Giorgia Meloni, leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party and candidate for prime minister, during an electoral rally in Turin, Italy, September 2022. Photo: Mike Dot.

Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI): Conservative, Populist, or Extreme Right? 

Please cite as:
Varriale, Amedeo. (2025). “Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI): Conservative, Populist, or Extreme Right?” ECPS Party Profiles. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 27, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/op0011

 

This study demonstrates that Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) is best characterized as a conservative party with a strong ideological foundation in cultural and socio-economic conservatism. While the party occasionally uses populist rhetoric—particularly anti-elitist and people-centric language—populism plays only a secondary role. The party’s programs from 2018 and 2022 emphasize traditional values, national identity, and limited but socially conscious state intervention, aligning it more with liberal conservatism than with radical right populism. FdI’s relatively moderate stances on civil rights and its pro-European, Atlanticist foreign policy further distance it from the extreme right. Thus, FdI is most accurately described as a populist-Conservative party, where conservatism is dominant and populism serves more as a rhetorical strategy than a core ideology.

By Amedeo Varriale*

Introduction

This contribution focuses on categorizing the political party Brothers of Italy (FdI) from an entirely ideological standpoint. In essence, the aim of this work is to address the question of whether Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s FdI should ultimately be classified as a conservative, populist, or far-right party. To achieve this aim, a theoretical framework based on an ideological approach – where each ideology is considered to be firmly grounded in a core set of values – will be combined with a qualitative methodology comprising discourse and manifesto analysis. This approach will be utilized to empirically determine which of the three ideologies (conservatism, populism, right-wing extremism) is most closely aligned with FdI’s general positions. 

Through both forms of analysis, domestic and foreign policy are considered in determining what party family FdI currently belongs to. Hopefully, the approach adopted in this investigation – both flexible and reliable – will shed light on this crucial European political actor and, in time, also inspire future scholars to use a similar framework to evaluate other[1] ideologically ambiguous cases. For instance, other right-wing parties in Europe may reflect modern liberal conservatism or represent something entirely distinct, more radical, or even extreme. 

The reason for selecting FdI as a case study lies not only in its brisk rise in political influence both domestically and internationally – due to the popularity of its leader among voters and her pragmatic relationship with key players (e.g. Donald J. Trump, Ursula von der Leyen, Elon Musk) – but also in its complex ideological roots, including its supposedly“post-fascist” legacy and its recent foreign policy realignment. Both aspects provide a unique case for analyzing the boundaries among conservatism, populism, and extreme right ideology in 21st century Europe. 

The FdI Case: Background, Literature, and Method

Party Background 

Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia – FdI) is a political party that emerged from a split in Silvio Berlusconi’s “big-tent” People of Freedom (Popolo delle Libertà – PDL) party on December 28, 2012 (Palladino, 2023). The split occurred in response to Berlusconi’s decision not to hold primary elections for the PDL’s leadership before the 2013 general election, as well as his continued endorsement of the technocratic government led by the Europhile economist Mario Monti (Tarchi, 2024: 22-23). Essentially, the goal of FdI’s three principal founders—Guido Crosetto, Ignazio La Russa, and Giorgia Meloni—was to create a new center-right to right-wing political entity with a distinctly nationalist (and thus Euroskeptic) and conservative agenda, in contrast to Berlusconi’s centrist and classical liberal party (Tarchi, 2024: 23–24).

However, for much of its existence, FdI struggled to make a significant impact on the Italian political landscape. In fact, between 2013 and 2022, it seemed that Meloni and her close associates were content with having a limited influence on the national agenda, operating mainly from the sidelines of Parliament. During this period, FdI accepted the role of junior partner in the center-right coalition, securing a modest 1.95% in the 2013 general election and a slightly better 4.3% in 2018 (see Il Sole 24 Ore, 2015; 2018). As a minor player, it frequently aligned with Forward Italy! (FI!) and the League (Lega) on critical matters such as immigration, security, taxation, and the broader economy. 

Literature Review

Taking this into account, the situation for FdI is now drastically different. The party decisively won the Italian general election in September 2022, securing 26% of the national vote (see Ansa.it, September 26, 2022). Indeed, not only has the prominent news outlet Politico described Meloni—Prime Minister since October 2022—as “the most powerful person in Europe” in its “Class of 2025” ranking, but her party also remains electorally stable, consistently leading national polls (see www.politico.eu). More crucially, analysts consistently acknowledge that there has been an ideological shift undergone by Meloni – as FdI repositioned itself in the international arena, becoming more moderate, Atlanticist, and “pro-European” on foreign policy – and that she will continue to be a high-profile figure in the near future (Cerasa, 2024; The Economist, January 24, 2024). 

Notwithstanding, numerous political commentators, particularly within the media, still draw attention to the darker past of Meloni’s party, stressing her party’s neofascist origins (see Neil, 2024; Riva and Bagnoli, 2024; Rizzitelli, 2024; Saviano, 2022; Stille, 2024). After all, FdI is a direct successor to the post-fascist National Alliance (AN) and an indirect heir to the neofascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). It is for this reason that most of its classe dirigente (“ruling class”) derives from the traditional extreme right and – as some suggest – that the logo of the party still reflects the old MSI’s tricolor burning flame (Tarchi, 2024: 23). This is a symbol that represents the fascist idea of palingenesis, which in the Italian case is meant to pay tribute to the rise of a new political force from Benito Mussolini’s ashes (for a more detailed account, see Jones, 2022).

Considering this, surprisingly, unlike in media circles, “FdI until recently attracted little academic attention” (Bressanelli & de Candia, 2023: 1). Nevertheless, in the rare instances where FdI has received scholarly focus, scholars disagree on the core ideology that shapes the essence of the party’s political discourse and policy decisions. On one hand, there are scholars that insist – notwithstanding its commitment to democracy as well as its pro-USA, pro-Israel, and pro-Ukraine stances – FdI can still be categorized as “far right” or “radical right” (see Broder, 2002; Donà, 2022; Indelicato and Lopes, 2024; Tortola and Griffini, 2024). Moreover, although the most severe designation “extreme right” is rarely ever employed in scholarly literature, the terms above have served as quasi-direct alternatives, carrying an either identical or similar negative connotation, and are interchangeably used to emphasize FdI’s extreme positions. On the other hand, other experts are more cautious with their categorizations and refrain from explicitly highlighting the party’s extremist credentials (e.g. Tarchi, 2024). Alternatively, a minority of specialists, such as the Italian academics Salvatore Vassallo and Rinaldo Vignati (2024) or the essayist Bill Emmott (2024) prefer to stress how Meloni’s party is best aligned with the ideology of conservatism. For instance, the former contend that FdI is a new “national conservative” party, rather than a populist or neofascist one, and the latter – although with some reservations – assents that Meloni has governed as a “bog-standard conservative” (Emmott, 2024; Ronaldo and Vignati, 2024). 

Although several analysts quickly label FdI as a “radical right” or “(new) populist radical right” party—including Biancalana (2024), Puleo and Piccolino (2022), Rooduijn et al. (2019), and Zulianello (2020)—this classification often leads to an incomplete reading for two reasons. First, FdI’s predecessor National Alliance (AN) was already being classified as a relatively “moderate” national conservative party by scholars in the early 2000s (see Ignazi, 2005; Tarchi, 2003; 2008). Thus, it is difficult to imagine that Meloni’s party today – which directly draws from its previous political legacy – would opt to radicalize itself, especially in a context where, following Berlusconi’s downfall, moderate right voters no longer have a stable political home, and a leadership vacuum exists within the center-right bloc. In fact, two Italian authors – Leonardo Puleo and Gianluca Piccolino (2022) – even outrightly state “FdI’s position in the bi-dimensional political space (GAL/TAN and Economic L-R) of the Italian party system appears quite similar to that of AN” (Puleo and Piccolino, 2022: 368). Unexpectedly, they still conclude that FdI is part of the populist radical right (PRR) family. Second, it appears that current literature, in attempts to categorize FdI, prioritizes issues that unequivocally align with PRR ideology (e.g. anti-elitism/populism, anti-progressivism, authoritarianism, nativism, Euroskepticism) while overlooking those that put the party at odds with this political family, such as its domestic economic policy and its “neo-conservative” and Atlanticist foreign policy. 

In summary, the principal debate among scholars revolves around the ideological nature of FdI. This includes discussions on whether it is a party that conveys a conservative message while effectively adhering to democratic laws (both in form and in practice), or whether it remains influenced by its neofascist heritage and is also now capitalizing on the populist wave, challenging core tenets and institutions of liberal democracy – such as the separation of powers, the rule of law, and minority rights – in a way typical of “radical right” parties, as Cas Mudde (2019) maintains. Considering this, this contribution will not directly focus on FdI’s relationship with (liberal) democracy, nor will it compare the party to its predecessor AN to stress its moderately conservative tendencies. Instead, as already mentioned, it will delve into a theoretical and empirical investigation of its worldview from a supply-side, to discover how it relates – discursively and programmatically – to three distinct contemporary ideologies: conservatismpopulism, and extreme right

Theoretical Framework and Methodology 

In summary, this contribution adopts a qualitative methodology and undertakes a manifesto analysis of the Brothers of Italy (FdI) party drawing primarily on the 2018 and 2022 general elections programs, supplemented by recent public statements (including interview material) by elected party representatives. That said, given the discourse analysis is more compact and direct than the manifesto analysis, the former precedes the latter in the body of this article. As the literature on party ideology suggests, the qualitative method embraced throughout is driven by an ideological approach (this functions as a theoretical framework) because in this particular case “the substance and prevalence of a party’s ideology are of primary interest to the investigator” (Lawson, 1976: 15). Ideology can be defined as “a body of normative and normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society” (Sainsbury, 1980: 8). Therefore, the main strength of the ideological approach resides in the fact that by observing a party’s ideology scholars can learn how a political organization interprets the world, frames its core values, and positions itself in relation to broader societal conflicts and ethical orientations. 

Discourse Analysis (DA) is – in simple terms – “the close study of language and language use as evidence of aspects of society and social life” (Taylor, 2013: 7). It is an appropriate tool to observe the political behavioral patterns reflected by politicians to learn something about their ideology. Instead, manifesto analysis is the perusal of “strategic documents written by politically sophisticated party elites with many different objectives in mind” (Laver & Garry, 2000: 620). Considering the above, a methodological synthesis where the analysis of discourse is presented alongside the analysis of electoral programs provides a unique opportunity to unravel whether the speeches or statements made by Meloni and her parliamentary group correspond or contradict the policies put forward in written form. Manifesto analysis is also particularly useful, because, as the public policy expert Emma Norris (2019) outlines, “Manifestos are a ‘party’s contract with the electorate’ – outlining competing visions and policies that make up their respective programs for government” (Norris, 2019). It follows, then, that party programs and party ideology are inextricably linked.  

The reason this study prioritizes Meloni’s statements over those of other FdI politicians is that, in a highly centralized party structure, key decisions are made primarily by the leadership—often by Meloni herself or her close inner circle (see Melito and Zulianello, 2025). Therefore, focusing on her discourse is the most effective way to identify recurring ideological trends within the party. Furthermore, it should be noted that only more recent statements (2018-2024) are considered as a unit of discourse analysis because examining party ideology through discourse cannot extend too far back: since its inception, the party has undergone major ideological shifts. Even Meloni’s most hardline positions – on Euroscepticism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and her originally sympathetic stance towards Vladimir Putin – have been notably moderated or altogether abandoned in recent years, making earlier statements less representative of the party’s current ideological trajectory. 

As for manifesto analysis, this study prioritizes the 2018 and 2022 programs given their relevance to national political orientation and ideological policymaking. Especially the 2022 program, which remains contemporaneous in relation to ideological framing, as it reflects the party’s most recent national electoral platform and serves as a blueprint for its current governance agenda. Instead, the inclusion of the 2018 manifesto enables a diachronic perspective, allowing for the detection of ideological continuities and changes over time. Combined with an analysis of current (or recent) discourse, this approach enables a robust comprehension of the party’s evolution of beliefs and present stance.

Conservatism as an Ideology

Photo: Dreamstime.

Which Conservatism?  

As the political theorist Edmund Neill (2021) asserts, “…unlike some of the vaguer, more contested concepts in political theory, such as nationalism, populism or fascism, conservatism appears to have a relatively fixed and stable meaning” (Neill, 2021: 1). Considering this, several scholars, including political historians, political scientists, and sociologists, either refuse to attach a permanent set of ideas to conservatism or offer disparate definitions of it, some of which are outdated in the contemporary context. The most cited definitions of modern conservatism are those belonging to theorists such as Peter Dorey (2011), Michael Freeden (1996), Ian Gilmour (1977), Samuel Huntington (1957), Karl Mannheim (1986), Michael Oakeshott (1991). 

Conservative ideas are also closely associated with influential post-Enlightenment intellectuals, including Edmund Burke, G.K. Chesterton, Joseph de Maistre, T.S. Eliot, W.H. Mallock and Heinrich von Treitschke (Neill, 2021: 1-3). In the more recent past, conservatism has been tied to the ideas of figures such as Christopher Lasch, Robert Nisbet, Sir Roger Scruton, and Leo Strauss. Perhaps, using a more inclusive parameter, even the controversial French novelist Michel Houellebecq can be added to the list. Instead, the Austrian School economists Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises are excluded, because although they have supported free-market capitalism and shared certain views with modern conservatives, they are ultimately classical liberals (Hayek, 2011; Wire and Deist, 2022).

In order to understand conservatism as an ideology, one must begin with the historical approaches to its study. For instance, Burke, an archetype of this political theory, was according to some the carrier of a rigid definition of conservatism (Bourke, 2018: 459; Huntington, 1956: 456). In essence, he laid the foundation for a conservative philosophy by presenting six definite maxims. First, Burke argued men are inherently religious beings, and religion itself is “the foundation of civil society” (Huntington, 1956: 456). Second, society needs to be understood as the natural and organic product of gradual historical growth (Huntington, 1956: 456). Third, man is primarily an instinctive and emotional creature, and habit trumps reason (Huntington, 1956: 456). Fourth, unlike liberals, Burke strongly believed community is always superior to the individual (Huntington, 1956: 456). It also for this reason that 20th-century conservative thinkers, such as Scruton, have acknowledged the importance of state intervention on private property when the general material welfare of the populace is threatened (Neill, 2021: 3). Fourth, men are naturally and inevitably unequal (Huntington, 1956: 456). Last but not least, he spoke against accelerated change, especially alterations to institutions and radical rethinking of social laws, explaining that “efforts to remedy existing evils usually result in even greater ones” (Huntington, 1956: 456). In simple terms, Burkean conservatism, favored (democratic) reform or “evolution” over violent “revolution” (Bourke, 2018: 459; Neill, 2021: 1). 

Notwithstanding, it is important to note that not all political theorists explicitly refer to conservatism as a full-scale ideology or provide a fixed definitional framework with a series of core ideological characteristics. In fact, important thinkers – Russel Kirk (1953) for example – postulate that conservatism involves a rejection of abstract ideologies in favor of a more pragmatic, tradition-based approach to political affairs. After all, it is logical for conservatives to regard ideologies as artificial, radical, and disruptive, insofar as they often fail to respect tradition and tend to be progressive rather than preservationist (see Neill, 2021: 7-8). Similarly, the German-Italian sociologist, Robert Michels (1968) argued that conservatism is not a doctrinal ideology (in the sense of having stable core concepts or abstract values) but rather a “positional ideology” – essentially an attitude – capable of endless modification. Instead, Peter Dorey (2011) prefers to directly ascertain that conservatism is a form of philosophical commitment to inequality, whereas more traditionalistapproaches – adopted by Gilmour (1977) or Oakeshott (1991) – interpret conservatism mainly in relation to its attitude towards societal change, accordingly something that should be managed cautiously.

 A more complete definition, where conservatism as an ideology has a relatively stable meaning, derives from the famous political scientist Huntington who suggests it is “that system of ideas employed to justify any established social order, no matter where or when it exists, against any fundamental challenge to its nature or being, no matter from what quarter” (Huntington, 1957: 455). In academia, this is often known as a dispositional approach to examine conservatism, although Huntington himself refers to it as the situational definition (Huntington, 1956: 455-456). Nevertheless, it appears that Huntington’s main objective in presenting this thesis was to support a “new” conservatism in America, one influenced by liberalism, in order to preserve the country’s liberal tradition (Bourke, 2018: 458). 

The main issue with traditionalist and dispositional approaches stems from this idea that conservatism is mainly an impulsive reaction to societal change and progress. However, modern history teaches us that not all political movements we usually associate with conservatism are nostalgic, backward-looking, reactionary, or skeptical of change per se. In fact, as Bourke points out, “self-designating conservatives have often been revolutionary in temper” (Bourke, 2018: 453). Specifically, strands of conservatism tied to Anglophile society and traditions, such as the Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan phenomena, have advocated radical systemic change to modernize certain[2] aspects of society (Neill, 2021: 2). 

Other very distinct examples of “revolutionary conservatives” include those intellectuals affiliated to the deutsche Bewegung (“German Movement”) who sometimes appear ideologically closer to National Socialism or fascism than conservatism, namely Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt and Oswald Spengler (Bourke, 2018: 454). While this form of conservatism can certainly be linked to a coherent political tradition and traditionalism per se, its most prominent feature was its “revolutionary spirit” (Bourke, 2018: 454). Moreover, there have been authoritarian and totalitarian states pursuing political causes entirely alternative to those of conservatives, the early Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and Albania under Enver Hoxha, that have been extremely resistant towards societal and institutional change. None of these were conservative or “right-wing” ideologically. In other words, conservatism should not be understood as being merely a reactive (or reactionary) political philosophy. 

Setting aside traditionalist and dispositional approaches, Karl Mannheim (1986) offers an alternative interpretation of conservative ideology. This sociologist dismisses the idea that conservatism is synonymous with traditionalism, or the mere upholding of the status quo. Instead, adopting a sociological perspective, Mannheim frames conservatism as a primarily (though, in his own words, “peculiarly”) modern phenomenon (Neill, 2021: 9). In essence, Mannheim argues that conservatism – as an explicit ideological stance – before the Enlightenment and the industrial revolution had no reason to exist (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). From this perspective, conservatism proposes a thorough replacement to the key principles of liberal Enlightenment thought. In doing so, it champions the concrete over the abstract (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). Liberal concepts such as freedomindividual liberty, or progress, lose their meaning unless they are understood as within a specific historical and cultural context, and seen as interdependent with other foundational principles like nation or tradition (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 9-10). 

In conservative ideology, the core tenets of Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment liberalism are not simply rebuffed as perilous and unnecessary, instead they are reframed in a more concrete manner, one that is “historically specific and only comprehensive within a wider social framework” (Mannheim, 1986 as cited in Neill, 2021: 10). Mannheim’s postulation is both interesting and more encouraging than other definitions for scholars who seek to define conservatism concretely, and more importantly, as an ideology. Nevertheless, in an objective critique of this approach, a political scientist, Michael Freeden (1996) highlights that “although Mannheim’s work is insightful, conservatism should not just be viewed as a peculiarly ‘reactive’ movement but as a full-scale political ideology” (Neill, 2021: 11). 

Insights from Freeden

In this work, conservatism is not seen as a basic or generic attitude, nor as merely a commitment to maintaining inequality (e.g. Dorey), a reactive impulse to preserve the status quo (e.g. Huntington), an effort to control change (e.g. Oakeshott and Gilmour), or a response to sociological shifts in defense of tradition (e.g. Mannheim). Instead, it is viewed as a more intricate and sophisticated philosophical system of beliefs. In other words, conservatism is a “systemization of ideas” or a coherent ideology (Freeden, 1996: 124-127; Neill, 2021: 11). In truth, conservatism is an ideology that possesses a morphological structure of “core concepts” – as the sociologist Michael Freeden (1996) observes. On one hand, core concepts are permanent and fundamental (Freeden, 1996: 77-91), as for example conservatism’s pessimistic idea of human nature, seen as something inherently imperfect and to be wary of. On the other hand, adjacent concepts are supplementary to core concepts and allow them to be refined and placed into a specific context (Freeden, 1996: 77-91). Regarding conservatism, it is their Hobbesian distrust that inspires their preference for limited government – as the academic Noel O’Sullivan (1976) has also argued before. Finally, peripheral concepts offer an ideology like conservatism a degree of versatility to adapt to shifting circumstances, rooted in definite times, places, and contemporary concerns (see Franks et al., 2018). For example, during and soon after the Enlightenment, conservative illiberalism (e.g. Burke was highly critical of the French revolution) was motivated by the fact new liberal ideologies were causing widespread disruption and posing a threat to accepted social norms and traditions. 

In any case, Freeden’s most significant contribution to the study of conservatism is providing us (intentionally or unintentionally) with a fixed or permanent definition of this concept, one that can serve as a foundation for assessing individual cases empirically. According to him, conservatism is “a fully-fledged ideology, based around the core concepts of managing change and of an ‘extra-human’ dimension to individual agency” (Neill, 2021: 16). It is apparent that adjacent and peripheral concepts constitute secondary aspects of conservative ideology, and therefore, they will receive limited attention in this study. Given this, Freeden’s clear definition enables an empirical approach to the analysis of FdI as a specific case. Only by borrowing this precise interpretation of conservatism, we can ultimately assess whether it is this ideology that influences FdI in its discourse and political program, rather than other current ideologies, such as the ones mentioned earlier.

Populism as an Ideology

What is Populism? 

Over the course of the years, theorists have continuously referred to populism as a “quintessentially contested concept” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: 2-5; Webber, 2023: 849). Indeed, its chameleonic, protean, and polymorphous characteristics, along with its inherent versatility, have made the ongoing debate surrounding the nature of populism a subject of considerable intellectual fascination on multiple fronts. Given this, it is important to emphasize that, at present, the majority scholars – regardless of whether they associate with the ideationalpolitical-strategic, or socio-culturalschools of thought – agree that in order for populism to function there must be a Manichean sentiment that accentuates the societal tension between “common people” and the elites, pitting one group against the other. Hence, there exists a general academic consensus regarding the fundamental nature of populism (Taggart, 2018). 

This leads us to the most widely accepted framework for the study of populism: the ideational approach, which is primarily associated with its key advocate, the Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2017). Mudde defines the concept as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2017: 29). According to this framework, “theoretically, populism distinguishes the people and the elite on the basis of just one dimension, i.e. morality” (Mudde, 2017: 32). Thus, in the simplistic and Manichean terms that populism abides by anti-elitism is merely the idea that (cultural, economic, political) elites are inherently evil(Mudde, 2017: 32-33)Following this logic, people-centrism is the idea that “the people” (regardless of whether they are defined as a class or nation) are inherently good and pure from an ethical standpoint (Mudde, 2017: 32-33). Similarly, the concept of volonté générale should be understood as “closely linked” to this “homogenous interpretation of the people” (Mudde, 2017: 33). It reflects the “honest and logical priorities of the (common) people” – which only populists can allegedly interpret rightly, as they claim to base their politics on what the people want: common-sense solutions to the everyday problems of common men and women (Mudde, 2017: 33). As Mudde’s is the prevalent definition – or, as Paul Taggart (2018) succinctly puts it, the one that is “winning” – it will serve as the working definition later applied to the empirical investigation regarding FdI’s discourse, manifesto and analysis. 

Evaluating Approaches to Populism 

The reason why it is better to observe populism through an ideological lens is that the other approaches exhibit more flaws than Mudde’s. For instance, while the outdated economic notions of populism have been refuted over time, even more modern approaches, such as Kurt Weyland’s (2017) political-strategic approach, presents substantial limitations. According to the lead critic of this approach – Daniel Rueda (2021) – considering populism merely as a political strategy utilized by a personalistic leader to maximize electoral profit is debatable for three reasons. Firstly, Weyland’s approach suffers from “selective rationalism,” in that it unreasonably assumes that only populist actors can be pragmatic and behave as self-interested “power-seeking actors” (Rueda, 2021: 169-171). However, in practice, within the political landscape of electoral competition, liberals, conservatives, socialists, and neo-communists, pursue similar strategies (Rueda, 2021: 171). 

Secondly, this approach is over-reliant on the idea of “leader-centrism” (Rueda, 2021: 174), when, in fact, not all populist actors are entirely centralized personalist parties that can only survive politically as long as their charismatic chief does. Let alone the fact that there have been several populist movements that are leaderless and characterized by a decentralized/horizontal structure, such as the Girotondi, INDIGNADOS and Occupy Wall Street, successful populist parties ranging from the rightist AfD to the leftist PODEMOS through the centrist Forward Italy![3] have outlived their leaders, continuing to be competitive in the political arena. Also, charisma is not a distinctive feature when it comes to the identity of a populist party, as some of the organizations have not always had charismatic leaders. For instance, none of the last three leaders of the AfD (Alexander Gauland, Frauke Petry, Alice Weidel) have been highly charismatic in the traditional sense, nor has Andrej Babiš from the Czech party ANO, and it is at best debatable whether other widely known figures such as Christopher Blocher, Matteo Salvini, or Geert Wilders are charismatic in the Weberian sense. 

Thirdly, the political-strategic theory is contentious because while it insistingly argues that populism is not an ideology, it concomitantly criticizes the left-wing variants of populism present in Latin America (thus recognizing the existence of an ideological element) which accordingly are less moderate and less democratic than their right-wing counterparts (Rueda, 2021: 178-180). Scholars who have picked up on this, such as Rueda, have legitimately made the accusation of “normative bias” (Rueda, 2021: 178). As stressed before in a different context: “…by saying this Weyland makes the opposite mistake that a handful of liberal scholars in Europe make when they paint all right-wing populism under the same brush dismissing all populism as reactionary, xenophobic and exclusivist. It is never a good idea to overlook individual cases that can be entirely different from one another…” (Varriale, 2024: 19). 

Similarly, the socio-cultural approach put forward by Pierre Ostiguy (2017) in The Oxford Handbook of Populism has a limitation. Ostiguy frames populism as a performative aspect of politics and argues it can be situated on a high-low axis orthogonal to the right-left dimension of a coordinate grid (Ostiguy, 2017: 77-87). This axis supposedly concerns the interactions between political actors and the population (Ostiguy, 2017: 77). Accordingly, political actors who are notpopulist are located on the high dimension because apart from utilizing institutionally mediated and impersonal authority (e.g. proceduralism or reglamentismo) to lead supporters, they also tend to be “well-behaved,” “stiff,” “polished,” and always educated, formal, and polite in manifesting their cosmopolitanism (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). In contrast, populists are the opposite from both a political-cultural and socio-cultural perspective and are positioned on the “low” pole of politics. Essentially, while being “nativist” and “culturally popular” they are also vulgar and uninhibited in their speech and come across as highly personalist in terms of leadership (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). Hence, populists rely on personal authority and behavioral strength to mobilize supporters (Ostiguy, 2017: 79). However, this theory overly generalizes, as not all populists fit the “low” category in both political-cultural and socio-cultural terms. For instance, few scholars question the populist credentials of the US People’s Party and the Pim Fortuyn List (LPF), yet their political-cultural mannerisms differed substantially from Ostiguy’s description (Mudde, 2017: 41).

Given these circumstances, despite the fact not all scholars agree with Mudde’s assertion that populism is inherently an ideology (e.g. Schroder, 2020), or more specifically a “thin-centered” one that relies on other ideologies to function (see Mudde, 2004), the ideational approach remains the most appropriate framework to study populism. It is undisputable that anti-elitism, alongside people-centrism and the concept of “general will,” are central components of the populist narrative across the political spectrum. In summary, since the majority of scholars directly or indirectly employ ideational approaches (and definitions) to populism (see Abts & Rummens, 2007; Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2017; Rooduijn, 2013, Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014, Stanley, 2008) this approach will also be assumed in this contribution to determine whether a key Italian political actor can be effectively classified as a populist formation.

Extreme Right as an Ideology

Casa Pound, an Italian neo-fascist extreme right-wing political association, held a manifestation in honor of fallen comrades in Milan on April 29, 2012. Photo: Eugenio Marongiu.

Extreme Right, Radical Right and Other Terms: An Overview

In this contribution, the choice for the term “extreme right” over other academic terminologies is based on the fact that, despite some disagreements (as we shall discuss below), it remains the most widely accepted, even though there is no universally agreed-upon definition (Mudde, 2000: 16). More crucially, it enables a comprehensive description of an ideology that consists of multiple diverse features (Mudde, 2000: 16). However, unlike conservatism and populism, which are today more readily definable ideologies, categorizing the so-called “extreme right” as a singular ideology is a more complex task. As Mudde himself states: “almost every scholar in the field point to the lack of a generally accepted definition” regarding what this term precisely means and which parties belong to its party family (Mudde, 2000: 10).

In essence, there are three cardinal reasons that render the objective usage of this term for political parties and movements relatively complicated. First, “extreme right” is sometimes conflated by scholarship with other terms such as “radical right” (Bell, 2001; Betz, 1994), “new right” (Chryssogelos, 2013), “ultra-right” (Padovani, 2016), or even “populist right” (Gross, 2022). For example, during the mid-to-late 20th century, scholars, particularly from English-speaking countries, frequently used these terms interchangeably to refer to the American nationalist movements located to the right of mainstream conservatism on the political spectrum (Ignazi, 2000: 38-40). Among those, radically conservative phenomena such as the John Birch Society and the McCarthyites, which were certainly vehemently anti-communist and perhaps even anti-pluralist but not necessarily opposed to representative democracy per se (Ignazi, 2000: 40-41). 

However, the main issue emerged when this label began incautiously being applied to a heterogeneous array of parties and movements across Europe, which were ideologically disparate (Ignazi, 2000: 42). This practice failed to discern between anti-establishment and anti-systemic actors, reformist and revolutionary movements, as well as democratic and anti-democratic parties. Not to mention, terms like “radical right” – still the most utilized alternative to extreme right in scholarship – were adopted incautiously to include extra-parliamentary terrorist groups that openly engage in illegal activity and aim to overthrow the democratic system entirely (Ignazi, 2000: 42). In essence, such a disjointed assemblage persisted into the late 20th century and erroneously grouped European anti-systemic and anti-democratic parties, typically neofascist groups, alongside American pro-systemic and democratic right-wing movements that had no connection to fascism or neofascism (Ignazi, 2000: 42). 

Analogous challenges surface with the designation “new right,” as there is still no scholarly consensus on which parties belong to this political famille spirituelle or on what type of rightist ideology this label should reflect overall. In French and Italian academic circles, the nouvelle droite or nuova destra is used to refer to the anti-capitalist, anti-liberal, and “ethno-pluralist” intellectual movement inspired by the GRECE[4] and in particular by the essayist Alain de Benoist (Ignazi, 2000: 43). In contrast, within the Anglosphere thinkers spoke of the “new right” only when referring to neoliberal and moderate movements focusing on the historical experiences of Thatcherism and Reaganism (Ignazi, 2000: 47). Essentially, this term has been employed to describe fully distinct phenomena with opposing perspectives, especially in the context of the political economy.  

It is also for this reason that today scholars who normally advocate for an ideational approach, such as Andrea L.P. Pirro (2021), have supported the use of new “umbrella concepts” – supposedly useful in the American context – such as “far right,” which purposely encompasses both political actors who are illiberal but democratic (e.g. “populist radical right”) and those who are entirely anti-democratic (e.g. “extreme right”) (Pirro, 2021: 3-6). However, this view can be problematic, as there is a fundamental axiological difference between parties that support democracy but are skeptical of certain aspects of liberal-democracy (such as the rule of law and individual/minority rights) and parties that outright reject democracy altogether. The term far right is only useful, if useful at all, when applied to so-called borderline cases (see Tarchi, 2015), namely Alternative for Germany (AfD), the old British National Party (BNP) led by Nick Griffin, and the Hungarian Jobbik. In theory, those parties outwardly endorse democratic representation, but their rhetoric and actions, as well as their links at a local level (at times with the “skinhead” community), suggest otherwise. In practice, they advocate for ultra-authoritarian positions and ultimately oppose democratic principles. 

Second, it remains unclear whether the extreme right party family should include actors who, in addition to repudiating democratic and liberal values, also openly embrace the fascist and/or National Socialist ideological tradition(s). One claim that can be made is that in the same way not all radical right parties are necessarily populist (although today most are), not all extreme right parties are neofascist or neo-Nazi. Essentially, this argument posits that an actor can be considered both “extremist” and “right-wing” (thus the label “extreme right”) due to their objection to pluralism (to the extent where political violence is tolerated or promoted) and equality (to the point where racial differences are regarded as natural and positive), without necessarily aligning with what Roger Eatwell (1992) illustrates as “Generic Fascism.”

In defense of this assertion, empirical work by historians such as Robert O. Paxton (2005) reminds us of that corporatist regimes such as the Francoist dictatorship in Spain and the Estado Novo (New State) led by António de Oliveira Salazar in Portugal were ideologically very far to the right, but did not fully align with the characteristics of fascism. Not only did they lack some of fascism’s defining features, such as militaristic mass mobilization and an intense cult of personality, but these deeply conservative and repressive dictatorships chose to ban fascist movements in their countries, namely the Spanish Falange (José Antonio Primo de Rivera) and the Portuguese Legion. Notwithstanding, the vast majority of contemporary extreme right parties are directly influenced by fascist or National Socialist ideologies, often employing the myths and symbols associated with both for political purposes. Hence, scholars who discriminately use the term “extreme right” to refer to neofascist and neo-Nazi movements today are doing so in bona fides and are, quite justified in their approach. 

Third, as Mudde explains, “there is a large number of political parties whose extreme right status is not debated” (Mudde, 2000: 16). However, sometimes it can still be difficult to differentiate between populist radical right parties and extreme right ones, especially when the latter attempt to modernize and “moderate” their positions for strategic rather than ideological purposes. For example, this occurred with the BNP under Griffin’s leadership, as he invited his supporters to abandon the “three Hs” – hard talkhobbyism, and Hitler (Cobain, 2006; see also Copsey, 2008: 138). Essentially, the idea was to have them stop shaving their heads, dressing in black, wearing big Dr. Martens boots, and expressing sympathy for Nazi actions during World War II. Also, extreme right parties may engage in a “double-speak strategy” which simply imitates the language of liberal democracy without effectively adhering to it (Feldman and Jackson, 2014). 

Similarly to FdI, which has been accused of tolerating the antisemitism and fascism of its youth sections in Rome (see Corriere Della Sera, June 14, 2024), organizations like the AfD actively participate in representative democracy yet continue to discretely engage with much more extremist factions at a local extra-parliamentary level (Hülsemann, 2024). In fact, the latter, still has a supposedly neo-Nazi wing called Der Flügel (see Pytlas and Biehler, 2023). On the other hand, it has also occurred historically that liberal-conservative parties have radicalized themselves under a new leadership, the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) taken over by the charismatic Jörg Haider in 1986 serves as a textbook example of this phenomenon (see Moreau, 2024). This creates even more confusion when discussing these types of parties. 

Defining the “Extreme Right”

Casting aside doubts and disagreements over terminology, defining the extreme right remains an essential academic practice before undertaking an empirical investigation of the phenomenon. In this contribution, the minimal definition employed and tested throughout the qualitative analysis is a recent one introduced by scholar Elisabeth Carter (2018) who asserts this ideology encompasses authoritarianismanti-democracy, and/or holistic nationalism (Carter, 2018: 174). Firstly, authoritarianism is characterized by “conventionalism,” “submission,” and “aggression.” Thus, a state or a party which ideologically promotes traditional social norms and morality (e.g. anti-abortion, anti-homosexuality, and patriarchal family structure) as well as the duty and compliance of citizens to the government, and punitive legal measures for those individuals who do not comply is an authoritarian entity (Carter, 2018: 169). Secondly, anti-democracy is defined as “any opposition to, or rejection or undermining of, the values of democracy, or of the values and the procedures and institutions of democracy…” (Carter, 2018: 170). Thirdly, nationalism – “in its holistic form” – can be defined as something that “undermines the civil and political liberty of the individual through the requirement of subordination to the collective…when it is exclusionary, not least because it targets minorities who are citizens, it signals a rejection of pluralism, diversity and equality” (Carter, 2018: 172).  This builds on Mudde’s characterization of nationalism as “a political doctrine that proclaims congruence of the political unit, the state, and the cultural unit, the nation” (Mudde, 1995: 209). 

Accordingly, in this case, if FdI is effectively recognized as an extreme right party, its ideology – from which its policies are derived – and its discourse will have to reflect most, if not all, of these elements. For example, if only two out of the three elements are present it will already be difficult to legitimate FdI as comfortably belonging to the extreme right party family. The main strength of Carter’s definition resides in its clarity and precision, as well as its universality and efficiency for the study of political parties. Fundamentally, this minimal definition is more concise but also more precise than other maximal definitions available. Also, its universality or “travelability” is remarkable, as it is easy to speculate – regardless of the geographic location – that a right-wing extremist party will in one way or the other be authoritarian rather than libertarian, distrust and despise the values and procedures of democracy, and identify with a nation to the point of celebrating both the cultural and ethnic characteristics of its people in a predominantly exclusionary manner. In essence, ethno- nationalism rather than civic nationalism

Moreover, other popular definitions – Mudde’s (1995) for instance – have been very effective in conveying a general idea of what ideological concepts revolve around extreme right parties (e.g. nationalismracismxenophobiaanti-democracystrong state). However, as this author himself admits, it is difficult to find parties that match these with complete accuracy (Mudde, 2000: 17). In another empirical investigation where Mudde observes the party literature of parties in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, he discovers not all are archetypal extreme right parties, as they are not unquestionably anti-democratic, nor are they always ethno-nationalists (Mudde, 2000: 165-184). Ultimately, it will be Carter’s definition that undergoes scrutiny to yield reliable results and provide further insights into Meloni’s political party. 

Anatomy of FdI: A Discourse Analysis

Supporters with Brothers of Italy flags during the electoral tour of the party’s leader Giorgia Meloni in Caserta, Italy on September 18, 2022. Photo: M. Cantile.

Examples of Conservatism in Discourse

Examples of FdI’s conservatism in discourse are evident in several public statements. Firstly, Meloni is known to quote the fathers of conservative thought, Chesterton and Scruton, in her speeches (Starkey, 2022; Laghos, 2022). For instance, she shared the former’s line: “swords will be drawn to prove that leaves are green in the summer” (Laghos, 2022). The original quote by Chesterton was intended as a satirical commentary, essentially a critique of the human propensity to clash with each other over trivialities, especially when ideologies become involved. On one hand, it is logical for Meloni – as a self-proclaimed conservative – to be skeptical of ideologies followed to the letter, particularly those she views as opposing her beliefs, such as socialism and Marxism. On the other hand, putting forward this quote contradicts her party’s broader outlook, which frames the natural (and “inevitable”) struggle against external threats to the nation – namely, the Islamic world, China, Russia, and any political entities promoting progressivism (or “woke ideology”) – all in defense of a Christian “Europe of the people” (Meloni, June 1, 2024). Uncoincidentally, in an article for The European Conservative, the political analyst Mario Laghos (2022) suggests “Meloni isn’t a modernist; she’s a profoundly Christian conservative. Her mission is to defend identity, spirituality, and the family” (Laghos, 2022).  

Secondly, a series of declarations originating from Meloni’s speeches at rallies, in press conferences, and interviews[5], are a clear sign of this politician’s philosophical attachment to conservative ideas. The same can be stated about the majority of her party officials and cabinet ministers. In fact, what transpires from the discourse of Meloni and FdI representatives is an inclination to be skeptical of change, and the desire to manage it (particularly regarding abortion, the nuclear family, and LGBTQ+ rights), alongside a conscious acceptance that individual agency is influenced by forces beyond the human domain. In essence, FdI’s weltanschauung frames a narrative of nation, tradition, divine and civilizational order (known as “Civilizationism” in academic terms, see Brubaker, 2017) that demands loyalty and action beyond self-interest. 

On one hand, an example of their will to control change comes from a statement published by Meloni herself on social media: “Yes to the nuclear family, no to LGBT lobbies. Yes to sexual identity, no to gender ideology” (Meloni, Instagram, June 15, 2022). This is a purely conservative position rather than a populist one. In fact, “radical left populist” parties (e.g. PODEMOS, Five Star Movement) and (now extinct) more libertarian right-wing populists (e.g. Pim Fortuyn List), tend to adopt a more flexible and inclusive definition of the people, and are generally more lenient toward the LGBTQ+ community. Whereas Meloni has never explicitly spoken against the rights of sexual minorities, her party’s stance to wholeheartedly conserve conformist social norms in a Catholic-majority country inevitably led her to oppose radical changes on these matters. In a similar vein, she has spoken against Assisted Reproductive Technology (ART), including gestational surrogacy (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 52-53). 

Paradoxically, in some instances Meloni – wittingly or unwittingly – has accepted ideas and conserved policies that are liberal or progressive rather than conservative. For example, when in power FdI avoided scrapping the center-Left’s law on civil unions. Additionally, the FdI-led government retained the Italian legge 194 (“law 194”) which renders abortion legal (even in subjects deemed healthy) within three months of pregnancy – as emphasized by Meloni during the G7summit held in Italy in June 2024 (Il Sole 24 Ore, YouTube, June 15, 2024). In these particular cases, Huntington’s theory of conservatism (discussed earlier) may seem more plausible, as these are classic examples of a common tendency among conservatives to prioritize political stability and the status quo, sometimes even aligning with ideas that may conflict with traditional conservative values. In other circumstances, Meloni attempted to reassure the population that “homophobia, meaning contempt for anyone who has a certain sexual orientation which results in discrimination or even physical violence, is an unacceptable scourge that should be forcefully fought against” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 54). Hence, on social issues, Meloni is increasingly framing FdI’s positions to align with a more moderate form of conservatism, already prevalent in the European Nordic regions and in the Anglosphere, as she draws inspiration from parties such as the British Tories (Roberts, 2022; Decode39, April 28, 2023). 

Indeed, when Meloni calls for a society that champions ““liberty of vote, liberty in business, liberty in expression,” she is speaking the language of liberal conservatism, rather than that of the old Italian destra sociale (“social Right”) associated with the MSI—and only marginally with a more ideologically constrained vision (for a detailed socio-economic account, see Andriola, 2020). That type of socialistic extreme right was still influenced by neofascist anti-capitalism, marked also by strong chauvinistic welfarism, economic interventionism, and ultimately an ultra-authoritarian, statist outlook. A similar strand of this ideology was found in neighboring France during the Vichy-regime era, where Maréchal Petain forcefully emphasized collectivist conservative values such as “TravailFamillePatrie” (“Work, Family, Fatherland”) instead of economic and individual freedom.

On the other hand, examples of how Meloni’s rhetoric draws on a moralistic and transcendental narrative are found in a diverse array of her public statements. Examples are drawn from her recurring references to the “sacred borders of the fatherland” or when she states the family, a union between a man and a woman… is the vital cell of society. According to this deeply conservative view, the individual is inescapably dependent on this extra-human dimension of social life and factors beyond human agency – including cultural inheritance and the family as a pre-political institution – play a crucial role in one’s integration into society. As alluded to earlier, this contrasts with progressive-liberal perspectives that instead affirm human agency, rational choice, and opportunities for social engineering or radical reform. In a lengthy interview, Meloni asserts, “What I am is the fruit of what has generated me—of the traditions and culture I have inherited, of the influence of religion in my civilization” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 38).

It is evident that, under Meloni’s leadership, FdI rejects modern progressive liberalism in favor of a more conservative version of liberalism. In this view, society is not simply a collection of atomized individuals but something more organic; individuals find meaning in life through deeper “extra-human” connections. In this vision, an individual’s everyday experience is shaped by culture, national identity, religion, and even biological sex. In this respect, FdI’s stance reflects a traditionally conservative position—one that is not necessarily illiberal or anti-liberal, but certainly not liberal either. More precisely, it can be described as a form of post-liberalism.[6] However, discussing her party’s view, Meloni insists that “liberal democracy is in our DNA” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 39). 

Turning to another aspect, FdI’s discourse frequently weaves together elements of conservatism and populism. On the rare occasions when populism takes a more prominent role, it typically emerges as a critique of supranational bodies, portrayed as being tainted by progressive or pro-migrant ideologies. Specifically, Meloni accuses the United Nations (UN) of attempting to use the Global Compact to “complete the grand plan of financial speculation, to deprive nations and people of their identity. Because without roots you’re a slave, and when you are a slave, you serve the interests of Soros” (Laghos, 2022). This statement contains a pronounced conspiratorial undertone. As the literature indicates, populists in power—whether ideologically or strategically—often employ conspiracy theories to “demonize and delegitimize” their opponents (Taggart & Pirro, 2022). Similarly to Meloni, FdI’s Antonio Baldelli makes his accusation: “numerous members of the Democratic Party (PD) and the Greens and Left Alliance (AVS) have obtained conspicuous financial support (more than 1,000,000 euros) from associations tied to the financier George Soros” (Il Fatto Quotidiano, YouTube, April 24, 2024). 

Therefore, one observable trend in the discourse analysis is the persistent use of antagonistic and inflammatory rhetoric—often marked by paranoid and conspiratorial tropes—towards political opponents, particularly the Democratic Party (PD), the Five Star Movement, and the left more broadly. Even Meloni, who generally serves as the “friendly face” of her party, tends to radicalize some of her otherwise more temperate positions (as we will discuss in subsequent paragraphs) on immigration when criticizing the policies of her leftist rivals. In La Versione di Giorgia (“Giorgia’s Take”), numerous interview passages portray the left-leaning Hungarian philanthropist, banker, and entrepreneur, George Soros in a purely negative light (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 50). In one instance, Meloni declares “I do not believe in puppeteers, however, speaking of Soros, this is a person that has publicly taken responsibility for having speculated against the Italian Lira in 1992 and today, through his galaxy of foundations, pursues a political agenda. This includes lavish foundations to some NGO’s that deal with immigration” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 50). While—as the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) notes—not every actor who promotes Soros-related conspiracy theories is necessarily advancing antisemitism, the narrative becomes clearly antisemitic when his pro-immigration views, background in banking, and legal funding of NGOs are deliberately linked to his Jewish heritage (see ADL.org, October 11, 2018). Given this, there is no substantive evidence of antisemitism in Meloni’s or FdI’s political discourse; their critique of Soros appears rooted primarily in policy disagreements over immigration. However—as we shall explore—while FdI is not strictly a populist party, it clearly employs populist rhetoric in specific contexts.

Examples of Populism in Discourse

Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, speaks at the Atreju convention in Rome, Italy on December 16, 2023. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

Beyond conservatism, the analysis of discourse predominantly associates this party with the populist party family. In fact, if scholars were to observe only the discourse and disregard other elements of analysis, such as policy positions, in order to attribute a precise ideology to FdI, many would likely infer that, due to its occasional inflammatory rhetoric—tainted with a mix of anti-elitism and people-centrism—the party is staunchly populist above all else. In early 2024, it was Meloni herself who stated in a parliamentary address that “nothing comes before the interests of the Italian people”(Meloni, March 21, 2024). This phrase resonates not only with contemporary textbook definitions of populism, such as Mudde’s, but also with older ones, like Edward Shils’ (1996). In fact, according to this leading sociologist, “populism proclaims that the will of the people as such is supreme over every other standard—over the standards of traditional institutions, over the autonomy of institutions, and over the will of other strata. Populism identifies the will of the people with justice and morality” (Shils, 1996).

Moreover, it was also Meloni who in her autobiographical book stressed that she is “proud to come from the people” and that before the 2018 Atreju[7] event appeared in an official party poster with the following slogan encapsulated: “peopleagainst elitesidentity against financesovereignty against technocracy” (Meloni, September 15, 2018). These are all tropes of ideological populism, as they are basic examples of anti-elitist and people-centric messages. Other than Meloni, many of her elected representatives employ the same rhetorical strategy of opposing various elites in the name of a “pure,” morally virtuous, and—at least from their perspective—homogeneous Italian people. It is this idea of homogeneity that prompts some of FdI’s elected representatives to voice more controversial views—ones that Meloni typically avoids. A clear illustration of the intersection between populist nativism[8]  rooted in the idea of “the pure people” (as defined by Mudde) – and extreme right holistic nationalism, can be found in a speech by FdI’s Minister of Agriculture, Francesco Lollobrigida (also Meloni’s brother-in-law). During a formal event held by a bipartisan and independent organization focused on promoting births, Lollobrigida declared that “an Italian ethnicity exists” and that it should be preserved (see Mastrodonato, 2023). In this case, although FdI (and Meloni in particular) partially defended Lollobrigida’s remarks—arguing that his language could have been more refined and concurrently asserting that there is a difference between the terms “race” and “ethnicity,” and that the party’s role is to preserve Italy’s cultural and linguistic identity rather than the population’s biological characteristics—this can still be understood as nativism. In fact, scholars who have thoroughly investigated both the populist right and the extreme right have pointed to a “new,” softened version of xenophobia that does not involve biological racism but rather cultural nativism (Betz, 2003: 195) or culturism(Schinkel, 2017).

From a socio-political standpoint, cultural nativism refers to the belief in the superiority of certain cultures—understood as “customs” and “ways of life”—relative to others (see Betz, 2003: 195). In any case, certain views regarding an epic struggle to counter immigration, declining birth rates, and liberal or progressive elites, expressed by FdI’s high-ranking politicians (e.g., Lollobrigida), are a cause for concern when they resonate with the Great Replacement Theory formulated by the French intellectual Renaud Camus (2021). This popular conspiracy theory argues that left-leaning corporate and political elites are orchestrating mass immigration and hyper-ethnic change aimed at replacing white majorities in Western countries with non-white people from Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

Setting aside its core concepts for a moment, populism also presents itself as an assemblage of distinct secondary (or “adjacent”) features. One of these is the idea that populists—especially those on the Right—seek to present themselves not only as the direct alternative to neoliberal, internationalist, and progressive ideologies but also as post-ideologicalactors altogether. Although populism is deeply ideological, populists are convinced that 18th- and 20th-century ideologies are too outdated and divisive for the monist and monolithic community (also known as the heartland) they idolize (see Taggart, 2000). When one of Meloni’s right-hand men and MEP, Nicola Procaccini, reposts online that the EU “has to focus on the concrete needs of citizens and offer solutions to the real necessities of the people, abandoning the insane ideologies of the past,” the concept of volonté générale subtly comes into play (Procaccini, February 12, 2025). More crucially, this statement shows that new-wave populists aim and claim to be post-ideological, yet it remains unclear whether this is an adjacent concept of populist ideology or simply a political strategy.

Similarly, in her book-length interview, when asked by her interlocutor – a well-known Italian journalist – what kind of political Right her party aspires to represent, Meloni plainly responds: “the camp of realism” in contrast to “the left’s utopian ideals” (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 36). Additionally, discussing the relationship between USA and Italy (after Trump’s tariffs) at a conference, FdI Senator Giovanni Fazzolari, asserts “Italy’s position does not change, because it is not ideological and pursues national interest” (Fazzolari, as cited in Scafi, 2025). These types of statements by FdI politicians further illustrate that Meloni’s party aspires to be a home for mostly moderate voters who may be skeptical of excessive liberalism (as both conservatives and populists are) but also endorse a pragmatic, business-oriented realpolitik rather than an idealistic approach. FdI is an ideological party in that it is driven by a set of core ideas, beliefs, and principles that shape its policies and actions, but it is not idealistic, as it does not pursue lofty, unattainable goals.

Examples of Right-Wing Extremism in Discourse

Examples of extreme right (or neofascist) forms of discourse are either rare or nonexistent in FdI’s repertoire, at least[9]among its parliamentary representatives. However, exceptions or isolated instances can be found in statements made by the President of the Senate of Italy, Ignazio La Russa MP, and Andrea Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice. Although La Russa, like his party leader Meloni, has clearly stated that “with neofascists and folklorist nostalgia we have nothing to share” (Linkiesta, October 14, 2021), he also ambiguously told an interviewer in 2022 that “we are all heirs of the Duce” (Mackinson, 2022). Additionally, when former Prime Minister and current Senator Matteo Renzi provocatively called La Russa a camerata (“a fascist comrade”) after being interrupted during a speech in parliament, La Russa—who is known to possess fascist-era memorabilia in his home—did not object, nor did he sue Renzi for defamation (Corriere della Sera, December 24, 2024).

Nevertheless, the most prominent example of extreme right authoritarianism and anti-democratic rhetoric in FdI’s public discourse originates from Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, the Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice. At an Italian Penitentiary Police meeting, where new state vehicles were being showcased, this MP openly stated: “The idea of seeing this powerful vehicle parade, the idea of letting citizens know who is behind that darkened glass, just as we do not let those behind that darkened glass breathe, is certainly an intimate joy for me” (Renzi, 2025: 112). The use of such language is clearly incompatible with any conception of democracy and its liberal foundations – particularly the rule of law and protection of human rights (Renzi, 2025: 113). Following this politician’s remark, both constitutional scholars and political opponents of FdI have emphasized that, unlike in authoritarian regimes (such as Fascist dictatorships), democratic states do not seek to dehumanize individuals in this manner, irrespective of whether they come from a background of organized crime or political terrorism (Renzi, 2025: 113). 

For all that, except for infrequent exceptions, a discourse analysis shows that features of extreme right ideology—such as authoritarianism and anti-democracy—are largely absent from the discourse of Meloni and her MPs. Moreover, even another core feature of right-wing extremism, namely holistic nationalism, is not consistently present in official speeches. As previously noted, holistic nationalism is a form of ethno-nationalism that, unlike civic nationalism, seeks to enforce ethnic, cultural, and spiritual uniformity within the nation-state. Overall, it is inherently exclusive, as it rejects internal diversity in favor of promoting a paternalistic and interventionist state that actively shapes national identity and loyalty. It has already been established that FdI is, above all, Meloni’s party, with her playing the central role in setting its agenda and making key decisions. Even so, Meloni herself cannot be considered an ethno-nationalist; her brand of nationalism is increasingly framed in civic and liberal-democratic terms. For example, in April 2024, during a bilateral meeting in Tunisia, she called for Italy to accept “more legal immigrants” (Fassini, 2024).

To be sure, Meloni’s positions on (or against) illegal immigration are—so far as discourse is concerned—not framed as extreme right positions. Meloni promotes a “sustainable and legal” form of immigration, which she refers to as “compatible immigration,” drawing on an old theory of integration developed by the Catholic-conservative thinker Cardinal Giacomo Biffi (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023). FdI’s leader also reframes Pope Francis’ message (albeit in a more populist and subtly ethno-pluralist fashion) and argues that people who migrate to European countries, especially from the African continent, must also have the financial opportunity and right not to migrate (Meloni, as cited in Sallusti, 2023: 48).

At first glance, this moderation of language does not appear to be a variant of double-speak—a strategy in which extreme right actors mimic the language of liberal democrats. Rather, it seems to reflect a moderation that, despite its (distant) neofascist origins, is now steadily progressing toward liberal conservatism. To provide a comparative example, a party in Europe that has followed a similar trajectory is Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) (see Varriale, 2024). In their respective countries, these parties have—to some degree—become more open to legal immigration and have reconsidered their hardline positions on abortion, gay marriage, and human rights in general.

Anatomy of FdI: A Manifesto Analysis

A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.

As previously discussed, this section analyzes only FdI’s 2018 and 2022 electoral programs, as they are deemed the most relevant for understanding the party’s current ideological stance, rather than reflecting positions from ten or twelve years ago. Moreover, FdI’s programs for EU elections (such as those in 2019 and 2024) are not analyzed, as these are second-order elections compared to domestic ones. As a result, they reveal less about a party’s ideological tendencies and more about how it wishes to be perceived in the European arena, as well as which parties it seeks to align with at the EU Parliament level.

Nevertheless, in-depth analyses of older electoral programs or ideological manifestos (e.g., the 2013 general election program, the 2014 EU election program, and the Tesi di Trieste) are already available in the scholarly literature (e.g., Donà, 2022; Sondel-Cedarmas, 2022; Tarchi, 2024). While the scholar Alessia Donà (2022) postulates that the second party convention, which produced the 2017 Tesi di Trieste, “formalized the radical right shift of FdI,” Tarchi emphasizes that alongside classic PRR positions, “other ideas were rather inspired by a conservative philosophy, destined, over time, to take precedence over the party’s political culture…” (Tarchi, 2024). More specifically, Tarchi points to the party’s criticism of the “cult of progress,” its repudiation of gender theory, its valorization of Italy’s historical heritage (e.g., art, landscape, nature), and its glorification of authority in state and society to suggest that the party is ultimately more conservative than populist (Tarchi, 2024).

Taking this into account, the characterization of FdI as unequivocally part of the PRR warrants both revision and refinement. Examining the party’s more recent programs is likely to produce distinct conclusions regarding its ideological orientation.

FdI’s 2018 Program

In a similar manner to the Tesi di Trieste, conservative and populist positions stand out in the 2018 electoral program titled “A Program for Italy: For Growth, Security, Family and Full Employment.”[10] However, in terms of economic policy, rather than adhering to overt economic nationalism or populism, FdI endorses a substantial degree of neoliberalism. A flat tax—where the tax rate is essentially the same for Italian citizens with higher incomes as for those with lower incomes—is proposed to stimulate the Italian economy (FdI 2018, section 1, point 1).

Although no specific income threshold is provided, and in a bid to appeal to the working class (an example of people-centrism, and thus populism), the document clearly states there should be a no-tax area for the more economically destitute (FdI 2018, section 1, point 1). Additionally, the so-called pace fiscale (“Fiscal Peace”) is promoted to give small and medium businesses (and individual taxpayers) the opportunity to rectify previous irregularities in accordance with the law (FdI 2018, section 1, point 3). FdI also aims to “facilitate access to (state) credit for small and medium businesses” (FdI 2018, section 1, point 9).

From a populist-conservative perspective, local small businesses are seen as an integral part of the organic state—essentially the backbone of the national economy—in contrast to big businesses, such as multinationals and third-sector financial services, which are blamed for offshoring and depriving ordinary Italians of jobs and Italy of its manufacturing base. After all, producerism is a socio-economic dimension of populism (and thus also an “adjacent concept”) that “implies a moral distinction between ‘makers’ and ‘takers,’ which stigmatizes undeserving people and pits those ‘who produce society’s wealth against those who consume it without giving back’” (Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2024: 2).

In brief, for parties such as FdI, who often combine conservatism with populism, the craft-oriented local businesses are the virtuous “makers” whereas the multinationals and financial services corporations are the parasitic “takers.” In any case, in public, the pace fiscale is often sold by FdI representatives as a measure by a forgiving paternalist state (led by an anti-elitist and pro-people party) that rewards hardworking citizens with a fiscal amnesty, a correction of past injustices (e.g. over-taxation, excessive bureaucracy) and an instrument to protect the “common people.” Overall, it is a people-centric measure to reconcile the state with its citizens. In simple terms, FdI (similarly to their allies from the League) believes that a smaller, less bureaucratic and less interventionist state allows individuals and businesses to flourish and benefit Italy’s overall growth. This can also be interpreted as a mildly conservative stance, given that—as noted earlier—limited government intervention is a secondary or adjacent concept to the ideological core of conservatism.

In any case, the EU is perceived as a supra-national “nanny-state” bloc that keeps Italy lagging behind. Under the banner “Less constraints from Europe” (FdI 2018, section 3), the program clearly states, “No to excessive regulations that obstruct development” (FdI 2018, section 3, point 2). Scholarly literature remains divided on whether these “new” parties that combine populism with conservatism—often grouped under the umbrella term PRR in Europe—are neoliberal, pro-market forces or anti-laissez-faire statist parties that support protectionism, dirigisme, and a social-market economy (see Carter, 2005; Galli & Bochicchio, 2019; Loch, 2021; Revelli, 2017; Taggart, 1995). In sum, it appears that right-wing populist parties can be both pro- and anti-free market (Brusenbauch Meislova & Chrysoggelos, 2024). However, it is evident that more radical populist parties do not endorse the same free-market (or “globalist capitalist”) outlook supported by parties affiliated with the European People’s Party (EPP). Clearly, the former favor a more authoritarian and statist form of economic nationalism. Nevertheless, unlike other parties in France and Germany, this does not seem to apply to the same extent with FdI.

Moreover, while there is some consensus among Italian intellectuals and pundits that FdI began its political career as a socially conscious, pro-welfare, statist force, it gradually moved in a classically liberal direction in economic matters, promoting deregulation and private enterprise. In fact, a shift in economic policy can already be observed in the 2018 manifesto. However, due to its ideologically populist-conservative Eurosceptic positions—similar to those of the British right—the main culprit in economic affairs is portrayed as the EU (a “protectionist racket,” see Hall, 2019).

According to Section 3 of the program, the EU question can only be addressed by rejecting austerity politics (FdI 2018, section 3, point 1), revising EU treaties (without specifying which ones) (FdI 2018, section 3, point 3), demanding “more politics and less bureaucracy in Europe” (FdI 2018, section 3, point 4), reducing the surplus of annual EU payments (FdI 2018, section 3, point 5), and defending Italian-made products (FdI 2018, section 3, point 7). However, the term “protectionism” is deliberately avoided so as not to appear excessively radical.

Many of these EU-related positions reflect ideological conservatism intertwined with populism, as they are driven by a revanchist nationalism rooted in nostalgia—a desire to return to a romantic and glorious past (pre-Maastricht EU) in which Italy was more economically self-sufficient and political decisions were made solely by sovereign national parliaments. More crucially, FdI’s view is that only then will politics finally reflect the volonté générale of the Italian people, as opposed to that of EU elites.

With regard to foreign policy, the program does not appear to place significant emphasis on this area, presenting FdI as a party that (at least in 2018) was primarily focused on reforming Italian domestic politics. Notably, there are no explicit references to maintaining positive relations with allies such as the USA, France, Germany, or Israel—nor any mentions of major global powers like Russia or China. This suggests that, in 2018, FdI drafted its program with the awareness that it had no realistic chance of winning the election—or even of being a runner-up—and instead pursued a strategy of indirect influence. It put forward catchy and straightforward policy proposals (particularly on immigration) in the hope that larger right-wing parties (e.g., Matteo Salvini’s League) would adopt them during the electoral campaign and implement them once in power.

Notwithstanding, in this program, foreign policy intersects with domestic politics. For instance, “Section 5” policies such as “the war on terror(-ism)” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 1) and a proposed Marshall Plan for Africa (possibly referring to foreign aid aimed at preventing illegal immigration) (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 4) are presented alongside domestic measures, specifically the “repatriation of all illegal immigrants” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 5), the “resumption of border control” (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 2), and the introduction of a new self-defense law (FdI 2018, Section 5, Point 7), apparently modeled after the (conservative/Republican) American version, which grants homeowners more extensive rights to use force against trespassers on private property. These points suggest that FdI’s foreign policy positions—limited as they may be—are used to reinforce its domestic agenda, particularly on immigration and national security.

While state security, including anti-terrorism measures, has historically been a bipartisan issue in Italian politics—especially during the 1970s due to neofascist and neocommunist terror attacks—it was, for a time, even adopted as a valence issue by the Left (see Rampini, 2019). However, after 9/11, the securitization[11] of this topic, reframed as a “war on terror,” became closely associated with neoconservative politics in the West, often pursued to advance anti-Islamist, and at times, overtly anti-Muslim agendas (see Abbas, 2021). However, FdI not only refrains from providing a detailed discussion of the policy but also omits any mention of the specific type of terrorism to be combated—perhaps as a calculated move to be perceived as a more moderate force, one that does not scapegoat broad and diverse religious communities. This approach appears aimed at appealing to a broader centrist electorate, extending beyond hardline conservatives and fascist nostalgics.

Insofar as FdI’s stance on immigration is concerned, it comes as no surprise that a party with authoritarian and deeply nationalist roots seeks to prevent immigration—especially from non-EU nations with distinct cultures, religions, and laws—and supposed future demographic changes (or “hyper-ethnic change,” to use an academic term coined in a 2018 text) in order to supposedly preserve the “spiritual” identity of the patria (the fatherland or “motherland” Meloni often mentions). There are elements of a deep-rooted conservative philosophy here, as not only is there a strong desire to control societal changes (in this case brought about by the integration of immigrants or refugees), but also an inherently pessimistic ideo of human cohabitation.

The latter aspect is typical of the old right but also of the “new right,” as it was the French nouvelle droite that popularized the concept of “ethno-pluralism” (or “ethno-differentialism”)—the idea that mutual respect among nations and peoples can only occur under the condition that different races or ethnicities live separately in their so-called natural homelands.

Furthermore, a conservative ideology or thought process can also be linked to the concept that, according to FdI, “borders are sacred” (as noted previously in the discourse analysis). The territorial space where a population lives is seen as the epicenter of the development of their particularistic collective identity, composed of a common language, traditions, legal and social norms, behavioral patterns, and a shared destiny.[12] Notably, conservatives do not merely defend the idea of border control from a legal standpoint. Similar to their conceptualization of private property—also regarded as inviolable and sacred—borders are considered symbolic anchors of national identity.

Following this logic, the nation is not simply a political entity but is perceived as an (extra-human) transcendent force that forges and sustains the community. For obvious reasons, this conservative nationalism intertwines with populism, as almost any type of immigration is a priori viewed as an external, unnecessary threat to the peace of the heartland—thus, to the moral (rather than specifically biological, as in Nazism) purity of the people, a monolithic community that does not require external input, as this may lead to corruption. For populists, immigration is seen as nearly as great a threat to the harmony of the organic nation as the elites are; indeed, they often believe elites purposely destabilize their countries, and here conspiracies may also come into play. Like other proposals in the program, these policies are merely listed, with no details provided on how to implement them—understandably so, as at the time FdI had no real ambition to govern. In any case, this vague list of policies serves the purpose of presenting FdI to potential voters as a conservative alternative to the more liberal (FI!) and populist (League) forces within the center-right coalition.

Nevertheless, certain aspects of this program exhibit distinctly populist traits, rather than aligning with conventional conservative principles. Examples of populism are clearly present in “Section 9” of the program (titled “More Territorial Autonomy, A Better Central Government”), where FdI advances proposals such as the direct election of the President of the Republic (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 1), the implementation of an imperative mandate (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 3), and a reduction in the number of parliamentarians (FdI 2018, Section 9, Point 2). The first policy is unmistakably populist, as it reflects a form of direct democracy[13] in which the people (i.e., eligible voters) directly choose the Head of State through a horizontal decision-making process. Implementing this measure would diminish the decisional authority of career politicians—often portrayed as “power-hungry” and “corrupt”—within the parliamentary system and increase popular influence, thereby supposedly making the presidential selection process more democratic and transparent.

The second policy is also populist because it empowers the people to remove “elite” figures (such as elected officials) from office before the end of their term, thus increasing politicians’ accountability to ordinary citizens and reducing their insulation from public concerns. Similarly, the third policy—the reduction in the number of parliamentarians—emerges from a populist (anti-elitist and people-centric) forma mentis for four reasons. First, it conveys a sense of rejection of the political elite, aiming to make Italian representative parliamentary democracy more efficient and cost-effective by reducing the privileges of the political class—or “caste,” as populists often argue. Second, it promotes the idea that a smaller parliament can make swifter and more people-centered decisions. Third, the reduction is seen as an opportunity to challenge the establishment and signal radical reform. In all three of FdI’s policies, there is a clear commitment to reform from a populist perspective, in which the people—both virtuous and endowed with common sense—are trusted to make important political decisions.

Conversely, “Section 7” of the program is titled “More Support to the Family” and encompasses both traditional conservative and more modern liberal-conservative policies. With regard to the former, FdI suggests that the family is unequivocally the “first and fundamental nucleus of society” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 1). Ironically, Margaret Thatcher—considered to reflect a Right that is more liberal than FdI—used to say, “there is no such thing as society, but just individuals and families” (see McLachlan, 2020). In the same section, FdI proposes “an extraordinary plan for births,” accompanied by entirely free nursery school (a policy most conservative and PRR parties agree upon) and state subsidies to families based on the number of children they have (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 2).

Concerning the latter, FdI’s program suggests “protection of work for young mothers” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 4) and the “defense of equal opportunity and protection of women” in the workplace, as well as “pension recognition in favor of mothers” (FdI 2018, Section 7, Point 5). These policies reflect FdI’s more liberal-democratic side. After all, Meloni—who claims to be “proud to be a woman and a mother” (in addition to being a Christian)—often talks about the challenges women face in modern society, especially single women who struggle economically and sometimes find themselves forced to consider abortion or options such as surrogacy. Other modern conservative policies appear in Sections “8” and “10” of the program, where the party suggests the “progressive elimination of precarious employment” (FdI 2018, Section 8, Point 8), the “protection of the environment” (FdI 2018, Section 8, Point 3), and support for renewable energy (FdI 2018, Section 10, Point 11).

The first set of policies is modern because, although they reflect a conservative perspective (FdI acknowledges motherhood as part of a broader social-demographic policy), they are adapted to conform to the values of a contemporary liberal-democratic Western society—a society where women are an active, fundamental, and indispensable part of both the family (as mothers and caretakers) and the workforce. Moreover, FdI appears to have a different view from most PRR and radical conservative parties on this issue, as their plan prioritizes women’s rights in the labour system (e.g., workplace representation, pensions). PRR parties, in particular, are theoretically against any form of affirmative action, as they believe it undermines the principle of meritocracy and increasingly benefits distinct minorities at the expense of majorities.

The second set of policies discussed above also reflects a modern and pragmatic conservatism, as they borrow from the répertoire of more liberal ideology and “provide alternative definitions of such core progressive concepts as ‘liberty,’ ‘progress,’ and ‘equality’” (see Neill, 2021: 14–15). Political parties with a predominantly conservative agenda, yet influenced by populist egalitarian ideals, may incorporate proposals in their programs that are not ordinarily aligned with the preservation of the existing order. Instead, these proposals aim to reduce economic inequalities (e.g., elimination of precarious employment) and subtly endorse certain forms of environmentalism (e.g., renewable energy policy). In this context only, FdI draws upon elements of a traditionally left-wing agenda. However, with respect to environmentalism, a form of environmentalist conservatism (or “green conservatism”) has already been conceptualized by various authors, ranging from Ludwig Klages to Sir Roger Scruton and Wendell Berry. In light of all the evidence, the fact that this final policy is mentioned only in the conclusive section (and final page) of the program suggests that although FdI’s ideological platform includes a responsible environmentalism, it is not one of the party’s main priorities—especially when compared to other issues such as immigration or the reduction of state bureaucracy, regulation, and taxation.

FdI’s 2022 Program

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet in Brussels, Belgium on November 03, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

The 2022 electoral program of FdI (titled “Ready to Lift Up Italy”[14]) is more comprehensive and detailed than its 2018 counterpart. It not only expands with fifteen additional sections but also includes a more extensive focus on foreign policy. Overall, what emerges from this program is the party’s “new” core ideology: a cultural and socio-economic conservatism that is more moderate, liberal, pragmatic, and Europhile (but also Atlanticist[15]), in contrast to the (slightly) Eurosceptic and populist tendencies of previous positions.

Taking this into account, the program begins with a section entirely dedicated to domestic policies aimed at supporting births and the family unit (FdI 2022, section 1). A quotation from former Pope John Paul II (who is appreciated in rightist circles for his anti-Communism) is included, stating that the family is a “foundational element of society” and what renders a nation truly sovereign (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 1). More specifically, FdI suggests progressively introducing the quoziente familiare—essentially a taxation system that primarily considers the number of individuals in the family unit (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 2).

Unlike in the 2018 program, there is no explicit reference to free nursery schools for economically disadvantaged families, although the “German model” of Tagesmutter is suggested as a concrete economic policy to address this matter (FdI 2022, section 1, par. 3). In any case, these are all textbook conservative policies, indirectly tied to the ideological conviction that there are forces beyond human control which exert substantial influence—both positive and negative—on the human condition. Among these forces are not only God, biology, and history, but also the family unit, which in many religious traditions is seen as a divine institution ordained by God and, from a biological standpoint, is an essential reproductive and child-rearing entity.

Sections “2” to “8” focus on a series of domestic economic policies: efficient usage of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (NRRP), a fairer tax system to defend the purchasing power of Italians, support for the Italian entrepreneurial system, promotion of Made in Italy brands, support for the dignity of work, support for younger generations, and the “revitalization” of schools, universities, and research. All these policy proposals involve a combination of tax reductions (mainly for smaller businesses and large families), streamlining of bureaucracy, and targeted state support (FdI 2022, sections 2–8). In essence, they reflect a “socially conscious” conservative core ideology that blends elements of capitalism and laissez-faire economics with a more social-democratic outlook—one that also aims to moderately regulate competition and maintain a (small) welfare state (e.g., a social market economy).

Specifically, the aspects that stand out—and align with democratic conservatism—include ideas such as “combating tax evasion” (including that of big banks and big business, in a more populist tone), promoting youth employment (through apprenticeships, internships, and reforms to Higher Technical Institutes), deterring delocalization (e.g., offshoring), and strategically using the EU’s NRRP funds to enhance Italy’s competitiveness and administrative efficiency (FdI 2022, sections 3, 7, 4, 2, respectively). 

More crucially, the EU project is not particularly questioned or criticized. On the contrary, FdI’s more recent program states that the party aims to accelerate European integration and sees the NRRP as an opportunity to achieve goals such as independence from Russian gas and energy security for Europe. Therefore, unlike most populist radical right parties (or PRRPs), the “new” conservative FdI believes that Italy’s future lies within the EU, rather than outside of it.

Section “9” of the program is pivotal for understanding the underlying ideology that informs FdI’s positions (FdI 2022, section 9). This section is particularly relevant because it highlights the party’s adherence to a (partial) welfare state, where “the state guarantees a web of social protection to sustain people who are fragile and struggle economically” (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 1). FdI also plans to support disadvantaged individuals through collaboration with the so-called third sector[16] and intermediate bodies, as the document states, “it is necessary to rediscover real national solidarity” (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 1). However, there is no specification as to whether FdI’s welfarism is directed at all individuals residing on Italian soil (including legal immigrants) or exclusively at Italian citizens.

In any case, FdI’s plan to abolish the reddito di cittadinanza (Basic Universal Income)—a policy criticized by some experts as an archetypical example of welfare chauvinism—does not appear to be accompanied by a proposal for a more inclusive welfare scheme, as advocated by liberal, progressive, and democratic-socialist parties (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 2). Nevertheless, FdI’s call for “a true social state that does not forget anybody” (FdI 2022, section 9) is informed and partly inspired by the political legacy of its predecessors, AN and MSI—both adherents to the historical destra sociale. The neofascist (yet pro-welfare) MSI was known for its corporatist and socialistic tendencies, although there is reason to believe that FdI does not endorse the same level of welfarism. What is clear, however, is that FdI’s appeal to a working-class, lower-middle-class, and middle-class, socially conservative (and often Catholic) electorate requires demonstrating a degree of sensitivity toward the needs of common people (see Angelucci, CISE, 2022).

Given this, even from an ideological standpoint, it has become evident that—while not strictly influenced by a leftist welfare state ideology—FdI advocates for the moral economics of distributism. This position supports widespread property ownership (similarly to British Thatcherites) and a robust social safety net in which smaller local communities play a major role, and state interventionism is employed to prevent both unfettered globalized capitalism and full-scale socialism. After all, such positions were already conceptualized by past conservative thinkers such as G.K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc.

Insofar as the economy is concerned, a degree of populism is also present in these programmatic directives, as it is evident that the volonté générale of the people can only be safeguarded when a state or government launches public housing plans, allocates funds for infrastructure development through “a system of public-private synergies,” provides incentives for the employment of people with disabilities, increases pensions, and offers other forms of social assistance (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 3). In the concluding paragraph of this section, it is also stated that there are plans to allocate additional public resources to the Italian civil service (FdI 2022, section 9, par. 3). Overall, there is a clear push to improve the living conditions of ordinary men and women. Therefore, there is evidence that FdI is not a fully anti-state conservative party and is not comparable to right-wing libertarian groups such as the UK and US libertarian parties.

The body of this program (sections “11” to “21”) contains a series of detailed policies ranging from healthcare reform and the defence of civil and social rights to the promotion of Italian culture (the new “Italian Renaissance”), tourism, investment, and agriculture—this last element is referred to as “a pillar of our nation” (FdI 2022, sections 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15, respectively). While not all these policies are directly relevant to an investigation concerning FdI’s ideological core, it is certain that the party’s positions continue to oscillate between classical liberalism and populistic conservatism in all of these areas.

For example, conservatism—focused on managing the changes to Western civilization brought by high-tech statism—emerges when they oppose the introduction of all instruments related to “mechanisms of mass digital control,” such as the scoring system or the “Social Credit System,” modelled after communist dictatorships like China (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 2). To be sure, right-wing parties across Europe and North America, including both moderate conservatives and PRR parties, voiced their criticism of what they saw as tools of “elite control” during the COVID-19 pandemic. Their objections covered a range of measures, from lockdown restrictions and mobile tracking apps (used to curb the virus’s spread) to compulsory vaccinations (Tasker, 2023; Wondreys & Mudde, 2022: 97).

Additionally, ideologically conservative features of the party—intended to regulate or mitigate societal change while preserving the biological essence of humanity—are evident when Meloni’s party rejects gay adoptions and surrogacy (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3). However, these positions are tempered by more liberal stances (almost mimicking the language of progressives), such as the “contrasting of any form of discrimination” (with specific references to antisemitism, racism, and radical Islamism in another section) and the “support for paths of emancipation from cultural stereotypes that see women in a position of subalternity” (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3). In this context, FdI also proposes harsher punishments for forced marriages and female genital mutilation—both practices that are rare but still present in certain cultures (FdI 2022, section 12, par. 3).

Other conservative proposals relate to “the promotion of Italian culture through the enhancement of cultural, artistic, historical, archaeological, ethnological, archival, and bibliographic heritage,” as well as “the valorization of the 2025 Jubilee…and of Christianity,” while also “combatting cancel culture and iconoclasm that threaten the symbols of our identity” (FdI 2022, section 12, pars. 2 and 4). All of the above are inherently conservative positions, as they are clearly influenced by an awareness and respect for the extra-human dimension, as well as classical history and aesthetics. Furthermore, a similar green conservatism present in the 2018 program is showcased in the 2022 edition through state policies designed to prepare Italy to adapt to climate change (which, unlike PRR actors, FdI does not deny), with the addition of an “environment-friendly” quote by traditionalist thinker José Ortega y Gasset (FdI 2022, section 16, par. 1).

Ultimately, in sections “21,” “22,” “24,” and “25,” the reformist vein of conservatism—still tinged with populist “pro-people” aspects—emerges (FdI 2022, sections 21–25). First and foremost, FdI outlines its policies against mass migration, framing them within a classical—and not necessarily authoritarian or anti-democratic—communitarian “law and order” approach. The program states that “security is the core of social coexistence and guarantees development and well-being” (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 1). However, its conflation of forms of “new criminality” with illegal immigration, without any demonstrable evidence, may suggest that—despite its democratic credentials—it engages in a form of “paranoid style” in politics (see Hofstadter, 1965), evoking resentment typical of culturally nativist parties.

To put it succinctly, FdI calls for complete control of Italy’s territorial and maritime borders, including the use of military force to stop boats carrying migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers if necessary (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). The party also proposes using hot spots in non-EU countries (e.g., Albania) to process migrants and determine their eligibility to enter Italy (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). Importantly, it legitimizes these policies by claiming alignment with the Schengen Agreement and international law, further asserting that the EU has requested such measures to combat mass migration (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 4). This reflects the party’s effort to avoid appearing either Eurosceptic or extremist. FdI also clearly states its support for the “social inclusion of legal immigrants” within the labor system (FdI 2022, section 21, par. 3).

Second, the party advocates for a major constitutional reform: the introduction of Presidenzialismo (FdI 2022, section 24). This Presidential system is proposed to transform Italy into a more people-centric democracy—where majority rule and the “general will of the people” supersede the power of checks and balances and the interests of institutional elites. According to FdI, this reform would enhance the country’s political stability and improve the efficiency of decision-making (FdI 2022, section 24, par. 1). Notably, this has long been a key policy for the party and has appeared in earlier electoral manifestos and programs.

Third, the final section of the program (“25”) outlines FdI’s vision of Italian foreign policy. The party proudly affirms Italy’s identity as the “cradle of Western civilization” and a “founding member of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 1). Concurrently, FdI urges Italy to “return as a protagonist in Europe, after years of marginalization under left-wing governments” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 1). These positions—particularly the first—stand in stark contrast to those of typical PRR actors. While FdI emphasizes a foreign policy centered on protecting national interest and defending the homeland, it also reaffirms its “utmost respect for international alliances” and support for NATO’s defense spending commitments (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 2).

Moreover, the document states that, alongside Italy’s international allies, FdI will continue to support Ukraine in the face of the Russian Federation’s invasion (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 2). Thus, unlike other right-wing or PRR parties in Europe (e.g., AfD, ANO, Fidesz, Lega), FdI appears to be fully committed to an Atlanticist (pro-USA, pro-UK) and Europeanist (pro-EU) liberal conservatism in the context of foreign alliances and policy. It is known that, while PRR parties have been apologetic toward Putin’s campaign in Ukraine and other political causes (as he is perceived as a bulwark against “Islamization” and progressive liberalism), center-right conservatives have unequivocally condemned his invasion of another sovereign state. Further evidence of this positioning shift can be observed in a paragraph (in the same foreign policy section) where it is stated that FdI wishes to uphold the classical and Judeo-Christian values of Europe alongside its “fundamental values of liberty, democracy, solidarity, subsidiarity, and justice” (FdI 2022, section 25, par. 3).

Discussion: Categorizing “the Uncategorizable”

Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

Preliminary Analytical Considerations

At this stage, following an in-depth discourse and manifesto analysis, it should be noted that there are five main reasons (although the fourth and fifth are related) that make FdI nearly impossible to categorize as a populist political party. First, as briefly discussed, the party entered the political scene—essentially in 2013—as a moderate and conservative force, one whose logo featured the slogan centrodestra nazionale (“National Centre-Right”). After its second National Congress in December 2017 in Trieste, FdI partially shifted toward a populist radical right (PRR) orientation, only to subsequently return to a less populist and more moderately conservative stance. Essentially, the years between the Tesi di Trieste and the beginning of the electoral campaign preceding the 2022 general election marked FdI’s “populist phase,” where Giorgia Meloni, competing with other more successful right-wing parties such as the Lega (led by the firebrand Matteo Salvini), was forced to radicalize her message to some extent. In hindsight, this choice was influenced by realpolitik rather than ideology, in a time immediately after the refugee crisis and prolonged economic stagnation, when a populist zeitgeist (see Mudde, 2024), accompanied by general fear, angst, and preoccupation (see Wittgenstein, 2001), consolidated itself in Europe as a direct result of EU policies, especially regarding austerity and its evasive responses to unemployment and mass immigration.

Second, remaining on the subject of political shifts, even today its positions are often blurred between three right-leaning ideologies. As the manifesto analysis particularly showed, these are— in order of importance—conservatism, (right-wing) populism, and classical liberalism[17]. However, in the 2022 program, populism plays a truly marginal role compared to the other two ideologies, and liberalism also plays a secondary role compared to traditional conservatism. To put it simply, conservatism is always the primary ingredient in FdI’s political cocktail.

Conservative ideology drives FdI’s stances on the economy, welfare, family life, the immigration-integration debate, law and order, transnational alliances, and the role of the state in general. All factors considered, even if conservatism dominates FdI’s agenda, the fact that socio-economic liberalism and populism are also present and sporadically influence some of the aspects mentioned above still makes it difficult for scholars to draw definitive conclusions about the party’s overall ideology. This also, in part, explains why certain scholars have argued that populism is “…a popular variation of conservative thinking which is situated in a triangle between anarchism, liberalism, and conservatism” (Priester, 2007: 9). Not to mention, the existence of different forms of conservatism, liberalism, and populism adds further complexity to the matter.

Third, one of the party’s important programs—crucial for the diachronic element of this analysis—almost entirely disregards foreign policy, except for vague proposals such as the Marshall Plan for Africa. This is problematic because a party’s or government’s foreign policy is objectively an extension of its domestic political philosophy and priorities, or as former US Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey contended: “foreign policy is really domestic policy with its hat on” (see Foyle, 2017). For obvious reasons, foreign policy positions naturally mirror a political actor’s core ideology. In other words, a political actor’s foreign policy is ultimately an extension of its domestic policy (Eksteen, 2019). PRR parties tend to be isolationist, Eurosceptic (sometimes anti-American, usually anti-NATO), and economically nationalist or protectionist. Furthermore, although not all populists have identical foreign policies (Verbeek & Zaslove, 2017), they are often against humanitarian and military intervention abroad but are open to dialogue and trade with authoritarian regimes (e.g., Russia).

With this in mind, it would have been easier to make the case that FdI was a full-blown PRR party in 2018 if its foreign policy had been explicitly presented in its program. However, even then, FdI’s populist-conservative positions on domestic policy were not sufficiently radical to automatically ascribe the PRR acronym to the party.

Fourth, FdI is essentially a personalist party (Ventura, 2022: 3), but there is reason to believe that Meloni—both as an individual politician and state leader—is ideologically more moderate than her party’s parliamentary “elite,” who mostly originate from the youth wings of the old MSI, are AN veterans, or have militated in other groupuscules of the Italian (especially Roman) extreme right. Specifically, unlike Senator La Russa and a few other MPs, Meloni has condemned Italian Fascism and its infamous laws against Jews and other minorities, explaining that the Italian Right “has consigned fascism to history for decades now” (Meloni as cited in Mattera, 2022). As shown, she has also occasionally spoken favourably of legal immigration and long-standing international alliances, positioning Italy within a liberal-democratic Western and European geopolitical framework.

Fifth, as the discourse analysis demonstrates, the rhetoric utilized by FdI’s representatives (sometimes including Meloni) makes the party appear more radical than it is in terms of policy. To put it succinctly, as the author Erik Jones (2023) has already pointed out, “Meloni’s policy agenda does not seem as frightening as her rhetoric” (Jones, 2023: 21). This is especially evident when the party’s leader addresses controversial issues such as the increase in illegal immigration, its links to NGOs operating in the Mediterranean Sea, and the legal funding from private donors supporting political agendas that conflict with those of the Italian Right. All these factors contribute to significant confusion among scholars attempting to categorize FdI—whether as conservative, populist, or part of the extreme right. In any case, what transpires from both the manifesto and discourse analysis is that conservatism occupies a more prominent position compared to the other two ideologies. The following section of this contribution will provide further clarification on why conservatism is at the heart of FdI’s political ideology.

Discussion 

This study employed a methodological synthesis of discourse and manifesto analysis to identify the core ideology underlying FdI’s political agenda. To bridge the two qualitative methods, an ideological approach was applied, in which three distinct political ideologies – conservatism, populism, and right-wing extremism – were examined through the possible manifestation of their core characteristics (as minimally defined in the scholarly literature) within FdI’s public statements and party documents. 

In terms of discourse, the data gathered shows that FdI (specifically Meloni, but also Baldelli, Delmastro Delle Vedove, La Russa, Lollobrigida, and Procaccini) uses antagonistic and inflammatory rhetoric. Much of this rhetoric belongs to the ideological repertoire of populism as it is embedded with anti-elitism and people-centrism, as well as an attachment to the vaguer concept of volonté générale/ “general will.” Examples of the former two have transpired when Meloni states that the interests of the people come before anything else and juxtaposes her commitment to popular interest with that of financial and technocratic elites. Examples of the latter have transpired when important FdI MEPs such as Procaccini have (discursively) highlighted the EU’s moral duty to focus on the concrete needs of citizens and leave behind any past ideological affiliation. More indirect examples of populist ideology have been gathered by compiling statements made in parliament by MPs (e.g., Baldelli) and by Meloni in one of her extended interviews, where, in typical populist fashion, they delegitimize and demonize their opponents, particularly those who disagree with them on the immigration question.

However, this populist rhetoric often presents itself alongside other (more or less moderate) conservative statements that emphasize the control of societal change and an awareness of an extra-human (and natural) dimension to individual agency. Examples of FdI’s conservatism in discourse may include Meloni’s quoting of Chesterton and Scruton, her inherently civilizationist statements (in favor of the West and Christianity), her traditionalist pro-family messages, and her commitment to defending the Italian border. The border is considered something sacred within the collective imaginary and certainly beyond the selfish interests of the individual.

With that in mind, a much more populistic (or even “extremist”) form of conservatism, tainted by cultural nativism and holistic nationalism—which most of FdI’s opponents find pathological—has been found in a statement made by Lollobrigida in support of increasing the birthrate among autochthonous Italians. Accordingly, Italians are said to possess particular biological, cultural, and linguistic characteristics. Notwithstanding, the somewhat blurry threshold that exists between right-wing populism and right-wing extremism is only crossed by FdI’s Delmastro Delle Vedove MP, who has discussed punishment for offenders in deeply disturbing authoritarian and anti-democratic terms. However, this example of extreme right ideology in discourse is not sufficient to argue that the party is extremist per se, as these core concepts of right-wing extremism did not replicate in the manifesto analysis. Given that FdI’s public discourse includes not only elements of conservatism and populism—more precisely, a form of populist conservatism—but also, albeit infrequently, traits associated with a more authoritarian and nationalist extreme right, it can be argued that the party adopts a more radical stance in its rhetoric.

Despite all of this, it is the manifesto analysis that makes it clearer what core ideology drives FdI’s politics. By observing the data gathered from the 2018 and 2022 programs, it can be deduced that FdI is, overall, a (right-wing) conservative party, as there are undeniably more core concepts of conservatism than populism throughout. For example, typically conservative (pro-market, small-government) anti-bureaucracy and anti-tax measures (e.g. flat tax, no tax area) were found in both programs. Although FdI’s economic neoliberalism (which is compatible with cultural conservatism) is balanced with a more communitarian and “compassionate” populist conservatism that allows for a “Fiscal Peace” between small- and medium-sized entrepreneurs or families and the Italian state. The message FdI wants to convey is that it envisions a small but efficient state that trusts its people and protects them by adapting to their temporary economic necessities.

Also, in its 2022 program, FdI’s “social Right” and social market economy inclination comes to the fore increasingly compared to the 2018 program, simply because the former is more detailed and exhaustive. Even so, these socially conscious and partially populist and statist measures (e.g. third-sector support, increase of pensions, quoziente familiare, welfare reforms) coexist with more liberal-capitalist and laissez-faire positions on the economy. From a purely economic perspective, there was no real change in FdI’s position between 2018 and 2022. That said, the 2022 manifesto is more liberal (though not fully neoliberal in the financial sense) on social issues and foreign policy—as already stated, the latter is essentially nonexistent in the 2018 program.

Similarly, an “unofficial” defining element of contemporary populism, Euroscepticism, is not consistently present in either of the programs. Perhaps a very soft form of Euroscepticism (sometimes referred to as Euro-criticism) is found in the older program (2018), as the party calls for fewer regulatory/bureaucratic constraints from the EU and for the revision of some of its treaties. However, both elements largely disappear by the time the 2022 program is drafted, and FdI even correlates the new EU funds (NRRP) with an opportunity for growth and a means to distance European economies from Russia’s. Another trait correlated with the PRR, protectionism (see Loch, 2021: 79), is only briefly touched upon in one 2022 program policy, which supports tariffs to prevent the importation of lower-quality products (e.g. Italian Sounding) that do not meet EU health and safety standards. Not to mention, in the more recent document, the party’s idea of sovereignty or sovereignism is so abstract and vague (to the point that FdI argues the family unit fully represents this concept) that it cannot be directly correlated with a populist Euroscepticism.

In both electoral programs, conservative concepts—such as the will to manage or prevent societal alterations and the idea that there is an extra-human dimension to individual agency (as well as forces of nature that define a people)—take precedence over populist anti-elitism and people-centrism. Purely populist positions, inspired by anti-elitism and direct democracy—such as the reduction of MPs (2018 program), the “imperative mandate” (2018 program), and the direct election of the President (2018 and 2022)—do not bear the same weight in FdI’s agenda as the impulse to conserve and uphold tradition. FdI not only believes that a dangerous form of progress will alter the dynamics of traditional society for the worse, through the introduction of supposedly unnatural or artificial practices such as gay marriage, surrogacy, and high-tech (Chinese-modeled) social credit systems, but also that the spiritual and natural identity of the nation is in danger due to mass immigration. Conversely, both in 2018 and in 2022—but especially in the latter—FdI reconciles these traditional conservative stances with more liberal ones, spanning from its support for anti-racism, gender equality, renewable energy, secure (not precarious) employment, civil unions, and social aid for the most disadvantaged people.

Conclusion

Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, reacts during a handover ceremony at Chigi Palace in Rome, Italy on October 23, 2022. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

This study has analyzed FdI’s discourse and policy positions, showing that while the party cannot, under any circumstances, be classified as extreme right—given the absence or inconsistency of core ideological elements—it also cannot be accurately characterized as a full-blown populist party. Whereas FdI clearly exhibits populist discursive traits, the core features of populism (anti-elitism, people-centrism, volonté générale) do not play a leading role in its electoral programs, and it is, at best, debatable whether they do so in its broader discourse. In fact, even when anti-elitism and people-centrism do (sporadically) manifest, they are largely disconnected from a broader populist weltanschauung in which the will of the people is paramount and influences every aspect of policy within an electoral program. By contrast, conservatism—and its key concepts—plays a key role in defining FdI’s agenda between 2018 and 2022. The management of societal change, followed by an awareness of an extra-human dimension to individual agency, lies at the very heart of FdI’s programs, which certainly offer a window into the party’s political ideology.

FdI is a conservative party, with conservatism serving as the primary force behind its policy agenda and likely its discourse as well. However, given that populism still plays a marginal role—particularly in framing the party’s language against elites—it is also accurate to describe FdI as a “populist-Conservative” party, where populism functions as a secondary ideological layer. This is substantially different from labeling FdI as a “conservative-Populist” or “radical-right populist” party, which would imply that conservatism is either peripheral or absent—an interpretation that does not align with the party’s actual positions. Furthermore, FdI’s relatively liberal stances on certain domestic policy issues (such as civil rights concerning women, people from the gay community, and legal immigrants), as well as its Atlanticist and pro-European foreign policy, indicate that while the party remains rooted in traditional conservatism, it is gradually undertaking a trajectory toward liberal conservatism.

Future studies could adopt a more comparative approach, analysing FdI’s stances alongside other groups from its party family, which would mainly be found in the European Conservatives and Reformists Party (ECR) (e.g.  Czech Republic’s ODS or Poland’s PiS). Alternatively, comparisons could be drawn with more radical right-wing organizations, such as the Lega or AfD, to see where the commonalities between conservatism and radical-right populism or right-wing extremism reside, if there are any. Naturally, political ideologies can also be studied from a demand-side perspective, and accurate analysis of FdI’s rising electoral base can tell us more about this party’s future trajectory. Current trends suggest a movement toward the political center, rather than a drift toward the extremes.


(*)  DR. AMEDEO VARRIALE earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).


 

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Footnotes

[1] In addition to the “borderline cases” (mentioned in this work’s section discussing the extreme right), some of the parties belonging to the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group (active in the European Union’s Parliament) may require a more nuanced analysis as they are not easily categorizable.  

[2] This reference primarily pertains to the large-scale deregulation and privatization of state-owned industries, as well as the creation of a “new middle class” through an increase in home ownership, that occurred during both tenures.  

[3] Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (2015) have included the party founded by the Italian tycoon Berlusconi in their study of “populists in power”, however, they have also hinted that it is reasonable for scholars to classify this is a center-right or classical liberal party, rather than a strictly populist one (see Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2015: 17-33). Ultimately, the nature of this party remains matter of ongoing contention.

[4] Groupement de Recherche et d’Études pour la Civilisation Européenne (GRECE)

[5] The only interview used to gather data for analysis is the one published by Rizzoli in book form in 2023, where Giorgia Meloni was interviewed by a famous Italian journalist – Alessandro Sallusti. Many distinct subjects are touched upon during this interview, thus, it is unquestionably the source that allows the most comprehensive understanding of Meloni’s (and FdI’s) political views.  

[6] Essentially, this means addressing some of the shortcomings of liberalism and especially economic neoliberalism (e.g. wage inequality, displacement of labor) without questioning or undermining other aspects, such as the rule of law. 

[7] Atreju is an annual kermess form of event organized by FdI and its youth wing where political figures who oppose each other’s views are given the opportunity to debate in a cordial, civil and somewhat informal context.

[8] Mudde specifically defines nativism as “an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (‘the nation’) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007: 19). 

[9] A reportage made public in the summer of 2024 by the Italian news outlet fanpage.it (also specialized investigative journalism undercover) proved there have been neofascist infiltrations among FdI’s youth wing (Gioventù Nazionale) at an internal level (see fanpage.it, YouTube, June 26, 2024). 

[10] Original title: Un Programma Per L’Italia: Per La Crescita, La Sicurezza, Le Famiglie e La Piena Occupazione.

[11] For this concept, refer to Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2009). 

[12] See E.J. Hobsbawm (1990). 

[13] For examples of how populism and direct democracy relate to each other, see Mohrenberg et al. (2019).

[14] Original title: (Il programmaPronti a risollevare l’Italia. 

[15] Unsurprisingly, as someone devoted to the preservation and enhancement of Italy’s (and Europe’s) relationship with the USA (both during the Joe Biden and Trump terms) Meloni has been conferred the “Global Citizen Award” by the Atlantic Council in New York City in September 2024 (see Vista Agenzia Televisiva Nazionale, 2024; see also Fortuna and Genovese, 2025).

[16] In the Italian context this is not finance-banking (like in certain countries of the Anglosphere) but a reference to the voluntary work sector (charities, churches, etc.). 

[17] While foreign scholars may struggle to accept Meloni’s new liberal image, some Italian journalists have described her as undergoing a “political metamorphosis” (e.g. Cangini, 2022) or as adopting (a typically radical right) statist stance with allies and a liberal anti-statist one with opponents (e.g. Muratore, 2023). 

A distressed Black woman professional faces gender discrimination and workplace bullying, as male colleagues point fingers and place blame. The image highlights the emotional toll of inequality and harassment in professional environments. Photo: Dreamstime.

“No One Can Make You Feel Inferior Without Your Consent”: Is Eleanor Roosevelt Right?

Can we truly choose not to feel inferior? In this thought-provoking commentary, Syed Yousha Haider critically examines Eleanor Roosevelt’s famous quote, “No one can make you feel inferior without your consent.” Blending insights from psychology, neuroscience, philosophy, and social theory, Haider explores the limits of agency in the face of trauma, social conditioning, and structural inequality. While celebrating resilience and self-determination, he also challenges oversimplified notions of empowerment. This essay invites readers to reflect on the complex dynamics of self-worth, consent, and resistance in a world where internal struggles are often shaped by forces far beyond the individual.

By Syed Yousha Haider*

Eleanor Roosevelt’s much-quoted maxim—”No one can make you feel inferior without your consent”—has traveled a long way from its origins as a personal empowerment mantra. The quote says that individual choice is more important than what other people think, based on ideas about agency, dignity, and self-concept. But beneath its catchy simplicity lies a philosophical paradox: is it ever in our choice to refuse consent to feelings of inferiority? Are these kinds of feelings, at least in part, caused by social, psychological, and even neurobiological processes that we can’t control? This essay argues that Roosevelt’s maxim, as inspiring as it is, is only partially true. Individual agency is essential to self-perception, but the action of structural forces, psychological conditioning, and automatic cognitive processes complicate the idea that one can simply choose not to feel inferior.

The Appeal of Personal Agency

People still use Roosevelt’s quote because it fits with the liberal humanist idea of the self-governing person. For example, Stoic philosophy heard Epictetus say, “It’s not what happens to you, but how you react to it that matters.” It seems like there is strength inside despite what is going on outside. Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) is probably the most scientifically-based type of psychotherapy. It also believes that how we feel is based on how we think about things, not the events themselves. This view says that changing the way you talk to yourself can help you get over feelings of inferiority and move on.

Also, there are literally countless examples from history of people who have overcome feelings of inferiority even though the system tried to make them feel less important. Viktor E. Frankl, a survivor of the Holocaust, famously said in his book Man’s Search for Meaning that the last of the human freedoms is “to choose one’s attitude in any given set of circumstances.” Many people point to Frankl’s ability to survive extreme dehumanization as proof that accepting one’s inferiority is a choice..

After serving 27 years in prison for refusing to change his beliefs to suit apartheid’s demands, Nelson Mandela came out of prison with his dignity unharmed and guided South Africa through a peaceful transition. The strength of agency against humiliation is demonstrated by the fact that he was able to maintain his dignity despite institutional racism. After surviving a Taliban assassination attempt, Malala Yousafzai transformed personal hardship into a global movement for girls’ education. Her refusal to submit in the face of patriarchal violence is a brilliant illustration of how victims can become empowered..

The idea that people are powerless in the face of hardship is refuted by the resilience philosophy. The study of learned optimism by Dr. Martin Seligman emphasizes how our mental habits can influence how we react to criticism and failure. People can develop what Seligman refers to as “psychological immunity”—a defense against internalized inferiority—by confronting negative internal monologues and redefining failures as temporary and external. Roosevelt’s ideal can then be seen as psychologically realized through the development of optimism and internal locus of control.

Limits of Consent: Neuropsychological Constraints

However, this utopian vision is obscured by current psychological and neuroscientific research. Cognitive processes related to self-worth are not always under conscious control. The Default Mode Network (DMN) is primarily outside of conscious awareness and is active during self-referential cognition and daydreaming. In order to construct a cohesive sense of self, it is known to combine memories, emotions, and imagined situations, maintaining negative self-beliefs without conscious consent.

Furthermore, unconscious bias affects how we view ourselves from an early age. Implicit Association Tests demonstrate how years of exposure to social stereotypes can cause people to internalize group stereotype attitudes toward members of their own group, such as women being biased against women in positions of power. These are kept in the brain areas responsible for moral and emotional judgments, the prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, demonstrating the neurobiological basis of negative self-perceptions.

Though unconscious, the trauma survivors feel ashamed and inferior. It has been observed that distorted self-perceptions, such as guilt and worthlessness, are more potent than logical thought in people with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). These are neurophysiologic reactions rather than choices, and correcting them usually requires a lengthy therapeutic intervention. In these situations, inferiority is more neurologically motivated than widely accepted.

Additionally, early attachment orientations are crucial in determining self-esteem and vulnerability to feelings of inadequacy, according to affective neuroscience research. A child who experiences emotional abuse or neglect may grow up with a persistent internal schema of worthlessness. The internalized, which was solidified during brain-sensitive developmental stages, restricts the person’s capacity to “withdraw consent” from inferiority complexes as an adult.

Second, feelings of inferiority might have adaptive roots, according to evolutionary psychology. Humans were made to live in small communities where access to resources and partners depended heavily on status and belonging. One adaptation that might have developed in order to survive is hypersensitivity to social rejection. However, this evolutionary baggage now shows up as irrational and habitual feelings of inferiority, especially in hierarchical environments like online forums, workplaces, and schools.

Social and Structural Determinants of Inferiority

In addition to the psychology of the individual, social structures also produce and enforce inferiority. Language, the media, and institutions are all infused with heteronormativity, which tends to dictate who is capable, desirable, or deserving. Symbolic violence, as defined by Pierre Bourdieu, describes how dominant social groups impose meanings that are internalized as acceptable. For example, colonial education systems used to portray colonized people as intellectually inferior; this claim is still present in the disparities in academic accreditation around the world.

Erving Goffman studied how stigma, or the discrediting of people for supposedly deviating from the norm, contributes to feelings of shame and undesirableness. According to his theory, the stigmatized individual absorbs society’s scrutiny and agrees to being inferior out of social pressure rather than choice. This consent is not voluntary; it is coerced.

According to the “stereotype threat,” as defined by social psychologist Claude Steele, people perform less well when they are concerned about reinforcing unfavorable stereotypes about their identity category. For instance, when race is emphasized on tests, African American students do worse—not because they think they are less capable, but rather because the cultural script instills fear, which impairs performance. Such scripts can effectively short-circuit the will by altering behavior and thought.

Another sociocultural phenomenon is groupthink. People will repress contradictory self-concepts in order to preserve group harmony, embracing the flawed consensus. Conventional instances, like discouraging women’s aspirations for education or politics, demonstrate how social norms can force internalization of inferiority.

Furthermore, social media has given rise to new channels for the propagation of inferiority. Social media platforms like Instagram and TikTok propagate idealized beauty standards and manufactured lives, creating a culture of comparison that undermines self-worth. Younger generations, particularly teenage girls, are disproportionately targeted by algorithmic promotion of idealized imagery, which contributes to the rise in anxiety and depression. Here, inferiority is fostered by repeated exposure to distorted norms rather than being elected outright.

Such effects are amplified by intersectionality. The accumulation of marginalization experiences is demonstrated by Kimberlé Crenshaw’s intersectional matrix of oppressive systems, which includes racism, sexism, and classism. Black women who are economically marginalized may encounter overlapping social messages that portray them as inferior in multiple ways. These messages, which are delivered through cultural imagery and institutional norms, carry a cumulative psychological burden that is difficult to deny.

Resisting Inferiority: Possibility and Limits

Resistance is evident in opposition to these limits. The recovery of the imposed identity of inferiority has already been demanded by feminist and postcolonial theorists. “Caring for myself is not self-indulgence, it is self-preservation,” as Audre Lorde insists, is a rejection of internalizing the condemnation of the world. Black Pride and LGBTQ+ affirmations are just two examples of grassroots movements that have successfully challenged hegemonic discourses and empowered people to reject internalized oppression.

The solution to this difficulty lies in education. According to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the oppressed must be able to recognize internalized inferiority brought on by systemic injustice and recover their dignity via critical thinking, or conscientization. Only with time, resources, and support groups—things that not everyone has access to—can it be accomplished.

The ability to challenge hegemonic narratives and reinterpret value on their own terms has been made possible by cyberspace. Default inferiority narratives are countered by discourses like #BlackGirlMagic and #DisabledAndProud. In addition to being empowering in and of themselves, these claims also have a cumulative effect by changing the broader cultural environment.

However, not all attempts at resistance are successful. The enduring resilience of systemic powers is demonstrated by the continued existence of racial profiling, wage inequality, and underrepresentation in leadership positions. One’s identity is typically determined by societal approval, even if you fight valiantly against subordinating ideologies. The internal conflict gets harder to sustain when one lacks acceptance and a sense of belonging.

However, resilience-building programs enable psychological resistance. Education and mental health programs that promote self-advocacy, growth mindsets, and trauma-informed care are essential. Instead of opposing systemic forces, these empower individuals to challenge internalized narratives. Roosevelt’s assertion is interpreted by adults as an invitation to build internal strength in tandem with structural change, rather than as a rejection of putting up with oppression.

The Philosophical Implications of Consent

Roosevelt only used the word “consent” to refer to a deliberate action. However, in ethics and the law, consent must be given voluntarily and free from coercion. Consent to be in a subordinate position cannot be based on psychological conditioning, neurobiology, or societal power dynamics that reduce one’s agency and awareness.

Here, it’s important to distinguish between “responsibility” and “causality.” One can be held accountable for facing their own shortcomings over time, even if they were never the direct cause of them. This nuanced stance maintains the moral requirement of agency while rejecting the all-powerful forces that exist within our inner selves.

The “dialogical self” theory of philosopher Charles Taylor makes consent more difficult to understand. According to Taylor, identity is socially constructed through interactions with other people rather than something that is determined for oneself. Feelings of inferiority could be exogenously programmed rather than endogenously generated if selfhood is relational. Roosevelt’s statement may therefore be exaggerated in light of the extent to which an individual can create their own sense of self-worth.

Jean-Paul Sartre and other existentialist philosophers support radical freedom and self-creation. His theory that “existence precedes essence” holds that people must create their identities consciously since they are not born with predetermined natures. According to this viewpoint, willpower alone is sufficient to overcome inferiority complexes. But Sartre also introduced the idea of “bad faith,” which acknowledges the limitations of volition and refers to people lying to themselves in order to escape the responsibility that comes with freedom. In The Ethics of Belief, philosopher William Clifford makes the case that it is immoral to hold beliefs in the absence of adequate evidence. When used in this context, inferiority complexes that are based on erroneous social or psychological assumptions are illogical and ought to be disregarded. However, Thomas Nagel argues that human subjectivity cannot be avoided; irrational feelings, such as inferiority, are.

Conclusion

A powerful affirmation of human dignity and inner strength is the Eleanor Roosevelt maxim. However, it would be oversimplifying the combined influence of psychological, biological, and social factors on self-perception to claim that no one can ever make us feel inferior if we do not consent. Although agency still functions, it must be understood in the context of limitations. Since Roosevelt’s assertion that reassertion of value is as much a matter of will as it is of struggle against forces of inheritance, the reality is not so much a question of its complete cancellation or confirmation. Therefore, empowerment is more about knowing on what terms to give consent than it is about refusing it.


 

(*) Syed Yousha Haider is a student with a growing interest in understanding the human mind and behavior. In his own words, he has always been curious about what drives people to think, feel, and act the way they do. This curiosity, combined with his desire to understand himself and others better, naturally led him to explore the field of psychology. While he is still learning, he finds joy in asking questions, noticing patterns in emotions, and reflecting on the deeper reasons behind everyday choices. For him, psychology is more than a subject—it is a way to connect with people, understand their stories, and perhaps even help make sense of his own.

Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University.

Professor Hanson: Trump’s Patrimonial Rule Treats the State as Personal Property and Undermining Impartial Governance

In a thought-provoking interview with the ECPS, Professor Stephen E. Hanson unpacks how US President Donald Trump exemplifies a growing global trend of patrimonial rule. Professor Hanson argues that Trump governs as if the state was his personal property—distributing power to loyalists, undermining impartial governance, and attacking state institutions. Drawing comparisons to Russia, Hungary, and Brazil, he warns of long-term damage to democratic institutions. Professor Hanson stresses the need for renewed public trust in government and a collective effort to counteract the erosion of modern governance.

 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Stephen E. Hanson, the Lettie Pate Evans Professor in the Department of Government at William & Mary University, offers a compelling analysis of the erosion of modern governance under US President Donald Trump. Drawing on his co-authored works The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, Professor Hanson argues that Trump’s presidency exemplifies a broader 21st-century resurgence of patrimonial rule—a system in which leaders govern as if the state were their personal property.

Professor Hanson underscores that “the key features [of Trump’s governance] are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.” This, he argues, is a defining characteristic of patrimonialism, a governance style that many assumed had been relegated to history but is now re-emerging in modern democracies.

Through the course of the interview, Professor Hanson details how Trump’s administration actively worked to dismantle bureaucratic institutions, a trend he links to similar developments in Russia, Hungary, Turkey and Brazil. He explains that Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results—mirroring tactics used by patrimonial rulers—posed unprecedented risks to American democracy, undermining public trust in institutions like the electoral system and the judiciary.

Professor Hanson also addresses the long-term consequences of Trump’s governance, particularly in how it has fueled distrust in expertise and weakened state capacity. He describes how, under Trump, public service was increasingly devalued, discouraging young professionals from pursuing government careers. “At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized,” he warns, emphasizing that rebuilding state institutions will be a daunting, long-term challenge.

Yet, Professor Hanson remains hopeful, advocating for a reassertion of the state as a force for public good. He stresses the need for new strategies to counteract patrimonialism, urging scholars, policymakers, and civil society to shift the discourse toward defending democratic governance. His insights offer a sobering but essential perspective on the ongoing assault on the modern state—and what can be done to reverse it.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Stephen E. Hanson with some edits.

How Trump’s Governance Undermined the Modern State

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

Professor Hanson, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In “Understanding the Global Patrimonial Wave,” you discuss the resurgence of patrimonial rule. How does Trump’s presidency fit into this framework, and what long-term effects might his style of governance have on American democracy?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Thanks for this question. I want to begin by acknowledging my co-author, Jeffrey Kopstein, who, of course, can’t join us for this interview, but everything we’ve done together is a completely equal collaboration. So I always begin by acknowledging his great work.

We do think, sadly, that our predictions in The Global Patrimonial Wave and The Assault on the State, the book we’ve just published, have unfortunately come true. The Trump administration, in its early weeks, has fulfilled these predictions practically, and we believe that our warning was, unfortunately, quite prescient.

Now, what did we see coming down the road? We argued that this new version of patrimonial rule is really a wave of the entire 21st century and quite unexpected. The old literature on patrimonialism—or neopatrimonialism, as it was often called—assumed it was a relic of traditional society destined to be overthrown by modernity. You might see periods of patrimonial interludes, particularly in the developing world, but nobody had predicted patrimonialism of the 19th-century sort, or even earlier, in countries like the US, Israel, the UK, much of Central and Eastern Europe, and now threatening the world.

So, we’ll discuss more details about the Trump administration in this interview, but the key features are that the ruler governs the entire state as if it were his personal possession, viewing the state as a kind of family business. He distributes parts of the state and its protection to loyalists, cronies, and even family members directly. At the same time, he attacks the impersonal and impartial administration of the state as an obstacle to his arbitrary power.

All of this comes directly from Max Weber, and in a way, we are simply applying Weber’s analysis to these unexpected 21st-century cases.

You highlight how strong bureaucratic institutions played a key role in managing the COVID-19 pandemic. How did the Trump administration’s approach to governance impact the US response to the crisis, and do you see lasting damage to state capacity?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We discuss this extensively in both the book and the article. What we argue is that patrimonial-style politics is fundamentally ill-suited for handling global pandemics. The first casualty of patrimonialism is the public good because governance is not about serving the public—it’s about fulfilling the private will of the ruler.

As a result, we see poor performances in countries governed by patrimonial rulers. If we compare data statistically, countries like Russia under Putin and the US under Trump performed very poorly. Patrimonial states tend to foster both distrust in the government—which discourages people from getting vaccinated or trusting experts—and the arbitrariness of the ruler himself. Trump’s public appearances, for example, where he seemingly endorsed sunlight as a cure for COVID-19 or suggested injecting bleach in front of his expert advisors, contributed to the excess death toll in the US compared to countries like Canada, which handled the crisis much more effectively.

Now, there are instances where patrimonial-style rulers managed certain aspects of the pandemic well. For example, Operation Warp Speed under Trump led to the rapid development of the vaccine, and Netanyahu’s vaccination campaigns in Israel were quite effective. However, we argue that these successes were not the result of patrimonial rule itself but rather the legacy of state-building efforts that predated these leaders. They were able to deploy existing state capacity, experts, and institutions in response to the crisis. But, of course, if the state is eroded too much over time, those resources will no longer be available in the future.

Rethinking Regimes: Why the Democracy-Autocracy Divide Is Not Adequate

Elon Musk speaks at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) at the Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center on February 20, 2025, in Oxon Hill, Maryland. Photo: Andrew Harnik.

Your work discusses the global trend of leaders undermining bureaucratic institutions. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this, and what challenges does this pose for future administrations attempting to restore trust in expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The book is called The Assault on the State, and I think one reason it’s now getting some attention is that the title encapsulates what we expected to happen under Trump. Maybe even we were surprised by the extent of the assault on the state. It’s not just an attack on the so-called “deep state” as a rhetorical device—it’s an actual effort to dismantle the entirety of the US federal government. With DOGE, the agency essentially created out of the blue and directed by Elon Musk in all but name, they are now going into every single state agency in the United States. They have very young people, between the ages of 18 and 25, embedded in agencies, looking at files, personnel issues, and money flows.

While there has been some effort lately to cut that back—largely due to the anger of Trump’s Cabinet ministers—it is still in place. The long-term damage to state capacity is incalculable.

So all of this fits within our framework, but in an extreme form. I’ll add one thing that might actually be a bit surprising—and perhaps even, in a strange way, good for those of us who want to restore the state. This is happening so quickly that the damaging effects will become apparent sooner rather than later. If that happens, maybe public opposition can also be mobilized more quickly.

You argue that traditional democracy/autocracy classifications are insufficient. Given Trump’s attempts to subvert democratic norms, where would you place his presidency within your broader conceptual framework?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: One of the arguments in the book that has actually been a little bit controversial—and difficult to convey to people—is that we really don’t think the democracy-autocracy divide is adequate to understand this phenomenon. It’s ingrained in how we think about political regimes; it’s the standard framework used by political scientists, social scientists, and journalists alike.

When we talk about regime types in political science, people assume it’s a scale measured by V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy), Polity, or Freedom House. In each case, there’s a line ranging from positive—representing the most democratic—to negative—representing the most autocratic.

One reason we failed to recognize the rise of patrimonialism earlier is that it doesn’t fit into this framework. A patrimonial-style ruler can win free and fair elections repeatedly. In some cases, they even thrive in electoral competition. Trump is a great example of this, as is Boris Johnson. These leaders leverage populist tropes, portray machismo, and rail against the so-called “deep state” bureaucracy or, in the case of Europe, anti-EU politicians in Brussels. This rhetoric has a strong popular appeal, allowing them to win elections handily.

When they do, it becomes difficult to argue that they are anti-democratic, given that they just won an election. So, we argue that the axis needs to change. Our analysis must shift to a second dimension: impersonal versus personalized state governance. This concept is rooted in Weberian sociology.

If this is an independent axis, it implies that there are four regime types, not just two. You can have bureaucratically rational democracies—Denmark or Canada come to mind. You can also have personalized democracies, which are patrimonial—this is the US under Trump. Similarly, you can have personalized autocracies, which are quite common, and bureaucratic autocracies, like Singapore or the 19th-century Prussian Rechtsstaat model.

If this two-by-two framework holds, then we need to recognize that patrimonialism can exist within democratic systems without immediately eroding their democratic nature. In cases like the Philippines, voters essentially choose which patrimonial clan will rule—whether it’s Duterte’s or the Marcos family’s—but the patrimonial style remains constant. These hybrid forms of governance challenge our traditional political science classifications, requiring us to rethink how we analyze regime types.

The Legacy of Trump’s Election Denial

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Trump’s refusal to accept the 2020 election results mirrors tactics used by patrimonial rulers. How does this compare to other historical or global cases, and what risks does it pose for future US elections?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: Well, connecting to what we just talked about, the January 6th events and Trump’s unwillingness to admit defeat are somewhat unusual in these cases. The reason for that is that, typically, you either have a clear-cut electoral victory—like Orbán in Hungary, where he wins elections that propel him to absolute power, securing a parliamentary supermajority that allows him to amend the constitution over time—or you have leaders who reluctantly step aside without outright denying their defeat. In Orbán’s case, the space for democratic competition clearly erodes, but it happens through legal mechanisms. He doesn’t need to claim the election was fake because, in fact, he won.

There may be some elements of this with Boris Johnson’s departure, where he was reluctant to step down and continued to complain that his downfall was somehow orchestrated by others. However, he never actually claimed he deserved to be the permanent ruler, and, of course, he exited through parliamentary means rather than an election dispute.

In this respect, Trump’s insistence that he never lost the election, that it was all rigged, and that the so-called “deep state” blocked his victory is somewhat unusual in the annals of these regime types. However, it has played a significant role in further undermining trust in US state institutions—particularly in voting systems, ballot counting, and electronic voting machines.

This poses a serious issue going forward. While, as I mentioned earlier, you can have a patrimonial democracy that remains competitive, it does erode the quality of democracy over time. If the public becomes convinced that the ballot box is rigged and that votes are fake, then eventually, supporters can be persuaded that their candidate won even when they actually lost. This, of course, can lead to even worse regime outcomes.

Western Democracy in Crisis

Your research connects US political shifts to broader global patterns. Does Trump’s rise signal a deeper systemic failure in Western democracies, and how can the US counteract these trends moving forward?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It’s definitely a bad situation. And we should add—Jeff and I are definitely in favor of democracy. Sometimes we get asked this question: “You’re so concerned about the State. Would you rather have a Reichstadt with no democracy than a democracy that’s patrimonial in some ways?” And the answer to that question is that we don’t have to make that choice.

The reality right now is that there’s no Reichstadt or a Singapore-style uncorrupted autocracy on offer. The only options available are populism in a democratic context and patrimonialism in the state context versus the old forms of liberal, rational-legal order, to use Weber’s terminology.

So part of our goal is to reclaim the State as a positive entity. We’ve seen it is bashed for so long from both the left and the right. Libertarians argue that the State is a block to liberty. On the left, critics see the military-industrial complex and the surveillance state as suppressing the people’s will. Religious nationalists believe the State is too secular and is stamping out religious life—and this isn’t just in the US but also in places like Russia. It’s different religious traditionalisms, but with the same kind of complaint.

The idea that the secular modern state is a good thing, that it helps protect the public welfare, is often missing from our political discourse. When you defend the State, you sound like you’re upholding an old, discredited status quo. But we should recognize that it’s not actually the status quo—that’s the whole problem.

This also connects to another issue. We are definitely in the camp that says neoliberalism has a lot to answer for over the last 30 years. The notion that the State should be reconstructed solely in service of markets, that it should be downsized as much as possible to become more efficient, or that the old welfare state was bloated and ineffective—those arguments, we believe, did significant damage. The financial crises of 2008 and then 2010–11 convinced many that the so-called meritocrats were not meritocratic, that the experts weren’t actually experts, that they didn’t know what they were doing, and that they didn’t care about ordinary people.

So now the task is to clarify that what failed was not the welfare state, nor the old establishment—it was a new group who came in, believing the establishment was inefficient and trying to dismantle the State. In some ways, returning to the State as a source and defender of public goods does not take us back to neoliberalism. It takes us further back—to the idea that the people can own the State, that the State can be democratic, and, ironically, that it can be truly republican in the sense of being a public institution that ordinary citizens own and connect to.

The Breaking of the Bureaucratic State: Can US Institutions Recover?

In ‘The Assault on the State,’ you argue that modern government is under attack. How does Trump’s presidency exemplify this trend, particularly regarding the erosion of democratic institutions and bureaucratic expertise?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: What’s happening in my country right now is painful to watch, especially for those of us closely connected to the production of expertise. I’m a university professor, and many of our students and graduate students go on to work in the federal government.

They do things like work on climate change, secure military bases against flooding, prepare for future pandemics, and test new vaccines. Even before the Trump administration, it was sometimes difficult to convince young people to join public service. Many would say, I can make more money in the private sector, or the public sector is too slow, too bureaucratic. But despite these concerns, we still managed to attract a number of brilliant young people every year who were willing to commit their entire careers to public service.

Now, that pipeline is nearly broken. At this moment, no one in their right mind would join the federal government—massive layoffs are happening, and every office is being downsized. But the bigger issue is long-term: How do you convince people that this won’t happen again? How do you get young professionals to invest years in degrees and early-career government positions when they know that the next administration could just come in and fire everyone again?

The damage is much more severe than just a single administration. The US may be the most extreme case, but we see versions of this pattern in every patrimonial system. Take the Tusk government in Poland—they’re struggling to restore trust in the judiciary and undo the changes made by the PiS party. Rebuilding state institutions is incredibly difficult. The old joke applies here: It’s a lot easier to turn an aquarium into fish soup than it is to turn fish soup back into an aquarium.

The destruction of the State leaves behind a mess that takes years, even decades, to repair. So I think we have to be very realistic about the crisis we face. This won’t be fixed with just one or two elections. Those of us who care about democratic states that provide public goods in the modern world—and I hope that’s a lot of people—will have to start with education, collective action, and actively countering this disastrous assault on institutions that truly matter.

Loyalty Is the Most Important Currency in Trump’s America

US President Donald Trump applauds from the White House balcony during a welcoming ceremony for the Washington Nationals baseball team on the South Lawn in Washington, D.C., on November 4, 2019. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

Trump frequently positioned himself against the “deep state,” portraying government institutions as adversaries. To what extent do you see this rhetoric as a deliberate political strategy versus a genuine ideological stance?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I don’t think patrimonial rulers are best understood as ideological. That’s the big difference between patrimonialism and fascism—certainly compared to Nazism. Leaders like Hitler and Mussolini had ideologies; they had visions of the future. You could say those visions were crackpot or outright evil, and certainly they were. But their argument was: We know where we’re leading this new empire—it will be racially pure, or it will be a resurrection of Roman virtue. Young people will imbibe this spirit, march in step, and be mobilized.

In contrast, patrimonialism tends to demobilize society. This was true of the old Tsarist style of rule, as well as older monarchies and other non-ideological regimes, which essentially said: Let the ruler take care of the state; it’s his personal possession—gender intended. Ordinary people, the Narod in Russian (the masses), were not supposed to have a direct connection to the state, which is the opposite of fascism and other mobilizational ideologies.

When it comes to Trump himself, there’s clearly no coherent ideology. He has shifted positions on all sorts of issues, but people make the mistake of assuming that means he has no center at all. He does—his center is that he alone can fix it. He sees himself as the anointed leader—now even believing that he is divinely chosen—to govern America’s patrimony.

The consistent theme underlying everything he does is that loyalty is the most important currency. If you’re not perfectly loyal, he will punish you. The deep state, those with expertise in impersonal legal norms, are actually “fakers” who need to be destroyed. And the US itself should be treated as the property of the ruling party, the ruling state, and, ultimately, the ruling household—namely, the Trump family.

We even see echoes of imperial-style patrimonialism here. Historically, patrimonial rulers made claims on territories that were supposedly part of their rightful domain. Putin, for example, asserts that Ukraine is inherently part of Russia. Now, with Trump, we start to see similar rhetoric—claims that Greenland, Canada, or even Panama somehow “belong” to the US. This imperialist mindset, tied to a patrimonial vision of governance, is something to watch closely.

Misinformation Thrives When ‘People Are Not Hearing Both Perspectives in Real Time

Your studies highlight how distrust in government is often fueled by misinformation. How did Trump’s presidency contribute to this, and what long-term effects do you foresee on public trust in US institutions?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: It really is a big part of the problem—no question. Social media, the internet more generally, the decline of local newspapers, and, again, the decline of trust in the so-called legacy media have made it much more difficult to get a coherent message out. Not everybody would have agreed with it, but at least elites in local politics across each state in the US, in each major city, used to have some common points of reference.

Back in the day, it was impossible to make a completely baseless claim and have it be repeated by media outlets all over the United States. That simply couldn’t have happened because not only did you have professional journalists reporting in each locality, but there was also the Fairness Doctrine—before the Reagan administration eliminated it. Under this rule, if you made one claim, you had to allow equal space for the opposing claim.

These sound like quaint notions now, but we actually need to return to them. Restoring the Fairness Doctrine would go a long way. I don’t know exactly how you would enforce it in today’s environment, but imagine if every podcaster or news show that put out an outrageous claim—say, all the election machines are rigged—had to give equal time immediately after for someone to say, ‘Actually, there’s no evidence for that whatsoever, and the people making this claim have been thoroughly debunked.’ Right now, people are not hearing both perspectives in real time. They are only hearing their point of view, and that clearly makes rebuilding trust difficult.

One last comparative point: If you look at the history of failed democracies, it’s not just social media that causes breakdowns. Weimar Germany famously fell into extreme party polarization, leading to a situation where budgets couldn’t be passed, and the political deadlock ultimately created the conditions for autocracy and Nazism. And all of that happened well before social media or the internet.

So, while misinformation and echo chambers exacerbate these crises today, they are not the only ways societies break down. However, once polarization takes hold, and each side of a divided society finds its own media outlets to reinforce its perspective—while completely distrusting all others—then it becomes incredibly difficult to restore public trust in government institutions.

Putin Is the Starting Point for the 21st-Century Wave of Patrimonialism

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

You discuss the global assault on modern governance. In what ways did Trump’s administration mirror or influence similar movements in countries like Hungary, Brazil, or the UK under Brexit leadership?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: The question of where it began is part of our book, and we make a claim that people found hard to believe but that we really stand by: it started with Putin.

We argue this partly through chronology. If you look carefully at the evidence before the rise of Putin in 2000 and the decades after, you had populism, of course—as you know better than anyone. There were plenty of populist movements in Europe, and they would rise on the far right or far left. They would sometimes gain parliamentary representation and make coalition-building difficult, but they never formed governments.

They were either systematically excluded from governance by pacts among mainstream parties, or they simply never achieved the electoral success to do so. The one breakthrough before Putin was Berlusconi and Forza Italia, where he briefly became Prime Minister in the 1990s. But his quick loss of power proves the rule—only after 2000, with a very close alliance with Putin, did Berlusconi’s leadership begin to take on more familiar patrimonial features.

So we place a lot of emphasis on Putin’s example. We think this is both emulation and direct support. It’s true that the Putin regime has funded pro-Russian parties worldwide, particularly in Europe. They have also pushed disinformation campaigns that serve the interests of the Russian Federation and its increasingly imperial ambitions.

Take Brexit, for example—the UK Parliamentary Commission concluded that Russia’s role in disinformation mattered in the referendum. Moscow has not been passive in this process. But beyond that, we argue the biggest factor was people simply looking at Putin’s model and realizing: “It never occurred to us before that you could build a 19th-century-style state in the 21st century—but look at what this guy has done.”

People thought Russia was finished. To quote a famous 2001 headline, Russia was seen as a laughingstock. International relations realists ignored it. And yet, Putin managed to reassert Russia as a great power, influencing global events—from Syria to US elections. Those who hated the liberal center, mostly on the right, but also some on the left, began saying: “Whatever’s going on in Russia, we need to figure it out. This guy has proven we no longer have to listen to the experts. We can beat the technocrats. We can restore traditional forms of machismo, religious veneration, and hierarchy.”

This emulation factor was very direct—for Orbán, for Netanyahu, and many others. These are empirical links, not speculation. People were surprised by our argument at first. But now, with recent events—including Trump’s presidency and the invasion of Ukraine—more people are asking us: “Did you really say Russia was the starting point for this?” Yes. That’s exactly what we said.

Patrimonialism Is Gaining Momentum—How Do We Stop It?

Even after his presidency, Trump’s influence may remain strong in shaping Republican politics. Do you see the attack on modern government as a continuing movement, and how might a second Trump term escalate these trends?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: I’m hoping when you say ‘a second Trump term,’ you mean this one—not the one that would come after. There’s already a lot of talk about amending the Constitution in the United States or reinterpreting it in a way that would allow him to serve beyond this term. This is very reminiscent of discussions in Russia in the 2000s, when Putin had to circumvent the official two-term limit in the Russian Constitution—first by installing his Prime Minister and then by changing the Constitution to allow himself to rule indefinitely.

These kinds of discussions matter for your question because, ultimately, these leaders must first be defeated before we can talk about reversing these trends. As long as they remain in power, the patrimonial style of governance will continue to be a dominant force—as everyone in the world can now see.

This is especially problematic when even China under Xi Jinping, while still a Leninist state with Leninist institutions, is increasingly taking on patrimonial features—with Xi posing as the father of the nation and asserting patrimonial rights to territories around China.

When China, the United States, and Russia—and to some extent Turkey, India, and Brazil—all lean in this direction, it becomes extremely challenging for the Macrons, the Scholzes, and the Starmers of the world. The remaining leaders who support modern democratic institutions are now struggling to figure out how to protect what’s left. So, the immediate problem is simply figuring out how to win in an increasingly lopsided world where patrimonialism is gaining momentum.

The longer-term challenge, which we discussed earlier, is about rebuilding a vision for the future—one that defends a modern, liberal state in the US (though, ironically, you can’t even use the word “liberal” anymore without it being dismissed as leftist radicalism or Marxism).

There is an enormous rhetorical and mobilizational challenge ahead—convincing ordinary citizens to resist these trends by making the case that patrimonialism doesn’t serve their public welfare. It doesn’t create a fair society. It fosters corruption, undermines integrity, and ignores public opinion. All of these principles—fairness, accountability, and good governance—depend on the survival of the modern state. Now is the time to spread that message.

The State Itself Is Under Assault—Democracy Comes Next

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

And lastly, Professor Hanson, if modern governance is indeed under siege, what steps can be taken—either by policymakers, scholars, or civil society—to rebuild public trust in democratic institutions and counter the assault on the state?

Professor Stephen E. Hanson: We were beginning to speak about this, and it’s the question that we all really have to engage with together. 

We end the book by saying that proper diagnosis helps on its own. One of the key steps is simply getting people to understand that it is the state itself that is under assault—and, in the longer term, democracy as well. Because if you don’t have a modern state, you eventually can’t run free and fair elections. You don’t have the impersonal procedures necessary to count votes fairly. Instead, you end up with what you see in Russia—political pressure to produce vote totals that show the leader receiving 90% or 80% of the vote, or some other absurd outcome. And that isn’t democracy. So, we are absolutely not saying that democratic erosion isn’t a problem—it is a serious problem. But it is a longer-term issue. The immediate, short-term problem is the destruction of state capacity—something that is already happening in the US and other places as well.

So, what can we do about it?

  1. Diagnosis – The first step is recognizing that this is a political issue that must be tackled directly.
  2. Reviving Public Service – The second is getting people to care about public service as a legitimate and worthwhile career—which is incredibly difficult these days, as I mentioned earlier, given the material concerns of young people. But, at the same time, I see many students at William & Mary every day who genuinely want to do good in the world—who want their lives to be dedicated to service.

And the truth is, there are many people like that around the world—especially in modern democracies—who would agree that if we don’t have the institutional capacity to deal with climate change, the next pandemic, immigration, or any number of existential global threats, then we simply won’t be able to solve them. As a species, we will not succeed.

So, I think another crucial step is getting the rhetoric right. Instead of constantly accusing patrimonial leaders and their supporters of being anti-democratic, which only alienates their voters, we should frame the argument differently. If you tell Trump voters, “Trump is an anti-democrat, and you’re an idiot for supporting him,” they will naturally reject that. They will see it as just another elitist telling them what to think—which only fuels the cycle of resentment. But if you frame the issue as “What’s happening is the destruction of the state’s ability to do good in the world,” you can actually win people over. 

Photo: Shutterstock AI.

Trump and The New Capitalism: Old Wine in New Bottle

Trumpism 2.0 marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The US is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

Introduction

Despite its apparent economic, political, and social challenges, the US remains a global powerhouse that can profoundly impact the world with even the slightest changes, whether progressive or regressive. Therefore, it is essential to understand and analyze the unpredictability and uncertainties upcoming with Trump’s (dis)order.

To grasp what Trump is trying to achieve, one should step back and take a bird’s-eye view to avoid the chaos and noise generated by him and his team. What do the iconic skyscrapers of Manhattan, such as the Empire State Building and the Chrysler Building, towering above the clouds, tell us?

When one listens to the sounds beneath the clouds, the shining progress emanating from Silicon Valley in northern California—the focal point of American entrepreneurship—whispers of groundbreaking discoveries and a bright future for the US and humanity in general. In Schumpeterian terminology, America’s “creative destruction” is ongoing. The share of the US GDP has reached 27% of global GDP. Although this is just below the 30% recorded in 2000, it is significant compared to the 23% in 2023, marking the United States’ rebound from its trough, driven by the forces of creative destruction. This pace of change in the structure of the US economy also transforms the financial architecture of the powerhouses on Wall Street, including the New York Stock Exchange.

However, the ongoing global competition indicates that this alone is not enough for America to maintain its competitiveness and status as a global empire. China’s rapid advancements in strategic high-tech industries—such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, semiconductors, 5G, and renewable energy technologies—along with heavy investments in R&D and talent acquisition to close the gap with the US, have reached a critical stage with far-reaching implications.

Moreover, the competition extends beyond the US and China, as Europe, Japan, and South Korea also play vital roles in niche technologies such as EV batteries, advanced robotics, and biotech. The outcome of this race will shape global supply chains, security policies, and economic leadership, ultimately defining the nature of the ongoing global power transition in the coming decades.

Trump Is Emulating Xi Jinping

Photo: Shutterstock.

As Graham Allison has analyzed in historical cases, the key concern now is how the US will respond to this precarious situation. Signals from Trump’s first term and early indications from his newly started second term suggest that the US political economy may be shifting toward a model resembling China under Xi Jinping. In other words, despite its significant economic superiority, America appears to be emulating its rival to defend its interests and contain China’s rise.

This shift toward unilateralism disregards international norms and values, undermines the post-World War II order it once championed, and abandons the institutions and stakeholders that upheld this system. As a result, the US is embarking on a perilous path that extends far beyond China. Increasingly, it is drifting away from the principles of law, rules, and values, instead embracing arbitrariness and raw power—posing a global threat that contradicts its raison d’être.

Meanwhile, the Statue of Liberty, a powerful symbol of American ideals such as freedom, democracy, and opportunity, is slowly disappearing beneath the clouds. As it fades into the distance, so does the American Dream—the long-standing promise of opportunity, prosperity, and success—becoming an increasingly unattainable illusion.These symbols, once synonymous with American greatness, now represent the triumphs of a bygone era.

Accordingly, the country’s status as a world leader in finance, technology, and industry is being redefined, and the old certainties are giving way to a new, uncertain reality.

Having sought to maintain its position by rejecting its past hegemonic sacrifices or leadership and putting a unilateral emphasis on the rhetoric of “America First,” “Making America Great Again” (MAGA) to protect its “greatness” will also reshape the nature of capitalism and globalization. Several questions need to be addressed and examined in this context. This commentary focuses on the new capitalism the United States has adopted to respond to ongoing global power pressures, changing competitive conditions, and potential consequences.

Three Models of Capitalism

Economic systems (such as capitalism, socialism, and mixed economies) are compared based on several key pillars. These include the right for ownership, the role of government, central planning vs competition, the workings of prices and the production mechanism, income distribution, equity, efficiency, and productivity, economic stability and growth, innovation and entrepreneurship, social welfare and public goods, flexibility and adaptability, approach to free trade vs. protectionism or autarky. There are also various hybrid models combining different system elements at different doses. Each economic system has strengths and weaknesses, depending on societal goals such as growth, equity, efficiency, and stability. 

In addition to these differences between economic systems, as J. H. DunningD. Rodrik, and J. E. Stiglitz published terrific works on, the world economy has also been characterized by different stages of globalization or deglobalization. These range from mercantilism, a potent form of protectionism, to the extreme form of neoliberal globalization, which went beyond control with severe negative repercussions, and now to new protectionism and civilizational nationalism, along with rising multipolarity and power shift.

Several questions need to be addressed and examined in this context. This commentary focuses on the “new capitalism” that the United States appears to have adopted to respond to ongoing global power shifts, changing competitive conditions, and potential consequences. Whatever form capitalism takes, the debate will always revolve around the market economy, capitalists, big corporations, property rights, and how the state controls and regulates all of this.

Two eminent thinkers, economic historian Fernand Braudel, who focused on long-term structures, and Karl Polanyi, a political economist, who analyzed economic transformations, and anthropologist, provided fundamental critiques of capitalism concerning the state, power, and institutions. Braudel and Polanyi view capitalism as an evolving historical system rather than a static or natural economic order. Through his longue durée approach, Braudel analyzes how capitalism has developed over centuries within specific historical contexts, while Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” illustrates the shift from embedded economies to market-driven societies.  

Both scholars differentiate between market economies based on local trade and reciprocity and capitalism, which operates on a larger scale and inherently tends toward monopolization. Braudel views capitalism as an upper layer of economic activity that never functions under pure free-market conditions, exploiting markets rather than being synonymous with them. Capitalism always seeks privileged access to resources, political power, and monopolies. Thus, Braudel and Polanyi converge in their critiques, exposing capitalism’s reliance on state power and monopolistic control and its disruptive effects on society. Braudel emphasizes capitalism’s exploitative nature, whereas Polanyi underscores the commodification of key economic factors, particularly labor. 

In short, both view capitalism as a threat to market economies and open societies when left unchecked. Capitalism often operates at the expense of broader societal well-being, benefiting elites while fostering instability and social resistance. Most notably, when the economy becomes “dis-embedded” from society and socially disruptive, the adverse effects of non-market processes, such as externalities and monopolization, become apparent. These circumstances call for state intervention to sustain markets. 

However, these two scholars not only explored the state’s crucial role in developing and shaping markets, as D. North demonstrated as an instituted process, but they also showed how state intervention is a double-edged sword and a hazardous process. Given the different allocations of power dynamics, the state’s role cannot be taken for granted.

As shown historically by M. Olson, in the context of development theory by Theda Skocpol, and more recently by C. Jonson during Japan’s rapid post-war development, effective state intervention depends on several restrictive conditions, such as state autonomy and capacity, free from the influence of interest-seeking coalitions. Most notably, Olson explores how special interest groups and coalitions gradually capture state power, leading to economic stagnation. This is also relevant in relatively stable societies, where entrenched interest groups gain influence, creating rigidities that slow economic growth and hinder necessary reforms.

To explore these developments further, I will delineate three evolving variants of capitalism based on ownership structures and governance mechanisms.

State-Controlled Oligarchic Capitalism (Turkey – Erdogan Model)

👉🏿 The private sector’s independence diminishes as the government integrates strategic industries into political control.

👉🏿 State-backed business elites thrive through public contracts, incentives, and preferential credit.

👉🏿 Bureaucrats and politicians hold executive roles in private firms, aligning private enterprise with state agendas.

👉🏿 This model merges authoritarian populism with capitalist oligarchy.

State Capitalism with Strategic Planning (China – Xi Model)

👉🏿 State ownership dominates, yet specific industries operate with market-driven efficiency.

👉🏿 Despite their semi-independent façade, companies like Huawei and Alibaba align with national economic strategies.

👉🏿 The government employs market forces for efficiency while maintaining overarching economic control.

👉🏿 This hybrid model blends centralized planning with capitalist dynamics.

Techno-Feudal and Oligopolistic Capitalism (US–Trump Model)

👉🏿 Traditional neoliberalism is evolving into a state-elite partnership.

👉🏿 Billionaire elites increasingly influence governance, making the state an agent of corporate interests.

Caricature: Shutterstock.

Tech giants like Tesla, SpaceX, Facebook-Meta, and major media conglomerates serve as political tools for mass influence. For instance, in a clear transactional or win-win approach, President Trump appointed Elon Musk to lead the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). However, the court blocked his attempt to intervene in the US Treasury and access private data, a case that fueled Trump’s anti-law aggression. Stephen Schwarzman, the chairman and CEO of Blackstone, Ana Botín, the executive chair of Banco Santander, Patrick Pouyanné, chairman and CEO of Total Energies, and Brian Moynihan, chair of the board and CEO of Bank of America, participated in a public dialogue with President Trump at the World Economic Forum‘s 2025 Annual Meeting, indicating a collaborative relationship. Additionally, US business leaders have significantly increased their financial support for President Trump’s second inaugural fund, with contributions expected to surpass previous records. Major corporations such as BP, Chevron, Shell, Google, Microsoft, and Apple have adopted the term “Gulf of America” in their communications following President Trump’s executive order renaming the Gulf of Mexico. This move signifies corporate alignment with the administration’s directives. 

Whatever hybrid forms of capitalist models evolve, they underline the rise of Strategic Capitalism, diminishing market competition, increasing state-business convergence, and greater government control over economic participants. In other words, “state capture by entrenched interest-seeking coalitions” is becoming increasingly widespread and pervasive. Most notably, when capital infiltrates the state—through so-called “legitimate lobbying,” as seen in the US—and effectively merges with the government, a fundamental question arises: On whose behalf does the state intervene in the market? How can the criterion of rationality be upheld?

Besides such domestic political-economy implications of the evolving forms of capitalism, their various configurations are also catalysts for conflict when they attempt to externalize emerging problems and challenges. The main dimensions of problem externalization might take several forms:

Globalization’s Externalities and National-Level Risks: While globalization promotes economic interdependence, it has also resulted in significant negative externalities, such as income inequality, industrial decline, job displacement, and financial volatility. Traditional economic governance models suggest addressing these risks at the national level through various mechanisms:

👉🏿 Wealth redistribution via progressive taxation (such as wealth taxes) to fund social welfare and infrastructure.

👉🏿 Regulatory adjustments through stronger labor protections, improved financial oversight, and enhanced corporate accountability mechanisms.

👉🏿 Fair wage policies to ensure that productivity gains translate into equitable income distribution for the working class.

However, instead of internalizing these costs within their economies, some nations are now externalizing them—shifting economic grievances onto foreign entities, often framed within a civilizational nationalist discourse. This trend has been particularly evident under the Trump administration.

The Shift from National Economic Regulation to External Blame: Historically, economic nationalism has been used as a policy tool to protect domestic industries. However, the new wave of civilizational nationalism reframes economic struggles as existential conflicts between distinct cultural or civilizational blocs. This shift is evident in several key areas:

👉🏿 Trade protectionism and economic sanctions through tariffs and trade restrictions on perceived economic competitors (e.g., the U.S.-China trade war).

👉🏿 Industrial policy disguised as strategic autonomy, supporting vital domestic industries for national security purposes (e.g., the EU’s strategic autonomy, the U.S. CHIPS Act).

👉🏿 Resource and financial weaponization, using energy supplies, commodities, or economic systems as geopolitical leverage (e.g., U.S. dollar-based sanctions, Russia’s energy policy).

👉🏿 Anti-globalization narratives rooted in identity politics, portraying globalization as an elite conspiracy that threatens national sovereignty, thus justifying exclusionary economic policies.

The motivation behind these strategies is to “externalize” the burden of globalization’s side effects—shifting responsibility away from corporations and national policymakers onto foreign nations or civilizational “rivals”—ultimately deepening global fragmentation.

Civilizational Nationalism Increases the Likelihood of Conflict: Economic nationalism has historically led to trade wars and economic decoupling. However, civilizational nationalism extends beyond economics, intertwining identity, culture, and geopolitics into economic policy, making conflicts more intense and less negotiable.

In this context:

👉🏿 The West perceives China as both an economic competitor and a cultural and ideological challenger.

👉🏿 Russia is pivoting away from global capitalism, crafting its own “civilizational” economic model centered on Eurasianism.

👉🏿 The European Union, recognizing the limitations of globalization, is adopting industrial policies emphasizing strategic autonomy.

👉🏿 South Asia and the Middle East are developing distinct regional capitalist models.

👉🏿 Meanwhile, the US, under Trumpism, appears to oppose the “rest” of the world.

In conclusion, by replacing domestic policy reform agendas, such as corporate taxation and labor protections, with blame-driven economic nationalism, governments avoid addressing the root causes of economic discontent and fuel long-term geopolitical instability. If this ongoing trend persists, the world may experience an era of intensified trade wars, economic decoupling, and heightened geopolitical tensions, reminiscent of the 1930s, increasing the risk of large-scale conflicts.

Trump’s Presidency and the Shift Toward Authoritarian Capitalism

Obviously, Trump’s populist authoritarian and pragmatist rhetoric lacks a coherent theoretical foundation. It can be seen as a contradictory fusion of economic nationalism, protectionism, and populism, driven more by emotional appeal than analytical rigor. Unlike traditional neoliberalism, which has grown in the US and promotes minimal state intervention, Trump’s era witnessed the convergence of state power with elite economic interests. As Antara Haltar observes, Trump’s policies – tariffs, tax cuts, de/regulation, and re/industrialization- to “Make America Great” again (MAGAnomics) reject core tenets of neoclassical economics, notably free trade, and efficiency. As M. Mazzucatoputs it, this aligns with techno-feudalism, in which large technology firms exert immense economic and social control. 

What is idiosyncratic and hypocritical is that Trump rose to power by appealing to those experiencing poverty, feeling left behind, and abandoned. However, he has ultimately shaped his policies to further enrich giant capital owners. He not only serves the interests of capital but has gone a step further by directly placing capitalists in key government positions. Even though his protectionist trade wars were framed to protect American jobs and boost employment and income, there is broad consensus among economists that these policies may primarily benefit select corporations at the expense of consumers and citizens. As J. Stiglitz correctly noted, there is already a high degree of market concentration in the US. 

While it remains unclear how he will deliver on his political promises amid the growing challenges of techno-feudalism, these features suggest that Trump’s evolving capitalism, which carries significant global implications, will emerge as a hybrid model combining the following aspects.

👉🏿 Nationalist Protectionism: A more aggressive form of protectionism where the government prioritizes domestic industries and restricts foreign competition. For instance, Trump’s decision to block the acquisition of United States Steel by the Japanese company Nippon Steel created tensions with Japan. Prime Minister Ishiba responded by saying that “the president blocking a takeover is a significant ‘political interference’ and difficult to understand.” This could lead to a more insular, self-sufficient economy, with tariffs and trade barriers becoming more prevalent.

👉🏿 State capitalism: A blend of state control and private enterprise, where the government is more active in guiding the economy. This could involve increased government ownership of key industries like energy, finance, or infrastructure.

👉🏿 Authoritarian Capitalism: A system where the government exercises significant control over the economy, often through a combination of state-owned enterprises, regulations, and repression of dissent. This could lead to a more rigid, hierarchical economy with limited opportunities for entrepreneurship and innovation.

👉🏿 Neoliberalism 2.0: A revised version of the neoliberal ideology that dominated the 1980s and 1990s. This could involve a renewed emphasis on deregulation, privatization, and free trade but with a more aggressive approach to suppressing labor unions and social welfare programs.

👉🏿 Corporate-Friendly Populism: A system where the government prioritizes the interests of large corporations and wealthy elites while using populist rhetoric to appeal to working-class voters. This could lead to a more unequal economy, with greater concentrations of wealth and power.

👉🏿 Hybrid Capitalism: A system that combines elements of different economic models, such as state-led development, private enterprise, and social welfare programs. This could involve a more nuanced approach to monetary policy, focusing on balancing competing interests and promoting sustainable growth.

The actual outcome would depend on a complex interplay of factors, including policy decisions, economic conditions, and societal responses. The impact-response paradigm will also reflect the nature of (i) the state-corporate symbiosis, in which even if Trump does not formally integrate capitalist figures like Elon Musk or Mark Zuckerberg into the government, he might pursue policies favoring elite interests, such as corporate tax cuts. (ii) Media and technology manipulation. Trump weaponizes social media platforms like Twitter (now X) while simultaneously attacking tech giants that challenge his influence. (iii) Regulatory favoritism. Despite public criticism of Silicon Valley, Trump’s administration provided regulatory and tax advantages to major corporations. (iv) Preferential treatment for loyal capitalists. Trump’s government allocated state contracts, tax breaks, and industry protections to politically aligned business figures.

To the extent that corporate feudalism is costly to the economy and society’s well-being, the US will likely turn to asymmetric power, military force, and destructive nationalist and civilizational rhetoric to balance, conceal, legitimize, and make it acceptable to the public.

Strategic Implications of Trumpism Globally

As Nancy Quian emphasizes, while initially seen as just a “trade war” with China, it quickly became clear that Trump’s ambitions were far more extensive. He started imposing tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and the EU, which were promptly met with retaliatory actions. Although it’s still uncertain whether Trump’s actions will dissuade his “strategic competitors,” they have already raised alarm among many European nations—long-standing strategic allies of the US since World War II and throughout the Cold War—along with NATO members and most OECD countries.  

Had he pursued his policies under the banner of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, multiparty free elections, separation of powers, checks and balances, and transparent governance, most of the OECD nations—controlling nearly 50% of the global GDP—might have been more open to closer cooperation with the US. However, Trump’s broad and aggressive stance and his confrontational rhetoric extending beyond trade wars are likely to leave the US deprived mainly of the allies it seeks.  

One reason for this maximalist stance may be Trump’s realization that gaining an economic advantage over China solely through trade wars is impossible. As a result, he has sought to incorporate military, political, technological, and other strategic means to secure a stronger position for the US. However, in doing so, he may have overestimated America’s strength—much like an empire already losing its hegemonic power. Instead of consolidating US influence, this overreach could accelerate America’s decline on the global stage.  

Additionally, should global resistance and retaliatory measures against Trump’s America gain momentum, two key consequences could emerge? First, competitors like China may grow even more potent. Trump’s disregard for international norms and values, his habit of barking orders at partners, and his use of political pressure like a small-town thug could alienate his allies and drive them closer to rising powers like China. Second, increasing costs for US consumers and damage to America’s strategic interests could weaken domestic support for Trump, potentially leading to a loss of the congressional majority in the 2026 midterm elections.

Conclusion

In our age of multipolarity, global capitalism is no longer a cohesive system under US hegemony. There are now competing forms of capitalism with different norms and values. There are three notable issues to underline here in terms of understanding the nature of rising capitalism under Trump 2.0. 

First, despite its contradictions, Trumpism exposes fundamental flaws in post-WWII economic orthodoxy—particularly its failures to address inequality, identity, and the unintended consequences of globalization. Therefore, the strength of Trump’s approach lies in its emotional resonance with voters who feel marginalized by globalization. Trumpism thrives not on traditional economic logic but on perceptions of cultural and economic displacement. 

Second, the fact that politicians come to power using right-wing populist rhetoric and then cede substantial control to capital rather than monitoring, directing, and engaging it in government for the benefit of the people underscores the volatile, elusive, and inherently dangerous nature of populist discourse. Trump’s apparent shift toward oligarchic capitalism (techno-feudalism) through his explicit favoritism toward specific billionaires signals a transition from “neutral” state capitalism to a system where the government actively serves dominant private entities. This shift undermines market competition, reduces economic democracy, and fosters monopolistic tendencies.

Third, rather than adhering to the principle of reforming the existing US system and global multilateral organizations, as Yuen Yuen Ang argues, Trump intends to export or externalize significant problems of the US economy, such as the ever-rising income inequality, chronic and systemic corruption caused by the rise of robber barons, and financial risks, to the “rest” of the world via “beggar thy neighbor policies.”

In this emerging conflict, the digital economy, technology wars, and financial sanctions have become key instruments. However, under Trump’s approach, the current global fragmentation and the new Cold War environment have evolved beyond a simple polarization between the West and the China-Russia axis. The struggle is no longer just between the center (West) and the periphery (Global South) but also within the Global South and the West.

That fragmentation might also lead to: (i) The breakdown of global supply chains as the West tries to reduce its dependence on China, shifting toward a “friendshoring” trade model. As a reaction, expanding BRICS nations are advancing de-dollarization and constructing alternatives to the Western financial system. (ii) A possible economic bloc formation against Western dominance reminiscent of the 1930s increases the risk of economic stagnation and geopolitical conflict. The US and the EU are implementing “Green Protectionism” via carbon tariffs. If these trends persist, the global economy may enter an era of trade wars, financial decoupling, and economic fragmentation. 

Finally, economists must grapple with the systemic issues that enabled its rise rather than dismissing it as an aberration. Until mainstream economics confronts these shortcomings, the populist movement it fuels is unlikely to fade.

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Memorial Service for the Muslim victims of the Christchurch shootings, held in Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand, on March 29, 2019, with a significant police presence. Photo: Sheryl Watson.

Agent-Based Simulation and Linguistic Analysis of Populist vs. Non-Populist Rhetoric: Insights on Polarization and Cohesion

Our agent-based simulations show that non-populist rhetoric, exemplified by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, fosters societal cohesion through positivity, inclusivity, and broad audience engagement. By maintaining a “middle ground,” it promotes civil discourse and prevents ideological divisions from deepening into polarization. Inclusive language ensures all groups feel recognized, addressing societal fractures. In contrast, populist rhetoric, typified by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reinforces divides through negativity and exclusion. By antagonizing outgroups and amplifying grievances, it fosters conflict and consolidates ingroup loyalty at the expense of societal harmony. This sharp contrast highlights the stabilizing potential of inclusive rhetoric versus the fragmenting impact of populist communication.

By Ana-Maria Bliuc*, John Betts** & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction

Charismatic leaders hold extraordinary influence over their audiences, shaping the emotional and ideological contours of polarization. Their rhetoric can intensify divisions when it is extreme or reduce tensions when it emphasizes inclusivity and moderation (Betts & Bliuc, 2022; Bliuc et al., 2023; Bliuc et al., 2024). Through emotional appeals, they cultivate trust, admiration, and even anger, channeling these emotions into collective action. However, this influence is complex: emotional appeals often create feedback loops that deepen loyalty while perpetuating divisive rhetoric. The “awestruck effect,” where followers suppress their emotions in response to a leader’s overwhelming presence, highlights the intensity of this dynamic. Additionally, charisma can be contagious, fostering intra-group cohesion while amplifying intergroup polarization.

This article explores how populist and non-populist rhetoric influences societal polarization, focusing on the speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern between 2017 and 2023. We present preliminary findings from our ongoing research, which uses linguistic analysis and computational modelling to understand how their communication styles shape societal dynamics. Erdogan’s speeches often reflect populist tendencies, using divisive language to define “the people” in opposition to “the elite” and “the others,” reinforcing group divisions. In contrast, Ardern’s rhetoric emphasizes inclusivity and optimism, promoting unity and social cohesion. These contrasting approaches offer valuable insights into the role of leadership communication in fostering either polarization or cohesion.

Our analysis uses tools such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to examine the tone, content, and inclusivity of their speeches. Additionally, we apply an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate how these rhetorical styles influence societal divisions over time. The ABM treats individuals as “agents” with distinct responses to messages, allowing us to explore how individual reactions can shape larger societal trends like polarization or unity. This ongoing research aims to shed light on how leaders’ rhetoric impacts societal cohesion or division. This preliminary analysis offers critical insights into how political communication shapes group dynamics, paving the way for further exploration of its long-term effects on societal cohesion or division.

Populists and Polarization

Populism is often a significant driver of societal polarization. Populist leaders, particularly those with charismatic appeal, play a central role in driving polarization. Their rhetoric often mobilizes emotions such as anger and fear, framing societal divides as existential battles (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Right-wing populists tend to focus on issues like immigration and national sovereignty, while left-wing populists emphasize economic inequality and social justice. Regardless of ideological orientation, their communication strategies frequently amplify societal divisions by fostering in-group loyalty and out-group hostility (Hawkins, 2009).

Populist leaders often employ divisive rhetoric that frames societal conflicts as a struggle between a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite,” thereby deepening societal divisions. This “us versus them” narrative simplifies complex issues and fosters an environment of distrust and animosity among different social groups. The emotional and moralistic language used by populists can exacerbate polarization by reinforcing in-group solidarity while marginalizing out-groups. The relationship between populism and polarization is particularly acute in contexts where political institutions are weak or trust in governance is low.

Erdogan’s Populism

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has become a defining feature of Turkey’s contemporary political landscape. His leadership, particularly as head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), illustrates a shift towards “civilizational populism.” This approach frames political conflicts not merely in terms of domestic divides but as existential struggles between competing civilizational identities, with Erdogan positioning himself and the AKP as defenders of Islamic values against secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

Erdogan’s populist rhetoric constructs a binary between the “pure and virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite,” with the latter often described as Westernized secularists who are portrayed as out of touch with Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity. This narrative draws on historical grievances, including the marginalization of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to galvanize his base. By invoking Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan aligns himself with a broader “Islamic civilization” and situates his leadership within a narrative of resistance to Western domination and secular modernity (Yilmaz & Morieson 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).

One hallmark of Erdogan’s populism is his strategic use of crises to consolidate power and deepen polarization. For example, in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, Erdogan framed the event as an existential threat orchestrated by foreign conspirators and domestic traitors, which justified the purging of perceived enemies within the state and society. His narrative positioned the AKP as the sole protector of national sovereignty and religious values, marginalizing dissenters as enemies of the state and Islam (Tas, 2020). Civilizational populism also extends to Erdogan’s foreign policy. His rhetoric frequently portrays Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world, defending Islamic interests against a hostile West (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Jacinda Ardern’s Leadership and Inclusive Rhetoric

Jacinda Ardern’s leadership as Prime Minister of New Zealand (2017–2023) offers a compelling example of how inclusive and empathetic rhetoric can foster societal cohesion in a world increasingly divided by polarization. Unlike populist leaders who often amplify divisions through exclusivity and antagonism, Ardern’s communication style is characterized by optimism, inclusivity, and a focus on collective well-being. Her leadership emphasized unity over division and shared values over antagonistic narratives.

One of the defining moments of Ardern’s tenure was her response to the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attacks, in which 51 people lost their lives in an act of white supremacist terrorism. Ardern’s immediate response, marked by empathy and solidarity, included public expressions of grief, wearing a hijab to demonstrate respect for Muslim communities, and categorically denouncing hate. Her government’s “Wellbeing Budget,” introduced in 2019, shifted the focus of governance from traditional economic indicators to measures of societal well-being, such as mental health, child poverty, and environmental sustainability. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ardern’s empathetic communication style played a pivotal role in maintaining public trust and compliance. Her use of direct communication through social media, coupled with clear and consistent messaging, fostered a sense of unity and shared purpose (Craig, 2021). 

Unlike the divisive strategies often employed by populist leaders such as Erdogan, Ardern’s rhetoric consistently avoided antagonism, focusing instead on fostering dialogue and inclusivity. Her communication style offers an alternative to traditional populism, highlighting the capacity of empathetic and inclusive leadership to bridge divides and promote societal cohesion.

Contrasts in Rhetorical Styles

The analysis of speeches delivered by Erdogan and Ardern highlights striking contrasts in their rhetorical styles. Erdogan’s speeches are characterized by brevity, negativity, and exclusivity, with an average length of 430 words compared to Ardern’s more expansive 2,051 words. His frequent appeals to a specific ingroup and the simultaneous exclusion or demonization of outgroups reflect a populist approach. This rhetoric employs divisive language that frames societal dynamics in binary terms: a virtuous “us” versus a corrupt or threatening “them.” Language tokens show the content of his speeches to be focused on Turkey’s prominence in the world (“nation,” “future,” “great,” “world”). This type of communication reinforces group boundaries, creating a heightened sense of identity among ingroup members while fostering animosity toward outgroups.

By contrast, Ardern’s speeches are characterized by inclusivity, positivity, and a focus on shared national identity. Her use of inclusive language, such as incorporating Māori terms like “koutou” (you all) and “katoa” (all), underscores her commitment to addressing diverse audiences as part of a unified whole. This rhetoric not only bridges ideological and cultural divides but also actively works to foster cohesion. By framing political challenges as collective issues requiring mutual effort, Ardern cultivates a sense of solidarity and reduces the potential for societal polarization.

Emotional Tone

A key finding of our study is the role of emotional tone in driving or mitigating polarization. Erdogan’s speeches often employ fear, anger, and grievance to mobilize his base. He also makes a greater use of words belonging to categories such as “power,” “politics,” “authority” compared to Ardern. These emotional appeals resonate strongly with ingroup members but simultaneously alienate outgroup members, fostering an antagonistic environment. The cyclical nature of such rhetoric—where repeated exposure reinforces emotional divides—intensifies polarization over time.

Ardern’s positive emotional appeals focus on empathy, hope, and collective well-being. This is evident in the greater prevalence of terms from categories like “perception,” “authentic,” “insight” compared to Erdogan. These messages resonate across diverse groups, creating an emotional connection that fosters trust and mutual respect. This ability to evoke positive emotions while addressing collective concerns makes inclusive rhetoric particularly effective in promoting cohesion and mitigating polarization.

Audience Reach

Another critical factor is the scope of a leader’s audience reach. Erdogan’s targeted approach speaks primarily to his ingroup, limiting the broader appeal of his message. This narrow scope ensures that his rhetoric resonates deeply with a specific subset of society but fails to engage or persuade others. His targeted communication exacerbates divisions by leaving outgroups feeling excluded and marginalized.

In contrast, Ardern’s broad reach allows her rhetoric to address diverse segments of society. By framing her messages in inclusive terms, she creates a sense of belonging among a wider audience. This broad appeal reduces the likelihood of polarization by fostering dialogue and understanding across ideological and cultural divides.

Broader Implications of Leadership Communication

The findings illustrate that the tone and reach of a leader’s rhetoric are as critical as its content in shaping societal dynamics. Erdogan’s populist approach leverages exclusionary narratives to consolidate ingroup loyalty but at the cost of societal cohesion. Ardern’s inclusive style demonstrates the potential for leadership to bridge divides and foster unity, even in challenging contexts.

These results have implications for understanding the role of political communication in contemporary society. They highlight the dual-edged nature of rhetoric: while it can mobilize and inspire, it can also divide and alienate. Leaders, therefore, carry a significant responsibility in shaping the emotional and ideological landscape of their societies.

Agent-Based Simulation: A Window into Long-Term Impacts

The Agent-Based Model (ABM) is a powerful analytical tool that simulates the way individuals interact within a society. In this case, we used it to explore how different rhetorical styles may shape public beliefs over time. This method allowed us to test the long-term effects of leaders’ communication styles in a controlled virtual environment, offering insights into their potential societal impact.

The agent-based simulations provide a unique perspective on the long-term effects of rhetorical styles. They show how individual responses to rhetoric can aggregate into broader societal trends. In Erdogan’s case, targeted, negative rhetoric creates a feedback loop of polarization. Even if the frequency of such rhetoric decreases, its polarizing effects persist due to the entrenched divisions it creates.

In contrast, Ardern’s inclusive rhetoric has a stabilizing effect. By fostering dialogue and promoting mutual understanding, her communication style helps build resilience against external shocks that might otherwise exacerbate societal divisions. These findings highlight the potential of positive, inclusive rhetoric to mitigate the destabilizing impact of populist communication.

The results show stark contrasts between these approaches. Ardern’s speeches were longer, more positive, and emphasized inclusivity and shared national identity. Her frequent use of inclusive language, including Māori terms reinforced this approach. Erdogan’s speeches, by contrast, were shorter, more negative, and often appealed to a specific in-group while excluding the out-group. When modelled over time using agent-based simulations, these rhetorical styles produced markedly different effects. Erdogan’s negative, targeted rhetoric deepened societal divisions, driving bipolarization. His exclusionary language reinforced pre-existing divides, ensuring polarization persisted even when communication was less frequent. Ardern’s inclusive and positive rhetoric, however, promoted cohesion by stabilizing the “middle ground,” where disagreements occurred without escalating into entrenched polarization. Her approach acted as a mitigating force, countering the effects of external shocks or crises that might otherwise deepen divisions.

Our study also highlights the importance of context in shaping the effects of rhetoric. Erdogan’s rhetoric resonates strongly in a political environment marked by economic challenges, geopolitical tensions, and cultural divisions. These conditions amplify the appeal of populist narratives that frame societal problems as the fault of external adversaries or internal enemies.

Ardern’s rhetoric, on the other hand, is tailored to a context emphasizing collective well-being, inclusivity, and national identity. Her communication style aligns with New Zealand’s cultural emphasis on egalitarianism and community, enhancing its effectiveness in fostering cohesion. These contextual factors demonstrate that the impact of rhetoric is not solely determined by the leader’s style but also by the broader social and political environment in which it is delivered.

Conclusion

The findings of this study underscore the profound impact of political rhetoric on societal polarization. Non-populist rhetoric, characterized by its positive tone, inclusivity, and broad audience reach, emerges as a critical tool for fostering societal cohesion. By maintaining a “solid middle ground,” such rhetoric enables civil disagreements while preventing ideological divisions from escalating into entrenched polarization. Inclusive language ensures that both ingroups and outgroups feel recognized and valued, addressing the psychological and ideological fractures that often underlie societal tensions.

In contrast, populist rhetoric, with its negative tone and narrow audience focus, deepens divides by reinforcing group boundaries and antagonizing outgroups. The polarizing effect of this rhetoric lies not only in its content but in its delivery—its ability to heighten conflict, amplify grievances, and consolidate ingroup loyalty at the expense of broader societal harmony. By appealing to exclusionary identities and emotional grievances, populist leaders exacerbate societal fragmentation, leading to a more divided and contentious public sphere.

For policymakers and practitioners, these findings highlight the necessity of prioritizing communication strategies that unite rather than divide. The tone and delivery of a leader’s message can determine whether disagreements are addressed constructively or exacerbate social cleavages. This calls for a re-evaluation of political discourse, focusing on strategies that emphasize shared values and mutual respect. While these preliminary findings highlight the power of rhetoric to shape group dynamics, further investigation is needed to fully understand the long-term implications of these communication styles in diverse contexts.


 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.


 

(*) Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc is an Associate Professor of Social and Political Psychology in the Psychology Department at the University of Dundee, where she has been a faculty member since 2019. Her research explores how social identities influence behavior across various contexts, including health, environmental issues (such as climate change), and socio-political domains (such as collective action and social change). Recently, her work has focused on online communities, investigating how collective identities and behaviors are shaped through digital interactions.

(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.


 

References  

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Bliuc, A. M.; Betts, J. M.; Vergani, M.; Bouguettaya, A. & Cristea, M. (2024). “A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society.” Communications Psychology2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

Bliuc, A.M.; Cristea, M. & Betts, J. (2023). The role of charismatic influencers in polarisation: an agent-based modelling approach. Paper presented at 19th General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology (EASP), Krakow, Poland.

Craig, G. (2021). “Kindness and Control: The Political Leadership of Jacinda Ardern in the Aotearoa New Zealand COVID-19 Media Conferences.” Journalism and Media2(2), 288-304. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia2020017

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. “Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Serieshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444

Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2

Ultra-right-wing Argentine politician Javier Milei during the PASO elections in Buenos Aires, Argentina on August 13, 2023. Photo: Facundo Florit.

Javier Milei’s Victory: A New Chapter for Right-Wing Populism in Argentina?

Despite the global far-right’s excitement over Javier Milei’s victory, it is crucial to approach Milei’s election cautiously and avoid interpreting it as a definitive sign of a substantial conservative shift in Argentine politics. To comprehend Milei’s success, it is essential to delve into the Argentine context, where it seems to signify more a public frustration with the establishment than a straightforward resurgence of right-wing populism.

By Imdat Oner*

After a second-round election on November 19, 2023, libertarian candidate Javier Milei emerged as the president-elect of Argentina, securing 56 percent of the votes compared to his opponent Sergio Massa’s 44 percent. This victory marked a significant milestone, as Milei garnered the most votes in any election in Argentine history.

In the wake of Milei’s decisive win, former US President Donald Trump commended the Argentinian president-elect, asserting that Milei would “truly make Argentina great again.” Jair Bolsonaro echoed these sentiments, hailing the victory as a triumph for “progress and freedom.” Some right-wing activists are already envisioning a domino effect, anticipating that Milei’s success could pave the way for Trump and Bolsonaro to reclaim power in 2024 and 2026.

Despite the global far-right’s excitement over Milei’s victory, it is essential to approach Milei’s election with caution and refrain from interpreting it as a clear sign of a significant conservative shift in Argentine politics. Understanding Milei’s success necessitates a nuanced exploration of the Argentine context, where it seems to reflect more a manifestation of public frustration with the establishment than a mere resurgence of right-wing populism.

Milei’s ascension to the presidency is unprecedented, marking the first occurrence of an outsider leading Argentina. His far-right inclinations, epitomized by his self-proclaimed anarcho-libertarian stance, set him apart from the conventional political spectrum. Peronism has upheld its supremacy in Argentine politics by building an alliance that encompasses both the left and the right, uniting trade unions and major businesses. The party movement has effectively established an organizational structure with widespread influence, extending across the country. 

Milei, a former TV commentator and economist, presented himself as a symbol of change against this establishment that has been in power in Argentina for the past two decades. His campaign was marked by a strong anti-establishment narrative, echoing the widespread dissatisfaction among voters. He focused on economic ideas and blamed past administrations resonating with a population weary of traditional politics. His use of a chainsaw as a symbol of cutting state spending emphasized his commitment to making radical changes.

In this context, Milei’s electoral success primarily derives from economic dissatisfaction rather than an embrace of far-right policies. The economy with inflation over 140 percent yearly and 40 percent of the people in poverty has fueled a collective desire among citizens for a departure from the existing status quo. Massa, the current Minister of Economy, faced the full force of public frustration during one of Argentina’s most severe economic crises in decades. Milei smartly connected with people by presenting himself as the leader of significant and quick change, contrasting with what many see as the mishandling of past administrations. 

However, Milei’s confrontational style, lack of political experience, and limited allies in Congress add an additional layer of unpredictability for the future. In reality, he could turn out to be one of the least influential Argentine presidents in many years. His political party, Freedom Advances, currently has only seven out of 72 seats in the Senate and 37 out of 257 seats in the lower Chamber of Deputies. Even if legislators from right-wing parties, including members of Mauricio Macri’s Republican Proposal party, support Milei, he won’t have enough support for a governing majority. The complexity of passing laws and radical reforms requiring a qualified majority poses a significant governance challenge for the president-elect. Securing the necessary majority for passing laws and projects entails negotiations with various factions within Peronism. Furthermore, Milei’s coalition does not have a single governor in any of Argentina’s 23 provinces.

The difficulties ahead for Milei extend beyond legislative hurdles. The implementation of a shock therapy in the economy often results in substantial adverse effects on employment and income, potentially sparking social unrest that could further strain the country’s already complicated situation. The extent of Milei’s ability to capitalize on his personal popularity will play a significant role in shaping his political influence over the country. To achieve the objective of forming a legislative majority, Milei will need to maintain popular support. 

In conclusion, while Javier Milei’s political style may bear similarities to Trump and Bolsonaro, his success in Argentina is more indicative of a deep-seated frustration with the establishment and traditional politics. As Milei assumes the presidency, the world watches with curiosity to see whether his unconventional approach can bring about the promised change in Argentina or if it encounters the challenges inherent in radical policy shifts.


(*) Imdat Oner is a former Turkish diplomat who recently served at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela. He holds a Ph.D. from Florida International University, where he wrote a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” His articles have been published in the Journal of Populism, War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, and the Miami Herald.