Associate Professor Guilherme Casarões.

Assoc. Prof. Casarões: What Really Died on October 4 Was Brazil’s Democratic Pact Itself

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Associate Professor Guilherme Casarões argues Brazil’s October 4 election marks more than a contest between Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro: it signals a deeper transformation of the country’s democratic order. Assoc. Prof. Casarões contends that “what really died, or what really was defeated on October 4th, was Brazil’s democratic pact itself,” while stressing that this does not mean democracy has ended. He sees Bolsonarism as still fundamentally personalistic, continuing to revolve around Jair Bolsonaro even as Flávio emerges as its electoral standard-bearer. The interview explores identity polarization, Christian nationalism, punitive security politics, Trumpism, and the transnational far right, while also examining Lulism’s growing association with the establishment. Together, these dynamics place Brazil at what Assoc. Prof. Casarões describes as a consequential political “crossroads.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Brazil’s October 4, 2026 presidential election produced a first-round result that significantly altered the political landscape ahead of the October 25 runoff. Flávio Bolsonaro finished first with about 47% of the vote, ahead of incumbent President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on 45.1%, while right- and far-right forces also performed strongly in congressional and gubernatorial contests. The outcome sharpened the confrontation between Lulism and a post-Jair form of Bolsonarism, while also raising broader questions about the resilience of Brazil’s post-authoritarian democratic settlement, the institutionalization of the radical right, and the future of political representation in the country. 

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Guilherme Casarões, Associate Professor of Brazilian Studies at Florida International University, argues that the significance of October 4 extends well beyond the immediate electoral competition between Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro. For Assoc. Prof. Casarões, the most consequential development is not simply the continued strength of Bolsonarism without Jair Bolsonaro on the ballot, but what the election reveals about the transformation of Brazil’s democratic order. As he puts it, “what really died, or what really was defeated on October 4th, was Brazil’s democratic pact itself.”

Assoc. Prof. Casarões is careful to stress that this does not mean Brazilian democracy has ended. Rather, he argues that the political pact sustaining democracy since the transition from military rule in the mid-1980s and its constitutional consolidation in 1988 “is now gone, or at least seems to be over for now.” In his view, this makes the 2026 election even more consequential than the watershed contests of 2018 and 2022. Brazil, he argues, has reached “a crossroads,” with the future character of its democratic system increasingly uncertain. 

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Casarões resists interpreting Flávio Bolsonaro’s success as evidence that Bolsonarism has already become fully institutionalized. Despite the son’s electoral rise and the growing importance of the Liberal Party, he maintains that the movement “still gravitates around the image of Bolsonaro the father” and remains “a very personalistic movement.” Ultimately, he suggests, Bolsonarism still resembles “a cult of a person,” and “this person is Jair Bolsonaro himself.”

The interview develops this diagnosis across a wider set of themes: the decline of policy-based competition and the rise of identity polarization; Christian nationalism and the religious-populist radical right; punitive approaches to crime; the transnational circulation of far-right ideas; and the interaction between Trumpism and Bolsonarism. Assoc. Prof. Casarões also examines the contrasting trajectory of Lulism, arguing that Lula has increasingly come to symbolize the establishment itself. Taken together, his analysis presents October 4 not merely as an electoral upset, but as a possible marker of a deeper reconfiguration of Brazil’s democratic and populist politics. 

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Guilherme Casarões, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Panel-DemographicPopulism

ECPS Panel on Demographic Populism / Demography as a Political Battleground: Migration, Family, Race, Religion, and Radical-Right Populism

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Moderator

Klaudia Koxha (Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of Lausanne).

Speakers

“Populist Strategies of Normalizing Demographic Fears,” by Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor in Political Science and Political Sociology at the University of Lausanne). 


“The Scientific Normalization of ‘the Great Replacement’ Conspiracy,” by Alberta Giorgi (Associate Professor in Sociology of Culture and Communication at the University of Bergamo).

“From Demographic Winter to Civilizational Struggle: Anti-Abortion Networks and the Global Radical Right,” by Carol Mason (Otis A. Singletary Chair in the Humanities and Professor at University of Kentucky, US).

“Mestizaje, Backlash, and the Politics of Demographic Populism: Race and Gender in Latin America,” by Carlos de la Torre (Professor at the Centre for Latin American Studies, University of Florida).

“Anti-Muslim Mobilization: Demographic Change and Radical-Right Populism in Austria,” by Reinhard Heinisch(Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg, European Studies Center associate at the University of Pittsburgh and visiting lecturer at Renmin University of China).

Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp.

Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp: Democratic Socialism Could Have a MAGA-Sized Effect Without Winning Majority Support Nationally

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In this ECPS interview, Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp of Northeastern University examines the evolving relationship between MAGA, democratic socialism, political communication, and the institutional structure of American politics. Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp argues that MAGA’s dominance of the Republican Party should not be confused with uniform ideological agreement among Republican voters, emphasizing that “there’s a difference between how much the beliefs have spread and how much the ideology or the party has taken over.” He suggests that democratic socialism could exert comparable national influence even without achieving majority support, noting that a progressive or DSA-aligned faction could still have “similar effects nationally.” The interview also explores media selection, institutional trust, polarization, AI-driven political persuasion, and the persistence of anti-establishment politics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United States approaches the November 3 midterm elections, the political landscape is defined by an unusually narrow congressional balance, weak public evaluations of the economy, declining approval of President Donald Trump, and an election increasingly interpreted through attitudes toward Trump himself. At the same time, MAGA has become deeply embedded in the Republican Party, while Democrats remain divided over how far an economically populist and democratic-socialist agenda should shape their response to Trumpism. Against this backdrop of personalized politics, ideological polarization, institutional conflict, and an increasingly fragmented information environment, the relationship between insurgent movements and the established two-party system has become especially consequential. 

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp of Northeastern University’s Department of Political Science and Network Science Institute offers a structural interpretation of the apparent asymmetry between MAGA’s transformation of the Republican Party and democratic socialism’s more contested position within the Democratic coalition. Rather than treating MAGA as equivalent to the Republican electorate as a whole, Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp stresses that “there’s the MAGA further-right faction and then the center-right faction. Those two things still exist.” He consequently distinguishes between the diffusion of ideological beliefs among voters and the institutional capture of a political party: “there’s a difference between how much the beliefs have spread and how much the ideology or the party has taken over.”

That distinction underpins one of the interview’s most consequential observations. Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp argues that democratic socialism does not necessarily have to become nationally majoritarian in order to acquire transformative political influence. Even if the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) or the broader progressive left were unable to move substantially beyond their current “core of urban, educated, young, left-leaning liberals,” he maintains that “they could still have similar effects nationally.” There is also, he adds, a possible route toward a broader populist coalition appealing to “economically distressed rural or suburban voters,” although such expansion is “not necessary for having a MAGA-sized effect.”

More broadly, Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp situates both MAGA and democratic socialismwithin the institutional architecture of American politics. Because the presidential and first-past-the-post systems sustain two large parties, he argues, ideological movements operate as factions competing for control within them. Political outcomes therefore depend not only on ideological appeal but also on contingency: “Trump almost lost the primary in 2016, and Sanders almost won the primary in 2016.” Had those outcomes shifted, he observes, “we’d be living in a very different world.” 

The interview thus moves beyond a simple comparison of left- and right-wing populismto examine how factional capture, institutional structure, media selection, political communication, AI-driven personalization, and anti-establishment sentiment may shape the next phase of American democracy.

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Dr. Mara Nogueira.

Dr. Nogueira: Trump’s Influence Is Shaping Brazil’s Election, Making It a Very Important and Dangerous One

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In this ECPS interview, Dr. Mara Nogueira examines Brazil’s 2026 presidential election through the intertwined dynamics of US influence, Bolsonarism, Lulism, religion, labor, and political identity. She argues that the role of the United States—and particularly the alignment between Donald Trump and the Bolsonaro family—has become a consequential new element in the contest, describing the election as “a very important and dangerous one.” Dr. Nogueira also reflects on the durability of Bolsonarism, the increasingly defensive character of Lulism, the political weight of evangelical networks, and the effects of precarious work, entrepreneurialism, and social media. More broadly, she situates Brazil within a transnational landscape of authoritarian and revanchist populism while stressing the importance of class, region, religion, and changing expectations of the state.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Brazil approaches the October 4, 2026 presidential election, the contest is unfolding amid persistent polarization, a resilient yet more defensive Lulism, the continued strength of Bolsonarism beyond Jair Bolsonaro himself, and increasingly salient cleavages around religion, public security, welfare, and regional inequality. These dynamics are particularly significant in light of the research of Dr. Mara Nogueira, Senior Lecturer in the School of Social Sciences at Birkbeck, University of London, whose work examines the intersections of populism, urban politics, labor, inequality, informality, and political belonging in Brazil, with particular attention to revanchist populism, antipetismo, and the social and spatial foundations of Bolsonarism. 

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Nogueira emphasizes that Brazil’s 2026 election cannot be understood exclusively through domestic political cleavages. Alongside the enduring influence of anti-PT sentiment, regional divisions, gender, class, and religion, she identifies the role of the United States—and particularly the Trump administration—as a new and consequential element in the electoral landscape. “One thing that you didn’t mention in your question and that I think is worth pointing out is the influence of the US in this election,” she stresses, adding pointedly: “They’re not hiding it.”

For Dr. Nogueira, this external dimension became especially visible when President Donald Trump imposed tariffs on Brazil, measures that she interprets as carrying “a very high political element.” She also points to broader American strategic interests in Brazil and argues that political influence should be understood alongside economic considerations, including US interest in Brazilian mineral resources. “There are several interests at play,” she notes, “political influence being one of them.”

The contrast with the 2022 election is, in her view, particularly significant. While Washington inevitably had interests in Brazilian politics under President Joe Biden, Dr. Nogueira argues that the current situation is qualitatively different because “the alignment between Trump and the Bolsonaro family is very well known.” This relationship, she cautions, constitutes “a dynamic there that will need more attention and more scrutiny.”

It is in this context that Dr. Nogueira describes the 2026 election as both unusually consequential and potentially dangerous. According to her, the presence of “one political project that’s very well aligned with American interests”means that, “with Trump in government,” the consequences “could be a very disastrous thing for Brazil and Latin America.”

The interview therefore situates Brazil’s electoral contest not only within the domestic struggle between Lulism and Bolsonarism, but also within a broader transnational configuration linking Trumpism, far-right populism, economic restructuring, religious mobilization, and changing expectations about the role of the state.

Beyond the question of US influence, the interview also explores the changing balance between Lulism and Bolsonarism as political projects. Dr. Nogueira argues that Lulism remains anchored in the Northeast and among lower-income voters, but has become increasingly defensive. She suggests that “Lulism has perhaps become a victim of its own success,” as social mobility has altered popular aspirations and Lula’s political appeal has become more closely associated with defending past achievements than promising transformative change. 

Religion is another central theme. Dr. Nogueira stresses that evangelical identity has become deeply embedded in everyday social networks and political value formation, particularly in Brazil’s urban peripheries. At the same time, she cautions against treating “the evangelical vote” as a homogeneous bloc, emphasizing the intersection of religion with class, region, gender, and other identities. 

The interview further situates Brazil within broader transformations in labor and political communication. Dr. Nogueira connects precarious employment, entrepreneurialism, and changing expectations of the state to the appeal of authoritarian and revanchist populism, while also highlighting the growing importance of social media and algorithmic echo chambers in shaping political identities and limiting communication across electoral divides. 

Here is our interview with Dr. Mara Nogueira, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Dr. Semir Dzebo.

Dr. Dzebo: Dayton Accomplished Peace in Bosnia, but It Has Not Been Great at Democracy

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In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that Bosnia remains marked by “stable instability”: Dayton secured peace but has struggled to function as a democratic constitution. Dr. Dzebo discusses “populist secessionism,” the erosion of anti-elite appeals under long incumbency, competing constructions of “the people,” Croat and Bosniak representation, foreign influence, disinformation, and the limits of territorial revisionism. Rather than expecting dissolution or a sweeping constitutional settlement, he points toward incremental reform, EU integration, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches its October 4 elections amid renewed strain on the political architecture established by the Dayton Peace Agreement. More than three decades after the end of the 1992–95 war, questions of statehood, entity autonomy, ethnic representation, foreign influence, and the legitimacy of shared institutions remain deeply intertwined. Political competition continues to be structured less by a conventional left–right divide than by competing understandings of sovereignty, citizenship, collective rights, and of who constitutes the legitimate political community. Against this fragmented backdrop, the elections are not simply about who will govern Bosnia and Herzegovina, but about the character and durability of the post-Dayton state itself.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines these tensions through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that electoral competition in Bosnia carries unusually high constitutional stakes because “whatever coalition gets formed after the October 4th elections is, in a way, a choice about the state itself.” In this sense, the election resembles “a de facto referendum” on the country’s future political architecture.

A central theme of the conversation is what Dr. Dzebo conceptualizes as “populist secessionism.” Whereas ordinary nationalism operates along a horizontal axis of competition between national communities, populist secessionism introduces a vertical, moral division between an allegedly authentic people and corrupt or illegitimate elites. In this framework, political disagreement becomes morally charged: as Dr. Dzebo puts it, disputes that might otherwise be negotiated can acquire “this moral dimension that turns them into treason,” making compromise appear as capitulation.

The interview also explores the limits of this strategy. Dr. Dzebo’s research suggests that support for secession in Republika Srpska is driven less by populist attitudes than by ethnonational identification, ingroup bias, deteriorating intergroup relations, and economic grievance. Long incumbency, moreover, can erode the credibility of anti-elitism: voters predisposed against elites may increasingly view Milorad Dodik himself as part of the elite.

The broader diagnosis culminates in Dr. Dzebo’s assessment of Dayton itself. Bosnia, he argues, lives in a condition of “stable instability.” Dayton “has really accomplished the first task” of securing peace, but “has not really been great at the second task” of functioning as a democratic constitution. Yet he rejects both expectations of imminent dissolution and hopes for a sweeping constitutional reset, instead pointing toward incremental reform, EU integration, implementation of Strasbourg judgments, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions as the more plausible path toward a more cohesive democratic order.

Here is our interview with Dr. Semir Dzebo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Michael Kazin.

Prof. Kazin: The Democratic Party Will Not Become a Socialist Party Anytime Soon

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Michael Kazin, a leading historian of American populism, social movements, and the Democratic Party, examines the asymmetrical rise of MAGA and democratic socialism in contemporary US politics. While stressing that the American left can significantly influence Democratic priorities, Professor Kazin argues that it has historically failed to take control of the party and concludes that “the Democratic Party will not become a socialist party anytime soon.” He links this limitation to the decline of organized labor, noting that Democratic class appeals increasingly come “from the top down.” At the same time, Professor Kazin contends that Democrats cannot simply return to the politics of Obama or Biden and must confront inequality, healthcare, housing insecurity, corruption, and distrust in government more fundamentally.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United States approaches the November 3 midterm elections, American politics is being reshaped by two powerful but asymmetrical currents: the consolidation of MAGA within a highly personalized Trump presidency and the growing visibility of democratic socialism within a Democratic coalition that remains considerably broader than its left flank. This tension provides the backdrop to the ECPS conversation with Professor Michael Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University and Editor Emeritus of Dissent, a leading historian of American populism, social movements, and the Democratic Party. Professor Kazin’s scholarship has long explored the political language of “the people,” the evolution of the American left, and the relationship between social movements, class politics, and party transformation. Georgetown likewise identifies Kazin as a scholar of US political and social movements, while his influential The Populist Persuasion traces recurring conflicts between “the people” and powerful elites across American history.

At the center of the interview is a fundamental question about whether the current revival of democratic socialism can move beyond insurgency and become a durable governing force. Professor Kazin’s answer is deliberately cautious. While the left can exercise substantial influence within the Democratic Party, he stresses that “historically, at least so far, it has not been able to take over the party entirely.” His conclusion is unequivocal: “The Democratic Party will not become a socialist party anytime soon.”

Yet Professor Kazin does not equate this electoral ceiling with political irrelevance. He argues that the contemporary left resembles earlier progressive factions that transformed Democratic priorities without controlling the party. Bernie Sanders demonstrated this dynamic in 2016 and 2020, while the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) have developed substantial organizational capacity in heavily Democratic cities. For Professor Kazin, their influence illustrates how a faction “does not control the party, but it can have a great deal of influence over it.”

The deeper obstacle, however, is organizational and social. Professor Kazin identifies the decline of organized labor as a critical reason Democrats struggle to construct a persuasive class-based politics. When unions were stronger, working-class appeals came from workers speaking to other workers; today, he argues, “when Democrats make a class appeal, it comes from the top down.”

This diagnosis also shapes Professor Kazin’s understanding of the post-Trump Democratic Party. He argues that Democrats increasingly recognize that they “cannot simply return to some of the policies of Obama or Biden” and must confront long-standing problems including economic inequality, healthcare, housing costs, and distrust of government. In this sense, the interview presents democratic socialism less as an imminent replacement for mainstream Democratic politics than as a persistent force capable of shifting the boundaries of what the party considers politically necessary and possible.

Here is our interview with Professor Michael Kazin, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Damir Kapidžić.

Prof. Kapidžić: Bosnia Faces Not Only Illiberal Normalization but the Slow Death of Its Institutions

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In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Damir Kapidžić examines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections through the intertwined lenses of ethnonationalism, democratic erosion, patronage, institutional paralysis, and foreign influence. He argues that the country’s principal democratic danger lies less in dramatic constitutional breakdown than in the “slow death” of institutions gradually weakened by illiberal practices, elite capture, and political incentives that reward dysfunction. Professor Kapidžić also highlights the durability of ethno-national patronage, the limits of civic alternatives, and the persistence of war memory and religious identity in structuring political competition. Looking beyond the elections, he cautions that Bosnia remains “stuck in the past,” with democratic renewal unlikely without changes in both domestic incentives and the wider external environment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches its October 4 elections at a moment when the country’s post-Dayton political order is once again under pressure over statehood, entity autonomy, ethnic representation, and democratic legitimacy. The campaign is shaped less by a conventional left-right divide than by competing visions of citizenship, constituent peoples, sovereignty, and the future of the Bosnian state. Against this background of ethnonationalism, populism, democratic erosion, and geopolitical influence, the elections offer an important vantage point from which to assess not only who will govern, but also the deeper institutional structures that continue to constrain Bosnia and Herzegovina’s democratic development.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Damir Kapidžić, Professor of Comparative Politics at the Faculty of Political Science and Director of the Institute for Social Science Research at the University of Sarajevo, argues that Bosnia’s most consequential democratic danger may not take the form of spectacular constitutional collapse. Rather, it lies in the gradual erosion and paralysis of institutions. “We do see the possibility of what I would not call a dramatic constitutional breakdown, but rather a slow death,” he warns, explaining that institutions can simply cease to function when government formation, regulatory bodies, or judicial appointments are left indefinitely unresolved. In his assessment, “the gradual normalization of illiberal practices is likely to continue,”while “a more likely scenario… would simply be a slow demise.”

Professor Kapidžić situates this institutional vulnerability within the contradictions of the Dayton system. While power-sharing has helped prevent renewed large-scale intercommunal violence, he argues that political elites have also “been able to capture the system for their own purposes.” The resulting elite consensus, he observes, has often centered not on effective governance but on “keeping the rule of law weak, not resolving wartime legacies, and capturing state institutions.”

These dynamics are reinforced by deeply embedded patronage networks. Coalition negotiations, Professor Kapidžić notes, are rarely programmatic; instead, they revolve around “the division of power and resources rather than the creation of policies.” Ethnonational parties therefore operate not only as guardians of identity but also as gatekeepers of material opportunity, presenting themselves as protectors of their communities’ access to “resources and employment.”

Looking beyond October 4, Professor Kapidžić remains cautious about the prospect of democratic renewal. Bosnia, he argues, is “very stable, but also stable in a negative sense,” with progress occurring “either very slowly or not at all.” The deeper problem is a political order “stuck in the past”—not simply the wartime past, but “the past 30 years of very little changing.” Without altered domestic incentives and a transformed external environment, Bosnia risks remaining trapped in what he describes as a recurrent political loop, “without clear signposts, clear guidelines about the possibilities, or a clear path forward.”

Here is our interview with Professor Damir Kapidžić, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Wolfgang Merkel.

Prof. Merkel on the Rise of the AfD: Trying to Outflank the Far Right Is Not a Winning Strategy

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Wolfgang Merkel examines the rise of the AfD, the weakening of Germany’s traditional political center, and the broader crisis of representation reshaping the party system. He warns that mainstream parties risk strengthening the far right when they adopt its positions: “If mainstream parties try to outflank right-wing parties by adopting their positions, they risk legitimizing them.” Professor Merkel also criticizes the Brandmauer as “a political mistake” and rejects an AfD ban as an attempt “to save liberal democracy by illiberal means.” At the same time, he emphasizes the resilience of German democracy, urging greater confidence in institutions and civil society. His conclusion is clear: “We Democrats need to be more optimistic.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Wolfgang Merkel, Director at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center and Professor of Political Science at Humboldt University Berlin, reflects on the transformation of Germany’s party system, the rise of the AfD, the weakening of the traditional political center, and the challenges these developments pose for democratic resilience. A leading scholar of democracy, polarization, political conflict, and institutional resilience, Professor Merkel situates recent electoral shifts within a broader erosion of the integrative capacity of Germany’s traditional Volksparteien and the growing centrifugal pressures affecting both the right and the left. 

Our conversation comes at a moment of profound transformation in German politics. The far-right AfD has achieved major victories in Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, while Die Linke has emerged as the strongest party in Berlin, exposing growing pressures on Germany’s traditional political center and on Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s CDU. These developments raise fundamental questions about populism, representation, socioeconomic and cultural cleavages, the Brandmauer, militant democracy, and the resilience of liberal institutions.

At the heart of the conversation is the question of how mainstream democratic parties should respond to the rise of the far right. Professor Merkel is particularly skeptical of strategies that seek to neutralize radical-right competition by adopting parts of its political agenda. “If mainstream parties try to outflank right-wing parties by adopting their positions, they risk legitimizing them,” he argues. Such a strategy, in his view, effectively communicates that these parties “were right” and that mainstream parties are merely “correcting their own policies and following their lead.” His conclusion is unequivocal: “I do not think this is a winning strategy.” Instead, democratic parties, he insists, should remain firmly anchored in constitutional principles and clearly defend democratic red lines against racism, xenophobia, and anti-pluralism. 

Professor Merkel nevertheless rejects a purely defensive conception of democracy. He describes the Brandmauer—the informal exclusion of the AfD from political cooperation—as “a political mistake,” arguing that it has allowed the party to remain comfortably in the role of protest opposition without having to demonstrate whether it can govern effectively. He is equally critical of proposals to ban the AfD, warning that such a move would amount to an attempt “to save liberal democracy by illiberal means” and could intensify rather than diminish political polarization. 

The interview also examines the deeper social foundations of Germany’s changing political landscape. Professor Merkel discusses how socioeconomic insecurity, cultural conflict, migration, regional grievances, and weakened cross-cutting cleavages are increasingly reorganizing political competition into antagonistic camps. He distinguishes cosmopolitan, municipal-communitarian, and chauvinist conceptions of belonging, while emphasizing that the crisis of representation extends beyond the right and is also visible in the resurgence of Die Linke. 

Yet Professor Merkel’s analysis ultimately resists democratic pessimism. Germany, he argues, should have greater confidence in its institutions, civil society, and decades of democratic development. “We Democrats need to be more optimistic,” he concludes. Democratic resilience requires not only resistance to anti-democratic pressures, but also the capacity to adapt, govern, rebuild trust, and actively shape political circumstances.

Here is our interview with Professor Wolfgang Merkel, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Dr. Sofie Blombäck.

Dr. Blombäck: The Debate Over Sweden’s Newest Citizens Has Become Quite Ugly

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In this ECPS interview, Assistant Professor Sofie Blombäck examines the Sweden Democrats’ electoral setback alongside the continuing normalization of ideas long associated with the radical right. She argues that some voters may feel they have already “gotten what they wanted” on migration, even as SD itself remains partly stigmatized. Dr. Blombäck also highlights a darker post-election development: debate over whether Sweden’s newest citizens, particularly Muslim immigrants, are treated as legitimate political actors. “In my personal view, the debate has become quite ugly,” she says. More broadly, she situates the election within a changing party system shaped by normalization, bloc realignment, strategic voting, weakened parliamentary norms, and shifting boundaries of political legitimacy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Sweden’s 2026 general election has brought into sharp relief a paradox that has been developing for more than a decade: the Sweden Democrats (SD) may lose electoral ground while continuing to shape the ideological and policy environment in which other parties compete. In this interview, Assistant Professor Sofie Blombäck, Senior Lecturer in Political Science at Mid Sweden University, examines this paradox through the lenses of radical-right normalization, party-system realignment, political stigma, representative democracy, and the changing relationship between voters and political elites. Her analysis places particular emphasis on the extent to which ideas associated with SD have become embedded in mainstream political competition even as the party itself continues to carry a degree of stigma. 

Dr. Blombäck argues that some voters who previously turned to SD because they wanted tougher migration policies may now feel that “they have now gotten what they wanted,” since the current policy direction has been “heavily influenced by the Sweden Democrats.” In her view, this helps explain how an electoral setback can coexist with deeper ideological influence: restrictive migration policies have become sufficiently entrenched that voters may no longer need to support SD itself in order to secure them. At the same time, she stresses that normalization remains incomplete. Although “the cordon sanitaire is gone,” and the stigma surrounding SD “is not as universal as it was four years ago,” the party is “not quite fully accepted into the mainstream.” 

The interview’s most striking discussion concerns the post-election controversy over immigrant participation and the political legitimacy of Sweden’s newest citizens. Dr. Blombäck notes that rising turnout in socioeconomically vulnerable areas with significant migrant populations has been portrayed by some actors on the right as threatening. This, she argues, has shifted debate toward a more fundamental question: whether immigrants, “and especially Muslim immigrants,” are treated as “a potential problem or legitimate political actors.” Reflecting on the tone of the post-election debate, she states plainly: “In my personal view, the debate has become quite ugly over the past week or two.” She adds that Sweden is “a country of immigrants,” and warns that political mobilization which questions the legitimacy of such citizens as political actors carries particularly significant implications. 

Beyond immigration, Dr. Blombäck situates the election within a broader restructuring of Swedish party competition. She argues that the party system has “tilted diagonally” along the GAL–TAN dimension, while the composition and ideological content of Sweden’s traditional blocs have changed. The result, she suggests, is not simply polarization, but a transformation in how parties compete, cooperate, stigmatize one another, and define the boundaries of political legitimacy in contemporary Sweden.

Here is our interview with Assistant Professor Sofie Blombäck, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.