Ajay Gudavarthy1

Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy: India’s Opposition Cannot Break Majoritarianism Without Breaking Neoliberal Consensus

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In this ECPS interview, Associate Professor Ajay Gudavarthy analyzes India’s 2026 state elections as a critical moment in the consolidation of Hindutva populism, neoliberal governance, and majoritarian politics. He argues that the BJP’s electoral successes cannot be understood merely as victories of cultural nationalism, but as part of a broader “hegemonic project” that fuses welfare delivery, infrastructural populism, caste reconfiguration, emotional polarization, and centralized state power. For Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy, the opposition’s crisis is not only electoral or organizational, but also ideological: it has failed to offer a compelling alternative to both majoritarianism and neoliberalism. As India moves toward 2029, he warns that “India’s opposition cannot break majoritarianism without breaking neoliberal consensus.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

India’s 2026 state elections have dramatically reshaped the country’s political landscape while intensifying debates over populism, democratic erosion, federalism, and the future of constitutional pluralism under Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP’s historic breakthrough in West Bengal, consolidation in Assam, the continuing erosion of Left politics, and the disruptive rise of Vijay’s Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) in Tamil Nadu together reveal a transformed political order increasingly structured by emotional polarization, welfare nationalism, charismatic leadership, cultural majoritarianism, and institutional centralization. At the same time, controversies surrounding voter-roll revisions, anti-Muslim rhetoric, bureaucratic exclusion, digital mobilization, and the growing fusion of state power with majoritarian narratives have deepened anxieties about the trajectory of India’s democracy and the resilience of its federal constitutional framework.

To examine these developments, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Associate Professor Ajay Gudavarthy of the Centre for Political Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), one of India’s leading scholars of populism, political emotions, democratic transformation, and contemporary Hindutva politics. Across a wide-ranging conversation, Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy situates the BJP’s electoral successes within what he describes as a broader “hegemonic project” that combines neoliberal governance, infrastructural populism, cultural nationalism, and emotive majoritarian mobilization.

For Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy, the significance of the 2026 elections lies not simply in the BJP’s electoral victories, but in the deeper social and ideological reconfiguration underpinning them. He argues that “market integration, modernity, and modern technology do not necessarily dilute traditional religious or caste identities. On the contrary, they can strengthen them further by nationalizing them and making them even more emotive.” In this sense, contemporary Hindutva emerges not merely as a nationalist ideology, but as a comprehensive populist assemblage linking “big development, big growth, majoritarian imagination, and a theocratic centralized state” with charismatic leadership and welfare delivery.

A central theme running throughout the interview is Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy’s insistence that the BJP’s dominance cannot be understood apart from the persistence of neoliberal consensus in India. According to him, the opposition’s crisis is not only organizational or electoral, but also ideological and cultural. “The opposition cannot effectively challenge majoritarian consensus without simultaneously confronting neoliberal consensus,” he argues. “The crucial question as India approaches 2029 is whether the opposition will be able to articulate a radical social democratic agenda capable of breaking neoliberal consensus and, through that, also disrupting the majoritarian political imagination.”

Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy further contends that the BJP has successfully transformed cultural nationalism into a hegemonic social condition by combining aspirational development with affective politics centered on belonging, civilizational memory, and anxieties surrounding immigration, identity, and social insecurity. Drawing on thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci, Michel Foucault, Zygmunt Bauman, David Goodhart, and Partha Chatterjee, he explains how populist politics in India increasingly operates through what he calls the convergence of “right-wing populism and subaltern pragmatism.”

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Gudavarthy cautions against reducing the current conjuncture to irreversible authoritarian consolidation. While he acknowledges that the BJP has succeeded in constructing “a comprehensive hegemonic project built around a powerful cultural narrative,” he also identifies growing “social, political, and constitutional excesses” as potential openings for democratic resistance.

This interview offers a theoretically rich and empirically grounded exploration of how populism, neoliberalism, emotions, welfare politics, and majoritarian nationalism are reshaping democratic politics in contemporary India—and what these transformations may mean for the future of democracy as the country moves toward 2029.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Ajay Gudavarthy, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Professor Alexandre Lefebvre.

Prof. Lefebvre: Liberals Must Become More Generous with Both Their Resources and Their Attention to Others

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Alexandre Lefebvre of The University of Sydney argues that liberalism’s crisis is not merely institutional but also ethical and existential. Against populist and post-liberal portrayals of liberalism as morally hollow, elitist, and radically individualistic, Professor Lefebvre insists that liberalism historically rested on “freedom and generosity, liberty and liberality.” Yet neoliberalism, he argues, “forgot one half of this tradition,” narrowing liberalism into a doctrine of individual freedom, market rationality, and procedural neutrality. For Professor Lefebvre, liberal renewal requires recovering liberalism as a “way of life” grounded in fairness, reciprocity, moral self-reflection, and generosity. His remedy is clear: liberals must become “more generous with their resources and more generous in the attention they give to others.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when liberal democracy is confronting intensifying pressures—from populist radical-right mobilization and democratic backsliding to widening distrust in institutions and deepening social fragmentation—the future of liberalism has become one of the defining political and philosophical questions of our time. Across much of the contemporary world, liberalism is increasingly portrayed as morally exhausted, technocratic, elitist, and detached from the existential concerns of ordinary citizens. In political discourse, it is frequently reduced either to market orthodoxy or procedural neutrality, stripped of any deeper ethical or cultural substance. Against this backdrop, the work of Professor Alexandre Lefebvre offers a strikingly different interpretation of the liberal tradition.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Lefebvre—Professor of Politics and Philosophy and Chair of Discipline, Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at The University of Sydney—argues that liberalism cannot survive as a purely procedural doctrine. Rather, it must recover its ethical, existential, and even spiritual dimensions if it is to respond effectively to the global rise of illiberalism and populism. Central to his argument is the claim that liberalism historically contained not only a commitment to freedom, but also to generosity. As he puts it, liberalism originally rested on “two fundamental values at its core,” namely “freedom and generosity, liberty and liberality.” Yet, according to Professor Lefebvre, neoliberalism emerged when liberal societies “forgot one half of this tradition” and elevated freedom while neglecting generosity, solidarity, and fairness.

Throughout the interview, Professor Lefebvre challenges widespread assumptions about liberalism’s moral emptiness. While acknowledging that many populist critiques rely on “an unfair and highly reductive interpretation of what liberalism actually stands for,” he nevertheless argues that liberals themselves have often “invited this criticism by effectively performing the role of the caricature.” Liberalism’s retreat into technocracy, proceduralism, and elite self-management, he contends, has weakened its emotional and moral appeal while intensifying public perceptions of inequality and exclusion. “Liberalism,” he warns, “has to rediscover generosity and solidarity through institutions rooted in justice and fairness.”

Drawing on thinkers ranging from John Rawls and Henri Bergson to Aristotle and John Stuart Mill, Professor Lefebvre develops a conception of liberalism not simply as a political arrangement, but as a “way of life” shaping everyday practices, relationships, and moral sensibilities. He argues that liberal democracies are facing not merely an institutional crisis, but “an existential crisis” rooted in the erosion of meaning, belonging, and ethical orientation.

Perhaps most strikingly, Professor Lefebvre insists that the renewal of liberal democracy depends less on technocratic management than on moral reconstruction. Liberalism, he argues, must once again become capable of inspiring attachment, solidarity, and self-reflection without succumbing to authoritarian perfectionism. In his concluding remarks, he summarizes this challenge with remarkable clarity: “If I had two wishes for liberalism, they would be these: that liberals become more generous with their resources and more generous in the attention they give to others.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Alexandre Lefebvre, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Javier Pérez Sandoval1

Dr. Sandoval: The Erosion of Trust Outlasts Electoral Change

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In this ECPS interview, Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval examines how democratic erosion is increasingly shaped by forces operating beyond conventional accounts of executive aggrandizement and electoral backsliding. Drawing on his research on global illiberalism, state erosion, populism, political violence, and subnational authoritarianism, Dr. Sandoval argues that the international democratic environment has become less supportive of opposition forces and more permissive of illiberal practices. He warns that while populist leaders may be defeated electorally, the institutional damage they leave behind is far harder to reverse. The interview also explores Mexico’s “ballots, bots, and bullets” dynamic, where digital manipulation and criminal violence reshape democratic competition from below, while declining trust undermines democratic recovery at both domestic and international levels.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The accelerating crisis of liberal democracy is no longer confined to domestic arenas of polarization, institutional decay, or electoral contestation. Increasingly, democratic erosion unfolds within an international environment that has itself become more permissive of authoritarianism, more tolerant of illiberal governance, and less capable of sustaining democratic norms across borders. In this context, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval, Postdoctoral Research Associate in Democracy at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame, whose research explores the intersections of global illiberalism, populism, state capacity, political violence, democratic resilience, and subnational authoritarianism. Across a wide-ranging conversation, Dr. Pérez Sandoval offers a rich analysis of how contemporary democracies are being reshaped not only from above by executive aggrandizement, but also from below through institutional hollowing, criminal governance, digital manipulation, and declining public trust.

At the center of the interview is Dr. Sandoval’s argument that the international democratic order itself has undergone a profound transformation. Drawing on his recent Journal of Democracy article, he argues that the post-Cold War assumption that “linkages to the West” would provide a reliable democratic impetus has weakened considerably. As democratic turbulence intensifies within the United States and Europe themselves, “it is no longer certain that these linkages to the international arena, and specifically to Western democracies, provide robust support for democratic forces around the globe.” In their place, long-established autocracies have become “increasingly organized and much more sophisticated in how they operate internationally,” contributing to what he repeatedly describes as the “normalization of illiberal practices” both domestically and internationally.

This transformation, Dr. Sandoval argues, has profound consequences for democratic oppositions operating in hybrid regimes and eroding democracies alike. Global illiberalism raises the costs of resistance, fragments opposition coalitions, and produces what he terms a “credibility gap,” in which democratic actors may sacrifice long-term democratic commitments for short-term electoral viability. The result is an increasingly zero-sum international environment in which “policy preferences and regime preferences are becoming increasingly aligned.”

The interview also explores Dr. Sandoval’s influential work on state erosion and populist governance. In his collaborative research with Andrés Mejía Costa, he distinguishes democratic backsliding from the “hollowing out” of state institutions through mechanisms such as the dismantling of bureaucracies, the rearrangement of state agencies, fiscal centralization, and judicial reconfiguration. While populist leaders may be removed electorally, the institutional damage they leave behind is far more enduring. As he warns, “state erosion and state damage are much harder to undo.”

Particularly striking is Dr. Sandoval’s discussion of democratic trust in both domestic and international contexts. Reflecting on transatlantic relations, he observes that “a partner that was once regarded as reliable may suddenly appear far less trustworthy,” adding that “even when a government leaves office or is voted out, the damage to trust may already have been done.” This erosion of institutional confidence, he argues, extends from citizens’ relationships with the state to alliances such as those between the United States, NATO, and Europe. Hence the interview’s central warning: the erosion of trust often outlasts electoral change itself.

The conversation further examines Mexico as a paradigmatic case of democratic vulnerability under conditions of criminal governance, digital misinformation, and political violence. Discussing the country’s 2024 elections—described through the now familiar formula of “ballots, bots, and bullets”—Dr. Sandoval analyzes how criminal organizations increasingly shape electoral competition and democratic participation. He warns that when political elites are effectively “vetted by criminal organizations,” the minimal democratic principles of electoral contestation and elite rotation become fundamentally distorted.

Yet despite the gravity of these developments, Dr. Sandoval does not embrace fatalism. Instead, he repeatedly returns to the importance of democratic diagnosis, documentation, institutional rebuilding, and civic cooperation. Democratic resilience, he argues, begins with the ability “to diagnose and call things what they are,” and with the willingness of democratic actors to unite around minimal democratic thresholds rather than maximalist ideological positions. In sum, this interview presents a sobering but deeply illuminating reflection on the contemporary condition of democracy—and on the difficult but necessary work required to defend it.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Javier Pérez Sandoval, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

PeterKreko2

Assoc. Prof. Krekó: There Are Dangers of Re-autocratization and Abuse of Power in Hungary

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In this ECPS interview, Associate Professor Péter Krekó examines Hungary’s uncertain political transition after Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat and the rise of Péter Magyar’s TISZA party. Drawing on his work on “informational autocracy,” disinformation, conspiracy theories, and populism in power, Assoc. Prof. Krekó argues that Orbán’s centralized media and propaganda machinery has suffered a striking collapse, opening possibilities for democratic renewal. Yet he warns against premature optimism. Hungary may move toward a more pluralistic and critical information space, but concentrated power, weak parliamentary alternatives, and one-sided polarization create “dangers of re-autocratization and of abuse of power.” For Assoc. Prof. Krekó, Hungary’s future depends on institutional reform, media pluralism, civic vigilance, and political self-restraint.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz government after sixteen years in power has generated intense debate over whether Hungary is witnessing a genuine democratic rupture or merely a reconfiguration of illiberal governance under new political leadership. For more than a decade, Hungary stood at the center of global discussions on democratic backsliding, populist governance, and informational manipulation, becoming what many scholars described as a laboratory of contemporary illiberalism. Among the leading analysts of this transformation is Péter Krekó, an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Psychology; the Research Laboratory for Disinformation & Artificial Intelligence at Eötvös Loránd University and director of the think tank Political Capital Institute, whose work on disinformation, conspiracy theories, and “informational autocracy” has significantly shaped scholarly understanding of the Orbán regime.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Assoc. Prof. Krekó examines the political and psychological foundations of Hungary’s illiberal system, the apparent collapse of Orbán’s informational machinery, and the uncertain prospects for democratic renewal under Péter Magyar and the TISZA party. Drawing on his interdisciplinary expertise as both a political scientist and social psychologist, Assoc. Prof. Krekó situates Hungary’s transition within broader debates on populism, post-truth politics, democratic resilience, and authoritarian adaptation.

At the center of the discussion is Assoc. Prof. Krekó’s application of the concept of “informational autocracy,” originally developed by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman, to the Hungarian case. According to Assoc. Prof. Krekó, Orbán’s rule depended less on overt repression than on the construction of “the most centralized and politicized mediaenvironment in the entire European Union,” where nearly 500 media outlets operated within a politically controlled ecosystem reproducing state-sponsored narratives and disinformation. Yet despite these asymmetrical conditions, Orbán’s “highly professional media and disinformation machinery” ultimately “was unable to spread its narratives effectively or shape public opinion in the way it once had.”

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Krekó warns against premature democratic triumphalism. Although he believes there is “some basis for optimism” that Hungary may move toward “a more diverse, more pluralistic, and, in many respects, more critical information space,” he repeatedly emphasizes the structural dangers accompanying overwhelming electoral victories and concentrated political authority. As reflected in the headline of this interview, Assoc. Prof. Krekó cautions that “there are dangers of re-autocratization and of abuse of power in Hungary,” particularly in a political landscape where “only the right exists in parliament” and where polarization may evolve into what he describes as “one-sided tribalism.”

The interview further explores the enduring effects of disinformation and conspiracy narratives on collective memory, the fragility of democratic norms after prolonged informational manipulation, and the challenge of depolarizing political cultures shaped by Manichean populism. Hungary, Assoc. Prof. Krekó argues, has been “a major experimental laboratory of post-truth politics,” and may now become “a major experimental laboratory of post-post-truth politics as well.”Whether the country ultimately evolves into “a model for re-democratization” or drifts toward new forms of hybrid rule remains uncertain.

Throughout the conversation, Assoc. Prof. Krekó offers a nuanced and cautious analysis that avoids both fatalism and romanticization. Instead, he frames Hungary’s transition as an open-ended political experiment whose outcome will depend not only on institutional reforms, but also on political self-restraint, media pluralism, civic vigilance, and the willingness of both elites and citizens to defend democratic norms consistently, regardless of partisan loyalties.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Associate Professor Péter Krekó, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Dr. Justin Patch.

Dr. Patch: In the Age of Populism, Politics Becomes a Struggle over Aesthetics

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In this ECPS interview, Dr. Justin Patch argues that, in the age of populism, politics increasingly unfolds as a struggle over aesthetics. Rather than being peripheral, cultural forms—music, memes, and DIY practices—are central to how “the people” are experienced and constructed. As he notes, “the primary terrain of public contestation becomes aesthetic,” as citizens navigate complex political realities through affect, symbolism, and participation. While democracy depends on the capacity to feel “part of something larger than yourself,” this same impulse creates openings for populist capture. By showing how art can function as both democratic expression and ideological instrument, Patch highlights a central tension: aesthetic experience sustains collective belonging yet also enables its manipulation by populist and authoritarian actors.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Justin Patch, Assistant Professor of Music at Vassar College, offers a powerful account of how politics in the age of populism increasingly unfolds through aesthetics—through sound, image, gesture, affect, and participatory cultural forms. Rather than treating music, memes, art, or DIY production as peripheral to political life, Dr. Patch argues that they are central to how citizens experience belonging, identity, and representation. As he puts it, “the primary terrain of public contestation becomes aesthetic.”

The interview begins by situating democratic culture in practices that emerge from below. Historically, Dr. Patch notes, “the part we celebrate is the work done underneath the state.” From farmers’ organizations to populist gatherings, music, dancing, hymn singing, sewing circles, and potluck dinners created forms of sociability through which “the people” could recognize themselves as political actors. The crucial distinction, he argues, is between culture produced by communities themselves and culture appropriated by state actors or those seeking “state capture.”

This distinction becomes more urgent when Dr. Patch turns to the affective power of political mobilization. Democracy, he argues, depends on people feeling that they are “part of something larger than yourself.” Yet this same need is also democracy’s vulnerability. Populism, authoritarianism, and radical-right movements can offer the same emotional intensity and collective belonging while redirecting it toward exclusionary or leader-centered projects. “Unfortunately,”he warns, “that same need to feel part of something larger can be hijacked.”

A major theme of the conversation is how music and popular culture translate resentment into political identity. Dr. Patch explains that art can become “a proxy for political thought” because of its emotional accessibility. Whether in CasaPound’s punk and hardcore scenes, white-power music networks, or strands of country music, cultural forms can provide “social and emotional cues,” “cognitive shortcuts,” and a language through which grievance becomes durable belonging.

The interview also explores digital populism and the politics of re-signification. In Trump-era memes, parody videos, and online bricolage, Dr. Patch identifies an “aesthetic of domination” in which cultural materials are appropriated, inverted, and weaponized. The ability “to take something associated with one set of values and reframe it entirely,” he argues, becomes a symbolic victory.

Yet Dr. Patch does not reduce popular culture to manipulation. He insists on the democratic importance of self-expression, arguing that “democracy is about a kind of self-expression that communicates with others.” The challenge, then, is to cultivate aesthetic literacy without suppressing popular creativity. Art, he concludes, can be “a pedagogical tool” for learning how to live with difference—and for recognizing humanity “even in the face of profound disagreement.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Justin Patch, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Filip Milacic.

Dr. Milacic: Outbidding Autocrats on Nationalism Only Strengthens Their Legitimacy

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In this ECPS interview, Dr. Filip Milacic argues that democrats should not abandon patriotic language to autocrats. Instead, they must develop inclusive and emotionally resonant national counternarratives. Warning that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy,” Dr. Milacic explains how authoritarian incumbents justify democratic erosion through “threat narratives” portraying the nation, sovereignty, or identity as endangered. He emphasizes that dignity, recognition, and belonging are crucial drivers of political behavior often neglected by liberal democratic theory. Drawing on cases from Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and the United States, he argues that democratic resilience requires institutions, strategy, and narratives—because politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when democratic systems across Europe and beyond are increasingly challenged by populist mobilization, identity conflicts, and institutional erosion, the politics of nationalism has re-emerged as a central battleground. Authoritarian and illiberal actors have proven particularly adept at embedding their political projects within emotionally resonant narratives of national protection, sovereignty, and belonging. It is within this contested terrain that Dr. Filip Milacic’s intervention—captured in the striking claim that “outbidding autocrats on nationalism only strengthens their legitimacy”—acquires both analytical urgency and normative significance. His work invites a reconsideration of how democratic actors engage with the nation not as a fixed identity, but as a politically constructed and contested narrative space.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Milacic—senior researcher at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation’s “Democracy of the Future” office—offers an empirically rich account of democratic backsliding, authoritarian legitimation, and the role of narrative politics. Central to his argument is the contention that opposition forces face a strategic dilemma when confronting nationalist authoritarianism: to ignore the nation, to mimic exclusionary nationalism, or to construct an alternative vision. While the first two options remain common, Dr. Milacic insists that “the third option is the most promising”—namely, the development of a democratic counter-narrative that is both emotionally compelling and normatively inclusive.

This emphasis on narrative is not merely rhetorical but deeply structural. As Dr. Milacic underscores, authoritarian actors do not simply dismantle democratic institutions; they justify such actions through what he terms “threat narratives.” In these narratives, “the state is under attack” and “the nation, national identity, or national sovereignty [is] threatened,”thereby creating a moral and emotional framework within which democratic erosion becomes acceptable, even necessary. Crucially, these narratives resonate not because citizens misunderstand democracy, but because, as he notes, voters often support such leaders “not because of their authoritarian policies, but in spite of them.” This insight shifts the analytical focus from institutional breakdown alone to the discursive processes that legitimize it.

Equally important is Dr. Milacic’s critique of prevailing assumptions within liberal democratic theory. By foregrounding dignity, recognition, and belonging, he challenges the reduction of political behavior to economic rationality. Instead, he argues that “interests related to self-esteem, dignity, and recognition are significant,” and that the nation remains a powerful source of both identity and security. This helps explain why authoritarian narratives, particularly in contexts marked by “formative rifts” such as territorial disputes or contested identities, gain traction so effectively.

Yet Dr. Milacic resists deterministic conclusions. While some societies may be more structurally susceptible to such narratives, they are not condemned to authoritarian outcomes. Democratic resilience, he argues, depends on political agency and the capacity to craft inclusive, emotionally resonant counter-narratives. Ultimately, the interview advances a compelling thesis: that the defense of democracy today requires not only institutional safeguards but also a re-engagement with the symbolic and affective dimensions of political life—because, as Dr. Milacic concludes, politics is “fundamentally a battle of narratives.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Filip Milacic, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Professor Craig Calhoun

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Calhoun: Brexit Reveals Regret, Weakened Influence, and Intensified Backsliding

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Craig Calhoun, Professor of Social Sciences at Arizona State University, revisits Brexit a decade after the 2016 referendum, arguing that it has revealed “regret, weakened influence, and intensified backsliding.” While Brexit was presented as a remedy for national decline, Professor Calhoun notes that “there is now a degree of regret,” as its economic costs—shrinking growth, declining investment, and reduced productivity—have become clearer. Yet his analysis moves beyond economics, situating Brexit within deeper struggles over English identity, regional inequality, democratic legitimacy, and geopolitical decline. He argues that Brexit has acted as a “catalytic event,” intensifying existing democratic malaise while exposing Britain’s unresolved tensions over belonging, representation, and national purpose in an increasingly unstable global order.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

A decade after the 2016 referendum, Brexit remains a defining fault line in British politics, shaping not only institutional trajectories but also the deeper contours of political identity, democratic legitimacy, and geopolitical orientation. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Craig Calhoun, Professor of Social Sciences, Arizona State University, offers a striking reassessment of Brexit’s long-term implications, foregrounding a central paradox captured in the headline insight: “Brexit reveals regret, weakened influence, and intensified backsliding.” While the referendum was initially framed as a corrective to perceived national decline, Professor Calhoun underscores that “there is now a degree of regret,” as its economic consequences—“shrinkage of the economy, loss of investment and productivity”—have become increasingly apparent.

Yet Brexit’s significance extends beyond material outcomes. Professor Calhoun situates it within a broader transformation of democratic politics, arguing that it has functioned not merely as an event but as an accelerant: “Brexit has functioned as a catalytic event… it has made things worse and intensified democratic backsliding.” In this respect, the UK’s trajectory reflects a wider pattern across Western democracies, where populist mobilization intersects with declining institutional trust and growing dissatisfaction with representation. Although Britain retains relatively robust institutional foundations, he notes a discernible erosion, with the country becoming “less democratic… to a noticeable degree.”

A key contribution of Professor Calhoun’s analysis lies in his emphasis on the persistence of underlying structural and cultural drivers. Far from resolving political tensions, Brexit has entrenched them. “Many of the same factors are still in place,” he observes, pointing to regional inequality, anxieties over English identity, and unresolved questions regarding immigration and belonging. These dynamics have not only sustained polarization but have also contributed to a fragmented party system and a growing perception that “organized politics does not express the concerns that ordinary people have in their lives.”

At the same time, Brexit has come to symbolize a broader narrative of national and geopolitical decline. As Professor Calhoun notes, “the UK appears less powerful, less economically prosperous, and less influential globally,” a perception that has become more visible in the post-2016 period. Crucially, while the Leave campaign acknowledged decline, it promised reversal—a promise that, in his words, “has not occurred.” This disjuncture between expectation and outcome has reinforced both disillusionment and the continued appeal of populist narratives centered on “the people” rather than systemic or institutional considerations.

By placing Brexit at the intersection of populism, nationalism, and democratic transformation, Professor Calhoun’s reflections illuminate the enduring reconfiguration of political subjectivity in contemporary democracies. His analysis suggests that Brexit is not an isolated case but part of a wider shift toward more unstable, contested, and fragmented political orders—where regret, polarization, and uncertainty coexist with persistent demands for recognition, representation, and belonging.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Craig Calhoun, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Professor Adam Przeworski

Professor Przeworski: There Is No Worldwide Crisis of Democracy

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In this interview, Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University, challenges dominant narratives of a global democratic crisis. Against widespread claims of democratic recession and authoritarian resurgence, he argues: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.” For Professor Przeworski, democracy remains best understood as a mechanism for processing conflict through elections rather than as a system that resolves all social, economic, or moral disagreements. While he acknowledges unprecedented developments—party-system instability, polarization, and the rise of new right-wing parties—he cautions against conflating these shifts with systemic collapse. His analysis highlights democracy’s self-preserving capacity, insisting that while “small transgressions may be tolerated,” major violations of democratic rules eventually encounter resistance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era increasingly defined by claims of democratic recession, authoritarian resurgence, and the global diffusion of populist politics, few voices carry the analytical weight and empirical authority of Professor Adam Przeworski, Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU). A foundational figure in democratic theory, Professor Przeworski has long conceptualized democracy not as a teleological endpoint, but as a contingent institutional arrangement grounded in electoral competition and the management of conflict. His minimalist definition—“a system in which governments can be selected and removed through elections”—offers a parsimonious yet powerful framework for evaluating both democratic resilience and vulnerability. In this interview, conducted against the backdrop of intensifying scholarly and public concern about democratic backsliding, Professor Przeworski advances a deliberately counterintuitive claim: “I do not believe there is a worldwide crisis of democracy.”

This assertion stands in sharp contrast to dominant narratives, including those informed by datasets such as V-Dem, which suggest a global shift toward autocratization. Yet Professor Przeworski challenges both the empirical basis and the interpretive framing of such claims. “What does it really mean to say that a majority of the world’s population lives under authoritarian governments?” he asks, expressing skepticism toward measurement strategies that, in his view, risk overstating crisis dynamics. Instead, he emphasizes a more structural and historically grounded perspective: “There are more democratic regimes—more democratic countries—in the world today than ever before.” For Professor Przeworski, the proliferation of democratic regimes, even amid evident tensions, complicates the narrative of systemic collapse.

At the core of his argument lies a reconceptualization of democratic instability. While acknowledging “recent changes that are indeed unprecedented—such as the weakening of political parties, the instability of party systems, and the emergence of new parties, particularly on the political right,” he resists interpreting these developments as evidence of a generalized breakdown. Rather, they reflect shifting configurations within democratic systems that have always been characterized by conflict, contestation, and dissatisfaction. Indeed, as he notes, “as much as half of the population is always dissatisfied with what democracy produces,” a condition intrinsic to competitive politics rather than indicative of systemic failure.

Crucially, Professor Przeworski situates contemporary democratic challenges within a broader theory of political conflict and institutional equilibrium. Democracy endures not because it resolves all conflicts, but because it provides a mechanism—elections—through which they can be processed and temporarily settled. Even processes of democratic erosion, he suggests, remain bounded by this logic. While incumbents may attempt to “undermine democracy without abolishing elections,” such strategies are neither universally successful nor irreversible. On the contrary, recent electoral developments in countries such as Poland and Brazil illustrate democracy’s capacity for self-correction. “Attempts to usurp power through various means eventually encounter resistance,” he observes, emphasizing that “small transgressions may be tolerated, but major violations of democratic rules are not.”

This perspective invites a more nuanced understanding of both populism and authoritarianism. Rather than external threats to democracy, they emerge as endogenous features of political competition under conditions of inequality, polarization, and institutional strain. At the same time, Professor Przeworski underscores the enduring appeal of democratic choice itself. “The very possibility of choosing who governs us,” he argues, “is an extraordinarily strong value to which people adhere.”

By challenging prevailing assumptions about democratic decline, this interview offers a sobering yet cautiously optimistic account of contemporary politics. It suggests that while liberal democracy faces significant pressures, its foundational mechanisms—and the normative commitments that sustain them—remain more resilient than often assumed.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Adam Przeworski, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Symposium2026-Panel5

ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 5: Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World — Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion

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Panel 5 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, moderated by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, offered a comprehensive examination of democratic resistance amid intensifying global pressures. Bringing together perspectives from political sociology, democratic theory, criminology, and international political economy, the panel illuminated how structural inequality, cultural backlash, institutional erosion, and coercive economic practices converge to sustain contemporary strongman politics. Contributions by Professor Jack A. Goldstone, Professor Steven Friedman, Professor John Pratt, and Professor Kent Jones underscored that democratic backsliding is not reducible to leadership alone but reflects deeper transformations in governance, legitimacy, and global order. The panel ultimately highlighted the urgent need to rethink democratic resilience beyond institutional safeguards toward structural and societal renewal.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 5, titled “Democratic Resistance in a Hardening World: Civic Capacity, Strongmen, and Economic Coercion,”concluded on April 22, 2026, the second day of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, “Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience.” Moderated by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham and Senior Fellow at Georgetown University’s Berkley Center, the panel examined the structural, ideological, institutional, and economic forces driving contemporary democratic erosion and the resurgence of strongman politics.

Professor Cesari’s moderation situated the panel within the symposium’s broader concern with democratic resilience under conditions of systemic crisis. The session brought together four distinguished scholars whose presentations approached the hardening global political environment from complementary disciplinary perspectives: historical sociology, political theory, criminology, and international political economy. Together, they explored how economic insecurity, democratic disillusionment, punitive politics, cultural backlash, and coercive trade policy have reshaped the terrain on which liberal democracy must now defend itself.

Professor Jack A. Goldstone, Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University and Senior Fellow of the Mercatus Center, opened the panel with “Structural Pressures Behind Strongman Politics.”Professor Goldstone argued that the rise of authoritarian-populist leaders cannot be explained simply by demagoguery or declining democratic values. Rather, it reflects long-term structural pressures, including globalization, technological displacement, regional inequality, immigration surges, cultural diversification, fiscal stress, and declining confidence in mainstream institutions.

Professor Steven Friedman, Research Professor of Politics at the University of Johannesburg and former Director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, followed with “Changing Democracy’s Address.” Professor Friedman challenged the assumption that contemporary democratic crises reflect a popular rejection of democracy itself. Instead, he argued that the dominant post-Cold War model of democracy has failed by neglecting private power and by presenting democracy as inherently Western, thereby weakening its legitimacy both in established democracies and across the Global South.

Professor John Pratt, Emeritus Professor of Criminology at Victoria University of Wellington, then presented “The Return of the Strong Men.” Professor Pratt traced the contemporary rise of populist strongmen to the neoliberal restructuring of the 1980s, the resulting legitimacy deficit, and the emergence of penal populism, anti-expert politics, enemy construction, and strongman promises of protection.

Professor Kent Jones, Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College, concluded the presentations with “Weaponized Trade Policy: Tariffs, Industrial Policy, and the Future of Global Economic Governance.” Professor Jones analyzed how Trump’s populist trade agenda undermined the rules-based global trading system, transforming tariffs into instruments of executive power, coercion, and institutional destabilization.

Thıs, Panel 5 offered a wide-ranging account of democratic resistance in an era marked by structural insecurity, institutional erosion, and globalized authoritarian repertoires.

Read the Full Report of Panel 5 from the ECPS Symposium 2026

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ECPS Symposium 2026 / Panel 4: Comparative Regional Pathways of Democratic Backsliding and Far-Right Mobilization

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Panel 4 of ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium examined democratic backsliding as a globally connected yet regionally differentiated phenomenon. Moderated by Professor Reinhard Heinisch, the session brought together comparative insights from Turkey, the United States, South Korea, East Asia, and Latin America. Professor Henri J. Barkey analyzed how personalistic leadership, institutional capture, and politicized law enable authoritarian consolidation in the cases of Trump and Erdoğan. Professor Hannes Mosler challenged the routine application of “populism” to East Asia, arguing that South Korea’s democratic erosion is better understood through far-right mobilization, historical revisionism, anti-feminism, and transnational networks. Professor María Esperanza-Casullo explored Latin American right-wing populism through narratives of grievance, hyper-masculinity, cultural antagonism, and elite collaboration, highlighting the need for conceptually precise and regionally sensitive democratic responses.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel 4 of the ECPS Fifth Annual International Symposium, “Reforming and Safeguarding Liberal Democracy: Systemic Crises, Populism, and Democratic Resilience,” convened on April 22, 2026, under the title “Comparative Regional Pathways of Democratic Backsliding and Far-Right Mobilization.” Moderated by Professor Reinhard Heinisch, Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg, the panel examined how democratic backsliding and far-right mobilization unfold across distinct regional contexts, while also interrogating the conceptual vocabularies through which these phenomena are analyzed.

Professor Heinisch framed the panel around a central comparative premise: while democratic backsliding appears as a broadly shared global trend, its manifestations differ significantly across regions. He emphasized that regional variation concerns not only what is empirically observed, but also how scholars conceptualize and interpret developments such as populism, far-right politics, authoritarianism, and democratic erosion. His moderation therefore situated the panel as both an empirical and conceptual inquiry into the regional pathways through which democratic systems come under pressure.

The panel brought together distinguished scholars working on different geographical and theoretical terrains. Professor Henri J. Barkey, Cohen Professor of International Relations Emeritus at Lehigh University, opened with “Building an Authoritarian Edifice Step-By-Step,” offering a comparative analysis of Donald Trump and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Professor Barkey explored how personalistic leadership, institutional capture, attacks on expertise, and the politicization of law contribute to the gradual construction of authoritarian power.

Professor Hannes B. Mosler, Professor at Universität Duisburg-Essen’s Institute of Political Science and affiliated with the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), shifted the focus to East Asia in “Populism and Transnational Ties of the Far Right in East Asia: Recent Developments in South Korea.” Professor Mosler questioned the applicability of populism as an analytical category in East Asia and argued that South Korea’s democratic challenges are better understood through the lens of far-right mobilization, historical revisionism, anti-feminism, and transnational ideological circulation.

Professor María Esperanza Casullo, Professor at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of History, Geography and Political Science, Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, concluded with “Populist Narratives and Democratic Backsliding: Perspectives from Latin America.” Professor Esperanza-Casullo examined contemporary Latin American right-wing populism through the concept of the populist myth, highlighting narratives of grievance, cultural antagonism, hyper-masculinity, and elite collaboration.

Together, the panel offered a comparative account of democratic erosion as a globally connected but regionally differentiated phenomenon, underscoring the need for precise concepts, contextual analysis, and transnational democratic responses.

Read the Full Report of Panel 4 from the ECPS Symposium 2026