Stephan Klingebiel

Prof. Klingebiel: Trump’s US Is Actively Undermining Multilateralism—So We Should Push for a ‘Global Order Minus One’

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Stephan Klingebiel argues that Trump-era populism signals a durable shift in global governance rather than a passing disruption. He stresses that the “rise of populism, nationalism, and right-wing populism predates Trump,” and warns that Washington is now “actively fighting all forms of multilateralism” through withdrawal, defunding, and the systematic contestation of UN language on issues such as “climate change,” “gender,” and “diversity.” Professor Klingebiel links this normative erosion to the weaponization of trade, tariffs, and development finance, which turns rules-based cooperation into coercive bargaining. He also highlights how geoeconomic competition is reshaping North–South relations by expanding bargaining space for resource-holding states. Looking ahead, he proposes a “global order minus one” as a pragmatic pathway to sustain multilateralism amid fragmentation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by intensified geopolitical rivalry, the resurgence of right-wing populism, and the erosion of long-standing international norms, the future of multilateral governance has become a central question for scholars and policymakers alike. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephan Klingebiel—Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)—offers a sober and incisive assessment of how Trump-era populism is reshaping global governance and what realistic alternatives may still be available.

At the heart of Professor Klingebiel’s analysis is a rejection of the notion that Trump-era populism represents a temporary aberration. Instead, he situates it within a broader and more durable constellation of political, ideological, and technological shifts. As he emphasizes, “the rise of populism, nationalism, and right-wing populism predates Trump,” extending across parts of Europe and the Global South. Trump, in this sense, is not an anomaly but a catalyst—“a prominent role” within a system that is unlikely to disappear in the near future.

A central theme of the interview is the normative and material hollowing-out of multilateralism. Professor Klingebiel argues that populism does not merely weaken international cooperation through withdrawals and defunding; it reframes cooperation itself as a zero-sum loss. In Trump’s discourse, he notes, the United States is consistently portrayed as a victim: “Canada, Europe—[they] have long lived at the expense of the United States.” This logic underpins what Klingebiel bluntly describes as an administration that is “actively fighting all forms of multilateralism.”

The interview traces how this antagonism manifests across institutions and issue areas—from the US withdrawal from dozens of international organizations to the systematic erosion of consensus-based norms within the United Nations. Particularly alarming, Klingebiel warns, is Washington’s effort to excise concepts such as “climate change, gender, gender-based violence, and diversity” from multilateral language, producing a chilling effect that leaves international organizations “no longer in a position to be explicit about real global challenges.”

Beyond institutions, Professor Klingebiel examines the weaponization of trade, tariffs, supply chains, and development finance, describing a shift from rules-based governance to coercive bargaining. This marks, in his view, a decisive break with past practices, where even hegemonic power was at least nominally constrained by international law. Recent cases—such as US actions in Venezuela—signal a world in which legal justification is no longer even rhetorically necessary.

Yet the interview is not purely diagnostic. Looking ahead, Klingebiel introduces one of his most provocative ideas: the possibility of sustaining multilateralism through a “global order minus one.” If a broad coalition of states remains committed to multilateral norms, he argues, such an order could both isolate unilateral obstruction and create incentives for eventual re-engagement. While acknowledging that “we are most likely not going back to the situation we had five or ten years ago,” Klingebiel insists that political choices made now—particularly by Europe and like-minded partners—will decisively shape whether the future belongs to cooperative governance or competitive fragmentation.

Together, the interview offers a penetrating reflection on populism, power, and the fragile future of the international order.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Stephan Klingebiel, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

KamranMatin5

Dr. Kamran Matin: Iran Regime Has Ruled by Coercion, Not Consent

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Iran is entering a critical juncture as renewed protests expose both the fragility and the resilience of the Islamic Republic. In this in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Kamran Matin argues that since the 2009 Green Movement, the Iranian regime has ruled “primarily through coercion rather than consent,” relying on repression while retaining the support of only a small social base. Yet violence alone does not explain regime survival. As Matin emphasizes, the Islamic Republic endures “not only through violence, but through a fragmented opposition” that lacks organizational depth, ideological coherence, and a credible alternative vision. Drawing on political economy, Gramscian theory, and regional geopolitics, Dr. Matin analyzes why economic shocks quickly become systemic political crises in Iran—and why, despite widespread de-legitimation, the unresolved question of “what comes next” continues to constrain revolutionary outcomes.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Iran has entered one of the most volatile phases of its post-1979 history. The protest wave that erupted after the sharp currency shock of late December 2025 quickly escalated into explicitly anti-regime mobilization, revealing not only the depth of socio-economic dislocation but also the political vulnerabilities of the Islamic Republic. In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Kamran Matin—Reader in International Relations at the University of Sussex—offers a theoretically informed analysis of the current conjuncture, foregrounding two interlinked claims that capture the central stakes of the moment: “Since 2009, [the] Iran regime has ruled by coercion, not consent,” and “[the] Iran regime survives not only through violence, but through a fragmented opposition.”

For Dr. Matin, the disputed 2009 election and the Green Movement mark a critical turning point in the regime’s mode of rule. As he emphasizes, “almost all of these signals are present in some form, but at least since 2009—going back to that critical moment—the Iranian state, the Islamic Republic, has ruled primarily through coercion rather than consent.” In his account, the erosion of consent is not merely ideological but institutional: the narrowing of factional pluralism and the weakening of reformist mediation diminished the regime’s capacity to manage dissent through electoral incorporation. The result, he argues, is a system that “retains the support of a small segment of Iranian society—perhaps 10 to 15 percent at most, and maybe closer to 10 percent,” while relying on “brute force: repression, torture, imprisonment, surveillance, and so on” to govern the remainder.

Yet Dr. Matin’s analysis also resists purely repression-centered explanations of authoritarian durability. Alongside state violence, he argues, regime survival is sustained by the organizational weakness and strategic incoherence of its opponents. “I would argue that, in addition to massive levels of violence, what sustains the regime is precisely the fractured nature of the opposition, its disorganization, and the absence of a political discourse that appeals equally to the main segments of society.” Even as protests broaden to include bazaar networks, students, workers, women, and peripheral provinces, the opposition—he contends—lacks the institutional capacity to translate mobilization into a viable transition project. “Apart from state violence,” he continues, “this lack of an organized alternative—ideologically, discursively, and organizationally—is a key factor keeping the regime in power.” The enduring strategic dilemma is therefore not simply the de-legitimation of the regime, but the absence of a credible successor: “Many people ask themselves, ‘What comes next?’”

Across the interview, Dr. Matin situates these dynamics within wider debates on revolutionary crises, hegemonic contestation, and regional geopolitics. He examines how economic shocks in a rentier political economy can rapidly become systemic political conflict; how coercion is deployed through targeted and exemplary violence; and how opposition plurality can both energize revolt and inhibit the formation of a unifying, “national-popular” project. Taken together, Dr. Matin’s intervention offers a stark but analytically precise assessment of Iran’s predicament: a regime increasingly dependent on coercion, confronting a society in revolt—yet facing an opposition still struggling to answer the question that shadows every revolutionary moment: what comes next?

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Kamran Matin, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

VirtualWorkshop-Session9

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 9: Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

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On January 8, 2026, ECPS convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion.” The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey, who framed exclusionary populism as a dual process that claims to empower an “authentic people” while simultaneously criminalizing stigmatized “others.” Assoc. Prof. Christopher N. Magno introduced the concept of criminal populism, showing how legal scandal and criminality can be transformed into political capital in the United States and the Philippines. Dr. Russell Foster examined how Austria’s FPÖ and France’s Rassemblement National legitimate anti-migration agendas through securitization and Gramscian metapolitics. Saga Oskarson Kindstrand drew on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats to challenge assumptions that populism undermines party organization. Discussants Hannah Geddes and Vlad Surdea-Hernea provided incisive reflections on theory, methodology, and democratic implications.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, January 8, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 9 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the session theme“Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion,” the session brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to explore how populist actors mobilize crime, security, and moral threat to redefine political belonging—deciding who counts as “the people,” who is constructed as a dangerous “other,” and how these distinctions increasingly enter mainstream politics.

The workshop opened with welcoming and technical remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced the session’s structure, speakers, and discussants on behalf of ECPS, situating the event within the Center’s broader commitment to comparative and theoretically grounded research on populism.

The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Helen L. Murphey (Postdoctoral Scholar, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University), whose introduction provided the session’s conceptual frame. Dr. Murphey emphasized that exclusionary populism operates through a dual logic: empowering an “authentic people” while simultaneously stigmatizing “others” as criminal, threatening, or disorderly. She highlighted how populists present themselves as reluctant political actors pushed into action by crisis and elite failure, while claiming exclusive authority over law and order. Importantly, she noted that these narratives are no longer confined to populist outsiders but increasingly circulate within mainstream party competition. Her framing raised core questions about the evolution of exclusionary discourse, its entanglement with crime and popular culture, and its implications for democratic norms and party organization.

Dr. Christopher N. Magno, who is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University, presented “From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,” introducing criminal populism as a framework for understanding how leaders transform criminality into political capital. Moving beyond penal populism, Dr. Magno showed how indictments and scandals are reframed as proof of authenticity and persecution, strengthening affective ties with supporters while eroding accountability. Drawing on cases from the United States and the Philippines, he demonstrated how criminal identity becomes a political asset.

Dr. Russell Foster, Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies, delivered “The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” examining how radical right parties in Austria and France mainstream anti-immigration positions through securitization and cultural adaptation. Using a Gramscian lens, he argued that migration is increasingly criminalized by being linked to anxieties over housing, welfare, and identity, while stressing that radical right trajectories vary across national contexts.

Saga Oskarson Kindstrand, PhD candidate at Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po, presented “Anti-Party to Mass Party? Lessons from the Radical Right’s Party Building Model,” challenging the assumption that populism rejects mediation. Based on ethnographic research on the Sweden Democrats, she argued that populist discourse can sustain dense party organization by moralizing membership, valorizing “ordinary people,” and cultivating urgency—re-legitimating the party as a representative vehicle.

The presentations were followed by engaged interventions from Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews) and Dr. Vlad Surdea-Hernea (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Natural Resources and Life Sciences in Vienna). Their critiques highlighted shared strengths in challenging established assumptions while probing issues of novelty, case selection, class, and internal party power. Together, the session offered a cohesive examination of how populism reshapes crime, exclusion, and democratic representation.

 

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MatiasBianchi2

Dr. Bianchi: Illiberal Actors No Longer Need to Pretend They Are Liberal

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In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Matías Bianchi offers a powerful diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism. Moving beyond regime-centric explanations, Dr. Bianchi argues that today’s defining shift is normative: “illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” He shows how illiberalism now operates through transnational networks embedded within liberal democracies, sustained by funding, coordination, and discourse originating largely in the Global North. Highlighting the erosion of liberal legitimacy, the normalization of illiberal language, and the structural weakening of the nation-state, Dr. Bianchi underscores why democratic institutions struggle to respond—and what is at stake if they fail to adapt.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the global diffusion of illiberal norms, understanding the evolving nature of authoritarian and illiberal politics has become an urgent scholarly and policy task. In this in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matías Bianchi, Director of Asuntos del Sur in Buenos Aires and co-author of “The Illiberal International,” offers a compelling diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism—one that departs decisively from regime-centric and state-centric explanations.

At the heart of Dr. Bianchi’s analysis lies a striking observation captured in the interview’s headline: “Illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” For Dr. Bianchi, the defining feature of the current moment is not the novelty of illiberal ideas themselves, but rather a profound normative and cultural shift that has lifted the constraints once requiring authoritarian or illiberal actors to cloak their agendas in liberal rhetoric. As he explains, “What we aim to show is that there is a set of actors working together and collaborating at different levels—geopolitical, institutional, and interpersonal—for whom liberal practices and ideas are no longer the goal.”

This “shedding of pretense,” as Dr. Bianchi describes it, represents a critical marker of the contemporary illiberal turn. Practices that were once “forbidden, punished, or had to be concealed are now openly articulated.” The symbolic need to maintain democratic façades—what Dr. Bianchi recalls through Fidel Castro’s claim that “we are a real democracy”—has eroded. “That veil is no longer necessary,” he argues, signaling a transformation not only in political behavior but also in the boundaries of legitimacy and civility within democratic publics.

Crucially, Dr. Bianchi situates illiberalism not as a discrete regime type but as a networked, relational political formation that increasingly operates within liberal democracies themselves. He emphasizes that many illiberal actors are embedded in ostensibly democratic systems—“in the European Union, the United States, or other contexts”—and that a major novelty of the past decade is that “much of the financing, support, and networking now originates from the US and Europe,” regions once seen as the pillars of the liberal international order.

Throughout the interview, Dr. Bianchi traces how cross-border coordination, transnational funding, and shared discursive strategies—exemplified by platforms such as The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) or slogans like “Make Europe Great Again”—have accelerated the normalization of illiberalism. These networks thrive amid what he identifies as a deeper crisis of liberalism itself: declining legitimacy, shrinking human rights cooperation, and the inability of liberal institutions to deliver material security, social inclusion, and credible governance in an increasingly unequal and digitally mediated global order.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Matías Bianchi, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Robert Butler1

Dr. Butler on Trump’s European Strategy: Non-Intervention Can Itself Become a Form of Intervention

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In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer at the University of Lorraine, examines how far-right actors in France and the UK construct legitimacy amid crisis and geopolitical uncertainty. Drawing on critical and multimodal discourse analysis, Dr. Butler explores authorization, crisis narratives, and moral evaluation in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage. Reflecting on Trump’s return to power, he cautions against simplistic readings of transatlantic influence, arguing that framing Europe as “weak and vulnerable” may have concrete political effects. As Dr. Butler strikingly notes, “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention,” reshaping sovereignty, responsibility, and counter-mobilization across Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Languages at the University of Lorraine (Nancy) and editor of Political Discourse Analysis: Legitimisation Strategies in Crisis and Conflict, offers a nuanced comparative analysis of far-right discourse in France and the United Kingdom. Drawing on critical discourse analysis and multimodal approaches, Dr. Butler examines how contemporary populist and far-right actors seek legitimacy in what he characterizes as a “de-legitimized political world.”

Across the interview, Dr. Butler emphasizes that far-right actors such as Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage rely heavily on authorization as a legitimization strategy, combining appeals to the personal authority of leaders with increasing references to impersonal authority, particularly “the rule of law.” As he notes, “we see authorization at work: the personal authority of leaders, alongside reliance on impersonal authority.” This dual strategy allows far-right actors to distance themselves from overt radicalism while positioning themselves as credible governing alternatives.

A central theme of the interview is the discursive construction of crisis. In the UK context, Dr. Butler explains that Reform UK frames crisis as systemic collapse, encapsulated in the slogan “Britain is broken,” while in France, the National Rally (NR) increasingly portrays crisis through the lens of economic sovereignty, borders, and protection of domestic production. These crisis narratives are not only rhetorical devices but also serve to justify policy claims that move “beyond moral evaluation” toward what Dr. Butler calls “the realm of substance.”

The interview’s headline theme emerges most clearly in Dr. Butler’s reflections on international crises and Donald Trump’s return to power. Addressing whether Trump acts as a catalyst for far-right normalization in Europe, Dr. Butler cautions against linear assumptions. Instead, he highlights how Trumpian discourse increasingly frames European leaders as “weak and vulnerable,” raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, protection, and authority. Crucially, Dr. Butler argues that a politics of disengagement may carry unintended consequences, noting that “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention.”

This insight anchors the interview’s broader contribution: far-right legitimization does not rely solely on overt alignment with radical allies but often involves strategic distancing, ambiguity, and moral labeling. As Dr. Butler puts it, describing states as weak may function as “a form of moral evaluation” that lacks substance yet reshapes political expectations and responsibilities.

By combining close discourse analysis with comparative political insight, this interview sheds light on how far-right actors navigate legitimacy, crisis, and authority—both domestically and internationally—at a moment when the boundaries between intervention, sovereignty, and normalization are increasingly blurred.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Robert Butler, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

VirtualWorkshops-Session8

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 8: Fractured Democracies — Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn

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On December 11, 2025, the ECPS convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series under the theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargin, the session examined how contemporary populism reshapes democratic politics through affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse explored charismatic populism, focusing on suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in Trumpism, while Artem Turenko analyzed the evolving rhetoric of AfD across the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament elections. Discussants Dr. Helena Rovamo and Dr. Jonathan Madison offered critical reflections on theory, methodology, and causality. A lively Q&A further addressed economic grievance, cultural representation, and the politics of knowledge production, underscoring the session’s interdisciplinary depth and relevance.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On December 11, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the session theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn,” the workshop brought together an international and interdisciplinary group of scholars to examine how contemporary populist actors reshape democratic politics through rhetoric, affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. The session formed part of ECPS’s broader effort to advance critical, comparative, and theoretically grounded scholarship on populism and its implications for democratic governance.

The workshop opened with brief welcoming and technical remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced the session’s structure, participants, and moderation on behalf of ECPS.

The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS), whose introductory framing provided the conceptual backbone for the discussion. Dr. Sargin situated the session within contemporary debates on democratic fragmentation, emphasizing that populism should be understood not merely as a rhetorical strategy or electoral phenomenon, but as a broader cultural and moral project. She highlighted how populist actors mobilize fear, resentment, and perceived crisis to reorganize political meaning, construct antagonistic identities, and legitimize increasingly exclusionary or punitive forms of governance. Importantly, Dr. Sargin underscored the adaptive nature of populism, noting its capacity to draw on diverse ideological resources, to shift across contexts, and to respond strategically to changing political opportunities. Her framing positioned the session’s papers as complementary explorations of how populism operates at the levels of leadership, discourse, and electoral competition.

The session featured two main presentations. Dr. Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong) delivered a theoretically innovative paper on charismatic populism, focusing on the roles of suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in sustaining populist authority. Drawing on Weberian sociology, cultural theory, and ethnographic insights from Trump rallies, Dr. Joosse demonstrated how charismatic leaders transform victimhood and norm-breaking into sources of legitimacy, thereby destabilizing democratic norms.

The second presentation, by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow), offered a comparative analysis of the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) rhetoric during the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament election campaigns. Employing a mixed-methods approach combining sentiment analysis and discourse-historical analysis, Turenko examined how AfD rhetoric adapts to electoral expectations while maintaining a stable populist grammar centered on crisis, sovereignty, and exclusion.

The presentations were followed by in-depth feedback from the session’s discussants, Dr. Helena Rovamo (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland) and Dr. Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute). Their interventions critically engaged both papers, raising questions about methodology, conceptual definitions of populism, the relationship between charisma and populist mobilization, and issues of causality and moral paradox. The session concluded with an open Q&A, further extending the discussion to questions of economic grievance, cultural representation, and the political conditions of knowledge production.

Together, the session offered a multifaceted and theoretically rich examination of populism’s role in contemporary democratic transformations.

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Tim Bale

Prof. Bale: Nigel Farage Is a Marmite Politician — Loved by His Base, Toxic to Many Others

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In this in-depth interview for ECPS, Professor Tim Bale offers a sharp assessment of Reform UK’s rise and Nigel Farage’s polarizing leadership. Farage, he argues, is “a Marmite politician — people either love or hate him,” making him both Reform’s engine and its constraint. Professor Bale suggests that Farage exemplifies “a classic populist radical-right leader” who channels anti-elite sentiment, yet risks alienating voters beyond his base. He links Reform’s surge less to ideological realignment than to Conservative decay, marked by Brexit fragmentation, leadership churn, and “over-promis[ing] and under-deliver[ing] on migration.” While Reform may reshape the political terrain, Professor Bale warns its ceiling remains visible—especially if questions of competence, Russia, and generational change intensify. Reform’s future, he concludes, is possible, but far from inevitable.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tim Bale—Professor of Politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London—offers a wide-ranging analysis of Nigel Farage, Reform UK, and the structural realignments reshaping British party politics. His insights are grounded in decades of scholarship on party evolution, populist rhetoric, and leadership psychology, making his perspective essential for understanding the United Kingdom’s shifting electoral landscape.

Throughout the interview, Professor Bale situates Nigel Farage as both emblem and engine of Britain’s contemporary radical right. As he puts it, “Nigel Farage is, in many ways, a classic example of a populist radical-right leader,” one who mobilizes support through a moralized confrontation between “the people” and supposed elite betrayal. Yet Farage’s strength is also his constraint. Professor Bale memorably describes him as “a Marmite politician,” a figure voters “either love or hate,” noting that this polarization “probably places a limit on Reform’s appeal.” Farage, therefore, embodies both populist vitality and electoral risk—“the ideal leader” in the eyes of his base, yet “a figure of suspicion” for many beyond it.

This duality frames Professor Bale’s central contention: that Reform UK’s rise must be understood not only in ideological terms but as an artefact of Conservative decay. Years of intra-party conflict, Brexit-driven fragmentation, and “over-promis[ing] and under-deliver[ing] on migration” have opened political space for Farage’s insurgency. Yet Professor Bale cautions against assuming an irreversible realignment. The Conservative Party remains “rooted in the middle-class political culture of the UK,” with institutional depth and internal veto points that make any “reverse takeover” more difficult than populist narratives imply.

Focusing on the structural and sociological conditions that shape political possibility, Professor Bale further highlights a widening generational divide. While education and age have become stronger electoral predictors than class, cultural conflict alone cannot explain support for Reform. If public priorities shift back from national issues to personal ones—from immigration to “the cost of living, [and] the state of public services”—Reform’s momentum may plateau. Moreover, its perceived softness on Russia remains “an Achilles’ heel,” one that stalled its surge when public attention sharpened in 2024.

Across this interview, Professor Bale neither exaggerates inevitability nor discounts volatility. Instead, he offers a sober framework for evaluating whether Reform represents a durable transformation or a protest cycle with a ceiling. Britain, he suggests, now faces a future where polarization, demographic turnover, institutional vulnerability, and charismatic leadership converge—precariously. This conversation, therefore, is not only timely, but analytically consequential.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Tim Bale, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

SusanStokes1

Professor Stokes: Democracy Will Survive and Can Return More Robust

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In her interview with ECPS, Professor Susan Stokes explains how rising inequality and polarization create fertile ground for democratic backsliding. “There’s a kind of direct, almost organic effect of income inequality on polarization,” she notes, adding that the United States is “a very unequal country—and the oldest democracy—yet being an old democracy does not protect us from backsliding.” Despite these vulnerabilities, Professor Stokes rejects fatalism. Civil society mobilization and the courts, she emphasizes, have been “major blocks in the way of autocratization under the second Trump administration.” Ultimately, she remains cautiously optimistic: “There are lots of reasons to be hopeful that democracy will survive and can be rebuilt in a more robust way.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview, Professor Susan Stokes—Tiffany and Margaret Blake Distinguished Service Professor and Director of the Chicago Center on Democracy at the University of Chicago—offers an empirically grounded and conceptually rigorous analysis of democratic erosion in the United States and beyond. Speaking with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), she underscores the structural forces propelling contemporary backsliding, most notably rising inequality and partisan polarization. As she succinctly puts it, “there’s a kind of direct, almost organic effect of income inequality on polarization. Then backsliding leaders… benefit from operating in a polarized polity. Therefore, once in office, they do what they can to exacerbate partisan conflict.”

A core insight from her recent work is that inequality—rather than classic institutional safeguards—best predicts democratic decline. Drawing on extensive comparative research, Professor Stokes highlights that “being an older democracy offers no more protection against backsliding than being a younger democracy.” The United States, therefore, faces a distinct vulnerability: “We are a very unequal country, and we are the oldest democracy. Being very unequal raises our chances of experiencing backsliding, and being an old democracy does not protect us from it.” These findings challenge long-standing institutionalist theories that assumed democratic age alone could inoculate systems from erosion.

At the same time, Professor Stokes emphasizes that democratic decline is never uncontested and rarely linear. Civil society resistance—particularly through mass mobilization—remains a crucial barrier to autocratization. Reflecting on recent US cases, she notes that “protests, as well as the courts, have been a major block in the way of autocratization under the second Trump administration.” Even when repression intensifies, the protest–voting linkage proves resilient, reinforcing democratic engagement rather than severing it.

Yet Professor Stokes ultimately insists that the current moment, while perilous, is not predetermined. She resists fatalist narratives that portray autocratization as inevitable or unstoppable. Instead, she stresses the multiplicity of democratic resources that persist even under considerable strain: electoral accountability, civil society activism, independent media, and crucially, the lower federal courts. As she concludes, “there are lots of reasons to be hopeful that democracy will survive and can be rebuilt in a more robust way.”

This interview explores these themes in depth—from inequality and polarization to institutional attacks, populist rhetoric, and the prospects for democratic renewal. Professor Stokes’s analysis combines empirical precision with comparative breadth, offering a clear-eyed but ultimately hopeful assessment of democracy’s capacity for resilience and reconstruction.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Susan Stokes, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

JosephWright

Prof. Wright: The Most Troubling Aspect of Trump 2.0 Is the Personalization of the Security Forces

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Joseph Wright (Penn State University) warns that the most alarming development of “Trump 2.0” is the rapid personalization of the state’s coercive apparatus. “The most troubling aspect… is the personalization of the security forces. That is the single most damaging thing that can happen to a country,” he cautions. Professor Wright notes that ICE has evolved into “a fully militarized internal security organization,” now poised to become one of the world’s largest such forces—capable, he warns, of being deployed “to seize ballot boxes” or “shoot protesters.” While federalism still offers partial safeguards, Professor Wright argues the United States is witnessing early signs of institutional capture characteristic of personalist regimes worldwide.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and sobering interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Joseph Wright of Penn State University offers a stark assessment of the United States’ democratic trajectory under a second Trump administration. Drawing on his extensive comparative research on personalist rule, bureaucratic erosion, and autocratization, Professor Wright argues that the defining danger of “Trump 2.0” lies in the accelerating personalization of the state apparatus, and especially of the coercive arms of government. As he warns, “What appears to me to be the most troubling aspect of the personalization of the government [is] the personalization of the security forces. That is the single most damaging thing that can happen to a country.”

Professor Wright situates his analysis within a broader global pattern in which elected strongmen—figures such as Erdoğan, Orbán, and other personalist executives—transform political parties, bureaucracies, and security institutions into instruments of personal power. Applying these insights to the contemporary United States, he identifies three markers of personalist party consolidation: a leader’s control of financial resources, control over candidate nominations, and the elevation of loyalists who depend entirely on the leader for their political survival. “He controls the money… he controls nominations, and… he appoints loyalists,” Professor Wright explains, noting that together these dynamics render party elites “basically unwilling to stand up to him.”

While the United States remains far from the fully consolidated autocracies seen in Turkey or Hungary, Professor Wright warns that early signs of bureaucratic hollowing and selective purges have already emerged. The Department of Justice, he argues, is the clearest example, where loyalist appointments and the abandonment of legal enforcement norms have created “a green light to lots of actors to be able to break the law.” Particularly concerning is the rise of a militarized internal security force centered on ICE, which he describes as “a fully militarized internal security organization” now positioned to become one of the largest coercive bodies in the world. Such a force, he cautions, could be deployed “to seize ballot boxes, to shoot protesters… or deter people from showing up at the voting booths,” mirroring patterns observed in autocratizing regimes elsewhere.

Yet, Professor Wright also emphasizes the continued importance of federalism as a barrier to total centralization. Local law-enforcement autonomy and decentralized election administration remain crucial buffers. Still, he stresses that the danger is not hypothetical but unfolding: “We don’t know where it’s going to go… things have progressed rapidly.”

Taken together, Professor Wright’s analysis offers one of the clearest comparative warnings to date: the durability of American democracy now hinges not only on electoral outcomes, but on whether the country can resist the deepening personalization of its most powerful state institutions.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Joseph Wright, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Virtual Workshops -Session 7

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 7: Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

by MultimediaVideos

Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a compelling interdisciplinary examination of how contemporary populism unsettles the foundations of democratic representation. Bringing together insights from digital politics, the history of political thought, and critical social theory, the session illuminated the multiple arenas—affective, constitutional, and epistemic—through which representation is being reconfigured. Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano revealed how memetic communication and generative AI reshape political identities and moral boundaries within far-right movements. Maria Giorgia Caraceni traced these dynamics to enduring tensions within the conceptual history of popular sovereignty, while Elif Başak Ürdem demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy generates misrecognition and drives grievances toward populist articulation. Collectively, the session highlighted the necessity of integrated, cross-disciplinary approaches for understanding the evolving crisis of democratic representation.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 27, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 7 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism,” assembled an interdisciplinary group of scholars to interrogate the shifting boundaries of political representation in an era defined by populist appeals, democratic fragmentation, and technological transformation. The workshop opened with a brief orientation by ECPS intern Reka Koleszar, who welcomed participants, provided technical guidance, and formally introduced the moderator, presenters, and discussant on behalf of ECPS, ensuring a smooth and well-structured beginning to the session.

Under the steady and incisive moderation of Dr. Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor at Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University), the session unfolded as a robust intellectual engagement with the crises and possibilities surrounding contemporary democratic representation. Dr. Magno framed the event by situating today’s populist moment within broader transformations affecting democratic institutions, public trust, and communicative infrastructures. Emphasizing that representation must be understood not only institutionally but also symbolically and epistemically, he set the stage for the three presentations, each of which approached the problem of representation from a distinct but complementary angle.

The first presentation, delivered by Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University), examined how memes, short-form videos, and AI-generated images operate as potent vehicles of populist discourse. His talk demonstrated how digital visual cultures simplify complex ideological battles, construct moralized identities, and normalize hostility—revealing the emotional and aesthetic foundations of far-right mobilization in Latin America. By mapping differences in memetic ecosystems across Argentina, Brazil, and El Salvador, Dr. Bayarri illuminated how digital artifacts reshape political communication and reconfigure the representational field.

Next, Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; and Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V) offered a long-term conceptual genealogy of popular sovereignty, tracing contemporary populism to the enduring tension between monist and pluralist understandings of “the people.” Through a reconstruction of Rousseauian and Madisonian frameworks, Caraceni argued that the conflict between unfettered majority rule and constitutional constraints is not a modern anomaly but a persistent structural dilemma within democratic theory—one that populism reactivates with renewed force.

The final presentation, by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University), analyzed populism as a political response to the failures of neoliberal meritocracy. Introducing the concept of epistemic misrecognition, Ürdem argued that meritocratic regimes undermine democratic parity by devaluing non-credentialed forms of knowledge, generating status injury, and closing off channels of political voice. Her synthesis of Nancy Fraser’s tripartite justice framework and Ernesto Laclau’s theory of political articulation offered a novel explanation for why unaddressed grievances increasingly channel into populist mobilization.

The session concluded with deeply engaged feedback given by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford), whose discussant reflections synthesized the thematic intersections among the papers while posing incisive questions that broadened the theoretical and comparative horizons of the workshop.

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