Iran, US, Israel.

Power Transition in the Middle East: The Intersection of US Global Rivalries and Israel’s Regional Ambitions

In this long ECPS commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the 2026 US–Israeli strikes on Iran as part of a broader transformation in global power politics rather than an isolated regional conflict. He argues that the confrontation reflects a strategic intersection of energy security, regional military dynamics, and intensifying great-power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China. The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz—through which a substantial share of global oil flows—demonstrates how military escalation, energy markets, and geopolitical competition are increasingly intertwined. Professor Ozturk suggests that contemporary conflicts are being managed through strategic compartmentalization: limited escalation, selective alliances, and narrative control. In this emerging landscape, regional actors and global powers alike seek to reshape influence within a fragmented and increasingly competitive international order.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Israeli-US attack on Iran, at this pivotal moment, is more than just another Middle Eastern conflict or a simple prelude to a new oil shock. It should be seen as part of a broader shift in global power, in which regional conflict, energy security, and great-power rivalry are managed together rather than separately. The aim in this deliberately segmented crisis caused by the last military stand-off with Iran is (i) to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities to bolster Israel’s regional dominance focused on security; (ii) Washington’s effort to retain strategic control over global energy flows amid rising competition with China; and (iii) in doing so, to keep the conflict politically contained—avoiding the perception of a broader clash of civilizations in the Muslim world, thus preventing them from falling under China’s influence and minimizing the reasons for China’s growing influence in the Global South.

That stance closely aligns with a recent British parliamentary report, which suggests that energy, war, diplomacy, and narrative are no longer separate policy areas. Instead, they are being strategically managed together. The result is a new power dynamic—one that shifts away from crisis management within a liberal international order and toward a more fragmented system characterized by selective coalitions, limited violence, and varying legitimacy.

Beyond Energy and Iran’s Nuclear Capacity

Without any convincing legal justification, UN resolution, or data from American institutions indicating that Iran posed an imminent threat—and launched during ongoing negotiations—these attacks resulted in the “arbitrary” killing of thousands of civilians in Iran, the massacre of schoolchildren, the arbitrary sinking of an unarmed Iranian ship returning from military exercises in India and of a Sri Lankan ship, killing hundreds of soldiers, as well as severe damage to many UNESCO-protected historical monuments in Iran. In such a context, the first and most important task is to correctly situate these attacks by the US–Israel axis.

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the US carried out coordinated strikes on Iran, targeting leadership sites, military forces, and nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. The immediate market response was straightforward. After the attacks, global energy markets became extremely volatile, with Brent crude soaring to a peak of $119.50 on March 9, 2026, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatened 20% of global supply. This ‘panic spike’ was followed by a sharp intraday reversal, with prices sliding back toward $90.00 after US officials indicated a quick end to the military operations, ultimately leaving the market stuck in a highly volatile trading range between $85.00 and $105.00 (Figure 1). 

The strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the global oil supply is beyond discussion. In 2025, nearly 15 million barrels of crude oil per day and about 20 million barrels of total oil transited Hormuz, most of which headed to Asian markets rather than Europe (Figure 2). Any serious disruption, therefore, impacts not just supply but also freight, insurance, and risk premiums across the wider global economy. Therefore, the 2026 assault on Iran has clearly and rightly revived a familiar concern: that the global economy remains vulnerable to disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

Energy Leverage and the China Factor

The energy dimension gives this compartmentalization broader strategic significance. The IEA reports that China and India together received 44 percent of the crude oil exported through Hormuz in 2025, while Europe accounted for only around 4 percent of those crude flows. The Atlantic Council similarly estimates that roughly 78 percent of Middle Eastern crude exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan passed through the Strait in 2025. A crisis involving Iran and Hormuz is therefore not merely a Middle Eastern problem; it is also a point of pressure on Asian industrial power.

China is particularly vulnerable, though not helpless. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies estimates that about half of China’s crude imports and roughly one-third of its LNG come from the Middle East. According to comprehensive market monitoring and tanker-tracking data, unofficial Iranian oil flows to China reached an average of approximately 1.38 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2025 (Kpler; Vortexa). While some short-term fluctuations were observed in early 2025, the annual average remained robust, consistently exceeding the 1.3 million marks. Reuters and financial analysts report that China purchased more than 80 percent of Iran’s total shipped crude throughout the year (Reuters; Modern Diplomacy). This volume represents approximately 13.4 percent of China’s total seaborne oil imports, underscoring Iran’s critical, albeit unofficial, role in Beijing’s energy security strategy despite ongoing international sanctions (Energy Policy Research Foundation). In this context, pressure on Iran also indirectly affects a vital part of the Chinese economy. However, the strategic significance should not be overstated. The EIA indicates that China’s crude supply sources are diverse, with Russia and Saudi Arabia remaining its top suppliers in 2024, while the IEA’s Global Energy Review shows China continuing to lead global renewable capacity growth. Blocking Iranian flows can cause friction, uncertainty, and increased costs, but it is unlikely to fundamentally derail China’s rise on its own.

The situation in Venezuela aligns with this perspective. Even before the January 2026 US unilateral and unlawful military strike that led to Nicolás Maduro’s kidnapping, Venezuelan crude oil was not a key element of Chinese energy security. Reuters reported that, in the first half of 2019, China imported around 350,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude daily—about 3.5 percent of its total imports. In 2025, Reuters estimated Chinese imports from Venezuela at approximately 470,000 barrels per day, or roughly 4.5 percent of China’s seaborne crude imports. A later Reuters report stated that Venezuelan supply accounted for only about 4 percent of China’s crude imports. The message is clear: Venezuela has been a useful supplier to China due to its discounts and political convenience, but not a vital part of Chinese energy security. Disrupting one sanctioned supplier may be strategically significant; however, it is not automatically a decisive move.

There is also a broader distribution issue. An oil price spike caused by war would hurt not only Asia but also Europe. The IEA has already warned of renewed volatility in the gas market and ongoing pressure on European competitiveness, while its Electricity 2026 report notes that electricity prices for energy-intensive industries in the European Union remained roughly twice US levels in 2025. In contrast, the EIA indicates that the US has been a net petroleum exporter since 2020, and its world oil transit chokepoints analysis shows that US imports from Persian Gulf countries have decreased significantly over time. The energy situation is real and important—but in the larger power struggle, it appears as a meaningful yet still limited factor rather than a decisive tool of containment.

Despite all these facts and figures, it would be inaccurate to view the current crisis as just a repeat of the 1970s. The main issue is not only scarcity but also how conflict is framed, limited, and strategically handled. The war is better understood as a managed crisis within a larger shift in global order: force is used, but not arbitrarily; escalation is tolerated, but only to a certain extent; legitimacy is not universal but gradually built through temporary alliances and selective diplomatic efforts. In this context, energy is more than just a commodity at risk. It is a vital part of a broader strategic struggle.

Israel’s Security Dilemma and the Logic of Securitization

As R. Gilpin puts it, history suggests that moments of major power shifts or systemic transitions do not simply unsettle small and middle powers; they also redistribute opportunity. Some regional actors use great-power rivalryimperial retreat, or strategic ambiguity to rise above their original weight—as Piedmont-Sardinia did in the wake of the Crimean War, Meiji Japan under the pressure of Western encroachment, and Ibn Saud amid the collapse of Ottoman authority. Some others, for instance, misread the same fluidity and overreach, as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did in 1990, when a bid for regional expansion triggered the first major post–Cold War crisis and ended in rapid military defeat. In this sense, periods of power transition rarely leave the regional tier untouched: they create openings for some states to rise and traps for others to collapse. Israel’s conduct in the present phase of global power transition suggests that it is trying to exploit precisely such a window—not merely reacting to uncertainty but attempting to convert it into a regional hegemonic opportunity.

As US primacy becomes more contested and the Middle East is reorganized by overlapping energy, security, and corridor politics, Israel appears to be pursuing a dual strategy of expansion through both partnership and coercion. Besides, on the side of deterrence, its aggressive stance on war also reflects Israel’s recognizable security calculation. For years, Iranian missile capabilities, proxy networks, and nuclear advances have been cast in Israeli strategic discourse as existential or near-existential threats. From that vantage point, the February 2026 campaign is intelligible even if it is not thereby rendered lawful or strategically prudent. Once a hostile regime is defined as a total strategic danger, the political threshold for extraordinary measures falls: Preemptive force, regime-degrading strikes, regional militarization, and external coalition-building become easier to justify.

That said, deepening structured cooperation with states can help establish a favorable regional order. In that context, Israel is using punitive military actions against adversaries such as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and allied armed groups to weaken hostile capabilities, restore deterrence, and expand its strategic maneuvering spaceThis suggests that Israel is acting less like a besieged small state and more like an aspiring regional poweraiming to secure regional dominance before the emerging multipolar order becomes less accommodating. This also explains why the current conflict setup is not just about immediate battlefield outcomes but about shaping the future political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. 

The partnership aspect of this strategy is particularly evident in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s trilateral framework with Greece and Cyprus has evolved well beyond ad hoc diplomacy into a more institutionalized framework for security, maritime coordination, energy cooperation, connectivity, and technological partnership, sharply excluding Turkey. The December 2025 joint declaration explicitly linked this cooperation to natural gas development, electricity interconnectors, energy security, the Great Sea Interconnector, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), The emerging axis is supported by tangible defense ties: Greece has approved the purchase of Israeli PULS rocket systems, and Reuters has reported plans to strengthen joint exercises among Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus have solidified their own trilateral format focused on maritime security, natural gas infrastructure, energy diversification, and UNCLOS-based delimitation. The broader framework connecting Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which institutionalizes regional gas cooperation and uses energy as a tool for political unity. Collectively, these arrangements go beyond typical bilateral or trilateral diplomacy; they are forming the backbone of an emerging Eastern Mediterranean order, with Israel playing an increasingly central role.

Rising patterns show that Israel’s Mediterranean strategy is now part of a broader geo-economic vision extending from the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus-Central Asia region to India and Europe. In his February 2026 address to the Knesset, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India and Israel as sharing “ancient civilizational ties” and called for deeper cooperation through IMEC and I2U2, giving the relationship a geopolitical depth beyond transactional defense ties. This matters because Israel’s partnerships are no longer confined to immediate neighbors; they are increasingly tied to larger corridor projects, technology platforms, and Indo-Middle Eastern alignments. This relationship is anchored in the geopolitical logic of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a proposed multimodal route linking India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, with maritime, rail, energy, and digital components converging on Israel’s Mediterranean gateway, and again excluding Turkey. Promoted by its backers as a faster and more resilient alternative to existing routes—and widely read as part of a broader effort to balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—IMEC helps explain why India–Israel ties now extend beyond bilateral cooperation into the strategic architecture of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean order.

At the same time, not every actor moving closer to Israel should be labeled as part of an open pro-Israel bloc. Saudi Arabia still publicly conditionally normalizes relations on Palestinian statehood, yet its strategic interests overlap with Israel’s on issues such as containing Iran, protecting energy supplies, and maintaining a favorable regional balance. The new Syrian leadership’s revived US-mediated security talks with Israel present an even clearer example of pragmatic convergence. These are not full alliances, but they do show that Israel is operating in an environment where former or potential adversaries are increasingly involved in patterns of coordination, deconfliction, or selective accommodation. The broader point is that Israel is trying to transform multipolar disorder into a hierarchical regional order: building networks where possible, managing enemies where necessary, and using both cooperation and calibrated force to expand the sphere within which it can act as the dominant regional power.

Strategic Compartmentalization and the Avoidance of a Civilizational Trap

This is where Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis becomes relevant—though not in the crude sense often invoked in moments of war. Huntington argued that post-Cold War conflicts would increasingly follow cultural and religious fault lines. Yet the emerging strategy of Washington and its regional allies is not to embrace such a clash outright, but to instrumentalize its logic selectively while containing its broader consequences. 

According to SIPRI, Israel is widely recognized to possess a nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s ongoing presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal, and repeated UN reports under Security Council Resolution 2334 continue to document settlement expansion. At the same time, UN humanitarian reports recorded that, by early December 2025, Gaza’s Ministry of Health reported more than 70,000 Palestinians killed, over 170,000 injured, and mass displacement on a devastating scale. Taken together, these facts make any claim that Israeli actions remain firmly within a stable zone of legal and moral legitimacy highly questionable.

Thus, the US-Israeli challenge has never been limited to threat detection alone. It has also involved managing the political fallout from their responses. From Trump’s and Netanyahu’s perspectives, the operation against Iran needed to be framed in a way that preserved as much international legitimacy as possible, even when a clear legal justification was difficult to establish. At the same time, the conflict had to be prevented from escalating into a civilizational clash that could push Muslim-majority societies toward China and expand Beijing’s strategic influence across the Global South. Here, deeper contradictions become unavoidable. 

Iran and Hamas are cast as securitized and containable threats, while Gulf monarchies and other Muslim-majority states are engaged through donor diplomacy, regime-security guarantees, and calibrated alliance management. The objective is not simply to fight an adversary, but to prevent the war from consolidating an anti-Western political identity across the broader Muslim world—especially at a moment when parts of the Global South are drifting toward more China-friendly alignments.

This is precisely where the current war differs from a simple Huntingtonian interpretation. The conflict has not been allowed to evolve into a straightforward “West versus Islam” narrative. Instead, much of the diplomatic framework has sought to confine it to a narrower Iran-Hamas security issue. The Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Board of Peace relied heavily on participation from Gulf Arabs and Central Asians, while excluding direct Palestinian political representation at the highest levels of decision-making. Conversely, the UN Human Rights Office sharply criticized this setup as incompatible with a reparative, rights-based approach to reconstruction. From an analytical perspective, however, the main point is not whether the structure is morally convincing. It is that the structure acts as a mechanism of compartmentalization: some actors are isolated as threats to be disarmed or neutralized, while others are kept within a cooperative framework of reconstruction, stabilization, and donor politics.

The regional response confirms that interpretation. In their extraordinary GCC-EU joint statement, Gulf and European ministers condemned Iran’s attacks on GCC states, emphasized that GCC territories had not been used to launch attacks against Iran, invoked self-defense, and highlighted the importance of protecting maritime routes, supply chains, and energy market stability. Meanwhile, Carnegie noted that Gulf monarchies are caught between Iranian escalation and US recklessness, with their main focus on preserving fragile economic and security systems. This is not the language of a unified civilizational bloc; it is the language of regime survival. Nor did the broader Muslim political field unify into a single anti-Western Front. The OIC’s condemnation of Israeli attacks on Iran coexists with muted and ambivalent official Gulf reactions, while AP reporting emphasized elite anger at the US for exposing Gulf states to retaliation without sufficient warning or protection. As a European Council joint statement states, what emerged was fragmentation rather than bloc unity—and that fragmentation was not accidental but part of the crisis’s strategic outcome.

As a conclusion to this part, Gulf monarchies are neither full participants in an anti-Iran crusade nor members of an anti-Western camp. They are defensive actors seeking to preserve commercial credibility, domestic order, and external security amid a war they did not want. That posture is inherently compartmentalizing. It seeks to prevent regional collapse without fully endorsing the strategic logic that produced the crisis in the first place.

Washington’s Domestic Politics and the Uses of External Crisis

The domestic American context also matters, although it should be approached with analytical caution. While the operational details of the strike on Iran are often examined solely from a kinetic perspective, the decision-making process cannot be separated from the Trump administration’s increasing domestic vulnerabilities. The kinetic action serves as the ultimate “escape forward,” where the smoke of external conflict hides the fire of internal issues. Notably, two factors—the recently disclosed Epstein Scandal and the motivations of Trump’s eschatological cabinet—are significant. 

DOJ/FBI memorandum issued in July 2025 stated that investigators found no evidence of a Jeffrey Epstein “client list.” However, in March 2026, the Associated Press reported that newly disclosed files—previously omitted due to an alleged coding error—contained strong allegations involving Donald Trump. While this may not directly confirm a causal link between scandal exposure and war-making, as the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation note, it nonetheless supports a more defensible argument: a scandal-ridden domestic environment can increase the short-term political value of external escalation by diverting scrutiny, reinforcing partisan discipline, and shifting media focus to security rather than accountability.

Beyond the tactical use of distraction, this pressure is increasingly driven by a fundamentalist-Christian elite that has gained unprecedented influence within the cabinet. The appointment of Christian-Zionist ideologues to key bureaucratic positions in the US and diplomatic roles abroad, especially in Israel and the surrounding region, shows that the administration’s foreign policies are being guided by eschatological beliefs. The recent gathering of prominent pastors to “anoint” the President for a perceived war acts as a strategic response to the Epstein disclosures. By portraying the President as a Cyrus-figure—a flawed vessel chosen for divine geopolitical realignment—this faction provides a moral cover that redefines personal scandal as part of spiritual warfare.

In this context, Epstein’s emergence as a posthumous influence agent suggests that the timing of these disclosures may be less coincidental and more coercive. Trapped between the threat of legal disgrace and the demands of his Dominionist base, the President’s move toward external escalation becomes an expected outcome of survival politics. The combination of these allegations with radical religious rhetoric shows that the administration is being pushed into a policy space where aggression is used as the main tool for maintaining domestic stability and ideological legitimacy.

Europe’s Passive Alignment with Trump’s Vision

Europe now appears less as a strategic leader and more as a sign of Western division. Although it remains an important economic player, its geopolitical influence is diminishing. It is a giant in market size, but surprisingly weak in political unity, strategic direction, and external influence. Its direct reliance on Hormuz crude is lower than Asia’s, but it remains highly vulnerable to energy price shocks, industrial setbacks, and alliance pressures. What is especially notable is that Europe has faced the recent escalation in the Middle East while transatlantic relations are already strained. A recent European Parliament study notes that since early 2025, EU-US relations have been increasingly tense over NATO, Greenland, Ukraine, trade, technology, climate, and China, indicating a deeper split in strategic visions across the Atlantic. A recent ECPS Report concurs, finding that the transatlantic relationship has reached a turning point under Trump-era right-wing populism, with erosion in security, trade, international institutions, and democratic norms. In this context, Europe faces the Iran-Israel crisis not with confidence, but amid broader geopolitical confusion. 

Yet this is exactly what reveals Europe’s muted stance on Israel. While Washington has become a source of pressure and unpredictability for Europe, the EU has struggled to develop a clear and independent position on Israel. This silence signifies more a weakness than a deliberate strategy: leadership gaps, the lack of a strong, shared perspective within the Union, and the lingering influence of Cold War-era habits of outsourcing hard security to the US. The ECPS volume is especially useful here because it views the current Atlantic crisis not as isolated turbulence but as a systemic shift that requires greater European agency and strategic independence. Europe’s relative passivity, then, should be seen not just as deference but as a sign of unpreparedness: a wealthy political bloc that has yet to turn economic influence into geopolitical power.

Conclusion

The 2026 war with Iran should be seen as more than just a regional military conflict or a temporary energy crisis. It reveals a broader shift in the global order, in which the lines between war, energy security, alliance politics, and narrative control are increasingly blurred. What is emerging isn’t a return to a stable US-centered system, nor a fully developed multipolar balance, but rather a fragmented and coercive landscape. In this environment, major powers, regional players, and smaller states seek to gain advantages through selective alliances, limited escalation, and compartmentalized crisis management. In this context, Israel has acted with unusual clarity, trying to turn global uncertainty into regional dominance through military deterrence, strategic partnerships, and corridor politics. The Gulf monarchies sit at a crucial middle ground, balancing pressure, exposure, and opportunities. Europe, on the other hand, seems less a driver of outcomes than a reflection of Western fatigue—economically significant, politically hesitant, and strategically unprepared for a world where American leadership has become both less dependable and more disruptive.

The deeper significance of this moment lies specifically here. The crisis isn’t just about Iran, or even about the immediate future of the Middle East. It’s about how power is exercised in an era when the liberal language of rules, institutions, and multilateral restraint persists but increasingly lacks the material cohesion or political authority that once sustained it. Strategic compartmentalization has become the preferred way to manage disorder: adversaries are securitized and targeted, partners are reassured and selectively brought in, and broader civilizational escalation is contained rather than solved. This might bring temporary stability, but it does so by reinforcing a new international logic—one characterized by differentiated legitimacy, asymmetrical coercion, and declining normative consistency. The real lesson of the Iran war, then, isn’t just that energy geopolitics has returned, but that it now functions within a more severe and openly hierarchical struggle over who will shape the regional and global order to come.


 

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Professor Peter W. Klein.

Prof. Klein: Political Transformation in Iran May Come, but Not in the Way the West Expects

Professor Peter W. Klein offers a historically grounded warning against simplistic regime-change narratives in Iran. In this ECPS interview, the Emmy Award–winning investigative journalist and University of British Columbia professor argues that political transformation in Iran may occur, but not in ways the West expects. Drawing on cases such as Hungary in 1956, the Bay of Pigs, Iraq, and Afghanistan, Professor Klein shows how external encouragement of uprising without sustained commitment can produce abandonment, repression, and long-term instability. He stresses that Iran’s history with the United States, the entrenched role of the IRGC, and the country’s internal complexity make any externally driven transition deeply uncertain. At the same time, he warns that escalation could trigger wider regional blowback, making caution, historical memory, and strategic realism indispensable.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Peter W. Klein, an Emmy Award–winning investigative journalist, documentary filmmaker, and full professor at the School of Journalism, Writing, and Media at the University of British Columbia, offers a historically grounded and sobering assessment of regime change narratives surrounding Iran. Drawing on decades of reporting from conflict zones and his scholarship on media, power, and political transformation, Professor Klein cautions against simplistic assumptions that authoritarian systems collapse once a single leader is removed. As he puts it bluntly, the notion that eliminating one figure will transform an entire political order is deeply misguided: “Removing one leader—whether it is Khamenei or Maduro—is enough… [that] everything else will somehow fall into place. But Venezuela is not Iran.”

Professor Klein situates the current debate about Iran within a longer historical pattern in US foreign policy: Rhetorical encouragement of uprisings without sustained commitment. Reflecting on historical precedents—from the 1956 Hungarian Revolution to the Bay of Pigs invasion and the 1991 Shiite uprising in Iraq—he identifies a recurring cycle in which external actors implicitly encourage rebellion but fail to provide protection once uprisings occur. Recalling the Hungarian case, he notes that revolutionary hopes were fueled by signals from the West, yet “when the revolution happened… there was no cover.” The consequences were devastating: The uprising was crushed, and reformist leader Imre Nagy was ultimately executed. These experiences, Professor Klein argues, highlight the moral and strategic dilemmas that arise when “the words don’t match the actions.”

This historical lens also informs Professor Klein’s skepticism toward contemporary discussions of regime change in Iran. While acknowledging that dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime is real, he emphasizes the structural and historical constraints shaping political change. Iranian public attitudes toward foreign intervention remain deeply influenced by historical memory—especially the 1953 CIA-backed coup, which continues to generate suspicion toward US rhetoric about liberation and democracy. Even where domestic frustration exists, external calls for uprising may produce the opposite effect. As Professor Klein explains, “many Iranians may resist calls for regime change if those calls come directly from the United States.”

Beyond historical memory, Professor Klein underscores the institutional resilience of the Iranian state, particularly the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Far from being an isolated security apparatus, the IRGC is deeply embedded in Iran’s political economy and social fabric. Its integration across military, economic, and political spheres makes the idea of a rapid grassroots overthrow highly improbable. In such contexts, he warns, expectations of swift democratic transition often ignore the realities of authoritarian resilience.

Professor Klein also highlights the dangers of escalation in the broader Middle East. With conflicts already unfolding across Gaza, Lebanon, and other regional arenas, miscalculation could transform localized confrontation into a wider regional war. The stakes, he warns, are immense: “The blowback from a regional conflict would be enormous… the cost of that may simply be too high.”

Ultimately, Professor Klein cautions against confident predictions about Iran’s political future. Transformation may indeed occur, but its direction remains uncertain and may not align with Western expectations. “There may be change,”he concludes, “but it may not be the kind of change that many people in the West would want.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Peter W. Klein, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

The Perils of Promising Liberation Without Commitment

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

Professor Peter Klein, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article published by the New York Times, you invoke historical precedents—from Hungary (1956) and the Bay of Pigs (1961) to the Shiite uprising in Iraq (1991)—to illustrate the dangers of encouraging rebellion without sustained commitment. In your view, what structural patterns recur across these cases that contemporary policymakers still fail to internalize?

Professor Peter W. Klein: When I saw President Trump making more than one plea to the people of Iran, saying this is your opportunity to revolt and overthrow the regime, there wasn’t—at least as far as I could see—an explicit promise of cover and protection, but it was certainly implicit. And it just resonated for me, which is what led me to write that essay in the Times. It resonated on many levels.

Having been raised by Hungarian refugees, I knew what happened in 1956. I didn’t live through it the way my brother did, but I heard many stories—about listening to Radio Free Europe and the encouragement of revolution, and then what happened when the revolution actually occurred. There was no cover. Of course, you understand the political context. It was the height of the Cold War; the two nuclear superpowers were confronting each other. What followed 1956 was a series of conflicts—both hot and cold—between the United States and the USSR.

But the implication at the time was that if you took to the streets and took over your country, you would be protected. That obviously did not happen. Imre Nagy came in, tried to establish a new government, and the effort was crushed. Ultimately, he was executed.

It also resonated for me because of reporting I had done in Iraq. I was there shortly after the fall of Saddam Hussein and had been sent to report specifically on the Shia population. In 2003, I think for many American audiences the distinctions between Shias and Sunnis, the Baathist system, the subjugation of the majority population, and the complexities of the relationship with Iran were not widely understood.

I went there with my colleague Bob Simon and producer Tricia Doyle for CBS 60 Minutes. We were trying to find the right way to tell the story. We spoke with a number of people. At one point we interviewed the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, who had come to Iraq and was saying that it was good America was there. But many people in the Shia community told us he did not have much credibility. They suggested that if we really wanted to understand the mood on the street, we should go on a Friday night to the Imam Ali Mosque in the holy city of Najaf and meet a young cleric named Muqtada al-Sadr.

We met with Sadr, and he was very clear. He said, “Saddam was a small serpent; the United States is the big serpent. You should leave. We don’t want you here.” And this view was rooted in history—specifically the events of the first Gulf War in the early 1990s, when George H. W. Bush had made a very similar appeal to the Shia population, encouraging them to rise up against Saddam. The message was essentially: this is your opportunity to take over your country. And the Shia did revolt.

But they were crushed—brutally crushed. And the Americans essentially watched. They were observing from aircraft as kerosene was poured on people and they were set on fire. It was horrific violence carried out by Saddam’s forces. The pattern of abandonment and betrayal echoed again and again.

I also grew up in Miami among Cuban exiles, so I was familiar with the history of the Bay of Pigs as well. It’s a pattern that we have seen repeatedly. And that is why I thought the historical resonance was worth highlighting.

Why Removing One Leader Rarely Transforms a State

You suggest that rhetorical support for uprisings can become morally problematic when it is not matched by material backing. From an ethical and strategic standpoint, where should the line be drawn between normative support for democratic movements and irresponsible geopolitical signaling?

Professor Peter W. Klein: Powerful countries are always going to try to shape the world and manipulate it to their needs. That is realpolitik. The challenge is that sometimes the words don’t match the actions.

As we have seen in the examples I noted—and many others—I don’t think the intention was necessarily absent. When Eisenhower sent messages to Hungarians suggesting that they should stand up to the Soviet empire and implying that the United States would have their back, I don’t think Eisenhower had ill intentions. He was expressing rhetoric aligned with American policy. But it’s a little like the dog that catches the car: once the revolution actually begins, the question becomes, what are we going to do now? The reality sets in. Are we really prepared to confront another nuclear power?

The same question applies to Iran. If the Iranian people actually listened and launched a full-scale revolution in their country, it is hard to imagine what exactly would happen. Would the United States really intervene, especially after all the rhetoric that this administration is not about regime change and that regime change is not its intention? In this case, it becomes particularly relevant and important to discuss, because the Trump administration has been quite clear from the beginning that regime change is not its philosophy and that it is highly critical of that approach.

Trump has also pointed to what he considers the example of Maduro—removing a bad actor or despotic leader while leaving the broader infrastructure intact. The idea seems to be that if you remove one person, things will somehow fall back into place. But we have seen the opposite in cases like Iraq. When Saddam was removed and deep de-Baathification dismantled the entire governing infrastructure, the country effectively collapsed.

I was in Iraq recently reporting on corruption there. Corruption is so rampant that people often say something striking: Under Saddam there was one corrupt person you had to pay off, but now there are hundreds—hundreds of hands, hundreds of Saddams. People say they don’t even know how to function in the system anymore. You see half-built buildings everywhere, and the oil infrastructure is a mess. The state simply never rebuilt a functioning system to replace what had been dismantled.

Nation-building is extremely difficult to do from the outside. It’s a bit like building a ship inside a bottle—you are trying to assemble something complex from outside the structure rather than letting it develop organically.

Trump has been advancing this idea that removing one leader—whether it is Khamenei or Maduro—is enough, that eliminating one figure will somehow allow everything else to fall into place. But Venezuela is not Iran. The United States can exert influence in places like Venezuela because of economic and political ties. Iran is probably one of the least likely places where the United States can simply step in and impose that kind of outcome, regardless of removing one leader. So, the philosophy itself seems flawed.

Billboard depicting Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei and Imam Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini on a building wall in Tehran, Iran, April 2018. The portraits honor the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini (Supreme Leader 1979–1989), and his successor Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader 1989–2026), whose images frequently appear in public spaces as symbols of the regime’s ideological authority. Photo: Dreamstime.

Why Regime Change in Iran Is Unlikely to Be Imposed from Outside

Your analysis implies that regime change is rarely a spontaneous outcome of external pressure alone. Based on your research into Iran and past US interventions, what conditions would realistically be required for a regime transition in Iran to succeed without producing state collapse?

Professor Peter W. Klein: I’m not an expert on Iran by any means. I’ve reported on Iran, and I have many friends who are Iranian, including Iranian scholars. So, this is very much a cursory view, and if you have audience members with PhDs in political science, my apologies for simplifying this. But my sense is that the grassroots movement of frustration in Iran is, in many ways, more complex than—I’ll compare it to the Hungarian case, which I know better because I grew up among Hungarians, lived in Hungary, and worked there as a reporter.

In Hungary, in 1956, there was genuine frustration with the centralized system and with many of the issues affecting the country. So, when the United States came in and suggested that Hungarians should move in a certain direction, there wasn’t much resistance to that idea. In fact, there was quite a bit of enthusiasm—people felt it was great that America was encouraging them. The United States was also very effective in its propaganda, presenting itself as a place where the streets were paved with gold.

My father believed much of that. When he came to America, he genuinely thought the streets were paved with gold because that was the image people had been given. But he ultimately became a very patriotic American because much of that promise proved true. He was able to buy a house and build a life in ways that would not have been possible for him in Hungary.

In Iran, however, the situation is far more complicated. There is the historical relationship with the United States—going back to the era of the Shah—as well as US support for Israel and the broader conflict between Iran and Israel. So even if many people are frustrated with the regime, and surveys suggest there is widespread dissatisfaction, the United States is not necessarily the actor they want telling them what to do.

It’s a bit like when I tell my kids to do something. Even if it’s a good idea, they might resist simply because it came from me. In the same way, many Iranians may resist calls for regime change if those calls come directly from the United States.

So, it is a very complicated scenario. As you suggested, regime change generally does not come from outside. It can happen if you bomb a country to smithereens, as happened in Iraq, and remove its leader. By definition, that produces regime change. But it is extremely messy regime change—often unsustainable—and it can take decades to rebuild a functioning state afterward.

The IRGC’s Embedded Power and the Limits of Regime Destabilization

You highlight the enduring memory of the 1953 CIA-backed coup in Iran as a source of skepticism toward American intentions. To what extent does this historical legacy still shape Iranian public attitudes toward US rhetoric about liberation and democracy?

Professor Peter W. Klein: It is definitely one of those sore points that continues to linger. So, the idea of the United States coming in and lecturing Iran—after having, in some cases, helped create some of the conditions that contributed to the problems they face today, and given the history of US involvement there—carries a lot of weight. This is not some theoretical issue involving something that happened in Argentina or some distant place. It happened in their own country. So, there is a great deal of sensitivity around it, at least from what I can tell from talking to Iranians. It is clear that there are real sensitivities surrounding that history.

You emphasize the institutional strength of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a central obstacle to regime change. How does the IRGC’s political–economic role within Iran complicate external attempts to destabilize the regime?

Professor Peter W. Klein: That’s a tough and a very good question. I think it’s one that people much smarter than me can answer much better than I can. I spent a lot of time dealing with the Rafsanjani regime years ago in Iran, and I got a glimpse of the complexities and the connections between the business elites and the IRGC. Not just the oil industry—although, obviously, the oil industry is huge. There are so many ties there, and of course there is a lot of corruption. So, this is not a stand-alone militia that is independent of the fabric of the country. While there is a lot of frustration with and fear of the IRGC, they are also integrated in many ways. And they are huge—they are powerful. This is not some small force.

Going back to my Hungary example, it required Soviet tanks and Russian soldiers to come in and crush that rebellion. In Iran, however, this is internal. It is an internal security force that is large, powerful, and integrated into many aspects of the economy and society. So again, it makes it very difficult to imagine a grassroots revolution simply changing that regime.

Escalation Risks: How a Localized Strike Could Ignite a Regional War

Iran-US war.
Photo: Pavel Kusmartsev / Dreamstime.

The current escalation involving US and Israeli strikes against Iranian targets intersects with ongoing conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and the broader regional confrontation with Hezbollah. How do you assess the risk that the Iranian theater could evolve into a multi-front regional war?

Professor Peter W. Klein:, That’s the fear that so many people have: where does this go? You think back on how regional or even world wars start—they start small. They begin with some small activity that somehow gets out of control.

I do think that one of the concerns I have is the lack of clear messaging, particularly from the United States. I think Israel’s messaging is quite clear, and their agenda has always been very clear on Iran. The more challenging thing is that the United States’ messaging is very unclear, and part of that may be that Donald Trump and the people around him haven’t aligned their messaging, and Trump himself has been inconsistent in what he has said. In politics and war, messaging is so important. If you are not sending a clear message about what the intention is and where things are going, everyone becomes uneasy. It makes everyone in that region a little bit trigger-happy or gun-shy, depending on which direction they are going in, and it creates the potential for a powder-keg situation.

I’m still hopeful that cooler heads will prevail and that this situation will be quieted down, because I do think that whether some people consciously—or perhaps subconsciously—appreciate it, there is a lot at stake here. This is not, going back to the Venezuela example, one economically powerful country that is somewhat isolated regionally. The implications of what happened in Venezuela carried very little chance of turning into a regional conflict.

Here, however, there is a huge chance of it. So, I’m hoping that the people who are in charge—even including the Israelis—realize that the blowback from a regional conflict would be enormous and that this situation has to be quieted down. As much as there may be aspirations of regime change, the cost of that may simply be too high.

Proxy Networks and the Uncertain Reach of Iran’s Deterrence Strategy

Iran’s strategic influence across the region is often exercised through proxy actors such as Hezbollah, Iraqi militias, and Palestinian groups. In your assessment, how central are these networks to Iran’s deterrence strategy, and how might they respond to intensified military pressure?

Professor Peter W. Klein: That dynamic has been around for a long time. So, I don’t know how much Hezbollah or other proxies factor into this particular conflict. I do know that there are heightened concerns. There are heightened concerns in New York City, and there are heightened concerns elsewhere that the actions being taken in Iran could have broader reverberations. I know people who live in Israel, near the border of the West Bank, and there is genuine concern that there may be activities coming from the West Bank similar to October 7.

Do I think that’s going to happen? Probably not. But I don’t live there, and that’s not my world. The fact that people are genuinely concerned about it is telling. There is a sense that it could have implications and blowback in specific areas and communities. But I don’t know how significant that is on the larger scale when it comes to this war.

Talk Is Cheap: The Political Incentives Behind Rhetoric of Liberation

Your article critically examines the recurring rhetoric of liberation and democratic uprising in US foreign policy. Why does this narrative persist despite repeated historical failures, and what political incentives sustain it?

Professor Peter W. Klein: It comes down to the fact that talk is cheap. Whether it’s telling your partner, your kids, your colleagues, or the people of another country, this is what I want to do, this is what the intention is. If you don’t follow through, you lose credibility. But there can still be a short-term gain from saying you should revolt, or we have your back, or we’re going to protect you.

And it’s also a little bit like one of the challenges of politics. Because if Eisenhower did it, or Kennedy did it, or George H.W. Bush did it, that was a long time ago. People ask, what does that have to do with today? What does that have to do with my administration? So, the sins of the country from the past are often forgotten.

They are also sometimes forgotten by the people who are being encouraged to revolt. The Iranians could have learned lessons from the Cubans and the Hungarians, but they didn’t necessarily look at those historical precedents. Instead, they might think: Great, we’ll just revolt—the United States says it has our backs.

But again, talk is cheap. It’s easy to gain short-term political advantage from it and perhaps even hope that the moment never actually arrives. You can present yourself as a powerful leader who believes in freedom, liberty, and democracy—an American apple-pie version of leadership that projects a positive image.

And then the options are: Nothing happens, and you get credit for your rhetoric without having to act; or something happens and you don’t follow through, in which case you pay the short-term political cost; or, in the rare case, you actually back them up.

Militias, Fear, and Control: The Architecture of Authoritarian Survival

Platoon of Iranian army soldiers carrying the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the international military competition ARMY-2018 in Pesochnoye, Kostroma Region, Russia, June 2018. Photo: Dreamstime.

You argue that authoritarian regimes rarely collapse easily and often respond to threats with intensified repression. In the Iranian context, what mechanisms of authoritarian resilience make the system particularly difficult to destabilize?

Professor Peter W. Klein: This is where the Revolutionary Guard has an advantage. In many of these authoritarian regimes, they are able to maintain their control for a variety of reasons, including ruling with an iron fist.

I’ll give you just a quick sidebar example that I found interesting. Under Saddam, I think it was his nephew who ran the militia there, and he knew that they needed to put considerable effort, money, time, resources, and human power into building a militia—a state militia that could crush rebellions, especially after there had already been a Shia rebellion. So even the fear of that could be enough. People walking around with guns can be enough—you don’t have to shoot people; the threat alone is often sufficient.

What I found particularly interesting was a videotape I obtained after the fall of Saddam. I got it from the palace in Baghdad, in the Green Zone. I had received a number of videotapes that I started going through, and one of them was the strangest thing. It showed Saddam Hussein shortly before the 2003 invasion, sitting with a group of his ministers. They were examining what looked like toys—things like tacks, slingshots, and Molotov cocktails, essentially very low-level weapons.

So, I sat down with a translator and a couple of other people to understand what the conversation was about and what was going on. No one had seen this footage before. I eventually included it in a documentary that aired on the History Channel, and the New York Times did a big story about it. The Daily Show even did a spoof on it.

But what was interesting—the real insight—was that Saddam was essentially telling the people around him that the Americans might invade in 2003 and that there could be another Shia revolt. He said they needed to get the people on their side, but they didn’t want the population to be armed well enough to challenge the regime. So, the idea was to provide low-level weaponry—Molotov cocktails and slingshots—that civilians could use against other civilians, but that would not be powerful enough to challenge Saddam’s forces.

It was somewhat comical. There is a reason The Daily Show used a clip of it, because it was surreal to see Saddam Hussein, this powerful dictator, discussing what looked like toys. But the conversation itself was very serious. The logic was that the regime’s militia could crush civilians armed with low-level weapons, while loyalist civilians—Baathists—could be mobilized to confront and suppress the Shia. And it really gave some insight, at least for me, into how authoritarian regimes think about structuring military power in order to control the public.

The Devil We Know: The Uncertain Consequences of Regime Collapse

You warn that even a successful uprising could produce internal fragmentation or civil conflict. Looking at cases such as Iraq after 2003 or Afghanistan after 1989, what lessons should policymakers draw about the dangers of post-regime power vacuums?

Professor Peter W. Klein: What we keep doing is going into places that are diverse and complex without fully understanding that diversity and complexity. In Iran, I couldn’t even begin to list all the groups—whether it’s the Baluch or others. There are so many different factions within Iran, and you can easily imagine significant factional violence or strife if the whole country were to collapse.

You saw this in Iraq, and Iraq was, frankly, a much simpler place than Iran. You basically had Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds. There were also Turkmen and a couple of other groups, but you still saw huge strife among these different communities. So, this reflects the argument that sometimes it is the devil we know rather than the devil we don’t know. You might have a strongman who runs a country and keeps some of those factions at bay, and at least you know how to deal with that one leader.

Once things break into factional violence, as we saw in Afghanistan, it becomes extremely difficult to control. This is why every world power ends up struggling in Afghanistan, because it’s like trying to fight a marshmallow—you can’t really knock it out. There are so many different factions, and the enemy becomes very undefined. It has been an endless challenge, whether for the Soviets, the Americans, or others.

I’m not saying that Iran is Afghanistan. Iran is obviously a much more organized and economically developed country in most respects. In some ways, that makes the target clearer. But it is still complicated, and if you got rid of the Revolutionary Guard, I honestly don’t know what would happen in that country.

The Fragmented Media Landscape and the Crisis of Trust

London Newspaper stand refects the diverse range of newspapers and languages of modern London. Photo: Dreamstime.

As an investigative journalist and documentary filmmaker, how do you see the role of media narratives and digital information flows shaping global perceptions of the Iran conflict and the legitimacy of calls for regime change?

Professor Peter W. Klein: We have a huge responsibility. Consistently some journalists rise to the occasion and do an amazing job, while many journalists don’t. I mean, it was interesting with Venezuela. All of these journalists who couldn’t find Venezuela on a map before suddenly became experts on Venezuela, and that’s just the reality that many journalists are thrown into: You have to quickly figure out and understand a place that you may never have covered before.

I appreciate the challenge that journalists face. As a journalism professor, it’s something we often talk about—the responsibility, not just the basic ethics, but also the implications of what we do. Journalism has become so bifurcated and complicated. It’s not only that newspaper or that newscast anymore. There’s social media, there are bloggers. Some of the most influential people in media are coming from very non-traditional places, whether it’s Joe Rogan with a podcast or late-night comedians who essentially have journalists on their staff digging in and pushing particular perspectives.

So, it has become even more complicated than just the New York Times, Washington Post, or Guardian reporters shaping the narrative. And the other challenge is that you may try to do a really good job, but obviously we don’t have control over the entire media landscape. There are always going to be people who are either getting stories wrong or pushing false narratives, misinformation, or misguided agendas. And I hear it all the time from the public. Just from talking to people at conferences and presentations I do, people are frustrated and confused. Where should I be getting my news? Who can I trust? Who shouldn’t I trust?

And there isn’t a great solution. One of the solutions we often suggest in the academic world is transparency—being transparent about your positionality and transparent about your political affiliations. There is some real value to that. But then all that means is that we end up having an echo chamber, where people go only to others who share the same political views and values they have, and they’re not exposed to opposing opinions.

So, there really isn’t a great solution, unfortunately. But I think just being aware matters. Your question itself has value, because having these open conversations can have some real, real positive impacts.

Change May Come—But Not in the Way the West Expects

And lastly, Professor Klein, looking beyond the immediate crisis, what scenarios do you see as most plausible for the next decade of Iranian politics—gradual reform, intensified authoritarian consolidation, externally triggered conflict, or eventual systemic transformation?

Professor Peter W. Klein: I’m suspicious of anyone who makes predictions, and I will confess that I am a terrible predictor. I thought Barack Obama would never become president, so I’m not a good person to ask. But I can tell you what my hope is. I hope that gradual transformation happens. I do think there are some very serious problems in Iran that need to be addressed, both internally and externally.

Maybe history will show that this particular attack opened the door for change. But the opposite can happen as well—it could move in the opposite direction. So, there may be change, but it may not be the kind of change that many people in the West would want. There could be a doubling down on the nuclear program, proxy wars, and similar policies.

I personally don’t think there is going to be a huge regional conflict. I don’t think this will open the door to World War III. But it is impossible to know for certain, which is why we really need to be very careful. Policymakers certainly need to be cautious, and in academia and journalism we also need to be careful both in making predictions and in explaining and analyzing the situation, because it is so complicated that most people don’t fully understand it, including myself.

Oil Tanker

Energy Geopolitics from Hormuz to Lagos: Commodity Shocks and African Vulnerability

In this analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how geopolitical tensions around the strategic oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz transmit economic shocks across the global political economy and disproportionately affect African states. Because many African economies remain highly dependent on commodity exports and imported energy, oil price volatility quickly translates into inflation, fiscal stress, and social pressure. Even oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria face paradoxical effects, benefiting from higher crude revenues while simultaneously suffering from rising domestic fuel costs. These inflationary pressures can fuel economic discontent, weaken government legitimacy, and create fertile ground for populist mobilization. Dr. Solaja argues that recurrent commodity shocks expose deep structural vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for economic diversification, energy transition, and stronger regional integration to build resilience.

By Oludele Solaja*

Geopolitical conflicts rarely stay within their battlefield boundaries. In a world with integrated economy, war in strategic energy corridor would swiftly lead to inflation, political instability and governmental pressures far from conflict. Geopolitical tensions in the strategic energy corridor are central to the functioning of the global political economy. The Strait of Hormuz holds a peculiar important position in the transit routes among all. Some one fifth of the global petroleum liquids passes through the narrow maritime passage in between Iran and Arabian Peninsula (US Energy Information Administration, 2023), hence the perception of armed conflict even if it’s just the rumor of one in the area would lead to an immediate volatility shock in the global oil market.

Not just the physical supply disruptions but the uncertainty itself would create price volatility. Higher cost of insuring the vessels, shifting of the routes and market responses all contribute to the volatility as well. Scholars of energy politics have always acknowledged that oil markets are intrinsically connected with national security and strategic rivalry (Bridge & Le Billon, 2017). As such, conflict occurring in energy producing areas could have economic impact across nations without any boundaries.

The effects on the developing nations would be even worse. World Bank warns that such shocks from the Middle Eastern energy supply chains could push the oil prices beyond $100/barrel, creating inflation pressure and fiscal burden upon developing nations. In an integrated global economy, a geopolitical shock will be transmitted across the commodity supply chain. Energy supply, food production, transportation network and capital flow are all interconnected.

Inflation Transmission and African Political Economy

When energy prices shock happens in African countries, typically there are two related effects: windfall profit to oil exporters, and inflationary pressure to domestic markets.

On one hand, oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria could profit from rising crude oil prices through high export revenues and balance of payments surplus. In theory, windfalls can stabilize fiscal conditions and support increase development expenditure. Nevertheless, political economy literature argues that commodity windfalls often reproduce and strengthen existing vulnerabilities of the economies, which fail to transform into sustainable development instead of generating rent-seeking behavior without firm institutions and diversified economies (Auty, 2001; Ross, 2012).

On the other hand, rising global oil prices will transmit inflation through the domestic economies. Transportation costs rise with higher fuel prices, pushing the price up of goods including foods, which need logistics and transportation, as well as costs for manufactured goods and fertilizers for farming. Electricity costs are also higher and so forth.

In Nigeria, this paradox is crystal clear. Despite being one of Africa’s biggest exporters of crude oil, Nigeria needs to import its supply of refined petroleum products as its own refining capacity is insufficient. This creates two divergent effects at the same time: Nigeria has to pay high fuel import costs from imported refined oil, while export revenue is expected to rise with higher crude prices. Informal sector workers who are in the vast majority in Nigerian labor market would experience increasing cost of living.

The consequences for oil-importing African countries are even harsher. Rising costs of fuel import not only leads to greater trade deficit and depreciation of national currency but also increase countries’ exposure to sovereign debt distress.

Commodity Shocks and Politics of Economic Discontent

The macroeconomic impact beyond energy sector can reshape the domestic political landscape by raising costs of living especially in the vulnerable societies. Political scientists have noted that a sudden increase in living costs can cause popular unrest, weaken government legitimacy, and contribute to the emergence of populism (Rodrik, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

In this case, a global economic shock would have translated into domestic political pressure. When confronting with inflation pressures, African governments often are compelled to subsidize the consumption of oil or enforce price caps, which have proven to undermine fiscal positions and postpone necessary structural adjustments. Repeated commodity shocks in institutionally weak economies can reproduce the same vicious cycles of economic discontent and political instability.

Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors therefore do more than creating turbulence for economies. They challenge domestic political legitimacy by accentuating conflicts between different strata of society about inflation, social welfare, and commodity distribution.

Structural Vulnerability in Commodity-dependent Economies

All of the aforementioned highlights the inherent structural vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent economic systems. Dependency theorists have consistently asserted that countries that depend on exports of primary commodities are exposed to volatility in international commodity markets (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1976). Moreover, the “resource curse” debate emphasizes rent seeking, volatility, and limited industrial development in extracting economies (Ross, 2012).

Energy geopolitical shock can only intensify this vulnerability. Shipping disruptions or higher freight costs resulting from higher insurance fees due to conflict at Persian Gulf can be re-routed around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, further intensifying the costs borne by all importing nations, especially those relying on food imports, manufactured goods and agricultural inputs. In such cases, the impacts of wars fought at energy corridors are redistributed across the commodity markets that link the Strait of Hormuz to consumers across a faraway land.

Policy Implications: Building Resilience

Mitigating vulnerability of geopolitical commodity shocks requires a long-term perspective beyond ad hoc management strategies. The first thing for African countries is to speed up economic diversification (industrialization and value adding in agriculture), because it will lead to sustainable development not only by reducing dependence on the exports of oil. Secondly, investment in infrastructure and on renewable energies will lead to energy sustainability in African countries and reduces the reliance on imported refined goods. Third, strengthen the social safety net (cash transfers, food security program, etc.) can shield the poorest households from inflationary shocks. Fourth, expand intra-African trade using the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make the region reduce dependence on unstable international commodity market.

Conclusion

Volatility in strategic energy corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz is a manifestation of geopolitical tensions’ spread across the global political economy. For Africa’s commodity-dependent economies, it amplifies the persistent structural vulnerabilities that are embedded in extraction-based development strategies. Short term export gains associated with rising prices rarely outweigh the subsequent inflationary pressures and fiscal instability in the longer run. Unless these development strategies are actively reformed to emphasize diversification, energy transition and resilience, each commodity shock following every conflict will result in the similar outcomes: temporary windfall gains followed by inflation-induced hardship and fragile development. Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors, hence, are not just regional security issues; they are fundamentally tests of structural resilience in the development agenda of the Global South.


(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.


 

References

Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Monthly Review Press.

Auty, R. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press.

Bridge, G., & Le Billon, P. (2017). Oil. Polity Press.

Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.

Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press.

Rodrik, D. (2018). “Populism and the economics of globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33.

Ross, M. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023). World oil transit chokepointshttps://www.eia.gov

World Bank. (2023). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.

Dr. Soheila Shahriari

Dr. Shahriari: Without Western Recognition, Rojava Lacks Leverage to Secure a Lasting Power-Sharing Deal with Damascus

In this ECPS interview, Dr. Soheila Shahriari offers a theoretically grounded diagnosis of Rojava’s most precarious post-ISIS moment. She argues that the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria should be understood not as a wartime improvisation, but as a long-evolving counter-hegemonic project rooted in democratic confederalism, gender equality, pluralism, and social ecology. Yet Dr. Shahriari underscores a stark geopolitical constraint: without formal recognition and enforceable guarantees from Western actors—especially the EU and the United States—Rojava lacks the diplomatic leverage to secure a durable decentralized settlement with Damascus. The interview explores how instrumental Western engagement, Turkey’s securitization paradigm, and Syria’s recentralization drive converge to endanger non-state democratic experiments. It also examines diaspora mobilization, the global resonance of Kurdish women’s politics, and the fragile future of local partnerships in conflict zones.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Soheila Shahriari from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in France offers a wide-ranging and theoretically grounded assessment of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (Rojava) at a moment of profound uncertainty. As shifting regional alignments, great-power bargaining, and Syrian state consolidation converge to narrow the space for Kurdish self-rule, Dr. Shahriari situates Rojava not merely as a wartime anomaly but as a counter-hegemonic democratic experiment struggling to survive in an international system dominated by state sovereignty, realpolitik, and authoritarian resurgence. The interview is organized around a central warning captured in the headline: Without formal recognition and protection from Western actors, Rojava lacks the diplomatic leverage necessary to secure a durable decentralized settlement with Damascus.

Dr. Shahriari argues that the current crisis stems less from military weakness than from structural diplomatic isolation. Despite their decisive role in defeating ISIS alongside the United States, Kurdish-led forces failed to convert battlefield legitimacy into institutional guarantees. The January ceasefire and negotiations over integration into Syrian state structures illustrate the narrowing options available to the Autonomous Administration under pressure from Damascus, Ankara, and shifting US priorities. In this context, Dr. Shahriari emphasizes that external recognition is not symbolic but constitutive of survival: without enforceable guarantees from actors such as the European Union and the United States, any decentralization arrangement risks becoming a temporary tactical compromise rather than a stable power-sharing order.

At the same time, the interview highlights the distinctive ideological and institutional character of the Rojava project. Dr. Shahriari describes it as an anti-statist political paradigm rooted in democratic confederalism, gender equality, pluralism, and ecological principles—an alternative model of governance emerging amid global democratic recession and Middle Eastern authoritarian consolidation. The conversation also explores how women-led institutions function as a “symbolic infrastructure” of resilience, how diaspora activism and transnational networks have reshaped Kurdish political imaginaries, and how the global visibility of Kurdish women fighters transformed international legitimacy. Yet these achievements, she notes, have not translated into formal diplomatic recognition, leaving the experiment vulnerable to geopolitical bargaining among states.

The interview also examines the structural limits of liberal internationalism and the instrumental nature of Western engagement with non-state democratic actors. Dr. Shahriari contends that Western powers’ prioritization of strategic alliances—particularly with Turkey—over normative commitments has undermined both Rojava’s prospects and the credibility of democratic rhetoric. Consequently, the future of Kurdish self-administration depends not only on negotiations with Damascus but on whether Western governments are willing to move from tactical cooperation to institutional protection.

Ultimately, Dr. Shahriari frames Rojava’s predicament as emblematic of a broader tension in contemporary world politics: the clash between innovative democratic experiments and an international order still organized around sovereign states and security competition. Whether Rojava becomes a model of negotiated decentralization or a casualty of regional power politics, she concludes, will depend on the availability of credible external guarantees—without which even the most resilient non-state democracy faces structural vulnerability.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Dr. Soheila Shahriari, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Rojava Should Be Read as a Post-National Political Project, not a Wartime Anomaly

Kurdish demonstrators protest Turkey and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s military operation in northern Syria, expressing support for Rojava and the YPG in Prague, Czech Republic on October 17, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Soheila Shahriari, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Your research frames Rojava as a counter-hegemonic democratic experiment emerging amid global democratic recession and Middle Eastern authoritarian consolidation. To what extent should Rojava be understood as a transformative model of post-nation-state governance versus a context-specific survival mechanism born of state collapse, particularly in a regional environment shaped by authoritarian resilience and populist Islamism and nationalism?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Thank you for having me. This is a very interesting question. I think reducing Rojava to a context-specific survival mechanism born of state collapse is analytically insufficient. While the collapse of state authority during the Syrian Civil War created the structural opening for Rojava’s institutional experiment, this was, to use Michel Foucault’s terms, a condition of possibility rather than the cause of Rojava’s emergence. These are two distinct things. Many argue that a power vacuum in Syria, combined with the withdrawal of Bashar al-Assad’s forces, explains Rojava’s emergence. But this was merely a facilitating condition, not the primary cause, and it is a somewhat simplistic way of understanding the issue.

Rojava can be described as post-national in some respects, but it differs from structures such as the European Union due to its distinct sociopolitical development and historical contingencies. It is better understood as an anti-state progressive political project grounded in women’s rights, pluralism, and ecological principles, operating within a hostile and authoritarian Middle Eastern environment.

It represents the institutionalization of a political paradigm that evolved over decades within the Kurdish movement, particularly through the theoretical trajectories associated with Abdullah Öcalan. The shift from Marxist-Leninist national liberation to democratic confederalism reflects a deep epistemological transformation—a move away from state sovereignty toward decentralized, council-based, multiethnic self-governance. Its pillars—radical democracy, women’s liberation, pluralism, and social ecology—are therefore not improvised wartime adaptations, but the product of sustained ideological development.

Rojava Transformed the Kurdish Imaginary from Ethno-Nationalism to Gender-Equal Pluralism

In your dissertation, you analyze how the Rojava revolution reshaped the Kurdish national imaginary in the diaspora, particularly through gender equality and pluralism. How has this transnational reconfiguration fed back into political mobilization within Kurdish regions themselves?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: When we are talking about the Kurdish diaspora, we have to move beyond the conventional understanding of diaspora because of the particular situation of Kurdistan. Kurdistan has a very distinct dynamism in terms of its diaspora community, marked by intensely reciprocal political, cultural, and social engagement and ties between different parts of Kurdistan and the West. Political developments in one area feed directly and immediately into others. They are highly interconnected, forming a transnational political space shaped by the unique circumstances of the Kurdish question.

So, the Rojava Revolution has fundamentally reshaped the Kurdish national imaginary in my research, shifting it from a traditional nationalist framework toward a radically gender-equal and pluralistic new system of being. This transformation affects Kurds as a whole, not just in the diaspora or in the West. Evidence for this claim includes the women-led uprising in Kurdistan, inspired very directly by the slogan “Woman, Life, Freedom” (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi), which was the very first slogan of Rojava’s gender revolution.

This is one clear example of how developments in Rojava have fed back into Kurdistan itself. The influence from Rojava toward diaspora communities in the West, and the domino effect of Rojava across the Middle East, was visible in the women-led uprising in Rojhelat, or Iranian Kurdistan. It also elevated Kurdish actors as agents of democratization across the region, not just in Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) but more broadly in the Middle East. Politically, this influence is visible in coalition-building and pluralistic alliances.

By coalition-building, I mean Rojava’s alliances with democratic forces—Arabs, Assyrians, Chaldeans, and other minorities—which have inspired Kurdish actors, especially in Iranian Kurdistan, to build coalitions with other national minorities across Iran against authoritarian central regimes. These are two telling examples of Rojava’s domino effect in the Middle East, especially in Iran: the women-led uprising in Iranian Kurdistan in 2022 and coalition-building with other national minority forces inside Iran, inspired by the same experience.

Women-Led Governance Is the Backbone of Rojava

Kurdish demonstrators
Protest by Kurdish demonstrators following attacks on Rojava in northern Syria, Trier, Germany, January 24, 2026.

You argue that women-led governance structures in Rojava function as a “symbolic infrastructure” of democratic resilience. How sustainable is this feminist institutional architecture under conditions of militarization, economic blockade, diplomatic isolation, and the surrounding pressures of authoritarian and autocratic regimes?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: First of all, the sustainability and mobility of Rojava’s feminist institutional architecture rests on its own radical resilience. Women-led governance structures, as you mentioned, are not merely symbolic but constitute foundational pillars of the political project. This is evident in the practical effectiveness of structures such as the co-presidency system, “Jineology” as an intellectual foundation of Rojava, the metamorphosis of the justice system in Rojava, and women-friendly structures like Mala Jin (Women’s Houses), the eco-feminist village of Jinwar, and women’s self-defense initiatives like the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ). These structures have demonstrated durability over a decade of conflict, yet their long-term viability is constrained by a geopolitical zero-sum game.

Again, the engagement of Rojava with Western allies in the fight against ISIS involved immense sacrifices, with 11,000 or 12,000 lives lost in the fight against ISIS, without securing formal international recognition or protection from Western allies. The problem starts here. When we look at the fragility and vulnerability of Rojava today, the crux of the matter is that Rojava made extraordinary sacrifices against the international threat of ISIS, yet this was a zero-sum game for Kurdish actors in Rojava. They did not succeed in securing international recognition or protection from the West.

As you mentioned in your question, the feminist governance model faces severe existential threats from militarization, economic blockade, and the hostility of neighboring states, particularly Turkey, as well as pressure from the central Syrian state of Ahmed al-Shara. In this context, its stability and durability hinge on sustained engagement with Western democracies, which must be held accountable, as a moral necessity, to defend Rojava’s democratic and gender-progressive structures against broader authoritarian and Islamist dynamics.

Decentralization Requires External Guarantees

With the recent military setbacks and integration pressures from Damascus, do you see the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) transitioning from a de facto autonomous entity toward negotiated decentralization, or facing structural dismantlement within a re-centralized Syrian state increasingly characterized by autocratic restoration?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The most viable path to avoid the worst-case scenario—I mean, the worst case is the structural dismantlement of Rojava within a re-centralized Syrian state—is sustained diplomatic engagement. Again, I emphasize sustained diplomatic engagement with Western countries. The preservation of the autonomous administration heavily depends on the political will of key actors, particularly the EU and the United States, to counter Turkey’s hostility, the Syrian state’s push for recentralization, and ongoing power pressures. Crucial and strategic steps have already been taken in this direction in recent months.

This includes the European Parliament resolution of February 2026, which explicitly calls on Turkey not to interfere in negotiations between the SDF and the central government. Another example is the invitation of General Mazloum Kobani, Commander-in-Chief of the SDF, along with Ilham Ahmed, co-chair of the Department of Foreign Relations of Rojava, to participate in the Munich Security Conference in February. A further example is the invitation of Ilham Ahmed and the Commander-in-Chief of the YPG to hold a press conference at the European Parliament on February 25, 2026.

These actions are essential to ensure that the rights of Kurds, as a collective entity, not only as individuals, are recognized within the Syrian Constitution. Without international backing and pressure, Rojava faces the risk of enforced decentralization under hostile conditions or full structural dismantlement in a centralized, autocratically restored Syrian state. Without such international recognition from Western actors, especially the EU or the United States, Rojava possesses limited diplomatic leverage to compel Damascus into a permanent decentralized power-sharing agreement.

War Conditions Distort Democratic Experiments

Aleppo, Syria, war
Destroyed residential building in a rebel-held area of Aleppo, Syria, February 12, 2013; three children collect firewood amid the rubble. Photo: Richard Harvey / Dreamstime.

Some critics suggest that Rojava’s multiethnic model struggled to maintain legitimacy among Arab populations in eastern Syria. To what degree were these tensions structural limits of democratic confederalism versus consequences of wartime governance conditions?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: I do not think that democratic confederalism as a theory contains a structural flaw. It is a highly progressive and democratic theory. It is not built on Kurdish supremacy or exclusionary nationalism; rather, it is explicitly anti-ethnic in its political logic. It seeks to transcend ethnicity as the basis of sovereignty and instead centers pluralism, decentralization, and participatory government.

Where tensions emerge is not at the level of theory itself but at the level of implementation. The translation of radical, ideologically dense thought into heterogeneous, war-torn territory—particularly among Arab populations who were not socialized into the PKK-led movement’s democratic and feminist paradigm—inevitably creates friction. These communities had lived for decades under authoritarian rule without meaningful experience of democratic institutionalization, gender parity mechanisms, or participatory governance.

The sudden introduction of a transformative political model such as Rojava under militarized conditions naturally produces uneven incorporation of Arab populations. Thus, the issue is less of a structural flaw of democratic confederalism itself and more of a gap between normative ambition and historically shaped political socialization under conditions of war.

Without Recognition, Vulnerability Persists

How do you assess the long-term viability of non-state democratic models like Rojava in an international system still dominated by state sovereignty and realpolitik, where authoritarian and populist governments increasingly shape regional norms?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The long-term viability of non-state democratic models like Rojava within an international system still structured by state sovereignty and realpolitik, as you mentioned, depends largely on their capacity to secure external guarantees for survival. In Rojava’s case, this means convincingly persuading key international actors, particularly, as I mentioned before, the EU and the United States, to recognize and protect its status as a de facto autonomous region. If I put it differently, I would say that Rojava must engage in sustained and intensive diplomatic negotiation with Western powers—not regional powers—in order to transform its considerable transnational soft power—by soft power, I mean the radical democratic structures, the feminist institutions that I mentioned before, and pluralism and tolerance among religious, sexual, and linguistic minorities in Rojava.

As I mentioned, this negotiation must focus on transforming this considerable transnational soft power into formal diplomatic recognition as a legitimate de facto political entity. Without such international diplomatic recognition, the democratic experiment of Rojava remains structurally vulnerable within a regional order increasingly shaped by authoritarian consolidation and populist realignment, especially given the hostile stance of Turkey.

Autonomy Without Safeguards Risks Re-Centralization

The new Syrian leadership continues to frame Kurdish autonomy as separatism. In your view, what institutional arrangements—federalism, asymmetrical decentralization, or cultural autonomy—could realistically reconcile Kurdish self-administration with Syrian territorial integrity?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The reconciliation of Kurdish self-administration with Syrian territorial integrity seems very complicated. While the Syrian leadership continues to frame Kurdish autonomy as separatism, the Rojava project is grounded in democratic confederalism, an explicitly anti-centralist political project that seeks to decentralize sovereignty through bottom-up popular organization rather than secession. So, you see that the political language is not the same. The political language of the Kurdish actors is completely different here. It is not easily understandable for Arabs in Syria, especially when it comes to talking about the central government.

Among the possible institutional arrangements that you mentioned, Rojava should work toward the consolidation of its de facto self-governance as a form of federalism or democratic confederalism. We can put it differently: a constitutionally guaranteed form of political, administrative, and security autonomy within a unified Syrian state could, in principle, reconcile self-administration with territorial integrity. But cultural autonomy alone would likely be completely insufficient, in my view, as it would not secure institutional or security guarantees.

However, the viability of any such arrangement depends, again—I emphasize this time and again—on formal constitutional recognition and enforceable guarantees. Without concrete international diplomatic backing, federalism or decentralization in Rojava or in Syria risks becoming a temporary tactical compromise rather than a durable political settlement in a context where the central government may seek to reconsolidate autocratic authority once stabilized. Any agreement lacking structural safeguards could devolve into a zero-sum game for Kurdish actors in Rojava. Therefore, reconciliation is not merely a question of institutional design, but of credible guarantees and power-balancing mechanisms capable of preventing the re-centralization of the Syrian state.

Turkey’s Security-Only Framing Blocks Strategic Recalibration

Erdogan
People in London protest against President Erdoğan and alleged war crimes against Syrians and Kurds following the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the area. Photo: Nicoleta Raluca Tudor / Dreamstime.

Turkey’s policy toward Rojava has been shaped by a security paradigm linking the region to the PKK, while unresolved domestic Kurdish issues — despite the ongoing so-called settlement process — reinforce threat perceptions. How might an “ethical-geopolitical repositioning,” combining security with legitimacy, alter Ankara’s strategic calculus, particularly within a political environment marked by populist securitization narratives?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: A very interesting question. Turkey’s approach to Rojava is anchored in a securitization paradigm, viewing the region as an existential threat because of its structural and ideological link to the PKK. Domestic political imperatives reinforce this framing. The AKP uses the label of terrorism to delegitimize Kurdish political claims and consolidate support among nationalist, ultra-nationalist or jingoistic constituencies.

An ethical-geopolitical repositioning would require Ankara to move beyond this monolithic security-centered view and recognize the legitimacy of the international soft power the Rojava project has generated. This would involve deconstructing the entrenched narrative that equates Kurdish self-governance with inherent terrorism and engaging in political and security arrangements that combine oversight with recognition. But in practical terms, for a state like Turkey, shaped by populist securitization narratives and the persistence of the Sevres syndrome in the mentality and psyche not just of the Turkish state but of the Turkish populace as well, such a shift appears to me highly unlikely, unfortunately.

Nation-State Bias Limits Support for Non-State Democracy

Western, especially American engagement with Rojava has often been instrumental—most visibly during the anti-ISIS campaign—yet politically noncommittal. Does this pattern reflect structural limits of liberal internationalism when confronted with non-state democratic experiments?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Western, particularly American engagement with Rojava has been largely tactical and situational rather than strategic or politically committed. This shows the structural limits of liberal internationalism which remains anchored in a nation-state-centric world order and struggles to accommodate or integrate non-state actors, especially democratic experiments like Rojava.

At the same time, Western powers consistently prioritize geopolitical and economic interests over democratic or humanitarian principles. Human rights rhetoric often collapses when it conflicts with the strategic value of allies like Turkey as a NATO member. In practice, realpolitik sets aside commitment to progressive non-state actors, unfortunately.

This pattern also illuminates the broader decline of Western democracies and the rise of populist nationalist leadership. The synergy between, for example, leaders like Donald Trump and regional autocrats like Recep Tayyip Erdogan created an environment in which the law of the jungle replaces internationalist norms, highlighting that even the most progressive and resilient non-state societies like Rojava can be sacrificed very easily for the sake of authoritarian resilience and short-term realpolitik.

Abandonment Erodes Trust in Western Alliances

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

The perceived abandonment of local Kurdish forces after their decisive role in defeating ISIS — alongside growing concerns about a possible resurgence of the organization in the event of instability in northeastern Syria — has raised questions about the credibility of Western alliances. What implications might this have for future local partnerships in conflict zones?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The perceived abandonment of the Kurdish forces in Rojava after their decisive role in defeating ISIS raises serious questions about the credibility of Western alliances and the viability of future local partnerships in conflict zones. Such experiences highlight the transactional nature of tactical cooperation and contribute to a broader erosion of trust in Western democratic commitments.

By allowing an authoritarian and Islamist state to challenge a progressive, non-state democratic experiment, Western powers, particularly the United States and, to a lesser extent, the EU, undermine their own moral authority and global leadership. This pattern may push local actors in future conflicts to seek alternative alliances, prioritize defensive nationalism, or act independently, recognizing that even democracies cannot always be trusted or relied upon to protect human rights or progressive governance.

Diaspora Mobilization Reshapes Western Perceptions

Your research highlights diaspora activism aimed at reshaping international perceptions of Kurdish movements, including efforts to de-list the PKK as a “terrorist organization.” How influential has diaspora lobbying been in shaping Western policy debates on the Kurdish question, particularly amid rising populist politics and securitized migration debates in Europe?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: The Rojava Revolution, and especially the Battle of Kobani, marked a turning point for the Kurdish diaspora, legitimizing transnational political engagement and reshaping Western perceptions of the Kurdish movement. Diaspora activism has intensified and diversified, with efforts to de-list the PKK as a terrorist organization becoming a central focus. While most Western governments maintain the PKK designation under pressure from Turkey, diaspora lobbying has influenced key legal and legislative debates. For example, the Belgium Court of Appeal ruled that the PKK was a party in a non-international armed conflict rather than a terrorist group.

In Sweden and Germany, Kurdish diaspora actors have leveraged parliamentary and public channels to present the Kurdish movement as a vanguard of democratization in the Middle East, advocating for formal cooperation with Rojava authorities. Yet, these efforts face structural limits, as Western states often prioritize realpolitik and Turkey’s strategic value as a NATO ally, maintaining the terrorist label despite democratic claims.

We have two examples of de-listing efforts. One of them is the Belgium Court of Appeal ruling the PKK not to be a terrorist organization. The other was a similar effort at the EU level, which initially moved toward delaying the PKK’s designation as a terrorist organization but, unfortunately, under pressure from Turkey, reinstated the label. So, there has been a clear dynamism in the post-Rojava revolution era within diaspora communities to de-list the PKK. 

Feminization Transforms Image, Alliances, and Moral Authority

To what extent has the “feminization” of Kurdish politics—symbolized by the global visibility of Kurdish women fighters and leaders—altered international legitimacy and solidarity networks compared to earlier phases of Kurdish mobilization?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: Since the Rojava Revolution in 2012–13, the feminization of Kurdish politics has dramatically enhanced the movement’s international legitimacy and expanded its solidarity networks. Earlier phases, particularly in the 1990s and the early 2000s, were dominated by male-dominated nationalist frameworks, with the PKK largely criminalized and marginalized in Western eyes, limiting advocacy and framing Kurds primarily as security threats.

The emergence of the YPJ, the Women’s Protection Units, and their decisive role in the Battle of Kobani in late 2014 and early 2015 marked a turning point. The global visibility of Kurdish women fighters aligned Kurdish political claims with the values of gender equality, secularism, and radical democracy, making the continued terrorist designation of the PKK increasingly incoherent and nonsensical in Western public opinion. Being Kurdish is now associated with supporting progressive governance, women’s rights, and secularism, distinguishing the Kurdish movement from other Middle Eastern actors or movements.

This shift has enabled the Kurdish movement to move beyond traditional ethno-nationalist alliances and cultivate broad intersectional solidarity networks. The transition from a male-dominated nationalist movement to a gender-centered revolutionary project has positioned the Kurds as a recognized driving force for democratization in the Middle East, securing global moral authority and institutional support that were absent in earlier decades.

Self-Determination, Not Statehood, Defines the Kurdish Question

And lastly, Dr. Shahriari, looking ahead, do you foresee the Kurdish political movement evolving toward statehood, a post-state transnational network model, a renewed pursuit of territorial autonomy within existing states, or fragmentation into divergent regional trajectories shaped by Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq?

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: I think it is a very good final question. What I can say is that I will not go into great detail, but the crux of the matter is that the Kurdish struggle over the past century has always centered on one fundamental issue: the right to self-determination. Everything else—the form of governance, whether federalism, autonomous self-rule, radical democracy, democratic confederalism, or full statehood of Greater Kurdistan—is epiphenomenal, or a secondary question.

The fundamental issue is the right to self-determination. These forms are largely, as I said, epiphenomenal and contingent, shaped by regional dynamics, international politics, and the balance of power at a given time. The future of the Kurdish movement will therefore be defined less by ideology and more by the practical ability to secure recognition and exercise collective rights within or across existing state frameworks.

Professor Oona A. Hathaway is Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School; Professor of Political Science in Yale’s Department of Political Science; Faculty at the Jackson School of Global Affairs; Director of the Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges; and president-elect of the American Society of International Law.

Prof. Hathaway: A Moment of Peril—and Possibility—to Reimagine the International Legal Order

Giving an interview to the ECPS, Professor Oona A. Hathaway reflects on the resilience and fragility of the post-1945 international legal order at what she describes as a moment of both peril and possibility. She identifies the prohibition on the use of force as the “bedrock of the modern legal order,” yet warns that today’s geopolitical climate is marked by “extraordinary instability” and mounting challenges from major powers. International law, she argues, ultimately depends on shared belief: “what makes international law work is that states believe it works.” If repeated unilateral uses of force erode that belief, a “reverse norm cascade” could follow. Yet Professor Hathaway also stresses that crisis can generate renewal—an opportunity to reimagine and reconstruct a more equitable and effective international legal order rather than surrender to fatalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Oona A. Hathaway—Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law at Yale Law School; Professor of Political Science in Yale’s Department of Political Science; Faculty at the Jackson School of Global Affairs; Director of the Yale Law School Center for Global Legal Challenges; and president-elect of the American Society of International Law—reflects on the resilience and fragility of the post-1945 international legal order at a moment she describes as both perilous and generative. The organizing theme of the interview is captured in the headline, “A Moment of Peril—and Possibility—to Reimagine the International Legal Order.” For Professor Hathaway, the contemporary crisis is not simply episodic noncompliance but a potentially systemic turning point—one that tests whether the prohibition on the use of force, which she calls the “bedrock of the modern legal order,” can endure under conditions of populism, geopolitical rivalry, and eroding rule-of-law commitments.

Professor Hathaway situates today’s tensions within a longer arc of normative transformation. The post-1945 order, she argues, was both a “genuine normative revolution that restrained power” and a system sustained by the strategic interests of dominant states. Yet the present moment raises acute questions about its durability. In her view, “what makes international law work is that states believe it works,” and the danger is that repeated unilateral uses of force could tip the system toward a “reverse norm cascade,” in which states “no longer believe that these rules matter and therefore no longer act as if they matter.” The concern is not only erosion, but the possibility of a broader unraveling in which the rules cease to structure expectations.

Several sections of the interview underscore why “today’s instability is unprecedented in the postwar international legal order.” Professor Hathaway emphasizes that in the post–World War II era “we’ve ever been at a moment of such instability and uncertainty” as when the most powerful state appears “clearly willing to use military force in violation of the UN Charter that it once championed.” This connects directly to another theme: “when rule-makers break the rules, the damage is far greater.” As Professor Hathaway notes, US violations are “particularly destructive,” not least because of the “failure of the international community to respond or push back forcefully,” shaped by entrenched assumptions about US stewardship and deep economic interdependence.

Yet Professor Hathaway also insists that breakdown need not foreclose renewal. “It is a moment of extreme challenge,”she concludes, “but it is also a moment of opportunity and creativity.” The task, she suggests, is to resist fatalism and instead “think together about what a more equitable and effective international legal order might look like”—because “it is up to us to decide which it will be.”

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Oona A. Hathaway, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

A Normative Revolution—and a Strategic Settlement

Photo: Zoia Fedorova| Dreamstime.

Professor Oona Hathaway, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Your scholarship traces the historic shift from a world in which war was lawful to one structured by the prohibition on the use of force. How should we understand the post-1945 legal order—as a genuine normative revolution restraining power, or as a contingent equilibrium sustained by the strategic interests of dominant states?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think both, actually. I don’t think they are inconsistent with one another. It was a genuine normative revolution that restrained power. There was the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, which initially outlawed war. It obviously didn’t succeed—we had World War II—but it began a process of both deconstructing the previous legal order and constructing something new that set in motion the creation of a new legal system. That was then reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter, in the prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). It was really restating the prohibition on war from the Kellogg-Briand Pact. But it was created by dominant states because they believed in these ideas. They believed in the prohibition on the use of force and that might doesn’t make right, and they had just fought a war with the Nazis over this principle of non-domination and the rejection of using military force to seize territory from other states.

But it was also in their interests, because they had gone through massive territorial expansion. The United States, of course, had acquired what is now the entire continental United States, plus Alaska and Hawaii, and has a number of other islands that are part of it as well, including Puerto Rico. It was therefore in the interest of these states—and, of course, at the time this was created, Britain still had a major empire, and France still had a major empire. China, of course, dominated a vast territory. It was a good time to say you can’t conquer territory through the use of force. It was a good time for these states to say, “let’s stop moving those borders around, let’s firm up these borders, and let’s say no one can take territory from anyone else.” Once you’ve already completed your accumulation of territory, it’s in your best interest to call a halt to the game.

So, it was in their interests, but it was also in their values; it was consistent with the values they fought the war for. They then sustained it both because they believed in the values of the system and because the system served their interests. It made for a much more peaceful and prosperous world. So, I don’t necessarily see the two as inconsistent with one another.

When the Bedrock Norm Is Strained, the Entire System Is at Risk

You describe the prohibition on force as the “bedrock” of the modern international order. To what extent did its success depend less on legal internalization than on the alignment between US hegemony and rule-based constraints, and what happens when that alignment dissolves?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: You’re right. I do believe that the prohibition on force is the bedrock of the modern legal order. It’s right at the beginning of the United Nations Charter, and in the book The Internationalists, which I wrote with my co-author Scott Shapiro, we talk about how that is the core norm of the system on which everything else rests.

So it depended on internalization, and that process that I described from 1928 to 1945 was a process of thinking through what it means to shift an order on its axis—to change it from a world order where force is permitted, where might makes right, where states can use military force to resolve disputes with one another, as used to be the case before 1928, before war was outlawed, to a world in which that’s no longer allowed, and then everything else has to flip on its head. Conquest was legal; now conquest has to be illegal. Gunboat diplomacy was legal; now gunboat diplomacy has to be illegal. And that requires a massive shift that I think they didn’t fully appreciate in 1928, but that unfolded from 1928 to 1945 and was internalized through the Charter and all the subsequent rules that were adopted.

But it is also the case, again, that this was in the interest of the United States. The United States both believed in these principles, but these principles also served a hegemonic state. It is a good thing if states are not trying to use military force to take territory from one another if what you want is not to have to be running around as a global power intervening to try to put out wars between states. So it is both the case that these were rules that were internalized and that they served US interests.

Now, what happens when that alignment dissolves? I mean, the US has made clear it doesn’t necessarily adhere to those legal principles any longer and has taken actions that are in violation of the UN Charter, most recently the intervention in Venezuela. We might see a military operation in Iran before long that would also be illegal. I think it puts major stress on the system, to the point that I’m not sure the legal order, as it is, can survive it. You know, it’s not just the US; it’s also Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s seizing of islands, rocks, and reefs in the South China Sea. There are a lot of assaults, but in a way the US, because it has been such a critical supporter of the international legal order, turning on that order in the way that it seems to be is a blow that may be hard to recover from.

A Normative Revolution Forged by Power, Values, and Interest

Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

Does the contemporary erosion of the prohibition on the use of force—as exemplified by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ unilateral military operation against Venezuela under the second Trump administration—reflect primarily a failure of international enforcement institutions, a crisis of belief in the legitimacy of international law among major powers, or a deeper transformation in how states conceptualize sovereignty, security, and permissible violence in an era of populism and geopolitical rivalry?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think it’s just too early to say exactly how deep the transformation we’re seeing really is. I’ve written a bit about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the Trump administration’s unilateral military operation against Venezuela, as I mentioned before, as truly fundamental challenges to the modern international legal order.

It is the case that international law relies on collective enforcement. And it’s very difficult for that collective enforcement to work when members of the Security Council are themselves violating the rules, because the institutional structures that are in place to enforce them can’t be used. Russia, the US, and China all have veto power and can block any action by the United Nations to enforce the legal rules. At the same time, the states that have traditionally led the charge in enforcing the rules through other means—through what Scott Shapiro and I have called outcasting—have relied on economic and other measures to respond to unlawful action and to encourage collective action, sanctions, and economic pressure. Russia was kicked out of the G8, which became the G7; Russia was expelled from the Council of Europe; and there are many ways in which Russia has been excluded from international institutions it had benefited from as a response to its unlawful actions, in addition to the economic sanctions that have been imposed and the funding and support provided by Ukraine’s allies to help it stand up to Russia. But it is very difficult to do that against a hegemon and a major economic power.

I think you are beginning to see some response by states that may represent the beginnings of an answer to that question, though it is still a little early to tell.

Power Shifts and Populism Are Eroding Restraints on Unilateral Force

How do shifts in global power distribution interact with ideological transformations—particularly nationalism and populism—to weaken constraints on unilateral force?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: Yes, there are major shifts in global power distribution. There are changes in economic power and changes in military power. You have the rise of China, both as an economic power and as a military power. It’s building a major navy and has become a more significant geopolitical force in a variety of ways. It’s also investing more in international institutions, which is important to note. So it’s not just building up its military; it has also become more active at the UN and other international institutions. 

Soi it’s hard to say at this moment where that’s going. Is that going to weaken constraints on unilateral force or not? I think what’s weakening constraints on unilateral force is the use of unilateral force by states like the US and Russia. And it’s not just the use of force, but also the response that you receive. Russia has had a pretty forceful response from the international community. So far, the US has not. There was a relatively modest response to the unilateral intervention in Venezuela.

States are frankly scared of Trump. They’re worried that he’s going to slap tariffs on them if they criticize him. I think the only answer is going to be to act collectively—for states to band together to try to shore up the international system and the prohibition on the use of force in particular. It’s going to be hard for any of them to criticize Trump individually, but acting more collectively and building alternative sources of economic power may be possible. So, for example, what Canada is doing in forming alternative economic partnerships and responding to US tariffs suggests one possible path forward. That is an answer to this problem—maybe the only answer to this problem.

Between the Old World Order and a World With No Rules

The headquarters of the United Nations in New York City. Photo: Dreamstime.

Do contemporary developments signal not merely norm erosion but a structural reversion toward an “Old World Order” in which material power once again functions as a source of legal entitlement?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: In the book The Internationalists, we talk about the Old World Order as the order in which war was lawful and states could use military force to resolve disputes, and what they took, they could keep—so might made right. 

One of the questions is whether we are in a moment of reverting back to that. The book describes both this old legal order and how we rejected it and created a new legal order built on the prohibition on force. And the question that certainly emerges at this moment, where we’re seeing states like the United States unilaterally using force, is: are we going to go back? Are we going to return to a world where military force was lawful and where material power functions as a source of legal entitlement?

It’s possible that we will. It’s also possible that there is something even worse. Scott and I wrote a recent piece in Foreign Affairs that argues there is only one thing worse than going back to something like the Old World Order—a legal order built on the idea that might makes right, where states can resolve disputes and enforce claims through military force—and that is a world with no rules at all, where there is no coherent legal system. The old order, for all its faults, was at least coherent and clear.

One of the problems we see with Venezuela, with the Trump intervention there, is that it was really just about one man’s whim. And that is very disruptive and chaotic, because if it becomes permissible for states to decide to go to war for no clear reason, it becomes very hard for other states to avoid war, because they don’t know what they would need to do to avoid falling afoul of a state that might want to use military force.

I recommend that to your readers if they want to take a look at it. They can find all my work, by the way, on oonahathaway.com. All my work is posted there, so if they want to track down any of these pieces, that’s a good place to go.

Populist Sovereignty Claims Are Challenging International Constraints

How do populist leaders’ claims to embody the “true people” reshape state attitudes toward international law, especially regarding multilateral constraints perceived as external impositions on sovereignty?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think I can speak most authoritatively, perhaps, to the Trump administration’s claims to embody “real Americans” as part of the argument that the United States should resist international law and that these multilateral constraints don’t serve America.

And what people are saying, if you look at his approval ratings, which are in free fall, is that he doesn’t actually represent real Americans. People care about the price of groceries, clothes, and other consumer goods. Those have been going up, and people’s real incomes have not been keeping pace with inflation. He came into office on a promise that he would make things more affordable for people, and he has done the opposite.

People were told at the State of the Union Address that things are better than ever, but most people’s experience is inconsistent with that—they actually feel that things are not better than ever. So, what you’re seeing is a contrast between a claim to speak for a set of people and people’s own experience of the effects of those policies.

I like to believe that, as a result, people are going to see that these policies are not in their best interest—that tariffs are not serving the United States and that wars of choice are not in the best interests of the American people—and reject them. So far, it does seem that people are not approving of what’s happening. I think that strategy is not going to be a winning one for the Trump administration for much longer.

The Impact of Populism Depends on the Resilience of Institutions

Frontal view of the U.S. Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C., on February 10, 2024. Photo: Gualberto Becerra P.

Is populism inherently destabilizing for rule-based international order, or can populist governments operate within legal frameworks when institutional checks remain robust?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: Gosh, that’s kind of an impossible question to answer. I don’t know if it’s inherently destabilizing; it depends a little on what one means by populism. Can populist governments operate within legal frameworks when institutional checks remain robust? Absolutely—of course they can.

I think they will respond to the incentives they face. And if there is a major cost to acting in ways that are inconsistent with legal frameworks, it is difficult for populist leaders to sustain violations of international law for long in the face of that. But that’s not uniformly true. This is just a hard question to answer. It is more a case-by-case matter, rather than something that lends itself to a general conclusion about the impact of populism on legal frameworks. It all depends on how strong and how robust those institutional checks remain, and on the nature of those checks. That is highly contingent.

When Law Ceases to Constrain Power, the System Cannot Function

To what extent does democratic backsliding within powerful democracies—through executive aggrandizement and weakened oversight—pose a greater systemic threat to international law than the rise of authoritarian states that never fully internalized those norms?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I think that democratic backsliding is a real challenge to international law, in part because what we’re seeing is not just democratic backsliding, but threats to the very idea of the rule of law, both domestically and internationally. When law is no longer a constraint on governmental power—again, whether domestic or international—that obviously makes it impossible for the international system to function.

I don’t know that I would fully accept the idea that authoritarian states never internalized those norms—maybe that’s fair—but they internalized them more than is sometimes appreciated, because the international legal order operates in large part by changing expectations about how others will react to what you do. Authoritarian states see that if they invade their neighbors, there are going to be consequences. Saddam Hussein learned that when he invaded Kuwait and attempted to take it over. The international community responded by rejecting his effort to conquer Kuwait and pushing him back. That was an instance in which an authoritarian ruler learned a hard lesson—that this was a norm the international community was willing to defend.

That was a useful lesson for other authoritarians to observe, and it made a difference in reaffirming the prohibition on the use of force and the idea that states can’t conquer territory, even when they have a dispute with a neighbor—that the way to resolve it isn’t to use military force. So, that authoritarian regimes, too, can be constrained by international law.

The important thing to remember about international law is that you don’t have to think you’re obeying it to obey it. International law works by changing the background norms and expectations that states have. You don’t have to be fully cognizant of the ways in which it is shaping your behavior for it to do so. Even authoritarian states are often abiding by international law in ways they may not fully appreciate or understand, and nonetheless international law remains very powerful in shaping their behavior.

When Rule-Makers Break the Rules, the Damage Is Especially Severe

Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. Protesters dressed as Musk, Farage, Vance, Putin, Trump, and Netanyahu. Photo: Ben Gingell.

When a historically law-creating state violates the rules it helped design, how does that differ from violations by revisionist powers in terms of precedent, legitimacy, and global imitation effects?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: This is obviously the question of whether US violations are more destructive than those of other states, given that the US has historically been a significant law-creating power. It wrote the first draft of the UN Charter, championed the United Nations system after the Second World War, and has been a key player—though it has not perfectly observed those rules. It’s important to point out that this is not the first time the United States has failed to play by the rules it helped put in place. But yes, I do think it is particularly destructive, especially when coupled with the broader set of assaults on the legal order from Russia.

What really matters, and what has been especially destructive so far, is the failure of the international community to respond or push back forcefully against the United States. That’s partly because people are used to thinking of the United States as a good actor, as a steward of the system. They also have deep economic ties that make any kind of criticism or economic sanctions against the United States almost impossible for them to contemplate. But, we are starting to see states recognize that what might once have seemed unimaginable is now imaginable, and that they have to begin thinking about how to reinforce the legal order in a situation where the United States can no longer be counted on to be a positive partner or actor.

So, we might begin to see some pushback, but we haven’t yet, and that is part of why this has been such a destructive moment.

Repeated Unilateral Force Could Trigger a Reverse Norm Cascade

Could repeated unilateral uses of force by leading powers generate a “reverse norm cascade,” transforming restraint from expectation into exception and thereby reshaping customary international law?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: That’s the fear. The fear is that these unilateral uses of force will eventually overwhelm the system. You can sustain a certain number of blows, but at a certain point the system becomes so weakened that it begins to fall apart. And the question is: when do you cross that line? When do we reach a point where we have a kind of reverse norm cascade, as you put it, in which states no longer believe that these rules matter and therefore no longer act as if they matter? What makes international law work is that states believe it works.

If they no longer believe in it, then it ceases to function. So, enough unilateral uses of force could, at a certain point, lead states to conclude that the system is not working very well and to ask why they should abide by the rules if others are not. That’s when you begin to see the whole structure start to fall apart. Are we there yet? I think not. Three more years of this? Maybe.

Expansive Self-Defense Claims Are Eroding the Prohibition on Force

How might expansive interpretations of self-defense—particularly against nonstate actors—gradually alter the legal architecture governing the use of force?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I have written about this as well, and I think we don’t talk about it enough as a challenge to the international legal order—this expansive interpretation of the Article 51 right of self-defense in the Charter. It allows states to respond unilaterally; you don’t have to go to the Security Council to defend yourself. But the language of the Charter refers to situations in which a state has been subject to an armed attack.

There have been increasingly expansive interpretations of the Article 51 right of self-defense, including, as you mentioned, extending it to attacks by nonstate actors, which was not understood as falling within the scope of Article 51 at its inception. This interpretation has been adopted particularly in the post-9/11 era, and you see more and more states embracing it after 2014 and the rise of ISIS in the Middle East. I do think this is extremely corrosive to the international system. It has really eroded the prohibition on the use of force, because at a certain point everything becomes self-defense.

The Charter defined this right of self-defense very narrowly, as a response to armed attack, and it did so for a reason. The drafters were very aware that defensive wars and offensive wars were sometimes very hard to distinguish. They wanted to establish a fairly narrow right for states to respond. They had to include the right of self-defense because many states insisted on it—you shouldn’t have to wait for the Security Council to act if you are literally under attack. But they intentionally meant for it to be a fairly narrow right, because once you start talking about wars of defense based on the idea that another state might pose a threat down the road, the distinction between offensive and defensive wars begins to collapse.

So yes, I do think this has been a real problem. And again, if your readers are interested, if you search my website for “self-defense,” you will find an article I’ve written on exactly this issue. It’s a real problem, and it predates the Trump administration; it is a bipartisan problem. Both Democratic and Republican presidents have presided over that erosion, so this is not an entirely new phenomenon.

When Dual-Use Becomes a Justification, Civilians Bear the Cost

Your research on the targeting of dual-use objects highlights the blurring of civilian and military categories. Does this evolution risk transforming international humanitarian law from a protective regime into a justificatory framework for expanded violence?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: I’d point your readers to a piece that I wrote in the Yale Law Journal on dual-use objects, called “The Rise of Dual-Use Objects,” with Azmat Khan and a third co-author, Mara Revkin, my former student and an amazing legal academic. This piece shows that the US has increasingly been targeting objects that it recognizes as dual-use, meaning both military and civilian use.

We argue in that piece that the rise of targeting dual-use objects has significantly eroded protections for civilians in wartime. We discuss this generally, but we also use evidence drawn from post-strike analyses of US counterterrorism strikes. We analyzed the targets of those strikes, which were gathered by Azmat Khan, a reporter from The New York Times, through Freedom of Information Act requests to the Department of Defense—requests she had to sue to obtain. So we have very specific data in the piece about what kinds of dual-use objects are being targeted, and we can show that civilians are really at risk in the targeting of these objects.

The argument we make is that this practice is blurring the distinction between civilian and military targets that is so critical to protecting civilians in wartime, and that we need to take significant steps to better protect civilians and to clarify this distinction between military and civilian objects, taking into account the impact on civilians of targeting such sites—not just the civilians who happen to be present at that moment, but also the long-term reverberating effects. You blow up a water treatment plant, and it’s not just the civilian workers there who are harmed; it’s everyone who now lacks access to clean water. You blow up an apartment building, and it’s not only the residents who are killed or injured, but also those who are deprived of housing. You blow up a bridge, and there may be civilians present on it, but afterward people cannot get to work, school, or their families because there is no access from one place to another. So, this is a really critical part of our thinking about how to protect civilians in wartime.

The Unraveling Order Also Opens Space to Imagine a More Equitable One

And lastly, Prof. Hathaway, are we witnessing the collapse of the post-1945 legal order or its transformation into a plural system of competing legal regimes—and what institutional or normative developments would be necessary to prevent the “gradual and then sudden” unraveling you warn about from becoming irreversible?

Professor Oona A. Hathaway: This is a reference to my piece in The New York Times titled “The Great Unraveling,”which looks at what’s happening to the modern legal order and argues that we might be witnessing its collapse. The question is whether we are in the midst of a collapse, on the precipice of one, or whether it has already occurred—and what is coming next. I don’t know that anybody really knows the answer to those questions. I think we’re in uncharted waters. In the post–World War II era, I don’t think we’ve ever been at a moment of such instability and uncertainty in the international legal order as we are today, where you have the most powerful nation in the world clearly willing to use military force in violation of the UN Charter that it once championed, and the prohibition on the use of force that is core to the normative legal order.

But we don’t know how aggressive President Trump is going to be. We don’t know yet if other states are going to follow in the United States’ footsteps and use force against their neighbors in ways that would previously have been clearly forbidden. And we don’t know whether something is going to emerge in its place if this system is collapsing.

We see some signs. We see Canada, for instance, trying to rally middle powers to work together to create an alternative economic system, because a lot of states are deeply concerned about the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration, and that has led them not to speak up or respond when the US acts in ways they view as inconsistent with the international legal order. This is going to be an important part of the response, but it hasn’t taken shape yet. So, the short answer is that we don’t know where this is headed. We are in a moment of extraordinary instability.

Let me end on a somewhat more hopeful note. Although this moment of instability is scary and concerning—for someone like me who believes that the core norm of the international legal order is the prohibition on the use of military force, and who sees that norm as uniquely at risk—it is also a moment when we can start to think about how to construct a new legal order. What might a new legal order look like? What new possibilities might emerge? What can we hope for, dream about, or imagine? How can we make the legal order more equitable?

So, it is a moment of extreme challenge, but it is also a moment of opportunity and creativity. We should be careful not to give up or assume that everything is lost, but instead try to think together about what a more equitable and effective international legal order might look like, and whether this is a moment in which the opportunity is opening to do something new and different. That new and different future could be bad, but it could also be a profound improvement. It is up to us to decide which it will be.

SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture 1: Evolution of EU trade policy and global trade order

Lecture 2: Populism, legitimacy, and the politicization of trade

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture 1: Political economy of EU–US trade relations

Lecture 2: Populism and the erosion/reconfiguration of transatlantic trade cooperation

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture 1: EU–US–China trade relations and global power competition

Lecture 2: Strategic autonomy, de-risking, and EU economic security tools

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture 1: US Indo-Pacific strategy and its trade implications

Lecture 2: EU engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, partnerships, strategic positioning)

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture 1: Scenarios for the future of global trade governance (fragmentation vs reform)

Lecture 2: Can the EU lead? Policy tools, regulatory power, and global influence

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

An ECPS panel at the European Parliament in Brussels, held on 3 February 2026, marked the launch of the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, examining mounting strains on the post-war Atlantic order. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

ECPS Panel at European Parliament: Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2026). “ECPS Panel at European Parliament: Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 11, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00143

 

The ECPS panel held at the European Parliament on 3 February 2026 marked a critical intervention into debates on the future of transatlantic relations amid the resurgence of right-wing populism in the United States. Convened to launch the report “Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options,” the event brought together policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to assess how Donald Trump’s re-election has reshaped Europe’s strategic environment. Discussions highlighted the simultaneous erosion of security cooperation, trade norms, multilateral institutions, and shared democratic values. Rather than treating these developments as temporary disruptions, the panel framed them as structural challenges requiring European agency, strategic autonomy, and democratic resilience. The report positions Europe not as a passive responder, but as a decisive actor capable of shaping a post-assumptive transatlantic order.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On 3 February 2026, the European Parliament hosted an ECPS panel convened to launch the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, a timely intervention into the accelerating strain on the post-war Atlantic order. Held in the Spinelli building in Brussels and hosted by MEP Radan Kanev, the event assembled Members of the European Parliament, scholars, policy practitioners, journalists, and civil society observers around a shared concern: the extent to which renewed US right-wing populism—crystallized in Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024—has shifted the premises of Europe’s external environment and, increasingly, its internal political equilibrium.

The discussion proceeded from the report’s core proposition that transatlantic relations cannot be understood only as a matter of diplomacy or foreign policy. Rather, domestic political dynamics—polarization, institutional capture, disinformation, and the reconfiguration of party systems—now shape the external posture of states and alliances. Against this backdrop, the panel examined how pressures on the four foundational pillars of the liberal international order—security cooperation, free trade, international institutions, and shared democratic values—are unfolding simultaneously and interactively. The report, coordinated under the ECPS and produced through a transatlantic academic collaboration involving the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, UC Berkeley, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and ARENA at the University of Oslo, offers a structured assessment of these developments and outlines policy options aimed at risk reduction and strategic adaptation.

Co-moderated by ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese and former MEP Sir Graham Watson, the event opened with reflections that framed the moment as one of geopolitical reordering and democratic vulnerability. Von Wiese situated Europe’s predicament within a wider shift in power relations, while Sir Watson emphasized the immediacy of populist mobilization and the need for democratic coordination beyond Europe. MEP Kanev’s hosting remarks foregrounded the entanglement of European domestic politics with US leadership change and warned of new forms of external meddling in Europe’s internal affairs. Further political interventions by MEP Valérie Hayer (The Chair of the Renew Europe Group) and MEP Brando Benifei (Chair of the EP Delegation for relations with the United States) underscored the ideological nature of Trumpism’s challenge to “liberal Europe,” the necessity of European firmness and credibility, and the growing imperative of strategic autonomy across trade, technology, and security.

The report’s editors—Marianne RiddervoldGuri Rosén, and Jessica Greenberg—then presented the report’s analytical architecture and central findings, before a wide-ranging Q&A tested its implications against questions of narrative, coalition-building, European divisions, and the operationalization of democratic resilience. Collectively, the panel framed the report not as a lament for a weakening alliance, but as a call to clarify Europe’s agency under uncertainty—and to translate unity, leverage, and values into durable policy choices.

Irina von Wiese: Opening Reflections on Populism and a Changing Geopolitical Order

ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese delivers opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, framing the discussion on populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese set an reflective tone, situating the discussion of populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations within both institutional and geopolitical contexts. Von Wiese noted that the report under discussion had been initiated well before its public launch, remarking on the striking extent to which unfolding global developments had amplified its relevance. She suggested that the themes addressed would likely remain salient for the foreseeable future, given the enduring transformations underway in global politics.

Drawing on a personal yet analytically resonant observation from her vantage point in central London, von Wiese referred to the construction of the new Chinese “super embassy” as a symbolic marker of broader geopolitical shifts. This development, she argued, encapsulated the pressures facing Europe as it navigates a rapidly evolving international order characterized by intensifying competition between emerging and established superpowers. Without pre-empting the panel’s substantive debates, she framed Europe’s position as increasingly constrained, compelled to recalibrate its strategic choices amid rival spheres of influence.

Concluding her remarks, von Wiese emphasized the importance of dialogue and multidisciplinary engagement, before inviting MEP Kanev to proceed and introducing Sir Graham Watson, her predecessor as Honorary Chair of ECPS, as a special guest.

Sir Graham Watson: Europe’s Populist Moment and the Imperative of Democratic Unity

Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, delivers opening remarks in a concise and candid tone. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks, Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, adopted a deliberately concise and candid tone. Sir Watson expressed strong appreciation for the participation of Valerie Heyer and Radan Kanev, emphasizing that their support for the report had been exemplary. He underlined their importance as political actors actively resisting the advance of populism within Europe, describing such engagement as both timely and essential.

He then drew attention to the immediacy of the populist challenge by noting that, at that very moment, a gathering of European populist actors was taking place nearby. Sir Watson warned that these movements were seeking to replicate in Europe the political dynamics associated with Donald Trump in the United States. Countering this trend, he argued, required firm and value-based cooperation with democratic partners committed to the rule of law and structured multilateral engagement, specifically referencing countries such as Canada and South Korea.

Sir Watson further criticized what he described as incoherence in European trade policy, pointing to the inconsistency of rejecting an unfair trade agreement with the United States while subsequently referring the Mercosur agreement to the Court of Justice. He stressed the need for Europe to “de-risk” its relations with populist-led governments, proposing closer engagement with democratic governments in countries such as Brazil and Argentina.

Sir Watson clarified that while these broader issues framed the discussion, the report itself offered a more focused analysis of the populist challenge and concrete guidance for policymakers, which he warmly commended to the audience.

Openning Remarks by MEP Radan Kanev: “The Importance of Re-evaluating Transatlantic Relations in the Current Global Political Climate”

MEP Radan Kanev, host of the event, delivers opening remarks highlighting the timeliness and political significance of the discussion. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks as host of the event, MEP Radan Kanev emphasized both the timeliness and the political significance of the discussion, expressing sincere appreciation for the opportunity to host what he described as an extremely important initiative. He thanked fellow Members of the European Parliament, including Valerie Hayer and Brando Benifei, for their participation, highlighting their presence as evidence of the cross-party character of the meeting and of a shared concern that transcended partisan boundaries.

Kanev opened substantively by citing the very first premise of the report being launched: that, under current conditions, domestic politics may matter more than foreign policy. He expanded this proposition by arguing that what is at stake is not merely domestic politics in general, but specifically Europe’s internal political dynamics and their growing entanglement with leadership developments in the United States. To illustrate this point, he turned to the political situation in his home country of Bulgaria, describing a striking competition among three prominent political figures—an influential oligarch, a long-standing dominant political leader, and a recently resigned president-turned-political actor—each openly vying for the favor of Donald Trump.

This dynamic, Kanev suggested, had reached an unprecedented point with the decision of Bulgaria’s already resigned pro-European prime minister to sign the so-called “Charter of the Board of Peace,” making Bulgaria—alongside Hungary—the only representatives of the European Union to do so. He underscored the paradox of this situation, noting that one of the signatories belonged to the European People’s Party (EPP) rather than to the political families typically associated with extremist or openly anti-European positions.

Kanev stressed that populism alone did not sufficiently explain the gravity of the current moment. Drawing on his own long political experience, he observed that Bulgaria, like many European countries, had been governed by various forms of populism—left-wing, right-wing, and centrist—for decades. The rise of populist movements, he argued, was therefore not in itself a novel or alarming development, nor an inevitable cause for panic. What Europe was facing, however, was something more profound and more destabilizing than the circulation of populist rhetoric.

To clarify this distinction, Kanev urged the audience to acknowledge several uncomfortable but necessary truths. From a European perspective, he argued, every Republican US president could historically be perceived as a form of right-wing populist, and indeed every American president since Andrew Jackson could be seen as populist to some degree. Moreover, US foreign policy had long been difficult for Europeans to accept, well before the Iraq War of 2003. Yet, Kanev insisted, Donald Trump represented a qualitatively different phenomenon.

This difference, he argued, could not be reduced simply to right-wing populism, domestic authoritarian tendencies, or aggressive rhetoric abroad—traits that many Europeans had, rightly or wrongly, long associated with US leadership. European leaders, Kanev suggested, might have been willing to tolerate Trump’s domestic agenda, despite its damaging effects on American institutions, and even his confrontational, transactional style in transatlantic relations, as evidenced by recent trade and security negotiations.

What fundamentally distinguished the present situation, in Kanev’s view, was the unprecedented level of direct meddling in Europe’s internal political affairs. Historically, while the United States had supported authoritarian or unsavory regimes elsewhere, it had never done so in Europe. On the contrary, US policy had consistently promoted democracy, market economies, free trade, and, crucially, European integration. Kanev emphasized that Bulgaria’s own accession to the European Union had been made possible largely through strong US pressure, a fact well known both in Western Europe and in the Balkans.

This longstanding pattern, he argued, had now been reversed. The current US administration, Kanev maintained, was actively working toward European disunity, seeking to transform Europe into an insecure and fragmented space of competing client projects—an approach previously seen in other regions of the world, but never within Europe or the transatlantic partnership. He cautioned against overemphasizing ideology or values in explaining this shift, suggesting instead that many European leaders aligning themselves with Trumpist positions were motivated less by genuine conservatism or nationalism than by personal authoritarian ambitions or corruption.

Kanev concluded by stressing that the challenges identified in the report—particularly in the areas of security and trade—were not confined to Brussels but affected national and pan-European levels alike, extending even beyond the EU to partners such as Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Addressing Europe’s right-wing nationalist and conservative movements directly, he posed a series of rhetorical questions to underline the contradictions inherent in their current alignments. He argued that the emerging political cleavage in Europe would no longer be defined by traditional ideological labels, but by a stark choice between accepting Europe as a chaotic sphere of multiple foreign influences or defending European solidarity as a matter of fundamental security and prosperity.

MEP Valérie Hayer: “Reflections on the Implications of Renewed US Populism for European Policies, Democratic Values, and Foreign Relations”

MEP Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group, speaks on renewed US populism and its implications for transatlantic democracy. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her address, Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group in the European Parliament, situated the discussion of renewed US populism within a broader transatlantic and democratic framework. Opening with expressions of gratitude to the organizers and contributors to the report, she emphasized both the importance and urgency of the initiative. She extended particular thanks to Radan Kanev for the invitation, noting that her remarks were shaped by her recent visit to Bulgaria, where she had met with civil society actors, journalists, advocates of judicial independence, and public authorities.

Drawing on this experience, Hayer pointed to the role of entrenched oligarchic power in undermining the rule of law, arguing that such dynamics posed threats comparable to, or even exceeding, those posed by the current US administration within its own institutional context. This observation served as an entry point into her central argument: that attacks on democracy are intensifying globally, including in the United States, long regarded as a bastion of freedom. The return of populism to the center of American power, she stressed, constituted not merely a domestic political development but a transatlantic shockwave with direct implications for European policies, democratic resilience, and Europe’s global position.

Hayer framed her intervention around three interrelated questions: what US populism means for Europe, how it operates, and how Europeans must respond. She argued that understanding these implications required conceptual clarity about Trumpism itself. While Donald Trump’s initial election in 2016 had often been interpreted in Europe as an anomaly driven by protest voting and institutional fatigue, his return to power in 2024 decisively shattered this assumption. Rather than an accident, it represented confirmation that Trumpism had evolved into a consolidated and ideologically coherent movement exercising near-total control over the Republican Party. Populism in the United States, she argued, had proven structural and resilient, capable of returning even after electoral defeat.

Trumpism Does Not Oppose Europe Per Se; It Opposes Liberal Europe

A central clarification in Hayer’s analysis concerned the object of Trumpism’s hostility. The Trumpist movement, she contended, is not directed against Europe as a civilization or geographical entity, but against liberals, moderates, pluralists, and defenders of democratic norms wherever they are found. In this sense, Trumpism does not oppose Europe per se; it opposes liberal Europe. This distinction explained why Trump and his allies often appeared ideologically closer to European far-right parties than to large segments of their own domestic electorate. Hayer noted that Trumpism displayed greater affinity with parties such as Germany’s AfD or France’s National Rally than with US Democrats or moderate Republicans, a pattern reflected in Trump’s hostility toward liberal European leaders and his praise for illiberal ones.

This ideological divide, she argued, was starkly exposed by the events of January 6, 2021. The assault on the US Capitol was not simply a security failure but a test of democratic allegiance. Those who unequivocally condemned it affirmed their commitment to liberal democracy, while those who minimized or justified it revealed a different set of priorities. Trump’s subsequent return to power sent a powerful signal to populist actors worldwide: violations of democratic norms could be politically survivable. This message, Hayer warned, emboldened illiberal movements in Europe as much as in the United States.

She further argued that the first norm eroded by Trumpism was truth itself. Trump’s governance, she observed, was marked by apparent contradictions: claims to uphold law and order while attacking judges and prosecutors; rhetorical support for democratic protesters abroad while repressing dissent at home; denunciations of corruption alongside the rewarding of personal loyalty over legality. These were not inconsistencies, she maintained, but defining features of transactional populism, in which loyalty and expediency outweigh institutions and rules. Such an approach destabilizes alliances by replacing predictability with improvisation and shared values with ad hoc deals.

This logic, Hayer argued, extended directly into foreign policy. Trump’s hostility toward the European Union was not merely economic or strategic, but ideological. The EU embodies regulation, multilateralism, minority protection, climate governance, and judicial independence—precisely the elements Trumpism frames as illegitimate liberal overreach. Consequently, EU laws are portrayed as constraints, European unity as a threat, and even territories such as Greenland as negotiable assets. In this worldview, European leaders are divided not by nationality but by ideology—classified as allies or adversaries depending on their stance toward liberal democracy.

Faced with this reality, Hayer called for a strategic, rather than emotional, European response. Europeans cannot determine US electoral outcomes, she acknowledged, but they retain agency in shaping their own reactions. She cited recent European initiatives—the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Digital Services Act, and the Digital Markets Act—as examples of necessary assertions of sovereignty in a hostile global environment. At the same time, she identified a major European failure: complacency following the election of Joe Biden, which led many to assume that Trumpism had been definitively defeated.

This misjudgment, she argued, contributed to delayed investments in European autonomy and resilience, particularly in defense, financial integration, and industrial capacity. She emphasized that the current US administration responds primarily to leverage rather than goodwill. When Europe demonstrated resolve—through trade instruments, deterrence signals, or legal firmness—the tone of engagement shifted. When it hesitated or sought appeasement, pressure intensified. The episode surrounding Greenland illustrated the necessity of firmness, not escalation, but credible dissuasion grounded in clear red lines.

Hayer concluded that European independence is no longer optional. Dependence creates vulnerability, whereas strategic autonomy enables resilience. She stressed that Europe possesses substantial industrial, technological, and economic assets, naming key actors across defense, energy, and technology sectors. Europe’s weakness, she argued, lies not in a lack of resources but in fragmentation, underinvestment, and political hesitation.

The decisive battleground, however, remains internal. While Europe cannot prevent populism in the United States, it can prevent it from governing Europe. Hayer warned against European populist leaders who align themselves ideologically with Trumpism, describing them as conduits rather than defenders of European sovereignty. Trumpism, she concluded, is not an external imposition but a project that survives in Europe only if Europeans legitimize it. The ultimate question, therefore, is not whether populism exists, but whether Europeans allow it to rule them.

MEP Brando Benifei: Taking Europe Seriously in an Era of Populism and Uncertainty

MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, reflects on the present and future of transatlantic relations from a practitioner’s perspective. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his address, MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, offered a practitioner-oriented reflection on the state and future of transatlantic relations, grounded in his direct and ongoing engagement with US counterparts. Benifei expressed particular gratitude to Radan Kanev and Valérie Hayer for convening the meeting in cooperation with the ECPS, emphasizing the importance and timeliness of the report being launched. He briefly previewed the report’s analytical framework, noting that it focused on four core pillars currently under strain: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. These themes, he suggested, captured the multidimensional nature of the present challenges, which would be explored in greater depth by the report’s authors.

Drawing on his role as chair of the transatlantic delegation, Benifei underlined the value of sustained dialogue with US political actors, highlighting both his frequent visits to the United States and the presence of representatives from American think tanks in the audience. He described the European Parliament as a “House of Democracy” and welcomed the opportunity for open exchange within this institutional setting.

Turning to the substance of the report, Benifei referred to the three scenarios it outlines for the future of transatlantic relations: potential disintegration, functional adaptation, or reorganization on new foundations. Based on his recent experiences with US administration officials, members of Congress, and other stakeholders, he argued that all three scenarios remained plausible in the current complex context. He emphasized, however, a central lesson drawn from these interactions: the European Union must be taken seriously. This requires clarity of position, internal unity, and—crucially—consistency between declarations and actions.

Benifei warned that recent patterns of announcing positions and subsequently retracting or failing to implement them had undermined the EU’s credibility in the eyes of US interlocutors. While he shared the view, often expressed by members of the US Congress, that Europeans should not overreact to daily rhetoric or shifting statements, he stressed that words had, at times, translated into concrete actions requiring firm responses.

In this context, he echoed the importance of European legislative sovereignty, particularly in relation to digital regulation. Referring to the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, Benifei expressed concern that US counterparts had explicitly urged changes to these laws in formal meetings. He rejected this approach, arguing that Europe must stand firm in defending its regulatory choices.

In concluding, Benifei argued that confronting populism and redefining transatlantic relations requires clarity about Europe’s own political project. Citing remarks by Mario Draghi delivered the previous day, he endorsed the view that the era of the EU as a loose confederation had ended. In a relationship increasingly shaped by political and security considerations, rather than commerce alone, Europe must strengthen its sovereignty and internal organization if it wishes to engage the United States on a more equal footing. The report, he concluded, offers a valuable contribution to understanding both Europe’s current position and the strategic paths ahead.

Professor Marianne Riddervold: The Four Pillars of the Atlantic Order Under Strain

Professor Marianne Riddervold presents the report’s analytical framework and key findings on transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Professor Marianne Riddervold, affiliated with ARENA at the University of Oslo, NUPI, and the University of California, Berkeley, introduced the report’s core analytical framework and key findings concerning the evolving state of transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. 

Professor Riddervold grounded the report’s intellectual motivation in an observation made as early as 2018 by John Peterson, who argued that the future of US–European relations and the liberal international order depended less on foreign policy choices than on domestic democratic politics in both Europe and the United States. In light of Donald Trump’s reelection in 2024, she suggested that this assessment had proven prescient. Contemporary news coverage, she noted, is dominated by developments that appear to challenge the very foundations of the transatlantic relationship, including disputes over tariffs, divergent approaches to Ukraine, tensions surrounding international treaties and voting behavior in the United Nations, uncertainty about NATO’s future, and deep disagreements over free speech norms. These tensions have been further exacerbated by Trump’s public threats to annex parts of the territory of NATO allies.

At the same time, Professor Riddervold emphasized that Europe and North America remain more closely interconnected than any other regions of the world, with over eight decades of dense cooperation behind them. The transatlantic relationship, she reminded the audience, has weathered major crises in the past and has at times emerged stronger as a result. Against this backdrop, the report set out to address a series of fundamental questions: how to make sense of current developments; how right-wing populism under Trump is affecting transatlantic relations; whether the present moment represents a qualitatively different rupture; and whether Europe is facing a more serious and long-term breakdown of a relationship long taken for granted.

To answer these questions, the report deliberately steps back from the volatility of the daily news cycle in order to provide a more systematic analysis. Professor Riddervold highlighted that the volume brings together leading experts on transatlantic relations, each drawing on extensive scholarly research to offer concise, focused analyses of how the relationship is changing and what these changes imply for Europe. She then outlined the structure of the report, explaining that it is organized around four foundational pillars that have historically underpinned the post-war transatlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and liberal democratic values.

This framework draws on the work of G. John Ikenberry, who conceptualized the “Atlantic order” as resting on these four interlinked pillars, established under US leadership after the Second World War. The first pillar is the security alliance system; the second concerns trade and finance; the third encompasses multilateral institutions and rules; and the fourth consists of shared liberal democratic norms. Professor Riddervold further explained that Ikenberry identified two mutually reinforcing bargains underpinning the relationship. The “realist bargain” involved European acceptance of US leadership in exchange for security guarantees and access to US markets, technology, and resources within an open global economy. The “liberal bargain” linked security and economic openness to shared commitments to multilateralism and democratic governance, institutionalized through NATO, the World Trade Organization, and other international bodies. Together, these arrangements placed transatlantic relations at the core of the broader liberal international order.

Professor Riddervold stressed that the transatlantic relationship has never been based solely on strategic or economic interests. It has also functioned as a security community rooted in shared values, often described as part of the Pax Americana. Although US foreign policy has long been criticized for inconsistencies and double standards, she observed that successive administrations and Congresses prior to Trump broadly shared the conviction that democracies possess a unique capacity for cooperation and that European integration served US as well as European interests.

To capture possible trajectories of change, each chapter in the report distinguishes between three future scenarios. The first is outright disintegration or breakdown of transatlantic relations, potentially affecting one or multiple policy areas, driven by domestic political pressures and structural geopolitical shifts. However, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the relationship is also sustained by deep economic, institutional, and cultural bonds that may help stabilize it even under strain. This recognition led the authors to explore two additional scenarios: a second scenario in which the relationship weakens but “muddles through” via functional adaptation in areas of mutual interest, and a third scenario in which the relationship is redefined and potentially revitalized, for example through external shocks such as war or crisis, or through the emergence of a more united and capable Europe seen as a valuable partner by Washington. She also noted the possibility, explored later in the report, of a redefined transatlantic relationship shaped by right-wing populist convergence.

A Deep and Potentially Durable Rift in Transatlantic Relations

Across all four pillars, the report’s overarching conclusion is stark: transatlantic relations are experiencing what it terms a deep and potentially durable rift. Professor Riddervold identified two main reasons for this assessment. First, weakening is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, institutions, and values—a pattern unprecedented in earlier crises. Second, Trump does not perceive a strong transatlantic relationship as valuable, marking a sharp departure from post-war US policy traditions. Even beyond Trump, she argued, US domestic polarization and shifting strategic priorities mean that a return to previous patterns of relations is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the report also identifies sources of cautious optimism. Several authors highlight functional adjustments that may allow cooperation to persist in specific areas, such as trade frameworks or defense-industrial cooperation linked to increased European defense spending. While the relationship may be weaker, such adaptations could gradually lead to a redefined partnership. Crucially, the report stresses that Europe has agency. When united, Europe possesses the capacity of a global power and can decide which values, institutions, and partnerships it seeks to uphold.

Concluding her presentation, Professor Riddervold summarized the report’s findings in the security and defense domain. Across multiple chapters, the authors argue that transatlantic security relations are entering a “post-American” phase, in which Europe can no longer rely on stable US leadership and must assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Whether the relationship muddles through or weakens further, the implication for Europe is the same: it must strengthen its security, defense, and strategic autonomy, reduce dependence on US military enablers, prepare for potential weakening of NATO commitments, and fully exploit its institutional, budgetary, and legal capacities. She concluded by stressing the need for a more unified and firmer European stance toward Washington before passing the floor to her co-editor for the subsequent sections of the report.

Assoc. Prof. Guri Rosén: Trade, Multilateralism, and the Erosion of the Rules-Based Order

Associate Professor Guri Rosén discusses the report’s analysis of trade and international institutions. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Guri Rosén, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo and Senior Researcher at ARENA – the Centre for European Studies – focused on the sections of the report addressing trade and international institutions. Building on the analytical framework outlined by her co-editor, she emphasized that transatlantic relations have historically rested on shared commitments to liberal trade principles and to rules-based institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). A central conclusion emerging from the report’s trade section, she noted, is that the rise of populism has significantly weakened domestic support for trade liberalization, thereby accelerating a shift—particularly under the Trump administration—toward protectionism, unilateral tariff policies, and a transactional approach that challenges the foundations of the global trading system.

Dr. Rosén explained that the trade section of the report examines several interrelated dynamics: the growing tension between globalization and domestic autonomy, the dual shocks posed by China and the United States to the international trading system, the new disruptions following the second Trump administration, and the broader collapse of the WTO’s authority. She then provided a structured overview of the individual chapters.

The first chapter, authored by Eric Jones of the European University Institute, traces the evolution of the international trade system after the Second World War. Jones highlights the enduring tension between the international division of labor and the need for domestic policy autonomy. He revisits the post-war “embedded liberalism” compromise, which enabled global trade while allowing governments to protect welfare states and manage social dislocation. As globalization deepened, however, capital mobility increasingly overshadowed trade, constraining governments’ policy autonomy and generating domestic discontent—conditions that, Jones argues, have fueled contemporary populist movements. Two key insights emerge from this analysis: first, the existence of a “control dilemma,” reflecting the structural conflict between a globally integrated economy and national social protection; and second, the growing contestation of institutions designed to coordinate economic interdependence. While intended to prevent governments from exporting domestic political problems to one another, such institutions increasingly address politically sensitive issues, reinforcing perceptions that critical decisions are being removed from democratic control.

Against this backdrop, Alasdair Young of the Georgia Institute of Technology examines the drastic shift in US trade policy during Trump’s second term. Young argues that the Trump administration views trade as a zero-sum game in which the European Union is portrayed as benefiting unfairly at America’s expense. From this perspective, the existing EU–US trade framework appears highly fragile, a vulnerability underscored by recent disputes such as those surrounding Greenland. Young emphasizes that the Trump administration has repeatedly returned with new demands even after agreements have been reached, undermining trust and predictability. He raises the question of how the EU should respond, concluding that retaliation would likely inflict comparable economic costs on Europe and the United States. This assessment helps explain why the EU has largely pursued a strategy of waiting out the Trump period while focusing on internal reforms.

The third chapter in the trade section, written by Kent Jones of Babson College, analyzes the breakdown of the multilateral trading system. Dr. Rosén noted that Jones characterizes recent developments as a systemic rupture. The Trump administration, he argues, has abandoned core WTO principles, including the most-favored-nation clause, and has invoked national security exceptions to justify measures aimed primarily at reducing trade deficits. By bypassing WTO dispute settlement mechanisms and imposing discriminatory tariffs, the United States has violated the multilateral norms it once championed. This shift from rule-based governance to transactional bargaining forces the EU to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis rather than relying on treaty-based frameworks.

The final chapter in the trade section, authored by Arlo Poletti of the University of Trieste, examines the political consequences of the “China shock”—the surge of Chinese imports since the early 2000s—on European labor markets and party systems. Poletti argues that this shock has contributed to the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe. As a result, the EU now finds itself constrained between a protectionist United States and an increasingly assertive China, a position made more difficult by Europe’s continued reliance on US security guarantees. Poletti contends that the EU should be prepared to credibly commit to retaliation in response to further US protectionist escalation, while also strengthening relations with other trade partners and fully deploying its expanded economic policy toolkit.

Dr. Rosén acknowledged that there are some differences of emphasis among the authors, but she stressed that their analyses converge on a shared strategic orientation. Taken together, the trade section recommends that the EU build economic strength and resilience while remaining anchored in a rules-based system. This entails prioritizing domestic objectives—growth, employment, and security—through the use of market power and regulatory tools, thereby forming the basis of a more competitive strategic autonomy. At the same time, member states must coordinate more effectively to avoid shifting the costs of globalization onto one another and to prevent a fragmented patchwork of national measures. Diversifying trade and investment ties across regions is also essential to reduce vulnerability to pressure from either the United States or China. Strengthening supply chains, technological capacity, and defense-related industrial bases is presented as integral to this effort, alongside continued engagement to keep the WTO functioning and to update its rules wherever possible.

Managing Multilateral Crisis without Escalation

Turning to the section on international institutions, Dr. Rosén explained that the report analyzes how right-wing populism and the “America First” agenda have disrupted the rules-based international order. While the EU regards multilateralism as central to its identity, the current US administration portrays international institutions as inefficient, elitist, and restrictive of national sovereignty. Mike Smith of the University of Warwick provides a conceptual framework for understanding what he terms a revolutionary assault on established international norms. Smith argues that while the first Trump administration was constrained by limited preparation, Trump’s second term operates with a far more radical and unconstrained agenda. He identifies three strategic options facing the EU: accommodating US demands, standing up to them, or working to build a more resilient form of multilateralism, potentially without US participation.

A further chapter by Edith Drieskens of KU Leuven examines the turbulence confronting the United Nations system. Dr. Rosén noted that a series of US executive orders mandating reviews of international organizations and foreign aid have resulted in severe budget cuts, pushing many UN agencies into survival mode. Organizations such as UNESCO have been singled out for defunding or potential withdrawal, while US support for the Sustainable Development Goals and for diversity and inclusion norms has been curtailed. Drieskens argues that the EU has adopted a cautious posture, refraining from overt criticism of the United States to avoid retaliation in areas such as trade or NATO cooperation.

Climate governance is addressed in a chapter by Daniel Fiorino of American University, who analyzes the consequences of the United States’ second withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. Fiorino argues that the administration has shifted from mitigation toward an “energy emergency” posture, dismantling regulatory constraints on fossil fuel development. While the most immediate effects are domestic, he suggests that US disengagement risks ceding technological and economic leadership in the green transition to Europe and China. From his perspective, the EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to maintain its Green Deal policies while waiting for potential change in the US political cycle.

The final chapter, by Frode Veggeland, examines the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization in 2025. Veggeland argues that global health governance is experiencing turbulence as funding becomes increasingly fragmented and earmarked. In this context, the EU must deepen cooperation with like-minded partners and assume a more prominent role in global health security, potentially filling the vacuum left by US disengagement through coalition-building as a form of soft power.

Dr. Rosén concluded by emphasizing that, across both trade and international institutions, the report’s authors view multilateral frameworks as core instruments of European power and legitimacy. Rather than waiting passively for renewed US engagement, the EU should combine short-term adaptation with selective pushback and long-term institutional strengthening. This approach, she argued, would allow Europe to protect its agency, defend core norms and interests, and contribute to more resilient international institutions capable of withstanding funding shocks, obstruction, and shifting power balances.

Professor Jessica Greenberg: Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership

Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg presents and synthesizes the report’s final section on democratic values. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Jessica Greenberg—Professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and a political and legal anthropologist specializing in Europe, human rights, social movements, democracy, and law—introduced and synthesized the report’s final section on democratic values. She described the report as both rewarding and collaborative to produce alongside her co-editors and contributing authors. She framed her remarks under the title “Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership,” signaling an intention to offer a more forward-looking assessment, even while acknowledging the gravity of the present transatlantic moment.

Professor Greenberg first underscored the methodological distinctiveness of the democratic values section. Unlike the report’s other sections, which are anchored primarily in international relations, political economy, or institutional analysis, this section is heavily shaped by sociological and anthropological approaches to institutions. She observed that democracy and populism are notoriously difficult to define and practice, often triggering a familiar “we know them when we see them” reaction. The aim of the section, she argued, is to move beyond such first-blush recognitions by probing how democracy, liberalism, and rule of law are lived, practiced, and reproduced inside institutions. Populism, in turn, is examined not merely as rhetoric or political style but as a “lifeworld”—an everyday, granular set of perceptions, dispositions, and practices. This emphasis, she explained, is critical for understanding democratic resilience, since democracy and rule of law operate through daily, practice-based dimensions that can be eroded gradually and normalized in subtle ways.

To illustrate the section’s conceptual framing, Professor Greenberg referenced a striking passage by Douglas Holmes, one of the contributors, which characterizes populism as a creative force capable of shaping not only politics but also feelings, thoughts, moods, intimacies, actions, and even perceptions of justice and reality. For Professor Greenberg, this formulation captured the section’s analytical ambition: to understand how populism works from the inside out, at the level where institutions and everyday life intersect.

She then turned to the first two chapters of the section—by Douglas Holmes and Saul Newman—which she described as mapping “populism’s paradoxes.” These chapters, she argued, establish the institutional and cultural terrain on which any effective response to populist capture must be built. Among the key paradoxes is that populist politics often presents itself as anti-elitist, anti-establishment, and anti-institutional, yet simultaneously relies on institutional frameworks at the international and European Union levels and pursues institutional capture domestically. The chapters emphasize that populist actors do not simply confront institutions from the outside; they rework them from within, altering their internal logics and operational “genetic code.” Understanding this reconfiguration, Dr. Greenberg suggested, is indispensable to designing meaningful responses.

A second paradox concerns populism’s relationship to nation and network. Populist politics tends to focus on national frameworks and racialized, homogeneous notions of “the people,” yet it is also increasingly transnational in practice. Populist movements share strategies, repertoires, discourses, and social media memes across borders, producing an internationalized—and in a counterintuitive sense, “cosmopolitan”—populist landscape. A third paradox, as Professor Greenberg presented it, is that populism functions as a critique of liberalism: it directly challenges liberal claims to provide representation, solidarity, care, justice, and inclusive political membership. Recognizing how populism positions itself against liberal institutions is, she argued, central to understanding its appeal and operational power.

Professor Greenberg proceeded to summarize the subsequent chapters, each offering a different window onto the erosion and contestation of democratic values. Reuben Anderson’s chapter, “The Liberal Bargain on Migration: Convergence in Securitizing Borders,” examines how framing migration as a security problem undermines meaningful integration and constrains democratic commitments to pluralism, rule of law, and inclusive governance. Professor Greenberg highlighted Anderson’s analysis of a “two-faced” migration regime on both sides of the Atlantic: migrants are funneled into labor-hungry economies, including through illegalized and exploitable work, while governments simultaneously stage “tough” crackdowns at physical borders and in third countries. The result, Anderson argues, is the expansion of an enforcement industry and a self-reinforcing spiral of securitization, displacing opportunities to address migration rights and labor-market needs in a more transparent and democratic manner.

The following chapter, Robert Benson’s “Illiberal International: The Transatlantic Rights Challenge to Democracy,” develops the theme of transnational far-right mobilization. Professor Greenberg emphasized Benson’s argument that such movements cannot be understood in isolation because they are deeply networked across borders. Think tanks, party foundations, legal advocates, and online platforms form alliances that circulate strategies, legal models, ideological frames, and digital tactics aimed at weakening democratic norms. Professor Greenberg drew attention to Benson’s description of a “transnational ecosystem of distrust” that corrodes confidence in electoral integrity, journalism, and scientific expertise. In her account, the chapter portrays this as intentional, organized, sophisticated, and strategically coordinated—requiring both place-based countermeasures and broader transnational coordination.

The final chapter in the section, by Albena Azmanova, centers on precarity and democratic resilience. Professor Greenberg presented this chapter as demonstrating how inequality, social vulnerability, and the affordability crisis fuel distrust in government and create fertile ground for grievance politics. She suggested that Azmanova’s analysis reinforces a core implication running through the section: robust social welfare policies are not peripheral to democratic stability but central to it. In this view, social policy is a key component of democratic resilience and a substantive counter-politics to populist mobilization.

The Transatlantic Alliance “As We Know It” Is Effectively Over

Having summarized the chapters, Professor Greenberg widened the lens to offer concluding reflections that also drew together threads from the report’s other sections. She argued that the transatlantic alliance “as we know it” is effectively over, citing President Trump’s threats to invade Greenland and the possibility that NATO itself could be destabilized. In her formulation, Trump’s repudiation of multilateral cooperation in trade and security, rejection of rule of law domestically and international law abroad, and nativist political stance collectively undermine the foundational commitments of the post-war alliance. The United States, she argued, has replaced cooperation and liberal trade with zero-sum protectionism and tariffs, while Trump’s disdain for democracy and global legal order finds affinity with populist forces on both sides of the Atlantic.

Yet Professor Greenberg also insisted on a crucial counterpoint: the alliance was never merely a technocratic handshake among bureaucrats. It was a living set of commitments that provided institutional architecture for multilateral cooperation, created pathways to respect sovereignty while binding national interests through shared visions of peace and security, and linked prosperity to democratic participation, human rights, constitutional guarantees, and equality. She invoked the breadth of actors who helped realize these commitments—from local communities and policymakers to human rights advocates and entrepreneurs—turning abstract principles into lived realities.

From this diagnosis, Professor Greenberg drew a stark strategic imperative: as long as Donald Trump remains president, he will continue to destabilize whatever trust remains in the decades-long alliance, and Europe cannot afford to wait, minimize the danger, or adopt a posture of denial. Europe, she argued, must “go it alone,” and it must act immediately. While she acknowledged that calls for a more unified Europe are not new, she argued that far more specificity is needed, and that the report’s four-pillar framework remains a useful guide for action. The EU, she maintained, is well positioned to lead in international cooperation, trade, security, and democratic values—if it consolidates internal integration, strengthens economic and financial coordination, and takes a firmer, more coherent line toward Washington beyond appeasement and passive wait-and-see strategies.

Professor Greenberg emphasized that the EU possesses political and financial leverage and should be prepared to use it. The United States, she argued, needs a unified EU in responding to Russia and China, in both security and trade, which positions Europe to advance strategic autonomy while serving as the most credible partner for strengthened bilateral and plurilateral arrangements. She reiterated themes of the report’s security recommendations: a more coherent long-term European security strategy, a stronger European defense industrial base, and more predictable support and guarantees for Ukraine—combined with careful management of relations with China and other partners. Strength, flexibility, and conviction, she argued, must guide the EU’s posture, enabling it to seize opportunities for cooperation when aligned interests arise—even as the United States becomes less reliable.

At the domestic level, Professor Greenberg echoed the report’s emphasis on prioritizing internal policy goals and using the EU’s market power and regulatory tools to support growth, jobs, and security at home, while avoiding race-to-the-bottom dynamics that reward fragmentation. Such an approach, she argued, would foster unity and build collective solutions to shared challenges—from precarity and public health to climate crisis. She also underscored the importance of sustaining international institutions as central to European power, legitimacy, and interests, with multilateral networks promoting rule-setting, transparency, and democratic procedures.

Finally, Professor Greenberg returned to the normative core of her section: a unified Europe must be defined by reasoned action and a strong ethical foundation. Democracy, pluralism, and rule of law cannot function as afterthoughts or merely procedural commitments. In her assessment, EU approaches to precarity, migration, and climate have at times reflected backsliding or even capitulation to populist pressures. Across the report, she noted, experts emphasize the necessity of confronting inequality, affordability crises, and institutional distrust if Europe is to lead democratically. Values, she concluded, must be made credible through concrete action: rule-of-law commitments, inclusion, human-rights-compliant migration, and renewed commitments to sustainability, health, and well-being across both urban and rural spaces.

In Professor Greenberg’s closing argument, Europe cannot outpace populist “shock and awe” tactics—rapid policy shifts, disregard for legal norms, and conspiratorial narratives designed to overwhelm and demobilize. Instead, Europe must counter destabilization with substance, endurance, clear communication, pragmatic hope, and institutional leadership. She ended on a horizon of conditional optimism: if Europe acts now to uphold the promise of the broken alliance, it can preserve a democratic home to which a future United States might one day return.

Q&A Session

Audience members pose questions during the panel’s Q&A session. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

The Q&A session opened with an intervention by Robert Benson, affiliated with the Center for American Progress (CAP), who posed two interrelated questions to the editors and panelists. First, he observed that the discussion had not drawn a clear analytical distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism and asked whether populism could function as an emancipatory political force—or even as a potential antidote to the form of populism associated with the Trump White House. Referencing ongoing debates within the US Democratic Party, Benson framed the issue as a strategic dilemma between more radical or more centrist political pathways.

His second question addressed the apparent contradiction inherent in transnational nationalism. Benson queried how nationalist parties such as Germany’s AfD could simultaneously align with the Trump administration and with counterparts like France’s National Rally, given nationalism’s ostensibly inward-looking logic. He suggested that such alliances might be better understood as instrumental rather than ideological, serving common ends such as profiteering, corruption, and the extraction of political or economic concessions from a fragmented Europe—an interpretation he linked to recent US national security thinking.

Responding first, Jessica Greenberg emphasized that, for the purposes of the report, the key analytical takeaway was not the normative distinction between left- and right-wing populism, but the observable political energy generated by both. She noted that populist movements across the ideological spectrum have mobilized significant loyalty, grassroots participation, and youth engagement, effectively capturing a sense of renewed citizenship and political agency. Greenberg argued that liberal democratic institutions cannot afford to relinquish this mobilizing capacity, stressing that liberalism must inspire hope and engagement rather than operate solely as a reactive force.

The second response came from Riccardo Alcaro, who addressed the question of transnational nationalist convergence. He argued that while alliances between nationalist parties and the Trump administration are inherently unstable, they persist because of a shared understanding of political enemies—primarily internal rather than external. This convergence, he suggested, transforms transatlantic relations from a strategic partnership into a politicized and ideologized framework. In such a configuration, transatlantic ties serve less to advance shared interests than to legitimize domestic political struggles against migrants, liberal institutions, and perceived “globalist” elites, a dynamic with particularly far-reaching implications for Europe.

The second round of the Q&A session was initiated by Kristo Anastasov, who framed his intervention from a geopolitical and historical perspective. Commending the panel for avoiding an exclusively ideological reading of contemporary transatlantic tensions, he argued that the report compellingly invited deeper engagement. Anastasov contrasted the current political landscape in the United States—characterized, in his view, by the existence of “two American nations” and a level of polarization historically associated with civil conflict—with the European situation. Despite the rise of populism and persistent divisions, he maintained that Europe continues to rest on a cross-ideological basis of consensus that prevents systemic rupture, with Hungary standing as a partial exception rather than the rule.

From this perspective, Anastasov suggested that Europe’s strategic task is not to replicate the American experience but to position itself as a stabilizing counterpoint—restoring damaged transatlantic links where possible while simultaneously forging new ones. He cited the European response to the Greenland crisis as illustrative of both strengths and weaknesses in Europe’s approach. On the one hand, Europe demonstrated unity and institutional capacity; on the other, he argued that hesitation—such as the decision not to seize frozen Russian assets held in Belgium—was interpreted by the Trump administration as weakness, prompting renewed rhetorical escalation. By contrast, Anastasov pointed to initiatives such as the Mercosur agreement and negotiations with India as examples of effective demonstrations of European strength, though he lamented that these efforts had been partially undermined by internal institutional delays. He concluded by asserting that appeasement and coexistence are ineffective in dealing with a deal-breaking counterpart, insisting that consistency and credible displays of strength are essential.

Responding, Marianne Riddervold thanked Anastasov for his remarks and for encouraging engagement with the report. She reiterated that the report’s objective was precisely to provide a systematic, conceptually grounded analysis rather than reactive commentary. Riddervold emphasized that all contributing authors converge on the recommendation that Europe must act firmly and collectively. At the same time, she acknowledged the structural dilemma facing Europe: persistent dependencies on the United States, particularly in security and defense, necessitate continued cooperation even as Europe works to reduce those dependencies. She noted that the Trump administration’s tendency to conflate trade and security—such as linking trade negotiations to Ukraine—poses an unprecedented challenge. Nevertheless, she observed that the European Union has demonstrated increasing speed and cohesion in responding to successive crises. While acknowledging delays and internal disagreements, she characterized the EU as an exceptionally flexible system capable of adapting creatively within its legal framework, including through partial or staged implementation of contested agreements.

Guri Rosén added that divergences among the report’s authors reflect real strategic tensions rather than analytical weakness. Some contributors stress the importance of demonstrating strength and leadership, while others argue that a “wait-it-out” strategy minimizes economic and political costs. Rosén argued that the report’s four-pillar framework—security, trade, institutions, and values—reveals the necessity of integrated thinking across policy domains. The central challenge for Europe, she concluded, lies not only in responding to external pressures but also in overcoming internal coordination difficulties. Determining whether to assert strength or exercise restraint ultimately depends on evaluating Europe’s collective interests across all sectors simultaneously, rather than in isolation.

The third round of the Q&A broadened the discussion to questions of strategy, narrative, internal European divisions, and the structural meaning of contemporary populism. Sandra Kaduri opened by asking whether a political tipping point might be emerging in the United States and whether European actors were fully exploiting this moment. Referring to subnational engagement at the most recent COP in Brazil—where over one hundred US governors and officials participated—she suggested that Europe might bypass the Trump administration by engaging more systematically with American actors beyond the federal executive. Kaduri also emphasized the potential of public opinion, polling, and values-based communication, arguing that majorities remain concerned about polarization and receptive to democratic norms, and questioning whether existing opportunities for narrative leadership were being missed.

A related intervention came from Becky Slack, who welcomed the report’s attention to framing and narrative. She posed a practical question regarding implementation: how the report’s recommendations on narrative could be operationalized, and which actors—political, institutional, or societal—would need to serve as partners in translating analytical insights into concrete communicative strategies capable of reducing polarization and strengthening democracy.

Reinhard Heinisch shifted the focus inward, challenging what he perceived as an overly homogeneous portrayal of Europe. He asked the panel to address persistent divisions between Eastern and Western Europe, their interaction with transatlantic relations, and the extent to which the United States might exploit these internal fractures—alongside what Europe could do to mitigate such vulnerabilities.

Offering a reflective comment rather than a direct question, Douglas Holmes introduced a historical and anthropological perspective. Drawing on his long experience interviewing Members of the European Parliament, he cautioned against linear or moralized readings of history. Holmes noted the paradox that the framers of the US Constitution—figures he described provocatively as religious fanatics and populists—produced one of the world’s most liberal political documents. From this, he suggested that the current moment may also contain unexpected possibilities, and he concluded by characterizing Trumpism less as an expression of American strength than of systemic weakness—an interpretation he offered as a potential source of strategic confidence.

Responding on behalf of the panel, MEP Radan Kanev addressed several of the themes raised. He argued that cooperation among European nationalist forces presents a greater challenge for those actors themselves than alignment with American dominance. Illustrating this point, he recounted the Romanian elections, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s support for a Romanian far-right candidate backfired, alienating ethnic Hungarian voters and inadvertently strengthening a liberal candidate. Such missteps, Kanev suggested, are likely to recur in attempts to build a coherent “nationalist international.”

At the same time, Kanev warned that history offers many examples of nationalist leaders willingly subordinating themselves to stronger external powers, citing Vichy France as a paradigmatic case. He expressed particular concern about Eastern Europe, where post-communist power structures have normalized dependency, making alignment with distant American power appear safer than genuine sovereignty.

Kanev concluded with a controversial but central argument: building a strong Europe requires distinguishing between nationalist and populist actors based not on ideological sympathy, but on their commitment to an independent Europe. Given the fragmentation of today’s political landscape and the erosion of traditional grand coalitions, he argued that European consensus-building must expand beyond familiar alliances to include Greens and selected conservative forces unwilling to act as external proxies—an inherently difficult but unavoidable task for Europe’s political future

Conclusion

The ECPS panel at the European Parliament underscored a central and sobering conclusion: transatlantic relations are no longer governed by inherited assumptions of stability, convergence, or automatic solidarity. The re-election of Donald Trump has not merely revived earlier tensions but has accelerated a deeper structural shift in which populism, domestic polarization, and transactional power politics increasingly define the terms of engagement. As the discussions repeatedly emphasized, this transformation affects not only external relations between Europe and the United States, but also the internal cohesion, democratic resilience, and strategic self-understanding of the European Union itself.

Across the panel, a clear analytical consensus emerged around three interlinked insights. First, the weakening of transatlantic relations is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—an unprecedented convergence of pressures that cannot be addressed through isolated or short-term fixes. Second, Europe retains agency. While it cannot shape US domestic politics, it can determine whether fragmentation, dependency, and narrative passivity define its response, or whether unity, strategic autonomy, and institutional leadership prevail. Third, populism must be understood not only as a political style or ideology, but as a governing logic capable of reshaping institutions from within, eroding norms gradually, and normalizing democratic backsliding unless actively countered.

The report and the panel discussions converge on the necessity of moving beyond reactive “muddling through.” Strengthening European defense capacity, asserting regulatory sovereignty, reinforcing multilateral institutions, and addressing socioeconomic precarity are not parallel agendas but mutually reinforcing dimensions of democratic resilience. Equally, narrative and coalition-building emerged as indispensable tools: Europe’s response must speak not only to elites and institutions, but to publics increasingly vulnerable to polarization, distrust, and grievance politics.

Ultimately, the panel framed the current moment not as the end of transatlantic cooperation, but as the end of its taken-for-granted form. The future relationship—if it is to endure—will depend on a more autonomous, coherent, and values-grounded Europe capable of engaging the United States as a partner when possible, resisting it when necessary, and leading where leadership is absent. The challenge, as the report makes clear, is no longer whether Europe should act, but whether it can act decisively enough, and soon enough, to shape the order emerging around it.

Report2025-3

Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options 

Please cite as:

Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00140

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“Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options” is a comprehensive ECPS report examining how the resurgence of right-wing populism—most notably under Donald Trump’s second presidency—reshapes the foundations of EU–US relations. Bringing together leading scholars, the report analyses the erosion of trust and shared norms across four pillars of the Atlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. It shows how domestic polarisation and illiberal trends now pose deeper, longer-term challenges than traditional diplomatic disputes. Combining theoretical insight with concrete policy recommendations, the volume outlines how the European Union can adapt strategically to a more volatile partner while defending multilateralism, democratic principles, and European strategic autonomy. An essential resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners navigating a changing transatlantic landscape.

The report offers a timely and comprehensive examination of how contemporary populism is reshaping one of the most consequential relationships in global politics. Published by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), it brings together leading scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to assess the structural impact of right-wing populism—most visibly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—on EU–US relations.

In this project, ECPS collaborates with the ARENA at the University of Oslo, the European Union Center at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, IES at the University of California, Berkeley, and CES at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The report is partially funded by the Jean Monnet-TANDEM and Transat-Defence Projects.

Moving beyond episodic diplomatic disputes, the report advances a central argument: the most serious long-term threat to transatlantic cooperation today stems from domestic political transformations. Rising polarisation, illiberal democratic practices, and populist challenges to multilateralism on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly undermine the shared norms and institutional foundations that have sustained the postwar Atlantic order. In this context, transatlantic relations are no longer strained merely by diverging interests, but by a growing clash over values, rules, and the meaning of democracy itself.

Analytically, the report is anchored in a four-pillar framework—security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—derived from the liberal foundations of the Atlantic political order. Each section combines historical perspective with forward-looking analysis, examining how populist governance affects NATO and European security, rules-based trade and the WTO, multilateral institutions such as the UN and WHO, and the liberal-democratic norms that once underpinned mutual trust. Across these domains, contributors identify patterns of erosion, adaptation, and selective cooperation, highlighting a shift toward a more transactional, fragmented, and unstable relationship. Overall, the EU–US relationship is entering a phase best described as “muddling through”: selective cooperation where interests align, paired with growing divergence elsewhere.

While acknowledging areas of continued collaboration, the authors emphasise that any future stability will depend less on restoring past arrangements than on Europe’s capacity to adapt strategically without abandoning its commitment to multilateralism, democracy, and the rule of law.

The report concludes with detailed, policy-oriented recommendations aimed at EU institutions and member states. These include strengthening European strategic autonomy, reinforcing democratic resilience, investing in defence and industrial capacity, and building new coalitions to sustain global governance in an era of populist disruption. As such, the volume serves not only as an analytical diagnosis of a transatlantic relationship at a crossroads, but also as a practical guide for navigating an increasingly contested international order.

Please see the Introduction, 17 chapters, and Conclusion of the report presented separately below.

Introduction

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg


SECTION 1: SECURITY

Chapter 1: Overview and Background: Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US-European Relations

By Riccardo Alcaro

 

Chapter 2: Functional Adaptation without much Love: NATO and the Strains of EU–US Relations

By Monika Sus

 

Chapter 3: EU-US-China Security Relations

By Reuben Wong

 

Chapter 4: The Russia-Ukraine War and Transatlantic Relations

By Jost-Henrik Morgenstern-Pomorski & Karolina Pomorska

 

SECTION 2: TRADE

Chapter 5: Overview and background: Transatlantic Trade from Embedded Liberalism to Competitive Strategic Autonomy

By Erik Jones

 

Chapter 6: EU-US-China Trade Relations

By Arlo Poletti

 

Chapter 7: From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration

By Alasdair Young

 

Chapter 8: Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization

By Kent Jones

 

SECTION 3: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter 9: Overview and Background: International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations

By Mike Smith

 

Chapter 10: The United Nations in the Age of American Transactionalism

By Edith Drieskens

 

Chapter 11: The Trump Administration and Climate Policy: The Effects of Right-wing Populism

By Daniel Fiorino

 

Chapter 12: Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU-United States Cooperation during a Changing International Order

By Frode Veggeland

 

SECTION 4: DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Chapter 13: Overview and background: Democracy and Populism — The European Case

By Douglas Holmes

 

Chapter 14: Illiberalism and Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Transatlantic Relations

By Saul Newman

 

Chapter 15: The Illiberal Bargain on Migration

By Ruben Andersson

Chapter 16: Illiberal international: The Transatlantic Right’s Challenge to Democracy

By Robert Benson

 

Chapter 17: Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity

By Albena Azmanova

 

Conclusion: How Should the EU Deal with Changing Transatlantic Relations?

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg

 

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Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—symbolizing strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Photo: Sameer Chogale.

Pax Americana to Pax Silica: Strategic Shifts in US Security Policy

From Pax Americana to Pax Silica, US grand strategy is undergoing a quiet but consequential transformation. In this timely commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar argues that recent US security documents—the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act—signal a shift away from global stewardship toward a selective, technology-centered, and leverage-driven order. Rather than underwriting international rules and alliances, Washington is increasingly exercising power through control over strategic technologies, supply chains, and infrastructural chokepoints—a model Dr. Chahar conceptualizes as Pax Silica. This reorientation prioritizes hemispheric consolidation, technological dominance, and transactional partnerships over normative leadership. For partners such as India, the implications are profound: engagement remains valuable but conditional, reinforcing the logic of strategic autonomy, calibrated cooperation, and multi-alignment in a fragmented global order.

By Prerna Chahar*

What is unfolding in US security policy is neither isolationism nor traditional internationalism, but a selective strategy centered on leverage, technology, and regional primacy. American grand strategy is undergoing a quiet yet consequential transformation one that redefines how power is exercised, how partnerships are valued, and how international order is sustained. Recent US strategic documents, the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) point to a decisive shift away from managing global order toward consolidating national advantage, with far-reaching implications for allies and partners.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), published on December 4, 2025, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, signed into law on December 18, 2025, together confirm that the era of Pax Americana characterized by institutional stewardship, alliance management, and normative leadership is giving way to a more selective, technology-centered, and transactional order. This emerging configuration may be described as Pax Silica: an order grounded less in alliances and rules and more in control over technology, supply chains, and strategic chokepoints.

NSS and NDAA: Reframing US Grand Strategy

The framing of the NSS 2025 itself signals a deliberate break from earlier approaches to American grand strategy. Four recurring themes encapsulate this reorientation.

First, the strategy explicitly rejects “old policies,” portraying past commitments to liberal internationalism, open-ended multilateralism, and interventionism as having diluted US sovereignty, weakened economic resilience, and overstretched strategic focus. This narrative of rupture legitimizes a more restrained and interest-driven approach to global engagement.

Second, the NSS defines what America wants with unusual clarity. Rather than emphasizing the maintenance of international order, it articulates bounded national priorities border security, economic nationalism, technological dominance, and hemispheric stability. Global leadership is no longer treated as an intrinsic responsibility but as a derivative of clearly specified national interests.

Third, both the NSS and the NDAA foreground American strength in material rather than normative terms. The NDAA 2026 authorizes over $900 billion in national defense funding, making it one of the largest defense policy bills in recent history. This level of spending underscores a sustained emphasis on military readiness, industrial capacity, and technological superiority. Military capability, innovation ecosystems, industrial depth, and technological leadership take precedence over values-based diplomacy, institutional rule-making, or normative influence.

The NDAA further operationalizes this shift through enhanced cybersecurity authorities, frameworks for the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence and machine-learning systems and strengthened protections for US Cyber Command and digital infrastructure. It also expands authorities related to airspace security and counter-unmanned aerial systems under provisions such as the Safer Skies Act broadening civil and federal counter-drone capabilities. Together, these measures reflect the logic of Pax Silica, in which control over technology and infrastructure replaces institutional stewardship as the primary currency of influence.

Fourth, the NSS report clarifies the renewed strategic focus on the Western Hemisphere. While global competition remains important, the strategy prioritizes hemispheric stability, border control, migration management, and economic dominance within the Americas. This represents a modernized revival of Monroe Doctrine logic, where securing influence in the immediate neighborhood is treated as foundational to national security. Engagement beyond the hemisphere is increasingly selective and interest-driven, filtered through considerations of domestic security, economic resilience, and technological advantage rather than assumptions of automatic leadership. The NDAA reinforces this orientation by prioritizing resources for homeland protection, maritime domain awareness in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and defense readiness tied to territorial security. Together, these documents signal a shift from global managerial ambitions toward consolidation of power closer to home.

Taken collectively, these elements reflect a fundamental strategic reorientation. Rather than presenting the United States as the custodian of international order, the NSS positions it as a state intent on consolidating advantage, preserving autonomy, and exercising leverage. This underscores the durability of what may be termed the Trump Corollary: the notion that alliances, institutions, and global engagements are instruments to be justified by tangible returns rather than commitments sustained for systemic stability or normative leadership.

US ‘Pax Silica’: Renewed Instrument of Power

Within this hemispheric and technological reorientation, Pax Silica captures the defining feature of the emerging order: power exercised through technological and infrastructural dominance rather than institutional rule-making. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, digital platforms, and financial networks now constitute the backbone of strategic competition. Control over access to these systems enables coercion and influence without overt force.

Edward Fishman, in his book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, demonstrates how American power increasingly operates through the regulation of markets, technology flows, and supply chains, an approach clearly visible in export controls, investment screening, and technology-denial regimes embedded in both the NSS and the NDAA. Unlike Pax Americana, which relied on openness, predictability, and alliance cohesion, Pax Silica is exclusionary and conditional. Cooperation is granted rather than guaranteed; access replaces inclusion as the principal mechanism of influence.

The most consequential aspect of this transition is the decoupling of power from stewardship. The United States remains pre-eminent, but it no longer seeks to underwrite global order as a public good. Instead, it prioritizes regional consolidation, technological control, and transactional leverage. This is not withdrawal, but re-hierarchization: the Western Hemisphere first, strategic technologies second, and global commitments contingent on domestic advantage.

Implications for India

The renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere carries important implications for India. While the Indo-Pacific remains relevant, it is no longer the singular organizing theatre of US grand strategy. Engagement in Asia is increasingly shaped by cost-benefit calculations and capability contributions rather than long-term commitments to regional order. For India, this creates both opportunity and uncertainty. Reduced ideological pressure allows greater strategic autonomy, but transactional partnerships demand constant negotiation. Cooperation in defense, technology, and supply-chain resilience particularly in semiconductors and critical technologies remains valuable yet inherently conditional. India’s participation in groupings such as the Quad must therefore be understood as calibrated engagement rather than alignment, reinforcing the logic of multi-alignment and diversification.

Conclusion

The shift from Pax Americana to Pax Silica reflects a profound transformation in US statecraft. The renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, combined with technological competition and transactional diplomacy, marks a move away from global stewardship toward selective, leverage-based power. For partners such as India, the challenge is to engage without illusion cooperating where interests converge, hedging where vulnerabilities emerge, and sustaining strategic autonomy in a world where leadership is fragmented and power is increasingly exercised through control rather than consensus.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations with published research on US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, regional coalition-building, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CCUS&LAS), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Emblem of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the ‘End of History’ to the ‘End of a Fiction’: What Davos 2026 Really Announced

Davos 2026 revealed a global order no longer converging on a single liberal model, but sliding into a harsher era in which power increasingly outweighs rules and “integration” is reframed as vulnerability. The most striking paradox was that this diagnosis came not from critics at the margins, but from the system’s own architects—transforming elite “candor” into a strategy for managing declining legitimacy. In a world shaped by fragmentation and coercive interdependence, China’s state-capitalist model is increasingly perceived as a more effective crisis-response framework, while the United States and Europe drift toward a troubling hybrid: adopting not China’s developmental strengths, but its coercive instruments of control. This dynamic reflects an emerging logic of reverse convergence—the West is no longer guiding the world toward liberalism, but being pulled toward the governance style of its principal rival.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Davos platform can be seen as a stage where dominant actors test narratives, identify legitimacy losses, and modify the public vocabulary they use to govern (or justify governing). It rarely makes formal decisions; instead, it indicates what elites believe they can still publicly defend—and what they can no longer convincingly pretend. Davos 2026, in that sense, can be viewed less as a policy summit and more as a diagnosis of the regime.

In this context, Davos 2026 is significant because the words spoken inside the room seemed less like a reaffirmation of the post-1990 liberal-global order and more like an early draft of its obituary. Larry Fink, Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and CEO of BlackRock—one of the world’s largest asset managers—started with a blunt admission that the world trusts Davos and the WEF’s ability to shape the future “far less,” warning that the forum risks seeming “out of step with the moment: elites in an age of populism” (Fink, 2026). Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, took it even further. He suggested that the problem isn’t just declining trust in institutions; it’s the collapse of the narrative foundations of the “rules-based liberal multilateral order” itself. He described “the end of a pleasant fiction… and the beginning of a harsh reality,” emphasizing that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition” (Carney, 2026).

If anything was “announced,” then it was not a new treaty or a coordinated policy package. It was an elite confession: the old legitimating story no longer works.

What Exactly Is Ending?

The natural questions—What was declared at Davos? Is it the end of the Western system? Is Chinese-style state capitalism rising? —are the right ones. But they require careful separation of the West as power from the West as ideology, and of neoliberal globalization from liberal democracy. What seems to be ending is not “the West” as a geographical or civilizational fact, but a historically specific settlement—visible in three interlocking dimensions.

The end of the convergence myth: One part of the story traces back to assumptions about nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization. Classical modernization thinking regarded history as a linear, stage-like process where societies would converge toward a single “advanced” model through diffusion, emulation, and integration—so that cross-civilizational differences would eventually appear as “time lags,” not alternative paths (Apter, 1965; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rostow, 1960). In that framework, modernity was not just one option among many; it was seen as the expected endpoint of development.

Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis—initially presented as an essay and later expanded into a book—was a late-twentieth-century extension of this modernization perspective (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). After the fall of Soviet-style planning, liberal capitalism seemed not just victorious but final: no significant systemic challengers remained, and future conflicts were seen as minor issues rather than real alternatives.

Davos 2026, however, seemed to quietly acknowledge that this convergence theory has run its course. After decades of “learning-by-doing” globalization, the idea that marketization, integration, and digitization would inevitably lead to liberal-democratic outcomes has become less convincing. Among many others, Öztürk (2025) calls this a fundamental “liberal fallacy,” revealed by post-2008 stagnation, growing inequality, and the resilience of authoritarian governance under capitalist conditions.

The decline of the authority of the “rules-based order” (as performance): A second aspect involves the public authority of institutional rules. Carney’s remarks illustrated a familiar phenomenon: states show belief in a rules-based order—displaying the “sign” publicly—while privately recognizing how often the rules break down in practice (Carney, 2026). His metaphor strongly mirrors Václav Havel’s assessment of late-socialist legitimacy: the system’s survival relied on ritualistic compliance and public participation in an official fiction, even when no one truly believed it (Havel, 1978).

In modern global politics, this is the credibility crisis of liberal internationalism: the rules exist, but enforcement seems selective; the universal language stays, but power distribution shapes outcomes. This is exactly where realism comes back—sometimes openly, sometimes disguised as “values-based pragmatism.”

The end of elite capitalism’s moral economy: Third, Davos 2026 hosted a legitimacy check on elite-led capitalism itself. Fink’s insistence that prosperity cannot be reduced to total GDP gains or stock-market success implicitly admits what critics have argued for decades: growth narratives do not automatically generate social approval when the distribution of wealth is unfair, public services decline, and opportunities disappear (Fink, 2026; Piketty, 2020).

This line closely mirrors Robert F. Kennedy’s well-known critique of national income accounting, asserting that GDP can measure “everything… except that which makes life worthwhile” (Kennedy, 1968). What once seemed like fresh wisdom at Davos in 2026 now appears as delayed recognition: a long-overdue admission that the legitimacy of capitalism cannot rely solely on aggregate indicators. Taken together, these three dimensions do not imply “the end of the West.” They signify the end of the West’s story about itself—the self-description of a system that universalizes its model as destiny, naturalizes its institutions as neutral rules, and considers legitimacy to be the automatic result of growth. Historically, when a hegemonic story collapses, systems rarely vanish overnight; instead, they change and adapt.

The Crisis of Corporate Capitalism as a Reflection of the System

Öztürk’s (2025) “reverse convergence” hypothesis provides one of the clearest ways to interpret Davos 2026. It avoids two lazy conclusions— (1) “China is replacing the West,” and (2) “nothing changes; it’s only noise”—by arguing that the direction of convergence has reversed. Liberal democracies are increasingly adopting illiberal governance techniques (expanded surveillance, executive discretion, securitized policy frames, controlled pluralism), while authoritarian regimes are adopting capitalist tools (market mechanisms, technological dynamism, corporate scale) without liberalizing. This is not ideological convergence through persuasion. It is functional convergence driven by systemic pressure.

Here, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” becomes central: disembedded markets cause social division and political backlash, but the protective countermovement can be seized—redirected into nationalist, exclusionary, or authoritarian forms instead of democratic re-embedding (Polanyi, 1944). Fernand Braudel’s distinction is also important: capitalism is not the same as competitive markets; it is often a structure of lasting domination shielded from democratic accountability (Braudel, 1982, 1984).

Add the modern layer of digital political economy. The tools of governance increasingly function through infrastructures of data extraction, algorithmic control, and dependency rather than through persuasion or consent. This is the shared domain of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), vectoral power and information monopolies (Wark, 2004, 2019), and “techno-feudal” rent extraction via digital platforms and cloud infrastructures (Varoufakis, 2023). In this view, Davos 2026 was not just a geopolitical event; it also revealed that corporate capitalism has created a legitimacy gap that traditional liberal narratives can no longer fill.

When Fink’s speech is analyzed through the perspectives of Polanyi and Braudel, it seems to outline a plan to restore legitimacy. He urged the WEF to “regain trust,” boost participation, and modernize the language used to defend capitalism (Fink, 2026). Even if the diagnosis is sound, the messenger presents a problem. The contradiction is structural: the credibility crisis he describes is closely linked to the financial and corporate structures that BlackRock represents. When the “doctor” is also one of the system’s most powerful beneficiaries, criticism is often seen as mere damage control by elites rather than genuine reformist bravery. 

Fink also emphasized that prosperity must become distributive, turning “more people into owners of growth,” not spectators (Fink, 2026). Yet this is where Davos rhetoric regularly stalls: it acknowledges the legitimacy problem but often proposes solutions at the level of communication rather than at the level of reconstruction. The 2026 shift, then, is not the defense of globalization’s moral premise; it is an attempt to rewrite capitalism’s legitimacy contract amid mass distrust.

A key concern running through the Davos discussions about AI is anxiety. The worry is that AI will repeat the distributional betrayal of globalization: early benefits go to owners of data, compute, models, and platforms, while the social costs are spread out to others. Without strong redistribution and governance, AI risks being less of a productivity leap and more of a new enclosure system—worsening dependence instead of expanding opportunities (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023).

From Benign Interdependence to Fortress Logic

Carney’s intervention was more impactful because it explicitly addressed what “trust” rhetoric often overlooks: the geopolitical and geoeconomic rupture of the rules-based order. His speech repeatedly suggested that the liberal promise of mutual interdependence has run its course. Integration can become a source of vulnerability and subjugation, leading states to pursue strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains (Carney, 2026).

At one point, Carney invoked a brutally realistic moral: “the strong can do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” The phrase echoes the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides—a canonical statement of power politics rationality (Thucydides, trans. 1972). The significance is not the originality of the reference; it is that Davos discourse now treats such realism as publicly speakable.

This is where “weaponized interdependence” becomes relevant: network power can be transformed into coercion when states or firms control critical chokepoints in finance, infrastructure, trade, and digital platforms (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Carney’s prescription—strategic autonomy or a “world of fortresses”—is therefore less a nationalist shift than an acknowledgment that global integration is no longer seen as harmless.

Seen from the broader perspective of globalization discourse, Davos 2026 signifies a significant reversal of the assumptions that characterized the early 2000s. Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat summarized the era’s belief that digital connectivity and integrated supply chains were “flattening” the world into a more open, opportunity-filled, and ultimately convergent space (Friedman, 2005). Two decades later, David J. Lynch’s The World’s Worst Bet reads like an obituary for that optimism: globalization now seems less like a benign force for shared prosperity and more like a risky gamble that has weakened industrial resilience, increased inequality, empowered strategic competitors, and fueled political backlash in the West (Lynch, 2025). The transition from “flatness” to “worst bet” reflects the same shift Carney now describes in geopolitical terms: integration is no longer assumed to be mutually beneficial; it is increasingly viewed as a potential pathway to dependence, coercion, and subjugation (Carney, 2026; Friedman, 2005; Lynch, 2025).

This closely aligns with Amitav Acharya’s argument that the liberal “rules-based order” was never entirely universal; it functioned as a Western-centered system with selective membership and inconsistent enforcement. What follows, according to Acharya, is not just “multipolarity,” but a decentralized “multiplex” world—more diverse, more contested, and less controlled by a single hegemon (Acharya, 2017; Acharya, 2018). Even defenders sympathetic to the liberal order acknowledge its historically Western core and its expansion after the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2008, 2018). 

Davos 2026, therefore, seemed like a moment when elites started speaking more openly than before about a world they can no longer describe as heading toward a single institutional model. However, there is a deeper contradiction at Davos: many of the harshest critiques in 2026 were made not by independent critics but by the system’s own architects—CEOs, senior officials, and high-level political leaders. This doesn’t invalidate their diagnosis, but it should change how we interpret it: what looks like honesty may also be a form of preemptive storytelling, a controlled version of systemic self-criticism aimed at maintaining core power structures while giving rhetorical ground.

The US–EU–China Triangle: Three Paths, One Convergent Pressure

Against this backdrop, the question facing mainstream systems is no longer just whether globalization can be “fixed,” but which governance model is increasingly seen as the better response to a high-stress world full of uncertainty, fragmentation, and coercive interdependence. Under conditions of heightened geopolitical competition, supply-chain insecurity, volatility in energy and food, and rapid technological rivalry, the focus is quietly shifting toward the idea that China’s model—often called socialist state capitalism—may provide faster, more disciplined, and more strategically coordinated solutions than the liberal market approach, mainly because it can mobilize resources, direct finance, and prioritize long-term national goals. In this context, Davos 2026 didn’t just expose a legitimacy crisis; it also pointed to a growing competition over “effective modernity,” where resilience and the ability to command are beginning to matter more than openness and procedural legitimacy.

Indeed, an even more concerning sign is emerging from within the West itself: leading trends in the United States and the European Union increasingly indicate that what they are taking from China is not its potentially positive strengths—such as developmental coordination or strategic industrial policy—but rather its negative governance traits: securitization, surveillance expansion, executive centralization, and the normalization of emergency-style rule. This creates a growing zone of hybridization, where liberal democracies preserve electoral rituals while gradually adopting illiberal techniques of control and exclusion. In other words, the West seems to be entering a phase of reverse convergence—a process where the “center” shifts toward the logic of its challenger, often in its most coercive forms—a dynamic that I will explore in detail.

Öztürk’s (2025) structured comparison across five dimensions—surveillance regimes, populist discourse, regulatory architecture, market concentration, and distributional outcomes—acts like a decoder for Davos 2026. It does not claim that the US, EU, and China are becoming identical. Instead, it argues that all three are responding to the same structural pressures—tech-driven control, oligopolistic concentration, legitimacy erosion—while doing so through different institutional legacies.

China’s large-scale integration of state and capital shows that advanced capitalism can exist without liberal democracy. It combines market activity and corporate growth within one-party control, increasingly extending worldwide through infrastructure, standards, and digital systems (Callahan, 2016; Creemers, 2018; Dai, 2020). Its governance tools—such as data-driven monitoring, biometric systems, and ideological control of platforms—provide an attractive model for regimes dealing with insecurity and social unrest, even though it also poses legitimacy challenges (Greitens, 2020).

The United States’ hybrid drift shows how liberal democracy can weaken internally due to inequality, institutional capture, and polarization, especially after the 2008 crisis delegitimized traditional economic promises and heightened distrust between elites and the public (Öztürk, 2025). Illiberal populism has proved to be a resilient narrative ecosystem (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Meanwhile, corporate surveillance and algorithmic governance operate alongside expanding security measures, leading to convergence driven by technique rather than ideology (Zuboff, 2019).

The European Union’s regulatory ambition, even under legitimacy stress, stands as the strongest counterexample to simple convergence claims because it has built the most ambitious rights-based regulatory framework in the democratic world, especially in the digital area (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). However, it remains vulnerable to legitimacy stress: far-right normalization, internal rule-of-law conflicts, uneven fiscal capacity, and ongoing reliance on US platform power. Regulation can limit domination, but legitimacy ultimately depends on distributive foundations—not just technocracy (Brown, 2019; Piketty, 2020).

If one sentence embodies the West’s strategic trauma, it is this: China demonstrates that sophisticated capitalism can operate without liberal democracy—and at scale. The Davos concern is not just that China competes, but that China’s model is increasingly serving as a reference point for organizing power in the twenty-first century (Öztürk, 2025).

The Hidden Davos Declaration

If we summarize Davos 2026 into a single implicit statement, it is: The global order based on rules-based multilateralism, benign interdependence, and trickle-down legitimacy has reached a final crisis. What comes next is probably going to be centered around: i) strategic autonomy (energy, supply chains, critical minerals, digital sovereignty) (Carney, 2026), ii) narrative legitimacy repair (“inclusive prosperity,” participation, trust) (Fink, 2026). iii) technological control architectures (AI governance, surveillance trade-offs, platform regulation conflict) (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023), and iv) a reduced faith in universalism, and a greater acceptance of bloc rivalry, vulnerability management, and “value-based realism” (Acharya, 2017; Ikenberry, 2018).

This is why Davos 2026 felt like a turning point: elites are no longer pretending we still live in the 1990s. But the new order being outlined is not automatically democratic. It can just as easily shift toward market authoritarianism—combining capital preservation with control-first governance. A democratic solution is still conceptually possible: re-embedding markets in democratic institutions (Polanyi, 1944), rebuilding a distributive social contract (Piketty, 2020), and limiting both corporate and government power through enforceable rights (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). Davos 2026, however, raises a brutally practical question: Can democracies re-legitimate themselves quickly enough before surveillance, AI, and strategic autonomy become permanent justifications for executive insulation?

That question, more than any speech, was the true “announcement.”


 

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