalayar. September 10, 2021. https://www.atalayar.com/en/articulo/politics/turkeys-judiciary-calls-ali-erbas-tone-it-down/20210909133027152860.html (accessed on August 19, 2024).

Parkinson, J.; Schechner, S. & Peker, E. (2014). “Turkey’s Erdogan: One of the World’s Most Determined Internet Censors.” The Wall Street Journal. May 2, 2014. https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304626304579505912518706936 (accessed on August 12, 2024).

Pearce, J. (2019). “Turkey to introduce new regulations for OTT services.” IBC. August 6, 2019. https://www.ibc.org/trends/turkey-to-introduce-new-regulations-for-ott-services/4239.article (accessed on August 16, 2024).

Rogenhofer, J. M. & Panievsky, A. (2020). “Antidemocratic populism in power: comparing Erdoğan’s Turkey with Modi’s India and Netanyahu’s Israel.” Democratization. 27(8), 1394–1412. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2020.1795135

Sahinkaya, E. (2021). “Erdogan Says Media Are ‘Incomparably Free,’ But Turkish Journalists Disagree.” VoA. October 13, 2021. https://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-erdogan-press-freedom/6269435.html (accessed on August 11, 2024).

Shearlaw, M. (2016). “Turkish journalists face abuse and threats online as trolls step up attacks.” The Guardian. November 1, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/01/turkish-journalists-face-abuse-threats-online-trolls-attacks (accessed on August 1, 2024).

Timucin, Fatma. (2021). 8-Bit Iron Fist: Digital Authoritarianism in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Cases of Turkey and Hungary. (Master’s thesis, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey). https://research.sabanciuniv.edu/42417/(accessed on August 21, 2024).

Westendarp, L. (2021). “Turkey orders arrests in latest crackdown on Gülen network.” Politico. October 19, 2021. https://www.politico.eu/article/turkey-arrest-crackdown-fethullah-gulen-network/ (accessed on August 11, 2024).

Wilks, A. (2021). “Turkey’s student protests: New challenge for Erdogan.” Al Jazeera.  February 6, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/2/6/turkeys-student-protests-new-challenge-for-erdogan (accessed on August 15, 2024).

Woodward, A. (2019). “Documents Reveal That TikTok Once Banned LGBTQ, Anti-Government Content in Turkey.” Forbes. October 2, 2019. https://www.forbes.com/sites/annabellewoodward1/2019/10/02/documents-reveal-that-tiktok-once-banned-lgbtq-anti-government-content-in-turkey/?sh=5145d5c81d7e (accessed on August 15, 2024).

Yabanci, B. (2019). Work for the Nation, Obey the State, Praise the Ummah: Turkey’s Government-oriented Youth Organizations in Cultivating a New Nation. Ethnopolitics, 20(4), 467–499. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2019.1676536

Yackley, J.A. (2016). “Turkey closes media outlets seized from Gulen-linked owner.” Reuters. March 1, 2016. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-media-gulen-idUSKCN0W34MLa (accessed on August 15, 2024).

Yerlikaya, T. (2019). “Supervision or Censorship? Turkey’s Regulation on Netflix and Web-Based Broadcasting.” Politics Today. August 29, 2019. https://politicstoday.org/supervision-or-censorship-turkeys-regulation-on-netflix-and-web-based-broadcasting/ (accessed on August 15, 2024).

Yesil, B.; Efe, K.Z. & Khazraee, E. (2017). “Turkey’s Internet Policy After the Coup Attempt: The Emergence of a Distributed Network of Online Suppression and Surveillance.” Internet Policy Observatory. https://repository.upenn.edu/internetpolicyobservatory/22 (accessed on August 25, 2024).

Yildiz, A. (2003). “Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook.” The Muslim World (Hartford). 93(2), 187–209. https://doi.org/10.1111/1478-1913.00020

Yilmaz, I. (2000). “Changing institutional Turkish-Muslim discourses on modernity, West and dialogue.” Congress of The International Association of Middle East Studies (IAMES). Freie Universitat Berlin, Germany, October 2000. 

Yilmaz, I. (2008). “Influence of Pluralism and Electoral Participation on the Transformation of Turkish Islamism,” Journal of Economic and Social Research. 10(2): 43-65.

Yilmaz, I. (2009a). “Predicaments and Prospects in Uzbek Islamism: A Critical Comparison with the Turkish Case.” USAK Yearbook of International Politics and Law, 2: 321-347.

Yilmaz, I. (2009b). “An Islamist Party, Constraints, Opportunities and Transformation to Post-Islamism: The Tajik Case.” Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika. 5(18), 133–147.

Yilmaz, I. (2009c). “Socio-Economic, Political and Theological Deprivations’ Role in the Radicalization of the British Muslim Youth: The Case of Hizb ut-Tahrir.” European Journal of Economic and Political Sciences 2(1): 89-101.

Yilmaz, I. (2009d). “Was Rumi the Chief Architect of Islamism? A Deconstruction Attempt of the Current (Mis)Use of the Term ‘Islamism’.” European Journal of Economic and Political Studies. 2(2): 71-84.

Yilmaz, I. (2010a). “A Comparative Analysis of Anti-Systemic Political Islam: Hizb ut-Tahrir’s Influence in Different Political Settings (Britain, Turkey, Egypt and Uzbekistan).” In: Michelangelo Guida and Martin Klus (eds) Turkey and The European Union: Challenges and Accession Perspectives. Bruylant, 253-268.

Yilmaz, I. (2016b). “The Experience of the AKP: From the Origins to Present Times.” In: Alessandro Ferrari and James Toronto (eds) Religions and Constitutional Transitions in the Muslim Mediterranean: The Pluralistic Moment. Abingdon, Oxon; New York, NY: Routledge, 2016, 162-175.

Yilmaz, I. (2018a). “Islamic Populism and Creating Desirable Citizens in Erdogan’s New Turkey.” Mediterranean Quarterly. 29(4): 52-76. https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-7345451

Yilmaz, I. & Bashirov, G. (2018). The AKP after 15 years: emergence of Erdoğanism in Turkey. Third World Quarterly. 39(9): 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I. (2019c). “Potential Impact of the AKP’s Unofficial Political Islamic Law on the Radicalisation of the Turkish Muslim Youth in the West.” In: Mansouri F., Keskin Z. (eds) Contesting the Theological Foundations of Islamism and Violent Extremism. Middle East Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2019, 163-184. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02719-3_9

Yilmaz, I. (2020a). “Islamist Populism in Turkey, Islamist Fatwas and State Transnationalism.” In: Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, 2nd Edition. London and New York: Routledge.

Yilmaz, I. (2021a). Creating the Desired Citizens: State, Islam and Ideology in Turkey. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 

Yilmaz, I. (2021b). “Islamist Populism in Turkey, Islamist Fatwas and State Transnationalism.” In: Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Political Islam, 2nd Edition, 170-187. London and New York: Routledge.

Yilmaz, I. & Albayrak, I. (2022). Populist and Pro-Violence State Religion: The Diyanet’s Construction of Erdoğanist Islam in Turkey. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yilmaz, I.; Demir, M. & Morieson, N. (2021a). “Religion in Creating Populist Appeal: Islamist Populism and Civilizationism in the Friday Sermons of Turkey’s Diyanet.” Religions. 12: 359. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12050359/

Yilmaz, I.; Shipoli, E. & Demir, M. (2021b). “Authoritarian resilience through securitization: an Islamist populist party’s co-optation of a secularist far-right party.” Democratization. 28(6), 1115–1132. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891412

Yilmaz, I. & Erturk, O. (2022). “Authoritarianism and necropolitical creation of martyr icons by Kemalists and Erdoganists in Turkey.” Turkish Studies. 23(2), 243–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2021.1943662

Yilmaz, I. & Erturk, O. F. (2021). “Populism, violence and authoritarian stability: necropolitics in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly. 42(7), 1524–1543. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1896965

Yılmaz, Z. & Turner, B. S. (2019). “Turkey’s deepening authoritarianism and the fall of electoral democracy.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 46(5), 691–698. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1642662

Dr. Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

Professor Sátyro: Authoritarian Leaders in Brazil Face Fewer Obstacles to Implementing Harmful Strategies

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In her deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism, Professor Natália Sátyro, editor of the recently released book “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil,” highlights the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions. She notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles. As Brazil navigates its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if such populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be further tested if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Donald Trump regaining power in other countries.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, provides a deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism. Highlighting the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions, Professor Sátyro notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles.

Reflecting on Brazil’s political landscape, Professor Sátyro emphasizes that while some areas of the country’s social policies are strongly institutionalized, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff exposed significant fragility in Brazil’s democratic institutions. “They withstood the process, but the effects were significant,” she states, drawing parallels with how populist authoritarian governments in other countries, like the United States and Hungary, have exploited identity-based antagonisms to mask their true predatory interests.

Professor Sátyro also discusses the broader global context, comparing Brazil’s right-wing populist movement with similar movements worldwide. She points out that the post-material issues such as neo-conservatism, gender debates and family roles distinguish the populist radical right from the mainstream right. Additionally, she stresses the inherent anti-democratic nature of the populist radical right’s reliance on fake news and disinformation drawing a connection to the strategies used by Donald Trump in the United States.

As Brazil continues to navigate its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if similar populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be tested further if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Trump regaining power in other countries. This interview offers a compelling examination of the complex dynamics at play in Brazil’s ongoing struggle between democratic resilience and the rise of authoritarian populism.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Natália Sátyro with some edits.

Theoretical Frameworks Don’t Always Fully Capture Brazil’s Complexity

Professor Sátyro, thank you very much for joining our interview series. We will be discussing the new book that you edited, “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil.” Let me begin with the first question. In the conclusion of the book, you refer to the musician Antonio Carlos Jobim, who famously said, “Brazil is not for beginners.” As a beginner myself, what should I understand from this phrase?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Thank you for the invitation. This phrase conveys the complexity of the Brazilian case and highlights the theoretical and practical challenges we face as academics. For instance, if we examine a political competition indicator at the subnational level, such as the number of effective parties, it might suggest the presence of three competitive parties in certain states. However, qualitatively, we must consider that each member of the same traditional political family may belong to a different party, rendering the measure of competition somewhat meaningless.

Another example is the need to understand Brazil as a presidential federation. It’s crucial to think about the coordination between the executive and legislative branches. In theory, to ensure governability, the president must maintain a majority in the legislative board, which is intuitive and applies to other political regimes as well. However, when we look at the context in which Jair Bolsonaro governed, for instance, he had a majority in the legislative branch, but he did not fully utilize this majority. He was a president who garnered less support from Congress for his proposals than Dilma Rousseff, who had such a poor relationship with Congress that it ultimately led to her impeachment. In other words, Bolsonaro could have accomplished much more in line with his agenda if he had chosen to or had the necessary skills.

This is the essence of Jobim’s statement—Brazil’s reality is more complex than it sometimes appears, and theoretical frameworks don’t always fully capture this complexity. That’s the idea behind this statement.

In your book, you highlight that the 13-year of left-wing governments came to an end through a broad coalition and an impeachment process. Could you elaborate on how President Dilma Rousseff’s 2016 impeachment contributed to the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil? What impact did Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) have on eroding public trust in Brazil’s democratic institutions, thereby enabling populist rhetoric? What key factors led to the downfall of left-wing governance in Brazil?

Professor Natália Sátyro: These are three distinct and complex questions.

First, it’s crucial to understand that President Rousseff, who was elected by popular vote, was removed from power without any reasonable justification—a fact that has since been confirmed by the judiciary. This is highly irregular in a presidential system. In parliamentary systems, a political leader can be removed without significant consequences if they do not meet expectations. However, Brazil had rejected the option for parliamentary governance twice in referendums. So, while the impeachment process followed institutional rituals, it was fundamentally flawed from the outset, which destabilized the political system. This opened the door for the emergence of a right-wing populist leader like Bolsonaro, someone without a strong political background who could barely articulate coherent thoughts but had significant popular appeal.

Regarding the second part of your question, Operation Car Wash was highly influential. It effectively removed the principal candidate from the left, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, through an illegitimate process where the same individual acted as both judge and prosecutor. This lack of impartiality was later demonstrated, and the process was overturned, but the damage was done. Judge Sérgio Moro’s actions disqualified Lula from the 2018 presidential race, completely altering its outcome. Ironically, Operation Car Wash began with the strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s Office during Lula’s administration but devolved into a witch hunt targeting only left-wing figures. Sérgio Moro later became a minister under Bolsonaro, further illustrating the political motivations behind the operation.

Finally, regarding the factors that led to the downfall of the left, it’s important to note that it wasn’t merely a downfall—it was a forceful removal. This distinction matters because Dilma Rousseff lacked the same economic acumen that Lula had. The economy was already struggling during the last year of her first term, and it was widely understood that an economic crisis was imminent, which indeed occurred. This reality weighed heavily on the electorate, as demonstrated by Perez Linan’s book titled Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, which emphasizes the economic factor.

Additionally, Dilma was not a natural politician; she was more of a technician, whereas Lula was an exceptional statesman and negotiator. Anyone succeeding him would inevitably face challenges in maintaining cooperation. Moreover, we must recognize that Dilma was a woman, and gender issues cannot be ignored. She was a tough woman, not very flexible in negotiating with the predominantly white, sexist men in the Brazilian Congress. There’s also an argument that she encouraged investigations into corruption across all parties, including her own, and the judiciary. A famous recording by Senator Romero Jucá spoke about her removal as part of a concerted effort that also involved the judiciary. This truly was a coordinated effort to bring down the left in Brazil.

“Where There Is No Money, There Can Be No Policy”

You argue that the purpose of the book is to analyze the drivers and the scope of the changes and reforms in the Brazilian system of social protection over the period of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro governments to understand how the golden age of social protection led to the dismantling of these systems. Can you elaborate what policies and strategies did Temer and Bolsonaro administrations use to dismantle the social protection system?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Oh, many strategies were used, and they varied depending on the specific social policy in question. The tactics included reforms, re-regulation, defunding, and deregulation of social policies. One of the most famous phrases during this period was, “Where there is no money, there can be no policy,” which reflects the strategy of defunding as a way to undermine social protection.

In the Brazilian case, we saw a combination of reforms, cutbacks, policy termination and deregulation, all aimed at containing and reducing social expansion. When observed together, it’s clear that these actions constituted a systematic retrenchment and dismantling of social policies. Different policies faced different strategies, but the overall goal was the same: to roll back the advancements made during the golden age of social protection.

Could you explain how neoliberal austerity measures and populist rhetoric interacted in Brazil during the presidencies of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro? What were the significant challenges that traditional social policies in Brazil encountered due to the combined pressure of neoliberal austerity and populist rule?

Professor Natália Sátyro: First, it’s important to recognize that these two objectives—neoliberal austerity and populism—did not apply equally to Temer and Bolsonaro. Temer was the representative of austerity. He was not a populist; he communicated in formal Portuguese, without any intention or ability to connect with the masses. Bolsonaro, on the other hand, was very much a populist. Unlike Temer, Bolsonaro did not advocate for austerity; in fact, he spent heavily and this was not only due to the pandemic. In his last year, he went beyond any minimal restraint in using public resources.

When it comes to fiscal austerity, it’s a tricky subject. Of course, maintaining fiscal balance is important, but we also know that social policies during times of crisis can be crucial drivers for the market. For example, the Bolsa Família (BF)program in Brazil had a huge impact on local markets.

Another point to consider is the difference between public and private management, particularly in terms of fiscal austerity. The concept of the public good doesn’t always align with efficiency, but in Brazil’s case, the greatest limitation of social policy is not just austerity—it’s inequality itself. Inequality in Brazil is so extreme that it creates enormous costs to maintain social systems. For instance, the real problem with social security isn’t the basic pensions, but rather the retirement benefits and privileges of the military and judiciary, which are extremely expensive. These privileges are difficult to reform due to the strength of pressure groups, making the system unsustainable.

When we consider austerity alongside populism, it’s clear that Latin America has always had populist politicians, both on the left and the right. Similarly, fake news has long been a part of the political landscape. However, what’s concerning today is the scale of the disinformation ecosystem. It has taken fake news to a new level, destabilizing democratic systems. This combination of disinformation and populism creates a significant challenge for democracy. In a debate, for example, a populist politician has an advantage over opponents because they are not committed to the truth and they can use widespread social media to spread misinformation. I believe this is a new and serious threat to democracy.

Bolsonaro Used Public Resources in a Very Aggressive and Abusive Manner 

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro during 74th Anniversary of Parachutist Infantry Battalion held at Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo

How did the rise of populist radical right ideologies during Bolsonaro’s presidency contribute to the reshaping and dismantling of Brazil’s social protection systems? Can you discuss the specific strategies used by the Bolsonaro administration to dismantle Brazil’s social welfare system, particularly regarding social security and healthcare?

Professor Natália Sátyro: The pension reform was introduced in the first year of Bolsonaro’s government, but it’s important to note that the entire negotiation process for this reform was actually initiated under Temer. The pension reform implemented in 2019 was radical in its aim to reduce the attractiveness of the public system. It was a strategic move because its consequences are long-term rather than immediate.

According to the authors who contributed to the chapter on social security, even without directly adopting a full capitalization system, the reform carried out during Bolsonaro’s presidency established a reduction in benefits and increased the requirements for granting them. This encouraged workers to migrate to complementary private pension systems. Moreover, there was a significant decrease in the government’s commitment to maintaining the attractiveness and robustness of the contributory public pillar of the social security system.

On the one hand, the reform created an alternative for high-income workers to build their complementary pensions outside the public system. On the other hand, it imposed many restrictions, making it almost impossible for low-income workers to receive full pensions after a lifetime of contributions. This reform effectively created a two-tier system, where high-income individuals could exit the public system, while low-income individuals faced increased barriers to accessing benefits.

In terms of healthcare, both Temer and Bolsonaro pursued similar strategies, emphasizing privatization and valuing curative services over preventive ones. Their approach involved deregulating the public and universal aspects of the healthcare system and opening it up to private initiatives. Deregulation, re-regulation and, above all, defunding were key strategies used to undermine the public health system.

Ironically, the arrival of the pandemic in some ways saved Brazil’s Unified Health System (SUS) from complete dismantling. The importance of a system that virtually serves everyone became clear during the pandemic. However, Bolsonaro’s inability to coordinate the response to the pandemic was evident. He refused to provide leadership and instead allowed states and municipalities to handle the crisis independently, in addition to promoting denialism with statements against vaccines and other public health measures.

Ultimately, the dismantling of social security was far more severe and impactful than the challenges faced by the healthcare system, though both were targeted by the Bolsonaro administration.

Bolsonaro was not re-elected in 2022 however received 58 million votes against the winner’s 60 million. How do you explain the relative success of Bolsonaro despite his policies to dismantle Brazilian social welfare regime?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Yes, this is why I mentioned that Brazil is not for beginners—it’s truly remarkable. It’s important to understand how Bolsonaro used government resources in a very aggressive and, frankly, abusive manner during his final year in office to boost his re-election chances. 

For example, the government created and accelerated the release of over 6,000 benefits for truck drivers and taxi drivers. Bolsonaro also authorized 12 banks, including public ones, to extend loans to recipients of the Brazil Aid (the new name for the cash transfer program that replaced the Bolsa Família) and the Continuous Benefit Payment, which provides a minimum wage to the elderly and people with disabilities. In 2022, he increased the number of families receiving Brazil Aid by 6.6 million and raised the benefit amount, but this increase was only budgeted for that year—clearly intended to influence the election.

Furthermore, the 6.6 million cards distributed for the Brazil Aid had the symbol of Bolsonaro’s electoral campaign. He also used TV Brasil to broadcast numerous speeches and propaganda, particularly from the Minister of Economy, Paulo Guedes. By the end of the year, more than 400 billion reais (around 80 billion dollars) had been spent beyond what was originally planned—this is not what one would expect from someone supposedly committed to austerity.

In addition to these actions, Bolsonaro’s campaign was supported by a powerful fake news machine, which served as a smokescreen for many of his questionable practices. We are living in an era of post-truth, where a massive echo chamber of misinformation can significantly influence public opinion. The 58 million votes Bolsonaro received are a direct result of these efforts to secure re-election, despite his harmful policies.

Authoritarian Leaders Face Fewer Obstacles in Brazil 

A key question the book explores is whether populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Brazil differ from the mainstream right, and if so, how? How does the Brazilian PRRPs’ approach to social policies compare to that of the traditional right, especially regarding welfare state retrenchment? Additionally, can you discuss the similarities and differences between Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party (PSL) and populist parties in Europe and the US in terms of economic, social and cultural issues? How does Brazil’s right-wing populist movement align with or differ from similar movements globally, particularly in social policy and governance?

Professor Natália Sátyro: There are at least two major differences between populist radical right movements and the mainstream right, at least in Brazil. The first major difference lies in post-material issues that characterize the far right, such as neo-conservatism, gender issues and debates on the role of the family. The second difference is their respect for democratic rules. While the mainstream right generally respects democratic norms, the populist radical right, as seen in their use of fake news on a large scale, is inherently anti-democratic.

I don’t consider myself an expert on other countries to make strong comparisons, but it’s clear that similar strategies are being used by figures like Donald Trump in the US. For instance, during the debate with Kamala Harris, Trump falsely claimed that immigrants were eating dogs and cats, a blatant lie that even the journalists had to immediately refute. Such absurd claims make meaningful debate difficult because they are so extreme that the opposition struggles to respond effectively.

Looking at Europe, the persistence of leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the victory of Giorgia Meloni in Italy, and Marine Le Pen’s strong showing in France, along with developments in Spain and Austria, highlight a broader cultural phenomenon affecting politics globally. In the Brazilian context, where social policies and institutions are weakly institutionalized or where democratic institutions are fragile, authoritarian leaders face fewer obstacles in introducing harmful strategies.

While Brazil has strong institutionalized policies in many areas, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff revealed the vulnerability of our democratic institutions. They managed to endure the process, but the effects were significant. Some cases confirm that populist authoritarian governments exploit identity-based antagonisms to obscure their true commitment to predatory interests, as seen with Trump in the US or Orbán in Hungary. Scholar Kanchan Chandra describes Brazil and India under their respective leaders as exhibiting “ethnocratic populism,” where populism is intertwined with a fearmongering, traditional, social and cultural hierarchy. 

These differences between the populist radical right and the mainstream right are crucial for understanding the current political landscape.

While concluding the book, you argue that “Brazil appears to be a compelling case of resilience worth considering… it has resisted a violent and explicit attack.” Thinking the possibility that Donald Trump can be re-elected as the president of the US, how do you think Brazilian democracy will react? Will it galvanize populist movements and populists like Bolsonaro in Brazil?

Professor Natália Sátyro: There are two possible paths and the outcome will largely depend on who wins the election in Brazil. If the radical right wins the presidential elections again, Trump’s re-election could have a significant impact on Brazil. Following Bolsonaro’s line, we could see further subordination to similar political ideologies and movements, potentially leading to events like the January 6, 2021, insurrection in the US and the January 8, 2023, attack in Brazil. However, if the left or a more democratic and less authoritarian right wins in Brazil, I don’t foresee as much of a problem. While Trump’s potential re-election might not directly affect Brazil in that scenario, the broader consequences of Trump’s actions and irresponsibility would still have global repercussions.

A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.

The Role of Mainstream Parties in the Success of Radical Right Populists 

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties. 

By Maël Jones

The issue of radical right populism (RRP) has exploded onto the political science scene in the last two to three decades. Naturally, this was to be expected after the success of these parties in elections across western democracies. As a result, a flurry of different opinions on the causes of the success of RRP parties have emerged, some mutually inclusive others less so. 

Much of the focus has been on the voter, the so-called demand-side. Here the big divide is generally between those who believe that RRP parties succeed because of economic reasons, while others believe the main driver to be cultural issues (Engler & Weisstanner, 2020; Bornschier, 2018: 213). Some other researchers have focused specifically on the supply-side: the parties (Mols & Jetten, 2020; Russo & Brock, 2024). In this case the focus is generally on the role of the radical right parties themselves (Mols & Jetten, 2020), or in rarer cases, the way in which other parties have interacted with RRPs (Russo & Brock, 2024). By focusing too much on the phenomenon of RRP itself, students of this discipline have forgotten much of what surrounds it. Because, while RRPs do influence voter decisions, voters do not only vote for RRPs they also vote against those parties that they, and the generations before them, trusted for decades – mainstream parties. To avoid lengthy definitions, we will consider mainstream parties as those broadly situated in the middle of the political spectrum and encompassing the country’s political establishment. In the EU, these parties are generally affiliated with the S&D, EPP, Renew, or the Greens. 

Since the onset of the liberal democratic model, mainstream parties have been central actors of the system – parties played an important role in simplifying the political process, representing a large amount of people and pulling people into the political process (Stokes, 1999: 243-244). Of course, the system of parties is imperfect, but the division of the political system into segments of society that were more or less adequately represented by said parties made for a stable system (Lipset, 2000: 50-51). Generally, left-wing parties represented the poorer working class while richer, middle- and upper-class voters opted for right-wing parties. Some systems also had a divide along race lines or religious beliefs (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 2000: 50) Yet, in recent years, the decline of these parties has been apparent (Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021: 37). At times, the green or liberal parties attracted voters away from the mainstream. Increasingly, though, as the latter have been integrated into the political establishment (Burchell, 2014), it has been the radical right that has taken over many of the votes previously held by mainstream parties. One of the main reasons for why this has happened, is due to political disaffection (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174, Hooghe et al., 2011).

The first strong indicator of such disaffection emerged in the decades around the end of the cold war: declining rates of voter turnout (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2011). Today, this issue is still at the heart of many political debates despite slowing down and even showing some signs of improvement (IDEA, 2024). In its stead, in the last 20 or so years we have seen votes for the radical right populists increase drastically across the board (Ivaldi, 2024). 

Political Disaffection

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

Let us first analyze what has driven political disaffection before turning to how voter turnout and the success of RRPs are linked.

There are multiple drivers for political disaffection. What is clear is that for people to feel implicated in a system and for that system to be of interest to them, they must feel like they have some power within it (Harder & Krosnick, 2008: 538). Thus, drivers of disaffection would cause people to doubt their importance within the political system and abandon it or look for ways to regain this power. Yet, increasingly, mainstream parties have taken steps to decrease the power of the people (Mair, 2011).

First, is the convergence of mainstream parties on policy issues. Some might be surprised by the claim that parties are “converging” when we are constantly being told that our democracies and societies are becoming increasingly polarized (Nguyen & Vu, 2019). But one must not automatically exclude the other. A convergence can exists on policy issues even when political rhetoric is as divided as ever. Additionally, the attention here is specifically on mainstream parties.

For decades, a body of literature has argued that the more political parties converge to the center, the better they will perform electorally (Spoon & Klüver, 2019: 1023). The theory holds merit and cannot entirely be dismissed. Yet, while maximizing their votes in order to win over the ‘median voter,’ mainstream parties have failed to represent those with more radical values. This creates a more volatile political arena that is more inclined to turn to the extremes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 1).

As some have remarked, Germany might be the best example for this in Western Europe. For decades now, the CDU and the SPD have moved towards the center (Berman & Kundani, 2021: 23). The former – a family and Christian-oriented party – increasingly moved left on social issues, while the latter – a left-wing workers’ party – increasingly moved to the right on certain economic issues. Both forming a ‘Grand Coalition’ and working together across most of the beginning of the 21st Century (Berman & Kundani, 2021).

But even France, an oftentimes divided society with historically strong labor movements, experienced a neoliberal transformation that transcended party politics. As some of the biggest neoliberal decisions were taken by socialist Presidents François Mitterand and François Hollande (Masquelier, 2021; Pinçon & Pinçon Charlot, 2014). Other countries have seen similar trends within their borders as well. Tony Blair’s Labor Party and Bill Clinton’s democrats both became important drivers of neo-liberalization in their respective countries, with little protest from opposition parties on that particular matter (Rieger, 2021: 113; Meerpool, 2019). 

Today, as Mair (2011: 72) notes, the question between state-controlled and market-controlled economies has been answered: the winners are market-controlled economies. The left-right divide on this issue has thus eroded and the current positions present a far less clear distinction. Therefore, mainstream parties attempt to find distinctions somewhere else: they insist on personalities, character traits and rhetorical differences. But these significantly impoverish the possible policy changes once in power and thus deprives electors of a feeling of potential change (Hay, 2007: 56-58).

In parallel to party convergence, a similar but distinct phenomenon has also been changing Western European societies: the depoliticization of many issues and the rise of the regulatory state. The effect of this is that many decisions which once lay with elected politicians – and thus by extension with the people – have been removed from the political sphere and into the bureaucratic and/or the market-controlled sphere. 

For example, a case of this is Central Bank independence. Central Banks originally emerged in very different circumstances depending on the countries and their history – some were private, others independent, and some were dependent on the national treasury (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020). But today, the idea that these institutions must be independent has been dominant for decades and remains almost entirely unchallenged. This idea was first formulated in 1962 by Milton Friedman (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020), an economist dubbed by Krugman (2007) as an “ideologue [and] the great popularizer of the free-market doctrine.” He was incidentally the man who went on to advise Raegan and Thatcher for their economic policies. While he remains one of the most influential and knowledgeable economists ever to live, he can hardly be described as neutral or apolitical. Yet, his long-term fight to make Central Banks independent has today been made to seem exactly that: neutral and apolitical. In turn, this has justified the depoliticization of central banks and its removal from public decision-making.

In the UK, the Bank of England was one of the last Central Banks to remain under the responsibility of the treasury, but in 1998, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, this changed, and the Bank was granted independence to set interest rates (Burnham, 2001). In a more global study encompassing 155 countries, Romelli (2024: 3), found that out of 370 reforms to central bank designs between 1923 and 2023, over 75 percent of them increased the bank’s independence. In the European Union (EU), the Maastricht treaty required EU countries to have an independent Central Bank. This was in addition, of course, to the European Central Bank (ECB) which is also independent and covers all 27 EU countries (Bruni, 1997).

The EU has not only pushed the depoliticization of central banks, but it has also brought about many depoliticizing policies within its member states. In the early 1990s, the European Commission began heavily banking on regulation and became a powerful actor in restraining an increasingly privatized market; thus began the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 1994). 

Regulation became a way for a Commission with a low budget to increase its decision-making powers without changing the rules of the game. At the beginning, this did not really pose too many problems. The Commission played a role which, in other democracies, was often taken on by independent agencies and this role was limited in scope (Majone, 1994). But with years passing, the Commission became more powerful, and the roles it took on, outgrew those that made it possible to overlook the institution’s undemocratic nature (Majone, 2014: 1217). Because after regulation came financial control. Of course, member states signed up to this. For example, they agreed to adhere to the so-called ‘Fiscal Stability Treaty’ in 2012 which significantly restrained individual state’s fiscal policies. States must for example avoid excessive public debt and must also submit their budget plans to the Council in order for them to be scrutinized (and possibly asked to be altered). This constrained governments’ actions and put more power into the hands of those with little to no accountability (Majone, 2014: 1220).

While it may seem that the blame is being shifted onto the EU and away from mainstream parties, this is not entirely accurate for two main reasons. First, as Mair (2011: 127) rightly argues, the EU did not grow organically, instead it was built by its architects. These architects were primarily the foreign ministers and leaders of European countries and thus members of the political establishment. Second, critique of the EU has been very constrained, especially in Western Europe. When governments disagree with EU policies, they blame Brussels without calling for real change. When they are happy with these policies, they take credit for them. The only real critics of the EU have been populist parties from both the left and the right (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 43). Thus, anyone who does not entirely agree with the European project or with the direction it has taken, has to either accept it or vote for populists.

Some other factors can also be named which originate from the political establishment and foster disaffection. Some examples of this are globalization which has deeply affected western societies but has been regarded by the political establishment as the only way forward (even though, in recent years, this enthusiasm has been curtailed slightly); as well as the metamorphosis of mainstream parties, going from ones representing specific groups and interests to catch-all parties with a hugely eroded identity (Mair, 2011: 79-85). 

Consequences of Political Disaffection

Photo: Shutterstock.

Having established the factors of political disaffection, we can move our focus to attempting to understand its consequences.

As mentioned earlier, lower voter turnout has been one of the main symptoms of political disaffection in the last few decades. The direct impact of the latter onto the former is of course hard to assess analytically because it contrasts a subjective state (disaffection) with a phenomenon that is directly and objectively quantifiable (turnout). 

Whether the existence of a link between low turnout and political disaffection needs to be “proven” is debatable. One could argue that the theoretical framework of representative democracy is sufficient to establish this connection. After all, the election of politicians to represent us is fundamental to the functioning of our system. This does not mean that those who do not vote are necessarily apolitical, indeed, many other ways to express one’s opinions exist. Yet, within the formal system, voting is the only universal way of making one’s opinions heard. Choosing not to vote – whether out of apathy or out of protest – can thus be seen as a symptom of disaffection from the present political system.

Based on this though, a vote for radical right populists must not necessarily be a sign of disaffection. And this is true, it is not per se a vote of disaffection, many other reasons exist to vote for RRPs, from authoritarian tendencies to a simple agreement with the party’s policies (Tillman, 2015). But what is of interest to us is specifically the rise of RRPs and why people today are far more likely to vote for such parties than they were 40 years ago. Here, it seems extremely likely that the disaffected have played an important role.

Not all scholars agree on the idea that those who are more dissatisfied will vote for RRPs. This is in large parts because those academics seem to associate disaffection with the idea of ‘protest votes,’ the latter of which is seen as an extension of ‘non-ideological votes’ (Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Yet, a protest vote must not necessarily be non-ideological. Voters can feel dissatisfaction with a political system because the parties that once represented them do not align with them anymore and thus their ideology is not represented anymore. In this case, an ideological vote simultaneously becomes a protest vote. 

In addition, in the likely case that parties do truly influence political opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), voters who might once have felt only some affinities to RRPs are likely to have developed a stronger ideological overlap over time – Thus distorting studies based on ideological overlap.

It thus seems obvious that when defined right and seen from a broader angle, disaffection from the political system and distrust of its main actors is a central driver of this political movement. People are more likely to vote for the radical right when politicians lose their trust and in turn radical right voters trust mainstream politicians less (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174). We know from Germany for example that “turnout surges benefit the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust” (Schulte-Cloos & Leiniger, 2022: 431) meaning that those who did not go out to vote in past elections and were dissatisfied with the system voted in large parts for the AfD. Additional research such as Hooghe et al.’s work (2011: 265) in Belgium also showed how those who are dissatisfied or distrustful are more likely either not to vote or to vote for populist radical right parties.

More simply though, radical right parties have been winning over votes in recent decades, votes that once were almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. Additionally, turnout has dwindled. Whatever the analytical reason, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not winning over or convincing as many people as they once were. One can always blame external factors such as misinformation or divisive rhetoric for this but that is not sufficient in our democratic system. Our system is simple, it requires parties and politicians to win votes. People thus need to be won over and convinced, if they are not, they will defect to other parties. Blaming elements out of their control will only make matters worse for liberal democratic mainstream parties.

Conclusion 

Having established a link between mainstream parties and disaffection with the political system in a first instance, and then between disaffection and radical right votes in a second; one can see a clear link between the mainstream’s failures and the success of RRPs. This link is important to make for a number of reasons. Firstly, simply because it has been overlooked by researchers. Secondly because it shifts a part of the responsibility from the voters onto the political establishment. This matters because the often-used argument that those who vote for RRPs are simply ill-informed or racist is analytically and politically rather unhelpful and oftentimes overlooks important components of the RRP vote. Lastly, establishing this link gives mainstream parties the tools to recenter their fight against the radical right. Many have attempted to fight this fight, but a misunderstanding of the causes seems to have led most of these efforts to failure. To truly fight RRPs, mainstream parties must know their voters, aim to truly represent them, and ensure that their policies – rather than their rhetoric – truly stand out and distance themselves from their political opponents and rivals.

References 

— (2024). “Voter Turnout Database.” International IDEA. www.idea.int website: https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database (accessed on August 31, 2024).

Bartolini, S. & Mair, P. (1990). “Policy competition, spatial distance and electoral instability.” West European Politics. 13(4), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389008424816

Berman, S., & Kundnani, H. (2021). “The Cost of Convergence.” Journal of Democracy. 32(1), 22–36. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0013

Bornschier, S. (2018). Globalization, cleavages, and the radical right. The Oxford handbook of the radical right, 212-238.

Bruni, F. (1997). Central bank independence in the European Union. In Towards More Effective Monetary Policy (pp. 341-386). London: Palgrave Macmillan UK.

Burchell, J. (2014). The evolution of green politics: development and change within European Green Parties. Routledge.

Burnham, P. (2001). New Labour and the politics of depoliticisation. In The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 3(2), pp.127-149.

Casal Bértoa, F., & Rama, J. (2021). “The Antiestablishment Challenge.” Journal of Democracy. 32(1), 37–51. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2021.0014

Engler, S. & Weisstanner, D. (2020). Income inequality, status decline and support for the radical right. Springer. https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-194698

Grzymala-Busse, A. (2019). “The Failure of Europe’s Mainstream Parties.” Journal of Democracy, 30(4), 35–47. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2019.0067

Harder, J. & Krosnick, J. A. (2008). “Why Do People Vote? A Psychological Analysis of the Causes of Voter Turnout.” Journal of Social Issues, 64(3), 525–549. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00576.x

Hooghe, M.; Marien, S.; & Pauwels, T. (2011). “Where Do Distrusting Voters Turn if There is No Viable Exit or Voice Option? The Impact of Political Trust on Electoral Behaviour in the Belgian Regional Elections of June 2009.” Government and Opposition (London). 46(2), 245–273. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2010.01338.x

Ivaldi, G. (2024). “EU elections: far-right parties surge, but less than had been expected.” The Conversation. June 10, 2024. https://theconversation.com/eu-elections-far-right-parties-surge-but-less-than-had-been-expected-232018 (accessed on August 30, 2024).

Arzheimer, Kai. (2008). “Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?” Zeitschrift Für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. 2(2), 173–197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12286-008-0011-4

Krugman, P. (2007). “Who Was Milton Friedman?” New York Review of Books. February 15, 2007. 54(2), 27. https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2007/02/15/who-was-milton-friedman/ (accessed on September 13, 2024).

Lipset, S. M. (2000). “The Indispensability of Political Parties.” Journal of Democracy. 11(1), 48–55. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2000.0016

Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (1967). Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments. New York: Free Press.

Mair, P. (2013). Ruling the Void: The Hollowing-Out of Western Democracy. London: Verso Books.

Masquelier, C. (2021). “Theorising French neoliberalism: The technocratic elite, decentralised collective bargaining and France’s ‘passive neoliberal revolution.” European Journal of Social Theory. 24(1), 65–85. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431020915855

Meeropol, M. (2017). Surrender: How the Clinton administration completed the Reagan revolution. University of Michigan Press.

Mols, F. & Jetten, J. (2020). “Understanding Support for Populist Radical Right Parties: Toward a Model That Captures Both Demand-and Supply-Side Factors.” Frontiers in Communication. 5. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2020.557561

Pinçon, M., & Pinçon-Charlot, M. (2014). La violence des riches: chronique d’une immense casse sociale. La découverte.

Rieger, Bernhard. (2021). “British varieties of neoliberalism: unemployment policy from Thatcher to Blair.” In: The Neoliberal Age? (pp. 112-). UCL Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1smjwgq.13

Romelli, D. (2024). Trends in central bank independence: a de-jure perspective. BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper, (217).

Russo, L., & Schulze Brock, P. (2024). “Mainstream partisans’ affective response to (non) cooperation with populist radical right parties.” West European Politics. 1–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2024.2336436

Schulte-Cloos, J. & Leininger, A. (2022). “Electoral participation, political disaffection, and the rise of the populist radical right.” Party Politics. 28(3), 431–443. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068820985186

Slothuus, R. & Bisgaard, M. (2021). “How Political Parties Shape Public Opinion in the Real World.” American Journal of Political Science. 65(4), 896–911. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12550

Söderlund, P. & Kestilä-Kekkonen, E. (2009). “Dark Side of Party Identification? An Empirical Study of Political Trust among Radical Right-Wing Voters.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 19(2), 159–181. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457280902799014

Spoon, J.J. and Klüver, H. (2019). “Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe.” European Journal of Political Research. 58(4), 1021–1042. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12331

Stokes, S. C. (1999). “Political parties and democracy.” Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1), 243–267. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.2.1.243

Tillman, E. (2021). “Authoritarianism and support for populist radical right parties.” In: Authoritarianism and the Evolution of West European Electoral Politics (pp. 115–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Van der Brug, W., Fennema, M., & Tillie, J. (2000). “Anti-immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote?” European Journal of Political Research. 37(1), 77–102. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00505

Wachtel, P. & Blejer, M. I. (2020). “A Fresh Look at Central Bank Independence.” The Cato Journal, 40(1), 105–132. https://doi.org/10.36009/Cj.40.1.7

Ziller, C. & Schübel, T. (2015). “‘The Pure People’ versus ‘the Corrupt Elite’? Political Corruption, Political Trust and the Success of Radical Right Parties in Europe.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties. 25(3), 368–386. https://doi.org/10.1080/17457289.2014.1002792

Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University.

Professor Kriesberg: Right-Wing Populism in the US Is Doomed to Failure, Even If Trump Is Re-Elected

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsUncategorized

Professor Louis Kriesberg argues that right-wing populism, as represented by Donald Trump in the US, is ultimately doomed to failure, even if Trump were to be re-elected. He draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, noting that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms. Although Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage, he remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving a compelling interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), veteran scholar Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University, delves into the complexities of right-wing populism in the United States (US), particularly in the context of Donald Trump’s political career. Central to the discussion with Professor Kriesberg is the idea that while Trump’s brand of right-wing populism has gained significant traction, it is ultimately doomed to failure. Professor Kriesberg draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, to argue that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms.

However, the interview also touches on the possible dangers facing American democracy if Trump were to be reelected. Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage but remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of the resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.

The conversation with Professor Kriesberg explores themes from his book Fighting Better, where he analyzes the constructive conflict approach in both international and domestic contexts. As a scholar with extensive experience in conflict resolution, Professor Kriesberg provides a nuanced perspective on how American democracy has been challenged, particularly during and after Trump’s presidency. 

By reflecting on the motivations behind his book, Professor Kriesberg notes the increasing polarization and hostility in American politics. His work seeks to apply the principles of conflict resolution—traditionally used in international disputes—to the domestic conflicts tearing at the fabric of American society. He highlights how the progress of various status groups, such as African Americans, women, and LGBTQ people, has led to significant backlash, which right-wing populism has exploited to deepen divisions.

Professor Kriesberg also offers insights into the potential future of American democracy, stressing the importance of addressing the root causes of inequality and fostering greater cooperation across political divides. His analysis provides a hopeful yet realistic outlook on the challenges ahead, emphasizing that while the road may be difficult, constructive conflict resolution offers a path forward.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Louis Kriesberg with some edits.

Conflict Resolution Could Also Be Relevant to Domestic Conflicts

What reasons compelled you to write the book ‘Fighting Better’ and what is the main purpose of this book? Why did you choose the title of ‘Fighting Better’ for your book? 

Professor Louis Kriesberg: Most of my research has focused on international conflicts, particularly the Cold War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, over time, I developed an interest in the transformations occurring within my own country since the end of World War II. I was struck by the increasing troubles in our society, particularly the growing political divisions, the nastiness in politics, and the threats of violence. This led me to believe that the development of conflict resolution, which I had contributed to for many years, could also be relevant to domestic conflicts, not just international ones.

In the preface, I mention that I had the audacity to undertake this analysis because I had lived through these changes and possessed the necessary skills. I felt I could contribute to understanding how our society’s troubles became so severe and how a constructive conflict approach could provide solutions.

I was driven to write this book because I wanted it to reach a broad audience—not just my academic colleagues or university courses, but the public at large. The title Fighting Better seemed fitting as it encapsulates the essence of what I aimed to achieve: a proper statement on how we can address conflicts more constructively.

Can you please explain to our readers how conflicts can be waged constructively by analyzing American conflicts that did or did not work out well for the contenders and the country as a whole?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: Certainly. Let me outline some basic principles of constructive conflict. I’ve discussed these ideas extensively in another book, Constructive Conflicts, co-authored with Bruce Dayton. The first edition was published in 1986, but the concepts remain fundamental.

First of all, many conflicts are managed through established institutions. All societies have rules for dealing with conflict—through legal systems, politics, and other institutionalized methods. Conflicts handled within these frameworks tend to be more constructive, provided the rules are fair and widely accepted.

Secondly, coercion isn’t the only way to influence conflict outcomes. There are three major inducements: persuasion, promises of benefits, and coercion. In nearly every conflict, one side tries to convince others of the rightness of their cause. Sometimes, offering benefits or incentives can also play a role in resolving conflicts. This means that not all conflicts rely solely on coercion, whether violent or nonviolent.

Thirdly, conflicts are often interwoven. We might frame them as isolated, but they are connected to broader and smaller issues. This interconnectedness offers opportunities to find better solutions, rather than seeing conflicts as fixed, zero-sum battles.

Fourthly, often, conflicts are framed as a battle between good and bad, but in constructive conflict resolution, it’s crucial to genuinely understand the other side—their needs, perspectives, and misunderstandings. This can lead to more effective conflict resolution.

Finally, conflicts evolve as contexts change, and different factions within each side may shift their positions. This fluidity can make finding better outcomes more possible or less likely, depending on how the situation is handled.

These are some of the basic ideas behind constructive conflict. We’ve explored these concepts further in other publications as well.

The Republican Party Has Pursued Policies That Exacerbated Inequality 

In your analysis of class-related conflicts, how did you observe the relationship between economic policies and the rise of class inequality from 1970 to 1992? What were the key factors contributing to the “hyper class inequality” that you describe as occurring between 1993 and 2022? How do conflicts across different dimensions of inequality (class, status, and power) interact and influence each other according to your findings?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: There has been remarkable progress in achieving greater equality for certain status groups in America, particularly African Americans, since the end of World War II. After the war, there were raised expectations among African Americans that they deserved much greater equality than they had experienced under the oppressive conditions of slavery and segregation. Even President Harry Truman recognized this, believing in the integration of African Americans into the army. However, the South’s conditions were dire, with many whites attempting to maintain the status quo and keep African Americans “in their place.” This led to increased resistance to Jim Crow laws, and the civil rights movement began to take shape, with leadership focused on nonviolent actions as a means to achieve change.

The situation in Birmingham, Alabama, was particularly troubling, with issues like the denial of equal seating on buses. This became a well-defined target for change, with African Americans demanding the right to sit anywhere on the buses. Leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., who was thoughtful and strategic, worked closely with other community leaders, particularly within the church, to build a movement that was carefully planned and constructively waged.

Despite the constructive approach, the white leadership in many Southern cities responded with destructive tactics, including repression, violence, and arrests. These actions, however, only garnered more support for the African American cause. The federal government, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was sympathetic to the movement, eventually intervened. The movement’s success inspired other groups of African Americans to employ nonviolent techniques in their own struggles for equality.

I was influenced by the traditional sociological framework that emphasizes the major dimensions of society: class, status, and power. The ideas of class inequality, particularly as discussed by Marx, provided a convenient way to organize my analysis. Class inequality was largely addressed through legislation rather than direct action. Initially, under Democratic leadership, particularly Lyndon B. Johnson, there were efforts to improve welfare payments for low-income people, including African Americans. This contributed to some increase in equality in the years following World War II, despite the negative impact of the Vietnam War.

However, when Ronald Reagan became President and leader of the Republican Party, there was a clear shift. Reagan cut back on welfare payments, limited worker union activities, and reduced taxes for the wealthy and corporations. These actions marked the beginning of a significant increase in class inequality, primarily driven by legislation and the idea that giving more money to the rich would benefit everyone through a “trickle-down” or supply-side economy. This theory, however, was widely discredited by economists who pointed out that increased demand from workers with higher wages is what truly drives economic growth, not the other way around. Despite this, the Republican Party continued to pursue policies that exacerbated inequality whenever they were in power.

While Inequality May Benefit Some in the Short Term, It Is Ultimately Destructive

In the introduction of the book, you refer to main written documents that created US like the constitution and the American Declaration of Independence which defends freedom, justice and life for all Americans however African Americans until the end of 1960s did not enjoy their full civic rights. What made Americans so indifferent to the plight of African Americans for so long? 

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily call it indifference. Some people, particularly the white leadership in the South during the Jim Crow era, believed they were benefiting from the system. They thought they could maintain cheaper labor by paying African Americans less and denying them basic rights. They saw this as advantageous for their own interests. However, in the long run, it was a mistake, even for those who thought they were benefiting. The South’s economy improved after the end of Jim Crow, proving that equality was beneficial for everyone. One of the key ideas of constructive conflict is to analyze the motivations of different groups and recognize when those motivations are shortsighted or harmful.

My emphasis on the founding documents, which pledge freedom and equality for all, was to highlight that these principles are more constructive and beneficial for society as a whole. It’s a normative judgment, but I believe that working towards equality and justice aligns with the core values of the United States. While inequality may benefit some in the short term, it is ultimately destructive to the nation’s founding ideals and to humanity as a whole.

In the book, you refer to events in the US since the presidency of Donald Trump and conclude that widespread fears have been common about the survival of American democracy and underline in the concluding chapter that: “In recent years democracy have deteriorated significantly.” Do you agree with those pundits who argue that American democracy is dying? Based on your study, what are the greatest threats to American democracy, and what constructive approaches could mitigate these dangers?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily use the word “dying.” I don’t think American democracy is doomed, but it has certainly been damaged. One peculiar aspect of this situation is that the progress made by various status groups—African Americans, women, LGBTQ people—through their actions, demands, and some legislative changes has led to significant social advances. However, this progress has sparked backlash. Some people resisted these changes, feeling that they were undesirable or even disruptive, leading to efforts to roll back these gains and return to more oppressive inequalities.

The Republican Party, in particular, became increasingly uncooperative with Democrats. Even attempts by leaders like Bill Clinton to bridge the divide were met with rigidity from Republicans, who increasingly embraced obvious falsehoods, misogyny, and racism, often appealing to white Christian identity. This strategy garnered some support, especially as it played into the anxieties of those who felt left behind by economic changes.

As income inequality grew, many working-class people experienced relative deprivation, with stagnating wages and a declining sense of economic security. This, combined with status anxieties—particularly among some men who felt their social standing was threatened—created fertile ground for the Republican Party to exploit cultural grievances while distracting from the real issue: the growing class inequality.

In this context, the interplay between status gains and the hyper-inequality in income and wealth has been particularly dangerous. The decreasing intergenerational mobility has made it harder for future generations to benefit from economic gains, further exacerbating tensions. To address these dangers, it’s crucial to focus on policies that reduce inequality, enhance social mobility, and foster greater cooperation across political divides.

Trump’s Right-Wing Populist Appeal Will Not Endure in the Long Term

Donald Trump vs Kamala Harris for US President. Photo: Qubix Studio.

With Donald Trump as former president and now president hopeful, right-wing populism has turned out to be a permanent feature of American democracy. Do you think right-wing populism will be here to stay or is it a phenomenon that will be forgotten after Trump ends his political life?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I don’t think it will be forgotten, but I believe the falsehoods and extremism in Trump’s rejection of American democratic principles will ultimately lead to its failure. I think we’ll see a restoration of more traditional American politics. Historically, we’ve seen similar episodes. McCarthyism was a dreadful chapter, but today, no one wants to be associated with it—it’s a term of shame. Similarly, in the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had significant political influence in many areas, which was profoundly undemocratic. However, that period is now largely forgotten. I think right-wing populism, as represented by Trump, is also doomed to failure. Even if he were elected again, I don’t believe his appeal will endure in the long term.

In the last chapter of the book, you observe that Trump’s presidency has been and remain largely contrary to the constructive conflict approach. He has failed to achieve many of his stated goals and the results of what he has accomplished have worsened progress toward more class, status and political power equality. What will happen to American democracy if Trump is reelected on November 5?

Professor Louis Kriesberg:  It would be terrible. However, I believe there will be significant resistance, and he won’t be able to impose his will entirely. During his first term, there was considerable pushback, and while he may have learned from that experience, I don’t think he will be more effective in overcoming the resistance. The strength of this resistance is well-grounded. Most people in this country are not staunch supporters of Trump—he has never had more than around 44% approval. As he tries to implement his agenda, I believe the resistance will only grow stronger.

After watching the debate of US presidential candidates on Tuesday night, who do you think will be the next US President?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I’m not sure how much the debate will influence the outcome. There’s no question that Kamala Harris was very skillful in baiting Trump to be his typical self—going off on tangents, lying, distorting, blustering, and at times, appearing bewildered and incoherent. This might play a role in the electoral college outcome, but it’s not necessarily decisive.

I believe Harris did a brilliant job of proving that she would be an effective, powerful, and good President, while Trump showed none of those qualities. However, some people may need to witness even more failures before they reconsider their support. Overall, I think the American people, for the most part, are sensible, despite occasional evidence to the contrary.

Matryoshka dolls for sale in souvenir shop in Budapest, Hungary on December 21, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance

by ArticlesAuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomePopulism & Politics (P&P)

DOWNLOAD PDF

Please cite as:
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041         

 

Abstract 

This article explores how China’s rise as a ‘civilization state’ encourages some European states to challenge US political dominance. While countries like Russia and Turkey have also employed civilizational populist rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy issues, this article focuses on Xi Jinping’s recent visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and examines how European leaders like Emmanuel Macron, Viktor Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational model. Further research is needed on the growing civilizational competition between these states and the West, particularly in Africa, where China, Russia, and Turkey project all variants (soft, smart, sharp and hard) of power to assert influence and challenge Western dominance in international relations and global politics.

By Ihsan Yilmaz & Nicholas Morieson

Xi Jinping’s Trip to France, Hungary, and Serbia

The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe sees him visit three “unlikely” – to quote the New York Times – countries: France, Hungary, and Serbia (Cohen & Buckley, 2024; Hawkins & O’Carroll, 2024).). While it is no surprise that Xi should visit France, Europe’s second-largest economy and one of the dominant powers within the European Union (EU), his decision to visit Hungary and Serbia, both comparatively smaller and economically less significant nations, raises important questions about China’s strategic interests in Europe. France, with its historical influence, advanced economy, and status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, is a logical destination for a leader looking to engage with the political and economic powerhouses of Europe. However, Hungary and Serbia, despite their more modest economic profiles, have become increasingly important players in Europe, particularly in relation to China’s broader geopolitical and civilizational goals (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022, 2023a; Yilmaz, 2023).

We argue that the rationale for Xi’s visits to Hungary and Serbia lies not solely in economic opportunities, though both nations have benefitted from Chinese investment in recent years, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rather, the visits are reflective of a deeper shift in the political landscape of these nations, which are characterized by an increasingly anti-American posture and skepticism toward the traditional liberal democratic order (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Both Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of the US and the EU in international and regional politics. This is where China’s appeal as a rising power offering a multi-polar global order becomes particularly significant. The governments of these countries see China as a potential ally in their efforts to challenge US hegemony and reshape the international system (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a).

The political leadership of France, Hungary, and Serbia increasingly align themselves with a worldview that emphasizes the decline of US dominance, and the rise of a multipolar order dominated by ‘civilization states’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz, 2023). This notion, which China has skillfully promoted, posits that the world is not merely divided by economic or political blocs, but by civilizations that possess distinct values, histories, and trajectories. China, under Xi Jinping, has positioned itself as the archetypal civilization state, drawing on thousands of years of history to assert its leadership on the global stage and present itself as an alternative to the Western liberal order. In this model, China seeks not only economic and political influence but also cultural and ideological legitimacy as a civilizational power.

For France, under President Emmanuel Macron, China’s rise presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Macron, while wary of China’s authoritarian tendencies, sees in China’s civilizational narrative a model for Europe’s own reawakening. The Chinese emphasis on unity, heritage, and the assertion of national and cultural identity resonates with Macron’s broader vision for Europe. Macron, like Xi, sees the dangers of the “false universalism” of the Anglo-American liberal order and is increasingly advocating for a European identity that stands apart from American influence. In this sense, China’s rise is not merely an economic partner for France but also a philosophical model for reclaiming European civilizational values (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b).

In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has long positioned himself as a critic of Western liberalism and American cultural hegemony. Orbán’s vision of Hungary as a bastion of traditional Christian civilization aligns well with China’s civilizational discourse. Orbán’s government has openly embraced the notion of a multipolar world where civilization states—rather than liberal democracies—are the dominant actors. The rise of China, along with Russia and Turkey, serves Orbán’s populist narrative that Hungary must resist the pressures of conforming to Western norms and, instead, forge its own path, drawing strength from its civilizational heritage (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b; Yilmaz, 2023).

Similarly, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has distanced his nation from the Western liberal democratic order, positioning Serbia as a state that is culturally and politically distinct from the EU and the US. Vučić does not explicitly frame Serbia’s political trajectory in terms of a clash of civilizations, but his rejection of Western interference and his embrace of Chinese investment and political support suggest that he sees in China an alternative model of governance—one that allows for authoritarian control without the need to submit to Western-style liberalism. The Chinese concept of a civilization state provides Vučić with the ideological justification to resist Western pressures, strengthen his own rule, and maintain Serbian autonomy in a world increasingly defined by civilizational competition (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024b).

This civilizational approach is not limited to China. Both Russia and Turkey have embraced the notion of a civilization state to justify their geopolitical ambitions and internal governance models (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has adopted a civilizational discourse that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russian Orthodoxy, culture, and history. Putin’s Russia positions itself as a bulwark against Western liberalism, framing its foreign and domestic policies in terms of defending its civilizational values against a Western world it views as morally and politically degenerate. This framing allows Putin to justify both his authoritarian rule at home and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, including its interventions in Ukraine and Syria.

Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has similarly embraced a civilizational discourse, one that draws on Turkey’s Ottoman past and its Islamic heritage. Erdogan’s vision of a neo-Ottoman Turkey asserts independence from the West and emphasizes Turkey’s role as a leader in the Muslim world. Turkey’s turn toward Islamist populist authoritarianism, justified by Erdogan as a defense of Turkish and Islamic values against Western liberalism, mirrors the civilizational narratives employed by both China and Russia (Yilmaz, 2021; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023c).

While Russia and Turkey’s adoption of civilizational rhetoric has certainly influenced their foreign policies and global politics, particularly in their respective regions, this article focuses specifically on China and its impact on Europe. We examine how Macron, Orbán, and Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational narrative and explore how China’s rise as a civilization state is reshaping the political and civilizational self-perception of these European nations. The emergence of a civilization-based framework in international relations is significant, not only for understanding China’s role in Europe but also for assessing the future of US-European relations (Yilmaz and Morieson 2024b).

Thus, we will take a closer look at Xi’s visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and explore how the leaders of these countries are engaging with China’s civilizational narrative. We will examine how this engagement influences their domestic policies, foreign relations, and how this emerging partnership may affect the broader geopolitical landscape in Europe and beyond.

France: Drawing Inspiration from China’s Rise to Rejuvenate ‘European Civilization’

Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron welcoming chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan for thier state visit in France at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 25, 2018. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

Xi’s visit to France is ostensibly to discuss trade issues with the populist French president, specifically those affecting China’s ability to sell electric vehicles in the European Union. Macron, for his part, also has economic issues to address with China, particularly regarding China’s restrictions on French agricultural goods. He has used this opportunity to urge Xi to stop supporting Russia and to pressure Putin into negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s decision to visit Serbia and Hungary – the European nations most sympathetic towards Moscow – suggests that Putin can expect continued support from China in their efforts to annex Ukraine.

These issues aside, there is a deeper purpose behind Xi’s visit and Macron’s enthusiastic reception, one that increasingly aligns with Macron’s views on the future of Europe and global politics. Indeed, Xi’s statement about France-China relations being a “model” for the world to follow suggests that something far more significant is taking place (Cohen & Buckley, 2024). Moreover, according to Xi, China “will work with France to deepen China-Europe mutually beneficial cooperation,” and the two are “major forces in building a multipolar world, two big markets that promote globalization, and two great civilizations that advocate cultural diversity” (Xi, 2024), a remark that underscores his civilizational perspective on global politics.

The leaders of both China and France, despite their differences, are drawn together by a shared antipathy towards the US and a shared civilizational perspective on global affairs, a perspective intrinsically connected with their anti-American politics. Naturally, China and France do not share the same opinion of the US. China views America as a rival; France views America, perhaps, as a perfidious ally, forcing ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture upon an unwilling French people. However, both would prefer a world in which American culture was less pervasive, Western universalism abandoned, and American power reduced. Both believe that soon, the rise of civilization-states will drastically diminish American power and prestige globally.

Xi has dedicated himself to the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation (sometimes understood as the Chinese ‘race’), which includes not only citizens of the People’s Republic of China but also Han Chinese globally (Carrai, 2021). At the same time, Xi portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a continuation of Ancient Chinese culture merged with Marxism (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Unlike Putin, he does not use the term “civilization state” to describe his country (Putin, 2023). However, much like Putin, Xi is adamant that China must draw on its civilizational heritage and reject the values of Western civilization, which he argues are not universal but particular to the West and thus unsuitable for China (Blackburn, 2021; Passeri, 2020). Civilizationism is thus a tool of liberation, through which Xi intends to free China of non-indigenous values and ideas, allowing it to overcome the US and establish the Chinese nation as Asia’s dominant power.

China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia is justified by Xi Jinping, if not motivated, as part of the necessary rise of Chinese civilization and its return to its rightful place as Asia’s hegemon, including the reclamation of traditional Chinese territories, such as Taiwan. Simultaneously, his regime’s repression of non-Han peoples, including the Muslim Uyghurs—a Turkic people—in Xinjiang, and the people of Tibet, is justified on the grounds that these regions have always been part of Chinese civilization. Therefore, the peoples of these regions are considered part of Chinese civilization, whether they accept it or not. In fact, those who resist must be coerced into this civilization, as evidenced by the ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang.

Moreover, Chinese leaders evidently believe that Western-style nation-states, particularly the small states of Europe, whatever their utility in the past, today prevent the West from gathering its true strength. In contrast, the large civilization-states of China, Russia, and India gain strength from their large populations and the ability to unite peoples who speak different languages under a single identity. In other words, Europe – despite its 300 million people – is weak because it is made up of many small nations, which would be far more powerful if they were to unite into a single polity. 

French leader Macron appears to agree with this assessment. Writer Aris Roussinos (2020), who seems somewhat sympathetic to Macron’s project, is among the few who have remarked on the importance Macron places on rejuvenating what he calls European Civilization. Indeed, while right-wing populist Marine Le Pen calls for the protection of France’s Judeo-Christian yet secular civilization (Morieson, 2021; 2022), Macron is moving beyond the nation-state paradigm, advocating for centralizing power within the EU to protect an otherwise moribund European civilization. Macron is perhaps best understood as a technocratic populist, but this label may not fully explain his complex and shifting political positions and may give the impression that he lacks core beliefs or policies (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). However, a close reading of his speeches reveals that Macron is deeply concerned about the future of European civilization and believes it represents the best of humanity, thus must protect its ‘humanist’ values.

One might ask from whom Macron proposes to protect European civilization. For Macron, European civilization has many enemies, but perhaps the key adversary is the US, which he views as an enemy precisely because it is an anti-civilizational power that defends the nation-state paradigm, insists that its values are universal, and desires a relatively weak Europe. Macron does not believe that American values are universal. He does not even believe that the US and other ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations, such as Great Britain, can be included within European civilization. In this way, Macron reveals that he does not believe in Western civilization per se, but rather that continental Europeans possess their own civilization, which is quite different from the traditions of the Anglos, particularly in that continental Europeans do not embrace the market economy and the nation-state paradigm as wholeheartedly.

Roussinos (2020) observes that in 2019, Macron gave a speech to France’s ambassadors in which he argued that “China, Russia, and India were not merely economic rivals but genuine civilization states… which have not just disrupted our international order, assumed a key role in the economic order, but have also very forcefully reshaped the political order and the political thinking that goes with it, with a great deal more inspiration than we have” (Roussinos, 2020). Warning his ambassadors that ‘civilizations,’ including European civilization, are ‘disappearing,’ Macron declined to condemn states that draw on their cultural heritage and proclaim themselves heirs to great civilizations. Instead, he suggested that Europeans should take inspiration from the ‘civilizational projects’ of Russia and Hungary, praising what he referred to as their ‘inspiring’ ‘cultural and civilizational vitality’ (Roussinos, 2020). According to Macron, such nations “take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have, to a certain extent, lost” (Roussinos, 2020). Furthermore, France has a mission to construct a “collective narrative and a collective imagination” among Europeans, meaning that his national project of rejuvenating France “must be undertaken as a project of European civilization” (Roussinos, 2020).

Later, in April 2024, Macron told an audience at Sorbonne University that “the European spirit” was essentially tired and “left to those who attacked it.” Macron admits that Europe has “lost its self-esteem,” which he regards as “strange” given its achievements (Macron, 2024). However, he says a defining aspect of European civilization is this self-doubt and “culture of confession,” worsened by the continent’s “demographic decline” – an obvious existential threat (Macron, 2024). His solution to Europe’s problems is to build “a more united, more sovereign, and more democratic Europe” in order to “assert ourselves among the other powers and in light of the century’s transitions” (i.e., the transition of power from Western nation-states to the civilization-states of the East) (Macron, 2024). Equally, Macron says European civilization is “humanist,” and to survive, it must reject the “Anglo-American model,” which permits the private sector to gain enormous power over human life, but also reject the Chinese model, in which the government is given total control over human life (Macron, 2024). Macron promises to challenge the Anglo-American model by taking control of cyberspace and enforcing European norms by banning hate speech and inappropriate content of various kinds, something he calls “a cultural and civilizational combat” (Macron, 2024).

Macron’s meeting with Xi thus brings together two men with civilizational perspectives on global affairs, both of whom believe that the age of Anglo-American universalism is coming to an end and that the nation-state paradigm must give way to something more vibrant, something that binds together past and present: the civilization-state, or in the case of Europe, a kind of supercharged, centralized EU. Despite the vast differences between the two men and their respective ‘civilizations,’ and the fact that Macron ultimately views China as a civilization Europe must challenge in the emerging multipolar world, they share a common belief in civilizationism that unites them in opposition to the US.

Fighting Liberal ‘Elites’ and Defending Judeo-Christianity by Drawing Hungary Closer to China

Chinese and Hungarian flags fly in the sky. Photo: Andy Liu.

When Xi visits Hungary, he will encounter a nation and a prime minister, Viktor Orbán, eager for Chinese investment, particularly in the form of an electric car plant that the Hungarian leader hopes the Chinese will build in partnership with his country. However, for Xi, this visit and whatever trade deals result from it are partly a reward for Orbán’s pro-China policies, his ambivalent attitude toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and his increasing anti-Western rhetoric, as well as his praise for China’s civilizational rejuvenation project. Equally, the visit demonstrates to Washington that Hungary cannot be relied upon to defend Western interests against Chinese aggression, and that Washington is growing increasingly isolated in its opposition to China’s rise.

Orbán is drawn to Xi in much the same way as Macron: both believe the rise of civilization-states like China is ineluctable, and both see China’s rise as an opportunity for their respective states – if not civilizations – to free themselves from Anglo-American norms. However, Orbán differs widely from Macron, and indeed the two might be understood as political enemies. While Macron calls for power to be centralized in Brussels, Orbán is a nationalist who rejects any notion that Hungary should comply with EU norms (Toomey, 2020). And although Orbán possesses a civilizational rejuvenation project, it is of an entirely different nature from Macron’s ‘humanist’ plan for Europe. Rather, Orbán calls for the re-Christianization of Europe, the strengthening of the nation-state and its borders, and he speaks not so much of European civilization but of Judeo-Christian civilization, a term that encompasses a different group of nations, possibly including Russia and the ‘Anglosphere’ nations. Where Macron sees the rejuvenation of European civilization as a way to defy growing autocracy in the East and the domination of the market in the West, Orbán is increasingly enamored with authoritarians abroad and authoritarian rule at home. Both believe that Europe’s demographic problem is existential, and that action is required to repopulate the continent. However, where Macron rejects ‘blood and soil’ ethno-religious nationalism, Orbán considers it a prerequisite for any successful plan to save Europe.

Furthermore, Morieson and Yilmaz (2024) observe that Orbán argues that “the EU and, particularly, the United States [are] so bent on forcing liberal culture on the world that they were inextricably moving all nations toward civilizational conflict: a conflict between the liberal West and ‘civilization-states’ that refused to liberalize, such as China and Russia” (Orbán, 2023). According to Orbán, the future of the world will be decided by this conflict, and therefore “the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose ‘universal values’ upon them in an effort to prevent war” (Morieson & Yilmaz, 2024; Orbán, 2023).

Orbán is known for his opposition to allowing Muslims to enter Hungary, either to stay or settle in Western Europe (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). According to Orbán, Muslims belong to a religion and civilization incompatible with Judeo-Christian values and, therefore, should not be allowed to live in Europe – especially considering Europeans’ rapid demographic decline – in great numbers (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). However, Muslims are not really Orbán’s core enemy. Rather, it is Western political and cultural elites that he blames for Europe’s problems, especially its fertility problem. Orbán claims that elites have caused the West’s decline in power and loss of self-esteem by embracing liberalism. Liberalism is corrosive, according to Orbán, because it creates societies that do not produce citizens willing to have children and reject their societies’ traditional values – the values that made their societies superior in the past. Liberalism, because it teaches the equality of all peoples, encourages cosmopolitanism and individualism, robbing people of their unique national and religious identities (Morieson, 2022). As a result of this cosmopolitanism and the declining birth rates, Western societies have opened themselves to foreigners who not only do not share their liberal values but also have larger families. Consequently, Europe has paved the way for its own downfall by abandoning Judeo-Christian values in favor of liberalism and failing to assimilate Muslim migrants into a secular, liberal society (Morieson, 2022).

Orbán’s civilizational rejuvenation project is inextricably linked to his admittedly illiberal, authoritarian style of governance. Indeed, Orbán’s solution to the problems allegedly brought about by liberalism is to marginalize his liberal and Marxist opponents, centralize power, dominate Hungarian media, and replace, wherever possible, the liberal cultural and bureaucratic elite with his own supporters, a populist plan Orbán speaks of openly and with pride. To combat corrosive liberalism, Orbán claims that authentic Europeans must combat the influence of Washington and Brussels – the two great liberal powers, in Orbán’s estimation – and re-orient Western civilization towards post-liberal Judeo-Christian values, which he argues are still compatible with democracy and freedom (Morieson, 2022). In Orbán’s Hungary, women are thus encouraged with cash payments to have more children (a project that has met with only modest success), and post-Marxist investigations that critically examine Western culture are defunded in the nation’s universities. LGBTQ people are tolerated, but increasingly marginalized. All in all, ‘wokeness’ is not welcome in Orbán’s Hungary and is understood as the ultimate product of liberalism (Morieson, 2022).

It is easy to understand Orbán’s enthusiasm for China. China’s rise comes at the expense of Orbán’s liberal democratic foes (i.e., Washington and Brussels), decreasing their ability to pressure Hungary to return to liberal democratic norms. Similarly, because China is both an authoritarian state led by the populist Xi Jinping and approaches international relations from a civilizational perspective, its rise legitimizes Orbán’s own authoritarianism and his project of civilizational rejuvenation. Indeed, for Orbán, China’s rise proves that authoritarianism and civilizational rejuvenation projects help create strong nations that can stand against American cultural hegemony and prevent corrosive liberalism from eroding traditional identities and values. As a result, although Hungary will remain within the EU, we might expect Orbán to draw the country closer to China in the future. This means that China will have a friendly nation within the EU in Hungary, sowing disharmony and forming alliances with other nationalist states to prevent the centralization of power in Brussels and thwart Macron’s plans for the civilizational rejuvenation of Europe as a liberal-humanist power.

Serbia: Defying International Liberal Order by Embracing Chinese Civilization State

President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.

It should come as no surprise that the date Xi Jinping has chosen to visit Serbia coincides with the 25th anniversary of the American-led NATO bombings of Belgrade’s Chinese embassy. This apparent mistake by Western forces has long been viewed in China as a deliberate attack and part of the West’s – particularly the US’ – attempts to prevent the rise of China. Equally, Xi is no doubt aware of the prevalence of pro-Russian, anti-American attitudes in Serbia, largely the result of the belief that NATO and the US treated Serbs unfairly during the 1999 conflict, but also due to the conservative values held by many Serbs, which sometimes conflict with American liberal values, particularly on issues related to LGBTQ rights and religious freedom.

It is not merely shared resentment toward NATO and the US’ conduct during the Kosovo War that has brought Serbia and China closer. The two nations have become increasingly close since the 2012 election victory of the governing populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which sees China as both a source of economic growth and technological development, but also as a partner less likely to criticize Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia following its attempted annexation of Ukraine and its often socially conservative politics. The SNS has welcomed Chinese investment in mining operations and key infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, making Serbia increasingly indebted to China as a result. At the same time, Western states’ criticism of Serbia, and a widespread belief among many Serbs that the US and NATO – representing the liberal order – are inherently hostile to Serbia, has driven the nation closer to China. Indeed, the SNS and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić, have positioned Serbia between the West and China, using its close relationship with China to improve its bargaining position with Brussels.

Although Serbia has sought EU membership, its democratic backsliding under populist rule has made this increasingly unlikely, and Vučić himself has campaigned against joining the EU. Moreover, EU states are increasingly critical of the so-called electoral autocracy that characterizes SNS rule (Seebass, 2024). For example, the German Federal Foreign Office considers the 2023 national elections in Serbia to have been fraudulent and “unacceptable for a country with EU candidate status” (X, 2023). According to the German Council on Foreign Relations, under SNS rule “the erosion of institutions that were only just democratizing has picked up pace.” The SNS now controls “Serbia’s media landscape… personal ties link the president to organized crime groups and well-coordinated hooligans prone to violence,” and “public discourse is marked by vicious rhetoric that has an especially detrimental effect on young people” (Seebass, 2024).

These trends have led to increasing criticism of Serbia by Western powers and NGOs, prompting the SNS to defy the West by maintaining good relations with Russia and deepening ties with China. Xi’s visit to Belgrade, and the extraordinary welcome provided by the SNS government, demonstrates Vučić’s desire to draw his nation closer to autocratic regimes that do not criticize his anti-democratic actions. Vučić received Xi in Belgrade with a ceremony during which he promised the Chinese leader that he would receive in Serbia a degree of “reverence and love” not “found anywhere else” and vowed that his government would only increase cooperation with Beijing, saying “the sky is the limit” (Hajdari, 2024).

Vučić is alleged to have instructed employees of state-owned companies to join the crowds welcoming the Chinese president, employing around 50 buses to increase crowd numbers and create the impression that the vast majority of Serbs love and revere Xi. Moreover, Xi authored an article in Serbia’s Politika (2024) news outlet describing China-Serbia relations as “ironclad” and noting that “China and Serbia have similar positions on many important international and regional issues” and that “facing the international situation intertwined with changes and turbulence,” the two nations “should continuously strengthen coordination… and stand together for an equal and orderly multipolar world” (Politika, 2024).

It is not difficult to read between the lines and recognize that Xi is calling for Serbia to assist China in challenging US and Western dominance in the international sphere. As Vedran Dihic (Cvetkovic & Heil, 2024) put it, “aside from any trade and economic benefits, there is a political message underlying Serbia’s hosting of Xi that is connected to broader efforts – notably by Moscow and Beijing – to challenge US influence and potentially reshape the international order. …Serbia is striving to deepen relations with actors outside the West and, in that sense, is a kind of autonomous player in the new geopolitical constellation.”

Serbia and China thus find themselves drawn together for similar reasons: both wish to challenge Western liberal dominance in the international sphere and to legitimize authoritarianism at home. China’s civilizational rejuvenation project is useful to Serbia, insofar as China’s insistence that Western values are anything but universal helps to legitimize the SNS’s turn against liberal democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law by portraying these principles as mere Western liberal constructs that have no place beyond Western Europe, and may even hold back the development of states like Serbia that exist beyond the West and East, or at their crossroads. 

Conclusions

Xi Jinping’s tour of France, Hungary, and Serbia demonstrates the growing influence of China in Europe. But it also tells us much about how Europeans are responding to China’s rise as a self-styled civilizational power, especially insofar as the rise of China is inspiring some European leaders to challenge US dominance in international politics and embrace the core values of “European civilization.”

For Xi, this civilizational turn is a means to legitimize China’s rise as a global superpower, positioning China not only as an economic force but as a civilization that challenges the universalism of Western values. His outreach to countries like Hungary and Serbia, where populist leaders see benefits in aligning with China’s vision, strengthens this narrative. Serbia, in particular, exemplifies a country striving to balance its ambitions of EU integration with a deepening relationship with China, fueled by shared anti-Western sentiments and authoritarian tendencies.

The convergence of leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić with Xi Jinping highlights the emerging trend of civilizational politics in global affairs. Despite their distinct national interests and ideological differences, these leaders share a skepticism towards the liberal international order championed by the US and NATO, and see the rise of China as a pivotal moment in redefining the global balance of power. Macron, with his vision of a centralized European civilization, and Orbán, with his push for a Judeo-Christian resurgence, both view the nation-state paradigm as inadequate for addressing contemporary challenges. In their own ways, they envision a future in which civilizational identity shapes the global political landscape.

For Macron, the rise of authoritarian China might not be entirely desirable, but it does provide France with an opportunity not just to grow its largely stagnant economy—finding in China a new market for its agricultural goods—but also to reflect on China’s civilizational assertiveness. Macron believes that China’s success, grounded in its ancient heritage and values, suggests that Europe must become more like China: united, assertive, and willing to stand up for its particular values against the false universalism of the Anglo-American world.

For Orbán, civilizationism is primarily a tool of populist discourse, used to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the ‘self’ represented as the traditional Christian Hungarian identity, and the ‘other’ as the Muslim or liberal West. However, like Macron, Orbán views the rise of civilization states as both inevitable and welcome. He believes this shift will create a multipolar world that weakens US and EU power, liberating Hungary from the burden of conforming to Western ‘universal’ norms.

Aleksandar Vučić may not explicitly frame his nation’s conflicts with the EU and the US as a clash of civilizations, but like Orbán, he rejects Western political interference in Serbian affairs. He appears to see in the rise of the Chinese self-proclaimed civilization state a way to challenge the US-dominated liberal international order and solidify his own authoritarian rule.

This civilizational approach is not confined to China alone. Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has embraced a similar narrative, framing itself as a protector of Orthodox Christian civilization, distinct from the West and immune to its liberal values. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is another example, promoting a neo-Ottoman vision that emphasizes Turkey’s Islamic and Turkic heritage in contrast to the West. Both Russia and Turkey have strategically positioned themselves as civilization states seeking to challenge US and Western dominance, much like China.

While China’s civilizational model seems to inspire many of Europe’s populist and authoritarian leaders, it also reveals how the notion of a civilization state is being used to reject Western (particularly Anglo-American) norms. Whether these leaders seek to emulate China or simply leverage its rise to challenge US hegemony, China’s growing influence seems to validate the belief that nations must turn to their own traditional values and culture to overcome American imperialism and cultural dominance.

Ultimately, the alliance between these diverse leaders reflects a growing resistance to the liberal democratic norms that have dominated the global order since the end of the Cold War. By positioning themselves against American cultural and political hegemony, these leaders are contributing to the emergence of a new multipolar world, where civilizational states challenge the legitimacy of Western universalism and aim to reshape global governance according to their own values and interests. As this trend continues to unfold, the dynamics of international relations are likely to shift in significant and unpredictable ways, with far-reaching implications for the future of global order.

Yet, despite the clear allure of civilization-state rhetoric, whether rejecting liberal democratic and Western/Anglo-American norms and embracing ‘our’ civilizational values can increase fertility, provide peoples with a shared purpose, or inspire reindustrialization remains an open question. The rise of civilization states has certainly helped leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić resist US-led globalization and liberalism, but the long-term consequences of these shifts are still uncertain.

One final point that deserves attention is the way the discourse of the civilization state is particularly useful to populist and authoritarian leaders. It allows them to legitimize authoritarian rule by rejecting liberal democracy on the grounds that it is not part of ‘our’ traditional values. Moreover, this discourse legitimizes bellicose foreign policies by justifying the annexation or control of territories that were once part of ‘our’ civilization. In this way, civilizationism creates a populist narrative of the ‘people’ vs. the ‘elites,’ often transnationalized to portray American or Western elites as the enemies preventing ‘our’ rise.

Furthermore, beyond Europe, China, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly extending their civilizational influence into Africa. All three are active in Africa through various soft, smart, sharp and hard power initiatives and projections, from China’s Belt and Road infrastructure projects, Russia’s security alliances, and Turkey’s cultural and religious diplomacy in addition to their Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) all over the world (Yilmaz et al, 2023). These activities reflect not only their economic and political ambitions but also an ongoing civilizational competition with the West for influence on the continent.

China, for instance, promotes its model of development without political liberalization, offering African nations an alternative to Western aid conditionality. Russia has focused on military and energy cooperation, while Turkey emphasizes religious and educational connections, seeking to revive its historical ties to Africa. Each of these actors brings a distinct civilizational narrative to Africa, challenging Western norms and promoting alternatives to the liberal international order.

As these three powers expand their influence, the competition between civilization states and the West will likely intensify, not only in Europe but across the Global South. Further research is needed to better understand how these powers are positioning themselves in Africa and how their civilizational frameworks interact with local political, economic, and cultural dynamics. Understanding this evolving landscape is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of the civilizational turn in global politics.

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.

References

Ádám, Zoltán and András Bozóki. (2016). “The God of Hungarians: Religion and right-wing populism in Hungary.” In: Saving the People How Populists Hijack Religion. Edited by Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell and Olivier Roy. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Blackburn, M. (2021). “Mainstream Russian Nationalism and the “State-Civilization” Identity: Perspectives from Below.” Nationalities Papers. 49(1), 89–107. https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2020.8

Brown, K. & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U. A. (2018). “Ideology in the Era of Xi Jinping.” Chinese Journal of Political Science, 23(3), 323–339. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-9541-z

Carrai, Maria Adele. (2021). “Chinese Political Nostalgia and Xi Jinping’s Dream of Great Rejuvenation.” International Journal of Asian Studies. 18, no. 1: 7–25. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1479591420000406

Cohen, Roger and Buckley, Chris. (2024). “Xi Visits Europe, Seeking Strategic Opportunity.” The New York Times. May 5, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/05/world/europe/xi-visits-europe-strategic-opportunity.html?unlocked_article_code=1.pk0.eFWa.fgG0hOFIUTah&smid=nytcore-ios-share&referringSource=articleShare&sgrp=c-cb (accessed on August 18, 2024).

Cvetkovic, Ljudmila and Heil, Andy. (2024). “What Is Behind Serbia and China’s ‘Ironclad Friendship’?” Radio Free Europe. May 7, 2024. https://www.rferl.org/a/serbia-xi-visit-china-relations-vucic-russia/32936674.html (accessed on April 21, 2024).

Hajdari, Una. (2024). “Serbia to Xi Jinping: No one reveres you like we do.” Politico. May 8, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/xi-jinping-belgrade-serbia-china-aleksandar-vucic-investments/ (accessed on August 17, 2024).

Hawkins, Amy and O’Carroll, Lisa. (2024). “Xi Jinping to visit France, Hungary and Serbia amid EU trade tariff row.” The Guardian. May 4, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/04/xi-jinping-visit-france-hungary-serbia-eu-trade-tariff-row (accessed on August 12, 2024). 

Macron, Emmanuel. (2019). “Ambassadors’ conference – Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic.” Defend Democracy Press. August 27, 2019.  https://www.defenddemocracy.press/ambassadors-conference-speech-by-m-emmanuel-macron-president-of-the-republic/ (accessed on August 17, 2024).

Morieson, Nicholas. (2021). Religion and the Populist Radical Right: Secular Christianism and Populism in Western Europe. Vernon Press.

Morieson, Nicholas. (2023). “Understanding Civilizational Populism in Europe and North America: The United States, France, and Poland.” Religions. 14, no. 2: 154. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14020154

Morieson, Nicholas & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Is A New Anti-Western Civilizational Populism Emerging? The Turkish, Hungarian and Israeli Cases.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0032.   

Morieson, Nicholas. (2022). “Węgry to Miejsce, W którym Trzeba Teraz być.” Węgierski Postliberalizm I Jego wpływ Na amerykańskich konserwatystów”. Chrześcijaństwo-Świat-Polityka, nr 26 (grudzień):154-86. https://doi.org/10.21697/CSP.2022.26.1.06

Passeri, Andrea. (2020). “Towards the ‘Great Rejuvenation’: State Nationalism, Shifting Identities, and Foreign Policy Choices in Contemporary China.” In: Rekindling the Strong State in Russia and China. Brill, 2020. 40-60.

Perottino, Michel and Guasti, Petra. (2020). “Technocratic populism à la française? The roots and mechanisms of Emmanuel Macron’s success.” Politics and Governance. 8.4: 545-555.  doi:https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i4.3412

Putin, Vladimir. (2023). “Vladimir Putin meets with members of the Valdai Club: transcript of the Plenary Session of the 20th Annual Meeting.” Valdai Club. https://valdaiclub.com/events/posts/articles/vladimir-putin-meets-with-members-of-the-valdai-club-transcript-2023/ (accessed on April 11, 2024).

Roussinos, Aris. (2020). “The irresistible rise of the civilisation-state.” Unherd. August 6, 2020. https://unherd.com/2020/08/the-irresistible-rise-of-the-civilisation-state/ (accessed on April 18, 2024).

Seebass, Frauke. (2024). Serbia Has Crossed the EU’s Rubicon; Germany and Its Allies Must Respond. German Council on Foreign Relations. February 20, 2024.  https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/serbia-has-crossed-eus-rubicon-germany-and-its-allies-must-respond (accessed on August 21, 2024). 

Toomey, Michael. (2018). History, Nationalism and Democracy: Myth and Narrative in Viktor Orbán’s ‘Illiberal Hungary.’ New Perspectives. 26(1), 87-108. https://doi.org/10.1177/2336825X1802600110

Orbán, Viktor. (2023). “Full speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the 32nd Bálványos Summer Free University on 22 July 2023.” Visegrad Post. July 25, 2023. https://visegradpost.com/en/2023/07/25/full-speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-32nd-balvanyos-summer-free-university-on-22-july-2023/ (accessed on February 19, 2024.

X. (2023). https://twitter.com/GermanyDiplo/status/1736847421974397201

Xi, Jinping. (2024). “Building on Past Achievements to Jointly Usher in a New Era
In China-France Cooperation.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. May 7, 2024. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zxxx_662805/202405/t20240507_11293719.html (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizens: State, Islam and Ideology in Turkey. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2023). Civilisational Populism in Democratic Nation-States. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, Nicholas. (2022). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” Religions. 13, 1026. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13111026

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, Nicholas. (2023a). Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, Nicholas. (2023b). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions. 14(5):631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, Nicholas. (2023c) “The Impact of Civilizational Populism on Foreign and Transnational Policies: The Turkish Case.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 5, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0022

Yilmaz, Ihsan; Akbarzadeh, Shahram and Bashirov, Galib. (2023). “Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs).” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0024a

Yilmaz, Ihsan and Morieson, Nicholas. (2024a). “Xi Jinping’s ‘Civilization State’ and Anti-Americanism in Europe,” Australian Outlook. May 24, 2024, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/xi-jinpings-civilization-state-and-anti-americanism-in-europe/ (accessed on August 23, 2024).

Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024b). “The Rise of Authoritarian Civilizational Populism in Turkey, India, Russia and China.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0033  

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrives in 10 Downing Street in London ahead of flying to Brussels for Brexit trade talks on December 09 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Many Facets of Medical Populism: British Political Tradition (BPT) and Covid-19

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.

By Andrea Guidotti*  

Introduction

This paper analyzes the role and significance of the Covid-19 pandemic in the development and behavior of British populist parties. It aims to observe how and when the so-called British Political Tradition (BPT) has been used by these parties as a guiding principle warranting the actions and policies implemented during the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. First, it will briefly introduce medical populism from a general perspective and within the specific situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, it will analyze the overall actions taken by the two main British (right-wing) populist parties at the time and their leaders: the Conservatives in power under Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s UKIP party. This piece is not intended to be a theoretical discussion regarding the populist status of the considered parties and assumes that both can be meaningfully characterized as consistently (but differentially) populist on a variety of issues – such as health, immigration, economics or Brexit. The final section discusses the relationships between populists’ responses to the pandemic and the BPT. It evaluates if populists’ attitudes towards COVID-19 and its political management are positively affected by the BPT.

Populism and the Pandemic

One must first understand what kind of crisis the COVID-19 pandemic was and, thus, what kind of phenomena populists were dealing with at the time. Some scholars conceive a crisis as a moment of saliency for systemic contradictions and a consequent perceived need for structural change and strong interventions to take place. In such a situation, political agents are overwhelmed by the unfolding events and there is no common recognized rationality for handling the crisis-driven situation (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 3).

Under a dynamic conception of crises, populist actors may be better conceived not just as passively reacting to given external shocks, but “as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis” (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 6). This is a general characterization of an endogenous crisis, where all the contradictions are generated within the political system, and in which political agents are acting. In other words, when confronted with such a scenario, populists from all over the political spectrum usually tend to at least trigger or even manufacture the crisis themselves to gain some leverage in the political system (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 4). Being an exogenous crisis with respect to populism, the pandemic is harder to politicize than other political shocks or events that are at least partially originated inside the system itself. In addition, it should also be noted that the pandemic has a peculiar nature: as a public health crisis, no one is free from its consequences and implications. 

Bobba & Hubé (2021: 9-10), drawing from other authors, use the following general framework to better understand health crises such as Covid-19. Health crises are thought to be divisible into three parts: (a) an initial phase in which you are confronted with the emergence of the problem; (b) a confrontation phase in which some actors blame other actors for being responsible for what is happening; (c) a managing phase in which who is blaming responsibility upon others generally tries to propose and claim its solutions.

Moving to populism to connect it with the pandemic, a meaningful characterization of the term in the context of public health crises is needed. Following Gideon Lasco’s argument (2020: 1), one could say that “medical populism” is “a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’.” Different examples of medical populism can be given, going from Jair Bolsonaro downplaying the threat of the virus and pitting the economy against public health policies, to Donald Trump paving the way for conspiracy theories about the virus’ creation and blaming illegal immigrants for its spread around the country. 

With specific reference to Covid-19, we can distinguish some main features of populist strategies acting within such a crisis: (i) the simplification of the pandemic, offering the simplest (and most simplistic) solutions to the problems that the health emergency is posing; (ii) the dramatization, distortion and spectacularizing the threats posed by the crisis; (iii) the forging of societal divisions claiming to be on the side of the ‘real people’ quite often opposed to an unspecified ‘otherhood’; (iv) the invocation of knowledge claims: for example with regards to the virus’ origins, about the most appropriate methodologies to prevent its spreading or on how to treat it consistently (Lasco, 2020: 2-3). 

Investigating the second feature of populism (ii), we can add the fact that populist actors must not be obscured by the coverage of the pandemic itself. They need to spectacularize the crisis with their messaging, a strategy that allows them to stand out as relevant and influential figures in the public and online media to claim reliability and legitimacy properly (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 5). 

Regarding the third feature (iii), it is difficult to frame the populist concept of the ‘real people’ alongside the strategy of pitting them against other groups or entities when the virus indiscriminately affects everyone. Being aware of this problem, “‘the people’ are imbued with various characteristics, biomedical and otherwise [with populists] claiming that their citizens are less susceptible to the virus” (Lasco, 2020: 4-7). Thus, the ‘others’ against which populists claim to fight in representation of the “real people” during the pandemic are generally international and supranational actors such as the WTO or other states such as China – if not intellectual elites such as academics, journalists or public health experts (Bobba & Hubé, 2021). 

Points (i) and (iv) are strictly intertwined in that simplification goes hand in hand with false claims and controversial scientific statements. In other words, we observe a “widespread deployment of scientific language and imagery – and a selective deployment of scientific consensus” (Lasco, 2020: 8).

British Populism and Covid-19

To better connect British populism with the case of the pandemic, it is useful to get a brief and general background of the previous relationships between populism and healthcare policies in the UK before Covid-19. There is a distinction between healthcare systems that are more or less resistant to populist performances. The former are well-resourced, present a developed network-based model of governance, and involve professions in the policy processes. On the contrary, the latter are poorly financed, present high levels of command along the line of the New Public Management-type (NPM) governance model and display low trust in healthcare providers (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 3). 

But the most important thing to recall regarding the evolution of the British healthcare system (NHS) and populism is the BREXIT process. During those years, right-wing populists argued that by leaving the European Union (EU) more funds could be allocated to better finance the NHS. Specifically, they framed the unsustainability of the NHS and its underdevelopment (mostly in terms of funds and available high-skilled personnel) as a problem of immigration, as the blame was directed towards immigrants enjoying health services paid for by British citizens (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 8). 

Johnson and the Conservatives

The Conservatives, led by then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, were in power when Covid-19 became a global medical problem, and remained so until the end of the pandemic. For some authors (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021), the first wave of the pandemic, from February 2020 to roughly July 2020, can be divided in three phases. The ‘breakout’ phase was characterized by state authorities acting in a relaxed way, without invasive governmental control over people’s freedoms. This moment corresponds to the public’s response to the news about the virus’ spreading. During the ‘confrontation’ phase, the virus’ infection began widely spreading, and the number of people testing positive to Covid-19 began to grow exponentially. The final, ‘managing,’ phase is characterized by attempts to stabilize the situation and enforce measures in order to cope and coexist with the virus while waiting for the development of vaccines. 

During the first two phases the Conservative Party did not take the risks seriously and showed a libertarian way of thinking, arguing against a strict and hard response to the crisis in terms of closures and restrictions. In particular, Prime Minister Johnson did not attend the meetings dedicated to the government’s response to the pandemic in early February 2020 and criticized some warnings made by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) (Bale, 2023: 69-70). An explanation for that could be that his actions and public statements were influenced and warranted by ‘misplaced optimism’ and regressive and nationalistic ideas, historically speaking, of the British role in the world – stressing the narrative around the exceptionality and efficiency of the NHS (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 6). 

Starting from the end of March and the beginning of April, things became more dramatic, and the Prime Minister Johnson’s attitude changed. Around this time the first lockdown was issued, disregarding the idea of ‘herd immunity’ where the virus is left to spread in the population to lower its virulence (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 21). In general, the government stressed conventional public measures and followed international guidelines along other major Western and European states (Bale, 2023: 70). Additionally, Johnson’s Cabinet avoided using tropes potentially contributing to the politicization of the crisis, and attempted to emphasize the importance of scientific guidelines (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26). 

Analyzing the rhetorical repertoire that has been used, the governmental discourse historically situated Covid-19 in mainly three different ways. To do so, the Cabinet used so-called ‘temporal claims,’ as defined in narrative discourse theory. Following the construction of a (i) radically discontinuous time, the virus has been described as a moment of generational significance. The pandemic was to be seen as an unprecedented event disrupting people’s habits and usual social behavior, in order for new economic, social and political initiatives to be ruled and legitimized. From another point of view, events have been plotted with a (ii) linear timeline, positing a unidirectional and cumulative development. Here, a descriptive account of some sequences and a principle of evaluation of the events and by which to assess the correctness of the action leading to their unfolding have been invoked. Lastly, the construction of a (iii) cyclical time helped the government to depict everyday life after the pandemic in a radically different way. In this respect, narratives were prospecting and sketching the idea of a ‘new normalcy’ bringing the emergence of new habits for everyone (Jarvis, 2021: 27-31).

To conclude this investigation of Johnson’s political communication during the pandemic, it is notable that he also employed daily governmental press briefings, using so-called the ‘numbers arms race’ and more broadly the already cited ‘war language.’ Both of them served as an enforcement to the claim of fighting for Britain in a once in a lifetime event. The key mantra has been the following statement: “Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives” (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 9-10). 

Farage and the UKIP

Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

In contrast to Johnson, who avoided politicizing the pandemic, Nigel Farage opted to fully utilize a populist political communication style typically associated with right-wing parties. Despite taking a cautious stance at the beginning of the breakout, he started acting as a radical libertarian, opposing public health restrictions and showing his open skepticism about government actions towards the pandemic (Bale, 2023). 

Two major critiques can be identified. The former critique strictly concerns the governmental actions taken when the health situation started being very problematic. Farage accused Johnson’s government of incompetency and indecisiveness in dealing with the crisis, framing his actions as a lack of leadership on the side of the Prime Minister (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 27). His arguments are composed by a mixture of “support for draconian measures on ‘law and order’ and ‘Britain’s borders’,” and “its essentially libertarian opposition to ‘political correctness gone mad’ as well as ‘red tape’ and the ‘faceless bureaucrats’” (Bale, 2023: 71). Resorting to well-known populist grievances, alongside other world leaders such as Trump, he adapted the issue of immigration and the concerns associated with it in claiming that migrants could enter and spread the virus if police enforcement on British borders were not sufficiently severe or incoming international flights were to be easily allowed for foreign travelers coming from high-risk countries (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 23). He also denounced the ‘herd immunity’ strategy initially sought to be pursued by the government, although he maintained a libertarian posture by stressing the fact that measures taken to stop the virus’ transmissibility were not meant to become a “house arrest” for the entire nation (Bale, 2023: 72). 

The latter part of his narratives, and the second critique he posed, is about the role of the UK in the world and the attempt to identify responsible actors for the pandemic to occur. In other words, he blamed China for not telling the truth about Covid-19’s emergence in the first place and for its deliberate suppression of key information and the intentional delaying of their communication to the international community (Bale, 2023: 71). Concisely: “While the government undermined the seriousness of the crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China” (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).

The British Political Tradition in Times of Crisis

According to Lijphart (1999), the British Westminster Model presents nine core tenets: (1) the concentration of the executive power in one party; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) a two-party system, where parties produce manifestos and seek a mandate to govern; (4) a majoritarian electoral system; (5) a unitary and centralized government; (6) interest group pluralism; (7) the concentration of legislative power in Parliament; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) the central bank is controlled by the executive. Following Hall (2011: 9-10) and Richards and Smith (2002)  we can add two more tenets: (10) the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; (11) a permanent, neutral, and anonymous civil service. 

What is important to us here is the fact that the Westminster Model emphasizes some peculiar aspects. First, a linear and gradual development of the British political system and its institutions. Second, it stresses a great degree of British exceptionalism, and the superior nature of its system compared to other Western ones. Third, it is warranted by the idea that power is to be concentrated and exercised with a top-down approach. Warranting this system, according to Hall (2011: 124-125), the British Political Tradition (BPT) could be characterized as presenting the following main themes: (i)A discourse that stresses a limited liberal notion of representation and the elitist view that politicians are best suited to make decisions on behalf of the populace […] and are willing to act against the expressed will of the public or in the face of substantial public opposition; (ii) A discourse that stresses a conservative notion of responsibility and the view that a strong, decisive government is the most effective, efficient and desirable form of government. […] (iii) A discourse about change which emphasizes the virtues of continuity, gradualism, flexibility and stability. […] (iv) A discourse concerning a sense of British distinctiveness and superiority politically (Hall, 2011: 124-125)

Regarding discourse (i), it must be added that the BPT is sustained by an elitist conception of democracy, particularly the famous ‘Westminster and Whitehall know best’ statement, which itself reflects the interest of the political elite, thus reinforcing their status and power (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 128). The BPT reifies over time already existing inequalities and asymmetries in the British political system between citizens. Therefore, these ideas and beliefs have been mostly supported by most of the population. This results in the populace developing a somewhat deferential attitude towards politics, where politicians are seen as the best holders of the right to take the most important and crucial decisions for all (Hall, 2011: 159). Moreover, Marsh and Hall rightly highlight that the BPT not only served the interest of the political elite, but also of the socio-economic one. Specifically, regarding discourse (ii) above, the climax of political conservatism made it easier for the working class to accept the status quo. Furthermore, the dominance of the executive power helped political elites to enact policies more favorable to the socio-economic ones without too much opposition (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 135). 

Johnson and the BPT

The discussion seems to beg the question: Has the BPT influenced the populist (Johson and Farage) behavior described above? Following Finlayson et al. (2023), we can observe the employment of several traditional tropes dating back to the language and discourse of the BPT. Particularly, Prime Minister Johnson’s behavior indicates the presence of a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, merging epistemic and political authority over the actions needed to cope with the pandemic. For example, the invocation of the concept of ‘the people’ is used to hide the public’s limited political agency and retain the rights and legitimacy over the enactment of the counteracting measures. All of this is also related to the low participatory governance tradition inherent in the British State, but also shows how Johnson proved to strategically build its narrative of the pandemic to advance and increase the further legitimization of past policy decisions, and in particular the ones connected with the Brexit process (Wellings et al., 2023: 238). The former British premier revitalized the concept of the ‘British people’ within the public imagination, employing the sustainability and functioning of the NHS and other health issues as an element of continuity in his narratives from the beginning of the ‘Leave Campaign’ for Brexit to their management during the pandemic (Welling et al., 2023: 242). 

To better understand the British government’s communicative repertoire, the authors identify four main figurations of ‘the people’ (Finlayson et al., 2023: 344). First, we have ‘statistical realities.’ Here, ‘the people’ are represented and aggregated numerically, thus appearing more as abstract elements that legitimize the quest for acquiescence from the government (Finlayson et al., 2023: 345-346). Put another way, this kind of framing not only confers to the Cabinet epistemic authority because numbers don’t need further explanations, but also certifies its tight cooperation with the scientific community (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 222). 

Second, we have the figuration of ‘suffering families.’ This narrative aims to develop a public ‘ethos’ via which it can acquire the rights and legitimacy required to advance its policies. The BPT here is involved and works when this communicative strategy properly connects governmental instructions with people’s feelings, needs, and emotions – knowing what is best to accomplish them (Finlayson et al., 2023: 347). 

Third, ‘the people’ are framed as responsible individuals. This one is seen as a rule follower, encapsulated in a hierarchical structure that crystallizes a top-down and vertical conception of the people/state relationships. Once again, the BPT widens the divide between the elites and the public. ‘The people’ are required to follow the moral claims encouraged by the elite to fulfill their individual and collective responsibilities and duties towards resolving the crisis. The individual responsibility regards the task that people are assigned to complete, such as wearing protective masks in public spaces while avoiding unnecessary contact with strangers. The collective responsibility is rooted in utilitarian reasoning: complying with the rules means a faster crisis resolution (Finlayson et al., 2023: 348-349). 

The second and third depictions help understand the way in which Johnson tried to preserve its populist-driven consensus from the backlash of its unpopular decisions during the crisis. He tried not only to highlight the community as a collective as the real protagonist of the effort to fight against the virus’ infection, but also to present himself as a transparent and compassionate leader (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 209-215). 

The fourth and final depiction utilized is ‘freedom-loving citizens.’ This time, citizens are represented as rights holders and interests to be appropriately recognized. Consequently, the government has a duty to protect these fundamental freedoms and, by showing the truth about them, affirm the legitimacy of its guidelines (Finlayson et al., 2023: 350). 

Farage and the BPT

The case of Farage is different. Being an oppositional force during the COVID-19 pandemic breakout, it was much easier for him to resort to typical and proven to be more effective populist grievances. However, the BPT resonates consistently in Farage’s discourses during the crisis: I’m convinced that its influence is evident when the UKIP’s leader blamed Johnson for his lack of leadership and inefficient management in the initial months of the crisis development. Specifically, Farage used his oppositional platform on health policies to rally against the government and exploit the newly achieved consensus to fuel support around the rebranding of UKIP in ‘Reform UK’ (McManus, 2021: 148-150). 

Relating to discourse (ii) presented before, I argue that Farage somewhat recalls the necessity for the executive to be strong and decisive in its actions on behalf of the State. Second, and about discourse (iv) discussed above, I argue that Farage recalls the BPT when he stresses the role of the UK in the world vis-à-vis the actions and warnings undertaken towards China by other Western leaders. Put another way, he tried to point out the distinctiveness and peculiarity of the British political system as opposed to others, especially in the Western World, while asking for a different resolution path for the crisis (Bale, 2023; Sahin & Ianosev, 2021). 

Overall, even if Farage was not in a position that favored traditional forms of British political thinking, the BPT proves to have (at least) partially influenced his claims and actions during Covid-19’s unfolding. 

Conclusion

To recall the main points of the argument above, there is clear evidence that the British Political Tradition (BPT) still influences how politicians behave in ordinary British political life and their policy-making choices. Even in the face of essential shifts and changes caused by the Covid-19 crisis, many political actors tried to adapt these new challenges to the long-standing historical and common way of interpreting political actions and decision-making in the UK (Hall et al., 2018: 15). 

The aim of this article was to check for the influence of the BPT on populist leaders. As we observed, the British traditional political style and tropes served both Johnson and Farage as a means to instill their ideas about how to manage the crisis. This proves the resilience of established political tradition and clarifies the volatility and ambiguity of the populist repertoire and strategies. Regarding the latter point, populist narratives varied a lot depending on two factors: (i) the position of the leader – being in charge or standing as an oppositional force – and hence its responsibility towards citizens; (ii) the ability to legitimately connect populist grievances in the context of the pandemics with already existing lines of political reasoning. Some examples exemplifying the second point are the case of migration and the issue of border control regarding the likelihood of importing and spreading the virus uncontrolled. 

(*) Andrea Guidotti is a master’s student at the University of Pavia and an intern at the ECPS.

References

Bale, T. (2023). “The United Kingdom: The Pandemic and the Tale of Two Populist Parties.” In: Ringe N. & Rennó L. (Eds.), Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Bobba, G. & Hubé, N. (2021). “COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.), Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

Finlayson, A.; Jarvis, L. & Lister, M. (2023). “COVID-19 and ‘the public’: U.K. government, discourse and the British Political Tradition.” Contemporary Politics. 29(3). pp. 339-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2162206

Hall, M. (2011). Political Traditions and UK Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230336827

Hall, M.; Marsh, D. & Vines, E. (2018). “A changing democracy: contemporary challenges to the British political tradition.” Policy Studies. 39(4). pp. 365-382. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1451504

McManus, I. (2021). “The Case of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).” In: Falkenbach, M., Greer, S.L. (eds). The Populist Radical Right and Health. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70709-5_8

Marsh, D. & Hall, M. (2015). “The British Political Tradition and the Material-Ideational Debate.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 18(1), 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.12077

Massidda, L. and Selva, D. (2023). “Correction to: Boris Johnson’s Approach to the Pandemic, In: European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis.” Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13

Jarvis, L. (2022). “Constructing the coronavirus crisis: narratives of time in British political discourse on COVID-19.” British Politics. 17. pp. 24-43. https://doi.org/101057/s41293-021-00180-w  

Lasco, G. (2020). “Medical Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Global Public Health. pp. 1417-1429. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1807581

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press: New Haven. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300189124

Richards, D. & Smith, M. (2002). Governance and Public Policy in the UK, Oxford University Press.

Ringe, N. & Rennó, L. (2023). “Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.” In: Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Routledge: New York. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Sahin, O. & Ianosev, B. (2021). “UK: Between Managed Moderation and Far-Right Conspiracy Theories.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.). Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: London. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

Sim, J. & Tombs, S. (2022). “Narrating the coronavirus crisis: state talk and state silence.” UK, Power and Resistance. 5(1-2). pp. 67-90. http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1332/xfuq5523

Speed, E. & Mannion, R. (2020). “Populism and health policy: three international case studies of right-wing populist policy frames.” Sociology of Health & Illness, 42(8), pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.13173

Wellings, B.; Bonotti, M.; Rublee, M. R. & Zech, S. T. (2024). “Correction to: Narrative fusion and layering: statecraft and the shaping of Boris Johnson’s pandemic narrative, 2020–2021.” British Politics. 19(2), 253–253. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-023-00241-2

A view of the AKP's Izmir Provincial Directorate. The Turkish flag, along with posters of Erdogan and Ataturk, are seen together on the front of the building on October 30, 2021, in Bayrakli, Izmir. Photo: Idil Toffolo.

From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives

by ArticlesAuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomePopulism & Politics (P&P)

DOWNLOAD PDF

Please cite as:

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

 

Abstract

This paper explores the dynamic interplay of victimhood narratives, populism, and civilizational rhetoric in Turkish Islamist politics, centering on the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tracing the historical trajectory of Islamist victimhood and its evolution, the study reveals how the AKP strategically fused domestic victimhood politics with Islamist civilizational populism. These narrative positions the AKP as the advocate for the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation against a perceived pro-Western, secular, and corrupt elite. This narrative extends beyond the national level, portraying the AKP as the defender of the Muslim ummah against alleged Western conspiracies. Challenging existing literature that characterizes the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a mere continuation of its Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, this paper argues for its significant evolution. It introduces two additional layers constituting a ‘new’ victimhood: 1) a national victimhood discourse and 2) manufactured victimhood. In the post-Gezi Protests era, the AKP not only revisits its Islamist victimhood mindset, inclusive of anti-Western conspiracies, but also adopts a nationalist victimhood discourse through a mimetic process, seamlessly integrating it with its existing Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative. Furthermore, with the AKP’s rise to hegemonic status, the party strategically manufactures a novel victimhood narrative, rooted in conspiracy theories alleging Western opposition to the leader of the Muslim World, Turkey. This narrative strategy enables the AKP to deflect criticism, legitimize crackdowns, and solidify its grip on power. By unpacking these layers of victimhood, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the AKP’s evolving narrative strategy and its implications for the political landscape in Turkey.

Keywords: victimhood, manufactured victimhood, Islamism, conspiracy theories, Turkey, Erdogan, populism, religious populism, civilizational populism 

 

By Nicholas Morieson,  Ihsan Yilmaz & Bulent Kenes

Introduction

Within Turkish politics, the fusion of populist victimhood narratives has emerged as a potent force, catalyzing shifts in ideologies, political strategies, and societal perceptions. This paper embarks on a multifaceted exploration of these developments, by dissecting the evolution and strategic amalgamation of victimhood discourses, populism, and civilizational rhetoric within Turkish Islamist politics. Central to this study is an in-depth analysis of these narratives, with a particular focus on their manifestation and transformation during the AKP’s tenure. Historical grievances, intertwined with conspiratorial narratives and appeals to the victimhood of the Sunni Muslim Turkish nation, form the bedrock of these ideologies.

Beginning with a historical exposition of perceived injustices and pivotal events that sowed the seeds of Turkish Islamist victimhood, this paper navigates the roots of these victimhood narratives. Within these, segments of conservative society are portrayed as historically oppressed under the Kemalist elite, casting the AKP as the sole and genuine representative of the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation. Moreover, this study illuminates the confluence of victimhood with populist rhetoric, epitomized by the AKP’s portrayal of itself as the champion of the people against a corrupt and oppressive elite. Furthermore, the analysis delves into civilizational populism, where the AKP constructs itself as the guardian of Turkish identity, fending off alleged Western conspiracies and positioning Turkey as a bulwark against external threats. Importantly, this analysis demonstrates how these narratives have transitioned victimhood from a solely national to a transnational experience by framing the ummah as under threat – and Turkey as its savior. 

In societies entrenched in prolonged and unresolved conflicts, perceptions of victimhood emerge as integral within the narratives of populist political parties. Members of the in-group engage in a subjective process of branding the out-group as morally unjust and assigning blame to the group for perceived and actual harms. In contrast, the members of the in-group are presented as the sole victims of these supposed internal and external threats. This subjective process is associated with a higher degree of conspirational thinking. A strong correlation has been identified between a sense of victimhood and a propensity to embrace conspiracy theories. Collective experiences of perceived victimization, in particular, heighten susceptibility to adopting conspiracy stereotypes (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015). 

Following instances of perceived discrimination, disadvantage, or being targeted by crime or violence, groups may formulate theories that allege certain out-groups are conspiring against the in-group. Victimhood tends to generate its own moral framework, which legitimizes the actions and potential revenge of the victims. It also encourages the victim to identify scapegoats and attribute blame to them. Scapegoating solidifies the identity of an enemy and their negative characteristics, helping victims avoid feelings of ambiguity or moral doubt. (Tepeli & Demirok, 2014; Parlak & Uz, 2015). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has effectively utilized scapegoating and conspiracy theories to achieve his goals (Yabanci, 2016). 

Narratives of victimhood play a pivotal role within Turkey’s national discourse, yet the absence of dialogue about its diverse victimhood narratives presents a notable gap in Turkish political history research. Accordingly, the inadequate analysis of various victimhood claims has hindered a thorough understanding of the AKP’s recent authoritarian shift. Existing literature tends to perceive the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a continuum of earlier Islamist victimhood narratives, overlooking its evolution which has seen the addition of two additional layers. These new layers, ‘national victimhood discourse/victimhood nationalism’ and ‘manufactured victimhood’, have helped create a distinct form of victimhood prevalent in contemporary Turkey.

This paper primarily examines the AKP’s use of victimhood discourses since 2002. Initially, these discourses gained momentum following tangible events such as ‘the February 28 post-modern coup process,’ headscarf ban, and discrimination against minorities. However, with the AKP’s third election victory and Gezi Park protests in 2013 (which led to anti-government mobilization), the party shifted to manufacturing victimhood narratives and employing anti-Western conspiracy theories to deflect failures. This manufactured victimhood, now centralized in official discourse and campaigning, aided in contradicting and distancing the party from its true status as the dominant national power. This paper highlights a shift from genuine to manufactured victimhood discourses by first exploring the historical development of victimhood in Turkey, then delving into its discursive evolution and its impact on Turkish politics.

The Vertical and Horizontal Dimension of Erdogan’s Populism

Numerous scholars concur that populism constitutes a distinct set of core ideas, often referred to as a thin ideology, rather than a comprehensive belief system with explicit guidelines addressing social, political, and economic issues, such as liberalism, social democracy, and communism. This thin ideology revolves around two central elements: (i) the antagonism between ‘the pure people’ and the elites, and (ii) the moral and normative supremacy of popular will (Mudde, 2004: 543). Populists interpret the concept of ‘the people’ in a manner that aligns with their political agenda. They assert that it is they alone that can represent the people against a perceived ‘corrupt’ elite seeking to exclude them from power. It’s important to note that this ‘unified and virtuous people’ represents an exclusionary political project and does not encompass the entire population of a given country (Lefort, 1988).

Populism manifests itself in two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). The vertical dimension revolves around a binary of the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt, evil elite’, while the horizontal dimension involves a binary opposition between insiders and outsiders. The outsiders, who curiously may be citizens, are nevertheless perceived as foreigners or internal enemies based on their identities (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). Within the ‘people,’ there exists a distinction between ‘people like us’ and those outside ‘our’ group, who are seen as threats to ‘our’ way of life. Across various political and social contexts, populism tends to designate certain out-groups, such as minorities, migrants, dissidents, and opposition parties and politicians, as scapegoats. In this regard, populism adopts a Manichean perspective, dividing society into opposing poles of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ or ‘friends’ versus ‘enemies.’ (Mudde, 2004: 543).

A recent study (Lewis et al., 2019) highlighted that Erdogan is the only right-wing leader who can be labelled as being ‘very populist.’ Since working in the National Outlook (Milli Gorus) years during the 1970s and 1980s, Erdogan’s worldview consistently featured Islamist populist elements, framing himself and practicing Muslims as the true owners of the homeland, who had been victims of the oppressive Kemalist establishment. Erdogan’s populism has intensified significantly in recent years and has become a core feature of his political narrative (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This intensification was particularly noticeable following key political moments such as the nation’s economic challenges in 2009 and the Gezi protests in 2013. Post-Gezi, Erdogan’s populism merged with a revived Islamist ideology, marked by strong anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This ideological shift is rooted in former Prime Minister’s Erbakan’s National Outlook Islamism and the totalitarian ideology of Erdogan’s influential role model, Necip Fazil Kisakurek. Together, these elements provide a strong religio-moral component, asserting that ‘the people’ they represent include not only those who were exploited, excluded, oppressed, and victimized but also practicing Muslims who are regarded as morally superior (Tugal, 2002).

In Erdoğan’s populist vision, the Kemalist elite, along with non-Kemalist secular Turks—including leftists, liberals, democrats, and many urban-educated individuals—constitutes the vertical dimension of populism. These are often portrayed as ‘elites’ (referred to as Beyaz Turkler or White Turks) who are perceived as disconnected from the ‘real’ and authentic values of ‘the people.’ They are frequently caricatured as sipping whisky by the Bosporus while the ‘real Turks’ endure hardships. They are typically accused of imposing historical traumas on ordinary people in the name of Westernization or progress. Turkish-Islamist media intellectuals have particularly popularized the pejorative figure of the White Turk, depicting them as arrogant, elitist, and anti-Islamist. The White Turk is constructed as someone who views practicing Muslims as provincial, lower class, and ignorant to define their own (secular, civilized, and Westernized) identity and justify their authority. In the Erdoganist narrative, the White Turks are held responsible for any issues in the country, with the specter of the past Kemalist regime playing a crucial role in illustrating the potential consequences for ‘the people’ if Erdogan were to lose power (Yilmaz, 2021).

The horizontal dimension is also significant in Erdogan’s populism, and his policies aimed at fostering a pious in-group. This is particularly the case in the recent manifestation of victimhood, which poses that the AKP, Erdogan and the in-group are being threatened and attacked by a range of conspiring internal and external enemies. Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, liberals, and notably, the Gulen movement became targets within this resurrected discourse, fueling the ‘resentment/revenge of the Sunni constituency against the Westernized elite and citizens practicing a Western lifestyle, perceived as responsible for the banishment of religion itself’ (Yilmaz et al., 2023).

Erdoganist Victimhood and Resentment: Kemalists as the Oppressors

Turkish victimhood discourse has been shaped by several key narrative themes. These themes provide shape to claims of victimhood by describing who the oppressors are, who is being threatened (victimized), and how historical, political or other contextual factors justify and legitimize these narratives.

Turkish victimhood has a long history in the national political arena and there is a degree of continuity between earlier Islamist victimhood, Kemalist victimhood and contemporary Erdoganist victimhood. The insecurities, anxieties, and fears within Erdoganism bear a striking resemblance to those found in Kemalism. Much like their Kemalist counterparts, Turkey’s Islamists harbor their own insecurities, feelings of victimhood, fears, and a siege mentality towards the West. They attribute the decline of revered institutions, namely the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, to the West, as documented by Akkoyunlu and Oktem (2016: 510). However, in the Islamist and Erdoganist narrative, Kemalists are viewed as products of Western cultural imperialism—self-colonizing pawns of the godless West fixated on eroding Turkey’s Islamic identity and threatening its Muslim population (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 510). Thus, Erdogan’s populism finds its roots in Turkish Islamist victimhood. It positions itself against the Kemalist hegemony by purporting to represent the demands, interests, victimhood, resentments, and frustrations of practicing Muslims, whom Erdogan frames as the true owners of the country. In this context, the potential for democratization of Turkey only exists if democracy is conceived as the ‘power of the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ (Yilmaz, 2021). 

Historically, victimhood discourses have held a central place in Islamist ideology in Turkey. The Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse argues that Islamists have been the true victims of the modernization process in Turkey (Yilmaz Z., 2017: 483). At the core of the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative lies the transformative events of 1923, involving the destruction of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the secular Republic. Kemalist reforms in education, social interactions, and politics dealt a severe blow to the status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. 

Consequently, the Kemalists, particularly represented by the Republican People Party (CHP) in political life, became the primary oppressor and threat in Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse. The persecution of leading Islamist intellectuals like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Said Nursi, and Sezai Karakoc, made possible by new laws, generated deep resentment and disillusionment among intellectuals and their followers toward the existing political order in Turkey. These intellectuals perceived themselves as “alienated in their own country,” forced into “estrangement,” and cast as “pariahs” (Aktay, 2003; see also Singer, 2013). In this Islamist imagination, the history of modern Turkey is entirely framed as the “victimhood of devout Muslims” (Yilmaz Z., 20174: 87).

The Kemalist animosity towards Islamists during the Kemalist decades, exemplified by the Constitutional Court’s frequent closure of Erbakan’s political parties, the “Republican Rally” in 2007, headscarf bans at universities, and continuous demonization of Islamist figures in the media, served to solidify Islamists’ perception of Kemalists as adversaries. This has cultivated a sense of “resentment and victimhood” among Islamists (Yılmaz Z., 2017). 

The conspiratorial anxieties and resentments of pro-Erdoganists related to the authoritarian secularism of Kemalism were not entirely unfounded. However, Erdogan’s discourse successfully manipulated these anxieties, fears, and resentments and leveraged them in sweeping narratives of the threat they posed to the fate of the nation and, more broadly, to the Muslim world. These narratives gained intense traction following the Gezi Protests in 2013 and, most prominently, the 2016 coup attempt. In Turkey’s current socio-political climate, even the slightest criticism is now framed as a terrorist activity masterminded by external enemies determined to destroy Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World.

Islamist Civilizational Populism: Framing the EU and West as Civilizational Enemies

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ali Erbas, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is seen during a public rally in Istanbul on the second anniversary of failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

While civilizationism has been interpreted as a form of nationalism, the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ undergo a reconceptualization when framed in civilizational terms. This perspective presents an alternative to nationalism, wherein the imagined community or nostalgic utopia is situated at a different level of cultural and political space compared to national discourse. It’s crucial to note that civilizationism doesn’t replace nationalism; instead, it becomes intertwined with nationalism (Brubaker, 2017: 1211).

‘Civilizational populism’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023) is defined as a set of ideas that asserts politics should reflect the “volonté générale” (general will) of the people. It posits that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ who collaborate with dangerous outsiders from other civilizations. These outsiders are portrayed as hostile and a direct threat to the people’s civilization and way of life (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023).

A civilisational populist perspective became prevalent in AKP politics following the decline of pro-European Union (EU) reforms and a weakening of ties with the EU. Firstly, it moved away from the prioritization of Westernization and relations-building with the West but, more significantly, it also placed a civilizational perspective at the core of Turkey’s interactions with the EU. This perspective framed Islamic civilization as being fundamentally opposed to Western civilization (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).

The AKP’s Islamist victimhood narrative portrays a vision of a united Muslim world (the Ummah) threatened by conspiracies orchestrated by “the Crusader West.” This narrative not only designates the ruling Islamist regime as a victim but also frames Turkey as a nation and country under threat. The concept of Islamist victimhood enables the AKP to present itself simultaneously as a target of Western conspiracies and as the foremost defender of Turkey and the entire Muslim world against these perceived conspiracies. This has led to the AKP adopting a transactionalist foreign policy approach towards the EU, stripping away the former ideational or identity-related significance of Turkey-EU relations (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).

The Arab Spring also presented a crucial opportunity for the AKP, as it offered hope regarding the fall of pro-Western authoritarian regimes, allowing Islamist forces to rise and potentially restore Islamic national identities. In response to the Arab Spring, the AKP identified a strategic window and began defining its civilizational identity in starkly anti-Western terms. This move aimed to address and appeal to anxieties, insecurities, and fears regarding Western retaliation. The AKP embraced its civilizational discourse more vehemently, categorizing the West and Islam as mutually exclusive and antagonistic enemies. Erdogan and his party increasingly employed a civilizational discourse that depicted Turkey as an exclusively Muslim nation. While presenting themselves and their supporters (AKP voters) as native and national, they categorized other political classes and their constituents as non-native due to their allegedly “alien” Western paradigms. Simultaneously, anti-Westernism escalated, with the AKP denouncing the EU/West for undermining Turkey’s alleged rise under AKP rule.

Religio-nationalist Victimhood

Another layer of the AKP’s victimhood discourse converges with the Kemalist national victimhood discourse that portrays Turkey as the prime target of Western powers and their local collaborators. The notion of a national victimhood discourse is deeply ingrained in the Turkish national psyche, emphasizing collective victimhood experienced by the Turkish people, especially at the hands of Western imperialist forces. This narrative, rooted in events dating back to 1908 and exacerbated during WWI, is also propagated through institutional mechanisms like the national curriculum.

Central to Turkey’s victimhood nationalism is what has been termed the Sevres Syndrome – a collective victimhood and siege mentality with roots in the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This treaty marked the gradual and tumultuous collapse of the Ottoman State. Over time, the memory of this treaty and its associated fears and losses metamorphosed into Sevres Syndrome, giving rise to numerous anti-Western conspiracy theories grounded in nationalism and anti-imperialism. Scholars suggest that the perception of unique in-group victimhood, such as that developed in the Sevres Syndrome, often solidifies national identities, fostering a siege mentality in which certain nations perceive the world as inherently against them.

Both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic grappled with the need to rationalize their defeats and challenges, resorting to a narrative involving external forces and internal adversaries. In the late Ottoman Empire, adversaries included Greece, Armenia, Russia, and the UK. Over time, this narrative evolved to include Kurds, Jews, communists, and Christians as victims of an enduring demonization campaign. Despite changing actors, the narrative has remained fundamentally consistent. Identifying enemies and incorporating conspiracy theories has become an ingrained aspect of the collective mindset, observed among both secularist and Islamist factions within Turkish society (Yilmaz, 2021).

National Victimhood Discourse

Interpreting the world through the narrative lens described above provides both secular and Muslim Turks with a framework that absolves them from extending empathy to other victimized groups, such as the Armenians. Combined with the Sevres Syndrome, it also allows them to present themselves unequivocally as the true victims of historical events. For instance, rather than confronting the reality of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish state projected Turks as historical victims, portraying them as targets of both murderous Armenians and the depredations of imperial powers. This framework is what we term the national victimhood discourse.

The national victimhood discourse has typically been (ab)used by the ruling elite within Turkish politics. This stands in contrast to the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, which emerged as an oppositional underdog narrative. The distinction lies in the requirement of victimhood nationalism for the claimant to represent both the nation and the state, necessitating a position of power to do so. The nation and state are the primary targets of victimization in this context, diverging from Turkish Islamist victimhood, where Islamists and their conservative constituents are the focus. Consequently, those invoking Turkish Islamist victimhood should ideally only speak on behalf of these particular segments.

Victimhood Narratives – and Their Evolution – During the AKP’s Rising Hegemony

Erdogan supporters are seen during the commemorations for the second anniversary of the 2016 coup attempt in Istanbul on July 15, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

The discussion above briefly outlined the key actors held responsible in AKP’s victimhood discourse, and the key influential factors that have shaped its narratives. In the following section, the content of these narratives and their evolution will be analyzed, investigating the initial articulations of victimization which were primarily in response to various socio-political and historical events. It will then examine their transformation and adoption of manufactured narratives and an increased reliance on conspiracy theories, which have been necessary to maintain a victimhood status—even as the AKP has become the most powerful hegemon in contemporary Turkey.

The evolution of the AKP’s contemporary victimhood narrative is marked by the integration of victimhoods associated with religio-nationalism, Turkish nationalism and Islamist populism. The party positions itself as a victimized yet conversely hegemonic entity speaking on behalf of the entire nation and, in an imagined sense, the Ummah. The contemporary manifestation of their claim to victimhood goes beyond these components to encompass an additional discursive layer of manufactured victimhood.

The AKP’s narrative of victimhood persists despite governing the country for twenty-one uninterrupted years and having acquired extensive political powers. When faced with challenges like economic downturns due to its policies or evidence of corruption, the party resorts to blaming external entities, such as foreign forces or interest lobbies, deflecting responsibility. 

Initial Era of Victimhood Narratives: Predominantly Anti-Kemalist 

The AKP’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections marked a significant departure from the long-standing dominance of Kemalists in Turkish politics. Utilizing the discontent of pious Muslims and broader dissatisfaction stemming from economic challenges, the AKP employed a potent populist discourse that perpetuated the belief that the majority were victims of the established order. 

In the early 2000s, the AKP successfully portrayed itself as the victim of the ‘White Turks,’ referencing the Kemalist hegemony and military tutelage that discriminated against conservative segments of society. Turkish Islamists described themselves as the ‘Black Turks’ (Bilici, 2009; Demiralp, 2012; Arat-Koc, 2018), claiming to have endured oppression at the hands of the Kemalist hegemony since the establishment of the Republic. In constructing this opposition (Black Turks vs White Turks), the AKP was able to portray themselves as the voice of the Black Turks. Erdogan consistently asserted his identity as a ‘Black Turk,’ for instance stating on one occasion, “In this country, there is a segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks.” On another occasion, he expressed, “I am honored to be a Black Turk” (Sabah, 2015).

During its two initial terms, the AKP’s victimhood discourses effectively highlighted Kemalist-era policies, including the February 28, 1997 “post-moder coup,” the headscarf ban, and discrimination in bureaucratic and military sectors. This political period saw a distancing from overtly Islamist victimhood references, and it was during this time that Erdogan famously stated the party had shed the garment of Islamism. 

In its initial phase of governance, the AKP maintained a pro-Western stance while focusing on its primary objective of challenging the Kemalist establishment. The primary resentment of Turkish-Islamist subjects was initially directed at White Turks, Kemalist elites, and CHP cadres. It persistently asserted that its struggle against the establishment was fundamentally a fight for democracy and human rights—a strategic move, considering the fate of its predecessors. The victimization under the Kemalist regime extended beyond conservative Muslims, encompassing Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, liberals, and socialists to varying degrees throughout the Republican period. 

Around the turn of the millennium, especially within the context of a military tutelage system, it became evident that a broader community needed to unite around a general democratization agenda. This unity was crucial for the AKP to address specific demands and gain power, resulting in the AKP and various victimized segments of society becoming mutually dependent in challenging the Kemalist tutelage regime. To garner support and demonstrate inclusivity, the AKP invited a broad spectrum of political actors, predominantly from center-right and liberal backgrounds, to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. Their narratives of Turkish victimhood incorporated discourses addressing long-standing issues faced by minorities under the Kemalist reign (Acikel, 1996; Demiralp, 2012; Yılmaz Z., 2017; Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018). This discursive period of victimhood was grounded in real events and did not rely on conspiracy theories. 

Aligning with its conservative democratic discourse, the AKP did not focus solely on expressing Muslim resentment but sought to empathize with other victimhood narratives and attempted to build a coalition among various marginalized groups. The party collaborated with actors such as the Gulen movement, religious Kurds, some Alevis, and the liberal democratic segments of society. These groups consistently supported the AKP, at least until the Gezi events in 2013, and benefited from the opportunity structures that emerged following the AKP’s election in 2002

Articulating Narratives of Human Rights Abuses

The AKP government responded to the demands of their coalition of victims by implementing reforms aimed at safeguarding human rights, especially in minority affairs. Between 2004 and 2013, significant openings were created in response to non-Muslim, Kurdish, and Alevi issues. Erdogan – the leader of this coalition of victims – opportunistically attempted to redirect the resentments of the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis toward blame attribution towards the CHP and Kemalism.

The AKP strategically anchored its victimhood claims in human rights discourses during the pre-Gezi period. Articulations of human rights (and human rights abuses) became a crucial tool for the AKP to assert and maintain its victimhood status. In a domestic political context, human rights arguments can be powerful in evoking a sense of ‘victimhood,’ portraying the state as an all-encompassing hegemon inflicting pain on less powerful groups. The AKP effectively utilized this argument, leveraging the balance of power in Turkish politics and events under the Kemalist regime, such as party closure cases, the headscarf ban, Erdogan’s short-term imprisonment, and the military’s rejection of Abdullah Gul’s presidential election due to his wife’s headscarf, which lent legitimacy to their rhetoric (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018: 299).

Victimhood Claims Taking on New Dimensions in Response to Key Political Events

In the pre-Gezi period, Turkish Islamist victimhood was primarily domestic, focusing on its underdog status against the Kemalists. However, the government response to the 2013 Gezi protests marked a significant departure from the predominantly anti-Kemalist and victimhood narratives that the AKP had been disseminating since coming into power. Erdogan perceived and presented the Gezi protests as a severe threat to his personal power, prompting a desperate need for new rhetoric to counter the peaceful civil protests. As Kemalist-centric victimhood narratives lost appeal, the AKP sought a new political discourse to reassert its victimhood status. During the Gezi protests, Erdogan resorted to civilisationist Islamist rhetoric, portraying not only the government but Turkey in its entirety as a victim of an international conspiracy orchestrated by the West and its local allies. This narrative amalgamated elements of ‘national victimhood discourse’ and ‘Turkish Islamist victimhood’ and positioned itself as a perpetual victim of various groups, countries, and interests, including Germany, the US, the UK, and media outlets Otpor! and CNN. The AKP also deployed a discourse of needing to protect itself and the ummah against imaginary enemies, including the ‘supreme intelligence,’ ‘interest rate lobbies,’ and foreign adversaries (Yilmaz, 2021). 

In the same year as the Gezi Protests, the 2013 military coup in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood-supported presidency of Mohammad Morsi dealt both a geopolitical and psychological blow to the AKP leadership (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518). The fall of a crucial Islamist ally and the imprisonment of its elected leader undermined the AKP’s regional aspirations, contributing to a deeper level of insecurity and an alarmist reading of domestic and regional dynamics. Importantly, the event validated Turkish Islamist’s deep mistrust and resentment towards the West. They perceived the muted response of Western media and governments to the coup, compared to the extensive attention given to the Gezi Protests, and the swift endorsement of the military-backed regime in Egypt, as proof of its double standards regarding democracy in the Muslim world (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518).

The controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was also a traumatizing event for millions of Erdoganists (Adisonmez & Onursal, 2020: 298). Erdogan adeptly turned the failed coup attempt into an extraordinary source of popular support, using the event as a rallying and mobilizing opportunity. More importantly, he gained the unwavering support of conservative religious and nationalist segments of society by articulating a discourse that instilled fear and anxiety, portraying all opposition and criticism as detrimental to their interests, lifestyles, and even to their existence (Ozen, 2020: 1-3). He consistently used a discourse of securitization to maintain this anxiety and fear, framing opposition to his government as an attack against Islam, the nation’s unity, the flag, and all sacred national values. 

Islamist Populism and Historical Islamist Victimhood

The political events detailed in the previous section have contributed significantly to the victimhood narratives propagated by Erdogan and the AKP. Although these events intersect with religious populism, there is also a distinct layer of victimhood that stems directly from Islamism and historical Islamist victimhood and addresses the perceived victimization of Muslims at the hands of various oppressors. Victimhood accounts within Turkish Islamism assert that Islamists have been the true casualties of Turkey’s modernization process, with a particular focus on the demise of the Ottoman State and the subsequent establishment of the secular Republic in 1923. Islamist populism plays a significant role in shaping AKP’s key narratives about friends and foes, and victims and victimizers. It has also allowed Erdogan and his party to create a victimhood discourse that connects to broader and transnational Muslim victimhood themes and narratives. 

Turkish Islamist victimhood is rooted in historical experiences of victimization, stretching back to the early Republican period and, for the AKP, encompassing party closures, military coups, detainment, and headscarf bans. At the core of this victimhood narrative lies the profound impact of secular Kemalist reforms in education, social structures, and politics, which dealt a severe blow to the prior status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. The oversight of all religious education and preaching was centralized under the state-affiliated Diyanet, and numerous religious institutions, including dervish lodges and Islamic charities, were prohibited or abolished. The new Turkish Criminal Code criminalized almost all forms of non-state (non-Diyanet) religious dissemination, leading to the persecution of various religious groups.

While certain historical events during the Kemalist era did disadvantage Islamists, the core of Islamist ‘victimhood’ in the Turkish case is primarily grounded in an ‘imaginary’ context. The articulation of these victimizations powerfully combines factual events with imaginary elements. This blending serves to amplify and sanctify their significance, contributing to narratives of victimhood that resonate emotionally and symbolically within the broader Islamist community. Within this Islamist imagination, modern Turkish history is framed as witnessing the ‘victimhood of devout Muslims.’ This framing is deeply embedded within the political imagination of Islamists, existing in a realm where the boundaries between reality and fiction are blurred, and encompasses material practices, emotions, symbolic efficacy, performances, and dramatizations. 

Although neither the AKP nor Turkey are officially the leader of the Muslim world, the Turkish Islamist imaginary envisions them as such (Cinar, 2018; Sezal & Sezal, 2017). Consequently, attacks against Turkish Islamists are portrayed as direct attacks against the Muslim world. President Erdogan, considered by many as the ‘heir presumptive’ of the caliphate and the leader of the Muslim world, plays a central role in legitimizing and disseminating this idea. In his famous balcony speeches following election victories, Erdogan claimed “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, [and] Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir” (Phillips, 2017: 29). This suggests that his political victory in Turkey is a success for all Muslim lands. In this narrative, even minor losses for the AKP are construed as significant blows to the Muslim world. 

Transitioning to a Manufactured Victimhood

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.

While Turkish Islamist victimhood encompasses both real and imagined accounts of events, it is important to note that this perception is not necessarily deliberate. It is a product of how Islamists interpret their political environment. In contrast, manufactured victimhood strategically combines the imagined Turkish Islamist victimhood with deliberately constructed falsehoods. Unlike Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood narratives, which originate from real events and their dramatizations, manufactured victimhood deliberately fabricates narratives—often in stark contradiction to the AKP’s hegemonic status—to create a sense of victimhood where none exists.

Despite the persuasiveness of the AKP’s victimhood claims, during its first decade in power, its overreliance on them eventually took its toll. Since their 2011 election victory, the AKP’s own supporters found it difficult to consolidate victimhood narratives that claimed the party was an underdog in Turkish politics. Regardless, even in 2014, the AKP continued to depict itself “as the oppressed blacks” and “eternal underdogs of Turkish society” (Yilmaz, 2021). Eventually, though, AKP’s Islamist victimhood vis-à-vis the Kemalists, which relied on human rights discourses, ceased to yield favorable political results. 

The persuasiveness of this messaging took an even steeper dive after 2016, when the AKP became the nation’s primary hegemonic power in Turkish politics and succeeded in marginalizing the Kemalist tutelage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). At this juncture, the AKP needed a new ‘anchor’ to re-establish itself as a victim, which it found in anti-Western conspiracy theories. The AKP no longer required the support of the EU, as the pressure for democratization, anti-corruption measures, and transparency had become burdensome. By this point, the AKP deemed transactional relations with the EU to be sufficient (for a detailed analysis, see Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020).

It was during this time that the AKP’s victimhood acquired more imaginary dimensions, and the party began constructing an imaginary victimhood narrative combined with Islamist civilizationism. These narratives rely on perpetuating anti-Western conspiracy theories to rationalize its problems, failures, and inefficiencies. This narrative shift allows the AKP to deflect criticism, attribute internal challenges to external actors, and maintain a sense of being besieged, despite holding significant political power. For the AKP, the West became a convenient rhetorical foil against which it sought to define the struggle of the faithful and the “national will” (Hoffman et al., 2018: 5).  

Erdogan played a crucial role in creating momentum for this discursive shift in victimhood. As the leader acquired significant power, he shifted blame away from himself, propagated the belief that the AKP was being threatened or attacked by internal and external enemies, and disseminated securitization narratives (Lancaster, 2014: 1684). These narratives became more entrenched in the years that followed. For instance, on July 21, 2020, while reflecting on the second anniversary of the new presidential system, he passionately declared: “The Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey are undergoing a historical period. In this period, there are all kinds of traps, attacks, conspiracies, betrayal, pain, and trouble. The Turkish Nation, with its citizens and security forces, is carrying out its struggle for independence and future, step by step to victory. We are determined to continue this struggle forever for the future of all our friends and brothers (the Muslim World) … Yes, we, as a nation that shed our sweat and blood, when necessary, believe that we will be gifted with God’s good tidings. We are well aware that the attacks that we have been experiencing for the last 7 years have aimed at our belief, history, culture, unity, togetherness, ezan (call to prayer), flag, and all our sacred values. We have no doubt that from the turmoil in the streets to the coup attempts, each attack meant shotgun shots for the same target. Our nation with its wisdom acquired through a thousand years of experience has seen this reality and has decided to join the ranks of its future and independence. It is our duty to pay our debt against this sacrifice of our nation by working with sacrifice, diligence and perseverance that will spoil all the conspiracies” (Erdogan, 2020: 2, 7).

Manufactured victimhood encompasses multiple layers, incorporating not only its own manufactured narratives but also elements of Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood. Major events like the Gezi Protests and the attempted coup illustrate the utilization of all three layers within different arguments presented by the AKP. This multifaceted approach serves to perpetuate the victimhood narrative, projecting the party as simultaneously oppressed despite wielding significant power. The strategic use of manufactured victimhood allows the AKP to shape public perception, maintain a sense of solidarity among its supporters, and deflect attention from internal challenges or criticisms.  

The above discussion highlights how the AKP’s strategic move to adopt anti-Western conspiracy theories navigates the changing dynamics of Turkish politics. This new narrative angle resonates with a segment of its support base, explaining economic challenges, international scrutiny, and internal dissent. This new narrative anchor helps sustain victimhood rhetoric, even as the AKP’s political landscape and power dynamics undergo significant transformations.

Conclusion

To trace the trajectory of the AKP’s discourse of victimhood, it is essential to first acknowledge its roots in the broader historical context of Turkish Islamist ideology. For decades, Islamist discourse depicted its adherents as the oppressed ‘Black Turks,’ enduring discrimination under Kemalist rule since the Republic’s founding. Discriminatory practices in public service recruitment, the disapproval of conservative traditions by Kemalist leaders, and pivotal events like the February 28 process, the headscarf ban, and Erdogan’s imprisonment collectively fueled and solidified the Islamist victimhood narrative by the turn of the millennium.

The AKP’s electoral triumphs have been intricately linked to the strategic deployment of victimhood discourses, casting its opposition as antagonists while presenting the party and its support base as victims. Initially directed at Kemalists, particularly the main opposition CHP, the AKP’s victimhood narrative evolved into a multi-layered framework post-Gezi, seamlessly and concurrently adopting anti-Western conspiracy theories. Notably, the party expanded its narratives of victimization beyond domestic boundaries, aligning its fate with the Muslim Ummah and employing victimhood to legitimize crackdowns on domestic opposition. This narrative shielded the AKP from criticism and effectively stifled dissent, especially in the face of corruption scandals.

An intriguing aspect of the AKP’s narrative is its dual portrayal, presenting itself as a domestic hegemon and protector of the nation, while simultaneously depicting itself as an underdog and target in global politics against the West. The adept utilization of conspiracy theories is an attempt to maintain the AKP’s image as the sole representative of Turkey and casting the West as an omnipotent hegemon in the geopolitical arena.

The multifaceted functions of victimhood claims within the political sphere are evident in the AKP’s narrative. Pre-Gezi, victimhood, coupled with human rights discourse, bolstered the AKP’s moral standing against Kemalists and the West. This narrative not only resonated with the conservative masses but also justified the party’s crackdowns on opposition, both internally and externally. The narrative’s evolution into an internationalized victimhood, seamlessly merging historical grievances with contemporary political maneuvering, showcases the adaptability and resilience of the AKP’s discursive strategy within the ever-shifting landscape of Turkish politics.

The political benefits of claiming victimhood—providing moral superiority, absolving guilt and shame, justifying misdeeds, enabling unfair behavior, and evading responsibility—is evident in the political sphere, as seen in the AKP’s narrative.

 

References

— (2015). “Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan: Zenci bir Türk Olmaktan Şeref Duyuyorum / (President Erdoğan: I am proud to be a Black Turk).” Sabah. June 25, 2015. http://www.sabah.com.tr/webtv/turkiye/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-zenci-bir-turk-olmaktan-seref-duyuyorum (accessed on August 3, 2024).

Adisonmez, U. C. & Onursal, R. (2020). “Governing Anxiety, Trauma and Crisis: The Political Discourse on Ontological (In)Security after the July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey.” Middle East Critique. 29(3), 291–306. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2020.1770445

Akkoyunlu, K. & Oktem, K. (2016). “Existential insecurity and the making of a weak authoritarian regime in Turkey.” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16(4), 505–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1253225

Aktay, Y. (2003). “Diaspora and Stability Constitutive Elements in a Body of Knowledge.” In: M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Esposito. Turkish Islam and Secular State: The Gülen Movement. Syracuse University Press, 133-140.

Arat-Koc, S. (2018). “Culturalizing politics, hyper-politicizing “culture”: “White” vs. “Black Turks” and the making of authoritarian populism in Turkey.” Dialectical Anthropology. 42(4), 391–408. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10624-018-9500-2

Bashirov, G. & Yilmaz, I. (2020). “The rise of transactionalism in international relations: evidence from Turkey’s relations with the European Union.” Australian Journal of International Affairs. 74(2), 165–184. https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2019.1693495

Bilewicz, M. and Sedek, G. (2015). “Conspiracy Stereotypes.” In: Michal Bilewicz, Aleksandra Cichocka, Wiktor Soral (eds.). The Psychology of Conspiracy. Routledge.

Bilewicz, M. and Stefaniak, A. (2013). “Can a victim be responsible? Antisemitic consequences of victimhood-based identity and competitive victimhood in Poland.” In: Responsibility: An interdisciplinary perspective. Warsaw: Matrix

Bilici, M. (2009). “Black Turks, White Turks: On the Three Requirements of Turkish Citizenship.’ Insight Turkey. 11(3): 23-35. 

Brubaker, R. (2017). “Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies. 40(8), 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

Cinar, M. (2018). “Turkey’s ‘Western’ or ‘Muslim’ identity and the AKP’s civilizational discourse.” Turkish Studies. 19(2), 176–197. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1411199

Demiralp, S. (2012). “White Turks, Black Turks? Faultlines beyond Islamism versus secularism.” Third World Quarterly. 33(3), 511–524. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2012.657487

Erdogan, R.T. (2020). Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Cumhurbaşkanlığı Kabinesi 2. Yıl Değerlendirme Toplantısı. Ankara: TCBB. www.tccb.gov.tr/assets/dosya/kabine/kabine.pdf

Grigoriadis, I. N. & Dilek, E. (2018). “Struggling for the Kurdish vote: religion, ethnicity and victimhood in AKP and BDP/HDP rally speeches.” Middle Eastern Studies. 54(2), 289–303. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2017.1402300

Hoffman, M.; Werz, M. & Halpin, J. (2018). Turkey’s ‘New Nationalism’ Amid Shifting Politics Further Analysis of Polling Results. Washington DC: Center for American Progress. February 11, 2018. https://www.americanprogress.org/article/turkeys-new-nationalism-amid-shifting-politics/ (accessed on August 3, 2024).

Lancaster, C. (2014). “The iron law of Erdogan: the decay from intra-party democracy to personalistic rule.” Third World Quarterly. 35(9), 1672–1690. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2014.970866

Lefort, Claude. (1988). Democracy and Political Theory. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

Lewis, P.; Barr, C.; Clarke, S.; Voce, A.; Levett, C. & Gutiérrez, P. (2019). “Revealed: The Rise and Rise of Populist Rhetoric.” The Guardian. March 6, 2019. www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2019/mar/06/revealed-the-rise-and-rise-of-populist-rhetoric (accessed on August 5, 2024).

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition (London). 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Parlak, I. and Uz, Pinar. (2015). “Mağdur/Mazlumdan Mağrur/Muktedire 30 Mart Seçimleri.” Düşünen Siyaset. 30: 69-106. https://gcris.pau.edu.tr/bitstream/11499/25940/1/12_magduriyet.pdf

Phillips, D. L. (2017). An Uncertain Ally: Turkey Under Erdogan’s Dictatorship. Taylor & Francis.

Sezal, M. A. & Sezal, I. (2018). “Dark taints on the looking glass: Whither ‘New Turkey’?” Turkish Studies. 19(2), 217–239. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1402681

Singer, S.R. (2013). ‘Erdoğan’s Muse: The School of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek.’ World Affairs 176 (4): 81–88.

Taguieff, Pierre-André. (1995). “Political Science Confronts Populism: From a Conceptual Mirage to a Real Problem.” Telos (New York, N.Y.), 1995(103), 9–43. https://doi.org/10.3817/0395103009

Tepeli, A. D. and Demirok, I. (2014). “Kaygıdan Komploya: Psikoloji Teorileri Açısından Komplo Teorilerine Dair Bir İnceleme.” Teorik Bakış. 5: 75-90.

Tugal, C. (2002). “Islamism in Turkey: beyond instrument and meaning.” Economy and Society, 31(1), 85–111. https://doi.org/10.1080/03085140120109268

Yabanci, B. (2016). “Populism as the problem child of democracy: the AKP’s enduring appeal and the use of meso-level actors.” Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies. 16(4), 591–617. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683857.2016.1242204

Yilmaz I.; Shipoli, E. and Demir, M. (2023). Securitization and Authoritarianism: The AKP’s Oppression of Dissident Groups in Turkey. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.

Yilmaz, I. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizens: State, Islam and Ideology in Turkey. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

Yilmaz, I. & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly. 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2022). “Religious Populisms in the Asia Pacific.” Religions (Basel, Switzerland ). 13(9), 802-. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13090802

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-24). Springer Nature Singapore.

Yilmaz, I.; Barton, G. & Barry, J. (2017). “The Decline and Resurgence of Turkish Islamism: The Story of Tayyip Erdoğan’s AKP.” Journal of Citizenship and Globalisation Studies. 1(1), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1515/jcgs-2017-0005

Yilmaz, Zafer. (2017). “The AKP and the spirit of the ‘new’ Turkey: imagined victim, reactionary mood, and resentful sovereign.” Turkish Studies. 18(3), 482–513. https://doi.org/10.1080/14683849.2017.1314763

Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald meets with supporters at the Cost of Living Coalition protest in Dublin, Ireland, on September 24, 2022. Photo: Liam Murphy.

Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomePopulism & Politics (P&P)

DOWNLOAD PDF

Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039       

 

Abstract

This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections. 

Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections

 

By Christo Pretorius

Introduction

On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.

Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.

Historical Context of Sinn Féin

It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168). 

Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).

Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).

 

Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441). 

A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).

Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10). 

This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).

Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).

 

Methodology

Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).

Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).

In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).

We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.

When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.). 

STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil. 

The Popular Populist Leftist Party

Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”

Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).

Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)

Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:

Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland

Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).

On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020). 

Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).

Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).

Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?

In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020). 

The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election? 

The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.

Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024

Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).

By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”

The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’

Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this: 

Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?

In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).

Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.

Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.

However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).

Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.

The Alternative to the Alternative Vote

Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.). 

Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024). 

Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).

As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024). 

However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.

Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos

2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto

Quote Page
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.”  4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.”  5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.”  5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.”  5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.”  7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.”  7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.”  10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.”  10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.”  11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.”  11

2020 General Election Manifesto

Quote Page
“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.” 3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.”  4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.”  4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.”  13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.”  25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.”  30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.”  44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.”  44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.”  44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.”  69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.”  71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.”  91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.”  96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.”  96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.”  104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.”  105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.”  105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.”  105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.”  106

2024 European Parliament Manifesto

Quote Page
“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.”  5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.”  13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.”  19

 

References

— (n.d.). Statistical breakdown of deaths in the Troubles of Northern Ireland 1969 – 2001. CAIN. https://belfastchildis.com/lost-lives/the-troubles-1969-1998-statistical-breakdown-of-deaths-in-the-troubles/ (accessed on July 25, 2024).

— (n.d.). Dictionary of Populism: Populism. ECPS https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/populism/ (accessed on July 26, 2024).

— (n.d.). Single Transferable Vote. Electoral Reform Society. https://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-voting-system/single-transferable-vote/ (accessed on July 30, 2024).

— (n.d.). Home. Independent Ireland. https://www.independentireland.ie/ (accessed on July 26, 2024).

— (n.d.). Election Guide: Recent and Upcoming Elections. International Foundation for Electoral Systems. https://www.electionguide.org/countries/id/105/ (accessed on July 29, 2024).

— (1917). “Sinn Fein Rebellion Handbook: Easter 1916.” Irish Times: Dublin. https://archive.org/details/sinnfeinrebellio00dubl/page/n7/mode/2up (accessed on July 26, 2024).

— (2004). An Ireland of Equals in a Europe of Equals: Sinn Féin EU Election Manifesto 2004. Sinn Féin. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/politics/docs/sf/sf100604man.pdf

— (2011). “The Case Against the Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join.” Irish Left Archive. January 24, 2011. https://www.leftarchive.ie/document/408/ (accessed on July 13, 2024).

— (2017). “Victim ‘waterboarded’ by ex-Sinn Féin man.” BBC. April 28, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-39747414 (accessed on July 27, 2024).

— (2018). “Sinn Féin accused of ‘rowing back’ on border poll.” BBC. July 31, 2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-45024893 (accessed on July 27, 2024).

— (2019). Monthly TrolleyGAR Figures. Department of Health. https://www.gov.ie/en/policy-information/-monthly-trolleygar-figures/ (accessed on July 26, 2024).

— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin.  

— (2020a). “Paul Quinn murder: Parents say Murphy apology not enough.” BBC. February 6, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-51381092 (accessed on July 27, 2024).

— (2020b). “Irish election: Sinn Féin criticises ‘disgraceful’ Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.” BBC. February 14, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51508380 (accessed on July 27, 2024).

— (2022). Letters: Sinn Féin and Generation Z. Irish Times. September 8, 2022.https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/letters/2022/09/08/sinn-fein-and-generation-z/ (accessed on July 22, 2024).

— (2023). “Ireland: RSF and its partners urge Sinn Féin to stop taking intimidating legal action against the media and journalists.” Reporters Without Borders (RSF).  https://rsf.org/en/ireland-rsf-and-its-partners-urge-sinn-f%C3%A9in-stop-taking-intimidating-legal-action-against-media-and (accessed on July 3, 2024).

— (2023). “Latest legal case by Sinn Féin TD heightens concern at potential chilling effect on media.” The Journal.November 14, 2023. https://www.thejournal.ie/legal-cases-defamation-politicians-press-council-6217636-Nov2023/ (accessed on July 22, 2024).

— (2024). A Guide to the Referendums on the Thirty-ninth and Fortieth Amendments to the Constitution. University College Dublin. https://www.ucd.ie/law/t4media/Referendum%20guide%202024.pdf

— (2024). “Elections 2024: Results.” RTÉ. https://www.rte.ie/news/elections-2024/results/#/local/national (accessed on July 13, 2024).

— (2024). Ireland: Results by national party – 2024-2029 (Final Results). European Parliament. July 16, 2024. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/national-results/ireland/2024-2029/ (accessed on August 5, 2024).

— (2024). SnapShot – July 2024: What is Getting Citizens’ Attention – Key Themes. IPSOS, B&A, & The Irish Times. https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2024-08/Snapshot%20Table%20July%2024.pdf

— (2024). “Independent Ireland Statement on a week of ‘Wild Speculation’.” Independent Ireland.https://www.independentireland.ie/news/independent-ireland-statement-on-a-week-of-wild-speculation (accessed on July 26, 2024).

— (2024) Local elections. Irish Times. August 4, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/local-elections/ (accessed on August 21, 2024).

— (2024). Opinion Poll Report June 2024. REDC & Buisness Post. June 30, 2024. https://epaper.businesspost.ie/bpprod/1719606210-2024-06-30-red-c-poll.pdf

— (2024). Taosíonn Athrú Anseo/Change Starts Here: Sinn Féin European Parliament Manifesto 2024. Sinn Féin. https://vote.sinnfein.ie/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Sinn-Fein-European-Election-Manifesto-2024.pdf

— (2024). “Homelessness hits record high of 14,000! Voting for Sinn Féin in the Local and European elections is the first step to getting a change of government that will fix this housing disaster. Because the longer Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Greens stay in government the worse this is going to get.” Sinn Féin. May 31, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/reel/1171661350920330 (accessed on July 13, 2024).

Adams G. (1996). Presidential Address to Ard Fheis 1996. https://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/15173 (accessed on July 23, 2024).

Allen K. (2023) Sinn Féin’s Southern Strategy: The Long March to the Centre. Irish Marxist Review, 12(36), 14-36.

Aontú. (2024). Manifesto: Local European Elections. https://aontu.ie/styles/kcfinder/upload/files/Final%20Local%20and%20European%20Election%20Manifesto%202024.pdf

Aontú. (n.d.). Immigration. https://aontu.ie/immigration (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Aytac S. E.; Carkoglu A. & Elci E. (2024). “Populist Appeals, Emotions, and Political Mobilization.” American Behavioral Scientist, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241240343

Boyce J. (2024). “The remaking of Sinn Féin.” New Humanist. May 28, 2024. https://newhumanist.org.uk/articles/6279/the-remaking-of-sinn-fein (accessed on July 22, 2024).

Bray J. (2024). “Sinn Féin ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’, says Mary Lou McDonald.” Irish Times. May 30, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2024/05/30/sinn-fein-eurocritical-not-eurosceptic-says-mary-lou-mcdonald/ (accessed on July 22, 2024).

Brennan, Cianan & McConnell, Daniel. (2020). “Sinn Féin ‘taking legal advice on’ exclusion from RTÉ leaders debate.” Irish Examiner. January 19, 2020. https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/arid-30976327.html (accessed on July 26, 2024).

Brennan J. (2023). “Sinn Féin’s High Wire Act Courting Big Business and Those Left Behind.” Irish Times. April 14, 2023. https://www.irishtimes.com/business/economy/2023/04/14/sinn-feins-high-wire-act-courting-big-business-and-those-left-behind/ (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Carroll R. (2020). “’Stay home’: Varadkar announces sweeping two-week lockdown.” The Guardian. March 27, 2020. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/27/stay-home-varadkar-urges-irish-in-drastic-lockdown (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Clarke V. (2024). “Ireland needs to move beyond ‘emergency response’ to immigration, Harris says as ‘community feels they’re not heard’.” Irish Times. March 27, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/2024/03/27/the-community-feels-that-theyre-not-being-heard-harris-says-immigration-plan-must-be-sustainable/ (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Collins S. (2020). “Detailed election 2020 exit poll results: How voters answered 15 questions. Irish Times. February 9, 2020. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/detailed-election-2020-exit-poll-results-how-voters-answered-15-questions-1.4167016 (accessed on July 27, 2024).

Constitution of Ireland. (1937). https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/cons/en/html (accessed on July 28, 2024).

Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Eireann) Act, 1922. (1922). https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1922/act/1/schedule/2/enacted/en/html (accessed on July 28, 2024).

Coogan T.P. (2008). A Memoir. Orion Publishing Group: London.

Cunningham K. (2024). “2024 Election polling day poll.” Ireland Thinks. June 9, 2024. https://analysis.irelandthinks.ie/post-election-exit-poll-feed/ (accessed on August 1, 2024).

Cunningham P. (2023). “7 biggest challenges of 2023 for the Coalition.” RTÉ. January 8, 2023. https://www.rte.ie/news/analysis-and-comment/2023/0108/1345451-politics/ (accessed on July 28, 2024).

Dáil Éireann: Debate on Treaty, Vol 3, Dublin. (1922). https://web.archive.org/web/20110607070232/http://historical-debates.oireachtas.ie/D/DT/D.T.192201070002.html (accessed on July 28, 2024).

de Bromhead, A.; Fernihough, A. & Hargaden, E. (2020). “Representation of the People: Franchise Extension and the ‘Sinn Féin Election’ in Ireland, 1918.” The Journal of Economic History. 80(3), pp. 886-925. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000376

Ehl D. (2024). “Ireland: Tensions over refugee crisis and Dublin tent cities.” DW. May 19, 2024. https://www.dw.com/en/ireland-tensions-over-refugee-crisis-and-dublin-tent-cities/a-69122611 (accessed on July 30, 2024).

Farrell, B. (1971). The Founding of Dáil Éireann: Parliament and Nation Building. Gill and Macmillan: Dublin.

Fegan J. (2015). “I quit Sinn Fein over bullying, says former councilor.” Independent. June 30, 2015. https://www.independent.ie/regionals/herald/i-quit-sinn-fein-over-bullying-says-former-councillor/31339538.html (accessed on July 30, 2024).

Finn C. (2024) “Five key takeaways on what went wrong for Sinn Féin and what it needs to do to up its game.” The Journal. June 10, 2024. https://www.thejournal.ie/five-key-takeaways-what-went-wrong-for-sinn-fein-6403653-Jun2024/ (accessed on July 3, 2024).

Finnegan A. & Conlon D. (2024). “Explained: Why is there a row between Ireland and the UK over migration.” Irish Times. April 30, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/podcasts/in-the-news/a-major-row-between-ireland-and-the-uk-over-migration-explained/ (accessed on July 30, 2024).

Foy K. (2023). “Full scale of Dublin riots destruction laid bare, as gardaí expected to arrest up to 150 more people.” Independent. December 13, 2023. https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/crime/full-scale-of-dublin-riots-destruction-laid-bare-as-gardai-expected-to-arrest-up-to-150-more-people/a1294562729.html (accessed on July 23, 2024).

Frayer, L. (2024). “How Sinn Fein has made themselves over.” NPR. March 15, 2024.https://www.npr.org/2024/03/15/1238876771/how-sinn-fein-has-made-themselves-over (accessed on July 27, 2024).

Gallagher F.; Cosgrove J. & Coates L. (2024). “As it happened: Ireland votes No on family and care referendums.” Irish Times. March 9, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/politics/2024/03/09/family-care-referendum-counts-live-updates-tallies-no-votes/ (accessed on July 23, 2024).

Gregory, K. (2010). “Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (aka, PIRA, ‘the Provos,’ Óglaigh na hÉireann) (UK separatists).” Council on Foreign Relations. March 16, 2010. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/provisional-irish-republican-army-ira-aka-pira-provos-oglaigh-na-heireann-uk (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Halpin P. (2024a). “Irish police dismantle Dublin’s migrant ‘tent city’.” Irish Times. July 23, 2024.https://www.irishtimes.com/ireland/social-affairs/2024/07/23/sinn-fein-pledges-new-migration-system-in-significent-policy-shift/ (accessed on July 29, 2024).

Halpin P. (2024b). “Irish coalition parties hammer Sinn Fein in local elections.” Reuters. June 8, 2024. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/irish-coalition-parties-set-trounce-sinn-fein-local-elections-2024-06-08/ (accessed on July 29, 2024).

Haverty, G. (2022). “Sinn Féin is speaking the language of my generation, but can they deliver?” Irish Times. September 7, 2022.  https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2022/09/07/sinn-fein-speaking-the-language-of-my-generation/ (accessed on July 26, 2024).

Kwai I. & Satariano A. (2023). “‘It Snowballed’: How a Knife Attack in Dublin Led to a Riot.” New York Times. November 24, 2023. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/24/world/europe/dublin-riots-police.html (accessed on July 26, 2024).

Laffan, M. (1999). The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 122-168.

Lally, C.; Holland, K.; O’Riordan, E.; Power, J.; Gallagher, C. & Hilliard M. (2023). “Dublin riots: Violent clashes with gardaí and vehicles set alight after children injured in knife attack.” Irish Times. November 23, 2023. https://www.irishtimes.com/crime-law/2023/11/23/dublin-stabbing-attack-live-updates-three-children-injured-chief-suspect-detained/ (accessed on July 26, 2024).

Maillot, A. (2015). In the Shadows of History. Manchester University Press: Manchester.

Martin, F.X. (2013). The Irish Volunteers 1913-1915: Recollections and Documents. Merrion: Dublin.

McCarron, J.; Coughlan, M. & McDonald, K. (2024). “Beyond the banner: who was elected for Independent Ireland?” RTÉ. July 1, 2024. https://www.rte.ie/news/primetime/2024/0615/1454850-beyond-the-banner-who-was-elected-for-independent-ireland/ (accessed on July 29, 2024).

McClafferty E. (2024). “What went wrong for Sinn Féin in Irish elections?” BBC. June 10, 2024. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c3gg85en299o (accessed on July 20, 2024).

McCormack J. (2020). “Irish general election: Who is Mary Lou McDonald?” BBC. February 10, 2020.https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51401416 (accessed on July 21, 2024).

McCullagh D. (1998). A Makeshift Majority: The First Inter-party Government, 1948-51. Institute of Public Administration: Ireland.

McDonald, M.L. (2021). Full text from Mary Lou McDonald’s speech at Sinn Féin Ard Fheis 2021. https://vote.sinnfein.ie/full-text-from-mary-lou-mcdonalds-speech-at-sinn-fein-ard-fheis-2021/ (accessed on July 27, 2024).

McDonald, M.L. (2023). Mary Lou McDonald Presidential Address to the Sinn Féin Ard Fheis 2023. https://vote.sinnfein.ie/mary-lou-mcdonald-presidential-address-to-the-sinn-fein-ard-fheis-2023/ (accessed on July 27, 2024).

McGee H. & Leahy, P. (2020). “Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane defends shouting ‘Up the ‘Ra’ after election.” Irish Times. February 10, 2020. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/sinn-f%C3%A9in-s-david-cullinane-defends-shouting-up-the-ra-after-election-1.4168791 (accessed on July 28, 2024).

McGee, H. (2018). “Hello Mary Lou, goodbye Gerry: how Sinn Féin grassroots view the leadership change.” Irish Times.February 10, 2018. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/hello-mary-lou-goodbye-gerry-how-sinn-fein-grassroots-view-the-leadership-change-1.3386754 (accessed on July 22, 2024).

Murphy M.C. (2021). “Brexit and the Election: The Issue That Wasn’t.” In: Gallagher M., Marsh M., & Reidy T. (ed.). How Ireland Voted 2020: End of an Era. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland.

Ní Aodha, G. (2020). “How did they do it? Sinn Féin’s historic 24% win was built on learnt lessons and a fed-up electorate.” The Journal. February 12, 2020. https://www.thejournal.ie/sinn-fein-comeback-5001379-Feb2020/ (accessed on July 24, 2024).

O’Connell, H. (2024). “Mary Lou McDonald says Sinn Féin will re-run referendums on family and care if they do not pass.” Independent. February 20, 2024. https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/mary-lou-mcdonald-says-sinn-fein-will-re-run-referendums-on-family-and-care-if-they-do-not-pass/a205864146.html (accessed on July 4, 2024).

O’Doherty, I. (2024). “Immigration is tearing Sinn Féin apart.” Spiked. January 8, 2024. https://www.spiked-online.com/2024/01/08/immigration-is-tearing-sinn-fein-apart/ (accessed on July 17, 2024).

O’Neill, J. (2019). “Gerry Adams’ IRA denial ‘a lie’, says veteran republican.” BBC. September 17, 2019.https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-northern-ireland-49718168 (accessed on July 19, 2024).

Pogatchnik S. (2024). “Sinn Féin walks immigration tightrope toward power in Ireland.” Politico. January 5, 2024.https://www.politico.eu/article/sinn-fein-dublin-mary-lou-mcdonald-towards-power-in-ireland/  (accessed on July 23, 2024).

Pogatchnik S. (2024). “Sinn Féin dominates Northern Ireland with unionists in post-Brexit shambles.” Politico. July 5, 2024. https://www.politico.eu/article/sinn-fein-win-northern-ireland-republican-brexit-uk-parliament-election/ (accessed on July 23, 2024).

Rico, G.; Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017). “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes.” Swiss Political Science Review. 23(4), 444–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261

Robertson, N. (2020). “Sinn Fein surged in Ireland’s election. Here’s why that’s so controversial.” CNN. February 10, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/02/10/europe/ireland-election-sinn-fein-analysis-intl/index.html (accessed on July 3, 2024).

Ryan P. (2023). “Two TDs launch new political party as ‘comfortable alternative’ to Sinn Féin.” Independent. November 17, 2023.  https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/politics/two-tds-launch-new-political-party-as-comfortable-alternative-to-sinn-fein/a1511055709.html (accessed on July 13, 2024).

McWilliams, D. & Taylor, C. (2020). “Ireland’s housing crisis in five revealing graphs.” Irish Times. January 26, 2020.https://www.irishtimes.com/life-and-style/homes-and-property/ireland-s-housing-crisis-in-five-revealing-graphs-1.4150332 (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Taylor, C. (2024). “Can Sinn Féin’s housing policy deliver for a locked-out generation of young buyers?” Irish Times. August 3, 2024. https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/2024/08/03/cliff-taylor-can-sinn-feins-housing-policy-deliver-for-a-squeezed-middle-of-young-buyers/ (accessed on July 25, 2024).

Tedin M.J.D. & Faubert V. (2020). Housing Affordability in Ireland. Publications Office of the European Union: Luxembourg. https://economy-finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2020-12/eb061_en.pdf

Weckler, A. (2022). “Mary Lou hitches up Sinn Féin partymobile for Silicon Valley drive-by.” Independent. September 11, 2022. https://www.independent.ie/business/technology/mary-lou-hitches-up-sinn-fein-partymobile-for-silicon-valley-drive-by/41975672.html (accessed on August 5, 2024).

Manifestos

Sinn Féin

— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin. https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2019/EU_Manifesto1.pdf

— (2020). General Election Manifesto: A Manifesto for Change, Giving workers & families a break. Sinn Féin.  https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2020/Giving_Workers_and_Families_a_Break_-_A_Manifesto_for_Change.pdf

— (2024). Taosíonn Athrú Anseo/Change Starts Here: Sinn Féin European Parliament Manifesto 2024. Sinn Féin. https://vote.sinnfein.ie/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Sinn-Fein-European-Election-Manifesto-2024.pdf

Fine Gael

— (2019). European Election Manifesto 2019: Let’s Take Ireland Forward Together. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/app/uploads/2019/05/European-Manifesto-2019-PRINT.pdf

— (2020). General Election Manifesto 2020: A Future To Look Forward To: Building the Republic of Opportunity. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/pdf/FG_GE20_Manifesto.pdf

— (2024). Manifesto: European Election 2024. Fine Gael. https://www.finegael.ie/app/uploads/2024/05/Fine-Gael-European-Election-Manifesto-2024.pdf

Fianna Fáil

— (2019). European Parliament Elections Manifesto 2019: Making Europe Work For You. Fianna Fáil. http://michaelpidgeon.com/manifestos/docs/ff/Fianna%20Fail%20EE%202019.pdf

— (2020). Manifesto 2020: An Ireland for all/Éire do Chách. Fianna Fáil. https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/31572/1/Fianna-Fail-General-Election-Manifesto-2020.pdf

— (2024) European Manifesto 2024: Europe Matters. Fianna Fáil. https://7358484.fs1.hubspotusercontent-na1.net/hubfs/7358484/Euro_Manifesto_May24-1.pdf

Figure Sources

Figure 1: https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/index.php/articles/election-results-in-irish-voters-favour-an-independent-republic

Figure 2: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/images/maps/map12.htm

Figure 3: https://www.facebook.com/sinnfein/videos/rt%C3%A9-to-exclude-sinn-f%C3%A9in-from-leaders-debate/459587158067050/

Figure 4: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1484509658817817 // https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=857897529506644 // https://www.facebook.com/reel/776873617923511