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Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

Virtual Programme: September 4, 2025 – April 16, 2026 via Zoom 

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser 

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

 

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

 

Session 1  

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World 

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Introduction

David J. Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus).  

Speakers 

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”  by Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota (Fordham University, NYC), Amartya Sharma (Student, George Washington University, D.C.)

“Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists shape Public Opinion,”  by Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) and Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri). 

“From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism,” by Akis Kalaitzidis, (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) and Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

Discussant

João Ferreira Dias (Researcher at the International Studies Centre of ISCTE, in the Research Group Institutions, Governance and International Relations).

 

Session 2

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford).

Speakers

Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas,” by Joanna Kurczewska (Professor in the humanities, Head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).
 
Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire,” by Kamil Jonski (Economist, PhD in law at the University of Lodz). 
 
“Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights,” by Malgorzata Fuszara (Professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS), University of Warsaw). 
 
Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law,” by  Jacek Kurczewski (Professor of humanities in the field of Sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw). 
 

Discussants

Magdalena Solska (Assistant Professor, Department of European Studies and Slavic Studies, University of Fribourg).

Barry Sullivan (Professor, Institute For Racial Justice, Loyola University Chicago School of Law).

Krzysztof Motyka (Professor, Institute of Sociological Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

 

Session 3 

Populism, Authoritarianism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers 

“Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian iIliberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” by Marc Loustau (PhD., Independent Scholar).

“Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia,” by Juraj Buzalka (Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University).  

“Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law,” by Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen (First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford).

Discussant

Erkan Toguslu

 

Session 4 

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Speakers 

“We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” by Samuel Ngozi Agu (Ph.D., Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria).

“Uses and Meanings of ‘the People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil,” by Eleonora Mesquita Ceia (Professor at the National Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil). 

“The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” by Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani)

“We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” by Mouli Bentman, Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel). 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology, SMBA University, Fes; Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University). 

Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders’ Narratives between 2010-2020,” by Gheorghe Andrei (PhD Student, University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). 

“The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy,”  by Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Postdoctoral Fellow, Technische Universität Dresden). 

“The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa,” by Melody Chindoga (Postdoctoral fellow, Midlands State University, Gweru Zimbabwe). 

“Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist,” by Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews). 

 

Session 6

Populism, Authoritarianism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World,”  by Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).

“Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy,” by João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (Member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education).

“Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-politics and Post-democracy,” by Andreea Zamfira (Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest). 

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University). 

Speakers

“Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism,” by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University).

“Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization,” by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).

“Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective,” by Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V).

“Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism,” by Bosco Lebrun (PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, Rome).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)


Speakers

Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia,” by Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong).

“Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage,” by Saga Oskarson Kindstrand (PhD candidate, Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po). 

“Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right,” by Jaime Roque, (PhD candidate, Center for Social Studies – University of Coimbra (CES-UC)). 

 “The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024,”  by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow).

Discussants

(TBC) 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

Speakers

“From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,”by Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University). 

“The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” by Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies) and Murat Aktas (Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University).

“Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust,” by Santiago López Rodríguez (Postdoctoral Fellow, Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University).

“Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview,” by Roberta Astolfi (Postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the SCRIPTS of the Free University Berlin). 

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Resilience in Market Democracy,”  by Peter Rogers (Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University).

“The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy,” by Pierre Camus(Postdoctoral Fellow, Nantes University).

“The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism,” by Soheila Shahriari (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, (EHESS)).

“Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile,” by Ecem Nazlı Üçok (PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“When Identity Politics and Social Justice Procedures Contribute to Populism,” by Saeid Yarmohammadi (University of Montreal).

“Why Do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies,”by Ariel Lam Chan (PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University).

“Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development,”  by Dr Dieudonne Mbarga (Independent Researcher).

“Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities,” by Ali Ragheb (PhD., University of Tehran).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

  

Session 12 

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” by Yves Valéry Obame (The University of Bertoua, Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab) and Salomon Essaga Eteme (The University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc)).  

“Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa,” by Geoffrey Nwaka (Professor of History, Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria). 

“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom,” by Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University).

“Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya, by Asenath Mwithigah (PhD Candidate, United States International University-Africa).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 13

 Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

 Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by Jasmin Hasanović (Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science).

“The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together,” by Théophile Pénigaud (postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS, Yale University). 

 “Institutionalizing the Assembled People,” by Sixtine Van Outryve (Postdoctoral Researcher, Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain).

“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,” by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 14  

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation  

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Brian Ball (Associate Professor, Northeastern University London & University of Oxford,Faculty of Philosophy). 

Speakers

“Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us?” by Joan Font (Research Professor, Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC).   

“How Does ChatGPT Shape European Cultural Heritage for the Future of Democracy?” by Alonso Escamilla (PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation, The Catholic University of Ávila in Spain) and Paula Gonzalo (Researcher, University of Salamanca, Spain). 

“The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness,” by Aly Hill, (PhD candidate, Department of Communication at The University of Utah).  

“Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world,” by Amina Vatreš (Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 15 

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy   

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers 

“Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor, History Faculty,University of Illinois, Springfield).

“Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” by Robert R. Traill (PhD in Cybernetics/Psychology at Brunel). 

“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism,” by Lorenzo Viviani (Professor, Political Sociology, Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy).

The Exclusionary Identity of ‘The People’ in Radical Right Populism,” by Cristiano Gianolla (Researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra; Lisete S. M. Mónico (Associate Professor, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, the University of Coimbra) and Manuel João Cruz (Post-doctoral researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s Contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belonginess,” by Mitja Stefancic (Independent Researcher, Civil Servant, Italy).

“The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema,” by Devapriya Raajev (MA candidate, Sociology, South Asian University, New Delhi). 

“’ I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy,” by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University). 

“State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military,”  by Niva Golan-Nadir (Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University) and Michael Freedman (Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

Discussants

(TBC) 

 


 

Biographies & Abstracts

Session 1 

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor in political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne where he leads the Research Observatory for regional research. He is currently the principal investigator the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University.

His works have been published in several peer-reviewed journals as European Politics and Society, Government and Opposition, Political Studies, Party Politics, Swiss Political Science Review, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Territory, Politics, Governance, Comparative European Politics, Contemporary Italian Politics, Socio-economic Review, Regional and Federal Studies, Journal of Borderlands studies, Revue française de Science politique, and Populism amongst others. He has published 45 books in 4 languages (English, Italian, French and German). His latest volumes include “The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (ed. with R. Heinisch and E. Massetti Routledge 2019), “Political Populism. Handbook of Concepts, Questions and Strategies of Research” (ed. with R. Heinisch and C.Holtz-Bacha, Nomos, 2021); “Sovereignism and Populism : Citizens, Voters and Parties in Western European Democracies” (ed. with L. Basile, Routledge 2022); “National Populism and Borders: The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe” (Elgar 2023); “Populism and Key Concepts in Social and Political Theories” (ed with. C. De la Torre, Brill, 2023), and “Territory and Democratic Politics. A Critical Introduction” (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2024).

He was the principal investigator of many research projects, including four funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. He has pursued an interdisciplinary educational path, earning a degree in sociology and anthropology, as well as a PhD in contemporary history, from the universities of Lausanne and Turin. He was a visiting professor and research fellow at the Universities of Columbia, Laval, Geneva, Groningen, Torino, Sorbonne-Panthéon- Paris, Science-Po-Paris, Valencia, Salzburg, European University Institute of Florence, Cornell University, and La Tuscia. His interests are devoted on political parties, populism, nationalism, regionalism, and Swiss politics in comparative perspective.

Introduction

David J. Sanders is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Essex. Professor Sanders is an internationally renowned expert on British politics and was appointed the UK’s first Regius Professor of Political Science. Professor Sanders has been a key figure in the achievements of Essex’s Department of Government, which has topped the UK politics rankings for the quality of its research in every national research assessment in the last 25 years.

After studying at Essex as a postgraduate student, Professor Sanders started teaching politics at the University in 1975. He is author of numerous influential books and articles on UK politics, including Lawmaking and Cooperation in International Politics, 1986 and Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 1990. He co-authored Political Choice in Britain, 2004, Performance Politics and the British Voter, 2009, Affluence, Austerity and Electoral Change in Britain, 2013 and The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, 2013.

He also co-edited the top UK political science journal, the British Journal of Political Science, between 1990 and 2008.

Professor Sanders is a Fellow of the British Academy and received a Special Recognition Award from the Political Studies Association in 2012 for his commitment to outstanding research, which has shaped public understanding of politics. From 2000 to 2012, he was a Principal Investigator for the British Election Study, which is conducted at every General Election to study electoral behaviour and how elections contribute to the operation of our democracy. This prestigious study was based at Essex from 1974 to 1983 and from 2000 to 2012.

Paper 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?

Abstract: Both India and the US seem to be in the grip of a populist movement that seems to share power with political dynasties and big business. How is this possible in a democracy? We examine this question by comparing families and dynasties in both countries — Kennedy vs Gandhi, currently out of power; Trump vs Modi, now in power. Both nations claim to be vibrant democracies, where populist nationalists have swept into power. Historically, India has been led by charismatic members of one dynastic family, namely the Gandhis; while the US definitely has political families (such as the Adams, Bushs, Rockerfellers, Clintons and now Trumps) it has not been dominated by one or two family dynasties in the way Asian democracies have been after colonialism ended.

Similarly, businesses have played a major role in politics of India and the US, but the business takeover of democratic institutions has had a bigger hand in the US politics than in India until recently; India was a quasi-socialist country till the 1990s. Both polities seem to be moving closer to big business, playing a major role in shaping policy and trade. Thus, we ask the question: are democracies at this populist moment in global politics controlled by the patricians (robber barons, big-tech, oligarchs) – big business and political dynasties? Our methodological approach is psycho-historical and biographical, while staying abreast of demographic data.

We compare the Kennedys vs. the Gandhis; and Trump vs Modi. The Gandhi family has dominated Indian politics for half of its modern history since gaining independence from British rule in 1947; while at least one member of the Kennedy family has been in power for at least the past fifty years in local or federal office, they’ve never held power in the way the Gandhi family did in India. Here we compare women leaders in both family histories, Indira Gandhi vs Kennedy female leaders. In comparing Trump vs. Modi we see a clear difference between two societies; Modi is not a billionaire, unlike Trump, rather a tea-seller from very humble origins. Yet, their populist governments have given power sharing arrangements to the big-business and big-tech oligarchs. When we compare the narrative of these two leaders we see a strong nationalistic streak that mobilizes populism in favor of nativism and an anti-globalist agenda.  The key question is are these societies converging or diverging? On the question of authoritarianism and populism they are converging, as India rises as an economic power and the US tries to remain a global democratic power, even though their local cultural politics are remarkably different.

Dinesh Sharma,Ph.D., is a social scientist with a Doctorate from Harvard University in human development and psychology. He is currently Director and Chief Research Officer at SteamWorksStudio in Central-Southern Jersey (an edu-tech venture), consultant at Fordham Institute for Research Service and Teaching (FIRST), and contributing faculty at Walden University. He was associate research professor at the Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, SUNY; a senior fellow at the Institute for International and Cross-Cultural Research in New York City; and a columnist for Asia Times Online, Al Jazeera English and the Global Intelligence among other syndicated publications. His biography, titled “Barack Obama in Hawaii and Indonesia: The Making of a Global President,” was rated a Top 10 Book of Black History for 2012 by the American Library Association. His next book, “The Global Obama” has been widely reviewed and received the Honorable Mention on the Top 10 Black History Books for 2014. His book on Hillary Clinton examined the rise of women politicians before the “Me Too” movement, “The Global Hillary: Women’s Political Leadership in Cultural Context” (Routledge, 2016) and was favorably reviewed.

Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, is a graduate student from New York City, currently studying at Fordham’s Graduate School of Education. Her academic interests focus on the psychological impacts of early-life trauma and the integration of mindfulness techniques in clinical settings to support emotional, cognitive, and physical integration. She is also engaged in research exploring the relationship between trauma and democracy. Shoshana is passionate about bridging psychological theory with real-world practice and plans to pursue a career in clinical psychology. 

Paper 2: Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion

Abstract: Populist leaders claim they are the true representative of “the people” against corrupt elites and various out-groups (very often immigrants) who are thought to threaten the well-being of the nation. If this is so, the leader is simply reflecting the will of the people as they ascend to power and carry out their agenda. From this view, the populist leader answers the call of the people and uses power to protect and restore the country by targeting the elites and out-groups that threaten it. However, populist leaders do not just reflect the will of the people, they actively cultivate public support for their political agenda. From this view, populist leaders deploy their rhetorical powers to persuade, and even manipulate, the people, by tapping into anxieties that build public support for the populist leader’s agenda. Moreover, the power of populist leaders to focus the attention of voters on the threats to their well-being enables them to tap into in-group fears of various socio-demographically different out-groups. Indeed, truly gifted populist orators can manufacture fear and anxiety by targeting specific out-groups as the “cause” of the economic, social, or political problems that, in their view, threaten the nation. 

In this paper, we examine results from a nationally representative survey conducted in the U.S. in October of 2024 to measure the ability of U.S. President Donald Trump to influence public opinion. We examine his ability to increase or decrease public support for a range of policies, specifically refugees and trade. Our survey allows us to compare how respondents view refugees depending on whether those refugees are from Ukraine or from Gaza, and how respondents view trade from Europe or from China. Moreover, our survey allows us to assess whether public opinion is more readily shaped by the cues provided by political leaders (what we call “follow-the-leader” effects) or by the social attributes of the “out-group” (what we call “social attributes” effects), both of which are important components of populist rhetorical appeals.

Michael Makara is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and his B.A. from Virginia Tech. Professor Makara’s research focuses on politics in authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations, with a regional focus on the Middle East. His research appears in Democracy and SecurityDefense and Security Analysis, and the Journal of the Middle East and Africa. At UCM he teaches a variety of courses related to comparative politics and politics of the Middle East. Every year, he leads a study abroad program to Jordan and Israel that aims to challenge students’ perceptions of the region. He recently published an article in the Journal of Political Science Education (with Kinsey Canon) that explores the impact of this program on the extent to which students adhere to common stereotypes of the Middle East. Dr. Makara also sits on the Board of Directors for the International Relations Council (IRC) of Kansas City and is the director the Mideast meets Midwest project to expand opportunities for university students to pursue Middle Eastern Studies.University of Central Missouri & Dr. Gregory W. Streich, University of Central Missouri. 

Gregory W. Streich is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages. He has published on a range of topics, including democratic theory, social capital, justice, and American Exceptionalism. Most notably, he has authored or co-edited three books: Justice Beyond “Just Us”: Dilemmas of Time, Place, and Difference in American PoliticsU.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide, and Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life. Additionally, he has won several awards for his teaching and research, including the Distinguished Faculty Award from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Paper 3: From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism

Abstract: This paper is meant to be a comparative study between four international crises: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Argentina’s 2001, the US’s Great Recession of 2008, and Greece’s Great Depression of 2010. It has been argued by economists, historians, and political scientists that economic crises produce populist movements in the countries that experience them (Kindleberger, 2005; Ferguson, 2012; Hartleb, 2012). Kindleberger argues that all economic crises are a product of a “bubble” or a “mania” and as such the corrective response is an economic crisis in the country that experiences such market inflation. As an economist, however, he says nothing of the impact of the crisis on the politics of the country or the responses to said crisis.

Generally speaking, populism has been at the forefront of countries with great inequalities in places like Latin America or India or in countries under severe socio-economic stress such as Weimar Germany. Yet the European Union may be in a recession but it could hardly be justification for the multitude of populist (anti-EU, anti-globalization, xenophobic, and racist) movements that have sprung up even in countries with solid economies such as Finland, Denmark, and UK. It is thus important to analyze the types of responses to these crises and the types of populism, if any, each country experiences as a result of a given crisis, accounting for its severity and the administrative and decision-making capacity of the state apparatus.

The association of economic crisis and populism seems to hold true in modern times in many areas of the world. In Thailand after the catastrophic collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997, in Argentina in 2001, and in the US after 2010, one can debate whether the bursting of the dot com bubble constitutes a crisis, but mostly after the collapse of the real estate market bubble of 2008 and more recently in Greece in 2010. Yet, in all those countries the experience with populism is different and the pressure created by the economic condition on the ground leads to different outcomes in the politics of those countries. In Thailand, the reaction to post-crisis populism was a coup, in Argentina was an extended period of “Kirchnerismo” , in the US the rise of what Hofstadter the “Paranoid Style in American Politics”, as well as the more traditional non-party political movements hat put enormous pressure on the traditional party structure pushing liberal democracy to the brink, while in Greece populism which is more associated with European populist tradition as experienced in most pre-and post-WWII countries created a hybrid nationalist-leftist populism more akin to early twentieth century European Corporatism. This research intends to highlight the political processes, Institutions, and leaders who have influenced the course of politics and argue that in all four cases, the best predictor for post-crisis behavior is the national political culture.

Akis Kalaitzidis is a professor of political science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri. He received his B.A. from the University of Tennessee-Knoxville in Economics and Political Science, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University in Philadelphia in Political Science. He joined the UCM faculty in 2004. He teaches a variety of classes, including American Government, The European Union, World Politics, International Organizations, and American Foreign Policy. He was Rotary Peace Fellow at the Rotary Peace Center Chulalongkorn University’s Program in Conflict Resolution and has been the director of the Missouri Ghana program (2011) and Missouri Greece program (2015). He is the author of Europe‘s Greece: A Giant in the Making, published by Palgrave McMillan (2010) and co-edited with Dr. Streich US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Greenwood 2012) among others. His work appears in a variety of journals, book reviews/contributions, and conference publications.

Paper 4: Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou

Abstract: This paper explores the role of populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential political figures. Papandreou served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 1996. His tenure coincided with a period of profound political and economic transformation following the restoration of democracy in 1975. His governance combined populist rhetoric with clientelist practices, crafting a distinctive political strategy that left a lasting impact on Greek politics. At the core of Papandreou’s political success was his ability to mobilize popular support through populist appeals, emphasizing social justice, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the welfare state. He positioned himself as a champion of the common people, presenting the Socialist Party as the defender of workers’ rights and national sovereignty, even as he reversed course on many of his programmatic policies.

Papandreou’s populism resonated deeply with the large segment of the Greek population that right-wing establishments had marginalized following the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the collapse of the military junta (1967-1974). As these disenfranchised groups leaned politically to the left, Papandreou shifted his stance from the center to the left, incorporating a more left-wing faction within his party. His message of social and economic justice empowered these communities, offering them a sense of inclusion and challenging the longstanding dominance of conservative elites. In parallel with his populist narrative, Papandreou employed clientelism as a tool for political stability. The distribution of state resources and public sector jobs—particularly after Greece acceded to the EEC and the influx of investment funds—was often based on loyalty rather than merit. This system of patronage not only secured votes but also fostered a political culture of dependence on the state for material rewards.

This study explores the interaction between populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state. It investigates Papandreou’s policies’ influence on Greece’s political culture, governance frameworks, and public administration and their enduring effects on the nation’s journey within the European Union. The analysis ultimately provides a critical evaluation of how populist rhetoric and clientelist strategies reinforced democratic institutions in Greece and altered state-society dynamics during the late 20th century.

Elizabet Kosmetatou is a Professor of History at the University of Illinois Springfield. 

 

Session 2 

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Abstract: In principle, the Polish transition to democracy initiated in 1981 was understood as liberation from Soviet colonialism, Communist totalitarian state ideology at the national level and “the resurrection of rights” (Kurczewski, 1993) at the individual level.

In practice, it quickly became controversial how the “will” of the nation should be determined and whose rights should be resurrected. The problem was nicely captured by a Christian member of the Polish Parliament, voicing objection to the abortion referendum on the grounds that such fundamental and morally-loaded issues could not be decided by “the accidental society” (in other words, the voting public).

Two decades later, opening debate that will be called “the four hours of anti-philosophy of law” (Safjan, 2015) the honorary speaker of Polish Parliament proclaimed that “law shall serve us. Law that does not serve the nation is lawlessness”. “Poland’s constitutional breakdown” (Sadurski, 2019) dutifully followed, beginning with “war” with the Constitutional Tribunal and ordinary courts.

Panellists will discuss:

-the concept of nation – civil and national} underpinning “Solidarity’s” resistance to the communist rule, and its evolutions after the 1989 breakthrough (Joanna Kurczewska),

-the shifting patterns of the political polarization and its impact on key liberal-democratic institutions like Parliamentary law-making process, Presidency and the Constitutional Court (Kamil Jonski),

-the sociological dimensions of the “rule of law” including the democratic transition, post-2015 backsliding and post-2023 restoration in context of doctrine of separation of powers (Jacek Kurczewski),

-the implications for the protection of human rights, with particular emphasize on woman’s rights (including access to the abortion) and minorities rights (Malgorzata Fuszara).

Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas

Joanna Kurczewska is a full professor in the humanities and head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Graduated University of Warsaw, Ph.D. at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (The Problem of the Nation in Polish Sociology at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries. A Comparative Analysis of Selected Concepts), habilitated doctor (Technocrats and the Social World – Analysis of Technocratic Ideas).

In 1981, co-operated with the Centre for Social and Professional Work at the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity” Trade Union as co-chair of the Union History Group.

A corresponding member of the Second Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 2011) and vice-president, formerly president of the Commission on Civilization Threats of the above Academy, a member of the Warsaw Scientific Society (since 2009), In 2007, she was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Selected publications: National Identities vis-a-vis Democracy and Catholicism – The Polish Case after 1989 (2005), Researcher vis-a-vis the Local Community (2008), Squeezing Brussels Sprouts? On the Europeanization of Local Communities in the Borderlands (2009).

Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire

Kamil Joński is an economist who graduated from SGH Warsaw School of Economics with a Ph.D. in law at the University of Lodz (Constitutional Tribunal and the Political Conflict – Law & Economics Perspective). He is an assistant at the Collegium of Socio-Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics. He works at several research projects financed by Polish National Science Centre, at Cracow University of Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Jónski worked on Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) in Polish Ministry of Justice (2012-2016) and on economic analysis of judicial system in MoJ’s supervised Institute of Justice (2016-2017). Since 2017, he is employed at Polish Supreme Administrative Court. 

Selected papers: Return to Power: The Illiberal Playbook from Hungary, Poland and the United States (2024), Legislative inflation in Poland: bird’s eye view on three decades after the the1989 breakthrough (2024), Evidence-Based policymaking during the COVID-19 Crisis: Regulatory Impact Assessments and the Polish COVID-19 Restrictions (2023), Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method (2023). Co-author of the 2022 report summarizing European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) survey of European judges about their independence.

Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights

Małgorzata Fuszara is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS) University of Warsaw, habilitated doctor in the Sociology of Law, Ph.D. in law. Served two terms as Director of the IASS, joint founder of Poland’s first Gender Studies Program at IASS, head of its Sociology and Anthropology of Custom and Law Chair. In 2014-2015 Plenipotentiary of Polish Government for Equal Treatment. President of Council of Women’s Congress Association, Chairwoman of the Women’s Council under the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Authored, co-authored and edited numerous publications in Polish, English, French and German, among others: Polish Disputes and Courts (2004), Women in politics (2007), New men? Changing models of masculinity in contemporary Poland (2008), Cooperation or conflict? The State, the Union and Women (2008), Women, elections, politics (2013), Disputes and their resolution (2017), Mass Aid in Mass Escape. Polish Society and War Migration from Ukraine (2022).

Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law

Jacek Kurczewski is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw. Editor-in-chief of Societas/Communitas. Specializing in the sociology and anthropology of law and customs, continuator of the Leon Petrażycki’s Polish school of sociology, a student of Adam Podgórecki. Former Academic Director of the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law. Member of Warsaw Academic Society.

In 1980–1992 an advisor on Rule of Law to the “Solidarity” Trade Union, member of Lech Wałęsa’s Citizens Committee, participant of the Round Table negotiations of 1989 (sub-table for freedom of association). Judge of the Tribunal of the State (1989-1991). Member of Parliament and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the first term (1991–1993). Coauthor of the draft laws: limiting censorship (1981), the law on counteracting drug addiction (1987), the law on assemblies (1990) and the Civil Service Code (2003). In 2007 awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Member of the Program Councils of the Polish public TV broadcaster and pollster CBOS Foundation. Author of The Resurrection of Rights in Poland (1993) and numerous research papers.

Chair

Mavis Maclean is a Senior Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College and a Research Associate at Department of Social Policy and Intervention. She has carried out Socio Legal research in Oxford since 1974, and was a founding director of OXFLAP in 2001. She has acted as the Academic Adviser to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and served as a panel member on the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry between 1998 and 2001, a major public inquiry into the National Health Service. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire

Discussants

Dr. Magdalena Solska is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Fribourg. She currently directs the research project “Political opposition in post-communist democracies and authoritarianisms,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (PRIMA Grant) in the period of 2023-2027. Her research focuses on political systems after communism and specifically on forms, strategies and institutionalization of opposition in selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History. Before joining the Loyola faculty, Professor Sullivan had a varied career in the private practice of law, government legal practice, the teaching of law and public policy, and university administration. Professor Sullivan was Dean of the School of Law at Washington and Lee University from 1994 to 1999 and Vice-President of the University in 1998-99. He was also a long-time litigation partner at Jenner & Block (1981-94, 2001-09), where he focused on appellate practice.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka is a legal philosopher and sociologist of law, Chair of Human Rights and Social Work (earlier: Sociology of Law and Morality) at John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Fulbright senior scholar in the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley (1994/1995), visiting researcher at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (July-October 2015). Member of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Advisory Board on Human Rights (2001 -2002) and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007-2012). Editor of “KUL Research Bulletin,” organizer of annual “Human Rights Days Conference.”

 

Session 3

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Abstract: In 2025, the Hungarian government announced it was creating a “Religious Freedom” caucus in the European Parliament. Domestically, Hungary has claimed a special relationship to the value of religious freedom since at least 2020, when the Hungarian parliament voted to enshrine religious freedom as an intangible value of Hungarian heritage (Hungarikum). On the one hand, the rising prominence of this discourse of religious freedom was precipitated by immediate political concerns as the Hungarian government has tried to distract attention from negative judgements at the European Court of Human Rights. On the other, this paper will go beyond journalistic accounts of political strategizing in order to sketch an outline of the emerging illberal political institutionalization of religious freedom. I will focus on the network of Hungarian institutional political actors that enact this discourse at the European and domestic levels, and detail the forms of publicly acceptable religious practice enabled by these institutions.

Marc Loustau is a cultural anthropologist and journalist reporting on religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe. Based in Budapest, Hungary, he is fluent in English and Hungarian and proficient in Romanian. His reported features and commentary have appeared in major U.S. and European newspapers and magazines. Drawing on his academic research, he provides smart and surprising fact-based commentary on contemporary events. He has delivered invited lectures at universities across Europe and North America and has presented at numerous international conferences. His book Hungarian Catholic Intellectuals in Romania: Reforming Apostles examines how contemporary Hungarian Catholic intellectuals are forging an ethical concept of nationhood.

Paper 2: Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia

Abstract: Since 1989, elements of radical Christian activism in Slovakia that have been frequently characterized as representing the ‘culture of life’ have been challenging the regime of post-socialist liberal constitutionalism represented by the European status quo. This challenge has primarily consisted of accusations that the latter suppresses newly acquired religious freedoms. The most significant counterpart of this radicalism – secular progressivism – has been arguing against expanding ecclesiastical privileges in the sphere of financing, education, and culture. Traditional social-confessional divisions in Slovak society have weakened, reshaping the discussion away from political freedom for all and toward a debate about who is suffering more oppression. In this conflict, the most profitable have been political entrepreneurs, especially current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who utilizes “culture war” discourse in his populist mobilizations.

Juraj Buzalka is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, where he has taught since 2006. His research focuses on the anthropology of political movements, exploring intersections of nationalism, populism, religion, and politics, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe. He is also interested in the politics of memory and the cultural dimensions of wine and food movements. Since 2013, he has been based at the Institute of Social Anthropology within the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. 

Paper 3: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law

Abstract: This year, Texas marks three consecutive decades of governance by the Republican Party. In that time, the party has built up what can be described as a theocratic illiberal regime. The theological positions of many of the state’s evangelical Christians have been incorporated into state law, often under the guise of religious freedom. In his paper, our third panelist, the Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, himself a Texas-based clergyman, will reflect how the rhetoric of religious freedom has been used to further the construction of an illiberal state within the United States federal system, eroded supposed the separation of church and state, and undermined freedom of religion itself.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He earned a Ph.D. in American Studies and an A.M. in History from Harvard University. A graduate of Meadville-Lombard Theological School, he was ordained by the Unitarian Universalist Church of Long Beach in 2007. Since 2018, he has served the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston. Before moving to Texas, he served congregations in California, Massachusetts, and Ohio. He has held non-residential fellowships at Rice University and Princeton University. A scholar and social justice activist he has helped organize multiple labor unions—including acting as one of the founders of the Harvard Graduate Student Union. He currently has three books under contract. The first is on contemporary Unitarian Universalist theology (Brill). The second collects his 2019 Minns lectures on American Populism and Unitarian Universalism (Palgrave Macmillan). And the third is focused on the political theologies of populism (Wayne State University Press).

 

Session 4

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor of political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne, where he leads the Research Observatory for Regional Research. He is currently the principal investigator of the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University. 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz El Bakkali is an associate professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology at SMBA University in Fes, Morocco, and a Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University in the US (2024/25), a PhD Joint-Sup at SIU, Illinois (2009/10), and a US Dept of State Fulbright Visiting P4T at UD Delaware (2007/2008). He obtained his PhD (2014) in media and communication from MVU, Rabat. His works focus on cultural studies and anthropology, primarily in the areas of media, gender, and religious studies. He has edited some books in these related research areas. Aziz has also written many articles in these related fields. El Bakkali has conducted other educational research, having taught English for over 24 years. He has published numerous articles in this field, which are featured on Publons, Google Scholar, SSRN, and other highly indexed works. 

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Paper 1: We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches 

Abstract: Democracy is often celebrated as a governance system that ensures citizen participation and accountability. However, in practice, centralized power structures often alienate the people and limit genuine participation, leading to political exclusion, inefficiency, and social unrest. This paper advocates for bottom-up approaches to governance as essential for realizing inclusive democracy and sustainable development. Using Nigeria as a case study, it highlights the limitations of top-down governance, as seen in widespread corruption, economic disparities, and rising public discontent. The study explores key strategies for enhancing participatory governance, including decentralization, civic education, community-based development, digital democracy, and legislative reforms. By shifting decision-making closer to the grassroots, these approaches empower citizens, enhance transparency, and promote equitable resource distribution. Empirical evidence from global case studies, such as participatory budgeting in Brazil and decentralized governance in Uganda, supports the argument that bottom-up models lead to improved governance outcomes. It further demonstrates the interdependence of participatory governance and sustainable development, as nations that prioritize inclusivity experience greater political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion. The persistent challenges in Nigeria – ranging from separatist movements to youth-led protests like #EndSARS – underscore the urgent need for governance reforms that integrate local voices into policymaking. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a fundamental shift in governance – one that places the power of decision-making in the hands of the people. By adopting citizen-driven governance, nations can close the gap between leaders and the governed, ensuring greater accountability, inclusivity, and democratic integrity.

Samuel Ngozi Agu is a distinguished academic and the Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. With a Doctor of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy from the University of Port Harcourt, he is also an Inaugural Lecture Laureate, recognized for his impactful scholarship. He holds a postgraduate certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Central European University, Budapest, and a Professional Certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Benjamin Cardozo and Hamline Universities’ Schools of Law, in collaboration with the American Bar Association. With over 16 peer-reviewed journal articles, 15 contributions to university research books, seven authored books, and two co-authored books, Professor Agu’s work spans critical areas in social and political philosophy, with a focus on democracy, good governance, logic, critical thinking and youth entrepreneurship. He has presented his research at numerous national and international conferences, reflecting his commitment to advancing thought leadership in his fields. Professor Agu had served as Director of the Business Resource Centre (Entrepreneurship) and Director of the University Examination Centre at Abia State University. His leadership and academic endeavors continue to shape both the intellectual and administrative landscape of the institution.

Paper 2: Uses and Meanings of ‘The People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil 

Abstract: The implementation of populism is not homogenous among South American countries so populism in this particular region has many variations. Yet, they are similarly determined by episodes of political and social transition – for instance, the crisis of traditional political elites and the appearance of new political actors – along with variables of economic force or instability. Brazil serves as a good example. From the classical populism of Getúlio Vargas in the decade of 1930s until the far-right authoritarian populism of Jair Bolsonaro, all populist experiences in Brazil are linked to important changes in society. 

Brazil has experienced several particular populist leaders: some with marked populist features than others; some exposing a reactionary antagonism while others a mitigated one. This empirical variation produced different uses and meanings of “the people” in service of populism in order to try to secure political support and gain elections. But is this variation observed in the rhetoric of the same populist leader over time? Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a democratic and liberal populist leader, is in his third presidential term (2003-2006; 2007-2010; 2023-). He faced three presidential campaigns forged by the particular contexts and crises of each period. The goal of the paper is to identify and explain the uses and meanings of “the people” by Lula in his three political moments. Do they vary according to social demands and the political context of each period, or does the content of the idea of “the people” remain unchanged because it is used by the same populist leader? 

As to the methods, the qualitative approach is adopted based on bibliographic and documentary research, including online news materials, official campaign speeches and political programmes. This empirical research aims to contribute to the debate on the concept of ‘people’ as a discursive construction, drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau. Moreover, the paper argues that the Lula case offers complexity that challenges the view within populism studies that populism is committed to opposing liberal democracies.

Eleonora Mesquita Ceia is a Doctor of Law at the Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany. Professor of State Theory at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil. Professor in the Postgraduate Program in Contemporary Legal Theories at UFRJ. Currently her research focuses on transitional justice, constitutionalism, democracy, and populism. Her most recently published article was ‘Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?’ in Populism and Time: temporalities of a Disruptive Politics edited by Andy Knott.

Paper 3: The idea of ‘People’ within the domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

Abstract: Democracy is considered to be as motherhood and apple pie of any political system (Adam Swift,2014). Till a few years ago, this assumption was challenged mainly by Islamic countries, who were predominantly of the opinion that the West was imposing a liberal democratic set-up on their countries through coercion. Interestingly, during the second decade of the 21st century, the critique of democracy emerged not externally but from the internal system of the democratic political framework. 

The socio-political context of this internal critique is Populism of specific variety. It was the origin of a process of disaffection and disgust with liberal institutions, manifested in the increasing level of abstention and apathy (Chantal Mouffe, 2018). From the triumph of liberal democracy to its failure and its insufficient response toward the aspirations of the public, it created an apolitical social sphere. This vacuum was filled up by populist forces in India in 2014.

This upsurge of Hindu Nationalism is a variant of populism based on the emotional appeal to the psychological dimension of Indian society. Along with the failure of the liberal elites, the subalternisation of the political culture has created fertile ground for this variant of populism to develop (Ashutosh Varshney, 2022). Just like all other variants, Hindu Nationalism is essentially anti-institutionalist and restructuring the logic of liberal institutions is one of its objectives (Ajay Gudavarthy,2019). One of the specificities of this populism in India is its organic emergence from the Unconscious domain of Indian society (Ashis Nandy, 2020). Gradually, it acquires authoritarian tendencies of unique character, which we haven’t witnessed till now.

It is in this context this paper will try to delve on the four sets of questions. Firstly, How the political mobilisation of Hindutva is based on politics of emotion? Secondly, in what ways Populist politics within the framework of Hindu Nationalism is unique (authoritarian) in its form and content? Thirdly, can we think of any ‘alternative’ of Populism within the context of India in particular and the world in general? Lastly, theoretically, what would be the sphere of the revolutionary subject (the idea of people) within the space of re-imagined progressive politics (alternative) that this paper intends to think through?

Shiveshwar Kundu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kalyani, West Bengal. His academic interests encompass political philosophy, Indian politics, and psychoanalysis. Kundu has contributed opinion pieces and scholarly articles to publications such as Forward PressNewslaundry, and The Telegraph India, where he addresses issues related to democracy, caste, and ideological movements in India.

Paper 4: We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Abstract: This paper examines the populist redefinition of We, the People and its implications for liberal democracy. Historically an inclusive foundation for democratic citizenship, the phrase has been appropriated by populist movements to delineate a “true people” in opposition to perceived outsiders. Rather than viewing this shift as mere rhetorical manipulation, the paper argues that it reflects a deeper crisis within the liberal-democratic tradition itself. The erosion of a shared conception of citizenship and the common good—exacerbated by identity-driven politics and post-liberal critiques—has facilitated this populist reinterpretation. While populist leaders exploit these fractures, their rise is symptomatic of broader ideological shifts in liberalism, which increasingly prioritizes particular identities over universal democratic ideals. Engaging with contemporary political theory and populism studies, this paper advocates for reclaiming We, the People as a genuinely inclusive democratic principle, emphasizing equality, pluralism, and civic participation as essential to the resilience of liberal democracy.

Mouli Bentman is a researcher and lecturer at Sapir Academic College, specializing in political philosophy and democracy studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a DEA from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research explores the philosophical foundations of democracy, the relationship between political authority and legitimacy, and the intersection of classical and contemporary political thought. Dr. Bentman’s academic work engages with fundamental questions in political philosophy, including the nature of sovereignty, the evolution of democratic governance, and the role of political myths in shaping collective identities. His scholarship examines both historical and contemporary theories of democracy, with a particular focus on Political Imagination. At Sapir Academic College, he teaches courses on political theory, democratic institutions, and the philosophical underpinnings of modern politics, emphasizing critical engagement with canonical and contemporary texts.

Michael Dahan received his PhD in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2001. Currently his research focuses on two primary areas – the impact of technology on democracy as well as big data, algorithmic regimes and political participation. He provides grounded analysis on a regular basis in both areas and advises on policy issues in his areas of expertise. He is a regular contributor to the media on issues related to technology and politics. Dr. Dahan has extensive first-hand experience in the security and development fields in both policy and practice. At present he lectures on the political and social aspects of hacking and cyber warfare, politics and technology and political populism. He is a senior lecturer in the departments of Public Policy and Public Administration, and Communication Studies, Sapir College, Israel. He has also taught at the Hebrew University, Ben Gurion University, Bar Ilan University, and the University of Cincinnati. 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders Narratives between 2010-2020

Abstract: The paper will analyze the construction of the Romanian and Hungarian people in the speeches of the political leaders of the ruling parties in the two countries between 2010-2020. Considering the centrality of the concept of the people for populist theory, the main question of the paper is how it was constructed and what resources were used in this construction. The hypothesis suggested is that the political leaders used narratives about the past which reflect a historical clash between two visions about how the Romanian and Hungarian people to be built. In order to test the hypothesis will be used the qualitative analysis in a deductive approach. The analysis will try to unravel the narratives and expose the characteristics attributed to the Romanian and Hungarian people. The speeches will be selected considering the significance of the moment when were delivered, like national commemorative or celebration days as well as during electoral campaigns or related to important events.

Gheorghe Andrei is a PhD Student at University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales ParisHis research interests include comparative analysis, social studies, local development, and case studies. He has authored a publication titled Discursive Strategies of a Populist Leader in 2020 Romanian Legislative Elections: The Rhetoric and Political Style of George Simion, which examines the rhetorical approaches of populist leaders in Romania.

Paper 2: The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy

Abstract: This study analyzes the concept of “people” and “nation” within the social and political context of recent years in Germany, focusing on how these concepts have been employed by right-wing groups to create social divisions, particularly in East Germany. The use of these concepts as tools for reinforcing identity distinctions has led to the emergence of “us vs. them” social dichotomies, presenting threats to social cohesion and democracy. This process, particularly in the context of social crises such as the migration crisis, has contributed to the erosion of democratic structures.

Drawing on the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Karl Franz Gehlen, this research emphasizes the human condition of vulnerability and the necessity for social and cultural institutions. This need for belonging, in specific contexts, can transform into a tool for establishing authoritarian orders, while simultaneously holding the potential to significantly strengthen democratic capacities. The study highlights this duality and examines how groups, without fully considering this theoretical sensitivity, have employed the concepts of “people” and “nation,” often inadvertently weakening democratic frameworks.

A deeper understanding of the theoretical foundations of Gehlen’s work has been significantly advanced through the opportunity to engage in scholarly dialogues and academic collaborations with Professor Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, the final assistant of Arnold Gehlen and editor of his collected works, in the Chair of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Dresden. This intellectual engagement facilitated a more profound exploration and development of Gehlen’s concepts in philosophical anthropology, while also linking them to their broader political and social implications for democracy.

Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Technische Universität Dresden. As the first place in the Tehran University Entrance Written Exam for the PhD Program in “Iranian Studies” (2010), and studied in the field of “International Relations” at Allameh Tabataba’i University (2017)’; Keikhosrou Doulatyari mainly dealt with the topic of “Emancipation of Human Subjects” during his PhD period. These engagements led him to the completion of a book in 4 volumes “Avay-e-lasst Dar Gûlistan-e-allast”; The essence of his experience in the decade 2010-2020 also included correspondence and active collaboration with Some prominent university professors. His project at the Technical University of Dresden focuses on indicators of social integration. Finding integration indicators and testing the criteria with the principles of MIPEX (The Migrant Integration Policy Index): Basic rights, Equal opportunities, and a Secure Future. Parallel to these criteria, the features of host countries are also crucial, which is why the project also offers preliminary insights into similarities with regard to a historical perspective.

Paper 3: The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa

Abstract: Populism emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to the evolving concept of democracy, encapsulated in the phrase “government of the people, for the people, and by the people.” In recent decades, populism has gained traction in Africa, with political leaders employing populist strategies to galvanize support through charismatic leadership, anti-elitist rhetoric, and the promise of social inclusion. A significant aspect of African populism is the incorporation of nativist ideologies, which have been used as tools for political mobilization, often through strategies such as anti-imperialism, land redistribution without compensation, and opposition to “White monopoly capital.” These nativist elements resonate deeply with the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which have shaped Africa’s socio-political landscape. In this context, nativism acts as a form of resistance, aimed at countering the colonial legacy and restoring African identity through the reclamation of cultural and political autonomy. However, when nativism is intertwined with populist rhetoric, it poses challenges to democratic values by fostering political polarization, excluding certain groups from the national identity, and undermining social cohesion. This paper explores the role of nativism in shaping populist movements in Africa, analyzing its impact on democratic processes and social integration. It argues that while nativism serves as a means of addressing historical injustices, it also risks reinforcing exclusionary practices that could threaten the future stability of African democracies. The paper calls for policies that promote inclusivity, equality, and integration to counter the divisive effects of nativist populism.

Melody Chindoga is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Public Policy and Devolution at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. She earned her PhD in Political Science from the University of Fort Hare, where she also completed her Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science, as well as a Bachelor of Administration in Public Affairs .Dr. Chindoga’s research interests encompass international relations, peace and governance, comparative politics, democracy, gender and politics, the politics of populism, and climate change . Her scholarly work includes co-authored articles such as “A Comparative Analysis of Nativism in Rural South Africa and Zimbabwe,” which examines how nativist discourse has been utilized by political factions in both countries to maintain power , and “Perceptions of Eastern Cape Rural Citizens on the Zuma-led Faction’s Nativist Discourse in South Africa,” which explores rural citizens’ responses to nativist politics in South Africa. Dr. Chindoga contributes to the academic discourse on post-colonial politics and governance in Southern Africa through her research and publications.​

Paper 4: Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist

Abstract: This paper argues that contemporary populism is characterised by three oppositional stances: its being anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-intellectual. This is then offset by an exaggeratedly pro-people stance that contemporary populism assumes. This is far from being a faithful representation of the people and is more of a deceitful caricaturing. This caricaturing of the people is actually a point borrowed from Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism. The people caricatured, quickly assume the form of an ochlocracy that again, to borrow from Arendt’s argument, form a temporary alliance with the elite. The paper further argues that the anti-elitism of contemporary populism tends to displace an earlier established elite with a new, often worse one, this becoming the proverbial case of the people falling out of the frying pan and into the fire. 

For purposes of historical analysis, the paper will divide populism into two phases. The first was an early to mid-twentieth century phase of predominantly Latin American and more specifically Argentinian populism (Laclau 2005); and the second, a contemporary, 21st century phase of populism. The conceptual distinction between these phases is in terms of a lose fiscally profligate earlier 20th century Latin American form and a tight fiscally prudent 21st century populism. An instance of a more recent fiscally profligate Latin American populism in the first decade of the 21st century would be the significant redistributive element in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

Recent examples of populism induced by fiscal prudence that will particularly form the focus of the paper are the Brexit referendum that according to Thimo Fetzer (2019) was created by the austerity cuts of the David Cameron led Conservative government; and the brutal ‘chainsaw’ austerity cuts of Xavier Milei in Argentina (Ovyat, Oncu & Rabinovich, 2025), the transference of which we are witnessing to the US in the Elon Musk led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The paper will also bring into consideration the populism of Narendra Modi’s India, where the government’s stance is typically pro-populist in terms of targeting elites and intellectuals, and at the same time partakes of the fiscal prudence that it is argued is a hallmark of contemporary 21st century populism. The Modi government has created a class of beholden beneficiaries of its welfarist largesse that in Hindi are called labharthis who are likely to continue voting for the government. What the Modi government’s populism has done is to transform welfarism from redistributive egalitarian to minimal subsistence.

Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

 

Session 6 

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World

Abstract: For much of the modern era, the world has viewed the United States as a paragon of liberal democracy, standing in contrast to developing democracies that struggle with institutional weaknesses, corruption, and executive overreach. However, recent patterns of democratic backsliding suggest a fundamental shift: As American institutions erode under polarization, populism, and elite norm-breaking, the United States is de-exceptionalizing and beginning to resemble the very democracies it was once contrasted against. At the same time, many developing democracies—while still flawed—are showing signs of institutional strengthening, electoral integrity, and greater civic engagement. This paper argues that these two trends represent a global realignment of democratic norms, in which the traditional hierarchy between “established” and “emerging” democracies is increasingly outdated. As Laurence Whitehead suggests, democratization is an “open-ended” process subject to reversals and detours. The erosion of democracy in developed countries like the United States demonstrates that democratic institutions in all contexts—whether long-standing or newly emerging—are vulnerable to similar pressures and should be studied accordingly.

Jonathan Madison is a historian and political analyst specializing in democracy, elections, and governance in Latin America and the United States. He holds a PhD in Global and Imperial History from the University of Oxford, where his research focused on 20th-century democracy in Brazil. His dissertation, The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968, reexamines Brazil’s post-war democratic experiment and its impact on the country’s political trajectory. Jonathan is currently a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute, where he researches and advocates for election reforms aimed at improving candidate quality and political incentives. He also provides analysis on political risk, foreign policy, and democratization. His writing appears in Democracy’s Sisyphus, his Substack newsletter, where he explores foreign policy as well as historical and contemporary challenges to democratic governance. He has also contributed to multiple media outlets, podcasts, and newspapers in both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Jonathan is part-time history instructor at Brigham Young University.

Paper 2: Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy

Abstract: Public discussion about the crisis of democracy has been focused on the institutional approach of politics, normally leading to a dichotomic diagnosis either affirming that we live in an authoritarian tendency, or that the institutions are proving to be resilient, safeguarding democracy. That approach helps to diagnose the present situation of existing democracies. Still, it doesn’t explain the causes of democratic crisis and the non-institutional causes for democratic erosion. This work intends to articulate the institutionalist approach with a sociological interpretation of the causes of the democratic crisis. Drawing back to the construction of democratic State and institutions as a product of modernization, the sociological approach interprets the present crisis as a turning point in the dynamics of social reproduction and trends of social change. It thus analyses populist action as a disruptive force that tries to mobilize popular support in deconstructing institutions and mechanisms of checks and balances for gathering power and excluding opponents. An analysis of populist discourse provides empirical evidence of how populist discourse constructs an image of “the people” as a morally pure and identifiable entity, using it in such a mobilization against democratic institutions. The analysis should not only point to aspects already discussed in the literature about populism, such as the counterposition of “us vs. them”, but also reconstruct how populist discourse gives meaning to the inherent, structural contradictions of modern society to direct political action, outlining a theoretical framework for the interpretation of democratic crisis.

João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho is a Brazilian social scientist. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Sciences in 2019, at the State University of São Paulo (Unesp), where he also taught Political Theory. He is a member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education. Currently, he is researching populism and political authoritarianism, focusing on the emergence of the new radical right and its form of online mobilization, as well as the impact of digital media on democracy. His main research interests are Sociological Theory and Political Theory.

Paper 3: Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to a multicausal, comprehensive analysis of the erosion of (representative) democracy, and of the relationship between this process and the one of rising (new) populism in Europe, by exploring mainly the theoretical perspectives advanced by two important political scientists, Daniel Barbu and Peter Mair. In their search for an in-depth understanding of this regressive process of de-democratization, Barbu and Mair have observed and described in detail a series of unexpectedly comparable changes, that have occurred in Western, respectively post-communist countries, since the 1990s: the precarization of the relationship between politics and society; the destructuring and delegitimization of parties as representative bodies; the de-parliamentarization and the tendency towards apoliticism; the personalization of political will; the weakening or hollowing out of res publica; the emergence of new “wooden languages” and “civil religions” (such as the one of “the rule of law”); the pre-eminence of the market logic in relation to the democratic constitutional order; the increasing recourse to unelected entities; the “government by cartel”; the curtailment of individual freedoms and of people’s sovereignty, etc. Against the already general (research) practice, Mair and Barbu suggested that (new) populism needed to be examined first as an associated symptom of the decline of politics and of representative institutions, and second as a cause.

Andreea Zamfira is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, an associate researcher at the Regional Centre for Advanced Francophone Studies in Social Sciences, and a member of the editorial board of Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review and Studia Securitatis. She conducted research and completed professional internships at Sciences Po Paris, the University of Lyon, and the Free University of Brussels, among others. Her research interests focus on democracy studies (competing conceptions of democracy, the erosion of party democracy, transnationalization and de-democratization of politics) and ethnic studies (nation-building, nationalism, national minorities, national/ethno-cultural identities, politics of identity). She has a PhD in political and social sciences at the University of Bucharest and the Free University of Brussels. 

Paper 4: Overcoming the Demagogic Impasse: The Historical Benefits of Democratic Populism

Abstract: In recent years, the rise of elitist and demagogic discourses alike has posed significant challenges to democratic institutions worldwide. This phenomenon, characterized by divisive rhetoric and the erosion of public trust, has led many to question the resilience of liberal democracies. However, amidst this crisis, a countervailing force is emerging: democratic populism. This paper seeks to explore the radical benefits of democratic populism as a means to overcome the demagogic impasse and revitalize democratic governance.

Democratic populism, rooted in the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and grassroots participation, offers a compelling alternative to the top-down, exclusionary politics of demagoguery. History of ideas shows how this path can achieve great success: most of our liberal institutions indeed come from populist demands, populist stances or even populist movements, such as the three revolutions of liberty in England, USA and France (Raynaud, 2009). By empowering citizens and fostering a more responsive political culture, democratic populism can reinvigorate civic engagement and restore faith in democratic processes. This paper will delve into the theoretical underpinnings of democratic populism as defined by Margaret Canovan, examining its historical antecedents and contemporary manifestations.

Thibaut Dauphin is a French political scientist specializing in Enlightenment political philosophy, comparative politics, and the intellectual history of republicanism and nationalism. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Bordeaux, where his dissertation, titled Le comparatisme politique dans l’œuvre de Voltaire, re-evaluated Voltaire’s political thought through a comparative lens, challenging the notion that Voltaire lacked a coherent political theory. Currently, Dr. Dauphin serves as a postdoctoral researcher at the CNRS-affiliated UMR 6240 LISA at the University of Corsica and is an associate researcher at the Institut de Recherche Montesquieu (IRM) at the University of Bordeaux . His research interests include Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu; the evolution of republican ideas; populism; and the role of sovereignty in modern democracies.

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University. He holds a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington, with research focusing on criminology, spatial justice, and state violence. His work examines the epidemiology of violence, the intersection of crime and politics, and the criminalization of poverty and race. He coined the term criminal populism to describe how politicians exploit crime as political capital, a concept explored in his publication Criminal Populism: Crime as Political Capital in the Philippines and the United States. His Epidemiology of Violence project has mapped over 7,000 cases of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines using GIS. His research is published in leading criminology journals, and his forthcoming article, From Sociology of Poverty to Criminology of the Elite, explores elite criminality. Dr. Magno has served as a Research Fellow at Philippine Normal University and a Visiting Research Associate at Ateneo de Manila University. A dedicated educator, he has received multiple teaching and service awards for student engagement and community-based learning.

Discussants

(TBC)

Paper 1: Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism

Abstract: Meritocracy is often celebrated as a fair mechanism for social mobility, yet it functions as a legitimizing ideology that deepens inequalities and restricts democratic representation. By positioning education as both an equalizer and a sorting mechanism, meritocracy imposes an impossible paradox—tasking education with ensuring fairness while simultaneously justifying exclusion. This paper critically examines meritocracy’s political function, arguing that its promise of delayed justice transforms demands for equality into technocratic concerns rather than political struggles. 

Building on Clare Chambers’ “moment of equal opportunity,” I show how meritocracy distorts the purpose of education, shifting its role from emancipating individuals to fitting them into predetermined social and economic hierarchies. Instead of empowering people to voice demands and contest inequalities, education under meritocracy serves as an instrument for maintaining the status quo. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s argument that equality is an axiom rather than an outcome, I argue that meritocracy’s reliance on future-oriented fairness masks its ongoing reproduction of structural exclusion. 

This paper’s original contribution is to reframe meritocracy as a mechanism of depoliticization, not only by justifying inequality but by restricting political representation itself. Using Nancy Fraser’s framework of redistribution, recognition, and representation, I demonstrate how meritocratic discourse forecloses egalitarian demands within technocratic governance, making them inexpressible through institutionalized politics. As a result, these unmet demands resurface through populist mobilization, not as a rejection of democracy, but as an attempt to reclaim representation from meritocratic elites. Following Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist articulation, I theorize how populism emerges as a re-politicization of grievances that meritocracy systematically silences. By foregrounding the conceptual contradictions of meritocracy as a political ideal, this paper offers a political theoretical account of how stratified education systems sustain hierarchies, depoliticize inequality, and ultimately contribute to democratic destabilization.

Elif Başak Ürdem is a PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University, specializing in political theory and data science. Her research explores the intersections of meritocracy, populism, and democratic representation, with a particular focus on how meritocratic ideals legitimize inequalities and depoliticize social struggles. Drawing on theories of justice, recognition, and redistribution, their work critically examines how stratified education systems shape political agency and democratic participation. Başak holds an MA in Legal and Political Theory from University College London (UCL), by being funded by the Jean Monnet Scholarship, and a BA in Political Science from Istanbul Bilgi University, graduating top of their class. She has previously worked as a Senior Child Protection Officer at Refugee Rights Turkey and has research experience at Bilkent University and Infakto Research Workshop. Her broader interests include democratic theory, refugee rights, and the philosophy of education. 

Paper 2: Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization

Abstract: This study explores how memetic communication serves as a critical tool for understanding the core dynamics of populist discourse in contemporary politics. Focusing on right-wing populist movements in Latin America—specifically Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador—the research examines how memes produced and disseminated using generative AI tools (e.g., Stable Diffusion, DALL-E, MidJourney) encapsulate and propagate the central narratives of populism.
Through the analysis of visual data collected between September 2022 and February 2024, this research identifies how memes simplify complex political ideas into emotionally resonant messages that mobilize supporters and reinforce the dichotomous “us vs. them” framework central to populist rhetoric. These memes not only polarize public opinion but also act as bridges, transferring violent and exclusionary narratives into offline political arenas, including parliamentary discourse.

By combining digital ethnography with fieldwork, this study highlights how populist movements utilize generative AI to craft a visual language that dehumanizes marginalized groups—such as women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and racialized communities—while amplifying their populist agendas.This research contributes to understanding the role of digital communication in shaping and sustaining populist discourse, offering insights into how these visual narratives resonate with audiences and impact political processes in under-researched regions.

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at the Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and social sciences. His research focuses on the so-called “far right” and current polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Gabriel has worked in European and Latin American contexts. He has taught regular and master classes at various international centers. He has been a Newton International Fellow of the British Academy at the University of London, and a Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Gabriel Bayarri also has applied political experience working with the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro and as a councilor in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He is involved with the following research groups and centers: the COMMRADES Group at Rey Juan Carlos University, the Centre for Right-Wing Studies (University of California, Berkeley), the Centre for Research into Global Power, Inequality and Conflict (RGPIC, Macquarie University), the Psychosociology of Social and Gender Violence research group (Complutense University), and the Technopolitics research group (Open University of Catalonia). Gabriel Bayarri has been a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) since 2020.

Paper 3: Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective 

Abstract: The literature on populism, especially that produced by political scientists and sociologists, is rich with empirical studies focusing on individual cases. In all these studies, when faced with the need to explain the emergence and success of populist politics, scholars tend to refer to the socio-economic transformations that have affected liberal political systems for the past few decades. On the other hand, political theory has tried to contribute by attempting to overcome the fragmentation caused by this vast amount of case-specific studies and deepen the understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon, trying to identify general concepts through which it can be described. My research, situated within the framework of theoretical studies, aims to take a further step by adopting a long-term perspective. Starting from the assumption that populism can be considered part of the evolutionary history of the concept and practices of popular sovereignty, and using interpretative categories from the history of political thought, I analyse populism as a peculiar answer to the dialectic between the need to affirm or recognize the principle of popular sovereignty, and the need to limit it in order to avoid its excesses. This tension originated with the establishment of the modern principle of sovereignty, which occurred following the modern revolutions. It can be traced back to the earliest theoretical and political reflections on the topic, which can be attributed to Rousseau and Madison. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to transcend explanations based solely on the analysis of contingencies and enrich our understanding.

Maria Giorgia Caraceni a PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought at Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome and a contract researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V. She conceived and launched the Permanent Transdisciplinary Seminar for PhD candidates and early-career researchers, held annually since 2024 at Guglielmo Marconi University in collaboration with the University of Foggia. In this context, she coordinates both organizational and scientific aspects, and oversees the publication of the seminar proceedings. Maria earned her B.A. and her M.A. cum laude in Philosophy from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she also obtained a post-graduate diploma. After graduation, she taught courses in History of Philosophy and Political Philosophy at the People’s University of Rome for four years.  Additionally, she serves as an editor for two academic journals: “Dialegesthai”, an online journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tor Vergata, and “Power and Democracy. International Journal of Politics, Philosophy, and Law”, a journal of the Centro Studi Tocqueville-Acton. Her research interests focus on Political Theory, particularly Democratic Theory and the History of Concepts in Political and Democratic Lexicon.

Paper 4: Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism

Abstract: According to Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005, 227–28), Rawls’s political liberalism (1989, 1996) overlooks the antagonistic undercurrents inherent in the pluralism of values. This is why Mouffe rejects “a ‘win-win politics’ that goes beyond the adversarial model by promoting solutions that supposedly benefit all people in society” (2000, 108–28). Should we indeed give up on the idea to conduct win-win politics, that is to find and carry solutions which benefit all people in society? I argue that the agonistic rejection of win-win politics is inappropriate because solutions which benefit all people in society can exist and their promotion is a valuable alternative to political liberalism and agonistic pluralism.

I identify three aspects which are essential to Mouffe’s theory but prove to be erroneous. The first one is the idea that “us” implies always to delineate “them”; the second one is the idea that the nature of the relationship “us/them” is necessarily conflictual; and the third one is a rigid reading of values and visions of goods which is assumed to be fixed over time. I argue that empirical science offers examples of political developments benefiting all people in society. I go on by explaining that not only win-win solutions exist, but their promotion is valuable too. The inevitability of conflict implied by agonistic pluralism has a cost for all parties, in terms of energy, well-being and opportunity. Political liberalism does not promote solutions benefiting all people in society, but only some specifically liberal views. Win-win politics avoids both pitfalls.

Bosco Lebrun is a PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, in Rome. After a double training in philosophy and international relations, he specialized in political theory and in particular in democratic theory. His research interests include disagreement, social cohesion, and democratic innovations. The provisional title of his PhD dissertation is: “Weighted Voting: Addressing Disagreements on the Desirability and Feasibility of a Refined Allocation of Voting Rights Based on Affectedness”.

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)  

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia

Abstract: This paper draws on the Nietzschean underlay to Weber’s theory of charismatic revolution—specifically, the saturnalian reversal of values that occurs under the influence of ressentiment—in order to account for the ability of Trump and his followers to undercut and reinvent American moral culture. Reversing what Weber called the “theodicy of good fortune,” charismatic leaders frequently adopt postures of moral abjection within present value systems while at the same time envisioning new social arrangements that will lift them into positions of authority. The condemnation of opponents is key to this process: from the devotionally-skewed perch where charismatic sightlines originate, such rebukes from moral authorities are rendered in parallax view, gaining a function that is opposite to condemnation’s intended purpose insofar as it authenticates the righteousness of the one being condemned. In such circumstances, new charismatic identities are forged, existing amid an exclusive intimacy between leader and follower. Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with Trump supporters throughout the 2024 Presidential campaign, the presentation examines the salience of “garbage” to Trump’s moral entrepreneurship. The case displays the importance of ressentiment for interpreting charismatic revolution, and it illustrates the reactive “thinness” of charismatic identitarian content. Recognition of this feature is, in turn, important for integrating charisma studies with studies of populism (which is itself usually characterized as being ideologically “thin”).

Paul Joosse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong.  His work examines Weber’s theory of domination as it interacts with social movement theory and (critical) criminology.  Recent projects have included theorizing the link between gender and charismatic power, using the example of Trump to develop a typology of charismatic counter-roles, and weaving Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panic with Weber’s theory of charisma to show how charismatic acclamation is intimately liked to the aspersion of ‘folk devils.’  This work has been published in Social Forces, Sociological TheoryTheory and Society, Journal of Classical Sociology, and Sociology of Religion, among others.  In connection with his sociological work, he is Chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section for the History of Sociology and Social Thought and he currently serves on the executive board of the International Sociological Association’s Sociological Theory research cluster (RC16).

Paper 2: Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage

Abstract: This paper contributes to recent research showing that, contrary to the view of populist parties embodying direct, unmediated representation, some European PRRPs are cultivating robust local networks and reintroducing elements of the 20th-century mass party. While documented across Europe, its implications for populist theory remain unresolved. One key antimony remains unresolved: while the mass party is celebrated as the epitome of representative democracy, defined by party-based linkage, the populist form of representation—with its ‘anti-institutional impulse’—is associated with direct, unmediated forms of linkage. 

To address this tension, I advance the concept of ‘linkage’ as a key framework for understanding how this seemingly contradictory party model functions in practice, focusing on members’ perceptions of their role within the party and the wider democratic system. It draws on an ethnographic study of the PRRP the Sweden Democrats, including interviews and participant observations of party meetings. The analysis concludes that it was the fundamentally populist party-member relationship that most strongly echoed the ethos of the 20th-century mass party, positioning the party as an intermediary between citizens and the state. This raises the broader question of whether populism, emphasising the unity and common interests of ‘the people’ against perceived elites, may provide a foundation for mass-party-like structures to re-emerge, even under postmodern conditions often associated with declining political engagement and partisan identification. By uniquely uniting empirical data with populist theory, this study not only enriches our understanding of how PRRPs mobilise citizens but also offers new insights into the intersection between populism and party organisation.

Saga Oskarson Kindstrand is a first-year doctoral candidate at Sciences Po’s Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, supervised by Professor Colin Hay. His research examines how political parties function as intermediaries between society and the state, with a particular focus on how European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) develop party-based linkages. He explores how these parties mobilise active memberships despite broader trends of political disengagement and how their claim to represent ‘the people’ is reflected in party organisation.

Paper 3: “Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right

Abstract: During the fiftieth anniversary of the Portuguese Revolution, the Chega party received around one million votes and more than quadrupled its parliamentary bench. This development as been mostly viewd from the prism of the populist leader’s discursive performances, i.e., an anti-systemic threat to liberal democracy risen from outside the social mainstream. This paper challenges that view by arguing that the far-right’s “politics of fear” is, in reality, deeply imbedded in the economic and cultural logics of neoliberal ideology. Anchored in Stuart Hall’s concept of authoritarian populism, this hypothesis is explored through a frame analysis of the front pages of the first 100 issues of Folha Nacional (Nacional Sheet) – a weekly newspaper published by Chega. The framing of the main social themes found in the sample – corruption, (in)security, and economic failure – reveals a dialectic between societal crisis and authoritarian solutions containing parallels with the post-fascist far-right and the legacy of Thatcherism. In other words, Chega’s ideological repertoire did not emerge from the margins of society, but represents a radicalization of a long political tradition based on market liberalism and moral discipline under the guise of popular grievances.

Jaime Roque is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, where he also earned his BA and MA in Sociology from the Faculty of Economics (FEUC). His doctoral research, funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), examines the parliamentary practices of the Portuguese far-right party Chega, focusing on how its discourse and strategies intersect with neoliberalism and authoritarian populism. ​Roque has presented his work at international conferences, including the UNPOP International Colloquium, where he analyzed Chega’s use of media narratives around insecurity as part of a broader “politics of fear.”  He is also a contributing author to the Populism and Emotions Glossary, with a chapter on authoritarian populism. In addition to his research, Roque serves as a guest lecturer at FEUC, teaching the undergraduate course “Poder, Política e Governação” (Power, Politics, and Governance). His academic interests include far-right movements, populism, neoliberalism, political parties, and parliamentary sociology.

Paper 4: The evolution of the rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: a comparative analysis of the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024 

Abstract:  The article focuses on the transformation of the rhetoric of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) during two election campaigns to the European Parliament – 2019 and 2024. The author proceeds from the assumption that there is a certain relationship between electoral success and the level of populism expressed in terms of the language the party uses. The populist party will soften its rhetoric during the election campaign when it does not expect electoral success to expand the potential electorate. Otherwise, the rhetoric will be tougher when the party is expected to win. This is clearly the case in the 2024 campaign, when the political weight of the AfD in the European arena has increased compared to 2019. Using various kinds of content analysis, among which sentiment analysis is of key importance, the author points out that the rhetoric shown in electoral programs and posters is in line with the positions of the party and fraction “Identity and Democracy” that is being scrutinized in the article as well. The negative sentiment prevailed in two campaigns, but it has changed slightly. The thematic focus of both programs has not altered much. A distinctive feature of the rhetoric of right-wing populists is still the focus on migration issues. The received results at the junction of linguistics, political science and international affairs may be applicable for a more complex study of the campaigns to the European Parliament employing data from 2014. This article could also be a help for research on German populism, especially in the context of entering the mainstream by a populist actor.

Artem Turenko is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. His thesis examines “The impact of electoral cycles on the rhetoric of right-wing parties: transformations of the populist agenda (the case of the Alternative für Deutschland). 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism

Abstract: This study examines criminal populism, a political strategy where leaders gain popularity by exploiting crime, both through direct involvement and by shaping public perceptions of law, justice, and disorder. While many populist politicians use their legal troubles to bolster their outsider image, others leverage media platforms, such as crime-focused television and radio programs, to build public trust and legitimacy before transitioning into political power.

The study explores the rise of politicians who, before holding office, hosted crime and dispute-focused media programs, portraying themselves as champions of justice and order. By sensationalizing crime, offering simplistic solutions, and positioning themselves as the voice of the people against corrupt elites, these figures cultivate a loyal following that translates into electoral success. Case studies include figures from the Philippines and beyond, demonstrating how media-driven crime narratives fuel political ambition.

By blurring the lines between crime reporting, entertainment, and governance, criminal populism subverts democratic institutions and reshapes public perceptions of law and justice. This study critically assesses the long-term implications of media-driven criminal populism, highlighting its role in eroding institutional trust and legitimizing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of law and order.

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University.  Also see page 43. 

Paper 2: The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies

Abstract: The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs-FPÖ), one of the first radical right and populist parties established in Europe after World War II, and the National Rally (known as the Front National from 1972 to 2018) exhibit notable differences due to their distinct historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. However, these two radical right and populist parties, both founded by politicians associated with the Nazis, also share significant commonalities. This is one of the key reasons why we place them at the centre of our research. These two political parties were among the first radical right and populist parties to emerge in the EU member states after World War II, serving as models for their peers. For instance, the Front National was the first radical right party to win local government in 1983. It was also the first radical right party to enter the national parliament after World War II, securing 35 seats in 1986. Similarly, the FPÖ became the first radical right party after World War II to win an election in 1999 and subsequently form a coalition government in an EU member state. Also, both radical right and populist parties gained legitimacy through the support of mainstream political parties. Although they initially embraced anti-communist and anti-Semitic rhetoric and policies, they gradually shifted their focus toward targeting Muslim immigrants, marking another point of convergence. This paper examines the legitimization process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s migration policies and their electoral success through the lens of Gramscian hegemony theory.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Murat Aktas is a Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. He graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Administration in 2000. In 2004, he completed his master’s degree in the Department of Information and Communication Science at Paris 10 Nanterre University. He completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot, in Sociology of Politics, in 2011. His PhD focused on the European Union and Turkey. From 2017 to 2018 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Ecole des Haut Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, researching on the National Front (Front National-FN) and Immigrants. He has authored and edited several books, including The European Union and Turkey; The Information Society Globalization and Democracy; The Arab Spring; and Conflict Resolution and Peace. He also served as guest editor of a special issue for International Sociology on “The Rise of the Far Right and Populist Movements in Europe.” His current research focuses on radical right and populist movements in Europe, Artificial Intelligence, techno oligarchy, human rights and democracy.

Paper 3: Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust

Abstract: This paper explores the racialized construction of the “Sephardic Jew” as a cultural and political trope in 19th-century Spain and its enduring repercussions throughout the 20th century, particularly during the Holocaust. The idea of the Sephardic Jew was shaped through a contradictory mixture of philosephardism and antisemitism, where Spain claimed a unique historical connection to Sephardic communities while simultaneously reinforcing exclusionary and racialized narratives. This discourse fostered a vision of Sephardic Jews as both culturally Spanish and irrevocably other, which shaped Spain’s diplomatic and social responses during times of crisis.

By examining Spain’s attitudes toward the Sephardic diaspora and the racial arguments embedded in its philosephardic policies, the paper traces how these perceptions influenced the self-identification and survival strategies of Sephardic communities in Europe during the Holocaust. In moments of extreme danger, some members of the Sephardic community internalized this racialized discourse, emphasizing their perceived cultural proximity to Spain as a means of securing protection. Yet despite these efforts, they often faced rejection and abandonment by the very nation that claimed to safeguard them. This duality underscores the tragic consequences of a racialized identity imposed from without and, at times, embraced from within.

Through an interdisciplinary approach that draws on historical analysis, critical race theory, and Holocaust studies, this paper seeks to contribute to the broader discussion on how racialized imaginaries shape national policies and community dynamics. It also reflects on the contemporary implications of this legacy for understanding exclusion, identity, and memory in democratic societies today.

Santiago López Rodríguez (Salamanca, 1991) is a postdoctoral fellow at Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University (2021-2023), where he is conducting a research project entitled funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: “Witnessing the Holocaust: Spain and Portugal during the Second World War” (2023-2026). His research deals with Franco’s regime and the Holocaust, the focus being on the diplomatic role of Spain in occupied countries. He taught at the University of Extremadura (2017-2020) and was also a visiting researcher at the Complutense University of Madrid (2017-2018) as well as at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (2019). He graduated in History and Historical Heritage at the University of Extremadura (2009–2013), where he also finished two Masters: one in Teaching (2014) and the other in Research and Humanities (2015). He completed his Ph.D. dissertation “Spanish Foreign Office during the Holocaust in Occupied France (1940-1944)” with a National Research Grant (2016–2020) which obtained the distinctions of Summa Cum Laude, International Mention, and Extraordinary Doctorate Award (2021).

Paper 4: Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview

Abstract: We can think about populism as a potentially authoritarian phenomenon that, despite its anti-liberal features, finds a place in a liberal, democratic framework, earning from it part of its legitimacy by electoral consensus. This consensus focusses on the leader and their acclamation. All these factors root in (the need for) an oversimplified worldview strongly linked to a Manichean division between “we, the (real, good) people” and “they, the (evil, corrupted) others”. This division reflects Schmitt’s “friend-foe” interpretation of politics and leads to a society in which the gap between “us” and “them” is impossible to fill. This impossibility inhibits an open political discussion and, thus, the liberal democratic process itself. 

My political-philosophical analysis concentrates on how art and aesthetics can make us aware of borders and limits of the Political and thereby of its plurality but also its grey zones, where the borders between “us” and “them” become clearer and affects us the most. 

I will approach these borders by pointing out (1) how the definition of our socio-political world and our divisions in “us” and “them” depend (also) upon our aesthetic approach, and (2) how the capacity of art—more specifically, of the aesthetical reactions of discomfort—to confront a large number of people with discriminating, excluding, or oppressive phenomena considered “normal” before makes art relevant for addressing the apparently insuperable division between “friends” and “foes” in a plural, changing, and challenging society and therefore for sublating the heavy hurdles that populism presents for a democratic political process. 

Roberta Astolfi is a postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS) of the Free University Berlin as well as a lecturer at the “Center of Political and Legal Theory” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science of the same University. I gained my doctorate in Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law at the Georg-August-University Göttingen and my MA with highest honours in (Political) Philosophy at La Sapienza University (Rome). Before holding my current position, I was a research assistant at the professorship for Political Theory, History of Ideas, and Political Culture of the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and also a lecturer at both the “Center of Political Theory and Philosophy” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science (Free University Berlin) and at the Department of Philosophy of the Georg-August-University Göttingen, as well as a SCRIPTS postdoctoral fellow. My current research focuses on the relationship between politics and aesthetics and, more specifically, on the epistemic-critical power of aesthetics in confronting the limits of our socio-political world. Before that, I researched on populism, technocracy, and the impoverishment of the individuals’ political role.

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Resilience in Market Democracy

Abstract: Many people speak about democratic decline and the resilience of democracy in hard times. In this discussion, resilience has gained traction but consistently defies attempts to unify theories or confine the concept to a singular research or policy portfolio. Instead of seeking to unify resilience, this paper draws on a theory of polysemy to tease out the diversity of encounters one may have. Findings over a decade of research into resilience of different types are used to reframe resilience as an ’emergent institution’ of democracy today. The emerging resilience is becoming a many-headed-hydra – or, in theoretical terms, a ‘polysemic institutional characteristic’ of contemporary democracies. Should we engage with this as a research agenda then futures research into resilience should emphasise the transformative potential, for good or ill, of a fundamental challenge traditional democratic values posed by an ‘institutionalised’ sense of resilience.

Peter Rogers is a Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University. A medical graduate from the University of Sydney, he received his PhD from the School of Communication Sciences and Disorders at the University of Sydney in 2003. Drawing upon his dual backgrounds in medicine and applied linguistics, his research interests lie in the broad area of health communication, with a particular focus on topics relating to linguistic diversity.  Peter also has a research and PhD supervision profile in the area of second language acquisition, where his specific interests concern the links between language learning, motivation and identity, particularly as these issues relate to today’s rapidly globalising world. His fields of research endeavour are united by the common themes of linguistic diversity and social inclusion.

Paper 2: The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the future of Democracy

Abstract: Today in France, local elected officials have two training rights to facilitate the execution of their mandates and contribute to the renewal of the local political class. Two funding mechanisms coexist: a collective right funded directly by local authorities, and an individual right of €400 per year, with a maximum cumulative limit of €800. The training market is controlled by the French state, which accredits 240 training providers.

Training of elected officials is regularly presented as a tool for “re-enchanting” local democracy, as it aims to make holding office accessible to everyone. In this sense, it would serve as a skills equalizer, theoretically enabling anyone to “level up” to assume the role. The primary beneficiaries would be those citizens who are less predisposed to handle political responsibilities, finding in it a way to compensate for “gaps” and to catch up with those who can just rely on tacit socialization once in office. 

Nevertheless, the training of elected officials carries a paradox. In seeking to re-enchant political engagement, it also contributes to disenchantment. On one hand, it validates the very principle it aims to combat. By claiming to make holding local office accessible to all, it inherently suggests a prerequisite of skills. Local functions would not be accessible to just anyone without prior preparation or continuous training. On the other hand, since this training is reserved solely for local elected officials, it contributes to the distinction between elected officials and the rest of the citizens by reinforcing their specialization through the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills.

Ultimately, based on statistical data related to the training practices of local elected officials in France in recent years (n=30 000) and several dozen interviews, the aim of this contribution is to show that, although the training of elected officials represents a strategic project to strengthen democracy, its implementation contributes to reinforcing the weak representativeness of local elected officials compared to the rest of the population by reserving the knowledge related to the management of local authorities for a certain “elite.”

Pierre Camus is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Nantes University. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Nantes – CENS (UMR 6025). He is also co-president of the National Observatory for the Training of Local Elected Officials (ONFEL).

Paper 3: The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism 

Abstract: This article investigates the rise of a women-led radical democracy in the region known as Rojava within the context of the Syrian civil war since 2012. Governed under the framework of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), this development is widely referred to by scholars as the “Rojava Revolution.” This shift has unfolded through a bottom-up political project known as democratic confederalism, sustained by diverse forms of civil society resistance in Rojava. This has occurred despite the broader context of war-torn Syria, which has become a battleground for various Islamist opposition groups such as Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Hurras al-Din and Al-Tawhid Brigade all of whom have fought both each other and the government of Bashar al-Assad. Despite their nuanced ideological and tactical differences, all these groups share the common objective of establishing an Islamic state founded on Sharia law, marked by gender inequality.

Despite the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the escalation of political violence and chaos, many studies have proved successful and responsive feminist interventions made by Kurdish women activists and academics in Rojava.  These interventions have been accompanied by a strong receptivity to the Rojava project among all its national minorities, as well as “the fierce loyalty of its defenders and its people.”  Rojava has survived significant challenges, including civil war, the fight against the ISIS, enduring occupation, embargoes, a challenging humanitarian situation, and ongoing Turkish invasions. Rojava remains firmly opposed to the former Baath regime, underlying the maximalist involvement of all national minorities in society. This includes engagement in a wide range of local and social activities, “from communes and councils to work in the health sector, women’s movements, and self-defense structures.”   So much so that academics such as Michel Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga have described Rojava as “one of the most radically progressive societies on the planet.”    

This article argues that the global decline of democracy, particularly in the West, led to the abandonment of Rojava’s nascent democracy, despite Rojava having been a Western ally in the fight against Islamist extremism and sharing democratic values with the West, during the two major Turkish invasions in 2018 and 2019. Despite these challenges, the people of Rojava have continued to resist maintaining their democracy. 

Soheila Shahriari holds a doctorate in political science, awarded by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in 2024. Her PhD thesis, entitled “Transnational political engagement and gendered reconfiguration of the national imaginary among Kurds in the West in the post-Rojava revolution era”, examines the underlying rationales behind commitment to Rojava by looking at the political socialization of research participants, the rearrangement of the Kurdish political spectrum and the multifaceted dynamics shaping Kurdish political engagement in the transnational context in the aftermath of the Rojava revolution. She has identified three central dynamics: the vigorous mobilization of Kurdish diaspora communities in the West to advocate the removal of the PKK from Western terrorist lists, the transformative ripple effects of the Rojava revolution across the Middle East and its role in the feminization of Kurdish politics, and the emergence of Kurds as an emphatic driving force behind democratization in the region. Furthermore, she brings to the fore the transformative power of the gender revolution in Rojava, in relation to its deep influence on reshaping the Kurdish national imaginary in the West around the principles of gender equality, pluralism and secularism, marked by a decisive rejection of patriarchy, political intolerance, Islamism and Sharia law. Shahriari holds  two master’s degrees: one in sociology from Tehran University in Iran and another in political sociology from Sorbonne University Paris in France.

Paper 4: Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile

Abstract: This paper examines feminist migrant activism in Poland and Turkey against the backdrop of rising authoritarianism and anti-gender policies (Gwiazda, 2021; Özkazanç, 2020). Under the PiS government in Poland and the AKP regime in Turkey, intensified attacks on gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminist movements have created increasingly hostile environments, forcing many activists into self-exile. This study examines how these activists, through their migration, cultivate new forms of feminist solidarity that transcend national borders while responding to the distinct political contexts of their home and host countries. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and three focus groups, the study examines how these women navigate the dual pressures of political repression and displacement, crafting spaces of resistance that challenge both patriarchal norms and nationalist ideologies. These activists embody a transformative politics of possibility (Escobar, 2020), fostering networks of care, solidarity, and alternative visions of belonging in their diasporic communities. The study draws on frameworks of pluriversal political praxis (Escobar, 2020) and prefigurative politics (Monticelli, 2022) to analyze how these women envision and enact futures beyond exclusionary systems. By focusing on the personal and collective experiences of feminist migrant activists, this paper highlights the resilience and creative strategies they employ to reclaim political agency. It emphasizes how their activism not only confronts oppressive structures in their countries of origin but also contributes to reshaping the sociopolitical landscapes of their new environments, offering insights into the broader implications of feminist diaspora activism in times of political uncertainties.

Ecem Nazlı Üçok is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University in Prague. She holds a Master of Science in Sociology and Gender Studies from Lund University, Sweden, and teaches both master’s and bachelor’s level courses at Charles University and ARCHIP. She has been a doctoral fellow at the University of Vienna and Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy. Her research interests include political sociology and psychology, urban sociology, social movements, political activism, anti-gender movements in Europe, far-right politics, transnational migration, and the study of men and masculinities.

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: When identity politics and social justice procedures contribute to populism

Abstract: The ethnographic perspective as modern initiator of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, identity politics as upside-down governing power and the popular formation of social justice principles are three paths, among others, through which the expansion of populist discourses in liberal democratic contexts could be explored. Although ethnography, the tradition of studying ‘others’ in their respective contexts, and later sociological methodology, has shifted slightly towards Western societies, it has retained its colonial perspective. Identity politics, meanwhile, by essentializing their core values and ignoring others, reinforces the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which might be juxtaposed with other approaches to otherness, such as that of Carl Schmitt et al. (2005). The third factor is the increasing challenge for bottom-up movements to contribute to principles of social justice. The failure of this process is reflected in a “worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms, soaring inequality, and intensified anger and anomie” (Lefebvre, 2021). In this ‘zombie liberalism’ scenario, which lies between dead and living states, fundamental human rights are violated, including by public institutions. As a result, a ‘spiritual exercise’, as Rawls (1971) describes it, aimed at seeking principles of justice is problematized and, by undermining people’s agency, the impact of civil society on the liberal democratic sphere diminishes.
Identifying We the People and others as distinct groups, as well as identity politics and the problematic popular quest for principles of social justice, provide fertile ground for populism. By synthesizing these processes, this paper seeks to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of democracy.

Saeid Yarmohammadi is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal, Canada. He is currently writing a thesis on individual understandings of social justice in the Iranian context among Shiite Muslim adults living in Tehran. His areas of interest include politics and religion, culture and religion, social inequalities and social justice in its various forms, including the origins and history of this notion. His dissertation proposes an analysis of theories of social justice in different contexts, including liberal democracies, to provide a portrait of the place given to this notion in the context of my research. His thesis project includes an assessment of politics of identity in the context of Iran, which contribute to understandings of social justice in this context. Having training in political science and anthropology in addition to my areas of study and adopting a multidisciplinary approach, he is interested in the analysis of social justice in political contexts, including liberal democracies. Talking about conference participation, He has taken part in several international conferences organized by the International Sociological Association and by different universities in Canada and elsewhere.

Paper 2: Why do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies

Abstract: Scholars widely agree that institutional trust is in crisis across Western developed countries, yet the causes of this decline remain elusive. While extensive research has examined institutional performance and procedural fairness, far less attention has been given to the frontline federal workers who serve as the face of government in daily citizen interactions. This study posits that public trust is not solely a function of institutional structure but is also shaped by the characteristics and behavior of government workers. To assess institutional trust, this study employs a conjoint experimental design, varying six institutional attributes: (1) efficiency, (2) expectations, (3) transparency, (4) accountability, (5) perceived moral disposition of workers, and (6) political affiliation of workers. This study hypothesizes that efficiency will be the strongest predictor of institutional trust, operationalized by the public’s preference to seek assistance from one agency over another. Additionally, it anticipates that citizens will prefer bureaucrats who are perceived as caring and personal, yet politically neutral and impersonal. As institutional legitimacy is increasingly contested in an era of political polarization and social fragmentation, this research highlights the need for governance strategies that go beyond structural reforms, emphasizing the critical role of street-level bureaucrats in fostering public institutional trust.

Ariel Lam Chan is a third-year PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University. Her current research focuses on understanding the causes of institutional trust in U.S. public-service agencies, exploring how factors such as bureaucratic performance, internal processes, and moral/ political disposition of workers influence public confidence in government institutions. Additionally, Ariel is working on a comparative study of Hong Kong’s educational landscape, particularly examining the National Security Law’s impact on curriculum reform and how it shapes students’ critical thinking and understanding of national identity. In addition to her work on educational policy, Ariel is also conducting research on the consequences of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in cases of sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Her study investigates how NDAs silence survivors and hinder their ability to seek justice, while also impacting their career trajectories, financial situations, and emotional well-being. Ariel’s interdisciplinary research blends sociological theory with practical policy implications, and she is dedicated to addressing pressing issues of governance, institutional trust, and social justice.

Paper 3: Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development

Abstract: This research explores the relevance of active citizenship in supporting processes of transformation and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts from the observation that democratic and governance deficits stem from non-inclusive public policies (in their formulation, implementation and assessment), leading to corruption, social inequalities and undermining peace. In response, she proposes to consider active citizenship as a strategic lever. By valuing non-state social actors, this concept is likely to strengthen participatory dynamics and promote inclusive governance. Active citizenship is thus emerging as an essential paradigm and mechanism for improving the development performance of sub-Saharan African states. A benchmarking  of relevant experiences of active citizenship in the West and elsewhere (such as in Canada, the United States or Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall), is the approach envisaged for its achievement. 

Dieudonne Mbarga is an Independent Researcher.

Paper 4: Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities

Abstract: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), often celebrated as a foundational moment for democracy in the Middle East, paradoxically entrenched exclusionary notions of “the people” that resonate with contemporary challenges to liberal democracies. This study interrogates how constitutionalist rhetoric, while invoking unity and citizenship, systematically marginalized religious minorities, ethnic groups, and the working class—a dynamic mirroring modern populist discourses that pit “the true people” against “others.” Employing Pierre Machery’s concept of “the unsaid” and historical discourse analysis, this article examines parliamentary debates, protest narratives, spy reports, photographs and memoirs to reveal how revolutionary elites instrumentalized a vague, Persian-centric nationalism to exclude minorities and consolidate power. Findings demonstrate that the constitutionalists’ strategic ambiguity around “the people” enabled majoritarian oppression, sidelining religious groups (e.g., Zoroastrians, Jews) as sectarian pawns, suppressing labor voices in favor of merchant elites, and erasing ethnic identities (e.g., Kurds, Azeris) from national imaginaries. By situating Iran’s revolution within global patterns of democratic erosion—where appeals to “the people” fracture civil society—this research underscores the enduring tension between democratization and exclusion. It argues that inclusive democratic resilience requires confronting historical legacies of ideological erasure, offering lessons for contemporary struggles against illiberal majoritarianism and divisive populism. 

Ali Ragheb is a sociologist with a PhD, Master’s, and Bachelor’s degree from the University of Tehran, Iran. Ranked 1st in the national PhD entrance exam (2019) and 4th in the Master’s exam (2015), he is a recognized talent by the Iranian National Elites Foundation. His research explores economic inequality, cultural sociology, and critical theory, focusing on Iran’s urban middle class. He is the author of Pasdaran-e Nabarabari (Guardians of Inequality), Mashrute-ye Hamegan (The Constitutional Revolution for All), and Tohi-Shodan az Mashrute (The Erosion of Constitutionalism), alongside numerous peer-reviewed articles. He has also translated works on democracy, digital divides, and Max Weber’s sociology of religion. Ali serves as a regional editorial board member for Global Dialogue (ISA) and is a member of the ISA’s Research Committee on Social Stratification. He is a member of the Iranian Sociological Association (since 2017) and has held editorial roles, including assistant editor of the Journal of Sociology of Art and Literature (University of Tehran, 2021-2022). As president of the University of Tehran’s Sociology Student Scientific Association (2018-2019), he managed the journal Sareh. His work bridges critical cultural studies, historical sociology, and political economy, offering insights into inequality and social transformation.

 

Session 12

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy

Abstract: In a context in which African democracies struggle to consolidate, communal and identity-based populism plays an ambivalent role, serving both as a force of contestation and a tool for reinforcing power. This panel examined its influence on elections, political transitions, and democratic institutions in Africa. Three main areas structure the discussion: the study of populist strategies during electoral periods and their connections to identity-based mobilisations and clientelism; the analysis of populism’s role in political polarisation and the contestation of electoral outcomes; and the exploration of digital media as platforms for the dissemination of populist discourses and political radicalisation. Drawing on case studies and comparative approaches, this panel aims to understand how populism fluctuates between strengthening democratic participation and threatening institutional stability while proposing ways to enhance democratic resilience in the face of the rise of identity-based populism in Africa.

Yves Valéry Obame is a sociologist, holding a doctorate/Ph.D in political sociology obtained from the University of Yaoundé I in 2022. Lecturer-Researcher at the University of Bertoua in the Department of Political Science and also Associate Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon, he is also a member of the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).His research focuses primarily on how electoral technologies (particularly biometrics), public policies and, more generally, socio-technical transformation processes structure electoral governance, the dynamics of citizenship and political behavior. A Swiss Confederation Excellence Scholar, he joined the Geneva Africa Lab and the Global Studies Institute to lead a postdoctoral project entitled “The making of citizen monitoring of voting in the era of biometrics in Cameroon: the experience of the ’11 Million Citizens’ Movement.” He examined, at ground level, the way in which an associative actor works, in an unprecedented way, to fight against electoral fraud to guarantee the authenticity of the results from the ballot boxes in a context deemed constrained and despite the biometric reform introduced into the electoral process in 2013. More broadly, this project reports on the dynamics of institutionalization of electoral biometrics and the contemporary transformations of political citizenship that they induce, revealing how, in Cameroon, the dominant group in power governs through biometrics.

Salomon Essaga Eteme is a sociologist with a Ph.D. in sociology. He serves as a lecturer at the University of Ngaoundere and an associate lecturer at the Catholic University of Central Africa (UCAC). His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on the intersections of social dynamics, environmental issues, and development. He is a researcher at the CERESC Laboratory at the University of Yaoundé I and an associate researcher at the Centre for Environment and Development (CED). Dr ESSAGA ETEME also works as a social engineer and environmental consultant, offering his expertise to field-based projects that integrate social science insights with ecological challenges. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow under the RESSAC project, implemented by the CIFOR–ICRAF–GDA–UYI consortium, where he contributes to the sociological analysis of relationships between local communities and natural resource management policies.

Paper 2: Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa

Abstract: The paper argues that the practice of democracy in Africa should integrate the traditional knowledge and institutions of local communities in the continent, and that Africa should search within its own knowledge systems for appropriate ideas and approaches to its democratization and development. African knowledge systems have for a long time been undervalued because of the dominance of Eurocentric mindsets and practices. Critics now blame state failure and the development crisis in 

Africa on the “disconnection between formal institutions transplanted from outside, and indigenous institutions born of traditional African cultures”. The prevailing Western model of liberal democracy, especially in the form  introduced in Africa by some authoritarian military and civilian regimes, has not served the continent well; instead it has tended to alienate rather than motivate and mobilize the people. There is now a search for a virile democratic alternative that can reconcile the traditional and the modern, in a partnership that will ensure popular participation, cultural self-determination and democratic legitimacy. Marshall Sahlins has rightly emphasized the need for all peoples “to indigenize the forces of global modernity and turn them to their own ends” as the real impact of globalization depends on the responses developed at the local level.

The paper discusses Nigeria’s recent experience with democracy, especially with respect to the role of traditional leaders and institutions; and in relation to the ongoing debates about a suitable system of democratic local government that will expand the political space, and strengthen the capacity of indigenous institutions and other organizations of civil society at the village/grassroots level.  A number of current government policies are based on the misguided assumption that the position of African traditional rulers and institutions is incompatible with democratic practice. The paper considers how successive post-colonial governments and constitutions in Nigeria have tried to evolve a suitable chieftaincy policy, and to manage relations with traditional leaders at the state and local levels. As well, governance reforms in the country have tended to concentrate on regulating party politics and competitive elections, protecting civil and political rights, anti-corruption and so on. The major gap in the good governance agenda appears to be at the local government level where the major challenges of democratic decentralization and poverty alleviation remain largely unaddressed.

Geoffrey I. Nwaka is an urban historian. He graduated and worked in England and in Canada, and is currently Professor of History at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. He has had several years of teaching and research experience in the Nigerian university system, and was at various times guest researcher/visiting scholar at a number of universities and research institutes in Europe, Australia and North America. His research interests are in historical and contemporary urban issues, environmental protection, and African development. He has travelled and published widely and served in government during 1990/91 as Special Adviser to the Governor of Imo State.

Paper 3: Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom

Abstract: One-fifth of the democracies saw erosion between 2012 and 2024, with ‘us or them ‘ polarisation rising. At the heart of this process lies using ‘the people’ as a unifying force of civil society or as a divider. This paper aims to discuss the contribution of the people in either the democratization process or majoritarian domination, using Nigeria and the United Kingdom as reference countries. The failure of Nigeria to diversify its economy and the UK’s transition to renewable resources are examples of contrasting experiences of resource nationalism impacting environmental structural adjustment. Drawing from the decolonial environmentalism perspective, this paper explored how coloniality persists in shaping resource management, democracy, and socio-spatial injustice. This study adopts a qualitative research methodology through a systematic review of existing literature, policy documents, and case studies on Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 

Using a decolonial environmentalism lens, the paper critically analyzes scholarly debates, reports, and empirical findings to assess democracy, resource governance, and socio-environmental justice. Through focusing on community-based conservation in Nigeria and energy transition in the UK, the paper stresses the social inclusion of indigenous people’s knowledge base in development processes. The studies examined strengthen the principles of decolonial environmentalism in negating the division of the North from the South and the demission of despotic policies as opposed to egalitarianism. Thus, this paper has called for policy reforms in Nigeria’s resource governance, utilization of renewable energy, and fair international cooperation. By positioning justice at the centre of a pyrrhic vision, this paper presents a critical view of what democracy and post-colonial, ecologically just and sustainable environments can mean in the future.

Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research focuses on addressing plastic waste pollution, promoting environmental sustainability, and advancing development and green practices. Mr. Busayo Olakitan Badmos is a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research interests span sustainability studies, environmental crime, deforestation, conflict, illegal mining, and development. He is committed to exploring the complex intersections between environmental sustainability and socio-economic challenges, contributing to research that informs policy and promotes sustainable development.

Paper 4: Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya

Abstract: As digital activism reshapes civic engagement globally, African Gen Z activists are leading a new wave of political resistance. In Kenya, movements like #RejectFinanceBill2024 and #OccupyParliament have leveraged social media to challenge state policies, mobilising unprecedented digital dissent. Yet, despite their viral success, these movements struggle to translate online mobilisation into tangible governance reforms. This paradox, persistent digital resistance versus limited institutional change, raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of digital activism in strengthening democratic accountability. This study offers a theoretical examination of Kenya’s digital activism through a tri-theoretical lens: Political Process Theory (PPT), Digital Contention Theory (DCT), and Connective Action Theory (CAT). It critically investigates:
• What structural barriers and political opportunities shape the trajectory of digital activism in Kenya?
• Why digital movements persist online despite repression but struggle to institutionalize change?
• How Gen Z activists challenge traditional leadership models by mobilising through
decentralised digital networks?
By situating Kenya’s digital activism within broader global debates on digital resistance, governance, and democratic resilience, this theoretical inquiry develops a conceptual framework for understanding the evolving relationship between online political engagement and structural constraints. It provides insights relevant not only to Africa but also to global policymakers, scholars, and activists seeking to bridge the gap between digital mobilisation and sustainable political transformation.
This paper will provoke critical discussions on the future of digital resistance-can online activism move beyond momentary disruption to drive lasting institutional change?

Asenath Mwithigah is a Graduate student, United States International University-Africa. She is a social development expert with over 10 years of professional experience in working with non-profits organizations nationally, and internationally to strengthen their programming and unlock the organizational potential on Environmental, Social and Governance sectors to contribute to the Development Goals. She is currently the Technical Director of a national youth organization working to document the progress made by young people in Kenya in various sectors contributing to SDGs.  

 

Session 13

Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC)

Paper 1: Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The study aims to present the multifaceted nature of ‘the people’ within the ethnopolitical context of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Departing from the traditional focus on ethno-nationalism in the populist framing of ‘the people’ in BiH, the main argument is that understanding ‘the people’ in BiH requires a dialectical relationship encompassing three forms of populism: inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic. While inter-ethnic populism constructs ‘the people’ through an agonistic frontier among ethnic groups in the most common sense, intra-ethnic populism establishes agonistic frontiers within them, positioning ‘the people’ in opposition to their political elites. Finally, cross-ethnic populism seeks to construct ‘the people’ around populist demands that transcend ethnic divisions, uniting groups through shared claims that cannot be expressed within the ethnic framework. By tracing these patterns, this approach offers new insights into conceptualizing populism, seeing it not as a disruptive force but as a potential catalyst for democratic renewal. It highlights how populism may enhance political pluralism by challenging the status quo and affirming democratic capacities around new subjectivities beyond ethnicity.

Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science. His field of research encompasses social and political movements, socialism, (post)Yugoslav studies as well as geopolitics and cyberpolitics. He is also interested in critical political theory, dealing with contemporary debates on democracy and the relationship between activism and the idea of emancipation in contemporary political theory. 

Paper 2: Institutionalizing the Assembled People 

Abstract: For centuries, the task of establishing a democratic system has been monopolised by specialists. The task of making decisions on public affairs has also been reserved for a professional political ruling class. This paper is based on the hypothesis that, in the face of this monopolisation of both instituting and instituted political activity, ordinary individuals are able not only to decide but also to decide how they are going to decide – in other words, to create their own rules collectively.

The contribution will test this hypothesis based on fieldwork conducted over two years within the radical democracy movement in Commercy (Meuse), from the start of the Gilets jaunes assemblies in November 2018 to the presentation of a list in the March 2020 municipal elections, aimed at empowering the popular assembly gathering local residents. Mobilising ethnography, semi-directive interviews and collation of materials, this paper aims to reconstruct the direct democracy system of assemblies both imagined and instituted by Commercy’s actors to replace representative democracy. Since the start of the Yellow Vests movement, the group has carried out extensive theoretical imagining of how this new system might work, the practical problems the assembly would face, as well as the fundamental rules that would frame the assembly’s exercise of power. The aim here is to give an account of this instituting activity by the movement, based on its practice of direct democracy in assemblies. 

While their direct democracy practices of assemblies have been instituted since the beginning of the Gilets Jaunes movement, it is in its electoral phase that the movement will institutionalise what the democratic system it practices could look like if it came to power. It would do what representative government has always refused to do: “give an institutional role to the assembled people”, according to Bernard Manin in Principles of Representative Government. During the election campaign, the Commercy group thus collectively drafted a local Constitution and a Charter of Commitment, created from their practices during the Yellow Vests, which aimed to organise the exercise of power by the popular assembly if their list were to be elected. The group thus reinterpreted fundamental political concepts through the prism of assembly direct democracy. If the concepts of constituent paradox, constituent power, constitutional text (both its interpretation and revision), but also self-limitation, deliberation, representation, execution of decisions and participation, have a particular meaning under representative government, the aim here is to explore the meaning attributed to them in the context of this experiment in assembly direct democracy, and to see how they relate to other democratic conceptions. This chapter therefore takes the actors’ reflections on these fundamental political concepts seriously, as they represent a movement’s reinvention of the political, based on its own practices.

By showing the system devised by the Commercy group, this paper takes seriously Castoriadis’ injunction that “creating forms of democracy that are not alienating, where people participate in modern society, can only be the work of the whole people, not of a theorist”. It aims to show how a movement can create new forms of democracy and answer institutional questions traditionally left either to theorists or to policy-makers, in a perspective of democratising the theorisation of the political.

Sixtine Van Outryve is a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School, where she obtained her LL.M. degree as a BAEF fellow in 2018. She is also a lecturer at Radboud Universiteit in The Netherlands, teaching political theory to master’s students. In March 2024, Sixtine defended her Ph.D. in Law at the Centre for Philosophy of Law of U.C.Louvain in Belgium, her home country. In her dissertation, she developed a normative theory of communalist direct democracy – defending that public power be exercised by the assembled people at the local level – and analyzed its practice by social movements through qualitative research methods. During her doctoral journey, she was a visiting researcher at the School of Social and Political Science of Edinburgh University in the United Kingdom (2021-2022) and at the CERAPS of Université de Lille in France (Spring 2023). She also holds a master’s degree in Law from K.U.Leuven in Belgium (2015), as well as a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy (2014) and in Law (2013), both from U.C. Louvain, where she became a teaching assistant in Law at the beginning of her career. 

Paper 3: The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together

Abstract: There is a widely shared sense—rightly or wrongly—that the grip of (sound) arguments on public debate has waned in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory and Brexit in the UK in 2016 have spurred inquiries about alleged dysfunctions in public communication, including the spread of “fake news,” algorithmically curated social networks, or populist rhetoric. In this paper, I suggest that the problem may run deeper. From the beginning, deliberative democrats have overlooked a crucial distinction: that between deliberating and voting, as well as the fundamentally different rationales that underpin them. In other words, it has been recklessly assumed that the virtues of public deliberation would carry over to voting. Yet many reasons for voting for or against a proposal may be entirely rational and understandable irrespective of the merit of arguments. Conversely, the motivating power of public justification is considerably muted as soon as one enters the voting booth. In this paper, I argue that the impact of public deliberation on voting decisions has remained undertheorized, mainly postulated or inferred from the success of heterogeneous settings, such as deliberative mini-publics (Jürgen Habermas 2006). While some proponents of deliberative democracy have worked out the internal relationship between deliberating and voting (Chambers and Warren 2023), there remains a disconnect between the public forum and the voting booth. In response, I attempt to sketch out a voter-centered, realistic, and context-sensitive approach to democratic deliberation.

Théophile Pénigaud is a postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS at Yale. He specializes in political theory, and his research interests include the history of political thought, democratic theory, the theories of justice, and political epistemology. His book The People’s Deliberations: Context and Concepts of Rousseau’s Political Philosophy was published in French by Classiques Garnier in 2024. He holds a Ph.D. from the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Just before coming to Yale, he directed a Junior Laboratory on “Changes and Current Trends in Democracies” at the École Normale Supérieure and was a lecturer at Lyon 3 University.

Paper 4: Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Abstract: This paper examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation. 

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She is global advocacy officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization where she works directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. Nieves has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSt in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identiteis that do not align with political boundaries.

 

Session 14

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us? 

Abstract: This paper examines how varying conceptions of democracy influence citizens’ support for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at different levels of decision-making authority. We draw on original survey data (June 2023) from over 3,000 individuals in Spain. The survey was designed to capture participants support for AI‐based decision-making across different levels of authority: from administrative tasks to informing political decisions or standing for election. In general, respondents are sceptical about this possibility and show low support for almost all the situations posed – except for routine administrative tasks, where there is a (slim) majority of respondents who would support it. We analyse to what extent distinct democratic conceptions shape support for algorithmic decision-making at these levels, while controlling for other relevant socio-demographic and attitudinal variables (including personality and self-perception). Our findings reveal that individuals who endorse representative and populist-oriented conceptions of democracy are significantly less inclined to support AI in political decision-making, with the former supporting it only for the administrative level and the latter in any case. Conversely, those with authoritarian-oriented conceptions exhibit a higher level of support when AI is used at higher levels of decision-making. Finally, individuals endorsing expert-oriented conceptions support algorithmic decision-making at all levels. These results broadly align with prior research (except in the case of expert-oriented conceptions) and suggest that scepticism towards AI in governance is not uniform but is crucially mediated by citizens’ normative views on democracy.

Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC). His research interests involve any of the different ways public administrations have to know citizen preferences, including elections, surveys, local participation processes, citizen juries, deliberative polls, referendums or advisory councils. His papers about participatory institutions have been published in journals as European Journal of Political Research, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Politics, Public Administration, Political Studies, Politics & Policy or Administration & Society. His books include Font, J, della Porta, D and Sintomer, Y (eds) (2014): Participatory democracy in Southern Europe: causes, characteristics and consequences, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield or Font, J and Méndez, M (eds) (2013): Surveying ethnic minorities and immigrant populations: methodological challenges and research strategies, Amsterdam University Press Research series, Amsterdam. 

Paper 2: How does ChatGPT shape European cultural heritage for the future of Democracy? 

Abstract: Cultural heritage plays an essential role in shaping our identities and understanding our past, present, and future. However, it is also fragile and vulnerable to the ravages of time, conflict, natural disasters, and now, artificial intelligence. 

The launch of ChatGPT has sparked immense interest both in the opportunities it offers and for the risks involved in its generative artificial intelligence linguistic model. To date, research has been conducted on its use in various fields, from natural language processing to customer service or content creation, as well as in the education and public health sectors. Nevertheless, little has been addressed in the field of cultural heritage.

Based on the above, this article presents the results of a study in which ChatGPT-4 was commissioned to generate thoughts, written representations and visual productions about the importance of European Cultural Heritage values in the future of Democracy. To this end, a battery of tests was developed to assess their interaction, understanding, production and dissemination in relation to European Cultural Heritage and democratic values. 

According to an interpretive-comparative analysis of 30 interactions, ChatGPT-4, while providing answers of sufficient quality to address European Cultural Heritage, is unaware of the values underlying this heritage and the future importance of its preservation for European identity and democracy.

Alonso Escamilla is Manager of European Projects and Research at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain). For this same institution, he is a PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation and a Member of the Research Group: Territory, History and Digital Cultural Heritage. He have successfully designed, implemented and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: Council of Europe, European Commission, European Trade Union Confederation, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, European Youth Forum, and United Nations Development Programme.

Paula Gonzalo is Projects Coordinator of the Foundation for Cooperation and Community Development of El Salvador (CORDES) and Researcher at the University of Salamanca (Spain). She has successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Trade Union Institute, the SALTO Participation and Information Resource Centre, and the Ibero-American Social Security Organisation.

Paper 3:  The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness

Abstract: While Silicon Valley elites were once synonymous with liberal, white-collar startup culture, big tech has strategically realigned with the political right during the second Trump Administration. Elon Musk’s leadership in the Department of Government Efficiency highlights the consequences of this shift on U.S. conservatism. Drawing on three case studies—the Trump administration’s mass firing of federal workers, DOGE’s takeover of key government systems, and DOGE’s mass emails to federal employees—I examine how Musk’s outsized role in the second Trump Administration has challenged the working-class consciousness and white identity politics that have fueled Trump’s contemporary success. 

I argue that Musk’s reliance on tech-driven logics of efficiency and optimization to purge so-called ‘elites’ from the federal government has simply replaced technocrats with technology itself, reinforcing the very institutional and bureaucratic structures the political right opposes. By prioritizing technological efficiency at the expense of low- and middle-income federal employees, I show how these logics challenges Trump’s alignment with his white working class by substituting a people-versus-elite framework with an emerging people-versus-tech alternative. The resulting bipartisan dissatisfaction underscores the limits of right-wing populism in the age of big tech.

Aly Hill is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at The University of Utah. She specializes in political extremism, harassment, and mass shootings, with a focus on democratic institutions and public discourse. She has published and presented on topics including the Alt-right, QAnon’s digital migration, mass shooting news coverage, the U.S. anti-immigration movement, online harassment, and far-right memes. Aly holds an M.A. in Communication with a concentration in political communication from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in Political Science and Communication from The University of Utah. Outside of academia, Aly collaborates with experts in education, government, public policy, and data science to develop frameworks aimed at improving diplomacy and community investment.

Paper 4:  Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world

Abstract: This paper examines how algorithms perpetuate the “us/them” antagonism by creating filter bubbles that isolate users in echo chambers and filter out clashes that intensify conflict between opposing groups. It investigates the implications of these dynamics in the digital realm and their spillover into analogue democratic interactions. By shaping information flows, algorithms redefine collective identity and challenge the cohesion of democratic societies. Populism amplifies these effects by harnessing algorithmic divisions to mobilize support, yet it also serves as a lens to understand how people seek representation in fragmented publics. Focusing on insights from communication science, the aim is to illuminate populism’s complex role in an algorithmically mediated world.

Amina Vatreš is a teaching assistant at the Department of Communication Studies/Journalism at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Sciences. She was awarded with the “Silver Badge of the University of Sarajevo” twice for academic excellence, as one of the best students of both undergraduate and MA studies. Currently she is a PhD candidate enrolled in the interdisciplinary doctoral program, with her dissertation focusing on the field of artificial intelligence and its communicological-philosophical implications. She is the author and co-author of several scientific papers and book reviews indexed in international scientific databases, and has actively participated in a significant number of organizational committees for both international and domestic conferences, as well as in conducting PR activities and promoting numerous scientific events. Her research interests encompass critical topics at the intersection of communication, technology, and society, including algorithmic censorship, the societal impact of artificial intelligence, AI-driven disinformation, and the sociopolitical challenges posed by advanced machine learning systems.

 

Session 15

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics

Abstract: Pericles’ Funeral Oration, delivered in 431 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, is often celebrated as a powerful tribute to Athenian democracy, extolling the virtues of the city-state’s political system and its citizens. However, this paper argues that the oration should not be viewed solely as a celebration of democratic ideals, but rather as a populist and manipulative rhetorical strategy employed by Pericles to justify his failure to achieve a swift resolution to the war, which he had initially promised when persuading the Athenians to engage in the conflict.

Pericles is traditionally depicted as the ideal democratic leader whose populism did not fuel ochlocracy. His nuanced emotional appeal to the Athenian demos, whose decision-making he controlled, ensured that governance remained structured and reasoned.

Drawing on political philosophy, particularly the concept of populism, this paper posits that Pericles’ speech was a political maneuver designed to sustain his authority and maintain public support for a war that was escalating beyond his initial expectations. Political philosophy often reveals how, in the early stages of war, politicians frame it as a manageable, short-term endeavor with limited costs. However, wars frequently spiral out of control, becoming protracted and costly due to miscalculations, shifting political realities, and unforeseen consequences. 

Having initially convinced the Athenians that the Peloponnesian War would be a quick victory, Pericles faced mounting criticism as the war dragged on. In this context, the Funeral Oration was not so much a celebration of democratic values but rather a tactical effort to rally the populace by evoking patriotic sentiments and framing the sacrifices of the dead as part of a noble and necessary cause. By emphasizing the greatness of Athens and its citizens, Pericles attempted to redirect public dissatisfaction, portraying the war as essential to preserving Athenian ideals, even though it was straying further from the swift, decisive victory he had once promised.

In this way, the oration serves not so much as an exaltation of democracy, but as a populist tactic designed to manipulate the masses into supporting a war that was increasingly seen as spiralling beyond the leader’s control. Consequently, Pericles’ rhetoric shifts from celebrating democracy to prioritizing the consolidation of power and shaping public opinion in the face of an escalating and uncontrollable conflict.

Elizabeth Kosmeratou is a Professor in the History Department at the University of Illinois, Springfield.

Paper 2: Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing? 

Abstract: This paper explores the decision-making process as described by Ross Ashby in his “Design for a Brain”.  This explains how we can build a simple decider-mechanism into a highly adaptive brain-like system, and indeed it tallies with Piaget’s developmental hierarchy of human development.  Stafford Beer showed the same development for “collective brains” of social groups.  On these models, I discuss (i) the thinking and voting processes within democracy, especially the “panic” (populist) choice, when none of the options available seem relevant, and (ii) the options for authoritarian rulers (benign or otherwise) plus their likely decisions, and the reasons for them.  I also consider conflicts of interest within a democracy; and (following Aslaksen) I extend the Ashby/Beer model into international politics — with a table comparing all three. I then apply this approach to two key problems (barely-solvable politically): (1) Climate-change and (2) Limits-to-Growth, and argue that these two causes are largely responsible for ●immigration difficulties, ●minor wars,

●Cost-of-living — and are hence THE CAUSE OF POPULIST “PANICS”.  Next, I consider the power of Mega-Companies, and how we might deal with them — preferably at an international level.

 I conclude by endorsing some basic revisions of democratic procedures, including  

●use of AI (to overcome some serious obstacles such as objections to universal pensions), 

●Ranked choice voting, and 

●Compulsory voting (which also makes identity and fraud checks much easier).                                                  

Robert R. Traill has a PhD in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel, while also serving a one-year fellowship in the social sciences at Birmingham University. While teaching science in high schools, he developed an interest in the shortcomings of the political system. Thus, he went back to Melbourne University to do a BA in Economics, Political Science, Psychology, after which he worked in the corporate world. At North Thames Gas Board in London, he negotiated a Buyer-Decision-Model project with Professor Gordon Pask and his “System Simulation” company.  Within NTGB, he also worked in Market Research, and on the side, attended a course on “Biological Bases of Behaviour” with the Open University. He published in the Journal of Psychiatry and Psychiatric Disorders and developed his research interests in Economics and Sociology. 

Paper 3: The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism

Abstract: This article examines the role of personalised leadership in populism, focusing on its impact on the construction of political hegemony within the process of signifying the people. Adopting a political sociological perspective, it integrates theoretical frameworks on the personalisation of politics, leadership, disintermediation, and populism, exploring how populist leaders construct an imagined ‘people’ and establish direct, emotionally charged connections with them. The study highlights how populist leadership represents a specific trajectory within the broader phenomenon of personalisation, shaped by its distinctive conception of politics and democracy. Through the strategic manipulation of resonance, populist leaders politicise social resentment and frame ‘the people’ as a symbolic and homogeneous community, characterised by anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. This dynamic is reinforced through symbolic and performative strategies that unify fragmented societies, leveraging the politics of similarity to forge strong, direct bonds with their constituencies.

A key example of this dynamic is Donald Trump’s leadership, which exemplifies how populist leaders engage in disintermediation, bypassing traditional institutions and media filters to establish an unmediated connection with their supporters. Trump’s rhetoric and communicative style—marked by anti-establishment narratives, the rejection of political correctness, and the strategic use of social media—illustrate how populist leaders transform disintermediation into a challenge to liberal democracy.

While primarily theoretical, this article lays the groundwork for further empirical investigations into the mechanisms and consequences of populist leadership across different cultural and political contexts. By advancing the discourse on political sociology, it offers a nuanced understanding of how populist leaders manipulate resonance and redefine political representation, shedding light on the broader implications of populism for contemporary democracy.         

Lorenzo Viviani is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. He serves as Secretary of the Political Sociology Section of the Italian Sociological Association (AIS) and is an active member of several other international sociological associations. Currently, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Società Mutamento Politica – Italian Sociological Review (Class A, ANVUR). His recent publications include books, book chapters, and journal articles focusing on the rise of populism in the context of post-representative democracy, with a particular emphasis on the sociology of political parties and leadership.

Paper 4: The exclusionary identity of ‘the People’ in Radical Right Populism

Abstract: The growth of radical right politics raises concerns about authoritarian and exclusionary scenarios, while populism is understood as a logic that articulates democratic demands and strengthens political engagement. There is a lack of research on the democratic views of radical right populism. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on these phenomena generally examines either the supply or demand side of politics, neglecting the narrative dimension that emerges from the two intertwining. This article aims to fill these gaps by using the heuristic of the “emotion narrative” that circulates between the supply and demand sides of radical right populist parties to examine their political culture. 

Assuming that populism creates social identities through the affective articulation of popular demands, focusing on the “narrative of emotions” (and not only on the narrative dimension of particular emotions) allows us to analyse how social and political objects, facts, ideas, and scenarios generate political culture. Through a mixed-methods comparative study of Portugal and Italy, this article assesses the emotion narratives of the parties Chega and Fratelli d’Italia. The dataset includes 14 semi-structured interviews with MPs and an original survey with 1,900 responses regarding political realities (on the democratic system, power structures, ethnic diversity, political history, and role of the media) and hypothetical scenarios (on authoritarianism, the rise of migration and diversity, anti-corruption, securitisation of the state, and expanded use of referendums). The emotion narratives of radical right populist political cultures engender democratic visions rooted in exclusionary identities with positive affection for centralism, authoritarianism, and securitisation of the state, as opposed to innovation and participation.

Cristiano Gianolla is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra (UC), where he integrates research thematic line on Democracy, Justice and Human Rights. He obtained a PhD in Sociology and Political Science (cum laude) from Coimbra and Sapienza University of Rome, with a dissertation on Gandhi’s democratic theory and a comparative study of emerging political parties in India and Italy. Cristiano is the Principal Investigator and Work Package leader of PROTEMO (Horizon Europe, 2024-2026) and CO3 (Horizon Europe, 2024-2027, with Vanda Amaro Dias) projects. He was the Principal Investigator (PI) of the UNPOP project (FCT, 2021-2025) and a team member of the ECHOES (H2020, 2018-2021), ALICE (ERC, 2011-2016), and FRANET (2021-2022) projects. He is a co-founding and co-coordinating member of the ‘Inter-Thematic group on Migrations’, editor of e-cadernos scientific journal and a reviewer for scientific journals. Cristiano coordinates the PhD course ‘Democratic Theories and Institutions’ and the MA course ‘Critical Intercultural Dialogue’ at the Faculty of Economics of the UC, where he also teaches on the PhD course ‘State, Democracy and Legal Pluralism’. His publications include authored and edited books, chapters, and articles on democratic theory, populism, emotion, narrative, postcolonialism, intercultural dialogue, citizenship, and migration.

Lisete S. M. Mónico is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, Ph.D. in Social Psychology from University of Coimbra, European Diploma of Advanced Studies in Social Psychology (DEEAPS, Università degli Studi di Bari), teaches courses in Research Methods and Social Psychology since 1999. Mobility Coordinator (2017-2023) and Coordinator of the BSc in Psychology (2021-) at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences. Member of The Center for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive and Behavioral Intervention (CINEICC), dedicates her professional activity to research in the field of Social Sciences. Author of several books, book chapters, and articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

Manuel João Cruz has a PhD in Communication Sciences and is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra (UC), where he is part of the Democracy, Justice and Human Rights thematic line. His research focuses on the instrumentalization of trauma in political communication. At CES, Manuel João Cruz was part of the project “UNPOP: Dismantling Populism: Comparing the formation of narratives of emotion and their effects on political behavior”, which has already been completed, and is currently collaborating on the project CO3 – COntinuous COnstruction of resilient social COntracts through societal transformations. He has published on populism, narrative and affect in politics. Her main research interests include Media, Populism, Democracy and Narrative Studies.

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization 

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belongness

Abstract: My paper aims to discuss the role of the arts in both shaping feelings of belonginess and preventing the rise of nationalisms and populisms. To achieve this goal, the role of Laibach’s artistic contribution in staging nationalist feelings and ideas of ethnic belonginess is analyzed. Indeed, it can be suggested that, as Laibach were effective in criticizing the corrupted form of socialism in former Yugoslavia during the 1980s, so they were effective in exposing the origins of nationalist feelings and populism throughout their activity (1980-2020). In the past, Laibach responded to criticisms by arguing that they are “fascists as much as Hitler was a painter”. Moving from this argument, this article aims to understand Laibach’s strategy and the band’s past achievements. In addition, in the final part it furtherly asks what are the lessons that can be nowadays drawn from Laibach’s successful artistic engagement. 

Mitja Stefancic is a fully Independent Researcher and Civil Servant in Italy. He holds an MPhil in “Modern Society and Global Transformations” from the University of Cambridge and a BA in Social Sciences from the University of Essex. His PhD research focuses on the corporate governance and regulation of cooperative banks. He presented his research endeavours at scientific conferences, including EURICSE’s conference on cooperative banking and sustainable finance in Trento, Italy; the ICA 2014 Research conference in Pula, Croatia; and at the 2013 “Potential and Limits of Social Solidarity” conference in Geneva, Switzerland. His scientific contributions are published in journals such as Studi Economici, the Journal of Entrepreneurial & Organizational Diversity, the International Business & Research Journal, and has a forthcoming paper on coop banks in the ICA Review of International Co-Operation.

Paper 2: The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema

Abstract: The last decade has witnessed the growing ascendancy of Hindutva nationalism in India, as evident in various government policies, political statements, and social movements. Leaders from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and right-wing groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have increasingly referenced the concept of Akhand Bharat—a vision of a united Indian subcontinent encompassing present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other neighbouring regions under Hindu cultural hegemony. Statements from BJP leaders and affiliated groups have fueled religious polarisation, with rising incidents of communal violence, cow vigilantism, and attacks on minorities. The arts, such as literature, film, music, and cultural artefacts, have always been crucial in manufacturing national consciousness and collective identity in accordance with the ruling class ideology. 

Bollywood-the multi-million Hindi cinema industry emerging as a potent space for the generation and proliferation of this nationalist as well as religiously charged narratives. These are reflected in several movies, including The Kashmir Files (2022) and The Kerala Story (2023), which campaign for the ruling establishment’s political persuasion in some of their content. The development of these religiously laced and politically driven narratives in Bollywood is a crucial part of the much more significant paradigm shift toward right-wing nationalism. Movies depicting specific communities as the enemy within, contribute to furthering the divides between different communities. This destroys the very spirit of communal harmony and undermines the pluralistic nature of Indian society. The growing politicisation of Bollywood has exacerbated religious polarisation, leading to a more divisive and less tolerant India. In this paper, I aim to critically analyse the content of religious and nationalist narratives in Indian cinema in the last decade and explain how such cinemas have evolved into a tool that contributes to the polarisation of religious identities, casting religious minorities as the vilified ‘other’, thereby disrupting the secular nature of Indian democracy. The paper concludes by arguing that the politicisation of Bollywood has contributed to the bias towards right-wing nationalism, creating tensions among religious communities and eroding communal spirit.

Devapriya Raajev is currently pursuing my MA in Sociology at South Asian University, New Delhi. Her academic interests lie at the intersection of culture, media, democracy, gender studies, and intersectionality. She conducted fieldwork with the Human Rights Commission and tribal schools. She was also a member of the survey team for the Garima Project on women’s safety, conducted in association with the Gujarat Police. These experiences have shaped her understanding of structural inequalities and informed my academic inquiries. This paper reflects her ongoing engagement with questions around representation, power, and identity in contemporary media landscapes.

Paper 3: ‘I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy

Abstract: After the 2020 election, President Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani said many outrageous statements about the election which eventually led to his disbarment in two jurisdictions.  Giuliani also defamed two election workers in Georgia named Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, concocting a bizarre and untrue conspiracy that they added suitcases of outside ballots into the official count in Georgia. They had done nothing of the sort. But based on this defamatory lie, these women’s lives were turned upside down. They faced verbal and physical threats. 

This paper will explore the approach by the legal nonprofit Protect Democracy to fight disinformation by using defamation law in the United States and plaintiffs who are election workers, including Freeman and her daughter Moss. Protect Democracy found that disinformation about the 2020 election was being spread online by a handful of superspreaders like Giuliani, who had large followings on social media. This legal approach on relying on defamation law has been criticized by First Amendment scholar Professor RonNell Jones. Still, this piece will argue that defamation law is an important and effective tool in fighting disinformation like the Big Lie that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 presidential election. 

The victory that Freeman and Moss won against Rudy Giuliani was so eye-poppingly large at over $145 million that it serves as a potent deterrent for other would-be defamatory election deniers. And in a world where other mechanisms of accountability, like the criminal justice systems at the state and federal levels, have been slow or ineffective at holding those who tried to overthrow the 2020 election liable, several defamation cases about 2020 have either settled or ended with impactful judgments. This piece will also note how the attacks on Ms. Freeman and her daughter were racialized and why having access to compensation is particularly needed for middle- and lower-class Black victims of defamatory campaigns. 

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is a Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University. She was counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and an associate at Arnold & Porter. She is a graduate of Harvard and Columbia Law. She has testified before Congress as an expert on campaign finance. She has also helped draft Supreme Court briefs. She is the author of the books Corporate Citizen (Carolina 2016) and Political Brands (Elgar 2019), and Corporatocracy: How to Protect Democracy from Dark Money and Corrupt Politicians (NYU 2024). She published over 20 law review articles and hundreds of legal op-eds. She was a legal contributor to CNN for the 2024 election. She has been published in Washington Post, New York Times, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Review, Roll Call, Business Week, Forbes, The Atlantic, USA Today, San Francisco Chronicle, The Hill, Huffington Post, Judicature, The Nation, Salon, Talking Points Memo, Tampa Bay Times, The Progressive, Medium, and Shondaland. She has also been quoted by the media in Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Time, Bloomberg, Mother Jones, SCOTUS Blog, Politico, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Globe, NBC.com, Vox, VICE, Sirius Radio, NPR, Fox, CSPAN, DNA TV, and NY1.

Paper 4: State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military

Abstract: This study examines state institutional dissatisfaction in democracies, focusing on military institutions in religiously divided societies. We argue that all-encompassing societal dissatisfaction occurs when a state institution in a heterogeneous society applies a single policy to diverse groups with discretion and secrecy. Using a mixed methods design and an original survey, we investigate the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study in a democracy without full separation of state and religion. Our findings reveal significant dissatisfaction with the IDF’s religious practices among both secular and religious Israeli Jews. Paradoxically, this shared dissatisfaction may contribute to institutional stability by preventing any group from feeling privileged. The study contributes to understanding policy implementation in divided societies and has implications for military integration strategies in diverse contexts.

Niva Golan-Nadir is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University. She  received her Ph.D. from the school of Political Science at the University of Haifa, where she further completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the division of Public Administration and Policy. She is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, The University at Albany and at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Her research focuses on a comparative analysis of enduring gaps between public preferences and legal-institutional arrangements in democracies. Her research interests also include comparative politics, public administration, state-religion relations and Israel studies. Her recent book, ‘Public Preferences and Institutional Designs: Israel and Turkey compared’ (2022, Palgrave Macmillan), has been awarded final list and honorary mention (second place) by the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies and Concordia University Library. During 2024-2025, she is a visiting scholar at the Taub Center for Israel Studies at New-York University.

Michael Freedman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT. His research focuses on religion and conflict in Israel and the Muslim world, examining the political behavior of religious actors – including rabbis, imams, and religious social movements – and inquires how they perceive the state, whether they collaborate with it, and how they behave towards actors they perceive as enemies. His research uses sermons and legal rulings produced by religious leaders to explain why some leaders confer the state with legitimacy while others choose to challenge it.

Photo: Dreamstime

Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison

Please cite as:

Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2025). “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000116

 

Abstract

The accelerating erosion of regulatory safeguards, widening wealth inequality, entrenched elite influence, and the proliferation of surveillance regimes mark a new phase in the global crisis of corporate capitalism—one that is narrowing the normative and institutional gap between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Building on Karl Polanyi’s notion of the double movement and Fernand Braudel’s distinction between market exchange and capitalist domination, this article develops a comparative political economy framework to examine how structural disruptions in capitalism are reshaping global governance and fueling the rise of populist authoritarianism. The analysis contrasts the institutional trajectories of the United States, the European Union, and China, highlighting both convergent and divergent patterns in their responses to this systemic crisis. By integrating insights from political economy, comparative governance, and authoritarian studies, the paper advances a theoretical synthesis that explains the mechanisms of “authoritarian convergence” without reducing them to a deterministic path. It concludes that resisting this drift requires re-embedding markets within democratic institutions and forging a renewed, inclusive global social contract capable of constraining both corporate and state power.

Keywords: Corporate Capitalism, Authoritarian Convergence, Populism, Democratic Backsliding, Karl Polanyi, Double Movement, Fernand Braudel, Global Governance, Inequality, Regulatory Failure, Comparative Political Economy

By Ibrahim Ozturk*

1. Introduction: Capitalism, Crisis, and the Convergence of Systems

With the collapse of central planning and the global decline of communist ideology in the early 1990s—preceded by the wave of neoliberal deregulation in the early 1980s associated with the so-called Washington Consensus—liberal democracies came to be viewed not only as models of modern governance, marked by openness, transparency, and institutional pluralism, but also as systems capable of guiding countries such as China and, later, Russia toward a liberal worldview grounded in free-market economics and democratic governance.

After an initial period of reform—primarily in the economic sphere—beginning in China in the early 1980s and later in Russia in the early 1990s, developments appeared to support the anticipated trajectory of convergence, broadly continuing until the mid-2000s. However, the post-2008 Great Stagnation marked a decisive turning point, dispelling the “liberal fallacies” rooted in overoptimism and ideological faith in inevitable convergence. Not only did several countries once expected to converge begin diverging from liberal democratic norms, but many established democracies with market economies also started adopting features traditionally associated with authoritarian governance. Moreover, regimes long regarded as illiberal—such as China and Russia—demonstrated remarkable adaptability by integrating market mechanisms, digital innovation, and populist rhetoric into their authoritarian rule. Taken together, these developments underscore that liberal and authoritarian regimes are not merely coexisting but, in significant ways, are converging.

That is, as liberal regimes increasingly adopt features characteristic of illiberal governance, illiberal regimes have, in turn, successfully integrated into the market and globalization processes driven by corporate capitalism, while maintaining their authoritarian political systems. This two-way process—referred to in this article as reverse convergence—is rooted in a common underlying factor: the systemic crisis of corporate capitalism.

Economic activity, which ought to be embedded within society and regarded as an integral part of social life (Polanyi, 1944; Braudel, 1982; Block, 2003; Sandel, 2012), has instead come to be perceived as a narrow, detached sphere shaped by the immunization of the corporate capitalism (Greider, 1992 & 2003) through “financial fundamentalism” that Vickrey (1998) warned against. Increasingly, it is viewed as a domain dominated by elites, operating contrary to the broader public interest—or at least perceived as such by large segments of society.

Especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, this perception has fueled a countermovement marked by diverse forms of critique. Despite their ideological differences, these critiques converge on a common theme: the call to restore the will of the “virtuous people” against unaccountable elites (Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005; Müller, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019)—a formulation closely aligned with the core definition of populism. In this sense, the global reaction against corporate capitalism has been effectively appropriated and redirected by authoritarian populist forces (Fraser, 2017; Zuboff, 2019; Piketty, 2020; Brown, 2019).

Recent political and economic developments in the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China—where these transformations are particularly pronounced—reflect dynamics long anticipated by scholars, most notably Karl Polanyi (1944) and Fernand Braudel (1984). Polanyi, through his concept of the “double movement,” explored how societies historically respond to the destabilizing effects of unregulated markets by demanding protective social and political countermeasures. Braudel, in turn, distinguished between market economies and hierarchical capitalism, highlighting how modern economic elites operate within spheres largely insulated from democratic accountability.

More recently, these foundational frameworks have been extended by scholars analyzing the rise of digital capitalism. Zuboff’s (2019) theory of surveillance capitalism, Wark’s (2019) notion of the vectoralist class, and Varoufakis’s (2023) concept of techno-feudalism each offer critical insights into how corporate power, digital infrastructures, and state capture are reshaping the structures of political authority. Building on the approaches of Polanyi and Braudel, this article investigates how structural transformations in global capitalism—particularly under the pressures of digitalization, the expansion of cyberspace, rising wealth and income inequality, and the ensuing populist backlash—have increasingly blurred the boundaries between regime types.

This study uses comparative case analysis to examine the US, EU, and China as key regions where the disruptions caused by corporate capitalism align with the rise of authoritarian populist strategies. Each case offers a unique way of managing, challenging, or exploiting the structural pressures of global capitalism. Through this comparative approach, the paper aims to explain why and how different political systems are increasingly adopting illiberal norms, such as centralized authority, elite entrenchment, and norm erosion, even as they officially support divergent ideologies.

The structure of the paper is outlined as follows. After this introduction, the next section details the theoretical framework behind the concept of reverse convergence. Section 2 examines the contributions of Polanyi, Braudel, and other key scholars, situating their ideas within the context of current global trends. Section 3 presents a comparative empirical analysis of governance patterns in the US, the EU, and China, utilizing policy documents, governance indicators, and regulatory frameworks. The final section presents the normative implications of these findings in a nutshell. The article ends with key policy implications and recommendations.

Read Full Article Here

Lise Bjånesøy2

Dr. Bjånesøy: FrP Turns Economic Frustration in Norway into Populist Momentum

In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, the country’s political landscape has been reshaped by growing polarization and the unexpected strength of the populist radical right. While Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly secured another four years in power with 87 out of 169 seats, the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP) achieved a historic breakthrough, doubling its vote share to 24% and becoming the second-largest party. This surge signals deep currents of economic dissatisfaction and changing voter dynamics, especially among younger men.

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, offers insights into how FrP transformed economic frustration into populist momentum. “Economic issues, such as wealth tax and the cost of living, have been central in this election,” explains Dr. Bjånesøy. “FrP has strongly profiled itself against wasting taxpayers’ money, attracting voters dissatisfied with Labour and consolidating support among those frustrated with rising living costs.”

FrP’s success, however, goes beyond economics. Dr. Bjånesøy highlights the party’s strategic mobilization of young voters, particularly young men, driven largely by social media dynamics. “For young men who get their news from social media, there’s a 28% likelihood of voting FrP, compared to just 14% among those who don’t. Social media plays an important role in mobilizing this demographic.”

Despite this populist surge, Norway remains a centre-left outlier in the Nordic region, diverging from Sweden and Finland, where right-wing governments dominate. Dr. Bjånesøy attributes this partly to narrow electoral thresholds and coalition dynamics, as well as Labor’s recovery under Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister, dubbed the “Stoltenback effect,” which boosted Labor’s popularity by 10 percentage points.

Still, she warns against underestimating FrP’s growing influence: “FrP has benefited from reduced stigma around supporting the party and has mobilized nearly all the voters who don’t dislike them. But their ability to expand further will depend on how effectively Labour manages governing alongside four smaller left-wing parties.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Bjånesøy underscores the urgent need for research on social media’s political impact, calling it a “key driver of generational divides” and shifting populist dynamics.

This interview unpacks the interplay between economic grievances, political polarization, and digital mobilization in shaping Norway’s electoral landscape — and what it reveals about the future of populism in Europe.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy

Dr. Bjånesøy: FrP Turns Economic Frustration in Norway into Populist Momentum

In Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly held on to power — but the real story was the historic surge of the populist Progress Party (FrP), which doubled its vote share to 24% and became the country’s second-largest party. In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Lise Bjånesøy (University of Bergen) explains how FrP converted economic grievances into populist momentum, capitalizing on anger over wealth taxes, cost-of-living pressures, and distrust of “wasteful elites.” FrP also mobilized younger men through social media, a trend Dr. Bjånesøy calls a key driver of Norway’s new political divides.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Norway’s September 8, 2025, general election, the country’s political landscape has been reshaped by growing polarization and the unexpected strength of the populist radical right. While Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s Labour Party narrowly secured another four years in power with 87 out of 169 seats, the populist right-wing Progress Party (FrP) achieved a historic breakthrough, doubling its vote share to 24% and becoming the second-largest party. This surge signals deep currents of economic dissatisfaction and changing voter dynamics, especially among younger men.

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, Postdoctoral Fellow at the Department of Government, University of Bergen, offers insights into how FrP transformed economic frustration into populist momentum. “Economic issues, such as wealth tax and the cost of living, have been central in this election,” explains Dr. Bjånesøy. “FrP has strongly profiled itself against wasting taxpayers’ money, attracting voters dissatisfied with Labour and consolidating support among those frustrated with rising living costs.”

FrP’s success, however, goes beyond economics. Dr. Bjånesøy highlights the party’s strategic mobilization of young voters, particularly young men, driven largely by social media dynamics. “For young men who get their news from social media, there’s a 28% likelihood of voting FrP, compared to just 14% among those who don’t. Social media plays an important role in mobilizing this demographic.”

Despite this populist surge, Norway remains a centre-left outlier in the Nordic region, diverging from Sweden and Finland, where right-wing governments dominate. Dr. Bjånesøy attributes this partly to narrow electoral thresholds and coalition dynamics, as well as Labor’s recovery under Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister, dubbed the “Stoltenback effect,” which boosted Labor’s popularity by 10 percentage points.

Still, she warns against underestimating FrP’s growing influence: “FrP has benefited from reduced stigma around supporting the party and has mobilized nearly all the voters who don’t dislike them. But their ability to expand further will depend on how effectively Labour manages governing alongside four smaller left-wing parties.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Bjånesøy underscores the urgent need for research on social media’s political impact, calling it a “key driver of generational divides” and shifting populist dynamics.

This interview unpacks the interplay between economic grievances, political polarization, and digital mobilization in shaping Norway’s electoral landscape — and what it reveals about the future of populism in Europe.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Economic Grievances Fuel FrP’s Surge

Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The general elections on Monday (September 8, 2025) saw Labour narrowly retain power while the populist radical right Progress Party (FrP) nearly doubled its vote share to 24%. From your research, what explains FrP’s electoral surge despite being historically the most disliked party in Norway?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s a very good question. I think there are quite a few reasons why the Progress Party (FrP) has been doing so well in this election. First of all, it has been the loudest opposition party to the current government, which helps them attract voters dissatisfied with the Labour government as well as generally discontented voters.

Second, economic issues have been a very important part of this election. It’s been a big, salient topic, and the FrP has benefited from that focus. Another significant factor is that they have gained many voters from the Conservative Party. In fact, a lot of people who previously voted Conservative now support the Progress Party. At least that’s what we’ve seen in earlier data. We’ll have to wait, of course, for the post-election data collection, but when we conducted a large survey in June, we found that 50% of those who said they intended to vote for the Progress Party had previously supported the Conservatives.

Another reason is that they attract more young voters, particularly young men, and social media seems to play an important mobilizing role for this group.

Regarding the Progress Party’s reputation as a very disliked party — which it still is within the Norwegian political system — I think this suggests they may now have mobilized almost all the voters they can. In other words, they’ve consolidated support among those who don’t dislike them, but they remain a highly unpopular party overall.

Media analyses describe the rise of FrP as part of the “MAGA-fication” of Norwegian politics, particularly among young male voters. To what extent does FrP’s messaging reflect a broader Americanization of populist rhetoric, and how much is it rooted in domestic Norwegian grievances?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a good question. First of all, I think it’s very interesting how a Norwegian election campaign is perceived in other countries. I’ve not heard the word MAGA-fication in any Norwegian newspapers, and I don’t think we would use that term to describe what is going on in Norway. So, I don’t think we can take it that far as being a MAGA-fication. Although the FrP did very well in this election — historically well, indeed — and they are attracting young men in particular, I still don’t think I would use the word MAGA-fication. I think, as you say, the success of the Progress Party in this election can be explained by domestic Norwegian grievances rather than any Americanization of populist rhetoric.

There has been one incident that perhaps comes a little close to the Americanization of populist rhetoric, and that was just a few days before the election, or very close to election night. There was a televised political debate where the leader of the Progress Party, Sylvi Listhaug, blamed the leader of the AUF, the youth wing of the Labour Party, for being a notorious liar, and she repeated over and over again that he is a liar, ‘you’re lying’. This was based on a relatively normal political statement, and yet she labelled him a liar. The Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who was also part of that debate, responded by saying, essentially, “Okay, so you want to become Prime Minister, but you can’t talk like this.” That, he implied, would represent a new turn for Norway.

So, I think that might be one of those rare events that could be described as an Americanization of populist rhetoric. But other than that, we haven’t really seen this pattern; it hasn’t been a major part of the election campaign, at least in my view.

Norwegian farmers protest government agricultural policies outside parliament in Oslo. Banner targets former Agriculture Minister Sylvi Listhaug. Photo: Dreamstime.

FrP Capitalizes on Economic Anger While Labour Leans on Stoltenberg Boost

The campaign was dominated by debates on the cost of living, wealth taxes, the oil fund’s investment in Israel, and relations with Donald Trump. How did FrP successfully own these issues and deploy populist frames contrasting “the people” with “corrupt elites” or “globalist priorities”?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: The economic issues you mentioned, such as wealth tax and cost of living, are very important political issues for the Progress Party. They attract voters who are against the wealth tax, for instance. The high salience of this issue can probably help explain some of the gains and some of the success of the Progress Party in this election. Another example is that they have strongly profiled themselves as being against wasting taxpayers’ money. On the cost of living, they argue that the current government spends far too much of the taxpayers’ money and simply wastes it away. These have been two key issues for the Progress Party and their voters.

However, issues such as foreign policy and relations with Donald Trump are among the reasons why Labour did so well in this election. It never became quite clear during the campaign whether Listhaug would be a candidate for Prime Minister. She never explicitly said she wanted to be, but she repeated that it was natural for the party with the highest share of votes to take the Prime Minister position. So, it was never a clear yes or no. This created debate about whether she would do a good job as a potential Prime Minister, especially when it came to foreign policy and representing Norwegian interests in relation to Donald Trump, for example. So, I think some of these issues were very good for the Progress Party, but issues like foreign policy worked in favour of Labour and the current government.

Labour’s rebound has been attributed in part to the “Stoltenback effect,” boosting Labour’s popularity by 10 percentage points following Jens Stoltenberg’s return as finance minister. Do you see this as evidence of leadership personalization countering populist momentum, or does it simply mask deeper structural shifts favouring PRR parties?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: There are several reasons that can explain this boosted popularity of the Labour Party. One of the reasons is the one you mentioned — the Stoltenback effect — as we got Jan Stoltenberg back as finance minister. But it’s also important to mention that it was the current Prime Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, who brought Stoltenberg back. So, it was also a boost in popularity for him, showing good leadership skills by bringing Stoltenberg back.

Another important issue is that the agrarian Centre Party, which had previously been in a coalition with the Labour Party, left the government coalition. So now, the Labour Party holds government power alone. It was a minority government, and I think that was very good for Labour.

A third explanation is foreign policy and Trump, as we just talked about. We want competent and highly experienced politicians to navigate this sort of uncertain political world that we are living in.

Finally, I think it’s quite exceptional how the Labour Party — and the current government — was so unpopular for a long time because the economy was performing poorly, yet they still managed to retain power. It makes this quite an exceptional election. A fourth contributing factor is that while the economy had been doing really badly, it is now performing much better. So, they have managed to turn the economy around to a better situation for people.

Norway Balances Populist Surge with Centre-Left Resilience

Despite FrP’s strong gains, Norway remains a centre-left outlier compared to Sweden and Finland. Based on your work on political tolerance, why has Norway diverged from this broader Nordic trend, and what factors have enabled it to resist a full populist breakthrough despite growing polarization?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: It’s important to emphasize that the results of this current election would have looked different if the Green Party, which is part of the left-wing bloc, had not passed the electoral threshold, and if the Liberal Party, which is part of the right-wing bloc, had passed it. In that case, this election could still have been a win for the right-wing bloc. But it ultimately ended up being a win for the left-wing bloc.

One key reason for this outcome is that the Green Party, for the first time, passed the electoral threshold and received what’s called utjevningsmandat — additional seats in the Storting (Norwegian parliament). However, it’s also important to emphasize that the Labour Party, which is now most likely continuing as a minority government, will have to navigate the next four years with four smaller parties. This could prove very challenging and, in fact, represents something of a dream opportunity for the Progress Party, which will likely benefit from Labour having to cooperate with these four much smaller left-wing parties.

Considering how well the Progress Party performed in this election, I don’t think Norway is an outlier, because we see two dynamics unfolding simultaneously. On one hand, there is a clear right-wing wave and a significant boost for the Progress Party; on the other, there is continued support for the current government. These trends coexist, but in the end, the results largely come down to the margins of which parties managed to pass — or failed to pass — the electoral threshold.

In your dissertation, you argue that FrP is both politically tolerated and highly negatively evaluated. How do you reconcile this paradox, particularly in the light of FrP’s breakthrough in the 2025 election?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I think real tolerance is to allow democratic rights and privileges to those you dislike or disagree with. In that sense, it’s perhaps not a paradox; the Progress Party is still disliked, but we still see high tolerance of the party. However, based on these high levels of dislike for the FrP, the Progress Party might have reached its electoral high at this point. Maybe there are no more voters to mobilize. That said, this can change in the next election. We have seen that the levels of dislike for the Progress Party fluctuate. If I remember correctly, the highest levels were above 60%, and now about 55% of voters dislike the party. So, slightly fewer voters now dislike the party than before. A few more also tend to like it, but this can change.

Still, because of these very high levels of dislike towards the Progress Party, it can be hard for them to mobilize even more voters than they already have. Another important point when discussing the dislike of the Progress Party is that they have to collaborate. If the right-wing bloc had won the election, they would have had to work with parties whose voters dislike them. For the Liberal Party, for instance, many of its voters dislike the Progress Party, which makes collaboration difficult, or at least quite challenging, for a potential governing bloc. For some voters, it would be hard to accept cooperation with the Progress Party. Especially if we go back to the example where Listhaug called the youth wing leader of the Labour Party a liar, a notorious liar — that kind of rhetoric is very difficult for the Liberal Party to accept.

Less Stigma, Digital Mobilization, and a Generational Shift

Norwegian Progress Party (FrP) campaign booth. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your findings show that party institutionalization influences public tolerance of the populist radical right. Given FrP’s long-standing presence in Norway’s political system, does this institutional legitimacy insulate it from the broader backlash against far-right parties elsewhere in Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: This might actually be another reason why the Progress Party did very well in this election. There has been less stigma connected towards voting FrP in this election compared to elections before. It seems like it’s more acceptable to say that you are a Progress Party voter than it has been before. This is not based on data — this is just my hunch — and we haven’t seen this in the data yet, but my hunch says that there is actually less stigma directed towards being a Progress Party voter than there has been before.

One reason might be that the party has moderated itself, particularly after the past government experience. The government experience that they have had might also contribute to less stigma towards them. However, voters still didn’t want Sylvi Listhaug as Prime Minister. That was part of the political debate in this election — whether she was going to be a Prime Minister or not — and most voters didn’t want her as Prime Minister.

So, I don’t think that any political parties are immune to backlash. But I think that the Progress Party benefits a lot from the current political situation, when the Støre government will have to cooperate with these four smaller parties on the left. I think the next election in four years will be extremely exciting. It will be very interesting to see how well the Progress Party does then. Maybe they will get an even better boost of votes — we’ll have to see.

With FrP performing especially well among younger male voters, do you see signs of a generational realignment in Norwegian politics, or is this a temporary reaction to specific economic and identity-based issues?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: In this election, we have seen that young men turn to FrP, while young women turn to the left. That’s a sign of increased polarization among young people — men go one way, and young women go the other. One of the things we’ve seen in our data — we’ve analysed data from the Norwegian Citizen Panel, where we have around 10,000 participants — is that we can look in more detail at how young men and young women vote.

What we’ve found using those data is that both young women and young men actually have an increased likelihood of voting for the Progress Party if they get their news from social media. For young men, there is a 28% likelihood of voting FrP if they get their news from social media. And if you are a young man who does not get your news from social media, there’s only a 14% chance that you will vote for the Progress Party. It’s a huge boost in the likelihood of voting FrP if you are a young man and get your news from social media.

We find the same pattern among young women as well, but it’s a much weaker relationship, so it’s particularly strong among young men. We also find that young men who get their news from social media tend to place themselves further to the right, and they are more dissatisfied with the economy. So, in that case, we can say they’re not being “tricked” into voting for the Progress Party — they genuinely agree with them.

Of course, it might be that those who place themselves further to the right and want to vote for the Progress Party are also those who tend to get their news from social media. But still, I think there’s something going on with social media that is an important explanation for what’s happening among young men.

I also don’t think this is just a temporary shift. But I think we need to learn more about what’s going on, particularly in this case, and also study more closely what’s happening on social media. We’ll just have to wait — we need a lot more research on this particular topic — but there are definitely some very interesting dynamics unfolding among the young.

Positive Views on Immigration Hold

In your 2019 article, you found that public attitudes toward asylum seekers shifted after the 2015 refugee crisis. Has the 2025 campaign, particularly debates on Gaza and Ukraine, triggered similar shifts in threat perceptions and migrant-related framing?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: Immigration issues were not a big part of this election campaign. So, in that case, there was no particular reason to expect any shift in public attitudes based on the campaign itself. But I think it’s interesting how we still remain quite positive towards immigration after receiving a large number of refugees from Ukraine, especially. This means that we did not see the same shift in public attitudes as we did during the 2015 refugee crisis when Norway also received a significant number of refugees.

Looking at trends and opinion data collected in the Norwegian Citizen Panel, we see that 51% of respondents think that immigration is an advantage, which is actually exactly the same level as in 2014. Back then, 51% also said that they viewed immigration positively. So, while the trend fluctuates somewhat over time, at this point, it stands at the same level as when we first started measuring it in 2014.

However, on some other questions we examine, more people today say that they think it should be more difficult to get asylum. We also see an increase in people who believe that the conditions for integrating refugees in Norway are bad, or at least not very good. So, there is some movement and some shifts in attitudes towards immigration and asylum seekers, but I haven’t seen anything specific related to this current election.

Social Media’s Role Needs Deeper Investigation

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Your research suggests media framing can normalize exclusionary populist narratives. To what extent did the Norwegian media in 2025 amplify FrP’s populist discourse, and does this signal a shift toward mainstreaming radical right rhetoric?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: That’s a whole research question in itself. Based on what I’ve seen, we had quite a fair election campaign, where the various political parties participated in debates and were given the same opportunities on the same media platforms to debate. But we have been very interested, both in research and in the media, in what’s going on with young men in this election. However, I haven’t seen the same level of interest in young women. So, we have some shifts in the media that affect our focus, I guess. Maybe I would like to see more attention paid to what’s going on with young women as well. 

FrP has gained a lot of media attention, particularly because they were doing very well in the polls, so it was natural to be interested in that, but also because they were performing strongly among young men. So, we’ve seen this increase in media attention, but I do think that, if anything, we should pay even more attention to what’s happening on social media. And that would be my hunch, based on your question.

And lastly, looking ahead, what research agenda do you see as most urgent for understanding the evolving relationship between populist radical right parties, public opinion, and democratic resilience in Norway and across Europe?

Dr. Lise Bjånesøy: I’ve probably also given away what I think is one of the most important areas to focus on now. One of the key research agendas going forward is to learn more about what is happening on social media — how we are affected by it, or not affected by it, and how our experiences on these platforms differ. The algorithms give us more of the content that we already like, and we need to understand what effects this has on political participation, both in Norway and across Europe. I believe this is a very important research agenda, as we currently know too little about the effects of social media on politics.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

The ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, launched its Virtual Workshop Series on “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World” on September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions through April 2026, the series examines how populist strategies reshape democracy across diverse contexts. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the opening session featured Professor David Sanders’ keynote on six structural drivers fueling populism and its growing threats to liberal democracy. Case studies explored populist dynamics in the US, India, Greece, Thailand, and Argentina, highlighting intersections of dynasties, corporate power, elite cues, and economic crises. Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias emphasized three takeaways: populism as performance, polarization over persuasion, and the enduring impact of national political cultures.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, inaugurated its Virtual Workshop Series with the opening session, “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World,” held on Thursday, September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions from September 2025 to April 2026, the programme brings together leading scholars to examine the contested meanings of “the people” and their pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of democracy across diverse political, cultural, and institutional settings. Designed as a continuation of the successful three-day in-person conference at St. Cross College, Oxford University (July 1–3, 2025) — “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” — the series deepens and extends those debates, fostering comparative, cross-disciplinary dialogue on democratic backsliding, resilience, and transformation in a rapidly shifting global landscape.

Opening on behalf of ECPS, Stella Schade outlined the series’ comparative and cross-disciplinary ambition: to move beyond regional silos and examine how populist projects travel, adapt, and entrench themselves within distinct political and media ecologies.

Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne), a leading authority on populism and party systems, the session framed populist authoritarianism not as a single doctrine but as a repertoire of strategies—discursive, organizational, and institutional—deployed under diverse conditions. 

Professor David Sanders (University of Essex, Emeritus) set the analytical agenda with a wide-ranging keynote that argued populism poses greater risks to liberal democracy today than in earlier cycles, owing to transnational diffusion of tactics and the erosion of shared standards of truth. He identified six structural drivers—declining left–right anchors, post-truth dynamics, politicized immigration, identity fragmentation, globalization’s discontents, and norm subversion through strategic learning—and outlined five fronts for democratic response, from inclusive immigration policy and rebalanced rights discourse to retooled economic governance, renewed state capacity, and robust platform regulation.

The panel that followed translated these themes into concrete case studies. Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University) traced the entanglement of family dynasties, corporate finance, and “outsider” populist narratives in India and the United States, highlighting the paradox whereby leaders mobilize anti-elite sentiment while constructing elite power networks of their own. 

Professor Gregory W. Streich and Dr. Michael Makara (University of Central Missouri) examined how elite cues and out-group framing shape opinion formation, showing that populist endorsements polarize more than they persuade and exert greatest influence on low-salience issues where prior beliefs are weak. 

Professor Akis Kalaitzidis (University of Central Missouri) offered a comparative analysis of Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the United States to argue that economic dislocations catalyze distinct populist trajectories, each filtered through national political cultures and institutional constraints. 

Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou (University of Illinois Springfield), in joint work with Kalaitzidis, revisited the Papandreou era to illuminate how charismatic leadership, clientelism, and European integration jointly reconfigured Greece’s political economy, leaving a durable imprint on state capacity and party competition.

Serving as discussant, Dr. João Ferreira Dias synthesized the contributions around three cross-cutting claims: populism functions as performance more than program; polarization, not persuasion, is its primary mass effect; and national political cultures mediate how populist styles are institutionalized. His commentary linked micro-level mechanics (elite cues, media incentives) to macro-level outcomes (executive aggrandizement, clientelist normalization), underscoring the session’s central lesson: understanding populist authoritarianism requires attention to both the technologies of mobilization and the structures that enable their entrenchment. 

As the series unfolds, ECPS and its partners will continue to probe these dynamics comparatively, asking not only how democracies backslide, but also how they can be renewed.

Report on ECPS Virtual Workshop Series — Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism Around the World.

Aryeh Neier

Human Rights Icon Aryeh Neier: Anti-Israel Speech Is Not Antisemitism

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Aryeh Neier — founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and former President of the Open Society Foundations — delivers a powerful assessment of Gaza, free speech, and international accountability. Neier argues that criticism of Israeli policies must not be conflated with antisemitism, stressing that “even antisemitism constitutes protected speech.” He further asserts that “Israel is engaged in genocide,” citing systematic obstruction of humanitarian aid and disproportionate force in Gaza. While the ICC remains “the only viable path” for justice, he warns that political barriers persist. From US policy dynamics to global human rights challenges, Neier offers rare insights into one of today’s most divisive debates.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), iconic human rights defender Aryeh Neier — former Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), and former President of the Open Society Foundations — reflects on Israel’s war in Gaza, free speech controversies, and the challenges of international accountability. With a career spanning more than six decades and seven honorary degrees, Neier brings unmatched authority to one of today’s most polarizing debates.

At the heart of the conversation lies his assertion that criticism of Israeli policies must not be conflated with antisemitism. “Differentiating antisemitism from anti-Israel speech is something that the Trump administration has failed to do,” Neier argues, highlighting how US political discourse has blurred the lines between prejudice and legitimate dissent. He warns against undermining free expression on American campuses: “Even antisemitism constitutes protected speech,” he insists, while adding that universities must balance academic freedoms with preventing disruption to institutional activities.

Turning to Gaza, Neier presents a grave legal assessment: “Israel is engaged in genocide,” he says, grounding his conclusion in the 1948 Genocide Convention. He points to two central factors: Israel’s sustained obstruction of humanitarian aid and the use of disproportionate force. “Starvation, as a method of warfare, is forbidden under the First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions,” he stresses, adding that the denial of food, water, and medical supplies, combined with the use of 900-kilogram bombs in densely populated areas, “seems to me to amount to the crime of genocide.”

Aryeh Neier also emphasizes the limitations of international mechanisms. While the International Criminal Court (ICC) remains the most viable forum for prosecutions, enforcement will require political shifts. Drawing parallels to the former Yugoslavia, he notes, “Slobodan Milosevic never imagined he would face trial, yet years later he was sent to The Hague.”

On US policy, Neier identifies Evangelical Christian groups, not AIPAC, as a dominant influence shaping Washington’s stance toward Israel, complicating responses to international legal rulings. He also warns of growing generational divides within US politics, with younger voters increasingly critical of Israeli policies — a factor he believes may eventually reshape policy debates.

This interview offers a profound exploration of the intersection between human rights, international law, free speech, and accountability. From Gaza to US campuses, Neier challenges political distortions and underscores the urgency of protecting both humanitarian principles and civil liberties in an age of polarization.

Here is the transcript of our interview with human rights champion Aryeh Neier, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Aryeh Neier is an iconic human rights defender, former Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), and former President of the Open Society Foundations.

Human Rights Icon Aryeh Neier: Anti-Israel Speech Is Not Antisemitism

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Aryeh Neier — founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and former President of the Open Society Foundations — delivers a powerful assessment of Gaza, free speech, and international accountability. Neier argues that criticism of Israeli policies must not be conflated with antisemitism, stressing that “even antisemitism constitutes protected speech.” He further asserts that “Israel is engaged in genocide,” citing systematic obstruction of humanitarian aid and disproportionate force in Gaza. While the ICC remains “the only viable path” for justice, he warns that political barriers persist. From US policy dynamics to global human rights challenges, Neier offers rare insights into one of today’s most divisive debates.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), iconic human rights defender Aryeh Neier — former Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), founding Executive Director of Human Rights Watch (HRW), and former President of the Open Society Foundations — reflects on Israel’s war in Gaza, free speech controversies, and the challenges of international accountability. With a career spanning more than six decades and seven honorary degrees, Neier brings unmatched authority to one of today’s most polarizing debates.

At the heart of the conversation lies his assertion that criticism of Israeli policies must not be conflated with antisemitism. “Differentiating antisemitism from anti-Israel speech is something that the Trump administration has failed to do,” Neier argues, highlighting how US political discourse has blurred the lines between prejudice and legitimate dissent. He warns against undermining free expression on American campuses: “Even antisemitism constitutes protected speech,” he insists, while adding that universities must balance academic freedoms with preventing disruption to institutional activities.

Turning to Gaza, Neier presents a grave legal assessment: “Israel is engaged in genocide,” he says, grounding his conclusion in the 1948 Genocide Convention. He points to two central factors: Israel’s sustained obstruction of humanitarian aid and the use of disproportionate force. “Starvation, as a method of warfare, is forbidden under the First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions,” he stresses, adding that the denial of food, water, and medical supplies, combined with the use of 900-kilogram bombs in densely populated areas, “seems to me to amount to the crime of genocide.”

Aryeh Neier also emphasizes the limitations of international mechanisms. While the International Criminal Court (ICC) remains the most viable forum for prosecutions, enforcement will require political shifts. Drawing parallels to the former Yugoslavia, he notes, “Slobodan Milosevic never imagined he would face trial, yet years later he was sent to The Hague.”

On US policy, Neier identifies Evangelical Christian groups, not AIPAC, as a dominant influence shaping Washington’s stance toward Israel, complicating responses to international legal rulings. He also warns of growing generational divides within US politics, with younger voters increasingly critical of Israeli policies — a factor he believes may eventually reshape policy debates.

This interview offers a profound exploration of the intersection between human rights, international law, free speech, and accountability. From Gaza to US campuses, Neier challenges political distortions and underscores the urgency of protecting both humanitarian principles and civil liberties in an age of polarization.

Here is the transcript of our interview with human rights champion Aryeh Neier, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Why Gaza Meets the Genocide Threshold

Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.

Mr. Aryeh Neier, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As one of the most influential human rights defenders in modern history, you have stated that you are persuaded Israel is “engaged in genocide” in Gaza. How do you define genocide in this context under international law, and how do Netanyahu’s increasingly populist and authoritarian coalition policies — particularly regarding humanitarian aid, military conduct, and civilian protections — factor into your conclusion that the legal threshold has been crossed?

Aryeh Neier: As far as the legal definition of genocide is concerned, it is the 1948 Genocide Convention that defines the crime under international law. The crime consists of destroying a national, racial, ethnic, or religious group, in whole or in part. This destruction can occur through direct killing or by creating conditions of life intended to bring about the death of such a group, in whole or in part. The attempt to commit genocide is also a crime under international law, just as the actual commission of genocide is. Regarding those who organize the effort, I’m less focused on the coalitions they may form. To me, the guilty parties are those who possess both the authority and the intent — and intent is the crucial factor under international law in defining the crime of genocide.

You have linked your conclusion primarily to Israel’s sustained obstruction of humanitarian aid. From a legal perspective, do you interpret starvation as a method of warfare here as evidence of specific genocidal intent to destroy a population, in whole or in part? To what extent does Netanyahu’s populist-nationalist rhetoric and reliance on far-right coalition partners signal deliberate policy intent rather than reckless disregard?

Aryeh Neier: Again, I’m not concerned with the coalition that may be supporting Netanyahu. The issue is whether they exercise the authority that makes them guilty participants in the crime of genocide. Starvation, as a method of warfare, is forbidden under the First Protocol of the Geneva Conventions. It is absolutely prohibited, and those who act with intent to cause starvation should be considered to have participated in the commission of genocide.

Although I focus heavily on the denial of humanitarian assistance — including food, water, and medical supplies — to the population of Gaza, I would also include, as part of the crime of genocide, the use of disproportionate force by the Israeli government. For example, the Israeli government used 900-kilogram bombs in its attacks on Gaza, particularly in the early months. Bombs of that size can kill people within 200 meters and are utterly inappropriate for use in a densely populated area like Gaza.

While such weapons might have legitimate uses in warfare — for example, destroying a naval base or a military factory producing large amounts of armor — their use in crowded urban areas inevitably means that a very large number of civilians will be killed, and that is what happened in Gaza. Therefore, the combination of the way these attacks were carried out and the denial of humanitarian assistance, including food, water, and medical supplies, seems to me to amount to the crime of genocide.

From Blockades to Bombing Patterns

Based on your experience at Human Rights Watch and the Open Society Foundations, which forms of evidence are most critical for establishing war crimes liability in Gaza — convoy interdictions, caloric deprivation, bombing patterns, or policy directives?

Aryeh Neier: All of the above are factors that can be considered as evidence. If there were to be a criminal trial in the International Criminal Court (ICC), there would need to be clear evidence showing what the defendants actually did. There would have to be witnesses who could testify to their actions, as well as an examination of any available documents, along with testimony from observers who were present. The Israeli government has done as much as it could to limit the possibility of such testimony by preventing international journalists and human rights groups from entering Gaza. Therefore, the witnesses would most likely have to be people from Gaza who experienced these crimes, along with some Israelis who are knowledgeable about the practices and could testify before the ICC.

Given the populist pressures within Netanyahu’s coalition, which levels of command responsibility appear most salient — cabinet-level policy decisions, directives from the defense establishment, or field-level operational orders? How should investigators document the causal link between strategic blockade policies, child malnutrition, and elevated civilian mortality?

Aryeh Neier: I don’t think one can specify in advance how a prosecution would proceed. It would be up to the prosecutors to determine what evidence they are able to obtain. If they can secure military directives, they would use those. But if they are not able to access such directives, testimony from individuals who were present when decisions were made would become important. If that is also unavailable, they would need to examine patterns of action by those who committed the crimes. They would look at actions taken, for example, to destroy farms and greenhouses in Gaza, which provided some of the food. They would examine those who obstructed trucks attempting to deliver assistance and review the orders that limited the number of trucks entering Gaza. All of these would be factors. It’s impossible to specify in advance what evidence the prosecutors would rely upon.

ICC Remains the Only Path for Gaza War Crimes Accountability

The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.

You once critiqued the UN Human Rights Council’s bloc politics and selective scrutiny. How should advocates leverage UN mechanisms on Gaza while mitigating the reputational drag of perceived selectivity and ensuring even-handed standards?

Aryeh Neier: The UN Human Rights Council is a political body. The various governments that serve on the Council at any given moment have their own political interests. They often form blocs, and, to some extent, those blocs protect the countries that are members of them. So, if one is dealing, for example, with crimes committed in Sudan, there may be African countries that have alliances with Sudan or obtain oil from it, and those countries may be protective of the Sudanese government. Similarly, when addressing Russia’s crimes in Ukraine, there may be countries from the former Soviet Union that still maintain alliances with Russia and would shield it from scrutiny. It is, therefore, impossible to rely on the UN Human Rights Council as a fully neutral body capable of making impartial decisions on crucial human rights matters. One tries, as much as possible, to mitigate that factor, but it cannot be entirely eliminated.

Having been a key advocate for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), how do you compare the feasibility of creating a similar ad hoc tribunal for Gaza versus relying on the International Criminal Court (ICC)? What lessons from Bosnia and Rwanda are relevant here, and which pitfalls should be avoided?

Aryeh Neier: The reason it was possible to create the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda is that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council all accepted the establishment of those bodies. None of them exercised their veto power to block their creation. Unfortunately, if there were an attempt to create an ad hoc tribunal along the lines of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the United States would almost certainly exercise its veto to prevent the formation of such a body. Therefore, I don’t think we can expect that there will ever be a special tribunal for Gaza. I believe the International Criminal Court, which is not subject to such veto power, remains the only possibility for criminal prosecution for the crimes committed in Gaza.

European Courts May Pursue Cases Against Israeli Officials

If Israel were to initiate domestic investigations into alleged violations, how should the ICC evaluate their credibility under complementarity rules? In the absence of genuine proceedings, should European states more aggressively invoke universal jurisdiction to pursue accountability?

Aryeh Neier: One could evaluate whether Israel is acting in good faith in prosecutions in the same way one evaluates any other situation in which there could be prosecutions. That is, is there a genuine investigative process, and does the investigative process actually lead to indictments? If Israel were to claim that it is engaged in an investigation and its performance does not inspire credibility, then I think the International Criminal Court should proceed on the basis that Israel is not doing what it should, and therefore only the International Criminal Court is capable of bringing such a prosecution.

I think it’s entirely possible that some European countries will, at some point, exercise universal jurisdiction with respect to crimes committed in Gaza. It is likely that Israelis will travel to various European countries. The countries that have condemned the crimes taking place in Gaza may become aware that someone who was a military figure is traveling within their borders, and in those circumstances, one could imagine that universal jurisdiction would take place.

There have been, for example, a number of prosecutions in European countries of Syrian officials who traveled in different European countries — in Switzerland, for example — and Switzerland used universal jurisdiction to bring such persons to trial. I don’t imagine this would involve the highest-level Israeli officials, the people who have the most significant responsibility for the crimes committed in Gaza. But I think it could well happen that there will be such cases, and we won’t know until it actually happens whether there will be such trials.

There are a couple of organizations. There’s an organization based in Switzerland, for example, called Trial, which specifically looks for such cases and tries to ensure prosecutions take place. I don’t know whether they’re looking at any cases right now; they might be, they might not be. I think most of the Israeli officials who have a high level of responsibility for the crimes in Gaza are avoiding travel to European countries.

Future Political Shifts Could Open Door to Prosecutions

Israelis protest at Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup on April 1, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

You have noted that both the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the ICC lack direct enforcement powers and rely on state cooperation. What realistic regional or transnational coalitions, in your view, could translate court rulings into tangible protection or material relief for civilians in Gaza?

Aryeh Neier: I’m not sure that an international coalition could achieve that. I think the critical step is to try to bring a case before the International Criminal Court. The ICC has jurisdiction over individuals, not countries. And if, at some stage, it was possible to bring top officials responsible for the crimes in Gaza before the ICC, that would be the way to secure some form of accountability.

When the wars in the former Yugoslavia took place, the officials responsible for major crimes never imagined they would face the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Yet, eventually, Slobodan Milosevic was sent to the court by other officials in Serbia, and Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic were ultimately captured and brought before the tribunal.

It took many years. It may also take many years in the case of Gaza. But it cannot be ruled out. It is possible that, over time, there could be political change in Israel and that future leaders might seek to ensure some form of accountability. One cannot predict how this will develop.

According to numerous expert assessments, the US administration may be violating both domestic and international law by supplying arms to Israel despite documented restrictions on humanitarian aid to Gaza. Based on your experience with US accountability mechanisms, do you believe American officials could face future legal challenges under the Arms Export Control Act or under aiding-and-abetting doctrines in international law?

Aryeh Neier: I think I would give the same answer to the question of whether Israeli officials might, at some stage, face accountability and eventually be held responsible. One cannot predict how matters will develop politically in the United States. It is unlikely that the Trump administration would pursue the prosecution of those who may be complicit in the genocide taking place in Gaza. However, one cannot know who the officials will be in the United States 10, 15, or 20 years from now, and it is possible that, at some stage in the future, there might be a willingness to prosecute American officials. I would not say it is likely, but it’s possible.

Evangelical Influence Shapes US Policy Toward Israel

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

You have emphasized that Evangelical Christian groups, rather than AIPAC, exert disproportionate influence on US policy toward Israel. How does this ideological alignment affect Washington’s responses to ICJ and ICC proceedings?

Aryeh Neier: Certain evangelical groups in the United States have managed to incorporate Israel and its prospects into their theology. These groups are particularly strong in the southern states, creating a powerful political bloc that is immensely supportive of Israel. A prominent figure within that bloc is Mike Huckabee, a former governor of Arkansas, whom the Trump administration has designated as its ambassador to Israel. Placing someone like that in such a key diplomatic position highlights both the strength of this bloc within the United States and the political difficulty of overcoming its influence.

You had warned that President Biden risks losing young voters over his handling of Gaza. To what extent do you see US domestic politics colliding with international humanitarian law — and could electoral considerations meaningfully shift US policy?

Aryeh Neier: There has been a generational division in the United States. Among other things, older members of the Jewish community have tended to be very supportive of Israel, whereas many younger Jews, particularly those attending universities, are often highly critical of the Israeli government’s policies. I believe this divide extends beyond the Jewish population to the broader American public. The generational gap is quite wide, but how it will ultimately play out is uncertain. It may become a significant factor in shaping US policy in the years to come, or it may not.

Refusing to Buy Israeli Weapons May Pressure Policy Change

In your work on sanctions and human rights, you have argued that targeted measures can drive behavioral change. In Gaza, which tools — such as asset freezes, travel bans, or conditionality on arms transfers — would be most effective in influencing policy without exacerbating civilian suffering? Looking at past cases such as Myanmar and South Africa, sanctions’ effectiveness often depends on timing and international coordination. What benchmarks should be used to assess whether external pressure is genuinely shaping Israel’s policy on humanitarian access?

Aryeh Neier: It’s very difficult to answer that question. I would not have imagined, before the sanctions were placed on South Africa, what would be most effective. But I think that, in the case of South Africa, for example, the international sports ban had a significant effect. South Africans, like the people of many countries, were very supportive of their athletes and eager to see them succeed in international competitions. When South African athletes were excluded from such events, it had a considerable impact. Economic sanctions also had a significant effect.

My guess is that, in the Israeli situation, the most significant kinds of sanctions would be those that impose limits on military support for Israel. Israel is itself a significant manufacturer of arms, and much of its international revenue comes from arms sales to various countries. So, I think that if sanctions were imposed, there should be two kinds: one, a sanction on the delivery of weapons to Israel, and the other, a sanction on the purchase of Israeli weapons.

I once spoke to an Israeli official about limiting the sale of certain weapons to other countries that were engaged at that time in very serious human rights abuses. He explained that, for Israel’s arms manufacturing to produce the weapons Israel believes it needs, the country must achieve economies of scale by manufacturing far more weapons than it actually requires for its own purposes. Therefore, it has to sell those weapons to other countries. Selling weapons internationally, he said, was crucial for Israel’s own military needs.

My guess is that this is probably still the case. Therefore, if sanctions involved refusing to purchase Israeli weapons, that might be as effective as refusing to sell certain weapons to Israel.

Anti-Israel Speech Shouldn’t Be Confused with Antisemitism

Pro-Palestinian protesters hold signs. Photo: Oliver Perez.

As someone who defended free speech in the Skokie case, how do you distinguish between antisemitism and legitimate criticism of Israeli state policies — especially in today’s polarized academic, civic, and political environments?

Aryeh Neier: Differentiating antisemitism from anti-Israel speech is something that the Trump administration has failed to do. It has attacked many universities in the United States, accusing them of allowing antisemitism to flourish on their campuses. Very often, however, the protests that have taken place on American campuses are directed against Israeli practices rather than being antisemitic in character. From a free speech standpoint, my view is that even antisemitism constitutes protected speech.

It isn’t the case, however, that many universities in the United States are public institutions where the First Amendment’s free speech guarantees apply. Many of the universities accused of allowing antisemitism on their campuses are private universities, like Harvard University and Columbia University, and they are not required to adhere to First Amendment protections. Nevertheless, in general, they do try to protect freedom of speech.

I believe they can and should protect freedom of speech, even for antisemites, but they should not allow such individuals to disrupt university activities, such as classes, graduations, or other events. So, one needs to look at each of those situations and see whether the university has acted appropriately. But the Trump administration, by confusing antisemitism and anti-Israel positions, has made the whole situation a mess.

Truth Commissions Won’t Deliver Justice in Gaza

And lastly, looking ahead, what model of transitional justice would best address violations committed by all parties — a hybrid court, ICC-led prosecutions, or a regional truth and reconciliation commission with prosecutorial powers? How can victim-centered justice remain central in the face of deep political deadlock?

Aryeh Neier: I think the only possibility of accountability is prosecutions before the International Criminal Court. I don’t imagine that there would be a Truth and Reconciliation Commission that could function effectively because it would have to involve both the Israelis and the Palestinians, and it’s very difficult to imagine that they would collaborate on a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Moreover, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission would not itself have prosecutorial powers. In the case of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, there was legislation which provided that those who did not disclose their crimes and acknowledge their crimes still could be prosecuted. But the prosecution was separate from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission itself, and in practice, not that many persons who had committed crimes during the apartheid regime were actually prosecuted in South Africa, even when they refused to acknowledge and disclose the crimes that they committed.

So, I’m not at all inclined to think that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission could play a useful role in the situation of Gaza. I think, as difficult as it may be, one should try to see to it that the International Criminal Court is able to function with respect to the crimes committed in Gaza.

The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and its implications for EU defense policies.”
Photo: Kirill Makarov.

Between Security and Suffering: The Human Cost of Europe’s Defense Resurgence 

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshapes Europe’s security landscape, the EU faces a “watershed moment” demanding unprecedented defense spending and strategic autonomy. The “ReArm Europe Plan” allocates €800 billion for defense modernization, while EU states’ military expenditure has already surged 30% since 2021. Yet, this security buildup comes at a profound human cost: since 2022, over 1.3 million soldiers have been killed or wounded, with tens of thousands more facing lifelong trauma. While Europe seeks to safeguard territorial integrity and independence, the article questions whether spiraling militarization undermines humanitarian priorities, deepens instability, and perpetuates cycles of suffering rather than ensuring lasting security.

By Mohammed Afnan

Europe faces a serious threat to its territorial integrity, unprecedented since the Cold War. It is going through a “watershed moment in its security.” “Business as usual approach of underinvestment and fragmentation” is no longer viable given the Ukraine-Russia war and the American President Donald Trump’s frequent calls for the EU to take greater responsibility for its own defense.

Recent calls for increased defense spending by NATO members, predominantly including EU states, along with US Vice President J.D. Vance’s emphasis on “Europe’s threat within” at the last Munich Security Conference, signal the potential for tectonic shifts in the transatlantic relationship. It requires the EU to adopt a holistic and horizontal approach integrating defense and security dimensions of the continent. Nevertheless, questions remain regarding how far the EU can go, particularly within the milieu of historic transatlantic connections between the EU and the US, and the internal divergences concerning security within the EU member states. Since the wider debates have been taking place in this regard, the article will examine how a resurgence of traditional security concerns on the backdrop of Russia-Ukraine War, is going to affect the human cost of war.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the European defense landscape since February 2022. European Commissions’ “White Paper for European Defense –Readiness 2030” proposed a vision to rearm Europe by enhancing the indigenous defense production and rapid deployment of military troops and assets across the EU. It clearly signifies the European Union’s maneuver to protect its citizens and consolidate its defense capabilities. “Readiness Plan,” also known as “ReArm Europe Plan” presented in March 2025 suggests leveraging over €800 billion in defense spending. As a matter of time, EU clearly understands the importance of strategic independence in the chaotic world.

Following the Russian invasion, EU leaders adopted the Versailles declaration pledging to enhance investment in defense sector. It aimed to boost the defense industry and gain strategic independence. Between 2021 and 2024, EU member states overall defense expenditure stood at €326 billion, marking an increase of 30%. The expenditure is expected to increase by more than €100 billion in real terms by 2027. It correlates with the defense investments too. In 2023, compared to the preceding year, defense investment increased by 17%, setting a record high of €72 billion. In 2024 alone, €102 billion was invested, in which beyond €90 billion was used for defense equipment procurement. Nevertheless, it raises questions regarding the utility of these enormous amounts in terms of enhancing the conditions of citizens, even those of soldiers engaged in deadly conflicts. Eventually, border defense and territorial integrity comes at the cost of losing lives, undermining the cost of human lives.

Throughout history, the recurring military conflicts and wars have brought devastating damage and countless destruction to both the lives and the physical environment. It is estimated that more than 37 million combatants have died in wars since 1800. If we take civilian deaths into consideration, the number of deceased will pile up. In the Second World War alone, which spread across much of the globe, 21 million soldiers died. Based on the data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 3.9 million people, including both civilians and combatants, have died in the armed conflicts between 1989 and 2024. Europe and America witnessed the fewest deaths, with around 370,000 and 230,000 deaths, respectively.

Parallels have been drawn comparing the casualties of the Second World War and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Based on the issue brief by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), over 950,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the war began between Russia and Ukraine. Most of these soldiers belong to Russia’s Far North, Far East, and prisons. On the Ukrainian side, a total of 400,000 have been killed or wounded, and between 60,000 and 100,000 combatants have lost their lives. The severe injuries may have taken the well-being of the remainder of their life. Defense spending with its strong emphasizes on defense production and modernization makes these lives and their relatives futile. It may hinder the post-war reconstruction, especially in addressing long-term psychological trauma. Along with that, there are apprehensions that this increased spending could waste resources and cause political instability without delivering real security for the citizens. 

Overall, the resurgence of traditional security threats in Europe due to the Russia-Ukraine war is accompanied by sharply increased defense spending and military preparedness. This, however, comes with a high human cost in terms of lives lost and wounded, reminding that the price of safeguarding territorial integrity and security continues to be profound human suffering and loss. Human cost of war may hinder the post-war reconstructions. This needs to be taken into consideration in policy circles.

In sum, Europe’s renewed focus on defense and security — marked by unprecedented spending, strategic realignments, and calls for autonomy — reflects an unavoidable response to the Russia-Ukraine war and shifting transatlantic dynamics. Yet, this militarization entails profound trade-offs. While €800 billion in planned defense investments aims to safeguard territorial integrity, the staggering casualties — over 1.3 million killed or wounded since 2022 — highlight the immense human cost of security. Without balancing strategic preparedness with humanitarian priorities and post-war recovery, Europe risks undermining the very values it seeks to defend, perpetuating cycles of suffering and instability.

Finkelstein

Prof. Finkelstein: Israel Will Mass Gazans at the Border, Bomb Relentlessly, and Force Egypt’s Hand

Professor Norman Finkelstein—NYC-born to Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, ranked the world’s fifth most influential political scientist—tells ECPS that “Israel will mass Gazans at the border, bomb relentlessly, and force Egypt’s hand.” Professor Finkelstein forecasts pressure on Cairo amid “images broadcast worldwide,” frames today’s war as a qualitative break aimed at depopulation (“stay and starve or leave”) and argues that “an imposed famine…constitutes clear proof of genocide.” He argues that, while procedural workarounds to a US veto exist at the UN, they are politically improbable in practice; hence he looks to EU trade leverage instead—though that, too, is stalled by a ‘lack of political will.’ Downplaying doctrinal debates over Zionism, he casts Israel as a ‘Jewish supremacist state’ analogous to apartheid-era South Africa, and notes collapsing Democratic support alongside generational GOP splits.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Norman Finkelstein—born in New York City to Jewish Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, named the fifth most influential political scientist in the world—states the core claim that frames this conversation: “Israel will mass Gazans at the border, bomb relentlessly, [and] force Egypt’s hand.” 

The interview that follows situates Professor Finkelstein’s analysis within a stark forecast of prospective mass displacement. While he cautions that “I don’t think it’s easy to predict where this will lead,” he argues that Israel is “trying to amass the entire population of Gaza on the southern border,” after which “they will… begin bombing it relentlessly.” The intended effect, he suggests, is to compel Cairo under unbearable humanitarian pressure—“images broadcast worldwide… with desperate civilians screaming to be allowed into Egypt”—to open its frontier. Whether Egypt can resist that pressure, he adds, “I’m not sure.”

Professor Finkelstein frames the contemporary campaign as a qualitative break from earlier cycles of “mowings of the lawn.” The methods are not new, he says, but their magnitude is: destruction that once shocked humanitarian observers now approaches comprehensive urban pulverization. As to intent, he maintains that the objective is depopulation: “the people of Gaza will be given two choices—stay and starve or leave.” In his view, exterminatory violence functions as instrument as well as outcome—driven by “pure bloodlust,” by a desire to re-establish deterrence (“if the thought crosses your mind that there is a military option against us, just look at Gaza”), and by the aim to break both Gazan and international will.

On proof, Professor Finkelstein argues the evidentiary bar has already been met through rigorous humanitarian monitoring and legal dossiers. He points to a “voluminous documentary record,” including a South African memorial at the ICJ, and insists that “we’ve already reached the highest threshold of accuracy in documentation when it comes to Gaza.” For him, the decisive element is engineered deprivation: “an imposed famine—a human-made famine—constitutes clear proof of genocide.”

Institutionally, he sees impunity less in legal design than in political inertia. While acknowledging UN tools that can bypass a US Security Council veto, he judges them unlikely to be activated and locates leverage instead in Europe’s trade ties—frustrated, he says, by a “lack of political will.” In the domestic US arena, he notes collapsing Democratic grassroots support for Israel and a sharp generational split among Republicans, concluding that “it’s very difficult right now to defend Israel.”

Analytically, Professor Finkelstein downplays doctrinal debates about Zionism, preferring a structural diagnosis: Israel as a “Jewish supremacist state” enforcing regional dominance through periodic “mass death and destruction,” a pattern he analogizes to apartheid-era South Africa. Read against that backdrop, the title’s forecast is not a provocation but, in his account, a logical extension of means toward an end.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Norman Finkelstein, edited lightly for readability.

Professor Norman Finkelstein was born in New York City to Jewish Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, named the fifth most influential political scientist in the world.

Prof. Finkelstein: Israel Will Mass Gazans at the Border, Bomb Relentlessly, and Force Egypt’s Hand

Professor Norman Finkelstein—NYC-born to Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, ranked the world’s fifth most influential political scientist—tells ECPS that “Israel will mass Gazans at the border, bomb relentlessly, and force Egypt’s hand.” Professor Finkelstein forecasts pressure on Cairo amid “images broadcast worldwide,” frames today’s war as a qualitative break aimed at depopulation (“stay and starve or leave”) and argues that “an imposed famine…constitutes clear proof of genocide.” He argues that, while procedural workarounds to a US veto exist at the UN, they are politically improbable in practice; hence he looks to EU trade leverage instead—though that, too, is stalled by a ‘lack of political will.’ Downplaying doctrinal debates over Zionism, he casts Israel as a ‘Jewish supremacist state’ analogous to apartheid-era South Africa, and notes collapsing Democratic support alongside generational GOP splits.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Norman Finkelstein—born in New York City to Jewish Holocaust-survivor parents and, in 2020, named the fifth most influential political scientist in the world—states the core claim that frames this conversation: “Israel will mass Gazans at the border, bomb relentlessly, [and] force Egypt’s hand.” 

The interview that follows situates Professor Finkelstein’s analysis within a stark forecast of prospective mass displacement. While he cautions that “I don’t think it’s easy to predict where this will lead,” he argues that Israel is “trying to amass the entire population of Gaza on the southern border,” after which “they will… begin bombing it relentlessly.” The intended effect, he suggests, is to compel Cairo under unbearable humanitarian pressure—“images broadcast worldwide… with desperate civilians screaming to be allowed into Egypt”—to open its frontier. Whether Egypt can resist that pressure, he adds, “I’m not sure.”

Professor Finkelstein frames the contemporary campaign as a qualitative break from earlier cycles of “mowings of the lawn.” The methods are not new, he says, but their magnitude is: destruction that once shocked humanitarian observers now approaches comprehensive urban pulverization. As to intent, he maintains that the objective is depopulation: “the people of Gaza will be given two choices—stay and starve or leave.” In his view, exterminatory violence functions as instrument as well as outcome—driven by “pure bloodlust,” by a desire to re-establish deterrence (“if the thought crosses your mind that there is a military option against us, just look at Gaza”), and by the aim to break both Gazan and international will.

On proof, Professor Finkelstein argues the evidentiary bar has already been met through rigorous humanitarian monitoring and legal dossiers. He points to a “voluminous documentary record,” including a South African memorial at the ICJ, and insists that “we’ve already reached the highest threshold of accuracy in documentation when it comes to Gaza.” For him, the decisive element is engineered deprivation: “an imposed famine—a human-made famine—constitutes clear proof of genocide.”

Institutionally, he sees impunity less in legal design than in political inertia. While acknowledging UN tools that can bypass a US Security Council veto, he judges them unlikely to be activated and locates leverage instead in Europe’s trade ties—frustrated, he says, by a “lack of political will.” In the domestic US arena, he notes collapsing Democratic grassroots support for Israel and a sharp generational split among Republicans, concluding that “it’s very difficult right now to defend Israel.”

Analytically, Professor Finkelstein downplays doctrinal debates about Zionism, preferring a structural diagnosis: Israel as a “Jewish supremacist state” enforcing regional dominance through periodic “mass death and destruction,” a pattern he analogizes to apartheid-era South Africa. Read against that backdrop, the title’s forecast is not a provocation but, in his account, a logical extension of means toward an end.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Norman Finkelstein, edited lightly for readability.

Quantity Has Turned into Quality: Gaza’s Destruction Is Now a Different Phenomenon

Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Finkelstein, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Drawing on “Gaza: An Inquest into Its Martyrdom,” how do you conceptualize Gaza today—blockade, occupation, siege, apartheid, genocide—and how do you explain Israel’s persistent impunity despite extensive documentation of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law (IHL/IHRL) violations?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: There’s an expression in English: there’s nothing new under the sun. For those who have studied the history of Gaza, in particular since 1967, it can’t be said that Israel has pioneered new methods since October 7th, 2023. What has changed—and changed very significantly—is the magnitude of the Israeli repression in Gaza. There is also another expression: at some point, quantity turns into quality. That is to say, if the magnitude of the Israeli death and destruction in Gaza has significantly increased, then qualitatively we’re talking about something new. So, even though the methods are not new, the quantity is of such an altogether different magnitude; then we’re talking about a qualitatively different phenomenon.

What does that mean in practice? Let’s take one simple comparison. During the last of Israel’s massive killing sprees in Gaza, Operation Protective Edge—that was in July–August 2014—it lasted approximately about 51 days. During Operation Protective Edge, about 18,000 homes were destroyed, and about 550 children were killed. The head of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Peter Moorer, when he toured Gaza after Operation Protective Edge, said that in his entire career he had not ever seen such a magnitude of destruction. Well, compare that with today. Then it was 18,000 homes; now the estimates are 200,000 homes destroyed. And the estimate is about 92 or more percent of all the housing in Gaza has been pulverized. Then it was 550 children; now the estimates are 20,000-plus children have been killed. So, it’s quantitatively at an altogether different magnitude, and so it’s qualitatively a different phenomenon. Now, what does that mean practically?

Practically, that means that Israel, in the past, has carried out what it calls “mowings of the lawn” in Gaza. That is to say, these are high-tech killing sprees, basically to remind the people in Gaza who is in charge. In this case, Israel. But after October 7th, the Israelis realized that they had not just a crisis, but they had an opportunity. The opportunity flowed from the crisis. The opportunity was to resolve the Gaza question once and for all. In effect, that meant implementing the final solution to the Gaza question. And the final solution to the Gaza question basically meant, one way or another, to empty out Gaza. It could be ethnic cleansing. It could be making Gaza uninhabitable, so the people of Gaza, by hook or by crook, would figure out a way to leave. Or it could also mean mass extermination. 

The Israeli policy over the past two years has been a combination of those 3 things. Ethnic cleansing—that was the goal at the very beginning, to empty out the population into the northern Sinai. That didn’t work for various reasons. Then, the massive destruction of Gaza, to make it uninhabitable. What they’re doing right now in the last habitable spot of Gaza, which is Gaza City. They will reduce it to what they have reduced the north of Gaza and Rafah to; now they will do it in Gaza City, and there will be nothing left. It will just be a wasteland of rubble. In order to break the backs of the people of Gaza, in order to soften the target so that they will leave once and for all, they’re engaging in a policy of mass famine and mass extermination.

The second part of your question was: why have they been able to get away with it with impunity, despite the massive documentation? Well, during all of Israel’s previous operations, there was massive documentation. After Operation Cast Lead in 2008–9, there was the voluminous Goldstone Report, which was authored by a South African Jew who also called himself a Zionist, and it was a devastating report on what Israel had done to Gaza—just collected dust. That report was commissioned by the Human Rights Council. There was another report after Operation Protective Edge, commissioned by the Human Rights Council. It was also devastating. It also just ended up collecting dust. So, however much documentation is accumulated, turning these commissions of inquiry, or human rights documentation, into an actual implementation of a law is, as is pretty obvious at this point, not easy.

Engineered Famine Is Proof of Genocide

Besieged Gaza’s decades-long socio-economic collapse has tipped into famine—under what critics call genocidal Israeli policies. Photo: Mohamed Zarandah.

On the genocide claim, which probative elements (specific intent, patterns of destructive acts, official statements, engineered humanitarian deprivation) do you judge strongest or weakest, and how should advocates avoid both over- and under-pleading?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: That’s a very good question. In my view, the goal is to empty out Gaza. That, to me, is the central objective. They don’t care much where the people of Gaza end up—Tahiti, Samoa, the Solomon Islands, Nauru, Tuvalu—it makes no difference, as long as the “Gaza question” is resolved. You should bear in mind that this was also Hitler’s view. Until the late 1930s, and perhaps even into the early 1940s, the plan was to transfer Europe’s Jews out of Europe, and there were all sorts of schemes underway in different parts of the world to relocate them. That goal, however, became unviable after World War II broke out, when the seas were no longer open for free travel. It was then that they shifted to the extermination plan.

Similarly, I believe Israel’s aim is to depopulate Gaza, and one way to achieve that is by making it unlivable. As Israeli officials have repeatedly stated: the people of Gaza will be given two choices—stay and starve or leave.

Secondly, the mass extermination is a component of the plan, because there are three aspects to the mass extermination. Aspect number one is pure bloodlust. The Israelis were outraged—and that’s really a euphemism. They were enraged by what happened on October 7th and were determined to exact blood: an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. Except, in the case of the Israelis, judging by what was recently said by a former senior Israeli official—I believe it was the former head of Israeli intelligence—the ratio was set far higher: for every Israeli killed, fifty Gazans must be killed. So, there was the bloodlust component. That, in significant part, explains not just the scale of the killing in Gaza but also the jubilation with which it is carried out, the fact that they broadcast it all over their social media, showing how they are wreaking death and destruction on Gaza. So, the extermination, in part, springs from bloodlust.

A second aspect of the extermination is what Israel calls restoring its deterrence capability after October 7th. The idea began circulating in parts of the Arab world: maybe there is a military option against Israel. If a ragtag guerrilla force assembled by Hamas could inflict so much damage, perhaps others could as well. Israel, therefore, felt compelled to send a message: if the thought crosses your mind that there is a military option against us, just look at Gaza. In this sense, the mass extermination was also intended to restore what Israel calls its deterrence capability—that is, the Arab world’s fear of Israel. That’s what they mean by deterrence capability.

The third aspect of the mass extermination is to break the will of the people of Gaza—and also that of the international community. While the international community speaks of ceasefires and rehabilitation, the goal of the mass extermination is to send a clear message: there will be no ceasefire, and there will be no rehabilitation. The people of Gaza must leave, and one way to convince them of that is to kill them en masse and deprive them of the basic necessities required to sustain life.

There is nothing left in Gaza now. I don’t know where people get these ideas about reconstruction. If you look at the official reports, they estimate it would take 50 years to rebuild Gaza. The place has been pulverized; there’s nothing left—it’s a vast wasteland.

So, I believe the extermination has been a means to the end of resolving the Gaza question. But even if it is a means to an end, it is still genocide. Using genocidal methods to achieve the goal of “resolving” the Gaza question does not make it any less so. The fact that extermination serves as a means, rather than an end in itself, does not negate its genocidal nature. They are employing genocidal means to achieve their objective.

The Record Is Voluminous; The Crime Is Clear

What standards of sourcing, chain-of-custody, and methodological transparency should scholars/NGOs adopt to pre-empt “disinformation” rebuttals while remaining legible to courts and broader publics?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: I don’t think, unlike others who seem to believe, that the key to gaining authoritative information about Gaza is admitting journalists. First of all, we have met much higher standards of proof than journalistic evidence. From the superfluity of human rights and humanitarian UN-affiliated organizations, they have been transmitting information on, literally, a daily basis, to prove that Gaza has crossed the threshold of famine.

There is this very subtle system of accounting by international humanitarian groups. There’s food deprivation, there’s starvation, and there’s famine — these are different degrees. In order to discern at which threshold you stand, it requires very precise information. When they came to the conclusion that about a million people in Gaza are now in famine conditions, they needed very precise accounting, because these are very rigorous, stringent organizations. They need very precise accounting to validate the claim of famine, or starvation, or extreme food deprivation.

There are so many organizations working in Gaza — Save the Children, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, UNESCO, Doctors Without Borders, UNCDA, the UN Commission on Trade and Development, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund — all of them are on the ground. We have a voluminous documentary record.

Just to give you one example: the South African delegation to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) submitted what’s called a memorial, which is its main documentation of the genocide in Gaza. It hasn’t yet been released to the public, but you know how long it is? It’s 700 pages with 4,000 pages of documentation. There’s no dearth of documentation. Frankly, as against the organizations I’ve listed, journalistic reportage is the least reliable. These are just people who fly in and fly out. They have very little knowledge of the situation in Gaza. The journalists are highly partisan. They basically have to report what their editors want them to report when it comes to Israel and Palestine.

So, in my opinion, we’ve already reached the highest threshold of accuracy in documentation when it comes to Gaza. We don’t need any more. As you know, all the major human rights organizations have reached the same conclusion: Amnesty International has concluded that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza; Human Rights Watch has concluded that Israel is committing genocidal acts in Gaza; and the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, B’Tselem, has likewise concluded that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

The overwhelming majority of recognized experts on genocide agree as well. In a recent poll of an organization with about 500 scholars specializing in genocide studies, 28% responded, and of those, 86% stated that Israel is committing genocide in Gaza.

So, I don’t think the problem at this point is documentation. I believe that an imposed famine — a human-made famine — constitutes clear proof of genocide.

Mass at Rafah, Bomb Relentlessly, Force Egypt’s Hand

How do you assess the likelihood, modalities, and timelines of large-scale displacement from Gaza to Egypt (or beyond)? Which regional veto players (Egypt, Hezbollah, Gulf states) most credibly deter or enable such outcomes, and why?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: I don’t think it’s easy to predict where this will lead. Israel is trying to amass the entire population of Gaza on the southern border. At some point, President Trump has given them the green light, but he’s also signaled that they need to get this job done quickly, as pressure on the US is steadily increasing. My guess—and I must emphasize that I have no military knowledge whatsoever—is that they will gather as many people as possible at the southern border and then begin bombing it relentlessly.

The resulting pressure will inevitably fall on Egypt: you have to let them in. Because nobody is stopping Israel. How Egypt will respond to that remains an open question. There will be images broadcast worldwide of Israel relentlessly bombing two million people, with desperate civilians screaming to be allowed into Egypt. Whether Egypt will be able to resist that pressure, I’m not sure.

Not Law but Will Is the Chokepoint

United Nations Headquarters in New York, USA. Photo: Diego Grandi.

Which institutional pathways—US Security Council shielding, lawfare, diplomatic narrative management—most decisively sustain Israeli impunity, and where are the most realistic chokepoints for pressure?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: The US has been an obstacle, but it’s not entirely accurate to call it an insurmountable one. There are various UN mechanisms for bypassing the US veto in the Security Council, including what’s known as the “United for Peace” option in the General Assembly. I won’t go into the technical details, as they’re not particularly relevant, since it’s unlikely to happen.

Secondly, the Europeans can exert significant influence. Europe—not the US—is Israel’s main trading partner, through the EU. They have many potential avenues of leverage. The issue, however, is not institutional or bureaucratic obstructionism. The real problem is a lack of political will.

What could be done now? I don’t believe much can be done. I don’t like to be the bearer of bad news. On the other hand, I believe in treating adults like adults: if we’re at an impasse, we’re at an impasse. If people were willing to escalate their resistance, then I do believe there are options.

For example, there are possibilities to shut down the Israeli terminals at major airports if you can amass enough people willing to go there and be arrested. I think many people would be willing to get arrested. The problem, however, is organizational—I don’t want to use big words, but it really comes down to organizational vision.

There are potential avenues. For instance, there was an announcement by the dock workers in Genoa—they’re sending over a flotilla to Gaza. If the Israelis attack that flotilla, there will be a price to pay in terms of commerce on the seas. Whether that’s just talk or whether there’s an action plan behind it, I don’t know.

There are things that can be done, but they require both will and organization.

Corruption and Coercion Shape the Annex

The entrance sign of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at its headquarters in The Hague, Netherlands, on February 14, 2018. Photo: Robert Paul Van Beets.

You’ve criticized UN handling of conflict-related sexual violence. What does the Annex controversy (Israel/Hamas) reveal about the political economy of UN norm-setting, evidentiary thresholds, and great-power leverage?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: The UN, as anybody who works in it will tell you, is a profoundly corrupt organization. On the other hand, it does a lot of good things, and you have to balance both those factors. I think there’s a lot of corruption in the UN and affiliated bodies like the ICC.

I’ve just completed a new book called Gaza’s Gravediggers: An Inquiry into Corruption in High Places, which speaks to specific individuals and specific events where, in my opinion, individuals are either being bribed or blackmailed by Israel.

I mentioned earlier in this conversation the Goldstone Report. The Goldstone Report was a devastating indictment of Israel’s conduct during Operation Cast Lead. Within a few months of its issuance, Goldstone retracted the report, and in my opinion, he retracted it because he was blackmailed. If you read the record, as I have, there’s no other explanation.

The former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, was responsible for handling the case of the Mavi Marmara, a flotilla of ships that went to Gaza on May 31, 2010, which came under attack by Israel, resulting in 10 passengers killed. There is no question in my mind that she was blackmailed into giving Israel a pass.

The former president of the ICJ, Joan Donoghue, was an American. As you know, in January 2024, the ICJ, the main legal arm of the United Nations, found that Israel was plausibly committing genocide. In April 2024, Joan Donoghue appeared on a BBC program called HardTalk and blatantly lied, claiming that the ICJ did not find Israel was plausibly committing genocide. It was the most flagrant, outrageous lie.

The current vice president of the ICJ, Judge Julia Sebutinde, is clearly a fanatic—I believe she’s a Christian evangelical fanatic—but beyond that, it’s my opinion that she is either being bribed or blackmailed by Israel and has been delivering outrageous dissents in ICJ jurisprudence. In my forthcoming book, I have a 100-page chapter documenting her lies and dissents.

And then there’s the most recent case. Without going into detail, which can’t be done over a broadcast, there is no evidence—in the traditional sense of evidence: medical, forensic, or digital—that Hamas weaponized rape on October 7th. There is none. They admit it. There isn’t an issue there. There is no digital evidence of rape. There is no medical-legal evidence of rape. The only thing there is consists of so-called “witnesses.” That’s it.

Whereas on the other side, there is voluminous evidence that Israel is committing rape, threatening rape of men, threatening rape of women, and engaging in massive sexual violence.

In the face of that, every year the UN puts out a report on sexual violence in conflict situations called Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV). There was a lot of pressure put on Guterres, the Secretary-General, to list Hamas in the appendix to the report as a perpetrator of sexual violence and to exclude Israel. That’s what Guterres did: he listed Hamas and excluded Israel. That was another blackmail.

Israel Acts As a Jewish Supremacist State, Not a Zionist One

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

Does contemporary Zionism now shape Israeli military doctrine in Gaza toward openly eliminationist aims, marking a shift from settler-colonial control to population destruction, ethnic cleansing, or permanent incapacitation?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: I don’t think that’s true. I don’t believe it has much to do with Zionism. I wrote my doctoral dissertation on Zionism, so I can claim a certain amount of expertise on the subject. This has little to do with Zionism. Israel is a Jewish supremacist state, and it is acting in a way not unlike apartheid-era South Africa.

Remember, South Africa, beyond its system of white supremacy, was engaged in a series of neighboring colonial wars with Mozambique and Angola. The South Africans killed around a million people during the 1970s and 1980s in the course of the anti-colonial wars along South Africa’s borders and, of course, in Namibia as well. They waged a colonial war against SWAPO, the Southwest African People’s Organization, and it resulted in a massive bloodletting. Literally, I believe it was more than a million people. You can check and correct me if I’m wrong.

That’s Israel. Israel is a Jewish supremacist state determined to maintain a Jewish supremacist state within its borders and to crush any resistance on its periphery. It’s similar to what South Africa did. But in South Africa, there was Mozambique, where FRELIMO, led by Samora Machel, was in power. Machel was probably assassinated by the South Africans; it’s not known for sure, but he was killed in a plane crash. Then there was FRELIMO in Mozambique and, in Angola, the MPLA—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

In the same way that South Africa fought to preserve its regional dominance, Israel faces Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria on its periphery and has periodically carried out mass death and destruction to maintain its regional hegemony. Like South Africa, Israel has committed similar kinds of massacres to uphold what I would describe as a system of Jewish supremacy and regional dominance.

This has something to do with Zionism, but not as much as some might think. Zionism’s goal was to create a Jewish state, just as South Africa’s white nationalists sought to create a white state. However, invoking ideologies like Zionism can confuse the reality of the current situation, especially for people who haven’t, like myself, spent several years studying every detail of Zionism to write a dissertation.

If you frame it more plainly—as a Jewish supremacist state determined to maintain a population that is more or less purely Jewish while preserving its hegemony and dominance in the region, much like apartheid-era South Africa—the picture becomes much clearer.

Democrats Support Israel in Single Digits; GOP Split by Age

And lastly, Professor Finkelstein, how do right-wing and liberal US populisms intersect to normalize Gaza’s suffering—e.g., via identity-based mobilization, security mythologies, and the bipartisan “fortress democracy” frame?

Professor Norman Finkelstein: The Democratic Party, at its base, is composed of people belonging to minorities and those who are generally liberal in their persuasions. These two constituencies are not going to support a genocide in Gaza. Right now, support for Israel within the Democratic Party may already be in the single digits—I believe it’s around 9%—and it has dropped drastically.

In the Republican Party, support for Israel has also declined significantly among younger Republicans, but among older Republicans, particularly supporters of Trump, it remains considerably high.

I think it’s very difficult right now to defend Israel. To do so, you’d have to come across as either a psychopath or a moron; otherwise, it’s impossible to defend.