National Guard troops stand on standby during a downtown demonstration opposing expanded ICE operations and supporting immigrant rights in Los Angeles, United States, June 8, 2025. Photo: Brphoto | Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 8: Fractured Democracies — Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 8: Fractured Democracies — Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 13, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00120  

 

On December 11, 2025, the ECPS convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series under the theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargin, the session examined how contemporary populism reshapes democratic politics through affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse explored charismatic populism, focusing on suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in Trumpism, while Artem Turenko analyzed the evolving rhetoric of AfD across the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament elections. Discussants Dr. Helena Rovamo and Dr. Jonathan Madison offered critical reflections on theory, methodology, and causality. A lively Q&A further addressed economic grievance, cultural representation, and the politics of knowledge production, underscoring the session’s interdisciplinary depth and relevance.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On December 11, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 8 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the session theme “Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn,” the workshop brought together an international and interdisciplinary group of scholars to examine how contemporary populist actors reshape democratic politics through rhetoric, affect, moral narratives, and strategic communication. The session formed part of ECPS’s broader effort to advance critical, comparative, and theoretically grounded scholarship on populism and its implications for democratic governance.

The workshop opened with brief welcoming and technical remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced the session’s structure, participants, and moderation on behalf of ECPS.

The session was chaired and moderated by Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS), whose introductory framing provided the conceptual backbone for the discussion. Dr. Sargin situated the session within contemporary debates on democratic fragmentation, emphasizing that populism should be understood not merely as a rhetorical strategy or electoral phenomenon, but as a broader cultural and moral project. She highlighted how populist actors mobilize fear, resentment, and perceived crisis to reorganize political meaning, construct antagonistic identities, and legitimize increasingly exclusionary or punitive forms of governance. Importantly, Dr. Sargin underscored the adaptive nature of populism, noting its capacity to draw on diverse ideological resources, to shift across contexts, and to respond strategically to changing political opportunities. Her framing positioned the session’s papers as complementary explorations of how populism operates at the levels of leadership, discourse, and electoral competition.

The session featured two main presentations. Dr. Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong) delivered a theoretically innovative paper on charismatic populism, focusing on the roles of suffering, moral inversion, and ritualized transgression in sustaining populist authority. Drawing on Weberian sociology, cultural theory, and ethnographic insights from Trump rallies, Dr. Joosse demonstrated how charismatic leaders transform victimhood and norm-breaking into sources of legitimacy, thereby destabilizing democratic norms.

The second presentation, by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow), offered a comparative analysis of the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) rhetoric during the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament election campaigns. Employing a mixed-methods approach combining sentiment analysis and discourse-historical analysis, Turenko examined how AfD rhetoric adapts to electoral expectations while maintaining a stable populist grammar centered on crisis, sovereignty, and exclusion.

The presentations were followed by in-depth feedback from the session’s discussants, Dr. Helena Rovamo (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland) and Dr. Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute). Their interventions critically engaged both papers, raising questions about methodology, conceptual definitions of populism, the relationship between charisma and populist mobilization, and issues of causality and moral paradox. The session concluded with an open Q&A, further extending the discussion to questions of economic grievance, cultural representation, and the political conditions of knowledge production.

Together, the session offered a multifaceted and theoretically rich examination of populism’s role in contemporary democratic transformations.

 

Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse: “Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia”

Dr. Paul Joosse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong.

In his thought-provoking presentation, Associate Professor Paul Joosse (University of Hong Kong) offered an analytically rich exploration of the affective and performative mechanisms through which populist leaders cultivate authority, mobilize followings, and enact moments of political rupture. Drawing from his extensive research on charisma, deviance, and political communication, Dr. Joosse located contemporary populism within deeply rooted sociological traditions, while simultaneously illuminating its specific manifestations in digitalized, hyper-mediatized democracies.

The presentation formed part of the broader inquiry into how rhetoric, emotion, and repression reshape democratic life under populist pressures. Dr. Joosse’s intervention focused on three intertwined dimensions—charisma, suffering, and Saturnalian dynamics—and traced how these elements collectively produce the moral and emotional architecture that sustains populist movements.

Charismatic Authority and the Populist Style

Dr. Joosse began by returning to Max Weber’s classical conception of charisma, underscoring its relevance for understanding populist phenomenon. Charisma, in Weber’s formulation, does not reside solely in individual traits; it is a relational, socially conferred status that emerges through recognition by followers. Populist leaders—from Donald Trump to Jair Bolsonaro, from Nigel Farage to Javier Milei—embody this dynamic through the cultivation of an anti-institutional persona that claims direct, unmediated connection with “the people.”

According to Dr. Joosse, populist charisma is characterized by: i) Transgressive communication styles that break norms and dramatize authenticity; ii) Moral binaries that differentiate “the people” from corrupt elites; iii) Performative storytelling that situates the leader as both savior and victim

This last dynamic—the leader as a suffering figure—became a central axis of the presentation. Dr. Joosse argued that charisma is amplified when leaders frame themselves as persecuted champions, unjustly targeted by the state, media, or global conspiracies. This suffering narrative strengthens affective bonds, deepens identification, and transforms personal grievances into collective ones. In this sense, charismatic populism thrives not simply on policy dissatisfaction but on shared emotional worlds—particularly resentment, humiliation, and righteous indignation.

Suffering as Political Currency

A key theoretical intervention of the talk was Dr. Joosse’s insistence that suffering is not merely an effect but an active resource in populist mobilization. Drawing on both sociological and anthropological literature, he argued that suffering has historically served as a legitimizing device, one that enables leaders to claim moral high ground and portray themselves as martyrs of the people.

Dr. Joosse identified three modalities through which suffering functions: i) Victimization narratives, where leaders claim persecution by courts, the “deep state,” or globalist elites. ii) Redemptive suffering, where hardships encountered by leaders are portrayed as sacrifices undertaken on behalf of the people. Iii) Shared suffering, where leaders mirror or echo the injuries of their supporters—economic precarity, cultural displacement, or political marginalization.

This dynamic, Dr. Joosse suggested, is especially potent in digital ecosystems. Persecution—real or imagined—spreads rapidly through partisan outlets and social media networks, reinforcing the conviction that the leader’s fate and the people’s fate are intertwined.

Dr. Joosse emphasized that this logic can escalate political tensions. When suffering becomes a performative spectacle, it invites supporters to interpret legal accountability or institutional checks as proof of elite conspiracy, thereby undermining democratic legitimacy itself.

Populism and the Saturnalian Inversion

One of the most original contributions of the presentation was Dr. Joosse’s application of the concept of Saturnalia—the ancient Roman festival marked by role reversals, carnivalesque transgression, and temporary suspension of social hierarchy—to the study of populism.

Drawing on the work of Mikhail Bakhtin and on sociological accounts of ritual inversion, Dr. Joosse argued that populist mobilization often takes the form of a Saturnalian eruption in democratic politics. During such moments: i) Norms of decorum, expertise, and civility are overturned; ii) Taboo-breaking becomes a marker of authenticity; iii) Power relations appear symbolically reversed, with “the people” momentarily enthroned over elites. 

This logic helps explain why populist rallies, online forums, and protest events frequently feature humor, ridicule, spectacle, and deliberate vulgarity. These aesthetic practices work not only to entertain but to destabilize the symbolic order—mocking institutions, lampooning experts, and challenging conventional authority.

In Dr. Joosse’s reading, charismatic populists are uniquely skilled Saturnalian performers. Their rhetorical excesses, anti-elite insults, and affective provocations create temporary spaces where ordinary constraints dissolve, generating feelings of liberation among supporters. However, he warned that this inversion, while framed as emancipatory, can also harden into authoritarian sentiment: when Saturnalia ceases to be temporary, democratic norms risk lasting erosion.

The Interplay of Emotion, Ritual, and Media

Throughout the presentation, Dr. Joosse emphasized that charismatic populism is not merely ideological but ritualistic and affective. It depends on i) Co-present gatherings (the rally as ritual); ii) Digital echo-chambers that amplify transgression; iii) Symbolic dramatization of conflict. Media infrastructures—traditional and digital—serve as essential amplifiers of populist charisma. They broadcast Saturnalian moments, circulate symbolic violence, and feed narratives of leader-centric suffering.

Dr. Joosse noted that the current media ecosystem is fertile ground for such dynamics: fragmented attention, algorithmic escalation, and polarizing news cycles intensify the emotional resonance of populist performances. As a result, charisma becomes mass-mediated, creating parasocial intimacy between leaders and followers who may never meet. This, he argued, distinguishes contemporary populism from earlier forms: it is both personalized and distributed, rooted in individual charisma but sustained by networked amplification.

Implications for Democratic Fragility

Dr. Joosse concluded by situating his analysis within the broader theme of “Fractured Democracies.” The interplay of charismatic authority, symbolic suffering, and Saturnalian rupture presents several dangers for democratic governance: i) Delegitimization of institutional checks when leaders portray legal accountability as persecution; ii) Normalization of political transgression, weakening norms needed for democratic stability; iii) Emotional tribalization, which reduces politics to moralized conflict; iv) Acceleration of epistemic fragmentation as suffering narratives circulate unchecked.

He argued that liberal democracies must take seriously the emotional and ritual dimensions of political life. Technocratic or procedural responses alone cannot counteract populist charisma; rather, democratic actors need to cultivate alternative forms of affective engagement, narrative-building, and civic ritual.

In sum, Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse delivered a conceptually rich and theoretically innovative account of how populist charisma operates through suffering and Saturnalian inversion. His presentation illuminated the mechanisms by which populist leaders harness emotional energies, disrupt symbolic orders, and generate powerful moments of political transgression. By situating these dynamics within a broader sociological and historical frame, Dr. Joosse provided participants with an analytical vocabulary capable of explaining both the appeal and the democratic risks of contemporary populism.

 

Artem Turenko: “The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the ‘Alternative for Germany’: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024”

Artem Turenko is a PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow.

The presentation delivered by Artem Turenko also offered a rigorous comparative analysis of the rhetorical evolution of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) across two European Parliament election campaigns—2019 and 2024. Situated at the intersection of political linguistics, populism studies, and European politics, Turenko’s research interrogates a widely held assumption in the literature on populism: that populist parties strategically soften their rhetoric when electoral success is uncertain and radicalize it when victory appears likely. Through a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative content analysis, sentiment analysis, and discourse-theoretical insights, the study provides a nuanced, partially counterintuitive answer.

The analytical strength of the presentation lies not merely in its empirical findings, but in how it captures the AfD’s rhetorical balancing act as a populist actor transitioning from peripheral challenger to semi-mainstream contender within both German and European political spaces. The AfD’s participation in the Identity and Democracy (ID) faction—and later its exclusion and reconfiguration into the “Europe of Sovereign Nations” group—forms a crucial contextual backdrop shaping its discursive strategies.

Methodological Architecture and Analytical Scope

Turenko’s research is grounded in a systematic comparison of two core textual corpora: the AfD’s European Parliament election programs (2019 and 2024) and accompanying campaign posters. Employing ATLAS.ti software, the author conducts sentiment analysis at the paragraph level while also mapping thematic clusters and key lexical markers associated with right-wing populism. Complementing this quantitative layer is a qualitative discourse-theoretical lens inspired by the concept of topoi, particularly as developed in the discourse-historical approach (DHA). This allows the study to trace recurring argumentation schemes such as crisis, threat, sovereignty, and decline.

Crucially, the analysis does not treat rhetoric as a static ideological artifact but as a strategic instrument shaped by electoral expectations, factional alliances, and shifting political opportunity structures at the European level.

Continuity Beneath Change: Thematic Stability Across Campaigns

One of the central findings emphasized in both the presentation and the underlying paper is the remarkable thematic continuity in AfD rhetoric across the two campaigns. Migration, Islam, sovereignty, and skepticism toward supranational governance remain the party’s rhetorical backbone in both 2019 and 2024. Even as the European and domestic political environments changed dramatically—marked by pandemic aftermath, energy crises, war in Ukraine, and geopolitical instability—the AfD’s core narrative of a threatened nation embedded within a dysfunctional EU persisted.

According to Turenko, this continuity suggests that the AfD’s populism is less reactive than structurally embedded. Rather than reinventing its agenda, the party selectively recalibrates emphasis while maintaining a stable ideological grammar. This is particularly visible in the sustained dominance of negative emotional tonality across both election programs. In absolute terms, the 2024 manifesto contains even more negatively coded paragraphs, although this increase is partly attributable to the expanded length of the document.

Rhetorical Radicalization Without Emotional Escalation

The study’s most analytically significant contribution lies in its challenge to the expectation that greater electoral success necessarily produces harsher rhetoric. While Turenko demonstrates an increased frequency of lexical markers associated with right-wing populism in 2024—such as “danger,” “threat,” “ban,” and “reject”—the overall emotional tone of the rhetoric changes only marginally. Negative sentiment remains dominant, but not dramatically more intense.

This apparent paradox becomes intelligible through a third-eye reading: the AfD radicalizes not by amplifying emotional hostility, but by broadening the semantic ecology of crisis. In 2019, crisis discourse was relatively narrow, focused primarily on migration and the euro. By 2024, the crisis topos expands to encompass energy, gas, climate, gender, public health, and global finance. The party thus multiplies perceived threats without fundamentally altering its emotional register. Crisis becomes omnipresent, normalized, and structurally embedded rather than rhetorically explosive.

Strategic Softening and Discursive Moderation

Equally revealing is what disappears from the AfD’s rhetoric. The complete absence of the term “Dexit” in the 2024 program—after its notable presence in 2019—signals a tactical softening on the issue of EU withdrawal. From a third-eye perspective, this omission reflects strategic moderation rather than ideological retreat. The AfD reframes its Euroscepticism from exit-oriented rupture to internal resistance and sovereignty reclamation, aligning more closely with the broader ID faction’s stance as articulated in documents such as the Antwerp Declaration.

At the same time, the emergence of “gender ideology” as a distinct thematic field in 2024 indicates an effort to expand the party’s cultural conflict repertoire. This shift mirrors transnational right-wing populist trends and suggests a strategic attempt to mobilize new constituencies without abandoning core voters.

Visual Rhetoric and Populist Simplification

The comparative analysis of campaign posters reinforces these conclusions. While the 2019 visuals were narrowly focused on border security and migration control, the 2024 posters display a significantly broader issue spectrum, including family policy, energy security, freedom of speech, and EU power limitation. Yet, the emotional architecture remains consistent: short imperatives, exclamatory slogans, and stark binaries. The substitution of “crisis” with “chaos” in visual rhetoric exemplifies how the AfD preserves affective intensity while updating its symbolic vocabulary.

In sum, Turenko’s presentation demonstrates that the AfD’s rhetorical evolution between 2019 and 2024 is best understood as adaptive recalibration rather than linear radicalization or moderation. The party intensifies populist markers and expands its crisis narrative while simultaneously avoiding discursive moves that could alienate broader electorates or constrain coalition possibilities at the European level. The AfD emerges as a populist actor increasingly skilled in managing the tension between ideological rigidity and strategic flexibility. The study thus offers valuable insights not only into German right-wing populism, but also into the broader dynamics of populist normalization within contemporary European politics.

 

Discussant Feedback and Responses

Dr. Helena Rovamo’s Feedback on Dr. Paul Joosse’s Presentation

Dr. Helena Rovamo is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland.

Session’s first discussant Dr. Helena Rovamo’s feedback on Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse’s presentation constituted a thoughtful and methodologically attentive intervention that both affirmed the scholarly value of the work and pushed its conceptual boundaries. Positioned within the broader framework of the ECPS workshop, her remarks underscored a shared recognition among presenters that populism must be understood not merely as a strategic or rhetorical phenomenon, but as one deeply embedded in affect, morality, and social relations.

Dr. Rovamo’s engagement unfolds along three analytically distinct yet interconnected axes: methodology, theory, and empirical generalization. First, her methodological inquiry into Dr. Joosse’s ethnographic practice at political rallies foregrounds the often-overlooked relational dynamics of fieldwork. By asking how rally participants experienced being approached by a researcher, Dr. Rovamo implicitly raises questions about reflexivity, power, trust, and emotional negotiation in politically charged environments. This intervention situates populism research within broader debates in qualitative sociology concerning the co-production of data and the affective dimensions of knowledge generation.

Second, Dr. Rovamo’s theoretical questioning targets the conceptual interface between charisma and populism. Rather than accepting their linkage as self-evident, she presses Dr. Joosse to clarify whether charisma constitutes the essence of populism, a parallel phenomenon, or an underlying social mechanism that populist rhetoric mobilizes. This line of questioning reflects a concern with analytical precision and signals the risk of conceptual conflation. Her comments invite a deeper theorization of whether populism should be understood primarily as discursive performance, moral framing, or charismatic social bonding.

Finally, Dr. Rovamo’s reflections on Donald Trump and the apparent durability of his support introduce a critical temporal dimension. By asking whether anything can weaken Trump’s charisma or the broader MAGA movement, she challenges static understandings of charismatic authority. This question opens space for considering erosion, routinization, or transformation of charisma under conditions of scandal, failure, or institutionalization.

Assoc. Prof. Joosse’s Response

Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse’s response to Dr. Rovamo’s feedback offered a theoretically rich and reflexively grounded clarification of his methodological choices and conceptual commitments. His intervention can be read as an effort to reposition charisma theory as an indispensable, yet insufficiently integrated, component of contemporary populism studies—while simultaneously demystifying the empirical mechanics of researching charismatic movements in situ.

On the methodological plane, Dr. Joosse addressed concerns regarding fieldwork at Trump rallies by reframing such spaces as inherently dialogical rather than hostile research environments. He emphasized that MAGA rallies function as political forums in which participants are not only ideologically motivated but socially primed for interaction. The combination of extended waiting periods, strong collective identity, and expressive political culture renders rally-goers unusually accessible to qualitative inquiry. This response implicitly challenges assumptions about populist publics as suspicious or closed off, instead portraying them as actively seeking recognition and discursive engagement. From an analytical standpoint, Dr. Joosse thus normalizes populist spaces as legitimate sites of sociological encounter rather than exceptional or epistemically compromised arenas.

The theoretical core of Dr. Joosse’s response lies in his articulation of charisma theory and populism theory as complementary rather than competing frameworks. He conceptualizes populism as a relational dynamic centered on the people–elite antagonism, while charisma theory foregrounds leadership and authority grounded in popular legitimacy operating outside institutional norms. Importantly, Dr. Joosse resists reductive equivalence: not all populism is charismatic, and not all charisma is populist. Yet, he argues that each framework addresses the blind spots of the other—charisma theory often under-theorizing collective authorization, and populism theory under-specifying leadership dynamics. His response positions this synthesis as a broader scholarly project aimed at rebalancing agency between leaders and followers.

Dr. Joosse’s reflections on Donald Trump further extend this synthesis through a Weberian lens. Drawing on Max Weber’s concept of routinization, he suggests that charismatic power rarely collapses due to external critique or scandal. Instead, it dissipates internally as followers transform revolutionary authority into ritualized tradition. Trump’s future, in this reading, hinges less on opposition strategies than on whether his movement eventually converts his exceptionalism into reproducible form—akin to the symbolic afterlife of figures such as Ronald Reagan.

Dr. Joosse also underscores the destabilizing nature of charismatic authority. By redefining political rules and defying normative expectations, charismatic leaders render conventional democratic “playbooks” ineffective. This, he argues, explains why institutional actors historically resort to coercive measures when legitimacy contests fail. Dr. Joosse’s response situates Trumpism not as an anomaly, but as a classic instance of charismatic disruption—one whose resolution remains structurally indeterminate rather than strategically manageable.

Dr. Rovamo’s Feedback on Artem Turenko’s Presentation

Dr. Helena Rovamo’s feedback on Artem Turenko’s presentation offered a constructive and analytically focused engagement that both affirmed the scholarly value of the study and probed its core assumptions. Her intervention can be understood as an invitation to strengthen the explanatory architecture of the research by sharpening its theoretical logic and methodological transparency.

Dr. Rovamo began by recognizing the contribution of Turenko’s work to the study of populist rhetoric, particularly highlighting its emphasis on temporal change. She framed this diachronic perspective as a significant strength, noting that tracing how populist communication evolves across electoral cycles enriches existing understandings of populism as a dynamic rather than static phenomenon.

At the same time, Dr. Rovamo raised a fundamental theoretical challenge to the study’s central assumption: that populist parties soften their rhetoric when electoral success is uncertain and harden it when victory appears likely. Drawing on intuitive and strategic reasoning, she suggested an alternative expectation—namely, that parties with little to lose might radicalize more aggressively, while those nearing electoral success might moderate their tone to consolidate broader, centrist support. This question did not dismiss the proposed hypothesis but called for a clearer articulation of its underlying causal logic.

Her critique then shifted to methodology. Dr. Rovamo queried how Turenko inferred the AfD’s expectations of winning or losing across different campaigns, implicitly pointing to the difficulty of operationalizing party perceptions and strategic calculations. She suggested that other explanatory variables—beyond electoral anticipation—might account for rhetorical shifts, thereby encouraging a more pluralistic causal framework.

Finally, Dr. Rovamo turned to the analysis of campaign posters, proposing that future research might benefit from incorporating systematic visual analysis. She implied that visual rhetoric could reveal affective and symbolic dimensions of populism not fully captured through textual analysis alone.

Artem Turenko’s Response

Artem Turenko’s response to Dr. Helena Rovamo’s feedback constituted a reflective and forward-looking clarification of his theoretical assumptions and research design. His intervention can be read as an attempt to situate his findings within an ongoing scholarly debate while acknowledging both the provisional nature of his conclusions and the broader trajectory of his doctoral research.

Addressing the central theoretical challenge, Turenko defended his hypothesis concerning the relationship between electoral expectations and rhetorical intensity by situating it within an existing, though contested, body of literature on populist strategy. He emphasized that scholarly findings on rhetorical “softening” and “hardening” are not uniform and often vary depending on whether populist parties operate in government or opposition. By invoking comparative cases—such as governing populist parties in Hungary versus opposition populists in Western and Central Europe—he underscored the importance of positional context in shaping rhetorical behavior. From an analytical standpoint, this response reframed his assumption not as a deterministic rule but as a context-sensitive proposition.

Methodologically, Turenko clarified that his inference regarding the AfD’s expectations of electoral success was grounded in longitudinal polling data, regional election outcomes, and observable trends in voter support—particularly the party’s sustained gains in eastern German Länder and its expanding appeal in western regions. He acknowledged, however, that the literature offers no definitive consensus on how electoral anticipation translates into rhetorical strategy, thereby implicitly accepting Dr. Rovamo’s call for theoretical openness.

Finally, Turenko addressed the suggestion to incorporate visual analysis by situating the current study within the constraints of an article-length publication. He explained that while posters were included as supplementary material, a systematic visual analysis exceeds the scope of the present article. Importantly, he positioned this limitation as temporary, outlining plans for a more comprehensive, multi-level and multimodal analysis in his doctoral thesis, encompassing regional, federal, and European elections.

Dr. Jonathan Madison’s Feedback on Dr. Joosse’s Presentation

Dr. Jonathan Madison is a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute.

Dr. Jonathan Madison’s feedback on Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse’s presentation constituted a dense and multi-layered scholarly intervention that simultaneously affirmed the contribution of the research and pressed it toward greater conceptual and explanatory depth. Madison’s remarks can be read as an effort to situate Dr. Joosse’s analysis of charismatic populism within broader debates on moral order, religious symbolism, and ideological asymmetry.

Dr. Madison began by foregrounding a foundational concern shared across populism studies: the contested nature of the concept itself. By encouraging presenters to clarify their operative definitions of populism, he implicitly highlighted the stakes of conceptual framing for empirical interpretation. This move positioned Dr. Joosse’s work within a wider methodological conversation about what, precisely, scholars are identifying when they analyze populist movements—style, ideology, moral narrative, or social relation.

Turning specifically to Dr. Joosse’s paper, Dr. Madison expressed strong appreciation for its treatment of victimhood as a constitutive element of charismatic populism. He underscored the value of Dr. Joosse’s analysis in showing how narratives of persecution forge an intimate, morally charged bond between leader and followers. Yet Dr. Madison’s feedback was not merely confirmatory; it pivoted toward a series of probing questions that exposed internal tensions within this framework.

A central paradox Dr. Madison identified concerns Christianity. He questioned how Donald Trump can successfully mobilize a sense of Christian oppression when Christianity itself remains a dominant moral framework in American society—and when Trump routinely violates its ethical norms. This question destabilizes simple oppositions between hegemonic morality and populist rebellion, suggesting instead a more complex moral inversion in which norm violation becomes a source of authenticity and solidarity.

Relatedly, Dr. Madison invited Dr. Joosse to reflect on the role of liberalism, neoliberalism, and capitalism as perceived antagonists within Trumpist rhetoric. He proposed that these abstract systems may function as the true objects of rebellion, allowing Christianity to be reframed as a victimized tradition rather than a ruling moral order. This line of inquiry situates charismatic populism within a broader ideological backlash against modernity and abstraction.

Dr. Madison also drew attention to Dr. Joosse’s brief mention of physical suffering, asking whether moments such as Trump’s assassination attempt—and the symbolic solidarities that followed—should be more fully integrated into the analysis. Finally, he raised a critical asymmetry: why condemnation from Trump’s opponents strengthens in-group cohesion, while Trump’s own insults fail to alienate his supporters. This question challenges conventional theories of moral offense and reciprocity.

Assoc. Prof. Joosse’s Response

Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse’s response to Dr. Jonathan Madison’s feedback offered a nuanced and reflexive elaboration of the moral, religious, and sociological paradoxes embedded in contemporary charismatic populism. His intervention can be read as an effort to theorize contradiction not as a weakness of Trumpism, but as one of its constitutive sources of power.

Addressing Dr. Madison’s question concerning Christianity, Dr. Joosse began by disentangling two analytically distinct issues: Christianity as a hegemonic moral framework and Christianity as a site of internal contestation. While acknowledging that American civil religion is historically rooted in Christianity, he emphasized that hegemonic status does not preclude intense intra-Christian struggle. Competing interpretations of moral authority, decline, and authenticity allow segments of Christianity to frame themselves simultaneously as historically dominant and presently dispossessed. In this sense, Trumpism draws on a narrative of loss rather than marginality, positioning Christianity as a tradition under siege that must be restored rather than defended.

Dr. Joosse then confronted the apparent contradiction of Trump as a Christian figure. Rather than denying the tension, he theorized it as central to charismatic legitimation. Drawing on interview material, he highlighted how supporters distinguish between moral perfection and divine instrumentality. Trump is not venerated as a moral exemplar but accepted as a flawed vessel—often analogized to biblical figures such as King Cyrus—through whom a higher purpose is enacted. This framing allows supporters to bracket Trump’s personal transgressions without undermining his perceived mission, reinforcing rather than weakening charismatic attachment.

On the question of modernity and ideological backlash, Dr. Joosse cautiously acknowledged the relevance of global order, nationalism, and resistance to transnational governance. Yet he underscored a methodological asymmetry between macro-level explanations and micro-level meaning-making. From his ethnographic standpoint, supporters rarely articulate their grievances in abstract ideological terms such as neoliberalism or globalization. Instead, these structural forces are translated into experiential narratives of cultural displacement and moral erosion, suggesting that charismatic revolt operates through lived affect rather than formal ideology.

Dr. Joosse’s reflections on physical suffering further deepened the analysis. He interpreted Trump’s public emphasis on bodily harm—particularly following the assassination attempt—as a powerful act of sacralization. The visual and symbolic replication of injury by supporters, including comparisons to Christian iconography of sacrifice, transforms vulnerability into proof of devotion. Suffering thus becomes a resource for charismatization, dramatizing personal risk as evidence of moral commitment.

Finally, Dr. Joosse addressed Dr. Madison’s question about asymmetric moral judgment. Rather than treating the double standard as a puzzle to be solved, he reframed it as a defining feature of charismatic authority. Operating outside conventional moral and institutional rules, charismatic figures are granted exceptional latitude by their followers, who reinterpret norm violations as authenticity, strength, or combativeness. From this perspective, Trump’s immunity to disqualification is not anomalous but exemplary of charisma’s capacity to suspend ordinary evaluative frameworks.

Taken together, Dr. Joosse’s response advanced a compelling sociological insight: charismatic populism thrives not despite moral contradiction, but through its capacity to absorb, reinterpret, and weaponize it.

Dr. Jonathan Madison’s Feedback on Artem Turenko

Dr. JMadison’s feedback on Artem Turenko’s presentation and paper constituted a careful and theoretically oriented intervention that both affirmed the empirical quality of the research and pressed for greater conceptual rigor. Dr. Madison’s comments can be read as an effort to sharpen the analytical foundations upon which claims about populism and rhetorical change are built.

Dr. Madison began by commending the methodological strength of Turenko’s study, particularly the systematic analysis of campaign messaging and the careful handling of empirical material. He framed the paper as a valuable contribution that other scholars could readily build upon, thereby situating it positively within the broader field of populism research.

At the core of his feedback, however, lay a sustained concern with conceptual clarity. Dr. Madison emphasized that while “populism” is frequently invoked, it remains a deeply contested concept, and he noted that the paper does not sufficiently define how populism is understood or operationalized. He questioned the implicit assumption that references to danger, threat, or crisis can be treated as inherently populist, pointing out that such language may equally characterize ideological projects grounded in nationalism, authoritarianism, or even fascism. From this perspective, Dr. Madison challenged the paper to explain what distinguishes populist rhetoric from other forms of radical or right-wing political communication.

Relatedly, Dr. Madison cautioned against treating “radicalization” and “populist rhetoric” as interchangeable terms. He argued that increasing rhetorical intensity does not automatically equate to populism and that the analytical distinction between these phenomena must be made explicit. Without such clarification, claims about the evolution of populist rhetoric risk conceptual slippage.

Finally, Dr. Madison revisited the issue of causal directionality in Turenko’s argument. He questioned whether rhetorical moderation or radicalization should be understood as a response to anticipated electoral outcomes, or alternatively as a causal factor shaping those outcomes. By highlighting this ambiguity, Dr. Madison invited greater methodological reflexivity and encouraged consideration of competing causal explanations. Overall, Dr. Madison’s feedback underscored the importance of definitional precision and causal clarity in transforming strong empirical research into a robust theoretical contribution.

Artem Turenko’s Response

Artem Turenko’s response to Dr. Madison’s feedback unfolded as a reflective and conceptually attentive clarification of his analytical choices. His intervention can be read as an attempt to reconcile empirical findings with the conceptual ambiguities that pervade the study of populism, while openly acknowledging the limits of explanatory certainty.

Addressing the definitional critique, Turenko began by situating his work within the plurality of scholarly interpretations of populism. He emphasized that his article does not advance a singular or exhaustive definition but instead draws on two widely used conceptualizations: populism as a thin-centered ideology and populism as a political style. In this sense, populism is understood both as an ideological formation that attaches itself to host ideologies—such as nationalism or authoritarianism—and as a mode of political communication characterized by emotional appeal, moral polarization, and simplified antagonisms. From an analytical standpoint, this hybrid approach reflects a pragmatic effort to capture the multidimensional nature of AfD rhetoric rather than to impose rigid categorical boundaries.

Turenko further responded to concerns about conflation between populism and radical right ideology by foregrounding the AfD’s internal heterogeneity. He highlighted the party’s long-standing tension between a more moderate, economically liberal wing and a more radical nationalist faction rooted primarily in eastern Germany. This intra-party struggle, he argued, is visibly encoded in the party’s official programs, which function as negotiated compromises rather than ideologically coherent manifestos. This insight reframes AfD rhetoric as a balancing act between competing internal constituencies rather than a linear trajectory toward radicalization.

On the issue of distinguishing populism from nationalism or fascism, Turenko conceded that lexical markers such as “danger,” “threat,” or “ban” are insufficient on their own to identify populism. Instead, he pointed to argumentation schemes derived from the discourse-historical approach, particularly the topos of danger and crisis, which link perceived threats to calls for extraordinary political action. In this view, populism emerges not from isolated vocabulary but from patterned narratives that construct “the people” as collectively endangered.

Finally, Turenko addressed the challenge of causal directionality regarding rhetorical softening or hardening. He acknowledged that the relationship between electoral expectations and rhetoric remains unresolved in the literature and admitted the possibility that his initial assumption may require revision. His empirical finding—that AfD support increased without significant rhetorical change—was presented as an invitation for further research rather than definitive proof.

The Q&A Session

The Q&A session also functioned as an important analytical extension of the workshop, drawing together core themes of cultural grievance, economic representation, and the politics of knowledge production. The exchange revealed how empirical findings on populism are shaped not only by theoretical frameworks but also by positional contexts—both of researchers and of the actors they study.

The first intervention, raised via the chat by Nikola Ilić and addressed to Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse, probed the relationship between economic grievance and cultural disrespect in Trumpist mobilization. Ilić’s question implicitly challenged culturalist accounts of populism by asking whether material deprivation operates as a precursor to the moral and symbolic injuries identified in Dr. Joosse’s analysis. 

Dr. Joosse’s response offered a nuanced clarification: while economic concerns—especially inflation and the cost of living—were frequently articulated by rally participants, these concerns were expressed through culturally mediated narratives rather than through technical economic reasoning. Trump’s tariff proposals, for example, were embraced less as policy instruments than as symbolic promises of restored fairness and national strength. From an analytical standpoint, Dr. Joosse reframed economic grievance as a representational resource rather than a causal foundation, emphasizing that objective wealth indicators do not align neatly with subjective experiences of loss. His response reinforced the broader argument that populist appeal operates through meaning-making processes rather than material conditions alone.

The second intervention, posed by Dr. Bulent Kenes and directed to Artem Turenko, shifted the discussion toward epistemic and institutional constraints. Dr. Kenes raised a pointed question regarding the feasibility of studying far-right populism in Europe from within Russia, given the Kremlin’s widely alleged instrumental support for radical-right movements across Europe and beyond. His inquiry foregrounded the political conditions under which academic knowledge about populism is produced, implicitly questioning issues of autonomy, censorship, and selectivity.

Turenko’s response offered a candid and context-sensitive account of Russian academic practice. He argued that, paradoxically, the study of European far-right parties—particularly the AfD—is relatively unproblematic within Russian political science. Far-right populism in Europe is widely covered in Russian media and extensively analyzed in academic institutions such as the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. According to Turenko, this openness contrasts sharply with the difficulties scholars face when studying sensitive domestic or progressive topics, including left-wing movements or LGBTQ-related politics. His remarks highlighted an asymmetry of academic freedom: external cases of populism are treated as analytically legitimate objects, while internal or normatively challenging subjects remain constrained in Russian case.

Conclusion

Session 8 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a theoretically sophisticated and empirically grounded contribution to contemporary debates on populism and democratic fragility. Bringing together sociological theory, discourse analysis, and comparative political research, the session demonstrated that populism cannot be adequately understood as a singular ideology, rhetorical tactic, or electoral strategy. Rather, it emerges as a multifaceted political phenomenon that operates simultaneously at the levels of emotion, morality, symbolism, and institutional contestation.

Taken together, the presentations by Assoc. Prof. Paul Joosse and Artem Turenko highlighted two complementary dimensions of the populist turn. D. Joosse’s analysis foregrounded the affective and ritual foundations of charismatic authority, showing how suffering, transgression, and Saturnalian inversion enable populist leaders to suspend normative constraints and reconfigure legitimacy itself. Turenko’s comparative study, by contrast, illuminated the strategic and discursive adaptability of populist parties within electoral competition, demonstrating how populist rhetoric can remain structurally stable while selectively recalibrating its thematic focus in response to shifting political opportunities.

The interventions by discussants Dr. Helena Rovamo and Dr. Jonathan Madison played a crucial integrative role in sharpening the session’s analytical stakes. Their feedback underscored the importance of conceptual precision, methodological reflexivity, and causal clarity in populism research. By questioning the boundaries between populism, radicalism, nationalism, and charisma, they highlighted enduring tensions within the field and pointed toward the need for more theoretically explicit and dialogical scholarship.

The Q&A session further expanded the discussion by linking populist mobilization to broader questions of economic representation, cultural grievance, and the politics of knowledge production. These exchanges revealed that populism operates not only through material claims or ideological positions, but through culturally mediated narratives that translate structural anxieties into moralized political meaning.

In sum, the session reinforced a central insight of the ECPS workshop series: that understanding the populist turn requires sustained interdisciplinary engagement with the emotional, symbolic, and strategic dimensions of democratic life. By bridging micro-level meaning-making with macro-level political dynamics, the session offered valuable analytical tools for assessing both the appeal of populism and its profound challenges to democratic norms and institutions.

People

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 7: Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a compelling interdisciplinary examination of how contemporary populism unsettles the foundations of democratic representation. Bringing together insights from digital politics, the history of political thought, and critical social theory, the session illuminated the multiple arenas—affective, constitutional, and epistemic—through which representation is being reconfigured. Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano revealed how memetic communication and generative AI reshape political identities and moral boundaries within far-right movements. Maria Giorgia Caraceni traced these dynamics to enduring tensions within the conceptual history of popular sovereignty, while Elif Başak Ürdem demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy generates misrecognition and drives grievances toward populist articulation. Collectively, the session highlighted the necessity of integrated, cross-disciplinary approaches for understanding the evolving crisis of democratic representation.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 27, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 7 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism,” assembled an interdisciplinary group of scholars to interrogate the shifting boundaries of political representation in an era defined by populist appeals, democratic fragmentation, and technological transformation. The workshop opened with a brief orientation by ECPS intern Reka Koleszar, who welcomed participants, provided technical guidance, and formally introduced the moderator, presenters, and discussant on behalf of ECPS, ensuring a smooth and well-structured beginning to the session.

Under the steady and incisive moderation of Dr. Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor at Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University), the session unfolded as a robust intellectual engagement with the crises and possibilities surrounding contemporary democratic representation. Dr. Magno framed the event by situating today’s populist moment within broader transformations affecting democratic institutions, public trust, and communicative infrastructures. Emphasizing that representation must be understood not only institutionally but also symbolically and epistemically, he set the stage for the three presentations, each of which approached the problem of representation from a distinct but complementary angle.

The first presentation, delivered by Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University), examined how memes, short-form videos, and AI-generated images operate as potent vehicles of populist discourse. His talk demonstrated how digital visual cultures simplify complex ideological battles, construct moralized identities, and normalize hostility—revealing the emotional and aesthetic foundations of far-right mobilization in Latin America. By mapping differences in memetic ecosystems across Argentina, Brazil, and El Salvador, Dr. Bayarri illuminated how digital artifacts reshape political communication and reconfigure the representational field.

Next, Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; and Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V) offered a long-term conceptual genealogy of popular sovereignty, tracing contemporary populism to the enduring tension between monist and pluralist understandings of “the people.” Through a reconstruction of Rousseauian and Madisonian frameworks, Caraceni argued that the conflict between unfettered majority rule and constitutional constraints is not a modern anomaly but a persistent structural dilemma within democratic theory—one that populism reactivates with renewed force.

The final presentation, by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University), analyzed populism as a political response to the failures of neoliberal meritocracy. Introducing the concept of epistemic misrecognition, Ürdem argued that meritocratic regimes undermine democratic parity by devaluing non-credentialed forms of knowledge, generating status injury, and closing off channels of political voice. Her synthesis of Nancy Fraser’s tripartite justice framework and Ernesto Laclau’s theory of political articulation offered a novel explanation for why unaddressed grievances increasingly channel into populist mobilization.

The session concluded with deeply engaged feedback given by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford), whose discussant reflections synthesized the thematic intersections among the papers while posing incisive questions that broadened the theoretical and comparative horizons of the workshop.

 

Dr. Christopher Magno: Framing the Crisis of Representation in an Age of Populism

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University.

Session began with an illuminating opening address by Dr. Christopher Magno. Expressing his appreciation to the European Center for Populism Studies and to participants joining from across the globe, Dr. Magno framed the session as an interdisciplinary engagement with one of the most pressing challenges facing contemporary democracies: the erosion, contestation, and reconfiguration of political representation in an age of intensifying populism. As chair of the session, he emphasized that the three featured papers—spanning political theory, digital communication, and the sociology of knowledge—collectively reveal the multifaceted nature of today’s representational crisis.

Dr. Magno began by noting that institutions traditionally associated with democratic representation—parties, parliaments, courts, and the media—are experiencing unprecedented stress. Populist leaders increasingly claim to speak exclusively for “the people,” positioning themselves against bureaucracies, independent institutions, and constitutional checks. Simultaneously, citizens express diminishing trust in political actors and deep frustrations with the perceived distance between decision makers and everyday life. Against this backdrop, Dr. Magno highlighted several foundational questions that today’s scholars must revisit: Who—or what—is represented in modern democracies? What constitutes legitimate political knowledge? How is “the people” symbolically constructed? And in what ways do new communicative infrastructures reshape these dynamics?

Introducing the session’s first paper, Dr. Magno highlighted Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano’s analysis of memetic violence within far-right populist movements in Latin America. He explained that Dr. Bayarri shifts the analytical focus from formal institutions to the emotional and visual terrain of memes, short videos, and AI-generated images. These digital artefacts, he noted, perform serious political work: they simplify complex conflicts into stark moral binaries, normalize hostility through humor, and help forge emotionally charged communities bound by grievance and belonging. In an era of generative AI, Dr. Magno observed, narrative authority increasingly slips away from traditional institutions and into decentralized digital ecosystems where populist movements thrive.

He then turned to Maria Giorgia Caraceni’s contribution, which situates populism within the long intellectual history of popular sovereignty. Dr. Magno explained how Caraceni contrasts a monist Rousseauian conception of a unified general will with a pluralist Madisonian framework grounded in constitutional limits and minority protections. From this perspective, populism reactivates monist understandings of “the people,” illuminating not an aberration but a recurring tension embedded in democratic evolution.

Finally, Dr. Magno introduced Elif Başak Ürdem’s paper, which interrogates populism as a rational response to neoliberal meritocracy’s structural failures. Central to Ürdem’s argument is epistemic misrecognition—the process through which technocratic institutions devalue non-credentialed forms of reasoning, producing profound experiences of exclusion and injury. Dr. Magno noted that this framework invites participants to view representation not only institutionally but also epistemically: as a question of whose knowledge counts and who is recognized as a legitimate political subject.

By weaving together structural, cultural, and conceptual analyses, Dr. Magno concluded, the three papers collectively illustrate that the crisis of representation cannot be reduced to economic grievances, digital disruption, or constitutional design alone. Rather, it emerges at their intersection—and it demands renewed scholarly attention to exclusion, sovereignty, and the contested construction of “the people.” With these reflections, he opened the floor and invited the first presentation.

 

Asst. Prof. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano: “Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization” 

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University.

Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano delivered a rich and empirically grounded presentation that examined how far-right populist movements in Latin America strategically deploy memetic communication—particularly memes, short-form videos, and AI-generated images—to mobilize emotions, construct political identities, and shape moral boundaries. Drawing on more than a decade of research in Brazil and three years of fieldwork in Guatemala, Argentina, Uruguay, and El Salvador, Dr. Bayarri’s talk offered an in-depth exploration of the visual and affective infrastructures that sustain contemporary populist politics. His presentation stemmed from a recent Newton International Fellowship undertaken at the University of London, funded by the British Academy.

At the outset, Dr. Bayarri presented three guiding research questions. First, he asked how memes and AI-generated images intervene in far-right populist discourse—not as light entertainment, but as political artifacts capable of translating ideology into immediate emotional resonance. Second, he explored what comparative insights emerge from studying Brazil, Argentina, and El Salvador, three countries with distinct histories yet convergent visual strategies for constructing “the people” and identifying internal enemies. Third, he probed how humor functions as a mechanism of symbolic violence, normalizing hostility toward women, LGBTQ+ communities, racialized groups, and political opponents.

While Dr. Bayarri did not delve deeply into theoretical debates, he situated memetic communication at the intersection of postcolonial studies, political anthropology, and visual analysis. He conceptualized memes as “cultural and affective artifacts”: multimodal, intuitive forms that condense entire worldviews into a single image or short video. Drawing on affect theory, particularly Sara Ahmed’s work, he underscored how emotions structure political recognition, shaping who is perceived as threatening or trustworthy. His concept of memetic violence captured how humor, satire, and exaggeration operate as tools to legitimize aggression. Far from being peripheral, memes constitute a central mechanism through which far-right populism exerts affective force.

From Pixels to Protest: AI’s Role in Shaping Populist Mobilization

A major portion of the presentation focused on the transformative impact of generative AI. Tools like MidJourney, DALL·E, and Stable Diffusion, he argued, have dramatically lowered the barriers to producing high-quality political imagery. Supporters no longer require graphic-design skills; simple textual prompts now generate polished depictions of Javier Milei as a medieval crusader, Jair Bolsonaro as a messianic figure, or Nayib Bukele as a futuristic sovereign. Rather than diversifying the visual field, AI often reinforces authoritarian and nationalist narratives, giving them heightened emotional charge and aesthetic cohesion.

Methodologically, Dr. Bayarri employed a mixed approach combining digital ethnography, visual analysis, and on-the-ground fieldwork. Across Telegram groups in the three countries studied, he collected more than 25,000 images—both manually produced and AI-generated. Equally significant were his ethnographic observations at rallies, demonstrations, and political events. He emphasized that online imagery does not remain confined to screens; instead, it reappears in chants, T-shirts, flags, street art, and casual political conversations. This online–offline loop shows that memetic communication actively shapes political behavior and helps embed antagonistic narratives in everyday life.

Dr. Bayarri then examined each country case in turn. In Argentina, supporters of Javier Milei construct an intensely mythological visual universe in which the libertarian candidate appears as a lion, crusader, or savior. National symbols blend with fantastical elements to portray him as a heroic figure rescuing the nation from the corrupt “political caste.” Although AI use remains moderate, AI-generated images play a significant symbolic role by presenting Milei with heightened coherence and aesthetic polish. Offline discourse mirrors these representations; slogans such as “He will turn lambs into lions” or “He is our Templar” circulate widely.

Divergent Populist Aesthetics Across Latin America

Brazil, by contrast, exhibits relatively low AI use to date but an extremely high volume of manually produced memes. Here, the dominant motifs are Christian morality, national purity, and moralized depictions of innocence. Bolsonaro is frequently shown embraced by Jesus, while rivals such as Lula are caricatured as corrupt, dirty, or monstrous. Telegram groups often include calls for violence framed through moral binaries like “a good bandit is a dead bandit.” Dr. Bayarri suggested that these moralized narratives may evolve significantly as AI becomes more integrated into Brazilian political communication ahead of the 2026 elections.

El Salvador displayed the highest level of AI-generated imagery. President Nayib Bukele is visually reimagined as a king, messiah, or futuristic architect of national modernity. AI-generated skylines, military parades, and stylized heroism reinforce his narrative of decisive, transformative leadership. Manual memes complement this aesthetic by targeting journalists, NGOs, feminists, and other perceived critics, casting them as threats to national security. Supporters often describe Bukele in salvific terms, saying “He saved us” or “He gave us back our country.”

Across these cases, Dr. Bayarri identified three recurring patterns of memetic violence: (1) Moral binaries, which compress politics into a struggle between good and evil; (2) Humor as dehumanization, making aggression appear harmless and fostering group cohesion; (3) The online–offline loop, where images circulate recursively between digital platforms and street politics, blurring boundaries between representation and mobilization.

In concluding, Dr. Bayarri highlighted three broader implications. First, memes profoundly shape how far-right populist identities are constructed and experienced. Humor, affect, and visual storytelling are not peripheral but foundational to populist subjectivity. Second, generative AI intensifies these dynamics by amplifying heroic imagery and accelerating the dehumanization of opponents. Finally, he argued that understanding contemporary populism requires integrating digital research with embodied ethnographic observation. Memetic communication, especially when accelerated by AI, is not simply representational—it actively organizes emotions and behaviors in ways that help far-right populist movements thrive.

 

Maria Giorgia Caraceni: “Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective”

Maria Giorgia Caraceni is a PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome and Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V.

Maria Giorgia Caraceni delivered a conceptually rich and historically grounded presentation that positioned populism within the long and complex trajectory of the modern idea of popular sovereignty. Speaking from the perspective of the history of political thought, Caraceni argued that contemporary debates on populism cannot be adequately understood without recovering the intellectual genealogy from which the modern notion of “the people” and its sovereign authority emerged. Her central methodological commitment—what she described as a history of ideas approach—aimed to situate present-day populist practices within the deeper philosophical tensions that have shaped democratic theory since the eighteenth century.

Caraceni began by reflecting on a longstanding challenge in populism studies: the enduring absence of a single, shared definition of populism. Drawing on Yves Mény, she observed that the root of this conceptual indeterminacy lies in the ambiguity of populism’s primary referent, the people. In democratic systems, “the people” is both omnipresent and elusive—an essential but vague category whose empirical boundaries are contested and whose normative authority is continually invoked but rarely clarified. This ambiguity, she suggested, is not a mere lexical problem but a structural feature of democratic politics itself.

The Deep Tensions Underlying Popular Sovereignty

To illuminate this structural dimension, Caraceni turned to Ernesto Laclau’s influential theory. She highlighted Laclau’s claim that “the people” is not an empirical datum but an “empty signifier”—a political construct capable of being filled with diverse and often incompatible demands. For Laclau, a popular identity emerges when heterogeneous grievances are articulated into an equivalential chain: broadening in scope, but thinning in specificity. Caraceni noted that this process results in a political identity that is extensive yet intentionally impoverished, capable of unifying diverse groups under a simplified symbolic banner.

However, the central theoretical move in her presentation was to show that Laclau’s distinction between the logic of equivalence (unifying demands into a monist identity) and the logic of difference (preserving particularities within a pluralist landscape) is far from a contemporary innovation. Rather, she argued, these two logics mirror the foundational contrast between the political philosophies of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and James Madison—the canonical interlocutors in the conceptual history of modern popular sovereignty.

Caraceni then reconstructed these contrasting intellectual traditions. Rousseau, she explained, theorized popular sovereignty by grounding it in the general will, which for him represented the collective, indivisible will of the people. The general will did not correspond to the aggregation of private opinions, but to their transcendence through the removal of subjective differences. Yet Caraceni stressed that Rousseau’s framework contains an intrinsic and often overlooked tension. While it aspires to unanimity, it ultimately reduces this unanimity to majority rule. Individuals in the minority, Rousseau insists, must recognize (or be compelled to recognize) that they were “mistaken” about the general will, having already submitted themselves to the collective through the social contract. Thus, Caraceni noted, Rousseau’s monist conception effectively authorizes the majority to compel conformity from dissenters, revealing the latent risk of majoritarian absolutism.

The Battle Between Pluralism and Monism

Madison, by contrast, represents the paradigmatic pluralist response. In Federalist No. 10, Madison acknowledges the inevitability of factions arising from divergent interests and unequal faculties. The key political challenge, he argues, is preventing majority factions from using their numerical strength to oppress minorities. Popular sovereignty must therefore be limited—structured through constitutional mechanisms, separation of powers, and institutional checks—to safeguard individual rights and ensure that no majority can consolidate unrestrained power. Caraceni emphasized that Madison’s project was not to deny the legitimacy of popular rule, but to prevent its degeneration into tyranny. The enduring dilemma he identifies—how to reconcile majority rule with minority protection—remains at the heart of democratic constitutionalism.

Caraceni argued that this Madisonian insight shaped the development of modern constitutional systems, particularly after the Second World War. Judicial review, entrenched rights, rigid constitutional amendment procedures, and the elevation of constitutional norms above ordinary legislation were all introduced to prevent the abuses of unbridled majoritarianism. In these frameworks, the people remain the ultimate source of legitimacy, but their power is mediated, structured, and limited by constitutional forms.

This historical account provided the foundation for Caraceni’s interpretation of contemporary populism. She contended that populist movements emerging since the late twentieth century—especially those mobilized in reaction to globalization and technocratic governance—effectively revive a monist conception of popular sovereignty. Populist leaders, she argued, reclaim the Rousseauian imaginary of a unified general will, presenting themselves as the authentic embodiment of the “true people” while depicting institutions such as courts, parliaments, and bureaucracies as illegitimate obstacles to popular expression. This rhetorical strategy enables a fusion between the will of a part of society and the will of the whole, a move mirrored in institutional pressures toward centralizing executive power and delegitimizing dissent.

Populism Against the Constitution

Caraceni highlighted several contemporary examples of this dynamic, referring to cases where populist executives pursue constitutional reforms aimed at weakening checks and balances—most clearly visible, she suggested, in Hungary, but with resonances across Europe and beyond. Such “reformative hyperactivism,” as she described it, enables populist leaders to occupy the institutional field while justifying their actions as the restoration of popular sovereignty against unaccountable elites. Yet, she argued, the true target of this agenda is not merely political opponents but liberal constitutionalism itself.

One of the most compelling contributions of Caraceni’s presentation was her insistence that the tension between populism and constitutionalism is not merely circumstantial, but structural. The modern concept of popular sovereignty, she argued, has always contained an unresolved aporia between singularity and plurality—between the desire for a unified people and the necessity of institutionalized limits. Populism, in her view, is not an aberrant pathology or a transient consequence of current crises. Rather, it is a recurring reactivation of the conceptual contradictions embedded within democratic modernity.

In concluding, Caraceni proposed that a full understanding of populism requires a dual-level investigation. On the one hand, scholars must undertake a genealogical inquiry into the history of popular sovereignty to show how its original ambivalences reemerge in contemporary politics. On the other hand, they must analyze the socio-political conditions that trigger populist waves and shape citizens’ attachments to populist claims. Populism, she suggested, arises when structural tensions converge with contextual catalysts, producing moments in which the unresolved dilemmas of popular sovereignty become politically salient and institutionally disruptive.

Caraceni closed by reaffirming her hypothesis: populism should be understood not only as a contingent response to present crises but as a recurring manifestation of the inherent contradictions of democratic sovereignty. Her future work, she noted, will continue to explore how these conceptual tensions shape the evolution of democratic institutions and the practices of popular rule.

 

Elif Başak Ürdem: “Beyond Fairness — Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism”

Elif Başak Ürdem is a PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University.

Elif Başak Ürdem delivered a theoretically ambitious and conceptually innovative presentation that examined the relationship between neoliberal meritocracy, social status, and the emergence of contemporary populist politics. Drawing on her broader dissertation research—an empirical analysis of 29 Western liberal democracies—Ürdem used this presentation to articulate a missing conceptual link in the existing literature: how and why a system ostensibly based on fairness and equal opportunity generates political resentment, status injury, and ultimately populist mobilization. Her presentation sought to resolve an epistemological puzzle within populism research by advancing the concept of epistemic misrecognition, while also bridging the frameworks of Nancy Fraser and Ernesto Laclau to reinterpret populism not as an irrational deviation, but as a political logic emerging from structural failures.

Ürdem began by identifying gaps in the theoretical landscape. While traditional research has often treated populism as a “thin ideology” or an emotional deviation from democratic norms, she argued that this perspective has produced an analytical blind spot. Empirical studies increasingly show that declining subjective social status, rather than objective deprivation alone, is a more powerful predictor of populist support. Yet popular explanations—such as cultural backlash or status anxiety—lack an account of why grievances today are drawn toward populist channels rather than absorbed through traditional left-wing or class-based politics. Here, Ürdem positioned meritocracy as the missing but insufficiently theorized piece.

Populist Articulation in the Age of Neoliberal Meritocracy

Turning to Laclau, Ürdem emphasized the need to shift our ontological stance. For Laclau, populism is not a fixed ideology but a logic of political articulation. Populism emerges when institutions lose their capacity to absorb social demands, creating a backlog of unmet demands that begin to link together through an equivalential chain. These demands, though different in content, share a common blockage—an inability to be processed by existing political and institutional frameworks. What eventually crystallizes is an “empty signifier” such as the people, through which heterogeneous frustrations are expressed.

Laclau, Ürdem argued, gives us the form of populist rupture but not the content. What, she asked, are the specific forces generating unmet demands today? Why do people feel unheard, misrecognized, or excluded? Her answer drew heavily on Nancy Fraser’s tripartite theory of justice and its three mutually constitutive dimensions: redistribution, recognition, and representation. For Fraser, justice requires participatory parity—conditions allowing all members of society to interact as peers. These conditions break down when: Redistribution is undermined through material inequality and economic exclusion. Recognition is denied through cultural hierarchies that devalue specific groups. Representation is distorted when political boundaries and decision-making structures exclude or silence certain voices.

Ürdem’s theoretical innovation was to show how neoliberal meritocracy—far from being a neutral fairness principle—produces systematic failures across all three dimensions. Meritocracy promises equal opportunity and rule by competence, but in practice, she argued, it becomes a justificatory regime that launders privilege, devalues non-dominant cultural repertoires, and delegitimizes democratic participation. She traced these failures in turn.

The Redistributive, Recognitional, and Representational Deficits of Meritocracy

First, redistribution failure occurs because meritocracy conflates procedural equality with outcome legitimacy. Drawing on Claire Chambers, Ürdem explained how the “moment of equal opportunity”—such as a supposedly fair university admissions process—obscures the accumulated advantages embedded in class background. Stratified education systems, far from leveling the playing field, amplify inequalities by rewarding those already endowed with cultural and economic capital. What appears to be the outcome of merit is often the endpoint of a process structured by inherited privilege. Thus, redistribution failure is built not only into welfare regimes but into the very definition of merit.

Second, and central to Ürdem’s contribution, is recognition failure, which she conceptualized as epistemic misrecognition. Meritocracy claims to be an objective measurement of intelligence and effort, yet it privileges middle-class cultural repertoires—such as negotiation skills, verbal expressiveness, and institutional navigation—as if they were neutral indicators of ability. Drawing on Annette Lareau’s distinction between “concerted cultivation” (middle-class childrearing) and “natural growth” (working-class childrearing), Ürdem showed how schools and employers interpret middle-class behaviors as talent while reading working-class dispositions as deficits. This is not merely cultural marginalization; it is an injury to one’s perceived capacity for reason. The working class is not only under-rewarded but rendered unintelligible within dominant rationalities. This epistemic misrecognition then feeds redistribution failure: only certain forms of knowledge are validated and economically rewarded.

Third, representation failure follows from the technocratic turn of neoliberal meritocracy. If political competence is equated with technical expertise, then democratic contestation is framed as inefficient or dangerous. Drawing on Hopkin and Blyth, Ürdem described how key economic decisions in Europe have been insulated from public influence in the name of market stability. Those already suffering from maldistribution and misrecognition are thus doubly silenced: they are deemed economically unviable, culturally irrational, and politically incompetent. Their grievances lack institutional channels for articulation.

Populism as the Consequence of Meritocratic Closure

Ürdem’s argument culminated in showing how these three failures converge to produce the exact conditions Laclau describes. Material insecurity, cultural devaluation, and political exclusion create a reservoir of unmet demands that cannot be expressed within the existing technocratic grammar. These demands—dismissed as resentment, envy, or irrational populist anger—accumulate and link together through the shared experience of being unheard and unrecognized. Populism, she argued, is the return of the political that neoliberal meritocracy tries to suppress.

In closing, Ürdem highlighted the three main contributions of her paper. First, it reframes populism not as a deviation from democratic norms but as a symptom of meritocratic closure. Second, it introduces epistemic misrecognition as a crucial mechanism explaining how meritocracy produces status injury and political alienation. Third, it builds a conceptual bridge between Fraser’s theory of justice and Laclau’s theory of political articulation, offering a relational language for analyzing how neoliberal meritocracy generates populist demands.

Ultimately, Ürdem’s presentation provided a compelling theoretical explanation for why grievances in contemporary democracies increasingly move through populist channels rather than traditional left-wing politics. By demonstrating how neoliberal meritocracy denies material security, cultural standing, and political voice, she argued that populism emerges as a rational—if explosive—response to a system that insists individuals both deserve their suffering and lack the vocabulary to articulate it.

 

Discussant Dr. Sanne van Oosten’s Feedback

Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Oxford.

 

As discussant, Dr. Sanne van Oosten offered an engaged, generous, and analytically sharp set of reflections on the three papers presented by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano, Maria Giorgia Caraceni, and Elif Başak Ürdem. She opened by emphasizing how impressed she was with the intellectual quality and timeliness of all three contributions, stressing that each paper was theoretically sophisticated, empirically grounded, and deeply attuned to current developments in populism research. Her comments combined appreciation with pointed questions designed to push the authors’ arguments further.

Reflections on Gabriel Bayarri Toscano’s Paper

Turning first to Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano, Dr. van Oosten praised his analysis of memes and AI-generated images as more than mere jokes, instead treating them as political artefacts that make complex ideological narratives instantly intelligible. She highlighted how convincingly his presentation showed that these visual forms translate abstract ideas into accessible, emotionally resonant symbols, thereby shaping how people perceive political conflicts and identities.

Dr. van Oosten drew an illuminating historical parallel between contemporary memes and earlier traditions of political cartoons. She noted that, for centuries, cartoons have functioned as dense, highly coded political commentaries that require substantial cultural and contextual knowledge to decode. In her view, Dr. Bayarri’s work sits in continuity with this long history: today’s memes, like past cartoons, demand a broad repertoire of cultural and political references from their audiences. She suggested that future historians are likely to use these memes in much the same way scholars now use historical cartoons—as windows into the emotional, moral, and ideological landscapes of a particular era. She invited Dr. Bayarri to reflect on how he expects these memes to be interpreted in hindsight: What broader narratives will they be seen as part of, and to what extent will their meaning remain legible to those lacking the original context?

Another key theme in her feedback concerned the democratization of image production. Dr. van Oosten underscored the significance of Dr. Bayarri’s observation that, with generative AI, users no longer need technical skills such as Photoshop to create powerful images. She encouraged him to delve more deeply into how this shift may or may not change the political communication landscape. While it seems that “anyone” can now produce striking visual content, Dr. van Oosten raised the possibility that this apparent openness might have limited real impact, depending on who actually controls visibility, distribution, and reach.

Building on this, she asked for more detail on the country comparison. Dr. Bayarri’s research shows notable variation in AI use between Brazil, Argentina, and El Salvador, with Brazil relying more on manually produced memes and El Salvador displaying the highest proportion of AI-generated images. Dr. van Oosten urged him to theorize why this is the case. Do these differences reflect national political cultures, varying levels of digital infrastructure, platform ecosystems, or simply the characteristics of the specific Telegram groups he studied? Exploring these explanations, she suggested, could considerably strengthen the comparative dimension of the paper.

Finally, Dr. van Oosten urged closer attention to authorship and agency in meme production. Drawing on an example from the Netherlands, where a major far-right meme group turned out to be administered by members of parliament rather than anonymous “ordinary” users, she questioned the common assumption that meme-makers are isolated individuals in their bedrooms. She encouraged Dr. Bayarri to investigate who actually produces the content he analyzed—grassroots supporters, organized campaign teams, party professionals, or hybrid constellations—and how their prompts, aesthetic choices, and strategic goals shape the memetic ecosystem.

Reflections on Maria Giorgia Caraceni’s Paper

Dr. van Oosten then turned to the paper by Maria Giorgia Caraceni, which she described as a highly impressive exercise in conceptual and historical synthesis. She commended Caraceni for bringing together Ernesto Laclau, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and James Madison into a rigorous framework that clarifies how monist and pluralist understandings of popular sovereignty inform contemporary populist claims to majority rule. In particular, she appreciated how Caraceni showed that populism’s narrow conception of “the people” as a unified majority has deep roots in democratic thought, rather than being an abrupt contemporary aberration.

Her main invitation was for Caraceni to spell out more explicitly what is normatively and politically problematic about majority rule when it is equated with “the true people.” Dr. van Oosten suggested that while the paper clearly demonstrates how this conception marginalizes minorities, it could go further in specifying what, concretely, is lost when political systems center only the majority voice. Which minority experiences, vulnerabilities, or interests are obscured or silenced? How does this affect the quality of democratic citizenship and equality?

To deepen this point, Dr. van Oosten proposed an intersectional lens. Drawing on intersectional thinking, she noted that almost everyone is a minority in some dimension of their identity: a white man might be less educated, living with a disability, or economically precarious; a member of an ethnic majority might belong to a sexual or religious minority, and so on. From this perspective, minority protection is not about safeguarding a small, isolated segment of the population, but about recognizing that virtually all citizens have dimensions of vulnerability. She encouraged Caraceni to integrate this insight as a way of reinforcing her critique of monist majority rule and showing how the erosion of minority protections ultimately undermines democratic security for nearly everyone.

Dr. van Oosten also connected Caraceni’s theoretical framework to contemporary right-wing populism. She suggested that many actors on the right attempt to marry deeply unpopular economic agendas—such as policies favoring big business—with claims to represent the majority, often framed as the “white” or “ordinary” people. This allows them to appropriate the language of majority rule even when their economic programmes do not benefit most citizens. She encouraged Caraceni to engage with this paradox more explicitly, as it would further demonstrate the political importance of her conceptual work and reveal how appeals to “the majority” can obscure underlying alliances with powerful economic interests.

Reflections on Elif Başak Ürdem’s Paper

Finally, Dr. van Oosten addressed the paper by Elif Başak Ürdem, which she praised for its clarity and for the analytical power of its tripartite framework, drawing on redistribution, recognition, and representation. She found Ürdem’s critique of meritocracy particularly compelling, especially the argument that meritocracy amplifies existing class structures by valuing certain cultural repertoires and parenting styles while devaluing others. She linked this insight to the COVID-19 pandemic, when society sharply distinguished between “essential” and “non-essential” work—often revealing that many of the most necessary jobs were neither the highest paid nor the most prestigious. This experience, Dr. van Oosten suggested, dramatically illustrated the disconnect between meritocratic status and social value.

Her main question for Ürdem concerned what happens after populist radical right parties enter formal politics and even government. Ürdem’s paper convincingly theorizes misrecognition and status injury under conditions in which certain groups feel their views and ways of knowing are excluded from mainstream political representation. But in several countries—such as Italy or the Netherlands—previously marginalized populist radical right forces now hold significant power or participate in governing coalitions. Dr. van Oosten asked how this development affects the dynamics of misrecognition: Do supporters feel less misrecognized once “their” parties are in office, or does the sense of exclusion persist, perhaps redirected toward new enemies such as supranational institutions, domestic elites, or cultural minorities? She suggested that exploring these empirical cases could refine Ürdem’s argument and test its implications under changing political conditions.

Dr. van Oosten closed by linking Ürdem’s work to recent empirical research, such as studies by Caterina de Vries and colleagues on public service deprivation and support for the populist radical right. These studies show that tangible reductions in access to public services and state presence—whether in healthcare, local infrastructure, or everyday administration—significantly increase the likelihood of developing radical right attitudes and voting patterns. Dr. van Oosten argued that these findings resonate strongly with Ürdem’s emphasis on misrecognition and perceived abandonment, and she encouraged her to integrate such evidence more directly, as it would further substantiate her claims about the material and symbolic dimensions of exclusion.

Overall, Dr. Sanne van Oosten’s discussant feedback combined deep engagement with the authors’ arguments, thoughtful connections to broader literatures, and constructive suggestions for future development. Her interventions highlighted the conceptual richness and empirical relevance of all three papers and reinforced the central theme of the session: that understanding populism today requires grappling simultaneously with structures, narratives, identities, and the evolving conditions of democratic representation.

 

Presenters’ Responses to the Discussant

Following Dr. Sanne van Oosten’s detailed and generous discussant remarks on all three papers presented in Session 7, each of the authors offered thoughtful and discerning responses. Their replies not only clarified core dimensions of their arguments but also highlighted areas for further conceptual and empirical development. Collectively, their reflections underscored the intellectual richness of the session and the productive synergies between their respective approaches to understanding populism, representation, and democratic tension.

Response by Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano

Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano began by expressing deep appreciation for Dr. van Oosten’s insights, noting that her comments resonated not only with his own work but with the broader themes raised by the session. He addressed her first set of questions regarding the historical continuity between contemporary memes and older forms of political cartooning. Dr. Bayarri explained that he is currently preparing an application for a research grant with the British Library to analyze two centuries’ worth of political cartoons—an endeavor that he hopes will illuminate parallels between earlier visual political repertoires and today’s memetic ecosystems. His goal is to identify aesthetic and semiotic patterns that recur over time, particularly within Latin America’s visual construction of political enemies and moral antagonisms. Yet he cautioned that building such a historical bridge is methodologically complex. Unlike more recent comic traditions, older cartoons were produced under different political, cultural, and technological conditions, making direct linear comparison difficult. Nevertheless, he affirmed that Dr. van Oosten’s suggestion had strengthened his resolve to pursue these connections.

Dr. Bayarri then elaborated on the participatory and collaborative dimensions of contemporary meme production, clarifying that one key feature distinguishing memes from classic cartoons is the ability of users to modify, remix, and re-embed visual content. Even when a meme originates from a single creator, its life cycle involves numerous micro-alterations—changing symbols, colors, props, or textual overlays. He described this as a form of “compositional logic” fundamental to understanding the affective bonds and collective identity that emerge within far-right digital communities.

With the rise of generative AI, however, Dr. Bayarri observed a new paradox: while meme-making has become technically democratized, it also risks becoming re-individualized, since AI-generated images typically emerge from a single textual prompt rather than collective layering. This shift mirrors older forms of authorship and centralization found in 20th-century cartooning, thereby complicating assumptions about participatory production in digital environments.

Addressing the question of national variation in meme ecosystems, Dr. Bayarri noted that regulatory frameworks and the timing of fieldwork significantly shape the prevalence of AI-generated content. Brazil, which is gearing up for upcoming elections, has already begun debating and formulating regulations governing AI-produced images. Meanwhile, rapid technological innovations occurring within months of each electoral cycle mean that fieldwork snapshots inevitably capture evolving and uneven dynamics. He stressed that differences between countries often reflect the temporality of technological diffusion rather than stable cultural patterns.

Finally, Bayarri responded to Dr. van Oosten’s questions about authorship. He confirmed that meme producers range widely—from isolated individuals angered by corruption scandals, to organized far-right digital activists, to coordinated troll networks operating as part of broader communication strategies. His findings indicate a layered ecosystem in which spontaneous grassroots contributions coexist with strategically orchestrated propaganda infrastructures.

Response by Maria Giorgia Caraceni

Maria Giorgia Caraceni also conveyed gratitude for Dr. van Oosten’s constructive feedback. She clarified that her use of the term “majority” refers specifically to political or parliamentary majorities, rather than majorities in sociological or demographic terms. In her view, the central danger arises when such majorities operate without constraints, unencumbered by constitutional limits or checks and balances.

Caraceni emphasized two key risks. First, majorities are inherently transient; a group exercising unchecked power today may find itself marginalized tomorrow. Constitutional constraints therefore serve as safeguards not only for minorities but for the political majority itself. Second, in representative democracies, the absence of an imperative mandate means elected representatives may drift from their constituencies. Without institutional limits, citizens—including members of the majority—risk being exposed to abuses of concentrated authority.

She agreed with Dr. van Oosten that public misunderstanding about the function and purpose of constitutional constraints exacerbates this problem. Many citizens perceive constitutional limits as obstacles to popular sovereignty rather than as protections designed to secure democratic equality. For Caraceni, this signals a deeper cultural challenge, rooted in insufficient public knowledge about constitutionalism and democratic institutional design. She noted that dissatisfaction tends to reemerge during moments of economic hardship or geopolitical instability, when populist narratives gain traction by framing constitutional safeguards as elitist barriers to the people’s will.

While she acknowledged the difficulty of resolving this cultural and educational deficit, Caraceni affirmed that her future work aims to continue interrogating the structural tensions between monist and pluralist logics of sovereignty—tensions she believes are recurrent features of democratic life rather than temporary aberrations.

Response by Elif Başak Ürdem

In her response, Elif Başak Ürdem thanked Dr. van Oosten for raising crucial questions that helped refine her conceptual framework. Ürdem explained that her work increasingly focuses on class through the lens of recognition, particularly in relation to what Michael Sandel terms the “dignity of labor.” She reiterated that epistemic misrecognition concerns not merely cultural disrespect but the denial of moral equality—societal messages implying that certain forms of work, knowledge, or reasoning lack legitimacy.

Ürdem addressed the question of what happens when populist radical right parties gain formal representation or enter government. Drawing on Laclau’s notion of the double movement between represented and representative, she argued that once populist figures become institutional actors, their symbolic authority allows them to frame demands, grievances, and identities in powerful ways. This does not necessarily eliminate feelings of misrecognition. Instead, supporters may redirect their sense of exclusion toward new perceived antagonists—technocratic institutions, judicial bodies, EU frameworks, or cultural elites—maintaining a populist logic even after electoral success.

Finally, Ürdem reflected on the political implications of her research. She argued that scholars and political actors who oppose right-wing populism must engage more directly with questions of class, status, and recognition, rather than dismiss populist grievances as irrational. Populism, in her interpretation, signals a return of political contestation that neoliberal meritocracy sought to suppress. She concluded by noting that she intends to further clarify the contours of epistemic misrecognition in subsequent iterations of her work.

The presenters’ responses collectively demonstrated a shared commitment to deepening their theoretical and empirical approaches, while also highlighting the generative impact of Dr. van Oosten’s discussant interventions. Their reflections showcased three distinct yet complementary engagements with populism—as a visual and affective practice, a constitutional and philosophical dilemma, and a response to structural injustice and misrecognition. In doing so, they underscored the richness of Session 7’s contributions and the value of interdisciplinary dialogue in advancing contemporary populism research.

 

Q&A Session

The Q&A session brought forward a lively, intellectually generous exchange among the panelists, the discussant, and the audience. Moderated by Dr. Magno, the conversation unfolded as an open, exploratory dialogue, allowing participants to deepen key themes emerging from the three papers. The session illustrated how visual politics, democratic theory, and meritocratic misrecognition intersect in shaping contemporary populist dynamics.

Dr. Magno began by drawing historical parallels between Dr. Bayarri’s work on memes and his own earlier research on US colonial caricatures of Filipinos. He noted that early caricatures—produced in an era without radio or television—served as state-driven tools of othering that legitimized colonial domination. By contrast, he observed that today’s digitally generated memes democratize the power to distort, ridicule, or challenge political figures, shifting symbolic control from state institutions to digitally networked publics. This, he suggested, makes Dr. Bayarri’s work crucial for understanding how contemporary othering unfolds outside traditional institutional boundaries.

Dr. Bayarri responded by acknowledging Dr. Magno’s points on the historical legacy of visual stereotyping. He noted that AI-driven meme production has enabled new forms of symbolic violence, normalizing racialized or dehumanizing narratives under the guise of humor. Such normalization, he argued, can seep into public discourse and influence political behavior, including support for exclusionary policies. He affirmed that studying the evolution of these visual forms—both their genealogy and their political effects—remains central to understanding far-right mobilization.

The discussion then shifted to Elif Başak Ürdem’s presentation. Dr. Magno suggested that figures like Donald Trump may operate as examples of “criminal populism,” where political actors capitalize on their own legal troubles to attract supporters—a reversal of penal populism, which targets marginalized groups. He asked whether Ürdem saw Trump’s mobilization strategy as a form of epistemic misrecognition.

Ürdem offered a nuanced clarification. While Trump strategically uses misrecognition narratives, she argued that he does not embody them; rather, he appeals to supporters who feel politically powerless or epistemically dismissed. The issue, in her view, is not the charisma of elite leaders but the inability of existing political frameworks to absorb certain demands, a dynamic rooted in technocratic governance and meritocratic valuation. She stressed that when rational debate becomes circumscribed by elite-defined norms, grievances—however simple or uncomfortable—find alternative, populist outlets.

The final thread of discussion centered on Maria Giorgia Caraceni’s theoretical framework. Dr. Magno invited Caraceni to reflect on the phenomenon of voter regret among supporters of populist leaders such as Trump or Duterte—groups who later experience personal harm under the policies they endorsed. Caraceni acknowledged the complexity of this dynamic, noting that institutional design shapes both the risks and recoverability of populist excesses. Presidential systems, she suggested, are especially vulnerable due to heightened polarization and fewer internal constraints. Ultimately, however, she argued that these cycles underscore the fragility of democratic knowledge: voters often underestimate the protective role of constitutional safeguards until it is too late.

The session concluded with a contribution from Dr. Bülent Kenes, who suggested that Ürdem consider integrating Rawlsian ideas—particularly the “veil of ignorance”—to further illuminate meritocracy as inherited privilege rather than neutral achievement. Ürdem replied that although Rawls was not included in her presentation, his work, alongside Fraser’s and Laclau’s, is extensively engaged within her paper.

 

Conclusion

Session 7 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a vivid demonstration of how interdisciplinary scholarship can illuminate the evolving relationship between populism and democratic representation in the twenty-first century. Across the three papers and the subsequent discussion, a unifying theme emerged: the crisis of representation is not reducible to a single institutional malfunction but is instead the outcome of intersecting structural, cultural, and epistemic transformations reshaping democratic life. By juxtaposing visual political cultures, the conceptual history of sovereignty, and the failures of neoliberal meritocracy, the session revealed that contemporary populism draws strength from multiple sites of dislocation—affective, constitutional, and socio-economic.

Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano’s work showed how memetic communication and generative AI reorganize the emotional infrastructures of politics, enabling far-right movements to mobilize affective communities and reinforce exclusionary narratives. Maria Giorgia Caraceni’s long-term theoretical perspective underscored that the conflict between monist appeals to a unified people and pluralist constitutional constraints is not an anomaly of the present but a recurring tension at the core of democratic sovereignty. Elif Başak Ürdem’s analysis further demonstrated how neoliberal meritocracy erodes participatory parity, generating misrecognition, political silencing, and an accumulation of unmet demands that increasingly crystallize in populist forms.

Equally significant were the insights of discussant Dr. Sanne van Oosten, whose commentary skillfully connected these diverse contributions. Her reflections highlighted how digital aesthetics, constitutional design, and meritocratic ideology collectively shape the representational vacuums in which populism thrives. The presenters’ responses reinforced the session’s central insight: that understanding populism requires attention to both deep structural contradictions and the emergent cultural and technological terrains through which political identities are forged.

Ultimately, Session 7 illuminated how the crisis of representation is inseparable from broader contests over sovereignty, recognition, and the definition of legitimate political knowledge. In doing so, it reaffirmed the necessity of interdisciplinary inquiry for grasping the complexities of democratic life in an age of resurgent populism.

Women’s March Demonstration — Protesters take to the streets of Eugene, Oregon, despite the rain. Photo: Catherine Avilez.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: “Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice”

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 13, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00118

 

On November 13, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the sixth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada), the session featured Dr. Jonathan Madison, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho, and Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira, who examined how populism both mirrors and magnifies democracy’s crisis of representation. Their analyses, complemented by insightful discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, generated a vibrant dialogue on institutional resilience, digital disruption, and the reconfiguration of democratic legitimacy in an age of populist contention.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 13, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 6 of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice,” brought together a distinguished group of scholars from political science, sociology, and democratic theory to examine one of the defining questions of our age—how populism both reflects and reshapes the crisis of democratic representation.

Under the capable and engaging chairmanship of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Visiting Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada; formerly of Yildiz Technical University, Turkey), the session unfolded with remarkable intellectual rigor and fluidity. Professor Kaya’s moderation ensured a balanced and inclusive dialogue among the presenters, discussants, and participants, fostering an atmosphere of critical reflection and open exchange.

The session featured three compelling presentations. Dr. Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow, R Street Institute) opened with “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in an Age of Liberal Backsliding.” His paper challenged conventional hierarchies between “established” and “emerging” democracies, arguing that institutional resilience—particularly the robustness of liberal institutions—rather than wealth or longevity, determines a democracy’s ability to withstand populist pressures.

Next, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (LabPol/Unesp and GEP Critical Theory, Brazil) presented “Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy.” His intervention explored populism as a sociological manifestation of democracy’s structural contradictions, emphasizing the interplay of economic inequality, charismatic leadership, and digital communication in the destabilization of representative institutions.

Finally, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira (University of Bucharest) delivered “Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy.” She advanced a sophisticated conceptual framework distinguishing between democratic and strategic populisms and called for reclaiming political science’s critical vocation amid the hollowing of democratic politics in the neoliberal era.

The presentations were followed by incisive discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London) whose reflections broadened the theoretical and comparative scope of the session. Their critiques and elaborations inspired an engaging debate that continued into the Q&A session, where Professor Kaya adeptly guided a lively, cross-regional discussion on the transnational diffusion of populism and the institutional responses to democratic backsliding.

In sum, Session 6 stood out as an exemplary exercise in interdisciplinary dialogue—anchored by Professor Kaya’s thoughtful moderation and enriched by a diverse array of perspectives that collectively illuminated the multifaceted relationship between populism, representation, and the evolving fate of democracy in the twenty-first century.

 

Dr. Jonathan Madison: “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in an Age of Liberal Backsliding”

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his thought-provoking presentation, Dr. Jonathan Madison examined one of the most pressing paradoxes of contemporary politics: Why some established democracies have proven fragile in the face of populist authoritarianism, while certain so-called “emerging” democracies have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Drawing on a comparative analysis of the United States and Brazil, Dr. Madison challenged conventional assumptions about democratic consolidation and offered a compelling argument for rethinking how resilience is conceptualized in the age of democratic backsliding.

Rethinking Democratic Backsliding

Dr. Madison began by noting that, since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been widely regarded as the paradigmatic liberal democracy, while Brazil has struggled to maintain democratic stability amid recurring episodes of military rule and institutional volatility. Yet the trajectories of both nations under populist leadership—Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil—suggest a striking reversal of expectations. Whereas Brazil has, at least so far, managed to contain and punish anti-democratic actors, the United States has continued to experience deep institutional erosion and mounting threats to liberal norms.

This observation, Dr. Madison argued, invites a critical reconsideration of the analytical divide between “consolidated” and “emerging” democracies—a divide that has long underpinned political-science typologies. He presented three key findings: First, that Brazil’s liberal institutions have proven more resilient than those of the United States; second, that liberal, rather than strictly democratic, institutions are the decisive bulwark against populist authoritarianism; and third, that the conventional distinction between established and emerging democracies fails to predict resilience in the present era of backsliding.

Liberal vs. Democratic Institutions

A central conceptual contribution of Dr. Madison’s paper lies in his insistence on differentiating between democratic and liberal institutions. Democratic institutions refer to the procedures of electoral competition—regular elections, party systems, and voting mechanisms. Liberal institutions, by contrast, include independent courts, separation of powers, oversight agencies, and constitutional protections for individual rights. According to Dr. Madison, much of the existing literature on backsliding conflates these two domains, obscuring the fact that it is liberal institutions—rather than electoral ones—that are most often targeted and eroded by populist leaders.

Populist authoritarians such as Trump and Bolsonaro, he emphasized, have rarely campaigned on overtly anti-democratic platforms. Instead, they have portrayed themselves as embodiments of the “popular will” and have weaponized democratic legitimacy against liberal constraints. In this sense, democracy has not been rejected but appropriated as a rhetorical tool for dismantling the liberal guardrails that limit executive power.

Competing Explanations: Delivery vs. Institutions

Dr. Madison situated his argument within two major explanatory frameworks in the literature on backsliding. The delivery hypothesis attributes democratic erosion to governments’ failures to provide socioeconomic benefits—declining industrialization, rising inequality, and insecurity—thereby driving citizens toward anti-system alternatives. The institutional hypothesis, by contrast, focuses on how executives exploit loopholes and weakened checks to expand power.

While acknowledging both dynamics, Dr. Madison sided primarily with the institutional explanation, albeit with two refinements: First, that liberal institutions are the true targets of authoritarian populists, and second, that institutions are not self-executing. Their survival depends on political actors’ willingness to uphold them.

The Myth of Democratic Consolidation

Turning to the broader theoretical implications, Dr. Madison questioned the enduring validity of the distinction between “established” and “emerging” democracies. The twentieth-century paradigm, he noted, assumed that consolidated democracies—those of North America and Western Europe—had evolved beyond the fragilities of their “third-wave” counterparts. Yet, as recent developments show, phenomena once associated with Latin American politics—clientelism, corruption, and executive overreach—now thrive in the very heartlands of liberal democracy.

Brazil and the United States, he argued, invert the old hierarchy. The United States, supposedly the archetype of stability, has struggled to contain populist assaults, while Brazil, an “emerging” democracy with a much shorter democratic lineage, has successfully constrained executive excesses and imposed accountability after the fact.

Case Study I: The United States

Dr. Madison’s detailed case study of the United States underscored the weaknesses of its liberal architecture. Donald Trump’s rise in 2016, framed as a crusade on behalf of the “forgotten working class,” did not initially signal anti-democratic intent. Yet, once in office, Trump expanded executive authority through hundreds of executive orders, politicized the Department of Justice, and undermined independent oversight.

Institutional responses were inconsistent and often ineffectual. While the Supreme Court occasionally blocked his initiatives, partisan loyalty within Congress neutralized both impeachment efforts and subsequent investigations. The January 6th attack on the Capitol exposed the depth of the institutional malaise: Even in the face of direct insurrection, accountability mechanisms faltered.

Subsequent attempts to hold Trump legally responsible—including constitutional challenges under the 14th Amendment—were thwarted by judicial hesitation and partisan polarization. Dr. Madison argued that such failures illustrate how unwritten norms, rather than codified constraints, underpin much of the US system—norms that can easily be disregarded when political will collapses.

Case Study II: Brazil

By contrast, Dr. Madison presented Brazil as an unexpected success story of institutional resilience. Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019–2022) resembled Trump’s in its populist style and attacks on liberal institutions. Bolsonaro ruled extensively through Medidas Provisórias (provisional measures), sought to politicize law enforcement, and vilified the Supreme Federal Tribunal. At rallies, he even declared, “I truly am the Constitution.”

Yet, Brazil’s institutions withstood these assaults. Congress allowed many provisional measures to expire or heavily amended them. The judiciary—particularly the Supreme Federal Tribunal—asserted itself repeatedly against executive encroachment. As Bolsonaro attempted to undermine the 2022 election by alleging fraud in Brazil’s electronic voting system, the country’s electoral justice apparatus acted swiftly, opening investigations and reaffirming the system’s integrity.

After Bolsonaro’s defeat, accountability followed with unprecedented speed. In 2023, the electoral court barred him from office for a decade for abusing presidential powers. In 2024, prosecutors indicted him for conspiring to subvert the election through a military coup attempt—marking the first time in Brazilian history that coup plotters faced prosecution.

Explaining Divergent Outcomes

Dr. Madison identified several structural factors explaining these divergent trajectories. Institutional design, he argued, was paramount. In Brazil, provisional measures expire automatically unless Congress acts—creating built-in limits on executive decree powers. In the United States, by contrast, executive orders and emergency powers are open-ended unless Congress intervenes, which it rarely does.

Party-system dynamics also played a role. The United States’ rigid two-party polarization has fostered a “siege mentality,” discouraging intra-party accountability. Brazil’s fragmented multiparty system, conversely, allowed legislators greater independence from the executive, enabling them to restrain Bolsonaro without threatening their own political survival.

Legal culture further deepens the contrast. Brazil’s civil-law system empowers its Supreme Court to act preemptively in defense of constitutional order, while the US common-law tradition restricts courts to adjudicating concrete disputes. Finally, Brazil’s collective memory of dictatorship has shaped a constitutional architecture that codifies protections the US continues to rely on as unwritten norms.

Liberal Institutions as the True Safeguard

Dr. Madison concluded by reiterating that the distinction between established and emerging democracies is increasingly untenable. The resilience of democracy depends not on age or wealth but on the vigor of liberal institutions and the political will to defend them. The Brazilian case demonstrates that even younger democracies can adapt and respond effectively to populist threats when constitutional design, judicial activism, and institutional pluralism align.

At the same time, Dr. Madison cautioned that Brazil’s assertive judiciary now faces its own dilemma: Overreach in defense of liberalism can itself undermine democratic pluralism if it suppresses legitimate dissent. Ultimately, the challenge is to strike a balance between constraint and participation—a task that requires constant vigilance in all democracies, established or emerging alike.

Through his nuanced comparative analysis, Dr. Madison’s paper offered a powerful reminder that no democracy is exceptional, immune, or permanently consolidated. In an age of populist volatility, resilience is earned, not inherited.

 

Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho: “Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy”

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) at night, Brasília, Federal District, Brazil, August 26, 2018. Photo: Diego Grandi.

In his presentation,  Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho explored populism as a sociological phenomenon intimately bound to the structural crisis of modern democracy. His analysis situated populism not merely as a reaction to democratic failure but as a dynamic force that both exploits and deepens democracy’s internal contradictions.

Dr. Carvalho opened by asserting that democracy is undergoing a structural crisis, not a temporary malfunction. Populism, he argued, cannot be understood in isolation from this broader transformation of democratic systems. Rather than external threats, populist movements are symptomatic of inherent tensions between the normative aspirations of democracy—equality, freedom, and solidarity—and the systemic imperatives of capitalist societies, which operate through competition and the pursuit of particular interests.

These contradictions, rooted in modernity itself, cannot be resolved by political will alone. Drawing on the sociological insights of Claus Offe, Dr. Carvalho recalled that the mid-20th century democratic compromise—anchored in welfare-state regulation and competitive party politics—temporarily stabilized the tension between capitalism and democracy. However, the neoliberal deregulation of markets and the rise of new social movements since the 1980s disrupted that equilibrium. In his view, the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 and subsequent political realignments made Offe’s diagnosis more relevant than ever: The institutional structures that once mediated social conflict have lost legitimacy and efficacy, opening space for new, disruptive forms of populist mobilization.

Charismatic Leadership and the Production of Meaning

The second pillar of Dr. Carvalho’s argument focused on populist leadership as a form of charismatic authority that emerges precisely in times of systemic dislocation. Drawing on Max Weber’s classical concept and Ulrich Oevermann’s reinterpretations, he described populist leaders as figures who interpret social contradictions, giving them symbolic meaning and emotional coherence within a political community. Leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Donald Trump in the United States, and Javier Milei in Argentina exemplify what Dr. Carvalho called disruptive charisma—a leadership style that mobilizes discontent by presenting itself as a redemptive force against corrupt elites and unresponsive institutions.

Such leaders do not merely exploit crises; they narrate them. Through simplified dichotomies between “the people” and “the elite,” they transform diffuse frustrations into moral conflicts, thereby legitimizing attacks on democratic institutions. The leader becomes both the interpreter and the embodiment of the people’s supposed will.

Digital Media and the Disruption of the Public Sphere

A central innovation in Dr. Carvalho’s framework concerns the reconfiguration of the public sphere by digital media. Social networks, he argued, have profoundly destabilized traditional forms of political communication. In the past, legacy media served as institutional gatekeepers, moderating the flow of information and maintaining a degree of discursive coherence. Digital platforms, by contrast, enable direct and immediate communication between leaders and followers—an illusion of intimacy that bypasses established mediating institutions such as political parties, journalists, and civil society organizations.

While this “direct connection” appears democratic, it is in fact highly mediated by algorithms and platform architectures designed to maximize engagement rather than deliberation. The populist leader’s ability to speak “directly” to the people through social media thus amplifies polarization and erodes the legitimacy of traditional institutions. Dr. Carvalho likened this transformation to economic deregulation: Just as markets freed from oversight can generate instability, the deregulation of communication creates a volatile and fragmented public sphere.

Populism as Mobilization Against Mediation

For Dr. Carvalho, the defining feature of contemporary populism is its mobilization against institutional mediation. Populist discourse constructs representative institutions—parliaments, courts, and the media—as obstacles to authentic popular sovereignty. By delegitimizing these intermediaries, populist leaders claim to restore democracy to “the people,” while in practice undermining the very mechanisms that sustain democratic pluralism.

He illustrated this logic through an empirical vignette from Brazil. Following Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat in the 2022 presidential election, supporters gathered outside government buildings chanting: “Get out, justice—supreme is the people.” This slogan, he noted, encapsulates the populist inversion of democratic legitimacy. The protesters demanded the removal of Supreme Court justices, not by name, but by function—attacking the institutional role itself. Their claim that “the people are supreme” asserted a direct, unmediated sovereignty that rejects the procedural and institutional framework through which democracy operates.

In this sense, the populist demand is paradoxically framed as more democratic: It invokes the name of the people to justify the dismantling of institutions designed to protect popular rule. The rhetoric of “immediate democracy” thus becomes a vehicle for anti-institutional mobilization.

Toward a Sociology of Democratic Disruption

Dr. Carvalho emphasized that his research remains part of an ongoing project aimed at developing a sociological framework for empirical investigation. His future work will explore how populist movements, particularly through digital media, reconfigure the relationship between leaders, followers, and institutions. He intends to conduct qualitative case studies examining how online mobilization interacts with the transformation of party politics—citing Italy’s Five Star Movement as a paradigmatic case of “digital direct democracy.”

He also proposed a nuanced concept of crisis as an open-ended moment of transformation rather than mere breakdown. A crisis, in his interpretation, is a juncture of potential reconfiguration—it can lead toward renewed democratization or toward authoritarian closure. Populist movements seek to occupy this liminal space, channeling uncertainty and discontent into collective action. Understanding how populist leaders interpret and operationalize such moments, he argued, is key to grasping democracy’s current vulnerability and possible renewal.

Dr. Carvalho concluded by stressing that populism should not be viewed as an anomaly or external threat to democracy but as an internal mode of contestation emerging from its structural contradictions. The interplay between capitalism’s systemic logic and democracy’s normative promises has produced recurring crises of legitimacy, which populist leaders exploit through affective communication and anti-institutional rhetoric.

His sociological interpretation reframes populism not as the pathology of democracy but as one of its revealing expressions—a mirror reflecting the unresolved tensions of modernity. By mobilizing citizens against mediation in the name of immediacy and authenticity, populist movements both expose and accelerate democracy’s ongoing transformation.

Dr. Carvalho’s intervention thus offered a rigorous and thought-provoking framework for analyzing the sociopolitical mechanisms through which populism “mobilizes for disruption” in an era where democracy’s very foundations are being redefined by digital technologies, structural inequalities, and the erosion of institutional trust.

 

Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira: “Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy”

A rear view of people with placards and posters on global strike for climate change. Photo: Dreamstime.

In her intellectually rich and methodologically reflective presentation, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira advanced a powerful analytical framework for reinterpreting populism within the broader crisis of contemporary democracy. Rather than approaching populism as a pathology or deviation, she argued that it must be seen as a reaction—a symptom and sometimes a corrective—to the structural transformations that have hollowed out the meaning and substance of democratic politics.

Populism Reconsidered: Between Democratic and Anti-Democratic Forms

Dr. Zamfira began by situating her work in dialogue with previous presentations at the workshop, notably that of Dr. Carvalho. While concurring with the notion that democracy faces a structural crisis, she raised a crucial question: which populism are we addressing—the democratic or the anti-democratic? This question framed her broader argument that the contemporary conceptual landscape surrounding populism has become increasingly blurred, both in academia and in public discourse.

She noted that populism can be studied through several lenses—ideological, strategic, or discursive—but that the persistent conflation of these dimensions has led to confusion. Particularly, she distinguished between ideological (or democratic) populism and strategic populism. The former represents a normative and legitimate effort to reclaim political agency and representation in the name of the people, while the latter functions as a manipulative instrument within the spectacle of modern politics.

Citing the French political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, Dr. Zamfira emphasized that populism—although often criticized for its anti-pluralist tendencies—can perform a democratic corrective function, exposing the deficits of representation and the alienation of citizens from political elites. In this sense, ideological populism reflects an authentic desire to re-politicize public life and re-anchor democracy in the sovereignty of the demos. By contrast, strategic populism is tied to the “spectacularization” and “theatricalization” of politics in the media age, where populism becomes a performance rather than a project.

The Positive and Negative Faces of Populism

Drawing on the works of Peter Mair, Philippe Schmitter, and Richard Katz, Dr. Zamfira reminded the audience that populism, despite its risks, may also yield positive outcomes. It can compel traditional parties—detached from society and reduced to electoral machines—to reconnect with citizens or face obsolescence. Democratic populism, in this sense, acts as an agent of renewal within a stagnant political order.

This approach, she argued, departs from the mainstream portrayal of populism as an inherently destructive or extremist force. While populist leaders and movements can indeed threaten liberal norms, ideological populism—understood as a set of ideas rather than as a strategy—offers a deeper philosophical and sociological insight into the nature of political legitimacy and popular sovereignty. For Dr. Zamfira, this theoretical differentiation is crucial for restoring balance and nuance to contemporary analyses of populism.

Revisiting Barbu and Mair: Diagnosing Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Dr. Zamfira then turned to her two central interlocutors: Daniel Barbu, a Romanian political philosopher and historian, and Peter Mair, the late Irish political scientist. Both thinkers, she argued, provided penetrating accounts of the erosion of representative democracy—what Mair termed “the hollowing of Western democracy” and Barbu called “the absent republic.”

Peter Mair’s Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (2013) was presented as a seminal work for understanding how European democracies have lost their representational vitality. Mair traced the growing gap between political elites and citizens, arguing that parties have withdrawn from their societal roots while citizens, in turn, have disengaged from formal politics. The result is a “democratic void” in which electoral mechanisms persist, but meaningful political contestation declines.

Daniel Barbu, in The Absent Republic (1999), diagnosed a parallel condition in post-communist Europe. In his account, democracy has become formally present but substantively absent: The state operates according to its own self-referential logic of power rather than the will of its citizens. Popular sovereignty, while preserved as a rhetorical principle, is emptied of real influence. The republic, in Barbu’s phrase, becomes “absent” because its institutions no longer mediate between society and power.

Dr. Zamfira suggested that despite their distinct intellectual traditions, both thinkers converge on a shared diagnosis: The weakening of the link between rulers and ruled. Their reflections articulate the broader transition from politics to post-politics—a condition of depoliticization in which fundamental political questions are displaced by managerial and technocratic decision-making—and from democracy to post-democracy, where formal procedures remain but substantive pluralism and ideological conflict erode.

The Crisis of Political Science and the Loss of Critical Function

In a particularly reflective segment, Dr. Zamfira extended Barbu’s critique to academia itself. She argued that much of contemporary political science has become complicit in the post-political condition it describes. Echoing Barbu’s contention that political science is increasingly a “discourse that accompanies power,” she lamented its drift away from critique toward technocratic neutrality.

Political science, she argued, must reclaim its critical vocation as the conscience of democracy. The discipline’s task is not merely to measure political behavior but to interrogate the structures of power that constrain democratic agency. In the current intellectual climate—marked by polarization and conceptual simplification—this reflexive and critical function is more necessary than ever.

Populism as Effect, Not Cause, of Democratic Erosion

Dr. Zamfira challenged the prevailing tendency to treat populism as the cause of democratic backsliding. Instead, drawing on both Barbu and Mair, she proposed that populism should be seen as an effect of structural democratic erosion. The rise of populist discourse reflects the profound disconnect between politics and society—a void left by depoliticized elites, bureaucratic governance, and the dominance of market rationality.

Depoliticization, she explained, transfers decision-making from elected representatives to unelected experts and administrative bodies. As Mair observed, governance becomes “about people, not by them.” In such a context, populism emerges as a reaction—a demand to restore voice, representation, and conflict to a technocratic order that has rendered citizens spectators rather than participants.

The Road to Post-Democracy

Building on Colin Crouch’s notion of post-democracy, Dr. Zamfira outlined the broader trajectory of this transformation. Post-democracy is characterized by the persistence of democratic forms—elections, parties, and constitutions—without their substantive content. Ideological contestation gives way to managerial consensus; citizens remain nominally sovereign, but real power migrates toward economic elites, corporate actors, and international institutions such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization.

Citing Eric Schattschneider’s classic distinction between government by the people (the pluralist model) and government for the people (the elitist model), Dr. Zamfira argued that Western democracies have steadily moved toward the latter since the 1990s. The transition from pluralism to elitism, she suggested, has eroded the participatory foundations of democratic life.

Reclaiming the Critical Space for Democracy

In conclusion, Dr. Zamfira issued a clear call to re-evaluate both the academic and political treatment of populism. When elitist models of democracy dominate, all populist discourses—whether democratic or authoritarian—risk being delegitimized as extremist or irrational. This conflation, she warned, blinds political science to the genuine democratic energies that may animate certain populist movements.

To recover the integrity of democratic theory, Dr. Zamfira urged scholars to re-engage with populism’s critical dimension—as a response to alienation, not merely as a threat to order—and to reclaim the discipline’s role as democracy’s critical conscience. Her intervention stood out as both theoretically rigorous and normatively committed, illuminating the necessity of nuanced reflection in a time when democracy’s form endures but its meaning is at risk of disappearing.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Amir Ali

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Amir Ali, Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), offered a deeply engaging and intellectually expansive intervention as discussant, responding to three presentations. His comments demonstrated a remarkable comparative and theoretical breadth, drawing on experiences from India, as well as on key works in democratic theory and political economy.

Beginning with Dr. Jonathan Madison’s paper, Dr. Ali expressed broad sympathy with its analytical depth while identifying a key conceptual tension. He argued that Dr. Madison placed “too much explanatory weight” on the liberal dimension of democracy, implicitly assuming that liberal institutions could redeem democracy from its contemporary crisis. Invoking Canadian political theorist C.B. Macpherson, Dr. Ali reminded the audience that “liberal democracy” is a hyphenated idea in which the liberal element historically dominates and undermines the democratic one. This imbalance, he suggested, has led to a steady evisceration of democracy under liberal capitalism.

To reinforce this point, Dr. Ali referenced Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy (2011), arguing that the United States’ current democratic turmoil, epitomized by the Trump phenomenon, represents the “chickens of democracy coming home to roost.” The US project of exporting liberal democracy abroad, he contended, resulted in “carbon copies” of democracy—thin, depleted, and formalistic versions of a system already hollowed out at home.

While agreeing with Dr. Madison’s call to collapse the analytical divide between “established” and “emerging” democracies, Dr. Ali challenged the implicit optimism in liberal institutionalism. From his vantage point in India, he observed that constitutional institutions—such as the Election Commission—had been systematically weakened by populist-authoritarian governments. What was once a robust guardian of electoral integrity had become, in his words, “a toothless tiger.” This erosion of institutional autonomy, he argued, undermines any faith in liberal institutions as bulwarks against democratic backsliding.

Populism, Capital, and the Fractured Public Sphere

Turning to Dr. Carvalho’s sociological interpretation of populism, Dr. Ali praised the paper’s focus on the contradictions of democracy but urged a stronger integration of the contradictions of capitalism into the analysis. Populism, he argued, arises not merely from democratic tensions but from deeper economic dislocations produced by global neoliberalism—the “continuous defeat of labour by capital” over the last four decades. The populist construction of “the people,” he contended, serves to obscure these material contradictions by redirecting discontent away from structural inequality and toward cultural or institutional scapegoats.

Dr. Ali also expanded Dr. Carvalho’s discussion of the public sphere. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality, he argued that the fragmentation wrought by digital media is not simply a weakening of the public sphere but its obliteration. “Social media has smashed the public sphere into smithereens,” he remarked, noting how algorithmic logics and data manipulation—exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica scandal during the Brexit campaign—have reconfigured political consciousness itself. This transformation, he warned, poses an “existential threat”to democracy, as it dissolves the conditions for collective deliberation that once made democratic politics possible.

The Question of “Good” and “Bad” Populisms

In response to Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira’s paper, Dr. Ali began with initial disagreement but ultimately expressed appreciation for her nuanced approach. He questioned her distinction between “democratic” (good) and “anti-democratic” (bad) populisms, suggesting that populism, whether left- or right-wing, tends inevitably toward authoritarianism. Citing India’s political history, he invoked Indira Gandhi’s left-wing populism of the 1970s—which culminated in the suspension of democracy during the Emergency—as an example of how populist appeals, even when grounded in egalitarian rhetoric, can precipitate democratic backsliding.

Dr. Ali’s skepticism was rooted in his observation that populism’s logic of personalization and mass mobilization undermines institutional checks and pluralist deliberation, regardless of ideological orientation. In this sense, populism’s “democratic” variants may share more structural affinities with authoritarianism than is often acknowledged.

Political Science, Technocracy, and the Loss of Critique

Dr. Ali concluded his intervention with reflections that engaged Dr. Zamfira’s critique of political science as an increasingly accommodating discipline. He agreed that the field has too often become a “discourse that accompanies power” rather than interrogates it. Echoing her concern, he called for a revival of the discipline’s critical function, arguing that the marginalization of political theory and the ascendancy of technocratic and economic approaches have impoverished both scholarship and democratic imagination.

Returning to first principles, Dr. Ali proposed a return to Aristotle’s conception of politics as the master science—the discipline that encompasses the ends of all other human activities. The displacement of politics by economics and technology, he suggested, has produced not only a theoretical crisis but also the very political vacuum in which populism thrives. “Perhaps one way of countering populism,” he concluded, “is to reread Aristotle—again and again.”

Dr. Ali’s intervention stood out for its theoretical range, comparative insight, and critical acuity. By weaving together classical political philosophy, Marxian political economy, and lived experiences from India, he illuminated how global populism reflects the intertwined crises of capitalism, communication, and democratic representation. His commentary enriched the session’s intellectual dialogue, bridging empirical realities with enduring questions about democracy’s moral and philosophical foundations.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Amedeo Varriale

Dr. Amedeo Varriale delivered an incisive and reflective intervention as discussant during the session, engaging critically and constructively with the presentations. His comments combined empirical insight, theoretical clarity, and comparative perspective, particularly drawing from his background in European political studies and his familiarity with both Western and Southern European populist experiences.

Dr. Varriale began by focusing on Dr. Madison’s paper. He praised it for its methodological precision, empirical richness, and conceptual originality, noting that it offers an important contribution to the academic debate on democratic backsliding. Dr. Madison’s central claim—that liberal institutions, rather than developmental indicators such as wealth or regime maturity, determine a state’s resilience to populist authoritarianism—was, according to Dr. Varriale, both compelling and empirically well-supported.

He commended Dr. Madison’s comparative analysis between Brazil and the United States, emphasizing how the paper demonstrated the Brazilian judiciary and legislature’s stronger capacity to constrain illiberal executives compared to their US counterparts. The examples of Bolsonaro’s medidas provisórias and Trump’s use of executive orders, emergency decrees, and partisan manipulation of independent agencies, he said, vividly illustrated how populist leaders “tamper with liberal aspects of democracy” while maintaining democratic façades.

Dr. Varriale found particular value in the way the paper foregrounded liberal institutions as guardians against populist excess, suggesting that it advanced the debate beyond the more traditional focus on populism’s discursive or ideological dimensions. However, he used Dr. Madison’s findings to open a broader reflection on the decline of classical liberalism in American conservatism. He observed that the Republican Party, once rooted in liberal individualism, free markets, and civic patriotism, had under Donald Trump devolved into a populist, crypto-authoritarian movement, marked by protectionism, conspiracy thinking, and xenophobia. This ideological transformation, he argued, represented one of the most striking manifestations of how populism can hollow out long-established party traditions and erode the liberal core of democratic politics.

Polarization, Populist Cycles, and the Limits of Centrist Politics

Expanding his remarks, Dr. Varriale reflected on the polarized state of American politics, where extremes on both right and left have squeezed out centrism, classical liberalism, and social democracy. Drawing on Benjamin Moffitt’s concept of “anti-populist consensus politics,” he expressed skepticism that such a consensus could re-emerge in a society as demographically and culturally fragmented as the United States. In his view, the disappearance of a shared political middle—combined with deep divisions between metropolitan and rural America—jeopardizes the country’s ability to continue functioning as the “leader of the free world” in an increasingly multipolar order. He warned that, given these divisions, “there is no guarantee that after Trump there won’t be another Trump—or someone worse.”

Populism, Partyless Democracy, and the Crisis of Representation

Turning to the presentations by Dr. Carvalho and Dr. Zamfira, Dr. Varriale connected their insights to the work of Peter Mair and William Galston, both of whom had theorized the weakening of the representative link between citizens and political elites. He highlighted Mair’s distinction between democracy’s two pillars—popular sovereignty and constitutionalism—and argued that populism thrives by overemphasizing the former while undermining the latter. Populists, he noted, have “no issue with popular sovereignty or majority rule, but a deep aversion to the rule of law and minority protections.” This imbalance transforms democratic majoritarianism into illiberal governance.

Building on Dr. Carvalho’s sociological framework, Dr. Varriale linked this dynamic to the phenomenon of “partyless democracy,” where populist movements reject political parties as corrupt intermediaries and promote direct forms of plebiscitary participation. He drew on examples from Italy—particularly the Five Star Movement (M5S)—to illustrate how anti-elite and anti-party sentiment can morph into anti-political and anti-constitutional tendencies. The M5S’s efforts to abolish public funding for parties and drastically reduce the number of parliamentarians, he argued, risked turning politics into a domain accessible only to the wealthy and further eroding democratic pluralism.

Populism’s Dual Face: Corrective and Destructive

Dr. Varriale nuanced his critique by acknowledging, in agreement with Dr. Zamfira, that not all populisms are inherently anti-democratic. In certain historical contexts—such as Solidarity (Solidarność) in Poland or the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico—populist movements have functioned as democratic correctives, challenging authoritarian elites and expanding political inclusion. Nonetheless, he cautioned that populism’s structural anti-pluralism—its conviction that only it represents the “true people”—renders it perpetually vulnerable to authoritarian outcomes. Whether on the left or the right, populism’s exclusionary logic and hostility to institutional mediation ultimately threaten the liberal core of democracy.

In closing, Dr. Varriale reiterated that the current populist zeitgeist is best understood as the product of a longstanding tension within democracy itself—between the popular and the constitutional dimensions. Populism amplifies one at the expense of the other, promising empowerment while eroding constraint. His intervention underscored the need for renewed scholarly and civic engagement with liberal institutions, representative mediation, and pluralist values if democracy is to withstand its contemporary trials.

Presenters’ Responses

Following the discussants’ insightful interventions by Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, the three presenters offered their concluding reflections. Their responses were thoughtful, collegial, and self-reflective, highlighting the intellectual complementarity of their research and the productive avenues for further development that emerged through the discussion.

Dr. Jonathan Madison began by expressing deep appreciation for the discussants’ thoughtful engagement, noting that the feedback illuminated new dimensions of his comparative study on democratic backsliding in Brazil and the United States. He particularly emphasized the intellectual convergence between his own paper and Dr. Carvalho’s work, remarking that their analyses “filled in some gaps for each other.” He acknowledged that the discussion, especially the points raised about social media and its role in reshaping democratic participation, had provided an important new perspective that he hoped to incorporate in future versions of his research. Dr. Madison reaffirmed that the intersection of institutional resilience, populist behavior, and digital disruption represents a crucial frontier in understanding contemporary democracy. 

Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho followed with a succinct and reflective response. He thanked both discussants for their rigorous and provocative assessments, emphasizing how the feedback would directly inform the ongoing development of his research project on populist mobilization and the structural crisis of democracy. Dr. Carvalho reiterated his appreciation for the interdisciplinary dialogue, noting that the comments had enriched his understanding of how populist discourse interacts with broader transformations in communication, capitalism, and political mediation. While he refrained from engaging in detailed debate, he emphasized that the exchange of ideas offered “something to think of and try to incorporate” into his evolving sociological framework. 

Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira provided the most extensive and reflective reply, directly addressing the points raised by both discussants. She began by thanking Dr. Ali and Dr. Varriale for their rigorous critiques, describing their interventions as intellectually stimulating and fruitful for her ongoing reflections.

Responding first to Dr. Ali, Dr. Zamfira acknowledged the value of his notion of the “populist construction of the people,” which she found conceptually intriguing and potentially useful for exploring populism as a reaction to capitalism and growing economic inequality. She clarified that her earlier distinction between “good” and “bad” populism was not intended as a moral hierarchy but as an analytical shorthand for differentiating “beneficial” and “pernicious” functions of populism within democratic regimes. Drawing on scholars such as Peter Mair and Richard Katz, she reiterated that certain populist movements can perform corrective functions by reactivating political participation and exposing representational deficits.

Addressing the discussion on the pandemic and populist governance, Dr. Zamfira agreed that populist leaders often managed the crisis poorly but contextualized this within a pre-existing technocratic drift in policymaking. Long before the pandemic, she argued, political decision-making had increasingly been justified through the rhetoric of urgency, expertise, and efficiency, rather than representation and deliberation. The pandemic, therefore, intensified rather than initiated this trend, placing populists in a reactive position against an already depoliticized public sphere.

She also strongly endorsed Dr. Ali’s call to restore the autonomy and critical function of political science, warning against its transformation into a technocratic discourse that “accompanies power.” For Dr. Zamfira, reclaiming this critical vocation is essential to understanding — and not merely diagnosing — democracy’s structural crisis.

Turning to Dr. Varriale’s comments, Dr. Zamfira nuanced her position on populism’s relationship with minorities and constitutionalism. While conceding that certain populist movements exhibit exclusionary, nationalist, or xenophobic tendencies, she argued that not all populisms are built on exclusion. In some cases, populism can function as a logic of articulation between the people and elites, incorporating marginalized groups into the political community. This inclusive variant, she noted, aligns with the interpretations of Pierre Rosanvallon and Peter Mair, who recognize populism’s potential to expand democratic participation under specific contexts.

In conclusion, Dr. Zamfira reiterated that populism should be understood as a symptom of democracy without a demos — a response to a representation void created by institutions that have lost their ability to reflect social expectations. Her closing reflections synthesized the session’s debates into a powerful theoretical statement: populism, far from being a monolith, represents the dynamic interplay between crisis, representation, and the enduring struggle to reclaim democracy’s social foundation.

Q&A Session

Photo: Dreamstime.

 

The Q&A session unfolded as an intellectually vibrant continuation of the day’s presentations and discussions. It deepened the exploration of the transnational dimensions of populism, the contextual dynamics of authoritarian drift, and the institutional and cultural factors shaping democratic resilience. The conversation was animated by thoughtful exchanges among the moderator, presenters, discussants, and audience members.

Opening the floor, Dr. Ilhan Kaya posed a fundamental question that framed the discussion: Is there a broader contextual or historical moment that explains the simultaneous rise of populist and authoritarian governments across diverse political systems—from India to the United States, from Turkey to Hungary and Brazil? He further inquired whether populism could be understood as a form of political “contagion,” spreading across borders through inspiration and imitation.

Responding first, Dr. Amir Ali argued that the post-2008 global financial crisis served as a decisive structural backdrop for the surge of populist movements. He identified 2016 as a symbolic turning point — the year of Donald Trump’s election and the Brexit referendum — that consolidated this wave. According to Dr. Ali, the economic dislocation of the late 2000s combined with mounting disillusionment toward neoliberal governance to produce fertile ground for anti-establishment politics. Populism, he suggested, emerged as both a reaction to economic precarity and a symptom of democratic malaise.

Building on this, Dr. Amedeo Varriale emphasized that populism’s spread has not been confined within national boundaries but has often evolved through transnational emulation. Drawing on examples from Central and Eastern Europe, he observed how leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary have inspired similar populist movements elsewhere, notably in Romania, where nationalist actors have consciously imitated Orbán’s rhetoric and political strategies. For Dr. Varriale, this demonstrated that populism functions as a transborder discourse, traveling through networks of ideological affinity, media exposure, and strategic learning.

Expanding the discussion, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho introduced a sociological perspective, situating the populist wave within two interconnected global transformations: The economic crisis and digitalization. These processes, he argued, have created quasi-universal conditions—economic insecurity and the transformation of communication—that enable the proliferation of populist styles of leadership. Yet, Dr. Carvalho stressed that the expression of populism remains nationally contingent. The global conditions may be shared, but the ways in which populist movements interpret and adapt them depend on domestic political histories, institutional configurations, and leadership dynamics. His intervention underscored the necessity of combining structural explanations with detailed empirical analysis to grasp populism’s heterogeneous manifestations.

Memory, Institutions, and the Lessons of Dictatorship

ECPS’ Executive Chair Selcuk Gultasli directed a pointed question to Dr. Jonathan Madison, asking about the role of collective memory—specifically Brazil’s memory of military dictatorship—in reinforcing democratic resilience, in contrast to the United States, which lacks such a historical experience. Dr. Madison’s response highlighted the institutional legacy of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, deliberately crafted to prevent a recurrence of authoritarianism. This historical consciousness, he explained, has endowed Brazilian democracy with a stronger normative and institutional defense against executive overreach. He contrasted this with the American political culture, where the prevailing belief that “it can’t happen here” fosters complacency toward democratic erosion.

Dr. Madison noted that Bolsonaro’s glorification of the military past ironically reinforced institutional vigilance, prompting legislative and judicial bodies to codify new legal protections against threats to democracy. By contrast, the United States’ absence of a lived experience of dictatorship has contributed to a weaker reflex of institutional self-preservation in the face of populist challenges.

The Trump Factor and Republican Conformity

Returning to the American context, Dr. Ilhan Kaya inquired about the Republican Party’s accommodation of Donald Trump, despite opposition from prominent figures like George W. Bush and Mitt Romney. Dr. Madison responded by emphasizing the structural and electoral logic of partisanship in the US: Once Trump redefined the Republican base, dissent became politically untenable. The survival instincts of legislators—dependent on party nomination and voter loyalty—made resistance a “losing strategy.” Those who opposed Trump, he observed, “are no longer in the party or in politics.” In a two-party system, the inability to form new right-wing alternatives, unlike in Brazil’s multi-party setting, has entrenched Trumpism within the Republican mainstream.

Dr. Amir Ali concluded this exchange with a literary reflection, recalling Sinclair Lewis’s 1935 novel It Can’t Happen Here, which envisioned an American demagogue eerily resembling Trump. The reference served as a sobering reminder that the specter of authoritarian populism in liberal democracies, once thought impossible, has long been imaginable—and remains profoundly relevant today.

Conclusion

Session 6 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series offered a rigorous and multidimensional examination of the intricate relationship between populism and democracy’s representational crisis. Across the session’s three presentations and two discussant interventions, a coherent analytical thread emerged: Populism is not an external aberration but a constitutive symptom of democracy’s structural tensions. The dialogue underscored that the populist moment must be understood as both a mirror and a magnifier of the democratic malaise that stems from the erosion of liberal institutions, the commodification of politics, and the fragmentation of the public sphere.

Dr. Jonathan Madison’s comparative analysis of Brazil and the United States reconceptualized democratic resilience beyond the simplistic dichotomy of “established” and “emerging” democracies. His emphasis on the strength of liberal institutions—rather than developmental or historical pedigree—highlighted how institutional design and political will determine the capacity to withstand populist incursions. In contrast, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho’s sociological approach situated populism within the structural contradictions of modernity, showing how capitalist imperatives and digital communication jointly destabilize traditional forms of political mediation. Finally, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira extended this analysis into the domain of democratic theory, distinguishing between ideological (democratic) and strategic (instrumental) populisms, and urging a re-politicization of democracy through renewed scholarly critique.

The discussants, Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, deepened the debate by foregrounding global and comparative perspectives. Dr. Ali’s intervention emphasized the intersection of populism with neoliberal capitalism and the digital disintegration of the public sphere, while Dr. Varriale illuminated populism’s ambivalent role as both a democratic corrective and a vehicle for illiberal consolidation. Together, their insights reinforced the view that populism’s endurance reflects a deeper legitimation crisis rather than a transient political aberration.

Ultimately, Session 6 revealed that the future of democracy depends on restoring the delicate balance between popular sovereignty and institutional constraint. Defending liberal institutions is necessary but insufficient unless paired with a genuine effort to revive representation, pluralism, and critical engagement. Populism, in this light, serves as both a warning and a potential catalyst—an invitation to reimagine democracy not as a static form but as a living, contested process in need of perpetual renewal.

Photo: Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 5: “Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions”

Please cite as:

ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 5: Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00117

 

Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series examined how populist movements across different regions construct “the people” as both an inclusive democratic ideal and an exclusionary political weapon. Moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, the session featured presentations by Dr. Amir Ali, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari, and Andrei Gheorghe, who analyzed populism’s intersections with austerity politics, linguistic identity, and post-communist nationalism. Their comparative insights revealed that populism redefines belonging through economic moralization, linguistic appropriation, and historical myth-making, transforming pluralist notions of democracy into performative narratives of unity and control. The ensuing discussion emphasized populism’s adaptive power to manipulate emotion, memory, and discourse across diverse democratic contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 30, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 5 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This ongoing series (September 2025–April 2026) explores the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of populism’s impact on democratic life across diverse global contexts.

Titled “Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions,” the fifth session brought together scholars from political science, sociology, and linguistics to interrogate how populist movements construct and mobilize “the people” as a moral, cultural, and emotional category. The discussion illuminated the multiple ways in which populist discourse reshapes collective identity, redefines sovereignty, and challenges democratic pluralism.

The session was moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, an arts researcher and practitioner based in Utah and Scandinavia, whose expertise in cultural narratives and affective politics enriched the workshop’s interpretive lens. Three presentations followed, each approaching the notion of “the people” from a distinct analytical angle. Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) examined the paradox of austerity populism, arguing that fiscal conservatism has become a populist virtue masking economic dispossession. Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Technische Universität Dresden) turned to the linguistic life of democracy in Germany, tracing how words like Volk, Leute, and Heimat encode competing visions of community, inclusion, and exclusion in the contemporary public sphere. Andrei Gheorghe (University of Bucharest and EHESS, Paris) presented a comparative analysis of Romanian and Hungarian populisms, exploring how leaders from Viktor Orbán to Traian Băsescu construct national identity through historical memory and moral dualism.

The session also featured two discussants whose critical reflections deepened the dialogue: Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St Andrews) offered comments that emphasized conceptual clarity, methodological coherence, and the comparative breadth of the papers. Dr. Amedeo Varriale (PhD, University of East London) provided incisive observations connecting the economic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of populism, situating the presenters’ work within wider debates on ideology, nationalism, and discourse.

Throughout the session, Dr. Hart guided the discussion and er moderation fostered an interdisciplinary dialogue among presenters and discussants, drawing attention to the intersections of economy, discourse, and collective memory. Ultimately, Session 5 revealed that the populist construction of “the people” is not merely a rhetorical act but a performative process—one that transforms democratic ideals of equality and representation into instruments of control and exclusion.

Dr. Amir Ali: “Ripping Off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-Fist”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

In his insightful and intellectually charged presentation, Dr. Amir Ali of Jawaharlal Nehru University examined the paradoxical relationship between populism and austerity in contemporary politics. With comparative references to India, the United Kingdom, and Argentina, Dr. Ali argued that modern populist regimes—despite their pro-people rhetoric—engage in policies that effectively “rip off” the very constituencies they claim to represent.

Dr. Ali began by framing the core paradox of his paper: while populism ostensibly celebrates and empowers “the people,” its economic manifestations often culminate in policies of fiscal restraint, austerity, and redistribution away from the lower classes. To conceptualize this tension, he introduced the evocative metaphor of “ripping off the people,” signifying the betrayal of the populist promise through the simultaneous glorification and exploitation of the masses.

From Geddes’s Axe to Milei’s Chainsaw: The Genealogy of Austerity

In his introduction, Dr. Ali employed a historical lens to trace the evolution of austerity politics—from the early twentieth-century “Geddes Axe” in Britain to the brutal symbolism of Argentine President Javier Milei’s “chainsaw.” The former, referencing post–World War I budget cuts under British Chancellor Sir Eric Geddes (1921), marked the institutionalization of austerity as a state virtue. The latter, Milei’s notorious use of a chainsaw as a political prop, epitomizes the contemporary radicalization of austerity—an aggressive, performative politics of cutting state expenditure to the bone.

This imagery, Dr. Ali suggested, captures a broader transformation in global political economy: austerity has shifted from being a technocratic policy of restraint to a populist spectacle of destruction. Under this regime, “cut, baby, cut”—echoing Donald Trump’s “drill, baby, drill”—becomes a rallying cry of fiscal violence dressed in popular legitimacy.

Three Faces of Populism: Anti-Elite, Anti-Establishment, Anti-Intellectual

Dr. Ali conceptualized populism through its tripartite oppositional structure: it is anti-eliteanti-establishment, and anti-intellectual. Yet, these negations coexist with an exaggerated pro-people posture, creating what he termed a “caricature of the people.” Drawing from Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), he observed that when “the people” are caricatured, they quickly transform into a mob—a collective easily manipulated by demagogues and complicit elites.

In Dr. Ali’s analysis, populism’s anti-elitism is thus inherently deceptive. It dismantles one elite only to enthrone another, often more corrupt and authoritarian. This “frying pan to fire” dynamic exemplifies the central irony of contemporary populism: in purporting to empower the people, it reconstitutes new hierarchies of domination.

Historical and Conceptual Distinctions: Populism Then and Now

A key contribution of Dr. Ali’s presentation was his distinction between twentieth-century populism and twenty-first-century populism—both historically and conceptually.

The populisms of the twentieth century, particularly in Latin America, were fiscally profligate and redistributive. Leaders such as Juan Perón in Argentina or Indira Gandhi in India engaged in state-led welfarism and social inclusion. In contrast, contemporary populism, as witnessed in the regimes of Narendra Modi, the Brexit Conservatives, and Javier Milei, is fiscally conservative. It espouses austerity while deploying populist rhetoric to justify inequality.

In Dr. Ali’s words, the “populism of the fiscally tight-fist” marks a conceptual rupture: it moralizes austerity and sanctifies fiscal prudence, transforming economic cruelty into civic virtue.

Case Studies: India, Britain, and Argentina

To substantiate his argument, Dr. Ali developed a comparative triad of case studies—India, the United Kingdom, and Argentina—each exemplifying a unique variant of austerity-driven populism.

India under Narendra Modi, he argued, exemplifies fiscally conservative populism. Modi’s government, while maintaining strict fiscal discipline, employs targeted welfare schemes—such as direct cash transfers—to cultivate an electorate of Labharthi (beneficiaries). These schemes, though presented as welfarist, are not redistributive in nature; rather, they create a beholden class whose dependence on state largesse ensures political loyalty.

Dr. Ali drew an instructive comparison between India’s Labharthi and the descamisado (“shirtless ones”) of Peronist Argentina. While Perón’s descamisados represented a mobilized working class empowered through redistribution, Modi’s Labharthi are atomized dependents sustained by piecemeal welfare. The former embodied class inclusion; the latter reinforces clientelism. This distinction, he argued, underscores the moral inversion of populism under neoliberal austerity: generosity becomes a tool of subordination.

In the United Kingdom, Dr. Ali turned to the work of economist Timo Fetzer (2019), whose empirical study in the American Economic Review demonstrated a causal link between austerity policies under David Cameron’s government and the 2016 Brexit vote. Fetzer’s data, Dr. Ali noted, reveal how regions most devastated by austerity were disproportionately likely to vote “Leave.” Hence, the populist revolt against elites was, paradoxically, the political offspring of elite-engineered austerity.

Finally, Argentina provided what Dr. Ali termed “the brutal extreme” of austerity populism. Drawing on research by Jem Ovat, Tisabri Anju, and Joel Rabinovich (Economic and Political Weekly), he noted that Milei’s shock therapy has slashed central government expenditure by 27.5% within a single year, producing a budget surplus of 3.3% of GDP—the first in fourteen years. This dramatic fiscal contraction, celebrated as economic salvation, has simultaneously deepened inequality and social precarity.

Together, these cases illustrate Dr. Ali’s thesis that austerity is the economic face of populism’s deceit: it claims to save the people from excess while impoverishing them through scarcity.

Austerity as Virtue and Violence

Dr. Ali engaged critically with two major works on austerity: Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (2013) and Clara E. Mattei’s The Capital Order (2022). From Blyth, he borrowed the notion of austerity as an ideological weapon masquerading as prudence. From Mattei, he adopted the argument that austerity originated as a political technology to discipline labor and preserve capitalist order.

Extending these insights, Dr. Ali argued that austerity today functions as virtue signaling—a moral performance by governments and elites who equate fiscal restraint with righteousness. While austerity may be an admirable personal trait, he warned, its translation into public policy is catastrophic. As a state doctrine, it penalizes the already austere working classes, weaponizing virtue into violence.

The Indian Trajectory: From Anti-Corruption to Authoritarian Populism

Dr. Ali traced the genealogy of India’s populism to the 2011 anti-corruption movement, which, under the guise of civic purification, delegitimized the political class and paved the way for Modi’s ascent. Like Brazil’s anti-corruption crusade that felled Dilma Rousseff, India’s movement transmuted moral indignation into reactionary populism.

Interestingly, Modi’s 2014 campaign was not overtly populist but technocratic—promising efficiency and reform. However, as Dr. Ali observed, over time his regime adopted increasingly populist tactics: emotional appeals, symbolic nationalism, and welfare clientelism. These, combined with austerity policies, have produced a paradoxical populism—economically neoliberal but culturally majoritarian.

Free Speech, Anti-Intellectualism, and the Politics of Hate

Dr. Ali also addressed the anti-intellectual dimension of contemporary populism. In India, institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) have been vilified by the media as “anti-national.” He likened this to Viktor Orbán’s assault on the Central European University in Hungary—an effort to delegitimize critical thought and replace it with populist orthodoxy.

Linked to this is what he called the fetishization of free speech—exemplified by Elon Musk’s acquisition of X (formerly Twitter). In the guise of free speech absolutism, populist regimes weaponize communication platforms to normalize hate speech and suppress dissent. The result is a paradoxical public sphere: loud with propaganda, silent on inequality.

Silence on Inequality and the Rhetoric of the People

Despite their loquacity, populist leaders share a striking silence on one issue: inequality. Dr. Ali invoked Thomas Piketty’s recent work on the “billionaire raj” to highlight the deepening disparities in wealth and power. While populism mobilizes resentment against elites, it rarely challenges structural inequality; rather, it reconfigures resentment into cultural or religious antagonism.

In India, this silence is particularly pronounced. The populist narrative celebrates national pride and market success while masking the precarity of millions living below subsistence levels. The rhetoric of “the people” thus becomes, in Dr. Ali’s words, “a political caricature”—a manipulated portrait of the masses, drawn by leaders who claim to represent them but instead exploit their vulnerability.

The Populist Caricature and the Politics of Ripping Off

Dr. Ali concluded with a vivid metaphor. The populist leader, he suggested, resembles an artist who asks the people to pose for a portrait—only to render them grotesquely, as a caricature. When the people object to their distorted image, he tears up the paper and discards them. This, for Dr. Ali, encapsulates the moral economy of contemporary populism: it elevates the people rhetorically only to discard them materially.

Drawing on Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, he cited the line: “He will scorn the base degrees by which he did ascend.” Once the leader rises to power, he abandons the very people who lifted him. Similarly, Dr. Ali evoked King Lear“Tis the time’s plague when madmen lead the blind.” The metaphor aptly captures a global moment where demagogues, propelled by economic despair, guide nations into deeper crisis.

Ultimately, Dr. Ali’s presentation offered a sobering reflection on the moral contradictions of contemporary populism. The populism of the fiscally tight-fist, he argued, redefines austerity as virtue, dependency as empowerment, and domination as democracy. Beneath its pro-people veneer lies a politics of dispossession—a systematic ripping off of the people in the name of serving them.


Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari: “The Living Language of Democracy: Folk and Leute in Contemporary Germany”

PEGIDA supporters demonstrate in Munich, Germany, on February 15, 2018. Photo: Thomas Lukassek.

In his thought-provoking presentation, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari explored the emotional and political dimensions of two fundamental German words—Volk (“the people” as a symbolic national collective) and Leute (“people” in the everyday, social sense). His research investigates how these linguistic categories shape the lived experience and imagination of democracy in modern Germany, particularly amid the resurgence of right-wing populism in the country’s east.

Dr. Doulatyari opened his talk by situating his research within the long tradition of German philosophical anthropology and sociology, referencing his collaboration with Siegbert Rieberg—one of the last academic assistants to Arnold Gehlen, a founding figure of twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. Drawing on this lineage, he posed a central question: How do Germans today use and feel the words “Volk” and “Leute” when they talk about nation, belonging, and democracy?

Both terms, he argued, carry deep emotional and historical weight. Volk represents a vertical, symbolic notion of unity—“one people, one nation”—while Leute expresses a horizontal sense of community grounded in daily coexistence: neighbors, friends, and ordinary citizens. These linguistic currents embody two distinct emotional orientations of democratic life. The Leute current is inclusive, open, and social, corresponding to everyday democracy; the Volk current is cohesive, symbolic, and often exclusionary, evoking the idea of an authentic or “true” people.

Language, Emotion, and the Grammar of Belonging

Dr. Doulatyari emphasized that these words are not merely lexical choices but emotional and political signifiers. Each term, he explained, constructs a “grammar of belonging” that defines who is included in or excluded from the democratic “we.” By studying how Volk and Leute appear in political speech, popular media, and street demonstrations, his research illuminates how collective identities are linguistically produced and contested in contemporary Germany.

His methodology combines field observation—being present in demonstrations, public gatherings, and social forums—with digital corpus analysis using the Leipzig Corpora Collection. This dual approach allows him to examine both the embodied use of language in real-life contexts and its broader semantic trends in contemporary German discourse, particularly during 2024.

By searching for instances where Volk and Leute occur alongside the pronoun wir (“we”), Dr. Doulatyari identified how Germans imagine collective identity through language. The recurring question, he observed, is not simply who are the people? but who are “we”?

From “Wir sind das Volk” to “Wir sind mehr”

A key part of his analysis focused on two powerful slogans that have defined Germany’s recent political discourse. The first, “Wir sind das Volk” (“We are the people”), emerged in 1989 as a democratic cry during the protests that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, in recent years, this same phrase has been appropriated by right-wing populist movements—most notably the Pegida demonstrations—to advance exclusionary and nationalist agendas. What was once a rallying call for democratic inclusion has been transformed into a slogan of cultural homogeneity and xenophobia.

In contrast, the counter-slogan “Wir sind mehr” (“We are more”) arose in response, expressing solidarity with diversity, inclusion, and democratic pluralism. It embodies the same emotional energy as “Wir sind das Volk” but redirects it toward openness rather than closure. For Dr. Doulatyari, this semantic struggle over we-ness lies at the heart of Germany’s democratic tensions today.

Populism Between Folk and Leute

Dr. Doulatyari observed that right-wing populist politicians have become adept at navigating between these two registers of language. They speak the language of Leute—informal, familiar, and seemingly ordinary—to appear close to everyday citizens. Yet simultaneously, they invoke the symbolic power of Volk to claim moral and political authority, suggesting they alone speak for “the real people.” This rhetorical oscillation allows populists to naturalize exclusion while sounding democratic.

He further noted that in everyday expressions—such as die normalen Leute (“the normal people”)—the term Leute carries emotional warmth and authenticity but is increasingly co-opted by populist discourse to draw boundaries against supposed elites or outsiders, including the European Union or migrants. Thus, populism instrumentalizes linguistic intimacy (Leute) and symbolic unity (Volk) to sustain a politics of division.

The Missing Bridge: Democracy’s Structural Challenge

At the heart of Dr. Doulatyari’s argument lies a structural diagnosis. Beneath both Volk and Leute, he suggested, exists a “hidden wish”—a desire to be seen, to belong, and to participate meaningfully in collective life. Volk seeks stability and rootedness, while Leute seeks recognition and inclusion. The democratic challenge, therefore, is not the existence of emotion but the absence of institutional structures capable of linking these two desires.

Drawing on Siegbert Rieberg’s notion of Raum der Bedeutung—the “space of meaning”—Dr. Doulatyari argued that modern democracies face a profound crisis of meaning-space. When institutions fail to connect the symbolic (unity) and the social (participation), the linguistic field fractures. The result is polarization: emotional belonging turns into frustration, and nationalism replaces solidarity.

Reclaiming the Language of Democracy

Dr. Doulatyari concluded by emphasizing that language itself remains one of the strongest symbolic institutions of democracy. In cultural life, new efforts are emerging to reimagine Volk and Leute in inclusive ways. He pointed to artistic and civic examples such as the Volksbühne theater in Berlin, which has sought to reappropriate Volk through multicultural performances, and to the growing use of Leute in music and popular media that emphasize everyday connection and plural belonging.

Ultimately, he argued, the struggle over these two words mirrors the struggle over democracy itself. Whoever controls the meaning of “we” controls the moral legitimacy of the political order. To revitalize democracy, societies must rebuild trust not through ethnic or cultural homogeneity but through constitutional loyalty and civic inclusion.

In his concluding reflection, Dr. Doulatyari proposed a metaphor of reconciliation: Volk and Leute are not opposites but complementary forces—two sides of the same human story. Democracy thrives only when symbolic unity and social diversity remain in dialogue. Language, therefore, is not a mere reflection of democracy—it is its living heartbeat.


Andrei Gheorghe: “Constructing ‘the People’ in Populist Discourse: The Hungarian and Romanian Cases”

Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

In his presentation, doctoral researcher Andrei Gheorghe explored the evolving concept of “the people” in contemporary populist rhetoric, focusing on Hungary and Romania. His analysis examined how populist leaders in both countries, responding to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, redefined the people as a moral and cultural community opposed to liberal elites and supranational structures such as the European Union.

Gheorghe began by recalling the paradox that inspired his study. After joining the European Union and benefiting from substantial economic aid and development funds, Hungary and Romania should have experienced greater trust in European institutions and liberal democracy. Instead, both countries witnessed the rapid rise of national populism. Populist movements began portraying Brussels not as a partner in reconstruction but as a foreign power threatening national sovereignty and identity. To Gheorghe, this paradox—prosperity accompanied by populist rebellion—signaled a deeper crisis of legitimacy rooted in the intersection of globalization, economic vulnerability, and post-communist transformation.

From Economic Transition to Populist Disillusionment

In both Hungary and Romania, the economic crisis exposed the limits of neoliberal reform and the fragility of the newly established democratic institutions. Gheorghe observed that privatization, market liberalization, and dependency on foreign investment constrained the ability of these states to protect citizens from economic shocks. The resulting unemployment, declining public services, and emigration eroded trust in liberal elites and created fertile ground for populist narratives that denounced both domestic and supranational actors as betrayers of the national interest.

This context, Gheorghe argued, explains why populist leaders could claim to speak in the name of the people even in societies that had only recently embraced democracy and European integration. Populism’s success, he suggested, lies not only in economic grievances but also in the symbolic redefinition of the people—from a plural civic community into a morally and culturally homogenous entity.

Theoretical Foundations: Who Are “the People”?

Turning to theory, Gheorghe drew on the works of Pierre Rosanvallon, Jan-Werner Müller, Cas Mudde, Carlos de la Torre, and Ernesto Laclau to situate his analysis within the broader field of populism studies. Rosanvallon famously noted that populism lacks programmatic texts defining its vision of society; instead, it operates through emotional and moral claims about representation. Mudde’s minimalist definition—a thin-centered ideology that divides society into two antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”—provides the foundation for Gheorghe’s conceptual framing.

For populists, Gheorghe explained, the people are not the civic collective of citizens found in liberal democracy. Rather, they are imagined as an organic, pre-political community bound by tradition, religion, and moral virtue. This “monolithic people” is contrasted with an alien elite—cosmopolitan, immoral, and detached from the national culture. Populist discourse, he noted, turns cultural alienation into political antagonism: elites are portrayed not merely as corrupt but as traitors serving foreign interests, “globalists,” or external powers such as Brussels or Washington.

Following Carlos de la Torre and Ernesto Laclau, Gheorghe emphasized the centrality of the populist leader in constructing this imagined community. The leader both embodies and defines the people—deciding who belongs, which grievances are legitimate, and what values constitute the national essence. The people, in this framework, do not pre-exist the leader’s discourse; they are performed and imagined through it.

This process, Gheorghe argued, is both inclusionary and exclusionary. While populist rhetoric unites diverse groups under the banner of a shared national identity, it demands conformity—participants must abandon plural identities in favor of a single, purified “we.” The populist people are thus inclusive in rhetoric but exclusive in practice, denying dissent and diversity.

Emotions, Memory, and the Construction of Unity

A major part of Gheorghe’s argument focused on the role of emotion in populist politics. While emotions are integral to all political communication, populists weaponize them to create a permanent sense of urgency and insecurity. The threats they invoke—loss of freedom, identity, sovereignty, or national dignity—are often vague yet omnipresent, mobilizing a collective fear that demands decisive action from the leader. This emotional climate reinforces dependence on the leader as protector and savior.

A second critical strategy is the manipulation of history and collective memory. Drawing on theoretical insights from memory studies, Gheorghe argued that populist leaders reconfigure the past to legitimize their present political projects. By reinterpreting historical traumas or glorifying national struggles, they produce a narrative of continuity between the “true people” of the past and the “authentic nation” of the present. Such myth-making not only strengthens community identity but also positions the leader as the inheritor of historical missions—defender of the nation, guardian of faith, or restorer of sovereignty.

Methodology and Empirical Focus

Gheorghe’s research is based on a qualitative discourse analysis of approximately seventy speeches and interviews by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and sixteen by Romanian populist leaders between 2010 and 2020. This comparative approach seeks to reveal both the shared logics and contextual differences in how Hungarian and Romanian populists construct “the people.”

One challenge he encountered, Gheorghe noted, was the difference in political stability. In Hungary, Orbán’s continuous rule since 2010 provided a coherent and evolving populist discourse. In contrast, Romania’s frequent leadership changes—between the Social Democrats and Liberals—produced a fragmented populist rhetoric that shifted with each election cycle. Nonetheless, both contexts shared a common reliance on emotional mobilization, historical distortion, and anti-elitist moral dichotomies.

The Hungarian Case: National Salvation and Christian Identity

In Hungary, Orbán’s speeches consistently portrayed the 2008 financial crisis as a civilizational rupture comparable to the First and Second World Wars or the fall of communism. He described the event as a “Western financial collapse” that revealed the decadence of liberal capitalism and the moral corruption of the West. In this narrative, Hungary is recast as a moral beacon—a Christian nation destined to defend Europe’s spiritual heritage against both neoliberalism and migration.

Gheorghe highlighted Orbán’s recurring themes: the “changing world,” the erosion of stable traditions, and the necessity of unity under a strong national leader. The populist discourse of Christian Hungary, he noted, transforms economic insecurity into a moral crusade. By positioning Hungary as the “shield of Europe” against external threats—Muslim immigrants, liberal globalists, or EU bureaucrats—Orbán constructs a homogenous people defined by faith, history, and obedience to the national mission.

The Romanian Case: Sovereignty and Anti-Corruption

In Romania, Gheorghe found a similar moral framing, though less coherent due to political turnover. Populist rhetoric depicted Brusselsand Washingtonas distant centers of control manipulating Romania’s political elites. The European Commission and anti-corruption campaigns launched after 2004 were reframed as tools of domination, undermining the sovereignty of “the Romanian people.”

Leaders accused domestic institutions—such as the Constitutional Court or the judiciary—of serving foreign interests. Gheorghe noted how some populist figures even compared anti-corruption investigations to the repressive tactics of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s communist regime, portraying themselves as victims of political persecution and defenders of national freedom. This rhetorical inversion—turning accountability into tyranny—allowed populist leaders to present themselves as moral saviors resisting external and internal conspiracies.

The Monolithic People and the Populist Savior

Gheorghe concluded that in both Hungary and Romania, populist discourse constructs a dichotomous world divided between the true people and their corrupt enemies. Through emotional manipulation, historical revisionism, and symbolic appeals to sovereignty, populist leaders transform plural democracies into moral theaters where only one voice—the leader’s—can claim authenticity.

The leader’s self-presentation as the savior of the people is central to this process. In Gheorghe’s analysis, the populist leader not only represents the people but creates them—defining their boundaries, their fears, and their identity. This monolithic construction of “the people” legitimizes authoritarian tendencies and weakens democratic pluralism.

Ultimately, Gheorghe’s research underscores how the concept of the people—once the foundation of democratic sovereignty—has been reappropriated as a tool of exclusion and control. In both Hungary and Romania, populism’s emotional and historical narratives reveal not the empowerment of citizens, but their transformation into instruments of moralized political power.


Discussant’s Feedback: Hannah Geddes
 

As the discussant for Session 5, Hannah Geddes offered a series of insightful, constructive reflections on the three presented papers, focusing on their conceptual clarity, methodological coherence, and potential contributions to the broader study of populism. Her interventions demonstrated both attentiveness to theoretical nuance and an appreciation for the diversity of approaches within the session.

Geddes began by commending the first paper for its eloquence and ambitious scope. The presentation traced the evolution of populism across different temporal and geographical contexts, juxtaposing the populist movements of the twentieth century with contemporary global manifestations. Geddes praised the richness and narrative breadth of this comparative approach but advised caution in managing its analytical scale. She observed that the project’s very strength—its temporal and spatial expansiveness—also posed a risk of diffuseness. To enhance conceptual focus, she encouraged the presenter to identify a single, clear narrative thread or central conceptual relationship to anchor the argument. While she interpreted the paper as a story about austerity and the shifting nature of populism from the last century to this one, Geddes urged the author to articulate explicitly what they wished audiences to take away as the paper’s core insight. She further recommended greater justification for the selection of case studies—given the movement between diverse contexts such as Argentina, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom—suggesting that more explicit criteria would clarify both the comparative logic and the contrasts being drawn.

Turning to the second paper, which explored populism in contemporary Germany through the linguistic lens of Folk and Leute, Geddes found the approach highly innovative. She praised the focus on specific words as a prism for understanding how citizens perceive the nation, democracy, and belonging. This, she noted, provided a compelling bridge between sociolinguistics and political sociology. Drawing from her own background in migration studies, Geddes found the discussion of social integration particularly resonant. She also drew an interesting parallel to civic nationalism in Scotland—an inclusive, left-leaning nationalism that offers a counterpoint to exclusionary nationalisms elsewhere. Methodologically, she encouraged the author to reflect further on how the micro-level linguistic analysis connects to the macro-level story about nationalism and democratic identity.

In her comments on the third paper, which examined the populist construction of “the people” in post-2008 Hungary and Romania, Geddes highlighted the analytical richness of comparing two national cases with differing political dynamics. She noted that while the author regarded Viktor Orbán’s long tenure as a challenge for comparative consistency, it might instead serve as an analytical advantage. The contrast between Hungary’s continuity of leadership and Romania’s frequent leadership changes, she argued, offers a unique opportunity to explore how the cult of personality—a recurrent theme in populism studies—shapes the formation of political legitimacy. This contrast could deepen the study’s comparative contribution by illuminating how populism functions both with and without a stable charismatic figure.

Geddes concluded by commending all three presenters for their originality and intellectual rigor. She emphasized that, collectively, the papers illuminated the many ways populism negotiates identity, representation, and belonging across diverse linguistic, cultural, and political terrains.

 

Discussants FeedbackDr. Amedeo Varriale

Serving as discussant for the session, Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered a set of insightful, critical, and comparative reflections on the three papers. His comments were characterized by a deep engagement with the economic, ideological, and cultural dimensions of populism and by a commendable openness to perspectives beyond his own regional expertise.

Dr. Varriale began by commending the overall quality of the session, noting that it provided him with an opportunity to engage with case studies situated outside his primary area of specialization, particularly those concerning Romania, Hungary, and India. His observations combined a critical analytical lens with an appreciation for the diversity of methodological approaches and the empirical richness that each presentation offered.

Dr. Varriale’s most detailed feedback concerned Dr. Amir Ali’s paper, which examined the evolution of populism through an economic lens. He praised the work for its originality and relevance, noting that while recent decades have seen a shift from economic explanations of populism toward ideational and discursive frameworks, Ali’s intervention restored analytical balance by foregrounding the economic underpinnings of populist politics.

He summarized the central argument as a contrast between twentieth-century populisms, which tended to be fiscally expansive, and twenty-first-century populisms, which are ostensibly more fiscally prudent and even pro-austerity. According to Dr. Varriale, Dr. Ali compellingly argued that today’s right-wing populists, through appeals to budgetary discipline and ordoliberal rhetoric, have paradoxically expanded inequality under the guise of responsibility. This “save now, spend later” ethos—borrowed from household economics and applied to the state—has, in Dr. Ali’s view, “ripped off the people,” undermining the egalitarian promises populism claims to defend.

Dr. Varriale praised the empirical rigor of the paper, which drew on multiple country examples—Argentina, Britain, and India—and incorporated statistical evidence alongside theoretical insight. He also commended its engagement with leading economists such as Thomas Piketty and political scientists of populism. However, he offered several critical reflections.

He questioned the neat historical division between “fiscally profligate” twentieth-century populisms and “fiscally prudent” contemporary ones. Citing examples such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina, and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, Dr. Varriale noted that some twentieth-century populists also embraced neoliberal reforms, privatization, and deregulation. Conversely, contemporary populists—both left and right—have often pursued expansive fiscal policies. He cited Italy’s Five Star Movement, whose universal basic income program resulted in massive unaccounted costs, and Matteo Salvini’s League, which simultaneously advocated higher spending and tax cuts. Likewise, Giorgia Meloni’s government has funded large-scale projects—such as repatriation centers in Albania and the proposed bridge between Sicily and mainland Italy—illustrating that fiscal restraint is hardly a defining feature of right-wing populism.

For Dr. Varriale, these examples reveal that populist economic behavior transcends simple ideological categories. Both left- and right-wing populists can be fiscally extravagant or interventionist depending on the political utility of such policies. He observed that many contemporary European populists—including Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán—combine leftist economic nationalism with right-wing cultural conservatism, producing a hybrid form of economic populism marked by protectionism, state interventionism, and resistance to supranational fiscal constraints.

Turning to Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari’s linguistically oriented paper on the German concepts Folk and Leute, Dr. Varriale highlighted its originality and the subtlety with which it linked language, culture, and politics. He found the exploration of these terms as emotional and symbolic markers of inclusion and exclusion within German democracy both innovative and methodologically rich.

Dr. Varriale expressed particular interest in Dr. Doulatyari’s attention to the word Heimat (homeland), noting that the concept carries heavy political and ideological weight in contemporary Germany. He connected it to the far-right’s appropriation of Heimat discourse, citing the emergence of the ultra-nationalist Heimat Party, which draws on neo-fascist traditions inherited from the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). In this regard, he suggested that Doulatyari’s linguistic analysis could shed light on how far-right actors strategically reclaim emotionally resonant terms to naturalize exclusionary identities.

In his reflections on Andrei Gheorghe’s comparative study of Hungarian and Romanian populism, Dr. Varriale commended the research for its historical and empirical depth. He appreciated the focus on post-2008 developments and the analysis of how political leaders in both countries manipulated collective memory to construct “the people” as a moral and cultural category.

Dr. Varriale’s central question to Gheorghe concerned the comparative framework. While Gheorghe had described Hungary’s political continuity under Viktor Orbán as a challenge for comparative consistency, Dr. Varriale suggested that this apparent limitation could instead be an analytical strength. The juxtaposition of Hungary’s stable populist leadership with Romania’s fragmented and frequently changing political elite, he argued, offers a valuable opportunity to explore the relationship between charismatic leadership and populist legitimacy.

He noted that such a comparison could illuminate broader questions within populism studies: namely, how populist movements sustain emotional and ideological coherence in the absence of a singular leader, and how the “cult of personality” functions differently across national contexts.

Dr. Varriale concluded his discussant remarks by commending all three presenters for their intellectual rigor, methodological diversity, and capacity to advance the interdisciplinary study of populism. Their combined contributions—spanning economics, linguistics, and comparative politics—illustrated the multiplicity of populist expression across time, geography, and ideology. His reflections underscored a unifying insight: that populism, in its economic, cultural, and discursive forms, remains a fluid and adaptive phenomenon whose contradictions reveal as much about democratic societies as about its self-proclaimed defenders of “the people.”

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Amir Ali

Responding to Hannah Geddes’s question regarding the principal takeaway of his paper, Dr. Amir Ali emphasized that the heart of his research lies in diagnosing the dramatic decline of democracy across both established and emerging democratic systems. He pointed to the erosion of democratic norms not only in countries historically considered stable—such as the United Kingdom and the United States—but also in nations like India and Argentina, where populist politics have increasingly undermined institutional checks and balances.

Dr. Ali situated this decline within a broader pattern of populist-driven democratic backsliding, arguing that the populist invocation of “the people” has been used to justify anti-institutional behavior and to erode procedural democracy. In countries like India, he noted, populism has shifted from mobilizing marginalized groups toward consolidating majoritarianism, producing an authoritarian populism that paradoxically weakens the very democratic institutions it claims to defend. His succinct yet powerful intervention reframed the economic discussion of his earlier presentation within the political consequences of populism’s global ascent.

Presenter’s Response: Andrei Gheorghe

Andrei Gheorghe responded at length to the comments from both Hannah Geddes and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, clarifying how political instability in Romania complicates comparative analysis with Hungary. He acknowledged Geddes’s observation that Hungary’s sustained leadership under Viktor Orbán contrasts with Romania’s revolving-door politics, where party leaders are frequently replaced after electoral losses. This instability, Gheorghe explained, stems from fragmented party structures, internal factionalism, and volatile coalitions that prioritize electoral expediency over ideological continuity.

He described this dynamic as a form of “duplicity”—where Romanian leaders often adopt divergent tones depending on context. For instance, figures like Victor Ponta, the former prime minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, presented one discourse in official capacities and another in televised populist appeals. This rhetorical inconsistency, Gheorghe noted, reveals the opportunistic and performative nature of Romanian populism, which often relies on theatrical rather than substantive engagement with “the people.”

In response to Dr. Varriale, Gheorghe elaborated on his selection of Traian Băsescu as a central case in his PhD research, rather than newer populists like George Simion of the AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians). While acknowledging that AUR represents a rising anti-establishment force, he explained that his project focuses on the 2010–2020 period, examining earlier waves of populism that set the stage for contemporary developments. He drew parallels between Liviu Dragnea’s populist strategy and Orbán’s, noting that Dragnea sought to imitate the Hungarian leader’s anti-globalist and anti-Soros rhetoric. However, unlike Orbán, Dragnea’s approach was largely theatrical and self-serving, aimed primarily at obstructing anti-corruption reforms rather than establishing an enduring populist regime.

Gheorghe concluded by distinguishing between Hungary’s transformational populism, which sought to reshape the political order, and Romania’s performative populism, which functioned as an electoral instrument. His reflections demonstrated a nuanced understanding of populism’s diverse modalities within post-communist Europe.

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari

Finally, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari responded warmly to the discussants’ observations, expressing appreciation for their engagement and particularly for Dr. Varriale’s comments on the semantic and political weight of the German term “Heimat.” He clarified that in his analysis, Heimat represents not merely a geographical or familial attachment but an emotionally charged concept that encapsulates both belonging and fear of change.

He elaborated that in contemporary Germany, Heimat has reemerged as a politically contested symbol—often invoked in far-right demonstrations by groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden or by nationalist parties seeking to preserve an idealized “German way of life.” The term thus functions ambivalently: for some, it expresses nostalgia and cultural continuity; for others, it becomes a vehicle for exclusion and xenophobia.

By linking this semantic field to collective memory and personal narratives, Dr. Doulatyari underscored how everyday language mediates the boundaries of inclusion in democratic societies. His response deepened the audience’s understanding of how linguistic symbols operate as repositories of national emotion, bridging sociology, linguistics, and political philosophy.

In their collective responses, the three presenters reaffirmed the intellectual depth and interdisciplinary scope of the session. Each, in their own way, illuminated how populism—whether expressed through fiscal policy, historical narrative, or linguistic identity—reshapes democratic life by redefining who “the people” are and what democracy itself means in the twenty-first century.

Q&A Session 

The question-and-answer segment that followed the presentations reflected a rich exchange of ideas connecting nationalism, transborder identities, and the populist construction of “the people.” Dr. Bulent Kenes opened the discussion by situating the presenters’ work within a broader transnational frame. He observed that many populist movements across the world invoke the notion of a “greater nation”—an expanded vision of the homeland that transcends current state borders. This rhetoric, he noted, has deep historical roots: from the idea of a Greater Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz to parallel visions such as Greater Romania, Greater Serbia, and even the historical Greek Megalidea. Kenes highlighted how these ideological constructs often blur the distinction between national and transnational belonging, with populist leaders positioning themselves as protectors of an imagined community that extends beyond formal state boundaries. He then asked Andrei Gheorghe and Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari to elaborate on how the idea of transborder nations operates in their respective cases—Hungary and Romania for Gheorghe, and Germany for Doulatyari—and how such rhetoric might extend to the diasporic sphere.

Andrei Gheorghe responded by affirming the centrality of transborder nationalism in Hungarian populist discourse. He explained that Viktor Orbán’s political project draws heavily upon the concept of the Carpathian Basin, a symbolic space encompassing all territories historically inhabited by Hungarians. This notion, he noted, remains deeply rooted in the Hungarian national consciousness, particularly through the trauma of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which redrew Hungary’s borders after World War I.

According to Gheorghe, Orbán has strategically revived these memories of betrayal by the West—referring to the 1848 revolutions, the Trianon settlement, and the 1956 anti-communist uprising—as recurring episodes in which Hungary was “abandoned” by its Western allies. This narrative of victimhood, he observed, plays a vital role in Orbán’s populist self-image as the defender of the Hungarian nation against foreign interference, whether from Brussels, global capitalism, or multiculturalism.

Gheorghe further noted that Orbán’s 2010 policy granting citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians abroad exemplifies this symbolic reconstruction of a transborder Hungarian community. This move, while politically strategic, also reinforces a form of exclusionary nationalism grounded in cultural and ethnic homogeneity. In Orbán’s rhetoric, the European Union and its liberal policies are often portrayed as existential threats that “dilute Hungarian blood” and undermine traditional values.

By contrast, Gheorghe explained that Romanian populism during the 2010–2020 period was less preoccupied with territorial nationalism. Instead, Romanian populist leaders focused on anti-liberal and anti-corruption narratives, framing the European Union and domestic liberal elites as agents of foreign control. Figures such as Traian Băsescu and Liviu Dragnea employed populist rhetoric to claim defense of the “Romanian people” against external imposition, but the Greater Romania idea itself was largely marginal during this decade.

Nonetheless, Gheorghe acknowledged that earlier nationalists like Corneliu Vadim Tudor, founder of the Greater Romania Party, had openly propagated territorial revisionism and anti-Western sentiment. His discourse—marked by hostility toward the EU and NATO—served as an early prototype for later nationalist populism. Gheorghe concluded that while Orbán’s project represents a systemic populism of transformation, Romanian populism has been largely performative and reactive, invoking national identity primarily for electoral gain.

Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari addressed Dr. Kenes’s question by reflecting on how the German concept of Heimat (homeland) functions as both a unifying and divisive symbol within populist discourse. He explained that while many Germans and migrants alike use Heimat positively—to express emotional attachment, memory, and the sense of home—right-wing populist movements have instrumentalized the term to evoke fear of change and resistance to cultural diversity.

Groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden, he noted, have repurposed Heimat as a slogan to defend a mythologized “German way of life” against perceived external threats, especially immigration. Thus, Heimat has become a site of symbolic conflict—a word that simultaneously embodies hope for belonging and anxiety about identity loss.

Speaking from his own perspective as an Iranian member of the diaspora, Dr. Doulatyari added that his personal engagement with German culture and philosophy has given him an empathetic understanding of Heimat as an inclusive emotional category. Yet he acknowledged that for many migrants, the term remains fraught with exclusionary overtones. Some prefer the more neutral Land (“country”) to avoid the nationalist implications of Heimat.

Dr. Doulatyari’s reflections illuminated how linguistic symbols like Heimat mediate the tension between inclusion and exclusion—revealing how populism transforms shared cultural words into battlegrounds of identity politics.

Conclusion

Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series illuminated the intricate mechanisms through which populism reshapes democratic imaginaries by redefining “the people.” Across the presentations and subsequent discussions, a unifying insight emerged: populism operates simultaneously as an affective narrative, an ideological strategy, and a performative act that fuses moral claims with political exclusion. Whether expressed through fiscal austerity, linguistic symbolism, or historical reimagining, the populist invocation of “the people” serves as both a promise of inclusion and a technique of control.

Dr. Amir Ali’s examination of austerity populism revealed how economic restraint is moralized as civic virtue, transforming the rhetoric of empowerment into a politics of dispossession. Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari’s linguistic inquiry demonstrated that words such as Volk and Leute carry profound emotional weight, shaping democratic belonging through competing grammars of unity and diversity. Andrei Gheorghe’s comparative study of Hungary and Romania traced how post-communist populisms mobilize collective memory and moral dualism to construct homogenous national communities opposed to liberal pluralism. Together, these analyses highlighted populism’s ability to blend economic anxiety, cultural nostalgia, and emotional resonance into a coherent—yet exclusionary—vision of the social order.

The discussants, Hannah Geddes and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, underscored the interdisciplinary strength of the session, situating its findings within broader debates about representation, identity, and democratic resilience. Their reflections drew attention to the elasticity of populism as both discourse and practice—a phenomenon that adapts fluidly across linguistic, economic, and political contexts while sustaining its central dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.”

Ultimately, the workshop underscored that populism’s greatest challenge to democracy lies not in its opposition to elites alone but in its capacity to redefine the meaning of democracy itself. By appropriating the language of popular sovereignty, populist actors transform inclusion into hierarchy and belonging into boundary, reminding scholars that the defense of democracy requires continuous vigilance over the words, emotions, and memories through which “the people” are imagined.

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

UNTOLD Europe Project Workshop: The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies

On 21 October 2025, the ECPS, in partnership with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, held the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. Titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” the event gathered scholars, journalists, and activists to examine how historical hierarchies continue to shape European migration discourses and governance. Panels led by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Prof. Ilhan Kaya, and Dr. Reda Majahar, among others, explored the politics of representation, power asymmetries in knowledge production, and decolonial approaches to migration policy. The workshop concluded with group discussions emphasizing the need to decolonize migration narratives, amplify migrant voices, and promote inclusive, rights-based policy frameworks across Europe.

Program of the Workshop

Participants engage in a panel discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On 21 October 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. The event, titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” brought together scholars, journalists, civil society representatives, and activists to critically examine how historical hierarchies and colonial frameworks continue to influence migration discourses and policy across Europe.

The workshop opened with welcoming remarks from the project partners, followed by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Project Coordinator at Oxfam Intermón, who presented the goals and structure of the UNTOLD Europe Project. She highlighted the project’s mission to uncover the enduring impact of colonial histories on European migration governance and to promote inclusive, rights-based narratives.

The introductory panel“Who Tells the Story? Power, Perspective, and the Politics of Migration,” explored the intersection of history, power, and representation in shaping migration narratives. Professor Ilhan Kaya (Ghent University) discussed the importance of reclaiming the “right to tell” within European contexts, emphasizing memory and agency in migration storytelling. Journalist Nawab Khan reflected on the shortcomings of EU migration policy in his talk, “Why the EU Migration Policy Has Failed Till Now?”, Doctoral Researcher Marwa Neji (Ghent University) examined power asymmetries in knowledge production, while Ahsen Ayhan (Solidarity With Others) discussed the emotional and gendered dimensions of displacement in “Home We (Can’t) Carry: Migration, Gender and the Politics of Inclusion.”

The second session, “Migration Experiences – Voices and Perspectives,” foregrounded personal testimonies and lived experiences. Professor Ilias Ciloglu shared “My Personal Journey of Building a New Life in Belgium from the Ground Up,” while Becky Slack (Your Agenda) addressed the media’s role in framing migration and gender. Dr Reda Majahar (University of Antwerpen) critically examined “Global North–South Hierarchies in Refugee Research under European Funding Regimes.” Katerina Kočkovska Šetinc (Peace Institute Slovenia) and Mojca Harmandić (Pandora’s Path Institute) reflected on integration and systemic barriers in their speech “In Between Journeys and Belonging: Intersections of Migration, Integration, Support, and Systemic Barriers in Slovenia.”

After lunch, participants turned to comparative perspectives in the Country Case Studies session. Presentations explored how colonial logics inform contemporary migration frameworks: Andriana Cosciug (Romania), César Santamaría Galán (Spain), Fouzia Assouli (Morocco), and Anissa Thabet (Tunisia) each presented on their respective contexts.

 

The final part of the workshop was dedicated to interactive case study discussions. Participants, divided into small groups, analyzed country-specific materials and collaboratively developed alternative framings for migration narratives. They identified recurring colonial logics in European migration management, discussed missing voices, and drafted practical recommendations for EU policymakers.

Participants engage in interactive group discussions during the final session of the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.

The workshop concluded with group presentations and a lively plenary discussion. Participants emphasized the need to decolonize policy discourses, amplify migrant and gendered perspectives, and foster communication strategies rooted in equality and human rights.

ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole contributes to the final plenary discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.

The UNTOLD Europe Workshop offered a rich space for cross-sectoral dialogue, combining critical academic insights with creative and policy-oriented reflection. As part of the broader UNTOLD Europe Project, the event marked an important step toward reimagining how Europe narrates migration—beyond colonial legacies and toward inclusive, humane, and forward-looking policy frameworks.

Group photo of participants at the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Cover

International Conference — Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics

On October 23, 2025, Deakin University hosted the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics” at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, in collaboration with the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). The event convened leading scholars from across the globe to examine how unelected state institutions—from militaries to judiciaries—adopt populist idioms to claim legitimacy “in the name of the people.” Opening the conference, Professor Simon Tormey reflected on the indeterminacy of populism as both ideology and style, while Dr. Nicholas Morieson’s keynote advanced a framework distinguishing between populism’s exogenous capture and endogenous discourse. Through three thematic panels, participants explored how bureaucratic, military, and judicial populisms reshape governance, authority, and democratic accountability worldwide.

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Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 23, 2025, scholars, researchers, and practitioners from around the world convened both in person at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, and online via Zoom for the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics.” Jointly organized by Deakin University, the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS (Politics & International Studies), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), the event brought together comparative, theoretical, and empirical perspectives to interrogate the rise of populism within unelected state institutions.

The conference opened with welcoming remarks from Professor Simon Tormey, who acknowledged the Wurundjeri people as the traditional custodians of the land and extended respect to Elders past, present, and emerging. In his opening speech, Professor Tormey reflected on the evolving state of populism research from a political theorist’s perspective, highlighting the fluidity and indeterminacy of the term. He traced conceptual approaches—from Cas Mudde’s ideological framing to Margaret Canovan’s notion of “the people” and Ernesto Laclau’s discourse-based theory—while raising critical questions about the nature of populism in bureaucratic and technocratic settings. Professor Tormey proposed that populism, far from a fixed ideology, operates as a style or mode of political communication that traverses both elected and unelected institutions.

Setting the intellectual tone for the day, Professor Tormey argued that the enduring puzzle in populism studies lies in its conceptual elasticity—its ability to appear simultaneously as a critique of power and a mode of authoritarian legitimation. He invited participants to consider whether bureaucracies and technocracies, often viewed as non-populist domains, might themselves harbor populist impulses—mobilizing claims to “the people” to defend authority, moral order, or institutional sovereignty.

Following the opening address, Dr. Nicholas Morieson delivered the keynote speech, presenting the conference’s concept paper on bureaucratic populism. His framework identified two faces of the phenomenon: exogenous capture, where populist leaders co-opt bureaucratic, judicial, or military institutions to serve partisan ends; and endogenous discourse, where institutions themselves adopt populist rhetoric, positioning their interventions as expressions of popular will against corrupt elites. Dr. Morieson demonstrated how this dual dynamic blurs the boundary between populism and guardianism, enabling unelected institutions to assert custodial power in the name of “the people.”

Through comparative analysis of cases in Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan, Dr. Morieson illustrated how militaries and judiciaries invoke democratic legitimacy while constraining popular sovereignty. His address underscored the need for a discourse-centered approach to detect when bureaucratic language shifts from technocratic neutrality to populist moralization—an analytical challenge of growing global relevance.

With panels devoted to bureaucratic, military, and judicial populism, the conference offered a vital forum for exploring how populist logics travel across state institutions and reshape democratic governance. As Professor Tormey aptly noted, the day’s discussions would not only deepen understanding of populism’s multiple faces but also probe one of the most pressing questions of our time: how the very institutions meant to safeguard democracy may increasingly speak—and act—in the name of the people.

 

Panel 1 – Bureaucratic Populism and its Implications

Paper 1: No Public Service, No Democracy. Why Populist Administrations are Dismantling the Professional Public Service,” by Mark Duckworth (Co-Director of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies; a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).

Paper 2: A Different Populism: Anglophone, New World, Frontier,” by Professor Stephen Alomes (Adjunct Associate Professor at RMIT University).

Paper 3: “Compliance and Capture: Bureaucratic Transformation under Populism in India and Hungary,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University). 

Paper 4: “Survival, Sovereignty and Destiny: Centralized Power in Putin’s Russia Through Bureaucratic Populism,” by Lachlan Dowling (Student at Deakin University).

Paper 5: “Bureaucratic Populism and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: A Study of Institutional Populism and Hybrid Governance,” by Kashif Hussain (PhD candidate in Peace and Development Studies from the University of New England).

 

Panel 2 – Military Populism in Comparative Perspective

Paper 1: “The Making of a People’s General: Military Populism and the Discursive Legacy of Soedirman in Indonesia,” by Hasnan Bachtiar (PhD candidate at Deakin University), Azhar Syahida (A Researcher at the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia) Ahalla Tsauro (PhD student at Université Laval, Canada).

Paper 2: “Military Populism in Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand: An Empirical Analysis,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University).

Paper 3: “The Re-Emergence of Military-Populist Governance in Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto,” by Wasisto Raharjo Jati (A Researcher at the Center for Politics within Indonesia’s BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency) in Jakarta). 

Paper 4: “Militarized Populism and the Language of Conflict: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of the India–Pakistan May 2025 Standoff,” by Dr. Waqasia Naeem (Associate Professor in School of English at Minhaj University Lahore). 

Paper 5: “Hybrid Regimes and Populist Leaders: A Case Study of Imran Khan’s Trajectory from Parliament to Prison,” by Faiza Idrees (Independent Researcher from Pakistan) & Muhammad Rizwan (PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University). 

 

Panel 3 – Judicial Populism and Competing Narratives of Authority

Paper 1: “How can courts be populist? by Mátyás Bencze (Former Judge and a Professor of Law at the Universities of Szeged and Győr, Hungary).

Paper 2: “Judging the State of Exception: The Judiciary in the Israeli Populist Project,” by Dr. Elliot Dolan-Evans(Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University). 

Paper 3: “Judicial Populism in Pakistan: Discourse and Authority in the Panama Papers Judgments,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University) & Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations, and Chair of Islamic Studies at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University). 

Paper 4: “Populism and the Noxious Relationship Between Political and Intelligence Elites in Post-Communist Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania,” by Bohuslav Pernica (Lieutenant colonel (ret.), co-editor of the White Paper on Defence, Czechia) & Emilia Șercan (Assistant Professor in the Journalism Department at the University of Bucharest). 

Paper 5: “Competing Populisms in Pakistan: Politicians’ Anti-Military Narratives and Bureaucratic Counter-Narratives,” by Zaffar Manzoor (MPhil Scholar at the Department of English Linguistics and Literature, Riphah International University Islamabad, Pakistan) & Dr. Muhammad Shaban Rafi (Professor of English at Riphah International University Lahore, Pakistan).

 

Closing Session

Photo: Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging”

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00116

 


On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 16, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the fourth session of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This series (September 2025 – April 2026) provides a structured forum for interdisciplinary dialogue on the contemporary challenges of democratic backsliding, populism, and the future of liberal democracy across different regions.

The fourth session, titled “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging,” focused on how political actors construct and mobilize the idea of “the people” to reshape democratic imaginaries, often in ways that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion. Against a backdrop in which one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared between 2012 and 2024, the session explored the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument used to legitimize exclusionary, often authoritarian projects. The event brought together a diverse group of scholars and practitioners from India, Nigeria, Israel, Morocco, Switzerland, and beyond, reflecting the comparative and interdisciplinary scope of the series.

The session was chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne). Following a welcome by Reka Koletzer on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mazzoleni opened with a conceptual framing that situated the panel within broader debates on populism and democratic legitimacy. He emphasized that there is “no populism without the people,” tracing the notion’s roots to ancient Greece and its evolution as a key source of political legitimation. 

Historically, he noted, when “the people” were not central, politics drew on divine authority. Today, however, democratic politics is increasingly intertwined with religion and sacralized notions of a homogeneous people—developments that pose serious challenges to the rule of law and democratic sustainability. Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted how populist leaders exploit these dynamics to consolidate power and reshape belonging, stressing the importance of contextual, cross-regional reflection—linking contributions from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to global debates.

Three scholarly presentations followed, each addressing the theme from a distinct geographical and theoretical perspective: Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu (Abia State University, Nigeria) presented “We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” arguing for decentralization and participatory governance as democratic correctives to elite-dominated political systems. Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani, India) delivered “The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” offering a psychoanalytic and structuralist interpretation of the rise of Hindu nationalist populism. Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel) presented “We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” examining how populist movements appropriate the universalist language of liberal democracy to undermine its institutions from within.

The presentations were followed by discussant feedback from Associate Professor Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (SMBA University, Morocco; Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholar, Arizona State University) and Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). Their interventions offered comparative perspectives, theoretical reflections, and methodological suggestions, deepening the debate and encouraging the presenters to refine their arguments. A Q&A session allowed for interactive exchanges between the speakers and participants, further probing the conceptual, empirical, and normative implications of the presentations. Finally, Prof. Mazzoleni provided a general assessment, synthesizing the key insights of the session.

This report documents the presentations, discussants’ feedback, Q&A exchanges, and concluding reflections, offering a comprehensive overview of a rich and interdisciplinary scholarly discussion on how “the people” is performed, politicized, and contested in contemporary democratic politics.

Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu: The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

In his presentation titled “The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu explored the philosophical and structural underpinnings of contemporary populism, focusing particularly on the Indian case. His talk was anchored around two central questions: (1) how to understand the rise of populism in India and its philosophical justification, and (2) what kind of alternative conception of “the people” can offer a revolutionary counterpoint to right-wing populism. Through this dual lens, Dr. Kundu aimed to bridge political theory—especially psychoanalytic and structuralist perspectives—with empirical developments in Indian democratic politics.

Dr. Kundu began by noting that, historically, critiques of democracy tended to originate from outside liberal democratic systems—for example, from traditional societies or cultural contexts resistant to liberal political models. However, the current wave of populism represents a distinctive internal critique of liberal democracy, emerging from within its own institutional and ideological frameworks. This shift marks populism as a transformative force, challenging not external impositions but the internal logic and practices of liberal democratic governance.

Focusing on India, Dr. Kundu traced the philosophical roots of populism’s rise to its opposition to Enlightenment-derived ideas of consciousness, rationality, and elite liberal politics. Liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have historically relied on “conscious” language and scientific outlooks to address complex social problems. In the Indian context, this was vividly visible in the 1970s and 1980s when many liberal elites—especially from prestigious institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University, St. Stephen’s College, Jadavpur University, and Presidency College—engaged in social outreach projects in rural areas. Their efforts, however, often failed because they approached communities with pre-formulated “scientific” solutions rather than through genuine dialogue. This failure, according to Dr. Kundu, reflected a broader disconnect between liberal political discourse and the emotional, affective, and unconscious dimensions of popular life.

Similarly, in the period leading up to 2014, the language and policies of India’s dominant liberal-progressive forces, notably the Congress Party, were insufficient to prevent the rise of right-wing populism. Dr. Kundu emphasized that Hindu nationalist forces were able to mobilize repressed emotional energies linked to long-standing issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the abrogation of Article 370 concerning Kashmir, and debates over the Uniform Civil Code. These issues, though latent in the public consciousness, had been inadequately addressed by previous governments. Right-wing populists successfully activated these emotional reservoirs, enabling their rapid rise to power in 2014.

To make sense of this phenomenon, Dr. Kundu proposed a theoretical hypothesis grounded in Althusserian psychoanalysis. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, particularly the concepts of the unconscious elaborated by Freud (id, ego, and superego), he argued that populist leaders can be understood as symptomatic expressions of the id—the primal, instinctual component of the human psyche. Liberal and Marxist political traditions have largely ignored or repressed the role of unconscious elements such as desire, fantasy, sexuality, and instinct in the public domain. Populism, by contrast, taps into these unconscious forces, channeling them into political mobilization.

For Dr. Kundu, this psychoanalytic perspective allows for a more structural understanding of emotion in politics. Rather than treating emotions as irrational residues to be overcome through reason, he urged scholars to analyze how unconscious drives are structured and mobilized within political contexts. Authoritarian populism, in this view, thrives where liberalism fails to address or incorporate these unconscious dimensions into its political discourse.

Dr. Kundu also linked the rise of populism to structural inequalities in both economic and political domains. Liberalism’s inability to offer credible redistributive solutions has created fertile ground for right-wing mobilizations. He noted that discussions of redistribution in contemporary democracies have become narrowly focused on land reform, neglecting broader possibilities for income and resource redistribution suited to modern contexts. A renewed focus on redistribution, he suggested, is essential to constructing a progressive alternative to populism.

The second major component of Dr. Kundu’s presentation addressed the question of alternatives: what kind of “people” could function as a revolutionary subject capable of countering right-wing populism? Here he engaged with debates among left theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who emphasized the political construction of “the people” as a central task of progressive politics. Dr. Kundu argued that in India—and indeed in many democracies—progressive forces have struggled to construct such a people. Their presence is often vibrant in student politics, gender activism, and issue-based mobilizations, but they have been unable to translate these energies into sustained electoral strength.

Dr. Kundu illustrated this point by referencing the case of Bernie Sanders in the United States. Sanders’ radical redistributive platform failed to secure the Democratic Party nomination twice, revealing a structural incompatibility between progressive redistribution and prevailing democratic politics. A similar gap exists in India, where progressive movements have not succeeded in transforming localized activism into a broad-based political subject capable of challenging Hindu nationalist hegemony.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Kundu identified signs of potential realignment in the 2024 Indian general election. He presented data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showing that the Congress Party increased its share of Dalit and Adivasi votes in 2024, reversing some of the gains made by the BJP in 2014 and 2019. Specifically, the BJP won 29 Scheduled Caste-reserved seats in 2024, down from 46 in 2019, while the Congress rose from 6 to 20 seats in the same category. The Congress also increased its national vote share from 16.7% in 2019 to 20.8% in 2024. Dr. Kundu interpreted these shifts as evidence that appeals to redistribution and social justice can resonate with marginalized groups, forming the basis for a counter-populist political alliance.

In his concluding reflections, Dr. Kundu reiterated that challenging authoritarian populism requires constructing alliances among marginalized and dispossessed groups—economically, culturally, and politically. The brief resurgence of center-left discourse in 2024 offers some grounds for cautious optimism. However, he emphasized that a durable alternative must address both structural inequalities and the unconscious dimensions of political subjectivity. Authoritarian populism has reshaped the notion of the political subject beyond universal, rationalist language; understanding and engaging with unconscious drives may be essential to forging new forms of democratic politics.

Overall, Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation offered a theoretically rich and contextually grounded analysis of populism’s rise in India. By integrating psychoanalytic theory, structural political economy, and empirical electoral data, he illuminated both the sources of right-wing populism’s appeal and the formidable challenges facing progressive alternatives.


Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu: ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches

Street life and transportation in bustling, tropical Lagos, Nigeria. Photo: Dreamstime.

Due to unforeseen internet connectivity problems during the virtual panel, Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu’s presentation could not be delivered live. Instead, this report provides a structured summary of his draft article titled “We, the People: Rethinking Governance through Bottom-Up Approaches,” capturing its key arguments, theoretical foundations, and policy recommendations.

The Crisis of Centralized Governance

Dr. Agu begins by interrogating the disjuncture between the ideals and practice of democracy. While democracy is often celebrated as governance “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in practice, many democratic systems concentrate power at the center. This over-centralization alienates citizens from meaningful decision-making, erodes trust in institutions, and fuels social unrest.

Nigeria, his primary case study, exemplifies this paradox. After more than two decades of democratic rule, the country continues to struggle with corruption, inequality, and exclusionary governance structures. Mass movements such as #EndSARS, #OccupyNigeria, and #EndHardship reflect widespread frustration with a political system that privileges elite interests while sidelining the grassroots. These protests, Dr. Agu argues, are not isolated events but symptoms of a deeper crisis of representation.

To address this gap between citizens and the state, Dr. Agu proposes a shift toward bottom-up governance—an approach that places citizens and communities at the center of governance processes. By devolving decision-making authority, enhancing civic education, promoting community-based development, embracing digital democracy, and enacting inclusive legislative reforms, bottom-up governance can strengthen accountability, improve development outcomes, and restore democratic legitimacy.

Theoretical Framework: Participation–Accountability–Development Nexus

Dr. Agu anchors his analysis in a combination of Participatory Governance Theory and Sustainable Development Theory, integrating insights from deliberative democracy and Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach. i) Participatory Governance Theory emphasizes that democracy requires more than periodic elections. Active citizen engagement in decision-making enhances legitimacy, trust, and policy effectiveness. Participation is not merely instrumental; it is constitutive of democracy itself, transforming citizens from passive recipients into co-producers of governance. ii) Sustainable Development Theory stresses that development is most durable when it is inclusive and participatory. Decisions that emerge from the grassroots better reflect local needs and ensure long-term stewardship of resources.

From this synthesis, Dr. Agu develops the Participation–Accountability–Development (PAD) Nexus, which posits that: Decentralization + Civic Engagement → Increased Participation → Strengthened Accountability → Improved Governance Outcomes → Sustainable Development.

This model links governance reforms directly to human flourishing, suggesting that bottom-up governance expands people’s capabilities to lead lives they value.

Bottom-Up Governance: Concept and Rationale

Dr. Agu defines bottom-up governance as a participatory system of administration in which power and authority originate from the grassroots rather than being imposed from above. In this model, citizens directly influence policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Unlike the top-down model, which treats citizens as passive recipients of elite decisions, bottom-up governance positions them as active co-creators of development outcomes.

This approach reclaims the moral foundation of democracy by restoring to citizens both agency and authorship. It turns governance from “government for the people” into “government with the people,” fostering trust, curbing corruption, and ensuring that policies reflect real needs.

In the Nigerian context, persistent problems such as declining voter turnout, the rise of separatist agitations (e.g., IPOB, Niger Delta movements), and youth-led mobilizations highlight the urgent need for participatory governance rooted in local realities.

Linking Participatory Governance to Sustainable Development

Empirical evidence, Dr. Agu notes, shows a direct relationship between grassroots participation and improved governance outcomes. Nigeria’s Community Social Development Project (CSDP) provides a compelling example. Under this initiative, communities identify their priorities, plan projects, and oversee their implementation. The result has been more inclusive, transparent, and effective local development.

Globally, similar successes abound:

  • Brazil’s participatory budgeting has improved resource allocation and citizen trust.
  • Rwanda’s Vision 2020 leveraged community participation (via Umuganda and Imihigo) to drive development.
  • Uganda’s Local Government Act (1997) empowered rural councils to deliver essential services more efficiently.

These cases demonstrate that bottom-up governance enhances transparency, curbs corruption, and produces more sustainable development outcomes than centralized models.

Nigeria’s Governance Challenges and Social Movements

Dr. Agu situates Nigeria’s governance crisis within this framework. Despite democratic institutions, the country has failed to translate formal democracy into inclusive development. Voter turnout has plummeted from over 69% in 2003 to just 26.7% in 2023, reflecting widespread disillusionment with political elites.

Social movements have increasingly filled this participatory vacuum. #OccupyNigeria (2012) emerged in response to fuel subsidy removal; #EndSARS (2020) evolved from police brutality protests to broader demands for accountability; more recent protests highlight worsening economic hardship. Alongside these movements, separatist agitations and insurgencies reflect deep grievances over political exclusion and resource distribution.

For Dr. Agu, these developments underscore a structural failure of top-down governance. Without meaningful channels for citizen engagement, protests and unrest become the primary means of political expression.

Strategies for Implementing Bottom-Up Governance

Dr. Agu identifies five interlinked strategies to institutionalize participatory governance in Nigeria:

Decentralization: Strengthen local governance through constitutional reforms that devolve fiscal, administrative, and political powers to local authorities. Empower local governments with independent revenue sources and decision-making authority.

Civic Education: Integrate civic learning into educational curricula to cultivate active citizenship. Promote civil society–led public debates, town halls, and participatory forums to bridge citizen–state gaps.

Community-Based Development (CBD): Institutionalize CDD frameworks that prioritize local ownership, inclusivity, and accountability. Target marginalized groups (youth, women, people with disabilities) to ensure equitable participation.

Digital Democracy: Leverage technology for transparency and citizen engagement through participatory budgeting platforms, budget tracking tools, and open data initiatives. Invest in digital inclusion to ensure rural populations are not excluded.

Legislative Reforms: Enact laws mandating community representation in decision-making bodies. Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and consider electoral reforms (e.g., proportional representation) to enhance inclusivity.

Reclaiming Democracy from Below

Dr. Agu concludes that achieving inclusive democracy and sustainable development in Nigeria requires a fundamental shift from elite-centered, top-down governance toward citizen-centered, bottom-up approaches.

Grassroots participation, underpinned by decentralization, civic education, community engagement, and digital innovation, can bridge the widening gap between state and society. This shift is not merely a policy alternative but a democratic imperative. By empowering citizens as co-authors of governance, Nigeria can foster political stability, social cohesion, and sustainable growth. Ultimately, as Dr. Agu emphasizes, the future of democracy depends on restoring the agency of “We, the People” and making governance a shared enterprise.

 

Dr. Mouli Bentman & Dr. Michael Dahan: ‘We, the People’: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv, Israel on July 18, 2023, against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup as a bill to erase judicial ‘reasonableness clause’ is expected to pass despite 27,676 reservations. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan delivered a jointly structured and intellectually rich presentation that explored how populist movements have appropriated the core language of democracy—particularly the notion of “the people”—to undermine liberal democratic institutions from within. Their central claim was both clear and unsettling: the rise of right-wing populism is not simply a matter of rhetorical manipulation but stems from deep-seated contradictions within liberal democracy itself. By tracing the intellectual genealogy of concepts like legitimacy and universality, and examining contemporary political developments in Israel, the speakers demonstrated how populists have weaponized democratic language to hollow out liberal democracy.

Dr. Bentman opened the presentation by focusing on the paradox at the heart of modern democracy. The phrase “We the People,” once celebrated as the most universal and inclusive expression of collective self-rule, has been turned upside down by populists. Rather than binding citizens across differences, it is now mobilized to divide society between an “authentic” people and its perceived enemies: corrupt elites, minorities, ideological adversaries, and liberal institutions. This shift, he argued, is not merely tactical—it reflects unresolved tensions within the liberal democratic project itself, particularly around questions of legitimacy, universality, and belonging.

To illustrate these tensions, Dr. Bentman offered a concise intellectual history. In the 17th and 18th centuries, debates over political legitimacy revolved around the source of authority. Conservatives grounded legitimacy in divine will, tradition, and natural hierarchy. Liberals, by contrast, rooted legitimacy in the individual—his rights, autonomy, and consent. Thinkers like John Locke argued that governments exist to protect natural rights—life, liberty, and property—while Jean-Jacques Rousseau located legitimacy in la volonté générale, the collective self-rule of the people. Out of this intellectual revolution emerged the liberal democratic order, promising universal rights and collective self-government.

Yet, as Dr. Bentman reminded the audience, critical thinkers from Karl Marx to Simone de Beauvoir exposed the limits of this liberal promise. Marx demonstrated how formal liberty meant little for the working class within a society structured by property and capital. Critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno highlighted the dominance of instrumental reason. Postcolonial and feminist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Beauvoir revealed how liberalism often coexisted with colonialism, patriarchy, and structural violence. By the mid-20th century, figures like Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Judith Butler deepened the critique, showing how power was embedded not only in the state or capital but in knowledge systems, discourses, and identities themselves.

According to Dr. Bentman, these critiques were not intended to destroy liberal democracy but to deepen it—to expose hidden exclusions and move toward a more just and pluralistic order. However, they inadvertently opened a new political space. If universality had always been partial and exclusionary, could it ever truly include everyone? This unresolved question created an opening for the populist right. Traditionally defenders of hierarchy, the populist right seized upon liberalism’s self-critique, not to expand democracy but to hollow it out. By appropriating the language of postcolonialism, identity politics, and suspicion of elites, they reframed democratic institutions as tools of domination and presented themselves as the authentic voice of “the people.”

Dr. Bentman gave the example of American right-wing activist Charlie Kirk, who appropriated the language of decolonization to depict Christian Americans as the “colonized,” oppressed by secular liberal elites. Similarly, concepts like diversity are inverted to portray universities as discriminatory against conservatives, and the white middle class is recast as a marginalized group. This rhetorical reversal is emblematic of a broader global trend in which the tools of democratic critique are redeployed to legitimize exclusionary majoritarianism.

Dr. Michael Dahan then shifted the focus to Israel as a case study illustrating these dynamics with striking clarity. Ten years ago, Dr. Dahan noted, Israeli politics lacked clear populist parties. This has changed dramatically, particularly over the past two years. Today, two parties embody populist politics: Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength) Party, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, which espouses Jewish supremacism. Over two decades, the Israeli right has reframed liberal universalism as a mask for elite domination, elevating instead a narrow ethno-national identity of “the Jewish people” as the sole legitimate sovereign. Palestinians, Arab citizens, left-wing Israelis, and anyone not fully aligned with this project are cast outside the political community.

The events of October 7, 2023—when the state catastrophically failed to protect its citizens—might have been expected to trigger a profound legitimacy crisis. State security apparatuses, emergency services, and welfare systems all collapsed. Civil society—volunteers, NGOs, local authorities—filled the void, rescuing survivors and supporting displaced communities. Rather than acknowledging this, the government turned against these actors, accusing them of betrayal or complicity. Dr. Dahan interpreted this as a deliberate strategy: by delegitimizing alternative sources of solidarity, the state seeks to monopolize the definition of “the people.” This strategy demonstrates how populism not only survives institutional failure but actively feeds on it, having already replaced a universal civic “we” with an exclusionary ethno-national fiction.

Dr. Dahan then tied these developments to broader theoretical trends. Liberalism’s hold on universality has weakened. Critical theories that once sought to liberate have been hijacked. Foucault’s critique of power is misused to undermine expertise; Butler’s performativity is invoked to question democratic norms; postcolonial critiques justify nationalist withdrawal. Pluralism devolves into fragmentation, and fragmentation is weaponized to justify majoritarianism. Democracy is redefined not as a system of rights, deliberation, and checks, but as the unchecked rule of a self-defined majority.

In concluding, Dr. Bentman and Dr. Dahan argued that reclaiming universality is essential to countering these trends. Drawing on thinkers like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt, they underscored that universality is not sameness, but the institutionalization of diversity under shared rules of fairness. “We the people” must mean all of us—not because we are identical, but because we commit to living together under a shared civic framework. Achieving this requires three strategies: (1) building deliberative infrastructures—citizen assemblies and participatory forums—to integrate diverse voices; (2) protecting civil society organizations from delegitimization; and (3) reinforcing constitutional and judicial safeguards to prevent majoritarian overreach.

Their presentation offered a powerful synthesis of political theory and contemporary politics, revealing how liberal democracy’s own internal critiques have become tools for its destabilization—and suggesting pathways to reclaim democratic universality in an era of resurgent populism.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali

Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

In his role as discussant, Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali offered an incisive and comprehensive reflection on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His intervention combined an overall thematic synthesis with targeted commentary on each presentation, situating the papers within broader scholarly debates on populism, democracy, and political participation.

Dr. El Bakkali highlighted that, taken together, the papers moved beyond superficial analyses of populist rhetoric to probe the philosophical, institutional, and psychological foundations that make the performance of “the people” both possible and potent. He noted a common thread: the mobilization of “the people” not as a pre-given democratic sovereign, but as a politically constructed entity, often instrumentalized by leaders who claim to act in the name of democracy while redefining its substance.

Turning to individual presentations, Dr. El Bakkali commended Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s examination of Hindu nationalism as a form of authoritarian populism in India. He observed that Dr. Kundu’s analysis effectively linked the rise of Hindutva populism to disillusionment with liberal democratic institutions, emphasizing the role of emotions and psychological factors in shaping populist subjectivities. Dr. Kundu’s argument that Hindutva is rooted less in formal political strategy than in emotional mobilization and cultural identity was, in Dr. El Bakkali’s view, compelling. However, he suggested several ways to sharpen the analysis:  

First, the paper could focus more explicitly on emotion as a political technology—examining how populist leaders strategically use fear, pride, and resentment to define belonging and mobilize support. Second, incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse or electoral mobilization, would ground the theoretical reflections more robustly. Third, linking the Indian case to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism could situate it within broader comparative frameworks, rather than treating it as a unique exception. 

Despite these suggestions, Dr. El Bakkali described the presentation as “very interesting and rich,” highlighting its contribution to understanding the emotional and psychological underpinnings of contemporary populism.

Dr. El Bakkali then turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s presentation, which he found both timely and significant, especially for the Global South. Dr. Agu’s argument centered on how top-down governance in Nigeria has produced alienation, corruption, and inequality, and how decentralization, civic education, community-based development, and digital democracy can offer participatory alternatives. While praising the clarity and relevance of the paper, Dr. El Bakkali cautioned against romanticizing grassroots governance as a moral corrective to elite domination. He noted that local participation can itself be entangled with control and clientelism, as local elites may capture power, reproduce inequalities, or create new patronage networks. He suggested that the paper address the risks of elite capture and local clientelism, drawing on evidence from Nigerian municipal politics to strengthen its critique. 

He also posed two substantive questions: How can one distinguish between participatory democracy and populist mobilization, given that both claim to speak for “the people”? Why were Brazil and Uganda chosen as comparative cases, and how do their experiences differ from those of other Global South contexts?

Finally, Dr. El Bakkali discussed the paper by Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which he found theoretically rich and thought-provoking. He agreed with their argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects a deep crisis within liberal democracy, where inclusive universalist ideals have been weaponized to draw exclusionary boundaries between “true” citizens and outsiders. He noted that their paper reveals how populist discourse cannibalizes the Enlightenment’s universalist vocabulary, converting inclusion into exclusion through subtle linguistic strategies. He suggested that this point could be elaborated further. Additionally, he encouraged the authors to integrate non-Western perspectives to avoid reproducing Eurocentric narratives and to expand their discussion on the role of civic education and institutions in reconstructing inclusive forms of belonging beyond ideological polarization.

He concluded with two broad, thought-provoking questions: How can we reclaim the notion of “the people” without reproducing the exclusionary binaries on which populism thrives? Has the concept of “the people” outlived its democratic usefulness?

In conclusion, Dr. El Bakkali praised all three presenters for their illuminating and multifaceted contributions, noting that their work enriched the scholarly conversation on populism, belonging, and democratic governance. His feedback was both analytical and constructive, offering theoretical reflections, methodological suggestions, and comparative perspectives to deepen and sharpen each paper’s contribution.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Azize Sargın

Discussant Dr. Azize Sargın delivered thoughtful and analytically sharp feedback on the three presentations, combining conceptual engagement with practical questions that encouraged further development of each paper. She began by expressing her gratitude to the panel organizers and commended all presenters, highlighting in particular the efforts of the African presenter for ensuring that his research was represented despite technical difficulties. She emphasized that all scholars should have equal opportunities to present their work, framing this as a broader academic responsibility to support inclusive scholarly participation.

Dr. Sargın first turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s paper, acknowledging that although the presentation itself could not be delivered due to technical issues, the abstract offered a compelling entry point for discussion. She found the argument for bottom-up governance—emphasizing decentralization, civic education, and digital democracy—particularly persuasive.

However, she raised several important conceptual and practical questions for the author to consider in further developing the paper. First, she asked for a clearer definition of “bottom-up governance”: whether it refers primarily to institutional decentralization, or whether it encompasses a broader social process of civic empowerment. This conceptual clarification, she argued, is crucial for understanding how such governance might function in practice.

Second, she commended Agu’s linkage between participatory governance and sustainable development, calling it a “powerful claim” that bottom-up governance can foster inclusivity, stability, and growth. However, she encouraged the author to demonstrate more concretely how these dynamics would work in practice, ideally through specific mechanisms, policy examples, or empirical evidence drawn from Nigeria or other comparative cases.

Third, she suggested that the author consider the challenges to implementing bottom-up governance in Nigeria, asking whether these are primarily political, structural, or related to civic capacity. By addressing these challenges, the paper could offer a more nuanced and grounded account of how bottom-up approaches might be operationalized in real-world governance systems.

Turning to Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation, Dr. Sargın praised the paper for its ambition and depth, especially in examining the conceptual and emotional dimensions of authoritarian populism within India’s contemporary political landscape. She highlighted the paper’s strength in linking the rise of Hindu nationalism to both the failures of liberal democratic institutions and the psychological and emotional undercurrents of Indian society, situating the discussion within the broader global crisis of liberal democracy.

She then offered several constructive reflections. First, she encouraged the author to clarify how these complex theoretical ideas would be operationalized—both methodologically and empirically. She suggested that clearly articulating how the politics of emotion is examined in the Indian context would strengthen the analytical coherence of the paper. Second, she raised an important comparative question: whether Hindu nationalist populism should be understood as a variant of global populism or as a distinct phenomenon rooted in India’s post-colonial and religious context. Finally, she expressed curiosity about the alternatives to populism that the paper hinted at. She asked whether these alternatives in the Indian context might involve a revival of liberal institutions, a grassroots democratic project, or a more radical reimagining of politics. These questions, she noted, could deepen the paper’s contribution to debates on authoritarian populism and democratic renewal.

Dr. Sargın concluded with reflections on Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan’s paper, which she described as “very engaging and conceptually rich.” She highlighted the central argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects not mere rhetorical manipulation but a deeper crisis within liberal democracy itself. This framing, she argued, is significant because it positions populism as a symptom rather than a distortion, prompting critical reflection on liberalism’s internal tensions.

She raised two key questions for the authors. First, does the crisis lie within liberalism’s theory of inclusion itself, or in how that theory has been institutionalized and practiced? Second, she asked whether their analysis is grounded in specific empirical contexts—such as particular populist movements in Western democracies—or whether it is meant as a globally applicable conceptual reflection. These questions, she suggested, could help clarify the scope and applicability of their arguments.

Dr. Sargın concluded by thanking all presenters for their contributions, noting that each paper tackled different dimensions of the panel’s central theme with intellectual rigor and originality. Her feedback was structured, probing, and constructive, encouraging the presenters to strengthen conceptual clarity, operationalize their claims empirically, and engage with broader theoretical debates.

 

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu

Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu delivered a thoughtful and philosophically grounded response to the comments and suggestions raised by the discussants. His reply offered both clarifications on theoretical positioning and elaborations on how his analysis engages with the emotional and structural dimensions of authoritarian populism in India, as well as reflections on alternative democratic imaginaries.

Dr. Kundu began by thanking Dr. El Bakkali for his constructive suggestions, emphasizing that they aligned closely with aspects he had already sought to highlight in his presentation. In particular, he welcomed the suggestion to further develop the analysis of emotion as a political technology—that is, the ways in which political leaders deploy pride, belonging, and resentment to shape collective identities and mobilize political support. This, he noted, was already a central thread of his argument, and he plans to strengthen this dimension further. 

He also acknowledged the importance of incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse and electoral mobilization strategies, to ground the theoretical reflections. In addition, he agreed that linking the Indian case more explicitly to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism would situate his work within broader comparative discussions, enhancing its analytical reach.

Responding to Dr. Sargın’s question on the operationalization of his theoretical framework, Dr. Kundu provided an extended explanation of how his work positions emotion within political theory. He observed that modern political philosophy has historically privileged reason over emotion, a hierarchy that can be traced back to Enlightenment thought and its liberal humanist legacy. Both liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have been shaped by this rationalist orientation—liberalism through its focus on institutional reason, and Marxism through its claim to be a “scientific” critique of capitalism.

Dr. Kundu explained that his project seeks to theorize emotion not as the opposite of reason but as an integral dimension of political subjectivity and mobilization. Drawing on Althusser’s post-Marxist intervention, he highlighted how Althusser linked ideology to the unconscious, thus opening a conceptual space where desire, fantasy, and affect become central to understanding political dynamics. By situating ideology within the unconscious, Althusser challenges the dominance of rationalist frameworks and reveals how structures of feeling shape political identification.

For Dr. Kundu, this perspective is essential for understanding the rise of Hindutva nationalism in India after 2014. Hindu nationalist movements, he argued, have strategically mobilized affective sentiments tied to religious identity, historical narratives, and collective grievances. Issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Uniform Civil Code, and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir tapped into deep-seated emotional reservoirs and historical resentments. Progressive parties, including the Indian National Congress, largely failed to address or mobilize these sentiments substantively, allowing Hindu nationalist forces to harness and redirect these affective energies for electoral gain.

By bringing psychoanalytic and structural perspectives into the analysis, Dr. Kundu aims to provide a richer theoretical account of how populist movements shape political subjectivities and construct “the people” through emotional infrastructures, rather than merely through rational discourse or institutional politics.

Addressing Dr. Sargın’s question regarding alternative democratic imaginaries, Dr. Kundu clarified that his notion of an “alternative people” refers to social groups and communities marginalized by existing structural logics—political, cultural, and social. In the Indian context, this primarily includes lower-caste communities, whose experiences of marginalization parallel those of racial minorities in other societies. He argued that any democratic reimagining must begin with these dispossessed groups, whose historical exclusion provides the basis for a more inclusive conception of “the people.”

Central to this reimagining is the principle of redistribution. Dr. Kundu stressed that redistribution should not be understood narrowly as land reform but as encompassing the redistribution of income, resources, and welfare benefits. He pointed to the 2024 general elections in India, where the Congress Party and opposition forces effectively mobilized redistributive politics to gain support among marginalized communities. He argued that reviving redistribution as a central political principle is essential for countering the affective and cultural narratives mobilized by populist movements, thereby addressing both material inequalities and symbolic exclusions.

Dr. Kundu concluded by reaffirming his commitment to integrating the discussants’ feedback into his ongoing research. He intends to deepen the empirical base, clarify conceptual frameworks, and further elaborate the normative and strategic implications of his work. His response underscored the theoretical ambition of situating emotional dynamics at the center of political analysis, while also engaging with the practical stakes of democratic politics in contemporary India.

 

Presenters’ Response: Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan offered a thoughtful and layered response to the feedback raised by the discussants on their joint presentation examining the populist subversion of the universalist ideal encapsulated in the phrase “We the People.” Their response addressed theoretical, methodological, and contextual questions, while also extending the discussion to the role of technology and the current crises of liberalism.

Dr. Bentman began by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s observation that their paper relied primarily on European political theory, without engaging with non-European perspectives. He candidly acknowledged this as both a limitation and an opportunity. He noted that, as a scholar raised in a context that “pretends to be part of Europe while geographically located in Western Asia,” he had not developed expertise in non-European political philosophies. However, he agreed that integrating non-Western intellectual traditions could enrich the analysis, offering alternative conceptual vocabularies and historical experiences that may shed new light on populist transformations. He expressed genuine interest in pursuing this line of inquiry in future research, acknowledging the validity and importance of the comment.

Dr. Bentman then turned to the core theoretical question raised by both Dr. El Bakkali and Dr. Sargın: whether liberalism can be reconstituted to meet contemporary challenges, or whether it is in a terminal phase. Drawing a provocative historical analogy, he compared the current crisis of liberalism to the crisis of monarchy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Just as monarchies lost their legitimacy when they could no longer command the consent of their subjects, Dr. Bentman argued that liberalism today faces a legitimacy deficit. It struggles to convince citizens that its institutions and principles still offer a viable framework for collective life.

From his perspective, populism represents not an endpoint but a transitional phase, a political and ideological interregnum between the decline of liberalism as the hegemonic model and the emergence of whatever may replace it—whether a renewed form of liberalism or new authoritarian formations. He expressed doubts about whether liberalism can fully recover but left open the possibility of a “Liberalism 2.0,” contingent on liberal thought and institutions recognizing their limitations, reopening themselves to pluralism, and reclaiming political strength without ceding ground to populist forces.

Dr. Bentman pointed to contemporary political dynamics in Europe as illustrative. For example, in France, the collapse of centrist parties has led to unstable coalitions between radical right and left forces. Similar patterns, he observed, are visible across Europe, the United States, Israel, and India. These developments signal the erosion of liberalism’s institutional backbone—a challenge that demands both theoretical innovation and political reorganization.

Methodologically, Dr. Bentman emphasized that their project seeks to bridge political theory with empirical analysis, especially data on trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions. This dual approach is designed to ensure that the philosophical arguments remain grounded in political realities.

Dr. Michael Dahan supplemented Dr. Bentman’s remarks by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s point on technology. Drawing on his background in technology and internet studies, Dr. Dahan clarified that the role of digital media in their analysis is not deterministic but catalytic. He described technology as functioning like a “chemical catalyst” in political processes—amplifying and accelerating underlying social and political dynamics rather than creating them outright. 

In particular, new media platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram play a critical role in disseminating populist rhetoric, often more so than visible public platforms like Twitter or Facebook. Their encrypted, closed-network nature makes them harder to monitor and analyze, but their role in embedding populist narratives in everyday communication is substantial. Dr. Dahan underscored that understanding these dynamics is crucial for any analysis of contemporary populist movements.

Dr. Dahan then turned to what he described as the “elephant in the room”: the mobilization of Jewish supremacist rhetoric and historical imaginaries in Israel. He argued that framing the October 7th attacks as a “second Holocaust” played a decisive role in enabling populist rhetoric to feed and justify acts of mass violence, including widespread participation in the war on Gaza. This, he suggested, illustrates how populist discourses can appropriate historical traumas and collective identities to mobilize support for exclusionary and violent political projects.

The presenters’ reply demonstrated an openness to critical feedback and a willingness to expand their analytical framework. They acknowledged gaps (particularly regarding non-European perspectives), clarified their theoretical stance on the crisis of liberalism, and highlighted the catalytic role of technology and identity narratives in contemporary populist politics. Their response situated their work at the intersection of political theory, empirical analysis, and contemporary political developments, reinforcing the paper’s relevance to ongoing debates about populism, democracy, and liberalism’s future.

 

Q&A Session 

The Q&A session opened with a conceptually rich question from Dr. Bülent Keneş, directed to Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which probed the historical and normative tension between pluralism, polarization, and national unity. Referring to the presentation’s guiding motto—“People — Once united, now divided”—Dr. Keneş observed that calls for a “united people” often carry nostalgic undertones, yet history reveals that such unity has frequently been mobilized by fascist and authoritarian movements to suppress pluralism in the name of a singular, homogenous “people.” His question centered on three key points: How should we interpret the contemporary tension between pluralism, which sustains democratic contestation, and polarization, which turns difference into entrenched enmity? To what extent does the longing for a “united people” risk reviving homogenizing impulses that undermine liberal democratic pluralism? What might constitute the optimal balance between pluralism, polarization, and unity in a healthy democracy?

Dr. Dahan began by reflecting on the constructed nature of “the people,” drawing on political theory and comparative examples. He emphasized that “the people” is always imagined—whether as an ethno-national entity or as a pluralist civic collective. Nations, from Czechs to Turks to Serbs, are imagined communities, and the content of this imagination determines whether “the people” is inclusive or exclusionary.

If this imagined construct is filled with pluralist values and a multifaceted vision, democratic contestation can thrive without descending into authoritarianism. However, if the construct is defined in ethno-nationalist terms, history shows that societies eventually devolve toward exclusionary or authoritarian structures. This, he cautioned, is a “very dangerous slope” that has been observed across historical and contemporary contexts.

Dr. Dahan illustrated this tension through American historical imaginaries of “We, the People.” While the ideal was articulated as multifaceted and inclusive, its realization has always been contingent on institutional arrangements. He underscored that the key to achieving pluralist unity lies in building and maintaining institutions that can embody this inclusive vision and in ensuring that public trust in these institutions remains strong.

He cited Canada’s constitutional framework as a partial example of this attempt. Through a multicultural constitutional vision, Canada sought to establish an institutional basis for inclusive belonging. While not perfect—racism and nationalist sentiments persist—Canada demonstrates that institutional design matters in mediating between pluralism and unity.

Importantly, Dr. Dahan noted that political culture and historical trajectories shape how these tensions play out. Countries in Eastern Europe, for example, followed different democratic transitions depending on their political histories, demonstrating that no universal template exists. Any attempt to balance pluralism and unity must therefore take local political cultures seriously.

He concluded by invoking his own hybrid identity as a Moroccan Jew with an American accent to illustrate how multifaceted identities complicate ethno-national definitions of “the people” and point toward the need for inclusive imaginaries in diverse societies.

Dr. Bentman expanded on these themes by examining the conceptual duality of “we” in political thought. He argued that both liberalism and fascism mobilize “we,” but in fundamentally different ways. In liberal thought, “we” refers to individuals choosing to live together, either literally or metaphorically, under shared civic rules. In fascist and authoritarian conceptions, “we” refers to an organic national or racial body, something that transcends voluntary association and instead invokes essentialized cultural or racial unity.

Dr. Bentman observed that the founding liberal “we”—as in the American constitutional moment—was itself exclusive, excluding Black people, women, and many minorities. Over time, liberalism expanded the circle of inclusion. However, he argued that inclusion alone proved insufficient. Inviting marginalized groups into a structure designed for a dominant cultural model revealed deeper structural limitations. As societies became more plural, structural and cultural incompatibilities surfaced, contributing to today’s democratic crises.

He noted that contemporary right-wing actors are not necessarily openly fascist, but they appropriate liberal language—individualism, democracy, rights—strategically, blending it with exclusionary identity politics. This hybrid rhetoric allows them to appeal to citizens without explicitly disavowing democratic norms, making their challenge more insidious.

Dr. Bentman drew historical analogies to moments of deep political transformation, such as the 17th-century crisis of monarchy, when political theory (Hobbes, Locke) and institutional innovation (constitutional monarchy) developed in tandem. By contrast, today, he argued, there is a disconnect between political theory and political practice: political scientists and philosophers have not yet articulated a compelling new framework to address the current crisis, while the radical right has developed a coherent and widely disseminated intellectual infrastructure—often outside traditional academia—that is effectively reshaping political imaginaries.

Dr. Bentman concluded by stressing that liberal democracies face a conceptual and political struggle to articulate a renewed vision of pluralist unity. Without such a vision, the political ground may increasingly be ceded to exclusionary movements.

Dr. Azize Sargın raised an incisive theoretical question regarding the concept of the “revolutionary subject” in Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation on authoritarian populism in India. Specifically, she asked whether the meaning and role of the revolutionary subject differ across contexts, such as between India and Western Europe, and how this concept might be contextually adapted in different socio-political settings.

In his response, Dr. Kundu affirmed that the notion of the “revolutionary subject” is deeply contextual and contingent upon local socio-political cultures. Drawing on the Indian case, he argued that the revolutionary subject comprises the dispossessed and marginalized communities—including Dalits, Adivasis, minorities, women, and other groups excluded from the country’s dominant economic and political narratives. These groups, he explained, are structurally positioned outside the logic of capital and have been systematically marginalized from India’s celebrated “growth story.”

Dr. Kundu emphasized that progressive political forces must engage with these groups if they wish to effectively counter the rise of right-wing populism. He argued that while right-wing populist movements possess strong cultural and nationalist narratives, they lack a coherent economic theory. This absence makes them vulnerable when confronted with structural questions of inequality. For Dr. Kundu, “redistribution” represents the key political discourse capable of challenging the entrenched structures—whether they be economic systems, caste hierarchies, patriarchal relations, or racial discrimination—that sustain inequality.

By centering redistribution, progressive movements can articulate a vision of economic and social justice that mobilizes marginalized groups as active political agents. Dr. Kundu concluded by agreeing with Dr. Sargın’s premise: the definition and composition of the revolutionary subject will vary across different contexts—shaped by specific historical, social, and political circumstances in each society.

 

Concluding Remarks by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni

Professor Oscar Mazzoleni closed the session with a set of thoughtful reflections that synthesized the key themes of the day’s discussion. He identified two central issues that framed the debate: 1) The hijacking of “the people” by populist movements, particularly those on the right and of an authoritarian character, which often deploy a top-down vision to construct an exclusionary notion of belonging. 2) The democratic responses from below, emphasizing bottom-up strategies, the role of civil society, the defense of pluralism and individual rights, and the promotion of an inclusionary political vision.

Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted the dual nature of populism as both a strategic political project—seeking to mobilize identity and belonging—and a symptom of deeper structural crises within liberal democracies. To understand the global success of populist movements, he argued, it is crucial to analyze three interrelated dimensions:

Rule of Law: Populist movements exploit weaknesses and contradictions within democratic legal systems. While the rule of law embodies universal principles such as pluralism and respect for others, its local variations and inconsistent application create vulnerabilities that populists capitalize on.

Territory and Borders: Questions of belonging are inseparable from territorial and border politics. Defining “who belongs” involves not only political conflict but also emotional dynamics and, in some contexts, war. Borders shape identities and collective imaginaries, becoming a key arena for populist mobilization.

Globalization and Neoliberalism: The neoliberal transformation has not merely reduced the role of the state but has reshaped cultural attitudes, placing competition—both between individuals and between nations—at the core of social relations. This has produced new uncertainties and a heightened desire for belonging, which right-wing populists have adeptly exploited.

According to Prof. Mazzoleni, populist movements thrive by tapping into these tensions, positioning “the people” against democracy, the rule of law, and pluralistic communities. Polarization and hate have emerged as dominant political emotions, deepening democratic fractures. While acknowledging the gravity of these challenges, Prof. Mazzoleni concluded with a measured pessimism: understanding these dynamics clearly is a necessary starting point for rebuilding hope and formulating effective democratic responses in the future.

 

Overall Conclusion

The fourth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a rich and multi-layered examination of how “the people” is constructed, mobilized, and contested across diverse political contexts. Bringing together perspectives from Nigeria, India and Israel, the session illuminated the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument leveraged to legitimize exclusionary projects. Throughout the discussions, three interrelated themes emerged.

First, the conceptual construction of “the people” remains central to both democratic renewal and authoritarian subversion. As shown in the presentations, populist actors strategically deploy affective, cultural, and institutional mechanisms to redefine “the people” in exclusionary ways, often by appropriating liberal democratic language itself.

Second, structural dynamics—legal, territorial, and economic—shape the political uses of “the people.” Populist movements thrive where the rule of law is inconsistently applied, where borders and belonging are contested, and where neoliberal globalization has generated competition, insecurity, and a search for identity. These structural tensions are not peripheral but fundamental to understanding contemporary populism.

Third, the responses to populist constructions of “the people” must engage both top-down and bottom-up dynamics. While populism often advances through centralized, leader-driven narratives, democratic resilience depends on revitalizing participatory governance, reinforcing pluralist institutions, and fostering inclusive imaginaries that bridge rather than deepen divisions.

The interplay of theoretical reflections, empirical insights, and comparative perspectives generated a vibrant interdisciplinary dialogue. Presenters offered innovative analyses of participatory governance, psychoanalytic approaches to populism, and the subversion of universalist ideals. Discussants sharpened these contributions through methodological and conceptual critiques, while the Q&A underscored the urgency of rethinking pluralism, polarization, and unity in fractured democracies.

As Professor Oscar Mazzoleni emphasized in his concluding remarks, understanding populism as both a strategic project and a symptom of structural crises is essential for formulating effective democratic responses. This session thus laid a strong foundation for continued interdisciplinary engagement on how “the people” is performed and politicized in the 21st century.

United States Bill of Rights alongside a Bible and bullets. Photo: Cheryl Casey.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00115



On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 2, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Session 3 explored the entangled relationship between populism, freedom of religion, and illiberal regimes. The session, chaired by Marietta D.C. van der Tol (Landecker Lecturer, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College, Cambridge), brought together a diverse set of perspectives, ranging from anthropological and theological insights to political and legal analyses. The session was opened with a welcome speech by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced chair, speakers, and discussant on behalf of the Center. 

In her framing remarks, Dr. van der Tol pointed to “the strong connection that we are seeing between, on the one hand, the rise of illiberalism, and on the other hand, the use of Christianity within the narratives that underpin the rise of illiberalism.” For too long, she noted, illiberalism has been seen as a phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe, associated with Russia, Hungary, or Slovakia. While acknowledging the reasons for that association, she warned against a narrative that renders Eastern Europe “less good than Western Europe.” What made this session distinctive, she argued, was its inclusion of the United States, which allows scholars to “bridge the East–West divide on this matter” and explore illiberalism as a transnational, rather than regionally bounded, phenomenon. 

To frame the discussion conceptually, Dr. van der Tol introduced the notion of “Christianism”—a politicized form of Christianity comparable to Islamism—drawing on Rogers Brubaker’s work. She emphasized that Christianism manifests not only at the level of ideas but “increasingly on the level of governance.” This, she suggested, requires interdisciplinary perspectives from politics, theology, anthropology, history, and law to grasp the shifting role of religion in illiberal politics.

The session featured three major contributions: Dr. Marc Loustau on Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Juraj Buzalka on pragmatic politicization in Slovakia, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen on the incorporation of evangelical theology into Texas law. Their interventions were followed by commentary from discussants Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, who drew comparative and theoretical connections across the cases.

Together, Session 3 illuminated how the language of religious freedom—once considered central to liberal democracy—has been appropriated by illiberal actors to mobilize cultural symbols, entrench political power, and reshape national and transnational identities.

Marc Loustau: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Procession during Easter Holy Mass in the old village of Hollókő, Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his presentation, Dr. Marc Loustau (Independent Scholar) offered a critical examination of how illiberal regimes—most notably Hungary—instrumentalize the discourse of religious freedom for political ends. His paper, titled “Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” sought to unsettle long-standing scholarly assumptions that the institutionalization of religious freedom is solely a liberal project.

Dr. Loustau began by situating his intervention within the broader field of religious freedom studies. Traditionally, he explained, much of the critical scholarship has approached the subject as an essentially liberal discourse rooted in international law and Western foreign policy. This body of work, following thinkers such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, often argued that religious freedom regimes operate as “ostensibly neutral” frameworks designed to protect religious minorities but in fact reproduce “Protestant, individualized religious subjectivities.” According to Dr. Loustau, the scholarly task had long been “to unmask the workings of power behind an ostensibly liberal regime of human rights.”

How Illiberal Regimes Reframe Religious Freedom as a Tool of Nationalist Legitimation

Yet, Dr. Loustau stressed, this framing overlooks the way in which illiberal regimes have increasingly co-opted the very language of religious freedom. “It struck us that religious freedom as a discourse, and its institutionalizations, were just as prominent, if not more prominent, in illiberal regimes like Hungary, Russia, and now, ever increasingly, the United States,” he argued. To limit critique only to liberal regimes, therefore, “misses the way that religious freedom is deployed as a central plank of illiberal politics.”

As a case study, Dr. Loustau focused on the Hungary Helps Program, a flagship initiative of Viktor Orbán’s government. The program, he explained, is publicly celebrated as Hungary’s effort to defend persecuted Christians abroad. “Hungary Helps was very active in Syria,” he noted, “alongside the work of Putin’s Russian regime to protect Orthodox Christians in the Middle East.” On the surface, this appears as a humanitarian initiative. Yet Dr. Loustau emphasized its deeper ideological function: “It was actually designed to unify the cause of defending Christians abroad with the cause of defending Christian culture within Europe against supposed persecution by secular Europeans and secular humanists, also in the United States.”

This dual strategy, he argued, effectively blurs the boundaries between international solidarity with persecuted Christians and a domestic culture war against liberal secularism. By presenting Hungary as a defender of a global Christian civilization, Orbán’s government re-frames religious freedom into a tool of nationalist and illiberal legitimation. Dr. Loustau placed this development in comparative perspective, pointing also to Slovakia’s recent illiberal turn under Robert Fico, and to the United States, where Republican leaders increasingly invoke religious freedom in culture-war politics.

Reframing Religious Freedom as a Tool of Power

The broader theoretical question raised by Dr. Loustau concerns how scholars should adapt the critique of religious freedom when liberalism is no longer the presumed framework. “If we cannot presume that liberalism is the institutional framework within which religious freedom emerges as a project,” he asked, “how might we imagine the scholarly project of critique?” His presentation thus invited a reconsideration of how illiberal regimes use religious freedom not to protect pluralism, but to consolidate cultural hegemony.

By highlighting Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Loustau’s intervention underscored the need to extend critiques beyond liberal universalisms and into the realm of illiberal politics, where appeals to faith and persecution are mobilized as powerful tools of authoritarian populism.

 

Dr. Juraj Buzalka: Religious or Secular Freedom? Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-Socialist Slovakia

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico speaks at a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Uzhhorod, Ukraine, on September 5, 2025. Photo: Yanosh Nemesh.

In his presentation, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, an Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University, explored the complex intersection of religion, politics, and populism in Slovakia. He argued that the country’s evolving religious landscape cannot be understood merely through statistics on declining religious identification, but must instead be seen through the lens of cultural economy, historical traditions, and global influences that have fueled the pragmatic politicization of religion by illiberal leaders.

A Breakthrough Moment

Dr. Buzalka began by situating his remarks in a very recent political development. “The spectacular clash of religious and secular liberalism took place last Friday,” he explained, “when Slovakia adopted a constitutional law recognizing only biologically defined male and female sexes.” This change, backed by Prime Minister Robert Fico’s far-right government and supported by Christian Democrats representing about ten percent of the electorate, effectively removed legal recognition for transgender citizens. “Transgender people are no longer recognized,” Dr. Buzalka emphasized. “The change of gender, or even a name from female and male in Slovak, is now not possible.”

This was no ordinary legislative amendment. It marked the 23rd change to Slovakia’s constitution since independence in 1993, but unlike previous amendments, it struck directly at the secular foundations of the state. According to Dr. Buzalka, the new law “undermines the secular character of the state, limits freedoms of citizens as defined by a liberal constitution, and even challenges the primacy of EU law.” While experts noted the implications for European integration, public debate largely overlooked this dimension.

The driving force behind the amendment, Dr. Buzalka suggested, was not primarily religious conviction but political opportunism. “The most profitable in this passing of law has been the political entrepreneur Robert Fico,” he said. Once a Social Democrat in the Blairite mold and a self-proclaimed champion of European integration, Fico has reinvented himself as a “National Social Democrat” with far-right leanings. His party, SMER, faces imminent expulsion from the Party of European Socialists. This dramatic ideological shift, Dr. Buzalka argued, is less surprising when seen through the logic of political instrumentalization: religion has become a useful resource for populist leaders seeking legitimacy and mobilization.

The Post-Peasant Setting

Dr. Buzalka framed his analysis in anthropological terms, drawing on the concept of cultural economy and what he described as Slovakia’s “post-peasant condition.” Despite modernization, urbanization, and globalization, Slovak society remains deeply shaped by its rural past. “Slovakia is still much more defined by its rural heritage than neighboring countries,” he explained. “The modern people traveling all around and speaking foreign languages are the children and grandchildren of former peasants.” This agrarian memory, he argued, sustains a cultural imagination in which religion retains moral authority and symbolic capital.

In this setting, religion is often perceived as morally superior to Western-style secular individualism. This moral economy resonates across political divides, making it unsurprising to Dr. Buzalka that former communists have embraced Catholicism or that voters support both progressive presidential candidates and far-right parties in parliamentary elections. “There are contradictions that might seem irrational from the perspective of top-down politics,” he observed, “but they have their own rationality connected to the post-peasant condition.”

To conceptualize this phenomenon, Dr. Buzalka drew on Douglas Holmes’s theory of integralism, a counter-Enlightenment tradition committed to traditional cultural forms but expressed in modern political settings. He argued that Slovakia’s version is a distinctly East European, post-socialist appearance of integralism—rooted in rural memory, family structures, and communal solidarity. “This is the local version of a religiously inspired movement,” he said, “vigorous and modern, but drawing legitimacy from an imagined moral superiority of traditional community.”

From Communism to Catholicism

One of the most striking themes in Dr. Buzalka’s talk was the fluidity of ideological identities in Slovakia. “It is not surprising for an anthropologist to see former communists sitting in church,” he noted. Similarly, Robert Fico’s personal trajectory—from communist youth, to Blairite reformer, to devout Catholic populist—illustrates this adaptability. Many Slovak voters, too, move between supporting liberal and illiberal actors depending on context. As Dr. Buzalka explained, “Believers could vote for a progressive, openly liberal president at one point, while supporting a Fascist party in parliamentary elections at another. These contradictions are easily swallowed.”

This political pragmatism is not a betrayal of tradition but a continuation of it, embedded in the post-peasant cultural economy where ideological boundaries blur. Dr. Buzalka emphasized that the seeming incoherence of Slovak politics must be understood in terms of lived cultural logics, not abstract ideological purity.

Global Dimensions of Religious Populism

While Slovakia’s political shifts are rooted in local traditions, Dr. Buzalka insisted they are also part of a global phenomenon. “Usually, we tend to see globalization coming from the West in the form of markets and democracy,” he noted. “But alongside these came zealous conservative values, carried by religious freedom movements—often financed from abroad.”

He cited reports showing that Slovak conservative associations received around $10 million from US-based evangelical movements, while across the EU similar groups benefitted from €1.1 billion in external funding. These resources have strengthened far-right and religiously conservative networks, embedding Slovakia in what Dr. Buzalka described as “a new alliance of religious extremists, far-right populists, and oligarchic funders.” This alliance, he warned, is “reshaping European politics, directed by private wealth and legitimized through state funding, engineering a long-term authoritarian transformation under the guise of tradition and care.”

The paradox, Dr. Buzalka observed, is that these populists portray progressivism as a decadent Western import, yet their own religious conservatism is itself imported. “They told us progressivism comes from the spoiled West,” he said, “but in fact, their practices and ideologies are also victims of imported beliefs.” This dynamic, he suggested, reveals the hybrid nature of illiberalism: deeply rooted in local cultural traditions, but also energized by transnational flows of ideology and capital.

Religion, Populism, and Hybrid War

In concluding his presentation, Dr. Buzalka returned to the broader stakes of his argument. Religiously motivated radicalism in Slovakia, he argued, succeeds because it draws strength from both local and global forces. Locally, it arises from the post-peasant condition, where communal solidarity and agrarian memory sustain integralist ideologies. Globally, it is reinforced by the flows of funding, ideology, and disinformation that link Slovakia to broader networks of populist and authoritarian politics.

This dynamic, he suggested, should be understood as part of a wider “hybrid war” against liberal democracy, in which religion is mobilized alongside other tools of disinformation and polarization. “What looks like a defense of national tradition,” he concluded, “is paradoxically itself imported from abroad.”

Although a progressive response is emerging, Dr. Buzalka expressed skepticism about its depth. “It is rather shallow,” he warned, “and still questioned by the global situation.” As Slovakia heads toward further electoral contests, including in neighboring countries like the Czech Republic, the struggle between secular liberalism and religious populism remains finely balanced. “We might see quite interesting results,” he observed, “but what is clear is that the liberal democratic order is being questioned by new forms of anti-modernist discourse.”

 

Dr. Colin Bossen: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? Evangelical Christian Theology and State Law

A man holds cautionary signs, including one reading “Jesus Or Hellfire!”, in Times Square, New York City, on July 2, 2018. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.

In his presentation, Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, explored how religious pluralism and Christian nationalism collide in contemporary US politics, with Texas as a case study. Drawing on a recent lawsuit filed by members of his own congregation, Dr. Bossen argued that struggles over religion and law in the United States are not merely contests between religion and secularism but rather between competing theological and political visions of religion in public life.

A Case Study from Texas

Dr. Bossen began by recounting how the case emerged directly from his congregation. In August 2023, a member of the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston and her daughter joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against 11 Texas public school districts. The case challenged Senate Bill 10 (SB10), which sought to require every public classroom to display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments.

Federal Judge Fred Biery issued a preliminary injunction preventing the law from taking effect, citing the First Amendment of the US Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” On the surface, Dr. Bossen observed, the ruling looked like a straightforward act of secular jurisprudence—a clear demarcation between church and state. But Dr. Bossen suggested otherwise. “My claim is that the lawsuit should not be seen as a contest between a secular understanding of the state and a religious one,” he argued. “Rather, it is best understood as a clash between two different religiously inflected views.”

The first, represented by the bill’s authors, is Christian nationalism. The second, invoked implicitly by the plaintiffs and Judge Biery, is what Dr. Bossen—drawing on historian David Hollinger—called liberalizing religion.

Christian Nationalism vs. Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen outlined these competing visions. Christian nationalism, he explained, is the claim that the United States is fundamentally a Christian nation and that its laws and culture should reflect Protestant Christian values. Quoting Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry’s book Taking America Back for God, he emphasized that Christian nationalism blurs religion with race, citizenship, and ideology: “It conflates being Christian with being white, native-born, American, and conservative.” This was evident in the words of Texas Senator Mays Middleton, one of SB10’s authors: “We are a state and nation built on ‘In God We Trust.’”

By contrast, liberalizing religion—rooted in liberal Protestant traditions but now broader—asserts that religion should remain a matter of individual conscience and voluntary association. While maintaining the separation of church and state, liberalizing religion also insists that religiously grounded moral values have a legitimate place in shaping a pluralistic society.

Historically, this current emerged from mainline Protestant denominations—Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Episcopalians—and became influential through civil rights, women’s rights, immigrant rights, and other social movements. Hollinger has shown that even as mainline church membership declined, their liberalizing influence expanded outside churches, shaping public discourse on anti-racism, anti-sexism, and social justice.

From Liberal Protestantism to Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen illustrated this trajectory through the story of former Texas governor Ann Richards. Richards, a Democrat, had ties to Unitarian Universalism, one of the most liberal religious traditions in the US. She sent her children to a Unitarian preschool in Dallas. Her daughter, Cecile Richards, later led Planned Parenthood, while maintaining ties to Unitarian congregations.

When Roe v. Wade was overturned, the Dallas Unitarian Church reaffirmed reproductive rights as a religious value. Rev. Daniel Cantor declared, “God loves you. You have dignity and worth, and your life is the priority here.” For Dr. Bossen, this demonstrates how liberalizing religion is not limited to Christianity but now includes Jews (especially in Reform and Reconstructionist traditions), Hindus, Buddhists, and even non-religious people committed to pluralism and individual conscience.

The Lawsuit: Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD

The lawsuit against SB10, formally titled Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, exemplified this broader coalition. The plaintiffs included 22 adults and their children: nine Jewish, five Protestant, one Hindu, one Unitarian Universalist, and six non-religious individuals. Even atheists framed their objections in terms consistent with liberalizing religion. One couple argued that they wanted their child “to independently develop decisions on religious matters” rather than have one religious worldview imposed by the state.

The coalition did not withdraw into private schooling or homeschooling; instead, they sought to reform public institutions to ensure pluralism. Judge Biery’s ruling reflected this perspective. He warned against the dangers of “majoritarian government and religion joining hands,” invoking both religious and secular thinkers who advanced pluralist principles. Strikingly, he even suggested that instead of the Ten Commandments, Texas classrooms might post excerpts from Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, a popular book associated with Unitarian Universalist moral teaching.

Christian Nationalist Backlash

Unsurprisingly, the ruling provoked backlash from Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, a staunch Christian nationalist. Paxton claimed: “From the beginning, the Ten Commandments have been irrevocably intertwined with America’s legal, moral, and historical heritage.” He dismissed the plaintiffs as “woke radicals” bent on erasing American history—ignoring the fact that most were religious individuals advancing a theological vision at odds with his own.

Dr. Bossen noted that Paxton’s rhetoric exemplifies the Christian nationalist refusal to recognize liberalizing religion as genuinely religious. Instead, it delegitimizes pluralistic theologies by branding them as secular, elitist, or radical.

Political Theology and Populism

Dr. Bossen argued that this clash is best seen through the lens of political theology—the incorporation of theological concepts into state structures. In Texas, the question is whether the state will enshrine the theology of Christian nationalism or liberalizing religion.

He connected this to broader debates on populism: “Elsewhere, populist movements can be understood as efforts to create forms of collective identity that seek to answer the question of who ‘the people’ are for a given polity.” Christian nationalism aligns with white supremacist populism, defining “the people” as white, Christian, and native-born. Liberalizing religion, by contrast, aligns with a pluralist populism that imagines “the people” as multiracial, multiethnic, and religiously diverse.

Thus, the Texas case is more than a local legal battle. It reflects a national struggle over identity, belonging, and democracy. Will the United States be defined by exclusionary Christian nationalist theology or by an inclusive pluralist theology rooted in liberalizing religion?

Toward a Broader Framework

Dr. Bossen concluded by noting that his project is still developing. He expressed interest in deepening the theoretical framework connecting religion, law, and liberal statecraft. “My examination of the contest between Christian nationalism and liberalizing theology, white supremacist and pluralistic populism in my state of residence, is just at its beginning,” he said. “I look forward to perspectives that will help me develop a richer framework around the connections between religion and law.”

For now, however, the Texas case offers a vivid window into how religious freedom, constitutional law, and political theology are being contested in the United States. The struggle is not between religion and secularism, Bossen concluded, but between two rival theologies—one exclusionary, majoritarian, and authoritarian, the other pluralistic, voluntarist, and democratic.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

Dr. Simon P. Watmough (Freelance Researcher; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ECPS)

Serving as discussant, Dr. Simon P. Watmough offered a wide-ranging and integrative commentary that placed the three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—into comparative and global perspective. He praised the panelists for providing “three rich case studies” that at first glance might seem disjointed, yet clearly “strike a common thread” in demonstrating the politicization of religious freedom as a tool of illiberalism.

Linking Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas

Dr. Watmough began by highlighting how the Hungarian and Slovak cases reveal the ways in which religious freedom has been instrumentalized as a wedge issue. In Hungary, he noted, post-2010 politics under Viktor Orbán have become the “classic exemplar of the culture war on a European stage.” Initiatives such as Hungary Helps, described in Dr. Marc Loustau’s presentation, exemplify how religion is used simultaneously to mobilize domestic constituencies and divide opponents at the EU level.

Here, Dr. Watmough posed a provocative question: “Does heritage status make religious freedom a national possession rather than a universal right?” If illiberal actors succeed in nationalizing religious freedom, it undermines its universality. He wondered whether EU universalism—anchored in rights-based frameworks—might provide a counter-strategy: “This whole Christian nationalism thing breaks down at some point when you confront it with universal rights and universal values.”

Turning to Slovakia, Dr. Watmough observed striking similarities with Hungary. Robert Fico, he argued, is “kind of Orbán redux”—a political entrepreneur who has reinvented himself across ideological lines, shifting from a socialist orientation to illiberal nationalism. Like Orbán, Fico demonstrates how populist leaders act as political chameleons, continually reshaping their platforms in response to perceived voter demand. “Give the customers what they want, sell, sell, sell, and make a tidy political profit,” Dr. Watmough remarked, framing such politics as a business model of pragmatic populist entrepreneurship.

The Texas Case in Historical Perspective

Addressing Colin Bossen’s Texas case, Dr. Watmough noted both continuity and divergence with Central Europe. The battle over displaying the Ten Commandments in schools represents not only a contemporary struggle but one deeply embedded in “a big strand of traditional American contestation about what America means, going back 250 years.” Whereas Hungary and Slovakia showcase the appropriation of religion for nation-building in post-socialist and EU contexts, Texas reflects long-standing American debates about religious establishment, pluralism, and the meaning of the First Amendment.

Dr. Watmough predicted that such state-level efforts at religiously inflected lawmaking would soon face scrutiny from the US Supreme Court: “There’s no more dodging. The Court is going to have to weigh in on these contestations in American politics very soon.” The question, he suggested, is whether Texas represents an outlier or a bellwether for broader US trends toward illiberal theocracy.

Cross-Cutting Themes

Dr. Watmough then drew out several themes that cut across all three cases. First, he underscored the instrumentalization of law as a mechanism of illiberal politics. Whether through constitutional amendments in Slovakia, legal initiatives in Hungary, or bills in Texas, religious freedom is mobilized not as a universal safeguard but as a weapon to entrench exclusionary visions of the polity.

Second, he returned to the theme of populist political entrepreneurship. Orbán, Fico, and actors in the US all display what he termed a capacity for pragmatic adaptation, reshaping ideology in order to maximize political profit while keeping illiberal projects intact.

Third, Dr. Watmough raised the question of pluralism’s future. Illiberal actors instrumentalize religion to define narrow and exclusionary conceptions of “the people.” In contrast, liberal-democratic traditions struggle to sustain universalist frameworks capable of resisting these wedge strategies.

The International Dimension

Finally, Dr. Watmough emphasized the importance of transnational linkages. He reminded the audience that ECPS has consistently highlighted the “illiberal internationale”—a loose but increasingly coordinated network of right-wing populists, illiberal regimes, and oligarchic funders who reinforce and legitimate one another across borders. He cited Russian financing of European far-right parties, the spread of disinformation campaigns, and the diffusion of Orbán’s governance model to Poland and Slovakia as examples. “The question we can ask ourselves,” he concluded, “is whether this is more than elective affinity. Are we talking about systemic international linkages?”

Dr. Watmough’s intervention provided a powerful comparative and global frame for the panel. By situating Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas within shared dynamics of lawfare, populist entrepreneurship, and transnational illiberal collaboration, he illuminated both the distinctiveness of each case and the broader structural forces connecting them. His remarks pressed the panelists to consider not only the national specificities of religious politicization but also its implications for the future of pluralism, the resilience of liberal universalism, and the rise of an illiberal international order.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium)

In his discussant remarks, Dr. Erkan Toguslu offered a thoughtful synthesis of the panel’s three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—focusing on how religion and the principle of religious freedom are being redefined and instrumentalized in contemporary illiberal politics. While acknowledging the contextual diversity of the cases, he highlighted common dynamics that reveal religion not as a neutral principle, but as a powerful tool of political entrepreneurship and symbolic politics.

Religion as Instrument and Symbol

Dr. Toguslu began by underscoring that “protecting religious freedom is not a neutral right.” Rather, across the cases, it emerges as a form of political entrepreneurship and the domestication of religion into political projects. In Hungary, for instance, programs such as Hungary Helps link the defense of persecuted Christians abroad to the narrative of Christianity being eroded at home by secular elites. This fusion of domestic and foreign policy, he argued, exemplifies how religious freedom is recast as a cultural weapon in ongoing symbolic battles.

Such strategies, he suggested, challenge the liberal assumption that public space is neutral and open to all. Instead, religion is increasingly imposed in arenas that should remain pluralistic—schools, constitutions, and civic institutions—transforming freedom itself into a contested object.

Redefining Freedom in Illiberal Politics

A key theme in Dr. Toguslu’s comments was the paradoxical role of religious freedom in illiberal settings. “What does it mean,” he asked, “if religious freedom is used to defend a majority rather than a minority, or to impose a single interpretation on the public?” The very principle meant to protect pluralism and diversity is turned into a justification for restricting them.

In Slovakia, as Dr. Juraj Buzalka showed, this dynamic is tied to what Dr. Toguslu called “hybrid ideologies.” Former communists turned Catholics, or ex-socialists aligning with religious conservatism, illustrate a “strange rationality of contradictions.” Yet, such contradictions are sustained by a post-peasant social imaginary in which rural memory and cultural conservatism provide a sense of moral superiority. Here, religion becomes a moral anchor against liberal modernity, even when articulated by actors with seemingly incompatible ideological pasts.

Liberal Democracies and Illiberal Politics

Turning to the United States, Dr. Toguslu emphasized the broader lesson of the Texas case: even within a liberal democratic regime, illiberal politics can take root. The Ten Commandments bill illustrates how legal and theological struggles play out in ostensibly secular institutions. He argued that this should not be seen simply as a clash between secularism and religion, but as “a confrontation between two theologies: Christian nationalism and liberal, individualistic religion.”

The case demonstrates how religious freedom is mobilized both by those seeking to impose a homogenous religious identity and by those defending pluralism. As in Hungary and Slovakia, law becomes a central battleground—whether through constitutional amendments, federal injunctions, or symbolic legislation.

Broader Theoretical Reflections

In closing, Dr. Toguslu connected his observations to broader critiques of secularism advanced by scholars like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad. Their insights remind us that secular institutions themselves are never neutral; they can also be hegemonic frameworks that shape politics in particular ways. “Doesn’t matter if it’s liberal or illiberal,” he remarked, “somehow religion becomes a political strategy.”

Linking his comments back to Dr. Watmough’s intervention, Dr. Toguslu emphasized that the instrumentalization of religion in public space—whether in Europe or the United States—reflects a common strategy of illiberal actors. It is less about protecting diversity than about mobilizing cultural symbols for political power.

 

Q&A Heighlights

A “God, Guns, and Trump” sign displayed on an old military bus following the 2020 presidential election in November 2020, Tampa, Florida. Photo by Florida Chuck.

The Q&A session following the panel presentations provided a dynamic exchange of perspectives that deepened the central themes of religion, illiberalism, and populism. Moderated discussion was interspersed with audience interventions, and much of the dialogue focused on the intersections of religion, nationalism, and coalition-building across diverse contexts.

Cross-Religious Alliances and Conservative Convergence

The first question came from Dr. Bülent Keneş, who observed that despite deep doctrinal differences, religious groups across Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism often converge on conservative social issues—particularly around family values, gender roles, and LGBTQ+ rights. He noted that this convergence was evident in the support some Muslim migrants in the United States had shown for Donald Trump. He asked whether there is potential for “a broader cross-religious alliance among conservative religious constituencies” that could collectively challenge liberal democracy.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen responded affirmatively: “The short answer is yes. I think that is the major project that a great number of Christian nationalists are trying to engage in.” He pointed to efforts in Texas by leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, who not only mobilize around opposition to LGBTQ+ rights but also stoke fears of Islam by manufacturing what he called a “Muslim scare.” For Dr. Bossen, such strategies are designed to “unify that coalition of evangelicals and conservatives” by creating a common enemy. This, he argued, is not merely a possibility but an active project that is already undermining liberal democratic structures.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu added nuance, drawing on European examples. He recalled studies showing that Muslim voters in Belgium and elsewhere had shifted from supporting Socialist or Green parties to aligning with Christian Democrats due to shared traditionalist values. “These moral backgrounds come up during elections, always,” he noted, suggesting that shared cultural conservatism does create “easy connection points.” However, he remained cautious about whether this amounted to a genuine, coordinated cross-religious coalition.

Constitutional Limits and the Role of the Supreme Court

The next intervention came from Dr. Simon Watmough, who picked up on themes from his earlier feedback. He asked Dr. Bossen whether constitutional limits might constrain Christian nationalist projects, and whether the US Supreme Court would ultimately act as arbiter: “Is it going to be the Supreme Court that is going to be the arbiter of that, do you think?”

Dr. Bossen was skeptical. He described Texas as a testing ground for illiberalism in the United States, where state laws are intentionally crafted to provoke Supreme Court review. Drawing parallels to the long-term legal strategy that led to the overturning of Roe v. Wade, he warned that conservative activists are now honing similar approaches on issues like gender rights. “Law is becoming less and less a matter of reasoning, and more and more a matter of power,” Dr. Bossen argued. He foresaw a growing fragmentation of the United States into illiberal and liberal states, with the Supreme Court unlikely to hold the line: “I’m skeptical that the Court, as it is currently constituted, is going to maintain those limits.”

Youth, Education, and Coalition-Building

Nina Kuzniak raised the issue of young people, noting the increasing presence of theologically grounded values in US public schools. She asked Dr. Bossen whether religious freedom could serve as an antidote to Christian nationalism and how young people might be supported in resisting state-sponsored religious conservatism.

Dr. Bossen responded that the key lay in coalition-building across differences. He acknowledged the difficulty of interfaith dialogue but pointed to the diverse coalition of plaintiffs in the SB10 lawsuit—Jews, Protestants, a Hindu, a Unitarian Universalist, atheists, and agnostics—as a model. “Is there a way to expand that coalition to really push back against Christian nationalism on religious freedom as the unifying thread?” he asked. He also suggested that youth-focused initiatives, such as interfaith programs, could be a promising space for cultivating pluralistic values: “It’s a really interesting question to explore… something that we could even think about here in Houston.”

Christian Nationalism, Whiteness, and Inclusion

Finally, Erkan Toguslu returned with a probing question about the racial dynamics of Christian nationalism. He asked how non-white groups, particularly Black Americans, fit into a movement that appears to be overwhelmingly white.

Dr. Bossen acknowledged the centrality of whiteness to Christian nationalism: “The coalition of people that are Christian nationalists are overwhelmingly white.” Yet he also emphasized its fluidity, noting how European immigrant groups once outside whiteness were eventually incorporated. He suggested that some non-Black minorities, including Southeast Asians and Mexican Americans in Texas, may be seeking partial inclusion into whiteness by aligning with Christian nationalist politics. “They’re trying to perform a certain kind of whiteness and be incorporated into that system,” he explained. This dynamic, he argued, reflects how Christian nationalism continues to equate citizenship with whiteness, while offering conditional entry to groups willing to embrace its ideological framework.

Taken together, the Q&A highlighted the complex entanglement of religion, race, law, and politics across contexts. Dr. Bossen underscored the polarization of American religion into two competing camps: one rooted in Christian nationalism, the other in liberalizing religion. Dr. Toguslu and Dr. Watmough, meanwhile, stressed the transnational resonances, with parallels in Central Europe’s religious conservatism and the use of legal instruments to entrench illiberal values.

The Q&A session ended with a sense of both urgency and possibility: the urgency stemming from the active undermining of liberal democracy through cross-religious conservative coalitions, and the possibility residing in countervailing alliances of pluralistic religious and secular actors. As Dr. Bossen put it, the struggle is not merely legal but a contest over what kind of nation—and what kind of people—the United States, and by extension other democracies, will become.

 

Concluding Reflections by Dr. Marietta van der Tol

Christians raise their hands in worship during a church service. Photo: Joshua Rainey.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol offered a wide-ranging analysis that drew together the themes of the panel while situating them within broader questions about religion, illiberalism, and the fragility of constitutional democracy. She emphasized the importance of examining both the fragmentation of political life and the ways in which thin, flexible ideologies can sustain surprising alliances across religious and political divides.

Fragmentation and the Allure of Populist Rhetoric

Dr. van der Tol began by reflecting on the ways fragmentation enables individuals to selectively engage with populist rhetoric without assuming responsibility for its more dangerous implications. “One can identify with one part of the conversation, and sort of not be responsible for the other parts of that same conversation that might be appealing to others,” she observed. This selective embrace, she argued, helps explain the “marriage between Christian nationalism and far-right politics,” as well as the increasing openness to extremist groups in contexts such as the UK and the Netherlands.

From her conversations with those sympathetic to Christian nationalism, she noted that individuals often acknowledge problematic elements of the rhetoric but dismiss them as irrelevant: “They don’t think it is about them, or that it is about somebody else… it’s not in their immediate reference framework, so therefore it’s not that important.” This dynamic, she suggested, provides a crucial clue for understanding both the endurance of such politics and the challenge of dismantling the alliances it sustains.

Thin Ideologies and Transnational Coalitions

A key theme of her remarks was the fluidity of conservative religious and nationalist discourses. She described them as a “thin ideology”—adaptable to varied cultural contexts and capable of mobilizing disparate constituencies. Issues like abortion, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights can be reframed as “anti-liberal,” “anti-Western,” or “anti-secular,” depending on the audience. “These issues can rally very different groups of people who may not normally see eye to eye,” she explained.

This flexibility helps explain how secular nationalists, Christian conservatives, Muslims, and Hindus sometimes converge in transnational coalitions. Yet Dr. van der Tol cautioned against assuming such actors share identical motivations. “Some people might vote for restrictions of abortion on biblical grounds. That is a very different argument from somebody who says we need the reproduction of the nation to be sped up,” she stressed. Recognizing these distinctions, she argued, is essential both for analytical clarity and for identifying potential fractures within alliances.

At the same time, she remained skeptical of the durability of these coalitions, pointing to their Western—and particularly American—centrism. Many alliances, she argued, are “dominated by Americans, often dominated by American funding.” This creates structural imbalances: non-Western actors may be symbolically included but not taken seriously. She recalled a case where Hindu nationalists were relegated to a marginal panel chaired by an Anglo-American figure, remarking: “It’s an uneven alliance… some of these alliances might not be as long-lived as people would like them to be.”

The Central Role of Law and Constitutionalism

Dr. van der Tol then turned to the role of law in these struggles. She highlighted how right-wing intellectuals often elevate the constitution as the “heart of the nation,” citing Roger Scruton’s claim that constitutionalism itself embodies national identity. This, she argued, explains why culture wars so often manifest through legal battles: “If people are trying to identify and determine what the heart of the nation is, one of the first places they will go is the law, and the Constitution.”

While this focus may seem circular, it is also dangerous. She expressed concern that illiberal actors are not merely amending constitutions but transforming constitutional interpretation itself. Subtle shifts in legal reasoning, rather than headline-grabbing amendments, may prove most consequential. “Paying attention to these technical changes at the level of interpretation requires legal skill, but it cannot live outside the analysis of sociologists, theologians, and political scientists,” she warned. For her, the erosion of constitutionalism risks destabilizing democracy more profoundly than episodic political crises.

Democracy, Pacification, and Religious Freedom

Finally, Dr. van der Tol raised sobering questions about the future of democratic stability. Whereas earlier eras relied on constitutional settlements or compromises—what she called “pacification, where people might exchange certain constitutional goods to pause the culture war”—today’s conflicts may resist such resolution. She cautioned that democracy itself is being redefined, not merely challenged: “The question now is even what is the measure of democracy that the far right thinks is necessary?”

In her conclusion, she reflected on the paradoxical role of Christianity in these processes. It is particularly troubling, she noted, that Christianity—historically a force for constitutional settlement after Europe’s religious wars—is now invoked to undermine constitutionalism. “It’s quite sad to see how Christianity is being used for some of these processes,” she remarked. Yet she also underscored that religious freedom remains key to renewing democratic legitimacy. Even conservative religious communities that are skeptical of liberal democracy have historically accepted it because of guarantees of religious liberty. “Whatever the future of democracy looks like, it’s going to have to take religious freedom seriously to the point where it allows these communities to buy in again.”

Dr. van der Tol’s closing assessment thus underscored the interdisciplinary challenge of analyzing religion, law, and populism in contemporary politics. She highlighted the fragility of alliances, the centrality of legal contestation, and the unsettling transformations of constitutionalism underway. Most of all, she reminded the audience that the stakes are not abstract: “There’s something at stake. Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Her reflections left the audience with both caution and urgency: caution, in recognizing the thin and fragile nature of many transnational illiberal alliances; and urgency, in grappling with the profound implications of constitutional and cultural transformations for the future of democracy itself.

 

Conclusion

Session 3 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series made clear that the entanglement of religion, populism, and illiberalism is neither accidental nor confined to any one region. Across Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas, the panelists showed how appeals to religious freedom—once a cornerstone of liberal democracy—are increasingly being redefined as instruments of exclusion, mobilization, and power consolidation.

Dr. Marc Loustau demonstrated how Hungary reframes religious freedom to defend Christian identity at home while projecting humanitarian solidarity abroad, thereby transforming a liberal principle into an illiberal cultural weapon. Dr. Juraj Buzalka revealed how Slovakia’s “post-peasant” cultural economy and opportunistic leadership have enabled the pragmatic politicization of religion, blending global conservative funding with local traditions. Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, meanwhile, highlighted the US case of Texas, where religious freedom is contested not between secularism and faith, but between two theologies—Christian nationalism and liberalizing pluralism.

The discussants, Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, drew the threads together, underscoring how religion is domesticated into politics through lawfare, culture wars, and symbolic politics. Both stressed that these developments form part of a wider “illiberal internationale,” linking actors across borders through shared narratives, funding, and strategies.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol warned that these shifts point to deeper transformations of constitutionalism itself. If the constitution becomes not a neutral framework but the very terrain of ideological struggle, then democracy’s foundations may be unsettled in ways more enduring than electoral swings. As she cautioned, “Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Ultimately, the session underscored both the fragility and urgency of democratic resilience. Understanding how illiberal actors instrumentalize religion is not only an academic task but a political imperative for safeguarding pluralism, constitutionalism, and the future of democracy.

Photo: Dreamstime.

From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding

The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted a panel titled “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding.” The session gathered distinguished scholars to examine the accelerating erosion of democracy, the potential transition from populism to fascism, and the moral and intellectual duties of those who continue to defend democratic values in dark times.

Selcuk Gultasli, ECPS Chairperson, opened the session by emphasizing the urgency of the theme. He noted that the panel sought not only to analyze the rise of populism but also to confront how authoritarian tendencies may harden into fascism. ECPS, he explained, is committed to making the discussion widely accessible through a detailed report and online recordings, ensuring that policymakers, academics, and engaged citizens can benefit from the insights shared.

Moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, then set the tone by recalling ECPS’s mission: to document and analyze how populism threatens democracy worldwide. He warned that populist leaders are not isolated figures but draw legitimacy from mass support, which, in Arendtian terms, provides the essential condition for fascist governance. Today’s task, Professor Aktar concluded, is no longer about building democracy but about preventing its collapse.

Professor Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University) opened with a comparative analysis of populism in Europe and the United States. She argued that American populism, embodied by Donald Trump, is marked by unpredictability and authoritarian experimentation, untethered from coherent historical anchors. The most dangerous development, she suggested, lies not in street militias but in “social authoritarianism”—elite legal and intellectual projects such as Project 2025 that aim to dismantle democracy from within. The elevation of Charlie Kirk as a martyr, she warned, signals a new form of religious-political mobilization with fascistic overtones.

Professor Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg) challenged the myth of a pristine democracy interrupted by an authoritarian onslaught. He argued that the current model of democracy was already exclusionary before the rise of authoritarianism, and the current Western model itself is failing. By ignoring the dangers of private corporate power and clinging to Eurocentric notions of “consolidation,” democrats have overlooked the deeper roots of disillusionment. For Professor Friedman, the task is to redefine democracy as equal human choice in all decisions that affect people’s lives—a principle that requires confronting both state and private power.

Professor Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida) provided an ethnographic perspective on Christian nationalism in the United States. She mapped three strands—evangelical dominionism, Catholic integralism, and Pentecostal-charismatic movements—that, despite historical rivalries, now converge in rejecting pluralism and democracy. She also highlighted the convergence of these religious forces with secular techno-utopianism and nihilistic online subcultures. The result, she argued, is a coalition oriented toward collapse and accelerationism, united less by theology than by anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University) situated the discussion in a global frame. He argued that democracy was tarnished long before populism’s rise, corrupted by Cold War secrecy, US hypocrisy in international law, and the exploitative logic of capitalism. Populism, in his view, compounds these crises by waging an “epistemological war” against truth and expertise. Facing climate change, nuclear peril, and extreme poverty, Professor Falk urged intellectuals to embrace utopian thinking and even revolutionary transformation, reorienting governance toward the global public good.

Professor Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) concluded with a stark warning about the authoritarian project underway in the United States. Drawing lessons from leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán and Turkey’s Erdoğan, he argued that Trump and his allies are pursuing a systematic strategy of democratic dismantling: media capture, judicial purges, lawfare, and gerrymandering. While fascistic elements are present, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of terminological precision. Resistance, he suggested, requires early mobilization, broad coalitions, and a focus on economic issues that resonate with ordinary voters.

Together, the panelists painted a sobering picture: populism today is no longer merely a style of politics but a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with global reverberations. From Christian nationalism to techno-utopianism, from corporate power to manipulated legal frameworks, the threats are multifaceted. Yet the panel also underscored a common responsibility—that intellectuals must speak with clarity, resist euphemism, and foster new visions of democracy suited to the crises of our age.

 

Professor Mabel Berezin: “Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe”

People gather at Turning Point USA headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, for a memorial following the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk during his speech at Utah Valley University in Orem. Photo: Dreamstime.

In her presentation, Professor Mabel Berezin delivered a sobering analysis of the current trajectory of democracy in the United States and Europe. Speaking from the vantage point of an academic who has long studied populism and fascism, she situated the discussion within a comparative framework, but with particular urgency regarding developments in the United States since the 2024 presidential election.

Berezin opened with a reflection on the language used to describe contemporary democratic crises. The term “democratic backsliding,” she argued, now feels wholly inadequate for the American case. Since Donald Trump’s return to power, the country has been subject to what she described as a “high-speed wrecking ball” against its democratic institutions. While democratic erosion is a global phenomenon, its forms vary across national contexts, depending on political histories and institutional resilience. This, she suggested, underscores the need for context-specific strategies of intellectual and civic engagement.

European Populism and American Exceptionalism

Berezin revisited an argument she first articulated in 2017 in her essay “Trump is Not a European-Style Populist and That is Our Problem.” In that piece, she observed that while European far-right populists—such as Marine Le Pen in France or Giorgia Meloni in Italy—often ground their appeals in nostalgia for a stronger nation-state and postwar social protections, the American populist right is marked by unpredictability. European populists, she argued, want “more state, not less,” and their grievances frequently revolve around immigration and monetary issues within the European Union framework. By contrast, the American case lacks a coherent historical anchor, and Trump’s political appeal did not fit neatly into established narratives.

For Professor Berezin, this unpredictability made Trump particularly dangerous. While European populists often pursue recognizable policy goals rooted in the past, Trump’s movement was untethered, fueled instead by volatile grievances and charismatic mobilization. The absence of clearly defined political expectations in the US created fertile ground for authoritarian experimentation.

The Rise of Social Authoritarianism

Turning to the US after the 2020 and 2024 elections, Professor Berezin noted the growing academic consensus that Trumpism bears fascist characteristics. However, she argued that the most pressing threats to democracy are not necessarily the paramilitary groups that rallied in Charlottesville or stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Instead, the greater danger lies in what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a project spearheaded by intellectual cadres aligned with institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the Federalist Society, and the architects of “Project 2025.”

These actors, she explained, represent the true intellectual core of the movement. Unlike the visible extremists brandishing weapons, these figures deploy law, language, and bureaucracy as instruments of authoritarian consolidation. By targeting institutions and systematically reshaping the judiciary, they seek to dismantle the so-called “deep state” and restrict fundamental freedoms under the veneer of legality. As Professor Berezin quipped, it is easier to imprison someone who fires an AR-15 than it is to restrain a legal strategist whose weapon is a thesaurus.

The Paramilitary of Jesus

While she downplayed the long-term mobilizing potential of armed militias, Professor Berezin identified a new and alarming development: the posthumous elevation of Charlie Kirk, a conservative media figure assassinated in September 2025. Initially dismissing him as a fringe podcaster, Professor Berezin admitted she was shocked by the scale and spectacle of his memorial service, which she described as a “paramilitary of Jesus with the blessings of the state.” The event drew millions of attendees and viewers, including Trump and much of his cabinet, and revealed a level of organization, youthful enthusiasm, and emotional intensity that Professor Berezin found profoundly unsettling.

What struck her most was the fusion of evangelical symbolism with political mobilization. The service emphasized family, reproduction, and communal solidarity, urging followers to “have more children than you can afford” and to embrace family as one’s central role in society. While the rhetoric appeared religious, Professor Berezin suggested it was in fact a form of secular mobilization—anchored less in theology than in a cultural project of authoritarian belonging.

Kirk’s assassination, she argued, paradoxically strengthened the movement. In death, he was transformed into a martyr, his charisma frozen in time, and his image available for endless appropriation by the MAGA movement. This development, she warned, fills a “missing link” in the analytical framework of American authoritarianism, supplying the movement with an emotionally powerful narrative and a mobilizing force that mainstream democratic actors struggle to match.

Intellectual Responsibilities

The central theme of Professor Berezin’s speech was the intellectual responsibility of scholars in confronting authoritarianism. She acknowledged the limitations of academic writing and debate in the face of mobilized authoritarian forces but insisted that silence or timidity is not an option. Universities, law schools, and other institutions must be willing to say “no” to authoritarian incursions, resisting the erosion of academic freedom and democratic values.

Dialogue, she suggested, remains valuable, but only if understood not as a tool of conversion but as a means of fostering engagement. In her own teaching on fascism and nationalism, Professor Berezin frequently encounters conservative students who seek to talk rather than proselytize. Creating spaces for such conversations, she argued, can generate a deeper understanding of democratic principles across divides.

Yet Professor Berezin also warned against complacency. She noted that the rhetoric of Trump’s movement is saturated with appeals to “freedom,” while democracy itself is rarely mentioned. The gap between these two concepts must be addressed directly. For her, one crucial task is rearticulating what democracy actually means in the public sphere. Many Americans, she lamented, support democracy as an abstract good but lack a concrete understanding of its practices and requirements.

Democracy and Education

Professor Berezin concluded by situating intellectual responsibility within the longer history of democratic education. She invoked John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and the civic initiatives launched in the United States during the onset of World War II, such as the National Foundation for Education and American Citizenship. These historical precedents, she argued, remind us that democracy must be taught, nurtured, and continuously reinforced through education.

For Professor Berezin, the path forward lies not in rhetorical denunciations of fascism but in cultivating a renewed public understanding of democracy itself. Education, both formal and informal, is the most effective channel for resisting the deeply embedded authoritarian forces now at work. If democracy is to be saved—or at least its decline attenuated—scholars, educators, and intellectuals must reclaim their role in shaping civic culture.

Conclusion

Professor Berezin’s presentation offered a bracing assessment of the state of democracy in America and beyond. By contrasting European and American populisms, highlighting the intellectual underpinnings of authoritarianism, and analyzing the symbolic mobilization of figures like Charlie Kirk, she illuminated the complex and evolving threats facing democratic societies. Her call to intellectual responsibility—grounded in education, engagement, and the defense of democratic institutions—underscored the urgent role of scholars in meeting this historical moment.

 

Professor Steven Friedman: “Democracy for All: Rethinking a Failed Model”

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

In his presentation, Professor Steven Friedman offered a provocative and deeply critical re-examination of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Speaking as both a South African scholar and a citizen who lived through apartheid and the democratic transition of 1994, Professor Friedman challenged prevailing assumptions about democracy’s origins, legitimacy, and sustainability. His core argument was clear: the crisis facing democracy today is not merely the product of authoritarian incursions or populist disruption but the collapse of a flawed model of democracy that has dominated global thinking for the past three decades.

The Myth of a Pristine Democratic Past

Professor Friedman began by dismantling what he called the “myth of the pristine democratic environment.” Many observers, he argued, continue to think of democracy as a fully functioning, well-ordered system that has been corrupted by external “barbarians.” While acknowledging the existence of authoritarian challengers, Professor Friedman insisted that this framing misdiagnoses the problem. According to him, democracy has not simply been hijacked; rather, the dominant model itself is failing. To understand today’s crisis, we must interrogate the assumptions underpinning this model.

Democracy as a Western Export

The first of these assumptions, Professor Friedman argued, is the idea that democracy is inherently Western. For decades, he noted, democracy outside North America and Western Europe has been judged by the extent to which it resembles an idealized Western model. This attitude, embedded in the “transition to democracy” scholarship of the late twentieth century, created a hierarchy in which Africa, Asia, and Latin America were cast as perpetual apprentices striving to approximate Western democracies.

He pointed to the academic obsession with “democratic consolidation” as an example. Despite the proliferation of literature on the subject, there has never been a coherent definition of what a “consolidated democracy” actually is. In practice, Professor Friedman argued, the concept functioned as a mirror: if a country looked like Western Europe or North America, it was deemed consolidated; if not, it was considered deficient. This was less a political theory, he suggested, than an ethnic bias.

Today, the irony of this model is stark. The very Western democracies once held up as exemplars are themselves eroding fundamental freedoms. Professor Friedman shared a telling personal anecdote. During apartheid, South Africans envied Western societies for their freedoms of speech and assembly. Yet today, he noted, German academics fear losing their jobs for participating in discussions critical of Israel, and Americans risk detention for political speech. The “boot,” he observed, “is now on the other foot.” Modeling democracy on the West, he concluded, is no longer tenable.

Palestine as a Democracy Problem

Professor Friedman underscored this argument with a pressing contemporary example: Palestine. He contended that the suppression of pro-Palestinian expression in Western democracies represents a profound democratic failure. Citizens in the UK and elsewhere have been arrested for holding signs opposing genocide, while in many countries, calls for boycotts—an elementary form of democratic speech—are criminalized.

Equally troubling, Professor Friedman argued, is the gap between public opinion and elite policy. Surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for a just resolution to the conflict, yet Western governments either ignore this consensus or offer token gestures while maintaining policies that sustain the crisis. This disconnect illustrates how democracy, when treated as a Western possession, erodes its own legitimacy. For Professor Friedman, the Palestine issue is not peripheral but central to understanding democracy’s current global malaise.

Ignoring Private Power

The second flawed assumption of the dominant model, Professor Friedman argued, is its fixation on the state as the sole threat to freedom. According to this view, democracy exists primarily to constrain state power and ensure accountability to citizens. While important, this perspective ignores another crucial reality: private power can be equally oppressive when left unregulated.

Professor Friedman reminded his audience that this insight is hardly radical. Theodore Roosevelt, in the early twentieth century, warned that unregulated commercial power could dominate and oppress citizens just as much as the state. For much of the postwar period, Western democracies acknowledged this reality, regulating corporate influence to safeguard public interests. Yet in the past thirty years, this recognition has disappeared from mainstream democratic theory. Private power is rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarship or policy debates, leaving citizens vulnerable to corporate domination.

He illustrated this point with evidence from the 2024 US elections. Democratic candidates who campaigned on regulating corporate price gouging outperformed their peers by 8–10 percentage points, sometimes winning in unexpected constituencies. This, Professor Friedman argued, underscores the centrality of addressing private power to democratic renewal. Citizens disengage not because they are seduced by authoritarianism, but because they see mainstream parties as unwilling or unable to improve their material conditions.

The Real Crisis: Disillusionment, Not Populism

Professor Friedman pushed back against the notion that democracy’s greatest threat lies in the rise of populist strongmen. The problem, he suggested, is not the growth of the authoritarian right but the erosion of faith among non-right constituencies. In the US, for example, Trump did not dramatically expand his base between 2020 and 2024. Instead, 17 million former Democratic voters simply abstained. Disillusionment, not conversion, handed Trump his victory.

This phenomenon is not unique to the US. Across Western Europe, too, the crisis of democracy stems less from the swelling of the right than from the alienation of citizens who feel their votes no longer matter. When private power goes unregulated and living standards stagnate, democratic participation declines. Professor Friedman emphasized that this structural disillusionment is a more urgent challenge than the electoral gains of right-wing populists.

Redefining Democracy

In concluding, Professor Friedman turned to the question of intellectual responsibility. Scholars, he argued, must abandon the failed model of democracy and reimagine its meaning. For him, democracy is not a set of institutions or a Western inheritance but a principle: every adult human being should have an equal say in every decision that affects them.

He acknowledged that no society has ever fully realized this ideal. But, citing South African theorist Richard Turner’s essay “The Necessity of Utopian Thinking,” Professor Friedman insisted that such standards must serve as guiding measures. Without them, democrats risk losing sight of their goals.

Placing equal human choice at the center of democracy, Professor Friedman argued, has two transformative implications. First, it erases the Western bias by recognizing democracy as a universal entitlement, not a Western export. Second, it compels recognition that private power must be regulated just as much as state power to ensure genuine freedom. Free speech, free assembly, and other democratic rights flow from this foundational principle.

Conclusion

Professor Friedman’s presentation was both a diagnosis and a manifesto. He rejected nostalgic narratives of a lost democratic golden age, instead locating today’s crisis in the flaws of a dominant model that has privileged Western forms and ignored private power. By highlighting the Palestine issue, he demonstrated how democratic principles are being eroded in the very societies that claim to embody them. By pointing to corporate power, he revealed the blind spots of a state-centered understanding of democracy.

Ultimately, Professor Friedman’s call was for a radical rethinking of democracy as a universal system of equal human choice. Only by embracing this vision, he argued, can democrats move beyond disillusionment and resist both authoritarianism and apathy. His intervention offered a powerful reminder that democracy’s renewal depends not on replication of Western models but on confronting the structural inequalities—both public and private—that undermine it.


Professor Julie Ingersoll: “That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US”

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In her presentation, Professor Julie Ingersoll offered a sobering ethnographic analysis of how religious and ostensibly secular movements in the United States have converged into a powerful populist force. Drawing on more than three decades of field-based scholarship on American religion, Professor Ingersoll explained how seemingly disparate strands of Christianity—along with nonreligious ideological currents—have coalesced into a theocratic, anti-democratic vision that underpins the populist movement known as MAGA. Her intervention highlighted the importance of rethinking how scholars conceptualize religion itself, arguing that theological differences often obscure shared cultural and political commitments.

The Ethnographer’s Lens

Professor Ingersoll situated her perspective within her disciplinary background. Unlike scholars who approach populism through theories of democracy or abstract political models, her work is rooted in ethnography and the close study of religious communities over time. Her aim, she explained, is not to prescribe strategies for saving democracy but to document the lived dynamics of religious movements and to clarify what society is up against. This commitment to description and analysis, she argued, is itself a vital intellectual responsibility: to bear witness, to explain, and to equip others with a deeper understanding of the cultural forces reshaping American politics.

Three Streams of Christian Nationalism

Central to Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her mapping of Christian nationalism into three distinct but increasingly interconnected traditions.

Evangelical Protestant Dominionism: The first stream emerges from white conservative evangelical Protestantism, particularly the Reconstructionist movement of the 1950s. These groups believe the Bible speaks to every area of life and advocate a theocratic social order rooted in pro-slavery Southern Presbyterianism. They view pluralism and social equality as heretical and insist that Christians are commanded to exercise “dominion” over the world, a mandate they trace back to Genesis. This dominionist vision has informed generations of evangelical activism, positioning biblical law as the sole legitimate foundation for governance.

Catholic Integralism: The second stream arises from Catholic integralism, a minority tradition within Catholicism that rejects church-state separation and seeks to organize society according to Catholic teaching. Integralists draw inspiration from the historic doctrine of the divine right of kings and today align themselves with efforts to dismantle the administrative state. Professor Ingersoll pointed to Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society’s transformation of the US Supreme Court as evidence of integralist influence. Their promotion of the “unitary executive” doctrine reflects a broader ambition to consolidate political power in ways that erode checks and balances.

Charismatic and Pentecostal Movements: The third stream comes from charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity, particularly the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) that arose in the 1990s. Emphasizing prophecy, apostleship, and spiritual warfare, these groups interpret the world as a literal battlefield between divine and demonic forces. Their “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions Christians seizing control of key spheres of society, from government and business to media and education. Professor Ingersoll warned that this branch of Christian nationalism, with its apocalyptic worldview and demonization of opponents, is especially prone to violence.

While historically divided and even hostile to one another, these three streams have forged common cause within the MAGA movement. Their theological disagreements, Professor Ingersoll argued, often matter less in everyday practice than their shared opposition to pluralism, egalitarianism, and democracy.

Rethinking Religion

A major contribution of Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her challenge to conventional understandings of religion. Too often, she argued, scholars and observers treat religion as a coherent set of theological beliefs derived from sacred texts. In reality, religious communities function as shifting assemblages of practices, narratives, and cultural markers that organize social life, demarcate insiders and outsiders, and legitimate particular hierarchies.

She illustrated this with a simple example for her students: when people choose a church, they often do so based on social comfort and community ties, not doctrinal precision. Over time, their beliefs shift to align with the group. In this sense, theology frequently follows social belonging rather than the other way around. Recognizing this dynamic, she argued, helps explain how divergent Christian traditions can set aside doctrinal disputes to advance a shared political project.

The Blurring of Religious and Secular

Importantly, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that Christian nationalism does not exist in isolation. It converges with ostensibly secular ideological movements, most notably Silicon Valley techno-utopianism. Tech futurists, accelerationists, and advocates of the “Dark Enlightenment” envision the collapse of democracy and its replacement by corporate-style governance, with CEOs and elite boards as rulers. They promote building digital and physical enclaves—whether in the cloud, on artificial islands, or even on Mars—where hierarchy replaces equality.

Despite their secular self-image, these movements align with Christian nationalism on core commitments: hostility to egalitarianism, skepticism toward democracy, and openness to societal collapse as an opportunity for renewal. Together, they form a strange but potent coalition, bound less by shared theology than by shared anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Ingersoll also pointed to nihilistic online subcultures that defy the left-right binary, particularly those implicated in the assassination of Charlie Kirk. These groups embrace collapse and seek to accelerate it, even if what follows is “nothingness.” Though ideologically incoherent, they reinforce the broader accelerationist impulse uniting religious and secular anti-democratic forces.

Theocratic Visions and Apocalyptic Anticipations

Across these groups—whether dominionist, integralist, Pentecostal, techno-utopian, or nihilist— Professor Ingersoll identified a common conviction that society is in chaos and decline, and that collapse is either inevitable or desirable. Some even imagine themselves as agents accelerating history toward apocalyptic ends. Though they may diverge sharply on what comes after collapse—the Kingdom of God, a Mars colony, or nihilistic nothingness—they are united in their rejection of democracy and equality in the present.

This convergence, she warned, explains why observers have underestimated their power. Analysts often dismissed each strand as fringe or mutually exclusive, missing the cultural work that bound them together. Only by reframing religion not as fixed belief but as lived practice can we see the coherence of this coalition.

Intellectual Responsibilities

Professor Ingersoll concluded by reflecting on the intellectual responsibilities of scholars in this precarious moment. She admitted that offering prescriptive solutions has never been her strength, nor does she claim to have a plan for saving American democracy. What she can do, she insisted, is “stay in her lane”: documenting, explaining, and bearing witness to the forces reshaping society.

She acknowledged the difficulty of gaining perspective within the United States, where daily life remains unchanged for many even as democratic institutions crumble. Yet she argued that democracy has already collapsed in significant ways, and the upcoming 2026 election may already be compromised beyond repair.

For academics, the challenge is compounded by growing pressures to remain silent. Universities, law firms, media organizations, and even independent institutions have faced campaigns to suppress dissent. Faculty—tenured, untenured, and even retired—have been fired or disciplined for their speech, often on the basis of accusations tied to social media. The silencing of intellectual voices, Professor Ingersoll warned, represents not just an attack on individuals but an erosion of democracy itself.

Conclusion

Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation illuminated the deep entanglements of religion, culture, and politics in the rise of American populism. By tracing the convergence of evangelical dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal charismatics, techno-utopians, and nihilist subcultures, she revealed a coalition united not by theology but by anti-democratic commitments. Her insistence on reframing religion as lived practice rather than doctrinal belief opened new avenues for understanding how these disparate groups reinforce one another.

Ultimately, her message was both analytical and cautionary. The coalition she described thrives on visions of collapse and acceleration, rejecting democracy and equality in favor of theocratic or technocratic alternatives. For scholars, the responsibility is to continue speaking, documenting, and explaining—even in the face of silencing. As Professor Ingersoll made clear, the stakes are nothing less than the future of American democracy.

 

Professor Richard Falk: “Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time”

UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.

In his presentation, Professor Richard Falk offered a sobering international perspective on the decline of democracy, the failures of US leadership, and the urgent need to rethink political responsibility in light of global crises. Speaking as a longtime scholar of international law and global order, Professor Falk situated the challenges of populism and authoritarianism within broader structural failures—of US democracy, capitalism, and the international system established after World War II.

The Tarnishing of Democracy

Professor Falk began by challenging the notion that populism alone is the cause of democratic erosion in the US. Democracy, he argued, was already “badly tarnished” long before the rise of Trumpism. For decades, the United States projected itself as the world’s exemplary democracy, yet in practice it offered citizens only a “choiceless democracy.” The two-party system, constrained by Cold War ideologies, provided little space for fundamental debate on the most pressing issues.

Secrecy further hollowed out democratic practice. The CIA and other US agencies subverted democratic movements abroad—staging coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere—while concealing these actions from the American public under the guise of national security. By normalizing criminal interventions as necessary for security, Professor Falk argued, the US “permanently corrupted the moral sensibilities of the citizenry.” Democracy was reduced to participation in elections that offered no real alternative, fueling disillusionment among the poor, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups whose grievances were consistently dismissed.

The Global Projection of Hypocrisy

Internationally, the United States squandered the opportunity after World War II to construct a just world order. Instead, it entrenched a system that privileged the victors. The United Nations Security Council institutionalized inequality by exempting the five permanent members from compliance with international law. As Professor Falk emphasized, this design elevated geopolitics over morality and law, undermining the credibility of global governance from the start.

The consequences of this hypocrisy are evident today. In conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza, international law is selectively invoked: wielded as a weapon against adversaries while ignored when allies commit violations. This double standard, Professor Falk argued, has transformed the US from a supposed champion of the rule of law into “the champion of moral hypocrisy.” The result is widespread alienation across much of the Global South, where US credibility as a promoter of democracy has eroded.

Capitalism, Populism, and the Assault on Truth

A further obstacle to democratic renewal lies in the current stage of global capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Professor Falk argued, is both exploitative and ecologically destructive. By privileging short-term profits over sustainability, it undermines governments’ ability to act in the public interest. Corporate influence on politics ensures that urgent global challenges—climate change, poverty, and disarmament—are subordinated to private interests.

Within this context, populism becomes not a solution but an amplifier of democratic decay. Trumpism, Professor Falk contended, embodies an “epistemological war against the Enlightenment.” It is hostile to expertise, reason, and evidence, and sanctions those who attempt to tell inconvenient truths. The suppression of international voices speaking out about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, including United Nations officials, is emblematic of this assault on truth. Words such as “genocide” are rendered almost unspeakable, even as atrocities unfold in real time. By eroding the possibility of truth-telling, populist politics undermines responsible citizenship and corrodes the foundations of democratic accountability.

Toward Emancipatory Politics

Against this backdrop, Professor Falk posed the critical question: what does it mean to be a responsible citizen in such dark times? His answer pointed toward the necessity of utopian thinking and, potentially, revolutionary transformation. Incremental reform within existing structures, he argued, is insufficient. The dominant social forces—military-industrial complexes, corporate lobbies, and entrenched elites—must be displaced by actors committed to the global public good.

For Professor Falk, the form of governance is less important than its orientation toward reality. Addressing existential challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, mass poverty—requires political systems that privilege truth, sustainability, and the collective interest over short-term expediency. Intriguingly, he noted, some of the most responsible practices in these areas currently come from China, a state that is highly autocratic and, in many respects, anti-democratic. This paradox raises the possibility that the ecological and geopolitical crises of the twenty-first century may demand post-democratic or post-populist forms of governance if humanity is to survive.

Conclusion

Professor Richard Falk’s presentation was a sweeping indictment of both US democracy and the international order it helped create. He argued that the failures of American democracy—its secrecy, its choicelessness, and its moral corruption—have reverberated globally, eroding trust in the very idea of liberal democracy. Coupled with an ecologically destructive capitalism and a populism hostile to truth, these dynamics leave humanity in a perilous position.

Yet Professor Falk’s talk was not only diagnostic but also prescriptive in spirit. He called for a politics of emancipation grounded in truth-telling, utopian imagination, and global solidarity. Whether through democratic renewal or through new, post-democratic arrangements, he urged that political systems must be reoriented toward the survival and flourishing of the human species. In a dark time, emancipation requires both courage and a willingness to envision radical alternatives.

 

Professor Larry Diamond: “Combatting Authoritarian Populism”

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

In his presentation, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a sweeping and sobering assessment of the threats facing democracy in the United States and around the world. Framing his remarks against a backdrop of rising authoritarian populism, Professor Diamond emphasized that the global tide of illiberalism is far from cresting. Instead, the forces of democratic backsliding—anchored in right-wing populism—are accelerating across multiple continents, diffusing strategies and legitimizing authoritarian models. Against this international canvas, he examined the United States as a critical battleground, where Donald Trump’s return to power has raised the prospect of a systematic dismantling of liberal democracy.

A Global Wave of Authoritarian Populism

Professor Diamond began by situating current US dynamics within a global context. Across Latin America, he observed, populist models inspired by both Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele are gaining traction. Chile may soon see a populist restoration, Bolivia and Colombia could follow suit, and Ecuador has already taken a hard turn to the right. These trends reflect a wider diffusion effect: just as democratic activists once drew inspiration from leaders such as Mario Soares in Portugal or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, today’s populist movements model themselves on figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.

Europe, too, faces serious risks. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally stands poised to take power in France, while Nigel Farage has become a plausible candidate for prime minister in the United Kingdom. Germany, traditionally a bulwark of liberal democracy, now contends with dynamics of polarized pluralism reminiscent of interwar Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, right-wing parties are resurgent, with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party threatening hard-won democratic restoration. Taken together, Professor Diamond warned, these developments mark an era of “deeply, dangerously fluid” political polarization.

Trumpism and the Project of Authoritarian Entrenchment

Within this global wave, the United States has reemerged as both a model and a cautionary tale. After returning to the presidency, Trump has pursued a far more methodical strategy to consolidate power, guided by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. This playbook, Professor Diamond explained, echoes Orbán’s transformation of Hungary from a liberal democracy to what he termed an “illiberal non-democracy”—a regime that preserves the appearance of competitive elections while hollowing out checks and balances.

Trump’s project, Professor Diamond warned, has advanced along nearly every step of the authoritarian “12-step program” outlined in his earlier book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. These steps include extreme polarization, demonization of the opposition, systematic attacks on the media, politicization of the courts, and the purge of independent institutions. What distinguishes the current moment, he stressed, is that these efforts are no longer impulsive but deliberate, refined over four years of preparation.

The Assault on Media, Courts, and Institutions

Professor Diamond catalogued the multiple fronts of authoritarian encroachment. Independent media face unprecedented threats from concentrated ownership by Trump-aligned billionaires, such as the Ellison family’s acquisitions of TikTok and Paramount (including CBS News). Once pillars of journalistic independence, these outlets risk being transformed into regime mouthpieces. The trend mirrors patterns in Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, where businessmen allied with ruling parties purchased media outlets to neutralize dissent.

The judiciary has likewise been targeted. Inspectors general across federal agencies were summarily dismissed at the outset of Trump’s new administration. Judge Advocate Generals in the Army, Navy, and Air Force—key advisors on constitutional limits within the military—were purged, raising concerns about the politicization of the armed forces. This, Professor Diamond noted, is a particularly ominous development: authoritarian leaders often seek to secure military loyalty as a safeguard against democratic resistance.

Universities, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations are also under attack. As in Hungary, where Orbán vilified George Soros, Trump’s allies have begun targeting major civil society organizations such as the Open Society Foundations and the Ford Foundation. Lawfare—weaponizing legal mechanisms to intimidate and suppress—has become a defining strategy, extending even to efforts to prosecute political opponents like former FBI director James Comey.

Gerrymandering, Lawfare, and Electoral Manipulation

At the electoral level, Trump’s allies have embraced grotesque gerrymandering to entrench minority rule. By redrawing districts with ruthless precision, they aim to secure durable Republican control of the House of Representatives, even without majority support. Echoing Orbán’s tactics in Hungary, such manipulation risks creating a façade of competition while structurally foreclosing alternation in power.

The broader strategy, Professor Diamond explained, is not to abolish elections but to subvert them—maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy while ensuring outcomes favorable to the regime. This is why vigilance over the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential elections is crucial. Without robust mobilization and institutional safeguards, the US risks sliding into electoral authoritarianism.

Intellectual Responsibilities: Rigor and Precision

Responding to the session’s theme of intellectual responsibility, Professor Diamond underscored the importance of terminological clarity. While Trumpism has fascistic elements—such as the stigmatization of minorities and the elevation of a charismatic leader—he cautioned against prematurely labeling the United States a fascist regime. Misusing charged terms, he argued, risks polarizing discourse further and alienating potential allies in the defense of democracy. Instead, scholars must distinguish carefully between illiberal democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and full-fledged authoritarianism. Intellectual rigor, he insisted, is itself a form of civic responsibility.

Lessons for Resisting Authoritarianism

Professor Diamond concluded with several lessons drawn from global experiences of democratic backsliding.

Mobilize early and vigorously:  The sooner authoritarian projects are resisted, the greater the chance of success. Once the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services are stacked with loyalists, reversing course becomes exponentially harder.

Combine institutional and civic strategies: Courts, legislatures, and oversight mechanisms remain critical tools, even if weakened. Judicial rulings can still draw lines, and regaining control of congressional committees would enable investigations into corruption. At the same time, civil society mobilization is indispensable: protests such as “No Kings Day,” which drew millions into the streets, exemplify the power of mass resistance.

Build broad electoral coalitions: Ultimately, authoritarian leaders are most often defeated at the ballot box. Opposition coalitions must transcend class and identity divides, adopting inclusive strategies that resonate beyond traditional partisan bases. Professor Diamond cited Turkey’s municipal elections, in which campaigns of “radical love” forged unlikely alliances, as an instructive model.

Prioritize economic performance: Voters care most about material conditions. Autocrats often mismanage economies due to corruption and cronyism, creating openings for opposition campaigns focused on bread-and-butter issues. As James Carville’s dictum reminds us: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Professor Diamond noted that Trump’s approval ratings are underwater across all policy areas, including crime and immigration, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with his governance.

Conclusion

Professor Larry Diamond’s presentation painted a stark picture of democracy under siege. Around the world, populist leaders are modeling themselves not on democratic icons but on illiberal strongmen. In the United States, Donald Trump’s methodical pursuit of power threatens to transform the country into an electoral authoritarian regime. From media capture and judicial purges to gerrymandering and lawfare, the signs are clear: America is far along the authoritarian pathway.

Yet Professor Diamond also offered hope rooted in historical lessons. Authoritarian regimes often collapse under the weight of their corruption, economic mismanagement, and overreach. Intellectuals must contribute with rigor and clarity, resisting hyperbolic labels while documenting authoritarian encroachments. Civil society must mobilize boldly, institutions must be defended, and electoral coalitions must be broadened.

The struggle, Professor Diamond concluded, is urgent but not lost. The fate of American democracy—and its global influence—will hinge on the ability of citizens, scholars, and leaders to confront authoritarianism with courage, precision, and unity.

 

Q&A Highlights 

A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.

The Q&A session following the panel underscored the urgency and complexity of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. Questions probed deeply into the militarization of politics, the durability of authoritarian regimes, and the prospects for democratic renewal. The exchange illuminated both the dangers at hand and the intellectual responsibility of scholars to frame these dangers with clarity.

Militarization of Politics in the US

The first question raised the issue of Donald Trump’s overt and covert attempts to draw the military into American politics. Referencing the July 4th military parade and the deployment of the National Guard in major US cities including Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, the questioner asked whether such actions risked militarizing US politics or politicizing the armed forces, with potential implications for other struggling democracies.

Professor Larry Diamond responded with grave concern. He described these moves as “serious, intentional, and very dangerous,” with both symbolic and practical consequences. Beyond rallying an exclusionary nationalism, Trump’s efforts have raised fears of outright constitutional violations. Professor Diamond relayed the warning of a senior retired military officer that Trump might attempt to deploy the National Guard in contested districts during the 2026 congressional elections to interfere with ballot access and recounts. Such maneuvers, he stressed, would mark a decisive step toward authoritarianism, as they seek to build a military apparatus personally loyal to Trump and the MAGA movement.

Professor Julie Ingersoll added another dimension, noting the religious undercurrents in Trump’s ties to figures such as Pete Hegseth, whose deep connections to Christian Reconstructionist networks highlight the fusion of military symbolism with theocratic ideologies. This overlap, she argued, further illustrates the blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and authoritarian aspirations in the US.

Can Authoritarian Regimes Be Reversed?

A second question asked whether history offered examples of authoritarian governments being deposed through democratic means, referencing Armitage’s claim that such reversals are rare. Responding, Professor Diamond acknowledged the difficulty but pointed to Poland as a partial example of democratic restoration, albeit one fraught with constitutional landmines left behind by previous authoritarian-minded governments. He predicted that future reversals would similarly confront dilemmas: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without replicating their illiberal methods.

Professor Diamond rejected the notion that authoritarian projects last indefinitely. Their corruption, failures, and reliance on aging leaders such as Erdoğan, he argued, ultimately erode their viability. New democratic moments do emerge, though they face immense challenges. For the US, the fundamental test will come in the 2026 midterm elections, where the integrity of voting and counting remains the essential condition for democracy.

 

Concluding Reflections by Professor Cengiz Aktar

In his closing remarks, moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar reflected on the themes of the discussion with a sobering tone. He observed that the global zeitgeist had shifted dramatically: no longer are scholars debating how to build democracy, but rather how to prevent its collapse. Echoing Richard Falk’s notion of “dark times,” Professor Aktar emphasized that naming the threat accurately—calling fascism by its name—is essential. Euphemisms, he argued, obscure the gravity of the crisis.

Professor Aktar pointed to both danger and paradox. While populist and authoritarian leaders draw significant mass support, their rise reveals the gap between freedom and democracy. He recalled Professor Mabel Berezin’s warning that invocations of “freedom” are often decoupled from democratic commitments, enabling libertarian and extremist actors to weaponize speech through digital platforms. At the same time, freedom of expression is selectively curtailed, as seen in the suppression of voices denouncing atrocities such as the Gaza genocide.

Ultimately, Professor Aktar concluded that the world is entering an especially perilous period marked by democratic erosion, mass manipulation, and authoritarian resilience. In this context, he stressed the vital role of intellectual gatherings like this one, noting that the ECPS will likely need to convene further forums to analyze and resist these trends. His remarks closed the session on a sober but mobilizing note: intellectuals, activists, and citizens alike must remain vigilant and engaged in defense of democracy.

 

Overall Conclusion

The ECPS panel “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding” offered a sobering yet clarifying examination of the forces eroding democracy across the globe. What emerged most clearly is that populism today cannot be dismissed as a passing style of politics or a democratic “correction.” Rather, it increasingly serves as a vehicle for authoritarian entrenchment, exploiting institutions, culture, religion, and technology in ways that carry fascistic echoes.

Professor Mabel Berezin’s analysis highlighted the transformation of US populism into what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a strategy less reliant on militias than on legal, cultural, and intellectual frameworks that dismantle democracy from within. Professor Steven Friedman dismantled the illusion of a pristine democratic past, reminding us that Western models themselves are faltering, especially when they ignore the power of corporate interests and the structural exclusions on which they rest. 

Professor Julie Ingersoll exposed the convergence of Christian dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal-charismatics, and techno-utopians into a shared anti-democratic coalition—an unlikely but potent fusion united by hostility to pluralism and democracy. Professor Richard Falk placed these developments in global perspective, underscoring the hypocrisy of US democracy promotion, the corrosive effects of secrecy and capitalism, and the urgent need for emancipatory politics grounded in truth-telling and ecological survival. Finally, Professor Larry Diamond warned of deliberate authoritarian projects in the United States, modeled on Orbán and Erdoğan, that weaponize law, gerrymandering, media capture, and even the military to consolidate power.

The Q&A deepened these concerns, particularly around the militarization of politics under Trump and the fragility of democratic reversals. The possibility of deploying the National Guard for electoral interference, as Professor Diamond relayed, illustrates how quickly democratic norms can collapse.

Moderator Cengiz Aktar closed with a stark reminder: the global zeitgeist has shifted. We are no longer asking how to build democracy but how to prevent its collapse. The panelists converged on a central responsibility—that intellectuals must resist euphemism, call authoritarianism and fascism by their names, and provide frameworks that clarify rather than obscure. In an era marked by disinformation, selective freedoms, and systemic crisis, clarity itself becomes a democratic act.

The challenge, then, is twofold: to defend democracy where it still exists and to reimagine it in forms capable of confronting the structural inequalities, ecological perils, and authoritarian tactics of our age.

Demonstration organized by KOD in Kraków, Poland, on January 9, 2016, in defense of free media and democracy against the PiS government. Photo: Krzysztof Nahlik.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 19, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00114



On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On September 18, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the second session of its Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. The session, titled “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” brought together leading scholars to examine the Polish case as a lens into broader struggles over democracy, representation, and rights. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (University of Oxford), the event highlighted Poland’s experience of post-1989 transformation, the contested legacy of Solidarity, constitutional polarization, and ongoing battles over women’s and minority rights.

Following the introduction of the programme and participants by Reka Koleszar on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford) opened by situating the discussion within a wider European context. Reflecting on Britain’s surge of far-right populism, she posed a dilemma: should mass populist movements be regarded as authentic expressions of civic grievance, or as dangerous forces of hatred and violence? She expressed hope that the Polish experience could illuminate how democracies might redirect discontent toward renewal rather than demagoguery.

The first presentation, delivered by Professor Jacek Kurczewski on behalf of his wife, the absent Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), revisited her long-standing work on Polish patriotism. Drawing on the legacy of Solidarity and the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, she argued that inclusive, pluralist patriotism once united workers, intellectuals, and clergy, but that its legacy has since weakened. She warned that today’s exclusionary populism thrives on the failure to sustain that inclusive vision.

Dr. Kamil Jonski  (University of Łódź) then addressed Poland’s constitutional polarization. His paper, “Single Text, Clashing Meanings,” traced how the 1997 Constitution, from its inception, was a battleground of rival axiologies. While liberals view it as a rights-based framework, conservatives interpret it through a lens of sovereignty and morality. The 2015 constitutional crisis, resulting in right-wing packing of the Tribunal, offered opportunity to impose one of those visions, and produced a constitutional quagmire with disagreement not only on values, but also legitimacy of institutions (including top judicial bodies).

Professor Malgorzata Fuszara  (University of Warsaw) explored the contested trajectory of human rights. She distinguished between broad consensus on universal rights after 1989 and the divisive politics of women’s and minority rights. Abortion restrictions, stalled LGBTQ reforms, and uneven protections illustrate enduring resistance. Yet she also highlighted progress, including the redefinition of rape law and gender quotas in parliament, underscoring the unfinished task of fully integrating women’s and minority rights into Poland’s human rights framework.

Finally, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw) presented his own paper on representation and the rule of law. He challenged populist claims that only elected politicians embody the nation, arguing that judges also represent the nation through law, oath, and culture. Reviving lay participation in justice, he suggested, could counteract populist narratives and strengthen judicial legitimacy.

The discussion was enriched by three international discussants. Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg) highlighted the need to revisit the legacy of Solidarity for democratic resilience and probed the paradox of women’s electoral behavior. Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago) compared Poland’s constitutional struggles to US debates, raising questions about the gap between cultural appeals and economic policy. Professor Krzysztof Motyka (Catholic University of Lublin) drew attention to the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, from Father Popiełuszko’s defense of life to the linguistic shift from civic to human rights.

Together, the session illuminated Poland as a microcosm of global struggles: how inclusive traditions are eroded by polarized politics, how constitutions fracture under competing axiologies, and how rights remain contested terrain.

Professor Mavis Maclean: Populism — Authentic Civic Voice or Dangerous Force of Hatred?

Participants of nationalist and anti-Islamic demonstration organized by far-right organisations use smoke races, hold banners in Warsaw, Poland on April 10, 2016. Photo: Wiola Wiaderek.

Mavis Maclean opened her contribution by emphasizing the significance of the discussion, describing it as both urgent and only just beginning to receive the attention it deserves. Reflecting on a recent conversation with a colleague who asked about the figure of Tommy Robinson, Maclean situated him within a broader European surge of far-right populism rooted in anxieties over immigration. She recalled that even British prime ministers had spoken of the country as becoming an “island of strangers.” For Maclean, this illustrates how immigration has become a focal point for rising populist energies that have caught established institutions unprepared.

She posed a central dilemma: should populist movements be valued as authentic expressions of civic sentiment, or feared as destabilizing forces that can slip into violence and hatred? Drawing contrasts with more hopeful movements in other contexts, Maclean warned that in Britain today the populist surge appears more threatening than transformative. Traditional party structures have weakened, with the Conservatives in decline and figures such as Nigel Farage and the Reform Party gaining visibility on the far right. Maclean expressed hope that the day’s presentations would help identify constructive responses—ways to reinforce the rule of law, rebuild political trust, and channel popular discontent into democratic renewal rather than demagoguery. 

Joanna Kurczewska: “Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of Solidarity 1980–1989 in the Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas”

Solidarity logo on a flag during an anti-government demonstration, June 30, 2011, in Warsaw, Poland. Solidarity, a Polish trade union federation, was founded on August 31, 1980, at the Gdańsk Shipyard under the leadership of Lech Wałęsa. Photo: Tomasz Bidermann.

Because of illness, Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences) could not attend the panel in person. Her paper was instead delivered by her husband, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw). His presentation offered a rich reconstruction of Kurczewska’s long-term research on the intellectual and cultural legacies of Polish patriotism, with particular attention to the Solidarity movement (1980–1989).

Kurczewski opened with reflections on the difficulty of translating concepts such as “patriotism” and “nationalism” across linguistic and cultural contexts. In Poland, patriotism carries largely positive connotations, while nationalism is often viewed with suspicion. By contrast, in English-language scholarship “nationalism” is frequently a neutral, technical category. Kurczewska’s analysis insists that these terms cannot be divorced from their cultural histories.

The paper revisited her pioneering study from the 1990s, based on interviews with 53 Polish politicians in the early years of the Third Republic. Surprisingly, many of them—whether from the former Communist Party or from the anti-communist opposition—downplayed Solidarity as a living source of political ideas. While acknowledging its historical importance, they treated it as a closed chapter rather than a repertoire for democratic renewal.

From Solidarity to Liberal Patriotism

Today, in a deeply polarized Poland divided between Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Coalition, Kurczewska argues it is essential to recall the pluralism and inclusivity that defined Solidarity’s original ethos. Born from the Interfactory Strike Committee in 1980, Solidarity united workers, engineers, intellectuals, and Catholic clergy under a shared platform, symbolized by the charismatic figure of Lech Wałęsa and the Black Madonna emblem on his lapel.

A key focus of Kurczewska’s analysis is the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, the Catholic priest murdered by communist security services in 1984. Through his “Masses for the Homeland,” Popiełuszko created spaces that were both liturgical and profoundly civic. These gatherings became cultural products of resistance: religious rituals infused with democratic, republican, and Romantic ideals of truth, justice, courage, and solidarity. Importantly, they were inclusive, drawing believers and non-believers alike, and forging bonds between workers and intellectuals. In this, Kurczewska identifies a crucial anthropological dimension of patriotism—as lived practice and social performance, not just political ideology.

Popiełuszko’s sermons, she argues, advanced a form of “liberal patriotism.” Unlike traditional Polish Romantic nationalism, his vision insisted that the national community must guarantee individual autonomy and human rights. This creative redefinition of patriotism during late communism exemplifies how cultural and religious traditions can be reinterpreted to support democratic values.

Enigmatic Representation and Forgotten Legacies

Kurczewski then turned to the transition of the 1990s, when post-communist social democrats successfully reinserted themselves into politics. By appropriating elements of national tradition, they achieved electoral victories, while radical nationalists were marginalized to the political fringe. Yet, as Kurczewska warns, this era of “inclusive politics” has given way to a new fragmentation. Today, figures from the far-right fringe not only gain parliamentary seats but even sit in the European Parliament, bringing anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and anti-European rhetoric into the mainstream.

The conclusion of the paper introduced the notion of “enigmatic representation.” Kurczewska observed that Polish politicians of the 1990s, whether post-communist or from the Solidarity camp, tended to speak in the name of “the nation” or “society” without genuine interest in citizen voices. Society was treated as an object to be mobilized rather than a subject of representation. She suggested that this top-down approach may have sown long-term frustration, paving the way for today’s populist politics, which relies on exclusive language, sharp polarization, and appeals to younger generations through anti-migrant and anti-EU narratives.

The paper ultimately invites us to reconsider Solidarity not as a nostalgic memory, but as a resource for rebuilding democratic culture. Its pluralism, inclusive patriotism, and agonistic rather than antagonistic style of communication offer lessons for today’s Poland, where politics risks sliding into exclusionary populism. Kurczewska’s anthropological lens underscores that patriotism, when rooted in lived practices of solidarity, can remain a democratic force rather than a vehicle of division.

Delivered with warmth and intellectual care by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, the paper stood as both a historical analysis and a contemporary warning: Poland’s democratic future may depend on recovering the forgotten legacies of inclusive patriotism forged in the crucible of Solidarity.

Dr. Kamil Joński: “Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire”

Dr. Kamil Joński’s presentation offered a penetrating exploration of the Polish constitutional crisis, reframing it as not merely a legal or institutional dispute but as a struggle over political meaning, legitimacy, and the cultural axiology of constitutionalism itself. His central thesis was clear: although the 1997 Constitution has become an accepted normative text in Poland, its interpretation has fractured along deep political, cultural, and religious cleavages. This fragmentation has led to what Dr. Joński called a “constitutional quagmire,” in which the same constitutional text sustains radically divergent visions of democracy, the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the judicial bodies to be recognized as a court of law.

Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Polarization

Dr. Joński began by situating the problem historically. The first decade after the fall of communism was dominated by what scholars call the post-communist cleavage: the political opposition between former regime actors and the dissident opposition. Yet this cleavage reached exhaustion by the early 2000s.

By 2001, two new parties emerged from the younger generation of anti-communists: Civic Platform (PO), founded by Donald Tusk, and Law and Justice (PiS), founded by the Kaczyński brothers. Since 2005, Dr. Joński argued, the rivalry between these two parties has organized not only political life but also the constitutional order itself. 

The Fragile Legitimacy of the 1997 Constitution

 

Dr. Joński turned next to the peculiar circumstances of the 1997 Constitution. Although it has endured for nearly three decades, its legitimacy has always been contested. Drafted by a parliament with an artificial post-communist majority—produced by electoral reform rather than a genuine social mandate—it was opposed by the Christian right, which offered an alternative “citizens’ draft” of the constitution. Finally, the constitution was approved in a referendum by the majority of 53.5% of voters on a 43% turnout. According to its critics, this meant less than one-quarter of eligible Poles endorsed the Constitution,  labeling it not only “post-communist” but also “a minority constitution.” Yet, this contested document functioned relatively effectively for nearly 20 years, providing a framework for governance, EU accession, and steady economic development.

The 2015 Break: From Amendment to Interpretation

This balance collapsed in 2015. For the first time since democratization, one party—PiS—secured both a single-party parliamentary majority and the presidency. This unique constellation of power made it possible to embark on what retired Constitutional Tribunal justice Professor M. Wyrzykowski described as a “war against the Constitution.” Crucially, PiS lacked the supermajorities needed for formal constitutional amendment. Instead, it turned to institutional capture of the Constitutional Tribunal as a means of constitutional change through interpretation.

To this end PiS embarked what Dr. Jonski called “purposeful top-down de-legitimization” of the Tribunal. Initially respected across the political spectrum, and even praised for rulings sympathetic to Catholic doctrine in issues like abortion, the Tribunal was rapidly delegitimized through propaganda campaigns. branding it as an enemy of “the people.” Once PiS nominees assumed control over the Tribunal, it became what Professor Wojciech Sadurski has termed a “governmental enabler.” For PiS supporters, the Tribunal was re-legitimized as a defender of “the people” against liberal elites.

The Long Shadow of 1997

One of the most striking elements of Dr. Joński’s presentation was his demonstration of the continuity between the 1997 referendum and contemporary politics. Using electoral and survey data, he showed that nearly 45% of the variance in the 2025 presidential runoff could be explained by voting patterns from the 1997 constitutional referendum. In other words, attitudes toward the Constitution nearly three decades earlier are still visible on the Poland’s political map.

This persistence suggests that disputes about the Constitution are not only institutional but deeply cultural, rooted in long-standing divisions between religiously practicing conservatives and more secular, liberal constituencies.

Survey Evidence: Religion, Memory, and Constitutional Identity

Dr. Joński enriched his argument examining data from the late 1990s through the 2010s, to  trac how different groups answered the questions related to the Constitution. Due to the shifts in Polish political landscape, he grouped respondents according to two criteria: self-identification on the left-right scale and religious service attendance.

In 1997, opposition to the constitution was heavily concentrated among respondents identifying with political right and declaring weekly service attendance. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution twenty years earlier—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters most frequently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change.

In 1997, opposition was heavily concentrated among practicing Catholics on the right. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters consistently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change, arguing that the text was ill-suited to Poland’s needs.

When constitutional amendment proved politically unattainable, these constituencies turned to reinterpretation through institutional capture. This strategy was visible in survey responses during the height of the Tribunal crisis: when asked whether they supported the Tribunal or the government, practicing right-wing voters typically sided with the latter, despite the Tribunal’s earlier record of religiously sympathetic rulings on abortion, “blasphemy” and “conscientious objection.

Competing Constitutional Axiologies

The idea of saturating constitutional text with values is offered by legal doctrines favored on the political left (R. Dworkin’s 1996 “moral reading” of constitution) as well as right (A. Vermeule’s 2022 “Common Good Constitutionalism”).

At the heart of Dr. Joński’s analysis is the idea that such process occurred in Poland, and on both sides of axiological conflict. Thus, Poland faces a paradox: the Constitution can be shared as a text, yet it divides substantively as a contested source of meaning. Each camp projects its values onto the same text, producing parallel constitutional orders.

The Dual-Track Constitutional Order

After 2015 constitutional crisis and its implications, the situation is even worse, as both sides disagree not only on axiological meaning of the constitutional provisions, but also on the institutions legitimized to resolve the disputes (the legality of judicial appointment and the very status of the court of law). Today, Poland operates under what Dr. Joński called a dual-track constitutional regime.

Conclusion: A Constitution without Consensus

In closing, Dr. Joński emphasized the paradoxical nature of Polish constitutionalism. The 1997 Constitution, once derided as illegitimate, has become broadly accepted as a normative framework. Yet this acceptance has not produced consensus. Instead, it has given rise to clashing interpretations, each claiming fidelity to the text while advancing divergent value systems, visions of democracy, sovereignty, and rights.

This “single text, clashing meanings” dynamic illustrates the fragility of constitutional democracy in polarized societies. Poland’s experience suggests that legitimacy is not only a matter of formal adoption but of sustained cultural consensus. Absent that, constitutions risk becoming battlegrounds of identity, leaving societies vulnerable to constitutional crises.

Prof. Małgorzata Fuszara: “Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights”

Women’s strike and protest in Warsaw, Poland, against the abortion ban and the legal changes restricting the right to appeal fines or penalties. Photo: Eryk Losik.

Professor Małgorzata Fuszara delivered a nuanced and historically grounded analysis of the trajectory of human rights in Poland, with particular attention to the contested arenas of women’s rights and minority rights. Her paper carefully distinguished between two categories: the general, universal human rights that gained wide acceptance after 1989, and the more divisive domains of gender equality and minority protection, which remain highly politicized.

Human Rights under Authoritarianism and the Democratic Breakthrough

Professor Fuszara began with a reminder of the authoritarian context before 1989. For half a century, fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to demonstrate, and the freedom to travel abroad were absent or severely restricted. Even trivial matters, such as the minutes of academic meetings, required approval by the censor. Public gatherings of more than five people needed official authorization. Passports were withheld and permission was required for every trip abroad.

Such restrictions underscored how authoritarian regimes can comprehensively curtail freedoms. Against this backdrop, the democratic breakthrough of 1989 brought a remarkable consensus: across the political spectrum, there was broad agreement on the need to enshrine fundamental rights. Drafting regulations for assemblies, for instance, was not a divisive issue. The recognition of basic human rights became part of Poland’s democratic DNA, at least at the level of principle.

From Consensus to Contestation

Yet Professor Fuszara emphasized that the consensus around general human rights did not extend to the rights of women and minorities. Here, division emerged immediately after 1989. The most striking example was reproductive rights. Under communism, abortion had been legal since 1956, earlier than in much of Western Europe. Generations of Polish women grew accustomed to reproductive autonomy. Thus, it came as a shock when the very first legislative proposals in the post-1989 parliament sought to introduce a total ban on abortion.

This debate revealed deep internal fractures. Even within Solidarność, the emblem of democratic opposition, the leadership supported abortion restrictions, while the women’s section opposed them. Since then, reproductive rights have remained one of the most divisive issues in Polish politics. Attempts to tighten abortion laws, particularly through Constitutional Tribunal rulings, repeatedly sparked mass mobilizations. The so-called “Black Protests” drew waves of young women—and many men—onto the streets, reshaping electoral patterns. Yet despite these mobilizations, restrictive laws remain in place, making abortion a symbol of both resistance and regression in contemporary Poland.

Minority Rights: Uneven Trajectories

Turning to minority rights, Professor Fuszara offered a differentiated assessment. The situation of ethnic and national minorities is relatively stable and in line with European Union standards. Legal provisions facilitate their parliamentary representation, and although disputes persist over which groups qualify as national minorities, these are largely managed within democratic debate.

In contrast, sexual minorities remain excluded from full equality. Efforts to introduce marriage equality or even civil partnerships have repeatedly failed. Professor Fuszara recalled attempts made over a decade ago, including during her own tenure as government plenipotentiary for equality, which were ultimately defeated. Although new proposals occasionally emerge, expectations remain low, and Poland continues to lag behind Western Europe in this field.

Professor Fuszara also stressed that formal legal guarantees often diverge from political practice. She recalled episodes when women protesting abortion restrictions faced harsh police repression, highlighting how authorities can undermine rights through coercive enforcement. These instances illustrate the fragility of rights protections in polarized contexts: while the principles of human rights may enjoy rhetorical consensus, their application can be obstructed by partisan or authoritarian impulses.

Recent Advances and Sources of Optimism

Despite these challenges, Professor Fuszara pointed to important achievements. Poland has ratified the Istanbul Convention, strengthening protections against gender-based violence. A major legal reform last month redefined rape in line with feminist jurisprudence, foregrounding the perspective of the victim for the first time. This marked an overdue recognition of the principle that women’s rights are human rights.

She also highlighted the adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists in 2011. Poland is, alongside states of the former Yugoslavia, one of the few post-communist countries to institutionalize such measures. As a result, women now hold slightly over 30% of parliamentary seats—a modest but significant improvement compared to the past, and higher than in several neighboring states, such as Hungary, where women constitute just 15% of parliament.

Nevertheless, Professor Fuszara closed with a sober reflection. Under communism, gender equality had been proclaimed as a principle, but often only formally. Post-1989, this principle was never fully reframed within the human rights paradigm. The slogan “women’s rights are human rights,” first articulated globally at the Vienna Conference in 1993 and reaffirmed in Beijing in 1995, still struggles to gain full resonance in Poland. For many politicians, gender equality remains a marginal issue, subordinated to party competition or cultural conservatism.

Conclusion

Professor Fuszara’s presentation revealed a paradox at the heart of Polish democracy. On one hand, there is a strong, cross-party commitment to universal human rights, born of the shared memory of authoritarian restrictions. On the other, women’s rights and minority rights continue to be arenas of deep contestation, exposing the limits of consensus and the persistence of patriarchal and exclusionary norms.

Her reflections traced both regression—visible in abortion restrictions and stalled progress on LGBTQ rights—and genuine advances, such as the redefinition of rape and the implementation of gender quotas. Above all, she insisted that rights cannot be taken for granted. They must be continuously defended, reframed, and expanded. The challenge remains to integrate women’s rights and minority rights fully into the fabric of human rights, so that they are no longer treated as exceptions but as integral to the democratic promise made in 1989.

Professor Jacek Kurczewski: “Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law”

Modern building of the Supreme Court of Poland in Warsaw, photographed on January 7, 2020. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his presentation, Professor Jacek Kurczewski explored the contested notion of representation at the heart of Poland’s ongoing rule-of-law conflict. Framing the problem through both political sociology and constitutional analysis, he examined how populist rhetoric weaponizes the formula “we, the people” against the judiciary, and how judges themselves may legitimately be understood as representatives of the nation.

Populism, “the People,” and Judicial Autonomy

Professor Kurczewski began by situating the debate in the populist appropriation of democracy. Leaders of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) claimed to embody the authentic will of the people, portraying judicial independence as an undemocratic obstacle. Judges, they argued, were relics of communist privilege or elitist guardians hostile to popular sovereignty. The rhetoric was often vulgar—accusations ranged from petty theft to corruption—but also grounded in a doctrinal attack: the judiciary was accused of claiming sovereignty for itself, elevating constitutional interpretation above the elected parliament.

This framing, Professor Kurczewski noted, created a false dichotomy: elected representatives as the sole voice of the people versus judges cast as self-appointed elites. The populist narrative ignored the constitutional and cultural grounds by which judges themselves exercise representative authority.

The Judiciary and Competing Logics of Representation

Drawing on Hanna Pitkin’s classic theory of representation—the idea of representing what is not physically present— Professor Kurczewski argued that judges too represent the nation. They do so not through electoral mandate but through their role as guardians of law, which is itself a core element of national culture. The Polish constitution, party manifestos, and civic tradition define the nation as a community of culture, history, and shared values. Law, he emphasized, is inseparable from this community; to apply and protect it is to embody the nation’s identity.

Judicial oaths reinforce this function. Each Polish judge swears to serve the Republic faithfully, uphold the law, and dispense justice impartially and with dignity. In this way, judges symbolically—and practically—act as representatives of the nation’s legal and moral order, even though they are not chosen by direct election.

Professor Kurczewski highlighted that the tension is not between representation and non-representation but between different forms of representation. Parliamentarians, under the free mandate principle inherited from Burkean tradition, represent the nation as a whole rather than their constituencies. Judges, by contrast, represent justice and the legal order. Both are indirect vehicles of sovereignty, as Article 4 of the Polish Constitution affirms that power derives from the nation and is exercised either directly or through representatives. Thus, the confrontation between politicians and judges is not about legitimacy per se, but about clashing logics of legitimacy—electoral versus legal-constitutional.

Professor Kurczewski also lamented the decline of lay judges in Poland since 1989. Once a significant institution allowing citizens to participate directly in adjudication, lay judges were marginalized in the transition era as professional judges sought to elevate the dignity and autonomy of the judiciary. This, he argued, was a missed opportunity. Strengthening lay participation could provide a democratic bridge between the judiciary and society, countering populist claims that judges are isolated elites.

Conclusion

Professor Kurczewski concluded that defending judicial independence cannot rely solely on institutional autonomy. It must also involve rethinking representation in more inclusive ways. Recognizing judges as representatives of the nation—albeit in a distinct mode from elected politicians—undermines populist accusations of illegitimacy. At the same time, reinforcing lay participation in courts could help reconnect the judiciary with society, blunting populist attacks and deepening democratic legitimacy.

Ultimately, the struggle for the rule of law in Poland is not only a battle over institutions but also over meanings of representation itself. Who speaks for the nation—the politicians who claim its voice, or the judges who embody its law? Professor Kurczewski’s intervention suggested that the answer must acknowledge both, while resisting the authoritarian temptation to silence one in the name of the other.

Discussants’ Contributions

Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg)

The first discussant, Dr. Magdalena Solska, Assistant Professor at the University of Fribourg, opened the commentary session by reflecting on the richness of the panel and the uniqueness of the Polish case. She approached her role primarily through questions and reflections designed to stimulate further debate.

Turning first to Prof. Joanna Kurczewska’s paper on Polish patriotism and the legacy of Solidarity, Dr. Solska praised the author’s use of the concept of resistance rather than mere opposition. She underlined that in political science, resistance carries a moral and normative dimension highly relevant to understanding the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. Yet she also raised a challenging question: was it perhaps inevitable that the legacy of Solidarity would weaken in the face of the unprecedented pressures of post-communist transformation—social, political, and especially economic? In her view, the turbulence of systemic change may have eroded the sense of national community that Solidarity once embodied. If so, she suggested, today’s polarized context may offer an opportune moment to revisit that legacy and ask how it could contribute to democratic resilience.

On Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Dr. Solska praised the presentation as resourceful and empirically rich, especially in its reconstruction of the long and contentious constitution-making process of the 1990s. She welcomed the reminder that Poland’s constitutional reality long preceded its final text, making the process unique compared with other post-communist countries. At the same time, she offered constructive critiques. First, she encouraged Dr. Joński to state his research question more clearly at the outset, as the central argument—explaining the enduring loyalty of PiS’s electorate—only emerged at the end. Second, she questioned his use of “liberal-democratic” versus “religious-traditional” categories, suggesting that the latter can also be democratic and that alternative labels might better capture the cleavage. Finally, she argued that the desire for constitutional change among practicing conservatives should not automatically be viewed as negative, given the ambiguities of the 1997 constitution. She encouraged deeper engagement with the role of political polarization, which in her view desensitizes electorates to rule-bending practices by their preferred parties.

With respect to Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minorities, Dr. Solska raised a probing question about electoral behavior: why do significant numbers of women in Poland vote for PiS, often in higher proportions than for the liberal Civic Coalition? This paradox, she suggested, requires careful sociological and political analysis.

Finally, commenting on Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on representation and the rule of law, Dr. Solska asked how, in a context of deep political polarization, the rule of law might realistically be restored or strengthened. Since the rule of law presupposes broad consensus, she expressed skepticism about whether such consensus is achievable in today’s climate and pressed Professor Kurczewski to consider not if but how this renewal might occur.

Her remarks set the tone for an engaged and critical discussion, highlighting conceptual nuances, empirical puzzles, and the pressing challenge of polarization across all contributions.

Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago School of Law)

The second discussant, Professor Barry Sullivan of Loyola University Chicago, opened his remarks by situating the Polish experience within a comparative perspective shaped by his own work on American constitutionalism. Noting that he often asks his students to grapple with the challenges of interpreting and implementing a constitution written more than two centuries ago, he found Dr. Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional trajectory particularly illuminating. He highlighted the striking continuity Dr. Joński traced between the contested adoption of the 1997 Constitution and today’s disputes over its meaning, emphasizing how early legitimacy deficits continue to reverberate decades later.

Drawing from the US context, Professor Sullivan posed a pointed question: to what extent does the Polish case reveal a disconnect between cultural politics and economic interests similar to that visible in the United States? He observed that in contemporary American politics, ruling parties often cultivate loyalty by appealing to socially conservative values—on issues such as abortion, marriage equality, and education—while simultaneously advancing deregulatory or pro-capitalist policies that may not materially benefit the same constituencies. He asked whether a similar disjunction between value-based appeals and economic outcomes can be seen in Poland’s current political landscape.

Turning to Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on judicial independence and representation, Professor Sullivan drew an instructive comparison with the US Supreme Court. In recent years, he noted, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the executive branch, issuing consequential rulings at great speed and often without reasoned explanations. This, he stressed, departs from the traditional American ideal of the rule of law, which requires not only judgments but transparent justifications that anchor decisions in legal reasoning rather than political expediency. Professor Sullivan thus invited further discussion of whether Poland’s embattled judiciary faces parallel challenges, and how judges can maintain legitimacy in the face of politicized attacks.

Finally, Professor Sullivan engaged with Professor Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minority rights, drawing an analogy to the US struggle over civil society and historical memory. He noted that in Poland, as Professor Fuszara described, the media and public institutions became contested arenas after 1989. Today, in the US, similar dynamics are unfolding as political actors attempt to control not only state institutions but also cultural ones once assumed to be apolitical, such as museums, the Smithsonian, or even the National Park Service. He cited recent reports of efforts to purge references to slavery and racial injustice from park materials, framing this as part of a broader strategy to politicize civil society and restrict critical narratives.

In closing, Professor Sullivan praised the panel for offering a rich comparative perspective on constitutionalism, human rights, and political polarization. While acknowledging his questions as those of an outsider, he emphasized how Poland’s experience provides important lessons for scholars and practitioners wrestling with the fragility of the rule of law in democracies old and new.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

The third discussant, Professor Krzysztof Motyka, offered reflections that bridged the three presentations while drawing on historical, theological, and sociological perspectives. He began with a commentary on the legacy of Blessed Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, situating him not only as a figure of anti-communist resistance but also as an early defender of human rights. Professor Motyka underscored that Popiełuszko consistently emphasized the sanctity of life “from conception,” opposing the liberal abortion laws of communist Poland. While not advocating punitive measures, he insisted that the Church’s responsibility lay in both proclaiming the sanctity of life and ensuring social and state support for women in difficult circumstances. Professor Motyka reminded the audience that Popiełuszko remains venerated as a patron of reconciliation and respect for life, symbolized by his inclusion in national commemorations. He also recalled Cardinal Glemp’s 1988 caution that protecting the unborn must not become a tool of political bargaining, highlighting the tension between moral conviction and political instrumentalization.

Turning to Professor Fuszara’s presentation, Professor Motyka focused on the linguistic and conceptual transformation in Poland’s rights discourse. Before 1989, he noted, academic and legal circles predominantly used the language of “civil” or “civic rights,” tied to the framework of citizenship and the state. Only in the late 1980s did the universalist vocabulary of “human rights” gain prominence, a shift that reflected broader philosophical and political change. The adoption of this language after the democratic transition, he argued, signaled a recognition that rights derive from human dignity and nature, not merely from state recognition.

Finally, commenting on Dr. Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Professor Motyka provided a personal reflection. While uncertain of his own vote in the 1997 constitutional referendum, he recalled that many Poles who opposed the text did so less for substantive reasons than for historical or emotional ones. For some, it seemed a bitter irony that a parliament dominated by post-communists was entrusted with drafting and adopting the nation’s new constitution—a task many believed should have belonged to the democratic opposition. For these voters, rejecting the Constitution was less about legal content and more about expressing a sense of historical injustice.

Professor Motyka concluded by thanking the panel, stressing that such interdisciplinary dialogue helps illuminate the deeper moral, cultural, and symbolic dimensions of Poland’s constitutional struggles.

Concluding Assessments by Professor Mavis Maclean

In her closing reflections, Professor Mavis Maclean offered a comparative perspective from the United Kingdom, noting with interest that none of the panelists had raised the issue of money. In the UK, she explained, questions of judicial policy, legal reform, or access to justice are always framed by cost. Having worked as an advisor in the Ministry of Justice, she recalled that every proposal was first judged by whether it offered “value for money”—a narrow and often crude measure for shaping a justice system. By contrast, Australia has adopted a more nuanced framework, discussing reforms in terms of “social return on investment,” yet even there, financial justification dominates policymaking. Maclean observed, with a touch of irony, that Poland must be “so rich” not to worry about such constraints, though she suspected this might not fully be the case.

Turning back to the themes of the seminar, she emphasized how refreshing it was to hear discussions focused on values rather than pounds and pence. In Britain, even debates about immigration, populist protest, and human rights are quickly reduced to questions of affordability—border controls, asylum procedures, or welfare costs. By contrast, today’s conversation had foregrounded principles: rule of law, democracy, patriotism, and social solidarity. She concluded warmly, congratulating the presenters for offering not only answers but also new terms and questions to reflect upon long after the session.

Panelists’ Replies

Professor Małgorzata Fuszara began by addressing the question of why women appeared to support Law and Justice (PiS) more than Civic Coalition (KO). She clarified that this impression is misleading. While PiS did secure more total votes than KO, the gender balance within each electorate shows a different pattern. Among PiS voters, men outnumbered women; conversely, among KO supporters, women outnumbered men. The clearest gender divide emerges at the extremes. In the far-right Confederation electorate, fewer than 30% of voters are women, while over 70% are men. On the left (Lewica), the trend reverses: more than 60% of voters are women. This divide has sharpened since the abortion protests, particularly among younger generations—young women tend to vote for the left, while young men lean to the far right.

Turning to media, Professor Fuszara stressed that control over television, though still significant, is an old debate. The new battlefield lies in social media, which once held the promise of greater freedom of expression but is now vulnerable to manipulation. Disinformation campaigns and far-right influence in digital spaces, she warned, pose a profound threat to democracy.

Dr. Kamil Jonski added a brief but pointed reflection on constitutional politics. He agreed that recognizing the need to amend the Polish Constitution is not problematic in itself. The danger, however, lies in the trajectory: opposition to the Constitution, followed by calls for amendment, then support for court-packing, and finally acceptance of its outcomes. This sequence, he argued, captures the narrative of groups seeking to reshape constitutional law to their advantage.

Replying to Dr. Solska’s question on how to resolve the conflict over the Rule of Law in Poland, Professor Kurczewski said: “I think we need to once again draw on Solidarity’s past experience. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister after 1989, said, we need a ‘thick line’ (gruba kreska) to separate the future from the past. A full reset of the machinery of justice and a renewal of the judiciary is the only solution.”

Photo: Dreamstime.

Overall Conclusion

The second session of the ECPS–Oxford University Virtual Workshop Series, “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” revealed Poland as both a distinctive case and a mirror of global democratic challenges.

Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s paper, presented by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, underscored how Solidarity’s inclusive patriotism—once uniting workers, clergy, and intellectuals—has been eclipsed by exclusionary narratives. Dr. Kamil Joński traced the constitutional quagmire created by divergent axiological readings of the 1997 Constitution, showing how a single text can sustain polarized visions of democracy. Professor Małgorzata Fuszara demonstrated that while consensus formed around universal human rights after 1989, women’s and minority rights remain embattled terrain, marked by regression in reproductive rights but tempered by incremental progress such as gender quotas and reforms to sexual violence law. In his own contribution, Professor Jacek Kurczewski reframed the judiciary as a representative institution of the nation, stressing that defending the rule of law requires broadening the democratic meaning of representation.

The discussants deepened the analysis: Dr. Magdalena Solska highlighted the fragility of Solidarity’s legacy and the paradoxes of electoral behavior; Professor Barry Sullivan drew US–Polish comparisons on constitutionalism and the politicization of civil society; and Professor Krzysztof Motyka reminded participants of the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, linking contemporary struggles to the witness of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko.

As Chair, Professor Mavis Maclean reminded the audience that while populism may reflect civic grievances, it can also corrode democratic institutions. The Polish experience, she argued, offers lessons for how democracies might transform discontent into renewal rather than demagoguery.

This session thus underscored a central theme of the workshop series: that the future of democracy hinges on reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending contested institutions, and embedding rights in both law and culture.