Professor Jacob Mchangama.

Prof. Mchangama: Liberal Institutions Are Becoming Increasingly Illiberal in Their Attempts to Fight Populism

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In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Jacob Mchangama warns that liberal institutions are becoming “increasingly illiberal” in their efforts to combat populism and disinformation. Examining electoral censorship in Brazil, Germany’s militant democracy, and the EU’s Digital Services Act, he argues that restrictive speech policies risk undermining democratic legitimacy while strengthening authoritarian forces. Emphasizing the democratic significance of independent digital media, particularly in Hungary, he cautions that “imposing government control is ultimately a cure worse than the disease.” Professor Mchangama also examines the dangers of AI-driven censorship, selective free-speech advocacy, and declining institutional trust, advocating decentralization, transparency, and user empowerment as alternatives to increasingly technocratic approaches to regulating the democratic public sphere.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic institutions confront populism, disinformation, political censorship, and the growing influence of artificial intelligence and technology giants, freedom of expression has become both a cornerstone of democratic resilience and a deeply contested principle. Brazil’s presidential election and the US midterms offer particularly revealing examples of these tensions. Across liberal democracies, efforts to counter extremist mobilization and digital disinformation raise an increasingly urgent question: Can democracy be protected through restrictions on the very freedoms that sustain it?

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jacob Mchangama, Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech, Research Professor at Vanderbilt University, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), and author of Free Speech: A History from Socrates to Social Media, examines this paradox. His central concern is that the erosion of public trust has prompted liberal institutions to adopt increasingly illiberal responses. As he observes, “this collapse of trust has led liberal institutions to become increasingly illiberal, responding to mistrust from the demos with mistrust of the demos.” Such efforts to control political narratives, he warns, create “a vicious cycle that, in the long term, will undermine rather than strengthen democracy.”

Professor Mchangama develops this argument through Brazil’s judicial interventions in electoral expression, Germany’s increasingly restrictive speech legislation, and the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA). Questioning the effectiveness of Europe’s militant democracy model, he invokes the Weimar Republic’s historical experience, when emergency powers intended to safeguard democratic institutions were subsequently exploited by the Nazis. His conclusion is stark: “the very instruments intended to protect democracy were used to abolish it.” For Professor Mchangama, contemporary restrictions risk reproducing this institutional vulnerability, particularly when political forces hostile to liberal pluralism acquire governmental power.

The dangers become especially pronounced in the digital sphere. Reflecting on Hungary’s opposition mobilization through independent online media, Professor Mchangama emphasizes that social platforms remain indispensable instruments of democratic dissent, even when dominated by powerful corporations. Although acknowledging the internet’s toxicity and concentrated ownership, he argues that “imposing government control is ultimately a cure worse than the disease.” Similarly, he cautions that Europe, historically central to developing legal protections for expression, is now “creating the blueprint for online censorship,” potentially legitimizing authoritarian restrictions elsewhere.

Beyond censorship, the interview explores artificial intelligence, decentralized factchecking, governmental transparency, and the democratic potential of digital participation. Professor Mchangama distinguishes user empowerment from preemptive safetyism, warning against transforming AI governance into preventive ideological gatekeeping. Ultimately, drawing inspiration from Frederick Douglass, he insists that freedom of expression protects listeners as well as speakers. His overarching democratic principle is unequivocal: “You’re not going to strengthen democracy by hiding that reality.”

Here is our interview with Professor Jacob Mchangama, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Yaniv Roznai.

Prof. Roznai: Israel Would Not Survive Another Coalition Like Netanyahu’s

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As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, constitutional scholar Professor Yaniv Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could threaten the country’s liberal-democratic future. In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, he declares: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” Examining democratic backsliding, judicial independence, political polarization, and the growing influence of religious nationalism, Professor Roznai also cautions that Netanyahu’s defeat would mark only the beginning of democratic restoration. Drawing comparisons with Poland and Hungary, he argues that Israel’s fragmented opposition would face formidable coalition challenges. Meaningful democratic renewal, he maintains, requires constitutional safeguards, stronger institutional checks and balances, and democratic education.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its democracy faces profound challenges stemming from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, the controversial judicial overhaul, and the devastating consequences of October 7 and the war in Gaza. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, constitutional resilience, and whether electoral change can reverse the institutional and societal transformations of recent years.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director of the Rubinstein Center for Constitutional Challenges at Reichman University and Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University’s University Center for Human Values, offers a deeply concerned assessment of Israel’s democratic trajectory. A leading scholar of constitutionalism, populism, and democratic erosion, Professor Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could have existential consequences for Israel’s liberal-democratic future.

Reflecting on the possibility of Netanyahu remaining in power, Professor Roznai states: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” His warning extends beyond institutional deterioration to the potential departure of Israel’s educated and liberal population. “I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years,” he observes, pointing to the already significant emigration of academics, doctors, and other professionals.

Professor Roznai situates these concerns within a broader analysis of populist constitutionalism. Although Israel has not yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism, he argues that its democratic institutions remain vulnerable to executive encroachment. As he explains, “The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.” He identifies the judiciary, independent legal authorities, and civil society as essential safeguards against the concentration of political power.

Drawing on comparative experiences, Professor Roznai argues that a post-Netanyahu Israel would resemble Poland more than Hungary, primarily because of the fragmentation of its opposition and the complexities of coalition formation. Unlike Hungary, where Péter Magyar emerged as a dominant opposition leader, Israel’s alternative political camp encompasses ideologically diverse parties from the left, center, and right, alongside Arab parties. Even if Netanyahu loses, Professor Roznai cautions, the resulting government would struggle to pursue a unified agenda of democratic restoration. “From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary,” he observes, emphasizing that Israel would not have “a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition.” Such fragmentation could complicate efforts to reverse institutional abuses and strengthen democratic safeguards.

Professor Roznai also cautions against assuming that Netanyahu’s electoral defeat would automatically restore democratic governance. “That will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning,” he emphasizes. Meaningful restoration, in his assessment, would require completing Israel’s Bill of Rights, strengthening constitutional safeguards, protecting judicial independence, and rebuilding democratic literacy through education.

Ultimately, his assessment presents the coming elections not simply as a contest over political leadership but as a critical juncture in the struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity, democratic institutions, and long-term national future.

Here is our interview with Professor Yaniv Roznai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Gideon Rahat.

Prof. Rahat: Netanyahu’s Departure Could Pave the Way for Democratic Renewal in Israel

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In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines Israel’s democratic prospects ahead of the October 27 elections. He argues that Netanyahu’s departure could enable a redistribution of political power and a return to consensus-based democracy, while warning that deeply personalized parties and weakened institutional checks threaten democratic resilience. Highlighting Netanyahu’s role in legitimizing the religious-nationalist far right, Professor Rahat cautions: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” Despite these enduring challenges, he sees opportunities for democratic renewal through institutional reform, stronger political parties, and the restoration of checks and balances.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its political landscape remains deeply polarized by Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, and the profound consequences of the October 7 attacks and the devastating war in Gaza. Beyond the immediate electoral contest, fundamental questions concern the resilience of democratic institutions, the personalization of political power, and whether a post-Netanyahu government could reverse Israel’s democratic backsliding.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat, holder of the Gersten Family Chair in Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, offers a nuanced assessment of these challenges. Drawing on his scholarship on political parties, populism, and democratic institutions, Professor Rahat argues that Netanyahu’s departure could create an opportunity for democratic renewal, although Israel’s deeply personalized party system presents formidable structural obstacles.

Central to his analysis is Netanyahu’s consolidation of political authority and his transformation of Likud. According to Professor Rahat, Netanyahu’s populism combines centralized personalism with an antagonistic division between the supposedly authentic people and institutional elites. Yet his removal could fundamentally alter these dynamics. As Professor Rahat explains, “Netanyahu did not allow anyone around him to grow politically.” Consequently, he argues, no obvious successor possesses the capacity to reproduce Netanyahu’s centralized political infrastructure. His departure could therefore allow political power to be redistributed, potentially facilitating a return to consensus-based democracy.

However, Professor Rahat simultaneously warns that Netanyahu has fundamentally transformed Israel’s political landscape by legitimizing previously marginal ultranationalist forces. Examining the rise of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, he emphasizes the decisive role of political elites in enabling radicalization. Referring to Netanyahu’s political elevation of Ben-Gvir, Professor Rahat observes: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” This normalization of the far right represents an enduring challenge that may survive Netanyahu’s eventual departure.

The interview also explores the weakening of judicial independence, the marginalization of Arab political parties, and the enduring trauma of October 7. Professor Rahat emphasizes that the erosion of institutional safeguards cannot be reversed through leadership change alone, warning that “a court cannot sustain democracy by itself.” Democratic reconstruction, he argues, requires stronger political parties, institutional reforms, and a broader distribution of political authority.

Moreover, Professor Rahat’s analysis distinguishes between the possibility of ending Netanyahu’s personalized rule and the more demanding task of rebuilding Israeli democracy. His cautiously hopeful conclusion underscores the importance of institutional transformation beyond electoral alternation: “Hopefully, this would allow Israel to return to a more consensus-based form of democracy.”

Here is our interview with Professor Gideon Rahat, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Yoav Peled.

Prof. Peled: Israel Risks Losing What Remains of Its Liberal Democracy After October 27

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In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Yoav Peled, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, warns that Israel’s October 27 elections could accelerate the erosion of liberal democracy rather than reverse it. Examining Netanyahu’s enduring populist appeal, the growing influence of religious nationalism, and the weakening of judicial independence, Professor Peled describes Israel’s transition from “a sort of semi-liberal democracy to a majoritarian democracy.” He argues that the opposition’s reluctance to cooperate with Palestinian parties and its unwillingness to address Palestinian statehood severely constrain prospects for democratic renewal. Warning that “any remaining resemblance to a liberal democracy is going to be erased,” Professor Peled maintains that without addressing Palestinian rights, “Israeli democracy cannot be sustained.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Israel approaches its October 27 elections, the country faces profound political and societal divisions shaped by the aftermath of October 7, the devastating war in Gaza, intensifying religious nationalism, and persistent challenges to democratic institutions. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political resilience, the growing influence of the radical right, and the opposition’s uncertain alternatives raise fundamental questions about Israel’s democratic future and its relationship with Palestinians. Against this backdrop, Professor Yoav Peled, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Tel Aviv University, offers a sobering assessment of Israel’s democratic trajectory, warning that “any remaining resemblance to a liberal democracy is going to be erased.”

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Peled situates Israel’s democratic deterioration within the longer historical evolution of ethno-national populism, religious Zionism, and differentiated citizenship. Drawing on his influential scholarship, he argues that Netanyahu’s political resilience cannot be understood solely through electoral competition or governmental performance. Rather, it reflects deeply embedded ethno-class resentments, particularly among segments of the Mizrahi population, and an emotional identification with populist leadership that transcends conventional assessments of political accountability.

Central to Professor Peled’s analysis is the erosion of the institutional foundations of liberal democracy. He characterizes Netanyahu’s judicial reform initiative as “really a regime coup against the system that prevailed until then,” describing a transition from “a sort of semi-liberal democracy to a majoritarian democracy.” In his interpretation, the systematic weakening of judicial independence and other institutional checks threatens the constitutional limitations that protect individual and minority rights against unrestricted majority rule.

Yet Professor Peled emphasizes that Israel’s democratic crisis extends beyond institutional restructuring. He identifies the unresolved Palestinian question as a fundamental contradiction within the country’s political order. Reflecting on his earlier scholarship with Gershon Shafir, he acknowledges that their previous optimism regarding the reconciliation of Zionism and democracy proved “completely unwarranted.” For Professor Peled, continued occupation, settlement expansion, and Palestinian political marginalization make democratic renewal increasingly difficult.

The interview also examines the growing influence of religious nationalism, the transformation of the West Bank under Bezalel Smotrich, and the consequences of October 7 for Israeli political culture. Professor Peled argues that the opposition’s reluctance to cooperate with Palestinian parties, combined with its limited commitment to Palestinian statehood, demonstrates the narrow ideological boundaries of electoral competition.

Moreover, Peled presents the October 27 elections not as an opportunity for democratic restoration but as a potential accelerator of existing transformations. Warning that Israel is moving toward what he calls a “religious-nationalist state,”he maintains that without fundamentally addressing Palestinian equality and self-determination, “Israeli democracy cannot be sustained.” His assessment raises a broader question about whether electoral competition can preserve democratic institutions when the underlying structures of ethnonational exclusion remain largely uncontested.

Here is our interview with Professor Yoav Peled, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Lucio Renno.

Prof. Rennó: Brazil Faces Unusual Democratic Backsliding Through Legislative Authoritarianism

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As Brazil approaches its October 25 presidential runoff, Professor Lucio Rennó of the University of Brasília warns of an unusual trajectory of democratic backsliding driven primarily by Congress rather than the presidency. In this ECPS interview, Professor Rennó examines the institutionalization of Bolsonarismo, the consolidation of political polarization, and the persistence of authoritarian enclaves inherited from military rule. Drawing parallels with what scholars call legislative authoritarianism, he cautions that congressional power-grabbing could weaken the Supreme Court and institutions of horizontal accountability. As Professor Rennó observes, “We can identify elements of that same logic in Brazil.” Yet he also emphasizes democratic resilience, highlighting the role of civil society, judicial institutions, and political opposition in resisting institutional erosion and preserving constitutional democracy. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Brazil approaches the decisive October 25 presidential runoff, the country’s political trajectory raises questions extending far beyond the contest between President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Flávio Bolsonaro. In the October 4 first round, Flávio Bolsonaro secured 47.03 percent of the vote against Lula’s 45.16 percent, while the broader Bolsonarist camp strengthened its congressional presence. ForProfessor Lucio Rennó, Professor at the Political Science Institute of the University of Brasília, these developments illuminate not only the institutionalization of Bolsonarismo but also an unusual transformation in the mechanisms of Brazilian democratic backsliding.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rennó, whose research examines populism, authoritarian attitudes, electoral realignment, and democratic resilience, argues that Brazil is witnessing a distinctive concentration of political power. Unlike conventional patterns of democratic erosion, where executives progressively dismantle constitutional constraints, the Brazilian process is increasingly driven by the legislature. As he observes, “What we’re witnessing in Brazil today is a rather unusual process of democratic backsliding, in which power-grabbing and the centralization of power are occurring primarily within Congress rather than the executive branch.”

Drawing on The Crisis of Democracy in Brazil, co-authored with Leonardo Avritzer, Professor Rennó situates this development within the country’s enduring institutional vulnerabilities, particularly the “authoritarian enclaves” inherited from military rule. He identifies a Congress dominated by a pragmatic, clientelistic coalition with conservative policy orientations as a potential vehicle for weakening constitutional checks. Comparing this trajectory with developments in Peru, where scholars have identified legislative authoritarianism, Professor Rennó warns: “We can identify elements of that same logic in Brazil.”

The implications extend directly to judicial independence and horizontal accountability. Professor Rennó anticipates congressional efforts to restrict the Supreme Court’s authority and potentially weaken institutions such as the Public Prosecutor’s Office, the Federal Police, and the Tribunal de Contas. Under a Flávio Bolsonaro presidency, he cautions, executive-legislative alignment could accelerate these developments, weakening oversight institutions “primarily to the benefit of Congress rather than the presidency.”

Yet Professor Rennó’s analysis also emphasizes the resilience of Brazilian democracy. He underscores the constitutional role of the Supreme Court, the mobilizing capacity of civil society, and the potential resistance of the Workers’ Party and congressional opposition.

Ultimately, the interview situates these institutional struggles within a broader political realignment: the consolidation of Bolsonarismo and Petismo as competing national identities. As Professor Rennó explains, Brazil is witnessing “the construction of political identities that transcend politics and increasingly affect our daily lives.” The October runoff therefore represents not merely a presidential contest but a critical moment in the continuing struggle over institutional power, democratic accountability, and Brazil’s political future.

Here is our interview with Professor Lucio Rennó, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Adolph Reed.

Prof. Reed: The Structural Contradictions That Gave Rise to Trumpism Remain Unresolved

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As the United States approaches the 2026 midterm elections, Professor Adolph Reed Jr. offers a critical political-economic interpretation of Trumpism, arguing that the structural contradictions underlying authoritarian nationalism remain fundamentally unresolved. In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Reed examines the tensions between capitalist accumulation and democratic legitimacy, challenges race-reductionist explanations of inequality, and critiques neoliberalism’s displacement of class-based politics. Warning that “the threat of another version of Trumpism will continue to be there,” he emphasizes the limitations of electoral mobilization without durable working-class organization. Drawing on his experience with the Bernie Sanders campaigns, Professor Reed advocates rebuilding solidaristic, universalist politics capable of confronting both economic inequality and authoritarianism through sustained political organization and democratic-socialist transformation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United States approaches the November 3, 2026, midterm elections, fundamental questions persist about the political-economic foundations of Trumpism, the durability of authoritarian nationalism, and the declining capacity of the American left to articulate a transformative alternative. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Adolph Reed Jr., Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and Distinguished Visiting Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke College, offers a historically grounded critique of Trumpism, neoliberalism, racial politics, and the erosion of working-class political organization.

One of the most distinctive voices in American political thought, Professor Reed challenges interpretations that privilege political personalities, demographic identities, or ideological labels over the structural contradictions of capitalist democracy. Rather than becoming preoccupied with whether Trumpism should be classified as populism or fascism, he emphasizes its political consequences and underlying material conditions. “Trumpism is clearly a form of authoritarianism,” he argues, while observing that it remains loosely aligned with authoritarian tendencies emerging across Europe and Latin America.

Crucially, Professor Reed cautions against assuming that Trump’s departure would eliminate the political forces associated with his presidency. “The structural contradictions aren’t going anywhere,” he insists, identifying the increasingly fraught relationship between capitalist accumulation and political legitimation as a defining tension within neoliberal democracies. Unless these contradictions are addressed through an alternative political vision capable of providing security and well-being, Professor Reed warns, “the threat of another version of Trumpism will continue to be there.”

The interview also explores Professor Reed’s longstanding critique of race-reductionist explanations of political behavior and inequality. Questioning the treatment of racial categories as coherent political constituencies, he argues that contemporary social science has been “more or less willfully making class and political economy disappear from our understanding of American politics.” His historically specific approach to racism and white supremacy challenges explanations that detach racial ideologies from material interests, institutional structures, and political mobilization.

Turning to democratic socialism, Professor Reed reflects on his involvement in both Bernie Sanders presidential campaigns and the organizational limitations that constrained their transformative potential. “You can’t elect your way to social transformation, at least not without an organizational base,” he observes. Despite these setbacks, he identifies growing skepticism toward capitalism among working people as evidence of changing political possibilities.

Ultimately, Professor Reed argues that confronting authoritarianism and neoliberalism requires sustained organizing beyond electoral cycles. His central message emphasizes the patient reconstruction of working-class solidarity, institutional capacity, and universalist politics. As he concludes, “You’ve got to be able to focus both on what needs to be done to stop the bleeding right now, to keep things from getting worse, and on where we’re trying to go in the long run.”

Here is our interview with Professor Adolph Reed, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

MEP Hanna Gedin.

MEP Gedin: The EU Is Losing Its Voice When It Comes to Upholding International Law

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MEP Hanna Gedin argues that the EU’s credibility as a defender of democracy, human rights, and international law is being weakened by political double standards and the growing normalization of radical-right ideas. In this ECPS interview, she warns that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and points to inconsistencies in migration policy and relations with Israel and Turkey. Gedin also urges the European left not to adapt to the far right, but to build its own agenda around inequality, housing, energy, and the cost of living. “You need to have your own agenda,” she says, and to “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Hanna Gedin, Member of the European Parliament for Sweden’s Vänsterpartiet (Left Party, V) and Vice-Chair of The Left Group, reflects on Sweden’s post-election political deadlock, the normalization of radical-right ideas in European policymaking, the erosion of international law, and the strategic dilemmas facing the democratic left. Gedin, who works on the internal market, industry, energy, women’s rights, and gender equality, situates these questions within a broader critique of inequality, restrictive migration policy, and the weakening of Europe’s normative credibility. 

The interview begins with the struggle to translate Sweden’s new parliamentary majority into a viable center-left government. Gedin rejects the idea that Vänsterpartiet should once again support a government from outside, insisting that “if our votes are needed, if our mandates are needed, of course we should be in the government.” She argues that the Center Party (C) “needs to choose,” because “there is no middle way.” At the same time, she acknowledges the deep economic divide between the two parties but maintains that cooperation remains possible on issues ranging from feminism and climate to international law and support for communities outside major cities.

A central theme of Gedin’s remarks is the extent to which the radical right has reshaped mainstream political agendas. She argues that Swedish parties have been “adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats,” while politics has increasingly shifted away from “bread and butter” concerns toward culture-war issues. For Gedin, the answer is not imitation but political differentiation: “For the left, it’s really important not to adapt.” Instead, she insists, “You need to have your own agenda,” centered on the cost of living, inequality, housing, and material security.

This concern extends to migration policy at both Swedish and European levels. Gedin describes a “shift and an adaptation to the radical right” in EU migration politics and recalls far right and right-wing MEPs cheering “Send them back, send them back” during a vote on return hubs. Yet she also points to Sweden’s debate over teenage deportations as evidence that public attitudes can shift when abstract migration categories acquire “names and faces.”   

The interview’s sharpest normative critique concerns international law. Gedin argues that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and warns of “a complete erosion of international law” driven by double standards. She contrasts the EU’s firm response to Russia’s war against Ukraine with what she sees as a much weaker approach toward Israel, arguing that such inconsistency undermines European credibility globally.    

Ultimately, Gedin presents a distinctly materialist response to the rise of the far right. She argues that the left must make politics concrete: reduce inequality, address rents and energy costs, tax the very rich, and “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

Here is our interview with MEP Hanna Gedin, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

MEP Brando Benifei.

MEP Benifei: An Alliance of Interests Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs Threatens Our Democracies

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MEP Brando Benifei warns that Europe’s struggle for technological sovereignty is inseparable from the defense of democracy. In this ECPS interview, he argues that the EU must strengthen its technological capacity while preserving its regulatory autonomy against external pressure and concentrated corporate power. Benifei stresses that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and warns that the extreme right has moved closer to “techno-oligarchs,” forging “a form of alliance and mutual support.” He describes this convergence as “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.” Beyond regulation, Benifei calls for “a democratic reaction” and a “new social contract” capable of making European societies “more equal and freer.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era in which technological power, geopolitical rivalry, and democratic vulnerability are increasingly intertwined, the European Union faces a double challenge: strengthening its strategic autonomy while defending the institutional and normative foundations of liberal democracy. Few policy areas illustrate this convergence more clearly than artificial intelligence, digital regulation, platform governance, and transatlantic relations. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, reflects on Europe’s technological dependencies, regulatory sovereignty, Big Tech power, disinformation, and the growing political relationship between digital oligarchies and the popuplist radical right.    

At the center of Benifei’s analysis is the argument that Europe’s struggle for sovereignty cannot be reduced to economic competitiveness or technological capacity alone. It also concerns who has the power to establish the rules governing digital societies. He insists that Europe must develop its own technological capabilities while preserving its regulatory autonomy, arguing that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and describing this principle as “an absolute red line.” At the same time, he warns that Europe cannot remain merely a regulatory power without developing the technological infrastructure necessary to sustain that role. As he puts it, the EU “can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today.”    

The interview becomes particularly significant when Benifei turns to the political consequences of concentrated technological power. He argues that the rise of the extreme right is increasingly connected to powerful actors within the technology sector. “The extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs,” he says, adding that they have “forged a form of alliance and mutual support.” For Benifei, this convergence now constitutes “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.”    

His response is not limited to regulation. Benifei calls for what he describes as “a democratic reaction” and “the proposal of a new social contract” capable of making societies “more equal and freer.” In his account, inequality and declining freedoms can provide “fertile ground” for an alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs and for what he characterizes as a “hateful and democracy-demolishing approach.”

Against this backdrop, the conversation explores the broader implications of AI governance, algorithmic amplification, digital enforcement, disinformation, transatlantic pressure, and European sovereignty. Benifei’s remarks ultimately frame the contemporary digital struggle not merely as a debate over innovation or regulation, but as a deeper contest over democratic authority, economic power, and the institutional capacity of Europe to determine its own political and technological future.

Here is our interview with MEP Brando Benifei, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Natália Sátyro.

Prof. Sátyro: Bolsonarismo Has Already Become Bigger Than Bolsonaro Himself

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In an interview with ECPS, Professor Natália Sátyro argues that Brazil’s 2026 presidential election reflects a conflict extending far beyond the Lula–Flávio Bolsonaro runoff. At its center is a Bolsonarismo that, she says, “has already become bigger than Bolsonaro himself”—a durable movement combining neoconservative cultural politics, neoliberalism, anti-system mobilization, and competing notions of who deserves state protection. Professor Sátyro examines how family, religion, gender, race, class, and welfare policy have become intertwined in this struggle, contrasting Bolsonarismo’s “familialism by default” with a more state-centered social-protection model. Ultimately, she sees Brazil confronting two competing projects: “one very conservative and neoliberal, and the other more progressive and focused on social justice,” with profound implications for democracy, citizenship, and social rights.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election has become more than a contest between President Lula and Flávio Bolsonaro. It has developed into a struggle over competing conceptions of democracy, citizenship, social protection, family, gender relations, and the role of the state. The first round placed Flávio Bolsonaro at 47 percent and Lula at 45.1 percent, sending the election to an October 25 runoff. Against this backdrop, Professor Natália Sátyro, Professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG), brings to the debate a distinctive perspective grounded in her scholarship on family policy, social protection, institutional change, state capacity, gender, and minority access to welfare.

At the center of Professor Sátyro’s analysis is the argument captured in the headline of this interview: “Bolsonarismo has already become bigger than Bolsonaro himself.” In her view, Bolsonarismo has developed into “a strong movement with neoconservative characteristics” and “a powerful neoliberal appeal,” combining anti-PT and anti-system politics with a differentiated conception of state protection for those considered deserving and undeserving. She argues that its electoral advance has come not only at the expense of the left but also of Brazil’s traditional mainstream right, making Bolsonarismo, in her words, “certainly here to stay.”    

The durability of Bolsonarismo, Professor Sátyro suggests, cannot be understood solely through electoral competition. It is embedded in a broader cultural and institutional project in which the family occupies a central place. She describes an “explicit defense of a traditional patriarchal type of family” and emphasizes the political importance of evangelical networks in mobilizing support around family, gender, sexuality, education, and moral order. For Professor Sátyro, the cleavage is therefore not simply between cultural conservatism and redistribution. “What is at stake today,” she argues, “is democracy versus something non-democratic

Her analysis also brings welfare-state politics into this broader conflict. Professor Sátyro characterizes the Bolsonaro project as one of “familialism by default,” in which “the family and the market should be the pillars of social protection in Brazil.” This model, she argues, reinforces gendered caregiving roles and deepens class inequalities because affluent families can purchase care in the market while poorer families depend more heavily on extended family and community networks.   

Ultimately, Professor Sátyro sees Brazil as confronting two competing political projects: “one very conservative and neoliberal, and the other more progressive and focused on social justice.” The runoff, therefore, is not merely about presidential succession. It raises a larger question about what kind of citizenship, welfare regime, social order, and democratic state Brazil will seek to consolidate in the years ahead.

Here is our interview with Professor Natália Sátyro, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Daniel Schlozman.

Prof. Schlozman: American Voters Are Tired of Trumpism

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In this ECPS interview, Professor Daniel Schlozman examines the 2026 US midterms through the deeper crisis of American party organization. While arguing that “voters are tired of Trumpism,” he cautions that Democratic gains may reflect electoral fatigue rather than durable realignment. The interview traces Trumpism’s roots in long-standing currents on the American right, the centrality of immigration, the accommodation between populism and concentrated wealth, and structural vulnerabilities in the constitutional order. On the Democratic side, Professor Schlozman stresses class dealignment, weakened institutional loyalties, and the limits of policy “deliverism.” His central lesson is organizational: political loyalties are built through lived collective experience, and durable democratic politics ultimately requires renewed institutions, participation, and deep party organization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United States approaches the November 3, 2026 midterm elections, the political landscape is marked by an unusual convergence of electoral fatigue, institutional strain, partisan asymmetry, and organizational weakness. In this wide-ranging ECPS interview, Professor Daniel Schlozman, Joseph and Bertha Bernstein Professor in the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University, situates the midterms within a much longer transformation of the American party system. His central diagnosis is strikingly concise: “Voters are tired of Trumpism.” Yet Professor Schlozman is careful to distinguish electoral fatigue from a deeper realignment. Even if Democrats perform strongly, he argues, such gains may reflect “much more a reaction against an incumbent who’s been around for a long time than the stirring of Democratic forces” capable of generating a durable alternative.    

That distinction frames the interview’s broader inquiry into Trumpism, MAGA, and the condition of American democracy. Professor Schlozman emphasizes continuity as much as rupture: Trump, he argues, emerged from “long-standing currents on the American right,” even as anti-immigration became perhaps the most consequential innovation in the contemporary Republican coalition. At the same time, the Republican Party’s transformation cannot be understood solely through ideology. Trumpism combines leader-centered populism, anti-immigration politics, cultural resentment, and alliances with concentrated economic power. As Professor Schlozman puts it, the contemporary tech elite has “basically made its peace with Trumpism,” creating a political configuration in which populist attacks on cultural elites can coexist with plutocratic power.

The interview then turns to the institutional foundations of democratic resilience. Professor Schlozman argues that the vulnerabilities exposed by Trumpism are not wholly new: “the Madisonian system … was always vulnerable.” The Supreme Court, presidential power, the pardon authority, Senate malapportionment, and the difficulty of constitutional amendment all reveal structural weaknesses that make a simple return to the pre-Trump status quo inadequate. For Professor Schlozman, the deeper problem is not merely constitutional design but the erosion of political organizations capable of translating interests into durable loyalties.   

This is especially visible on the Democratic side. Working-class voters, he observes, are no longer being politically formed “in the union hall and the clubhouse”; increasingly, “they’re getting educated on TikTok.” His critique of Biden-era “deliverism” follows directly from this diagnosis: material benefits alone cannot generate political attachment when parties lack institutions embedded in voters’ everyday lives. “Political loyalties,” Professor Schlozman insists, “are made through the experiences of voters’ actual lives and the ways they see themselves in political collectivities.”   

Across the discussion—from the DNC and party gatekeeping to democratic socialism, Zohran Mamdani, unions, civic associations, and digital political life—Professor Schlozman returns repeatedly to the same institutional imperative. Elections can be won through money, advertising, and mobilization, but durable politics requires something deeper. As he puts it, “If you want a politics that’s more durable than that, you go back to institutions and institution building.” The interview ultimately asks whether American democracy can rebuild those forms of organization before electoral competition becomes ever more personalized, fragmented, and detached from durable collective life.

Here is our interview with Professor Daniel Schlozman, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.