Fourth Annual International Symposium on Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
Moderator
Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc(Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).
Speaker
“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” byDr. Erin K. Wilson(Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).
Paper Presenters
“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” byDr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey(Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).
“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” byDr. Valeria Reggi(Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).
“Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” byDr. Jarosław Suchoples(Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).
In this timely and wide-ranging interview, Stanford University’s Professor Larry Diamond explores the resurgence of authoritarianism and the global diffusion of fascistic features. “We don’t have the fully formed, classic version of fascism today,” he explains, “but there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent spreading worldwide.” Drawing on his democratic theory expertise and recent support for an international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond dissects how elected strongmen exploit polarization, subvert institutions, and erode epistemic authority. From Erdoğan to Orbán to Trump, he examines the authoritarian playbook and offers paths forward—through institutional reform, global alliances, and deliberative democracy—to defend liberal norms before they are incrementally strangled into irrelevance.
In an age of democratic erosion and the rise of authoritarian populism across continents, Professor Larry Diamond, one of the world’s foremost scholars on democracy, joins the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) to assess the contemporary mutations of fascism. As a senior fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution and Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Professor Diamond brings a deeply informed and historically grounded perspective to the question that frames this conversation: Are we witnessing a return of fascism—or something disturbingly adjacent?
Reflecting on the recent international declaration signed by Nobel laureates and leading intellectuals warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” Professor Diamond strikes a careful but urgent tone. “I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se,” he explains, “because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.”
Throughout the interview, Professor Diamond underscores the ways in which elected strongmen—from Narendra Modi in India to Viktor Orbán in Hungary, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey to Donald Trump in the United States—gradually dismantle liberal-democratic norms. This process, which he calls the “incremental strangulation” of democratic institutions, shares strategic continuities with the fascist playbook of the 20th century, even if it is less overtly violent in form.
The interview also addresses the weaponization of cultural and religious norms, the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties, and the epistemic breakdown that enables authoritarian actors to dominate public narratives. Professor Diamond warns of “a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party,” a dynamic echoed in the declaration’s call to “uphold facts and evidence” in the face of disinformation.
The Declaration Against the Return of Fascism, published on the centenary of the original 1925 anti-fascist manifesto, serves as a timely and powerful backdrop to this conversation. Signed by a wide array of Nobel laureates, leading scholars, and cultural figures, the declaration urges renewed commitment to democratic values, multilateralism, and human rights. It warns of a “renewed wave of far-right movements” that threaten to erode hard-won liberties under the guise of nationalism and moral purity.
As Professor Diamond makes clear, the danger we face today is not merely political—it is civilizational. And while the forms may differ from the 1930s, the stakes are every bit as high.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Larry Diamond.
We’re Not Seeing Classic Fascism
Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.
Professor Larry Diamond, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question:As a signatory of the recent international declaration warning that “the threat of fascism is back,” how would you characterize the most empirically robust indicators of this re-emergence? To what extent do contemporary manifestations differ from classical fascism in terms of institutional form and sociopolitical function?
Professor Larry Diamond: I thought it was a very good statement. I had reservations about it because I think the term fascism is used too casually. It’s a very specific historical phenomenon that involves elements of extreme authoritarianism, deprivation of civil liberties, contradiction of the rule of law, individual rights, and the very principle of individuality.
There are certainly a number of regimes around the world that manifest those characteristics or have been moving in that direction. But fascism is also ultra-nationalistic and typically quite aggressive and expansionist. It celebrates violence as a means of acquiring and maintaining rule and political domination, including the violence of extreme shock troops or irregular forces that do the bidding—celebrating and elevating the leader while intimidating anyone who would challenge them. Fascist regimes freely use violence or the threat of violence to suppress and silence the opposition and to threaten their neighbors as well.
So, I think there is no pure form of fascism in the world today that is entirely similar to what we saw in Germany or Italy in the 1930s. But there are a number of regimes that have fascistic elements or properties—certainly Vladimir Putin’s in Russia, and there are others, in Turkey and India. And now certain features of what Donald Trump has been trying to construct in the United States—in terms of the intimidation of opposition, threats to opposition, the invitation to violence, and the celebration of violence by his followers—have fascistic properties.
I think it’s better to talk about fascistic properties or features rather than fascism per se, because I don’t think we have the fully formed, classic version of it in many places today. But there is a lot of fascistic behavior, organization, and intent that’s spreading around the world today.
Authoritarian Regimes Are Repackaging Masculinity, Identity, and Power to Redraw Citizenship
The declaration identifies a resurgence of “manufactured traditional authority,” rooted in religious, gender, and national identity constructs. How do you see these cultural logics being instrumentalized within modern illiberal or authoritarian-populist regimes to reshape the boundaries of political legitimacy and citizenship?
Professor Larry Diamond: Well, you certainly see a kind of resurrection and celebration of extreme masculinity, and of very traditional—even martial or militaristic—notions of what constitutes male identity and the male role, and the effort to subjugate women, and to draw artificially rigid boundaries around sexual identity and sexual behavior, and just put people into rigid, state-sponsored, movement-sponsored boxes.
These are also elements of an extreme authoritarian or, in some ways, fascistic mentality. You see this in China too—although it’s kind of odd to call a Communist regime fascistic—but they share certain properties in terms of hierarchy, domination, chauvinism, militarism, and aggressive threats to their neighbors.
So I find it more useful personally—and I think we’re drifting in that direction in the world, and the phenomenon, with its many component parts, seems to be more relevant these days—but I find it more useful to break it apart into its pieces and analyze where these pieces are emerging or gaining momentum, and what it means for the character and dynamics—internally and internationally—of authoritarian behavior.
Autocrats Strangle Democracy in Stages
Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
In your analysis of democratic regression, you emphasize the process of “incremental strangulation” of liberal institutions by elected executives. How does this slow erosion align with the historical trajectory of fascism, and would you consider today’s authoritarianism to be a technocratic mutation of the fascist archetype—less overtly violent, but no less repressive?
Professor Larry Diamond: It certainly is in most places less repressive than the classic instances of fascism, particularly in Nazi Germany. But some of them have been creeping in that direction. It didn’t take long between the time that Hitler entered power in early 1933 to the time, really just months later, that he had eliminated opposition and begun to throw his opponents in jail—and before too much longer, the emergence of concentration camps. I would not describe the collapse of the liberal and constitutional state in Germany after Hitler’s rise to the Chancellorship as an incremental process. It happened in stages, but they came very rapidly and very brutally.
Italy was a little bit more incremental, but not in the same way as we’ve seen under Orbán in Hungary, under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey, under Narendra Modi in India—which remains sufficiently incremental so that people still debate whether we can call India an electoral democracy. I tend to think it’s crossed the line into authoritarianism.
It took a while in Venezuela under Hugo Chávez. It didn’t take very long this most recent time in power for Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua. It happened pretty quickly under Bukele in El Salvador.
So it varies. But in the classic instance of a country that has been a democracy for some time—whether a liberal democracy or not—it usually is an incremental process that may move step by step over a period of years: to demonize the opposition, undermine the independence of the legislature, and certainly the judiciary, which must be quashed if authoritarian regimes are to have kind of free rein to emerge. And the ultimate elimination of all independent sources of power—regulatory institutions in the executive branch, civil society, the professional civil service, the business community, the mass media, and so on. Usually, it takes a few years, and sometimes a number of years, for an emerging autocrat to sufficiently conquer and crush these independent institutions in government and civil society so that they can have unchecked power.
Moreover, even when they’ve crossed the line into authoritarianism—which I think Erdoğan did within some number of years after taking power around 2003, more than two or three perhaps, but considerably less than ten—even after the line had been crossed from electoral democracy into electoral or competitive authoritarianism, the incremental descent can proceed. And the regime can become more authoritarian, more abusive, more terroristic, more domineering, more hegemonic—and, to use a word that is increasingly in vogue—with more and more frequent manifestations of fascism.
Authoritarianism Thrives Where Truth Dies
The declaration posits a growing epistemic crisis—an erosion of truth, science, and critical inquiry. Are we witnessing a systemic undermining of epistemic authority as a strategy of soft authoritarianism, and how does this epistemic degradation relate to the collapse of public trust and the spread of disinformation?
Professor Larry Diamond: I think the causation moves in both directions. It’s a collapse of trust in all kinds of institutions and sources of information that helps pave the way for authoritarian populism to come into power and elevate a leader—a “great leader”—as the source of all wisdom and authority, to try and rescue the country from various forms of treason, greed, sabotage, corruption, however they depict the ruling elite, the ruling establishment.
Then, of course, once in power, these kinds of leaders and parties further accentuate public distrust in science, in objective sources of knowledge, in alternative sources of information—in anything we know to be true, independent of what the dear leader and the ruling party say is true.
So, I think what you describe as an epistemic crisis typically precedes, to some degree, the coming to power of an authoritarian, hegemonic, extremely illiberal populist political party, with deeply authoritarian, if not fascistic, intentions and ambitions. And then they drive it—they drive the people—further into distrust and cynicism, and into a mode of thinking and reasoning that puts blind faith in a single leader and party.
Why Democracy Must Lead the Fight Against Authoritarian Drift
The declaration calls for renewed multilateralism grounded in human rights and the rule of law. With international institutions facing legitimacy crises, what new or reformed global mechanisms might be necessary to counteract the diffusion of authoritarian norms and “sharp power” influence?
Professor Larry Diamond: There are many dimensions to the crisis we’re facing globally regarding the rule of law and the liberal international order. And obviously, these have worsened with the multiple conflicts in the Middle East over the last two and a half years, if not more.
I worry deeply about the damage that’s been done to the United Nations and the overall erosion of liberal international institutions, which are being undermined from all directions—by Russia and China, by Iran, and by Donald Trump in the United States, with his contempt for multilateral institutions and for the liberal international order itself. After all, that order has helped keep peace in Europe for 80 years—until Vladimir Putin shattered it. I believe it still remains our best hope for international peace, security, and individual freedom.
At present, international multilateral institutions are in serious distress. The United Nations has appeared quite feeble in response to the recent Middle East crisis. The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization are all under significant strain. The entire nuclear nonproliferation regime—which, in my view, did a relatively poor job of restraining Iran from pursuing nuclear weapons—has also faltered.
To my mind, we need to begin with the democracies of the world and try to build outward from there, reaffirming commitments to the rule of law, international order, and collective security. That must include a reassertion of peace and security mechanisms in the Middle East, as well as a clear and unified message to the People’s Republic of China that the international community opposes any use of force to resolve the Taiwan conflict or differing interpretations of sovereignty across the strait. Certainly, it also means that Vladimir Putin cannot be allowed to forcibly dissolve Ukraine into a greater imperial Russia.
We need a stronger NATO, a reinforced alliance of liberal democracies, a renewed commitment to the integrity of borders, and shared principles of collective defense. These are the building blocks for reconstituting global order. But we cannot begin rebuilding while the United States is in retreat from that very order.
In my view, we must not only deepen cooperation with our NATO and EU allies—as well as partners like Japan, South Korea, Australia, and, where feasible, India—but also revitalize and relaunch the United States’ instruments of international engagement. This includes agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Voice of America, and other channels of diplomacy, assistance, and cultural exchange. We should be offering scholarships, promoting global educational exchange, and ensuring that our scientific, technological, and medical innovations are shared worldwide.
They Need to Polarize Politics to Seize Power
In “The Electoral Reform Imperative,” you diagnose affective polarization as a destabilizing force for democratic governance. How do populist actors exploit this emotional antagonism to reframe pluralism as moral corruption and consolidate plebiscitary rule under the guise of majoritarianism?
Professor Larry Diamond: They do it pretty much as your question describes. It’s very important to understand that people who want to crush democracy—and who seek to do so through politics, by winning power via competitive elections—need to create an atmosphere of fear and desperation. In other words, they need to polarize politics in order to seize power.
All of the agents of illiberal or authoritarian populism—Orban, Erdoğan, Robert Fico in Slovakia, certainly Modi in India, Andrés Manuel López Obrador during his six-year presidency in Mexico, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, and now his successor, Nicolás Maduro—they all polarize politics. They must generate fear and hatred for the other side, because rational politics—deliberation, compromise, reason—(these) are the enemies of their project to conquer and entrench total power.
So they manufacture fear, animosity, and hatred. They deploy memes and narratives that divide people on an emotional level and manipulate symbols of fear, violence, militarism, and extreme ambition to pit citizens against one another. They typically identify a dangerous “other” within the country. Often it’s a minority group or outsider—it could be immigrants, a marginalized group like the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe, or a religious minority of some kind. But they always need someone to scapegoat, someone to vilify and rally people to fear.
Deliberation Works—If You Create the Right Setting
Your collaborative work on “America in One Room” suggests that structured deliberation can depolarize attitudes and restore democratic norms. How scalable are these models of deliberative democracy in politically fragile or culturally heterogeneous societies—especially where civic trust is already eroded?
Professor Larry Diamond: We think the methods are scalable. The problem with scalability is not that you can’t bring people with very different political orientations or racial and religious backgrounds into one room. When you step outside the white-hot glare of politics and mass media polarization and simply invite people to deliberate, to share their views and listen to others, it often works. You don’t need to persuade people—it’s the setting that matters.
The real challenge is that in-person deliberation is very expensive. You have to fly people to a location, manage the logistics of in-person gatherings, and hire moderators to facilitate small-group sessions.
Now, at our Deliberative Democracy Lab at Stanford University, we have an online platform—very similar to the one we’re using now—that can accommodate 10, 15, or even 20 participants. If it can handle 12, that’s already enough. This platform uses a simple form of artificial intelligence to manage the discussion: it poses questions, ensures everyone has a chance to speak, maintains respectful dialogue, and balances participation.
It’s a flexible, intuitive, and fair tool that has opened up dramatic new possibilities for scaling deliberation—provided the questions and the framework for engagement are well-designed.
Electoral Systems Must Temper, Not Amplify, Polarization
Illustration by Lightspring.
Given the weaponization of electoral legitimacy by populist incumbents to hollow out liberal checks and balances, do you view institutional reforms such as proportional representation or open primaries as viable defenses against democratic backsliding—or might they risk unintended consequences?
Professor Larry Diamond: It’s a good question. When you start tinkering with institutions—certainly including electoral systems—you do risk unintended consequences. I think this should counsel some degree of humility on the part of institutional reformers.
In countries like India, the US, and the United Kingdom—where simple majoritarian, first-past-the-post systems prevail—allowing a candidate to win with just 35 or 38 percent of the vote, as has occurred in Britain with the Labour Party, is not particularly democratic. In an era of deep political polarization, requiring voters to choose only one candidate often results in leaders who command the support of just a third of the electorate. This outcome fuels political cynicism by granting disproportionate power to figures lacking broad public backing. And keep in mind what can happen: maybe in one election a moderate Labour Prime Minister comes to power, but four or five years later a more extreme party might win an absolute majority of seats due to the bonus effect inherent in first-past-the-post system.
In a social and psychological context of polarization—driven by rising economic inequality and social media—you don’t want an electoral system that exacerbates polarization further. So, I favor at a minimum moving to the Australian system of preferential voting, or what we call ranked-choice voting in the US. Another option is proportional representation. Although moving to proportional representation would be very hard for the US, if a country adopts it, I think a moderate version is preferable—one that avoids excessive party fragmentation and promotes open-list voting, so parties aren’t entirely in control of who within the party gets elected. For countries struggling with polarization, the Irish system of the single transferable vote is a good model to consider.
Co-Opting Without Capitulating
And lastly, Professor Diamond, to what extent does the co-optation of far-right discourse by centrist parties accelerate the normalization of authoritarian populism? Is this a short-term electoral tactic or a structural accommodation with long-term implications for the ideological boundaries of democratic politics?
Professor Larry Diamond: It’s another good question. And since these projects have really been gaining momentum over the last 15 years or so, it’s still too soon to answer definitively. It’s even more recent in terms of right-of-center parties trying to co-opt some of the voters and agenda of the extreme right.
I will say this: on the one hand, right-of-center parties—and even progressive ones—are beginning to respond. A recent and insightful commentary by a progressive British analyst in The New York Times argued that progressive parties would be well-advised to take immigration management more seriously. His central point was that a cohesive sense of national identity is often necessary to foster the social solidarity required to support the disadvantaged—the poor, the marginalized, and others in need. That solidarity, however, becomes more difficult to sustain when segments of the population perceive that social benefits are increasingly directed toward newcomers who have not yet become part of the national fabric.
I think Europe, the United States, and other advanced industrial democracies need humane and generous immigration policies. For one thing, they need the labor. With declining populations or slowing growth rates, they will face labor shortages of various kinds. But they also need to be serious about preserving the integrity of borders. If you don’t have borders, you don’t really have a country.
So, on the one hand, it is right and proper for political parties—not only of the right but also of the center-left—to recognize the frustrations surrounding unchecked immigration that the far right, often tinged with fascistic overtones, has been fanning. These concerns should be acknowledged and addressed. But that does not mean adopting the racism, hatred, or xenophobia of the far right.
Being humane, decent, respectful, and committed to the dignity of all people, regardless of origin, is essential. But that doesn’t necessarily mean—and I don’t think it is sustainable for liberal democracies to assume it should mean—purely open borders. That’s just one example where mainstream or progressive parties can respond to some of the legitimate issues the far right has exploited.
The far right is also raising concerns about economic inequality and injustice—issues that are central to progressive platforms. So, I think this has to be approached on an issue-by-issue basis.
Fourth Annual International Symposium on Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
Moderator
Antoine Godbert(Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).
Speakers
“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).
“Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki(Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).
“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider (Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).
Fourth Annual International Symposium on Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) was honored to host Deputy Justice Minister Dariusz Mazur as a keynote speaker at its Fourth Annual International Symposium on “Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges.”
In his address, Deputy Minister Mazur delivered a powerful reflection on the state of the rule of law and judicial independence in Poland. Drawing from over 25 years of service in the Polish judiciary, Mazur addressed how legal institutions can resist authoritarian tendencies and safeguard democratic values in an era of increasing polarization and populist pressure.
Born in Krakow in 1970, Dariusz Mazur began his judicial career at the District Court for Krakow-Podgórze, eventually serving as a judge at the Regional Court in Krakow. From 2010 to 2020, he chaired the 3rd Criminal Division and served as the Coordinator for International Cooperation and Human Rights in Criminal Matters. He has been actively involved in legal education through the European Judicial Training Network (EJTN) and the National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution, and has authored numerous publications in Polish, English, German, and Czech.
In 2016, he was named “European Judge 2015” by the Polish Section of the International Commission of Jurists for his landmark decision rejecting the extradition of Roman Polanski to the United States. In 2020, he received the Badge of Honor from the Polish Judges’ Association Iustitia for his efforts in defending the judiciary’s independence and raising international awareness about the challenges facing Poland’s legal system.
Deputy Minister Mazur’s keynote emphasized the vital role of judges, legal institutions, and international collaboration in resisting illiberal populism and upholding constitutional democracy.
Outside the courtroom, Mazur has a keen interest in history, rock music, and capoeira regional, a traditional form of Brazilian martial arts.
In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.
Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.
This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”
In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.
For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”
This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.
Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
Keynote Speech
The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).
Kamil Wyszkowski has been working for the United Nations. He currently serves as the Representative and Executive Director of the UN Global Compact Network Poland and as the Representative of UNOPS in Poland. He is an expert on UN and EU policies, particularly in areas intersecting business and public administration.
From 2002 to 2009, he worked at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), where he was responsible for international and multilateral cooperation and for developing programs across Europe and Asia. He has implemented development projects in dozens of countries, including Iraq, India, Thailand, and Romania, drawing on knowledge transfer from Poland. He has also worked at UNDP headquarters in New York and its regional center for Europe and the CIS in Bratislava. From 2009 to 2014, he was the Director of the UNDP Office in Poland. Since 2004, he has been the National Representative and Chair of the Board of the UN Global Compact Network Poland (GCNP), which coordinates cooperation between the UN and business, academia, cities, public administration, and NGOs in Poland. He has also led the Know How Hub (a UNDP Poland initiative, now under GCNP) since 2011.
He lectures at institutions including Central European University (Bucharest), Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv), Warsaw School of Economics, Kozminski University, Collegium Civitas, SWPS University, the Paderewski Institute of Diplomacy, and the University of Warsaw.
Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
Moderator
Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).
Speakers
“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski (Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).
“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol (Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).
In this compelling interview, Professor Rafal Soborski critiques Poland’s liberal democratic actors for mimicking right-wing rhetoric in a failed attempt to broaden appeal. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he warns, urging pro-democratic forces to adopt bold, progressive agendas rooted in class justice and social solidarity. Drawing comparisons to political centrists across Europe, Soborski emphasizes that ideological clarity—not cautious managerialism—is key to countering the far right’s emotional narratives and mobilizing mythologies. His insights offer a timely call for a renewed progressive vision amid the turbulent political landscape in Poland and beyond.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Rafal Soborski offers a trenchant critique of the Polish liberal democratic actors’ strategic missteps in the recent presidential election, arguing that centrist attempts to mimic the right not only fail to capture conservative voters but also alienate the progressive base. “Shifting right doesn’t win over the right—it alienates the left,” he asserts, summarizing what he sees as a recurring failure of liberal parties not only in Poland but across much of Europe.
Professor Soborski, who teaches International Politics at Richmond American University and serves as a Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University, situates this analysis within a broader critique of what he calls “managerial centrism.” For him, this style of governance—technocratic, uninspiring, and devoid of ideological ambition—has become a default mode for centrist parties. “Even when the center wins elections, it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism… without a compelling vision of its own,” he explains.
This was evident in the performance of Civic Platform’s candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, who lost narrowly to the nationalist Karol Nawrocki in a deeply polarized race in Poland. Rather than galvanizing progressive voters with bold policies, Trzaskowski, Professor Soborski suggests, hedged his ideological bets and made symbolic missteps that demoralized key constituencies. “I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates,” Professor Soborski notes. “This alienated many people on the left… while not convincing anyone on the right.”
In his view, such political positioning reflects a deeper failure to recognize the need for ideological clarity and courage. Drawing comparisons to Germany’s Olaf Scholz and Britain’s Keir Starmer, Professor Soborski warns that when liberal parties attempt to neutralize far-right narratives by parroting them, they lose both authenticity and voter trust. “It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right,” he laments.
For Professor Soborski, the path forward lies not in cautious centrism but in a reinvigoration of progressive values—rooted in social justice, pro-Europeanism, and recognition of class dynamics. “I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right,” he concludes, “rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory.”
This interview reveals not only the ideological contours of Poland’s political battleground but also the urgent need for liberal democratic actors to rethink their strategy before the far right consolidates its recent gains.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Rafal Soborski.
Populism Is a Style, Not an Ideology
Posters of 2025 Polish presidential candidates Rafał Trzaskowski (KO) and Karol Nawrocki (PiS) in Kuślin, Poland, on April 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Rafal Soborski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. You’ve argued that populism lacks ideological coherence. How would you categorize Karol Nawrocki’s brand of politics—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—within your broader critique of the term ‘populism’?
Professor Rafal Soborski: I don’t think mine is a critique of the term populism as such. But instead, what I would argue—and I am, of course, far from being original here—is that approaching populism as an ideology, even a thin one, is misguided. Incidentally, the author to whom we owe the concept of thin-centered ideology, Michael Freeden, does not think populism qualifies as one, so it doesn’t qualify as a worldview. According to Freeden, thin-centered ideologies have a restricted conceptual core, a restricted range of concepts, and hence need broader, more mature ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, to serve as their hosts. But the thin-centered ideologies are still more complex than populism. So think of nationalism, feminism, perhaps ecology.
On the other hand, populism revolves merely around the opposition between the decent people and the corrupted elite, and this is not enough to construct a worldview that any ideology is expected to offer. Of course, you can further distinguish between right-wing populism, left-wing populism, and so on. But such distinctions often reveal that populism does not really make much sense as an ideological category. So both Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders have been described as populists, but their views are dramatically different.
During the pandemic, I analyzed approaches to COVID-19 that others had categorized as populist, and I showed that there was no consistent pattern or any general similarities in terms of the track record—in terms of the success or otherwise—of so-called populist policies, and that, in fact, the major factor was the degree of neoliberalization. So, I think it is better to keep populism as a description of the type of political communication—the style of political communication—and perhaps also the convention-breaking behavior of some politicians, including dressing down, swearing, smoking—in the case of Nawrocki, sniffing snus during TV debates with Trzaskowski.
But the populist manner may carry very different ideological and political messages, and in that sense it may be better to speak of populist nationalism or populist socialism rather than vice versa—rather than socialist populism. Populism then becomes just a description of the style in which a given ideology is conveyed.
As for Nawrocki, I think all of the adjectives that you have mentioned—Trumpian, nationalist, anti-liberal—could potentially apply, for of course they are different categories. Trumpism seems to have an obvious meaning. It’s a blend of hostile grievances against all kinds of minorities and some pernicious establishment—which is, of course, ironic, considering Trump’s own status—and Trumpism is expressed more as ephemeral sound bites than coherent ideas. We’ve become used to that with Donald Trump. Trump is also associated with political transactionism, bringing his personal monetary interest quite unashamedly into politics, which also affects what he says and how he says it. So it remains to be seen if Nawrocki tries to emulate this.
Is Nawrocki a nationalist? Certainly. And it is a nationalism that thrives on and stirs up collective fears and collective resentment in a volatile world whose complexities this kind of nationalism oversimplifies.
Anti-liberal? Well, absolutely. However, I think we need to be fair and wait and see who Nawrocki turns out to be ideologically when in office.
We need to remember that until he was selected by Jarosław Kaczyński as an ostensibly nonpartisan candidate—but really the candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)—he had been almost a complete unknown to the wider public. So I think we need to wait and see what happens.
Ideological Balkanization and the Far Right’s Mythmaking Machine
You’ve called for taking ideology seriously in times of crisis. What ideological threads—beyond vague populism—do you see underpinning Nawrocki’s support base and discourse?
Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you for this question. Yes, I think political ideology should be taken seriously, and I discussed this in my work. For years, however, ideology has undergone a radical transformation, becoming increasingly fragmented, fluid, ephemeral, reacting haphazardly to rapid social and political changes. So, traditional left-right distinctions have blurred. They have given way to hybrid belief systems and situational politics, featuring often contradictory positions depending on the issue at hand, emerging at any moment. Of course, social media have accelerated this shift as well, favoring meme-driven and personality-centered politics over more durable, collectively held ideological commitments. And, comprehensive worldviews are losing ground to issue-based activism, identity politics, and also algorithmically reinforced echo chambers. So, ideology has changed, and far-right politics provides a particularly revealing lens through which to analyze ongoing ideological transformations.
The far right today combines elements of nationalism, traditionalism, libertarianism, conspiracism, accelerationism—you name it—into an unstable and contradictory but potent political force. The far right also engages in constructing and mobilizing its followers around myths—political myths of civilizational decline, national betrayal, or demographic apocalypse. It offers emotionally charged narratives of victimization and redemption. So, for example, “the Great Replacement” myth frames migration as an existential threat to the West; “the Deep State” conspiracy envisions elites orchestrating some global control or takeover. The far right relies on such narratives, positing a moralized struggle between the people and their perceived enemies, and seems to be capitalizing on the fears that these cause.
Overall, I think what we witness is ideological Balkanization—adherence to tribalism over universalism, feeling over reasoning—and it’s going in that direction. But this does not mean that we should be paying less attention to these fragmented new forms of ideology. Ideology scholars should really be exploring ideology in its different expressions, whether they are sophisticated and structured, or crass and fleeting. For better or worse, this is how we tend to think politically today, and we should be studying this.
However, coming back to Nawrocki, I think it is likely that he will be blending different ideological themes, and it seems certain to me that it will be a narrative mobilizing collective exclusionary emotions over reasoning. But still, as I said earlier, I think we need to wait and see. His political communication thus far has been subject to the pressures of electoral competition much more than it will be when he’s in office, with at least five years of presidency ahead of him. Perhaps he will continue this kind of discourse, or perhaps he will change. We’ll see.
The Far Right Has a Base and a Superstructure—But No Real International
President-elect Karol Nawrocki campaigning ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential election in Łódź, Poland, on April 27, 2024. Photo: Tomasz Warszewski.
How does Nawrocki’s alignment with Trumpism reflect broader transnational ideological flows between far-right actors across the Atlantic? Are we seeing a global ideological bloc emerging?
Professor Rafal Soborski: That’s a great question. Far-right ideologies take increasingly transnational forms. This includes the emergence of different forms of civilizationism, variously aligning with or transcending nationalism or racism. So, with my colleagues at London Metropolitan University, Professor Michał Garapich and Dr. Anna Jochymek, we’ve been working on a project funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council, studying the emerging transnational Polish-British far right. And we see a significant number of Polish migrants in Britain recruited by British far-right organizations. We also see British far-right leaders and activists visiting Poland, for example, to take part in the Polish Independence March on 11/11, which is probably the world’s largest transnational far-right hub, as well as a symbolic space for the reproduction of political myths.
Far-right cooperation is fast becoming both a matter of ideological synergy and financial benefit. Far-right influencers play an increasingly important role, and there is money around them. So, for example, one Polish-British far-right PR expert has been behind the rightward shift of Elon Musk, and both have promoted the staunchly pro-Israeli, Islamophobic far-right influencer Tommy Robinson.
So, in that sense, I think an ideological bloc has already emerged, and this far right of today does have both its base and its superstructure, using Marxian terminology. But having said all that, far-right nationalism’s logic is not really given to cooperation—to put this mildly—and as we know from history. So, I anticipate all kinds of tensions, potentially conflicts emerging, and I don’t think that a robust, coherent far-right international is likely in that sense.
Populist Nationalism Thrives on Imagined Enemies And PiS Knows This Well
With Nawrocki now positioned to veto progressive reforms by Tusk’s government, are we witnessing a new phase of institutional gridlock engineered by ideological confrontation between liberalism and authoritarian conservatism?
Professor Rafal Soborski: I think this is highly likely. But I don’t think, to be honest, that Tusk’s government would have done much, even with a president from its own side. The coalition is too divided on social issues and has been, I have to say this with regret, highly ineffective. And Tusk’s party itself is really right-wing—I mean, by Western standards. This is a neoliberal/neoconservative party. It resembles the Tories under Cameron before their shift in a far-right direction. So, yes, but I don’t think that it would be a very dramatic change in relation to what we have.
Do you foresee PiS leveraging the presidency to engineer a strategic comeback in 2027, thereby locking in illiberal reforms? If so, how might ideology serve as the vehicle of this restoration?
Professor Rafal Soborski: I think the broad ideological outlook of Law and Justice (PiS) will remain as it is—traditional, conservative on social issues, and protectionist—some would say drifting towards the left—on economic issues. At the same time, the populist nationalism that PiS represents, as I said earlier, thrives on imagining enemies and hostile forces. So, at one point it was the LGBT community that PiS stigmatized, with some regions and locations under the control of the party declaring themselves to be LGBT-free zones. At other points, it was refugees from the Middle East, whom Kaczyński presented in a language resembling Nazi rhetoric, really—namely, as carriers of dangerous diseases. So, with the rapid growth of the Ukrainian population in Poland following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, PiS will be keen to capitalize on any emerging fears and tensions between the Polish population and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, and that this will be used to engineer this strategic comeback in 2027.
PiS Is Illiberal—But Let’s Not Mistake It for Neoliberal
Chairperson of Law and Justice, Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Photo: Tomasz Kudala.
In your analysis, how does neoliberalism continue to structure Polish politics even amidst this nationalist, anti-liberal wave? Can we speak of an ‘illiberal neoliberalism’ in the Polish context?
Professor Rafal Soborski: This is an interesting question—questions like this color the debate on whether we still live in a neoliberal era. Trump’s tariffs, Brexit, etc., seem to perhaps contradict this. Neoliberalism—and by this I mean a crass version of 19th-century economic liberalism, not the paradigm in the studies of international relations also known as neoliberalism—has been the hegemonic ideology for so long that, even if we are to assume its terminal decline in the near future, it will continue resonating for some time. By the way, the end of neoliberalism was pronounced a few times before, especially during the 2008 economic crisis—the gravest one since 1929—which revealed the serious flaws of neoliberalism, and then during the pandemic, when suddenly the state, which neoliberals tend to blame for all problems, proved indispensable, and neoliberal regimes coped with the pandemic far worse, far less effectively than the more social-democratic, statist ones.
Now, neoliberalism is compatible with authoritarianism—think of Chile under Pinochet’s rule, for instance—but as far as PiS is concerned, I am not sure if the party represents illiberal neoliberalism. Neoliberals preach that markets are always right, they don’t find inequality to be a problem, they promote austerity and the rolling back of the welfare state. And PiS, on the other hand, is actually quite statist in approach, supportive of the welfare state—for whichever reasons, usually just electoral reasons, but still—and big projects like, for instance, the central airport in Poland, which is now in a bit of a limbo. Economic inequalities—we have to keep this in mind—under the PiS government declined in Poland. The Gini coefficient, which measures inequality, fluctuated during PiS years but was never higher than in 2015 and is now significantly below average. So, I wouldn’t describe them as illiberal neoliberals. They are certainly illiberal, but probably not neoliberal.
Is Poland a Nationalist Haven?
Your recent co-authored work shows how Polish migrants in the UK are co-opted into transnational far-right movements. How might Nawrocki’s presidency reinforce or reshape diasporic nationalism and transnational far-right solidarities?
Professor Rafal Soborski: Thank you very much for this question. This is the topic that I’m working on with Professor Garapich and Dr. Jochymek at LMU.
Poland is often seen by the global far right as a nationalist haven that remains relatively homogeneous ethnically, that remains traditional, conservative, and has also been very economically successful in recent decades, while maintaining a strong identity. And this kind of perception has been articulated and reinforced by all kinds of far-right influencers, but also by Donald Trump. When he visited Warsaw during his first presidency, he chose Warsaw as the location for his main European speech—often described by scholars as the major narrative of Western civilizational populism.
I think this perception of Poland—has been undermined by the 2023 elections and the premiership of the globalist Donald Tusk, as he’s seen by the far right. But if PiS regains power in 2027, then the far-right narrative about Poland as a model country is likely to make a comeback.
I already mentioned our work on Polish migrants in Britain, one of the largest minorities in the country. At this point, approximately 700,000 Poles live in Britain, and their voting patterns are interesting. They are different from how Poles living in, for example, the United States or Canada vote. So in the first round of the presidential elections, almost 36% of those who voted voted for Trzaskowski. But then he was followed by two far-right candidates—Sławomir Mentzen, over 18%, and Grzegorz Braun, who got over 14%—and Nawrocki was only fourth, with just 13%. So it seems that Polish right-wing migrants in Britain prefer either the more extreme narrative coming from Braun, which is messianic, antisemitic, extremely homophobic, or the more economically libertarian far-right views of Mentzen. And the popularity of the latter may be explicable by the fact that many Poles living in Britain are self-employed and hence averse to big state and high taxation. But in the second round, Trzaskowski got almost 61%. So we should keep in mind that the majority of Poles in Britain are not interested in politics and do not vote. Those who vote ultimately voted for the centrist candidate.
Now, coming back to Nawrocki: only time will tell what his win means for transnational far-right solidarities. What we know is that the PiS government until 2023—so for eight years—supported symbolically and financially various initiatives of the Polish diaspora in Britain that were of a far-right nature, and the British press did register this. More broadly, taking a more global perspective, as the far right assumes an increasingly civilizationist posture, transnational far-right ideologies, activism, and symbolism will become more important, I’m sure—reinforcing these solidarities that you’ve asked about. However, as I already said, we should not forget the lesson from history: that collision courses are inherent in nationalism, and such friendships are likely to be subordinated and perhaps ultimately trumped by jingoistic passions.
Shifting Right Won’t Win the Right
What are the ideological weaknesses of the liberal opposition in Poland, particularly in light of Trzaskowski’s narrow loss? Is managerial centrism enough to challenge the far right’s mobilizing narratives?
Professor Rafal Soborski: It certainly is not enough, and this can be seen not just in Poland, but also in other places, including Germany or Britain, where—even when the center wins elections—it then limits itself in office to this very managerialism you mentioned, without a compelling vision of its own. It tends to mimic instead the narratives of the right. Think of Keir Starmer’s shift to the right in recent months, or Scholz when he was Germany’s Chancellor. There are many other examples. And I think this was also a mistake of the coalition government in Poland—the rightward shift in the rhetoric around migration, for example, and no progress whatsoever on the promises made to the LGBT community. And of course, this was caused by the coalition being divided on the question. But why would voters take into consideration the inner workings of the governing coalition? They generally expect results.
Many leftists did vote for Trzaskowski, perhaps with a heavy conscience. I would have liked many more of them to vote for him, just to avoid having a nationalist with a shady past as president of the country. But Trzaskowski himself should have shifted in a more progressive direction. For example, I don’t think he convinced anyone by hiding the rainbow flag that was handed to him by Nawrocki during one of the debates, and then it was quickly taken over from Trzaskowski by a left-wing candidate. This alienated many people on the left—members of the LGBT community, I presume, as well—while not convincing anyone on the right, who had seen Trzaskowski before participating in Pride marches in Warsaw. So, this was inconsistent, and shifting to the right will not work.
Don’t Chase the Right—Reclaim Class Politics and Solidarity
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.
How should pro-democratic forces in Poland reframe their political project to contest both the nationalist cultural agenda and the underlying neoliberal consensus you critique?
Professor Rafal Soborski: I think it is evident from what I have said so far that my political views are leftist and progressive. I would like to see pro-democratic forces in Poland challenging the right rather than hoping in vain that they can occupy some of the right’s discursive territory. I would like to see an open, pro-European Poland respecting minorities and celebrating diversity.
But I would also like to see the importance of social class really appreciated by Polish progressive politicians.The liberal center, and even the liberal left, sometimes appear to believe that class is no longer a significant dimension of identity or social stratification. They see class as a concept that was relevant in the industrial era—in the 19th century, early 20th century—but not in an information- and service-based society of today. But the concept of class describes an economic relationship, and anyone working for wages, not living off rent or interest, belongs to the working class. So to appeal to this huge group, pro-democratic forces should start talking about the four-day working week, more loudly about universal income, universal benefits—especially in the context of AI, which will likely eliminate a wide range of professions, a wide range of jobs, or rather, it will replace humans in those jobs.
The Razem (Together) party in Poland has started this conversation, and I think this is the way to go, rather than caring mainly for the interests of a small number of wealthy individuals or entrepreneurs, however important they may be for the economy. We should also remember on this point that some of the people who voted for Law and Justice—I suspect a significant share of the party’s electorate—chose it because of the range of social benefits, welfare benefits that the party has introduced or expanded, hence, as I mentioned, reducing inequalities while at the same time sustaining economic growth. So, I think a social democratic, solidary response—protecting the poor while shifting more of the financial burden towards the privileged few—is what I would recommend, and I would recommend this both in principle and also strategically, as a way to weaken, to defeat PiS.
And finally, Professor Soborski, given the gender and education-based electoral cleavages evident in the runoff, how might intersectional ideological analysis help explain—and perhaps overcome—these divisions?
Professor Rafal Soborski: Most of the cleavages were not that surprising—big cities for Trzaskowski, provincial Poland for Nawrocki, Western Poland for Trzaskowski, Eastern Poland for Nawrocki. Education was, of course, a big factor as well. But what I would like to highlight—what came unexpectedly—was the support far-right candidates Mentzen and Braun received from young people, who then, in the second round, voted primarily for Nawrocki. So clearly, this is a group for whom Civic Platform—the coalition government—does not seem to have a convincing offer, and I already explained what I see as the right response.
Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
Moderator
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari(Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).
“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz(Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).
Paper Presenters
“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski(Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).
“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri(Assoc. Professor& Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).
Fourth Annual International Symposium on Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’
May 22–23, 2025 | University of Warsaw
We are honored to present the keynote address by Professor Jocelyne Cesari, a leading authority on religion and politics, whose lecture, “A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” offered a groundbreaking exploration of how religious narratives and civilizational imaginaries are co-opted and reframed by populist movements in both national and transnational arenas.
Drawing on her extensive comparative research and most recent book We God’s Nations (Cambridge University Press, 2022), Professor Cesari challenges static interpretations of religious identity and civilizational tropes. Instead, she proposes a relational framework to understand how populists reconfigure religion and belonging in response to political, geopolitical, and social anxieties—often turning religion into a marker of national authenticity and global resistance.
This keynote engages deeply with the symposium’s central theme: how civilizational populism transforms the political landscape across continents, and how religious claims are mobilized to draw boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them.’ Professor Cesari’s insights illuminate how populists selectively mobilize Christianity, Islam, or Hinduism—not simply as belief systems, but as civilizational signifiers—to justify exclusionary politics and cultural hierarchies in an increasingly interconnected but divided world.
