The opening lecture by Professor Destradi examined the international implications of populism, first by outlining how populism has been conceptualized in comparative politics and political theory. It also introduced the current state of research on the global effects of populism, particularly its potential impact on foreign policy, international disputes, contributions to global public goods, participation in multilateral institutions, and the formation of partnerships with authoritarian and populist governments.
Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041
Abstract
This article explores how China’s rise as a ‘civilization state’ encourages some European states to challenge US political dominance. While countries like Russia and Turkey have also employed civilizational populist rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy issues, this article focuses on Xi Jinping’s recent visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and examines how European leaders like Emmanuel Macron, Viktor Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational model. Further research is needed on the growing civilizational competition between these states and the West, particularly in Africa, where China, Russia, and Turkey project all variants (soft, smart, sharp and hard) of power to assert influence and challenge Western dominance in international relations and global politics.
The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe sees him visit three “unlikely” – to quote the New York Times – countries: France, Hungary, and Serbia (Cohen & Buckley, 2024; Hawkins & O’Carroll, 2024).). While it is no surprise that Xi should visit France, Europe’s second-largest economy and one of the dominant powers within the European Union (EU), his decision to visit Hungary and Serbia, both comparatively smaller and economically less significant nations, raises important questions about China’s strategic interests in Europe. France, with its historical influence, advanced economy, and status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, is a logical destination for a leader looking to engage with the political and economic powerhouses of Europe. However, Hungary and Serbia, despite their more modest economic profiles, have become increasingly important players in Europe, particularly in relation to China’s broader geopolitical and civilizational goals (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022, 2023a; Yilmaz, 2023).
We argue that the rationale for Xi’s visits to Hungary and Serbia lies not solely in economic opportunities, though both nations have benefitted from Chinese investment in recent years, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rather, the visits are reflective of a deeper shift in the political landscape of these nations, which are characterized by an increasingly anti-American posture and skepticism toward the traditional liberal democratic order (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Both Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of the US and the EU in international and regional politics. This is where China’s appeal as a rising power offering a multi-polar global order becomes particularly significant. The governments of these countries see China as a potential ally in their efforts to challenge US hegemony and reshape the international system (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a).
The political leadership of France, Hungary, and Serbia increasingly align themselves with a worldview that emphasizes the decline of US dominance, and the rise of a multipolar order dominated by ‘civilization states’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz, 2023). This notion, which China has skillfully promoted, posits that the world is not merely divided by economic or political blocs, but by civilizations that possess distinct values, histories, and trajectories. China, under Xi Jinping, has positioned itself as the archetypal civilization state, drawing on thousands of years of history to assert its leadership on the global stage and present itself as an alternative to the Western liberal order. In this model, China seeks not only economic and political influence but also cultural and ideological legitimacy as a civilizational power.
For France, under President Emmanuel Macron, China’s rise presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Macron, while wary of China’s authoritarian tendencies, sees in China’s civilizational narrative a model for Europe’s own reawakening. The Chinese emphasis on unity, heritage, and the assertion of national and cultural identity resonates with Macron’s broader vision for Europe. Macron, like Xi, sees the dangers of the “false universalism” of the Anglo-American liberal order and is increasingly advocating for a European identity that stands apart from American influence. In this sense, China’s rise is not merely an economic partner for France but also a philosophical model for reclaiming European civilizational values (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b).
In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has long positioned himself as a critic of Western liberalism and American cultural hegemony. Orbán’s vision of Hungary as a bastion of traditional Christian civilization aligns well with China’s civilizational discourse. Orbán’s government has openly embraced the notion of a multipolar world where civilization states—rather than liberal democracies—are the dominant actors. The rise of China, along with Russia and Turkey, serves Orbán’s populist narrative that Hungary must resist the pressures of conforming to Western norms and, instead, forge its own path, drawing strength from its civilizational heritage (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b; Yilmaz, 2023).
Similarly, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has distanced his nation from the Western liberal democratic order, positioning Serbia as a state that is culturally and politically distinct from the EU and the US. Vučić does not explicitly frame Serbia’s political trajectory in terms of a clash of civilizations, but his rejection of Western interference and his embrace of Chinese investment and political support suggest that he sees in China an alternative model of governance—one that allows for authoritarian control without the need to submit to Western-style liberalism. The Chinese concept of a civilization state provides Vučić with the ideological justification to resist Western pressures, strengthen his own rule, and maintain Serbian autonomy in a world increasingly defined by civilizational competition (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024b).
This civilizational approach is not limited to China. Both Russia and Turkey have embraced the notion of a civilization state to justify their geopolitical ambitions and internal governance models (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has adopted a civilizational discourse that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russian Orthodoxy, culture, and history. Putin’s Russia positions itself as a bulwark against Western liberalism, framing its foreign and domestic policies in terms of defending its civilizational values against a Western world it views as morally and politically degenerate. This framing allows Putin to justify both his authoritarian rule at home and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, including its interventions in Ukraine and Syria.
Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has similarly embraced a civilizational discourse, one that draws on Turkey’s Ottoman past and its Islamic heritage. Erdogan’s vision of a neo-Ottoman Turkey asserts independence from the West and emphasizes Turkey’s role as a leader in the Muslim world. Turkey’s turn toward Islamist populist authoritarianism, justified by Erdogan as a defense of Turkish and Islamic values against Western liberalism, mirrors the civilizational narratives employed by both China and Russia (Yilmaz, 2021; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023c).
While Russia and Turkey’s adoption of civilizational rhetoric has certainly influenced their foreign policies and global politics, particularly in their respective regions, this article focuses specifically on China and its impact on Europe. We examine how Macron, Orbán, and Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational narrative and explore how China’s rise as a civilization state is reshaping the political and civilizational self-perception of these European nations. The emergence of a civilization-based framework in international relations is significant, not only for understanding China’s role in Europe but also for assessing the future of US-European relations (Yilmaz and Morieson 2024b).
Thus, we will take a closer look at Xi’s visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and explore how the leaders of these countries are engaging with China’s civilizational narrative. We will examine how this engagement influences their domestic policies, foreign relations, and how this emerging partnership may affect the broader geopolitical landscape in Europe and beyond.
France: Drawing Inspiration from China’s Rise to Rejuvenate ‘European Civilization’
Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron welcoming chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan for thier state visit in France at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 25, 2018. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
Xi’s visit toFrance is ostensibly to discuss trade issues with the populist French president, specifically those affecting China’s ability to sell electric vehicles in the European Union. Macron, for his part, also has economic issues to address with China, particularly regarding China’s restrictions on French agricultural goods. He has used this opportunity to urge Xi to stop supporting Russia and to pressure Putin into negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s decision to visit Serbia and Hungary – the European nations most sympathetic towards Moscow – suggests that Putin can expect continued support from China in their efforts to annex Ukraine.
These issues aside, there is a deeper purpose behind Xi’s visit and Macron’s enthusiastic reception, one that increasingly aligns with Macron’s views on the future of Europe and global politics. Indeed, Xi’s statement about France-China relations being a “model” for the world to follow suggests that something far more significant is taking place (Cohen & Buckley, 2024). Moreover, according to Xi, China “will work with France to deepen China-Europe mutually beneficial cooperation,” and the two are “major forces in building a multipolar world, two big markets that promote globalization, and two great civilizations that advocate cultural diversity” (Xi, 2024), a remark that underscores his civilizational perspective on global politics.
The leaders of both China and France, despite their differences, are drawn together by a shared antipathy towards the US and a shared civilizational perspective on global affairs, a perspective intrinsically connected with their anti-American politics. Naturally, China and France do not share the same opinion of the US. China views America as a rival; France views America, perhaps, as a perfidious ally, forcing ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture upon an unwilling French people. However, both would prefer a world in which American culture was less pervasive, Western universalism abandoned, and American power reduced. Both believe that soon, the rise of civilization-states will drastically diminish American power and prestige globally.
Xi has dedicated himself to the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation (sometimes understood as the Chinese ‘race’), which includes not only citizens of the People’s Republic of China but also Han Chinese globally (Carrai, 2021). At the same time, Xi portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a continuation of Ancient Chinese culture merged with Marxism (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Unlike Putin, he does not use the term “civilization state” to describe his country (Putin, 2023). However, much like Putin, Xi is adamant that China must draw on its civilizational heritage and reject the values of Western civilization, which he argues are not universal but particular to the West and thus unsuitable for China (Blackburn, 2021; Passeri, 2020). Civilizationism is thus a tool of liberation, through which Xi intends to free China of non-indigenous values and ideas, allowing it to overcome the US and establish the Chinese nation as Asia’s dominant power.
China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia is justified by Xi Jinping, if not motivated, as part of the necessary rise of Chinese civilization and its return to its rightful place as Asia’s hegemon, including the reclamation of traditional Chinese territories, such as Taiwan. Simultaneously, his regime’s repression of non-Han peoples, including the Muslim Uyghurs—a Turkic people—in Xinjiang, and the people of Tibet, is justified on the grounds that these regions have always been part of Chinese civilization. Therefore, the peoples of these regions are considered part of Chinese civilization, whether they accept it or not. In fact, those who resist must be coerced into this civilization, as evidenced by the ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang.
Moreover, Chinese leaders evidently believe that Western-style nation-states, particularly the small states of Europe, whatever their utility in the past, today prevent the West from gathering its true strength. In contrast, the large civilization-states of China, Russia, and India gain strength from their large populations and the ability to unite peoples who speak different languages under a single identity. In other words, Europe – despite its 300 million people – is weak because it is made up of many small nations, which would be far more powerful if they were to unite into a single polity.
French leader Macron appears to agree with this assessment. Writer Aris Roussinos (2020), who seems somewhat sympathetic to Macron’s project, is among the few who have remarked on the importance Macron places on rejuvenating what he calls European Civilization. Indeed, while right-wing populist Marine Le Pen calls for the protection of France’s Judeo-Christian yet secular civilization (Morieson, 2021; 2022), Macron is moving beyond the nation-state paradigm, advocating for centralizing power within the EU to protect an otherwise moribund European civilization. Macron is perhaps best understood as a technocratic populist, but this label may not fully explain his complex and shifting political positions and may give the impression that he lacks core beliefs or policies (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). However, a close reading of his speeches reveals that Macron is deeply concerned about the future of European civilization and believes it represents the best of humanity, thus must protect its ‘humanist’ values.
One might ask from whom Macron proposes to protect European civilization. For Macron, European civilization has many enemies, but perhaps the key adversary is the US, which he views as an enemy precisely because it is an anti-civilizational power that defends the nation-state paradigm, insists that its values are universal, and desires a relatively weak Europe. Macron does not believe that American values are universal. He does not even believe that the US and other ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations, such as Great Britain, can be included within European civilization. In this way, Macron reveals that he does not believe in Western civilization per se, but rather that continental Europeans possess their own civilization, which is quite different from the traditions of the Anglos, particularly in that continental Europeans do not embrace the market economy and the nation-state paradigm as wholeheartedly.
Roussinos (2020) observes that in 2019, Macron gave a speech to France’s ambassadors in which he argued that “China, Russia, and India were not merely economic rivals but genuine civilization states… which have not just disrupted our international order, assumed a key role in the economic order, but have also very forcefully reshaped the political order and the political thinking that goes with it, with a great deal more inspiration than we have” (Roussinos, 2020). Warning his ambassadors that ‘civilizations,’ including European civilization, are ‘disappearing,’ Macron declined to condemn states that draw on their cultural heritage and proclaim themselves heirs to great civilizations. Instead, he suggested that Europeans should take inspiration from the ‘civilizational projects’ of Russia and Hungary, praising what he referred to as their ‘inspiring’ ‘cultural and civilizational vitality’ (Roussinos, 2020). According to Macron, such nations “take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have, to a certain extent, lost” (Roussinos, 2020). Furthermore, France has a mission to construct a “collective narrative and a collective imagination” among Europeans, meaning that his national project of rejuvenating France “must be undertaken as a project of European civilization” (Roussinos, 2020).
Later, in April 2024, Macron told an audience at Sorbonne University that “the European spirit” was essentially tired and “left to those who attacked it.” Macron admits that Europe has “lost its self-esteem,” which he regards as “strange” given its achievements (Macron, 2024). However, he says a defining aspect of European civilization is this self-doubt and “culture of confession,” worsened by the continent’s “demographic decline” – an obvious existential threat (Macron, 2024). His solution to Europe’s problems is to build “a more united, more sovereign, and more democratic Europe” in order to “assert ourselves among the other powers and in light of the century’s transitions” (i.e., the transition of power from Western nation-states to the civilization-states of the East) (Macron, 2024). Equally, Macron says European civilization is “humanist,” and to survive, it must reject the “Anglo-American model,” which permits the private sector to gain enormous power over human life, but also reject the Chinese model, in which the government is given total control over human life (Macron, 2024). Macron promises to challenge the Anglo-American model by taking control of cyberspace and enforcing European norms by banning hate speech and inappropriate content of various kinds, something he calls “a cultural and civilizational combat” (Macron, 2024).
Macron’s meeting with Xi thus brings together two men with civilizational perspectives on global affairs, both of whom believe that the age of Anglo-American universalism is coming to an end and that the nation-state paradigm must give way to something more vibrant, something that binds together past and present: the civilization-state, or in the case of Europe, a kind of supercharged, centralized EU. Despite the vast differences between the two men and their respective ‘civilizations,’ and the fact that Macron ultimately views China as a civilization Europe must challenge in the emerging multipolar world, they share a common belief in civilizationism that unites them in opposition to the US.
Fighting Liberal ‘Elites’ and Defending Judeo-Christianity by Drawing Hungary Closer to China
Chinese and Hungarian flags fly in the sky. Photo: Andy Liu.
When Xi visits Hungary, he will encounter a nation and a prime minister, Viktor Orbán, eager for Chinese investment, particularly in the form of an electric car plant that the Hungarian leader hopes the Chinese will build in partnership with his country. However, for Xi, this visit and whatever trade deals result from it are partly a reward for Orbán’s pro-China policies, his ambivalent attitude toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and his increasing anti-Western rhetoric, as well as his praise for China’s civilizational rejuvenation project. Equally, the visit demonstrates to Washington that Hungary cannot be relied upon to defend Western interests against Chinese aggression, and that Washington is growing increasingly isolated in its opposition to China’s rise.
Orbán is drawn to Xi in much the same way as Macron: both believe the rise of civilization-states like China is ineluctable, and both see China’s rise as an opportunity for their respective states – if not civilizations – to free themselves from Anglo-American norms. However, Orbán differs widely from Macron, and indeed the two might be understood as political enemies. While Macron calls for power to be centralized in Brussels, Orbán is a nationalist who rejects any notion that Hungary should comply with EU norms (Toomey, 2020). And although Orbán possesses a civilizational rejuvenation project, it is of an entirely different nature from Macron’s ‘humanist’ plan for Europe. Rather, Orbán calls for the re-Christianization of Europe, the strengthening of the nation-state and its borders, and he speaks not so much of European civilization but of Judeo-Christian civilization, a term that encompasses a different group of nations, possibly including Russia and the ‘Anglosphere’ nations. Where Macron sees the rejuvenation of European civilization as a way to defy growing autocracy in the East and the domination of the market in the West, Orbán is increasingly enamored with authoritarians abroad and authoritarian rule at home. Both believe that Europe’s demographic problem is existential, and that action is required to repopulate the continent. However, where Macron rejects ‘blood and soil’ ethno-religious nationalism, Orbán considers it a prerequisite for any successful plan to save Europe.
Furthermore, Morieson and Yilmaz (2024) observe that Orbán argues that “the EU and, particularly, the United States [are] so bent on forcing liberal culture on the world that they were inextricably moving all nations toward civilizational conflict: a conflict between the liberal West and ‘civilization-states’ that refused to liberalize, such as China and Russia” (Orbán, 2023). According to Orbán, the future of the world will be decided by this conflict, and therefore “the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose ‘universal values’ upon them in an effort to prevent war” (Morieson & Yilmaz, 2024; Orbán, 2023).
Orbán is known for his opposition to allowing Muslims to enter Hungary, either to stay or settle in Western Europe (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). According to Orbán, Muslims belong to a religion and civilization incompatible with Judeo-Christian values and, therefore, should not be allowed to live in Europe – especially considering Europeans’ rapid demographic decline – in great numbers (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). However, Muslims are not really Orbán’s core enemy. Rather, it is Western political and cultural elites that he blames for Europe’s problems, especially its fertility problem. Orbán claims that elites have caused the West’s decline in power and loss of self-esteem by embracing liberalism. Liberalism is corrosive, according to Orbán, because it creates societies that do not produce citizens willing to have children and reject their societies’ traditional values – the values that made their societies superior in the past. Liberalism, because it teaches the equality of all peoples, encourages cosmopolitanism and individualism, robbing people of their unique national and religious identities (Morieson, 2022). As a result of this cosmopolitanism and the declining birth rates, Western societies have opened themselves to foreigners who not only do not share their liberal values but also have larger families. Consequently, Europe has paved the way for its own downfall by abandoning Judeo-Christian values in favor of liberalism and failing to assimilate Muslim migrants into a secular, liberal society (Morieson, 2022).
Orbán’s civilizational rejuvenation project is inextricably linked to his admittedly illiberal, authoritarian style of governance. Indeed, Orbán’s solution to the problems allegedly brought about by liberalism is to marginalize his liberal and Marxist opponents, centralize power, dominate Hungarian media, and replace, wherever possible, the liberal cultural and bureaucratic elite with his own supporters, a populist plan Orbán speaks of openly and with pride. To combat corrosive liberalism, Orbán claims that authentic Europeans must combat the influence of Washington and Brussels – the two great liberal powers, in Orbán’s estimation – and re-orient Western civilization towards post-liberal Judeo-Christian values, which he argues are still compatible with democracy and freedom (Morieson, 2022). In Orbán’s Hungary, women are thus encouraged with cash payments to have more children (a project that has met with only modest success), and post-Marxist investigations that critically examine Western culture are defunded in the nation’s universities. LGBTQ people are tolerated, but increasingly marginalized. All in all, ‘wokeness’ is not welcome in Orbán’s Hungary and is understood as the ultimate product of liberalism (Morieson, 2022).
It is easy to understand Orbán’s enthusiasm for China. China’s rise comes at the expense of Orbán’s liberal democratic foes (i.e., Washington and Brussels), decreasing their ability to pressure Hungary to return to liberal democratic norms. Similarly, because China is both an authoritarian state led by the populist Xi Jinping and approaches international relations from a civilizational perspective, its rise legitimizes Orbán’s own authoritarianism and his project of civilizational rejuvenation. Indeed, for Orbán, China’s rise proves that authoritarianism and civilizational rejuvenation projects help create strong nations that can stand against American cultural hegemony and prevent corrosive liberalism from eroding traditional identities and values. As a result, although Hungary will remain within the EU, we might expect Orbán to draw the country closer to China in the future. This means that China will have a friendly nation within the EU in Hungary, sowing disharmony and forming alliances with other nationalist states to prevent the centralization of power in Brussels and thwart Macron’s plans for the civilizational rejuvenation of Europe as a liberal-humanist power.
Serbia: Defying International Liberal Order by Embracing Chinese Civilization State
President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.
It should come as no surprise that the date Xi Jinping has chosen to visit Serbia coincides with the 25th anniversary of the American-led NATO bombings of Belgrade’s Chinese embassy. This apparent mistake by Western forces has long been viewed in China as a deliberate attack and part of the West’s – particularly the US’ – attempts to prevent the rise of China. Equally, Xi is no doubt aware of the prevalence of pro-Russian, anti-American attitudes in Serbia, largely the result of the belief that NATO and the US treated Serbs unfairly during the 1999 conflict, but also due to the conservative values held by many Serbs, which sometimes conflict with American liberal values, particularly on issues related to LGBTQ rights and religious freedom.
It is not merely shared resentment toward NATO and the US’ conduct during the Kosovo War that has brought Serbia and China closer. The two nations have become increasingly close since the 2012 election victory of the governing populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which sees China as both a source of economic growth and technological development, but also as a partner less likely to criticize Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia following its attempted annexation of Ukraine and its often socially conservative politics. The SNS has welcomed Chinese investment in mining operations and key infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, making Serbia increasingly indebted to China as a result. At the same time, Western states’ criticism of Serbia, and a widespread belief among many Serbs that the US and NATO – representing the liberal order – are inherently hostile to Serbia, has driven the nation closer to China. Indeed, the SNS and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić, have positioned Serbia between the West and China, using its close relationship with China to improve its bargaining position with Brussels.
Although Serbia has sought EU membership, its democratic backsliding under populist rule has made this increasingly unlikely, and Vučić himself has campaigned against joining the EU. Moreover, EU states are increasingly critical of the so-called electoral autocracy that characterizes SNS rule (Seebass, 2024). For example, the German Federal Foreign Office considers the 2023 national elections in Serbia to have been fraudulent and “unacceptable for a country with EU candidate status” (X, 2023). According to the German Council on Foreign Relations, under SNS rule “the erosion of institutions that were only just democratizing has picked up pace.” The SNS now controls “Serbia’s media landscape… personal ties link the president to organized crime groups and well-coordinated hooligans prone to violence,” and “public discourse is marked by vicious rhetoric that has an especially detrimental effect on young people” (Seebass, 2024).
These trends have led to increasing criticism of Serbia by Western powers and NGOs, prompting the SNS to defy the West by maintaining good relations with Russia and deepening ties with China. Xi’s visit to Belgrade, and the extraordinary welcome provided by the SNS government, demonstrates Vučić’s desire to draw his nation closer to autocratic regimes that do not criticize his anti-democratic actions. Vučić received Xi in Belgrade with a ceremony during which he promised the Chinese leader that he would receive in Serbia a degree of “reverence and love” not “found anywhere else” and vowed that his government would only increase cooperation with Beijing, saying “the sky is the limit” (Hajdari, 2024).
Vučić is alleged to have instructed employees of state-owned companies to join the crowds welcoming the Chinese president, employing around 50 buses to increase crowd numbers and create the impression that the vast majority of Serbs love and revere Xi. Moreover, Xi authored an article in Serbia’s Politika (2024) news outlet describing China-Serbia relations as “ironclad” and noting that “China and Serbia have similar positions on many important international and regional issues” and that “facing the international situation intertwined with changes and turbulence,” the two nations “should continuously strengthen coordination… and stand together for an equal and orderly multipolar world” (Politika, 2024).
It is not difficult to read between the lines and recognize that Xi is calling for Serbia to assist China in challenging US and Western dominance in the international sphere. As Vedran Dihic (Cvetkovic & Heil, 2024) put it, “aside from any trade and economic benefits, there is a political message underlying Serbia’s hosting of Xi that is connected to broader efforts – notably by Moscow and Beijing – to challenge US influence and potentially reshape the international order. …Serbia is striving to deepen relations with actors outside the West and, in that sense, is a kind of autonomous player in the new geopolitical constellation.”
Serbia and China thus find themselves drawn together for similar reasons: both wish to challenge Western liberal dominance in the international sphere and to legitimize authoritarianism at home. China’s civilizational rejuvenation project is useful to Serbia, insofar as China’s insistence that Western values are anything but universal helps to legitimize the SNS’s turn against liberal democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law by portraying these principles as mere Western liberal constructs that have no place beyond Western Europe, and may even hold back the development of states like Serbia that exist beyond the West and East, or at their crossroads.
Conclusions
Xi Jinping’s tour of France, Hungary, and Serbia demonstrates the growing influence of China in Europe. But it also tells us much about how Europeans are responding to China’s rise as a self-styled civilizational power, especially insofar as the rise of China is inspiring some European leaders to challenge US dominance in international politics and embrace the core values of “European civilization.”
For Xi, this civilizational turn is a means to legitimize China’s rise as a global superpower, positioning China not only as an economic force but as a civilization that challenges the universalism of Western values. His outreach to countries like Hungary and Serbia, where populist leaders see benefits in aligning with China’s vision, strengthens this narrative. Serbia, in particular, exemplifies a country striving to balance its ambitions of EU integration with a deepening relationship with China, fueled by shared anti-Western sentiments and authoritarian tendencies.
The convergence of leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić with Xi Jinping highlights the emerging trend of civilizational politics in global affairs. Despite their distinct national interests and ideological differences, these leaders share a skepticism towards the liberal international order championed by the US and NATO, and see the rise of China as a pivotal moment in redefining the global balance of power. Macron, with his vision of a centralized European civilization, and Orbán, with his push for a Judeo-Christian resurgence, both view the nation-state paradigm as inadequate for addressing contemporary challenges. In their own ways, they envision a future in which civilizational identity shapes the global political landscape.
For Macron, the rise of authoritarian China might not be entirely desirable, but it does provide France with an opportunity not just to grow its largely stagnant economy—finding in China a new market for its agricultural goods—but also to reflect on China’s civilizational assertiveness. Macron believes that China’s success, grounded in its ancient heritage and values, suggests that Europe must become more like China: united, assertive, and willing to stand up for its particular values against the false universalism of the Anglo-American world.
For Orbán, civilizationism is primarily a tool of populist discourse, used to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the ‘self’ represented as the traditional Christian Hungarian identity, and the ‘other’ as the Muslim or liberal West. However, like Macron, Orbán views the rise of civilization states as both inevitable and welcome. He believes this shift will create a multipolar world that weakens US and EU power, liberating Hungary from the burden of conforming to Western ‘universal’ norms.
Aleksandar Vučić may not explicitly frame his nation’s conflicts with the EU and the US as a clash of civilizations, but like Orbán, he rejects Western political interference in Serbian affairs. He appears to see in the rise of the Chinese self-proclaimed civilization state a way to challenge the US-dominated liberal international order and solidify his own authoritarian rule.
This civilizational approach is not confined to China alone. Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has embraced a similar narrative, framing itself as a protector of Orthodox Christian civilization, distinct from the West and immune to its liberal values. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is another example, promoting a neo-Ottoman vision that emphasizes Turkey’s Islamic and Turkic heritage in contrast to the West. Both Russia and Turkey have strategically positioned themselves as civilization states seeking to challenge US and Western dominance, much like China.
While China’s civilizational model seems to inspire many of Europe’s populist and authoritarian leaders, it also reveals how the notion of a civilization state is being used to reject Western (particularly Anglo-American) norms. Whether these leaders seek to emulate China or simply leverage its rise to challenge US hegemony, China’s growing influence seems to validate the belief that nations must turn to their own traditional values and culture to overcome American imperialism and cultural dominance.
Ultimately, the alliance between these diverse leaders reflects a growing resistance to the liberal democratic norms that have dominated the global order since the end of the Cold War. By positioning themselves against American cultural and political hegemony, these leaders are contributing to the emergence of a new multipolar world, where civilizational states challenge the legitimacy of Western universalism and aim to reshape global governance according to their own values and interests. As this trend continues to unfold, the dynamics of international relations are likely to shift in significant and unpredictable ways, with far-reaching implications for the future of global order.
Yet, despite the clear allure of civilization-state rhetoric, whether rejecting liberal democratic and Western/Anglo-American norms and embracing ‘our’ civilizational values can increase fertility, provide peoples with a shared purpose, or inspire reindustrialization remains an open question. The rise of civilization states has certainly helped leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić resist US-led globalization and liberalism, but the long-term consequences of these shifts are still uncertain.
One final point that deserves attention is the way the discourse of the civilization state is particularly useful to populist and authoritarian leaders. It allows them to legitimize authoritarian rule by rejecting liberal democracy on the grounds that it is not part of ‘our’ traditional values. Moreover, this discourse legitimizes bellicose foreign policies by justifying the annexation or control of territories that were once part of ‘our’ civilization. In this way, civilizationism creates a populist narrative of the ‘people’ vs. the ‘elites,’ often transnationalized to portray American or Western elites as the enemies preventing ‘our’ rise.
Furthermore, beyond Europe, China, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly extending their civilizational influence into Africa. All three are active in Africa through various soft, smart, sharp and hard power initiatives and projections, from China’s Belt and Road infrastructure projects, Russia’s security alliances, and Turkey’s cultural and religious diplomacy in addition to their Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) all over the world (Yilmaz et al, 2023). These activities reflect not only their economic and political ambitions but also an ongoing civilizational competition with the West for influence on the continent.
China, for instance, promotes its model of development without political liberalization, offering African nations an alternative to Western aid conditionality. Russia has focused on military and energy cooperation, while Turkey emphasizes religious and educational connections, seeking to revive its historical ties to Africa. Each of these actors brings a distinct civilizational narrative to Africa, challenging Western norms and promoting alternatives to the liberal international order.
As these three powers expand their influence, the competition between civilization states and the West will likely intensify, not only in Europe but across the Global South. Further research is needed to better understand how these powers are positioning themselves in Africa and how their civilizational frameworks interact with local political, economic, and cultural dynamics. Understanding this evolving landscape is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of the civilizational turn in global politics.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.
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The Ventotene Manifesto beautifully weaves together the aspirations for a united Europe with the principles of (federalist) liberalism. Its legacy should encourage European citizens to ponder the significance of European values and to defend them. How? By promoting a system both market-based and social; that rejects collectivism and embraces individualism; that prompts personal responsibility and denounces populism; that promotes transparent, efficient, and democratic governance; that acknowledges liberal democracy’s flaws but knows that the authoritarian pathway – fostered by populist forces – is ruinous. This is federalist liberalism.
The European Union (EU) has historically been seen as a beacon of peace, cooperation, and shared values. However, in recent years, there has been a noticeable rise in populist movements – from the right to the left – across several EU countries. The use of nationalist discourse, the unabashed use of demagogy and populism as a method of political offer, and the recourse to the “protection” of the state, are elements which demonstrate today’s crisis in the EU. These elements typically belong to the populist discourse and weaken the EU as a whole. In particular, the surge in right and far-right movements has led to increased polarization in the member states (Roberts, 2022), with political discourse becoming more confrontational. Alongside the rise of far-right ideologies, euroscepticism has also gained momentum. Eurosceptics often criticize the EU’s institutions for being bureaucratic, undemocratic, and infringing upon national sovereignty.
A general sense of dissatisfaction concerning the economic conditions in some EU countries, immigration, the post-Covid-19 pandemic, and the Russian war in Ukraine are among the conditions that enable right- and left-wing populism and anti-Europeanism to gain popularity. Growing eurosceptic sentiment fuels debates about the EU’s future, with traditional debates on supranationalism – that is, supranational actors promote integration through the spillover effect – and intergovernmentalism – that is, member states, following national interests, dictate control (Schmidt, 2016). Modern Europe has a decade-long legacy of fighting against totalitarian regimes and defending democratic values; and this should remind the EU about its determination to overcome internal divisions and continue to promote peace, prosperity, and solidarity.
The 80th anniversary of the Ventotene Manifesto, penned by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi (2006 [1944]) is being celebrated this year and continues to stand as an inspirational cornerstone text of the EU and its values. However, it is also a useful guide for dealing with the multiple crises plaguing the EU. Conceived in 1941 while the two authors were confined on the island of Ventotene, the document was initially distributed covertly. Eugenio Colorni later published it, adding a preface. Secretly printed in Rome in January 1944, it was later complemented with two essays by Spinelli, “The United States of Europe and the Various Political Tendencies” (1942) and “Marxist Politics and Federalist Politics” (1942-1943). While Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi’s Pan-Europe (1997 [1923]) advocated for a European union steered by technocrats (thus more functionalist), the Manifesto proposed a European Federation with a parliament and a government wielding substantial powers in areas like economics and foreign policy.
While this article reviews Spinelli’s and Rossi’s work, it starts from the Manifesto and its legacy to outline some priorities for the EU to return to the federal spirit and the renewal of liberal ideas in a federalist key considering the EU’s current political context. The Manifesto proposed the creation of a “United States of Europe” as a solution to avoid future conflicts on the continent and to promote peace and prosperity through greater political and economic integration between European nations (D’Auria, 2011). The document, which has had a major impact on the federalist movement (Vayssière, 2005), is still a roadmap towards an unfinished project in today’s EU, threatened in its cohesion and unity by internal – populists – and external actors – autocrats. The Manifesto’s principles and ideals might serve as a guide to strengthen the European integration process and face the current challenges with determination and common vision.
In his preface, anti-fascist Italian philosopher Eugenio Colorni cautioned against merely rearranging populations after the Second World War, advocating instead for a genuine European Federation, more advanced than the ineffective League of Nations. Mindful of the 1930s they experienced, Spinelli and Rossi argued that an integralist principle of non-intervention among European nations was absurd; and no country should freely opt for an authoritarian regime – as this would have, as it had, dramatic consequences for its neighbors. Thus, they emphasized the need to establish a new transnational political entity, a European Federation. Colorni called for the establishment of a unified federal army, a single currency, the elimination of customs barriers and migration restrictions between states, representation of citizens in federal institutions, and a cohesive foreign policy.
There is little point in listing the Manifesto’s achieved and unachieved policies, as the world today is significantly different from the mid-1940s’. It is rather useful instead to focus on the major insights set out by the authors and to understand how these can be adapted today and how they can benefit the European governance. At the Manifesto’s core lies the principle of freedom and the four liberties – free movement of goods, people, capitals, and services. For Spinelli and Rossi, a free and united Europe represented the path to rekindling the development of modern civilization oriented on liberal democracy. They envisioned a federal union enhanced by the close cooperation among member states, democratic representation for European citizens, and an unwavering respect for the continent’s cultural diversity.
The authors started by proposing to overcome territorial selfishness, both at the national and European levels, and to eliminate obstacles to the free movement of people and goods. They aspired to a reduction of state interference in citizens’ lives, openly criticizing authoritarian approaches (2006 [1944]). A significant section of the Manifesto addresses economic issues. The authors argued that given the global economic interconnectedness, the entire world has become the living space for people eager to maintain a modern way of life. In an age of economic interdependence, the authors argued, trade wars are counterproductive and unnecessary. Rossi and Spinelli highlighted how the total nationalization of the economy was seen as a liberating utopia by the working classes; however, once realized, it did not lead to the desired goal, but rather to a system in which the population is subservient to the bureaucratic managerial class.
A Europe that is truly free and ready to face future challenges is also one that values the free market and assigns the state an appropriate role, one that does not see it as a protagonist in the lives of citizens. On these notes, without mentioning it, the Manifesto was to designate federalist liberalism as the way forward for a future European construction – not by chance, both federalism and liberalism champion individual freedom, advocate for the autonomy of local communities, checks and balances. Federalist liberalism aims to strike a harmonious balance between the sovereignty of member states, and prioritizes safeguarding individual rights, while fostering economic growth and welfare. Within this framework, European federalism emerges as an indispensable system for securing peace, stability, and progress across the continent, harmonizing the individual nations’ autonomy with collaborative efforts at the European level.
The federalist vision of a united, free, and democratic Europe shines as a beacon of hope, and serves as both compass and inspiration. The Manifesto’s relevance endures today for several reasons, each aligning with five EU’s key priorities: an effective European Federation, the emphasis on peace and democracy, the spirit of solidarity, the quest for a shared European identity, and the promotion of democratic governance.
The vision of a European Federation has seen significant realization with the gradual formation of today’s EU. Given today’s global challenges, there’s an amplified need for increased integration and cooperation among EU member states. But most of all, there is still much to be done in terms of the EU’s efficiency and integration (Schimmelfennig et al.,2023) – for example fiscal union, cooperation in the energy sector, policies for high-tech companies. Today’s EU needs Spinelli’s and Rossi’ enthusiasm to reinvigorate, enhancing cohesion and cross-collaboration among its member states. It is in times of change that the concept of a European Federation might renew its significance. While deepening integration in key areas like defense, health, and foreign policy will pave the way for more effective EU as local and global actor. Just as in the early days of the European Community, when nations pooled coal and steel within the supranational organization European Coal and Steel Community (Glockner-Rittberger, 2012).
Secondly, the Manifesto underscored the pivotal role of peace and democracy in averting conflicts and ensuring the citizens’ welfare. Peace in Europe is not a given; and it is indispensable for forging a united and prosperous Europe. However, geopolitical tensions, regional crises, and autocratic and terrorist threats still test the continent’s security. Thus, upholding democratic values and fostering unity among European nations remain crucial for peace and stability. There cannot be peace without rule of law. European-style democracy is not merely a political system; it embodies a set of values, principles, and rights safeguarding well-being and freedom. But again: without the rule of law, democracy is also vacuous. It is from freedom that peace and democracy are achieved, not the other way around. See, for example, the accession of some former Warsaw Pact countries to the European Community in 2004: only under conditions of freedom they were able to develop a modern economy and liberal democracy, thus true peace, and welfare.
Solidarity is emphasized in the Manifesto as a vital principle binding the peoples of Europe together and it continues to resonate in today’s European political discourse. Solidarity – an ethical guideline and element of integration – is a hidden principle of federalist liberalism: the better-off helps the weaker – not only out of a spirit of charity, but because it may be in its interest to deal with partners in the best conditions to cooperate. Effective solidarity transcends national divisions. A unified response from EU member states, solidarity is also sharing responsibility in the current challenges. It encompasses respecting human rights, but it is also pivotal in the economic sphere as well, fostering also growth, dignity, and prosperity.
The Ventotene Manifesto advocated for a European identity rooted in shared values, cultures, and a common historical legacy. Federalist liberalism would preach that fostering European identity might be an answer to rising nationalism. The concept of European identity is not necessarily at odds with the idea of nationhood and national identity. It offers a pathway to a united yet open and uncertain future, complementing – and not substituting – national identities. It offers a shared platform where diverse European cultures and traditions coexist, fostering mutual enrichment and collaboration. While the European identity has been and still is object of debate (Wallace-Strømsnes, 2008), the European identity is an identity among other global identities. It is on this common ground that European states came together and federated; and today it needs further integration via a new European governance model (Kaplan, 2018).
A fifth element is a governance system grounded in democratic principles and transparency. Amid ongoing critiques of EU bureaucracy, the Manifesto – again – offers valuable perspectives on this. The transparency of European institutions cannot only be a matter of fact but must also be perceived by the population (Brandsma, 2019, Font-Pérez-Durán, 2022). Such a governance framework would prioritize European citizens’ democratic representation and their interests, ensuring that European-level decisions resonate with people’s interests and values. Transparency empowers citizens with access to information and involve them in decision-making processes, expanding their rights, bolstering the legitimacy and efficacy of European institutions to get the new European governance more efficient and accountable.
Today the Manifesto underscores the significance of a free and open society, a fundamental framework cherishing individual freedom, market economy, and the rule of law. The Ventotene Manifesto beautifully weaves together the aspirations for a united Europe with the principles of (federalist) liberalism. Its legacy should encourage European citizens to ponder the significance of European values and to defend them. How? By promoting a system both market-based and social; that rejects collectivism and embraces individualism; that prompts personal responsibility and denounces populism; that promotes transparent, efficient, and democratic governance; that acknowledges liberal democracy’s flaws but knows that the authoritarian pathway – fostered by populist forces – is ruinous. This is federalist liberalism. Spinelli and Rossi could not have imagined today’s EU, which has made huge strides from post-World War Two Europe, but they wanted a transnational and social, open, and transparent European federalist movement.
The Manifesto stands as a symbol of the quest for a European identity anchored in cooperation, unity, and solidarity. Federalist liberalism not only represents a perfect synthesis between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism, but it might reinvigorate the current EU. Spinelli and Rossi envisioned a federation as the output of a new governance. However, the realization of this project has been gradual, and the journey remains unfinished. The Ventotene Manifesto is not only a historical reference point, but also a source of inspiration and a call to action for who believe in the European project. It is a reminder of the need to overcome national divisions and to work together to enhance a united, free, and prosperous Europe. It offers both a history lesson and a roadmap for the future. Its federalist viewpoint, rooted in liberal and democratic principles, is still valid today for us to recognize the compatibility of cooperation and freedom.
References
Brandsma, Gijs J. (2019). “Transparency of EU informal trilogues through public feedback in the European Parliament: promise unfulfilled.” Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 26, Issue 10, pp. 1464-1483, DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2018.1528295
Coudenhove-Kalergi, Richard Nicolaus. (1997 [1923]). Pan-Europa. Un grande progetto per l’Europa unita. Rimini: Il Cerchio Iniziative Editoriali.
D’Auria, Matthew. (2011). “The Ventotene manifesto: The crisis of the nation state and the political identity of Europe.” In: Spiering, Menno; Wintle, Michael (Ed.). European identity and the second world war. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
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While a new term for Erdogan will bring more challenges, Turkey will remain a crucial interlocutor for the EU on many issues, including migration, energy, and regional security, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Despite EU has clearly determined that Turkey under Islamist populist Erdogan has been less democratic and more authoritarian, the Union falls short of making serious warnings in this regard.
Turkey’s Islamist-populist president Recep Tayyip Erdogan beat his rival Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the main opposition party CHP and the candidate of six-party opposition bloc in the elections held on Sunday. Despite the twin earthquakes that killed more than 50.000 people in early February, a looming economic crisis, and the deepening polarization, Erdogan managed to secure another five years at the helm of Turkey. Seemingly, his Islamist populism entrenched with authoritarianism paid off at the ballot box and enabled him to enter the third decade of his rule which means he will be ruling Turkey for a quarter of a century. While he received 52 percent of the vote, his challenger Kilicdaroglu got 48 percent.
The Turkish Parliament, whose members were elected in the first round of the vote on May 14, 2023, is deemed to be the most conservative-nationalist House in the hundred years of the Republic. Combined with increasingly authoritarian regime of Erdogan, the future does not bode well for almost half of the population who voted for the opposition. As BBC put it ‘the strategic NATO nation’ had chosen its path, most voters opting for a seasoned autocrat rather than an untested democrat in the form of Kilicdaroglu. While Kilicdaroglu stressed the need to revitalize the relations with the European Union (EU) – which is frozen for almost a decade – and revise the migrants deal that was agreed in 2016, Erdogan barely mentioned the EU in his election campaign. For Erdogan, the relationship with Brussels is run on a transactional basis.
For the first round of elections of May 14, the joint observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) found that the legal framework did not fully provide a basis for holding democratic elections. Frank Schwabe, head of the PACE delegation, underlined that Turkey did not fulfil the basic principles for holding a democratic election. “Key political and social figures are in prison even after judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, media freedom is severely restricted and there is a climate of self-censorship. Turkey is a long way from creating fair election campaign conditions,” said he. For the second round, Schwabe reiterated his position that the second round also took place in an environment that in many ways did not provide the conditions for holding democratic elections. Selahattin Demirtas, the former leader of the second largest opposition party, pro-Kurdish HDP is still in jail despite the ruling by the European Court of Human Rights that he should be freed with immediate effect.
The election on Sunday was closely watched by European Union, US, the Middle East and Russia. The point was made by Baroness Cathy Ashton, the EU’s former foreign policy chief.
“What happens in Turkey in terms of its democracy and in terms of its place in the region has a huge impact on Europe, on Asia, and of course on all of the global issues that we’re all grappling with. So, it is really important,” said she. And the Economist, the British weekly announced on its cover that the Turkish election was the most important of 2023. “Most important, in an era when strongman rule is on the rise, from Hungary to India, the peaceful ejection of Mr Erdogan would show democrats everywhere that strongmen can be beaten,” wrote the weekly. There was hope if Erdogan could be defeated at the ballot box, it would send a message to all the populist authoritarian regimes across the globe.
Although it was not unexpected that Erdogan would use a populist discourse to demonize his opponents, what is surprising was Kilicdaroglu’s embrace of populist rhetoric right after it became obvious that the presidential election would go to a run-off on May 28. Kilicdaroglu who lost the first round of presidential elections by almost 5 percent of the vote immediately changed his course and employing an ethnonationalist strain, swerved right. He promised to send home millions of Syrian refugees and doubled down the nationalist tone in his rhetoric. According to an Al Monitor/Premise poll which was conducted between May 19-23 across Turkey, 71 percent of the respondents favored an imminent return of refugees. The economy and refugees stood out as the top two issues that the respondents deemed challenges for the country. To win the nationalist votes, Kilicdaroglu signed a protocol with the leader of the far-right Victory Party, Umit Ozdag. Ozdag proclaimed the return of the refugees as the number one priority for his party. The protocol promised to return all of the refugees within a year. Right after the first round of elections, Kilicdaroglu claimed Erdogan had brought 10 million refugees to the country and that number would increase if he would remain in power. Adopting a fearmongering style, Kilicdaroglu implied that ‘our daughters’ would not be able to go around safely if the Syrian and other refugees would stay in Turkey.
While Kilicdaroglu was busy in forming alliances with the far-right parties, Erdogan, too, was seeking to enlist the support of religious populist and far-right parties. Erdogan who won five parliamentary elections, two presidential polls and three referendums, this time around, felt he could be beaten by the opposition. Thus, he agreed to create an alliance with the Islamist New Welfare Party and the Kurdish Islamist Huda-Par (Free Cause Party). Huda-Par is essentially the political projection of Kurdish Hizbullah, an Islamist organization, unrelated to Lebanese Hezbollah, known for its gruesome murders in the 1990s. These two parties have declared that they want Turkey to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention and the repeal of the Law 6284 which basically provides protection for women against violence. Moreover, Erdogan went ahead to court far-right leader Sinan Ogan campaigning heavily on terrorism. In the large meetings which hosted tens of thousands of people, he showed fake videos that falsely implied his opponent Kilicdaroglu had links with outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).
Cultural Metamorphosis
Besides politics, Erdogan has successfully pursued a populist political ideology together with cultural populism. Erdogan’s authoritarianism is more than ballot box as he employs television and music, monuments and memorials that have been prime levers of a political project, a campaign of cultural ressentiment and national rebirth. As the New York Times reported it, this cultural metamorphosis reoriented national culture and promoted a nostalgic revival of the Ottoman past ‘sometimes in grand style sometimes as pure kitsch.’.
What Next With EU?
While a new term for Erdogan will bring more challenges, Turkey will remain a crucial interlocutor for the EU on many issues, including migration, energy, and regional security, particularly against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine.
Turkey has applied EU back in 1959, was declared candidate in 1999 and started accession talks in October 2005. It is the longest history of a candidate country ever. It has been 18 years since the accession talks started however barely16 chapters out of 35 have been opened and only one chapter has been provisionally closed. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy and former German Chancellor Angela Merkel together with the Greek Cypriots have been instrumental in blocking the accession talks. Erdogan’s authoritarian populist streak has also been pivotal in European Council’s decision to freeze accession talks in 2018. This is due to Ankara backtracking on democracy and civil liberties, particularly following the 2016 coup attempt (whose details are still murky), and tensions over developments in Turkish foreign policy. Included were Ankara’s naval operations in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean, as well as Ankara’s Syria policy and Cyprus. In 2018, after a similar decision by the European Parliament, the EU froze the accession negotiations, although they were already comatose.
‘The EU’s serious concerns on the continued deterioration of democracy, the rule of law, fundamental rights and the independence of the judiciary have not been addressed. There was further backsliding in many areas,’ said the European Commission country report of 2022. On most democracy indexes, Turkey has gone down dramatically. According to World Press Freedom Index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) in the beginning of May, Turkey together with Tajikistan and India dropped from being in a “problematic situation” into the lowest category and now ranks 165 out of 180. “Turkey jails more journalists than any other democracy,” said RSF. After Erdogan’s win of the presidential election, it will not be surprising if he tightens his grip on fundamental freedoms and on freedom of expression, in particular.
The relations between Turkey and EU have been transactional since almost 2013 when Erdogan embraced authoritarianism after a huge corruption scandal erupted implicating his son and several of his ministers. One of the milestones of this relationship has been the refugee deal of 2016 according to which Turkey would prevent the crossings of migrants to EU.
EU, without committing itself to any form of membership talks has openly called for ties based on mutual benefit. “The EU and Türkiye continued high-level engagement in areas of common interest such as climate, health or migration and security. This was in line with the EU’s offer to support a more positive dynamic in EU-Türkiye relations, expressing readiness to engage with Türkiye in a phased, proportionate, and reversible manner in a number of areas of common interest, subject to the conditions set out by the European Council. On energy, Türkiye continues to be an important and reliable transit country for the EU,’ said the country report of 2022. On the refugee deal, the EU has commended Turkey for hosting more than 3.5 million people.
EU has clearly determined that Turkey under Erdogan has been less democratic and more authoritarian, however, Brussels falls short of making serious warnings in this regard. “There are serious deficiencies in the functioning of Türkiye’s democratic institutions. During the reporting period, democratic backsliding continued. Structural deficiencies in the presidential system remained in place. Key recommendations from the Council of Europe and its bodies have yet to be addressed. Parliament continued to lack the necessary means to hold the government accountable. The constitutional architecture continued to centralize powers at the level of the Presidency without ensuring the sound and effective separation of powers between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. In the absence of an effective checks and balances mechanism, the democratic accountability of the executive branch continues to be limited to elections,’ remarked the country report.
This transactional nature of the relationship has been confirmed by the messages of EU leaders in the wake of the presidential elections. While the foreign policy chief Josep Borrell congratulated Erdogan and called for the continuation of relations based on mutual interest, the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has invited Erdogan to Berlin without mentioning the serious backsliding on fundamental freedoms.
The world order has been rapidly shifting from a unipolar to a multipolar one. The battle over Europe’s future and the emerging new security architecture will have major implications for the EU and Turkey. As a major security, political and economic actor, Turkey will have a vital role in the future of EU. Thus, Brussels should craft a clear strategy to address dramatic deterioration of fundamental freedoms on the one hand and deepen relations with a view to revitalize the accession process, on the other.
Discussing the impact of the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV) on the country’s foreign policy, Professor Verbeek highlighted his observation that the reputation and soft power of the Netherlands in international diplomacy weakened. Dutch diplomats had to rescue the image of the country and Dutch economic interests abroad.
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bertjan Verbeek of Radboud University in the Netherlands argues that—depending on how they define the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”—various populist parties may approach international politics differently.
According to Verbeek, a left-wing populist party often defines the “pure people” in terms of class. Class is not a national concept; in principle, it is a transnational concept. So, a left-wing populist party would look upon the “pure people” as the working class globally, and the “corrupt elite” may well be then policymakers within international organizations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank. On the other hand, Professor Verbeek underlines that for right-wing populist parties, the “pure people” is the native population of the country, whereas the “corrupt elite” is the national elite that ignores the interest of the “pure people.” Thus, right-wing populists judge foreign policy in terms of what it brings to the “pure people” within the nation.
The following excerpts from our interview with Bertjan Verbeek have been lightly edited for clarity and length.
Your work has drawn on Cas Mudde’s notion of populism as a “thin-centered ideology.” Could you clarify how you understand populism in these terms?
First of all, the work I have written is co-authored with my colleague Andrej Zaslove at Radboud University. He is more the populist expert, and I am the foreign policy expert. We feel a focus on thin-centered ideology is important because there is so much debate on what populism actually is. And there are many ways of approaching and defining it. They all have their merits, but we see value in drawing a distinction between those who are really populists and those who use populist strategies for other purposes.
For instance, mainstream parties can adopt populist tactics and strategies because they want to fish in the same pond as the populists. So, we feel that it is difficult to tell whether an actor is a genuine populist or whether he or she is just using populist rhetoric. If you focus on populism as a strategy or as a style—which are two different alternative definitions of populism— you risk confusing the people who imitate the populists and those who really are.
So, that is why we preferred Cas Mudde’s suggestion of populism as “thin ideology” because it makes clear, first of all, what populism is really about. Populists see the world as the “pure people” against the “corrupt elite.” That is the core of all populist thought. The basis of that is ultimately a notion of the sovereignty of the people, which may result in proposals that relate to what we might call “direct democracy.” In such cases, the people are given more say in politics in whatever form. That is the core of the populist ideology.
But, as we all know, it is not enough for a political party to emphasize the notion of “the people.” You need to have additional ideas about what you want to do in a society policy-wise. This is where the idea of thin ideology comes from—these parties usually borrow from other ideologies to have a more or less coherent and efficient way to link their perceptions of society with what they want to accomplish in terms of policy. They might borrow from the left; they might borrow from the right. They might borrow, as we argued elsewhere, from more regional notions or liberal notions.
So, depending on where they borrow from, a populist party or organization or movement is more or less left- or right-wing. However, the core is always the notion of the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” More importantly, populist parties can differ on actually who constitutes the “pure people” or the “corrupt elite.” Beyond this, they can differ in terms of the kind of thick ideology they borrow from to develop a comprehensive vision that presents a whole variety of potential populist positions.
You argue that research on populism has focused more on domestic politics, thus neglecting the links between populism and foreign policy. In what ways does populism influence the foreign policies of states and affect relations between states?
There are several dimensions to the question. The first concerns how they define the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Populist parties—let’s focus on parties for the moment—may have a different idea of what international politics looks like. So, if you are a left-wing populist, you often define the “pure people” in terms of class. And class is not a national concept, in principle—it is a transnational concept. Thus, they would view the “pure people” as the global working class or the global poor. And the “corrupt elite” are—in the perspective of a left-wing populist—typically international organizations or their representatives like the IMF or the World Bank. This is a different kind of perspective to the more nationalist or nativist populist party that would say the “pure people” is the native population of the country, and the “corrupt elite” is the national elite that ignores the interest of the former. This party would judge foreign policy in terms of what it brings to the native population. That is the first dimension in which populist parties might differ vis-à-vis what international politics is about in the first place.
The second important element is the position of power or influence of a political party or a movement. Some populists are outside the parliament. They mobilize people in the streets and put pressure on the government. Some are in the parliament but not in government, so they can have some influence. Some are an official part of the government or even dominate a government like Fidesz, the ruling party in Hungary. Other parties are not formally part of the government, like the Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). The PVV is a nationalist, right-wing populist political party in the Netherlands that formally supported the Dutch government between 2010 and 2012 but did not hold cabinet seats.
In contrast, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) is a right-wing political party in Denmark that has been in government for many years. Nevertheless, while outside the cabinet, the PVV still negotiated a formal agreement with the governmental parties on policy. That agreement gives them more impact on formulating policies in general and hence also on foreign policy. The second dimension is the relative power position of the political party in the system and how close it is to governing.
The third potential element is how the rest of the world views a robust populist movement or a solid populist party. What do international and transnational actors think? How do they react? This is ultimately what global politics is about. So, my colleagues and I investigated the impact of the Dutch PVV on the country’s foreign policy. One of the most interesting points was that the reputation of the Netherlands in international diplomacy weakened when the PVV was supporting the coalition government between 2010 and 2012. This is curious since the foreign minister was not from the PVV (because the PVV did not join the cabinet). Yet Dutch diplomats were still concerned. The soft power of the Netherlands suffered from this reputational loss. Dutch diplomats then had to rescue the Netherlands’ image somehow and protect Dutch economic interests abroad. The case shows the impact of this third dimension — how other countries or international players view a populist party’s role in the system — can affect a country’s reputation and its soft power. This is true even when the party is not strictly in the government.
Brexit May Intensify Scottish Nationalism and Separatism
Brexit suporters, brexiteers, in central London holding banners campaigning to leave the EU on January 15, 2019.
You argue the rise of populism in Europe in the early 1990s coincided with three major international transformations—the end of the Cold War, the advent of globalization, and the intensification of the European integration process. How do you relate the success of populist movements within this international context?
Well, again, in very different ways… But first, I think it is a good question because I feel like this has been one of the most neglected elements in the study of populism. At the end of the Cold War, the ideological balance of power between left-wing and right-wing in many European countries—both West European and Central and Eastern European—ended. When communism died as an ideological enemy, domestic political systems became ripe for ideological realignment. In many countries, there were specific political parties that had been in power for a long time, partly based on the idea that “Well, you have to choose us because if you don’t elect us, then the communists will come to power.” The Christian Democratic parties often played this game, but not only them. The room for electoral volatility increased a lot because people became less attached to the dominant political parties.
The most disturbing effect of Brexit is that it has bolstered, not quieted, English nationalism. Brexit may thus also have indirect unintended consequences—namely, fueling further Scottish nationalism and thus separatism.
In addition, the established parties—particularly the Social Democrats—had no ideological alternative to appeal to voters. Indeed, in a way, neoliberalism captured the field ideologically and in terms of political discourse. The end of the Cold War, in this sense, created the possibility for a new politics.
Now, in different countries, that void was filled with different types of parties, and in some countries, it was populist parties that stepped into the breach. Some of them—for example, regional populist parties like the Lega Nord (a right-wing, federalist, populist, and conservative political party in Italy) or the Vlaams Belang (VB) in Belgium, originally the Vlaams Blok (a Flemish nationalist right-wing populist political party. It dissolved after a trial in 2004 condemned the party for racism and was reconstituted as the Vlaams Belang). The VB had already been engaged with European integration, not necessarily in a negative way.
As the Lega Nord did in northern Italy and VB in Flanders, they were also mobilizing masses, saying that Europe is an advantage because we can use it to promote the regional aspect central to our brand. So, the European Union’s (EU) importance was significant for some populist parties because they saw an opportunity to strengthen their regional position vis-à-vis the mainstream parties. Later that changed because of migration and the perceived adverse effects of European integration. Populist parties often took a much more negative attitude toward Brussels, but that has not always been the case. So that is how the EU comes in. But we should also interpret the role of the EU in the context of globalization.
Neoliberalism has become increasingly dominant on a global scale. European integration, just like any other regional integration scheme in the world, has served partly as a kind of protection from the effects of globalization by creating a bigger common market. And globalization has produced winners and losers. The EU, to a certain extent, protected some of the losers and maybe promoted some of the winners. The critical point is that some of the losers felt that the EU was not protecting them. Thus, the EU created its own perceived losers and winners through its integration scheme. So, in very different ways in different countries, globalization and European integration have provided grist to the mill for both left-wing and right-wing populist parties, who can cast these dynamics as threats rather than opportunities.
The fourth and final dimension is how the end of the Cold War changed matters in Eastern Europe. Populism in Eastern Europe has been driven by a failure to reckon with the role that politicians and parties played during and immediately after the collapse of communist regimes. Sometimes, like in Hungary, it relates to events that happened after the end of World War I in terms of loss of territory and prestige. That is a different type of populism, and sometimes we miss the point that it is more complicated than just anti-immigration. It taps into something much more profound. It relates as well to the end of the Cold War, which opened the possibilities for new parties and the possibility of pursuing a foreign policy that reflects less the current circumstances than the international politics of Europe in the 20th Century.
What is your take on the role of populist forces in the Brexit process?
Well, I’ve always been a little bit in doubt about whether or not to call UKIP (the UK Independence Party, a Eurosceptic, right-wing political party in the United Kingdom) a populist party. It seems more like a single-issue movement driven by a mission to correct a single historical mistake — namely, Britain’s entry into the European Community in the 1970s. At the same time, though, it is clear that the UKIP and later the Brexit Party have clear populist elements. They claim to represent the “pure people”—the citizens of Great Britain—and they perceive the presence of an apparent “corrupt elite,” the so-called Eurocrats. And they started with typical populist notions of trying to give the “pure people” a direct say in politics.
So, yes, I accept that we could call UKIP populist. But we cannot understand their success without looking into the less-than-politically-astute actions of then Prime Minister David Cameron of the Conservative Party, who deliberately took a gamble in putting this before the English public. His bet was that whatever he had negotiated with the EU to improve Britain’s position in the EU would see the British people back him unreservedly so that the internal critics within his Conservative Party would be silenced. Instead, he harvested a rejection of the very idea of Britain’s membership.
Even seeing UKIP as a populist party, we cannot understand its success without that strategic error or miscalculation of the Conservative Party and its leader. But, in the end, Brexit is still not over. The negotiations are over, but its implementation is still ongoing, as is often the case with international agreements. I find the most curious effect of Brexit—which drew most of its support in England outside of London and the southeast—is that it seems to have boosted, rather than quieted, English nationalism. Brexit may thus also have indirect unintended consequences—namely, fueling further Scottish nationalism and thus separatism.
A right-wing populist party considers diplomats to be representatives of the national elite, wasting resources on cocktail parties and global jet setting, forgetting what ordinary people want in foreign policy. So, populists seek to bypass the diplomats and engage in more direct foreign policies—strong leader to strong leader—rather than through complicated multilateral diplomatic engagements.
Do you think there is a populist foreign policy? How shall we understand the foreign policy outlook of different populist parties based on the demarcation–integration cleavage?
Well, what my colleague Andrej Zaslove and I tried to do was first to establish how the various populist parties define “pure people” versus the “corrupt elites.” Next, if we know what type of thick ideology they draw on to complete their political program, we felt it should be possible to make some tentative predictions about what different populist parties might put forward in foreign policy.
If you are a real left-wing populist party that has a global outlook in which class contradictions are central, then you would favor foreign policies that are distributive on a global scale and that are somehow directed at opening up and gaining more influence over international institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO. You would link up with transnational movements that seek to open up such international institutions, make them more pluralistic and inclusive. So, that is what we would expect from a left-wing populist party.
Meanwhile, we would expect a more right-wing populist party to see the “pure people” as a kind of national element, maybe even a nativist one. Arguably, representatives of the national elite in foreign policy would be the diplomats who are—from their perspective—mainly engaged in cocktail parties and jet setting, forgetting what ordinary people want in foreign policy. So, we would expect populists to bypass the diplomats and engage in more direct foreign policies—strong leader to strong leader—rather than through complicated multilateral diplomatic engagements.
Moreover, we would expect populists to protect the “pure people” through their foreign policies by spending less on development assistance and transfers in the EU. Because they are likely to be particularly critical about migration, we would expect them to toughen up migration policies or engage in anti-migration policies in general. So, in that sense, we believe that we can formulate expectations about those foreign policies, but again—as I indicated before—whether they materialize much depends on the relative strength of such parties or individuals in their respective political systems.
All politics, in the end, is about compromising unless you enjoy an absolute majority like Fidesz in Hungary. The latter may be the best case to observe populist foreign policy. Hungary under Viktor Orbán clearly displays populist foreign policies—keeping out migrants, not complying with EU external policy (such as vis-à-vis Russia), or ignoring attempts to create European solidarity regarding Covid-19 vaccinations. All in all, they pursue a much more unilateral foreign policy. So, I guess that comes, reasonably, close to a populist foreign policy.
How do you make a distinction between the often-conflated concepts of populism and nationalism? How does a populist foreign policy differ from a nationalist foreign policy?
Well, we attempted to tackle this conceptual problem at some point. We are not sure whether we succeeded at that. The problem is the notion of nationalism. That is a complicated concept in the first place. One idea of nationalism suggests a common identity related to a shared past, present, and future. This identity is usually connected to a particular territory. The nation embracing the identity usually asks for and might be prepared to strive for some degree of autonomy or even full-blown independence.
Sometimes nationalism and populism may overlap. In foreign policy, nationalism is usually linked to promoting the nation’s interests abroad or protecting it from foreign interests (say, by subsidizing exports rather than opening up to the free market or by trying to conduct one’s own monetary policies despite fiscal and economic globalization). There are other things we can think of that might constitute some kind of nationalist foreign policy. If that is done by a country representing one nation, forming one sovereign state, then this notion of nationalism is unrelated to populism. This will also be the case if the sovereign state pursuing a nationalist foreign policy represents several nations within the state that somehow have built an inclusive set of institutions.
The populist element will only come if the nation is not considered an inclusive entity —namely, a situation in which some groups would not be considered part of the “pure people” that the sovereign state is supposed to represent in its foreign policies. In that sense, populist nationalism is much more internally divisive, rather than uniting the entire country behind the idea of the nation.
How do you explain the influence of populist foreign policies on multilateralism and global governance?
In the first lesson, a teacher of international relations would tell you that you should not just focus exclusively on the domestic side because any country with similar national interests would act similarly. For instance, Italy is a country that has very few natural resources. It depends on gas and oil from so many countries. For this reason, Italy often pursues unilateral foreign policies, sometimes deviating from the EU line. So, Italy strikes its own deals—like energy deals with Russia, Iran, and Libya—in the national interest, not because it is a populist thing to do.
It is a thing that may be any government would do given the dependency of this country on energy sources. Therefore, we need to be careful in that sense to explain everything based on party politics. After all, party politics is just one aspect of a more extensive system.
Trumpism Is a Product of a Divided Society
A Tea Party rally at the Federal Building, Los Angeles, CA on September 12, 2009. Photo: Joseph Sohm
The Trump administration pursued a populist foreign policy dubbed “America First,” as the president put it. Donald Trump’s unilateralist foreign policy constrained multilateralism in the WTO (among other intergovernmental organizations) and created the impression that a wave of neo-mercantilism against free trade was in the offing. What do you think about the implications of the mercantilist tendencies of populist parties or leaders in power? And do you believe populist parties may trigger a process in which global trade becomes fragmented along neo-mercantilist lines in the near future?
I am going to take a very long road to answer this question. I may, at first, underestimate the importance of Trump’s personal style and his individual actions also in foreign policy. Having said that, though, I still feel that the success of Trump, being elected in 2016, can only be because a minority, but still, a sizable group of Americans voted for him. In that sense, Trumpism is also the product of a society that it is divided, of a society where at least some people have a clear notion of what we may call populism. I mean, Trump’s success heavily depended also on the organizational strength of the populist Tea Party for a long time.
The Tea Party was populist, I would say, in at least one important way. One wing of the Tea Party represented the traditional fear of an overweening federal government. So, it is about limiting the federal government based on the “pure people.” The “pure people,” of course, are the gun owners who consider bearing arms a legitimate way to protect themselves from government overreach.
Moreover, there is a potent populist sentiment that is traditionally very well organized within the Republican Party. On the one hand, I think that this thin ideology is pretty much unique for the United States. Of course, there are populist elements of style, some of them copycat behaviors, particularly the way Trump engaged in political debate in the first place—namely, the divisiveness that is part of his style. But I find the fundamental idea of the “pure people” very peculiar to the United States. I don’t think that is easily exportable to other countries, even though we may see everywhere little Trumps but not backed up in the same way or so forcefully by that type of populist organization.
The Conflict Over Global Trade Is Likely to Continue
The second element is that the United States is in relative decline. China is growing faster. India is growing faster. Foreign producers outcompete many American economic sectors. In that sense, no matter whether we have a Democratic or a Republican president, they will never be able to ensure global free trade on solely American terms. However, as we have often claimed, there will always be protectionist elements, neo-mercantilist elements in American foreign policy, if only to secure certain vital voters every two years in the midterms and their presidential elections. This mechanism will not readily disappear.
Trump has made a difference as Joe Biden will make a difference. But they have different styles. They have different interest groups to protect or to cater to. Within those boundaries, I think there will be a little bit less neo-mercantilism because Biden is slightly more open. He is engaging with the world, and he wants the United States to play a significant role. He wants the damaged reputation of the United States to improve. But I don’t expect him to be a complete free trader. Traditionally, the Democrats have been the party of protectionism more than the Republicans.
It will mean that the United States will still play a very active protectionist role in international trade. We should not forget that the American reluctance to engage in multilateral agreements has been there maybe even since Clinton, but certainly since Bush and Obama. So, the United States has always had a kind of preferred strategy to strike bilateral deals with states before engaging in multilateral deals on the same subject because the bilateral approach strengthens their hand. First, having concluded the bilateral agreement, then going to the WTO for multilateral agreement— helps ensure the multilateral deal is closer to US interests.
That would, in general, of course, be an improvement in terms of more free trade. That is true, too. But that approach to global trade has been there under four presidents already, which will only continue, given the rise of China and India. After all, China and India —and Brazil for that matter— want to have more say in global trade and global finance, and the United States is getting weaker economically.
Gradually, but slowly, we will have to compromise if these countries want to stay in the same institutional framework. We know that if China is unhappy with the prevailing international arrangements, it is prepared to start its own international institutions, such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And Washington will probably find out that if they don’t compromise, or at least open up in a way to China’s interests, then China will work its way around the United States. So, briefly speaking, I don’t expect the United States to suddenly return to being the hegemon that it may have been in the past and magnanimous toward the rest of the world. In that sense, conflicts over global trade and global finance are likely to continue.
Professor Bertjan Verbeek
Who Is Bertjan Verbeek?
Bertjan Verbeek is a professor of international relations at Radboud University in the Netherlands. He is an expert in the influence of populism on foreign policy, the role of international organizations during crises, and the learning ability of governments during and after crises. He is currently undertaking an international comparative study on crisis decision-making in foreign policy. He argues that, despite the populist radical right’s popularity among political scientists, little scholarship has focused on its influence on foreign policy. For Verbeek, this lack of study is due, in part, to a general lack of attention to the role of political parties in foreign policy, both in comparative politics and international relations.
