Donald Trump and US flag.

Trump Lost, but the Conditions That Produced Populism Persist

In this commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines whether recent electoral defeats of authoritarian populists in the United States, Hungary, Brazil, and Serbia signal an emerging democratic counterwave or merely temporary setbacks for populism. Arguing that Trumpism’s electoral defeat does not eliminate the structural conditions that produced it, Professor Ozturk explores how economic inequality, institutional capture, globalization, and technological concentration continue to undermine democratic legitimacy. Drawing on comparative political economy and Daron Acemoglu’s scholarship, he emphasizes the urgency of rebuilding political representation, shared prosperity, and democratic control over technological change. Moreover, he warns that electoral victories alone cannot secure democratic renewal: without credible economic alternatives, institutional reconstruction, and effective governance, authoritarian populism may return in more resilient forms.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Can electoral defeats in the United States, Hungary, Brazil and Serbia become a genuine democratic counterwave—or will populism return unless its structural causes are addressed? Donald Trump’s resounding defeat in the November 2026 midterm elections, following electoral breakthroughs against authoritarian populists in Hungary, Brazil and Serbia, and partly in Israel, though with significant uncertainties, may mark the beginning of a democratic counterwave. Yet elections can remove or constrain leaders without eliminating the structural conditions that produced them. Unless democratic governments rebuild political representation, state capacity and shared prosperity, today’s victories may pave the way for tomorrow’s populist return.

The Democratic victory was much more than an ordinary shift in the congressional balance of power. By taking control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate—including victories in states and constituencies Trump had carried comfortably only two years earlier—Democrats delivered the most consequential institutional rebuke to Trump since his return to the White House.

According to Reuters’ detailed account of the results, Democrats secured at least 54 Senate seats and gained at least 30 seats in the House. The electoral shift extended well beyond established Democratic territory, reaching deeply Republican states such as Texas, Kansas and South Carolina. 

The table reveals the election’s two-sided character. On the one hand, the scale and geographical spread of the Democratic victory make it impossible to dismiss the result as a routine midterm correction. Trump-backed Republicans lost support almost everywhere, including in regions that had recently seemed beyond the Democrats’ reach. The outcome has restored Congress’s capacity to investigate abuses, resist presidential appointments and prevent the legislature from functioning as an extension of the executive branch.

This institutional dimension is especially important given the severity of America’s democratic deterioration. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2026 recorded a 24 percent decline in the United States’ Liberal Democracy Index during the first year of Trump’s second term, with the country falling from twentieth to fifty-first place globally. V-Dem identified legislative constraints as the most severely damaged component of American democracy and described the speed of executive aggrandizement as unprecedented in modern American history. 

Against this background, restoring an independently controlled Congress is not merely a partisan change. It reactivates one of the principal constitutional mechanisms capable of constraining executive power. It may block further democratic erosion and create institutional space for recovery. But this is still a lifeline, not a democratic restoration—and certainly not the end of Trumpism. Trump remains in the White House. The institutional damage inflicted on the civil service, judiciary, regulatory agencies, universities, media and wider public sphere has not been reversed. Nor have the economic and cultural grievances that returned him to power in 2024 disappeared. Congressional control may constrain Trump’s room to maneuver, but it cannot by itself rebuild public trust, reverse inequality, or restore the social foundations of liberal democracy.

The second half of the table is therefore as important as the first. The Democrats’ victory was broad, but support for the Democratic Party remains relatively shallow. The Associated Press Voter Poll found that many voters who supported Democratic congressional candidates remained dissatisfied with the party itself. Roughly one-fifth of Democratic voters held an unfavorable view of the party they had just voted for. Many were not endorsing a clear Democratic program; they were looking for an instrument to restrain Trump and punish the incumbent government.

The crucial fact, therefore, is that many of the citizens who punished Trump in 2026 were the same economically and culturally frustrated voters who had punished Joe Biden and the Democrats in 2024. Their movement between the parties reflects neither ideological conversion nor a stable embrace of liberal democracy. It reflects a volatile electorate that repeatedly votes against governments perceived to have failed on prices, employment, security, public services, and political integrity.

The election’s economic geography reinforces this interpretation. Voters who reported serious hardship from inflation and everyday costs moved decisively toward Democratic candidates—even in Republican strongholds. They blamed Trump’s tariffs, the Iran war and the failure to fulfill his promise to reduce prices. Corruption also mattered, particularly the perception that the presidency was being used to advance Trump’s personal, family and corporate interests. The outcome was consequently an accountability vote with two connected elements: a demand to restrain presidential power and a demand for economic delivery. Concentrating only on the first would be a serious mistake.

Congressional investigations into corruption, conflicts of interest and executive abuses are indispensable. But if Democrats define their victory primarily as an authorization to investigate Trump, they may constrain one president without weakening Trumpism. Investigations can expose abuses; they cannot make housing affordable, create career-building employment, rebuild declining regions or give working people greater influence over technological and economic change. The midterms should therefore be interpreted neither as a final defeat for American populism nor merely as a temporary anti-incumbent swing. They represent a narrow but historic window in which democratic forces can move from anti-Trump resistance to democratic reconstruction.

Whether this opening becomes a lasting realignment will depend on what Democrats do with their new institutional power. If they combine constitutional accountability with a credible programme addressing affordability, inequality, good jobs, regional decline and technological disruption, the election may become the starting point of a more durable democratic counterwave. If they return to technocratic incrementalism or assume that Trump’s personal unpopularity has solved the problem, the same electorate may swing back in 2028.

The central lesson is therefore not that American populism has been defeated. It is that Trump has become electorally vulnerable because he failed to deliver on the grievances that originally brought him back to power. Those grievances remain politically available. The question is now whether democratic government can finally address them before another authoritarian populist does.

Daron Acemoglu is right to warn that the most difficult work begins after the electoral victory. As he argues in What Happened to Liberal Democracy?, liberal democracy prospered when it was associated with shared prosperity, political voice, social mobility and the broad distribution of opportunity. It entered crisis when liberalism detached from these social foundations and became increasingly associated with technocracy, globalization, and the priorities of highly educated metropolitan elites.

If Democrats cannot respond to extreme inequality, the affordability crisis and the disappearance of secure, career-building employment—especially for workers without university degrees—the political pendulum may swing back in 2028. Neither an exclusive reliance on taxes and transfers, nor centrist attachment to the pre-Trump status quo, nor the fashionable expectation that AI-driven “abundance” will automatically resolve distributive conflict offers an adequate response.

This is precisely why the American midterm result deserves greater attention than a conventional anti-incumbent election. It creates an institutional barrier against Trump’s authoritarian ambitions, but it also places Democrats under an obligation to demonstrate that pluralist democracy can govern and deliver. If they use their congressional majority mainly to investigate Trump while failing to articulate a credible economic and social program, they may constrain him temporarily while inadvertently preparing the next Trump—or a younger, more capable successor.

In my ECPS commentary “Trump and the New Capitalism: Old Wine in New Bottle,” I argued that Trumpism 2.0 represents more than nationalist rhetoric or protectionist trade policy. It combines economic nationalism, corporate oligarchy, technological concentration and elements of digital feudalism. State power is not withdrawn from the economy; it is reorganized to serve politically connected corporations, dominant technology platforms and favored economic interests. The 2026 vote has interrupted this project, but it has not dismantled the political economy that sustains it.

The American result forms part of a wider sequence of authoritarian-populist reversals. In Hungary, the Tisza Party ended Viktor Orbán’s sixteen-year rule and secured a constitutional supermajority. According to the detailed 2026 Hungarian election analysis published by the Institut für Europäische Politik, Tisza won 53.29 percent of party-list votes and 138 of the National Assembly’s 199 seats.

In Serbia, the student-backed opposition movement that emerged from protests following the Novi Sad railway-station disaster defeated Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling alliance. Reuters reported that the movement received 52.7 percent of the vote and secured 139 of the 250 parliamentary seats.

In Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, although the narrow margin confirmed that Bolsonarismo remains deeply embedded in Brazilian political and social life. As Professor James N. Green warned in an ECPS interview conducted after the election, the Brazilian far right has lost a battle, not the wider political struggle. It retains conservative congressional support, religious networks, digital mobilization capacity and a substantial electorate.

Israel provides a more qualified case. Benjamin Netanyahu’s nationalist-religious bloc won only 53 of the Knesset’s 120 seats, but the process of forming a government remains unresolved.  Netanyahu’s parliamentary position has been severely weakened, but it would be premature to describe this as a completed transfer of power.

Taken together, these developments justify speaking cautiously of a democratic counterwave. They show that elections, civic mobilization, coordinated opposition and institutional resistance can still constrain leaders who appeared politically invincible. But they do not demonstrate that authoritarian populism has been ideologically defeated.

Populist Reverse-convergence vis-à-vis Structural Failure

In “Populist Attacks on Institutions as a Reaction to Hyper-globalization,” I argued that populist attacks on independent institutions cannot be understood separately from the economic and social dislocations produced by unmanaged globalization. Financial crises, regional decline, inequality, declining social mobility, and the perception that national governments have lost control over economic outcomes generate both demand for populism and the political opportunities populist entrepreneurs exploit.

This argument is consistent with Dani Rodrik’s research on the relationship between globalization and right-wing populism, and with Sergei Guriev and Elias Papaioannou’s extensive study of the political economy of populism. Economic shocks do not translate mechanically into populist politics. They operate through perceptions of status, cultural displacement, political exclusion, and the failure of representative institutions. In “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison,” I developed this argument further by describing a process of authoritarian convergence. Liberal democracies and explicitly authoritarian systems remain different, but widening inequality, technological surveillance, corporate concentration, regulatory capture, and weakened public institutions are narrowing parts of the practical distance between them. The result is a political paradox. Governments remain formally democratic, but citizens increasingly experience economic decisions as matters over which they exercise little meaningful influence. Elections continue, but changing the government does not necessarily alter the underlying distribution of economic power.

The political damage was compounded by the way globalization was governed. Trade integration generated large aggregate gains, but governments too often treated the workers, firms and regions bearing the adjustment costs as if they would automatically move into new and better employment. Autor, Dorn and Hanson’s research on the China shock found that import-exposed local labor markets experienced persistent falls in employment, wages and labor-force participation, while their later work linked greater trade exposure to political polarization. The OECD Employment Outlook 2026 reaches a similar conclusion across advanced economies: the benefits of openness were real, but the losses were geographically concentrated and often endured for years. The resulting backlash was therefore not simply an irrational rejection of trade. It was also a reaction to governments that liberalized markets without constructing adequate mechanisms for regional renewal, worker adjustment, social insurance and political voice.

China’s current growth model has intensified this distributive problem. China is neither the sole cause of Western deindustrialization nor merely an economic threat; its growth has enlarged world trade and accelerated the diffusion of affordable green technologies. Yet weak domestic consumption, state-directed credit, large industrial subsidies, and manufacturing overinvestment now create asymmetric competitive pressure that open market economies cannot ignore. The IMF’s 2025 Article IV consultation warns that export-led adjustment and unwarranted industrial-policy support are producing excess supply and adverse spillovers for trading partners, while the European Commission has documented extensive state-induced distortions and unfair subsidization in strategic sectors. The democratic answer cannot be indiscriminate protectionism, which would raise prices and deepen fragmentation. But passivity would accelerate industrial erosion and feed populist claims that elected governments have surrendered control. A credible response requires rules-based trade defense, reciprocity in market access, coordinated industrial and competition policy, place-based investment and pressure for China to rebalance towards domestic consumption rather than exporting its internal imbalances.

Yet such pressure will be ineffective if exercised through a fragmented, transactional multipolar order in which major powers rely on unilateral tariffs and competing economic blocs. Bringing China closer to fair play requires rebuilding an open, inclusive and enforceable multilateral order, supported by reformed WTO rules on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, excess capacity and reciprocal market access. Trump’s electoral defeat should therefore be understood not only as a setback for authoritarian populism, but also as a strategic opportunity to move beyond unilateral protectionism and toward renewed multilateral order and cooperation. If democratic governments use this opening to construct a fairer international system that reconciles openness with social protection, industrial resilience and democratic accountability, they may simultaneously address China’s distortive practices and the domestic grievances on which Trumpism and related populist movements thrive.

Under these conditions, authoritarian populism becomes a distorted form of democratic protest. Citizens support leaders who promise to recover sovereignty and political control, even when those leaders subsequently use that mandate to dismantle the institutions that make democratic correction possible.

Why Some Populists Lose—and Others Survive Failure

The emerging counterwave supports a first proposition: where electoral competition remains meaningful, authoritarian populists who govern badly may eventually be punished. Populists promise that concentrating authority will enable them to break institutional deadlock and deliver rapid results. Once in office, however, many generate corruption, patronage, inflation, declining services, administrative incompetence, and international isolation. When the discrepancy between rhetoric and performance becomes sufficiently visible, even formerly loyal voters may abandon them.

But this mechanism operates only where opposition forces can organize, voters can obtain independent information, and electoral authorities, courts, and security institutions have not been completely subordinated. My comparative study “Confronting Populist Authoritarians: The Dynamics of Lula’s Success in Brazil and Erdogan’s Survival in Turkey” demonstrated why similar economic and political failures can produce different outcomes. Lula’s broad democratic coalition defeated Bolsonaro, though it could not eliminate Bolsonarismo. In Turkey, Erdogan’s institutional capture, control over resources and capacity to fragment the opposition insulated him from the consequences of economic failure.

This leads to a second and more troubling proposition: where a populist leader has captured the state, failure may produce intensified authoritarianism rather than electoral defeat. In “A Lesson from Turkey: Economic Crises as Steppingstones, but Not Exit Routes for Authoritarian Populists,” I argued that economic crises may help populists enter power without subsequently providing an exit route from populist rule. Once leaders have captured the judiciary, media, bureaucracy, security apparatus, and mechanisms for distributing state resources, poor economic performance ceases to be sufficient to remove them.

Leaders who fear prosecution, loss of wealth or exposure of wrongdoing acquire powerful personal incentives to prevent alternation in power. The more offenses committed in consolidating the regime, the more dangerous surrendering office becomes. The regime’s failures therefore deepen its dependence on repression. Turkey illustrates this danger. Freedom House’s 2026 assessment documents the consolidation of power through constitutional engineering, institutional capture and the imprisonment of opponents, journalists and civil-society representatives.

My more recent analysis, “Stealing from the Future,” shows how such a regime may use fiscal transfers, public procurement, credit and inflation to purchase present political support by transferring the costs to future taxpayers. Economic policy becomes a technology of political survival rather than an instrument of long-term development. Consequently, no mechanical sequence in which the defeats of Trump, Orbán, Bolsonaro or Vučić necessarily predict the fall of Erdogan or Narendra Modi. Democratic openings can spread confidence, but national outcomes depend on the depth of institutional capture, the credibility of opposition forces and whether electoral punishment remains possible.

The Acemoglu Challenge: Redirecting Technological Change

The struggle over artificial intelligence will be critical to whether the American midterm victory develops into a durable democratic realignment. An ECPS long read, “The Economist versus Acemoglu: Who Will Govern the Next World Order?”, argues that the controversy surrounding Acemoglu is not simply a dispute over AI productivity. It concerns who directs technological change, who captures its gains, and whether democracy can discipline concentrations of corporate power that markets have themselves created. Acemoglu, David Autor and Simon Johnson’s proposal for “Building Pro-Worker AI” distinguishes technologies that complement workers and create new human tasks from technologies principally designed to replace labor. Acemoglu’s related intervention in Nature warns against organizing the entire technological agenda around artificial general intelligence and the automation of human capabilities.

If AI intensifies workplace surveillance, displaces labor and concentrates income among a few technology companies, it will aggravate precisely the inequalities and insecurities that nourish authoritarian populism. A democratic strategy must instead use public procurement, research funding, competition policy, worker participation and taxation to redirect innovation toward augmenting human capabilities and creating socially valuable employment. This is where the political meaning of Trump’s midterm defeat will ultimately be determined. 

Congressional investigations and institutional checks are necessary, but they cannot substitute for a new governing philosophy centered on productive employment, affordable housing and healthcare, regional regeneration, technological democracy and the reconstruction of worker power.

After Victory Comes Democratic Delivery

Democratic successors must restore legality without producing institutional paralysis. They must dismantle state capture without replacing it with partisan revenge. They must defend pluralism while demonstrating that pluralist democracy can govern, coordinate and deliver. The current electoral reversals are therefore openings rather than conclusions. The V-Dem Democracy Report 2026 finds that nearly three-quarters of the world’s population lives under autocratic rule and that democracy, for the average global citizen, has returned approximately to its 1978 level. Only eighteen countries are currently democratizing, while nearly a quarter of the world’s states are undergoing autocratization.

The American midterm victory is therefore historic, but its meaning remains unsettled. It may mark the beginning of democratic reconstruction. Equally, it may be another swing of the electoral pendulum, driven by an electorate that remains economically insecure, politically unrepresented, and willing to experiment repeatedly with anti-establishment alternatives.

If democratic governments cannot address these structural grievances, authoritarian populism will return—perhaps under younger, more disciplined and more competent leaders who have learned from the failures of Trump, Orbán and Bolsonaro. Winning an election can remove or constrain an authoritarian government. Only democratic delivery can weaken the economic, institutional and cultural conditions that continually reproduce authoritarian populism.

US President Donald Trump speaks at a White House press briefing after a Black Hawk helicopter collided with American Airlines Flight 5342 near DCA Airport in Washington on January 30, 2025. Photo: Joshua Sukoff.

The US Midterm Verdict: What’s at Stake?

In this analysis, Dr. Prerna Chahar, Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation in New Delhi, examines the political and institutional implications of the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections. With Democrats capturing both chambers of Congress, the results represent a significant setback for President Donald Trump, reshaping legislative priorities, congressional oversight, and executive-legislative relations. Dr. Chahar explores how economic discontent, inflation, tariff policies, and the US-Iran war contributed to Republican losses while raising questions about Trumpism’s future and the Republican Party’s political identity. She argues that the elections constitute a critical test of democratic accountability, institutional checks and balances, and political polarization, with consequences extending beyond Washington to global security, international partnerships, and America’s geopolitical leadership.

By Dr. Prerna Chahar*

The American midterm elections are often seen as a referendum on the incumbent president. But the Nov. 3, 2026, elections have proven that they are far more than just a regular election. It’s not just about who occupies the seats in Congress. It’s about who sets the legislative agenda, who provides oversight of the White House, and how much room President Donald Trump has to pursue his domestic and international ambitions in the last two years of his second term.

The results represent a major political blow to the Republicans. The Democrats took control of both houses of Congress, flipping the Republican majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. The question, therefore, is no longer simply who won the elections. It is what this outcome means for American democracy, Trump’s political authority, the Republican Party’s future.

A Referendum on Trump: The Politics of Public Discontent

Midterm elections have historically been tough for the party in the White House, with losses in Congress. With two exceptions, the president’s party has lost ground in every midterm election since World War II. But the size of the 2026 Democratic gains suggests more than the typical electoral penalty applied to an incumbent administration.

The economy became a defining issue. Inflation, rising living costs, fuel prices and fears of economic uncertainty have shaped voters’ opinions. The Republican campaign was also complicated by Trump’s tariff policies and the economic fall-out from the US-Iran war. A central focus of public anger was the administration’s decision to strike Iran in February 2026 and the subsequent rise in fuel prices. Voters also expressed concern about corruption, executive power and the way the administration governed.

The election also exposed the limits of presidential popularity as a substitute for good governance. Trump’s political influence has remained central to the Republican Party, but the results indicate that presidential endorsements and campaign rallies cannot necessarily insulate congressional candidates from dissatisfaction with the administration.

The scale of participation is equally significant. Preliminary estimates suggest that approximately 122.7 million ballots had been counted, representing around 48.8 percent of the eligible population. It was the second-highest midterm turnout in more than a century, behind only the record of 2018. That turnout suggests voters saw the election as meaningful for the country’s political future.

The Congressional Arithmetic: A New Political Reality

The most immediate consequence of the Democratic victory is institutional. Control of Congress determines much more than the passage of legislation. It determines committee leadership, congressional investigations, budgetary negotiations, confirmation processes and the ability to scrutinize executive decisions.

By January 2027, Democrats will have control of Congress, and the legislative landscape will be very different for the administration. The House can investigate, can subpoena officials to testify, and can look over federal spending. The Senate has constitutional authority over presidential nominations and appointments.

The new Democratic majority also keeps House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries in the race to become the first Black Speaker of the House. His leadership will be tested by the challenge of balancing progressive demands with the priorities of moderate Democrats, particularly on taxation, immigration, healthcare and economic policy. 

However, a Democratic-controlled Congress does not mean that Trump has lost executive authority. The president retains the power to veto legislation, direct executive agencies and exercise considerable discretion in foreign affairs. Democrats would require a two-thirds majority in both chambers to override a presidential veto, which they do not possess.

The result, therefore, is not a transfer of presidential power but a redistribution of institutional leverage. The next two years could bring legislative gridlock, vigorous oversight by Congress and new debates over the constitutional boundaries of executive power.

Beyond the Ballot: What’s at Stake?

The election offers Republicans a chance to answer fundamental questions about political identity and leadership. The party has to ask whether its electoral strategy has become too closely tied to the personality and political agenda of Trump.

The results could feed internal tensions between traditional conservatives, populist supporters and Republican lawmakers worried about the party’s future electoral prospects. Vice President JD Vance and other possible Republican leaders also will be asked about the party’s direction leading into the 2028 presidential election.

But it would be premature to read the results as the death of Trumpism. His political base is still an important constituency, and the Republican Party still has considerable clout in state governments and conservative political networks. The question is whether the midterm loss is because people are unhappy with specific policies, the president’s style of governing, or a general change in what voters want.

A Test of American Democracy 

The 2026 midterm elections are ultimately about how American democratic institutions function. The US constitutional system includes important elements of separation of powers, congressional oversight, and electoral accountability. Split politics can result in legislative paralysis, but it can also strengthen institutional checks and balances.

The results created a difficult political landscape for Trump in his remaining two years in office. For Democrats they provide congressional power but also the obligation to show that electoral victories can be translated into effective governance.

For the international community, the result is one more piece in an uncertain geopolitical landscape. India’s strategic partnership with the United States, European security, the Indo-Pacific balance of power and Washington’s approach towards global conflicts will all be influenced, to varying degrees, by the new congressional dynamics.

The larger lesson is that American elections are never exclusively domestic events. Decisions taken in Washington affect global markets, diplomatic relationships, security partnerships and international institutions.

But beyond the ballot, a more consequential question looms: Can America’s political institutions reconcile competing visions of national power, democratic accountability, and global responsibility? The 2026 midterms shifted the balance of power in Congress. What Washington does next will determine if they too change the course of American politics and its relationship to the world.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a Research Consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi, India. Her research interests focus on US foreign policy, inter-American relations, and regional cooperation in East Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

A demonstrator holds a sign reading “Jesus Would Never Vote MAGA” during a protest in Orlando, Florida.

Talarico, Hamilton and the Contest for American Christianity

In his commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the growing struggle over religious authenticity and political legitimacy within American Christianity. Focusing on James Talarico and Adam Hamilton, he explores how progressive and moderate Christian voices challenge MAGA’s association of religious identity with conservative political allegiance. Drawing on Norris and Inglehart’s theory of cultural backlash, Dr. Dias analyzes how Christian nationalism mobilizes anxieties over social change while portraying inclusion as a threat to religious authenticity. He argues that connecting LGBTQ inclusion, economic affordability, and social protection to Christian obligations offers an alternative political interpretation of faith. Thus, the commentary highlights religious pluralism as essential to democratic citizenship and challenges claims of exclusive ownership over Christianity.

By João Ferreira Dias

When Donald Trump described James Talarico as “beyond woke” and “an insult to Jesus,” he was claiming the authority to decide which political positions a Christian may legitimately hold. Talarico’s support for transgender people became grounds for questioning the authenticity of his faith. The accusation reveals a wider dispute over the political ownership of Christianity, in which disagreement with the MAGA movement can be presented as a departure from Christianity itself (Malcolm, 2026).

The emergence of Talarico and Adam Hamilton gives that dispute a particular significance. A Presbyterian politician and a Methodist pastor are drawing on their faith to articulate alternatives to MAGA, connecting Christian responsibility with inclusion and the ability of ordinary people to afford their lives. In doing so, they challenge an association between Christian identity and Republican allegiance that has acquired the force of a moral obligation for parts of the American electorate.

Christianity has, of course, sustained different political traditions in the United States. The Social Gospel and the role of Black churches in the civil rights movement belong to that history. What is at stake today is the public visibility and legitimacy of those alternatives in a political environment where the defense of Christianity is frequently invoked to justify resistance to social change.

The notion of cultural backlash developed by Norris and Inglehart (2019) helps explain this relationship. The expansion of liberal values can be experienced by socially conservative constituencies as the loss of a familiar moral order and of their own authority within it. Under these conditions, political mobilization draws strength from the promise to recover what has supposedly been taken away. The nation’s religious identity becomes part of that promise, giving changes in gender relations or the recognition of sexual minorities the meaning of a threat to the country itself.

Within MAGA Christianity, faith can therefore function as a claim to cultural precedence. The Christian is imagined as the rightful custodian of America, whose place must be restored against institutions and groups accused of displacing him. This gives political leadership a restorative mission: the recovery of a Christian nation whose authentic character is understood to precede, and take priority over, the choices of its increasingly diverse citizens.

But who is entitled to define that authenticity?

The attacks on Talarico and Hamilton show how theological boundaries can be made to follow political ones. Their support for LGBTQ inclusion has been used to question whether they qualify as Christians at all (Jenkins & Ashby, 2026). An interpretation of the duty to love one’s neighbor is treated as evidence that the person advancing it has abandoned the faith. The charge of being “woke” allows the substantive disagreement to be displaced by an accusation of religious illegitimacy.

Talarico and Hamilton contest that exclusion from different positions. Talarico advances a more explicitly progressive argument against Christian nationalism. Hamilton brings a more moderate approach, shaped by pastoral work across political differences. Their convergence lies in understanding Christian obligation as a reason to include people whom the cultural backlash identifies as a threat, and to address the material difficulties that restrict their lives.

This is where affordability becomes important.

A family unable to pay for medical treatment presents a moral question as well as an economic problem. The same applies to people whose wages no longer cover housing, or whose care responsibilities prevent them from earning enough to support their children. Connecting these circumstances with faith gives the commandment to love one’s neighbor a material consequence. Compassion acquires implications for the organization of public life, including the distribution of resources and access to essential services.

Talarico made that connection when he answered Trump’s attack by questioning policies that remove health coverage from sick people while granting tax reductions to billionaires (Malcolm, 2026). The response brings the debate back to the consequences of political choices. It asks what Christian responsibility requires when the people affected are poor or dependent on assistance, rather than allowing religious authenticity to be settled exclusively through positions on sexuality and gender.

Inclusion and affordability can thus form part of the same argument. A person’s dignity is affected by discrimination and by the inability to obtain treatment or maintain a home. For a moderate or progressive Christianity, both circumstances can create obligations towards the neighbor. This gives religious voters a language through which social protection and equal citizenship become coherent expressions of faith.

The democratic significance of this alternative depends on allowing that argument to remain open to disagreement. A progressive Christian claim to exclusive religious authenticity would reproduce the problem it contests. Liberal democracy provides room for religious convictions to inform political participation while requiring citizens to share institutions with people who reach different conclusions, including those who profess no religion.

Talarico and Hamilton matter because they make that possibility visible within Christianity itself. For voters accustomed to hearing that faith requires allegiance to the religious right, their interventions reopen a political choice. The Christian voter can support inclusion and policies that make everyday life affordable while understanding those commitments as part of a religious obligation. MAGA must then defend its political programme before an electorate whose faith it can no longer simply claim to own.


 

References

Jenkins, J., & Ashby, E. (2026, October 29). “Republicans turn to transgender-focused attack ads against Democrats of faith.” Religion News Service.

Malcolm, T. (2026, March 22). “War of words between Trump, Talarico heats up with president’s rant.” Chron.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841

Dr. Jelena Lončar is Associate Professor of Political Sociology at the University of Belgrade’s Faculty of Political Science and a lecturer at the School for International Training Graduate Institute. Her research examines political representation, women’s and ethnic minority rights, and autocratization in Southeast Europe.

Assoc. Prof. Lončar: Citizens Confronting Authoritarianism Can Learn Valuable Lessons from Serbia’s Student Movement

Following the October 25, 2026 electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition, Serbia offers significant lessons for citizens confronting competitive authoritarianism. In an interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Jelena Lončar of the University of Belgrade examines how student-led protests evolved into nationwide democratic mobilization through nonviolent resistance, cross-class solidarity, decentralized organization, and grassroots election monitoring. She argues that positive messaging, sustained civic engagement, and direct contact with citizens helped overcome authoritarian strategies of protest containment. Yet she cautions that Serbia’s experience cannot simply be replicated elsewhere, given differences in repression and institutional conditions. Ultimately, democratic consolidation requires independent institutions, political pluralism, and continued public scrutiny beyond electoral victory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Serbia has entered a potentially transformative political moment. What began as student-led protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway-station tragedy evolved into a nationwide movement against corruption, institutional capture, and authoritarian governance, culminating in the October 25, 2026 electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s autocratic ruling coalition. Yet translating electoral victory into democratic consolidation remains a formidable challenge.

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Jelena Lončar of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Belgrade examines how sustained civic mobilization, nonviolent resistance, and grassroots electoral oversight challenged entrenched authoritarian power—and what citizens confronting similar regimes elsewhere might learn from Serbia’s experience. As she emphasizes, “Citizens in other competitive authoritarian regimes could learn a great deal from the student movement.” The most transferable lessons, she argues, include “positive messaging, clear demands, sustained activity across the country, mobilization across social groups, and a commitment to nonviolence.”

For Assoc. Prof. Lončar, Serbia’s experience underscores the democratic potential of political participation beyond established parties and electoral institutions. Neighborhood assemblies, nationwide marches, student blockades, and citizen-led election monitoring helped transform political disillusionment into collective agency. As she observes, “The student movement succeeded in waking citizens up and encouraging them to take responsibility for their communities.”Crucially, these practices challenged not only the ruling coalition but also the political passivity on which authoritarian resilience often depends.

Drawing on her scholarship on competitive authoritarianism, political representation, and the performative dimensions of power, Assoc. Prof. Lončar highlights the significance of solidarity networks and sustained mobilization. “This combination of sustained mobilization and extensive election monitoring helped turn public dissatisfaction into an electoral challenge,” she explains. Yet she cautions against treating Serbia as a universally transferable model: more closed autocracies present different institutional constraints, opportunities for electoral competition, and levels of repression.

The interview also explores the unfinished challenges of democratic transition, including institutional capture, minority representation, gender equality, nationalism, and Serbia’s geopolitical orientation. Assoc. Prof. Lončar warns that replacing incumbents cannot automatically dismantle clientelistic networks or guarantee institutional accountability. As she stresses, “Continued public scrutiny will therefore be essential.”

Serbia’s experience raises a broader comparative question: Can movements that successfully mobilize against authoritarianism translate their moral authority into durable democratic institutions without reproducing the concentration of power they opposed? Assoc. Prof. Lončar’s analysis suggests that the decisive test lies not simply in electoral victory but in institutional pluralism, sustained civic engagement, and the peaceful transfer of power.

Here is our interview with Associate Professor Jelena Lončar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Citizens’ Renewed Political Engagement Is Essential to Serbia’s Democratic Transition

Serbia student protests.
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Lončar, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with Serbia’s historic electoral breakthrough and the challenges of democratic transition. On October 25, the student-backed list secured 141 parliamentary seats, ending 14 years of dominance by Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Yet networks established under Vučić remain deeply embedded in the judiciary, security services, public administration, and media. What are the principal obstacles to translating this electoral victory into genuine democratic transition and transformation? To what extent could institutional capture survive the defeat of the political forces responsible for sustaining it?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: I’d like to start with what has already been achieved before returning to the obstacles. I’d say that citizens who had become very passive and disillusioned with politics have become politically active again. We saw an extraordinary electoral turnout, but a great deal had already happened before election day.

We’ve seen the formation of neighborhood assemblies, a form of democratic innovation in which citizens participate in discussions of local political issues. They met in squares and parks in different neighborhoods to discuss local issues and how to support the student movement. It’s a form of direct democracy. 

We’ve also seen hundreds of thousands of citizens supporting students during their protests and marches, alongside widespread grassroots mobilization during the electoral campaign. Citizens spoke to their colleagues and neighbors about the importance of voting, volunteered to monitor elections, and became very active on social media. This is the first time we’ve seen such huge grassroots mobilization, at least in Serbia.

Immediately after the elections, we even saw citizens painting over graffiti and cleaning up public spaces, demonstrating that they care for the public good and symbolically sending a message that they would remain active even after the student-backed list won the elections.

The student movement succeeded in waking citizens up and encouraging them to take responsibility for their communities. This is a prerequisite for democracy. My hope is that they will remain active and scrutinize the work of the new government and other public institutions. Their continued engagement could help prevent another concentration of power.

Grassroots Mobilization Can Help Prevent Another Concentration of Power

Now, as for the obstacles you asked me about, criminal networks retain considerable influence and control important flows of money. We do not yet know what will happen to these networks. The regime treated the state budget as its own private money, and there are indications that substantial sums have left the country in recent days. The incoming government will face serious economic challenges alongside the task of institutional reform.

People loyal to the outgoing regime also remain in the judiciary, police, and security services. Reforming these institutions will take time. The Progressive Party still has loyal media outlets, and watching them in recent days, you would hardly know that anything had changed in the country. They gave the impression that Vučić was about to return to power.

Then there’s also the question of the student-backed list itself. It is not a political party with an established structure or a history of working together. Many of the candidates have only recently met, have never worked together before, and come from different ideological backgrounds. They have no experience in politics. It’s their first time. Maintaining cooperation and unity within the parliamentary group of 140 MPs, who have never worked together, as well as unity with the student movement, which will not be present in the institutions, will be important if they want to carry out substantial reforms.

As I said, so many of these candidates entering public office have very limited experience with parliamentary and administrative procedures. They will need time to learn, develop these relationships, and turn electoral promises into decisions that citizens expect.

The student movement has already demonstrated considerable organizational capacity. But governing and being present in the institutions will bring further responsibilities, including decisions about limited resources, divisive issues, and competing demands. My first hope is that the institutions will perform their constitutional roles, to start with, and then regain citizens’ trust.

Serbia does have professionals with knowledge and experience. They were very much constrained by political control, and I hope that the new government will quickly create conditions in which expertise and institutional independence become essential parts of the transition.

Justice Must Be Based on Evidence, Not Political Retaliation

In the days following Vučić’s defeat, Serbia has witnessed arrests, resignations, renewed corruption investigations, and challenges to politically appointed officials. How can the incoming leadership dismantle patronage networks and restore institutional accountability without reproducing the politicization of state institutions? Where should the boundary lie between transitional justice and political retaliation?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, that is one of the very important questions we face nowadays, even though the student-backed list has not yet taken power. So many crimes and corruption cases have gone uninvestigated for more than a decade, and citizens in Serbia are hungry for justice. Many people also lost their jobs, faced intimidation, and experienced violence because they refused to obey or dared to resist the regime. Their frustration is entirely understandable. 

But certainly, this frustration should not become a justification for individuals to draw up lists of those they believe deserve punishment, as we’ve seen, or to treat arrests as achievements in themselves. We need an independent judiciary that investigates cases on the basis of evidence and respects due process.

Losing a public position does not establish criminal guilt, but holding public office should not provide protection from investigations either. Many of the leaders of the previous regime will now be MPs, members of Parliament, but they should still face investigations if they were involved in any illegal activities.

The credibility of the transition will depend on whether citizens perceive the judiciary as actually doing its job. The student movement has demonstrated patience, unlike the citizens. But again, students will not be the ones taking public positions, and we still do not know who those people in the government will be. So many things are still unknown to us.

Citizen Monitoring Was Crucial to Protecting the Electoral Process

Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia.
Students collect signatures in support of calls for early parliamentary elections in Valjevo, Serbia, on December 28, 2025. Photo: Adam Radosavljevic / Dreamstime.

A firsthand account of the elections describes approximately 50,000 citizens participating in monitoring across some 8,300 polling locations. Although these figures require independent verification, they suggest an extraordinary effort to protect electoral integrity. Does this indicate that democratic change in competitive authoritarian regimes depends not only on winning votes but also on citizens temporarily assuming oversight functions that captured institutions fail to perform?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Absolutely. If there’s one thing we can learn from the Serbian experience, that’s it. Competitive authoritarian regimes hold elections regularly, but those elections are neither free nor fair. Election observation missions have documented numerous irregularities in previous Serbian elections.

I remember the debate last year about whether students should demand elections at all. Many argued that there was little point under the existing conditions, given vote buying, the use of public office and public money during campaigns, multiple voting, pressure on public sector employees, voter intimidation, the use of unofficial copies of electoral registers to track voters on election day and pressure them to vote, and the photographing of ballot papers to prove how someone had voted.

The students’ response was that they could not resolve all these problems until they took power. The only way to do so under the existing conditions was through elections. However, they could do everything possible to prevent serious irregularities on election day. This made monitoring the voting and counting process extremely important. In previous elections, many polling stations had been monitored only by representatives of the ruling party because the opposition lacked the personnel to cover every location. Manipulation was easier in those places.

The scale of citizen involvement helped address this gap. Of course, election monitoring cannot remove every inequality created during a campaign, but it can certainly make manipulation more difficult and help protect the votes that have been cast. In the longer term, oversight responsibilities must be performed by institutions that citizens can trust. But in the recent elections, citizen involvement, alongside a very high turnout, was the most important factor.

The Students Reached Communities That Opposition Parties Could Not

The student-backed list appears to have displaced Serbia’s established opposition as well as defeated Vučić’s ruling coalition. How do you explain the movement’s ability to mobilize constituencies that conventional opposition parties could not reach? Does this represent a renewal of democratic representation, or could its rejection of established political elites generate a different form of anti-establishment populism?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: The regime’s dominance relied heavily on constantly generating fear of enemies, including the opposition. Years of such messaging contributed to deep distrust of opposition parties. A similar strategy was used against civil society. This strongly affected citizens’ trust in the opposition, their perceptions of it, and their willingness to vote for opposition parties.

Some responsibility also lies with the opposition parties themselves. They were fragmented and often more focused on disputes with one another than on challenging the regime. They also lacked sustained work on the ground and, at times, the courage to take political risks. I would therefore see this result as a renewal of democratic representation rather than a rejection of political parties as such.

Given the lack of control over the media, it was essential to reach citizens directly and convince them that the aim was to improve the country rather than destabilize it, as they constantly heard in the media. The students did this through their marches and cycling journeys, conveying strong emotional messages of patriotism, hope, and love. They reached communities that established opposition parties had struggled to engage.

Now the task is to strengthen institutions and internal democracy within political parties. Parties will probably become more prominent again. The students have not established a long-term structure, and their goal is not to compete in future elections. So we will probably see political parties competing in the next elections, but we can also expect new political parties to emerge. Democracy needs organizations through which different interests can be expressed and contested. Distrust of the existing parties should encourage their renewal rather than become a reason to reject political pluralism.

The Students Turned Demands for Justice into Broad Social Solidarity

Students and citizens participate in the “Your Hands Are Bloody” protest, blocking an intersection near Avala in Zrenjanin, Vojvodina, Serbia.
Students and citizens participate in the “Your Hands Are Bloody” protest, blocking an intersection near Avala in Zrenjanin, Vojvodina, Serbia, on January 25, 2025. Photo: Ivan Pancic / Dreamstime.

The Novi Sad railway-station disaster transformed demands for accountability into a nationwide movement against corruption and institutional capture. How did students successfully connect a specific tragedy to broader grievances while maintaining support across ideological and social divisions? What made this mobilization different from earlier protest waves that Vučić’s government successfully contained?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Positive messaging was important, as was focusing on issues that connected citizens across ideological divides. The students presented the tragedy as a question of responsibility, justice, and the rule of law that concerned everyone. Citizens did not have to agree on every political issue to demand that institutions establish what had happened and hold those responsible to account.

Over the past two years, moral claims have been central to the movement. The students presented themselves as courageous, socially responsible actors defending the rule of law and justice without seeking personal gain. This messaging distinguished them from opposition parties, which were framed as interest-oriented. The students were seen as having no interest in taking power. They only wanted institutions to do their work and the Constitution to be respected.

Their willingness to make sacrifices further reinforced their moral authority and the sense that they were acting on behalf of all citizens and future generations. They justified their demands by emphasizing institutional accountability and consultation with experts. They argued that negotiating away their demands would violate their values and moral principles. Even when invited to discussions with the government or the president, they would say, “But there’s nothing to discuss. We cannot negotiate about the rule of law. What are we going to say? You should respect one law, but not the other? There’s nothing to negotiate about the principles, about the values, about the laws.”

This broad solidarity gave real legitimacy to their actions. Their sense of unity was reinforced by consistent public messaging and deliberate silence about internal disagreements. This did not mean that these differences had disappeared. Rather, the students kept their shared demands at the center of their public activity. Their sustained presence across the country, together with the relationships built during marches and local gatherings, helped turn that message into something citizens could experience directly. This was very different from what we’ve seen in past protests.

Silence Became a Persistent Act of Resistance to Power

In your 2025 study “Performance, Performativity, and Political Power,” you engage with Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault to understand how power is constituted and resistance performed. How might this framework explain the students’ use of silence, university blockades, decentralized plenums, and symbolic actions? Did these practices generate an alternative form of political power capable of challenging Vučić’s personalized authority?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Silence is very important here. Shortly after the tragedy, students began organizing 15-minute silent commemorations outside the faculties, one minute for each victim. After a 16th victim died from injuries, the commemoration was extended to 16 minutes. The ritual was very simple. Participants would gather at a designated location, someone would announce the beginning and end of the silence, and those present would simply stand silently, blocking the street before dispersing. This happened every day, with other citizens also joining the students.

Every day for almost two years, at 11:52, the exact time of the collapse, citizens gathered at intersections and in public squares across Serbia. Their presence interrupted everyday life and made it difficult to push the tragedy out of public view. Silence also became part of larger protests and demonstrations. On New Year’s Eve in December 2024, for instance, thousands gathered in a central Belgrade square for a silent commemoration instead of partying and listening to music. They chose to commemorate the victims together. The silence began at 11:52 p.m., just a few minutes before midnight. You could hear music and fireworks in the distance, and we all knew that this was the regime’s music.

Silent protests have been organized in many countries before, but what stands out in the Serbian case is the centrality and duration of this practice. It remained central throughout the last two years. While in other countries we’ve seen silence used as a brief commemorative moment, here it became the movement’s principal action, organizing political participation and public engagement.

The authorities’ response to the silent blockades was also particularly harsh. There were several reported incidents of cars being driven into protesters. During the protest on March 15 last year, the reported sonic weapon incident also disrupted the evening silent commemoration.

In my research, I have also been interested in what participants created through this repeated practice. Silence kept the victims and the circumstances of their deaths present in public life, resisting attempts to move on without accountability. In this way, they created a public memory, with citizens themselves deciding what would remain in that memory.

Silence also became a persistent act of resistance to power. Citizens continued to occupy public spaces and challenge authority despite intimidation and violence. Standing together, day after day, helped build relationships of solidarity, mutual recognition, and shared responsibility. Participants began to see themselves differently, as citizens with both the capacity and the responsibility to act. This is where I find the question of political subjectivation particularly useful. Through participation, citizens challenged the passive roles assigned to them and experienced their own political agency.

The plenums and university blockades added another dimension. Students made decisions together, debated responsibilities, and sustained the practical work of collective action. In Hannah Arendt’s terms, we can think of power emerging through acting together. This is what Arendt would describe as the power to do, the power to create.

The Foucauldian perspective draws attention to how resistance challenges established relations of power and changes the ways individuals understand themselves. These practices gave the movement an authority grounded in participation and solidarity. They created a basis from which to challenge personalized rule, but translating that authority into accountable institutions now remains a separate task.

Serbia Shows That Authoritarian Incumbents Are Not Impossible to Defeat

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

In your research with Dušan Spasojević, particularly “Facing Protests in Serbia: Patterns of New Competitive Authoritarianism” and your study of the 2023 elections, you examine how hybrid regimes adapt to protest through subtle institutional manipulation and selective repression. Why did these mechanisms ultimately fail against the student movement? Does Serbia’s experience challenge existing theories of competitive authoritarian resilience?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: In those two studies, we examined the electoral irregularities I mentioned earlier, as well as the strategies competitive authoritarian regimes use to contain protests. These include strategically ignoring protests rather than banning them, keeping the police out of sight, and constantly producing crises and narratives about vaguely defined international or regional enemies.

Such strategies can be effective when protests remain isolated and participants fail to develop solidarity networks and a collective identity. None of the previous protest waves managed to develop a social movement with a strong collective identity and solidarity, and many began without building on earlier waves.

The student movement made these strategies harder to sustain by maintaining its activities throughout the last two years and reaching citizens across the country. Most previous protests had taken place only in the capital. By contrast, students organized protests across the country and built support among different social groups, which was particularly important. This combination of sustained mobilization and extensive election monitoring helped turn public dissatisfaction into an electoral challenge.

I’d be cautious about treating this as a refutation of theories of authoritarian resilience. These theories help us understand the obstacles the movement faced, but they do not imply that authoritarian incumbents are impossible to defeat. Serbia’s experience shows that demands for justice can mobilize citizens and that protest movements can contribute to electoral change. This is very important to reiterate. Such change requires cooperation, commitment, and a credible prospect of change. However, whether this electoral defeat develops into a long-lasting transformation is something we still need to assess.

The Students’ Demands Offer a Basis for an Inclusive Democratic Project

Vučić’s political discourse frequently relied on claims of popular legitimacy and the portrayal of opponents as threats to national stability. Students, meanwhile, mobilized around demands for accountability and the rejection of corrupt elites. How should we distinguish their competing constructions of “the people”? Can a movement that challenges a populist authoritarian regime through anti-elite discourse avoid reproducing populism’s exclusionary logic?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: I would first distinguish the student movement from the student-backed electoral list. As I said, the students were not on the electoral list, which means they will not be in Parliament or the government. This distinction is important. If we take their stated intentions seriously, the aim is to create conditions for free elections in the next electoral cycle, when political parties can compete fairly.

There’s also a difference between criticizing elites for corruption and claiming that only one movement can legitimately represent all citizens. This is not what the students are claiming. Their demands centered on institutions doing their jobs and rules applying equally to everyone. This offers a basis for an inclusive democratic project.

Still, moral authority should not place anyone above criticism. The student-backed representatives will need to accept disagreement, opposition, and public scrutiny. Their commitment to pluralism will be tested by how they treat those who did not vote for them and how they respond when citizens challenge their decisions. I’m optimistic so far, but we will see.

Gender-Equality Legislation Means Little Without Effective Implementation

Three women hold a rainbow flag bearing the message “Peace and Love” during the Belgrade Pride Parade in Belgrade, Serbia, on September 18, 2016.
Three women hold a rainbow flag bearing the message “Peace and Love” during the Belgrade Pride Parade in Belgrade, Serbia, on September 18, 2016. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.

Your article “Autocratic Gender-washing: Gender-Equality Reforms in Serbia” demonstrates how authoritarian governments can instrumentalize women’s representation and gender-equality legislation to cultivate democratic legitimacy while sustaining conservative political agendas. What would distinguish substantive democratization from symbolic reform under Serbia’s incoming leadership? Could the transition expose the limitations of Vučić-era gender-equality policies?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: There needs to be a willingness to implement gender-equality legislation rather than simply adopt it. Having more women in leadership positions or establishing bodies responsible for gender equality really matters. But those bodies need adequate funding, staff, and the authority to carry out their work. That’s what I mean when I say that gender-equality reforms during Vučić’s regime were merely symbolic. The regime would establish a gender-equality institution without providing the funding necessary for it to carry out its work.

The adoption of the gender-equality law under Vučić in 2021 was also presented as evidence of progress, while its implementation remained deeply problematic. The law was not implemented, as its implementation was stopped very soon after it was passed. So, basically, there’s no difference between having the law and not having it if it’s not implemented at all. This gap between formal commitments and everyday practice is very important. Gender analysis in legislative and oversight processes, the use of gender-disaggregated data, and gender-responsive budgeting are all required under the current legislation. These need to become meaningful parts of decision-making, which they have not been so far.

We should assess whether women influence policies. We should also assess spending and how it affects women differently, including women whose interests are rarely represented. It remains to be seen how the new Parliament and government will approach these issues. They will face many competing demands, and gender equality may not be a high priority at the beginning.

That’s precisely why continued pressure from women’s organizations and other civil society actors will matter. A change of government will certainly not guarantee a change in priorities. The new leadership will face many challenges, particularly at the beginning, but the pressure needs to be maintained.

Minority Representation Must Extend Beyond Parliamentary Presence

Your scholarship on political representation and minority rights raises an important question about the inclusiveness of democratic transformation. The student movement united diverse constituencies through broad demands for justice and accountability, but what place do ethnic minorities occupy within its emerging political project? Could an emphasis on national unity reproduce majoritarian assumptions that have historically marginalized minority voices?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: That’s a concern at the moment. Many minority voters supported the student-backed list, as the election results clearly indicate. At the same time, the electoral system provides a lower threshold for minority parties. The three largest minorities—Hungarians, Albanians, and Bosniaks—will have representatives in Parliament following the latest elections. There are no announced plans to change the arrangements for minority parties’ electoral participation. Rather, the aim is to open up opportunities for minority citizens to become more interested in voting for mainstream parties as well. The student movement also addressed this by reaching out to minority citizens, not only majority citizens, which is different from what we’ve seen before.

However, the parliamentary presence of minority parties is only part of the question. Minority representatives will need opportunities to influence decisions, and minority citizens will need to see their concerns taken seriously beyond election campaigns. Because the student-backed list has a very strong majority in Parliament, it will not need to form a coalition to establish a government. This will probably be the first time that minority parties are not part of the governing coalition. That makes the responsibility of the new leadership even more important. They should leave room for the particular experiences of discrimination and exclusion that minorities face.

It remains to be seen how these issues will be addressed once the government is formed. However, some minority parties supported the students during the protests, as did many minority citizens. This gives us reason for optimism about what we can expect from the new government.

Avoiding Kosovo May Preserve Unity but Cannot Replace Political Debate

Photo: Shutterstock.

In your 2023 BIRN interview, following threats over academic cooperation with Kosovo researchers, you warned that elites cultivate fear and deepen ethnic divisions. Does Vučić’s electoral defeat offer an opportunity to challenge the nationalist discourses that enabled such intimidation? Or might the incoming movement’s reluctance to confront Kosovo’s status leave essential foundations of Serbian ethnonationalism untouched?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: The student movement is internally very heterogeneous. We still know relatively little about the positions of the new MPs, and we do not yet know the composition of the government. Those entering office may decide to take greater responsibility for political decisions themselves, relying less on students than they did during the campaign. Once they assume their positions, they may act independently of the students. However, we still do not know their positions on these issues because their names have not yet been announced. Divisions are also possible, both within the student movement and among the newly elected officials.

We remember the broad coalition that came to power after Milošević’s fall in 2000 and how quickly its internal differences became apparent. Once the prime minister and ministers are named, the direction of Serbian foreign policy should become clearer. There’s certainly an opportunity to challenge the intimidation of academics, activists, and others who cooperate across ethnic boundaries. Doing so would require public officials to defend their freedom to work, even when they disagree with their views.

Avoiding the issue of Kosovo may have helped maintain unity during the mobilization process, but it cannot replace a longer-term discussion of nationalism, minority rights, and relationships with neighboring societies. These questions will now come to the forefront, but it will not be the student movement that will have to address them. Rather, the new officials, Parliament, and government will have to confront these challenges.

Solidarity Across Ethnic and Religious Divides Offers a More Inclusive Patriotism

Serbian nationalism has frequently invoked Orthodox Christianity, historical victimhood, Kosovo, and the defense of national sovereignty against perceived Western interference. To what extent has Vučić transformed these narratives into a form of civilizationalist populism? Could the student movement articulate a more inclusive conception of Serbian political identity without alienating nationalist constituencies that contributed to its electoral victory?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, elements of that argument apply, particularly to the final years of Vučić’s rule. It didn’t apply in the first few years, but toward the end of his rule, he increasingly drew on familiar nationalist narratives, presenting Serbia as a defender of sovereignty and traditional values against external pressure.

Orthodox Christianity and conservative morality featured in this discourse, while liberal actors and some Western demands were portrayed as threats to the country. We’ve also seen a rise in anti-gender mobilization, and Kosovo became a symbol of resistance to foreign intervention. At the same time, his use of these narratives was highly pragmatic. He maintained close economic relations with Western partners while cultivating ties with Russia and China. I would therefore be careful about presenting his politics as a consistent civilizational project. These messages also served the more immediate purpose of consolidating power and discrediting opponents.

There is now hope that the new government will articulate a more inclusive understanding of Serbian identity. But I’m not sure it will be able to attract these strongly nationalist constituencies, which will likely remain supportive of Vučić’s party.

What I find more important is the students’ ability to attract minority citizens and groups, as we discussed earlier. There’s something I haven’t mentioned that I consider particularly important: the solidarity shown toward Bosniak students during the marches from Novi Pazar, a town in southern Serbia where Bosniaks constitute the majority.

The Bosniak students from Novi Pazar marched to Belgrade, and many citizens welcomed them along the way. They made efforts to prepare food that the students could eat and learned a great deal about religious and cultural differences. This was a very broad expression of solidarity with minorities, which I find particularly important. It shows that attachment to the country can be expressed through solidarity across ethnic and religious differences. I hope this will become a lasting political approach.

Defeated Authoritarian Leaders Can Retain Influence Through Transnational Alliances

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meets with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić during an official visit to Belgrade, Serbia.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán meets with Serbian Prime Minister Aleksandar Vučić during an official visit to Belgrade, Serbia, on September 5, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic / Dreamstime.

Only days after their respective electoral defeats, Vučić and former Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publicly reaffirmed their political solidarity, with Vučić declaring, “We will return.” How should we interpret this continuing relationship within the broader transnational networks of populist and illiberal political actors? Can defeated authoritarian leaders retain influence through shared media strategies, ideological alliances, and cross-border political networks?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Authoritarian leaders learn a great deal from each other, and these connections are very strong. We’ve seen Vučić supporting Orbán during the last election campaign in Hungary and Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico attending Vučić’s rally during the election campaign in Serbia. Such relationships can help defeated leaders retain visibility, political support, and access to sympathetic audiences.

At the same time, the strengthening of the far right elsewhere in Europe, including Western Europe, could affect developments in Eastern Europe and the possibility of these forces returning to power in countries such as Hungary and Serbia. Much will depend on how much additional influence far-right parties gain in Austria, France, and Germany, as this could have a spillover effect on countries such as Serbia.

Vučić’s party still has a substantial parliamentary presence and loyal media outlets. Its representatives seem confident despite the electoral defeat. Anti-democratic attitudes and populist discourse certainly remain a threat to democratic consolidation. The party may use Parliament to obstruct reforms and its media presence to spread fear and create instability. What makes me somewhat less worried is that much of Vučić’s support rested on clientelistic networks rather than a firm ideological commitment. Those networks may become harder to maintain once access to state resources is reduced.

Much will also depend on how democratic forces address everyday problems, particularly the economy. Authoritarian populist leaders rely on fear, economic hardships, and security crises, all of which could help them regain support. In recent days, we’ve heard Vučić claim that pensions will no longer be paid and that Serbia will soon face electricity cuts. Many citizens believe these warnings, and the incoming government will need to communicate clearly and demonstrate that institutions can meet citizens’ basic needs.

Regional Stability Must Not Justify Support for Autocratization

Vučić maintained relationships with the EU, Russia, and China while benefiting from European concerns about regional stability. The student movement has largely avoided divisive positions on Kosovo, Russia, and European integration. Does this strategic ambiguity facilitate broad democratic mobilization, or could Serbia’s unresolved geopolitical orientation become a major obstacle to democratic consolidation? How should the EU reconsider its longstanding engagement with Balkan stabilitocracies?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Yes, the students’ strategic ambiguity helped them mobilize broad support. This was particularly important because defeating Vučić required such support. That’s why they focused on issues that would bring people together rather than divide them. Citizens with very different foreign policy and ideological views could unite around demands for accountability and functioning institutions. However, the new government will have to be more explicit about its strategic orientation and foreign policy. In my view, a clear pro-European orientation would be important for Serbia’s further democratization.

One source of frustration among citizens in Serbia is that EU support helped sustain Vučić in power. This is what you refer to as stabilitocracy. The EU supported stabilitocrats such as Vučić to ensure regional security and peace in the Balkans. Regional stability certainly matters, but it should not become a justification for supporting autocrats or overlooking autocratization. In the long run, autocratization will also affect stability. This is something we all need to relearn.

The EU needs to engage consistently with questions of electoral integrity, media freedom, and judicial independence, while listening to civil society as well as government officials. Its credibility will depend on whether democratic standards guide its actions, even when they conflict with short-term political or economic interests, such as lithium mining.

Lessons from Serbia for Democratic Movements Elsewhere

Protest in Istanbul
University students protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul on March 24, 2025, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sadik Gulec.

Serbia’s student movement combined decentralized organization, nonviolent resistance, cross-class mobilization, and extensive election monitoring to challenge entrenched political power. Which elements of this experience might be transferable to movements confronting competitive authoritarianism or autocracies elsewhere, including Turkey, Georgia, or other countries experiencing democratic backsliding? What institutional, cultural, or geopolitical conditions limit the transnational diffusion of Serbia’s example?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: Serbia’s experience shows that protests can contribute to a change of government, and this is not limited to Serbia; Brazil is another example. Citizens in other competitive authoritarian regimes could learn a great deal from the student movement. I would particularly emphasize positive messaging, clear demands, sustained activity across the country, mobilization across social groups, and a commitment to nonviolence, which was particularly important.

Extensive election monitoring also matters, as does drawing international attention to what is happening. I’m referring, for instance, to the students cycling to Strasbourg and Brussels. The involvement of the European Parliament was also important in drawing attention to developments in Serbia.

The relationships created through direct contact were especially important. Marches and visits to smaller communities allowed citizens to meet the students themselves and assess claims about the movement against their own experiences. This made it harder for hostile media narratives to undermine the movement.

However, these approaches cannot simply be transferred everywhere. In more closed autocracies, there may be less space to organize, elections may offer fewer openings, and repression can be more severe. Universities, local networks, and independent civic organizations may also differ in their capacity to sustain mobilization.

European countries outside the EU can sometimes benefit from the attention associated with the accession process and EU scrutiny. However, that attention is useful only if international actors are willing to respond. The Serbian case does offer some of these lessons, but we’ll see.

Serbia’s Democratic Future Depends on Citizens Remaining Politically Active

Finally, Professor Lončar, your work on political representation, authoritarian adaptation, and the performative dimensions of power suggests that democracy involves more than replacing incumbents through elections. What would constitute meaningful democratic consolidation in Serbia over the next four years? Can the student movement transform its moral authority and protest-based legitimacy into pluralistic, accountable institutions without reproducing the personalized power and political exclusions it mobilized against?

Assoc. Prof. Jelena Lončar: That is certainly their goal. My first hope is that institutions will start doing their jobs. An independent judiciary, effective checks and balances, and free media would be important signs of progress. They would also shape how citizens perceive reality and the issues facing society. Many citizens believed what they heard in the media, and media control strongly shaped their perspectives.

An end to smear campaigns against civil society, the survival of civic activism, and opportunities for citizens to participate in decision-making would also be very important. These factors contributed significantly to the success of the student movement, and we should build on these resources and citizens’ willingness to become more active in politics. Citizens should also be able to scrutinize the government without fear for their jobs or safety. However, it is difficult to predict the next four years when we are still absorbing the election results and do not yet know what the new government will look like.

The student-backed candidates will have a strong parliamentary majority, giving them considerable room to act. Much will depend on their internal relationships, and maintaining cooperation could be difficult, as I mentioned earlier. Continued public scrutiny will therefore be essential. One of the clearest measures of success would be whether the next election allows citizens to choose freely and whether those in power accept that they can be replaced.

Professor James N. Green.

Prof. Green: Bolsonarismo Has Not Been Defeated, It Has Merely Lost a Battle

Brazil’s October 25 presidential runoff delivered a narrow victory for Lula da Silva, but the enduring strength of Bolsonarismo raises profound questions about democratic consolidation. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor James N. Green, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes Professor of Latin American History Emeritus at Brown University, examines Lula’s electoral comeback, the institutional resilience of Brazil’s radical right, and the continuing threats of authoritarianism. Warning that “the far right in Brazil has not been defeated. It has merely lost a battle,” Professor Green explores conservative congressional obstruction, electoral delegitimation, religious fundamentalism, and democratic backsliding. Drawing on Brazil’s history of military dictatorship and democratic resistance, he emphasizes the indispensable role of grassroots mobilization, inclusive citizenship, and international solidarity in safeguarding democracy beyond electoral victories.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Brazil’s October 25 presidential runoff delivered a remarkable political reversal, with Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva securing a historic fourth term after overcoming his first-round deficit against Flávio Bolsonaro. Yet Lula’s narrow victory, with 51.79% of the vote against Bolsonaro’s 48.21%, exposes a fundamental paradox of contemporary Brazilian democracy: electoral resilience coexists with entrenched authoritarian tendencies, institutional polarization, and the enduring political strength of the radical right. Rather than signaling Bolsonarismo’s demise, the election raises profound questions about the fragility of democratic consolidation.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor James N. Green, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes Professor of Latin American History Emeritus at Brown University, draws on his scholarship on military dictatorship, democratic resistance, social movements, and political polarization to assess Brazil’s uncertain democratic future. His central warning is unequivocal: “The far right in Brazil has not been defeated. It has merely lost a battle.”

Professor Green situates Bolsonarismo’s resilience within Brazil’s historically conservative political culture and the institutional strength of Bolsonaro-aligned forces in Congress. Although democratic institutions successfully resisted the attempted coup of 2023, he cautions that authoritarian political currents remain deeply embedded. “They want an authoritarian state,” he warns, emphasizing that some radical-right forces seek to undermine the rule of law and the separation of church and state.

The danger extends beyond electoral competition. Professor Green identifies parliamentary obstruction, potential impeachment initiatives, and the delegitimization of electoral institutions as significant threats to Lula’s presidency. Reflecting on the far right’s allegations of electoral fraud, he warns that such narratives undermine democratic participation itself: “If people don’t believe the system is trustworthy, they’re not going to take the time or make the effort to go out and vote.”

Drawing historical parallels with Brazil’s 1964–1985 military dictatorship, Professor Green underscores the indispensable role of grassroots mobilization and international solidarity in resisting authoritarianism. He argues that the social movements instrumental in Lula’s electoral comeback must remain politically engaged beyond election cycles while preserving their capacity to criticize the government.

The interview also examines the growing influence of conservative evangelical Christianity, the vulnerability of LGBT+ rights, and the transnational connections between Trumpism and Bolsonarismo. For Professor Green, democratic consolidation ultimately depends on inclusive citizenship and institutional accountability. As he emphasizes, “If that society doesn’t protect broad democratic rights for everyone, no one’s rights are guaranteed.”

Looking ahead, Professor Green anticipates mounting confrontation between Lula’s governing coalition and the radical right, warning that the next four years could “further intensify tensions between the left and the right and deepen the country’s polarization.” His assessment reveals why defeating authoritarian populism electorally is not equivalent to overcoming its structural foundations.

Here is our interview with Professor James N. Green, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Associate Professor Roi Zur.

Dr. Zur: Prolonged Political Instability Could Consolidate Israel’s Populist Radical Right

Israel’s October 27 elections have exposed deepening ideological polarization, parliamentary fragmentation, and mounting challenges to democratic legitimacy. In an interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the University of Essex examines Netanyahu’s electoral resilience, Likud’s transformation into a populist radical-right party, and the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Highlighting the growing ideological convergence between Likud and its far-right allies, Dr. Zur warns that prolonged coalition deadlock could further consolidate authoritarian-populist forces. He also examines the political exclusion of Arab parties, the decline of Israel’s liberal-left, and emerging claims of electoral fraud resembling Trumpian populism. Ultimately, the interview explores how political instability and ethnonationalist polarization threaten Israel’s democratic institutions and future political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Israel’s October 27 elections have produced a fragmented political landscape, exposing the deepening ideological polarization, institutional vulnerabilities, and shifting boundaries of political legitimacy that characterize Israeli democracy. Although Likud remains the largest party, neither Benjamin Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc nor his opponents have secured a parliamentary majority. The results reveal the resilience of Netanyahuism, the growing dominance of competing right-wing formations, Labor’s historical decline, and the potentially decisive role of Arab parties. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about populism, democratic backsliding, secularism, and Palestinian rights.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the Department of Government at the University of Essex, whose research examines electoral competition, party strategies, and political polarization, offers a theoretically informed assessment of Israel’s evolving political landscape. His central warning is that prolonged political deadlock could further strengthen the forces responsible for Israel’s democratic deterioration. As Dr. Zur observes, “What seems more likely, in my view, is that we are heading into several months, or perhaps even a year, of political instability.” Crucially, he emphasizes that “Historically, such instability has helped the populist radical right maintain and consolidate its power.”

Dr. Zur situates this danger within Netanyahu’s transformation of Likud from a conventional conservative party into an increasingly radicalized populist formation. By systematically directing public frustration toward judicial authorities, security institutions, and allegedly unaccountable elites, Netanyahu has redefined political accountability through antagonistic populist narratives. As Dr. Zur argues, “Likud is no longer a classic center-right party. It increasingly resembles a European populist radical-right party.”

Equally consequential is the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Dr. Zur explains that Netanyahu’s cooperation with Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism has legitimized positions previously excluded from mainstream political discourse. These developments have fundamentally altered debates over territorial sovereignty, Palestinian rights, military conduct, and international law. Indeed, he argues that the ideological proximity between Likud and its radical-right partners makes it “increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.”

The interview also explores the structural obstacles confronting an alternative government, particularly the exclusion of Arab parties from legitimate coalition-making, disputes over ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the weakness of Israel’s liberal-left. Despite unprecedented Arab parliamentary representation, ethnonationalist boundaries continue to constrain coalition possibilities, while the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains central to ideological competition.

Perhaps most disturbingly, Dr. Zur identifies emerging allegations of electoral illegitimacy as evidence of democratic erosion. He notes that “Likud is making statements claiming that the elections were stolen, much like Trump’s claims in the United States after his electoral defeat.” Against this backdrop, the interview illuminates how electoral fragmentation, populist delegitimation, and radical-right normalization could interact to reshape Israel’s democratic future.

Here is our interview with Assistant Professor Roi Zur, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Khayyam Rzazade.

PopuliVerse Founder Rzazade: Populism Must Be Studied as a Global Political Logic, not a Regional Pathology

In this interview for the ECPS Voice of Youth series, Khayyam Rzazade, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa and founder of PopuliVerse, argues that populism must be understood as a global political logic rather than a regional pathology. Drawing on his research into Europe’s foreign and defense policies, he examines how populist actors selectively politicize international affairs while often maintaining established strategic commitments. Introducing his concept of foreign policy activation, Rzazade explores the conditions under which foreign policy becomes a site of people-versus-elite contestation. He also discusses PopuliVerse, an innovative research platform connecting fragmented scholarly debates, and advocates a comparative, methodologically rigorous approach that takes citizens’ political motivations seriously across diverse geographical and ideological contexts.

Interview by Natalia Crane

As populist movements increasingly influence international relations, security debates, and defense policy, understanding their political logic has become essential to contemporary political scholarship. In this interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Khayyam Rzazade, founder and editor of PopuliVerse,argues that populism must be approached as a dynamic political phenomenon transcending ideological and geographical boundaries. Reflecting on his experiences across the post-Soviet space and Europe, Rzazade emphasizes that “populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.”

Originally from Azerbaijan, Rzazade is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, participating in IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network examining populism’s international dimensions. Supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris, he has studied at institutions including Baku State University, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and the College of Europe. His professional experience spans parliamentary work, European institutions, and university teaching.

Drawing on Ernesto Laclau, Benjamin Moffitt, and Cas Mudde, Rzazade conceptualizes populism not as a fixed ideology but as “a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between ‘the people’ and an elite that is said to betray them.” His approach identifies three interconnected repertoires: plebiscitarian mobilization, antagonistic identity construction, and crisis performance. Crucially, these practices vary across political contexts, allowing the same actors to adopt populist rhetoric selectively.

This framework informs his doctoral research on how populist actors shape Europe’s foreign and defense policy, particularly amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, European rearmament, and uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Challenging assumptions that populist governments necessarily overturn established international commitments, Rzazade observes that “they pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.”

His concept of foreign policy activation examines when governments transform international questions into populist political conflicts. Despite growing domestic contestation, he argues that institutional commitments to NATO and the European Union frequently constrain radical policy departures. Consequently, populist governments often produce “change within orientation rather than change of orientation.”

Beyond his doctoral research, Rzazade discusses PopuliVerse, an initiative connecting fragmented scholarly conversations through a research library containing more than 8,000 academic works, a monitoring publication, and a commentary platform. His ambition reflects a commitment to making comparative populism research accessible across disciplines and regions.

Ultimately, Rzazade advocates methodological openness and greater attention to understudied political contexts, particularly the post-Soviet world, Asia, and Africa. Rejecting both the pathologization and romanticization of populism, he argues that scholarly rigor requires recognizing that “the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.”

The interview with Khayyam Rzazade is lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

From European Foreign Policy to the International Dimensions of Populism

Photo: Dmitry Demidovich.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? Why do you believe your area of research is particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Khayyam Rzazade: I am a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, working within IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network on the international dimensions of populism. My research is supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia in Genoa and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris. I also founded and edit PopuliVerse, a platform for populism research, or as I like to call it, “the universe of populism.”

I come from Azerbaijan, and my studies have taken me from Baku State University to Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw, and the College of Europe in Bruges, with an exchange year in Minsk in between. I have also interned at the Parliament of Azerbaijan, assisted a Member of the European Parliament, and taught Political Theory and Political Analysis to undergraduates at Baku State University and International Security to master’s students at ADA University. It has been quite a journey, and each of these experiences has left its mark on how I think.

My interests began with European foreign and security policy, particularly how the European Union builds a common response to threats such as Russia. The longer I worked on these questions, the clearer it became that foreign policy is not made only in Brussels or in ministries. It is also contested in parliaments, in the media, and around kitchen tables, and populist parties were frequently the actors challenging the established consensus. When the IDEoPOP position was announced, it felt as if it had been written with me in mind. This is how I arrived at my current research on how populist actors shape foreign and defense policy in Europe.

I believe this research matters a great deal today. Foreign and defense policy were long treated as areas of elite agreement, relatively sheltered from party competition, and that is no longer the case. Populist parties now govern or share power in several European countries, while Europe faces the war in Ukraine, a major debate over rearmament, and an uncertain transatlantic relationship.

These are decisions with long-term consequences, and citizens increasingly expect a say in them. As someone who studies populism, I try never to forget that the word begins with the people. Understanding how populists speak to citizens about security, and why so many citizens listen, is essential if Europe wants its foreign policy to remain both coherent and democratic.

Intellectual Influences: From Political Theory to Personal Experience

Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, experiences, or even unexpected sources of inspiration that have fundamentally shaped your thinking?

Khayyam Rzazade: My intellectual development has been shaped as much by places as by texts. Growing up in Azerbaijan, a young state in a difficult neighborhood, taught me early that foreign policy is never an abstraction. It touches borders, families, and daily life. Later, working at the European Parliament, I saw from the inside how slowly and carefully common European positions are built, and how fragile they can be. These two experiences still frame how I read everything else.

Among scholars, three have influenced me most. Ernesto Laclau taught me to treat populism as a political logic rather than a fixed set of policies, which is the starting point of my own conceptual framework. Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style, and especially on the performance of crisis, showed me that how populists speak and behave matters as much as what they claim to believe. Cas Mudde’s ideational approach, even where I depart from it, gave the field a shared vocabulary without which comparative work would hardly be possible. I would also add my supervisor, Fabrizio Coticchia, whose work on Italian defense policy convinced me that defense is a domain of party politics and public opinion, not only of strategy.

The less expected sources are sport and teaching. Long-distance running and cycling have taught me more about patience and consistency than any methods course, and a doctorate is above all a test of both. Teaching undergraduates in Baku taught me that if I cannot explain an idea to a twenty-year-old in plain words, I probably do not understand it well enough yet. I still apply that test to my own writing.

Studying International Politics Across Different Academic and Cultural Contexts

Having studied and worked in several countries, how have different academic environments and cultural contexts shaped your understanding of international politics? Have these experiences challenged any of your earlier assumptions about the subjects you study?

Khayyam Rzazade: Studying in Baku, Minsk, Venice, Warsaw, Bruges, and now Genoa and Paris have given me something no single institution could: the habit of noticing how differently the same event looks from different parts of the world.

In Baku, international politics was taught and discussed as a matter of survival for a small state between large neighbors. In Minsk, I saw a political system where the gap between official discourse and everyday conversation was wide, and where people had learned to read between the lines. Venice introduced me to the Italian tradition of thinking about politics historically and theoretically. Warsaw taught me how real the Russian threat feels on the EU’s eastern border. Bruges and Brussels showed me the European Union from the inside, with its achievements and its endless compromises. Each place shifted my vantage point a little, and I think that is exactly what a scholar of international politics needs.

These experiences challenged two assumptions I once held. The first was that there is a single “European” view of security. There is not. What looks like excessive caution in Rome looks like dangerous naivety in Warsaw, and both positions are held by serious and well-informed people. This is one reason why I became interested in the domestic contestation of foreign policy.

The second assumption was that populism is mostly a Western phenomenon tied to recent economic or cultural grievances. Coming from the post-Soviet space, where appeals to “the people” against corrupt elites have a long and complicated history, I became convinced that populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.

On a more personal level, moving between academic cultures also taught me humility. Each system values different things: the argument in one place, the data in another, the elegance of the prose in a third. I have tried to take a little from each. And I have learned that a good espresso and a long walk solve more research problems than one might expect.

Understanding Populism as a Political Logic

How do you conceptualize populism in your own research, and what led you to adopt that approach? Has your understanding of the concept changed as your research has developed?

Khayyam Rzazade: In my research, I treat populism as a political logic rather than as a fixed ideology or a particular family of parties. By political logic, I mean a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between “the people” and an elite that is said to betray them.

What makes this logic observable is how it is enacted. Here, I work with three repertoires that actors can deploy to a greater or lesser degree. The first is plebiscitarian mobilization, which means appealing directly to the people over the heads of institutions and intermediaries. The second is antagonistic identity construction, which means defining who belongs to the people and who stands against them. The third is crisis performance, which means presenting the political moment as an emergency that only the populist actor can resolve. I treat all three as gradational, so a party can be more or less populist across time and across issues.

I adopted this approach for a practical reason. My empirical domain is foreign and defense policy, where populist parties often say very little or say contradictory things, and where the question is not whether a party “is” populist but whether it chooses to make a given issue populist. A binary classification of parties cannot capture that. A gradational and issue-sensitive approach can. It also lets me work across quite different cases, from Podemos in Spain to PiS in Poland, without pretending they share an ideology.

My understanding has certainly changed. I began, like many students, with the ideational definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, which is clear and easy to apply. Working with real speeches and real governments made me less comfortable with it. The same party can be fiercely populist on migration and entirely mainstream on NATO, and I wanted a framework that treats this variation as the interesting part rather than as noise.

I have also become more modest about what any definition can do. Populism is a concept scholars use to make sense of a messy reality, and I try to hold it lightly enough to let the cases surprise me.

The Future of Populism Studies: Beyond Competing Definitions

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates—whether over ideology, discourse, strategy, political style, or something else—do you consider most consequential for the future of the field, and what misconceptions do you encounter most frequently both inside and outside academia?

Khayyam Rzazade: The classic debate between the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic approaches has been enormously productive, but I am not sure it is the one that will matter most in the coming years.

The four camps now largely agree on the core, which is the opposition between the people and the elite, and disagree mainly on where populism “lives”: whether in beliefs, language, organization, or performance.

The debate I consider more consequential is whether populism should be treated as a stable attribute of actors or as something that varies in degree across issues, moments, and audiences. This choice shapes everything downstream. If populism is a property of parties, we label a party populist once and then ask what populist parties do. If populism is instead a property of political action, the same party can be populist on one issue and entirely conventional on another, and the question becomes when and why an actor chooses to make a particular issue populist. 

My own work takes the second view. I think the field is moving in that direction too, partly because text-as-data methods now allow us to measure populism speech by speech rather than party by party.

A second debate that deserves more attention concerns the relationship between populism and its host ideology. We still know surprisingly little about which outcomes are driven by populism itself and which are driven by the nationalism, socialism, or conservatism it travels with. In foreign policy, this question is unavoidable, because the “populist” and the “nationalist” explanation often predict the same behavior. Separating them is difficult.

As for misconceptions, outside academia the most common one is that populism simply means the far right, or that it is a polite word for demagogy. This misses left-wing populism entirely and turns an analytical concept into an insult.

Inside academia, the misconception I encounter most often is the assumption that populists have no real foreign policy. My research suggests the opposite. Populist governments frequently have quite coherent foreign policy goals, and the interesting question is why they choose to politicize some of them loudly and leave others untouched.

And perhaps one more, which I say with affection for my own field: we sometimes forget that the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.

How Populist Actors Shape European Foreign and Defense Policy

Your doctoral research examines how populist actors influence foreign and defense policy in Europe, with a particular focus on Italy, Spain, and France. What have you found most interesting about the relationship between populism and foreign policy, and to what extent can populist movements fundamentally change a country’s international orientation once they enter government?

Khayyam Rzazade: What I have found most interesting is how selective populist actors are once they govern. The common expectation is that populists bring their anti-elite style into everything, including foreign policy. Looking closely at populist governments across Europe suggests something more deliberate. They pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.

My current research theorizes this process, which I call foreign policy activation, and asks under what conditions a populist government chooses to turn a foreign policy issue into a populist one.

Two conditions appear central. A government needs the capacity to frame the issue, meaning a credible elite to blame and a leader able to carry the message. It must also not be trapped by its own authorship. A party that has signed a procurement contract or approved a mission while in office cannot later denounce it as an elite betrayal without contradicting itself.

On the broader question, my view is that populist governments rarely change a country’s international orientation in a fundamental sense, at least in Europe. NATO, the EU, and treaty commitments are heavy anchors, and most populist parties, once in office, discover that they value the room for maneuver these frameworks provide.

What populists do change is the politics around foreign policy. They turn settled issues into contested ones, alter the tone of alliances, and make certain commitments harder to deepen even when they do not reverse them. In some cases, such as Poland under PiS, this contestation went quite far.

But the overall picture is change within orientation rather than change of orientation. Whether that holds as populists govern for longer and in more countries at once is, frankly speaking, the question that keeps me working.

From Researching Populism to Building PopuliVerse

PopuliVerse

How did your interest in populism develop from your early academic studies into your current research, and what eventually led you to take on a more active role in supporting the wider research community through PopuliVerse?

Khayyam Rzazade: My interest in populism grew slowly and then all at once. As a student of international relations in Baku, I was trained to think about states, alliances, and power, and populism barely appeared in the curriculum.

It entered my thinking through the back door. I studied in Italy while the Five Star Movement was in government and wrote my master’s dissertation there on Brexit. Then, in Bruges, I kept running into the same puzzle. The European foreign policy I was studying in seminars was being contested at home by parties who claimed to speak for the people against the elites in Brussels, and the textbooks had little to say about it.

The pattern became impossible to ignore while I was writing my recently published article on the EU’s collective securitization of Russia between 2014 and 2022, which began as my thesis for the advanced master’s degree. National positions on sanctions and defense were shaped by domestic political struggles, and populist parties were often at the center of them. By the time the IDEoPOP position was announced, populism had moved from the margin of my interests to the center.

PopuliVerse came from a more practical frustration. When I began my doctorate, I spent months on a literature review and discovered that research on populism is enormous, scattered across political theory, comparative politics, international relations, communication studies, and sociology, and often invisible from one subfield to the next.

Every doctoral student working on populism was drawing the same map from scratch, alone, and that seemed a pity. I also noticed that populist actors do something new every week, and that there was no single place to follow those developments with a scholarly eye. 

So, I decided to build the place I wished had existed when I started. I call it the universe of populism, partly as a joke and partly because I mean it. If it saves one early-career researcher a few of the months it cost me, it will have been worth building.

PopuliVerse: Addressing the Research and Information Gap

What inspired you to create PopuliVerse? Did you identify a gap in the resources available to researchers studying populism, or did your own research experiences reveal particular challenges that you wanted the platform to address?

Khayyam Rzazade: Both, really, and the two are connected. The gap I identified was not a shortage of research on populism but the opposite. There is a vast literature and no good way into it.

A search on any scholarly database returns thousands of results with no indication of which definition of populism a paper uses, which region it covers, or which “populism and X” debate it belongs to. A student interested in populism and foreign policy has to wade through work on populist communication, populist attitudes, and populist economics before finding what they need.

That is the problem the PopuliVerse Library tries to solve. It currently holds more than eight thousand academic works; each tagged along two axes: the approach to populism a piece adopts and the field it connects populism to. This allows someone to filter down to exactly the corner of the literature they care about. We do not host anyone’s PDFs. We point to the published version and let the authors and publishers keep what is theirs.

My own research revealed two further challenges. The first is speed. Populist actors generate news constantly, and scholars rarely have time to follow developments outside their own case. The PopuliVerse Monitor addresses this with a regular issue that records what populist actors did around the world, organized by region, alongside what was published in the field that month.

The second challenge is the distance between academic writing and public argument. There are very few places where doctoral candidates or more senior researchers can publish a short and well-argued scholarly piece. PopuliVerseCommentary is meant to be that place, published quarterly.

All of it is free, carries no advertising, and is designed to be citable, with DOIs and an ISSN application underway. I wanted it to be the kind of resource a serious scholar could cite without embarrassment, and a curious citizen could read without dealing with complicated language.

Building a Research Library Around a Contested Concept

Building a database of populism research involves decisions about which publications to include and how to categorize such a contested concept. How do you approach these methodological challenges, and how do you balance the need for a systematic resource with the diversity of theoretical perspectives within populism studies?

Khayyam Rzazade: The inclusion rule is simple. A work enters the Library if populism is a central object of analysis, not a passing reference, and if it has appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, an academic press, or a recognized policy institution.

I do not screen for theoretical approach, region, or conclusion. The moment a curator starts deciding which understanding of populism is the “right” one, the resource stops being a library and becomes an argument. My job is to make the field visible, and I have no intention of settling it.

The categorization is where the contested nature of the concept actually helps. Rather than imposing a single definition, the Library records the approach each work adopts, whether ideational, discursive, strategic, stylistic, or something else, as one of its tags. That turns the disagreement in the field into a filter.

A reader who works within the ideational tradition can find their colleagues, and a reader who wants to compare traditions can do so in a few clicks. The second axis tags the field populism is connected to, such as foreign policy, communication, or welfare.

Where a work resists classification, and many do, it carries more than one tag rather than being forced into one box. I will not pretend the system is perfect. Tagging eight thousand works involves judgement, and I correct errors as readers point them out. But I would rather have a transparent and improvable structure than no structure at all, and I think most scholars who have spent time drowning in search results would agree.

International Collaboration and the Importance of Academic Networks

Your work on PopuliVerse brings together perspectives from across the international research community. How have collaborations and academic networks influenced your intellectual development, your research, and your experience as an early-career scholar? What role do you think these networks play in advancing populism studies more broadly?

Khayyam Rzazade: I would not be doing this work without networks, and I mean that quite literally. IDEoPOP is itself a network: a group of doctoral candidates spread across several European universities and disciplines, all working on different aspects of populism’s international dimensions.

Having colleagues at the same stage who study the same phenomenon from other angles, such as communication or comparative politics, has corrected many of my assumptions before they reached paper. My supervisors in Genoa and Paris have been generous with their time, which is what an early-career scholar actually needs.

Co-authoring with Fabrizio Coticchia and colleagues in Genoa taught me how a paper is really built, and I am looking forward to a research stay at Monash University to work with Benjamin Moffitt, whose approach to populism has shaped my own. Each of these relationships began with an email I was nervous about sending.

For the field, I think networks do two things that individual scholars cannot. They move knowledge across the subfields that populism research is divided into, and they build the shared vocabulary that makes comparison possible.

Populism studies has grown very quickly and sometimes feels like several conversations happening in parallel rooms. Networks, whether formal projects, conference sections, or something like PopuliVerse, open the doors between those rooms.

That matters most for early-career researchers and for scholars outside the main Western European and North American centers, who often have excellent cases and limited access to the conversation. Bringing them in is not only fair; it is how the field gets better.

Connecting Academic Research with Public Understanding

Beyond academic publications and resources for other researchers, what impact would you ideally like your work to have? How can populism research contribute to understanding and addressing democratic challenges while maintaining scholarly rigor and independence?

Khayyam Rzazade: The impact I would most like to have is on how people talk about populism, inside and outside the seminar room. In public debate, the word is used either as an alarm or as an insult, and neither helps anyone understand what is happening.

If my research can help journalists, policymakers, and citizens see populism as a recognizable political logic with identifiable conditions and consequences, rather than a fever that strikes democracies from nowhere, I will consider that a real contribution.

The question of rigor and independence is one I take seriously, because populism is a field where it is easy to lose both. There is a pull towards treating populism as a pathology, which flatters the researcher and misreads the voters, and an opposite pull towards romanticizing it as the authentic voice of the people. Neither is scholarship.

The protection, in my view, is methodological honesty. Define your concept clearly, measure it transparently, let the cases contradict you, and publish the results even when they are inconvenient for your own politics.

PopuliVerse follows the same principle. It publishes work from every theoretical camp and does not take any editorial position on which is right. A field that studies the people-versus-elite divide should be the last to behave like an elite that already knows the answer.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists

Khayyam Rzazade advises young scholars to protect their lives outside the office, as he does through running, cycling, practicing yoga, playing ultimate frisbee, and teaching.

As academic research becomes increasingly international and competitive, which intellectual and practical skills do you believe young political scientists need most? What advice would you offer to early-career researchers entering the field today?

Khayyam Rzazade: I think young political scientists need three things. First, a method they can really do, not just describe. Pick one method and learn it well. Second, the ability to write clearly. Most good ideas in our field are lost in bad sentences. If a reader cannot follow your argument on the first try, the problem is usually the writing, not the reader.Third, patience with theory. It is tempting to jump to data, but a paper with no clear concept behind it will not survive review, and it should not.

On the practical side, my advice is simple. Find a niche where two fields meet and few people stand. Mine is populism and defense policy. It is a small corner, but it is mine.

Send the email you are nervous about. Almost every opportunity I have had began with a message to someone I did not know. Build something that helps others, whether a dataset, a reading list, or a platform, because it teaches you the field faster than reading alone, and people remember you for it.

And protect your life outside the office. I run, cycle, practice yoga, play ultimate frisbee, and teach. A doctorate is a long race, and you cannot sprint the whole way.

The Future of Populism Studies: New Questions and Understudied Regions

Looking ahead, how do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions, geographical contexts, or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention?

Khayyam Rzazade: I expect the field to move from asking what populism is to asking what it does and under which conditions. The definitional debates of the last twenty years were necessary, but they have reached the point of diminishing returns.

The more productive questions now concern populism in power over long periods. Most of our theories were built on populists in opposition or in their first term. We know much less about what happens when they govern for a decade, as in Hungary or Poland, or return to office after losing it.

Foreign policy is part of this shift. For a long time, it was a footnote in populism studies, and I think it will become one of the main chapters because the international consequences of populist government are now impossible to ignore.

Methods will change too. Text-as-data tools and large language models will let us measure populism at a scale and precision we could not reach before. This will test many claims that have so far rested on a few well-chosen quotations.

Geographically, the field is still too centered on Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The post-Soviet space, where I come from, has a long history of appeals to the people against corrupt elites that fits our definitions poorly and deserves its own theorizing. South and Southeast Asia and much of Africa are similarly understudied.

One more neglected area is the voters. We have thousands of studies of populist leaders and far fewer that take seriously the reasons ordinary people give for supporting them. For a field named after the people, that is an odd gap, and I hope the next decade closes it.

A Global Observatory of Populist Discourse

On your personal website, you describe how increasing your intellectual capacity and learning bring you happiness. If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue in the future? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to both scholarship and public understanding?

Khayyam Rzazade: If nothing stood in the way, I would build a global observatory of populist discourse. Imagine every parliamentary speech, party manifesto, and leader’s address in every democracy, continuously collected, translated, and measured for populist framing with transparent methods, and open to anyone who wants to use it.

We would finally be able to see populism rise and fall across issues, countries, and decades in something close to real time, and to test our theories against the whole world rather than a handful of cases we happen to know.

A project of that size needs a team, funding, and years, which is why I say it is a dream. But PopuliVerse is, in a modest way, a first step towards it, and I have learned that first steps tend to lead somewhere if you keep taking them.

As for a lasting contribution, I would be happy with two things. In scholarship, I hope to leave behind a clear theory of when populist actors turn foreign policy into a people-versus-elite struggle and when they leave it alone.

I also hope that my way of defining populism, which is deliberately eclectic and borrows from the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic traditions rather than picking one, proves useful to others who find the camps too narrow for the cases in front of them. Alongside that, I hope to leave a resource that helps the next generation of scholars find their way into the field faster than I did.

In public understanding, I hope people will one day use the word populism more carefully, as a description of a way of doing politics rather than a verdict on the people who vote for it.

That line on my website is true. Learning is what makes me happy, and I would like my work to leave others a little more curious than they were before.

Large data centers.

The Algorithmic Green Grab: Digital Sovereignty, Populist Promises and the Ecological Costs of AI

As governments increasingly embrace artificial intelligence as a pathway to technological sovereignty and economic development, its ecological consequences demand greater scrutiny. In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja uses the concept of “algorithmic green grab” to examine how AI-driven infrastructure expansion may concentrate control over electricity, water, and land while disproportionately transferring environmental costs to vulnerable communities. Focusing on Nigeria’s digital ambitions, Dr. Solaja explores the tensions between populist promises of technological independence, corporate interests, ecological justice, and democratic accountability. Drawing on political economy and environmental justice perspectives, he argues that genuine digital sovereignty requires transparent resource governance, meaningful community participation, and equitable distribution of benefits. The commentary calls for integrating ecological responsibility into national strategies for AI development.

By Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is increasingly perceived as a tool for national development, economic competitiveness and technological sovereignty. Governments are investing in data centers, cloud infrastructure and digital platforms, sometimes calling them critical to national independence in today’s competitive world economy. But the political rhetoric of “digital transformation” often clouds over the physical circumstances that make it feasible. AI requires electricity, water, land, minerals and wide industrial networks, large infrastructure. The seemingly intangible nature of this footprint therefore hides a more and more significant ecological footprint.

Global electricity consumption by data centers rose about 17 percent in 2025, and consumption by AI data centers grew by about 50 percent, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA). It estimates the total electricity used in data centers could reach 950 terawatt-hours by 2030 – compared with about 485 terawatt-hours in 2025 (IEA, 2026). The numbers are not representative of environmental pressures caused by all data centers. They do, however, prove that digitalization is an emerging issue of energy governance and environmental responsibility.

This commentary develops the idea of algorithmic green grab as a way to think about the political-economic dynamic of the expansion of AI and digital infrastructure and its centralization of control over ecological resources, while also potentially shifting ecological costs to communities who have less influence over the decisions being made. It makes the claim that the politics of digital sovereignty requires a consideration of not only who owns data and technology, but also who controls the energy, water and land that supports them.

When Sovereignty Becomes a Political Promise

Digital sovereignty is a very appealing political idea. It offers governments better control of national data, technology infrastructure and strategic capacities, especially in an era of proliferating digital platforms and computing capabilities in the hands of large corporations, geopolitical power players. Such concerns are legitimate. Governments may be limited in policy options by relying on external technology vendors and also may be vulnerable to commercial and geopolitical risks.

Sovereignty may also be a political story, however, in which governments claim that technology investments are a national necessity that must be taken for granted. This is where it meets populism. A populist political rhetoric often creates a separation of a people or a nation and far away or strong forces threatening them. In digital policy, this difference can be harnessed by pushing backs against foreign corporations, international rivals or domestic middlemen for technological control.

The challenge that comes when the language of national empowerment hides inequalities within the nation. A data center can be in the country but not be owned, governed or be democratically accountable within the country. Likewise, the storage of domestic data does not equate with technological independence, and foreign investment does not equate with broadly spread developmental gains.

The notion of the algorithmic green grab is based upon the wider political-economic idea of accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003) and the critique of data colonialism formulated by Couldry and Mejias (2019). It expands on these insights by foregrounding ecological resources and environmental relationships that are involved in the accumulation of the digital. The issue is not just that corporations get data from societies, but that digitalization might exacerbate contests for electricity, water and land, and that benefits and costs of this development might not be shared equally.

It’s not a case of saying that all digital sovereignty projects are populist and environmentally destructive. Instead, it highlights a political risk: A technological solution perceived as a necessary means of national affirmation can become subject to checks and balances concerning its distribution and ecological impact, which can be interpreted as a threat to progress. The political is then a sub-genre of technological success.

Nigeria’s Digital Ambition and Its Ecological Test

Nigeria is an important example of this tension. The country’s digital development agenda increasingly focuses on domestic infrastructure, investment and innovation and technological capacity. According to the Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation (2025), four data centers are being built in Lagos State in April 2025. The Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy (FMoCID) announced on August 31, 2026, the release of a National Digital Cloud Policy to facilitate investment, digital sovereignty and government transformation, including the development of the nation’s digital capabilities.

These are the good intentions of strengthening the position of Nigeria in digital economy. But there are questions that can’t be resolved based on investments or technology. How will any extra demand for electricity be met? How will water and cooling be controlled? How will land acquisition be evaluated, local infrastructure pressures and environmental risks be evaluated? Who is to gain economically and how will the affected communities be involved in decision making?

These are questions which would need evidence that relates to the project level, and it is too early to declare that, for example, reported facilities have already resulted in specific water depletion, electricity shortages or displacement. However, the lack of available, detailed and accessible environmental data would raise governance issues. Digital infrastructure should not be treated differently to other large-scale industrial projects for transparency and environmental assessment.

The Nigerian situation is another example of why it is important to differentiate ecological sovereignty from national sovereignty. A state can tighten its grip over the infrastructure but cannot guarantee equitable access to the resources on which this infrastructure depends. Algorithmic ecological sovereignty thus means the democratic and institutional power for governments and interested communities to shape the environmental decisions, resource allocation and accountability processes that support digital systems. It does not impose ecological justice as an outside constraint on technological independence, rather than a part of it.

From Digital Sovereignty to Ecological Accountability

AI-Data Center.
Aerial view of a new AI hub and data center under construction on the outskirts of Columbus, Ohio, USA, on November 2, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

The environmental implications of data infrastructure are not inevitable or uniform. They depend on technological design, energy sources, cooling systems, location, regulatory standards and institutional accountability. The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s account of water reuse in Quincy, Washington, describes a facility developed through collaboration between Microsoft and the city to reduce reliance on potable groundwater. Operational since 2021, the system offsets an estimated 138 million gallons of water demand annually (US EPA, 2023). Although this arrangement cannot simply be transferred to Lagos or other Nigerian locations, it demonstrates that infrastructure design and public regulation can influence the distribution of environmental costs.

Four Governance Principles Stand Out as Especially Significant

First, mandatory environmental transparency should accompany data-center development. Electricity usage, water needs, cooling solutions, emissions impacts and resource management plans should be made public by operators and relevant public agencies. This kind of data helps citizens, researchers and regulators assess the true costs of digital expansion.

Second, cumulative pressures need to be taken into account during environmental assessment. Individual facilities can meet regulatory standards, while the cumulative impacts of several developments can put increased stress on the existing electricity, water and land infrastructures. Assessment must therefore take into account project-specific impacts as well as the broader context of the ecological conditions of host communities.

Third, public incentives must be related to proven public value. Concessions, land allocations and infrastructure should be tied to quantifiable pledges in the areas of energy efficiency, responsible water use, skills development in the local community, environmental protection and community benefits. Investment is not an investment objective.

Fourth, there must be pathways for involvement of affected communities. Consultation should occur prior to making critical decisions, with information being available and mechanisms in place to raise concerns. This is not just a requirement of the procedures. It is at the heart of environmental justice, which has three dimensions: distributive, procedural and recognitional (Schlosberg, 2007).

These principles also offer a means to assess political statements regarding digital sovereignty. Citizens should be able to ask whether technological development bolsters collective control over resources, benefits communities in an equitable manner, and shields communities from environmental costs that fall unequally.

Conclusion

AI’s growth holds exciting potential for economic transformation, innovation and national development. But its environmental base requires a more critical comprehension of technology progress. Measuring digital sovereignty is not just about the placement of data centers or the amount of investments or even national cloud policies. It must also be evaluated in terms of governance of energy, water and land that digital systems rely on.

Algorithmic green grab points to the risk of new technologies re-producing the patterns of old forms of extraction and unequal development, but under the guise of innovation and national empowerment. Political pledges of independence subsumed into digital but not environmental accountability, risk digital sovereignty as a symbolic gesture rather than a substantive democratic state.

The question for Nigeria and other nations with aspirations to enhance their technology, then, is not whether or not technological advancement can be made at the cost of the environment. It is whether or not digital development can be structured to embed ecological resources, public responsibility, and community participation in technological sovereignty. What the societies that support the development of AI can and do say about who benefits, who is hurt, and whose ecological interests are considered will be as important for the future legitimacy of the development of AI as what algorithms can achieve.


 

References

Couldry, N. & Mejias, U. A. (2019). “Data colonialism: Rethinking big data’s relation to the contemporary subject.” Television & New Media, 20(4), 336–349. https://doi.org/10.1177/1527476418796632

Federal Ministry of Communications, Innovation and Digital Economy. (2026, August 17). Federal Government unveils National Digital Cloud Policy to drive investment, digital sovereignty and government transformation.https://fmcide.gov.ng/federal-government-unveils-national-digital-cloud-policy-for-investment-digital-sovereignty-and-government-transformation/

Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation. (2025, April 9). Four data centers under construction in Lagos State—Sanwo-Olu. https://fmino.gov.ng/four-data-centers-under-construction-in-lagos-state-sanwo-olu/

Harvey, D. (2003). The new imperialism. Oxford University Press.

International Energy Agency. (2026). Key questions on energy and AI. https://www.iea.org/reports/key-questions-on-energy-and-ai

Schlosberg, D. (2007). Defining environmental justice: Theories, movements, and nature. Oxford University Press.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). Water reuse case study: Quincy, Washington.https://www.epa.gov/waterreuse/water-reuse-case-study-quincy-washington