Dr. Courtney Freer (Assistant Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, GA).
Speakers
“Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region,” by Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber (Professor, Chairholder, Institute of Political Science, Chair of Middle East Politics and Society, the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg).
“The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC,” by Dr. Gail Buttorff(Associate Director of the Center for Public Policy and Assistant Professor at the Hobby School, University of Houston).
“The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership,” by Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel (Postdoc at Geography Institute, the University of Heidelberg).
“The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies,” by Kardo Kareem Rached (Assistant Professor at University of Human Development, Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region of Iraq).
“Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” by Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan (Senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington).
Dr. Courtney Freer is Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Studies at Emory University and Senior Fellow at Emory’s Center for the Study of Law and Religion. She previously served as Assistant Professorial Research Fellow at the Middle East Centre at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) between 2015-2021. Courtney’s academic work focuses on the domestic politics of the Arab Gulf states, particularly the political role of religion, and Islamism more broadly. She received her DPhil in Politics from the University of Oxford in 2015, having written a thesis examining the socio-political role played by Muslim Brotherhood groups in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The findings of this work were published by Oxford University Press in 2018 as Rentier Islamism: The Influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gulf Monarchies. She previously worked at the Brookings Doha Center in Qatar and the US-Saudi Arabian Business Council in Washington, DC, and holds a BA in Near Eastern Studies from Princeton University and an MA in Middle Eastern Studies from The George Washington University.
Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf region
Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber is Professor of Middle East Politics and Society at the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nürnberg (Germany) and visiting professor at the College of Europe (Natolin). He has been researching the Middle East and its transregional entanglements for more than two decades. He has lived and worked in different countries with substantial field work experience all across the region. As PI and Co-PI he has so far been awarded more than EUR 5 Mio. in research grants. Demmelhuber has advised different German ministries, the European Parliament (Subcommittee on Human Rights) and various foundations. He is serving in different scientific advisory councils, e.g. of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin (SWP) or the German Orient-Institute in Beirut (Max Weber Foundation). Demmelhuber is also board member and Hon. Secretary of the German Middle East Studies Association. Demmelhuber publishes regularly in leading international journals (e.g. Democratization, Third World Quarterly) and has published/edited numerous books, for example: The comprehensive volume on Authoritarian Gravity Centres: A Cross-Regional Study of Authoritarian Promotion and Diffusion (co-authored with Marianne Kneuer, Routledge 2020, paperback 2021) presents cutting-edge findings on the international dimension of authoritarianism.
Abstract: There is a scholarly consensus that the countries of the Arabian Peninsula – particularly the Gulf monarchies – exhibit a clustering of autocratic governance. However, it would be fundamentally wrong to perceive this regime type as static. Gulf politics is instead shaped by dynamic and vivid discourses, including domestic debates on regime consolidation (that go well beyond pertinent factors like repression, cooptation et al.), regional efforts to forge a shared regime identity, and international networks that facilitate the diffusion of autocratic practices, ideas, and norms. While structural factors, such as shifts in the international order, play a role, I try to argue in my talk that the primary drivers of autocratization must be understood through the actions and perspectives of individual actors, i.e. the politically relevant elite.
Resource Curse, Authoritarian Elections and Opposition in Gulf Countries
Dr.Gail Buttorffis Research Associate Professor, Hobby School of Public Affairs Associate Director, Center for Public Policy. Dr. Buttorff joined the Hobby School as a Visiting Assistant Professor in 2017. She holds a Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the University of Iowa. Her research interests focus on elections and gender and public policy in the Middle East and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, quantitative and survey methodologies. She is the author of Authoritarian Elections and Opposition Groups in the Arab World. Her work as also been published by Electoral Studies, Journal of Theoretical Politics, and by the Baker Institute for Public Policy, among others.
The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership
Dr. Tobias Zumbrägel is a senior researcher and lecturer at the department for Human Geography at Heidelberg University. Prior to this, he worked at the center for excellence Climate, Climatic Change and Society (CLICCS) at the University of Hamburg where he is an associate fellow. He studied History, Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies in Cologne, Tuebingen and Cairo. and holds a Ph.D. from the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg. Zumbrägel is the author of Political Power and Environmental Sustainability in Gulf Monarchies (Palgrave 2022). His main research focuses on questions of legitimacy, power and state authority in the Middle East with a special interest in Political Ecology, Energy Policy, Sustainability and Political Economy.
Abstract: Especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are leveraging sustainability transformations as strategic tools to enhance domestic legitimacy and project international influence, promoting a model of ‘soft’ authoritarianism. By diversifying energy portfolios and positioning themselves as influential players in global climate policy, both countries aim to foster public consent and strengthen internal regime support. Internationally, they pursue outward-oriented legitimacy by aligning with Western sustainability ideals while collaborating with other authoritarian states to diffuse this model, particularly in developing countries. Through flagship initiatives like Saudi Arabia’s NEOM, the Middle East Green Initiative, and the UAE’s Masdar City, they serve as role models for sustainable development within an authoritarian framework. This approach blends environmental innovation with a new form of governance, advancing their soft power on the global stage.
The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies
Kardo Rachedis a lecturer at the University of Human Development UHD—Sulaimany and Dirctor of the Quality Assurance at UHD. He is also manager of the Turkish Studies Unit at Sbay Research Center – Sulaimany. He has published various articles, most recently: “State-Reconstruction: Iraq after ISIS as a Case Study.” Analecta 13.25 (2023); “Financing of non-state armed groups in the Middle East: Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) as a case study.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2022): 1-26; “Institutionalizing the Salafi Thoughts by the State: The Saudi Salafism as a Case.” Trames 25.2 (2021): 239-255; “United States: A Review of the US Middle East Policy from Harry Truman to Bill Clinton.” (2021); “Post-ISIS Era and the State Dissolution in the Middle East: Iraq as a Case.” Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies (2020); “Post-ISIS Iraq and the Shia Armed Groups.” Central European Journal of International & Security Studies 13.1 (2019); “Article Review of Islamic Mobilization: Social Movement Theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.” Canadian Social Science (2018); “Public diplomacy effort across Facebook: A comparative analysis of the US consulate in Erbil and the Kurdistan Representation in Washington.” Sage Open 8.1 (2018); “The Likelihood of a Durable Peace and Longstanding Stability in an Integrated Iraq in the Aftermath of the Military Defeat of the Islamic State (IS) Group.” The Journal for Interdisciplinary Middle Eastern Studies 3 (2018): 73.
Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption
Dr. Kristin Diwan is a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.Her current projects concern generational change, nationalism, and the evolution of Islamism in the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Recent publications include “The New Industries: Tourism and Entertainment in a Changing Saudi Arabia,” in Sfakianakis, ed, The Economy of Saudi Arabia in the 21st Century (Oxford, 2024) and “Clerical associations in Qatar and the United Arab Emirates: soft power competition in Islamic politics,”International Affairs, 97.4 (2021): 945–963. Diwan was previously an assistant professor at the American University School of International Service and has held visiting scholar positions at the George Washington University and Georgetown University. She received her PhD from Harvard University.
Abstract: Gulf monarchies are not immune to the global rise in populist movements, despite their wealth and generous welfare systems. The adoption of austerity measures alongside the growing concentration of wealth in the hands of political and business elites is fueling a populist response, visible on social media and in Gulf parliaments. In this talk I will look at examples of populist opposition and how royal leadership is countering it, through suppression, cooptation, and the adoption of populist rhetoric to advance their own ruling agendas.
Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.
In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, Dr. Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, delves into the dynamics shaping Romania’s political landscape. She examines the resurgence of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs), their connections to historical and socio-economic grievances, and the transformative role of social media in contemporary politics.
Professor Soare begins by contextualizing Romania’s political evolution, emphasizing its “tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics” while highlighting systemic issues that have persisted since the democratic transition. She attributes the 2020 resurgence of RRPPs like the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) to a “perfect storm of pandemic-driven malaise, skilled political entrepreneurship, and strong grassroots mobilization.” She explains, “Significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or EU membership, fueling dissatisfaction and driving migration.”
The interview also explores the rise of far-right parties such as AUR and SOS Romania. Despite their shared emphasis on defending national identity and traditional values, Professor Soare draws a clear distinction between their organizational strategies, noting that AUR is a “rooted party with strong social ties,” whereas SOS operates as a “personal party” reliant on its leader’s visibility. This reflects broader societal trends, she adds, where “diffuse nationalism and skepticism about EU norms cross party lines,” resonating deeply with voters.
Professor Soare further examines how social media, particularly TikTok, has become a powerful tool for mobilizing young voters, pointing to Călin Georgescu’s “shocking” first-round presidential victory in 2024. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she observes. On Georgescu’s candidacy, she emphasizes its populist appeal, underpinned by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. She notes, “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility.”
Finally, discussing the implications of Georgescu’s potential presidency, Professor Soare underscores the risks and safeguards within Romania’s semi-presidential system. While cautioning against possible instability, she remains optimistic about the country’s ability to maintain its European trajectory, provided mainstream parties can mobilize effectively.
Here is the transcription of the interview with ProfessorSorina Cristina Soare with some edits.
Causes of the Populist Resurgence in Romania
Professor Soare, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your two articles on Romania for two ECPS reports in 2023 and 2024, you argue that the country was once considered a partial exception to the global diffusion of populism. However, in 2020, Radical Right Populist Parties (RRPPs) made a notable return to Parliament. What factors do you believe have driven this resurgence of RRPPs in Romanian politics?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. There are different reasons to consider. Romania has a tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics, and this is something we have to take into account, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, when different political parties adopted populist platforms with relevance in terms of electoral success.
What happened in 2020 reflects, on the one hand, a specific event connected to the pandemic and the malaise felt by different segments of the population. On the other hand, it highlights something more systemic that has crossed the political arena since the very beginning of the transition to democracy: the lack of widely distributed economic benefits. This is crucial because significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or, later, of the EU membership status achieved in 2007.
This dissatisfaction helps explain why Romania has one of the highest levels of citizens living abroad. Many emigrated due to the lack of a decent standard of living in Romania, while a smaller but significant minority sought opportunities where their training and high competencies could be better recognized in the job market.
There was an insightful article published today on Politico that illustrates the stark disparities in Romania, including gaps in education, the economy, and the pronounced divide between Bucharest and the rest of the country, as well as between the major cities and rural areas.
The 2020 resurgence of RRPPs was the result of a perfect storm: a context of widespread malaise driven by the pandemic, the rise of a skilled political entrepreneur in George Simion’s personality, and the organizational strength of the AUR party. Unlike some other populist movements, AUR cannot be considered a personal party. It has developed strong grassroots mobilization through associations and other structures, which have provided it with stable support over time since 2020.
The Rise of AUR and SOS Romania
George Simion, president of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), answers journalists’ questions during a press conference at the party’s headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on May 10, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
How do you interpret the rise of far-right parties like AUR and SOS Romania in the context of Romania’s political landscape? What specific societal or political factors have contributed to their increasing influence? What role do you think Romanian national identity and Euroscepticism play in shaping the populist rhetoric of parties like AUR and SOS Romania, particularly in their emphasis on sovereignty and traditional values?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. It is very relevant and covers several aspects. AUR and SOS Romania come from the same origins, or a new class of populist radical-right movements. Considering that SOS Romania’s leadership is represented by Diana Iovanovici Șoșoacă, who was elected as an MP on AUR’s list in 2020, there is some alignment between the two parties. However, the difference is particularly linked to their type of party organization. As I mentioned, AUR is a rooted party with social ties to various associative and activist experiences on the ground. On the other hand, SOS Romania operates more like a personal party, heavily relying on the vocal presence and visibility of its leader.
Both parties, however, share an emphasis on defending national identity. This emphasis is not unique to them. In the current presidential election, particularly during the first round, we can see that symbols of nationalism and religion are prevalent across the political spectrum. For instance, the candidate presented as pro-European, liberal, and progressive also subtly echoed these themes. She wore a small bracelet with the Romanian flag and a large cross, signaling diffuse nationalism and religious sentiment that transcends party lines.
What distinguishes AUR and SOS is the intensity with which they voice these themes. AUR increasingly resembles a radical-right party that tries to control the populist elements of its discourse, making it appear more mainstream. In contrast, SOS frequently crosses constitutional boundaries, echoing extremist rhetoric, including anti-semitism, which fundamentally clashes with Romania’s democratic constitutional pillars.
Regarding the European Union, mainstream parties often temper their criticism due to their positions in government and affiliations with European parliamentary groups. Opposition parties like AUR and SOS, however, are freer to express vocal critiques. AUR does not advocate an EU exit but calls for greater compatibility and synergy between Romanian values and EU expectations. For example, they argue against being forced to accept certain norms, such as those related to the LGBTQI+ community. Interestingly, this stance is not unique to AUR but is voiced more strongly because they are outside the governing establishment.
What I want to emphasize is that nationalism and skepticism about certain EU-related aspects are widespread in Romania. This sentiment is rooted in society, not concentrated in specific groups, and it crosses party lines. These attitudes were channeled effectively during the 2024 presidential election by a candidate who presented himself as an outsider, not part of the establishment. This provides a bridge to understanding more recent political developments.
Radical-Right Populism’s Shift in RomaniaFrom Ethnicity to Morality
How do you interpret the shift in focus from ethnic-based exclusion to cultural and religious-based exclusion among Romania’s radical-right populist parties, and what factors might have driven this transformation?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: In my most recent fieldwork, I gained a better understanding of the origins and organization of AUR. During earlier phases of research with Glad and Țufiş, we identified two main roots of AUR’s ideology. One root emphasized the need to restore a “Greater Romania,” particularly through unification with the Republic of Moldova. The other focused on conservative values, which draw on Romania’s history, including the so-called fascist period between the two World Wars. I use “so-called” because the term refers to the legendary movements of that era.
Beyond these two roots, there is a third, particularly evident in Transylvania, where a group of militants focus on defending Romania’s cultural integrity. This group views the Hungarian minority as a potential threat to the country’s territorial integrity. This tension helps explain why Viktor Orbán was so vocal when AUR joined the ECR group after the 2024 EP elections. However, ethnic minority integration is not a central issue in Romania’s political arena. Instead, AUR and SOS Romania emphasize the need to control the cultural and moral identity of the Romanian people.
Why is this so? From my interviews with militants, members, voters, and candidates for the EP elections, the explanation is relatively straightforward. There is a widespread frustration that European integration and globalization threaten the survival of Romania’s national identity. On one side, there is the perception that values inconsistent with Romania’s religious traditions—such as a liberal understanding of gender—are being imposed. On the other side, there is economic frustration, with narratives portraying Romania as a “colony” of other countries, forced to import norms and values misaligned with its traditions.
This frustration extends beyond short-term concerns. For instance, Romania experiences one of the most intense flows of economic migration in Eastern Europe, leading to a population decline. AUR and SOS claim that this shrinking population weakens Romania’s demographic strength and diminishes the relevance of the Romanian majority. While they do not explicitly target the Roma community, other groups, such as Hungarians, are subtly framed as long-term threats.
This also explains their stance on the role of women in society. AUR and SOS advocate for a traditional role for women, not only as part of Romania’s cultural traditions but also as a strategic element in ensuring the reproduction of the Romanian people. Women are viewed as critical to maintaining and securing the nation’s demographic sustainability in the long run.
Romania’s 2015 Law Transformed Party Dynamics
Official campaign posters for the 2024 Romanian presidential election in Timișoara, Romania, on October 27, 2024, featuring candidates Marcel Ciolacu, Nicolae Ciucă, Mircea Geoană, Elena Lasconi, George Simion, Hunor Kelemen, Ludovic Orban, and Cristian Terheș. Photo: Adrian Păcurariu.
How changes in Romania’s party registration laws in 2015 created an opportunity for the proliferation of new political parties? To what extent do you believe these changes reflect a broader trend in post-communist democracies, and how sustainable are these new parties in the long term?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Romania has been criticized, particularly by various NGOs active in democracy advocacy and monitoring, for having one of the most rigid laws regulating political parties. Previously, party registration required a threshold of 10,000 to 25,000 members, along with additional criteria for territorial distribution, and so on.
The original purpose of this regulation, introduced in the 1990s and amended in the early 2000s, was to reduce fragmentation in the political arena and enhance governability. However, NGOs, experts, and academics highlighted its negative consequences. The most significant issue was the difficulty new parties faced in organizing themselves, which severely restricted opportunities for renewal within the party system. Romania’s party system has often been described in the literature as relatively closed. While this framework provided predictability and stability, it also created an artificially constrained system—a cartel of parties that, through legal regulations on party laws, funding, and electoral thresholds (e.g., requiring a high number of signatures for candidacies), implicitly controlled not only Parliament but also broader political competition, thereby limiting the voice of the people.
When the party registration law changed, lowering the membership threshold to just two or three members—the same number required to establish an NGO—it symbolically aligned political parties with genuine civil society representation. This change significantly increased the number of new parties being created. As Claudia Țuțuianu and I observed in an article even before 2020, there was already evidence of radicalism in the extra-parliamentary political party landscape, indicating a demand for representation.
The change in the law facilitated the development of radical parties in Romania. For example, ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for December 1, several new parties associated with former AUR MPs are emerging as potential surprises. One such party, focused on young people, even endorsed the unexpected candidate who won the first round of the 2024 presidential election.
While the legal reforms certainly encouraged the proliferation of these parties, they did not create them. These parties emerged in response to existing conditions on the ground—political entrepreneurs addressing widespread frustration and a perceived need for greater representation.
This phenomenon is not unique to Romania and can be observed across Eastern Europe. A useful comparison is Bulgaria, where the political party system also experienced significant changes and increased fragmentation, particularly with the rise of radical right populist parties. These developments highlight similar levels of frustration and disillusionment among the electorate in both countries.
AUR Mobilized Economic Anxieties and Harnessed Diaspora Support
How has the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) managed to capitalize on economic and social anxieties to expand its political influence despite its controversial ties and radical rhetoric?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I think one element I forgot to mention in the previous question, but which I will use as the starting point here, is that while the law facilitated the proliferation of parties, some of these parties are well-developed in terms of organizational infrastructure, and AUR is one of them.
How AUR succeeded in voicing these anxieties is quite simple. First of all, through its origins, particularly at the diaspora level. What we observed in our research with Claudio Țuțuianu was that many militants were already active in providing social services to Romanians in Romania. They were channeling part of their well-being in Western countries to help their families, relatives, and, more broadly, the Romanian community in need back home.
By channeling these frustrations and demonstrating that they cared—through recruitment and by creating networks and connections with active individuals in formal and informal diaspora associations—AUR showed credibility. It was not just a political entrepreneur making promises; it presented itself as genuinely engaged. These networks significantly increased its credibility.
Additionally, George Simion himself was seen as credible because of his involvement in these networks, particularly in projects related to the union with the Republic of Moldova. While SOS Romania uses skilled communication and a highly fluid approach, the capacity of AUR to voice these anxieties is linked to its stability and organizational pervasiveness. The difference lies in AUR’s solid and far-reaching networks compared to SOS’s reliance on skilled political representation, particularly in the person of its leader, Mrs. Șoșoacă.
What role has the Romanian diaspora played in shaping the electoral success of populist parties like AUR, particularly in the light of their strategic targeting of diaspora voters?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: This is one of the most intensive areas of research on my agenda, so I feel quite comfortable answering it. The Romanian diaspora began to matter politically, becoming a significant actor capable of altering the direction and results of national-level competition, particularly starting with the 2009 presidential election.
The diaspora did not become active solely with AUR; its mobilization has evolved over time, particularly after 2008, when a change in the electoral law reserved seats in Parliament for diaspora representation. This created an incentive for political parties to mobilize diaspora voters. Of course, when discussing the diaspora, we are referring to a multi-layered and multi-sectoral community.
Why multi-layered? Because there are different temporal layers corresponding to various waves of migration. Some began their migration trajectory before the fall of the Berlin Wall, others in the early 1990s, and more in the 2000s and beyond. The level of integration within their resident communities varies depending on these chronological trajectories. There is also significant variation in professional trajectories—some diaspora members moved to highly skilled jobs, while others took less-skilled positions. Some exchanged exploitation in Romania for severe exploitation in other areas, particularly in southern Sicily, where there have been numerous reports of Romanian agricultural workers being exploited by Italian entrepreneurs. This triggered mechanisms from the Romanian state to defend its migrant workers.
The Romanian diaspora is highly heterogeneous. Why have these people felt mobilized by AUR, SOS, and even a credible, liberal party like USR? They have been mobilized primarily by parties presenting themselves as new—whether through their origins, age (as newer parties), or connections with the diaspora—and by their vocal anti-establishment platforms. These parties stood out as different from the traditional offerings of political parties, particularly the Social Democrats and Liberals.
Diaspora voters tend to vote not only based on the content of party platforms but also on the belief that they need politicians who are fundamentally different from the traditional post-communist elite. They seek politicians who can dismantle the “cartel” of parties, reduce corruption, and bring real change. Interestingly, in my interviews, I found that many diaspora voters expressed a strong desire for a future for themselves in Romania. They viewed their investment in these parties as a way to increase the quality of life and democracy in Romania.
The people I interviewed were not extremists, to the best of my knowledge. None of them advocated for regime changes or anti-democratic positions. Instead, their concerns centered on increased transparency, reduced corruption, and improved living standards in Romania, which would enable them to return and rebuild. This is, I believe, an important aspect of their motivation.
Calin Georgescu’s ‘Shocking’ Rise
Although far-right independent candidate Calin Georgescu was not seen as a serious candidate in almost all the polls, he won the first round of presidential elections which was dubbed as ‘shocking’ by many European experts. What are the key factors behind the unprecedented surge in support for Georgescu, particularly given his low polling numbers before the election? Do you agree with the characterization of his victory as ‘shocking’?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Yes, it was definitely shocking on different levels. First of all, as you rightly pointed out, it was unexpected based on the analyses and surveys published before the elections, which foresaw a runoff between the candidate endorsed by the Social Democrats and, in second position, a tight fight between the candidates of USR (Uniunea Salvați România-Save Romania Union) and AUR.
This candidate seemingly came out of nowhere. He was not very well known to the broader public, but he was not entirely new to Romanian politics. Those familiar with Romania’s political landscape and its moments of governmental instability know that his name had been mentioned on various occasions, starting in 2011 and again in 2015, as a potential technocratic Prime Minister. Additionally, after the 2020 elections, AUR initially endorsed Călin Georgescu as a potential Prime Minister before distancing themselves from him. This split occurred after a highly controversial interview in which Georgescu publicly supported two controversial figures in Romanian history—one a leader of the Legionary Movement and the other a marshal who aligned with Nazi Germany during the war in Russia. These statements were widely criticized as aligning with anti-democratic ideals, and Georgescu faced legal scrutiny over them, though the outcome of these proceedings remains unclear.
Furthermore, Georgescu has been active in publishing books and participating in associations that echo themes deeply rooted in nationalist rhetoric. These themes, while seemingly simple and basic, are reminiscent of ideas prevalent in the 1990s and even earlier. For example, he has espoused an unrefined form of nationalism, portraying Romanians as an extraordinary people and civilization. In one interview, he controversially claimed that proto-Romanian is the basis of Latin, which contradicts conventional historical and linguistic understanding.
Georgescu has also propagated conspiracy theories, such as denying the moon landing or questioning the official narrative of the September 11 attacks in the United States. While these ideas are contentious, they resonate with certain segments of the population, aligning with the common suspicions and frustrations of everyday people. This ability to connect with widespread sentiments is a hallmark of populism: speaking like the people while presenting oneself as a savior or a figure with extraordinary abilities.
Georgescu excels in this role. He voices what people think and does so with a reassuring tone and demeanor. He is well-educated, speaks polished Romanian, and appears as a composed and credible figure. These traits contrast with George Simion’s more vocal and aggressive style, which uses a simpler Romanian. Georgescu, by comparison, projects an image of sophistication and calm.
His campaign also made strategic use of visual and symbolic elements. For example, TikTok videos depicted him on a white horse wearing traditional Romanian clothing or as a wolf with fire emanating from his eyes or mouth, symbolizing strength and purity. These portrayals reinforced his image as a savior or protector. What truly explains his success, however, is his effective use of TikTok. His campaign on the platform was remarkably successful, allowing him to reach a broad audience with simple, relatable messages that resonated deeply with many voters.
How do you interpret the role of social media, particularly platforms like TikTok, in mobilizing voter support for far-right candidates in Romania? Does this signal a broader trend in European politics?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I wouldn’t generalize about TikTok at the European level, but it has definitely been both utilized and challenged by different candidates—not only in Romania but also across Europe and in the United States. TikTok is undoubtedly efficient. Why? Because it allows for short, impactful messages. While there is limited space for interaction, there is significant potential for engagement.
TikTok’s visual nature and simplicity make it highly accessible, which explains why a significant portion of Georgescu’s support came from young people, who are particularly familiar with the platform. Moreover, TikTok has been less scrutinized by regulatory organizations responsible for monitoring campaign activities, giving it an edge in reaching audiences without strict oversight.
As you may know, there has been ongoing debate in the European Parliament about TikTok’s policies, particularly its claim that it does not allow political campaigns or engagement. However, cases like this reveal vulnerabilities or loopholes in the system that enable mobilization in gray areas. This is a challenge not only for Romania but potentially for Europe and beyond.
Risks and Scenarios for Romania’s Future in EU and NATO
Marcel Ciolacu, president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Romanian prime minister, delivers a speech at the conclusion of the PSD Congress at ROMEXPO in Bucharest, Romania, on August 22, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.
Lastly, Professor Soare. What chance do you give to Calin Georgescu in the second round of presidential elections that will be held on December 8th? If elected, how efficient will he be in challenging EU and NATO’s positions on Ukraine? Given Georgescu’s pro-Russia stance and criticism of NATO, what might his potential presidency mean for Romania’s foreign policy, especially its role as a NATO member and supporter of Ukraine?
Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: It is difficult to assess Georgescu’s chances at the moment. There has been significant endorsement for his opponent, and a burgeoning cordon sanitaire is forming among mainstream political parties. However, one major factor is missing: the position of the Social Democrats. This is understandable, given the strategic importance of the legislative elections, which are scheduled between the two rounds of the presidential elections. The legislative elections will take place on December 1, followed by the second round of the presidential election on December 8.
Parties may be hesitant to publicly endorse Elena Lasconi at this stage, as such endorsements could jeopardize their own performance in the legislative elections. This creates a significant risk because Romania is a semi-presidential republic. On one hand, if the legislative elections result in a pro-European and mainstream coalition securing a majority, the risk posed by Georgescu’s presidency could be mitigated. The constitutional court’s rulings over the past decades have circumscribed presidential powers, meaning that control by a pro-European government and Parliament would ensure stability.
However, there is also a significant risk given that, in the first round, radical right candidates, including Georgescu, collectively received around 37% of the vote. This suggests strong potential for these parties, including smaller ones connected to AUR’s network, like the Party of Young People, which was active in supporting Georgescu’s candidacy. These parties could gain substantial influence in the next Parliament, complicating coalition-building efforts.
Two scenarios are plausible: i) A co-habitation scenario where Georgescu wins the presidency but is constrained by a pro-European government and Parliament, similar to the political situation in Poland. ii) An alignment between a pro-European coalition and Lasconi’s victory, driven by increased voter mobilization in the second round. This scenario seems credible but faces challenges.
One significant risk for the second round is that Georgescu could position himself as a victim of the establishment. If voter mobilization for Lasconi fails to materialize, it could instead rally anti-establishment voters behind Georgescu. This risk is heightened by the current complaint filed with the constitutional court, alleging illegal activities related to Georgescu’s TikTok campaign and calling for the annulment of the first round. Such actions could provoke greater sympathy for Georgescu and further energize his supporters, especially those with anti-establishment sentiments.
If Georgescu wins, however, there are still factors that could maintain Romania’s European trajectory. The alignment of Parliament and government with pro-European forces would act as a counterbalance, ensuring the preservation of Romania’s commitments to the EU and NATO. Thus, while his presidency could introduce instability, the broader political framework offers some safeguards for maintaining the country’s European route.
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape,”Dr. Spyros Sofos (Assisstant Professor, Department of Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver).
“Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024),” by Dr. Emre Erdogan(Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University).
“Autocratic Practices of The Gendered Regime in Turkey,” by Hafza Girdap (Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York).
“Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” byErgun Babahan (Journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news).
“Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power,” byDr. Aleksandra Spancerska(Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs).
Professor Jocelyne Cesari holds the Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and is Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University. Since 2018, she is the T. J. Dermot Dunphy Visiting Professor of Religion, Violence, and Peacebuilding at Harvard Divinity School. President elect of the European Academy of Religion (2018-19), her work on religion and politics has garnered recognition and awards: 2020 Distinguished Scholar of the religion section of the International Studies Association, Distinguished Fellow of the Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs and the Royal Society for Arts in the United Kingdom. Her new book: We God’s Nations: Political Christianity, Islam and Hinduism in the World of Nations, was published by Cambridge University Press in 2022 (Book Award of the Scientific Society for the Study of Religion). Other publications: What is Political Islam? (Rienner, 2018, Book Award 2019 of the religion section of the ISA); Islam, Gender and Democracy in a Comparative Perspective (OUP, 2017), The Awakening of Muslim Democracy: Religion, Modernity and the State (CUP, 2014). She is the academic advisor of www.euro-islam.info
In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape
Dr. Spyros Sofos is Assistant Professor in Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He has held academic positions in the UK, Sweden, and Italy, including at Lund University and the London School of Economics. His research examines the intersection of societal insecurity, identity, and collective action, with a focus on Turkish politics, nationalism, populism, European Muslim identities, and populism theory. His latest book, Turkish Politics and ‘The People’: Mass Mobilisation and Populism (Edinburgh University Press, 2022), traces the genealogy of populism in contemporary Turkey. He is the founder and lead editor of #RethinkingPopulism, originally launched in collaboration with openDemocracy.
Abstract: This talk explores the construction and evolution of the concept of “the people” in Turkey’s political discourse. It examines how ideas of popular identity have been historically used to support autocratic regimes, from Ataturk’s secularist rule in early republican Turkey to the tutelary democracies that followed his death and finally to the Islamist-nationalist populism of the present day. Central to this analysis is the metaphor of “the infant people,” a symbol embodying both innocence and helplessness. The talk highlights how political elites have alternately celebrated and patronized “the people,” portraying them as the rightful bearers of sovereignty while simultaneously deeming them unprepared to exercise their rights. This dual approach has fostered a flexible yet exclusionary narrative of nationhood—one that legitimizes authoritarian governance and deepens divisions between the people, their supposed guardians, and perceived enemies. By situating this analysis within broader discussions of populist authoritarianism in the Global South, the talk sheds light on the intersection of identity politics and power.
Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024)
Dr. Emre Erdogan is a Professor at the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University. With a doctoral degree in Political Science from Bogaziçi University, he has served as researcher and senior consultant in various projects in academia and civil society. His research focuses on political participation, foreign policy and public opinion, child and youth well-being, methodology and statistics. He extensively studies and publishes about youth in Turkey, integration of Syrian refugee youth in Turkey, othering, polarization and populism.
Abstract: This presentation examines the evolving dynamics of populism in Turkey, focusing on the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections. It highlights the continuities and shifts in populist strategies, exploring how nationalist rhetoric, religious symbolism, and anti-elitist narratives have persisted as central pillars of political discourse. Simultaneously, the presentation delves into significant changes, such as the impact of economic challenges, the rise of new populist actors, and the opposition’s adoption of populist tactics to counter the ruling party. By analyzing these trends, the study reveals how populism has reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape over the past two years. It addresses critical themes, including heightened polarization, the strategic use of media, and the enduring focus on identity politics. Special attention will be given to how crises like economic instability and natural disasters have influenced populist rhetoric and voter behavior. The presentation aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between continuity and change in Turkish populism, offering insights into its implications for democracy and governance. Through this lens, the audience will gain a nuanced perspective on the strategies employed by political actors and the broader socio-political consequences of rising populism in Turkey.
Autocratic Practices of the Gendered Regime in Turkey
Hafza Girdap is an adjunct lecturer in Women’s and Gender Studies at Stony Brook University, New York, where she is also a Ph.D. candidate. She is the spokesperson and program director at Advocates of Silenced Turkey (AST) and a founding member of Set Them Free, focusing on addressing women’s rights violations in Turkey. Girdap’s research examines human rights and the lives of Muslim women, particularly immigrant women’s experiences of integration and cultural identity. Her doctoral work explores self-identification and gendered racialization among immigrant women from Turkey in the US. Beyond academia, Girdap collaborates with research institutes on gender studies, incorporating the voices of women from non-Western contexts. Living in the US since 2016 due to political persecution, she has organized and spoken at UN panels on women’s issues, mentors youth, and runs online global book clubs that address women’s and youth empowerment.
Abstract: This presentation examines how patriarchy, nationalism, and political Islam intersect to shape women’s status and rights in Turkey, with a specific focus on the Justice and Development Party (AKP) era. Both secular and political Islamist patriarchies impose traditional roles on women, while Sunni nationalist hegemony marginalizes not only ethnic minorities, non-Sunni groups, and LGBTQ+ individuals but also those who fall outside the established identity of the mainstream political framework. Drawing on Islamist discourse, I will explore how the AKP has employed state policies and discursive language to regulate women’s status and justify systemic oppression. These dynamics underscore the gendered dimensions of Turkey’s autocratic regime, where authoritarian practices perpetuate systemic violence and inequality.
Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey
Ergun Babahan, born in Izmir, Turkey, in 1960, is a senior Turkish journalist. He studied law at Istanbul University, graduating in 1981. After practicing law for a year, he chose journalism as his profession. Over the years, he has worked in various prominent newspapers, including Yeni Asir, Soz, Hurriyet, Sabah, Aksam, and Star, serving as a reporter, editor, managing editor, editor-in-chief, and columnist. As editor-in-chief of Sabah, then Turkey’s second-largest newspaper, he successfully led the publication out of bankruptcy. Mr. Babahan has also enriched his professional experience internationally, attending the John S. Knight Journalism Fellowship Program at Stanford University through a scholarship from the German Marshall Fund. Additionally, he participated in a seminar on the American Foreign Policy Process at the University of Maryland, supported by the Ford Foundation.
Abstract: Erdogan once remarked to me, “The media does not bring you to power, but it can easily take you out of power.” This insight shaped his determination to control the media from the beginning of his political career. Having endured significant challenges from a media landscape under the influence of the military tutelage regime, Erdogan sought not to create an independent media but rather to make the media entirely subservient to his authority. He achieved this by exploiting conflicts among media proprietors and leveraging the state’s financial and legal resources. Today, no media structure in Turkey operates independently of Erdogan’s influence—not even outlets that label themselves as opposition. Turkey’s historical tradition of media servitude to those in power has significantly facilitated this process. Erdogan’s unprecedented control over the media now rivals the dominance once held by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the architects of military coups, shaping what he terms as “truth.” In this presentation, I will explore why the emergence of an independent media is virtually impossible in a society where reverence for state authority and wealth is deeply ingrained.
Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power
Dr. Aleksandra Maria Spancerska is a research fellow on Türkiye in the Middle East and Africa Programme. She graduated in international cultural studies and international relations with an oriental specialisation from the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. She received her PhD in 2024 in the field of social sciences in the discipline of political science and administration. She conducts research on Turkish domestic and foreign policy. She speaks English and Turkish.
Abstract: The concept of sharp power represents a novelty in the study of international relations. It was introduced into scholarly discourse by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig in 2017 at the International Forum for Democratic Studies. The purpose of the speech is to indicate the different areas of Türkiye’s activity in the international forum in terms of sharp power. In my speech I will focus in particular on: technology, modern forms of censorship, political dissidents, and the Turkish diaspora abroad.
Dr. Henning Melber (Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences/University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies/University of the Free State in Bloemfontein and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London).
Dr. Palesa Nqambaza (Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds).
Organizator and Presenter
Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. Ph.D. researcher at the University of Szeged, Hungary).
Objective
In a time when democracies are being tested, understanding how peace-building and democratic transitions succeed is more crucial than ever to remember and think collectively about the democratisation process, ECPS invites you to join the talk to explore Dr. Liz Carmichael’s Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994.
The case of South Africa in negotiating peace and democracy teaches us about resilience and unity and has global significance, especially in today’s world. Thus, this book is more than a historical account. It provides timeless insights into how diverse communities, including businesses, civil groups, religious organizations, and political parties, overcame political violence and fostered a shared vision of national peace. Carmichael shows that even in deeply divided societies, peace and democratization are only possible when carried by the people and not as top-down government projects.
Brief Biographies
Revd. Dr. Liz Carmichael MBE is an Emeritus Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford. Born in England, Liz was a doctor at Baragwanath Hospital, Soweto 1975-1981, then studied Theology at Oxford and worked in the Anglican Diocese of Johannesburg 1991-1996, being ordained priest and serving on peace committees under the National Peace Accord. She was Chaplain and Tutor in Theology at St John’s College 1996 -2011, and then held an Emeritus Research Fellowship, 2011-2023, which enabled her to research and write Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa. The National Peace Accord 1991-1994.
Dr. Henning Melber is an Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences/University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies/University of the Free State in Bloemfontein and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London. Melber came to Namibia as a son of German immigrants in 1967, where he joined the anticolonial movement SWAPO in 1974. He was Director of The Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit in Windhoek, Research Director of the Nordic Africa Institute and Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, both in Uppsala/Sweden.
Dr. Palesa Nqambaza is a scholar specializing in gender studies, political theory, and African philosophy. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds. Dr Nqambaza’s research engages deeply with contemporary South African politics through cultural expressions, particularly the Amapiano music genre, which she explores as a lens for understanding the socio-political perspectives of young South Africans post-1994.
Neo Sithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.
Ali H. Aslan (Washington-based Senior Journalist, Former Washington Correspondent & Columnist of Zaman Daily).
Speakers
“It Was (Mostly) the Economy, Stupid: Explaining Trump’s Victory,” by Dr. Alan Abramowitz (Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University).
“Explaining the US Election Outcome and Its Implications for Global Populism,” by Dr. Jennifer McCoy(Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University; Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace & Research Affiliate at CEU’s Democracy Institute in Budapest).
“The Role of White Evangelicals in the 2024 US Presidential Election: What We Know So Far,” by Dr. Marcia Pally (Professor at New York University, the Mercator Guest Professorship in the theology department at Humboldt University-Berlin).
“Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” byDr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University).
“The Return of Trump and the Future of Global Democracy,” by Dr. Marina Nord (Postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg).
Ali H. Aslan is aWashington-based Senior Journalist, Former Washington Correspondent & Columnist of Zaman Daily. Aslan, who was born in Turkey, holds a bachelor’s degree in business administration from Turkey’s prestigious Bogazici (Bosporus) University. Immediately after college, he started a 27-year journalism career at Zaman newspaper. Having assumed various duties at Zaman Istanbul headquarters including Deputy News Editor, he was assigned as Washington Correspondent of Zaman in 1997. He also wrote weekly columns for Zaman and its English language affiliate Today’s Zaman until they were forcibly taken over by Turkish government in 2016. Specialized in international relations with a focus on US, Turkey and the Middle East, Aslan’s work also appeared occasionally on US publications such as Foreign Policy and European Affairs.
It Was (Mostly) the Economy, Stupid: Explaining Trump’s Victory
Dr. Alan Abramowitz is the Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory College of Arts and Sciences. His research focuses on American politics, political parties, elections, and voting behavior. His current work examines party realignment in the U.S. and its impact on presidential and congressional elections.
Abstract: In my presentation, I will discuss how and why Donald Trump managed to win a decisive victory over Kamala Harris in the 2024 presidential election. I will argue that Trump won the election despite having a higher unfavorable than favorable rating among the electorate, being perceived as too extreme by a majority of voters and supporting unpopular policies on a number of important issues including abortion, health care and climate change. They key to Trump’s victory was that the incumbent Democratic president was deeply unpopular. Kamala Harris simply could not overcome being closely connected with that incumbent as the candidate of the president’s party and as the sitting vice-president. Nevertheless, Trump’s serious flaws as a candidate allowed Harris to outperform the normal expectations for the candidate from the incumbent party with a deeply unpopular leader.
Harris’s defeat followed a pattern that has been seen across western democracies in the aftermath of the 2020-2021 Covid pandemic—widespread discontent with high inflation and other economic problems leading to the defeat of incumbent parties of both the left and right. I will argue that claims that the 2024 election may presage a realignment of the American party system because of increased support for the Republican candidate among nonwhite voters are premature. We have seen claims like this before after the 1972, 1984, and 2004 elections and they proved incorrect. Donald Trump is likely to be as unpopular in his second term as he was in his first and Democrats should be well positioned to make gains in the 2026 midterm elections and in 2028 when Trump will be ineligible to run again.
The Role of White Evangelicals in the 2024 US Presidential Election: What We Know So Far
Dr. Marcia Pally is a Professor at New York University and has held the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, Berlin. She continues to serve there as an annual guest professor and is a member of the Center for Interreligious Theology and Religious Studies and the Berlin Institute for Public Theology. In 2019-2020, she was a Fellow at the Center for Theological Inquiry (Princeton). Her recent books include: White Evangelicals and Right-wing Populism: How Did We Get Here?; From This Broken Hill I Sing to You: God, Sex, and Politics in the Work of Leonard Cohen; Commonwealth and Covenant: Economics, Politics, and Theologies of Relationality; America’s New Evangelicals: Expanding the Vision of the Common Good.
Abstract: This presentation will first review the religious and historical factors along with the current conditions that have positioned many white evangelicals for right-wing populist positions and to vote for candidates they believe hold those positions. It will then look at tallies in the US presidential and key state elections and discuss the results (i) for the US presidency, (ii) the composition of federal and state legislative and judicial bodies (iii) speculatively, US influence abroad.
Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?
Dr. Mabel Berezin is Distinguished Professor of Arts and Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for Europeans Studies at Cornell University. She writes on challenges to democratic cohesion and solidarity in Europe and the United States. She is working on The End of Security and the Rise of Populism under contract at Oxford that examines the current global resurgence of nationalism and the populist challenge to democratic practice.
Abstract: Whether Trump wins or loses, Trumpism is with us in the United States. But to what extent does it have a transnational appeal, or to what extent does it influence right wing populists across the globe. My argument is that the political culture of the US does not translate easily to the European context. American political culture has a deeply individualist cast that makes for American exceptionalism in a good and bad way. My talk will explore American differences in light of the outcome of the presidential election. My main point will be that it will inspire and embolden some parts of the European right and not be relevant to others—except of course that everyone will have to recognize and engage diplomatically with whomever the American president is.
Explaining the US Election Outcome and Its Implications for Global Populism
Dr. Jennifer McCoy is Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University and Nonresident Scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as well as Research Affiliate at CEU’s Democracy Institute in Budapest. She was named a 2024 Andrew Carnegie Fellow for her project, “Mitigating Pernicious Polarization through Innovative Civic Educational Interventions.” Her current book project is Depolarizing Politics with Murat Somer, under contract with Princeton University Press. Her latest volume is Polarizing Polities: A Global Threat to Democracy, co-edited with Murat Somer (2019).
Dr. McCoy’s areas of expertise include democratic resilience, democratic erosion and partisan polarization; crisis prevention and conflict resolution; democracy promotion and collective defense of democracy; election processes and international election observation; and Latin American Politics. McCoy served as Director of the Carter Center’s Americas Program (1998-2015), leading projects on democratic strengthening, mediation and dialogue, and hemispheric cooperation. She has authored or edited six books and dozens of articles.
The Return of Trump and the Future of Global Democracy
Dr. Marina Nordis a postdoctoral research fellow at the V-Dem Institute (University of Gothenburg), and a member of the German research network ‘External Democracy Promotion’. Her research focuses on explaining autocratization and democratization processes, and interplay between economic processes and political transformation. Before joining the V-Dem Institute, she worked on several research projects at the Hertie School and at the German Institute for Economic Research, where she became passionate about bridging the gap between academic research and policy domains.
Abstract:What does the outcome of the US presidential election mean for the future of global democracy? As politics has become more polarized over the last decades, the outcome of the US presidential election is perceived as increasingly high stakes for the future of democracy worldwide. This presentation will give broader context to the story of global democracy and discuss the possible implications of a second Trump administration for the future of liberalism, democratic norms, polarization, and deliberation worldwide.
Venue: European Parliament’s Spaak Building in Brussels / Room: P5B001.
This event is hosted by MEP Radan Kanev in cooperation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)
Moderator
Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH(Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).
Speakers
“Opening Remarks” byIrina VON WIESE (Honorary President of the ECPS).
Welcome and Keynote Speech by Radan KANEV(Member of EP, EPP) on “EU Electionsand the Fragmentation of the Right-wing Populism: ‘Normalisation’ vs ‘Cordon Sanitaire’.”
Keynote Address byNathalie LOISEAU(Member of EP, Renew) on “A Transatlantic Perspective on theNew Composition of the EP and Upcoming Administration in the US, Challenges of Populist Politics and Its Repercussions on the Relations between the US and EU.”
This event will examine the impact of populist politics on the 2024 European Parliament and US presidential elections. The ECPS report provides an analysis of populist party performance in the 2024 European elections, featuring insights from country experts on outcomes across the EU’s 27 member states. Additionally, it highlights the broader challenges that populist successes pose for the EU’s future. The report’s findings will be presented along with an analysis of the potential directions of the upcoming US administration, setting the stage for a discussion on the future of transatlantic relations.
Brief Biographies
Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. He was awarded his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in April 2017 with a dissertation titled “Democracy in the Shadow of the Deep State: Guardian Hybrid Regimes in Turkey and Thailand.” Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. His work has been published in Politics, Religion & Ideology, Urban Studies and Turkish Review. Since 2005, Dr. Watmough has taught international relations, diplomacy, foreign policy, and security studies, as well as Middle Eastern history at universities in Australia and Europe. In 2010–11 he was a research fellow at the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (CASE) at the London School of Economics. He has held Visiting Scholar positions at Boğaziçi University in Istanbul (2012), the University of Queensland (2013), Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand (2014) and the University of Graz (2017). In addition to his academic publications, he is also a regular contributor to The Conversation and other media outlets.
Irina VON WIESE was born in Germany, the daughter and granddaughter of Polish and Russian refugees. After completing her law studies in Cologne, Geneva and Munich, she obtained a scholarship to study at the Harvard Kennedy School where she gained a Master in Public Administration. Her subsequent legal training took her to Berlin, Brussels and Bangkok, and gave her a first insight into the plight of refugees and civil rights defenders across the globe. From 1997 to 2019, Irina lived and worked as a lawyer in private and public sector positions in London. During this time, she volunteered for human rights organisations, advising on migration policy and hosting refugees in her home for many years. In 2019, Irina was elected to represent UK Liberal Democrats in the European Parliament. She served as Vice Chair of the Human Rights Subcommittee and as a member of the cross-party Working Group on Responsible Business Conduct. The Group’s main achievement was the introduction of EU legislation to make human rights due diligence mandatory in global supply chains. During her term, she was also elected to the Executive Committee of the European Endowment for Democracy, whose task is to support grassroots civil society initiatives in fragile democracies. Having lost her seat in the European Parliament after the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union, Irina returned to the UK, where she was elected to the Council of Southwark, one of London’s most diverse boroughs. Her links to Brussels are maintained through an advisory role at FGS Global, where she works on EU law and ESG issues. In addition, Irina is an Affiliate Professor at European business school, the ESCP, teaching international law and politics (including a course entitled ‘Liberalism and Populism’).
Radan KANEV is a Bulgarian politician who is currently a Member of the European Parliament. A member of the DSB party, which he led from 2013 to 2017, he previously served as Member of the National Assembly from 2014 to 2017. At the 2024 European Parliament election, Kanev was re-elected to the European Parliament. Despite being placed fifth on the PP-DB coalition list, which only won three seats, Kanev was able to receive more preference votes than candidates placed above him. Subsequently, he was to serve 5 more years as an MEP.
Nathalie LOISEAU is a French politician, diplomat, and academic administrator who has served as a Member of the European Parliament since 2019. Previously, she was the director of the École nationale d’administration (ENA) from 2012 to 2017 and served as France’s Minister for European Affairs from June 21, 2017, to March 27, 2019. She was the lead candidate for the La République En Marche electoral list in the 2019 European elections. She has since been a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the chairwoman of its Subcommittee on Security and Defense. In 2020, she also joined the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union.
Dr. Gilles IVALDI is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His main research interests include French politics, parties and elections, the far right, and the comparative study of populism in Europe and the United-States. Dr. Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation? 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
Dr. Emilia ZANKINA is an Associate Professor in Political Science, Vice Provost for Global Engagement of Temple University, and Dean of Temple University Rome campus. She holds a Ph.D. in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines populism and political parties, East European politics, civil service reform, and gender political representation. She has published in reputable journals and presses such as West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, Representation, ECPR Press, Indiana Press, and more. She frequently serves as an expert for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and EU commission projects. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies, and Editor-in-Chief of the Newsletter of the Bulgarian Studies Association. She is the recipient of a number of US national grants from IREX, ACLS, American Councils, Wilson Center, and more.
The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.
In response to these challenges, our workshop aims to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop will also examine the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.
The workshop, a collaborative effort organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium, will also address strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It will focus on countering disinformation through activism and explore everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event will discuss necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.
The organizing team, led by Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, encourages all participants to actively engage in discussions and share insights throughout the workshop. The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.
In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.
In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.
In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.
Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.
Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.
Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.
Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System
Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.
So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.
Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode
Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.
In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.
In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.
Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.
Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.
How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?
Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.
Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime
Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.
Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?
Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.
We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.
While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?
Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.
Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.
They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.
Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions
People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.
How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.
From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.
The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.
How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?
Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?
Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.
Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy
How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.
Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.
How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.
What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.
Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.
Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions
The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.
Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.
Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.
The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.
Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.
In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.
The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.
Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”
How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.
These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.
Dr. Cengiz Aktar(Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).
Speakers
“The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
“Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan(Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).
“Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” byDr.Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).
“Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).
“From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,”by Dr. David Aprasidze(Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).
“The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism,”Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board member. He is a former director at the United Nations specializing in asylum policies. He is known to be one of the leading advocates of Turkey’s integration into the EU. He was the Chair of European Studies at Bahçeşehir University-Istanbul. In 1999, Professor Aktar initiated a civil initiative for Istanbul’s candidacy for the title of European Capital of Culture. Istanbul successfully held the title in 2010. He also headed the initiative called “European Movement 2002” which pressured lawmakers to speed up political reforms necessary to begin the negotiation phase with the EU. In December 2008, he developed the idea of an online apology campaign addressed to Armenians and supported by a number of Turkish intellectuals as well as over 32,000 Turkish citizens. In addition to EU integration policies, Professor Aktar’s research focuses on the politics of memory regarding ethnic and religious minorities, the history of political centralism, and international refugee law.
The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia
Dr. Nerses Kopalyan is an Associate Professor-in-Residence of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. His fields of specialization include international security, geopolitics, paradigm-building, and philosophy of science. He is the author of “World Political Systems After Polarity” (Routledge, 2017), the co-author of “Sex, Power, and Politics” (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), co-author of “Latinos in Nevada: A Political, Social, and Economic Profile” (2021, Nevada University Press), and the upcoming “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War (2025, Routledge). His current research and academic publication concentrate on geopolitical and great power relations within Eurasia, with specific emphasis on democratic breakthroughs within authoritarian orbits, and the confluence of security and democratic consolidation. He has authored several policy papers for the Government of Armenia and serves as voluntary advisor to numerous state institutions. Dr. Kopalyan is also a regular contributor to EVN Report.
Abstract: The contours of the concept of populism, and its intrinsic illiberal characteristics, have remained minimal and primarily have failed to take root in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia. Armenia’s democratic breakthrough, and its burgeoning democratic political culture, have served as important guardrails against the development of populism in the country’s political system. This has been buttressed by the country’s severe security environment, facing direct threats from neighboring Azerbaijan and continuous hybrid activities from Russia. As such, the Government’s commitment to democracy is qualified as an important instrument within its nascent security architecture, and in this context, the government has proceeded with a method of governing that has been defined by difficult and unpopular choices, as opposed to relying on the tenets of populism to garner public support. Highly pragmatic, yet unpopular decisions and policies by this Government offer a window into cogently understanding Armenia’s successful in avoiding the trappings of populism, which, in turn, has been strongly enhanced by three important variables: a strong civil society, democratic cultural syndromes, and an illiberal opposition seeking to reverse Armenia’s democratic gains.
Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration
Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan is Professor and Head of the Chair of Political Science of Faculty of International Relations, as well as Lecturer at the Center for European Studies of Yerevan State University. His main interests are civil society, social partnership, human political rights and freedoms. He has been a DAAD-Visiting Scientist at the Institute of Political Science of Leibniz University of Hannover (2002-2009), DAAD-Visiting Scientist at the Geschwister Scholl Institute of Political Science of Ludwig-Maximilian University of Munich (2013) and the Institute for East European Studies of Free University of Berlin (2016), as well as the EU Erasmus Mundus «ALRAKIS» project Visiting Scientist at the Faculty of Social Sciences of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (2012). Since 2016, he is an international fellow of the Institute of Political Science at the Institute of Political Science of the Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
Abstract: The Velvet Revolution of 2018 and the coming to power of the new prime minister Nikol Pashinyan became a real step towards democratization and deepening of the European political integration of Armenia.
Armenia is a small country and there was great hope that the activities of the new Armenian authorities in relation to the recognized guidelines and standards of consolidation of democracy (separation of powers, independence of the judiciary, transitional justice), it is clear that Pashinyan and his team were able to achieve a breakthrough and are more inclined to adhere to democratic rhetoric.
The 2020 armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh lasted from September 27 to November 9, practically shaping a new reality in both foreign and domestic policy dimensions.
The fundamental question is how dangerous is political populism in post-war Armenia? As the example of Armenia shows, unlimited political populism can lead to victims and tragedies on a national scale. What has happened in the state since 2020, and what was for the new authorities of Armenia and Prime Minister N. Pashinyan, as the opposition political parties of the post-war situation wanted to gradually lead the country to political chaos and populism.
After the tragic events of the 44-day war ended, populist movements began to accuse N. Pashinyan of populism, since the promises made to the people during the period of protest activity and the struggle for high office were not fulfilled. This and a number of related factors raise additional doubts and skepticism among members of Armenian civil society who have been observing the activities of the new people’s leader since the opposition’s victory in May 2018.
Since coming to power, the Prime Minister has been repeatedly accused of demagogy. One of the main opponents of the “icon of the velvet revolution” are former Presidents of Armenia Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, who called the Prime Minister a populist.
What factors produced such unprecedented popular unrest to bring to power a new leader who embodied the discontent of the population? It is the hope for a new beginning, where lawlessness will be replaced by the rule of law, injustice by justice, and corruption by honest public officials.
Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan
Dr. Jody LaPorte is the Gonticas Fellow in Politics and International Relations at Lincoln College, University of Oxford. Previously, she served as a Departmental Lecturer in Politics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government. Her research focuses on the political and policymaking dynamics in non-democratic regimes, particularly in post-Soviet Eurasia. Dr. LaPorte holds a BA in Russian and East European Studies from Yale University and an MA and PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley. Before joining the Blavatnik School, she taught as a Departmental Lecturer in Comparative Government in the Department of Politics and International Relations at Oxford.
Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications
Tom de Waal is a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region. He is the author of numerous publications, most recently The End of the Near Abroad (Carnegie Europe/IWM, 2024). The second edition of his book The Caucasus: An Introduction (Oxford University Press) was published in 2018. He is also the author of Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide (Oxford University Press, 2015) and of the authoritative book on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (NYU Press, second edition 2013).
From 2010 to 2015, de Waal worked for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. Before that he worked extensively as a journalist in both print and for BBC radio. From 1993 to 1997, he worked in Moscow for the Moscow Times, the Times of London, and the Economist, specializing in Russian politics and the situation in Chechnya. He co-authored (with Carlotta Gall) the book Chechnya: Calamity in the Caucasus (NYU Press, 1997), for which the authors were awarded the James Cameron Prize for Distinguished Reporting.
From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia
Dr. David Aprasidze is a Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University. He earned his Ph.D. from Hamburg University in Germany and was a Fulbright scholar at Duke University in North Carolina, USA. Over the years, he has worked with public agencies and international NGOs operating in Georgia. His expertise includes higher education management and reform, with a research focus on political transformation, democratization, and Europeanization.
Abstract: In recent years, Georgia has undergone a stark shift from being a champion of Europeanization and democratization to embracing anti-liberal, populist, and pro-Russian stances. The ruling party, Georgian Dream, led by the country’s richest businessman, Bidzina Ivanishvili, has governed since 2012. Initially, Ivanishvili emphasized technocratic governance, managing the state like a corporation. His party portrayed itself as left-centrist, focusing on addressing bread-and-butter issues while also maintaining Georgia’s commitment to European integration. However, amid growing domestic and international criticism for undermining democratic institutions, both Ivanishvili and Georgian Dream shifted toward openly anti-liberal and radical-conservative narratives. This turn included the introduction of anti-NGO and anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, alongside a promotion of “traditional” and “religious” values, supposedly representing the majority. Georgian Dream has forged alliances with right-wing leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán and Slovakia’s Robert Fico, but given Georgia’s non-EU status, the country is increasingly aligning itself with Russia. What began as technocratic populism – offering a façade of professionalism to mask authoritarian and oligarchic tendencies – has evolved. Now, Georgian Dream is transparent about its goals: to eliminate political opposition, silence critical civil society, and intimidate the public.
The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism
Dr. David Matsaberidze is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Ivane Javakishvili Tbilisi State University. He earned his PhD in Political Science from Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University in 2015 and holds an MA in Nationalism and Ethnicity Studies from Central European University (2008). Between 2015 and 2017, Dr. Matsaberidze completed professional development programs in regional and international security at the George C. Marshall European Centre for Security Studies in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.
Since 2013, he has been a recurrent visiting expert with the Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes at the Austrian Ministry of Defense and Sports (Germany-Austria). From 2008 to 2014, he was a recipient of the Academic Fellowship Program under the International Higher Education Support Program of the Open Society Foundations.
Dr. Matsaberidze has authored 15 academic articles, 8 policy papers in international journals, and 2 books, along with 5 book chapters in English, focusing on democratic transitions, conflicts, nationalism, and security in the post-Soviet Caucasus, particularly in Georgia. His research has been conducted in collaboration with various academic and policy institutions in Germany, Austria, Romania, Serbia, Hungary, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
Abstract: The prospective talk will deal with the rotating populist discourses of the post-Soviet Georgia and track the main lines of its transformation from the nationalist populism to the conservative populism. In Georgia, it is taken for granted that political leaders are populists because of their emphasis on charisma and personality. However, although circumstances favored the emergence of political populism and a populist discourse of persuasion was a widespread phenomenon, these developments were neither inevitable nor automatic. The case of Georgia attests that populism as a political discourse typically encompasses the charismatic leader, popular societal demands, strong nationalist component, and the usual affirmation of the common people by the elites and the text and talk of professional politicians, or political institutions, includes both the speaker and the audience. This is not only a discursive mode of making policy, but also shapes the overall political agenda and public opinion, which in turn legitimizes policy decision-making. Therefore, reflecting on discursive practices contributes not only to our understanding of customary political practices, but also to their relationship to the social and political context and its detailed properties, including the constraints on discourse itself.
The post-Soviet Georgian populism is a mixture of populism in policymaking and nationalism in ideology, that allows politicians to control the public discourse and public mind. The first president, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was a redemptive populist who wanted to free the Georgian nation from the Russian yoke, thereby responding to the anti-Soviet sentiments of the time. His successor, Eduard Shevardnadze, was a pragmatic populist who restored order and stability to the ransacked nation after the civil war and ethnic conflicts of the early 1990s by introducing a civil society discourse built on democratization and state-building. The third president, Mikheil Saakashvili, was an idealistic populist who used an idealist, pro-Western discourse to renew the Georgian nation through modernization and democratization in the mode of a Western, civic nation. Since 2012, a kind of loss of the national idea can be observed in the political discourse, as the populist discourses of President Giorgi Margvelashvili (2013-2018) and the incumbent prime minister clashed: The former defended the constitutional backbone of the state, i.e., a functioning democratic state for the people, while the latter propagated left-wing populism to restore dignity and ensure the social well-being of the people, which threatens the national idea. The prime minister’s discourse is more widely accepted in society because politics becomes personal in light of a leader who succeeded in defeating the so-called ‘brutal regime’ of the previous government (Ivanishvili vs. Saakashvili). This aspect is a constant feature of the rhetoric of the post-Saakashvili political leadership of the Georgian Dream party.
The conservative-populist turn since 2020 attests the transformation of the foreign policy rhetoric of the Georgian Dream government towards the EUrope. The demarcation-integration cleavages (Kriesi et al., 2008; 2012) appearing in the Georgian society have superseded the traditional Rokkanian cleavages (that have never been consistent in Georgia) and crystalized into the populist radical right-wing direction by the Georgian Dream party: constructing the Georgian people as a cultural unit confined within the Georgian nation-state and through its traditional-conservatist rhetoric indirectly undermining the idea of the regional/EaP European integration, whilst opposing the normative based approach of the EU/Brussels and siding with Orbán’s Budapest, that defends Christianity and traditional-Conservative society. This is the recent strategy of the ruling Georgian Dream, concentrated on politics of radicalization towards domestic (opposition) and external (Brussels) actors through the strategy of alternative or competitive discourse formation, filling in the empty signifier constantly through changing topics and rhetoric(s).
The political discourse of the Georgian Dream sets the new demarcation-integration cleavages: we – Georgia/Georgians – a sovereign nation-state, against any external interference in our will of free choice of domestic and foreign policies (although very vague and not clearly defined), pursued in the interest of the Georgian people (a very populist discourse and rhetoric). The chosen strategy of the Georgian Dream undermines any sort of the whole of society defense system to contain interference of authoritarian regimes in democracies and puts limits on any sort of new democracy promotion project on the Eastern borderlands of the EU, to be driven internally by local actors and supported externally by IOs and CSOs. This undermines any attempt of forming new international resilience via alignment of national resiliencies whose aim is to contain Russian/Eurasian turn to autocracy, while promoting and advancing Euro-Atlantic integration in the EaP countries.
Prof. Jocelyn Cesari (The Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Chair in Islamic Studies and research professor of political science and international relations at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).
Prof. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics at Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies).
Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences and Law at University of Dundee).
Partner Institutions
European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)
Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)
Georgetown University (Washington DC)
University of Birmingham (Birmingham)
Deakin University (Melbourne)
DAAD / Cambridge University
In-East / University of Duisburg
Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)
This two-day symposium will explore different aspects of the interplay between populism, religion, and civilizationism from local, national, transnational, international and global perspectives. Evaluating their combined impact on plural societies, intergroup relations, social cohesion and democratic institutions, the symposium will analyze how populists from diverse cultural, geographical, and political contexts both in Global North and Global South interact with and employ religion, civilizationism and digital technologies in their discourses and performances.
Thematic Overview
Populism has emerged as a defining feature of contemporary politics, exerting profound local, national, international, and global influences. Increasingly, it has become part and parcel of states’ transnational activities in constructing and reaching out to their “peoples” outside of their nation-state boundaries. The rise of digital technologies and the rapid advances in AI applications have only intensified the impact of populism, locally, transnationally and globally.
Often characterized as a “thin ideology,” populism operates alongside core/thick ideologies such as socialism, neoliberalism, racism, or religion, serving as a potent force for impacting emotions, mobilizing the masses, shaping public opinion and securing (or seizing) political power. Within this context, civilization —in some cases — serves as a metanarrative through which populists emphasize distinctions and escalate antagonistic relations among ‘the people” and ‘others,’ usually along religious lines. Civilizational populism not only employs the traditional ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric but also accentuates cultural, civilizational and religious identities, intensifying conflicts within, beyond and between nations. Civilizational populist discourses have also initiated discussions on transnationalism, south-south cooperation, globalization, and multipolarity, thereby potentially influencing international relations.
In this new and rapidly changing context dominated by uncertainty on many levels, the symposium will focus on the complexity of populism not only from different disciplinary perspectives but also across multiple political, religious, and cultural groups beyond the North/South divide. The symposium also aims to provoke discussions on innovative ways to think about the policy implications of this complex phenomenon in cyberage.
We welcome paper proposals from scholars, media experts, civil society actors and policymakers to contribute to this critically significant dialogue.
Themes include but are not limited to:
Civilizational populism in the Global South and the Global North (proposals about situations in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Indo-Pacific and Southeast Asia are particularly welcome).
Digital technologies, including the use of AI, and civilizational populism (e.g., new opportunities to communicate and politically mobilize and the implications for the future of civilizational populism).
Local, national and transnational dynamics of civilizational populism and their policy implications.
Impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions of different ethnoreligious and political groups in societies, social cohesion and civility.
The impact of civilizational populism in contexts of acute intergroup conflict, including political violence and war.
Authoritarianism, authoritarian state and non-state actors and their modes of promotion of civilizational populism.
Foreign policy, inter-state relations and civilizational populism.
Neo liberalism, market and civilizational populism.
Target Audience
Policymakers, academics, researchers, civil society organizations, and practitioners in political science, sociology, international relations, and public policy
Expected Outcomes
Nuanced and enhanced comprehension of civilizational populism.
Identification of best practices and policy recommendations for addressing its complex challenges.
Shaping a new research agenda in response to rapid and drastic changes in society and digital technologies, opportunities for networking and collaboration.
Publication of selected papers and proceedings to disseminate insights and findings.
Format
Keynote speeches.
Roundtable discussions.
Paper presentations.
Key Dates
Extended Deadline for Abstract Submission: 15 November 2024.
Notification of Acceptance: 15 December 2024.
Paper Draft and PowerPoint Presentation Submission: 15 April 2025.
Symposium Dates: 22-23 May 2025.
Submission Guidelines
Abstract (600-800 words) and bio submissions (300-400 words) are invited to explore the symposium’s themes.
Submissions should include a clear methodology, theoretical framework, argument and potential contributions to the existing scholarship on populism.
Please indicate the relevance of your research to the symposium themes and its overall focus.
Add a few keywords to your abstract.
Contact Information
For inquiries and submissions, please contact the Symposium Coordinator Prof. Ibrahim Ozturk at iozturk@populismstudies.org
We look forward to your contributions and the vibrant discussions ahead.
This two-day symposium will explore different aspects of the interplay between populism, religion, and civilizationism from local, national, transnational, international and global perspectives. Evaluating their combined impact on plural societies, intergroup relations, social cohesion and democratic institutions, the symposium will analyze how populists from diverse cultural, geographical, and political contexts both in Global North and Global South interact with and employ religion, civilizationism and digital technologies in their discourses and performances.