Greece protests.

From Economic Crisis to Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece

Please cite as:
Kalaitzidis, Akis. (2026). “From Economic Crisis to Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). July 06, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000127



Abstract

Economic crises often serve as incubators of populism. When currencies collapse, or debts spiral out of control, mainstream parties lose credibility, creating openings for leaders who claim to defend “the people” against distant elites. The cases of Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece illustrate how crises enable populism, how populists frame economic struggles, and use them to subvert the political order. In Thailand, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to IMF-imposed reforms that hurt the rural poor. Thaksin Shinawatra rose on a populist platform of cheap healthcare and rural development, casting himself as defender of the countryside against Bangkok elites (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2009). In Argentina, the 2001–2002 default discredited neoliberal economic policies. Néstor and Cristina Kirchner mobilized popular anger against the IMF and creditors, mixing subsidies and protectionism with nationalist rhetoric (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008). In the United States, the 2008 financial crash produced dual populist currents: the Tea Party and Donald Trump on the right, and Occupy Wall Street and Bernie Sanders on the left, both targeting elites, including Wall Street and the Washington establishment (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012; Frank, 2016). In Greece, Syriza rose during the Eurozone crisis, opposing austerity and demanding sovereignty from the EU “Troika” (Pappas, 2019). Across these cases, populists reframed abstract economic shocks as moral struggles, pitting ordinary people against elites, technocrats, or foreign powers (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Their policies emphasized immediate relief—subsidies, redistribution, debt resistance—over fiscal orthodoxy. Yet each also confronted the hard limits of global capitalism, leading to compromise, backlash, or renewed instability (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Kahler & Lake, 2013). Economic crises highlight the tension between national democracy and global markets; populism thrives in this gap, using it to decay institutions and norms in democratic states. I argue that economic crises lead to democratic backsliding.

Keywords: Populism, Economic Crises, Democratic backsliding, Greece, USA, Thailand, Argentina

By Akis Kalaitzidis[1]

Do economic crises necessarily lead to democratic backsliding? My argument in this paper is that it does. Economic crises lead to increased populism, which ultimately erodes public confidence in the political system and degrades not only democratic regimes (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008) but also authoritarian ones (O’Donnell, 1999; Schedler, 2013). Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argued that the exclusionary populist politics of Slobodan Milosevic destroyed the multicultural authoritarian regime in Yugoslavia. Others have argued it is not necessarily the economic crises that produce populism but the conflict between the “winners and losers” of said economic crisis, which increases the feeling of loss among the many, something in conflict studies we call the Relative Deprivation thesis (Gurr, 1970). Others argue that it is race and status that are responsible for the increasing populism worldwide (Palmer, 2019). Finally, some blame global migratory patterns for being zero-sum, arguing that every newcomer is a net negative for the country that receives them (Palmer, 2019). 

Populist regimes are, par excellence, illiberal, argues Pappas (2019). In this sense, democracies decline step by step, embracing new institutional structures that undermine the preceding democratic ones and replace them with illiberal ones. Often personalistic, these new regimes create institutions closer to authoritarianism than to actual democracy and dominate their countries for a long time, for example, Hungary, Turkey, Argentina, etc. 

In this paper, I will examine four cases, in the order of the economic crises that affected them: Thailand in 1997, Argentina in 2001, the US in 2008, and Greece in 2015. It is my argument that economic crises arising from global economic dislocations and contagion (Desai, 2003) produce populist regimes that wreak havoc on established institutions and lead countries to political backsliding (Foa & Mounk, 2017). I will explain how populism works in light of severe financial crises, addressing the key elements such as a) its social base, b) the policies associated with the regime, c) its rhetoric, d) the organizational strategy of the regime, e) its leadership style, f) the mobilization associated with regime change, and finally, g) the legacy of each regime. 

Populism and Its Discontents

What is populism? And how does it affect different countries? Before I analyze my case studies, it is important to examine how these populist movements form and what they mean. Considering the variation in regimes and political cultures that produce populism, as well as the nebulousness of the concept, it is essential to define it as precisely as possible. Generically, the definition of populism is “a thin center ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Although Ernesto Laclau (2005) argued that populism does not lead to authoritarianism, my research finds evidence to the contrary. In fact, using populism as an intermediary variable, one can see that economic crisis can lead to political backsliding that takes the form of authoritarianism (Thailand, the USA) or not (Argentina and Greece), depending on political culture. I agree with Laclau that populism is a form of politics, not an ideology, but unlike Laclau, I view populism as a challenge to democracy and argue it should be viewed as such. 

Benjamin Moffit describes the various approaches to defining the concept through the years with a) the ideational approach, b) the strategic approach, and c) the discussive performative approach (Moffit, 2020). The Ideational approach argues that populism is a worldview and an ideology. Populism, sure enough, increasingly appeals to even the younger generation and has made inroads in even the strongest liberal democracies. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk argue that there are signs of the deconsolidation of democracies across the board (Foa & Mounk, 2017). Americans have long been growing dissatisfied with the state of their political system. As survey researchers have chronicled over recent decades, an overwhelming majority of citizens now believe that the US is ‘headed in the wrong direction,” (Foa & Mounk, 2017). 

In Europe, the shock of Brexit was felt in the corridors of European capitals, and some decided to work against the established order. Several populist leaders, among them the leaders of Italy, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, made an extra effort to dismantle liberal justice requirements and regress their country’s democracy (The Guardian, 3.30.2026). It remains to be seen whether the trend of democratic backsliding can be reversed following Viktor Orbán’s decisive defeat. 

In general, there are two forms of backsliding according to Nancy Bermeo (2016: 6): “Backsliding can take us to different end points at different speeds. Where backsliding involves rapid and radical change across a broad range of institutions, it leads to outright democratic breakdown and to regimes that are unambiguously authoritarian.” In one of my cases, a complete deconsolidation of democracy happened with the end of a populist regime in Thailand. Essentially, the end of the Thaksin experiment was the rise of the Thai military. In the other three cases, the backsliding has been much more gradual, and in those cases, Bermeo argues: “Where backsliding takes the form of gradual changes across a broad range of institutions, it is less likely to lead to all-out regime change and more likely to yield political systems that are ambiguously democratic or hybrid” (Bermeo 2016: 6). In other words, illiberal democracies. 

The last three cases here, Argentina, the US, and Greece, experienced a decline in democratic values, with the US doing the heavy lifting under the Trump Administration. Yet, even in the mild cases of Greece and Argentina, we have seen a serious weakening of democratic institutions, thus “Democratic backsliding can thus constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening of existing democratic institutions for undefined ends. When backsliding yields situations that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes particularly difficult,” (Bermeo, 2016:6). So as Palacios (2025: 1832) notes, “a large body of studies has found that populism ‘in the real world’ also has detrimental effects on the quality of democracy. Due to their ambiguous relationship with democracy, once in power, many populist forces adopt an agenda of institutional change that seeks to better approximate their illiberal democratic ideals to the practice.” 

What I argue in this paper is that populism transforms economic woes into political and, especially, moral conundrums, pitting parts of society against one another for the benefit of the leadership. The result of populism’s divisiveness is frequent democratic backsliding, as seen in Thailand, where it led to a coup d’ etat against Thaksin and renewed authoritarianism. In Greece, the collapse of the party system and increased violence among people, and in the US, the establishment of an authoritarian pronged leadership. Only in Argentina have the populists from the left been replaced by the populists of the right, with no discernible end to their economic woes.

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[1] Akis Kalaitzidis is a Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Affairs, University of Central Missouri. Email: kalaitzidis@ucmo.edu

AzizHuq

Prof. Huq: The US Supreme Court Has Created the Conditions for Democratic Backsliding

As democratic backsliding increasingly unfolds through legal institutions rather than overt constitutional rupture, what distinguishes constitutional resilience from constitutional decline? In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago examines how populism, executive power, judicial doctrine, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence are transforming liberal constitutionalism in the United States and beyond. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, he argues that contemporary democratic erosion often proceeds “under the cover of law,” while warning that populists are developing their own constitutional vision. From presidential immunity and democratic backsliding to algorithmic governance and AI-driven power concentration, Professor Huq offers a timely and sophisticated analysis of democracy’s evolving constitutional challenges in the twenty-first century.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the democratic world, constitutional democracy is undergoing a profound transformation. Contemporary democratic erosion rarely arrives through military coups or overt constitutional rupture. Instead, it increasingly unfolds through courts, legislatures, executive decrees, and formally legal mechanisms that gradually weaken institutional constraints while preserving the appearance of constitutional continuity. At the same time, digital platforms and artificial intelligence are reshaping the public sphere, altering the production and circulation of political information, and redistributing power between states, private technology companies, and citizens. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future of liberal constitutionalism, democratic resilience, and the capacity of democratic institutions to withstand both populist governance and technological disruption.

Few scholars have done more to illuminate these intersecting challenges than Professor Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. One of the world’s leading authorities on constitutional law, democratic backsliding, judicial independence, executive power, and the constitutional implications of artificial intelligence, Professor Huq has produced influential scholarship that bridges American constitutional law with comparative democratic politics. His work has fundamentally reshaped scholarly debates on constitutional resilience, the institutional foundations of liberal democracy, and the legal mechanisms through which elected governments may gradually undermine democratic competition without abandoning constitutional forms.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Huq argues that understanding contemporary democratic backsliding requires moving beyond conventional labels such as populism or authoritarianism toward a more institutional analysis of incentives, constitutional design, and political time horizons. Drawing on Mancur Olson’s theory of the “stationary bandit,” he suggests that “the crucial question” is not simply whether a leader is populist, but “what the time horizon of a populist leader is.” In his view, democratic stability depends heavily on whether political leaders remain constrained by long-term institutional incentives or instead pursue short-term extraction of political and economic rents.

Turning to the United States, Professor Huq contends that “American democratic erosion is proceeding under the cover of law.” Rather than dramatic constitutional breakdown, he identifies legal innovations—including aggressive partisan gerrymandering, expansive presidential authority, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence—as mechanisms through which democratic competition is being incrementally weakened. Most strikingly, he argues that “the Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding,” particularly through its broad conception of presidential immunity and its endorsement of constitutional doctrines that facilitate the concentration of executive power.

Yet Professor Huq’s analysis extends well beyond the American case. He argues that “populists have developed their own version of constitutionalism,” challenging the assumption that constitutionalism necessarily remains synonymous with liberal democracy. Rather than witnessing the disappearance of constitutional government, he suggests, democracies may instead be entering an era in which competing constitutional visions coexist and contest one another. Simultaneously, the digital transformation of politics introduces an additional layer of constitutional complexity. While acknowledging that empirical evidence remains incomplete, Professor Huq warns that contemporary information ecosystems reward emotional engagement over deliberation, observing that “the shift from reasoning to emotion favors populist politics.” He also cautions that, despite its transformative potential, artificial intelligence is currently reinforcing rather than reducing inequalities, concluding that “AI is concentrating power rather than leveling the playing field.”

Ultimately, Professor Huq offers neither fatalism nor easy optimism. Instead, he presents a sober institutional diagnosis of democracy’s contemporary challenges while emphasizing that democratic renewal will require rebuilding effective constitutional constraints, representative institutions, and political organizations capable of responding both to populist pressures and to the unprecedented constitutional questions raised by the digital age.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Aziz Huq, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Michael Shifter.

Prof. Shifter: Anti-Establishment Politics, Not Ideology, Drove Colombia’s Election

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election has reignited fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative democracy in Latin America. Is the country experiencing a conventional ideological shift, or does the election reveal a deeper transformation in democratic politics? In this ECPS interview, Professor Michael Shifter argues that Colombia’s election was driven less by ideology than by widespread anti-establishment sentiment rooted in persistent insecurity, weak state capacity, and public frustration with successive governments’ failure to deliver results. Examining the rise of security populism, the erosion of political moderation, the resilience of Colombian democratic institutions, and the evolving relationship with the United States, Professor Shifter offers a nuanced assessment of Colombia’s political trajectory and its broader implications for comparative studies of populism and democratic governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election marks one of the most consequential political turning points in contemporary Latin America, raising fundamental questions about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative government. The election of Abelardo de la Espriella, following the historic presidency of Gustavo Petro, has frequently been interpreted as evidence of a regional shift from the left toward the populist radical right. Yet such an interpretation, while politically intuitive, risks overlooking the deeper structural forces reshaping democratic politics across the hemisphere. Is Colombia witnessing an ideological realignment, or does the election reveal something more profound about the changing nature of democratic representation itself? As insecurity, organized crime, institutional distrust, and dissatisfaction with political elites intensify across Latin America, electoral competition increasingly appears to revolve less around competing ideological projects than around public demands for effective governance, security, and political renewal.

Few scholars are better positioned to interpret these developments than Professor Michael Shifter, Adjunct Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. For decades, his scholarship has examined the intersections of democratic governance, state-building, political violence, US–Latin American relations, and institutional development. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Shifter offers a nuanced interpretation of Colombia’s election that challenges conventional narratives about ideological polarization and instead places anti-establishment politics at the center of democratic change.

Professor Shifter argues that the conventional interpretation of Colombia’s 2026 election as simply a shift from left to right overlooks a deeper transformation taking place in the country’s democratic politics. “The conventional narrative… is that we’re seeing a turn to the right… I think that’s only part of the story,” he explains. “If we focus only on that, we’re missing something more profound and more fundamental,” namely “profound discontent, widespread anger, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment.” In his view, Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory represents not merely a rejection of Gustavo Petro’s left-wing government but the continuation of the same anti-establishment dynamic that first brought Petro himself to power in 2022. “It is not simply a shift from the left to the right,” he observes, “but a continuation of anti-establishment politics.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Shifter explores how declining confidence in traditional political parties, the rise of social media-driven campaigning, persistent insecurity, and frustration over governments’ inability to deliver tangible results are transforming democratic competition throughout Latin America. He explains why contemporary electoral behavior is increasingly shaped by emotional appeals rather than coherent political programs; why “security populism”has become an increasingly powerful electoral force; why the apparent rise of a unified global populist right often conceals significant ideological differences among its leaders; and why Colombia’s political center continues to erode under the combined pressures of institutional failure and rejectionist voting. At the same time, he cautions against reducing contemporary Latin American politics to simplistic ideological categories, emphasizing instead the diversity of populist experiences across the region.

Despite his concern about growing populist pressures, Professor Shifter ultimately offers a measured assessment of Colombia’s democratic future. One of the most important—and, in his view, most overlooked—developments of the Petro years was “the resilience of Colombian institutions: Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press.” While acknowledging the serious challenges posed by insecurity, polarization, and anti-establishment politics, he concludes on a cautiously optimistic note, expressing confidence that Colombia’s democratic institutions remain capable of preserving constitutional order and maintaining effective checks and balances in the years ahead.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Michael Shifter, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Real Story Is Colombia’s Deep Anti-Establishment Anger

President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella and Vice President-elect Jose Manuel Restrepo.
Credential-giving ceremony to President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella and Vice President-elect Jose Manuel Restrepo by the National Electoral Council in Bogota, Colombia on June 25, 2026. Photo: Anamaria Mejía / Dreamstime.

Professor Shifter, welcome! Let me begin with your recent New York Times essay, in which you describe Colombia’s 2026 presidential election not simply as a swing from left to right but as “a leap into the void.” Why do you believe this election represents something more profound than an ordinary alternation of power? What does it reveal about the current relationship between democratic representation, institutional legitimacy, and public demand for radical political change?

Professor Michael Shifter: The conventional narrative in Colombia, as well as in other recent elections in Latin America, is that we’re seeing a turn to the right, from governments of the left to governments of the right. I think that’s only part of the story. If we focus only on that, we’re missing something more profound and more fundamental, which is illustrated very clearly by Colombia’s recent election. That is the existence of profound discontent, widespread anger, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment.

If we look at the Colombian case in particular, we can go back to the elections four years ago, in 2022, with the election of Gustavo Petro from the left. It’s also worth remembering that his opponent in that election was Rodolfo Fernández, who was himself something of a political outsider and largely unknown. He lost the election, and Petro won, marking the first time Colombia had elected a leftist government. But that outcome clearly reflected widespread discontent with the establishment political parties and their failure to address the country’s profound problems.

Petro did some things that were positive. He put his finger on some legitimate grievances. He increased the representation and inclusion of previously excluded groups—Afro-descendants, Indigenous communities, women, and others who had long lacked access to political power in Colombia. That was an important achievement. But he also leaves behind a rather problematic record, particularly on the issue of security. We now see Abelardo de la Espriella tapping into that same discontent and anti-establishment sentiment, which is quite widespread in Colombia and elsewhere, and capitalizing on it very effectively and skillfully, principally through social media—not through a political party or any traditional organizational structure, but through social media.

So, I don’t think this is simply a turn toward a more conservative political option. It is, rather, a reflection of something much deeper: an anti-establishment sentiment that, in some ways, represents a continuity with Gustavo Petro. It is not simply a shift from the left to the right, but a continuation of anti-establishment politics.

Colombia demonstrated remarkable resilience under Petro, and the central question—which I try to highlight in that essay—is whether Colombia will be able to demonstrate the same resilience over the next four years under De la Espriella.

Frustration with Failed Governments Is Reshaping Democratic Competition

You argue that contemporary Colombian politics is increasingly driven by anti-incumbent sentiment rather than ideological commitment. To what extent does Colombia illustrate a broader transformation of democratic politics in which electoral behavior is shaped less by coherent political programs than by frustration, distrust, and a desire to punish governing elites?

Professor Michael Shifter: What we are witnessing, not only in Colombia but across Latin America and even globally, is politics that is driven and shaped less by coherent political platforms than by emotional appeals that tap into how people feel about not receiving the results that candidates promised on security, economic issues, and governance. It is also driven by the growing frustration that fundamental problems are not being addressed effectively or successfully. That’s precisely what we’re seeing in Colombia, and that’s why there was both an anti-incumbent and an anti-establishment sentiment, which De la Espriella very skillfully and astutely capitalized on to win the presidency.

Now, of course, we’ll have to see how he governs. But, more importantly, we’ll see whether Colombia’s institutions and civil society are truly up to the challenge of keeping in check any temptation to go beyond the country’s constitutional and institutional limits. That’s what we’ll be watching very closely. Hopefully, De la Espriella will prove to be someone who respects democratic norms and institutions. If so, that will lessen the burden on Colombia’s Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press. But we’ll simply have to wait and see.

Traditional Parties Failed to Learn the Lessons of 2022

Abelardo de la Espriella and Gustavo Petro emerged from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, yet both successfully presented themselves as anti-establishment outsiders. Does this suggest that contemporary Colombian populism is increasingly ideologically flexible—less a coherent doctrine than a performative strategy built around anti-elite rhetoric, moral polarization, and promises of national redemption?

Professor Michael Shifter: Of the two candidates and political figures—Petro on the left and De la Espriella on the right—the more ideological is Petro. After all, I don’t think they should be put in the same category. Petro has a long political history. He’s been in Congress for many years, and he was the mayor of Bogotá. He is clearly an ideologue of the left.

De la Espriella, by contrast, is someone who is new to politics. He has held no political office and has no administrative experience. He saw an opportunity to embrace positions that are considered to be on the right. But he is less of an ideological figure than someone who is simply very skillful and, much like Donald Trump in some ways, adept at capitalizing on public discontent and championing issues that resonate with the Colombian people—in the case of 2026, the deterioration of the security situation in Colombia.

They belong to different categories of leaders. But, both of them were very astute in sensing anti-establishment sentiment and riding that wave. Petro rode it in 2022, and De la Espriella did so, this year. 

What I find astonishing—and unfortunate—is that some of the more centrist and traditional political parties and figures were not sufficiently responsive to the message that Petro sent in 2022. That message was that they had to become serious about addressing the country’s persistent problems of violence, inequality, and the lack of state presence across much of the country. They didn’t do that. Even if you look at the platforms in 2026, there was not sufficient attention to, or focus on, the social agenda. That is a clear lesson of Petro’s presidency that was not adequately heeded by the more traditional political figures and parties.

Strengthening State Capacity Remains Colombia’s Unfinished Democratic Project

Colombia, protest.
Protesters march peacefully through Bogotá calling for the impeachment of President Gustavo Petro and opposing the government’s proposed reforms on April 21, 2024. Photo: Anamaria Mejía / Dreamstime.

More than two decades ago, you warned that Colombia’s central challenge was not simply defeating insurgent groups but strengthening state capacity and public institutions. Looking back at your earlier work on state-building, do the 2026 election results suggest that Colombia’s institutional weaknesses remain fundamentally unresolved despite years of security gains?

Professor Michael Shifter: This is the perennial question in Colombia, one that nobody has been able to answer adequately: Why has it been so difficult to extend an effective and legitimate state presence across much of the country over such a long period of time? Is it a lack of capacity? A lack of political will? This remains a subject of enormous debate, and I don’t think there are any definitive answers.

It’s important not to be too sweeping in our criticism or assessment of Colombia, because one has to recognize that there were some gains—although they were too modest—under Uribe in the early 2000s, and later under the government of Juan Manuel Santos, who served as president for eight years and oversaw both a peace agreement and a peace process. Those efforts did address some of these long-standing structural problems, but clearly not enough. They were not completely successful, nor have they been sustained.

So, it’s important to acknowledge the progress that has been made, while also recognizing that it has not been sufficient and that something fundamental has remained lacking. Many of the issues I identified years ago remain unresolved today. In 2000, I wrote a report on Plan Colombia, which, on balance, I considered a positive initiative, although I was critical of many of its elements and aspects. In that report, I emphasized the importance of strengthening state capacity across much of the country. Unfortunately, the conclusions of that report remain remarkably relevant 26 years later.

Colombia’s Crisis Reflects Both Structural Weaknesses and Government Failure

Your scholarship has long emphasized that persistent violence, inequality, and weak state presence have undermined democratic legitimacy in Colombia. How much of today’s electoral volatility reflects unresolved structural problems rather than the successes or failures of any single government?

Professor Michael Shifter: One has to recognize that it’s a complex picture. There is a combination of longer-term, chronic structural problems in Colombia that persist, coupled with the inadequate—or simply poor—performance of particular governments, in this case the Petro administration. There certainly was a rejection of Petro by many voters. Many of them had concerns about De la Espriella, but they really did not want continuity—another four years of the Historic Pact, the leftist coalition created by Petro and from which Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the left, emerged.

So, I think it’s a combination of dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. Petro promised a great deal. He was a very good campaigner and a good orator, but he wasn’t very effective at governing or delivering results. That is clearly part of the explanation for why his candidate lost, although it should be emphasized that it was by a razor-thin margin. This was not a decisive victory for De la Espriella. The country is divided in two, and it’s important to keep that in mind.

But it also reflects a broader sense of discontent with yet another government that, like those preceding Petro, failed to deliver on its promises, as well as a desire to try something different—to see whether someone like De la Espriella, who had no record in government and about whom relatively little was actually known, might offer an alternative. Many Colombians seemed to think: we tried the traditional political parties, and that didn’t work very well; then we tried a leftist alternative, and that also wasn’t very successful. So, let’s go in another direction. I think that was the way many Colombians approached their vote.

Populism Is Often Better at Making Promises Than Delivering Them

Throughout Latin America, citizens increasingly appear willing to prioritize effectiveness over procedural liberalism. Are we witnessing the rise of a populist conception of democratic legitimacy, in which leaders claim direct authorization from “the people” to bypass institutional constraints if they can promise security, economic stability, and public order?

Professor Michael Shifter: This is unquestionably a global trend. People increasingly give priority to results and tangible benefits as a source of political legitimacy. It’s not that democratic norms or institutions are unimportant; rather, they are simply not as important as achieving results. We’ve seen this reflected for many years in polling and surveys across Latin America. When people are asked whether they would be willing to sacrifice some democratic safeguards in exchange for a government that effectively addresses security, economic problems, and other pressing issues, many of them say yes.

Perhaps the clearest example is El Salvador, where you have a president who enjoys approval ratings of 80 to 90 percent despite showing very little regard for democratic or human rights norms. So, I don’t think this phenomenon is peculiar to Colombia. Of course, we’re seeing it in my own country, the United States. I’m from the United States, and this fits very well with that analysis and interpretation. People want results, and they are willing to sacrifice some democratic protections in order to achieve them.

In that sense, populist legitimacy is defined by the ability to deliver. The problem is that populism, by its nature, is often very good at making promises but much less effective at delivering on them. As a result, the legitimacy gains that initially appear possible often fail to materialize because populist leaders—we see this in the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela—promise dramatic transformation but ultimately fail to govern effectively.

Look at Venezuela today. One can go back even before Maduro, to Hugo Chávez, who governed for 13 years and made enormous promises of transforming the country. Today, Venezuela is in a disastrous situation and is now trying to cope with the aftermath of these horrific and tragic earthquakes. That situation derives from the populism of Hugo Chávez, who was a great orator, promised a great deal, but did not know how to govern and failed to deliver.

So, populism generates legitimacy only if it produces concrete results that people can actually experience. But, with very few exceptions, I don’t think populism has a particularly strong record of providing that kind of legitimacy.

Law-and-Order Leaders Still Have to Deliver Results

The 2026 campaign unfolded amid worsening insecurity and renewed concerns about organized crime. How do rising levels of violence reshape democratic competition? Do they create fertile ground for law-and-order populism or penal populism, where candidates transform fear into demands for strongman leadership, militarized security policies, and executive concentration of power?

Professor Michael Shifter: I think no one denies that we’re seeing, in country after country across Latin America, the spread of what I would call security populism, driven by the expansion of organized crime and violence in many countries, including some that, until recently, were relatively safe and secure but are now facing enormous threats to public order. This tends to favor candidates with a more right-leaning agenda—the so-called mano dura, or iron-fisted, approach. We’re seeing political figures capitalizing on that. We saw it in Chile, we saw it in Ecuador, and, of course, we saw it in Colombia. We’ll also see what happens in Brazil in October. We saw it in Peru with the recent election of Keiko Fujimori. This issue, which is becoming increasingly salient and a greater concern for many voters, tends to favor candidates and political figures who advocate law-and-order policies and come from the political right.

That being said, they still have to deliver. They have to produce results. And I’m not sure why people assume that these political figures are necessarily going to be more effective than those from the center, or even the left, in reducing criminality and violence in their countries. If you set Bukele aside—which reflects the very particular circumstances of El Salvador, a small country with the specific phenomenon of gangs rather than the massive transnational organized crime you see in Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, or Brazil, which are very different cases—you are not seeing many successful examples of these right-wing governments.

We’ll see what happens in Colombia, but certainly in Ecuador, which has become more militarized and where there has been greater cooperation and joint military operations with the United States, you’re not really seeing results. If there are no results, people will once again become frustrated and disappointed, and they’ll begin looking for other alternatives. Those alternatives could come from any point on the ideological spectrum.

I don’t think this is fundamentally an ideological question. It’s a question of effectiveness and efficacy. Some of these right-wing governments that are now coming to power may prove to be quite short-lived because people are impatient. They want results quickly, and when they don’t see them, they begin looking for other alternatives. So, there may be an immediate political effect stemming from the crisis of insecurity and organized crime in some countries, but it’s important to be cautious about interpreting this as a long-term trend that will necessarily reshape politics in Latin America for many years to come.

The Central Lesson of Petro’s Presidency Is That Competence Matters

Colombia's President Gustavo Petro.
Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have argued for many years that Latin American democracies often struggle to reconcile demands for social inclusion with effective governance. Looking at Gustavo Petro’s presidency, what lessons should future reformist governments draw about the relationship between ambitious political agendas, institutional constraints, and governing capacity?

Professor Michael Shifter: The central lesson of Gustavo Petro’s presidency is that competence matters. It’s not simply about ideology. You may have your heart in the right place. You may take important steps to include people who have long been excluded from power and incorporate them into the political process, and that’s an important achievement. But it’s not enough.

You also have to demonstrate governing capacity and competence, and that was lacking during Gustavo Petro’s presidency. His candidate carried the burden of that record into the 2026 election. Again, even though the election was extremely close, and even though there was a very strong political party—perhaps the strongest political party in Colombia today is the left-wing Pacto Histórico, which Petro created—the party machinery worked only up to a point. In the end, it was not enough to secure victory.

So, there does need to be a reformist agenda to tackle issues such as inequality, informality, and the other longstanding problems that have bedeviled Colombia and much of Latin America. But I’m not sure this was truly a reformist presidency. It was an administration that brought new voices to the table, and that deserves a great deal of recognition and credit. I’m hopeful that future Colombian governments will preserve that aspect of the Petro presidency while combining it with a genuine commitment to reform and a greater capacity to address the country’s long-term challenges. I don’t think the Petro administration was very successful in that regard, because achieving those goals requires a level of competence that this president did not demonstrate.

The Global Populist Wave May Be Losing Momentum

Donald Trump’s endorsement of Abelardo de la Espriella inevitably invited comparisons with the global circulation of right-wing populist ideas. To what extent are contemporary Latin American populisms becoming embedded within transnational populist networks that share anti-left, anti-elite, nationalist, and security-centered narratives?

Professor Michael Shifter: There has unquestionably been an increase in, and strengthening of, globalized networks. Latin American populist right-wing leaders have participated in meetings in Europe and elsewhere alongside other leaders of the right. But it’s important to make two qualifications. 

First of all, there may well be increased networking, greater contact, and more sharing of ideas and experiences. I’m not sure, however, that this has enormous significance in terms of effective policy coordination, because I don’t really see many signs of that. One thing is to talk about shared ideas and shared visions. Another is to work together effectively to address the problems these leaders articulate in their campaigns, and I don’t see much evidence of that happening, either within Latin America or in cooperation with other figures around the world, including President Trump.

The second point is that I’m not sure where this global swing toward populism stands at the moment. There have been some setbacks. We see the most striking case in Hungary. We also see changes in Donald Trump’s relationship with Prime Minister Meloni in Italy, and so on. So, the picture is much more complex. One really has to examine it on a country-by-country basis. I’m simply not sure where this trend stands at the moment. It may well be losing some momentum.

Again, there is a great deal of emphasis on performance, media, and projecting a sense of unity. But I don’t think that will be sufficient to generate broader support for these ideas unless these leaders can actually produce results. I don’t think they have been very effective in doing so. Donald Trump is a clear example. People are having a difficult time, and the promises he made during his 2024 campaign have not been fulfilled. As a result, there is considerable disillusionment, and every indicator we have—from opinion polls to other studies—points in that direction.

So, I’m just not sure about the strength or durability of this trend. Moreover, if you scratch beneath the surface and move beyond the superficial similarities, you find enormous differences among these leaders. To describe them as a single bloc, even within Latin America, is misleading. If you compare Bukele with Milei, for example, José Antonio Kast is very different from either of them, yet people tend to place him in the same basket as part of this broader shift to the right. But they are, in fact, very different. Daniel Noboa, President of Ecuador is also very different. A deeper analysis would show that there are at least as many differences as similarities among these so-called right-wing populist political figures.

Not All Populists Belong in the Same Category

Your work on Latin American populism has consistently cautioned against treating all populist leaders as a single phenomenon. How does the current Colombian experience refine our understanding of the similarities—and equally important differences—between left-wing and right-wing populism across the region?

Professor Michael Shifter: One thing we can say about the Colombian example is that De la Espriella, although he clearly had extensive contacts and some support from establishment figures during his campaign, and of course now that he’s president-elect, really is an outsider with virtually no political experience. So, we can make a lot of distinctions. Nayib Bukele was the mayor of San Salvador. José Antonio Kast served in Congress for many years. Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil was a member of Congress for many years. Even Javier Milei served in Congress. The backgrounds and biographies of each of these leaders are very different.

Obviously, Hugo Chávez was a military leader. Each of them comes from a different background, and that shapes, quite significantly, the way they approach the presidency and the way they govern.

De la Espriella is someone about whom there is a genuine debate among analysts. To what extent does he really hold strong ideological convictions, or is he simply a very skillful opportunist who saw an opening in Colombia, recognized widespread discontent, knew how to capitalize on it, and proved extremely effective in using social media and his considerable talents as a showman?

That is quite different from José Antonio Kast in Chile, who is not a showman but rather a more traditional conservative, clearly on the right, with long-standing ideological convictions. The same could be said, in different ways, of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

It’s understandable that there is a temptation to group all of these leaders together. That is valid in some respects. But, it’s important to look beneath the surface, because then you begin to see very different positions.

Take Javier Milei, for example, the president of Argentina, who is probably the leader most closely aligned with Donald Trump and who openly admires him. His foreign policy is largely in lockstep with Donald Trump’s. Yet they hold vastly different positions on economic and trade policy. Milei is a champion of free markets, whereas Donald Trump is a protectionist. Trump has said that his favorite word in the English language is “tariffs.” He calls it the most beautiful word, and, if there is one thing he has consistently believed in throughout his life, it is tariffs. That is diametrically opposed to Javier Milei’s economic philosophy. So, it is important to take these differences into account as well.

Traditional Parties Lost Credibility Because They Failed to Deliver

One striking feature of Colombia’s recent politics is the apparent collapse of the political center. What explains the declining electoral appeal of moderate, institution-oriented parties across Latin America, and is this erosion primarily driven by structural socioeconomic factors, institutional failures, or changing political communication?

Professor Michael Shifter: Political communication, particularly social media, is undoubtedly a new and growing factor shaping Latin American politics and global politics. I don’t think it favors centrist, sensible, moderate political options or political figures. Instead, it tends to favor the extremes and to radicalize sectors on both the hard left and the hard right, which contributes to increasing polarization. I think that is certainly a factor. It’s not the only explanation, but it is one that is hard to deny and has become increasingly important over the last five to ten years in shaping politics.

But I think the more important explanation is simply the failure of these traditional parties, which became calcified and discredited in the eyes of their constituents because people felt that they were not performing well, were not fulfilling their promises, and were not delivering results. As a consequence, people became disillusioned with those options and increasingly turned toward the more extreme alternatives that we are seeing across many countries.

What we’re also seeing in elections—and I think this is important to emphasize—is the growing importance of the anti-vote, or rejectionist vote. More and more people voted for De la Espriella because they feared the left remaining in power under Iván Cepeda and his agenda. At the same time, many people voted for Cepeda because they were fearful of what De la Espriella would mean for Colombia.

We saw the same pattern in Peru. A very strong anti-Fujimori vote explains why Roberto Sánchez, the candidate of the left, actually received more votes within Peru than Keiko Fujimori. She won because she received more votes from Peruvians living abroad. But much of her support also reflected fear of the left, fear of Roberto Sánchez, and fear of communism coming to Peru.

We’re seeing the same dynamic in the Brazilian election as well. There has always been an anti-vote that helps explain electoral outcomes, but it strikes me that it is becoming an increasingly important factor in explaining how voters make their decisions.

Bogotá and Washington Are Likely to Enter a Period of Closer Cooperation

US-Colombia
Photo: Dreamstime.

For many years you have examined the interaction between domestic political developments and US–Latin American relations. How might the return of a Trump-aligned government in Bogotá reshape bilateral relations, regional diplomacy, and Colombia’s role within the wider Western Hemisphere?

Professor Michael Shifter: There’s no question—and really no debate—that we’re going to see a stronger alliance between Bogotá and Washington, at least while Trump is in power and has control of Congress, which he does today, than we saw over the last four years under Gustavo Petro. There is going to be greater engagement and closer cooperation between the two governments. It’s not only President Trump, but there are also members of the US Congress, including Senator Bernie Moreno of Ohio and representatives from Florida, who are very enthusiastic about this new presidency and very relieved that they will not have to deal with Iván Cepeda. They see significant opportunities for deeper cooperation and collaboration.

That said, it’s important to be cautious. It’s easy to get carried away and become overexcited, but caution is warranted. Trump no longer has the political capital he enjoyed when he first came to power in the United States. He has lost a considerable amount of support, and many people have become disillusioned with him. Moreover, it appears most likely that Democrats will control the House of Representatives, and possibly the Senate as well, next January, meaning that De la Espriella will have to work with a Democratic-controlled Congress.

There may be a degree of irrational exuberance, to borrow an old phrase, surrounding this new relationship. It would be wise for the new government in Bogotá to take advantage of its alignment with Trump. There are clear benefits for Colombia. At the same time, however, it should avoid turning the relationship into an entirely partisan issue. For many years, Colombia has enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States. It would be extremely unfortunate and very damaging for both Colombia and the De la Espriella administration—if the relationship became tied exclusively to one party in an increasingly polarized US political environment, particularly one that is itself changing. It’s changing in a direction where Trump may no longer enjoy the complete control and dominance that characterized the first year and a half of his presidency.

I also think it’s important for Colombia to exercise caution from a regional perspective in its relations with other Latin American governments. It’s true that a number of leaders are now aligned with Trump, but there are also sharp differences among them. Some of them are hedging their bets. They are aligning themselves with Trump because they don’t want a confrontation or a fight with him—or with the United States—and that’s completely understandable. But Trump has also shown that he is not an entirely trustworthy partner. He can change his mind and turn on leaders at any moment.

It’s also unclear how many meaningful resources the United States will actually make available to assist governments struggling with an array of challenges, including organized crime and security. So, there are a great many caveats, and I hope the De la Espriella administration will develop a more sophisticated approach to managing its relationship with Washington.

Democratic Political Culture Remains the Strongest Defense Against Populism

Finally, Professor Shifter, stepping back from Colombia itself, what broader lessons does the 2026 presidential election offer for scholars of populism, democratic resilience, and political representation? Does Colombia represent an exceptional national case, or has it become an important window into the wider transformation of democracy taking place across Latin America and beyond?

Professor Michael Shifter: The 2026 elections in Colombia are very instructive in a number of ways. One is that they underscore the cost of failing to address long-standing problems by traditional, establishment-oriented, more centrist political parties and leaders.

This is what happens when you fail to heed what the electorate is telling you, which is clearly what voters were telling political leaders in 2022, if not earlier. Yet the inability to adjust and take those messages into account proved very costly. Colombia ended up with two options at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, even though many Colombians were not particularly happy with either of them. So, that is one important lesson.

On the more positive side—and I really want to emphasize this because I think it was perhaps the most underreported story of the Petro presidency—is the resilience of Colombian institutions: Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press. To me, that’s the other major lesson. 

Populism is emerging in places like Costa Rica, where one never would have expected it to emerge. It also emerged in Colombia, and there were various attempts by President Petro to go beyond the limits of his office, to interfere in government, and to disregard certain constraints and checks on his power. It certainly wasn’t for a lack of trying. What was striking, however, was the degree of pushback and resistance that Colombia demonstrated. That is an important lesson: democratic political culture is not trivial.

Countries that possess that democratic experience and tradition are going to be tested, just as Colombia was tested between 2022 and 2026, and they will continue to be tested in the years ahead. But I’m confident they will be able to preserve the democratic order and keep checks and balances intact, despite all the pressures and strains that will inevitably arise.

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar

MEP López Aguilar: The Return Regulation Is a Violation of EU Fundamental Values

As the European Union implements its new Migration and Asylum Pact amid growing populist pressures, fundamental questions are emerging about the future of European constitutionalism. In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents “a violation of EU fundamental values” and warns that migration governance is increasingly being reshaped by radical-right narratives. Reflecting on the erosion of the cordon sanitaire, the “Melonization” of European migration policy, and the normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, MEP López Aguilar contends that “migration is a fact, not a crisis,” while insisting that “asylum is a right” that must remain protected. The interview offers a timely reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, human rights, and the future of European integration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when migration has become one of the most polarizing issues in European politics, the European Union finds itself confronting a profound constitutional dilemma. The implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, together with the Return Regulation, has reignited fundamental debates about sovereignty, solidarity, fundamental rights, and the future of European integration. Once conceived as a legal and political project founded upon supranational cooperation, shared responsibility, and the protection of human dignity, the European Union is increasingly facing accusations that it is redefining migration governance under the growing influence of populist radical-right politics. Against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, demographic change, electoral realignments, and increasingly contested debates over migration, the central question is no longer simply how Europe manages migration, but whether it can continue to do so without compromising the constitutional and humanitarian values upon which the Union itself was built.

Few policymakers are better positioned to reflect on these developments than Juan Fernando López Aguilar. A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Spain’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since 2009, López Aguilar previously served as Spain’s Minister of Justice and chaired the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) between 2019 and 2024. Trained as a constitutional lawyer and widely recognized as one of Europe’s foremost authorities on constitutionalism, the rule of law, migration governance, and fundamental rights, he has played a central role in shaping EU migration and asylum legislation over the past decade. His long engagement with the negotiations surrounding the Migration and Asylum Pact places him at the heart of one of the Union’s most consequential constitutional debates.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents far more than a technical adjustment to migration management. Rather, he contends that it constitutes “a violation of EU fundamental values” and departs from the legal architecture painstakingly constructed through the Migration and Asylum Pact. Rejecting the growing trend toward externalizing asylum responsibilities, he warns that “migration management cannot come at the expense of the rule of law,” insisting that migration must be addressed through a genuinely European response grounded in “shared responsibility and binding solidarity” rather than bilateral arrangements with third countries.

Throughout the interview, MEP López Aguilar situates the transformation of European migration policy within broader processes of democratic and political change. He argues that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) increasing cooperation with radical-right parties has effectively dismantled the traditional Brandmauer or cordon sanitaire, allowing what he calls the “Melonization” of European migration policy to become mainstream. In his assessment, attempts to externalize migration control, normalize return hubs, and securitize asylum are inseparable from the wider normalization of populist narratives within European politics. At the same time, he cautions that Europe risks undermining its own credibility as a global defender of human rights through increasingly visible double standards in both migration and foreign policy.

Perhaps most strikingly, MEP López Aguilar rejects the assumption that migration itself constitutes Europe’s principal challenge. “Migration is a fact, not a crisis,” he argues, insisting that “reducing migration to zero is not only impossible—it is stupid.” Likewise, he defends asylum as a non-negotiable legal obligation, declaring that “asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost.” For MEP López Aguilar, the real danger lies not in migration itself but in the gradual erosion of Europe’s constitutional identity through the normalization of policies and rhetoric that once belonged exclusively to the political fringes. The interview therefore offers not merely a critique of current migration policy, but a broader reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, constitutionalism, and the future of the European project itself.

Here is the revised version of our interview with MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Martin Tanaka.

Prof. Tanaka: Populism Remains a Risk in Peru, but It Is Far More Contained Today

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has reopened fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional decay, and constitutional governance in one of Latin America’s most politically volatile democracies. In this timely interview with the ECPS, Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies, argues that while “populism remains a risk,” it is “much more controlled and limited” than many feared. He explains why Peru’s democratic crisis stems less from executive authoritarianism than from party fragmentation, legislative dysfunction, and institutional weakness, while cautiously suggesting that the country’s new political balance may create opportunities for negotiation, institutional reform, and democratic stabilization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has once again thrust one of Latin America’s most fragile democracies into the center of international attention. A razor-thin presidential runoff, renewed allegations of electoral fraud, deepening institutional distrust, chronic party fragmentation, and mounting public insecurity have revived long-standing debates over democratic resilience, populism, political representation, and constitutional governance. While Peru has long been viewed as an outlier for combining macroeconomic stability with persistent political instability, the election of Keiko Fujimori has introduced a new layer of uncertainty by reopening unresolved questions about the country’s post-authoritarian trajectory. At a moment when many democracies are struggling with populist polarization and democratic erosion, Peru offers an important case for examining whether institutional recovery remains possible after years of political fragmentation and declining public confidence.

Few scholars are better positioned to assess these developments than Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies. Widely recognized for his pioneering scholarship on weak party systems, ‘brokered democracy’, clientelism, populism, and democratic deterioration, Professor Tanaka has spent more than two decades analyzing why Peru’s democratic institutions have struggled to consolidate despite sustained economic growth. His research has fundamentally shaped comparative debates on party institutionalization, democratic accountability, and the paradoxes of governance in contemporary Latin America.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tanaka offers a measured yet cautiously optimistic assessment of Peru’s political future. Although he acknowledges that the 2026 election reproduced many of the structural weaknesses that have characterized Peruvian politics over the last decade—including institutional fragmentation and declining trust—he nevertheless argues that the outcome may represent an important turning point. As he observes, “the results are much better than our worst expectations,” because many of the parties most closely associated with irresponsible populism and legislative obstruction suffered significant electoral defeats. Rather than signaling the consolidation of anti-system politics, the new Congress may create stronger incentives for negotiation and coalition-building.

Throughout the interview, Professor Tanaka challenges several conventional assumptions about Peru’s democratic crisis. He argues that Peru’s recent democratic erosion has been driven less by executive aggrandizement than by “the decay of parties and the control of parties by particular interests and very narrow interest groups.” Unlike many contemporary cases of democratic backsliding, Peru’s principal danger has not been excessive presidential power but institutional fragmentation, legislative clientelism, and the collapse of effective political mediation. Yet he also sees reasons for cautious hope, emphasizing that “the distribution of political forces puts on the agenda the need to negotiate and to achieve agreements between parties with different perspectives,” while noting that “the risk of the continuation of this populist logic still exists, but it is much more controlled and limited.”

The conversation also explores broader theoretical questions concerning the evolution of populism, democratic legitimacy, corruption, judicial activism, and institutional reform. Professor Tanaka reflects on Peru’s distinctive combination of economic orthodoxy and political instability, examines why anti-corruption campaigns have generated widespread public disappointment, and assesses whether bicameralism and a more structured party system can help restore democratic governance. 

Looking beyond the current electoral cycle, he concludes that rebuilding Peru’s democracy will ultimately depend on strengthening the state’s administrative capacity, professionalizing the civil service, and reconstructing political parties capable of reconnecting citizens with representative institutions. As he puts it, “state reform and civil service reform are the major issues in Peru,” alongside political reforms that can begin “to reverse the dynamic of deterioration that we have faced in recent years.”

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Martín Tanaka, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar.

MEP López Aguilar: The Return Regulation Is a Violation of EU Fundamental Values

As the European Union implements its new Migration and Asylum Pact amid growing populist pressures, fundamental questions are emerging about the future of European constitutionalism. In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents “a violation of EU fundamental values” and warns that migration governance is increasingly being reshaped by radical-right narratives. Reflecting on the erosion of the cordon sanitaire, the “Melonization” of European migration policy, and the normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, MEP López Aguilar contends that “migration is a fact, not a crisis,” while insisting that “asylum is a right” that must remain protected. The interview offers a timely reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, human rights, and the future of European integration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when migration has become one of the most polarizing issues in European politics, the European Union finds itself confronting a profound constitutional dilemma. The implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, together with the Return Regulation, has reignited fundamental debates about sovereignty, solidarity, fundamental rights, and the future of European integration. Once conceived as a legal and political project founded upon supranational cooperation, shared responsibility, and the protection of human dignity, the European Union is increasingly facing accusations that it is redefining migration governance under the growing influence of populist radical-right politics. Against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, demographic change, electoral realignments, and increasingly contested debates over migration, the central question is no longer simply how Europe manages migration, but whether it can continue to do so without compromising the constitutional and humanitarian values upon which the Union itself was built.

Few policymakers are better positioned to reflect on these developments than Juan Fernando López Aguilar. A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Spain’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since 2009, López Aguilar previously served as Spain’s Minister of Justice and chaired the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) between 2019 and 2024. Trained as a constitutional lawyer and widely recognized as one of Europe’s foremost authorities on constitutionalism, the rule of law, migration governance, and fundamental rights, he has played a central role in shaping EU migration and asylum legislation over the past decade. His long engagement with the negotiations surrounding the Migration and Asylum Pact places him at the heart of one of the Union’s most consequential constitutional debates.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents far more than a technical adjustment to migration management. Rather, he contends that it constitutes “a violation of EU fundamental values” and departs from the legal architecture painstakingly constructed through the Migration and Asylum Pact. Rejecting the growing trend toward externalizing asylum responsibilities, he warns that “migration management cannot come at the expense of the rule of law,” insisting that migration must be addressed through a genuinely European response grounded in “shared responsibility and binding solidarity” rather than bilateral arrangements with third countries.

Throughout the interview, MEP López Aguilar situates the transformation of European migration policy within broader processes of democratic and political change. He argues that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) increasing cooperation with radical-right parties has effectively dismantled the traditional Brandmauer or cordon sanitaire, allowing what he calls the “Melonization” of European migration policy to become mainstream. In his assessment, attempts to externalize migration control, normalize return hubs, and securitize asylum are inseparable from the wider normalization of populist narratives within European politics. At the same time, he cautions that Europe risks undermining its own credibility as a global defender of human rights through increasingly visible double standards in both migration and foreign policy.

Perhaps most strikingly, MEP López Aguilar rejects the assumption that migration itself constitutes Europe’s principal challenge. “Migration is a fact, not a crisis,” he argues, insisting that “reducing migration to zero is not only impossible—it is stupid.” Likewise, he defends asylum as a non-negotiable legal obligation, declaring that “asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost.” For MEP López Aguilar, the real danger lies not in migration itself but in the gradual erosion of Europe’s constitutional identity through the normalization of policies and rhetoric that once belonged exclusively to the political fringes. The interview therefore offers not merely a critique of current migration policy, but a broader reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, constitutionalism, and the future of the European project itself.

Here is the revised version of our interview with MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Migration Management Cannot Come at the Expense of the Rule of Law

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar
MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar is interviewed by ECPS’ Selcuk Gultasli in his office at the European Parliament on July 2, 2026. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Juan Fernando López Aguilar, welcome! You argue that the new Return Regulation marks a constitutional rupture rather than merely another migration reform. Where, in your view, is the precise red line beyond which migration management ceases to be compatible with the European constitutional project?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: The red line is the lack of a European scale of response and the lack of consistency with EU fundamental values. Let me explain. We worked really hard to fulfil the mandate of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is part of the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 67 and Article 77 make it clear that there should be not only an EU migration and asylum policy but also a migration and asylum system based on EU law. It wasn’t easy because migration is obviously the most divisive issue around, and it contaminates not only asylum policy and lawmaking in the member states but also policymaking at the European level. Yet there should be a European migration and asylum system based on law, and we worked for two consecutive mandates—10 years—to make it happen by combining eight pieces of legislation.

The underlying idea is that there should be a European-scale response. You know why? Because no member state can deal with it on its own. It cannot be only a Greek problem when migrants arrive on the Greek islands in the Aegean. It cannot be an Italian problem when migrants arrive on the Pelagic Islands, such as Lampedusa, in the Mediterranean, coming from the African shore. Nor should it be a Spanish problem that we receive 47,000 people a year on the island of El Hierro in the Canaries, coming from Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau, and Guinea-Conakry. No, there should be a European-scale response, based on shared responsibility and binding solidarity.

That is the idea behind the Migration and Asylum Pact. But what is the idea behind the Return Regulation? It is to give the member states back the competence to negotiate bilateral agreements with third-country rulers so that, in exchange for money, they keep migrants out of our sight. Is it worthy? Is it consistent with EU values? My answer is no.

There is no European-scale response in Melonizing Europe, in Melonizing migration policy. Giving member states the authority to negotiate bilaterally with whomever is willing to be paid to keep migrants out of our sight in a so-called return hub—which is, let’s face it, a concentration camp for an unlimited period of time—should not happen under EU law. That is inconsistent with the very idea of the Migration and Asylum Pact. And, of course, in my view, it amounts to a denial of EU fundamental values, which are rooted in the principle that the EU is bound by international law, including human rights and international humanitarian law, which encompass shelter, rescue, and disease.

So, the conclusion is that this Return Regulation is not only a mistake; it is a violation of EU fundamental values and of EU law as enshrined in the Migration and Asylum Pact.

Reducing Migration to Zero Is Not Only Impossible—It Is Stupid

Only two years ago, you defended the Migration and Asylum Pact as the best achievable European compromise. Today, you argue that the Return Regulation fundamentally betrays European values. Did Europe cross a legal threshold, or has the political center itself shifted toward positions once associated exclusively with the far right?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Both. We worked so hard to put in place a migration and asylum system based on EU law precisely because it is difficult and deeply divisive. It is obvious that migration is geographically divisive. The perception in the Baltics is not the same as it is in the western member states of the European Union, let alone along the southern external border—namely Greece, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, or Spain—not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Canaries. Different member states have different views of the problem, and they also have different views of the importance of a European-scale response.

Still, it was possible precisely because the balance of forces in the previous mandate of the European Parliament made it possible. Of course, it took time. It was only after a long and difficult struggle that, at the end of the previous mandate—in December 2023—we finally reached an agreement, and the entire package of regulations was ultimately adopted in June 2024. That is why, two years later, in June 2026, it has finally entered into force. But what has happened since the 2024 elections? Yes, we now have a balance of forces leaning to the right and the far right more than ever before.

For the first time in the history of the European Parliament, the EPP, together with three far-right political groups, accounts for 60% of the vote, marginalizing the second-largest group, the Socialists, as well as the Greens, Renew, and the Left. The far right is dominating the House and shaping policy. And that means a great deal when we talk about migration and asylum policy.

It means that a negative vision of migration is dominating the political landscape in Europe. In my view, that is a terrible mistake. Migration is not a threat, let alone a crisis. Migration has always been a fact. It is a permanent fact in the history of mankind. Should we panic because migrants are hoping or longing to make it to Europe? We should not panic. We can handle it. We can handle it as long as we do it together, according to EU law, and without betraying EU values. If we do it that way, then we may succeed. If we do it separately, member state by member state, in contradiction with EU values, then we are doomed to fail. And, of course, trying to reduce migration to zero is also doomed to fail. It is not only impossible, but also stupid.

Return Hubs Without Legal Safeguards Betray European Values

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Supporters argue that external processing restores public confidence without abandoning humanitarian obligations. You contend that it instead erodes the Union’s constitutional identity. Why are they wrong?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Because once you authorize returns to third countries with no meaningful link to the returnees, you are prepared to transfer human beings—their families, vulnerable people, trafficked women, and minors—to countries where they do not belong, where it is impossible to ensure that their fundamental and human rights are respected. It is equally impossible to ensure that the Charter of Fundamental Rights is implemented because there is no obligation to apply the Charter when they are in Egypt, Niger, Tunisia, or Rwanda. Yet this has become the obsession of too many around the table of the Council of Ministers of the Interior of the European Union and also within the European Parliament. That is absolutely inconsistent with the obligation to put in place an EU-scale response that is bound by EU law and consistent with EU values.

You’ve got to make sure that fundamental rights are observed and respected. Even when you return people, there has to be a meaningful link, whether it is a country of transit or a country of origin. But it is unacceptable to send them back anywhere, as long as you are paying the ruler there to keep them out of your sight for an unlimited period of time.

Once they are in the European Union—and this is also, of course, subject to criticism—you may hold them in a retention center, in a so-called migration facility, for two years. That’s much too long. But once they are in a third country with no meaningful link to the returnees, there is no time limit. They can be held there forever, stockpiled forever. Is that acceptable? Is that consistent with EU law? The beauty of the Charter of Fundamental Rights lies precisely in the fact that it protects all human beings, not only European citizens. That’s the beauty.

Anyone under EU law is protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, whether you are a European citizen or not. If you, a Turkish citizen, are on European soil, you are also protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. It is not the case that it does not apply to you because you are not a European citizen. No, you are protected by EU law, by the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, because you are under EU law and on European soil. That is the beauty of it. And that is also denied by the fact that people are being returned to third countries to which they do not belong, simply for the sake of paying a ruler who is willing to accept them. That is absolutely, in my view, in contradiction with the very idea of European law and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Treating Migration as a Threat Is a Terrible Mistake

You write that asylum is no longer treated as a fundamental right but increasingly as an administrative inconvenience. Has the EU effectively redefined refugees from rights-holders into security risks?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: The EU is a union of 27 member states. But the majority, for now, is leaning in that direction. It is allowing a negative approach to migration to prevail as the dominant political view: the denial of migration, the belief that migration can be reduced by discouraging migrants, and the idea that you can simply send them back.

As the far right chanted in a stunning ovation following the adoption of the Return Regulation in the plenary session in Strasbourg—and I quote—”Send them back, send them back, send them back.” The idea that you can send back all migrants in the European Union is preposterous. It is self-damaging and ultimately self-defeating. The European Union is ageing. We are losing weight. We are losing GDP in comparison with the world’s major powers and global competitors. We are also losing population in comparative terms. So we need to change our stance on migration. 

In Spain, there is an alternative. In Spain, there is a positive view of migration because there is a progressive government. For one thing, Spain has, for several years now, surprisingly become the number one engine of growth and job creation. Spain is growing four times as fast as Germany, France, and Italy, while creating jobs and making economic growth compatible with social justice. That means the minimum wage is rising, pensions are rising, social protection is expanding, and social services also benefit from the contribution of migrants who are willing to pay taxes in order to finance the services needed to fulfil social rights and fundamental rights altogether. So, Spain is demonstrating that there is an alternative. Yet Spain is not only being minoritized; it is actually isolated in this approach. The prevailing view is a negative one, and that approach is both self-defeating and self-damaging for the future of the European Union.

Double Standards Are Undermining Europe’s Global Credibility

Row of EU Flags in front of the European Union Commission building in Brussels. Photo: VanderWolf Images.

The European Union often presents itself as a global normative power. Can Europe continue to lecture the world on human rights while simultaneously exporting asylum responsibilities beyond its own borders?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Of course, I share the ambition that the European Union should grow—and grow fast—and become a relevant global actor. Of course, I agree that the European Union has to exercise hard power, not only soft power. I also agree that the European Union should join forces to build a truly credible and effective European diplomacy and combine its strengths so that it can become a meaningful actor in the global arena—one that is heard, respected, and worth listening to when engaging with other global powers. I mean talking to the United States, talking to Russia, talking to China, talking to India. That is what becoming global means. So, yes, I share that ambition. And yet I am also among those who criticise the fact that the European Union is still far from reaching that goal.

On the contrary, I am deeply critical of the evidence that the European Union is indulging in double standards. It is absolutely unforgivable that the European Union has tried to be hard and tough on Russia after Putin’s aggression against Ukraine while saying nothing about the genocide in Gaza and doing nothing about the genocide in Gaza. In my understanding, it is absolutely obnoxious and unacceptable that the Trump administration has imposed unilateral sanctions on members of the International Criminal Court who dared to call genocide a genocide.

And the European Union has not activated the Blocking Statute to protect members of the International Criminal Court who happen to reside in the EU. The International Criminal Court is located in The Hague, in the Netherlands, within the European Union. They should be protected by EU law. Yet the European Union says nothing, so as not to disturb Trump—the abuser, the bully, the bullying abuser in the global arena. That double standard, of course, damages the European Union’s reputation and credibility. I say this with sadness. I am not complacent.

I say it harshly because I am a fighter. I would like to bring about change so that we overcome those contradictions and double standards and actually gain leverage in the global arena by setting an example, by leading through example. That should be the idea. That should be the inspiration. Of course, I hope we learn how to do that in the foreseeable future.

There Is No Brandmauer Left in European Politics

You argue that the agreement became possible because the European People’s Party increasingly relies on cooperation with the radical right. Has the so-called cordon sanitaire effectively collapsed in migration policy?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Absolutely. There is no cordon sanitaire anymore. In German, they call it BrandmauerEs gibt keine Brandmauer mehr (there is no firewall anymore) in the European Union. There is no cordon sanitaire whatsoever. I have seen it with my own eyes. I have chaired the Committee on Civil Liberties and Human Rights for 10 years now, and I am the spokesperson of the S&D Group on constitutional affairs. And what do I see? Ever since we voted to invest the second European Commission with the votes of the EPP, the S&D, the Liberals, and the Greens, from that very moment—which marked the beginning of this parliamentary legislature—a so-called new majority has emerged, the Neue Mehrheit (New Majority), as they call it in German. It consists of the EPP together with three far-right political groups. They call themselves Conservatives, Patriots, and Sovereignists.

They are the majority. They are the ruling majority in the Parliament, in the Commission, and in the Council. And, of course, that means a great deal. In practical terms, it means there is certainly no cordon sanitaire anymore. None whatsoever. The EPP has broken all barriers against the rise of the far right. On the contrary, it is cooperating actively with the far right, and it is serving the far right’s self-congratulatory agenda. We saw that in the European Parliament when the far right, together with the EPP, secured the majority to adopt the Return Regulation, which was notorious and obnoxious in my view. They all stood up in a standing ovation and began chanting, “Send them back, send them back.” That is the picture. No Brandmauer, no cordon sanitaire anymore.

Progressives Have Been Better at Diagnosis Than at Therapy

Many observers argue that mainstream parties have not defeated populism but instead absorbed its migration agenda. Has populism already won the migration debate without necessarily winning elections?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: I’ll tell you something. I am a progressive. I am a Spanish socialist, and I have been involved in socialist- and progressive-led platforms and think tanks for many years now. That means I have taken part in countless roundtables, seminars, symposiums, congresses, and conferences of progressive parties dealing with the populist agenda and the rise of populism. My first point is this: we progressives are very good at diagnosis, but we are very bad at therapy. We are very good at analyzing what is going on, but we have not been effective so far in reversing the rising tide of populism.

Of course, we do know what populism is about. Populism is a way of simplifying complexity. It is a way of lying to people, of infantilizing them by scapegoating individuals or entire groups in order to exploit the anger directed against those who are being scapegoated. The idea is simple. You’re in pain, you’re in trouble, you’re in disarray, you feel discomfort. Are you angry? I tell you something: I don’t have a solution for you. I have something better. I have someone for you to hate, and I will point my finger at someone for you to hate.

Of course, migrants are the number one choice. But it can also be Muslims, Black people, LGBTQ people, or women, because men are supposedly becoming impoverished as women advance. That is also a very common idea on the far right. You, a young man, are told that you have fewer opportunities than your father did because your father did not have to compete with so many empowered women. Because women are empowered, you have fewer opportunities. And then young people move to the far right all over the place. It’s very tempting, but it’s stupid.

Of course, it should be challenged. It should be fought against. But still, populism is on the rise. Of course, it has heavily contaminated the migration agenda. Populism has managed, first and foremost, to spread fear everywhere: We have been invaded. Migration is out of control. Sooner or later, you’re going to be replaced. Europe is not going to be white and Christian by tomorrow evening. By tomorrow evening, Europe is going to be Black and Muslim. Don’t you see? They are invading us. They are out of control. You have to react. You have to do something about it.

That kind of fear is spreading everywhere. Of course, it is evil rhetoric. It has to be fought against. It has to be dismantled. To begin with, it is not true. It is not true that migration is massive. It is not true that migration is out of control. It is not true that it is a conspiracy. It is not true that Europe is changing color or religion. It is simply not true. It is simply a lie. But still, it works.

That is why we progressives have a challenge: not only to be good at diagnosis, but also to become good at therapy. What should we do to reverse this trend? That is a huge challenge for progressive thinking and for progressive policymaking.

The Return Regulation Europeanizes the Meloni Model

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen meet in Brussels, Belgium on November 03, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You have repeatedly criticized what you call the ‘Melonization’ of European migration policy. To what extent has Giorgia Meloni succeeded in redefining the migration agenda not only in Italy but across the European Union itself?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Take a look at the Return Regulation. What happened? First, Meloni tried to strike a deal with neighbouring Albania in order to establish return hubs outside Italy through an agreement based on an exchange of money. But then, the Italian courts struck down what is, in my understanding, a sick idea. They rejected the initiative on the grounds of Italian law.

Meloni then went to the European Commission and essentially said: “Hey, listen, I need an umbrella. I need an EU umbrella for this because the Italian umbrella is not enough. The Italian courts are rejecting the legality of what I’m trying to do with Albania. We should put it into EU law.” And that is how they Melonized the return policy. They effectively elevated the Italian idea—the Meloni idea—to the European level. But the bad news is that the Return Regulation contradicts the very principle that migration and asylum legislation at the European level should be based on shared responsibility and binding solidarity. There is no shared responsibility in negotiating with a third-country ruler to establish a return hub financed by your own budget. There is no European added value in legalizing and Melonizing return policy and legislation.

There is simply no added value. It is left to the member states to negotiate. Of course, Spain is not compelled to do that. Spain is not doing it, as long as the Spanish government remains in progressive hands. But others may try. They may ask, “Why shouldn’t I pay the ruler of Tunisia? Why shouldn’t I pay some African dictator so that I can fly some Black people out of my country?” Of course, as I have already explained, the idea itself is evil-minded. To begin with, I heard many times during the negotiations: “Fly them to Rwanda.” And my question was always: “Why Rwanda?” Only because you think it makes no difference as long as they are Black. As long as they are Black, you think it doesn’t matter whether they are in Rwanda. It doesn’t matter whether they come from Mali, Niger, or Uganda—you simply fly them to Rwanda because, supposedly, it makes no difference there as long as they are Black.

Is that not racism? Is it racist? Absolutely racist. You have to care about people, about human beings. You cannot fly a Malian or a Nigerian to Rwanda because there is no purpose. There is simply no point in flying them to Rwanda just because you are paying Paul Kagame, the ruler of Rwanda for 35 years now. That is a preposterous idea. And yet, that is the Melonization of return policy.

Asylum Is a Right That Must Be Respected, Whatever the Cost

The Commission argues that stronger returns are indispensable for preserving public support for legal asylum. Is Europe sacrificing liberal constitutionalism in an attempt to save political legitimacy?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: Respect for asylum seekers must remain unwavering. The European Union is bound by international law, which includes both international humanitarian law and human rights. And, of course, the Geneva Convention relating to the protection of asylum seekers—the Refugee Convention—is international law, indeed one of the fundamental pillars of international law. So, yes, migration is a fact, not a crisis, not a threat. It is simply a fact. But you know what? Asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost, no matter what. It must be respected.

The problem is that there is now a prevailing idea within the current political landscape we have been discussing, one that is increasingly leaning to the right and the far right. That idea is that most asylum seekers are fraudulent. They are portrayed as economic migrants seeking better opportunities. According to this logic, they all have to be discouraged. Migrants are discouraged, and asylum seekers are discouraged as well. Because, as the ministers of the interior argue, most asylum seekers are actually fraudulent. They are not people being persecuted. They are not people whose physical integrity is at risk. They are simply people seeking better opportunities. So seeking asylum is presented as nothing more than legal advice given to them by their counsel. And they, too, have to be discouraged. That is deeply worrisome.

We should protect asylum seekers because that is part of the European Union’s identity and its commitment to human rights. It is both a fundamental principle and a legal obligation. Every member state, individually, is a signatory to the Geneva Convention. And the European Union itself is bound by international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights.

No Human Being Should Ever Be Described as Illegal

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

And lastly, you have warned that Europe risks normalizing practices that were once politically unthinkable. Looking beyond migration, do you see this normalization as part of a broader process of democratic backsliding within the European Union itself?

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar: We’ve got to care about it. I do care. I’m a fighter against that trend. I’ve always tried to stand up whenever I have seen signs of it unfolding before my eyes, here in the European Parliament and elsewhere. Of course, you can see that things are changing for the worse in the European Parliament in that regard as well. 

For instance, when I first came to the European Parliament, no one talked about illegal migrants. They spoke about irregular arrivals, but never about illegal human beings. Now it’s the new normal. You hear it a thousand times in every plenary session in Strasbourg. And you know what? No one notices anymore. No one stands up anymore and says, “Hey, listen, this is unacceptable. Are you talking about illegal human beings or what?” That’s unacceptable.

Migrants are not guilty because they tried, even in the worst of circumstances. Take, for instance, the boats coming to El Hierro in the Canary Islands. We receive 46,000 people a year in the Canaries, arriving by wooden boats departing from the western coast of Africa. It is the most perilous and deadliest route to the European Union. The Atlantic is much rougher than the Mediterranean. The waves are much higher in the Atlantic. And you know what? None of those trying to reach the European Union through the Canary Islands—because the Canary Islands are part of the European Union, absolutely—ignores the risk of perishing in the attempt, the risk of losing their lives. And still they try.

When they sink to the bottom of the sea, tragically, they are, in effect, saying, “Hey, listen, I’m dying, but still I had to try. I do not regret it because I had to try.” It’s terrible. That means a great deal. It means they are not taking a frivolous step, or trying to commit fraud, or trying to be troublemakers, or trying to create problems, or bring their problems to a foreign land. They are trying to do something with their lives out of despair. And that life is the only one they have. They are willing to sacrifice it for the sake of making it. That deserves respect.

The point I’m making is that the new normal is losing that human understanding of the tragedy I am describing. Instead, through aggressive rhetoric, those human beings are portrayed as illegal, as an invasion, as a threat to your security or to your identity. That is completely unworthy of the European Union. The European Union should not be like that.

So, I’m a fighter. Whenever I see that happening in the European Parliament, I react. But still, the question is: how long will it go?

Professor Aziz Huq.

Prof. Huq: The US Supreme Court Has Created the Conditions for Democratic Backsliding

As democratic backsliding increasingly unfolds through legal institutions rather than overt constitutional rupture, what distinguishes constitutional resilience from constitutional decline? In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago examines how populism, executive power, judicial doctrine, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence are transforming liberal constitutionalism in the United States and beyond. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, he argues that contemporary democratic erosion often proceeds “under the cover of law,” while warning that populists are developing their own constitutional vision. From presidential immunity and democratic backsliding to algorithmic governance and AI-driven power concentration, Professor Huq offers a timely and sophisticated analysis of democracy’s evolving constitutional challenges in the twenty-first century.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the democratic world, constitutional democracy is undergoing a profound transformation. Contemporary democratic erosion rarely arrives through military coups or overt constitutional rupture. Instead, it increasingly unfolds through courts, legislatures, executive decrees, and formally legal mechanisms that gradually weaken institutional constraints while preserving the appearance of constitutional continuity. At the same time, digital platforms and artificial intelligence are reshaping the public sphere, altering the production and circulation of political information, and redistributing power between states, private technology companies, and citizens. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future of liberal constitutionalism, democratic resilience, and the capacity of democratic institutions to withstand both populist governance and technological disruption.

Few scholars have done more to illuminate these intersecting challenges than Professor Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. One of the world’s leading authorities on constitutional law, democratic backsliding, judicial independence, executive power, and the constitutional implications of artificial intelligence, Professor Huq has produced influential scholarship that bridges American constitutional law with comparative democratic politics. His work has fundamentally reshaped scholarly debates on constitutional resilience, the institutional foundations of liberal democracy, and the legal mechanisms through which elected governments may gradually undermine democratic competition without abandoning constitutional forms.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Huq argues that understanding contemporary democratic backsliding requires moving beyond conventional labels such as populism or authoritarianism toward a more institutional analysis of incentives, constitutional design, and political time horizons. Drawing on Mancur Olson’s theory of the “stationary bandit,” he suggests that “the crucial question” is not simply whether a leader is populist, but “what the time horizon of a populist leader is.” In his view, democratic stability depends heavily on whether political leaders remain constrained by long-term institutional incentives or instead pursue short-term extraction of political and economic rents.

Turning to the United States, Professor Huq contends that “American democratic erosion is proceeding under the cover of law.” Rather than dramatic constitutional breakdown, he identifies legal innovations—including aggressive partisan gerrymandering, expansive presidential authority, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence—as mechanisms through which democratic competition is being incrementally weakened. Most strikingly, he argues that “the Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding,” particularly through its broad conception of presidential immunity and its endorsement of constitutional doctrines that facilitate the concentration of executive power.

Yet Professor Huq’s analysis extends well beyond the American case. He argues that “populists have developed their own version of constitutionalism,” challenging the assumption that constitutionalism necessarily remains synonymous with liberal democracy. Rather than witnessing the disappearance of constitutional government, he suggests, democracies may instead be entering an era in which competing constitutional visions coexist and contest one another. Simultaneously, the digital transformation of politics introduces an additional layer of constitutional complexity. While acknowledging that empirical evidence remains incomplete, Professor Huq warns that contemporary information ecosystems reward emotional engagement over deliberation, observing that “the shift from reasoning to emotion favors populist politics.” He also cautions that, despite its transformative potential, artificial intelligence is currently reinforcing rather than reducing inequalities, concluding that “AI is concentrating power rather than leveling the playing field.”

Ultimately, Professor Huq offers neither fatalism nor easy optimism. Instead, he presents a sober institutional diagnosis of democracy’s contemporary challenges while emphasizing that democratic renewal will require rebuilding effective constitutional constraints, representative institutions, and political organizations capable of responding both to populist pressures and to the unprecedented constitutional questions raised by the digital age.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Aziz Huq, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Crucial Question Is Whether a Populist Leader Has a Long or Short Time Horizon

Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: Joe Sohm.

Professor Aziz Huq, welcome! Let me begin with your recent commentary, “The Orange Bandit.” In this commentary, you employ Mancur Olson’s distinction between “stationary” and “roving” bandits to argue that Donald Trump’s second presidency has shifted from a potentially durable governing project toward the short-term extraction of political and economic rents. How does this framework deepen our understanding of democratic backsliding beyond the conventional language of populism or authoritarianism?

Professor Aziz Huq: Mancur Olson was an important political scientist and economist who wrote an influential article explaining both the origin of states and the way states evolve into either dictatorships or democracies. Olson’s model, although a highly simplified one, offers us a way of thinking about the development of states and the ways in which they legitimate themselves over time in a fashion that I think is helpful both in the United States and more generally.

Olson’s basic model is that a state begins when a powerful force that has acted as a predator upon a population ceases to move around. It goes from being mobile to what Olson called a stationary bandit and starts extracting revenues, in the form of taxation, from a stable and geographically persistent population. That part of Olson’s model explains the origin of the state.

What’s relevant here is that Olson then identifies two different strategies that the stationary bandit can pursue. The first is to extract a relatively limited amount of revenue with the aim of maintaining long-term economic prosperity and stability, thereby enabling a high rate of revenue extraction over time, even if only a relatively small percentage of revenue is extracted in any given period. So, that is a strategy that depends upon having a long-time horizon.

The second strategy that Olson identifies is one in which the stationary bandit seeks to extract as much as it can in as short a period of time as possible. That strategy is obviously not stable, but it is likely to produce both economic deterioration and political instability over the medium term.

One thing we have seen in the second Trump administration is an acceleration of revenue- and rent-extraction activities on the part of the White House. This is underscored by reporting that appeared in the last two days, after the Project Syndicate piece that you mentioned, describing the president’s increase in assets between 2024 and the end of 2025. That reporting shows that his assets have increased by about $2 billion. Much of this comes from activities in the cryptocurrency and financial speculation space. Other parts come from deals forged either with foreign governments or through the facilitation of foreign governments via the larger Trump Organization.

What the piece argues is that what we are seeing in the United States is a transition from the first to the second form of Olson’s stationary bandit. We are witnessing a move from a stationary bandit—or a state—that has a long-time horizon and therefore is able to constrain itself when it comes to rent extraction, to one in which the incentives for constraint seem to have vanished.

What is useful about Olson’s model—not just for the American case but more generally for the study of populism—is that it foregrounds a specific and important question. That question concerns the time horizon of a populist leader. It encourages us, I hope productively, to think about why a populist leader might, at certain moments, have a long time horizon, in which they are relatively constrained in terms of revenue and rent extraction, while at other moments they may have a much shorter time horizon, in which case the incentives for restraint are much weaker.

American Democratic Erosion Is Proceeding Under the Cover of Law

Much of your scholarship argues that democratic erosion proceeds through constitutional and legal mechanisms rather than overt constitutional rupture. Looking at the United States today, which recent developments most clearly illustrate constitutional backsliding under the veneer of legality, and how has Trumpism transformed the American constitutional order in ways that may outlast Donald Trump himself?

Professor Aziz Huq: Let me give you two examples of forms of backsliding—or mechanisms of backsliding—that are presently unfolding in the United States under legal cover. The first is the reorganization of legislative districts, which are the units of representation within the national Congress, through a process known as gerrymandering. Gerrymandering involves drawing district boundaries in ways that make it almost certain that one party—the favored party—will win the election. Historically, gerrymandering has been constrained by a web of federal statutes and constitutional requirements. However, over the past 12 months, the Supreme Court has dramatically weakened those statutory and constitutional constraints, allegedly in the name of advancing democracy.

The president has pressed his political allies, first in Texas, then in Florida, and subsequently in other states, to aggressively gerrymander those states in favor of Republicans. The result is that the electoral map—initially in Republican-controlled states and then, in response, in Democratic-controlled states—has become one in which almost all districts are safely Republican or safely Democratic. In other words, politicians know in advance how those districts will vote because of their demographic composition, leaving very few genuinely competitive elections. This is a process that is producing, through formally legal means, an electoral map that is effectively glaciated and largely immune to changes in popular preferences. That is one example.

The second, much more recent example is that only last week, the US Supreme Court, in a case called Trump v. Slaughter, embraced a constitutional doctrine known as the Unitary Executive Theory. The Unitary Executive Theory holds that the president has virtually unlimited authority to remove almost all officials below him or her within the executive branch. The president has already exercised versions of the authority this theory confers by dismissing a large number of regulatory officials and prosecutors within the Department of Justice. Prosecutors within the Department of Justice who remain subject to the threat of dismissal have come under immense pressure to bring cases against individuals whom the president has identified as political opponents, including James Comey, the former Director of the FBI, and Letitia James, the Attorney General of New York State.

That is an example of a legal theory that the Supreme Court has embraced under the rubric of democracy and a particular interpretation of the Constitution—an interpretation that I find unpersuasive, to put it mildly. Its direct and significant consequence has been to facilitate the weaponization of prosecutorial power. And I know you know the Turkish case very well—but we also know from many other cases of democratic backsliding that once prosecutions become weaponized, the space for democratic contestation narrows dramatically.

History Is Made by Both Long-Term Structures and Unpredictable Moments

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Your work suggests that democratic fragility emerges from the interaction of long-term structural forces—including constitutional design, widening economic inequality, and identity politics—rather than isolated political events. To what extent should Trump’s rise be understood as a symptom of these deeper pathologies rather than their principal cause?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is a large question that verges on the philosophical. If you speak to historians, some will emphasize what French scholars call la longue durée—the tectonic, slow-moving social and economic forces that serve as the engines of historical change. Others will point to discrete events—for example, the COVID pandemic or 9/11, which, in recent memory, have been important turning points for the United States—as the principal drivers of change. Still others might point to so-called great men, particular individuals who appear to play an outsized historical role.

My own view is that both of these accounts capture part of the truth, albeit to different degrees and at different moments. I think that understanding our current political moment requires attention both to the underlying structural forces—which, as you suggest, are economic in nature and also concern cultural change—and to the particular and unpredictable effects of discrete individuals and discrete events.

For example, it would be difficult to explain Trump’s second electoral victory in 2024 without taking into account one medium-term structural factor: the rise and subsequent decline of inflation in the wake of the COVID pandemic. At the same time, it would be a mistake to explain that outcome without paying attention to discrete events, particularly the failed assassination attempts against President Trump and the manner in which he responded to it. Both of these factors are important. The weight one assigns to each is, however, in part a reflection of one’s underlying philosophical commitments.

There Are More Parallels Than Divergences Between the US and Other Backsliding Democracies

Comparative studies of democratic backsliding often highlight attacks on courts, electoral administration, the civil service, and independent oversight bodies. Does the United States now resemble trajectories previously observed in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Turkey, or India, or does its constitutional architecture produce a distinct American model of democratic erosion?

Professor Aziz Huq: There are more parallels than divergences between the United States and the other jurisdictions you mentioned. In the United States, the insulation of the independent bodies you listed has always been imperfect. The courts are probably the most constitutionally entrenched of those institutions. However, the appointment mechanism for judges to the federal bench in the United States has, since the 1780s, run through the White House and the Senate. As a consequence, it has always been politicized, and there has never been a moment in American history when the US Supreme Court, in particular, as the country’s apex court, has been meaningfully free from the partisan forces that have shaped and directed its agenda. So, the Supreme Court has always been political. It just so happened that, at the beginning of his second term, Trump inherited a Court with six justices aligned with his party, including three whom he himself had appointed.

With respect to the civil service and other independent bodies, there is a degree of insulation that is not embodied in the constitutional text but rather in federal statutes. At least this administration has been quite successful in attacking—or simply ignoring—those statutory constraints. One important way in which the United States does differ from other jurisdictions that have experienced democratic backsliding, however, is its federal structure. In this respect, it is unlike Hungary, unlike Poland, and unlike Turkey, as I understand it, although somewhat similar to India.

Critically, under the Constitution, responsibility for election administration is largely diffused across the state and local levels and is therefore insulated from direct federal control. What this means is that federal efforts to seize control of election administration face extraordinarily high transaction costs. This is why Trump has been pushing the SAVE Act in Congress, which represents an effort to partially federalize—arguably unlawfully—a number of aspects of election administration. This is also why there has been discussion of deploying immigration agents—ICE agents—to polling stations around the country in November. These are the pathways being pursued because the more direct instruments available in countries such as Hungary and Poland are not necessarily available in the United States due to its federal electoral structure.

Presidential Immunity Has Changed the Constitutional Balance of Power

Donald Trump
Photo: Aleksandr Potashev / Dreamstime.

In “The Counterdemocratic Difficulty and your work on judicial independence, you argue that courts shape democracy not merely through landmark decisions but through their broader institutional role. How should we evaluate today’s Supreme Court—and the federal judiciary more broadly—in either constraining or facilitating democratic backsliding during Trump’s second presidency?

Professor Aziz Huq: The Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding, not only through the mechanisms that I’ve already identified, but also through other decisions that have made democratic backsliding much easier and much more attractive.

The most important of those decisions is one that the scholarship you mentioned does not address because it postdates that work. This is the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision granting the president a broad, almost absolute degree of immunity from criminal prosecution. That decision arose from a case involving the president’s role in the violence of January 6, 2021, and the associated efforts to derail the certification of the 2020 presidential election results. The effect of this presidential immunity ruling, which formally applies only to the president but, in practice, is likely to extend to and shield much of the conduct of the president’s subordinates, has been profound.

This is why you now see presidential advisers willing to argue that all federal agents are effectively immune from legal constraints. Stephen Miller, for example, made precisely that claim only days before ICE agents shot and killed Alex Pretti in Minneapolis, Minnesota. This is why you see not only a sense of immunity on the part of the president, but also a broader community of federal officers and agents behaving as though the law no longer applies to them. I think responsibility for that consequence—and, arguably, moral responsibility for the harms, including the deaths that have followed—must be laid at the feet of the Supreme Court that issued the immunity ruling.

Populists Have Developed Their Own Version of Constitutionalism

Across Europe and North America, populist leaders increasingly portray constitutional checks, independent institutions, and the administrative state as obstacles to the authentic will of “the people.” Has constitutionalism entered a new phase in which its greatest challenge comes not from coups or revolutions but from democratically elected governments themselves?

Professor Aziz Huq: I would modify the question slightly and distinguish between, on the one hand, liberal democratic constitutionalism, which is coming under the pressure that you describe, and, on the other hand, new populist forms of constitutionalism.

I think we make an analytical mistake—or go analytically awry—if we do not take seriously the idea that the new wave of populists, from Hungary to Turkey, from India to Japan, and even to the United States, have developed their own version of constitutionalism. That version may or may not, in some of those jurisdictions, become a durable and long-term form of constitutional order. So, I do think that we are witnessing a change in the nature, or at least the potential, of constitutionalism as a style of government.

I also think that the liberal, individual rights-focused conception of constitutionalism—and democratic in the sense of enabling not only free political choice but also the revision and reconsideration of political preferences—is the defining characteristic of liberal democracy. Those ideas are coming under increasing pressure, not simply because of innovations in American constitutional theory, but because those innovations are being diffused. They are learned in one jurisdiction after first being developed and deployed in another. What emerges from this process is not the disappearance of constitutionalism, but rather something new: a different form of constitutionalism that has yet to assume a fully coherent shape, and one that many of us—I would certainly include myself among them—are still struggling to understand and to map.

The Shift from Reason to Emotion Favors Populist Politics

You have argued that digital platforms have become part of democracy’s constitutional infrastructure rather than merely private communication spaces. How are social media platforms, algorithmic amplification, and generative AI reshaping the dynamics of populism, democratic polarization, and constitutional governance?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is a very important question, but one on which the empirical evidence remains imperfect. We know that people, not just in the United States but around the world, increasingly obtain their news and information from social media, particularly from platforms such as TikTok and Instagram, where information is broken down into very small, highly digestible components.

We also know that many—though not all—social media algorithms are designed to recommend content not on the basis of its truthfulness, but according to its likelihood of generating further user engagement. These recommender algorithms tend to steer users toward increasingly radical forms of speech—politically radical speech, as well as speech that is radical with respect to cultural and ethical norms, particularly around questions of gender and sexuality.

What we do not yet have, however, is strong evidence about how what appear to be profound structural changes in the public sphere—and I use that term both in the technical sense employed by Habermas and in the ordinary sense that most people would understand—translate into changes in political behavior. We can clearly observe that the public sphere is changing, but the number of studies linking those transformations to changes in political behavior remains relatively small, and their findings are often inconclusive.

So, we have to be very careful, as scholars, when thinking about the relationship between changing structures of public communication, on the one hand, and changing patterns of political behavior, on the other. It does seem difficult to imagine, however, that the forces broadly described as populist would not benefit from this new kind of media environment. It is hard to see how they would not be advantaged by the abbreviation of communication, by the shift from reasoning to emotion, and by the outrage- and clickbait-driven structure of the information ecosystem through which people engage with and learn about the world.

AI Is Concentrating Power Rather Than Leveling the Playing Field

Photo: Dreamstime.

Your recent scholarship examines artificial intelligence through the lenses not only of procedural fairness and due process but also distributive justice. As AI becomes increasingly embedded in courts and public administration, how might these technologies either reinforce or reduce inequalities in access to justice, legal accountability, and the rule of law?

Professor Aziz Huq: One of the issues I’ve been thinking about concerns what happens when the state, and in particular its judicial apparatus, introduces or adopts new technologies such as generative AI and other predictive tools. How do these technologies change the way adjudication is delivered? How do they affect who has access to adjudication? And how do they alter the distribution of power between the state and private actors?

At present, what we see is AI tools being adopted primarily in contexts where the adopter is a relatively powerful, centralized actor. This is true in the private sector, but it is also true in the public sector, where the most significant applications that have been studied are found in criminal law, social control, and national security. These are all areas in which the state exercises coercive power to achieve its policy objectives, often in relatively opaque ways. Yet these are precisely the domains in which we are seeing the most rapid technological adoption. That suggests that the introduction of AI generally shifts power from private actors to the state.

At the same time, however, the state is becoming increasingly dependent on a very small number of private actors for the services it requires. For example, the American state functionally relies on Amazon Web Services for much of its computing capacity. It contracts with firms such as Palantir for many of its predictive capabilities. So, even as the state becomes more powerful, it is simultaneously empowering a relatively small coterie of commercial actors. This is perhaps the clearest in the case of Palantir, whose CEO, Alex Karp, has been very public about his governing philosophy. What you therefore have is a group of private corporate actors that has become increasingly influential while holding a very particular vision of the state and of its relationship to the state. What we have seen so far is a relative concentration of power, enabled by technology, in ways that are, at least on their face, not obviously normatively attractive.

On the other hand, although there are many proposals to use generative AI and other AI tools to empower actors who would otherwise be marginalized by the criminal justice system or by ordinary adjudicative processes, it is very difficult to identify examples of such projects being implemented and operating at scale. What this suggests is that, even if AI has the potential either to level the playing field or to make it more asymmetrical, in practice it appears to be making the playing field more asymmetrical.

Militant Democracy Cannot Simply Be Imported into the Digital Age

In “Militant Democracy Comes to the Metaverse?” you revisit the theory of militant democracy to analyze digital platforms. As generative AI accelerates misinformation, deepfakes, and synthetic political communication, should constitutional democracies reconsider traditional understandings of free speech, platform neutrality, and democratic self-defense without undermining liberal constitutional values?

Professor Aziz Huq: As digital platforms become increasingly important, it is inevitable that states will reconsider the ways in which they are regulated. The theory of militant democracy, which emerged in the 1930s in response to the rise of fascism in Germany and Italy, provides us with important intellectual resources for thinking about that challenge. Militant democracy, however, has had, at best, a mixed track record in Europe. It has produced more misfires than successes.

So, part of the purpose of the paper you mentioned is to caution against any wholesale importation of militant democratic ideas into this new context. Rather, we should learn from both the successes and the failures of militant democracy and think carefully about how to adapt its successes to this new technological environment.

Populists Have Evolved Faster Than Their Democratic Opponents

Looking comparatively across the democratic world, do you believe constitutional democracies have become more resilient since the first global wave of democratic backsliding began roughly a decade ago, or have populist and authoritarian leaders simply become more sophisticated in pursuing incremental, legalistic forms of democratic erosion?

Professor Aziz Huq: What we have seen so far is rapid evolution on the side of populists, slower evolution on the side of those who oppose populists, and now, in countries such as Hungary and Poland, an effort to think about what happens after populism and how one insulates a polity from populism once it has taken hold.

I would not describe this as a situation in which one side has gained the upper hand while the other has been weakened. Rather, I would say that we have moved through different moments or cycles, each characterized by different forms of contestation and by different pragmatic and moral questions that have emerged.

The Next Great Democratic Challenge Is Rebuilding Political Representation

Voters wait in line at Mary Rose Cardenas Hall North on the University of Texas at Brownsville campus during the 2008 US presidential election on November 4, 2008. Photo: Dreamstime.

Finally, Professor Huq, if you were advising constitutional reformers seeking to future-proof liberal democracy against both authoritarian populism and the emerging challenges posed by artificial intelligence, digital platforms, and algorithmic governance, what institutional reforms would you prioritize?

Professor Aziz Huq: This is obviously the million-dollar question. And I don’t have a million-dollar answer. I do think that we have learned a lesson that the brilliant political scientist Juan Linz tried to teach us in the 1970s about what he called the perils of presidentialism. We’ve seen, time and again, the importance of having effective checks on the power of the executive branch. These can come from the courts, from so-called guarantor or fourth-branch institutions, such as auditors’ offices or independent prosecutors, and from the creation of a federal structure.

We’ve also seen the importance of building effective systems of representation that do not flow through the presidency. So, for example, in the United States, there is a real need to rethink how Congress is constituted. What are the structures of representation that generate the federal Congress? And how do you create a federal Congress that has both the incentive to respond to shifts in popular sentiment and is sufficiently coordinated to stand up to the presidency? That requires, among other things, a shift from a first-past-the-post system to a more proportional electoral system.

I also think it is difficult to imagine that this kind of reform of non-executive representative bodies can occur without also rethinking the political party structures that underpin them. One of the things that has happened over the last two decades is the collapse of traditional party structures. I think this is very clear in Europe. In the United States, you are seeing the same process unfold, albeit in a slower and more opaque fashion. The Republican Party has functionally collapsed. It has been taken over by its MAGA faction. And if you look at Democratic voters’ views of the Democratic Party, you see that the Democratic Party no longer has the kind of stable base or loyalists that it had 30 or 40 years ago. So that looks to me like a collapsed party structure of the kind that is plainly manifest in the United Kingdom, plainly manifest in France, and in other European jurisdictions. It simply has not yet taken an electoral form in the United States.

In that context, we need to think very hard about the associational forms of political representation. How do we coalesce into political communities in ways that effectively represent people, and, in particular, those who are on the sharp edge of economic change, whether that change stems from globalization or from the wave of unemployment that AI may well generate?

I don’t know if there is a general legal answer to that question. The answer in the United States is almost certainly going to be different from the answer in the United Kingdom, different from the answer in France, and different from what Turkey looks like. But it is one of the most important areas of reformist thinking that needs to be pursued over the next five to ten years.

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

Liberal Democracy in the United States: The Challenge of Trumpism

Please cite as:
Streich, Gregory W. (2026). “Liberal Democracy in the United States: The Challenge of Trumpism.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). July 01, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000126



Abstract

Liberal democracy is increasingly challenged by the rise of populism in the twenty-first century. In the United States, the rise of President Donald Trump, a populist leader pursuing policies that differ from those of traditional Republican Presidents, is increasingly challenging the norms and institutions of liberal democracy. In this paper, I examine populism as an ideology, style, and strategy, and apply those criteria to Trumpism as a unique form of populism in the US. I also examine the economic, political, and cultural themes of Trumpism. And while Trumpism has a domestic orientation highlighted by the slogan “Make America Great Again,” it also has an international orientation highlighted by the slogan “America First.” In both orientations, it is transforming US liberal democracy from within and altering its position as a leading defender of liberal democracy and free trade on the international stage.

Keywords: populism; democratic backsliding; liberal democracy; Trumpism; nativism; ethnonationalism; populist foreign policy

 

By Gregory W. Streich

Introduction

The twenty-first century has not been kind to liberal democracy: there are now fewer democratic nations in the world than at the dawn of the twenty-first century. In 2005, there were 27 democratizing regimes compared to 12 autocratizing regimes, but by 2025, the numbers flipped to 18 democratizing regimes compared to 44 autocratizing regimes (Nord et al., 2026). Researchers at V-Dem have found that liberal democracies declined from 22.03% of all nations in 2000 to 17.83% by 2023, while over the same period, electoral autocracies held steady, representing 32.2% of all nations in 2000 and 31.84% in 2023 (Nord et al., 2025). Additionally, V-Dem dedicated a section titled “USA – A Democratic Breakdown in the Making?” in their Democracy Report 2025, drawing attention to President Trump’s actions that purged military and civil servants as well as threatened independent media outlets, judges, universities, and more (Nord et al., 2025: 46-47). As a result, V-Dem’s 2026 report concluded that the United States has lost its status as a liberal democracy for the first time in fifty years, and instead joins the ranks of “electoral democracies” in which “liberal characteristics of established democracies – such as checks and balances on the executive, respect for civil liberties, and the rule of law – are eroding”(Nord et al., 2026: 10).

Similarly, a February 2025 report from Bright Line Watch found that the “overall performance of American democracy on a 0–100 scale has fallen to the lowest levels observed since they began tracking this measure in 2017: 53 among the public and 55 among experts” (Bright Line Watch, 2025). In their 2026 report, the public’s rating of democracy in the US dipped to 49 in April 2025 before rebounding back to 52 in early 2026, while expert ratings were relatively unchanged at 56 (Bright Line Watch, 2026). Additionally, the US has seen its Freedom House scores drop in recent years from 89/100 “free” to 84/100 in 2025 to 81/100 in 2026 (Freedom House, 2025, 2026). To be sure, the US is still a strong democracy. But when the world’s oldest, wealthiest, and, in many ways, most powerful democracy is identified as a case of democratic backsliding (Levitsky & Way, 2025), this is a significant development that has important ramifications for the health of liberal democracy both domestically and globally.

While liberal democracy is in retreat around the world for several reasons, one is the rise of populism. Both left- and right-wing populist leaders and political parties have emerged in various countries in reaction to the economic challenges of globalization and the rise of migration, both of which have sparked the anti-globalist and anti-immigration reactions that fuel populism (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Judis, 2016; Moffitt, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Scheiring et al., 2024). As such, populism is a symptom of those underlying causes but also exacerbates those anxieties and fears. While the US has seen the emergence of a left-leaning populism in the form of the Occupy Wall Street movement and the rise of Senator Bernie Sanders as a national political figure, in this paper, I focus on the rise of Trumpism as a right-leaning populism led by  Donald Trump’s “Make America Great Again (MAGA)” and “America First” movement. Indeed, political journalists have claimed that President Trump is undertaking the “Orbánization” (Beauchamp, 2024; Marantz, 2022, 2025) or even the “Putinization” of the US (Glasser, 2025; Kasparov, 2025).

Donald Trump is not alone in using populist appeals and styles to consolidate power and pursue his agenda. Populists of the left and right, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Narendra Modi in India, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, have all come to power through legitimate electoral mechanisms. However, once in office, “these populist leaders have skewed political competition by implementing discriminatory electoral rules, orchestrating partisan takeovers of the judiciary and of other independent institutions, and launching constant attacks on the media” (Rovira Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2025, p. 97). President Trump is following a similar playbook by using the power of the Presidency to reward friends and punish foes, all while consolidating more power in the Executive branch. For example, Trump has used Executive Orders, the Justice Department, and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to purge civil servants and attack judges, independent journalists, and political opponents. He has also intimidated and threatened legal action and regulatory review of universities, media outlets, late-night talk show hosts, and law firms. And, he has asserted (and attempted to assert) Executive control over independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve, National Labor Relations Board, and the National Science Foundation (among others), usurped Congress’s power of the purse, and has gone to war in Iran without Congressional consultation or approval (Luttig, 2025).

To the extent that Trumpism appeals to social conservatives who openly admire Viktor Orbán and Vladimir Putin for their defense of traditional gender roles and opposition to what they see as decadent liberalism, immigration, and LGBTQ rights, it is little wonder that the domestic policies of Trump reflect some of the same policies pursued by Orbán as he has turned Hungary into an illiberal democracy (Beauchamp, 2024b; Field, 2025: 17; Marantz, 2022; Rudolph, 2024). Indeed, Orbán has attended and spoken at several CPAC events in the US as well as hosted CPAC events in Hungary, cementing the ideological convergence of Orbánism and Trumpism. Further, Snegovaya et al. (2023) highlight many socially conservative policies on traditional gender roles and opposition to LGBTQ rights of Putinism that overlap with Trumpism in the US. While there are important differences, these overlapping policy interests are why some social conservatives in the US view Putin and Russia as an ally of the US in the battle against what they see as decadent liberal Western values.

Given the populist turn in the US and elsewhere, we are witnessing the formation of a new ideological conflict that will shape the twenty-first century: the battle between liberal democracy on one side and various forms of populism, autocracy, and authoritarianism on the other. An open question is which side the US will take in this battle, especially when it is being transformed from within by Trumpism.

The remainder of this paper consists of four parts. In Part 2, I review the literature on populism to argue that Trumpism meets the criteria of populism in its ideology, style, and strategy. I then examine the economic (Part 3), political (Part 4), and cultural dimensions (Part 5) of Trumpism and, in so doing, draw out some of its domestic and international manifestations. I then conclude (Part 6) with some observations about future research questions for the study of populism in general and Trumpism in particular.

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Dr. Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Opposition to LGBT Rights Is Ultimately a Contest Over International Authority

Homophobic counter-protesters from Malopolscy Patrioci organization, during manifestation against Krakow Equality March (Pride parade) at Main Market Square in Krakow, Poland on August 29, 2020.

Dr. Pauselli, welcome! Let me begin with your recent research on LGBTQ+ rights and authoritarian politics. You suggest that opposition to LGBTQ+ rights is often embedded within broader resistance to the liberal international order. Why have sexual orientation and gender identity issues become such powerful symbols in contemporary struggles over sovereignty, nationalism, populism, and global norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: First, international law has historically been understood through consent. Sexual orientation and gender identity norms, by contrast, expanded rapidly at the international level, largely through the interpretive work of courts, treaty bodies, and non-state actors rather than through explicit state agreement. That makes them an almost ideal target for a sovereigntist critique: they can be portrayed as obligations imposed without consent by unelected actors, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of international institutions. The ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.

The second reason is that these issues rest upon the symbolic material that nationalism mobilizes: the family, reproduction, the gender order, and the continuity of the nation across generations. That makes them a clear boundary marker. In my own work, I think about this in terms of ingroups and outgroups. Criticism over human rights tends to produce compliance among states that see the critic as one of their own and backlash among those that see the critic as an adversary. LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.

Third, opposition is cheap. Restricting these rights carries little material cost and threatens no powerful economic interests, while yielding a high identity return. It is a low-cost, highly visible signal of standing apart from the liberal international order.

Many authoritarian governments portray LGBTQ+ rights as foreign impositions or manifestations of “Western values.” How much does this rhetoric overlap with contemporary populist narratives that oppose cosmopolitanism, globalization, and transnational human rights norms in the name of national sovereignty?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is exactly what I was mentioning. It is true that populist and conservative governments have used anti-LGBT rhetoric to challenge what is perceived as a foreign imposition. But this rhetoric, as I mentioned before, is itself borrowed from transnational actors, including both non-state actors and organized state actors abroad.

Economic Growth Can Strengthen, Rather Than Weaken, Anti-LGBT Projects

To what extent do anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns serve as political instruments through which populist and authoritarian leaders mobilize conservative constituencies, manufacture moral panics, and divert public attention from governance failures or economic grievances?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very common interpretation of the instrumentalization of anti-LGBT rhetoric. I wouldn’t say that this is not the case. This powerful strategy of opposing LGBT rights and LGBT norms does, indeed, divert attention away from economic grievances. But in the research that I’m conducting with a graduate student at the University of Illinois, what we’ve been observing is that this is not the full story. There’s also an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state and heteronormative norms.

So, on the one hand, it is true that there’s the scapegoating thesis, which basically argues that anti-LGBT rhetoric is useful for leaders because it diverts attention from the failures of their own policies. But at the same time, there is some evidence that, during periods of economic growth and economic development, this rhetoric actually becomes even more powerful in strengthening the state and reinforcing certain ideas about the state. In other words, it is precisely when the state has the resources to impose and advance these anti-LGBT projects that this rhetoric becomes most effective.

The Real Contest Is Over Who Has the Authority to Shape International Law

The UN Human Rights Council has become a major arena for disputes over sexual-minority rights. What do the debates surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) resolutions reveal about the changing nature of global human rights governance and the growing contest between liberal and illiberal visions of international order?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: The idea of sexual orientation and gender identity being discussed and debated at global international institutions, especially human rights organizations, is relatively new. In the UN Human Rights Council, the first attempt to pass a SOGI resolution occurred in 2003, while the first resolution to be voted on and adopted came only in 2011. So, this is a very recent development—less than two decades old. And every time these initiatives have emerged, we have observed strong opposition from a bloc of countries. Although this bloc has changed over time, SOGI resolutions have consistently been among the most contested issues before the UN Human Rights Council.

So, this leads to the question that I’m essentially reframing from your question: Why is this the case, and what does it tell us about the contestation between liberal and illiberal visions of the international order?

One of the things that has become much clearer recently, especially after the many interviews I conducted in Geneva last summer, is that many states—particularly liberal states—are deeply concerned about the ability of multiple international institutions to reshape international law independently. The concern is that—or at least the way many states frame it—non-state actors, including the Human Rights Council and treaty bodies, have modified or reinterpreted international law beyond the consent of states. This challenges the basic, traditional understanding of international law, which has historically rested primarily on state consent.

What many states argue is that they never signed up for this. They basically say that they never consented to incorporating sexual orientation as one of the categories protected by international human rights law. They’re not necessarily contesting that these rights should not be protected. Rather, they do not accept this as part of the international human rights project because they never consented to it.

There is no international human rights treaty that explicitly includes it, and it is not part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. So, the concern is deeper than sexual orientation and gender identity themselves. It is fundamentally about the ability of these bodies—these non-state actors—to reshape international law and then hold states accountable for standards to which they have never consented.

But there is also concern about these norms empowering domestic actors who are currently repressed and who might use these international frameworks to challenge the domestic status quo. For authoritarian rulers, this is particularly threatening. They fear allowing advances and changes at the international level that domestic actors could subsequently invoke to challenge their own rule.

Political Anxiety, Not LGBT Rights Themselves, Drives Much of the Conflict

Helsinki Pride parade.
Helsinki Pride parade on July 2, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, do you expect conflicts over LGBTQ+ rights to remain one of the principal battlegrounds between liberal and authoritarian visions of international order, or are other human rights issues likely to supersede them?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is very hard to tell. It’s very difficult to predict the future, and every time social scientists have tried to do that, they usually fail because we’re not trained to know what’s going to happen. But one thing I’ve been observing is that the transnational LGBT movement is learning how to counteract the conservative backlash. Actors who have been promoting and protecting LGBT rights have been thinking very carefully about the frameworks and strategies that might be most helpful and effective in preventing the conservative backlash from gaining further ground. If these actors ultimately succeed in limiting the conservative backlash, then conservatives will probably find another issue to politicize. In that case, LGBT rights would gradually move away from the center of this contestation over the international liberal order.

At the end of the day, societies care about their well-being. The lack of progress and the anxieties generated by technological change have probably led many individuals to embrace anti-LGBT rhetoric as a way of resisting change and channeling their own anxieties. But the current challenge for the conservative side is that it ultimately needs to start delivering results and providing answers to those anxieties. If opposition to LGBT rights fails to do that, then they may find themselves in some trouble. They may need to turn to another issue or rely on something else to maintain their political power.

Rising Powers Prefer to Reshape Existing Institutions Rather Than Replace Them

In your research on China’s influence within the UN Human Rights Council, you show that Beijing’s presence systematically affects the voting behavior of other states. What does this finding tell us about how rising powers can reshape international norms from within existing institutions rather than by creating alternative ones?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: There are many things that are relevant to this issue. One is that, when we observe China being effective or successful in undermining international legal norms through its participation in the UN Human Rights Council, the first thing that comes to mind is that creating new institutions and providing them with legitimacy is very difficult. So, many authoritarian or illiberal states that oppose the international liberal order may find it much easier to advance their own agenda—even if it is an illiberal one—from within existing institutions that already enjoy high levels of legitimacy than through creating new institutions that few people know about and that may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

But, to address your question directly, the first thing this tells us is that rising powers like China are deeply interested in global governance. They’re not after anarchy, per se. So, by opposing the international liberal order, they are not opposing order itself. They do value order and global governance, but they may object to the content of the current norms that sustain that order. As China rises to the top of the global power hierarchy, it does not isolate itself. On the contrary, it actively participates in international institutions that help build and sustain order at the global level. It works through these institutions to advance its own goals.

Secondly, the other point I want to make is that international organizations are very important actors in shaping international norms. These norms essentially delineate what constitutes appropriate state behavior and what does not. They may not have teeth. We know that there is no global police force, and there is no United Nations army. But the norms that are developed and shaped within international organizations create a context—a normative structure—in which certain forms of state behavior become more or less costly. That normative environment may benefit some countries more than others. That is precisely where the contestation lies.

Independent Expert Bodies Are More Resistant to Political Contestation

Your research challenges the assumption that participation in international institutions necessarily socializes rising powers into liberal norms. Based on the case of China, under what conditions can international institutions instead become vehicles for norm revision, contestation, and the diffusion of illiberal ideas?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very interesting question, and it’s a very difficult one for me to answer. I don’t think I have a definitive answer. What I would say is that, based on research conducted by colleagues, it seems that institutions with broad participation—especially those characterized by direct state participation, where governments send representatives who ultimately decide whether to approve an institutional outcome, and where there are no independent experts or autonomous bureaucracies—are the institutions most likely to be used by illiberal states to challenge and contest international liberal norms. That’s the case with the UN Human Rights Council, for example. Every state has one vote, and every resolution is adopted if a simple majority of states votes in favor of it.

That is not the case, for example, with treaty bodies, where decisions are made by independent experts who adjudicate the cases brought before the institution. In those settings, states cannot—or at least do not necessarily—directly influence the outcomes through official channels.

Opposition to Human Rights Is Old—Its Transnational Coordination Is New

Turkish women rallied in Istanbul to protest proposed anti-abortion laws by then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on June 18, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

How do you interpret the growing convergence between right-wing populist movements and authoritarian governments in their critiques of international human rights institutions? Are we witnessing the emergence of a transnational backlash against liberal universalism, and if so, what are its implications for the future of global human rights governance?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: One thing that I find very revealing when I teach international human rights to my students is that resistance to international human rights—and even to liberal conceptions of rights—has been with us for a long time, almost since the beginning of the universal human rights project in the post-war era. What I would say is that norms that provide tools for marginalized individuals, communities, and other actors to resist power, abuse, and the arbitrary exercise of power will always be resisted and criticized by those who benefit from the existing status quo.

What I do think is somewhat new in recent years, or perhaps over the past few decades, is the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels. This coordinated opposition to the international liberal order and its norms—especially human rights—is something that is genuinely new. The opposition itself has always existed, but the coordination of that opposition is new.

I’m not sure what the future of the human rights project will be. But I would be very surprised if attacks on the human rights project were successful without offering an appealing alternative. What I do think is that, in the short run, attacking the international liberal order may be politically appealing to some individuals or actors, but, at the end of the day, something else has to replace it. I don’t see that happening right now. Nor do I think such an alternative would be particularly appealing to most actors.

Fear Flourishes Where Diversity Is Least Experienced

Your research on intergroup contact suggests that exposure to diversity can increase support for human rights. How should we understand this finding in light of the success of many contemporary populist movements that thrive on anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and exclusionary narratives?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: It’s actually quite consistent with what we’ve been observing regarding the success of these movements in advancing anti-group rhetoric and exclusionary visions of society. If we think about Brexit, or about some research that I’ve conducted on the LGBT-free zones in Poland, the areas that have embraced this rhetoric most strongly are precisely those that have had the least contact with these perceived outgroups. So, these movements tend to be particularly successful in areas—and among individuals—with relatively little exposure to migrants, minorities, or other perceived outgroups.

Securitization Changes How Border Agents Perceive Threats

In your work with Beth Simmons, you demonstrate that border hardening can increase allegations of torture and abuse by border and immigration officials. What does this reveal about the unintended human rights consequences of securitization policies in contemporary states?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we find in our research is that the construction of border walls predicts, in the short run—between one and four years—an increase in allegations of torture committed by border and immigration officials. Importantly, this effect is limited to that specific subset of state agents. We do not observe a corresponding increase in torture allegations against other state agents, such as the police or the military, but only among those tasked with enforcing the border.

What these findings tell us is that there is a human cost to promoting securitization projects. Expensive and highly visible initiatives, such as border walls, which are designed to restrict the entry of individuals into a given country or territory, may signal to the state agents responsible for border enforcement that there is a serious threat out there—even if, in reality, there is not.

The presence of these highly visible and costly projects may also signal that these agents need to rely on more extreme measures to protect the nation or its territory. This ultimately translates into concrete actions in the form of more cases of physical abuse and human rights violations. It’s not necessarily that border walls constitute a direct instruction from political authorities to torture individuals. Rather, these projects are interpreted by border agents in two ways: first, that there is a heightened threat, and second, that they should rely on a broader range of tools to prevent that threat from affecting their own country.

Border Walls Transform Political Messages into Enforcement Practices

Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Many governments justify stricter border controls in the language of security and sovereignty. To what extent has the rise of populism transformed migration governance by legitimizing policies that may undermine international human rights protections while claiming democratic legitimacy?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we actually find in our research is very interesting in terms of the connection between populist movements and rhetoric. Rhetoric alone—whether expressing anxiety over borders or anger about migration—does not predict greater abuse. Simply having a leader speak publicly about the border, migrants, and the need to protect the nation from an external threat does not, by itself, translate into border agents committing more acts of torture. This is conceptually and theoretically related to the idea that security and sovereignty are not necessarily at odds with human rights, or at least with sovereign border control. In principle, they can coexist.

The real risk lies in how this rhetoric is interpreted by the agents tasked with enforcing the border. The situation changes when this rhetoric is combined with a costly signal. One thing is for an agent simply to hear the leader talking about the border. But it is something quite different to hear the leader talking about the border while also observing a massive border wall that has cost millions of dollars. That is a much more concrete signal that this is a serious issue, that it is a priority for the state, and that there is a serious threat out there.

Human Rights Monitoring Depends on Networks of Trust

Your research on international organizations and NGOs emphasizes the importance of trust-based relationships in the production of credible human rights information. Why are some NGOs more influential than others in shaping international responses to rights violations?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Here’s where we move to the micro level of these actors. As political scientists, we’ve traditionally thought about international organizations and NGOs as actors. We call them non-state actors, but, in reality, they are made up of individuals. NGOs do not walk down the street by themselves. We cannot observe an NGO in the same way we observe a person. An NGO doesn’t have a conscience, nor do international organizations. Individuals do. They are the staff of these organizations, and they are the ones who actually carry out their work. So, trust between organizations is often built through trust between the individuals who belong to those organizations.

In our research, we find that interactions between NGO members and international organization staff over time increase the likelihood that the international organization will later speak out about issues in the countries those NGOs care about. For example, during a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, certain NGOs participate in the proceedings. They interact with Commission members, have conversations, and even share coffee with them. Then, months or even a couple of years later, because they now have their WhatsApp number or email address, they can contact the Commission and say, “Look, this is what’s happening in this country right now.”

It’s not that the Commission would have been unaware of those violations if the NGO staff had not reached out. Rather, because the information comes from an NGO with which Commission members have already established a relationship, that information is trusted—or at least trusted more—than the same information arriving through other channels, where they may not have the same ability to assess the credibility of the source.

This is how interactions between NGOs and international organizations can shape the monitoring role of international organizations in holding states accountable to international norms. It’s not that NGOs are the only providers of this information. Rather, because of prior contacts and repeated interactions, the information they provide carries greater credibility and is therefore more likely to influence the organization’s response.

Illiberal Regimes Are Building Their Own NGO Networks

Across Europe and the Americas, populist leaders frequently frame international organizations, NGOs, and human rights advocates as unelected elites disconnected from ordinary citizens. How has this populist critique affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of global human rights institutions?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: That’s a very interesting question. At the moment, I’m not aware of research that provides a clear answer to it. But I can imagine a few ways in which we might approach it. I think rhetoric is a very powerful tool for advancing political goals. But at the same time, these same populist and authoritarian leaders have also used NGOs themselves to boost their own legitimacy and advance their own agendas. So, while they argue that nobody elected these organizations and that it is unclear whom these NGOs actually represent, they also send their own NGOs abroad and rely on the credibility of the broader NGO community to shield themselves from international criticism.

I am currently developing research with a colleague, Sarah Bush, in which we examine what we call “illiberal NGOs,” or “cheerleader NGOs.” These organizations essentially participate in international institutions to praise authoritarian governments. We’re still not sure whether this is an effective strategy, but these populist and authoritarian regimes are clearly relying on NGOs to advance their own rhetoric. At the same time, whenever NGOs say things these governments don’t like, they respond by arguing that nobody elected them. That they do not necessarily represent or enjoy the support of society.

Norms Are Contested Because They Redistribute Power

A young woman on street enjoy holding gay pride banner during a protest. Photo: Dan Rentea.

Across your scholarship, a recurring theme is that international norms are not simply imposed from above but are contested, negotiated, and reshaped through interactions among states, international organizations, and civil society actors. How should we rethink the process of norm diffusion in an increasingly multipolar world where populist, nationalist, and sovereigntist actors challenge the universality of human rights norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a tough question. I’d like to begin by saying that we should think about norms and international norms as not being value-free. They’re not value-free. At their core, a norm is an expectation of appropriate behavior. The content of these norms may reflect liberal ideas, but they can also generate expectations about illiberal behavior. It’s not the case that, simply because a norm exists, it is, by definition, a liberal one.

At the end of the day, norms are about what constitutes appropriate or expected behavior for states, actors, or individuals in general. That behavior may be either consistent or inconsistent with the status quo. The expectation may be for individuals or actors to behave differently from how they have behaved in the past, or to behave in ways that challenge the existing distribution of power.

Because norms create expectations about certain forms of behavior over others, multiple actors naturally become interested in how those norms are developed, diffused, or resisted, since they affect the status quo in one way or another. They either reinforce it or challenge it. The contestation and negotiation that you’re asking about are really about the content of these norms. Norm diffusion should be understood as the diffusion of normative frameworks that benefit certain groups over others, depending on the content of the norm.

The Future of Human Rights Depends on Their Relevance to Everyday Life

And lastly, Professor Pauselli, taken together, your work examines authoritarian resistance, rising powers, borders, human rights, international organizations, and civil society. Do you see contemporary populism as primarily a challenge to specific liberal policies, or as a broader challenge to the universalist foundations of the postwar human rights regime? What does this imply for the future of democracy and global human rights protection in the twenty-first century?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Many colleagues might not agree with this, but the way I understand populism, or the concept of populism, is that it is, by definition, at odds with liberal conceptions of the polity and of how societies are organized. In terms of what populism implies for the future of this project, populism is the latest effective tool that certain sectors of the elite have found for gaining and maintaining power. I’m not sure whether they even think about the future of the international human rights regime. Populism is simply instrumental for them in maintaining or gaining power. It is effective because of the contemporary anxieties that societies face—anxieties that many members of society do not necessarily see being addressed by liberal democracy or liberal norms.

So, basically, there are two things going on here. On the one hand, we have the supply side, where elites find populist strategies and rhetoric effective for gaining or retaining power. On the other hand, we have the demand side, where members of society are looking for alternatives that can reduce their anxieties over issues such as economic development, progress, and inequality in general. And this is why populism is so effective right now.

Now, turning specifically to the human rights project, those actors who are engaged—or have long been engaged—in promoting and protecting human rights, the liberal actors, in some way, should be thinking about developing and strengthening tools that effectively communicate, through people’s lived experiences, how these norms—how human rights—positively affect their lives. Their everyday lives, in the areas and issues they care most about. I know this is very difficult. It is very hard for a human rights NGO to communicate to rural communities, or even marginalized urban communities, that an abstract text signed 70 or 80 years ago is relevant to them if they cannot see exactly how it connects to their own lives, especially when their lives lack so many basic things. This is the main challenge if the human rights project is to survive in the future: for constituents, broadly speaking—not just elites—to understand the value of that project for their own lives.