In a wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Deusto, examines the endurance and contradictions of Javier Milei’s populist-neoliberal experiment in Argentina. She interprets Milei’s strong midterm showing as “an endorsement of his government—but not a blank check,” warning that he and his followers “might interpret this electoral support as a green light to override institutional constraints.” Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism, the influence of US backing, and Milei’s alignment with transnational far-right networks. While his administration remains formally democratic, she cautions that Argentina’s “democratic coexistence” is under pressure from rising intolerance and exclusion, calling on observers to “remain vigilant.”
In the wake of Argentina’s pivotal midterm elections—widely regarded as a referendum on President Javier Milei’s two years in office—Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto, offers a penetrating analysis of Argentina’s evolving political landscape in her interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Dr. Sendra explains that Milei’s strong electoral performance, with La Libertad Avanza securing over 40 percent of the national vote, can be seen as “an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary.” Yet, she cautions, “this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei.” According to her, many voters sought to avert economic instability following US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s suggestion that Washington’s financial support might be withdrawn if Milei performed poorly.
In assessing the opposition’s weakness, Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism and its credibility crisis. After years of alternating rule and recurring scandals, “the movement does not have the legitimacy to point out Milei’s own mistakes,” she notes, arguing that “people simply do not see them as a credible alternative.”
The interview delves into Milei’s fusion of radical market liberalism and populist rhetoric, a dynamic Dr. Sendra explored in her co-authored study “Is Milei a Populist?” She calls this a conceptual “puzzle,” since neoliberalism “dismantles the idea of ‘the people’ as a collective subject,” whereas populism depends on it. Milei, she observes, reframes the shrinking of the state “not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative.”
Addressing Milei’s international alignments, Dr. Sendra underscores the significance of “the Trump factor” and US financial intervention, which she describes as “a form of foreign interference.” However, she distinguishes Milei from nativist far-right leaders, arguing that “his ideology is not nativist” but rooted in a nostalgic vision of Argentina’s 19th-century prosperity.
At the institutional level, Dr. Sendra warns that Milei’s growing concentration of power and confrontational leadership style could erode democratic safeguards. “Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints,” she cautions. Still, she notes that Argentinian civil society and political elites retain “the institutional resources to push back if he crosses certain lines.”
Looking ahead, Dr. Sendra predicts that Milei’s model could endure if inflation continues to decline and middle-class sectors remain shielded from austerity. Yet she foresees long-term risks: “His policies will produce inequality and exclusion,” she concludes, “but we will see that in the long term.”
On 21 October 2025, the ECPS, in partnership with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, held the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. Titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” the event gathered scholars, journalists, and activists to examine how historical hierarchies continue to shape European migration discourses and governance. Panels led by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Prof. Ilhan Kaya, and Dr. Reda Majahar, among others, explored the politics of representation, power asymmetries in knowledge production, and decolonial approaches to migration policy. The workshop concluded with group discussions emphasizing the need to decolonize migration narratives, amplify migrant voices, and promote inclusive, rights-based policy frameworks across Europe.
Participants engage in a panel discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On 21 October 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. The event, titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” brought together scholars, journalists, civil society representatives, and activists to critically examine how historical hierarchies and colonial frameworks continue to influence migration discourses and policy across Europe.
The workshop opened with welcoming remarks from the project partners, followed by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Project Coordinator at Oxfam Intermón, who presented the goals and structure of the UNTOLD Europe Project. She highlighted the project’s mission to uncover the enduring impact of colonial histories on European migration governance and to promote inclusive, rights-based narratives.
The introductory panel, “Who Tells the Story? Power, Perspective, and the Politics of Migration,” explored the intersection of history, power, and representation in shaping migration narratives. Professor Ilhan Kaya (Ghent University) discussed the importance of reclaiming the “right to tell” within European contexts, emphasizing memory and agency in migration storytelling. Journalist Nawab Khan reflected on the shortcomings of EU migration policy in his talk, “Why the EU Migration Policy Has Failed Till Now?”, Doctoral ResearcherMarwa Neji (Ghent University) examined power asymmetries in knowledge production, while Ahsen Ayhan (Solidarity With Others) discussed the emotional and gendered dimensions of displacement in “Home We (Can’t) Carry: Migration, Gender and the Politics of Inclusion.”
The second session, “Migration Experiences – Voices and Perspectives,” foregrounded personal testimonies and lived experiences. Professor Ilias Ciloglu shared “My Personal Journey of Building a New Life in Belgium from the Ground Up,” while Becky Slack (Your Agenda) addressed the media’s role in framing migration and gender. Dr Reda Majahar (University of Antwerpen) critically examined “Global North–South Hierarchies in Refugee Research under European Funding Regimes.”Katerina Kočkovska Šetinc (Peace Institute Slovenia) and Mojca Harmandić (Pandora’s Path Institute) reflected on integration and systemic barriers in their speech “In Between Journeys and Belonging: Intersections of Migration, Integration, Support, and Systemic Barriers in Slovenia.”
After lunch, participants turned to comparative perspectives in the Country Case Studies session. Presentations explored how colonial logics inform contemporary migration frameworks: Andriana Cosciug (Romania), César Santamaría Galán (Spain), Fouzia Assouli (Morocco), and Anissa Thabet (Tunisia) each presented on their respective contexts.
The final part of the workshop was dedicated to interactive case study discussions. Participants, divided into small groups, analyzed country-specific materials and collaboratively developed alternative framings for migration narratives. They identified recurring colonial logics in European migration management, discussed missing voices, and drafted practical recommendations for EU policymakers.
Participants engage in interactive group discussions during the final session of the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
The workshop concluded with group presentations and a lively plenary discussion. Participants emphasized the need to decolonize policy discourses, amplify migrant and gendered perspectives, and foster communication strategies rooted in equality and human rights.
ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole contributes to the final plenary discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
The UNTOLD Europe Workshop offered a rich space for cross-sectoral dialogue, combining critical academic insights with creative and policy-oriented reflection. As part of the broader UNTOLD Europe Project, the event marked an important step toward reimagining how Europe narrates migration—beyond colonial legacies and toward inclusive, humane, and forward-looking policy frameworks.
Group photo of participants at the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
On October 23, 2025, Deakin University hosted the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics” at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, in collaboration with the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). The event convened leading scholars from across the globe to examine how unelected state institutions—from militaries to judiciaries—adopt populist idioms to claim legitimacy “in the name of the people.” Opening the conference, Professor Simon Tormey reflected on the indeterminacy of populism as both ideology and style, while Dr. Nicholas Morieson’s keynote advanced a framework distinguishing between populism’s exogenous capture and endogenous discourse. Through three thematic panels, participants explored how bureaucratic, military, and judicial populisms reshape governance, authority, and democratic accountability worldwide.
On October 23, 2025, scholars, researchers, and practitioners from around the world convened both in person at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, and online via Zoom for the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics.”Jointly organized by Deakin University, the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS (Politics & International Studies), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), the event brought together comparative, theoretical, and empirical perspectives to interrogate the rise of populism within unelected state institutions.
The conference opened with welcoming remarks from Professor Simon Tormey, who acknowledged the Wurundjeri people as the traditional custodians of the land and extended respect to Elders past, present, and emerging. In his opening speech, Professor Tormey reflected on the evolving state of populism research from a political theorist’s perspective, highlighting the fluidity and indeterminacy of the term. He traced conceptual approaches—from Cas Mudde’s ideological framing to Margaret Canovan’s notion of “the people” and Ernesto Laclau’s discourse-based theory—while raising critical questions about the nature of populism in bureaucratic and technocratic settings. Professor Tormey proposed that populism, far from a fixed ideology, operates as a style or mode of political communication that traverses both elected and unelected institutions.
Setting the intellectual tone for the day, Professor Tormey argued that the enduring puzzle in populism studies lies in its conceptual elasticity—its ability to appear simultaneously as a critique of power and a mode of authoritarian legitimation. He invited participants to consider whether bureaucracies and technocracies, often viewed as non-populist domains, might themselves harbor populist impulses—mobilizing claims to “the people” to defend authority, moral order, or institutional sovereignty.
Following the opening address, Dr. Nicholas Morieson delivered the keynote speech, presenting the conference’s concept paper on bureaucratic populism. His framework identified two faces of the phenomenon: exogenous capture, where populist leaders co-opt bureaucratic, judicial, or military institutions to serve partisan ends; and endogenous discourse, where institutions themselves adopt populist rhetoric, positioning their interventions as expressions of popular will against corrupt elites. Dr. Morieson demonstrated how this dual dynamic blurs the boundary between populism and guardianism, enabling unelected institutions to assert custodial power in the name of “the people.”
Through comparative analysis of cases in Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan, Dr. Morieson illustrated how militaries and judiciaries invoke democratic legitimacy while constraining popular sovereignty. His address underscored the need for a discourse-centered approach to detect when bureaucratic language shifts from technocratic neutrality to populist moralization—an analytical challenge of growing global relevance.
With panels devoted to bureaucratic, military, and judicial populism, the conference offered a vital forum for exploring how populist logics travel across state institutions and reshape democratic governance. As Professor Tormey aptly noted, the day’s discussions would not only deepen understanding of populism’s multiple faces but also probe one of the most pressing questions of our time: how the very institutions meant to safeguard democracy may increasingly speak—and act—in the name of the people.
Panel 1 – Bureaucratic Populism and its Implications
Paper 1:“No Public Service, No Democracy. Why Populist Administrations are Dismantling the Professional Public Service,” byMark Duckworth (Co-Director of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies; a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).
Paper 2:“A Different Populism: Anglophone, New World, Frontier,” byProfessor Stephen Alomes (Adjunct Associate Professor at RMIT University).
Paper 3:“Compliance and Capture: Bureaucratic Transformation under Populism in India and Hungary,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Survival, Sovereignty and Destiny: Centralized Power in Putin’s Russia Through Bureaucratic Populism,” by Lachlan Dowling (Student at Deakin University).
Paper 5:“Bureaucratic Populism and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: A Study of Institutional Populism and Hybrid Governance,” by Kashif Hussain (PhD candidate in Peace and Development Studies from the University of New England).
Panel 2 – Military Populism in Comparative Perspective
Paper 1:“The Making of a People’s General: Military Populism and the Discursive Legacy of Soedirman in Indonesia,” by Hasnan Bachtiar (PhD candidate at Deakin University), Azhar Syahida (A Researcher at the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia)& Ahalla Tsauro (PhD student at Université Laval, Canada).
Paper 2:“Military Populism in Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand: An Empirical Analysis,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University).
Paper 3:“The Re-Emergence of Military-Populist Governance in Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto,” by Wasisto Raharjo Jati (A Researcher at the Center for Politics within Indonesia’s BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency) in Jakarta).
Paper 4:“Militarized Populism and the Language of Conflict: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of the India–Pakistan May 2025 Standoff,” by Dr. Waqasia Naeem (Associate Professor in School of English at Minhaj University Lahore).
Paper 5:“Hybrid Regimes and Populist Leaders: A Case Study of Imran Khan’s Trajectory from Parliament to Prison,” byFaiza Idrees (Independent Researcher from Pakistan) & Muhammad Rizwan (PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University).
Panel 3 – Judicial Populism and Competing Narratives of Authority
Paper 1:“How can courts be populist?” by Mátyás Bencze (Former Judge and a Professor of Law at the Universities of Szeged and Győr, Hungary).
Paper 2:“Judging the State of Exception: The Judiciary in the Israeli Populist Project,” by Dr.Elliot Dolan-Evans(Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University).
Paper 3:“Judicial Populism in Pakistan: Discourse and Authority in the Panama Papers Judgments,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University) & Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations, and Chair of Islamic Studies at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Populism and the Noxious Relationship Between Political and Intelligence Elites in Post-Communist Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania,” by Bohuslav Pernica (Lieutenant colonel (ret.), co-editor of the White Paper on Defence, Czechia) & Emilia Șercan (Assistant Professor in the Journalism Department at the University of Bucharest).
Paper 5:“Competing Populisms in Pakistan: Politicians’ Anti-Military Narratives and Bureaucratic Counter-Narratives,” byZaffar Manzoor (MPhil Scholar at the Department of English Linguistics and Literature, Riphah International University Islamabad, Pakistan) & Dr. Muhammad Shaban Rafi (Professor of English at Riphah International University Lahore, Pakistan).
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Gijs Schumacher of the University of Amsterdam argues that Dutch politics may be entering a “post-populist era.” As the Netherlands approaches yet another general election, Professor Schumacher highlights growing fragmentation across left, right, and radical-right blocs, noting that “many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between centrist parties.” While populism’s anti-establishment appeal remains psychologically powerful, he observes that this sentiment is now spreading “more evenly across the political spectrum.” According to Professor Schumacher, the Netherlands’ long tradition of elite cooperation could allow a shift toward “pragmatic governance,” provided that “the mainstream left and right tone down their toxic rhetoric.” The post-populist phase, he suggests, reflects not decline but recalibration.
As the Netherlands heads toward its third general election in just five years, the country’s political landscape appears more fragmented and volatile than ever. To understand the deeper psychological and structural undercurrents behind this instability, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Professor Gijs Schumacher, Professor of Political Psychology in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam and founding co-director of the Hot Politics Lab. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Schumacher reflects on the fragmentation of Dutch politics, the endurance of populist discourse, and what he calls the emergence of a “post-populist era.”
According to Professor Schumacher, the defining feature of contemporary Dutch politics is fragmentation across three major blocs — the left, the right, and the radical right. Yet despite the proliferation of parties, he notes that “people don’t travel much between blocs … the only real possibility for governments is through the middle.” This narrowing of viable coalitional options, he argues, leaves voters disillusioned and searching for alternatives: “Many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between these centrist parties … and they often end up supporting either other parties within the same bloc or more radical alternatives.”
Populism, Professor Schumacher emphasizes, remains central to understanding this dynamic — particularly its anti-establishment appeal. He observes that this instinct is deeply rooted in human psychology: “It’s a powerful psychological tendency to be skeptical of leadership — to doubt whether those in power are there for your good or their own fortune.” However, Professor Schumacher points out that the Dutch left has largely abandoned its own anti-establishment roots, creating a political vacuum that figures like Geert Wilders have exploited: “Historically, the left had a strong anti-establishment agenda … but in opposing the populist radical right, they’ve completely muted that stance.”
Despite this, Professor Schumacher does not foresee a permanent populist capture of Dutch democracy. Instead, he suggests the country may be entering what he calls a “post-populist era” — a phase in which anti-establishment politics no longer belongs exclusively to the radical right but becomes “more evenly distributed across the political spectrum.” In his words: “The Netherlands has a long history of deep affective polarization — even though we didn’t use that term at the time — but it was never a major problem because, at the elite level, there was greater cooperation. The mainstream left and right don’t need to fight each other; there’s little to gain from it. If their rhetoric were less toxic, there would be no real barrier to a return to pragmatic governance.”
For Professor Schumacher, this shift signals neither a triumph of populism nor its total eclipse but rather a recalibration — a search for equilibrium in a political system that remains both fragmented and remarkably resilient.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Richard H. Pildes, one of America’s leading constitutional scholars, warns that democracy’s survival depends not only on equality and participation but also on its capacity to deliver effective governance. “Democracy,” he says, “rests on two simple promises: equal voice and better lives. When governments fail in that second task, it profoundly undermines democracy itself.” Professor Pildes argues that excessive focus on participation, coupled with digital fragmentation and weakened political parties, have eroded governments’ ability to act decisively. The rise of “free-agent politicians,” algorithmic outrage, and social media-driven polarization, he cautions, threaten to make democracy less capable of solving problems. “Effective government,” Professor Pildes insists, “is the forgotten pillar of democracy.”
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Richard H. Pildes, the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law and one of the foremost scholars of constitutional and democratic theory, reflects on one of the most neglected yet urgent dimensions of democratic life: the capacity to govern effectively.
Professor Pildes argues that modern democracies have grown dangerously unbalanced by emphasizing participation and representation—the “inputs” of democracy—while neglecting its “outputs,” namely the ability of governments to deliver results that improve citizens’ lives. As he puts it, “I often think of democracy, and what justifies it, as resting on two simple promises. First, democracy promises to treat citizens as equals—with equal standing, equal voice, and equal moral worth. Second, it promises to make their lives better.” When democratic governments fail at that second task, he warns, “it profoundly undermines the justification and purpose of democracy itself.”
Throughout the interview, Professor Pildes develops this theme of effective government as democracy’s forgotten pillar, linking it to rising polarization, social media dynamics, and the fragmentation of political authority. “Neglecting the value of effective government,” he observes, “is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Perhaps the fundamental challenge for contemporary democracies is to demonstrate that they can once again deliver for their citizens.”
Professor Pildes identifies digital fragmentation as one of the defining forces reshaping democratic governance. The communications revolution, he explains, has made it “incredibly easy to mobilize opposition to whatever government is doing,” eroding the stability of political institutions and making compromise more elusive. Social media and algorithmic amplification have “flattened political authority,” giving rise to spontaneous, leaderless movements but also fueling paralysis in democratic decision-making.
He also traces how the decline of strong political parties has weakened democracy’s capacity to build coalitions and sustain coherent governance. Whereas parties once mediated between citizens and the state, today’s hyper-pluralist media ecosystems and privatized campaign finance systems have encouraged the rise of “free-agent politicians”—performative figures who bypass party structures to cultivate online followings and raise funds directly from polarized small donors.
Looking ahead, Professor Pildes cautions that the structural fragmentation produced by digital media cannot be easily reversed: “The genie is out; you can’t really go back.” Yet, he insists that democracies must learn to manage these forces more effectively if they are to regain public trust and legitimacy. “Democracy,” he concludes, “must prove that it can still deliver—by governing effectively, addressing citizens’ needs, and meeting the great challenges of our time.”
On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On October 16, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the fourth session of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This series (September 2025 – April 2026) provides a structured forum for interdisciplinary dialogue on the contemporary challenges of democratic backsliding, populism, and the future of liberal democracy across different regions.
The fourth session, titled “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging,” focused on how political actors construct and mobilize the idea of “the people” to reshape democratic imaginaries, often in ways that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion. Against a backdrop in which one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared between 2012 and 2024, the session explored the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument used to legitimize exclusionary, often authoritarian projects. The event brought together a diverse group of scholars and practitioners from India, Nigeria, Israel, Morocco, Switzerland, and beyond, reflecting the comparative and interdisciplinary scope of the series.
The session was chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne). Following a welcome by Reka Koletzer on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mazzoleni opened with a conceptual framing that situated the panel within broader debates on populism and democratic legitimacy. He emphasized that there is “no populism without the people,” tracing the notion’s roots to ancient Greece and its evolution as a key source of political legitimation.
Historically, he noted, when “the people” were not central, politics drew on divine authority. Today, however, democratic politics is increasingly intertwined with religion and sacralized notions of a homogeneous people—developments that pose serious challenges to the rule of law and democratic sustainability. Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted how populist leaders exploit these dynamics to consolidate power and reshape belonging, stressing the importance of contextual, cross-regional reflection—linking contributions from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to global debates.
Three scholarly presentations followed, each addressing the theme from a distinct geographical and theoretical perspective: Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu (Abia State University, Nigeria) presented “We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” arguing for decentralization and participatory governance as democratic correctives to elite-dominated political systems. Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani, India) delivered “The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” offering a psychoanalytic and structuralist interpretation of the rise of Hindu nationalist populism. Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr.Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel) presented “We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” examining how populist movements appropriate the universalist language of liberal democracy to undermine its institutions from within.
The presentations were followed by discussant feedback from Associate Professor Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (SMBA University, Morocco; Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholar, Arizona State University) and Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). Their interventions offered comparative perspectives, theoretical reflections, and methodological suggestions, deepening the debate and encouraging the presenters to refine their arguments. A Q&A session allowed for interactive exchanges between the speakers and participants, further probing the conceptual, empirical, and normative implications of the presentations. Finally, Prof. Mazzoleni provided a general assessment, synthesizing the key insights of the session.
This report documents the presentations, discussants’ feedback, Q&A exchanges, and concluding reflections, offering a comprehensive overview of a rich and interdisciplinary scholarly discussion on how “the people” is performed, politicized, and contested in contemporary democratic politics.
In this insightful interview, world-renowned revolution scholar Professor Jack A. Goldstone warns that we are witnessing both “a descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world” and “the beginning of a revolutionary movement.” Professor Goldstone argues that today’s global instability—rising inequality, elite overproduction, populist anger, and democratic decay—signals the breakdown of the post–World War II liberal order. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he notes, “are falling apart.” Yet he remains cautiously hopeful: while “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he foresees that by the late 2030s, a new generation will “demand more accountability, more freedom, and use new technologies to build a better world.”
In a wide-ranging and thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jack A. Goldstone—one of the world’s foremost scholars of revolutions and social change—offers a sobering yet ultimately hopeful assessment of the current global order. As the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, and director of Schar’s Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP), Professor Goldstone brings decades of comparative historical insight to bear on today’s crises of democracy, capitalism, and governance. His diagnosis is clear and unsettling: “We are in a kind of descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world. That’s also the beginning of a revolutionary movement.”
According to Professor Goldstone, the present era is marked by the unraveling of the political and institutional order that defined the last half-century. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he explains, “are falling apart—they’ve come under strain for decades and are now being picked apart by both elite groups seeking advantage and populations deeply dissatisfied with financial crises, cultural clashes, and stagnant mobility.” This confluence of forces, he argues, signals not simply democratic backsliding but the early stirrings of a new revolutionary epoch.
Professor Goldstone situates these developments within the long cycles of political upheaval he has mapped throughout his career. His structural-demographic theory identifies three recurring stressors that produce revolutionary moments: rising government debt, the overproduction of elites, and mass grievances rooted in inequality and declining opportunity. Today, all three are present—governments are overextended, elites are multiplying faster than elite positions, and younger generations across the world are losing faith in social mobility. As he observes, “Failure of mobility is becoming the expectation… and that has huge effects on people’s optimism for the future and confidence in government. It creates the kind of anger that fuels a revolutionary moment.”
Yet, Professor Goldstone warns, the contemporary landscape also differs profoundly from past revolutionary ages. New technologies—from algorithmic media to artificial intelligence—are reshaping how truth, mobilization, and resistance operate. “The internet,” he notes, “was once seen as a tool of democracy, but governments have learned to weaponize it. They don’t shut down dissent; they drown it in misinformation.” In this digital ecosystem, both democratic discourse and authoritarian control are being transformed, deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of change.
Still, Professor Goldstone’s long-view perspective tempers despair with cautious optimism. While he predicts that “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he insists that revolutionary renewal remains possible: “From the late 2030s onward, we will see the next generation demanding more accountability, more freedom, and using new technologies to build a better world for themselves.” For Professor Goldstone, the world’s descent into authoritarianism may, paradoxically, set the stage for its next great democratic transformation.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, examines how digital platforms have transformed both domestic politics and international relations. Drawing on her Leverhulme project on Sino–Russian disinformation synergies, she argues that Russia and China have developed a “division of labor” in online influence operations aimed at destabilizing Western democracies. “They have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left… In short, they play both sides,” she explains. By exploiting emotional content and deepening polarization, these actors are reshaping democratic discourse and testing the limits of resilience in open societies.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Maria Papageorgiou, Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Newcastle University, discusses the complex relationship between digital technologies, political communication, and the global rise of disinformation. Her current Leverhulme-funded project investigates Sino–Russian disinformation synergies during UK and US elections, shedding light on how coordinated influence operations exploit social divisions and challenge democratic resilience.
According to Dr. Papageorgiou, the structural shift introduced by social mediarepresents “a more profound transformation in communication than previous technological advancements.” Unlike earlier forms of mass media that centralized information flows, today’s digital platforms empower a wide range of actors—ordinary citizens, political elites, and state institutions alike—to produce and disseminate content instantly. “It allows real-time responses, travels almost instantly, and reaches audiences across multiple countries and languages,” she explains. Yet this democratization of communication also carries serious consequences: “Online content often contains false or exaggerated claims, leading to more emotional forms of political expression and, ultimately, to polarization.”
These dynamics are not confined to domestic politics. In the international arena, Dr. Papageorgiou notes that states increasingly use social media to construct and project national identity in real time, especially during crises. She points to cases such as Russia’s and China’s digital diplomacy during the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine war, when both countries sought to frame themselves as responsible global powers while amplifying counter-narratives to Western accounts. “Particularly during times of crisis, when information circulates in real time, states amplify their social media presence… to more easily frame and project their national identity,” she observes.
Her research finds that Russia and China have developed a complementary “division of labor” in influence operations, pursuing shared objectives of weakening Western unity and credibility. “They have attempted to amplify both sides of political debates through bots and anonymous accounts—using certain elements to appeal to the right wing and others to the left,” Dr. Papageorgiou explains. “They are particularly focused on exaggerating existing polarization, using these accounts to disseminate emotionally charged content designed to provoke reactions. In short, they play both sides.”
For Dr. Papageorgiou, this pattern highlights a wider transformation in global political communication: the erosion of traditional information hierarchies and the normalization of populist performance in digital spaces. “Digital platforms enable a more populist style of performance, especially when one holds executive authority,” she concludes. “We can now see that it is almost impossible to return to older forms of communication. The public is no longer receptive to them; they have become accustomed to these newer, more direct political practices.”
In a fragmented information landscape, her insights underscore both the promise and the peril of digital politics: greater participation on the one hand, and deeper division on the other.
Populist actors often present themselves as defenders of “the people” while strategically boosting state capacity for select groups and undermining it overall, argues Edward L. Knudsen, a doctoral researcher at the University of Oxford and Affiliate Policy Fellow at the Jacques Delors Centre. In an interview with ECPS, Knudsen explains how modern populists “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate,” creating new forms of exclusion and weakening accountability. He highlights fiscal control as the central battleground for populist movements and warns that if democratic actors fail to adapt to the rise of state capitalism, authoritarian forces may fill the void with illiberal governance models.
In recent years, the resurgence of populist and authoritarian politics has profoundly reshaped the relationship between state capacity, democratic accountability, and public goods provision. To unpack these dynamics, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Edward Lawrence Knudsen, a doctoral researcher in international relations at the University of Oxford and an Affiliate Policy Fellow in European political economy at the Jacques Delors Centre in Berlin. Knudsen’s research, particularly through his work on the Berggruen Governance Index (BGI), offers a nuanced framework for understanding how governance quality interacts with populist and illiberal strategies in both established and emerging democracies.
Knudsen argues that modern populist and authoritarian actors are not merely dismantling governance structures but “selectively increase governance measures for specific populations while often undermining them in the aggregate.”Rather than speaking for the entire nation, these actors redefine “the people” as a narrower in-group, targeting state capacity and democratic accountability to benefit this constituency. “They argue that democratic accountability should serve this group, that state capacity should be strengthened in certain areas, and that public goods provision should focus on those regions or communities,” Knudsen explains. This selective strategy challenges national-level governance indices and highlights the need for more disaggregated analytical tools.
Drawing on his article “A Falling Star,” Knudsen underscores the mutually reinforcing decline of state capacity and democratic accountability in advanced democracies, particularly the United States. He identifies a “downward spiral” in which decades of underinvestment erode state capacity, fueling dissatisfaction and boosting the appeal of populist leaders. These leaders “capitalize on pre-existing governance weaknesses by offering simple answers,” but once in power, they “rarely improve state capacity and often end up pillaging or plundering the state, further weakening it and deepening the negative spiral.”
A central thread in the interview is Knudsen’s emphasis on the fiscal dimension as the primary target of populist capture. “There’s a reason that in every democratic revolution in history, going back to the French Revolution, the first thing you try to do is seize the treasury from the monarch,” he notes. Fiscal control—both taxation and expenditure—remains the core battleground for insurgent populist movements seeking to consolidate power.
Looking ahead, Knudsen identifies the rise of state capitalism as the defining political-economic trend of the coming decade. He warns that if democratic actors cling to outdated ideas of non-intervention, they risk leaving the field open to authoritarian forces willing to use state power for illiberal ends. “If the center is not willing to counter that with a form of democratic state capitalism, then that’s the real risk for the future in terms of a rising tide of authoritarianism globally.”
This wide-ranging conversation traces how governance weaknesses enable populist exploitation, how technocratic language can mask illiberal intentions, and how democracies might strategically adapt to an era of intensified state intervention.
Professor Vlastimil Havlík warns that the incoming Babiš government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.” Although constitutional majorities are “very unlikely,” he predicts “a slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through politicization of public service media, weakening of liberal civil society, and the conflation of private business and state power. He describes ANO’s victory as “a consolidation of the illiberal space” and emphasizes that probable coalition partners like the Motorists and SPD share “hostile rhetoric toward NGOs” and key democratic institutions. Strategically, ANO now pursues “a soft version of Euroscepticism,” aligning with median voter preferences while maintaining a pragmatic, catch-all profile.
On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Vlastimil Havlík, a leading expert on Czech party politics and populism at Masaryk University and the SYRI National Institute, analyses the electoral outcome and its implications for Czech democracy. He argues that ANO’s 2025 victory represents “a consolidation of the illiberal space,”with the party securing record electoral support and aligning with far-right forces, but without the constitutional majorities that enabled Hungary’s Fidesz to overhaul the political system. Despite this, Professor Havlík warns that the incoming government “is not good news for the quality of Czech democracy.”
According to Professor Havlík, Babiš’s coalition arithmetic now depends on “Eurosceptic and far-right actors such as the Motorists and SPD,” making stable governance uncertain but also potentially dangerous. He cautions that their shared hostility toward public service media and liberal civil society could translate into concrete measures to weaken democratic institutions: “We may see attempts to limit the role and funding of public service media, or even to take it over,” he says. “There has also been very hostile rhetoric from the three parties toward NGOs… essentially liberal, left-leaning civil society organizations.”
Professor Havlík also highlights structural constraints that differentiate the Czech case from Hungary and Poland. A majoritarian Senate system and the presidency of Petr Pavel make constitutional majorities for populists “very unlikely.” Yet he foresees a “slower, incremental decrease in the quality of democracy” through piecemeal institutional changes, politicization of media oversight, and the blurring of boundaries between Babiš’s private business empire and the state.
Economically, Professor Havlík emphasizes continuity. ANO’s electoral base resembles that of the former Social Democrats, with strong support in peripheral regions suffering from economic stagnation. Strategically, the party has embraced “a soft version of Euroscepticism” and aligned itself with the “Patriots for Europe” group, adapting its discourse to a skeptical public while avoiding the radical Czexit positions of SPD.
In sum, Professor Havlík sees both continuity and transformation: ANO has evolved from centrist populism into a dominant illiberal force, constrained by institutions but poised to erode liberal democratic checks incrementally.
