An ECPS panel at the European Parliament in Brussels, held on 3 February 2026, marked the launch of the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, examining mounting strains on the post-war Atlantic order. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

ECPS Panel at European Parliament: Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations

The ECPS panel held at the European Parliament on 3 February 2026 marked a critical intervention into debates on the future of transatlantic relations amid the resurgence of right-wing populism in the United States. Convened to launch the report “Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options,” the event brought together policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to assess how Donald Trump’s re-election has reshaped Europe’s strategic environment. Discussions highlighted the simultaneous erosion of security cooperation, trade norms, multilateral institutions, and shared democratic values. Rather than treating these developments as temporary disruptions, the panel framed them as structural challenges requiring European agency, strategic autonomy, and democratic resilience. The report positions Europe not as a passive responder, but as a decisive actor capable of shaping a post-assumptive transatlantic order.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On 3 February 2026, the European Parliament hosted an ECPS panel convened to launch the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, a timely intervention into the accelerating strain on the post-war Atlantic order. Held in the Spinelli building in Brussels and hosted by MEP Radan Kanev, the event assembled Members of the European Parliament, scholars, policy practitioners, journalists, and civil society observers around a shared concern: the extent to which renewed US right-wing populism—crystallized in Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024—has shifted the premises of Europe’s external environment and, increasingly, its internal political equilibrium.

The discussion proceeded from the report’s core proposition that transatlantic relations cannot be understood only as a matter of diplomacy or foreign policy. Rather, domestic political dynamics—polarization, institutional capture, disinformation, and the reconfiguration of party systems—now shape the external posture of states and alliances. Against this backdrop, the panel examined how pressures on the four foundational pillars of the liberal international order—security cooperation, free trade, international institutions, and shared democratic values—are unfolding simultaneously and interactively. The report, coordinated under the ECPS and produced through a transatlantic academic collaboration involving the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, UC Berkeley, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and ARENA at the University of Oslo, offers a structured assessment of these developments and outlines policy options aimed at risk reduction and strategic adaptation.

Co-moderated by ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese and former MEP Sir Graham Watson, the event opened with reflections that framed the moment as one of geopolitical reordering and democratic vulnerability. Von Wiese situated Europe’s predicament within a wider shift in power relations, while Sir Watson emphasized the immediacy of populist mobilization and the need for democratic coordination beyond Europe. MEP Kanev’s hosting remarks foregrounded the entanglement of European domestic politics with US leadership change and warned of new forms of external meddling in Europe’s internal affairs. Further political interventions by MEP Valérie Hayer (The Chair of the Renew Europe Group) and MEP Brando Benifei (Chair of the EP Delegation for relations with the United States) underscored the ideological nature of Trumpism’s challenge to “liberal Europe,” the necessity of European firmness and credibility, and the growing imperative of strategic autonomy across trade, technology, and security.

The report’s editors—Marianne RiddervoldGuri Rosén, and Jessica Greenberg—then presented the report’s analytical architecture and central findings, before a wide-ranging Q&A tested its implications against questions of narrative, coalition-building, European divisions, and the operationalization of democratic resilience. Collectively, the panel framed the report not as a lament for a weakening alliance, but as a call to clarify Europe’s agency under uncertainty—and to translate unity, leverage, and values into durable policy choices.

Irina von Wiese: Opening Reflections on Populism and a Changing Geopolitical Order

ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese delivers opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, framing the discussion on populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese set an reflective tone, situating the discussion of populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations within both institutional and geopolitical contexts. Von Wiese noted that the report under discussion had been initiated well before its public launch, remarking on the striking extent to which unfolding global developments had amplified its relevance. She suggested that the themes addressed would likely remain salient for the foreseeable future, given the enduring transformations underway in global politics.

Drawing on a personal yet analytically resonant observation from her vantage point in central London, von Wiese referred to the construction of the new Chinese “super embassy” as a symbolic marker of broader geopolitical shifts. This development, she argued, encapsulated the pressures facing Europe as it navigates a rapidly evolving international order characterized by intensifying competition between emerging and established superpowers. Without pre-empting the panel’s substantive debates, she framed Europe’s position as increasingly constrained, compelled to recalibrate its strategic choices amid rival spheres of influence.

Concluding her remarks, von Wiese emphasized the importance of dialogue and multidisciplinary engagement, before inviting MEP Kanev to proceed and introducing Sir Graham Watson, her predecessor as Honorary Chair of ECPS, as a special guest.

Sir Graham Watson: Europe’s Populist Moment and the Imperative of Democratic Unity

Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, delivers opening remarks in a concise and candid tone. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks, Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, adopted a deliberately concise and candid tone. Sir Watson expressed strong appreciation for the participation of Valerie Heyer and Radan Kanev, emphasizing that their support for the report had been exemplary. He underlined their importance as political actors actively resisting the advance of populism within Europe, describing such engagement as both timely and essential.

He then drew attention to the immediacy of the populist challenge by noting that, at that very moment, a gathering of European populist actors was taking place nearby. Sir Watson warned that these movements were seeking to replicate in Europe the political dynamics associated with Donald Trump in the United States. Countering this trend, he argued, required firm and value-based cooperation with democratic partners committed to the rule of law and structured multilateral engagement, specifically referencing countries such as Canada and South Korea.

Sir Watson further criticized what he described as incoherence in European trade policy, pointing to the inconsistency of rejecting an unfair trade agreement with the United States while subsequently referring the Mercosur agreement to the Court of Justice. He stressed the need for Europe to “de-risk” its relations with populist-led governments, proposing closer engagement with democratic governments in countries such as Brazil and Argentina.

Sir Watson clarified that while these broader issues framed the discussion, the report itself offered a more focused analysis of the populist challenge and concrete guidance for policymakers, which he warmly commended to the audience.

Openning Remarks by MEP Radan Kanev: “The Importance of Re-evaluating Transatlantic Relations in the Current Global Political Climate”

MEP Radan Kanev, host of the event, delivers opening remarks highlighting the timeliness and political significance of the discussion. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks as host of the event, MEP Radan Kanev emphasized both the timeliness and the political significance of the discussion, expressing sincere appreciation for the opportunity to host what he described as an extremely important initiative. He thanked fellow Members of the European Parliament, including Valerie Hayer and Brando Benifei, for their participation, highlighting their presence as evidence of the cross-party character of the meeting and of a shared concern that transcended partisan boundaries.

Kanev opened substantively by citing the very first premise of the report being launched: that, under current conditions, domestic politics may matter more than foreign policy. He expanded this proposition by arguing that what is at stake is not merely domestic politics in general, but specifically Europe’s internal political dynamics and their growing entanglement with leadership developments in the United States. To illustrate this point, he turned to the political situation in his home country of Bulgaria, describing a striking competition among three prominent political figures—an influential oligarch, a long-standing dominant political leader, and a recently resigned president-turned-political actor—each openly vying for the favor of Donald Trump.

This dynamic, Kanev suggested, had reached an unprecedented point with the decision of Bulgaria’s already resigned pro-European prime minister to sign the so-called “Charter of the Board of Peace,” making Bulgaria—alongside Hungary—the only representatives of the European Union to do so. He underscored the paradox of this situation, noting that one of the signatories belonged to the European People’s Party (EPP) rather than to the political families typically associated with extremist or openly anti-European positions.

Kanev stressed that populism alone did not sufficiently explain the gravity of the current moment. Drawing on his own long political experience, he observed that Bulgaria, like many European countries, had been governed by various forms of populism—left-wing, right-wing, and centrist—for decades. The rise of populist movements, he argued, was therefore not in itself a novel or alarming development, nor an inevitable cause for panic. What Europe was facing, however, was something more profound and more destabilizing than the circulation of populist rhetoric.

To clarify this distinction, Kanev urged the audience to acknowledge several uncomfortable but necessary truths. From a European perspective, he argued, every Republican US president could historically be perceived as a form of right-wing populist, and indeed every American president since Andrew Jackson could be seen as populist to some degree. Moreover, US foreign policy had long been difficult for Europeans to accept, well before the Iraq War of 2003. Yet, Kanev insisted, Donald Trump represented a qualitatively different phenomenon.

This difference, he argued, could not be reduced simply to right-wing populism, domestic authoritarian tendencies, or aggressive rhetoric abroad—traits that many Europeans had, rightly or wrongly, long associated with US leadership. European leaders, Kanev suggested, might have been willing to tolerate Trump’s domestic agenda, despite its damaging effects on American institutions, and even his confrontational, transactional style in transatlantic relations, as evidenced by recent trade and security negotiations.

What fundamentally distinguished the present situation, in Kanev’s view, was the unprecedented level of direct meddling in Europe’s internal political affairs. Historically, while the United States had supported authoritarian or unsavory regimes elsewhere, it had never done so in Europe. On the contrary, US policy had consistently promoted democracy, market economies, free trade, and, crucially, European integration. Kanev emphasized that Bulgaria’s own accession to the European Union had been made possible largely through strong US pressure, a fact well known both in Western Europe and in the Balkans.

This longstanding pattern, he argued, had now been reversed. The current US administration, Kanev maintained, was actively working toward European disunity, seeking to transform Europe into an insecure and fragmented space of competing client projects—an approach previously seen in other regions of the world, but never within Europe or the transatlantic partnership. He cautioned against overemphasizing ideology or values in explaining this shift, suggesting instead that many European leaders aligning themselves with Trumpist positions were motivated less by genuine conservatism or nationalism than by personal authoritarian ambitions or corruption.

Kanev concluded by stressing that the challenges identified in the report—particularly in the areas of security and trade—were not confined to Brussels but affected national and pan-European levels alike, extending even beyond the EU to partners such as Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Addressing Europe’s right-wing nationalist and conservative movements directly, he posed a series of rhetorical questions to underline the contradictions inherent in their current alignments. He argued that the emerging political cleavage in Europe would no longer be defined by traditional ideological labels, but by a stark choice between accepting Europe as a chaotic sphere of multiple foreign influences or defending European solidarity as a matter of fundamental security and prosperity.

MEP Valérie Hayer: “Reflections on the Implications of Renewed US Populism for European Policies, Democratic Values, and Foreign Relations”

MEP Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group, speaks on renewed US populism and its implications for transatlantic democracy. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her address, Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group in the European Parliament, situated the discussion of renewed US populism within a broader transatlantic and democratic framework. Opening with expressions of gratitude to the organizers and contributors to the report, she emphasized both the importance and urgency of the initiative. She extended particular thanks to Radan Kanev for the invitation, noting that her remarks were shaped by her recent visit to Bulgaria, where she had met with civil society actors, journalists, advocates of judicial independence, and public authorities.

Drawing on this experience, Hayer pointed to the role of entrenched oligarchic power in undermining the rule of law, arguing that such dynamics posed threats comparable to, or even exceeding, those posed by the current US administration within its own institutional context. This observation served as an entry point into her central argument: that attacks on democracy are intensifying globally, including in the United States, long regarded as a bastion of freedom. The return of populism to the center of American power, she stressed, constituted not merely a domestic political development but a transatlantic shockwave with direct implications for European policies, democratic resilience, and Europe’s global position.

Hayer framed her intervention around three interrelated questions: what US populism means for Europe, how it operates, and how Europeans must respond. She argued that understanding these implications required conceptual clarity about Trumpism itself. While Donald Trump’s initial election in 2016 had often been interpreted in Europe as an anomaly driven by protest voting and institutional fatigue, his return to power in 2024 decisively shattered this assumption. Rather than an accident, it represented confirmation that Trumpism had evolved into a consolidated and ideologically coherent movement exercising near-total control over the Republican Party. Populism in the United States, she argued, had proven structural and resilient, capable of returning even after electoral defeat.

Trumpism Does Not Oppose Europe Per Se; It Opposes Liberal Europe

A central clarification in Hayer’s analysis concerned the object of Trumpism’s hostility. The Trumpist movement, she contended, is not directed against Europe as a civilization or geographical entity, but against liberals, moderates, pluralists, and defenders of democratic norms wherever they are found. In this sense, Trumpism does not oppose Europe per se; it opposes liberal Europe. This distinction explained why Trump and his allies often appeared ideologically closer to European far-right parties than to large segments of their own domestic electorate. Hayer noted that Trumpism displayed greater affinity with parties such as Germany’s AfD or France’s National Rally than with US Democrats or moderate Republicans, a pattern reflected in Trump’s hostility toward liberal European leaders and his praise for illiberal ones.

This ideological divide, she argued, was starkly exposed by the events of January 6, 2021. The assault on the US Capitol was not simply a security failure but a test of democratic allegiance. Those who unequivocally condemned it affirmed their commitment to liberal democracy, while those who minimized or justified it revealed a different set of priorities. Trump’s subsequent return to power sent a powerful signal to populist actors worldwide: violations of democratic norms could be politically survivable. This message, Hayer warned, emboldened illiberal movements in Europe as much as in the United States.

She further argued that the first norm eroded by Trumpism was truth itself. Trump’s governance, she observed, was marked by apparent contradictions: claims to uphold law and order while attacking judges and prosecutors; rhetorical support for democratic protesters abroad while repressing dissent at home; denunciations of corruption alongside the rewarding of personal loyalty over legality. These were not inconsistencies, she maintained, but defining features of transactional populism, in which loyalty and expediency outweigh institutions and rules. Such an approach destabilizes alliances by replacing predictability with improvisation and shared values with ad hoc deals.

This logic, Hayer argued, extended directly into foreign policy. Trump’s hostility toward the European Union was not merely economic or strategic, but ideological. The EU embodies regulation, multilateralism, minority protection, climate governance, and judicial independence—precisely the elements Trumpism frames as illegitimate liberal overreach. Consequently, EU laws are portrayed as constraints, European unity as a threat, and even territories such as Greenland as negotiable assets. In this worldview, European leaders are divided not by nationality but by ideology—classified as allies or adversaries depending on their stance toward liberal democracy.

Faced with this reality, Hayer called for a strategic, rather than emotional, European response. Europeans cannot determine US electoral outcomes, she acknowledged, but they retain agency in shaping their own reactions. She cited recent European initiatives—the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Digital Services Act, and the Digital Markets Act—as examples of necessary assertions of sovereignty in a hostile global environment. At the same time, she identified a major European failure: complacency following the election of Joe Biden, which led many to assume that Trumpism had been definitively defeated.

This misjudgment, she argued, contributed to delayed investments in European autonomy and resilience, particularly in defense, financial integration, and industrial capacity. She emphasized that the current US administration responds primarily to leverage rather than goodwill. When Europe demonstrated resolve—through trade instruments, deterrence signals, or legal firmness—the tone of engagement shifted. When it hesitated or sought appeasement, pressure intensified. The episode surrounding Greenland illustrated the necessity of firmness, not escalation, but credible dissuasion grounded in clear red lines.

Hayer concluded that European independence is no longer optional. Dependence creates vulnerability, whereas strategic autonomy enables resilience. She stressed that Europe possesses substantial industrial, technological, and economic assets, naming key actors across defense, energy, and technology sectors. Europe’s weakness, she argued, lies not in a lack of resources but in fragmentation, underinvestment, and political hesitation.

The decisive battleground, however, remains internal. While Europe cannot prevent populism in the United States, it can prevent it from governing Europe. Hayer warned against European populist leaders who align themselves ideologically with Trumpism, describing them as conduits rather than defenders of European sovereignty. Trumpism, she concluded, is not an external imposition but a project that survives in Europe only if Europeans legitimize it. The ultimate question, therefore, is not whether populism exists, but whether Europeans allow it to rule them.

MEP Brando Benifei: Taking Europe Seriously in an Era of Populism and Uncertainty

MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, reflects on the present and future of transatlantic relations from a practitioner’s perspective. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his address, MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, offered a practitioner-oriented reflection on the state and future of transatlantic relations, grounded in his direct and ongoing engagement with US counterparts. Benifei expressed particular gratitude to Radan Kanev and Valérie Hayer for convening the meeting in cooperation with the ECPS, emphasizing the importance and timeliness of the report being launched. He briefly previewed the report’s analytical framework, noting that it focused on four core pillars currently under strain: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. These themes, he suggested, captured the multidimensional nature of the present challenges, which would be explored in greater depth by the report’s authors.

Drawing on his role as chair of the transatlantic delegation, Benifei underlined the value of sustained dialogue with US political actors, highlighting both his frequent visits to the United States and the presence of representatives from American think tanks in the audience. He described the European Parliament as a “House of Democracy” and welcomed the opportunity for open exchange within this institutional setting.

Turning to the substance of the report, Benifei referred to the three scenarios it outlines for the future of transatlantic relations: potential disintegration, functional adaptation, or reorganization on new foundations. Based on his recent experiences with US administration officials, members of Congress, and other stakeholders, he argued that all three scenarios remained plausible in the current complex context. He emphasized, however, a central lesson drawn from these interactions: the European Union must be taken seriously. This requires clarity of position, internal unity, and—crucially—consistency between declarations and actions.

Benifei warned that recent patterns of announcing positions and subsequently retracting or failing to implement them had undermined the EU’s credibility in the eyes of US interlocutors. While he shared the view, often expressed by members of the US Congress, that Europeans should not overreact to daily rhetoric or shifting statements, he stressed that words had, at times, translated into concrete actions requiring firm responses.

In this context, he echoed the importance of European legislative sovereignty, particularly in relation to digital regulation. Referring to the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, Benifei expressed concern that US counterparts had explicitly urged changes to these laws in formal meetings. He rejected this approach, arguing that Europe must stand firm in defending its regulatory choices.

In concluding, Benifei argued that confronting populism and redefining transatlantic relations requires clarity about Europe’s own political project. Citing remarks by Mario Draghi delivered the previous day, he endorsed the view that the era of the EU as a loose confederation had ended. In a relationship increasingly shaped by political and security considerations, rather than commerce alone, Europe must strengthen its sovereignty and internal organization if it wishes to engage the United States on a more equal footing. The report, he concluded, offers a valuable contribution to understanding both Europe’s current position and the strategic paths ahead.

Professor Marianne Riddervold: The Four Pillars of the Atlantic Order Under Strain

Professor Marianne Riddervold presents the report’s analytical framework and key findings on transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Professor Marianne Riddervold, affiliated with ARENA at the University of Oslo, NUPI, and the University of California, Berkeley, introduced the report’s core analytical framework and key findings concerning the evolving state of transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. 

Professor Riddervold grounded the report’s intellectual motivation in an observation made as early as 2018 by John Peterson, who argued that the future of US–European relations and the liberal international order depended less on foreign policy choices than on domestic democratic politics in both Europe and the United States. In light of Donald Trump’s reelection in 2024, she suggested that this assessment had proven prescient. Contemporary news coverage, she noted, is dominated by developments that appear to challenge the very foundations of the transatlantic relationship, including disputes over tariffs, divergent approaches to Ukraine, tensions surrounding international treaties and voting behavior in the United Nations, uncertainty about NATO’s future, and deep disagreements over free speech norms. These tensions have been further exacerbated by Trump’s public threats to annex parts of the territory of NATO allies.

At the same time, Professor Riddervold emphasized that Europe and North America remain more closely interconnected than any other regions of the world, with over eight decades of dense cooperation behind them. The transatlantic relationship, she reminded the audience, has weathered major crises in the past and has at times emerged stronger as a result. Against this backdrop, the report set out to address a series of fundamental questions: how to make sense of current developments; how right-wing populism under Trump is affecting transatlantic relations; whether the present moment represents a qualitatively different rupture; and whether Europe is facing a more serious and long-term breakdown of a relationship long taken for granted.

To answer these questions, the report deliberately steps back from the volatility of the daily news cycle in order to provide a more systematic analysis. Professor Riddervold highlighted that the volume brings together leading experts on transatlantic relations, each drawing on extensive scholarly research to offer concise, focused analyses of how the relationship is changing and what these changes imply for Europe. She then outlined the structure of the report, explaining that it is organized around four foundational pillars that have historically underpinned the post-war transatlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and liberal democratic values.

This framework draws on the work of G. John Ikenberry, who conceptualized the “Atlantic order” as resting on these four interlinked pillars, established under US leadership after the Second World War. The first pillar is the security alliance system; the second concerns trade and finance; the third encompasses multilateral institutions and rules; and the fourth consists of shared liberal democratic norms. Professor Riddervold further explained that Ikenberry identified two mutually reinforcing bargains underpinning the relationship. The “realist bargain” involved European acceptance of US leadership in exchange for security guarantees and access to US markets, technology, and resources within an open global economy. The “liberal bargain” linked security and economic openness to shared commitments to multilateralism and democratic governance, institutionalized through NATO, the World Trade Organization, and other international bodies. Together, these arrangements placed transatlantic relations at the core of the broader liberal international order.

Professor Riddervold stressed that the transatlantic relationship has never been based solely on strategic or economic interests. It has also functioned as a security community rooted in shared values, often described as part of the Pax Americana. Although US foreign policy has long been criticized for inconsistencies and double standards, she observed that successive administrations and Congresses prior to Trump broadly shared the conviction that democracies possess a unique capacity for cooperation and that European integration served US as well as European interests.

To capture possible trajectories of change, each chapter in the report distinguishes between three future scenarios. The first is outright disintegration or breakdown of transatlantic relations, potentially affecting one or multiple policy areas, driven by domestic political pressures and structural geopolitical shifts. However, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the relationship is also sustained by deep economic, institutional, and cultural bonds that may help stabilize it even under strain. This recognition led the authors to explore two additional scenarios: a second scenario in which the relationship weakens but “muddles through” via functional adaptation in areas of mutual interest, and a third scenario in which the relationship is redefined and potentially revitalized, for example through external shocks such as war or crisis, or through the emergence of a more united and capable Europe seen as a valuable partner by Washington. She also noted the possibility, explored later in the report, of a redefined transatlantic relationship shaped by right-wing populist convergence.

A Deep and Potentially Durable Rift in Transatlantic Relations

Across all four pillars, the report’s overarching conclusion is stark: transatlantic relations are experiencing what it terms a deep and potentially durable rift. Professor Riddervold identified two main reasons for this assessment. First, weakening is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, institutions, and values—a pattern unprecedented in earlier crises. Second, Trump does not perceive a strong transatlantic relationship as valuable, marking a sharp departure from post-war US policy traditions. Even beyond Trump, she argued, US domestic polarization and shifting strategic priorities mean that a return to previous patterns of relations is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the report also identifies sources of cautious optimism. Several authors highlight functional adjustments that may allow cooperation to persist in specific areas, such as trade frameworks or defense-industrial cooperation linked to increased European defense spending. While the relationship may be weaker, such adaptations could gradually lead to a redefined partnership. Crucially, the report stresses that Europe has agency. When united, Europe possesses the capacity of a global power and can decide which values, institutions, and partnerships it seeks to uphold.

Concluding her presentation, Professor Riddervold summarized the report’s findings in the security and defense domain. Across multiple chapters, the authors argue that transatlantic security relations are entering a “post-American” phase, in which Europe can no longer rely on stable US leadership and must assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Whether the relationship muddles through or weakens further, the implication for Europe is the same: it must strengthen its security, defense, and strategic autonomy, reduce dependence on US military enablers, prepare for potential weakening of NATO commitments, and fully exploit its institutional, budgetary, and legal capacities. She concluded by stressing the need for a more unified and firmer European stance toward Washington before passing the floor to her co-editor for the subsequent sections of the report.

Assoc. Prof. Guri Rosén: Trade, Multilateralism, and the Erosion of the Rules-Based Order

Associate Professor Guri Rosén discusses the report’s analysis of trade and international institutions. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Guri Rosén, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo and Senior Researcher at ARENA – the Centre for European Studies – focused on the sections of the report addressing trade and international institutions. Building on the analytical framework outlined by her co-editor, she emphasized that transatlantic relations have historically rested on shared commitments to liberal trade principles and to rules-based institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). A central conclusion emerging from the report’s trade section, she noted, is that the rise of populism has significantly weakened domestic support for trade liberalization, thereby accelerating a shift—particularly under the Trump administration—toward protectionism, unilateral tariff policies, and a transactional approach that challenges the foundations of the global trading system.

Dr. Rosén explained that the trade section of the report examines several interrelated dynamics: the growing tension between globalization and domestic autonomy, the dual shocks posed by China and the United States to the international trading system, the new disruptions following the second Trump administration, and the broader collapse of the WTO’s authority. She then provided a structured overview of the individual chapters.

The first chapter, authored by Eric Jones of the European University Institute, traces the evolution of the international trade system after the Second World War. Jones highlights the enduring tension between the international division of labor and the need for domestic policy autonomy. He revisits the post-war “embedded liberalism” compromise, which enabled global trade while allowing governments to protect welfare states and manage social dislocation. As globalization deepened, however, capital mobility increasingly overshadowed trade, constraining governments’ policy autonomy and generating domestic discontent—conditions that, Jones argues, have fueled contemporary populist movements. Two key insights emerge from this analysis: first, the existence of a “control dilemma,” reflecting the structural conflict between a globally integrated economy and national social protection; and second, the growing contestation of institutions designed to coordinate economic interdependence. While intended to prevent governments from exporting domestic political problems to one another, such institutions increasingly address politically sensitive issues, reinforcing perceptions that critical decisions are being removed from democratic control.

Against this backdrop, Alasdair Young of the Georgia Institute of Technology examines the drastic shift in US trade policy during Trump’s second term. Young argues that the Trump administration views trade as a zero-sum game in which the European Union is portrayed as benefiting unfairly at America’s expense. From this perspective, the existing EU–US trade framework appears highly fragile, a vulnerability underscored by recent disputes such as those surrounding Greenland. Young emphasizes that the Trump administration has repeatedly returned with new demands even after agreements have been reached, undermining trust and predictability. He raises the question of how the EU should respond, concluding that retaliation would likely inflict comparable economic costs on Europe and the United States. This assessment helps explain why the EU has largely pursued a strategy of waiting out the Trump period while focusing on internal reforms.

The third chapter in the trade section, written by Kent Jones of Babson College, analyzes the breakdown of the multilateral trading system. Dr. Rosén noted that Jones characterizes recent developments as a systemic rupture. The Trump administration, he argues, has abandoned core WTO principles, including the most-favored-nation clause, and has invoked national security exceptions to justify measures aimed primarily at reducing trade deficits. By bypassing WTO dispute settlement mechanisms and imposing discriminatory tariffs, the United States has violated the multilateral norms it once championed. This shift from rule-based governance to transactional bargaining forces the EU to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis rather than relying on treaty-based frameworks.

The final chapter in the trade section, authored by Arlo Poletti of the University of Trieste, examines the political consequences of the “China shock”—the surge of Chinese imports since the early 2000s—on European labor markets and party systems. Poletti argues that this shock has contributed to the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe. As a result, the EU now finds itself constrained between a protectionist United States and an increasingly assertive China, a position made more difficult by Europe’s continued reliance on US security guarantees. Poletti contends that the EU should be prepared to credibly commit to retaliation in response to further US protectionist escalation, while also strengthening relations with other trade partners and fully deploying its expanded economic policy toolkit.

Dr. Rosén acknowledged that there are some differences of emphasis among the authors, but she stressed that their analyses converge on a shared strategic orientation. Taken together, the trade section recommends that the EU build economic strength and resilience while remaining anchored in a rules-based system. This entails prioritizing domestic objectives—growth, employment, and security—through the use of market power and regulatory tools, thereby forming the basis of a more competitive strategic autonomy. At the same time, member states must coordinate more effectively to avoid shifting the costs of globalization onto one another and to prevent a fragmented patchwork of national measures. Diversifying trade and investment ties across regions is also essential to reduce vulnerability to pressure from either the United States or China. Strengthening supply chains, technological capacity, and defense-related industrial bases is presented as integral to this effort, alongside continued engagement to keep the WTO functioning and to update its rules wherever possible.

Managing Multilateral Crisis without Escalation

Turning to the section on international institutions, Dr. Rosén explained that the report analyzes how right-wing populism and the “America First” agenda have disrupted the rules-based international order. While the EU regards multilateralism as central to its identity, the current US administration portrays international institutions as inefficient, elitist, and restrictive of national sovereignty. Mike Smith of the University of Warwick provides a conceptual framework for understanding what he terms a revolutionary assault on established international norms. Smith argues that while the first Trump administration was constrained by limited preparation, Trump’s second term operates with a far more radical and unconstrained agenda. He identifies three strategic options facing the EU: accommodating US demands, standing up to them, or working to build a more resilient form of multilateralism, potentially without US participation.

A further chapter by Edith Drieskens of KU Leuven examines the turbulence confronting the United Nations system. Dr. Rosén noted that a series of US executive orders mandating reviews of international organizations and foreign aid have resulted in severe budget cuts, pushing many UN agencies into survival mode. Organizations such as UNESCO have been singled out for defunding or potential withdrawal, while US support for the Sustainable Development Goals and for diversity and inclusion norms has been curtailed. Drieskens argues that the EU has adopted a cautious posture, refraining from overt criticism of the United States to avoid retaliation in areas such as trade or NATO cooperation.

Climate governance is addressed in a chapter by Daniel Fiorino of American University, who analyzes the consequences of the United States’ second withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. Fiorino argues that the administration has shifted from mitigation toward an “energy emergency” posture, dismantling regulatory constraints on fossil fuel development. While the most immediate effects are domestic, he suggests that US disengagement risks ceding technological and economic leadership in the green transition to Europe and China. From his perspective, the EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to maintain its Green Deal policies while waiting for potential change in the US political cycle.

The final chapter, by Frode Veggeland, examines the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization in 2025. Veggeland argues that global health governance is experiencing turbulence as funding becomes increasingly fragmented and earmarked. In this context, the EU must deepen cooperation with like-minded partners and assume a more prominent role in global health security, potentially filling the vacuum left by US disengagement through coalition-building as a form of soft power.

Dr. Rosén concluded by emphasizing that, across both trade and international institutions, the report’s authors view multilateral frameworks as core instruments of European power and legitimacy. Rather than waiting passively for renewed US engagement, the EU should combine short-term adaptation with selective pushback and long-term institutional strengthening. This approach, she argued, would allow Europe to protect its agency, defend core norms and interests, and contribute to more resilient international institutions capable of withstanding funding shocks, obstruction, and shifting power balances.

Professor Jessica Greenberg: Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership

Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg presents and synthesizes the report’s final section on democratic values. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Jessica Greenberg—Professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and a political and legal anthropologist specializing in Europe, human rights, social movements, democracy, and law—introduced and synthesized the report’s final section on democratic values. She described the report as both rewarding and collaborative to produce alongside her co-editors and contributing authors. She framed her remarks under the title “Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership,” signaling an intention to offer a more forward-looking assessment, even while acknowledging the gravity of the present transatlantic moment.

Professor Greenberg first underscored the methodological distinctiveness of the democratic values section. Unlike the report’s other sections, which are anchored primarily in international relations, political economy, or institutional analysis, this section is heavily shaped by sociological and anthropological approaches to institutions. She observed that democracy and populism are notoriously difficult to define and practice, often triggering a familiar “we know them when we see them” reaction. The aim of the section, she argued, is to move beyond such first-blush recognitions by probing how democracy, liberalism, and rule of law are lived, practiced, and reproduced inside institutions. Populism, in turn, is examined not merely as rhetoric or political style but as a “lifeworld”—an everyday, granular set of perceptions, dispositions, and practices. This emphasis, she explained, is critical for understanding democratic resilience, since democracy and rule of law operate through daily, practice-based dimensions that can be eroded gradually and normalized in subtle ways.

To illustrate the section’s conceptual framing, Professor Greenberg referenced a striking passage by Douglas Holmes, one of the contributors, which characterizes populism as a creative force capable of shaping not only politics but also feelings, thoughts, moods, intimacies, actions, and even perceptions of justice and reality. For Professor Greenberg, this formulation captured the section’s analytical ambition: to understand how populism works from the inside out, at the level where institutions and everyday life intersect.

She then turned to the first two chapters of the section—by Douglas Holmes and Saul Newman—which she described as mapping “populism’s paradoxes.” These chapters, she argued, establish the institutional and cultural terrain on which any effective response to populist capture must be built. Among the key paradoxes is that populist politics often presents itself as anti-elitist, anti-establishment, and anti-institutional, yet simultaneously relies on institutional frameworks at the international and European Union levels and pursues institutional capture domestically. The chapters emphasize that populist actors do not simply confront institutions from the outside; they rework them from within, altering their internal logics and operational “genetic code.” Understanding this reconfiguration, Dr. Greenberg suggested, is indispensable to designing meaningful responses.

A second paradox concerns populism’s relationship to nation and network. Populist politics tends to focus on national frameworks and racialized, homogeneous notions of “the people,” yet it is also increasingly transnational in practice. Populist movements share strategies, repertoires, discourses, and social media memes across borders, producing an internationalized—and in a counterintuitive sense, “cosmopolitan”—populist landscape. A third paradox, as Professor Greenberg presented it, is that populism functions as a critique of liberalism: it directly challenges liberal claims to provide representation, solidarity, care, justice, and inclusive political membership. Recognizing how populism positions itself against liberal institutions is, she argued, central to understanding its appeal and operational power.

Professor Greenberg proceeded to summarize the subsequent chapters, each offering a different window onto the erosion and contestation of democratic values. Reuben Anderson’s chapter, “The Liberal Bargain on Migration: Convergence in Securitizing Borders,” examines how framing migration as a security problem undermines meaningful integration and constrains democratic commitments to pluralism, rule of law, and inclusive governance. Professor Greenberg highlighted Anderson’s analysis of a “two-faced” migration regime on both sides of the Atlantic: migrants are funneled into labor-hungry economies, including through illegalized and exploitable work, while governments simultaneously stage “tough” crackdowns at physical borders and in third countries. The result, Anderson argues, is the expansion of an enforcement industry and a self-reinforcing spiral of securitization, displacing opportunities to address migration rights and labor-market needs in a more transparent and democratic manner.

The following chapter, Robert Benson’s “Illiberal International: The Transatlantic Rights Challenge to Democracy,” develops the theme of transnational far-right mobilization. Professor Greenberg emphasized Benson’s argument that such movements cannot be understood in isolation because they are deeply networked across borders. Think tanks, party foundations, legal advocates, and online platforms form alliances that circulate strategies, legal models, ideological frames, and digital tactics aimed at weakening democratic norms. Professor Greenberg drew attention to Benson’s description of a “transnational ecosystem of distrust” that corrodes confidence in electoral integrity, journalism, and scientific expertise. In her account, the chapter portrays this as intentional, organized, sophisticated, and strategically coordinated—requiring both place-based countermeasures and broader transnational coordination.

The final chapter in the section, by Albena Azmanova, centers on precarity and democratic resilience. Professor Greenberg presented this chapter as demonstrating how inequality, social vulnerability, and the affordability crisis fuel distrust in government and create fertile ground for grievance politics. She suggested that Azmanova’s analysis reinforces a core implication running through the section: robust social welfare policies are not peripheral to democratic stability but central to it. In this view, social policy is a key component of democratic resilience and a substantive counter-politics to populist mobilization.

The Transatlantic Alliance “As We Know It” Is Effectively Over

Having summarized the chapters, Professor Greenberg widened the lens to offer concluding reflections that also drew together threads from the report’s other sections. She argued that the transatlantic alliance “as we know it” is effectively over, citing President Trump’s threats to invade Greenland and the possibility that NATO itself could be destabilized. In her formulation, Trump’s repudiation of multilateral cooperation in trade and security, rejection of rule of law domestically and international law abroad, and nativist political stance collectively undermine the foundational commitments of the post-war alliance. The United States, she argued, has replaced cooperation and liberal trade with zero-sum protectionism and tariffs, while Trump’s disdain for democracy and global legal order finds affinity with populist forces on both sides of the Atlantic.

Yet Professor Greenberg also insisted on a crucial counterpoint: the alliance was never merely a technocratic handshake among bureaucrats. It was a living set of commitments that provided institutional architecture for multilateral cooperation, created pathways to respect sovereignty while binding national interests through shared visions of peace and security, and linked prosperity to democratic participation, human rights, constitutional guarantees, and equality. She invoked the breadth of actors who helped realize these commitments—from local communities and policymakers to human rights advocates and entrepreneurs—turning abstract principles into lived realities.

From this diagnosis, Professor Greenberg drew a stark strategic imperative: as long as Donald Trump remains president, he will continue to destabilize whatever trust remains in the decades-long alliance, and Europe cannot afford to wait, minimize the danger, or adopt a posture of denial. Europe, she argued, must “go it alone,” and it must act immediately. While she acknowledged that calls for a more unified Europe are not new, she argued that far more specificity is needed, and that the report’s four-pillar framework remains a useful guide for action. The EU, she maintained, is well positioned to lead in international cooperation, trade, security, and democratic values—if it consolidates internal integration, strengthens economic and financial coordination, and takes a firmer, more coherent line toward Washington beyond appeasement and passive wait-and-see strategies.

Professor Greenberg emphasized that the EU possesses political and financial leverage and should be prepared to use it. The United States, she argued, needs a unified EU in responding to Russia and China, in both security and trade, which positions Europe to advance strategic autonomy while serving as the most credible partner for strengthened bilateral and plurilateral arrangements. She reiterated themes of the report’s security recommendations: a more coherent long-term European security strategy, a stronger European defense industrial base, and more predictable support and guarantees for Ukraine—combined with careful management of relations with China and other partners. Strength, flexibility, and conviction, she argued, must guide the EU’s posture, enabling it to seize opportunities for cooperation when aligned interests arise—even as the United States becomes less reliable.

At the domestic level, Professor Greenberg echoed the report’s emphasis on prioritizing internal policy goals and using the EU’s market power and regulatory tools to support growth, jobs, and security at home, while avoiding race-to-the-bottom dynamics that reward fragmentation. Such an approach, she argued, would foster unity and build collective solutions to shared challenges—from precarity and public health to climate crisis. She also underscored the importance of sustaining international institutions as central to European power, legitimacy, and interests, with multilateral networks promoting rule-setting, transparency, and democratic procedures.

Finally, Professor Greenberg returned to the normative core of her section: a unified Europe must be defined by reasoned action and a strong ethical foundation. Democracy, pluralism, and rule of law cannot function as afterthoughts or merely procedural commitments. In her assessment, EU approaches to precarity, migration, and climate have at times reflected backsliding or even capitulation to populist pressures. Across the report, she noted, experts emphasize the necessity of confronting inequality, affordability crises, and institutional distrust if Europe is to lead democratically. Values, she concluded, must be made credible through concrete action: rule-of-law commitments, inclusion, human-rights-compliant migration, and renewed commitments to sustainability, health, and well-being across both urban and rural spaces.

In Professor Greenberg’s closing argument, Europe cannot outpace populist “shock and awe” tactics—rapid policy shifts, disregard for legal norms, and conspiratorial narratives designed to overwhelm and demobilize. Instead, Europe must counter destabilization with substance, endurance, clear communication, pragmatic hope, and institutional leadership. She ended on a horizon of conditional optimism: if Europe acts now to uphold the promise of the broken alliance, it can preserve a democratic home to which a future United States might one day return.

Q&A Session

Audience members pose questions during the panel’s Q&A session. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

The Q&A session opened with an intervention by Robert Benson, affiliated with the Center for American Progress (CAP), who posed two interrelated questions to the editors and panelists. First, he observed that the discussion had not drawn a clear analytical distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism and asked whether populism could function as an emancipatory political force—or even as a potential antidote to the form of populism associated with the Trump White House. Referencing ongoing debates within the US Democratic Party, Benson framed the issue as a strategic dilemma between more radical or more centrist political pathways.

His second question addressed the apparent contradiction inherent in transnational nationalism. Benson queried how nationalist parties such as Germany’s AfD could simultaneously align with the Trump administration and with counterparts like France’s National Rally, given nationalism’s ostensibly inward-looking logic. He suggested that such alliances might be better understood as instrumental rather than ideological, serving common ends such as profiteering, corruption, and the extraction of political or economic concessions from a fragmented Europe—an interpretation he linked to recent US national security thinking.

Responding first, Jessica Greenberg emphasized that, for the purposes of the report, the key analytical takeaway was not the normative distinction between left- and right-wing populism, but the observable political energy generated by both. She noted that populist movements across the ideological spectrum have mobilized significant loyalty, grassroots participation, and youth engagement, effectively capturing a sense of renewed citizenship and political agency. Greenberg argued that liberal democratic institutions cannot afford to relinquish this mobilizing capacity, stressing that liberalism must inspire hope and engagement rather than operate solely as a reactive force.

The second response came from Riccardo Alcaro, who addressed the question of transnational nationalist convergence. He argued that while alliances between nationalist parties and the Trump administration are inherently unstable, they persist because of a shared understanding of political enemies—primarily internal rather than external. This convergence, he suggested, transforms transatlantic relations from a strategic partnership into a politicized and ideologized framework. In such a configuration, transatlantic ties serve less to advance shared interests than to legitimize domestic political struggles against migrants, liberal institutions, and perceived “globalist” elites, a dynamic with particularly far-reaching implications for Europe.

The second round of the Q&A session was initiated by Kristo Anastasov, who framed his intervention from a geopolitical and historical perspective. Commending the panel for avoiding an exclusively ideological reading of contemporary transatlantic tensions, he argued that the report compellingly invited deeper engagement. Anastasov contrasted the current political landscape in the United States—characterized, in his view, by the existence of “two American nations” and a level of polarization historically associated with civil conflict—with the European situation. Despite the rise of populism and persistent divisions, he maintained that Europe continues to rest on a cross-ideological basis of consensus that prevents systemic rupture, with Hungary standing as a partial exception rather than the rule.

From this perspective, Anastasov suggested that Europe’s strategic task is not to replicate the American experience but to position itself as a stabilizing counterpoint—restoring damaged transatlantic links where possible while simultaneously forging new ones. He cited the European response to the Greenland crisis as illustrative of both strengths and weaknesses in Europe’s approach. On the one hand, Europe demonstrated unity and institutional capacity; on the other, he argued that hesitation—such as the decision not to seize frozen Russian assets held in Belgium—was interpreted by the Trump administration as weakness, prompting renewed rhetorical escalation. By contrast, Anastasov pointed to initiatives such as the Mercosur agreement and negotiations with India as examples of effective demonstrations of European strength, though he lamented that these efforts had been partially undermined by internal institutional delays. He concluded by asserting that appeasement and coexistence are ineffective in dealing with a deal-breaking counterpart, insisting that consistency and credible displays of strength are essential.

Responding, Marianne Riddervold thanked Anastasov for his remarks and for encouraging engagement with the report. She reiterated that the report’s objective was precisely to provide a systematic, conceptually grounded analysis rather than reactive commentary. Riddervold emphasized that all contributing authors converge on the recommendation that Europe must act firmly and collectively. At the same time, she acknowledged the structural dilemma facing Europe: persistent dependencies on the United States, particularly in security and defense, necessitate continued cooperation even as Europe works to reduce those dependencies. She noted that the Trump administration’s tendency to conflate trade and security—such as linking trade negotiations to Ukraine—poses an unprecedented challenge. Nevertheless, she observed that the European Union has demonstrated increasing speed and cohesion in responding to successive crises. While acknowledging delays and internal disagreements, she characterized the EU as an exceptionally flexible system capable of adapting creatively within its legal framework, including through partial or staged implementation of contested agreements.

Guri Rosén added that divergences among the report’s authors reflect real strategic tensions rather than analytical weakness. Some contributors stress the importance of demonstrating strength and leadership, while others argue that a “wait-it-out” strategy minimizes economic and political costs. Rosén argued that the report’s four-pillar framework—security, trade, institutions, and values—reveals the necessity of integrated thinking across policy domains. The central challenge for Europe, she concluded, lies not only in responding to external pressures but also in overcoming internal coordination difficulties. Determining whether to assert strength or exercise restraint ultimately depends on evaluating Europe’s collective interests across all sectors simultaneously, rather than in isolation.

The third round of the Q&A broadened the discussion to questions of strategy, narrative, internal European divisions, and the structural meaning of contemporary populism. Sandra Kaduri opened by asking whether a political tipping point might be emerging in the United States and whether European actors were fully exploiting this moment. Referring to subnational engagement at the most recent COP in Brazil—where over one hundred US governors and officials participated—she suggested that Europe might bypass the Trump administration by engaging more systematically with American actors beyond the federal executive. Kaduri also emphasized the potential of public opinion, polling, and values-based communication, arguing that majorities remain concerned about polarization and receptive to democratic norms, and questioning whether existing opportunities for narrative leadership were being missed.

A related intervention came from Becky Slack, who welcomed the report’s attention to framing and narrative. She posed a practical question regarding implementation: how the report’s recommendations on narrative could be operationalized, and which actors—political, institutional, or societal—would need to serve as partners in translating analytical insights into concrete communicative strategies capable of reducing polarization and strengthening democracy.

Reinhard Heinisch shifted the focus inward, challenging what he perceived as an overly homogeneous portrayal of Europe. He asked the panel to address persistent divisions between Eastern and Western Europe, their interaction with transatlantic relations, and the extent to which the United States might exploit these internal fractures—alongside what Europe could do to mitigate such vulnerabilities.

Offering a reflective comment rather than a direct question, Douglas Holmes introduced a historical and anthropological perspective. Drawing on his long experience interviewing Members of the European Parliament, he cautioned against linear or moralized readings of history. Holmes noted the paradox that the framers of the US Constitution—figures he described provocatively as religious fanatics and populists—produced one of the world’s most liberal political documents. From this, he suggested that the current moment may also contain unexpected possibilities, and he concluded by characterizing Trumpism less as an expression of American strength than of systemic weakness—an interpretation he offered as a potential source of strategic confidence.

Responding on behalf of the panel, MEP Radan Kanev addressed several of the themes raised. He argued that cooperation among European nationalist forces presents a greater challenge for those actors themselves than alignment with American dominance. Illustrating this point, he recounted the Romanian elections, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s support for a Romanian far-right candidate backfired, alienating ethnic Hungarian voters and inadvertently strengthening a liberal candidate. Such missteps, Kanev suggested, are likely to recur in attempts to build a coherent “nationalist international.”

At the same time, Kanev warned that history offers many examples of nationalist leaders willingly subordinating themselves to stronger external powers, citing Vichy France as a paradigmatic case. He expressed particular concern about Eastern Europe, where post-communist power structures have normalized dependency, making alignment with distant American power appear safer than genuine sovereignty.

Kanev concluded with a controversial but central argument: building a strong Europe requires distinguishing between nationalist and populist actors based not on ideological sympathy, but on their commitment to an independent Europe. Given the fragmentation of today’s political landscape and the erosion of traditional grand coalitions, he argued that European consensus-building must expand beyond familiar alliances to include Greens and selected conservative forces unwilling to act as external proxies—an inherently difficult but unavoidable task for Europe’s political future

Conclusion

The ECPS panel at the European Parliament underscored a central and sobering conclusion: transatlantic relations are no longer governed by inherited assumptions of stability, convergence, or automatic solidarity. The re-election of Donald Trump has not merely revived earlier tensions but has accelerated a deeper structural shift in which populism, domestic polarization, and transactional power politics increasingly define the terms of engagement. As the discussions repeatedly emphasized, this transformation affects not only external relations between Europe and the United States, but also the internal cohesion, democratic resilience, and strategic self-understanding of the European Union itself.

Across the panel, a clear analytical consensus emerged around three interlinked insights. First, the weakening of transatlantic relations is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—an unprecedented convergence of pressures that cannot be addressed through isolated or short-term fixes. Second, Europe retains agency. While it cannot shape US domestic politics, it can determine whether fragmentation, dependency, and narrative passivity define its response, or whether unity, strategic autonomy, and institutional leadership prevail. Third, populism must be understood not only as a political style or ideology, but as a governing logic capable of reshaping institutions from within, eroding norms gradually, and normalizing democratic backsliding unless actively countered.

The report and the panel discussions converge on the necessity of moving beyond reactive “muddling through.” Strengthening European defense capacity, asserting regulatory sovereignty, reinforcing multilateral institutions, and addressing socioeconomic precarity are not parallel agendas but mutually reinforcing dimensions of democratic resilience. Equally, narrative and coalition-building emerged as indispensable tools: Europe’s response must speak not only to elites and institutions, but to publics increasingly vulnerable to polarization, distrust, and grievance politics.

Ultimately, the panel framed the current moment not as the end of transatlantic cooperation, but as the end of its taken-for-granted form. The future relationship—if it is to endure—will depend on a more autonomous, coherent, and values-grounded Europe capable of engaging the United States as a partner when possible, resisting it when necessary, and leading where leadership is absent. The challenge, as the report makes clear, is no longer whether Europe should act, but whether it can act decisively enough, and soon enough, to shape the order emerging around it.

Report2025-3

Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options 

Please cite as:

Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00140

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“Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options” is a comprehensive ECPS report examining how the resurgence of right-wing populism—most notably under Donald Trump’s second presidency—reshapes the foundations of EU–US relations. Bringing together leading scholars, the report analyses the erosion of trust and shared norms across four pillars of the Atlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. It shows how domestic polarisation and illiberal trends now pose deeper, longer-term challenges than traditional diplomatic disputes. Combining theoretical insight with concrete policy recommendations, the volume outlines how the European Union can adapt strategically to a more volatile partner while defending multilateralism, democratic principles, and European strategic autonomy. An essential resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners navigating a changing transatlantic landscape.

The report offers a timely and comprehensive examination of how contemporary populism is reshaping one of the most consequential relationships in global politics. Published by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), it brings together leading scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to assess the structural impact of right-wing populism—most visibly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—on EU–US relations.

In this project, ECPS collaborates with the ARENA at the University of Oslo, the European Union Center at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, IES at the University of California, Berkeley, and CES at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The report is partially funded by the Jean Monnet-TANDEM and Transat-Defence Projects.

Moving beyond episodic diplomatic disputes, the report advances a central argument: the most serious long-term threat to transatlantic cooperation today stems from domestic political transformations. Rising polarisation, illiberal democratic practices, and populist challenges to multilateralism on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly undermine the shared norms and institutional foundations that have sustained the postwar Atlantic order. In this context, transatlantic relations are no longer strained merely by diverging interests, but by a growing clash over values, rules, and the meaning of democracy itself.

Analytically, the report is anchored in a four-pillar framework—security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—derived from the liberal foundations of the Atlantic political order. Each section combines historical perspective with forward-looking analysis, examining how populist governance affects NATO and European security, rules-based trade and the WTO, multilateral institutions such as the UN and WHO, and the liberal-democratic norms that once underpinned mutual trust. Across these domains, contributors identify patterns of erosion, adaptation, and selective cooperation, highlighting a shift toward a more transactional, fragmented, and unstable relationship. Overall, the EU–US relationship is entering a phase best described as “muddling through”: selective cooperation where interests align, paired with growing divergence elsewhere.

While acknowledging areas of continued collaboration, the authors emphasise that any future stability will depend less on restoring past arrangements than on Europe’s capacity to adapt strategically without abandoning its commitment to multilateralism, democracy, and the rule of law.

The report concludes with detailed, policy-oriented recommendations aimed at EU institutions and member states. These include strengthening European strategic autonomy, reinforcing democratic resilience, investing in defence and industrial capacity, and building new coalitions to sustain global governance in an era of populist disruption. As such, the volume serves not only as an analytical diagnosis of a transatlantic relationship at a crossroads, but also as a practical guide for navigating an increasingly contested international order.

Please see the Introduction, 17 chapters, and Conclusion of the report presented separately below.

Introduction

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg


SECTION 1: SECURITY

Chapter 1: Overview and Background: Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US-European Relations

By Riccardo Alcaro

 

Chapter 2: Functional Adaptation without much Love: NATO and the Strains of EU–US Relations

By Monika Sus

 

Chapter 3: EU-US-China Security Relations

By Reuben Wong

 

Chapter 4: The Russia-Ukraine War and Transatlantic Relations

By Jost-Henrik Morgenstern-Pomorski & Karolina Pomorska

 

SECTION 2: TRADE

Chapter 5: Overview and background: Transatlantic Trade from Embedded Liberalism to Competitive Strategic Autonomy

By Erik Jones

 

Chapter 6: EU-US-China Trade Relations

By Arlo Poletti

 

Chapter 7: From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration

By Alasdair Young

 

Chapter 8: Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization

By Kent Jones

 

SECTION 3: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter 9: Overview and Background: International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations

By Mike Smith

 

Chapter 10: The United Nations in the Age of American Transactionalism

By Edith Drieskens

 

Chapter 11: The Trump Administration and Climate Policy: The Effects of Right-wing Populism

By Daniel Fiorino

 

Chapter 12: Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU-United States Cooperation during a Changing International Order

By Frode Veggeland

 

SECTION 4: DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Chapter 13: Overview and background: Democracy and Populism — The European Case

By Douglas Holmes

 

Chapter 14: Illiberalism and Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Transatlantic Relations

By Saul Newman

 

Chapter 15: The Illiberal Bargain on Migration

By Ruben Andersson

Chapter 16: Illiberal international: The Transatlantic Right’s Challenge to Democracy

By Robert Benson

 

Chapter 17: Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity

By Albena Azmanova

 

Conclusion: How Should the EU Deal with Changing Transatlantic Relations?

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg

 

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Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—symbolizing strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. Photo: Sameer Chogale.

Pax Americana to Pax Silica: Strategic Shifts in US Security Policy

From Pax Americana to Pax Silica, US grand strategy is undergoing a quiet but consequential transformation. In this timely commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar argues that recent US security documents—the 2025 National Security Strategy and the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act—signal a shift away from global stewardship toward a selective, technology-centered, and leverage-driven order. Rather than underwriting international rules and alliances, Washington is increasingly exercising power through control over strategic technologies, supply chains, and infrastructural chokepoints—a model Dr. Chahar conceptualizes as Pax Silica. This reorientation prioritizes hemispheric consolidation, technological dominance, and transactional partnerships over normative leadership. For partners such as India, the implications are profound: engagement remains valuable but conditional, reinforcing the logic of strategic autonomy, calibrated cooperation, and multi-alignment in a fragmented global order.

By Prerna Chahar*

What is unfolding in US security policy is neither isolationism nor traditional internationalism, but a selective strategy centered on leverage, technology, and regional primacy. American grand strategy is undergoing a quiet yet consequential transformation one that redefines how power is exercised, how partnerships are valued, and how international order is sustained. Recent US strategic documents, the National Security Strategy (NSS), and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) point to a decisive shift away from managing global order toward consolidating national advantage, with far-reaching implications for allies and partners.

The National Security Strategy (NSS), published on December 4, 2025, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2026, signed into law on December 18, 2025, together confirm that the era of Pax Americana characterized by institutional stewardship, alliance management, and normative leadership is giving way to a more selective, technology-centered, and transactional order. This emerging configuration may be described as Pax Silica: an order grounded less in alliances and rules and more in control over technology, supply chains, and strategic chokepoints.

NSS and NDAA: Reframing US Grand Strategy

The framing of the NSS 2025 itself signals a deliberate break from earlier approaches to American grand strategy. Four recurring themes encapsulate this reorientation.

First, the strategy explicitly rejects “old policies,” portraying past commitments to liberal internationalism, open-ended multilateralism, and interventionism as having diluted US sovereignty, weakened economic resilience, and overstretched strategic focus. This narrative of rupture legitimizes a more restrained and interest-driven approach to global engagement.

Second, the NSS defines what America wants with unusual clarity. Rather than emphasizing the maintenance of international order, it articulates bounded national priorities border security, economic nationalism, technological dominance, and hemispheric stability. Global leadership is no longer treated as an intrinsic responsibility but as a derivative of clearly specified national interests.

Third, both the NSS and the NDAA foreground American strength in material rather than normative terms. The NDAA 2026 authorizes over $900 billion in national defense funding, making it one of the largest defense policy bills in recent history. This level of spending underscores a sustained emphasis on military readiness, industrial capacity, and technological superiority. Military capability, innovation ecosystems, industrial depth, and technological leadership take precedence over values-based diplomacy, institutional rule-making, or normative influence.

The NDAA further operationalizes this shift through enhanced cybersecurity authorities, frameworks for the secure development and deployment of artificial intelligence and machine-learning systems and strengthened protections for US Cyber Command and digital infrastructure. It also expands authorities related to airspace security and counter-unmanned aerial systems under provisions such as the Safer Skies Act broadening civil and federal counter-drone capabilities. Together, these measures reflect the logic of Pax Silica, in which control over technology and infrastructure replaces institutional stewardship as the primary currency of influence.

Fourth, the NSS report clarifies the renewed strategic focus on the Western Hemisphere. While global competition remains important, the strategy prioritizes hemispheric stability, border control, migration management, and economic dominance within the Americas. This represents a modernized revival of Monroe Doctrine logic, where securing influence in the immediate neighborhood is treated as foundational to national security. Engagement beyond the hemisphere is increasingly selective and interest-driven, filtered through considerations of domestic security, economic resilience, and technological advantage rather than assumptions of automatic leadership. The NDAA reinforces this orientation by prioritizing resources for homeland protection, maritime domain awareness in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and defense readiness tied to territorial security. Together, these documents signal a shift from global managerial ambitions toward consolidation of power closer to home.

Taken collectively, these elements reflect a fundamental strategic reorientation. Rather than presenting the United States as the custodian of international order, the NSS positions it as a state intent on consolidating advantage, preserving autonomy, and exercising leverage. This underscores the durability of what may be termed the Trump Corollary: the notion that alliances, institutions, and global engagements are instruments to be justified by tangible returns rather than commitments sustained for systemic stability or normative leadership.

US ‘Pax Silica’: Renewed Instrument of Power

Within this hemispheric and technological reorientation, Pax Silica captures the defining feature of the emerging order: power exercised through technological and infrastructural dominance rather than institutional rule-making. Semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, digital platforms, and financial networks now constitute the backbone of strategic competition. Control over access to these systems enables coercion and influence without overt force.

Edward Fishman, in his book Chokepoints: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare, demonstrates how American power increasingly operates through the regulation of markets, technology flows, and supply chains, an approach clearly visible in export controls, investment screening, and technology-denial regimes embedded in both the NSS and the NDAA. Unlike Pax Americana, which relied on openness, predictability, and alliance cohesion, Pax Silica is exclusionary and conditional. Cooperation is granted rather than guaranteed; access replaces inclusion as the principal mechanism of influence.

The most consequential aspect of this transition is the decoupling of power from stewardship. The United States remains pre-eminent, but it no longer seeks to underwrite global order as a public good. Instead, it prioritizes regional consolidation, technological control, and transactional leverage. This is not withdrawal, but re-hierarchization: the Western Hemisphere first, strategic technologies second, and global commitments contingent on domestic advantage.

Implications for India

The renewed US focus on the Western Hemisphere carries important implications for India. While the Indo-Pacific remains relevant, it is no longer the singular organizing theatre of US grand strategy. Engagement in Asia is increasingly shaped by cost-benefit calculations and capability contributions rather than long-term commitments to regional order. For India, this creates both opportunity and uncertainty. Reduced ideological pressure allows greater strategic autonomy, but transactional partnerships demand constant negotiation. Cooperation in defense, technology, and supply-chain resilience particularly in semiconductors and critical technologies remains valuable yet inherently conditional. India’s participation in groupings such as the Quad must therefore be understood as calibrated engagement rather than alignment, reinforcing the logic of multi-alignment and diversification.

Conclusion

The shift from Pax Americana to Pax Silica reflects a profound transformation in US statecraft. The renewed focus on the Western Hemisphere, combined with technological competition and transactional diplomacy, marks a move away from global stewardship toward selective, leverage-based power. For partners such as India, the challenge is to engage without illusion cooperating where interests converge, hedging where vulnerabilities emerge, and sustaining strategic autonomy in a world where leadership is fragmented and power is increasingly exercised through control rather than consensus.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations with published research on US foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, regional coalition-building, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CCUS&LAS), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

Emblem of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the ‘End of History’ to the ‘End of a Fiction’: What Davos 2026 Really Announced

Davos 2026 revealed a global order no longer converging on a single liberal model, but sliding into a harsher era in which power increasingly outweighs rules and “integration” is reframed as vulnerability. The most striking paradox was that this diagnosis came not from critics at the margins, but from the system’s own architects—transforming elite “candor” into a strategy for managing declining legitimacy. In a world shaped by fragmentation and coercive interdependence, China’s state-capitalist model is increasingly perceived as a more effective crisis-response framework, while the United States and Europe drift toward a troubling hybrid: adopting not China’s developmental strengths, but its coercive instruments of control. This dynamic reflects an emerging logic of reverse convergence—the West is no longer guiding the world toward liberalism, but being pulled toward the governance style of its principal rival.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Davos platform can be seen as a stage where dominant actors test narratives, identify legitimacy losses, and modify the public vocabulary they use to govern (or justify governing). It rarely makes formal decisions; instead, it indicates what elites believe they can still publicly defend—and what they can no longer convincingly pretend. Davos 2026, in that sense, can be viewed less as a policy summit and more as a diagnosis of the regime.

In this context, Davos 2026 is significant because the words spoken inside the room seemed less like a reaffirmation of the post-1990 liberal-global order and more like an early draft of its obituary. Larry Fink, Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and CEO of BlackRock—one of the world’s largest asset managers—started with a blunt admission that the world trusts Davos and the WEF’s ability to shape the future “far less,” warning that the forum risks seeming “out of step with the moment: elites in an age of populism” (Fink, 2026). Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, took it even further. He suggested that the problem isn’t just declining trust in institutions; it’s the collapse of the narrative foundations of the “rules-based liberal multilateral order” itself. He described “the end of a pleasant fiction… and the beginning of a harsh reality,” emphasizing that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition” (Carney, 2026).

If anything was “announced,” then it was not a new treaty or a coordinated policy package. It was an elite confession: the old legitimating story no longer works.

What Exactly Is Ending?

The natural questions—What was declared at Davos? Is it the end of the Western system? Is Chinese-style state capitalism rising? —are the right ones. But they require careful separation of the West as power from the West as ideology, and of neoliberal globalization from liberal democracy. What seems to be ending is not “the West” as a geographical or civilizational fact, but a historically specific settlement—visible in three interlocking dimensions.

The end of the convergence myth: One part of the story traces back to assumptions about nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization. Classical modernization thinking regarded history as a linear, stage-like process where societies would converge toward a single “advanced” model through diffusion, emulation, and integration—so that cross-civilizational differences would eventually appear as “time lags,” not alternative paths (Apter, 1965; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rostow, 1960). In that framework, modernity was not just one option among many; it was seen as the expected endpoint of development.

Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis—initially presented as an essay and later expanded into a book—was a late-twentieth-century extension of this modernization perspective (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). After the fall of Soviet-style planning, liberal capitalism seemed not just victorious but final: no significant systemic challengers remained, and future conflicts were seen as minor issues rather than real alternatives.

Davos 2026, however, seemed to quietly acknowledge that this convergence theory has run its course. After decades of “learning-by-doing” globalization, the idea that marketization, integration, and digitization would inevitably lead to liberal-democratic outcomes has become less convincing. Among many others, Öztürk (2025) calls this a fundamental “liberal fallacy,” revealed by post-2008 stagnation, growing inequality, and the resilience of authoritarian governance under capitalist conditions.

The decline of the authority of the “rules-based order” (as performance): A second aspect involves the public authority of institutional rules. Carney’s remarks illustrated a familiar phenomenon: states show belief in a rules-based order—displaying the “sign” publicly—while privately recognizing how often the rules break down in practice (Carney, 2026). His metaphor strongly mirrors Václav Havel’s assessment of late-socialist legitimacy: the system’s survival relied on ritualistic compliance and public participation in an official fiction, even when no one truly believed it (Havel, 1978).

In modern global politics, this is the credibility crisis of liberal internationalism: the rules exist, but enforcement seems selective; the universal language stays, but power distribution shapes outcomes. This is exactly where realism comes back—sometimes openly, sometimes disguised as “values-based pragmatism.”

The end of elite capitalism’s moral economy: Third, Davos 2026 hosted a legitimacy check on elite-led capitalism itself. Fink’s insistence that prosperity cannot be reduced to total GDP gains or stock-market success implicitly admits what critics have argued for decades: growth narratives do not automatically generate social approval when the distribution of wealth is unfair, public services decline, and opportunities disappear (Fink, 2026; Piketty, 2020).

This line closely mirrors Robert F. Kennedy’s well-known critique of national income accounting, asserting that GDP can measure “everything… except that which makes life worthwhile” (Kennedy, 1968). What once seemed like fresh wisdom at Davos in 2026 now appears as delayed recognition: a long-overdue admission that the legitimacy of capitalism cannot rely solely on aggregate indicators. Taken together, these three dimensions do not imply “the end of the West.” They signify the end of the West’s story about itself—the self-description of a system that universalizes its model as destiny, naturalizes its institutions as neutral rules, and considers legitimacy to be the automatic result of growth. Historically, when a hegemonic story collapses, systems rarely vanish overnight; instead, they change and adapt.

The Crisis of Corporate Capitalism as a Reflection of the System

Öztürk’s (2025) “reverse convergence” hypothesis provides one of the clearest ways to interpret Davos 2026. It avoids two lazy conclusions— (1) “China is replacing the West,” and (2) “nothing changes; it’s only noise”—by arguing that the direction of convergence has reversed. Liberal democracies are increasingly adopting illiberal governance techniques (expanded surveillance, executive discretion, securitized policy frames, controlled pluralism), while authoritarian regimes are adopting capitalist tools (market mechanisms, technological dynamism, corporate scale) without liberalizing. This is not ideological convergence through persuasion. It is functional convergence driven by systemic pressure.

Here, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” becomes central: disembedded markets cause social division and political backlash, but the protective countermovement can be seized—redirected into nationalist, exclusionary, or authoritarian forms instead of democratic re-embedding (Polanyi, 1944). Fernand Braudel’s distinction is also important: capitalism is not the same as competitive markets; it is often a structure of lasting domination shielded from democratic accountability (Braudel, 1982, 1984).

Add the modern layer of digital political economy. The tools of governance increasingly function through infrastructures of data extraction, algorithmic control, and dependency rather than through persuasion or consent. This is the shared domain of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), vectoral power and information monopolies (Wark, 2004, 2019), and “techno-feudal” rent extraction via digital platforms and cloud infrastructures (Varoufakis, 2023). In this view, Davos 2026 was not just a geopolitical event; it also revealed that corporate capitalism has created a legitimacy gap that traditional liberal narratives can no longer fill.

When Fink’s speech is analyzed through the perspectives of Polanyi and Braudel, it seems to outline a plan to restore legitimacy. He urged the WEF to “regain trust,” boost participation, and modernize the language used to defend capitalism (Fink, 2026). Even if the diagnosis is sound, the messenger presents a problem. The contradiction is structural: the credibility crisis he describes is closely linked to the financial and corporate structures that BlackRock represents. When the “doctor” is also one of the system’s most powerful beneficiaries, criticism is often seen as mere damage control by elites rather than genuine reformist bravery. 

Fink also emphasized that prosperity must become distributive, turning “more people into owners of growth,” not spectators (Fink, 2026). Yet this is where Davos rhetoric regularly stalls: it acknowledges the legitimacy problem but often proposes solutions at the level of communication rather than at the level of reconstruction. The 2026 shift, then, is not the defense of globalization’s moral premise; it is an attempt to rewrite capitalism’s legitimacy contract amid mass distrust.

A key concern running through the Davos discussions about AI is anxiety. The worry is that AI will repeat the distributional betrayal of globalization: early benefits go to owners of data, compute, models, and platforms, while the social costs are spread out to others. Without strong redistribution and governance, AI risks being less of a productivity leap and more of a new enclosure system—worsening dependence instead of expanding opportunities (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023).

From Benign Interdependence to Fortress Logic

Carney’s intervention was more impactful because it explicitly addressed what “trust” rhetoric often overlooks: the geopolitical and geoeconomic rupture of the rules-based order. His speech repeatedly suggested that the liberal promise of mutual interdependence has run its course. Integration can become a source of vulnerability and subjugation, leading states to pursue strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains (Carney, 2026).

At one point, Carney invoked a brutally realistic moral: “the strong can do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” The phrase echoes the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides—a canonical statement of power politics rationality (Thucydides, trans. 1972). The significance is not the originality of the reference; it is that Davos discourse now treats such realism as publicly speakable.

This is where “weaponized interdependence” becomes relevant: network power can be transformed into coercion when states or firms control critical chokepoints in finance, infrastructure, trade, and digital platforms (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Carney’s prescription—strategic autonomy or a “world of fortresses”—is therefore less a nationalist shift than an acknowledgment that global integration is no longer seen as harmless.

Seen from the broader perspective of globalization discourse, Davos 2026 signifies a significant reversal of the assumptions that characterized the early 2000s. Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat summarized the era’s belief that digital connectivity and integrated supply chains were “flattening” the world into a more open, opportunity-filled, and ultimately convergent space (Friedman, 2005). Two decades later, David J. Lynch’s The World’s Worst Bet reads like an obituary for that optimism: globalization now seems less like a benign force for shared prosperity and more like a risky gamble that has weakened industrial resilience, increased inequality, empowered strategic competitors, and fueled political backlash in the West (Lynch, 2025). The transition from “flatness” to “worst bet” reflects the same shift Carney now describes in geopolitical terms: integration is no longer assumed to be mutually beneficial; it is increasingly viewed as a potential pathway to dependence, coercion, and subjugation (Carney, 2026; Friedman, 2005; Lynch, 2025).

This closely aligns with Amitav Acharya’s argument that the liberal “rules-based order” was never entirely universal; it functioned as a Western-centered system with selective membership and inconsistent enforcement. What follows, according to Acharya, is not just “multipolarity,” but a decentralized “multiplex” world—more diverse, more contested, and less controlled by a single hegemon (Acharya, 2017; Acharya, 2018). Even defenders sympathetic to the liberal order acknowledge its historically Western core and its expansion after the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2008, 2018). 

Davos 2026, therefore, seemed like a moment when elites started speaking more openly than before about a world they can no longer describe as heading toward a single institutional model. However, there is a deeper contradiction at Davos: many of the harshest critiques in 2026 were made not by independent critics but by the system’s own architects—CEOs, senior officials, and high-level political leaders. This doesn’t invalidate their diagnosis, but it should change how we interpret it: what looks like honesty may also be a form of preemptive storytelling, a controlled version of systemic self-criticism aimed at maintaining core power structures while giving rhetorical ground.

The US–EU–China Triangle: Three Paths, One Convergent Pressure

Against this backdrop, the question facing mainstream systems is no longer just whether globalization can be “fixed,” but which governance model is increasingly seen as the better response to a high-stress world full of uncertainty, fragmentation, and coercive interdependence. Under conditions of heightened geopolitical competition, supply-chain insecurity, volatility in energy and food, and rapid technological rivalry, the focus is quietly shifting toward the idea that China’s model—often called socialist state capitalism—may provide faster, more disciplined, and more strategically coordinated solutions than the liberal market approach, mainly because it can mobilize resources, direct finance, and prioritize long-term national goals. In this context, Davos 2026 didn’t just expose a legitimacy crisis; it also pointed to a growing competition over “effective modernity,” where resilience and the ability to command are beginning to matter more than openness and procedural legitimacy.

Indeed, an even more concerning sign is emerging from within the West itself: leading trends in the United States and the European Union increasingly indicate that what they are taking from China is not its potentially positive strengths—such as developmental coordination or strategic industrial policy—but rather its negative governance traits: securitization, surveillance expansion, executive centralization, and the normalization of emergency-style rule. This creates a growing zone of hybridization, where liberal democracies preserve electoral rituals while gradually adopting illiberal techniques of control and exclusion. In other words, the West seems to be entering a phase of reverse convergence—a process where the “center” shifts toward the logic of its challenger, often in its most coercive forms—a dynamic that I will explore in detail.

Öztürk’s (2025) structured comparison across five dimensions—surveillance regimes, populist discourse, regulatory architecture, market concentration, and distributional outcomes—acts like a decoder for Davos 2026. It does not claim that the US, EU, and China are becoming identical. Instead, it argues that all three are responding to the same structural pressures—tech-driven control, oligopolistic concentration, legitimacy erosion—while doing so through different institutional legacies.

China’s large-scale integration of state and capital shows that advanced capitalism can exist without liberal democracy. It combines market activity and corporate growth within one-party control, increasingly extending worldwide through infrastructure, standards, and digital systems (Callahan, 2016; Creemers, 2018; Dai, 2020). Its governance tools—such as data-driven monitoring, biometric systems, and ideological control of platforms—provide an attractive model for regimes dealing with insecurity and social unrest, even though it also poses legitimacy challenges (Greitens, 2020).

The United States’ hybrid drift shows how liberal democracy can weaken internally due to inequality, institutional capture, and polarization, especially after the 2008 crisis delegitimized traditional economic promises and heightened distrust between elites and the public (Öztürk, 2025). Illiberal populism has proved to be a resilient narrative ecosystem (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Meanwhile, corporate surveillance and algorithmic governance operate alongside expanding security measures, leading to convergence driven by technique rather than ideology (Zuboff, 2019).

The European Union’s regulatory ambition, even under legitimacy stress, stands as the strongest counterexample to simple convergence claims because it has built the most ambitious rights-based regulatory framework in the democratic world, especially in the digital area (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). However, it remains vulnerable to legitimacy stress: far-right normalization, internal rule-of-law conflicts, uneven fiscal capacity, and ongoing reliance on US platform power. Regulation can limit domination, but legitimacy ultimately depends on distributive foundations—not just technocracy (Brown, 2019; Piketty, 2020).

If one sentence embodies the West’s strategic trauma, it is this: China demonstrates that sophisticated capitalism can operate without liberal democracy—and at scale. The Davos concern is not just that China competes, but that China’s model is increasingly serving as a reference point for organizing power in the twenty-first century (Öztürk, 2025).

The Hidden Davos Declaration

If we summarize Davos 2026 into a single implicit statement, it is: The global order based on rules-based multilateralism, benign interdependence, and trickle-down legitimacy has reached a final crisis. What comes next is probably going to be centered around: i) strategic autonomy (energy, supply chains, critical minerals, digital sovereignty) (Carney, 2026), ii) narrative legitimacy repair (“inclusive prosperity,” participation, trust) (Fink, 2026). iii) technological control architectures (AI governance, surveillance trade-offs, platform regulation conflict) (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023), and iv) a reduced faith in universalism, and a greater acceptance of bloc rivalry, vulnerability management, and “value-based realism” (Acharya, 2017; Ikenberry, 2018).

This is why Davos 2026 felt like a turning point: elites are no longer pretending we still live in the 1990s. But the new order being outlined is not automatically democratic. It can just as easily shift toward market authoritarianism—combining capital preservation with control-first governance. A democratic solution is still conceptually possible: re-embedding markets in democratic institutions (Polanyi, 1944), rebuilding a distributive social contract (Piketty, 2020), and limiting both corporate and government power through enforceable rights (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). Davos 2026, however, raises a brutally practical question: Can democracies re-legitimate themselves quickly enough before surveillance, AI, and strategic autonomy become permanent justifications for executive insulation?

That question, more than any speech, was the true “announcement.”


 

References

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Professor Stephan Klingebiel is Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

Prof. Klingebiel: Trump’s US Is Actively Undermining Multilateralism—So We Should Push for a ‘Global Order Minus One’

In this ECPS interview, Professor Stephan Klingebiel argues that Trump-era populism signals a durable shift in global governance rather than a passing disruption. He stresses that the “rise of populism, nationalism, and right-wing populism predates Trump,” and warns that Washington is now “actively fighting all forms of multilateralism” through withdrawal, defunding, and the systematic contestation of UN language on issues such as “climate change,” “gender,” and “diversity.” Professor Klingebiel links this normative erosion to the weaponization of trade, tariffs, and development finance, which turns rules-based cooperation into coercive bargaining. He also highlights how geoeconomic competition is reshaping North–South relations by expanding bargaining space for resource-holding states. Looking ahead, he proposes a “global order minus one” as a pragmatic pathway to sustain multilateralism amid fragmentation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by intensified geopolitical rivalry, the resurgence of right-wing populism, and the erosion of long-standing international norms, the future of multilateral governance has become a central question for scholars and policymakers alike. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephan Klingebiel—Head of the Department of Inter- and Transnational Cooperation at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)—offers a sober and incisive assessment of how Trump-era populism is reshaping global governance and what realistic alternatives may still be available.

At the heart of Professor Klingebiel’s analysis is a rejection of the notion that Trump-era populism represents a temporary aberration. Instead, he situates it within a broader and more durable constellation of political, ideological, and technological shifts. As he emphasizes, “the rise of populism, nationalism, and right-wing populism predates Trump,” extending across parts of Europe and the Global South. Trump, in this sense, is not an anomaly but a catalyst—“a prominent role” within a system that is unlikely to disappear in the near future.

A central theme of the interview is the normative and material hollowing-out of multilateralism. Professor Klingebiel argues that populism does not merely weaken international cooperation through withdrawals and defunding; it reframes cooperation itself as a zero-sum loss. In Trump’s discourse, he notes, the United States is consistently portrayed as a victim: “Canada, Europe—[they] have long lived at the expense of the United States.” This logic underpins what Klingebiel bluntly describes as an administration that is “actively fighting all forms of multilateralism.”

The interview traces how this antagonism manifests across institutions and issue areas—from the US withdrawal from dozens of international organizations to the systematic erosion of consensus-based norms within the United Nations. Particularly alarming, Klingebiel warns, is Washington’s effort to excise concepts such as “climate change, gender, gender-based violence, and diversity” from multilateral language, producing a chilling effect that leaves international organizations “no longer in a position to be explicit about real global challenges.”

Beyond institutions, Professor Klingebiel examines the weaponization of trade, tariffs, supply chains, and development finance, describing a shift from rules-based governance to coercive bargaining. This marks, in his view, a decisive break with past practices, where even hegemonic power was at least nominally constrained by international law. Recent cases—such as US actions in Venezuela—signal a world in which legal justification is no longer even rhetorically necessary.

Yet the interview is not purely diagnostic. Looking ahead, Klingebiel introduces one of his most provocative ideas: the possibility of sustaining multilateralism through a “global order minus one.” If a broad coalition of states remains committed to multilateral norms, he argues, such an order could both isolate unilateral obstruction and create incentives for eventual re-engagement. While acknowledging that “we are most likely not going back to the situation we had five or ten years ago,” Klingebiel insists that political choices made now—particularly by Europe and like-minded partners—will decisively shape whether the future belongs to cooperative governance or competitive fragmentation.

Together, the interview offers a penetrating reflection on populism, power, and the fragile future of the international order.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Stephan Klingebiel, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Trump-Era Populism and Global Governance

Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

Professor Stephan Klingebiel, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Is Trump-era populism best understood as a temporary disruption to global governance, or does it mark a structural shift toward a new “normal” defined by transactionalism and power asymmetries? What makes such a shift durable—or reversible?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: Thank you very much for this question. It is, of course, not an easy one, as it touches on many different dimensions. To begin with, I do not think that what we are currently witnessing is something that will simply disappear in the near future. The rise of populism, nationalism, and right-wing populism predates Trump. We saw these developments earlier in parts of Europe, such as Hungary, and also in several regions of the Global South.

What we are dealing with, then, is a broader system or constellation in which Trump plays a prominent role, but he is by no means the only actor. There are numerous other political figures, institutions, and ideological currents that are unlikely to vanish any time soon. As a result, this is a reality we will probably have to contend with for the foreseeable future.

These dynamics are also connected to wider structural trends. In some parts of the world, for instance, we see growing frustration among younger generations—this is particularly evident on the African continent. At the same time, the influence of traditional media is declining, while social media is gaining prominence. Social media, in turn, has the capacity to mobilize emotions in ways that differ significantly from earlier forms of political communication. From this perspective, it is important to recognize that the impact of social media is not a temporary phenomenon, but one that is likely to remain with us for some time.

The United States Is Actively Fighting All Forms of Multilateralism

How does populism erode multilateral cooperation not only materially (through withdrawal or underfunding) but also normatively, by reframing cooperation as loss rather than collective gain?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: I think we need to emphasize that, typically—and this is true for almost all populist leaders and movements—multilateral approaches are not really part of populist political identity or thinking. It is very much the opposite. As a populist leader, you emphasize national interest and present yourself as a victim. Just listening to many speeches by President Trump, including his most recent one in Davos, we see this clearly: he portrays the United States as a victim, arguing that the rest of the world—Canada, Europe—has long lived at the expense of the United States. The conclusion, of course, is that a populist leader then seeks to turn this around and make the rest of the world pay. In this narrative, the international system is framed as fundamentally unfair to the hegemon, to the United States. In that sense, the United States is actively fighting all forms of multilateralism.

We see this in many ways. The most visible manifestations are defunding and withdrawal from international organizations. At the beginning of January this year, President Trump announced that the US would withdraw from a total of 66 international organizations. We have also already seen the defunding of a number of other international institutions to which the United States was a part. 

However, what I would stress is that there are many additional ways in which the US has, over the past months, weakened—and to some extent even undermined—multilateralism. One example is the International Conference on Development Finance held last summer in Sevilla, Spain. The United States remained involved in the preparatory process until the very last moment, largely in order to slow down and weaken the negotiations and to ensure that the final outcome document would be as weak as possible. At the very end, the United States announced that it would not participate in the conference at all. In that sense, it did not show up in Sevilla. What is particularly striking, however, is that the US had already been spoiling the process before the conference and then, immediately afterward, resumed efforts to weaken the outcome document, build alliances, and contest the results of the conference.

More broadly, we can see that the United States is pursuing a range of strategies. One additional point is that, from the very beginning of the second Trump administration—in February and March 2025—the US administration has been working with a list of key terms and concepts it actively seeks to oppose. These include concepts such as climate change, gender, gender-based violence, and diversity. As soon as an international organization publishes a report or document addressing climate change or any of these other issues, the United States attempts to eliminate this kind of language and thinking.

This is particularly dangerous because, in institutions such as the United Nations—where many decisions are consensus-based—we now face a situation in which, across executive boards and institutional bodies, the United States consistently intervenes to block or dilute agreed language. For example, it seeks to replace “climate change” with terms like “extreme weather.” This practice is already shaping the internal thinking and behavior of international organizations. Increasingly, they are no longer in a position to speak openly about major global challenges. Instead, they try to avoid explicit language in order to escape constant confrontation with the United States. At the same time, the United States is actively seeking allies to challenge what was previously a broad global consensus, further eroding the normative foundations of multilateral cooperation.

We Are Entering an Era of Competing Organizations and Conflicting Norms

The headquarters of the United Nations in New York City. Photo: Dreamstime.

Are we witnessing the end of universal multilateralism, or its mutation into selective, interest-based cooperation? How does your concept of like-minded internationalism fit into this transition?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: It is probably too early to draw definitive conclusions about what kind of new era, we are entering. Much of this is still evolving. What is clear, however, is that there are very powerful forces actively trying to undermine the existing international order, most notably the United Nations. Even in the past, we saw situations in which certain actors—Russia, for example—did not accept international law in many respects, and similar patterns could be observed with other governments as well.

The key difference today, however, is that we previously had a very strong group of countries, including the United States, committed to ensuring that this international order functioned effectively. What we see now is that the United States itself is aligning with forces that are seeking to undermine—and in some cases even dismantle—this system.

Just a few days ago, President Trump publicly described the United Nations as an enemy. From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand that any international order in which the United States does not occupy a clearly dominant position is framed as contrary to American interests. The proposal of a so-called “peace council” by President Trump represents an open challenge to the United Nations. My assumption is that even if this initiative ultimately fails, and even if Trump is no longer president, the broader trend toward competing international organizations, rival groupings, and conflicting norms about the rules of the game will persist.

This brings us to the question of like-minded internationalism. On the one hand, a populist leader can seek out like-minded countries, as President Trump is doing. On the other hand, states that remain committed to multilateralism can also pursue cooperation among like-minded partners. This is something we can already observe. If you look at recent speeches in Davos—by leaders from Canada, France, and several other countries—you can see attempts to articulate collective action against the advance of right-wing populism.

At the same time, such efforts require substantial power backing to be effective. While we can see early signs of countries trying to organize this kind of counterpower, it remains a very difficult and uncertain undertaking.

We Are Seeing the Construction of a System Based on Coercive Power

Trump’s use of tariffs and trade threats as coercive tools, or as a “trade bazooka,” reflects a shift from rules-based trade to punitive bargaining. What are the long-term systemic risks of normalizing trade as a geopolitical weapon?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: We can now observe this dynamic across many policy areas. It relates to trade and tariffs, but also to foreign investment, access to critical minerals, and other domains. What is particularly new is the extent to which Trump is explicitly weaponizing all of these tools—imposing, or threatening to impose, tariffs whenever a country is deemed, from his perspective, not to be behaving in a desirable way.

One positive feature of the past was that, to a large extent, different policy areas were kept separate. If there was a conflict related to trade, it was addressed through trade instruments and negotiation. Today, this separation has largely disappeared. From a European perspective, we increasingly see that almost everything can be linked to questions about US support and positioning—for example, in relation to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—even when the issues at stake are, in principle, unrelated.

We have seen statements suggesting that if the European Union seeks to regulate US technology companies, this could have consequences for NATO. In reality, these issues are not directly connected, but this administration is deliberately trying to weaponize all the tools at its disposal. Tariffs, in particular, appear to be one of the most immediate and effective instruments Trump can use to respond to a situation. This is deeply concerning. It signals the construction of a system based on coercive power, rather than leadership through partnership. It is no longer about win-win outcomes or cooperation, but about imposing outcomes that align with what the US leadership wants to see.

As a brief aside—and this applies to many of the points I have made—this situation strongly reflects what European countries are currently experiencing, and it is highly relevant for them. At the same time, it is important to recognize that, from the perspective of many countries and actors in the Global South, such coercion and dominance—whether by the United States or by the West more broadly—is not new. These practices have long been part of their political reality.

From a European standpoint, the liberal international order now appears to be at serious risk, and this concern is entirely justified. Yet for many countries in Latin America, the Caribbean, or Africa, experiences such as military intervention are not unprecedented. In conversations I have had over recent weeks and months, academics, political leaders, and policymakers from these regions often say: this is our normal experience as relatively small and powerless countries. US-led military interventions, particularly in Latin America over past decades, are a familiar reference point. This perspective deserves to be taken seriously.

There is also an important additional dimension. In many respects, there is truth in the argument that the international system has never been fair to large parts of the world. What is new today is that Europe and other Western countries are now feeling the impact directly, because these same coercive tools are increasingly being used against them. Yet there remains a crucial difference compared to the past. Historically, the US government—and Western governments more broadly—at least operated with a set of double standards. There were formal commitments to principles such as territorial integrity and sovereignty, and when military interventions occurred, they were typically accompanied by some form of justification grounded in international law.

If we look at events such as what happened in Venezuela in early January 2026, it was clear from the outset that there was no attempt by the US administration to justify its actions on the basis of international law. This marks a significant departure from earlier practices. In the past, Western actors were at least under pressure to frame their actions within legal justifications. Today, the United States no longer appears interested in invoking international law even as a reference point. In this sense as well, we are confronting a new situation.

Geoeconomics Has Become a Very Crucial Dimension

How does the weaponization of trade, supply chains, and development finance reshape North–South relations, particularly for countries dependent on access to Western markets and institutions?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: I think what we have already seen over the last couple of years—and this is only partly related to the second administration of President Trump, as we observed it especially during the COVID period and even before—is that we are now in a situation where supply chains, access to critical minerals, and energy security have become much more important. Geoeconomics has therefore become a very crucial dimension.

In many ways, this increasingly gives even poorer, or very poor, countries a relatively powerful bargaining instrument. Just look, for example, at the situation of a number of Sahel countries, which are now in a position to offer what they have—whether in terms of international support in United Nations General Assembly decisions or access to minerals such as uranium and other resources—to different actors: European countries, the United States, but also China and Russia, particularly when it comes to uranium.

This gives many relatively small or economically less important countries much more power at their own disposal. And this kind of multi-alignment is something that, from this perspective, is seen by many actors in the Global South—on the African continent and beyond—as a positive trend.

Greenland — Seeing Territorial Integrity Questioned Is Deeply Troubling

Colorful houses in Greenland. Photo: Dreamstime.

How should we interpret Trump’s renewed rhetoric and pressure around Greenland—symbolically and strategically? Does this signal a revival of territorial or quasi-imperial logics under populist leadership?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: This is really—especially from a European perspective—a game changer. I think what we constantly see with the Trump administration is the need to make sense of what is actually going on. There is so much happening at the same time. Some of these activities may be relevant, while others appear to be mere rhetoric or deliberate distractions. At the beginning of his second term, or even before, Trump was already using narratives about Canada, the Panama Canal, and Greenland.

Many observers initially had the impression that this was little more than window dressing—aimed at domestic audiences rather than reflecting serious intentions. However, seeing these intentions articulated so explicitly—we want to take over Greenland—and accompanied by statements that the United States would be willing to use force or military power, including reiterations of this position in Davos and elsewhere, marks a clear escalation. Announcing, over a prolonged period, that the use of military power is not excluded represents a direct challenge to international law.

This is a genuinely new dimension, and it brings us back to an era when imperial ambitions were an accepted part of international politics. From the perspective of European countries, many countries in the Global South, and the normative framework of international law, there has long been a shared hope that the territorial integrity of states would remain a foundational principle of global order. Seeing this principle openly questioned by the world’s most powerful military actor is deeply troubling.

We are therefore at a turning point, and we are still grappling with what effective responses to this new situation might look like. At the same time, this rhetoric constitutes a real threat emanating from the administration. Over the past few weeks, we have seen at least some renewed movement toward European unity. It is also important to recognize that Europe—the European Union (EU) together with the UK, and other partners—as well as countries in the Global South, are not merely in a position to wait and observe. They also have the capacity to respond.

The United States itself depends heavily on the rest of the world—for trade, access to critical minerals, and political support, among other things. In this sense, the debate around Greenland is indeed a game changer. It is likely to shape strategic concepts and political priorities for years to come.

We Can Oppose Attempts to Establish a System of Hemispheres

In a fragmented, multipolar order, are spheres-of-influence politics becoming inevitable again? For smaller and middle powers, does this create new room for maneuver—or deepen structural dependency?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: I think this is very much a concept associated with President Putin in Russia, and it seems to have been taken up by President Trump as well. If you look at the National Security Strategy from early December 2025, it reflects, more or less, exactly this kind of thinking—how the world should be organized by large powers such as the United States. In this view, regions are defined in which major powers exercise special influence, with the United States claiming its own hemisphere, understood as the Western Hemisphere.

Whether this will ultimately become the dominant way in which the world is organized remains to be seen. At the very least, however, we can observe a real risk that this kind of concept may become attractive to a number of countries.

At the same time, we need to recognize that the imperial era—when colonial powers simply ruled over other countries and territories—is quite different from today’s reality, characterized by a very different global economy. In many parts of the world, there is now an alternative understanding of how the international order should be organized. We also see significant economic and military potential in Europe and elsewhere.

So, in a sense, this intention—we want to rule our own hemisphere—is clearly present. But whether it will actually define the future organization of the international system is still uncertain. Importantly, this is also a moment in which many actors and countries are trying to push back against such ideas. European actors, for example—the European Union and the UK—have the potential to link up with partners in the Global South who are not in a weak position in many respects. So we can oppose those intentions and approaches that seek to establish a system of hemispheres.

Europe Needs the Capacity to React Within Days or Even Hour

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

What realistic policy alternatives exist to prevent a spiral of authoritarianism, protectionism, and institutional decay? If you had to prioritize three concrete steps for Europe, what would they be?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: I think one main challenge we need to overcome is organizing collective action. Collective action, as we know, is often difficult to organize because, within one group, there are different views and different interests. Just look at the tariff threats from the US over the past weeks and months. We saw a situation in which, for example, the interests of France, Germany, and other EU countries diverged, making it difficult to arrive at a clear, unified position.

But this is not impossible. With the Greenland escalation over the last few weeks, we saw that collective action can indeed be achieved. So, organizing collective action is crucial. A second point is that collective action among a like-minded group is a requirement—a precondition—for success. At the same time, we also need to recognize that, in certain moments, a smaller group of actors may need to provide leadership, particularly in shaping concepts and strategies.

It is also useful to consider one advantage President Trump has: as the leader in power, he can decide overnight what he wants to do. For the European Union, it is far more difficult to speak with one voice within a very limited timeframe. What this means is that Europe needs to develop the capacity to react within short periods—within days or even hours.

This kind of leadership by some European countries—without neglecting the views and interests of smaller EU members or other actors—should ensure that there is a capable, small group in a position to respond quickly. Like-mindedness is one requirement, but it must also translate into an approach that is agile in many ways: agile in terms of speed, and agile in terms of producing solutions that are ready to confront new challenges, such as political leaders openly stating their intention to take over another country.

In this regard, I think it requires a strong willingness to mobilize political, economic, and military resources, and the capacity to make decisions swiftly. These are some of my responses to your question.

Global Order Minus One Could Become a Powerful Incentive

And finally, Professor Klingebiel, looking ahead, do you foresee a reconstitution of multilateralism, a stable equilibrium of fragmented governance, or a drift toward competitive blocs—and what political choices today will be decisive in shaping that outcome?

Professor Stephan Klingebiel: It is difficult to make any serious forecast at this point about how the world might look. However, what we have seen over the last couple of weeks is a growing discussion suggesting that we should consider—perhaps even actively push for—a global order that could be described as a “global order minus one.” This would mean that if there is a broad consensus among countries that want to uphold a multilateral approach, that want to keep the United Nations relevant—or even make it more relevant—while the United States takes a different position, it might still be possible to sustain a strong and effective form of multilateralism.

In such a scenario, we would be in a position to isolate, in many ways, what the United States is doing. Even from a conceptual perspective, this kind of global order minus one could become a powerful tool to incentivize the United States to rejoin the international consensus. If the United States were the only major player outside such an order, this would entail significant political and economic costs, as well as increased military risks for the United States itself.

What I want to emphasize is that we are most likely not returning to the situation we had five or ten years ago. Instead, we may be moving toward a different configuration in which global governance needs to be reformed in many ways—not least to incorporate rising actors from the Global South and to make the system fairer overall—but where this new arrangement could also generate substantial pressure on the United States to re-engage.

This perspective is also relevant when considering other actors that are not particularly committed to multilateralism, such as Russia. When it comes to China, the picture is somewhat different, but in all these cases, alignment remains necessary in various ways. A global order minus one may thus represent one possible pathway for navigating and potentially overcoming the difficult situation we currently face.

Professor Francisco Rodríguez is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Faculty Affiliate at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies.

Prof. Rodríguez: Venezuela Is No Longer About Venezuela, It’s About Demonstrating Power

Giving an interview to the ECPS, Professor Francisco Rodríguez argues that today “Venezuela is no longer about Venezuela; it is about demonstrating power.” He reassesses Chavismo’s constitutional refoundation, noting that “not even the most hardline opponents of Chavismo question the Constitution today,” while stressing that redistribution collapsed when oil rents vanished: “The model of oil-rent redistribution simply does not work if there are no rents to distribute.” Professor Rodríguez highlights the durability of moral antagonism—“us versus them”—and shows how social policy can operate as rule: “We bring you food; we take care of your family’s needs.” Crucially, he links the post-Maduro landscape to Delcy Rodríguez’s room for maneuver, arguing that if she can claim Washington is no longer backing the opposition, she can frame Maduro’s seizure as “a strategic victory.” Yet he warns that US demands for “power-sharing with the opposition” would be “deeply problematic for Chavismo.” He concludes that Trump’s approach is transactional: “not demanding political reform… [but] asking Venezuela to sell oil.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Francisco Rodríguez—Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and Faculty Affiliate at the University of Denver’s Josef Korbel School of International Studies—offers a comprehensive analysis of Venezuela’s post-Maduro political trajectory. Situating the case at the intersection of populist state resilience, authoritarian adaptation, and shifting US power strategies, Professor Rodríguez advances a stark diagnosis: “Venezuela is no longer about Venezuela; it is about demonstrating power.” In his account, the country has become a geopolitical signal—a site through which coercive capacity, transactional hegemony, and the limits of democratic opposition are being tested.

Professor Rodríguez begins by reassessing the foundational pillars of the Chávez-era project—constitutional refoundation, oil-rent redistribution, and the moralization of politics—arguing that these were not merely leader-centered strategies but elements of a durable populist state architecture capable of surviving leadership decapitation. While personally critical of the 1999 Constitution, he notes that “not even the most hardline opponents of Chavismo question the Constitution today,” underscoring how deeply constitutional refoundation has been absorbed into Venezuela’s political ethos. Even critics, he observes, now invoke the Constitution “as a model that the Maduro government is failing to uphold.”

On political economy, Professor Rodríguez emphasizes that populist redistribution depends on material abundance. “The model of oil-rent redistribution simply does not work if there are no rents to distribute,” he argues, pointing to a 93 percent collapse in oil revenues between 2012 and 2020. This collapse, compounded by US sanctions, forced the regime toward pragmatic—and even neoliberal—adjustments, not as a matter of ideological conversion but constraint. As Professor Rodríguez puts it, the economy remained closed “not because the government didn’t want it open, but because the United States government didn’t allow it.”

A central theme throughout the interview is the durability of moralized politics. Chavismo’s framing of politics as an existential struggle between “the people” and apátridas (stateless persons in Spanish/Portuguese, S.C) continues to structure both regime and opposition behavior. Professor Rodríguez cautions that this antagonistic grammar cannot be easily abandoned, particularly because “the opposition has also embraced a moralized framework, albeit from the opposite angle.” This mutual entrenchment helps explain why moments that might have enabled institutional cohabitation—most notably the opposition’s 2015 parliamentary victory—instead produced escalation and breakdown.

Within this transformed landscape, Professor Rodríguez devotes particular attention to Delcy Rodríguez’s room for maneuver. He argues that her political viability now hinges on whether she can credibly claim that Washington is no longer backing the opposition. Under those conditions, Maduro’s seizure can be reframed as “a strategic victory,” preserving Chavismo’s narrative of confrontation. At the same time, Professor Rodríguez warns that any US demand for “power-sharing with the opposition” would be “deeply problematic for Chavismo,” requiring a fundamental rewriting of its moral and institutional grammar.

The interview culminates in Professor Rodríguez’s assessment of US intervention under Donald Trump. Contrary to expectations, Trump did not demand democratization or power transfer, but oil. “What Trump is effectively doing now is not demanding political reform,” Professor Rodríguez explains; “he is asking Venezuela to sell oil to the United States.” This approach reflects a broader logic of informal empire: “It is more efficient to rule through domestic elites who follow US directives than to administer the country directly.” In this sense, Venezuela becomes less a national case than a global message—one that signals the new rules of transactional power, and the risks they pose for democratic oppositions worldwide.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Francisco Rodríguez, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Between ‘Us Versus Them’ and External Power: Chavismo After Maduro

Chavez-Maduro
Iconic sites in central Caracas, where buildings are decorated with murals promoted by the Chávez and Maduro governments. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Francisco Rodríguez, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question: With Nicolás Maduro removed yet the Chavista state apparatus largely intact, how should we reinterpret the foundational choices of the Chávez era—constitutional refoundation, oil-rent redistribution, and the moralization of politics—as elements of a populist state project capable of surviving leadership decapitation?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: First of all, thank you very much for having me, and thank you for the opportunity to have a conversation about Venezuela and its populist model and evolution. Let me start by addressing the three aspects you mention. One of them is the Constitution. To a certain extent, constitutional refoundation is something Chavismo achieved quite remarkably, and it has become deeply ingrained in the Venezuelan ethos. The evidence for this is that there is very little, if any, discussion among Venezuela’s political actors about the need to change the Constitution. This is not to say that I think the current Constitution is good. On the contrary, I am quite critical of the way it expands executive power, and I believe that reform in this area will be necessary. But the reality is that not even the most hardline opponents of Chavismo question the Constitution today. In fact, they often invoke it as a model that the Maduro government is failing to uphold.

Turning to the other two points you raised—moralization of politics and oil rents—I think what we have seen over the past few years, roughly over the past decade, is that the model of oil-rent redistribution simply does not work if there are no rents to distribute. In Venezuela, those rents effectively disappeared. Oil revenues declined by 93 percent between 2012 and 2020. They have recovered somewhat since then, but they remain around 75 percent lower than their peak in 2012. As a result, the government has far fewer resources to redistribute, and, to some extent, it has already been forced to move toward a neoliberal policy paradigm. The main reason it has not gone further in that direction is that the economy has been under sanctions, which has prevented the implementation of some basic elements of the neoliberal model, such as opening the economy to foreign investment. This closure was not due to a lack of willingness on the government’s part, but rather because the United States government did not allow it.

Moralized Politics, External Pressure, and Strategic Uncertainty

This brings us to the third point: the demoralization of politics. This is something Chavismo will have to grapple with and much depends on how the current intervention evolves. Chavismo’s narrative has long been one of moralization—of us versus them—casting its opponents as apátridas, people without a sense of the fatherland. This narrative was effective over the past decade, during a period of open confrontation with the United States. But what has happened now is that the US has prevailed, in the sense that it has imposed its power on Venezuela and compelled Venezuelan authorities to react according to its dictates. Venezuelan authorities are therefore no longer acting autonomously. How do they sustain this narrative under these conditions? In the two weeks since Maduro’s seizure, they have been playing a dual game: complying with US demands while simultaneously maintaining the narrative that Maduro has been kidnapped and must be returned. In this way, they can still preserve the idea of confrontation.

The problem—and we will probably return to this later—is that this confrontation has its own dynamics. It is not something Chavismo can easily abandon, because the opposition has also embraced a moralized framework, albeit from the opposite angle: an “us versus them” discourse that pits the good against the bad, or decent society against a corrupt criminal mafia. This is not a narrative that can be changed at will. Yet if, for example, as a White House spokesperson suggested —and as President Trump has hinted—a White House visit by Delcy Rodríguez is being contemplated, it will become very difficult to sustain that confrontational narrative.

This leads to the final question: is there a way for Chavismo to continue evolving, and what will its core narrative be? Is this a strategic retreat—a case of “we have to do this to defend the project”? Or does it mean abandoning some of the project’s foundational tenets altogether?

It Is Too Early to Tell Whether Adaptation Will Become Strategy

Hugo Chávez
Late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez attended the ceremony marking the laying of the foundation stone for a monument to Simón Bolívar in Moscow, Russia on October 15, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.[/caption]

In your work, you highlight how Chavismo constructed politics as a moral antagonism between “the people” and existential enemies. After Maduro’s seizure, does this moralized populist logic appear less as a contingent discursive strategy and more as a durable institutional grammar that shaped courts, security forces, and rent allocation?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: I am tempted to respond as Zhou Enlai is said to have responded to a question about the French Revolution: it is too early to tell. It later emerged that the question was lost in translation and was actually about the May ’68 revolts, but the answer certainly applies here as well. What we are seeing now is very short-term adaptation to external circumstances, which, depending on how events unfold, may later be interpreted as strategic. Let me illustrate this with the example of Chávez after the 2002 coup.

After returning to power following the 2002 coup, Chávez adopted a very conciliatory tone. He even asked for forgiveness for his previous attitude, acknowledging that he should not have fired the PDVSA (Venezuela’s state oil company) managers in the manner he did—an episode widely perceived as humiliating, or at least framed that way by Chávez himself. Crucially, at that moment he also acceded to the main demand of economic elites: changing the economic cabinet. He brought in a group of pragmatists to run the economy, and they remained in place for about a year. One year later, however, Jorge Giordani—Chávez’s chief architect and ideologue—was back in charge of economic policy.

Some interpret this episode as Chávez merely playing along, and there is certainly some truth to that. But there is also another dimension, linked to the enduring dynamics of confrontation. That economic cabinet survived through the general strike and the oil strike against Chávez and was only replaced once Chávez concluded that he was back in confrontation mode—that the opposition was again trying to overthrow him—and that he therefore needed a command economy capable of asserting control over oil resources. This entailed abandoning efforts to accommodate the private sector. If we look back at that moment, Chávez imposed exchange controls in January 2003 during the oil strike, but crucially, he did not lift them once the strike ended. In effect, he shifted from a strategy of trying to bring the private sector into a governing coalition and broadening his base of support to one centered on confrontation: controlling oil rents and disciplining the private sector through control of those rents and access to foreign exchange.

Trump Is Not Demanding Reform—He Is Asking for Oil

One of the key uncertainties today is how the United States will proceed. US policy will shape many of the constraints facing Venezuela. If the US were to station warships off Venezuela’s coast and dictate terms, Venezuela would have little room to maneuver. But this is a somewhat unusual version of coercion coming from the Trump administration. President Trump’s first administration was the one that stopped buying oil from Venezuela. What Trump is effectively doing now is not demanding political reform, elections, or the transfer of power to María Corina Machado. Instead, he is asking Venezuela to sell oil to the United States—something Venezuelan authorities had long been asking Trump to permit. This is not a demand that makes the Delcy Rodríguez regime uncomfortable.

To the extent that Venezuelan authorities can establish a working relationship with the Trump administration, and as long as Washington maintains this stance, the moral and institutional grammar you describe is likely to persist. This episode can easily be framed as yet another chapter in the “us versus them” struggle. It is important to recall that Chavismo’s confrontation has never primarily been with the United States, but rather with the domestic opposition and economic elites. If Delcy Rodríguez can credibly claim that Venezuela has won US support and that Washington is no longer backing the opposition, she can present this as a strategic victory. She does not need to deny that Maduro’s capture was problematic; she only needs to frame it as having defeated the opposition on that front.

Under those conditions, the discourse of confrontation would be preserved and would continue to be embedded in Venezuelan institutions. The real difficulty would arise if the US were to change course and demand power-sharing with the opposition. That scenario would be deeply problematic for Chavismo. While it might still be manageable, it would be extraordinarily difficult to justify to supporters. It would be just as challenging for Delcy Rodríguez as for María Corina Machado to explain why they should cooperate, why they should sit at the same table. Such a shift would require a profound rewriting of the moral narrative and the institutional grammar that accompanies it, because any genuine power-sharing arrangement would have to extend into the institutions themselves. That would represent a fundamentally different political game from the one Chavismo has played over the past quarter century.

María Corina Machado
Venezuelan opposition leader and ousted lawmaker María Corina Machado during a street protest movement of civil insurrection against the government of Nicolás Maduro in Caracas, Venezuela, 2017. Photo: Edgloris Marys.

The Difference Between Chávez and Maduro Is Abundance, Not Personality

From a populism studies perspective; to what extent did Chavismo succeed in transforming a charismatic, plebiscitary project into a post-charismatic regime—one in which moral legitimacy, clientelism, and coercion became routinized within the state itself?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: That’s a great question. It is tempting to focus on the contrasting personalities of Chávez and Maduro, but I would place much greater emphasis on material and economic constraints. Chávez governed during an era of abundance. When he came to power, Venezuelan oil was selling for about $9 a barrel; by the time he died, it was selling for more than $100.

Those rents later collapsed for two main reasons. The first was the sharp decline in oil prices between 2014 and 2016. The second was the political crisis triggered by that collapse, which led, among other things, to US economic sanctions. This raises an unavoidable counterfactual question—one that is necessarily subjective: how would Chávez have reacted to the complete erosion of rents? Would he have behaved differently from Maduro? My view is that he probably would not have.

Had Chávez found himself unable to win elections and facing both a hostile domestic opposition and a US government effectively seeking his removal, I believe he would have become just as repressive as Maduro. There is little in Chávez’s governing style to suggest otherwise. We need only recall the period leading up to the 2004 recall referendum, when Chávez used the Maisanta list to regulate access to public employment in a highly clientelist manner—shoring up support before the vote and intimidating not so much committed opposition voters as potentially neutral citizens and public employees who might have contemplated opposing him. In that sense, similar dynamics would likely have prevailed under Chávez.

That said, as an economist, I am not best equipped—nor is my discipline particularly well suited—to analyze questions of popular or leader charisma. What I can say is that Chávez’s association with a period of prosperity, driven by oil rents and reflected in improvements in living conditions and social indicators through expansive social spending, would likely have made the ensuing crisis resemble Cuba’s “Special Period.” The enduring memory of better times, and of restored dignity and living standards for many of the poor, might have been sufficient to sustain Chávez’s support—something Maduro has been unable to claim.

Chavismo Was Surprised by the Scale of Its Own Electoral Defeat

This contrast is still evident in public opinion today: Chávez remains widely popular, while Maduro does not. As a result, Maduro has relied far more heavily on coercion and institutional control, a tendency that reached an extreme in the 2024 elections, when the government concluded that it had no option but to brazenly steal the vote. Ironically, the fact that Maduro resorted to fraud suggests that he believed victory was still possible. This episode marked a moment when Chavismo was genuinely surprised by the depth of its loss of popular support.

It is important to stress, however, that this surprise did not stem from ignorance of opinion polls or a failure to monitor public sentiment. Careful readings of polling data suggested the election would be relatively close. Nor was it due to an inability to track electoral performance in real time; the government possesses a fairly robust system for doing so, which led it to believe it had mobilized roughly five million votes—enough to make the contest tight even under the opposition’s most favorable assumptions.

What Chavismo was not prepared for was the possibility that, of those five million mobilized voters, around one million would ultimately vote not for Maduro but for Edmundo González. In that moment, the very structures the regime had built revealed their limits. Returning to your question, this suggests that mechanisms of coercion were not fully routinized. They had been routinized for a long period during which they functioned effectively, as evidenced in 2021, when the opposition participated in elections, European Union observers were present, and the government swept the regional contests. At that time, the clientelist model worked.

By 2024, however, something had shifted. That structural break is precisely what the model—one that had kept Maduro in power for twelve years—is now struggling to confront.

CLAPs, Causality, and the Mechanics of Populist Rule

Given that Chávez-era distributive systems continue to function after Maduro’s removal, how should we reassess social policy not merely as welfare provision but as a populist technology of rule—and what does your work on targeted benefits tell us about how redistribution becomes a mechanism of political loyalty under authoritarian populism?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: I think it is important for me to explain briefly what my work does and what it does not do. This relates, in part, to the broader conversation between economics and the social sciences and to what economists typically try to accomplish. We generally aim to identify causal effects. In my World Development paper on how clientelism works, I use a natural experiment—the repetition of elections in the Venezuelan state of Barinas—to evaluate how social transfers respond to elections. More specifically, I examine the effect of electoral competitiveness on social transfers.

To do so, I use the government’s food package distribution system—the Local Committees for Supply and Production (CLAPs). What I find is quite interesting. When this natural experiment is used to identify causal effects, the results show that, as a consequence of the election, social benefits were targeted more toward median voters—those located in the middle of the political spectrum. This has important implications for the standard narrative on populism. Much of the literature assumes that government supporters are more likely to receive social benefits. That is true as a correlation, as a descriptive statistic, and that point is undeniable. But descriptive statistics are not the same as causal effects. This pattern may exist because the government is actively targeting its followers, but it may also exist because supporters are more likely to self-select into these programs.

It is easy to find anecdotal evidence of opposition supporters saying, “I’m not going to take a food package from the government; I’m not going to give them my information, because that allows them to control me. I don’t like that food; I think it’s poor-quality or even dangerous.” This behavior must be disentangled from other causal factors, such as income differences. Pro-opposition supporters tend to have higher incomes and can therefore more easily opt out of these programs. That disentangling is precisely what the causal experiment helps to achieve.

Between Welfare and Control

So, it is one thing to say that the government uses these programs electorally to target median voters, which is what my paper demonstrates. But it is also important to recognize that, descriptively, government supporters still tend to be the main beneficiaries of these programs. Another key finding in the data is that when people are asked, “Why are you getting CLAP boxes?” or “Why are you not getting CLAP boxes?”, the overwhelming majority respond, “I’m getting them because I registered,” or “I’m not getting them because I didn’t register.” Very few respondents—less than 10 percent—say, “I’m getting them because I support the government,” or “because I have friends in the government,” or “I’m not getting them because I’m not on the government’s side.”

This means that the system is politically targeted, but not necessarily in the way it is often assumed. As a result, voters’ reactions to it are also quite different from what is commonly presumed. In many respects, it appears as the state doing what it is expected to do: delivering food to people and to families. In another paper that I am about to publish in a collection with the Inter-American Development Bank, we estimate the calorie effect of the CLAP program and find it to be substantial—around 500 calories per person. In the context of a massive economic collapse, that can make the difference between famine and the avoidance of famine.

What we are seeing, then, diverges in important ways from standard assumptions. There are, of course, other mechanisms of control. The Carnet de la Patria, for example, operates much more in the classic quid pro quo clientelist manner: if you support me, you receive a monetary transfer. The government uses cash in this way, and it is often considered legitimate for it to do so. As Maduro once explicitly stated during a campaign speech, “This is dando y dando—you give, I give.” He was referring not to CLAP boxes, but to cash transfer programs.

How Everyday Welfare Became a Source of Regime Resilience

At the same time, there is another set of programs that is essentially universalistic. Even if these programs can be politically targeted for strategic reasons, they are universalistic in the sense that everyone is presumed to have access to them, and in practice, those who want access can obtain it. This closely resembles how the Misiones functioned under Chávez, or programs such as Misión Mercal. No one was asked for a government ID card or a Socialist Party card to buy subsidized food at Mercal supermarkets. You simply went in. Yet when you entered the store, saw the staff, and examined the packaging, it was clear that there was political messaging. The implicit message was that the government was doing good things for you. In this sense, it is comparable to Donald Trump signing COVID relief checks and sending them out as personal checks.

My view, then, is that when we try to understand why Chavismo’s popularity—and even Maduro’s support—has remained at around 30 percent, which appears to be roughly what he obtained in the election, we need to ask why, in the context of such a severe economic crisis, it did not fall to 10 percent. In Peru, for example, presidents often have single-digit approval ratings. Why did this not happen in Venezuela? Why was the revolution, in that sense, so resilient? The answer lies in its continued ability to build sources of legitimation, largely by conveying the idea that the state is being administered for you and on your behalf. Even amid economic crisis, the message remains: we are doing our job; we bring you food; we take care of your family’s needs.

When the Model Didn’t Change—but the Conditions Did

The persistence of Chavista governance raises questions about personalism. In retrospect, where do you see the key discontinuities between Chávez and Maduro—particularly regarding elite cohesion, coercive capacity, and the role of elections as rituals of legitimation rather than mechanisms of accountability?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: Here again, I would return to the counterfactual I mentioned earlier: how different is what we are seeing now from what we might have seen under Chávez had he faced an economic crisis similar to the one Maduro confronted? My view is that the differences are not as pronounced as they are often assumed to be. I do not see major discontinuities in the political model itself, or even in the modes of governance. Many of the apparent discontinuities are better explained by external factors—most notably the collapse of oil revenues and the imposition of economic sanctions, both of which emerged from a particular evolution of the political conflict. That evolution did not stem from the imposition of a fundamentally different governing model, but rather from a deeper issue: the absence of compromise as a viable option within the political culture.

If there is a moment that can be identified as truly decisive—and again, this is not because Maduro is fundamentally different from Chávez—it is the opposition’s victory of a supermajority in the 2015 parliamentary elections, a result that Chavismo initially accepted. The government did not annul or steal the elections and formally recognized the outcome. It did, however, challenge the election of several legislators from the state of Amazonas, a move that ultimately deprived the opposition of its supermajority. That supermajority would have enabled the opposition to initiate proceedings against the Supreme Court or convene a constituent assembly. In that sense, it was a kind of nuclear option, and Chavismo neutralized it by invalidating those legislative seats, while still allowing the opposition to retain a simple majority.

In almost any political system, one would then expect negotiations over cohabitation to follow. Typically, a government in that position would approach the legislature and say, “Let’s work this out. Let’s find a way to govern together. What do you want, and what do we want?” But no such effort was made—by either side. There are, after all, different ways of operating within a political system. One is through negotiation; another is through economic incentives or coercion, which governments routinely employ. Minority parties are bought off; opposition blocs are peeled apart. The government controls the state apparatus and oil rents and can easily approach opposition legislators individually or target small centrist parties, offering ministerial posts or control over specific policy areas—housing, the environment, minority rights. These are standard political tools.

Moral Antagonism and the Breakdown of Political Compromise

In this case, the government had two basic options. It could have sat down with the opposition coalition to negotiate a coexistence arrangement that would allow governance and the passage of legislation. Alternatively, it could have pursued a piecemeal strategy, fragmenting the opposition to construct a working majority. Maduro did neither, and the opposition likewise refused to engage in such processes.

This is where I would locate the core problem. I would hesitate to call it a discontinuity in the political model itself, but it was certainly a discontinuity in outcomes. The system was simply not designed to operate under a constitutional arrangement that required cohabitation. And this is not unique to Chavismo. It reflects a deeper feature of Venezuelan political history. During the democratic period that began in 1958, parliamentary and presidential elections were held simultaneously, ensuring that presidents almost always governed with a compliant Congress. The lone exception was in 1993, when Rafael Caldera won the presidency with only a plurality, leaving his party without congressional control and forcing some form of accommodation.

The belief that governments do not need to negotiate with the opposition is deeply ingrained in Venezuelan political culture. That is where the system—on both sides—ultimately breaks down. And it breaks down, once again, because of the politics of moral antagonism we discussed earlier. How can you justify governing alongside an actor you have portrayed as an existential enemy, as the embodiment of unpatriotic or immoral behavior? You cannot. Neither side could.

This dynamic was evident on the opposition side as well. When Henry Ramos Allup assumed the presidency of the National Assembly, he announced that the opposition would seek a constitutional route to remove Maduro from office within six months. In effect, he was openly advocating regime change. Both sides were locked into this confrontational mode, and their inability to move beyond it precipitated the escalation of the political conflict—ultimately leading to the adoption of scorched-earth strategies that inflicted severe damage on the economy.

From Democratic Opposition to Zero-Sum Politics

And finally, Professor Rodríguez, drawing on your New York Times analysis of Machado’s hardliner identity—including the symbolic handing over of her Nobel Peace Prize medal to President Trump—what does this episode reveal about the risks of moral absolutism, charismatic personalization, and alignment with coercive external power in populist contexts? More broadly, what does the Venezuelan case tell us about Trump’s transactional approach to authoritarian regimes and the dangers it poses for democratic oppositions elsewhere?

Professor Francisco Rodríguez: It is a very revealing episode because it encapsulates a central dilemma in opposition politics. Moderates within the opposition struggle to mobilize voters around their projects and are highly vulnerable to being denounced as collaborationists or as having been co-opted by the government. As a result, moderate opposition figures tend to reach a political dead end. Once they attempt to articulate an alternative based on compromise, they quickly lose momentum.

Returning to my earlier point about confrontation as part of the modus vivendi, the issue is not that no one has questioned this logic. Rather, within the opposition, those who have challenged it have not been electorally successful. This is evident in the case of Henri Falcón, who failed as a candidate in 2018 despite Maduro being as unpopular then as he was in 2024, according to opinion surveys. The same dynamic is visible with Henrique Capriles, who was once a highly popular opposition leader but lost significant support after adopting a more moderate stance. It is also evident in the case of Manuel Rosales, the governor of Zulia, who emerged as a plausible replacement after Machado was disqualified. Rosales had credibility as someone who had reclaimed Zulia from Chavismo and governed from the opposition without framing politics as a zero-sum struggle. Yet he was ultimately sidelined, largely because Machado’s supporters undermined him on the grounds that they reject any form of collaboration.

It is also important to recall that Machado herself was a vocal critic of Juan Guaidó, whom she regarded as too conciliatory toward Maduro. Her main criticism was that, as president of the 2015 National Assembly and interim president, he failed to invoke constitutional powers to formally call for foreign military intervention—effectively inviting external troops into the country. She criticized him forcefully for this. Looking further back, Machado was present at the swearing-in of Pedro Carmona as de facto president following the 2002 coup against Chávez. This is not mentioned simply to question her democratic credentials—though it is often raised in that context—but to underscore the narrative that underpins her political stance: the belief that Chavismo was never democratically legitimate. In her view, Venezuela was already a dictatorship in 2002, and a coup against that dictatorship was therefore justified.

Crisis, Charisma, and the Appeal of No Compromise

President Nicolas Maduro
Venezuela’s controversial President Nicolas Maduro speaks during a rally on the 22nd anniversary of the coup against Hugo Chavez in Caracas, Venezuela, on April 13, 2024. Photo: StringerAL.

This narrative resonates strongly in a country that has experienced the largest economic contraction ever recorded in peacetime, where roughly a quarter of the population has emigrated, poverty rates have exceeded 90 percent, malnutrition—virtually nonexistent in the mid-2010s—has risen to more than 25 percent, and the government has grown increasingly authoritarian. In such conditions, it is understandable that voters are drawn to a leader who argues that Maduro remains in power because previous challengers were not forceful or resolute enough. This is how Machado constructs her political persona: as the uncompromising figure, the leader unwilling to strike a deal with Chavismo, the one who promises not coexistence but defeat. Her slogan, hasta el final—“to the end”—signals a final confrontation in which victory is assured.

This narrative mobilized voters on two levels. Traditional opposition supporters embraced it enthusiastically, given their deep hostility toward Chavismo. At the same time, more centrist voters—some of whom had previously supported Chavismo—were also drawn to her. In many respects, Machado embodied characteristics associated with Chávez himself: a young, decisive, energetic leader offering a dramatic rupture. The promise she made closely resembled the promise Chávez made in 1999. This helps explain why roughly a third of the Venezuelan electorate reports supporting María Corina Machado while simultaneously viewing Chávez as a good president.

That support, however, did not entail a transformation of her underlying narrative or that of her core constituency. Instead, it reinforced a political posture fundamentally incompatible with governing alongside Chavismo. This is where the Trump administration’s intervention becomes especially revealing. The decision was to remove Maduro—to decapitate the regime—without fully dismantling it. Comprehensive regime change would have required military occupation, significant loss of US personnel, and a long-term commitment unlikely to be sustained by public opinion. As Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated, the costs of occupation often exceed those of initial military victory.

Instead, the United States adopted an approach reminiscent of earlier interventions, such as in Cuba and the Philippines after the Spanish-American War or in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua in the early twentieth century. The logic is straightforward: military leverage and conditionality remain in place, while local actors govern. It is more efficient to rule through domestic elites who follow US directives than to administer the country directly.

Why Machado Didn’t Fit the New Power Strategy

This framework also helps explain how Trump has framed his relationship with Machado. The implicit message is that she is admirable—even symbolic, as evidenced by the Nobel Peace Prize medal—but politically impractical. Incorporating her into governance would disrupt the broader strategy. After Maduro’s removal, Venezuela ceased to be primarily about Venezuela; it became a demonstration of power. The operation showcased the US capacity to remove a foreign leader with extraordinary efficiency, without the loss of American lives, and to detain him in the United States. Many observers, myself included, believe this likely involved internal collaboration, making it resemble a palace coup under the cover of military intervention. For Trump, however, the narrative is unambiguous: this is what American power looks like.

This is where Trump’s arrangement with Delcy Rodríguez acquires broader significance. The message is simple: compliance is rewarded. Speaking recently in Davos, Trump claimed—characteristically exaggerating—that Venezuela would earn more in the next six months than it had in the previous twenty years. That assertion is plainly false, given that those twenty years include the Chávez-era oil boom. But the rhetoric is less important than the underlying signal: the new Venezuelan authorities are doing what Washington demands, and they are being rewarded for it.

Trump delivered this message before an audience of European leaders, implicitly asking them which path they wished to follow—whether in relation to Venezuela, Greenland, or other geopolitical issues. Cooperation would bring benefits; resistance would invite hostility. This logic extends beyond Europe to the Middle East, including Gaza, and to Latin America more broadly. It reflects an effort to reassert US dominance in what Trump conceives as the Western Hemisphere, consistent with a revived Monroe Doctrine logic.

What emerges from this approach is an attempt to construct a functional protectorate—economically, and perhaps politically. Yet a protectorate, by definition, lacks full sovereignty. Under such conditions, the meaning of democracy becomes ambiguous. The likely outcome is an authoritarian system, potentially evolving into a form of competitive authoritarianism. Even if Venezuelan oil revenues were to increase by only a fraction of Trump’s exaggerated claims, the resulting economic growth—on the order of 20 to 25 percent annually for several years—would make such a regime politically viable.

Just as Maduro’s popularity collapsed with the economy, Delcy Rodríguez could gain substantial legitimacy if she presided over sustained economic expansion. That is the bargain Trump is offering—not out of benevolence, but because he wants Venezuela to serve as a showcase: a revitalized economy demonstrating the rewards of alignment with US hegemony. Ultimately, that is the message Trump seeks to send to democratic oppositions and authoritarian regimes alike: these are the new rules, and this is what you get when you play along.

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations

Please cite as:
Smith, Michael. (2026). “Overview and Background: International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00130

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Abstract
Populist politicians and parties view international institutions as instruments of competing state interests and see global governance as empowering a detached globalist elite that must be challenged in the name of the people. This stance contrasts with perspectives that treat international institutions as semi-autonomous actors or as arenas that facilitate communication and responsiveness across societies. The two Trump administrations represent an extreme form of United States (US) unilateralism and ‘domesticism,’ prioritizing domestic needs as the foundation of international leadership. Although the European Union (EU)’s long-standing commitment to multilateral institutions has been modified in recent years—partly in response to US pressure and partly due to internal populist currents—it continues to support transatlantic and global governance. The progression from ‘Trump 1.0’ through the Biden administration to ‘Trump 2.0’ reflects both enduring trends in US foreign policy and a weakening of constraints on presidential action. Whereas ‘Trump 1.0’ faced domestic and international limits, and Biden only partially restored multilateralism, ‘Trump 2.0’ pursues a far more radical and unconstrained agenda. These policies reshape international institutions and the broader international order, posing both risks and limited opportunities for the EU. The chapter outlines three strategic responses for the EU: reflex, resistance and reconfiguration, applied across the volume’s three scenarios.

Keywords: United States; Trump administrations; European Union; international institutions; multilateralism

 

By Michael Smith*

Introduction: The Challenge

The current tensions between the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and other actors in transatlantic relations can be seen in part as a continuation of a number of trends. Since the growth of what might be termed the Euro–American system in the 1950s, there have been tensions centring on US leadership and how it is exercised, the emergence of the European integration project and its impact on transatlantic relations, and the changing domestic politics of the United States, European countries and what is now the European Union (Smith, Guay and Morgenstern-Pomorski 2025, chapter 1; Sloan 2016). Although the Euro–American system has become largely encompassed by the US–EU relationship, there are other important dimensions, particularly in security politics, where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in the late 1940s and 1950s, retains a central role and has itself been a long-standing focus of transatlantic tensions over burden-sharing and the contributions of the allies. Such tensions, although at times severe, have largely been contained: partly as a reflection of common threat perceptions, partly as a reflection of shared values and a commitment to liberal democracy among the members of the system. This does not mean that everything has been plain sailing: almost every decade since the 1950s has seen transatlantic crises, some of which (for example, over the Iraq War in 2003) have been seen as presaging the ‘death of the west’ (Lieven 2003, Pond 2004).

Many of these crises and continuing tensions have centred on the role of international institutions. US leadership has on many occasions veered towards US unilateralism and towards ‘domesticism’ – the tendency to put US domestic politics and economics first, and to see international institutions as inconvenient interlocutors to be avoided or attacked if they cannot be manipulated. This inclination is evident both in the broadest terms – for example, the idea of a rules-based international order and the centrality of international law and diplomacy – and in respect of specific institutions, for example, those of the international financial order. At the same time, Europeans and particularly the evolving European Union, have placed their faith in multilateralism, the rules-based order and in the legitimacy of international institutions; this is hardly surprising given the genealogy of the European project, and the ways in which engagement with international institutions endows the EU with international legitimacy. Collective defence and NATO’s role as a European security organization have also fostered a form of multilateralism, qualified by the United States’ dominant role as the alliance’s key contributor.

Given this broad background, what are the specific characteristics of the current transatlantic challenge to international institutions? At one level, it is the challenge of populist approaches to international order. Both in Europe and in the United States, the current politics of populism imply a super-charged priority for domestic politics, the assertion of sovereignty and forms of nativism as the basis for foreign policy, and thus a version of international order based on the power and interests of competing states (Wainer, Destradi, and Zürn 2024; Pacciardi, Spandler, and Söderbaum 2024). As a result, the EU has been challenged from within by member states asserting their right to dissent from or obstruct policies, and externally by the actions of the United States under the two Trump administrations (2017–2021 and January 2025 to the present). In this version of international politics, the role of international institutions is fundamentally challenged: they can be seen as either instruments of the dominant states or as obstacles to the legitimate actions of national authorities. This set of views constitutes a challenge to principles of multilateralism, to ideas of global governance, and to the idea that international institutions can become either independent actors in specific fields or spaces for the development of ideas about a wide variety of activities in areas such as development, conflict resolution, human rights or the environment. Populism sees these activities as generating a cross-national elite, which in itself is a challenge to the will of the people and the needs of the national state.

In this context, the advent of ‘Trumpism’ as a form of populism and potential authoritarianism has major resonance. Such a stance by the United States is in itself not unprecedented; the predominance of isolationism in the 1920s and 1930s, and elements of Reaganism in the 1980s can be seen as precursors or sources of the Trump posture (in fact, ‘America First’ and ‘make America great again’ have been revived by Trump as slogans, not created by him). Here, the influence of domesticism is both explicit and wide-ranging, and is made more potent by the United States’ position as (still) the predominant economic and military power in the global arena. That arena is changing, and the emergence of new rivals to the United States is another key element in the current and continuing challenge; most notably, the rise of China and the revisionism of Russia has provided a stimulus to the projection of US domestic concerns and a determination to place American interests at the core of international action. No clearer illustration of the implications for international institutions can be found than in the US National Security Strategy published in December 2017, at the end of the first year of the first Trump administration: The United States will prioritize its efforts in those organizations that serve American interests, to ensure that they are strengthened and supportive of the United States, our allies, and our partners. Where existing institutions and rules need modernizing, the United States will lead to update them. At the same time, it should be clear that the United States will not cede sovereignty to those that claim authority over American citizens and are in conflict with our constitutional framework (The White House 2017, 40).

Such a statement is a clear departure from the principles of multilateralism: the idea that international institutions can add value and contribute to global public goods in a wide range of issue areas. No less is it a challenge to the established principles of EU external action, which embody a commitment to multilateral institutions as a core value, explicitly stated in the Global Strategy of 2016: Without global norms and the means to enforce them, peace and security, prosperity and democracy – our vital interests – are at risk. Guided by the values on which it is founded, the EU is committed to a global order based on international law, including the principles of the UN Charter, which ensure human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to the global commons…The EU will strive for a strong UN as the bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order, and develop globally coordinated processes with international and regional organisations, states and non-state actors (European Union 2016, 39).

For the EU, this general challenge from its most important international partner has, in part, been linked to challenges from within: the governments of Hungary, Slovakia and – until the elections of 2023 – Poland have challenged the legitimacy of EU actions and have professed their alignment with Trumpian populism. Although there have been some moves in EU external action away from strong multilateralism (partly as a result of pressure from the United States), the contrast remains stark (Youngs and Smith 2018; Smith 2018). Whilst Trumpian policies see international institutions as arenas for competition and as subordinate to national priorities, the EU still collectively prioritizes them as contributions to the global order and as arenas within which it can realize its role as a ‘power’ in the global arena.

From ‘Trump 1.0’ to ‘Trump 2.0’

There is no doubt that leaders in the EU saw the first Trump administration as a severe challenge, not only to specific EU interests but also to the norms of multilateralism and the rules-based international order on which the EU’s international legitimacy partly rested (Peterson 2018; Riddervold and Newsome 2018). In May 2018, the then president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, identified the US administration as a ‘capricious’ challenge, reinforcing the case for greater EU self-reliance (Tusk 2018). The four years of ‘Trump 1.0’ constituted a period of constant tension, not only relating to the EU and its policies (described by Trump as a ‘foe’) but also to the underpinnings of the EU’s international status. The Trump attack on international institutions, focused on the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a range of other agencies, called into question the status of international institutions in general, whilst the administration’s attacks on NATO threatened one of the key enabling pillars of the European project. On the whole, though, the worst did not happen: the administration was constrained domestically by its evident lack of preparation, and thus was unable to bend institutions such as the State Department to its will whilst experiencing internal conflicts that further weakened its capacity to act. At the same time, the residual effects of the Liberal International Order (LIO) and its rules-based system were able to moderate at least some of the Trump initiatives (Peterson 2018; Smith 2018, 2021; Schade 2023).

Part of the EU’s response to the Trump administration between 2017 and 2021 thus actually amounted to a policy of ‘wait and see’. European resistance to the erosion of the multilateral order was at least in part possible because of the limitations of ‘Trump 1.0’ and the Union’s capacity to muster collective resilience; in part, the Union’s leaders could hope that something better might emerge after the 2020 presidential election. The installation of Joe Biden as president in 2021 seemed to indicate that the period of contestation and disruption might be no more than a major blip or ‘bump in the road’ towards renewed EU–US cooperation and a reinvigoration of international institutions. European leaders, including the European Commission, certainly seemed to assume as much. In November 2020, immediately after the presidential election, the Union produced a paper aimed at setting a new agenda for transatlantic cooperation (Joint Communication 2020), whilst the nascent Biden administration was anxious to demonstrate its credentials in multilateral cooperation, global governance and transatlantic cooperation. To quote the new president in his first foreign policy address, ‘America is back’, and, to all intents and purposes, this presaged a new era of transatlantic convergence regarding the EU, NATO, and global institutions, including a number of those exited by ‘Trump 1.0’. The changed atmosphere of United States–European interactions was perceptible in a number of areas, with new agreements, new institutions such as the EU–US Trade and Technology Council and an absence of either verbal or more material attacks on the status and standing of the Union or NATO. The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 led to intense cooperation in terms of both economic and diplomatic sanctions and of the broader diplomacy of European order, whilst also re-energizing the role of NATO and of bilateral military cooperation at the transatlantic level. By the time of the 2024 EU–US Summit, the declaration could say without irony that ‘we are more united than ever.’

That statement appears strikingly irrelevant in light of developments since November 2024. The election of Donald Trump to a second term in November 2024 and his inauguration as president in January 2025 created an expectation of disruption and unpredictability not only in United States–European relations but also in world order more generally. It was clear from the outset that the new (returning) president had a much more well-defined agenda than in 2017, that he intended to implement it with urgency, and that there would be a much more thorough-going pursuit of the ‘America First’ agenda proclaimed at his first inauguration, underpinned by a more systematic approach to the purging of the federal government and in particular those elements dedicated to foreign policy and international relations (Chazan 2025; Chazan and Sevastopulo 2025). The evisceration of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the imposition of punitive ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on friend and foe alike, withdrawal (for the second time) from global climate institutions and from others such as the WHO and UNESCO, added up to a revolutionary attack on established international norms and processes. For NATO’s European members, the exercise of what might be termed ‘coercive alliance diplomacy’ in US efforts to increase contributions to the alliance led to a ‘deal’ that promised to reduce US commitments whilst yielding major returns for the US defence-industrial complex. For the EU, built on foundations of international cooperation and dedicated to ideas of multilateralism and global governance, Trump’s policies were an assault not only on its assumptions about partnership with the USA, but also on its claim to broader legitimacy as an actor within the multilateral system and a guardian of important norms and institutions. The conclusion of a strikingly one-sided EU–US trade agreement in the summer of 2025 only served to underline the apparent challenge to the EU’s status and expectations, whilst the agreement of NATO members to raise their defence spending to 5% of GDP over the next decade bore witness to the ‘coercive diplomacy’ exercised by Washington over its allies (Foy et al. 2025; Ganesh 2025). In September 2025, the address by President Trump to the United Nations General Assembly, in which he attacked not only the UN itself but also European countries, and provided a further onslaught on the efficacy of international institutions in general, provided a chastening confirmation of the new world that had taken hold in only a matter of months.

The Impact of ‘Trump 2.0’

What does the new world of ‘Trump 2.0’ imply for international institutions? At one level, US policies seem to imply the final dismantling of the liberal international order, with its assumptions about the role of international law and organizations and the benefits of international cooperation. As already noted, however, the pressures on the established order had been growing for many years even before the first Trump administration took office in 2017. But the second Trump administration has a much more developed idea of the uses of power and how the US position in the world can be exploited (Belin and Dworkin 2025; Kimmage 2025). In this context, the challenge posed by ‘Trump 2.0’ is not simply to specific institutions but also to key practices associated with the established international order. International law is to be seen as an instrument of state policy, and thus as capable of reinterpretation in line with the interests of leading states; diplomacy is redefined as a form of performative process, in which diplomatic events can be presented as ‘good television’ foregrounding the presence of President Trump; international organizations are seen as dispensable in light of the needs of the United States and other major ‘powers.’

One of the first executive orders issued by President Trump mandated not only withdrawal from the WHO and UNESCO, but also a comprehensive review of all international organizations and their ability to serve US interests (The White House 2025). At the same time, funding for a wide range of international bodies was cut, partly due to reduced USAID funding and partly as part of a broader strategy aimed at the US withdrawal from international cooperation. The United Nations system, according to one commentator, was at risk of being reduced to the status of the League of Nations during the interwar period from 1919 to 1939 (Patrick 2025), and the roles of individual organizations have been attacked across a very broad front. In addition to the familiar targets of the WHO and UNESCO, challenges to the WTO, the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the UN Relief and Works Agency in Palestine (UNRWA) as part of the ongoing conflict in the Middle East have been mounted (see chapter 10 of this report). Not only is the UN system at issue: as previously noted, continuing attacks on bodies such as the Group of 7 (G7) industrial economies and regional organizations such as NATO and the EU itself have proliferated.

The impact of these strategies is not limited to the activities of the specific organizations targeted; it also extends to the expectations and strategies of a wide range of states in the global arena. In particular, it extends to the other ‘great powers’ and ‘middle powers’ within the international system. Where the US withdraws or distances itself from organizations, this can open up space for the injection of new forms of multilateral cooperation, for example in the form of Chinese diplomacy surrounding the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) or the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) grouping which has now extended to include a range of regional powers as well as its core members (Rachman 2025). As a result, the nature and extent of multilateralism in the world arena is in a state of flux – the old order has been undermined, but a new order is struggling to be born.

For the EU, part of the impact is felt in the well-established tension between the Union’s internal politics and the external challenges posed by US policies. One of the key features of Trumpian policies is that they expose vulnerabilities and tensions within the EU: most obviously in the form of differential economic pressures arising from the erosion of international order in areas such as trade (see section 2 of this report), but also in the tensions observable between member states more or less receptive to Trumpian ideas. In the field of international institutions, the EU has been challenged to maintain its solidarity with the UN system and other global governance bodies. It has been challenged more fundamentally to maintain its commitment to multilateralism and to defend its investment in the institutions of the liberal international order, from which it derives important measures of legitimacy and leverage. The potential for marginalizing the EU’s efforts, both in Europe and on the global stage, is real as relations among a number of potentially dominant powers come to define the new world order. In this context, the capacity of EU institutions to develop strategies and support effective diplomacy becomes crucial. This insight was central to Ursula von der Leyen’s 2025 State of the Union address to the European Parliament, which focused strongly on how the Union might respond to both the challenges and the opportunities in the current conjuncture (von der Leyen 2025).

Strategies and Possibilities

How might the EU frame its responses to the challenges set out in the previous sections, with particular reference to international institutions? In her State of the Union address, President von der Leyen was anxious to underline the extent to which the EU can – and should – assert its agency in a fluctuating and potentially threatening environment. This posture is reflected, at least in part, in the three potential strategies outlined here: reflexresistance and reconfiguration.

  1. Reflex would primarily consist of adaptation to the new order, and in particular, the accommodation of US policy challenges. This strategy has risks attached to it – the most obvious being the danger of perceived dependency on the US, and the potential for forms of appeasement, as reflected in some of the accusations levelled at the EU–US trade agreement of July 2025. A corollary of this posture is that the EU’s agency and legitimacy in international institutions might be reduced or eliminated – a major blow to perceptions of the EU as a multilateralist and as a force for the consolidation or preservation of international institutions.
  2. Resistance would imply the use of the EU’s position in international institutions as a means of standing up to US policies, and actively promoting alternatives to the Trump administration’s initiatives through the exploitation of ‘competitive interdependence’ or ‘competitive strategic autonomy’ as outlined by Erik Jones in chapter 5 of this report. As with ‘reflex’ strategies, there are costs and risks attached to this course of action; most obviously, the costs and risks associated with the Trump administration’s well-known tendency to punish those who stand up to it. It is quite difficult to see how the EU could avoid considerable costs if it adopted a policy of active resistance to the Trump administration, and as noted earlier, those costs would likely be unevenly distributed among member states. One of the consequences of a policy of active resistance would thus be heightened pressures on the EU’s internal policy processes, and the risk of ‘de-Europeanization’ strategies being pursued by a number of member states.
  3. Reconfiguration is a third potential strategy for the EU in terms of its engagement with international institutions. In other words, in this strategy, the Union would develop new forms of multilateral bodies or press for the reform of existing bodies to make them more resilient in the face of pressures not only from US policies but also from the rise of new forms of multilateralism noted earlier. Such an incremental strategy would imply an emphasis on the EU’s agency within international institutions and an active attempt to shape their development in the face of challenges that are unlikely to disappear with the end of the current Trump administration. Such an ‘assertive’ or ‘creative’ multilateralism would by no means be cost-free, but it would have the virtue of coherence and consistency with the EU’s core values, as frequently stated.

Where does this leave us in respect of the three scenarios for the future of transatlantic relations outlined at the start of this volume? The disintegration of transatlantic relations has been prophesied on many occasions, and the current conjuncture suggests it is a possibility. There has undoubtedly been fragmentation during the past decade, and the danger is now more explicit than ever. But the sinews of transatlantic relations, both public and private, are robust and are likely to contain the damage at least in the medium term. It is not clear that there is scope in the near term for significant progress, as long as the challenges to international institutions reviewed here persist: quite simply, the US attack on multilateralism and the rise of multiple bilateralisms are not encouraging for the future of international institutions. Most likely, there will be at least a period of muddling through, but this should be qualified by the remarks above on strategy. Simply put, the EU has an opportunity to assert and maintain its multilateral credentials and to contribute to a creative period of muddling through, in which the resilience of international institutions is enhanced, and they are reconfigured to face a challenging new world order.

The following chapters reflect a number of these general arguments. In chapter 10, Edith Drieskens explores the enduring ambivalence of the United States towards international institutions, specifically the UN system, and assesses the EU’s capacity to replace or bypass the United States in the UN context. In chapter 11, Daniel Fiorino analyses the linkages between domestic and external policies in the USA, and the extent to which the EU might be able to promote incremental change in international environmental institutions in the absence of the United States. In chapter 12, Frode Veggeland provides a detailed analysis of the growth of turbulence around international institutions, and especially the WHO, which has been a major focus of US policies and thus a significant concern for the EU.


 

(*) Michael Smith is Honorary Professor in European Politics at the University of Warwick, UK, and Emeritus Professor of European Politics at Loughborough University, UK. He has published widely on transatlantic relations, American foreign policy and European Union external action; his most recent books are The European Union’s Strategic Partnerships: Global Diplomacy in a Contested World (edited with Laura Christina Ferreira-Pereira, Palgrave-Macmillan 2021), International Relations and the European Union (edited with Christopher Hill and Sophie Vanhoonacker, (4th edition, Oxford University Press 2023) and The European Union and the United States: Competition, Convergence and Crisis in the Global Arena (co-authored with Terrence R. Guay and Jost Morgenstern-Pomorski, 2nd edition, Bloomsbury 2025). Email: M.H.Smith@warwick.ac.uk


 

References

Belin, Constance, and Anthony Dworkin. 2025. Multilateralism with Less America: Trump’s Plan for International Organizations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/article/multilateralism-with-less-america-trumps-plan-for-international-organisations/

Chazan, Guy. 2025. “Fellowship of Trump Loyalists Makes Big Inroads into Foreign Service Roles.” Financial Times, May 27, p. 6.

Chazan, Guy, and Demetri Sevastopulo. 2025. “Hundreds of US Foreign Service Staff to Lose Jobs.” Financial Times, June 14–15, p. 6.

European Union. 2016. Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels, June.

Ganesh, Janan. 2025. “Europe Has No Choice but to Appease Trump.” Financial Times, September 25, 23.

European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2025. A New EU–U.S. Agenda for Global Change. JOIN (2020) 22 final.

Foy, Henry, Ben Hall, Leila Abboud, Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, and Laura Pital. 2025. “What Happens to Nato if the US Steps Back?” Financial Times, June 22. https://www.ft.com/content/548af6fa-0c4c-40d0-8048-31675f4a6f31

Kimmage, Michael. 2025. “The World Trump Wants: American Power in the New Age of Nationalism.” Foreign Affairs104 (2) (March–April): 8–21.

Lieven, Anatol. 2003. “The End of the West?” Prospect, September 20–25.

Pacciardi, Aurelia, Katherine Spandler, and Fredrik Söderbaum. 2024. “Beyond Exit: How Populist Governments Disengage from International Institutions.” International Affairs 100 (5): 2025–45.

Patrick, Stewart. 2025. League of Nations Redux? Multilateralism in the Post-American World. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2025/09/multilateralism-post-american-world?lang=en

Peterson, John. 2018. “Present at the Destruction? The Liberal Order in the Trump Era.” The International Spectator 53 (1): 28–44.

Pond, Elizabeth. 2004. Friendly Fire: The Near-Death of the Transatlantic Alliance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution for the European Union Studies Association.

Rachman, Gideon. 2025. “Plotting a Post-American World.” Financial Times, September 6–7, p. 9.

Riddervold, Marianne, and Alister Miskimmon Newsome. 2018. “Transatlantic Relations in Times of Uncertainty: Crises and EU–US Relations.” Journal of European Integration 40 (5): 505–21.

Schade, Daniel. 2023. “A Strained Partnership? A Typology of Tensions in the EU–US Transatlantic Relationship.” In Europe Under Strain? Current Crises Shaping European Union Politics, edited by Michael Roos and Daniel Schade, 191–209. The Hague: De Gruyter.

Sloan, Stanley R. 2016. Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Smith, Michael. 2018. “The European Union, the United States and the Crisis of Contemporary Multilateralism.” Journal of European Integration 40 (5): 539–53.

Smith, Michael. 2021. “European Union Diplomacy and the Trump Administration: Multilateral Diplomacy in a Transactional World?” In The Making of European Security Policy, edited by R. Haar, T. Christiansen, B. Lange, and S. Vanhoonacker, 179–97. London: Routledge.

Smith, Michael, Terrence Guay, and Jost Morgenstern-Pomorski. 2025. The European Union and the United States: Competition, Convergence and Crisis in the Global Arena. London: Bloomsbury.

The White House. 2017. National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, DC, December.

The White House. 2025. “Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations.” Presidential Actions, February 4.

Tusk, Donald. 2018. “Remarks by President Tusk Ahead of the EU–Western Sahara Summit.” European Council, May 16.

Von der Leyen, Ursula. 2025. 2025 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen. Strasbourg, September 10.

Wainer, Gabriel, Simone Destradi, and Michael Zürn. 2024. “The Effects of Global Populism: Assessing the Populist Impact on International Affairs.” International Affairs 100 (5): 1819–33.

Youngs, Richard, and Michael Smith. 2018. “The EU and the Global Order: Contingent Liberalism.” The International Spectator 53 (1): 45–56.

The headquarters of the United Nations in New York City. Photo: Dreamstime.

The United Nations in the Age of American Transactionalism

Please cite as:
Drieskens, Edith. (2026). “The United Nations.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00131

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Abstract
The United Nations’ (UN) eightieth anniversary in 2025 was expected to be a moment of reflection and renewal, but it has instead unfolded amid profound turbulence. This chapter analyses how a series of executive orders issued by the Trump administration have triggered an unprecedented reshaping of the United Nations’ finances, operations and presence. While some settings were directly targeted for funding cuts or reconsideration of membership, the most consequential decisions were broader reviews of US engagement with international organizations and foreign aid. These developments have generated ambiguity in United States–United Nations relations: the United States remains present in most settings, yet its actions have challenged core principles and practices, pushing the organization into a reactive stance that at times borders on survival mode. The chapter further examines the implications for United States–European Union relations, revealing a widening gap between Washington’s transactional approach and the European Union’s seemingly enduring unconditional commitment to multilateralism.

Keywords: multilateralism; United Nations; UN reform; US–EU relations; US–UN relations; Trump administration

 

By Edith Drieskens*

Introduction

Judging by the messages that fill the card shops in my hometown of Leuven, turning 80 is a remarkable achievement, one that symbolizes strength, resilience, wisdom and perspective. It is a time to celebrate accomplishments and share the stories behind them. But legacy also takes another form when reaching 80: it is an opportunity for renewal. With the illusion of permanence falling away, this age seems to reveal a rare kind of clarity. This lucidity makes turning 80 less about becoming someone new and more about acknowledging who one truly is beneath the layers of years. In this way, it marks a life shaped by constant change, as well as a final transformation before the very last chapter closes. Similarly, the United Nations’ (UN) eightieth year in 2025 has been marked by transformation, yet turbulence has overshadowed celebration, as a series of executive orders issued by the Trump administration has pushed the organization toward fundamental, even existential, reform.

This contribution analyses these decisions and their implications for both United States–United Nations (US–UN) and United States–European Union (US–EU) relations. It shows that, while the combined impact of speed and scope has created an unprecedented situation in the post-1945 international system, these decisions are less erratic than often considered. Yes, they have destabilized the UN’s functioning in recent months and will profoundly shape its functioning in the future. However, they are grounded in a blueprint originating with the first Trump administration and informed by the broader history of US–UN relations. It also shows that, like the UN, the EU has had little choice but to muddle through this milestone because of financial constraints and the absence of consensus beneath the seemingly unconditional rhetoric of support for multilateralism.

A Milestone in Crisis

As the UN marks its eightieth anniversary, reports suggest that the transformative meaning of legacy is particularly relevant for understanding current developments, with some observers even hinting that its final chapter is unfolding as we speak. A little over a year after major ambitions were outlined at the Summit of the Future, there appears to be little to celebrate, as budgetary cuts are expected to fundamentally reshape the organization (Byrnes 2025; Lynch 2025). For some, these cuts represent a long-overdue opportunity to reform the UN, potentially leading to a more effective and efficient organization. For others, however, they signal the end not only of the UN as we know it, but of the UN itself. A striking illustration of this view comes from UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Director Tom Fletcher, who notes that 79 million people are affected by these ‘brutal cuts’, leaving the organizations involved with equally ‘brutal choices’ and effectively reducing their work to ‘a triage of human survival’ (UN News 2025). Several other UN bodies, including the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the UN World Food Programme (WFP), have announced budget cuts of 10–20% or more, affecting thousands of staff (Lynch 2025).

Whether one thinks in terms of a turning point or a breaking point, of a challenge that can be tackled or a catastrophe that cannot, the fact remains that the depth and pace of the proposed reforms are without precedent. Once complete, the UN will be very different—in what it does, how it operates and even where it is based. The situation in Geneva appears particularly strained, as its role as host to numerous (specialized) agencies seems under threat (Jefford and Langrand 2025). Indeed, as part of the ongoing system-wide review, measures under consideration range from traditional cost-cutting, such as limiting travel and freezing new hires, to the more significant step of relocating entire units to lower-cost locations (Lynch 2025). Long-established UN cities seem to be losing ground, while others, like Nairobi, are set to gain, with the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and UN Women already planning to relocate their activities to the UN headquarters there. It is therefore not surprising that the mentioned reports discuss declining staff morale, strained working relations, and even demonstrations in Geneva – everything but the celebrations one might expect to mark eighty years (Blackburn 2015).

UN Reform by Force

Although the UN has faced decades of challenges, the current situation was primarily triggered by a series of ‘birthday cards’ – in the form of executive orders – signed by US President Trump in late January and early February. These decisions devote little attention to UN reform, but their combined effect has been extraordinary. Never before have so few words so profoundly reshaped this process. Some UN settings are directly targeted by these decisions. They have been explicitly targeted for reconsideration of membership and funding. All decisions in this category restore the previous status quo: they overturn those of the Biden administration, which itself had reversed decisions of the first Trump administration. More remarkable, and affecting all UN settings, have been the broader, horizontal decisions to review US support for international organizations and its approach to foreign aid.

Five settings fall within the first category, which involves naming, blaming and shaming: the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The first three have been identified as entities allegedly drifting from their original missions, acting against US interests and undermining allies (The White House 2025b). UNESCO has been accused of failure to reform and address concerns over mounting arrears, as well as anti-Israel sentiment. In a similar vein, UNRWA has been accused of infiltration by foreign terrorist organizations, with some employees allegedly involved in the 7 October attack on Israel. The UNHRC has been criticized for protecting human rights abusers. And while it does not do so explicitly here, the United States has previously criticized this body for bias against Israel. The WHO has been condemned for mishandling the coronavirus pandemic, failing to adopt urgently needed reforms, lacking independence, and demanding unfair payments from the United States (The White House, 2025f). In a similar vein, the Paris Agreement has been denounced as failing to reflect US values or economic and environmental objectives, and therefore not benefiting the American people (The White House 2025e).

These effects are significant for the mentioned settings because the United States is often a key financial contributor (CFR Editors 2025). However, the greatest impact has resulted from decisions that do not target specific UN bodies, or even the UN as such. The first decision mandates a re-evaluation of the US engagement with international settings in the broadest sense, encompassing organizations, conventions, and treaties (The White House 2025b). To this end, the secretary of state was to conduct a review in consultation with the US ambassador to the UN, spanning an estimated six months. The second, and in practice even more significant, decision calls for a re-evaluation of US foreign aid to realign it with American values and interests (The White House 2025c). While a 90-day pause was ordered for evaluation, a stop-work order on foreign aid issued by the secretary of state on January 24 significantly accelerated this process, prompting various UN bodies to abruptly freeze spending and lay off workers (Lynch 2025). The reason is not only that many UN bodies are dependent on US funding, but also that these cuts have come on top of an ongoing liquidity crisis, driven by late payments – including from the United States – and declining contributions. This situation was further aggravated by the Trump administration’s challenge to existing commitments under the Rescissions Act of 24 July 2025, which retracted congressionally approved funding for 2024 and 2025.

Beyond revisiting membership and funding, the Trump administration’s retreat from the UN targets the core values and principles underpinning its work. This withdrawal has been particularly visible in relation to sustainability and diversity, equality and inclusivity, commonly referred to as DEI (Gowan 2025; Lynch 2025). While the already mentioned withdrawal from the Paris Agreement has been the most visible decision in relation to the former, there is a broader belief that the United States has entered international agreements and initiatives that do not align with the country’s values or recognize its role in advancing economic and environmental goals, redirecting public money to countries that neither need nor deserve assistance (The White House 2025e). This reassessment has led the US mission to the UN to state that the US government is no longer willing to invest in the Sustainable Development Goals, as they are inconsistent with both US interests and sovereignty. This appeal to sovereignty is quite intriguing, as the Trump administration’s territorial ambitions regarding Canada, Greenland, and the Panama Canal challenge the principle of sovereignty as enshrined in the UN Charter (Gowan 2025). Concerning DEI, the Trump administration seeks to reverse its predecessor’s decisions (The White House 2025g). It has made this especially clear by rejecting references to gender ideology in the Commission on the Status of Women of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), opting instead to frame discussions in terms of biological sex (The White House 2025d; United States Mission to the United Nations 2025). Further challenging the UN’s human rights framework, it refuses to take part in the Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (Paccamiccio and McKernan 2025).

Implications for US–UN Relations

While the impact of the Trump administration’s decisions on the UN and its functioning is undeniably disruptive, observers find it difficult to determine what these developments mean for US–UN relations generally (Lombardo 2025). An important reason is that although these decisions suggest disengagement, the United States continues to participate actively in most UN settings. It even explicitly supports specialized (standard-setting) agencies such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) (Lynch 2025). Ambiguity deepens when its president publicly challenges the UN’s relevance by mocking that it provides him only with a faulty escalator and a teleprompter, only to subsequently acknowledge the organization’s potential and confirm his full support. As such, the status quo of the relationship cannot be described, using the terminology of this report, as either moving forward or toward disintegration. The former is evident: the relationship has scarcely improved since the Trump administration took office in early 2025 and began to push back. But the latter is similarly clear. At present, disintegration, in the sense of total collapse, is more evident in the United States’ relationship with certain UN bodies than in its overall relationship with the organization. Of course, this broader relationship is challenged by the disintegration of these settings, which has served as a sobering reminder that US engagement in international organizations is conditional, and that reversal awaits if those conditions are not met.

While recognizing that things can change swiftly in the Trump administration, the status quo of US–UN relations appears to be one of muddling through, although in a somewhat different sense than the editors suggest, who refer to cooperation in policy areas where it is seen as mutually advantageous. Here, cooperation is approached transactionally by one of the partners and is sustained only when it benefits that partner’s interests (Zareba 2025). With others failing to step up quickly and decisively to fill the financial gaps created by the decisions outlined above, the UN seems to have little choice but to accept the terms of cooperation put forward by the Trump administration. These terms, which began as a blueprint during its first term, have materialized in the past few months with remarkable pace and scope, making it much more difficult to single them out, as was sometimes done in the first term in the hope of a return to business as usual after four years (Almqvist 2017; Lynch 2025). This has left the UN with only radical choices. The positive narratives of African empowerment or of UN reform for the twenty-first century through which these decisions have been presented do not alter this reality (Byrnes 2025; Khumalo 2025; Shiffman 2025).

Those surprised by the renewed focus on American interests in US–UN relations may benefit from revisiting the work of the late Edward Luck, who characterized the US approach toward the UN as one of ‘mixed messages’ (Luck 1999). His analysis reminds us that the United States has consistently played an ambiguous role in the world of international organization, alternating between supporter and critic, and that the UN particularly stands out in this regard. Reviewing this work for Political Science Quarterly, Michael Barnett even concluded that the US–UN relationship would make an ideal episode on the ‘Oprah Winfrey Show’ – one titled ‘great powers who love and abuse the UN’ – although with an important caveat (Barnett 2000, 448). It would showcase ‘a long history of hurt feelings, mistrust and grave misunderstandings’, but not the usual happy ending, as ‘the estranged pair is unlikely to reconcile’ (Barnett 2000, 448). Beyond offering historical background, Luck’s work identifies several factors that have fueled tensions in US–UN relations, many of which remain relevant today. He argues that the United States’ inconsistent stance toward international organizations stems from a deeply ingrained sense of exceptionalism, which drives domestic debates over whether national interests are advanced or undermined by engagement. As such, drivers of tension include concerns about safeguarding national sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world, suspicions that organizations may be exploited to advance agendas that conflict with US objectives, and frustration over minority positions. Yet equally significant are issues of funding, burden-sharing and oversight.

Implications for US–EU Relations

This contextualization also reminds us that even though common institutions and rules are often seen as foundational pillars of the Atlantic political order, as is the case in this report, the United States and the EU have never fully aligned in their stance toward the UN. The EU’s discourse, unlike that of the US, has always conveyed an unambiguous message regarding the UN. A commitment to multilateral cooperation, particularly within the UN framework, is deeply embedded in its identity as an international actor (Drieskens 2023). The EU’s internal structure explains why this is the case: it is the most formalized and institutionalized example of multilateral cooperation. Importantly, multilateralism remains central to its approach, even as the notion of the EU as a geopolitical actor has become more prominent in recent years. According to the EU, contemporary challenges demand more multilateralism, not less. The coronavirus pandemic prompted the EU to articulate its ambition to reinforce the multilateral system in early 2021. Likewise, in the context of its pursuit of ‘strategic autonomy’, the Versailles Declaration adopted in March 2022 reaffirms ‘its intention to intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core’ (European Council 2022, 3). As such, few were surprised when, in the same meeting where the United States questioned the relevance of the UN, the EU reaffirmed its support for the rules-based international order that upholds the UN Charter in particular and multilateralism more broadly, thereby confirming its long-standing commitment to human rights and sustainability.

The EU’s continued adherence to these values led to a public rebuke by President Trump at the September 2025 General Assembly meeting in New York. The EU was called out, with even more words devoted to its failures than those of the UN (The White House 2025f). Responding rather than reacting, the EU opted to point out differences without naming the United States, stressing its own reliability and predictability (European Council 2025). In fact, it only mentioned the United States briefly in its address, without singling it out. Also, at other times in recent months, the EU’s public criticism has been mostly cautious or implicit, expressing regret and concern and reminding the United States that its decisions run counter to its own interests. As such, even if the EU has framed the situation internally as an opportunity to enhance its influence and has taken some financial decisions to address it, it has mostly acted as an observer (Sherriff 2025).

Insecurity and inability, rather than indifference, appear to have driven this public restraint, underscoring that the current EU–US relationship is not one of equals. Since the Trump administration assumed office, the EU has largely been walking on eggshells in its dealings with the US, devoting considerable effort to reducing existing tariffs and preventing new ones (Lehne 2025; Zerka 2025). This wider context of muddling through – largely rooted in fears of retaliation through tariffs or other ways, including the possible withdrawal from vital organizations such as NATO – has constrained the EU’s ability to publicly criticize the Trump administration’s dealings with the UN, leaving it with little alternative but to proceed with caution (Chadwick 2025b; Fox 2025). Financial constraints and a lack of consensus should also be mentioned here. Regarding the former, the EU has been urged to step up not only to alleviate humanitarian suffering, but also because the US decisions carry direct consequences for the EU given their close cooperation on the ground (Le Piouff 2025; Sherriff 2025). Yet stepping in to fully fill the gap left by the United States is not an option. Alternative priorities – several imposed by the Trump administration’s choices, such as the need for enhanced defence spending – mean there is little financial leeway (Chadwick 2025a; Vasquez 2025; Vinocur 2025).

Regarding the latter, it is important to recall that, given the distribution of competences within the EU on most UN matters, the ability to deliver a strong, unified response rests largely with the member states. Two challenges are important in this regard: they are not equally critical of the Trump administration, nor are they united in a maximalist commitment to the UN, with recent research confirming that engagement varies beneath the seemingly unconditional rhetoric discussed above (Blavoukos and Galariotis 2025).

Conclusion

In Charles Lindblom’s original conception, ‘muddling through’ refers to policy formulation through incrementalism, in which complex policy is developed through small, successive changes (Lindblom 1959). Grounding his argument in the context of US policy change, Lindblom contrasted this ‘branch method’ with the ‘root method’, which revisits the underlying fundamentals each time. This contribution has shown that, although the Trump administration appears to have shaken and even uprooted the foundations of the UN, the surprising element lies more in the speed and scale of its decisions than in their general direction, whether viewed in light of its first term or the broader historical context of UN–US relations. Time will tell in what form the UN will emerge from this storm. 

What is clear, however, is that these decisions have left the organization with little choice but to muddle through. The same applies to the EU, which lacks the means and the consensus to calm the crisis, let alone restore normalcy. However, returning to the birthday wishes that framed this contribution, the silver lining beyond the promise of UN reform may be the clarity this turbulent period provides: neither the US–UN nor the US–EU relationship is one of equals now, nor are they likely to become so in the years to come. With this timeline in mind, the EU should recognize that muddling through may be justified as an early crisis response, but it is unsustainable if multilateralism truly constitutes a cornerstone of its identity. While the plans for UN reform remain a work in progress at the time of writing, the parameters are quite clear. They encourage the EU to evolve from branching to rooting, engaging in a substantive discussion of its commitment to the UN system, including its reliance on others to realize its multilateral goals. Maintaining credibility as a dependable actor requires confronting these dependencies decisively, whether they involve the United States or other partners. In this context, the UN’s milestone may also offer a transformative opportunity for the EU, clarifying what its multilateral commitment means in practice and how to put it into practice.


 

(*) Edith Drieskens is an Associate Professor of International Relations at the Leuven International and European Studies (LINES) institute, where she teaches courses on international organizations, international relations theories and academic writing. Her work explores the regional dimension of global governance from a conceptual, theoretical and empirical point of view, focusing on the EU’s functioning in multilateral settings (mainly, but not exclusively) post-Lisbon (UN Security Council, UN General Assembly, UNESCO, WADA). She is co-editor of The Sage Handbook of European Foreign Policy (Sage, 2015). She holds a PhD in Social Sciences from Leuven University (December 2008), as well as master degrees in Political Sciences (Leuven University, 2000), European Studies (Leuven University, 2001) and American Studies (Universities of Antwerp, Ghent and Brussels, 2002). Before returning to Leuven on a full-time basis in September 2011, she was a Senior Research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague (2009–2011). Her ongoing research examines the EU as a heritage actor in international relations. Her research has appeared in a variety of international journals, including the Journal of European Public Policy, the Journal of European Integration, European Security, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies and Public Administration. Email: edith.drieskens@kuleuven.be


 

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Barnett, Michael. 2000. “Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999.” Political Science Quarterly 115 (3): 448–49.

Blackburn, Georgia. 2025. “Almost 500 Staff Protest against UN Budget Cuts as US Scales Back Humanitarian Funds.” Euronews, May 1. https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/05/01/almost-500-staff-protest-against-un-budget-cuts-as-us-scales-back-humanitarian-funds

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Chadwick, Vince. 2025a. “Inside the EU’s Private Assessment on Trump’s Massive Aid Cuts.” Euractiv, October 26. https://www.euractiv.com/news/inside-the-eus-private-take-on-trumps-massive-aid-cuts/

Chadwick, Vince. 2025b. “Europe Takes Note but No Action amid USAID Collapse.” Devex, March 18. https://www.devex.com/news/devex-invested-europe-takes-note-but-no-action-amid-usaid-collapse-109183

Drieskens, Edith. 2023. “European Integration and the United Nations.” In The Cambridge History of the European Union, edited by Mathieu Segers and Steven Van Hecke, 345–65. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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World Health Organization (WHO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, December 7, 2020. Photo: Elena Duvernay.

Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU–US Cooperation in a Changing International Order

Please cite as:
Veggeland, Frode. (2026). “Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU-United States Cooperation during a Changing International Order.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00133

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Abstract
This paper examines the World Health Organization (WHO) within the broader context of the post-1945 liberal international order. It begins with a brief historical account of the establishment and development of WHO, emphasizing its role as a central institution for global health governance. Particular attention is given to the role of the European Union’s (EU) member states and the United States (US) in supporting the WHO through financial contributions, personnel secondments, crisis assistance and capacity-building measures. The paper then explores more recent developments, notably the US withdrawal from the WHO during the first and second Trump administrations and the termination of key US aid programs. Finally, the implications of this withdrawal are analysed, both for WHO’s operational capacity and for transatlantic relations, with consequences for challenges such as the global fight against HIV/AIDS, antimicrobial resistance, drug and vaccine development and emergency preparedness.

Keywords: World Health Organization; United States; European Union; COVID-19; public health emergency; International Health Regulations

 

By Frode Veggeland*

Introduction

The World Health Organization (WHO) has been the key coordinating authority in global health governance within the post-Second World War liberal international order. Both the United States and Europe have been important supporters and contributors to the WHO. However, the future of both the WHO and the transatlantic partnership is currently uncertain. This paper explores the WHO’s evolution and its recent crises, focusing specifically on the United States’ notification of withdrawal. It further analyses what these events mean for the future of transatlantic cooperation.

The Establishment and Development of the WHO

The WHO was established in 1948 as a specialized agency of the United Nations (UN). The World Health Assembly, comprising all 194 member states (soon reduced to 193), is the supreme decision-making body and determines the organization’s policies and priorities. The assembly also appoints the director-general. The executive board facilitates the work of the assembly, provides advice and gives effect to its decisions and policies. It is composed of 34 members that are technically qualified in the field of health and represent the WHO’s regional offices: the Regional Office for Africa, the Regional Office for the Americas, the Regional Office for South-East Asia, the Regional Office for Europe, the Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Regional Office for the Western Pacific. The WHO’s main objective is ‘the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health‘ (World Health Organization 1946, art. 1), which is to be achieved by, among other things, the core function of acting ‘as the directing and co-ordinating authority on international health work‘ (World Health Organization 1946, art. 2(a)).

The WHO was seen as a major achievement in the evolution of international health institutions, thanks to its expertise and willingness to address intractable health problems (Youde 2012, 29). However, early on, the WHO’s reputation began to decline, reaching a low point in the 1980s and 1990s, when it was heavily criticized by member states and in public discourse for being too bureaucratic, ineffective and corrupt. Nevertheless, at this point the WHO could also point to some very successful initiatives in its effort to improve global health – including the eradication of smallpox (Brown et al. 2006; Yamey and Titanji 2025).

The organization resumed much of its authority as a prominent and leading force in international health work under the leadership of former Director-General Gro Harlem Brundtland (1998–2003), resulting in more action, such as finalizing negotiations on the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, the rebuilding of capacities for addressing HIV/AIDS, and a more prominent and visible presence on the international stage. Thus, even though the WHO’s role was still contested, some of the organization’s reputation was rehabilitated, paving the way for its continued role in global health governance (Brown et al. 2006).

The United States played a central role in the development of the liberal international order after the Second World War, which included the establishment of a multilateral framework comprising numerous international agreements and organizations, including the United Nations (Hopewell 2021; Lake et al. 2021; Hylke et al. 2024). The United States also played a key role in the WHO, not least as the largest financial contributor for much of the organization’s history. The member states of the European Union (EU) have also been active supporters of and contributors to the WHO, through financial support, personnel secondments, crisis assistance and capacity-building measures. In 2020, when the United States withheld some of its funding, the member states were collectively the largest donors to the WHO. The EU itself is not a member of the WHO and did not engage actively with the organization for a long time, even though a framework for cooperation between the two organizations has been in place since 1972 (with subsequent revisions), based on a series of exchanges of letters.

Recently, and particularly after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU has shown much more interest in the WHO (European Commission 2010, 2025; European Union 2022). There are several reasons for the delayed EU interest in the WHO. First, health policy has been (and still is) primarily the competence of the member states, which limits both the scope and form of health cooperation in the EU. Second, cooperation on health issues was not politicized and put high on the EU agenda until the 1990s onwards, when a series of health and security related crisis – such as the outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, also known as ‘mad cow disease’), the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and swine flu emergencies, and the volcanic ash cloud from Iceland in 2010 – contributed to raise the attention towards the need for collective preparedness and action (Greer and Jarman 2021; Brooks et al. 2023). Third, it was not until the 1990s and 2000s that the EU treaties provided a legal basis for the EU to more actively supplement and assist member states in health policy. Prime among these are article 152 of the Amsterdam Treaty (the ‘public health’ article), renumbered as article 168 in the Lisbon Treaty of 2009, article 222 of the Lisbon Treaty (the ‘solidarity clause’) – which ‘requires the EU and Member States to collectively assist any Member State affected by a terrorist attack or a natural or man-made disaster’ – and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (including the right to life and the right to healthcare) which gained equal status to treaty law in 2009 (Ekengren et al. 2006; Brooks et al. 2023).

Partly because of this specification of the EU’s role in health, the European Commission issued a document in 2010 signalling a more active role for the EU on the international stage in health cooperation. Regarding the relationship with the WHO, the document stated: At global level, the EU should endeavour to defend a single position within the UN agencies. The EU should work to cut duplication and fragmentation and to increase coordination and effectiveness of the UN system. It should support stronger leadership by the WHO in its normative and guidance functions to improve global health. The EU should seek synergies with WHO to address global health challenges. It should decrease the fragmentation of funding to WHO and gradually shift to fund its general budget (European Commission 2010, 6).

In line with the intentions stated above, the EU delegation in Geneva (where the WHO headquarters are located) began coordinating common positions on WHO matters among the EU member states in 2010 (Bergner et al. 2020, 3).

Thus, when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out in 2020, health policy had already moved higher up the EU’s political agenda, as reflected in earlier initiatives to strengthen transatlantic health cooperation with the United States. The agreement on mutual recognition between the European Community and the United States of America was set up in 1999 (Official Journal of the European Communities 1999). The agreement lays down the conditions under which the EU and the United States will accept conformity assessment results (e.g., testing or certification) from the other party’s designated conformity assessment bodies. In this way they can show compliance with each other’s requirements, essentially by replacing double testing with mutual trust. The 1999 agreement covered (through sectoral annexes) pharmaceutical goods manufacturing practices (GMPs) and medical devices. Other technical health areas were later included, such as inspections of manufacturing sites for human medicines in their respective territories, which were fully implemented in 2019. The Global Health Security Initiative was set up in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Delegations from the United States and the European Commission (as well as from EU member states) were included in this initiative.

The WHO was allowed to meet as an observer in the Global Health Security Initiative. In 2009, the EU and the United States created the Transatlantic Taskforce on Antimicrobial Resistance to address the urgent, growing global threat of antimicrobial resistance. Negotiations between the United States and the EU on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) began in 2013 (Khan et al. 2015). These negotiations included extensive plans for transatlantic cooperation on health issues, including health services, pharmaceuticals, and other health-related regulatory matters (Jarman 2014).

However, these negotiations were abandoned when Trump became president in 2016 and in April 2019 the EU declared that TTIP was ‘obsolete and no longer relevant‘ (Council of the EU 2019). Following the experiences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, the EU and the United States issued a joint statement in the fall of 2022 urging the strengthening of transatlantic cooperation on health, particularly in the context of health emergencies. In 2023, the EU–US Health Task Force was set up to prioritise three avenues for cooperation: combating cancer, addressing global health threats, and strengthening the global health architecture. These initiatives were launched during the Biden administration. The election of Trump in 2024 for a second term has raised new questions about the future of global and transatlantic cooperation on health, in general, and the role of the WHO in these efforts, in particular.

Turbulence in the WHO: Funding, Crisis Management and US Withdrawal

Even though the WHO’s authority was partially restored in the early 2000s, the organization continued to experience turbulence. Ansell and Trondal (2017, 4) identify three aspects of turbulence that are relevant here. Turbulent organizations refers to factors embedded within organizations, such as factional conflicts, staff turnover, funding, conflicting rules and internal reforms. Turbulence of scale appears when actions at one level of authority or scale of activities affect actions at another level or scale. Thus, what appears to be a ‘good‘ solution at one level might be considered a ‘bad’ solution at another. Turbulent environments speaks to factors external to organizations, such as crisis, rapid technological change, protests and partisan conflict. Here, attention is directed towards three challenges creating turbulence: the fragmented funding of the WHO, the handling of the Ebola disease outbreak in West Africa in 2014–2016, the WHO’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the subsequent notification of the United States to withdraw from the organization, first in 2020 and then again in 2025.

WHO Funding

The WHO’s funding comes from two primary sources: assessed contributions (i.e., membership dues paid by member states) and voluntary contributions from member states and non-state actors. Assessed contributions enable the WHO to prioritize and allocate resources to measures and activities considered most effective in fulfilling the organization’s mandate. Voluntary contributions are typically earmarked for the donor’s preferred project, which does not guarantee that the resources will be channelled to where they are most needed. The more the WHO depends on voluntary contributions, the less freedom of manoeuvre it has to fulfil its mandate.

Over time the share of assessed contributions to the WHO has been reduced in favour of voluntary contributions. In the mid-1980s, the share of voluntary contributions had almost caught up with the regular budget, which consisted of assessed contributions (Brown et al. 2006, 68). In the 2014–2015 budget 77% came from voluntary donations – these were, moreover, heavily dependent on rich donors such as the Gates Foundation and the United States (Gostin 2015, 6). In the 2022–2023 budget, the share of assessed contributions was only 12.1% of the WHO’s total revenue, whereas the share of voluntary contributions was 87.5% (KFF 2025, 8).

This fragmentation of funding and shift towards earmarked voluntary contributions has created problems for the WHO’s ability to fulfil its mandate, as priorities and policies are set by the World Health Assembly. In contrast, the larger share of the budget has been controlled by the most powerful donors of voluntary contributions (Brown et al. 2006). The assembly – in recent times, numerically dominated by poor and developing countries – is only in a position to control the use of the regular budget, consisting of assessed contributions. This situation has created turbulence within the organization, raising concerns about the WHO’s independence from internal and external actors and its capacity to follow up on prioritized health areas and thus achieve its objectives. Moreover, the possible withdrawal of the United States means that the WHO loses its historically largest financial contributor. Therefore, other states can fill this void.

The Ebola Outbreak 2014–2016 and the Call for Reform of the WHO

The Ebola epidemic outbreak in West Africa in 2014–2016 was ‘one of the largest, most devastating, and most complex outbreaks in the history of infectious disease‘ (Park 2022, 1). The outbreak put the WHO’s designated role in the global health response system to a severe test – according to many observers, a role that the WHO failed to fulfil (Gostin 2014, 2015; Park 2022). The WHO headquarters was criticized for responding too late to the outbreak, for placing too much responsibility on the Regional Office for Africa, and for hesitating to respond amid political and religious pressures in the affected countries. According to the International Health Regulations (IHR) – a binding agreement administered by the WHO – the WHO director-general has the exclusive power to declare a so-called Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), a mechanism that triggers a coordinated international response. During the Ebola outbreak the director-general did not declare a PHEIC until five months after the Ebola virus began to spread internationally and a long time after receiving warnings about the urgency to act, from local experts as well as from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as Doctors Without Borders (Park 2022).

The WHO’s handling of the Ebola outbreak drew heavy criticism and calls for reform. The reform proposals included: increasing the WHO budget and shifting the budget towards assessed contributions, empowering the director-general at the expense of the regional offices to ensure that the WHO speaks with one voice, and to exert the WHO’s constitutional authority as a normative organization by setting an ambitious agenda for negotiation of health treaties and voluntary codes (Gostin 2015). Some reforms were implemented, such as the creation of the Health Emergencies program, a Contingency Fund, and a dedicated global emergency workforce to be deployed rapidly to outbreak zones, the improvement of how the WHO assesses and communicates risks, strengthening of the implementation of the IHR and the enabling of rapid activation of research and development activities during epidemics to help fast-track effective tests, vaccines and treatments for subsequent outbreaks. Having established these initiatives, the WHO was assumed to be better prepared for the next international health emergency.

The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Subsequent Withdrawal of the United States from the WHO

The COVID-19 pandemic was a massive health and societal crisis, which showed how an infectious disease can spread around the globe in weeks, killing millions of people, as well as having devastating consequences economically and socially, and seriously setting back sustainable development (Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response 2021). The pandemic also underscored the importance of international cooperation in combating the virus, including the development and availability of vaccines and other essential medical countermeasures. The WHO played an important role in managing the pandemic – by declaring the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus a PHEIC, by assisting affected countries with knowledge, equipment and personnel, providing recommendations and advice on health measures, coordinating surveillance and control, and by its joint leadership of the multilateral efforts in the COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (COVAX) initiative to develop and manufacture vaccines and to guarantee fair and equitable access to these vaccines all around the world.

However, the WHO’s role during the pandemic was met with mixed evaluations. Central to the negative assessments were that the director-general could have declared the PHEIC earlier (a PHEIC was declared 31 January 2020 – one month after the coronavirus was identified), that the WHO was too soft on China, that the COVID-19 outbreak should have been declared a pandemic earlier (it was declared a pandemic by the WHO on 11 March 2020), that the communication of public health measures as well as the risks related to the virus were inconsistent, and that the system for funding was insufficient. The WHO received positive evaluations, particularly for its efforts to develop and make vaccines available – an effort that was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize – as well as for its technical guidance and ability to deliver hands-on support to affected states.

One of the harshest critics of the WHO in recent times has been the United States (Chorev 2020; Yamey and Titanji 2025). On 14 April 2020, President Trump announced the suspension of United States contributions to the WHO pending an investigation into the organization’s alleged mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic (The White House 2020). In a letter to the WHO’s director-general dated 18 May 2020, Trump criticized the organization for sounding the alarm too late when the coronavirus was identified, for having a ‘China-centric’ bias and failing to hold China to account, and for providing inaccurate or misleading information (The White House 2020). He also cited the vast difference between the United States’ contributions to the WHO and China’s. Moreover, the WHO’s general advice against travel restrictions was heavily criticized – advice that basically reflects the IHR’s general discouragement against broad travel bans as well as the scope and purpose of IHR (article 2), which says that a public health response to international spread of disease should avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade. In the letter, Trump delivered an ultimatum: make necessary reforms, or the United States would redraw its funding permanently and reconsider its WHO membership: “It is clear the repeated missteps by you and your organization in responding to the pandemic have been extremely costly for the world. The only way forward for the World Health Organization is if it can actually demonstrate independence from China. My Administration has already started discussions with you on how to reform the organization. But action is needed quickly. We do not have time to waste. That is why it is my duty, as President of the United States, to inform you that, if the World Health Organization does not commit to major substantive improvements within the next 30 days, I will make my temporary freeze of United States funding to the World Health Organization permanent and reconsider our membership in the organization. I cannot allow American taxpayer dollars to continue to finance an organization that, in its present state, is so clearly not serving America’s interests,” (The White House 2020, 4).

On 6 July 2020, President Trump announced that the United States would formally withdraw from the WHO, effective 6 July 2021. The Biden administration suspended notification of a withdrawal in 2021. That same year, the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response published its evaluation of pandemic management. The report included praise and criticism of the WHO and called for several reforms, including ’strengthen[ing] the independence, authority and financing of the WHO‘ (Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response 2021, 48). In line with the intentions of strengthening the global health framework, two sets of negotiations were initiated. In December 2021, talks on a new WHO Pandemic Agreement were launched. The goal was to strengthen pandemic prevention, preparedness and response globally. In May 2022, negotiations on revising the IHR were initiated. These were based on the same goal. Then, on January 20, 2025 – on the day of his inauguration – President Trump once again notified that the United States would withdraw from the WHO, effective one year later (The White House 2025). In this letter, he repeated the criticism he made in 2020. The withdrawal was met with intense criticism and warnings about the long-term health consequences, both globally and in the United States (Horton 2020; Yamey and Titanji 2025). The negotiations and revisions to the IHR were finalized and adopted on 1 June 2024. After finalizing negotiations in April 2025, the WHO adopted the new Pandemic Agreement on 14 May 2025. The United States will not be part of either.

We can summarize turbulence in the WHO in a few brief words. The WHO has experienced severe turbulence in the last decades. Some of the turbulence has been caused by internal factors, such as funding (turbulent organization) and questions about decisions at different administrative levels, including the director-general, the Head Office, and the regional offices (turbulence of scale). Even more serious turbulence, however, has been caused by external factors, where the political situation in the United States and its withdrawal from the WHO stand out as pivotal (turbulent environments).

Implications for EU–US Cooperation on Health

The United States has been central to the development and operation of the WHO for much of the organization’s history. The EU did not engage actively in the WHO until the early 2000s, and particularly after 2010 – reflecting the parallel strengthening of the EU’s general engagement in health policies. The EU’s increased support for international health cooperation can also be seen in connection with the EU’s role as a ‘soft superpower‘ (Meunier and Milada 2018). This role implies gaining influence internationally through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or military force, by means of ‘soft measures‘ such as humanitarian aid and health assistance in capacity-building and knowledge-building. Health cooperation can thus be used as both ‘soft’ and ‘smart’ power to advance foreign policies (McInnes and Lee 2012, 54–55).

In 2022, the EU published its new Global Health Strategy, signalling its intention to play a more active role on the international stage and to provide strong support for the WHO and other multilateral organizations (European Union 2022). The report states that global health is an ‘essential pillar of EU external policy, a critical sector geopolitically and central to the EU’s open strategic autonomy‘ and that ‘the EU intends to reassert its responsibility and deepen its leadership in the interest of the highest attainable standards of health based on fundamental values, such as solidarity and equity, and the respect of human rights‘ (European Union 2022, 4). The strategy also points to the need for ‘a new focus to maintain a strong and responsive multilateral system, with a World Health Organization (WHO) at its core which is as sustainably financed as it is accountable and effective‘ (European Union 2022, 7). Two of the strategy’s guiding principles emphasize the importance of international institutions. Guiding principle 14 states the support for ‘a stronger, effective and accountable WHO‘ and lists several prioritized actions the EU will take, such as seeking “formal EU observer status with full participation rights as a first step towards full WHO membership, contribut[ing] to making the financing of WHO more sustainable, advanc[ing] WHO reform to strengthen its governance, efficiency, accountability and enforcement of rules, and strengthen[ing] the WHO’s focus on its normative role in areas of global relevance,” (European Union 2022, 21).

Furthermore, guiding principle 16 states the general intention to ‘ensure a stronger EU role in international organisations and bodies’ (European Union 2022, 22). The EU also signals its intention to use a ‘Team Europe’ approach to follow up on the Global Health Strategy. Team Europe brings together a variety of relevant actors, such as EU institutions, member states and their diplomatic networks, financial institutions and other relevant organizations, to strengthen coordination, coherence and complementarity of actions and ensure the EU’s influence and impact.

Thus, in recent decades, there has been a paradoxical development in the positions of the EU and the United States towards global health governance in general and the WHO in particular. Whereas the EU has engaged more actively and stated strong support for the WHO and other multilateral organizations, the United States has retracted from international organizations and agreements, thus prioritizing attempts at using its power to gain influence through unitary action and bilateral agreements (Hopewell 2021; Lake et al. 2021; Hylke et al. 2024; Flint 2025). This retreat from the liberal international order implies abandoning the recognized relevance and authority of common values, ideas and norms, which have been incorporated into and are an essential part of this order since the Second World War.

The question of the consequences of the United States’ retreat for the transatlantic relationship thus arises. Is the relationship breaking down, or is it being renewed? Or is it ‘muddling through’ by adjusting cooperation based on issues seen as mutually advantageous? To make such assessments, it is necessary first to analyse the kinds of changes we are witnessing in the approaches of the EU and the United States to international health cooperation. In this context, two sets of concepts are relevant: bilateralism vs. multilateralism and transactionalism versus reciprocity (Keohane 1986; Bashirov and Yilmaz 2020; Flint 2025).

Table 12.1: Ideal types of approaches to international cooperation

  Bilateralism Multilateralism
Transactionalism Zero-sum games outside of international institutions (Approach 1) Zero-sum games within international institutions (Approach 2)
Reciprocity Plus-sum games outside of international institutions (Approach 3) Plus-sum games within international institutions (Approach 4)

Reciprocity here refers to the principle of mutual exchange and equal treatment, often involving shared values and long-term cooperation. At the same time, transactionalism is a pragmatic, short-term approach focused on immediate, tangible gains in a zero-sum ‘give and take’ scenario. Reciprocity implies a relationship built on mutual respect and consistent, predictable behaviour where cooperation is assumed to serve the interests of all (‘plus-sum game’). In contrast, transactionalism views relations as a series of discrete, one-off ‘deals‘ in which each party seeks to maximize its immediate benefit, often with no expectation of future cooperation beyond the current exchange. It is important to note that the approaches presented in Table 12.1 represent ideal types; in practice, states may use one or more approaches, or a combination of them, in different settings and at different times.

Approach 1 refers to a state`s emphasis on using its power to achieve (asymmetrical) bilateral agreements with short-term gains. The approach implies a lack of support for international institutions and unpredictable cooperative relationships, where common norms and values are downplayed in favour of relative gains. The Trump administration’s approach, particularly in its second term, shares many of these characteristics.

In Approach 2, international institutions are viewed as powerful tools for enforcing a state’s will on others. The approach is based on the precondition that powerful states can dominate and control the international institution at stake. The United States arguably used this approach in the early years of the global trade framework established in 1947 with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and its successor institution, the World Trade Organization, established in 1995. Here, the United States used its powers to dominate the shaping of the rules and operation of the framework in favour of specific national economic interests.

Approach 3 refers to the idea of mutual gains through broad long-term cooperation outside of multilateral institutions. The close relationship between the EU and Norway and (until recently) between the United States and Canada can illustrate this approach. 

Approach 4 refers to the core idea of a liberal international order: that states should be governed by agreed-upon legal and political international institutions and norms, rather than solely by power or force, and that such international cooperation may serve the interests of all. Here, possible short-term losses from international commitments are assumed to be offset by long-term gains. This approach has received sufficient support in the post-Second World War period, including from the United States, so that a predominantly liberal international order has been maintained to date. This order has been characterized by a multitude of international organizations and agreements, as well as successive multilateral negotiations, which have provided binding national commitments across a wide range of issues – from trade and health to human rights and climate and environmental protection. However, as stated earlier, this order is now under severe pressure.

Based on the developments in global health cooperation described above, the EU and the United States have arguably moved in opposite directions regarding their approaches to international cooperation. Whereas the EU has become a more vigorous defender of multilateralism, seeking to play a more active role in international organizations, the United States has abandoned multilateralism in favour of bilateralism. The US withdrawal from the WHO, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and the Paris Agreement on climate change, as well as the Trump administration’s circumvention of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules through its trade policies, are just a few examples of this. Moreover, whereas the EU emphasizes reciprocity and shared norms and values, Trump has clearly moved the United States further towards transactionalism.

Returning to the consequences for the transatlantic relationship of the United States’ retreat from multilateralism, the question arises: How are transatlantic relations changing under the Trump administration? Three scenarios are possible, and I will describe each in turn below.

Scenario 1: A possible strengthening of the transatlantic relationship. One scenario suggests that the transatlantic relationship may move forward and be strengthened in the face of global uncertainty and common challenges, threats and needs. Clearly, there is currently little to support this scenario. When it comes to transatlantic cooperation within the framework of global health governance, we first and foremost see a decline. There were attempts to strengthen health cooperation from the late 1990s onwards. Some of these – such as the TTIP negotiations – while others succeeded, such as the global health security initiative and the EU–US task forces for health and for antimicrobial resistance (AMR). However, the US withdrawal from the WHO means that the United States has put itself outside the EU’s view of the core pillar of global health cooperation. This approach affects the WHO’s operations and also spills over into transatlantic cooperation, for example, by putting many projects relevant to this cooperation at risk, including humanitarian aid, the fight against HIV/AIDS, and the fight against AMR. The potential to strengthen transatlantic cooperation on health is also undermined by the Trump administration’s general bilateral and transactional approach to international cooperation, its withdrawal from multilateral agreements and organizations that the EU strongly supports, and its frequent shifts in positions and policies toward other countries. In addition, the harsh and distrustful rhetoric of President Trump against the EU does not help, as with his claims, for example, that the EU is a ‘foe on trade‘ (BBC 2018), that it ‘was set up to take advantage of the United States‘ (Politico 2018), that it ‘was formed to screw the United States‘ (France 24 2025), and that it ‘is, in many ways, nastier than China‘ (Axios 2025). Such rhetoric does not serve as a sound basis for a trustworthy, strengthened cooperative partnership.

Scenario 2: Maintain the transatlantic relationship by ‘muddling through’. This scenario suggests that the transatlantic partnership will ‘muddle through’ geopolitical and domestic challenges through functional adjustments, while maintaining cooperation in areas seen as mutually advantageous. Some minor developments could support such a scenario – for example, that cooperation has continued to progress in technical and less political areas of health, such as mutual recognition of conformity assessment. However, the overall transatlantic relationship has been seriously damaged by the Trump administration’s approach, which clearly limits the adjustments that can be made. First, the United States’ withdrawal from the WHO puts many WHO-initiated cooperative projects involving both the United States and the EU at risk. One example is the combat against AMR. Second, many cooperative health projects depend on long-term commitments from involved parties to have any effect. The short-term, unpredictable approach of the Trump administration thus creates significant risks for engaging bilaterally with the United States on such projects. Third, much of the transatlantic cooperation on health is based on mutual trust, including technical cooperation such as mutual recognition of conformity assessment. Such trust has clearly been reduced in recent times.

Scenario 3: The disintegration of the transatlantic relationship. Following the assessments of the two other scenarios, recent developments clearly show a decline and disintegration in the transatlantic relationship. Two developments are particularly important in this context. First, the United States’ withdrawal from the WHO – and from other multilateral arrangements – makes it a less relevant partner for the EU, which prioritizes cooperation through the WHO (and other multilateral institutions). Second, the Trump administration’s seemingly abandonment, or at least serious downplaying, of international law and common norms and values, such as human and democratic rights, clashes with the norms, values and principles emphasized by the EU. Third, the Trump administration’s performance on the international stage, including its stance against the EU, makes it a less reliable partner – thereby creating high political risk for entering long-term commitments with the United States.

Responding to the Turbulence: Four Recommendations for the EU

The United States’ withdrawal from the WHO creates a void in influence and authority that others can fill. The EU can contribute to filling this void by:

1. Continuing to support and prioritize the WHO and speed up contributions to strengthen the WHO’s independence and financial situation. This can be achieved by contributing to maintaining and strengthening the EU’s role as a ‘soft superpower’ using health to advance foreign policy aims.

2. Building ‘coalitions of the willing’ within the WHO to strengthen the organization, influence and develop the global health agenda. Experiences from major transboundary crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as the wear and tear on transatlantic cooperation under the Trump administration, have revealed vulnerabilities in Europe and the need to reduce the EU’s dependence on other countries.

To address these challenges, the EU needs to:

3. Strengthen its ability to ensure health security and continue to prioritize strategic autonomy in the health area.

4. Downplay transatlantic cooperation on short- and medium-term commitments and avoid long-term commitments.

This way, political risks related to (health) cooperation can be reduced. The strain on the transatlantic partnership and the question of whether the United States can be considered a reliable partner reflect an uncertain, high-risk situation for the EU. A pragmatic approach is thus needed, where the EU leverages mutually beneficial transatlantic ties while simultaneously developing supplementary and compensatory strategies.

The EU should therefore:

5. Strengthen bilateral health cooperation with like-minded partners, including Canada, non-EU countries in Europe and other trustworthy countries.

Implementing these recommendations would go a long way toward ensuring that the EU retains the ability to exercise independence in health policy and responses to global health emergencies in the long term.


 

(*) Frode Veggeland has a PhD in political science from the University of Oslo and has published extensively on the EU, international organizations, regulatory governance, public administration and food and health policies, including crisis preparedness and crisis management. In 2006, he was Head of the Secretariat of the Governmental Commission that investigated the E. coli O103 outbreak in Norway. In 2021–2022, he was part of the Secretariat of the Norwegian Corona Commission, which investigated the government’s management of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022–2024 he was part of the Secretariat of the government-appointed committee that reviewed Norway’s experience of cooperation under the EEA Agreement and other agreements Norway has had with the EU over the past ten years, including cooperation on civil protection and health preparedness. Email: frode.veggeland@inn.no

 


 

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Why Europe, Not China or Russia, Is the Civilisational Problem in Trump’s NSS

Trump’s National Security Strategy marks a sharp break from post-Cold War US diplomacy: it portrays Europe, not rival powers, as the core site of Western civilisational decline. Warning of “civilisational erasure” through migration, demographic change and secularisation, it urges support for “patriotic European parties” resisting this shift. In this framing, the danger to the West is internal, not external, and the US becomes guardian of authentic Western identity—aligning more closely with Orbán, Meloni and PiS than with many elected governments. This leaves Europe facing a strategic dilemma: remain reliant on Washington or assert its own civilisational narrative. Europe must choose—adapt, resist, or define itself.

By Nicholas Morieson

The release of its National Security Strategy shows the Trump Administration to be especially concerned with the decline of Western civilization. One passage in the document drew considerable international attention. It warned that Europe now faces the risk of “civilisational erasure” driven by migration, cultural and religious change, low birthrates and the loss of historical identity. Unless Europe “corrects its current trajectory,” the document claims it could become “unrecognisable in 20 years or less.” The United States, it argues, should help by supporting the “patriotic European parties” resisting this shift.

This language marks a significant break with post-Cold War US diplomacy, and signals that Washington intends to treat its relationship with Europe as an arena of ideological struggle. Throughout the document, Europe appears both as an ally and as a civilisation in decline. Moreover, European governments are portrayed as having adopted values and migration policies that undermine the foundations of the West itself. As a result, the document implies, the United States has no choice but to ‘correct’ Europeans and essentially force them to reconnect with their traditional and authentic Christian-based civilization. 

Fears of Western decline are not new. Even in the year 2000, which may have been the high point of Western power and influence, American writer Jacques Barzun argued in his surprise bestseller From Dawn to Decadence that the West had entered a period of decadence. Barzun meant cultural exhaustion and the fading of artistic and intellectual ambition, not geopolitical weakness. He was not concerned with demography or the strategic balance of power. A generation later the picture is different. The sense of Western decline is no longer limited to cultural pessimists. Analysts now describe American relative decline, a stagnant Europe, and a China confident enough to present its rise as civilizational renewal.

This raises an important puzzle. The National Security Strategy presents Europe as a civilisation in decline but does not treat Russia, China or India in the same civilizational terms, even though these states are the United States’ principal strategic competitors. This is especially surprising insofar as those nations often position themselves as ‘civilization-states’ at odds with Western culture and avowed enemies what of what they view as American imperialism. Yet the document reserves its sharpest language for European societies that, in its view, have abandoned the cultural and religious foundations of the West. Why, then, should the Trump Administration attack allies in explicitly civilizational language while avoiding it with rival powers? The answer is that the Trump administration sees the main threat to Western civilisation as internal rather than external. In their view, the West is being weakened by its own governments and its own cultural choices. Europe therefore becomes the object of correction. The United States, as they understand it, must pressure Europe to return to the values that once defined Western civilisation rather than treat Europe as an equal partner in managing global competition.

The National Security Strategy places the United States at the centre of Western civilisation. In this narrative America becomes the core state responsible for restoring the cultural confidence that Europe has supposedly lost. Trump and Vance describe themselves as defending the West, however what is immediately obvious in the document is that the object of defence is not the geopolitical order that linked the United States and Europe throughout the Cold War. Rather, it is a set of cultural and religious markers that they believe Europe has abandoned. Civilisational rhetoric therefore becomes a tool for a nationalist project. The document justifies pressure on European governments, portrays right-wing populist parties as cultural allies, and reframes transatlantic relations as a struggle over the meaning of the West rather than as a partnership between democratic states.

While we should not overstate its importance, it is significant that an American strategic document now aligns the US more closely with Europe’s populist right than with many of Europe’s elected governments. Indeed, the Trump Administration appears to divide Europe in two. One Europe consists of liberal governments, EU institutions and political leaders committed to secular cosmopolitanism. The other Europe is defined by Christianity, firm borders, and inherited Western values and is represented above all by Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, Giorgia Meloni’s Italy, and Poland’s PiS opposition, right-wing populists who share the Trump Administration’s concerns over Europe’s civilisational decline. In their National Security Strategy, the Trump Administration presents the former as pushing Europe toward collapse and the latter as Western civilisation’s last remaining defenders. 

Although the Trump Administration positions itself and America as the arbiter of authentic Western values, the National Security Strategy contains an unresolved tension insofar as many of the social and cultural trends it critiques in Europe also exist within the United States. The United States is itself experiencing demographic change, declining Christian affiliation, and widening cultural diversity, which complicates claims that Europe alone is departing from the Western tradition. This raises a definitional problem because if the West is understood in civic terms Europe and America remain Western despite cultural change, but if it is defined by racial or religious identity, then the pressures described in the National Security Strategy are shared on both sides of the Atlantic. Moreover, several of the identity debates the administration portrays as corrosive in Europe originated in American academic and activist contexts, suggesting that the cultural dynamics it attributes to Europe are partly American in origin. This is why the Macron government in France ‘wages war’ on ‘wokeness,’ something they perceive to be a form of unwanted American cultural imperialism spreading throughout French institutions.  

The National Security Strategy therefore confronts Europe with a strategic and conceptual dilemma. Should Europe define Western culture on its own terms, and can it articulate a political and cultural identity that differs from the one now promoted by Washington? European governments speak of strategic autonomy, but their nations remain dependent on American security guarantees, particularly in defence and intelligence. European publics remain divided on migration and identity, which complicates any attempt to articulate a coherent cultural and political narrative. Furthermore, EU institutions prefer to define Europe as a legal and political project grounded in universal rights rather than as a civilisation with a particular religious or ethnic foundation. This makes it difficult for Europe to respond to the NSS, which casts it as a civilisation in decay and implies that its renewal requires a return to Christian cultural markers.

This tension has led some analysts, such as Aris Roussinos, to argue that Europe must either consolidate around its own values or accept a subordinate position in a Western order increasingly defined in Washington. Emmanuel Macron has attempted to present Europe as a civilisational actor capable of independent strategic judgement, yet it remains unclear whether this project can succeed given institutional fragmentation and the absence of a shared European cultural story. The National Security Strategy highlights that uncomplicated civilisational unity with the United States is no longer plausible. Such unity would require Europe to adopt a civilisational narrative aligned with American right-wing populist thought, something most European governments are unwilling to do.

The future of transatlantic relations may depend on the outcome of the next American Presidential election. A J.D. Vance victory would almost certainly deepen civilisational language in US strategy, increase pressure on the EU project and expand American support for right-wing populist parties in Europe. Europe shows little capacity to respond to this approach because it remains structurally dependent on American security and politically divided on issues of identity. Continued subordination would leave European governments reacting to American preferences rather than shaping their own strategic environment.

A Democratic victory would return the United States to its traditional support for the European Union. Civilisational rhetoric would recede, and Washington would again treat Europe as a partner in a rules-based and liberal international order. Yet this scenario also carries risks for Europe. A return to the status quo would still leave Europe reliant on American power and vulnerable to future political shifts in Washington. In the long term, Europe may need to assert greater strategic and political autonomy if it wishes to avoid oscillating between two competing American visions of the West.