Malaysian politician Anwar Ibrahim delivering a speech on the eve of September 16, 2008 — the day he intended to take over the Malaysian government. Photo: Chee Sheong Chia.

Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHomeJournal of Populism StudiesLeadership & Persona

Please cite as:
Shukri, Syaza & Hassan, Isyraf. (2025). “Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000119



Abstract

This paper examines how Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s tenth prime minister, employs civilisational populism in shaping his foreign policy rhetoric, particularly during the Gaza War that started in 2023. Through the lens of civilisational populism defined by Yilmaz and Morieson as a political strategy that constructs “the people” as defenders of a superior but threatened civilisation, the paper argues that Anwar leverages the Gaza/Palestinian cause to project Islamic solidarity and deflect domestic criticisms of liberalism. In doing so, he seeks to consolidate support against the conservative Islamist opposition, PAS, while maintaining international legitimacy. Drawing on the framework of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM), the study emphasizes the role of individual agency, cognitive calculations, and domestic political pressures in guiding Malaysia’s external stance. Anwar’s rhetorical and symbolic actions such as mass rallies, public condemnations of Israel, and economic restrictions on Israeli-linked entities are analysed not simply as moral positioning but as calculated decisions aimed at managing political survival within a fragmented coalition. The paper highlights contradictions in this approach, such as the BlackRock controversy and local backlash over prioritizing Palestinian aid over domestic needs, revealing the tension between foreign policy idealism and domestic political pragmatism. By integrating FPDM with civilisational populism, the paper provides an understanding of how Malaysia’s foreign policy is not purely reactive or interest-based but shaped by identity politics, leadership perception, and populist imperatives.

Keywords: Anwar Ibrahim; Malaysia; civilisational populism; foreign policy; Gaza War; Palestine; Islamic solidarity; populist rhetoric; domestic politics; identity politics; PAS; leadership agency

 

By Syaza Shukri & Isyraf Hassan

Introduction

The pendulum of civilisationism has swung. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, humanity entered an era of globalisation where connectivity prevailed. However, it did not last, and now that we are in the third decade of the 21st century, we are referring back to Samuel Huntington’s most well-known work, which states that civilisation will be the basis for clashes. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus fostered a wave of neoliberal globalization, making civilisational divisions seem unlikely. However, following the devastating events of 2001, these divisions have become more apparent, especially against Islamic civilisation. Instead of all-out war, the divisions we are seeing occurs within the framework of national elections. Politicians today are increasingly using civilisationism as part of their populist strategies to win votes.

According to Yilmaz and Morieson, civilisational populism is a political ideology that combines elements of populism with a civilisational framework. It involves a discourse that portrays a particular civilisation—often religious or cultural—as superior and under threat from outsiders or other civilisations. They argued, “populist uses of civilisational discourses differ from non-populist discourses insofar as they use civilisationism to construct internal divisions between an ingroup who they claim belong to ‘our’ civilisation (‘the people’), and outgroups (‘elites,’ ‘others’) who they claim have either betrayed the civilisation of the people or belong to a threatening foreign civilisation,” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022: 8).

This form of populism appeals to sentiments of cultural heritage, identity, and belonging by positioning “the people” as defenders of their civilisation against perceived existential threats.

For this paper, we are looking at civilisational populism and its impact beyond the nation-state. We argue that Anwar Ibrahim, the tenth prime minister of Malaysia, has been involved with civilisational rhetoric for the purpose of gaining support. Domestically, Anwar’s main political rival is the Islamist Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS). Shukri (2023) argued that PAS definitely participated in the civilisational narrative of Islam against non-Muslims, specifically non-Muslim Chinese of Malaysia. On the other hand, Anwar, as argued by Shukri (2024), is more of an inclusivist populist. There is heightened political tension in Malaysia between the Islamists that get support from the majority Malay population and Anwar’s own coalition that is usually labelled derogatorily as “liberal” and finds support among non-Muslims and urban Malays. Due to this pressure, Anwar needs to portray himself as a “defender” of Malays and Muslims but in a civilisational way beyond Muslims in Malaysia in order to maintain his inclusivist reputation. Specifically, this paper will look at Anwar’s rhetoric on the Israel-Gaza War that erupted in October 2023. 

Anwar has established himself as an Islamist since his days as a youth leader, and he later transitioned to become a Muslim democrat (Malik & Shukri, 2018). However, we observe that his more assertive rhetoric since becoming prime minister is slightly different from his days as the deputy prime minister under Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration. As a result, it may have led to intra-civilisational discord with other Muslim countries, such as with Saudi Arabia, albeit before the start of the ongoing war, when he was unable to meet either the king or the crown prince during his first visit as prime minister.

The next section will look at Malaysian politics and Anwar Ibrahim’s background. Next, we will look at the literature on civilisational populism and foreign policy decision making in order to provide a framework to guide our understanding of Anwar’s rhetoric about Palestine, Gaza, and the Muslim world. Following that, we will delve deeper into Anwar’s civilisational populism and his relationship with other Muslim leaders. The penultimate section will discuss the impact of Anwar’s civilisational rhetoric in the broader Muslim world context.

Read Full Article Here

Andrej Babiš, leader of the ANO party and one of the richest businessmen in the Czech Republic, during a press conference in Prague on March 2, 2013. Photo: Dreamstime.

Prof. Bustikova: Babiš’s Victory in Czechia Is a Big Win for Illiberalism in Europe

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsLeadership & PersonaUncategorized

On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, setting the stage for coalition talks with two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties. In this in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Lenka Bustikova analyzes the implications of this outcome for Czech democracy and the broader Central European political landscape. Warning that “Babiš’s victory is a big win for illiberalism in Europe,” she explains how this election represents both a consolidation of illiberal forces and a strategic shift in Babiš’s populism—from managerialism to paternalism—raising concerns about democratic backsliding and Czechia’s future orientation within the EU.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

On October 4, 2025, billionaire populist Andrej Babiš’s ANO party won the Czech parliamentary elections with just under 35% of the vote, securing 80 of 200 seats—an increase from the previous election. Although short of a majority, Babiš is expected to lead coalition talks. His most likely allies are two small right-wing, Eurosceptic parties: the anti-Green Deal Motorists for Themselves and Tomio Okamura’s anti-immigrant Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD). While ANO shares the Motorists’ opposition to EU emissions targets, relations with the SPD may prove more complicated due to internal divisions and radical demands. A new Babiš government would likely shift Czech foreign policy, notably by scrapping the Czech ammunition initiative supporting Ukraine.

Against this backdrop, Professor Lenka Bustikova, Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, provides a detailed analysis of the political transformations currently unfolding in Czechia. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), she warns: “I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift.”

Professor Bustikova situates the election within a broader pattern of democratic contestation in Central Europe, describing it as both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. Drawing on her scholarship on technocratic populism, she explains how Babiš has evolved from presenting himself as a competent manager to positioning himself as a paternal figure promising redistribution and state-led solutions to economic grievances. His emphasis on managerial competence now interacts with sovereigntist and anti-Green Deal rhetoric, reflecting a hybrid populist strategy.

Crucially, Professor Bustikova underlines the significance of the far right’s role in the coalition-building process. “If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning,” she notes. This development, she argues, marks a major illiberal breakthrough, with potential implications for Czechia’s position in the EU.

Although Czechia retains strong institutional guardrails—including the presidency, the Senate, the Constitutional Court, and a pluralistic media environment—Professor Bustikova expects democratic quality to decline during Babiš’s tenure. Situating these developments in a regional perspective, she warns that the illiberal camp is “numerically much stronger,” making future liberal victories increasingly difficult.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Lenka Bustikova, revised for clarity and flow.

Professor Lenka Bustikova is the Director of the Center for European Studies and Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida.

Czech Elections Mark a Strategic Shift Toward Illiberalism

Professor Lenka Bustikova, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In light of Andrej Babiš’s decisive electoral victory, how would you interpret the current realignment of Czech party politics? Does this signify a deeper structural shift toward sovereigntist populism, or is it a contingent backlash against liberal governance?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Thank you for this wonderful and difficult question. I would say that I am not alarmed by the outcome of the Czech elections, but I’m certainly concerned. What happened in this election—and many others have commented on it as well—is the consolidation of two camps. I would call them liberal and illiberal, because what the previous or outgoing government offered was not a particularly liberal government.

In this election, Andrej Babiš and his party, ANO, very successfully and skillfully consolidated voters who are unhappy, struggling, insecure, and also revengeful—and he did so effectively. The encouraging news about the Czech elections is that, in the previous election, about one million votes were wasted on smaller anti-system parties. This time, it was only 400,000. Babiš managed to unite this “coalition of the unhappy” and those seeking change, and he did it well. That camp has now consolidated, will have a voice, and will act as an accountability mechanism.

The liberal camp actually did quite well; the electoral math just didn’t work in their favor as it did four years ago. They were punished for not delivering on certain issues. They could have implemented progressive policies that wouldn’t have cost them much, but they didn’t—partly due to tensions within the coalition. They could have been more proactive on LGBTQ rights, registered partnerships, and perhaps on women’s rights.

More importantly, voters were facing a country with high inflation and high debt. The government did all it could, but it wasn’t enough. While the macroeconomic statistics in the Czech Republic are quite favorable, the government failed to communicate this effectively and neglected key economic issues, such as the housing crisis, that required greater attention. The outgoing coalition also continued to embody a kind of 1990s economic approach—loyal to an era that many voters now question and want to move beyond.

Overall, this election represents both a consolidation of the illiberal camp and a reconsolidation of the liberal camp. What we are seeing—in the Czech Republic and elsewhere—is that the illiberal camp is much stronger. If these patterns of consolidation continue, it will become increasingly difficult for the liberal camp to win elections. This is a major challenge in many countries today.

From Technocrat to ‘Big Daddy’ Populist

Drawing on your concept of technocratic populism, how does Babiš’s blend of managerialism and anti-elite rhetoric differ from classical populist radical right movements in Central Europe? Has this hybrid model evolved since his first premiership (2017–2021)?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: When we wrote the article with Professor Petra Guasti on technocratic populism, we conceived of it as an ideal type—and, of course, every ideal type, when faced with reality, becomes a bit murky and messy. In the original classification, technocratic populism in its pure form did not involve culture wars, nativism, or sovereigntism. It was about the populist utilization of expertise to win elections.

Babiš, who is a very flexible and savvy politician, has certainly evolved. Especially during the 2023 presidential elections, we saw him significantly amplify his nativist appeal—it was quite remarkable. But then he softened his rhetoric again. In the current election, he and his party, ANO, have toned it down.

We also see a shift away from the original technocratic populist model and its managerial appeal. When he first ran, he presented himself as a competent manager. Now, he positions himself more as a “big daddy” figure who will take care of things and spend generously on his constituents. The party he originally founded was fiscally conservative, advocating for running the state efficiently like a firm. That is no longer the platform. The current platform focuses on redistribution and targeted spending toward core constituencies.

This has little to do with efficiency, even though one of his electoral appeals is that the previous coalition was ineffective at managing economic problems—and there is certainly some truth to that. In many ways, this election has centered on pocketbook concerns, poverty, and voters in economically disadvantaged regions. Babiš and ANO have managed to mobilize these voters very successfully and effectively.

Sovereigntist Rhetoric, Pragmatic Strategy

Given Babiš’s membership in the Patriots for Europe and his critiques of the Green Deal, how do you assess the interplay between sovereigntist populism in Czechia and EU-level constraints? Are we witnessing a gradual erosion of the EU’s leverage over domestic political agendas?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: We certainly see that the European Union either lacks the instruments or is unwilling to use the instruments at hand to deal with autocratic or illiberal leaders, unfortunately. Babiš is a very pragmatic politician. He will criticize the Green Deal, but if, for instance, his agro-federate firm can benefit from it, I’m sure he would be open to discussions. One important aspect of the Green Deal debate is the likely involvement of the Motorists party, which is expected to be part of the future coalition and absolutely opposes the Green Deal. There is even a possibility that this party will get the environment portfolio, which would certainly lead to a strong pushback against the Green Deal from the incoming coalition.

The coalition negotiations have just started and will take some time, but resistance is almost certain. However, Babiš, being highly pragmatic, will likely oppose the Green Deal selectively, in ways that suit his political agenda, while also accommodating his coalition partners. I’m sure he will navigate this very skillfully, as part of the Green Deal is rhetorical, but there are also technical aspects that will not be easy to roll back.

A Volatile Marriage of Convenience

If Babiš succeeds in forming a minority government backed by SPD and Motorists, how might this affect the strategic behavior of far-right actors? Does your research on illiberal alliances suggest a stable coalition or a volatile marriage of convenience?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: The negotiations have just started, and one possibility is a coalition of ANO, led by Andrej Babiš, and Motorists. It’s not clear whether the far-right party—Tomio Okamura’s party—or its 10 plus 5 MPs will be part of the government or whether they will silently support the coalition from parliament. It’s possible that, for the far right, Babiš will ask them to nominate experts.

This is likely to be a volatile coalition, but Babiš has shown in the past that he can handle coalitions very well. In fact, anyone considering entering a coalition with Andrej Babiš should be very cautious. Babiš was once in a coalition with the Social Democrats, and he completely destroyed them, siphoning off all their voters. They are basically gone, especially after this election—a dead party for which Babiš can take much of the credit.

The SPD should really think twice about how to approach this future coalition relationship because the election results have shown that Babiš can very skillfully siphon off far-right voters as well. He is a highly strategic politician who has effectively cannibalized his coalition partners in the past.

With Motorists, there are likely to be some tensions. It’s not a stable party; it’s built around a few personalities. The biggest source of tension in the coalition will probably concern budget balance. The party of Motorists is, in a way, the intellectual child of former President Václav Klaus. They want to keep balanced budgets—an idea that has already been signaled as completely unrealistic. There may be some initial friction, but it’s likely they will get over it quickly.

Babiš is one of the most talented politicians in the Czech Republic today, and I expect he will handle this situation quite effectively, using a combination of arm-twisting and incentives. I suspect he will be very successful.

Okamura Overshoots, Babiš Benefits

Czech businessman and SPD leader Tomio Okamura in Prague on May 5, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.

The SPD underperformed compared to expectations. How do you explain the resilience of Babiš’s populist appeal despite the presence of established far-right actors? Does this reflect a mainstreaming of radical right discourse in Czech politics?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Okamura underperformed—his party underperformed. Moreover, he has a group of very undisciplined MPs because, in fact, he had three other parties in the coalition, so he has five MPs who are more like coalition MPs than SPD members. He is no longer an authentic politician. Many far-right voters, including those from other parties, no longer see him as a credible nativist fighter—that’s one aspect. But also, he is too extreme for the Czech context. He ran a very vitriolic, pro-Russian campaign and openly declared that he would like the Czech Republic to leave NATO and the European Union. Czech voters absolutely do not have the stomach for that, so he overshot. This is simply too extreme.

As Aleš Michal, one Czech political scientist, insightfully observed, the mobilization against the far right led by the pro-democratic parties and the coalition Together—when they warned Czech voters against parties that would steer the country towards Russia—actually worked. Anti-system and far-right or far-left voters moved under the umbrella of ANO. So, in a way, the strategy worked, but it did not help the coalition Together—it helped Babiš.

Another important aspect is that during the presidential elections, which Babiš lost but which were highly polarized, he managed to attract a significant number of far-right voters. In 2023, these voters grew accustomed to the idea of voting for him. So, although he lost the presidential election, it helped him enormously in this election, as he became an acceptable alternative for the far right.

Cultural Issues Trigger Policy Backlash

In your work on the “Revenge of the Radical Right,” you emphasize how minority accommodation can trigger backlash. To what extent are current Czech political dynamics shaped by cultural issues (e.g., LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, Ukrainian refugees) rather than economic grievances?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’ve thought about these issues quite a bit because I do think that with a lot of foreign mobilization today, the appeal of ethnic issues is somewhat subdued. I also have one or two articles with Professor Petra Guasti where we speculate about this. The logic of the book is that backlash ensues after the accommodation of minorities—it’s a backlash against elevating groups and putting forward policies that help them. In that sense, the logic of backlash applies here as well. In the Czech Republic, when you consider the status quo and the pursuit of policies that were genuinely beneficial to Ukrainian refugees, you can anticipate an ensuing backlash. Ukrainian refugees are no longer as warmly welcomed as they once were. There have also been many attempts to advance more robust legislation to protect women against rape and sexual assault, as well as attempts to codify the Istanbul Convention. These are all policies that, in a way, shift the balance of power or policy direction, and we have seen backlash as a result. Similarly, the LGBTQ community is hoping to increase their rights. Much of the public is quite open to this possibility, but the process of getting there involves shifting the balance and policies. Once that happens, advocates on the opposing side are naturally activated. So, I do think the policy backlash logic applies here as well.

Recent scholarship highlights the rise of confessional illiberalism across Central Europe. Do you see religiously inflected sovereigntism gaining ground in Czechia, or does the country’s secular legacy limit this trajectory compared to Hungary and Poland?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: This is an excellent question. It refers to a recent article that I’ve written with Lottam Halevi, who is now at the University of Constance. One important thing to keep in mind is that much of the mobilization around religious issues is actually a mobilization of political identity. It is not necessarily the case that more religiously infused countries will experience a higher mobilization of religious identity or religious activity as political identity. Czechia is a very secular country. However, we do see issues around transgender rights or some LGBTQ questions being framed in ways that are very similar to Hungary and Poland. The culture wars are nowhere near as fierce as in neighboring countries, but the country could potentially develop its own mini culture wars. 

Another important point is that in the Czech Republic, the Christian Democratic Party is firmly in a coalition and belongs to the liberal or pro-democratic camp. As long as they remain on the side of parties that respect the rule of law, this creates a kind of firewall against the politicization of some of these issues. Nevertheless, we have seen signs of this dynamic even in a country as secular as the Czech Republic.

Culture Wars Remain Underutilized in Czech Politics

Ukrainian activists protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine during a peaceful demonstration with flags in support of Ukraine in Prague, Czechia on February 24, 2023. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your article “In Europe’s Closet” discusses how minority rights can catalyze illiberal backlash. Are Czech populist and far-right actors increasingly weaponizing LGBTQ+ issues as part of their sovereigntist narratives? How does this compare to developments in Slovakia or Poland?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Suddenly, these issues are high on the agenda in Slovakia and Poland, even though in Poland some LGBTQ issues are not as salient as they were a few years ago. However, we do see narratives about protecting children against transgenderism emerging. This rhetoric often appears as part of anti-EU, Euroskeptic discourse—telling people what to do, how to raise their children, promoting a progressive agenda around women, or framing gender rights as a threat to traditional families. The offshoots of these narratives are present, though they are not a particularly dominant strain. Pocketbook issues largely dominated this election. So, the potential is there, but it remains underutilized. Moreover, the Catholic Church in the Czech Republic is quite restrained and does not enter into these debates in the way it does in Slovakia or Poland.

In your co-authored work on “Patronage, Trust, and State Capacity,” you argue that low bureaucratic trust fosters clientelism. How does this dynamic manifest in Babiš’s political strategy, especially considering his corporate background and patronage networks?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: Andrej Babiš cares about one thing only, and that’s his firm, Agrofert, and his political party is his firm. The party is not a regular party; it is a business project and a business offshoot. He has a huge conflict of interest, which nobody knows how he’s going to solve if he’s nominated as prime minister, because the Czech Republic doesn’t have an institute of blind trust. The conflict of interest will always be there because his firm, Agrofert, is a large recipient of state subsidies. That’s not necessarily patronage networks; it’s, in a way, making sure that the state is in a fantastic synergistic position with his firm. That is a particularity of his business background and the setup of the party. It is a vehicle for him to keep political power and be able to use state and EU subsidies, and the conflict of interest is just written all over him.

In terms of ANO as a party strategy, I would not necessarily define it as clientelism. What we saw when Babiš was in power, I would call targeted distribution—targeting pockets of voters, many of whom actually do need this targeting, and it is very beneficial to them. It involves picking out or dissecting groups that will be selected for state help, and again, the budget deficit is going to balloon. I don’t think that’s necessarily patronage, but it’s a targeted exchange that a lot of parties engage in, and it’s bread-and-butter politics. Having said that, aside from the targeted distribution, Babiš will make sure that his agglomerate benefits from him being prime minister again, which is a very likely scenario, as it seems now.

From Fiscal Conservatism to Programmatic Populism

Do you think Babiš’s economic promises—higher pensions, lower taxes, welfare expansion—should be understood as clientelistic appeals rooted in weak state capacity, or as programmatic populism aimed at reshaping public expectations?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: If I were to choose, I would really use more of a frame of programmatic populism or targeted distribution. We saw this between 2017–2021. What’s happening in the region now is that voter expectations have changed—and this applies to Poland and Slovakia as well—so that populist voters now expect redistribution and higher spending. If Babiš stays in power for four years, these expectations will become absolutely entrenched. There is a recent book on Poland by Ben Stanley that talks about this lock-in: basically, the transformation of the Polish party system in such a way that all voters now expect the next party in power to spend, no matter who that might be. If the current governing coalition ever comes back, they will have to do the same thing. They will not be able to promise balanced budgets. If they want to defeat Babiš four years from now, they will also have to promise spending. Good luck with the budgets, but there is a general entrenchment of voters expecting that the state needs to really open up the valves. It will probably have pretty bad long-term consequences, but nobody’s thinking long-term these days.

Given Babiš’s emphasis on managerial competence, how does technocratic rhetoric interact with populist radical right sovereigntist claims in his current coalition-building efforts?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: It’s going to be a big spending spree, and the Motorists will have to hold their noses. The far right really doesn’t care—actually, it supports spending as long as it’s spending on Czechs, or native spending, and not on Ukrainians or migrants. This is going to be a move from manager to, in a way, a paternal figure who is going to take care of everybody, including making appointments for colonoscopy. Part of the big appeal of Babiš was the emphasis on improving the healthcare system. 

Having been quite critical about ANO, I do have to emphasize that it’s quite possible that some of the portfolios the coalition will control can be given to very competent people. In the previous government, ANO had some ministers or portfolios that were run quite well. For example, the Ministry of Education underwent some really good changes. It’s also possible that some of the infrastructure projects that started and need to be completed, or the huge shortage of housing stock—if Babiš can really deliver on these issues, that’s going to be very successful, rewarded, and it would benefit the country quite a bit. If he throws in managerial competence and delivers, that would be fantastic, and it’s possible that there might be some policy changes that can be done well and have long-term benefits. But I suspect a big spending spree and a very short-term horizon, given Babiš’s age. We’ll see.

A Historic Breakthrough for the Far Right

Analysts have warned that Babiš could align Czechia with Hungary and Slovakia, forming a sovereigntist bloc inside the EU. Do you view this as a tactical positioning or a substantive ideological shift toward illiberal governance?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: I’m very concerned. Despite the relatively moderate appeal, I do think that Babiš’s victory is a significant win for illiberals in the region. I do not think this will be a bloodbath for Czech democracy, but I do think there’s going to be a lot of bleeding. The patient will survive, but there will be a strong shift. Babiš is also very strategic. If he and his coalition partners drag him to some extreme positions, the Czech public may become accustomed to that. If this coalition emerges, it will be the first time in Czech history that the far right is either in coalition or silently supporting the government. That’s a huge breakthrough, and it’s very concerning. The Motorists are not an extreme party, but they are certainly not rooting for the European rule of law and liberal democratic values. This is very troubling, and it’s a big win for illiberalism in Europe. Babiš’s victory is undoubtedly a big win for illiberalism.

Guardrails Exist, But Democratic Quality May Decline

The Statue of Justice by Marius Kotrba, a modern sculpture located at the Supreme Court building in Brno, Czech Republic, on March 10, 2022. Photo: Evgeniy Fesenko.

What are the potential institutional guardrails against democratic backsliding in Czechia, and how do they compare to Hungary and Slovakia during their own illiberal turns?

Professor Lenka Bustikova: There are a lot of guardrails. The most important actor is the current president, Petr Pavel. He can veto, he can play a huge informal role, and he will have to think very carefully about whether the future prime minister is going to violate the law by being in a position of conflict of interest. This is going to be a hard puzzle to solve. The Czech president is a pro-democratic, centrist figure with good temperament and very high levels of popularity.

The second guardrail is the second chamber, which Slovakia does not have. The Czech Senate is still dominated by so-called liberal or pro-democratic parties. There are a lot of roadblocks. Another institution that’s quite important is the Constitutional Court, which has saved Czech democracy many times. That’s also significant.

The media in the Czech Republic have been independent. Babiš is going to go after Czech Television and Czech Radio, but the country has a robust, pluralistic media scene. It might change, but that’s an important characteristic.

Czech civil society is quite active, although one has to be very careful about what mobilization means. For example, work by Petra Guasti and Aleš Michal showed that populists are sometimes much better at mobilizing. This election has shown that people can be mobilized for and against democracy, or for liberal or illiberal causes. This time, the election mobilized the illiberals more, but there were other elections in the past when the pro-democratic camp was mobilized quite well. Civil society is active. It pays attention.

So, there is hope, but I do expect that the quality of Czech democracy will decline during this period because of disrespect for the rule of law. Babiš does not like the rule of law, and his coalition partners are either extremists or at the fringe of the mainstream. Another thing I would like to mention is that one of the leaders of the Motorist Party has accusations of domestic abuse filed against him. In terms of signaling the moral integrity of political leaders, this also doesn’t bode well for appointing people with questionable moral standing to very high positions of power.

Swerve for Now, But the Future Looks Troubling

Finally, situating Czechia within the broader Central European context, do you see the current developments as part of a cyclical populist wave or a deeper structural illiberal swerve, as discussed in “The Illiberal Turn or Swerve in Central Europe?”

Professor Lenka Bustikova: At this moment, I expect that this is going to be four years’ worth, but I don’t know what’s going to happen at the end of these four years, because what we see in other countries is that when the 2.0 comes back—when populists return to power—they are much more effective. They know what to do, they have their playbooks ready, they have done this before, they are much more revengeful, aggressive, and they know how to get things done. So I expect that Babiš will weaken the rule of law and definitely try to weaken some of the guardrails. I do think that the coalition partners will certainly drag the country more towards the East than towards the West. The real question is going to be: after four years, is there anyone who will be able to beat them? It’s going to be very difficult because this consolidation of camps shows that the illiberal camp is simply numerically much stronger. Either they’ll have to make some terrible mistakes—which they will—and the voters may forgive them or may not, or the liberal camp will have to grow, and we see in other countries that it is a very steep hill to climb. So, swerve for now, but I am very concerned about the future.

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman is a Senior Lecturer at the Lauder Institute and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania.

Dr. Locoman: Moldova’s Win Is Real, But Russia Is Not Done Yet

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMigration

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections mark a pivotal moment in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the European Union and Russia. Despite unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—the pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions, however, that this success is “more of a temporary setback” for Moscow than a strategic defeat: “Russia will gather its resources again.” In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Locoman analyzes Moldova’s evolving democratic resilience, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, the role of the diaspora, and the country’s ambitious EU accession goal. She underscores the importance of sustained domestic reform and Western engagement to keep Moldova on its “irreversible European path.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections have emerged as a pivotal moment in the geopolitical contest between the European Union and Russia. Against a backdrop of unprecedented hybrid interference—including disinformation campaigns, illicit financing, and the use of new technologies—Moldova’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) secured a decisive victory. Yet, as Dr. Ecaterina Locoman cautions in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), this success must be understood as both real and fragile: “I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again.”

Dr. Locoman, Senior Lecturer at the Lauder Institute and in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, situates Moldova’s electoral resilience within a hybrid framework of domestic determination and external support. “We can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.”

This resilience was manifested not only through institutional preparedness—such as stronger oversight of illicit financing and disinformation—but also through robust diaspora engagement and sustained voter mobilization. “The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections,” Dr. Locoman notes, highlighting how mail ballots and close transnational ties helped bolster the pro-EU vote. She underscores that “the diaspora is relatively young… they maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home.”

At the same time, Moscow’s influence tactics are evolving. Russia experimented with “the use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency,” to obscure financial flows and spread propaganda. While these efforts ultimately proved less effective this cycle, Dr. Locoman warns against complacency: “Moscow is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region… they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This fight needs to continue.”

Looking ahead, Moldova’s ambition to join the European Union by 2030 faces both internal and external hurdles. Domestically, slow reforms, corruption, and economic vulnerabilities remain pressing concerns. Externally, geopolitical vetoes—most notably from Hungary—could obstruct accession negotiations. “I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030,” Dr. Locoman admits. Yet she also maintains a note of cautious optimism: “Up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years… and then, in the end, it happened.”

In this interview, Dr. Locoman offers a nuanced analysis of Moldova’s evolving democratic landscape, the adaptive strategies of Russian influence, and the strategic choices facing both Moldovan and European leaders in the years to come.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Resilience at Home, Support Abroad

National meeting of the Moldovan people with the flags of the European Union and the Republic of Moldova. Chisinau, Moldova, May 21, 2023. Photo: Andrei F.

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Moldova’s parliamentary elections delivered a decisive victory for the ruling pro-European Union PAS despite unprecedented Russian interference. Should we interpret this outcome as a durable consolidation of democratic resilience, or as a contingent success heavily dependent on extraordinary EU and Western support?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Thank you very much for having me. It’s a pleasure to be here. I think we can interpret the results of the Moldovan elections as a hybrid outcome. On the one hand, they reflect a strong domestic effort—both from political institutions and voters—who showed remarkable resilience in the face of Russian interference and influence. On the other hand, it is also clear that without the support of Western partners, especially the European Union, this success would not have been possible. So, it’s both a domestic and international story.

Importantly, if we look back at the 2024 presidential elections and now the 2025 parliamentary elections, voters have chosen a similar direction. This indicates that democracy in Moldova, while perhaps not as strong or stable as one might wish, is nonetheless evolving. Moldovans and their institutions are working every day to strengthen it. We saw a high degree of voter mobilization despite significant Russian efforts, including disinformation campaigns, cyberattacks, and illicit financing. Voter turnout was relatively high at 52%, demonstrating strong civic engagement.

Compared to the 2024 presidential elections, domestic institutions such as the prosecutor’s office and the police clearly learned from past mistakes. They were better prepared to identify and address unlawful use of illicit funding and electoral violations. This helped build voter confidence in the electoral process. As in previous elections, diaspora engagement was also very strong, further contributing to democratic resilience. Overall, these factors point to an increased resilience among Moldovans in defending their democratic process.

Pro-Russian Messages Losing Ground

To what extent do the results reflect a deepening societal commitment to a pro-European orientation, as opposed to a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies, whose populist appeals often fuse anti-elite rhetoric with civilizational tropes about Russia as Moldova’s “natural” ally?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman:  That’s a very good question. The results show that, again, the recent election, as well as those in 2024 and 2021, reflect a continuing trend that society as a whole is more or less committed to a pro-Western orientation. I travel to Moldova on a yearly basis, and I can see that the country has changed significantly in recent years since Maia Sandu became president. There is a very clear pro-European trend. That said, it’s true that we don’t have precise data on how many Moldovans live abroad. Every summer, many of them return, and perhaps my impression of the country is somewhat skewed because I visit during that period when a lot of diaspora members are back home. Still, the spirit in the country is very much pro-European.

It’s also true that there have been numerous reports on this topic. I have studied how both Russia and the West try to influence domestic politics in post-Soviet states, and my research shows that Russia has long been grooming local political actors in countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia. The fact that they were able to attract and cultivate specific types of political figures—such as Igor Dodon, for example, a former president of Moldova who now enjoys little popularity among large segments of the electorate—indicates that Moldovans are increasingly able to distinguish between leaders who genuinely seek to build a democratic, secure, and prosperous future for the country and those who do not.

Pro-Russian actors have not been particularly original or creative in how they promote their message. This message is losing ground, especially because of the war in Ukraine. It is no longer easy to “sell” this narrative. Previously, Moldovan politics often involved strategic shifts between Russia and the West, depending on which side best served domestic interests. Today, this approach is much harder to sustain. The war raging in neighboring Ukraine has made people more aware of the stakes, and Moldova has received a significant number of Ukrainian refugees. As a result, it has become much more difficult for pro-Russian parties to sell their message as effectively as before.

A Blessing in Disguise: Russia’s Unintended Push

Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.

With turnout just above 50%, what does this relative disengagement reveal about the durability of PAS’s mandate, and does persistent electoral apathy risk undermining the legitimacy of Moldova’s democratic consolidation over time?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I mentioned earlier, yes, the turnout was just over 50%, but this number is not unusually low for Moldova. In fact, compared to some recent elections in the region, 52% is relatively solid. However, you are right that it also signals that a significant portion of the electorate remains disengaged, which has implications for the durability of the ruling party’s mandate to govern over the next four years.

The fact that Maia Sandu’s party won elections for the second time is significant. They secured a clear majority of seats and resisted heavy Russian interference and influence. At the same time, much of their enthusiasm is concentrated during election periods, when the central question is whether the country is moving east or west. This enthusiasm does not always last throughout the full four-year governing period.

Moldovans are frustrated with the slow pace of reforms, the persistence of corruption, and the fact that judicial change has not progressed as quickly as many had hoped. Many voters remain disillusioned with these slow reforms, persistent poverty, and daily economic hardships. For this reason, it is especially important for the governing party to deliver results quickly—both to maintain its stated goal of joining the European Union and to ensure that its policies meet the expectations of the electorate.

In some ways, the Russian presence is acting as a “blessing in disguise.” Without the Russian threat at the border, Moldovan political parties might have been more complacent and less willing to pursue reforms. Because the threat is so close, it creates a greater sense of urgency among both political actors and the population to mobilize and align with the European Union.

What has changed significantly compared to previous elections—particularly over the past decade, since around 2010—is the unprecedented level of symbolic, technical, and financial support the European Union has provided to Maia Sandu and Moldovan political institutions. EU leaders have repeatedly visited Moldova and demonstrated their support, which is unprecedented in the country’s history.

In my own research, I found that since 1991, when Moldova declared independence from the USSR, one of its main foreign policy challenges has been ensuring that the West paid any attention to it at all. For many years, Moldova was on the radar only because of the Transnistrian conflict. As long as things were quiet and stable, there was little engagement. Now, however, Moldovan political elites—especially Maia Sandu—have succeeded in breaking through this indifference and convincing European leaders that Moldova is strategically important to the EU and its security.

Transnationalizing Moldovan Democracy

The diaspora played a decisive role in shaping the outcome. How should we understand this transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, especially given populist narratives at home that cast the diaspora as an illegitimate, “externalized” electorate undermining national sovereignty?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: That’s true. I like the expression you used—the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy. The numbers show that 280,000 Moldovans abroad voted in the elections. This is because the governing party recognized that much of their support comes from the diaspora, so they facilitated the voting process abroad. The introduction of mail ballots was a smart and strategic move, because people living in countries like the United States find it much easier to vote by mail than to go in person to Moldovan embassies or consulates. This was an important step, reflecting the fact that domestic political elites understood the crucial role the diaspora plays.

Another important factor is that the diaspora is relatively young. Most of those who have moved abroad are in their 50s, 40s, 30s, and 20s. They maintain very strong links to Moldovan politics and what is happening at home. Many have families in Moldova, so they remain deeply engaged, and I was pleased to see the high level of civic engagement among the diaspora, particularly their efforts to support and promote European integration.

It’s true that the more pro-Russia parties tend to portray the diaspora negatively. I think it was Igor Dodon who, at one point during a previous presidential election, referred to the diaspora as a “parallel electorate,” claiming that they don’t know what’s happening at home, that they live in the West and therefore want the country to join the West. He argued that they are disconnected from domestic realities, which is not true. The links between the diaspora and Moldova remain very strong.

If you visit in the summertime, you can see many young people and young families returning. In the 1990s and early 2000s, before Moldova had a visa-free regime with the EU, many Moldovans tried to work in the EU illegally. They often ended up stuck abroad, unable to return home, and the maximum support they could provide was through remittances.

Government building decorated with Moldovan and European Union flags, as well as national and EU symbols, in central Chisinau, Chisinau, Moldova on June 1, 2025. Photo: Gheorghe Mindru.

Now, because the EU has introduced a visa-free regime and many Moldovans have been able to obtain Romanian citizenship—thanks to Romania’s revised citizenship law allowing those who can prove family links from the interwar period when Moldova was part of Greater Romania to apply—many people have Romanian passports. This allows them to live and work legally in the EU.

As a result, many young families now live in European countries such as Germany, Belgium, and Great Britain during the year, but they build homes in Moldova, have parents and siblings there, and remain in close contact. So, it is not accurate to argue that the diaspora is disconnected from events at home. In fact, it is very much a part of what is happening domestically. As long as domestic political actors continue to engage the diaspora and maintain these connections, the pro-European movement will hopefully remain strong.

Hybrid Interference: New Tactics, Old Goals

Observers describe Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference. From disinformation to illicit financing, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about the adaptive limits of Moscow’s toolkit of influence?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Yes, we’ve seen new models of influence that Russia has used in the elections. The use of AI and alternative financial methods, like cryptocurrency, for example, is new. They tried to hide financial links by using cryptocurrency, which, in a way, influenced the process. But, this also revealed the limits of Russian influence. I would add a caveat here: Moscow—indeed the Kremlin—is one of the best students of the post-Soviet region. They know the region very well and have people who have studied it in depth. So, I expect that they will learn from their own mistakes and improve their strategies in the next elections. This means that Moldova’s pro-European victory should not be seen as a sign that we can become complacent or self-sufficient. This fight needs to continue. As I said, Moscow is a very good student of the post-Soviet region. They understand the internal realities of these countries. They know the challenges that people face, the domestic weak points, and they try to exploit these to the advantage of their messages and narratives.

At the same time, many of these tools proved ineffective at this point in time because Moldovan institutions—and civil society as well—were more proactive than in past elections. Moldovan institutions learned important lessons from the last presidential elections. Parties engaged in illicit financing were excluded from the ballot, prosecutions were pursued, and the government was much more transparent in communicating about disinformation campaigns. As a result, people were much more aware of what was going on.

While the Russian toolkit has evolved technologically, its effectiveness is limited when met with resilient institutions, rapid countermeasures, and credible alternatives. If we look at one successful formula that worked in Moldova at this moment, I would still be cautious not to declare this the end of Russian interference. Russian influence will remain strong in the region. But what worked was a credible pro-EU message from domestic political parties, coupled with strong and credible support from the EU, which was very important. Additionally, the pro-Russia parties were not as original in their messaging, and the ongoing war in neighboring Ukraine further strengthened the pro-EU camp.

Exploiting Weak Links: Moscow’s Populist Playbook

The T-34 tank monument and the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. The tank is a decommissioned T-34, now part of the Memorial of Glory. Photo: Dreamstime.

In the light of your research on Russian influence strategies, how do you interpret Moscow’s reliance on populist-style appeals—framing EU integration as a betrayal of sovereignty, invoking fears of war, or portraying elites as “foreign agents”? Does the Moldovan case suggest a recalibration of these tactics compared to Ukraine or Georgia?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: What is happening in Moldova, again, links to what I was just saying in response to the previous question. When I think about Georgia, the support for a pro-EU orientation was very strong. Public opinion support was extremely high, but it was not enough. When Russia was able to find a credible, strong domestic political actor, it was able to promote its own interests inside Georgia. What is different in Moldova’s case right now is that there was both a credible pro-EU party and strong public opinion support for the European Union. Now, Russia does not necessarily rely only on populist-style appeals. They know the weaknesses in each of these countries—the weak links—and they try to use those for their own interests. One thing I have noticed is that as long as domestic political elites are smart and strategic in how they frame their political messaging, it matters a lot.

I will give an example. Since Moldova declared independence in 1991, one very big question has been whether the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian or Moldovan. Political campaigns and electoral strategies were often built around this division. More pro-EU, pro-Romanian parties argued that the language is Romanian, while more pro-Russia parties insisted it is Moldovan. In every electoral campaign, these pro-Russia political parties used such narratives to distract voters from real issues like economic problems and corruption.

What happened in the years since Maia Sandu came to power is that the Moldovan constitution was amended to enshrine that the language spoken in Moldova is Romanian. So now, there is no debate about it. Nobody is questioning it anymore. The point I want to make is that as long as domestic political elites manage to settle these kinds of debates—which are not central to everyday life—then it becomes much harder for pro-Russia political actors to exploit them. People’s income levels or quality of life do not depend on whether they call the language Romanian or Moldovan.

When the Russians spot these kinds of differences, they manipulate public opinion and can win. But if domestic political elites can agree and establish clear positions on such issues, it becomes much harder for pro-Russia actors to influence the public. For example, pro-Russia parties have strong backing in the Orthodox Church in Moldova, which is very influential. There were reports that some priests were used by the Kremlin to influence public opinion. But as long as there is clear messaging from mainstream political parties in Moldova that they are not anti-religion, that religion is respected and people are free to practice their faith, then it becomes harder for pro-Russian narratives—often based on fake realities—to take hold.

When people hear credible messages from their own political elites, it becomes much easier for them to discern truth from lies. Similarly, the narrative about war has become much harder for Russia to sell right now. Why? Because they are waging a war in neighboring Ukraine. It is much harder to claim that moving toward the EU will bring war when there is already a war caused by Russia next door. This narrative was more effective in earlier elections, but now, as long as the West continues to support Ukraine and Ukraine withstands the Russian attack, it will be much easier for Moldova to remain strong and maintain its pro-European orientation and stance.

Without Reforms, Western Support Won’t Be Enough

How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given persistent vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: This is a very good question. I think about it very often. As much as Russian influence may be a blessing in disguise—in the sense that it mobilizes people at home to work hard and pushes political parties to deliver on their promises and act quickly—the support from the European Union, and even from the United States, is the best thing that can happen to Moldova. As long as the EU remains invested in Moldova, we will be able to maintain our pro-European path more easily.

One fear I have is that we might become complacent, assuming that the EU or the West will always come to our rescue and that we can simply continue doing whatever we are doing internally. When I go to Moldova, I often hear people—business people, entrepreneurs—complaining that not much has changed compared to 10 or 15 years ago. Corruption is still rampant. In order to obtain permits to build something, for example, you still need to pay someone in the government. This is unfortunate, and people are aware of it.

My conclusion is that domestic political parties must understand that this is a “make it or break it” moment. If they do not deliver on the promises they have made, it will become much easier for political actors in Moldova who promote Russian interests to regain power. And once that happens, it will be much, much harder to get Moldova out of Russia’s embrace. So, I think it depends very much on the willingness of the ruling party right now, and Maia Sandu, to deliver on the reforms they have promised.

A Temporary Setback, Not a Strategic Defeat

Do Moldova’s elections signal a broader decline in Russia’s ability to project influence across the post-Soviet space, or should Moscow’s defeat here be read as tactical rather than strategic?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: As I shared earlier, I do not think this is a Russian defeat in the long term. Russia is very adept at adjusting its messaging and tactics, not only with respect to the post-Soviet region but also to the wider EU region. They will learn from their mistakes and continue to influence domestic politics in Moldova, as much as we might not like it. Even if the political actors they supported did not win as many seats in Parliament as they initially hoped, we can look at the first four years of Maia Sandu’s party in government.

Basically, these previous four years were devoted to crisis management. Yes, it’s true, initially it was the COVID pandemic, but then the war in Ukraine, caused by Russia, turned everything upside down in Moldova. So instead of focusing on judicial reforms and economic development, as the party had initially promised and as Maia Sandu stated, they had to adjust. I think they managed—they were successful in delivering some of the promises made during the electoral campaign—but it was ten times harder.

I expect that Russia will continue to influence domestic politics. It’s part of their strategic goal to regain control over the post-Soviet region, and I don’t think this should be read as a strategic loss. It’s more of a temporary setback, but they will gather their resources again. Therefore, both Moldovan and European Union leaders need to stay on their toes, remain alert, and be careful about the next steps so they are prepared to counteract those measures.

EU Accession: Between Optimism and Doubt

Nicolae Ciucă (L), President of the National Liberal Party, Ursula von der Leyen (C), President of the European Commission, and Maia Sandu (R), President of Moldova, during the plenary session of the 2024 EPP Congress in Bucharest on March 6, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Dr. Locoman, President Sandu has tied her mandate to enshrining an “irreversible European path.” How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given the scale of domestic reforms required and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union?

Dr. Ecaterina Locoman: Recently, Maia Sandu visited Copenhagen. Denmark hosted a major summit with key EU leaders. Ukraine was there, Maia Sandu was there, and there were reports that they were hoping Hungary would be persuaded not to veto the right of Ukraine and Moldova to start accession negotiations. However, Hungary was not persuaded. So the only hope they have right now is that there will be a political change in Budapest, allowing this to move forward.

A lot of the frustration I hear among policymakers in Moldova, when it comes to the EU, is that they are disappointed the European Union decided to put Moldova and Ukraine in the same bucket for European integration. There were hopes that Moldova would be decoupled, that it would go its own way, and Ukraine would go its own way. But the Europeans still seem to favor moving forward together as a group.

A fear I have is that Moldova is much smaller than Ukraine. Yes, domestic reforms need to be done, but as long as there is political will, it is possible to achieve them. I share a bit of the concern raised in the question. I am afraid that if the situation continues as it is now, Moldova might face the same fate as the Western Balkans over the past 20 years. The door was opened for them too, but then they stalled, and no real progress has been made, apart from Croatia joining the EU.

So, I have some doubts—not fear, but doubts—about how quickly the situation can move by 2030. Is this truly realistic? But then again, up until 2022, Moldova had been knocking on the EU’s doors for more than 30 years, asking for candidate status, and the EU kept saying no. And then, in the end, it happened. Yes, it was because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and it was unfortunate that this was the trigger, but it happened. So I try to stay optimistic and hope that by 2030, Moldova will be able to join the EU.

United States Bill of Rights alongside a Bible and bullets. Photo: Cheryl Casey.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes

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Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00115



On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 2, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Session 3 explored the entangled relationship between populism, freedom of religion, and illiberal regimes. The session, chaired by Marietta D.C. van der Tol (Landecker Lecturer, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College, Cambridge), brought together a diverse set of perspectives, ranging from anthropological and theological insights to political and legal analyses. The session was opened with a welcome speech by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced chair, speakers, and discussant on behalf of the Center. 

In her framing remarks, Dr. van der Tol pointed to “the strong connection that we are seeing between, on the one hand, the rise of illiberalism, and on the other hand, the use of Christianity within the narratives that underpin the rise of illiberalism.” For too long, she noted, illiberalism has been seen as a phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe, associated with Russia, Hungary, or Slovakia. While acknowledging the reasons for that association, she warned against a narrative that renders Eastern Europe “less good than Western Europe.” What made this session distinctive, she argued, was its inclusion of the United States, which allows scholars to “bridge the East–West divide on this matter” and explore illiberalism as a transnational, rather than regionally bounded, phenomenon. 

To frame the discussion conceptually, Dr. van der Tol introduced the notion of “Christianism”—a politicized form of Christianity comparable to Islamism—drawing on Rogers Brubaker’s work. She emphasized that Christianism manifests not only at the level of ideas but “increasingly on the level of governance.” This, she suggested, requires interdisciplinary perspectives from politics, theology, anthropology, history, and law to grasp the shifting role of religion in illiberal politics.

The session featured three major contributions: Dr. Marc Loustau on Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Juraj Buzalka on pragmatic politicization in Slovakia, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen on the incorporation of evangelical theology into Texas law. Their interventions were followed by commentary from discussants Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, who drew comparative and theoretical connections across the cases.

Together, Session 3 illuminated how the language of religious freedom—once considered central to liberal democracy—has been appropriated by illiberal actors to mobilize cultural symbols, entrench political power, and reshape national and transnational identities.

Marc Loustau: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Procession during Easter Holy Mass in the old village of Hollókő, Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his presentation, Dr. Marc Loustau (Independent Scholar) offered a critical examination of how illiberal regimes—most notably Hungary—instrumentalize the discourse of religious freedom for political ends. His paper, titled “Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” sought to unsettle long-standing scholarly assumptions that the institutionalization of religious freedom is solely a liberal project.

Dr. Loustau began by situating his intervention within the broader field of religious freedom studies. Traditionally, he explained, much of the critical scholarship has approached the subject as an essentially liberal discourse rooted in international law and Western foreign policy. This body of work, following thinkers such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, often argued that religious freedom regimes operate as “ostensibly neutral” frameworks designed to protect religious minorities but in fact reproduce “Protestant, individualized religious subjectivities.” According to Dr. Loustau, the scholarly task had long been “to unmask the workings of power behind an ostensibly liberal regime of human rights.”

How Illiberal Regimes Reframe Religious Freedom as a Tool of Nationalist Legitimation

Yet, Dr. Loustau stressed, this framing overlooks the way in which illiberal regimes have increasingly co-opted the very language of religious freedom. “It struck us that religious freedom as a discourse, and its institutionalizations, were just as prominent, if not more prominent, in illiberal regimes like Hungary, Russia, and now, ever increasingly, the United States,” he argued. To limit critique only to liberal regimes, therefore, “misses the way that religious freedom is deployed as a central plank of illiberal politics.”

As a case study, Dr. Loustau focused on the Hungary Helps Program, a flagship initiative of Viktor Orbán’s government. The program, he explained, is publicly celebrated as Hungary’s effort to defend persecuted Christians abroad. “Hungary Helps was very active in Syria,” he noted, “alongside the work of Putin’s Russian regime to protect Orthodox Christians in the Middle East.” On the surface, this appears as a humanitarian initiative. Yet Dr. Loustau emphasized its deeper ideological function: “It was actually designed to unify the cause of defending Christians abroad with the cause of defending Christian culture within Europe against supposed persecution by secular Europeans and secular humanists, also in the United States.”

This dual strategy, he argued, effectively blurs the boundaries between international solidarity with persecuted Christians and a domestic culture war against liberal secularism. By presenting Hungary as a defender of a global Christian civilization, Orbán’s government re-frames religious freedom into a tool of nationalist and illiberal legitimation. Dr. Loustau placed this development in comparative perspective, pointing also to Slovakia’s recent illiberal turn under Robert Fico, and to the United States, where Republican leaders increasingly invoke religious freedom in culture-war politics.

Reframing Religious Freedom as a Tool of Power

The broader theoretical question raised by Dr. Loustau concerns how scholars should adapt the critique of religious freedom when liberalism is no longer the presumed framework. “If we cannot presume that liberalism is the institutional framework within which religious freedom emerges as a project,” he asked, “how might we imagine the scholarly project of critique?” His presentation thus invited a reconsideration of how illiberal regimes use religious freedom not to protect pluralism, but to consolidate cultural hegemony.

By highlighting Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Loustau’s intervention underscored the need to extend critiques beyond liberal universalisms and into the realm of illiberal politics, where appeals to faith and persecution are mobilized as powerful tools of authoritarian populism.

 

Dr. Juraj Buzalka: Religious or Secular Freedom? Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-Socialist Slovakia

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico speaks at a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Uzhhorod, Ukraine, on September 5, 2025. Photo: Yanosh Nemesh.

In his presentation, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, an Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University, explored the complex intersection of religion, politics, and populism in Slovakia. He argued that the country’s evolving religious landscape cannot be understood merely through statistics on declining religious identification, but must instead be seen through the lens of cultural economy, historical traditions, and global influences that have fueled the pragmatic politicization of religion by illiberal leaders.

A Breakthrough Moment

Dr. Buzalka began by situating his remarks in a very recent political development. “The spectacular clash of religious and secular liberalism took place last Friday,” he explained, “when Slovakia adopted a constitutional law recognizing only biologically defined male and female sexes.” This change, backed by Prime Minister Robert Fico’s far-right government and supported by Christian Democrats representing about ten percent of the electorate, effectively removed legal recognition for transgender citizens. “Transgender people are no longer recognized,” Dr. Buzalka emphasized. “The change of gender, or even a name from female and male in Slovak, is now not possible.”

This was no ordinary legislative amendment. It marked the 23rd change to Slovakia’s constitution since independence in 1993, but unlike previous amendments, it struck directly at the secular foundations of the state. According to Dr. Buzalka, the new law “undermines the secular character of the state, limits freedoms of citizens as defined by a liberal constitution, and even challenges the primacy of EU law.” While experts noted the implications for European integration, public debate largely overlooked this dimension.

The driving force behind the amendment, Dr. Buzalka suggested, was not primarily religious conviction but political opportunism. “The most profitable in this passing of law has been the political entrepreneur Robert Fico,” he said. Once a Social Democrat in the Blairite mold and a self-proclaimed champion of European integration, Fico has reinvented himself as a “National Social Democrat” with far-right leanings. His party, SMER, faces imminent expulsion from the Party of European Socialists. This dramatic ideological shift, Dr. Buzalka argued, is less surprising when seen through the logic of political instrumentalization: religion has become a useful resource for populist leaders seeking legitimacy and mobilization.

The Post-Peasant Setting

Dr. Buzalka framed his analysis in anthropological terms, drawing on the concept of cultural economy and what he described as Slovakia’s “post-peasant condition.” Despite modernization, urbanization, and globalization, Slovak society remains deeply shaped by its rural past. “Slovakia is still much more defined by its rural heritage than neighboring countries,” he explained. “The modern people traveling all around and speaking foreign languages are the children and grandchildren of former peasants.” This agrarian memory, he argued, sustains a cultural imagination in which religion retains moral authority and symbolic capital.

In this setting, religion is often perceived as morally superior to Western-style secular individualism. This moral economy resonates across political divides, making it unsurprising to Dr. Buzalka that former communists have embraced Catholicism or that voters support both progressive presidential candidates and far-right parties in parliamentary elections. “There are contradictions that might seem irrational from the perspective of top-down politics,” he observed, “but they have their own rationality connected to the post-peasant condition.”

To conceptualize this phenomenon, Dr. Buzalka drew on Douglas Holmes’s theory of integralism, a counter-Enlightenment tradition committed to traditional cultural forms but expressed in modern political settings. He argued that Slovakia’s version is a distinctly East European, post-socialist appearance of integralism—rooted in rural memory, family structures, and communal solidarity. “This is the local version of a religiously inspired movement,” he said, “vigorous and modern, but drawing legitimacy from an imagined moral superiority of traditional community.”

From Communism to Catholicism

One of the most striking themes in Dr. Buzalka’s talk was the fluidity of ideological identities in Slovakia. “It is not surprising for an anthropologist to see former communists sitting in church,” he noted. Similarly, Robert Fico’s personal trajectory—from communist youth, to Blairite reformer, to devout Catholic populist—illustrates this adaptability. Many Slovak voters, too, move between supporting liberal and illiberal actors depending on context. As Dr. Buzalka explained, “Believers could vote for a progressive, openly liberal president at one point, while supporting a Fascist party in parliamentary elections at another. These contradictions are easily swallowed.”

This political pragmatism is not a betrayal of tradition but a continuation of it, embedded in the post-peasant cultural economy where ideological boundaries blur. Dr. Buzalka emphasized that the seeming incoherence of Slovak politics must be understood in terms of lived cultural logics, not abstract ideological purity.

Global Dimensions of Religious Populism

While Slovakia’s political shifts are rooted in local traditions, Dr. Buzalka insisted they are also part of a global phenomenon. “Usually, we tend to see globalization coming from the West in the form of markets and democracy,” he noted. “But alongside these came zealous conservative values, carried by religious freedom movements—often financed from abroad.”

He cited reports showing that Slovak conservative associations received around $10 million from US-based evangelical movements, while across the EU similar groups benefitted from €1.1 billion in external funding. These resources have strengthened far-right and religiously conservative networks, embedding Slovakia in what Dr. Buzalka described as “a new alliance of religious extremists, far-right populists, and oligarchic funders.” This alliance, he warned, is “reshaping European politics, directed by private wealth and legitimized through state funding, engineering a long-term authoritarian transformation under the guise of tradition and care.”

The paradox, Dr. Buzalka observed, is that these populists portray progressivism as a decadent Western import, yet their own religious conservatism is itself imported. “They told us progressivism comes from the spoiled West,” he said, “but in fact, their practices and ideologies are also victims of imported beliefs.” This dynamic, he suggested, reveals the hybrid nature of illiberalism: deeply rooted in local cultural traditions, but also energized by transnational flows of ideology and capital.

Religion, Populism, and Hybrid War

In concluding his presentation, Dr. Buzalka returned to the broader stakes of his argument. Religiously motivated radicalism in Slovakia, he argued, succeeds because it draws strength from both local and global forces. Locally, it arises from the post-peasant condition, where communal solidarity and agrarian memory sustain integralist ideologies. Globally, it is reinforced by the flows of funding, ideology, and disinformation that link Slovakia to broader networks of populist and authoritarian politics.

This dynamic, he suggested, should be understood as part of a wider “hybrid war” against liberal democracy, in which religion is mobilized alongside other tools of disinformation and polarization. “What looks like a defense of national tradition,” he concluded, “is paradoxically itself imported from abroad.”

Although a progressive response is emerging, Dr. Buzalka expressed skepticism about its depth. “It is rather shallow,” he warned, “and still questioned by the global situation.” As Slovakia heads toward further electoral contests, including in neighboring countries like the Czech Republic, the struggle between secular liberalism and religious populism remains finely balanced. “We might see quite interesting results,” he observed, “but what is clear is that the liberal democratic order is being questioned by new forms of anti-modernist discourse.”

 

Dr. Colin Bossen: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? Evangelical Christian Theology and State Law

A man holds cautionary signs, including one reading “Jesus Or Hellfire!”, in Times Square, New York City, on July 2, 2018. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.

In his presentation, Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, explored how religious pluralism and Christian nationalism collide in contemporary US politics, with Texas as a case study. Drawing on a recent lawsuit filed by members of his own congregation, Dr. Bossen argued that struggles over religion and law in the United States are not merely contests between religion and secularism but rather between competing theological and political visions of religion in public life.

A Case Study from Texas

Dr. Bossen began by recounting how the case emerged directly from his congregation. In August 2023, a member of the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston and her daughter joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against 11 Texas public school districts. The case challenged Senate Bill 10 (SB10), which sought to require every public classroom to display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments.

Federal Judge Fred Biery issued a preliminary injunction preventing the law from taking effect, citing the First Amendment of the US Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” On the surface, Dr. Bossen observed, the ruling looked like a straightforward act of secular jurisprudence—a clear demarcation between church and state. But Dr. Bossen suggested otherwise. “My claim is that the lawsuit should not be seen as a contest between a secular understanding of the state and a religious one,” he argued. “Rather, it is best understood as a clash between two different religiously inflected views.”

The first, represented by the bill’s authors, is Christian nationalism. The second, invoked implicitly by the plaintiffs and Judge Biery, is what Dr. Bossen—drawing on historian David Hollinger—called liberalizing religion.

Christian Nationalism vs. Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen outlined these competing visions. Christian nationalism, he explained, is the claim that the United States is fundamentally a Christian nation and that its laws and culture should reflect Protestant Christian values. Quoting Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry’s book Taking America Back for God, he emphasized that Christian nationalism blurs religion with race, citizenship, and ideology: “It conflates being Christian with being white, native-born, American, and conservative.” This was evident in the words of Texas Senator Mays Middleton, one of SB10’s authors: “We are a state and nation built on ‘In God We Trust.’”

By contrast, liberalizing religion—rooted in liberal Protestant traditions but now broader—asserts that religion should remain a matter of individual conscience and voluntary association. While maintaining the separation of church and state, liberalizing religion also insists that religiously grounded moral values have a legitimate place in shaping a pluralistic society.

Historically, this current emerged from mainline Protestant denominations—Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Episcopalians—and became influential through civil rights, women’s rights, immigrant rights, and other social movements. Hollinger has shown that even as mainline church membership declined, their liberalizing influence expanded outside churches, shaping public discourse on anti-racism, anti-sexism, and social justice.

From Liberal Protestantism to Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen illustrated this trajectory through the story of former Texas governor Ann Richards. Richards, a Democrat, had ties to Unitarian Universalism, one of the most liberal religious traditions in the US. She sent her children to a Unitarian preschool in Dallas. Her daughter, Cecile Richards, later led Planned Parenthood, while maintaining ties to Unitarian congregations.

When Roe v. Wade was overturned, the Dallas Unitarian Church reaffirmed reproductive rights as a religious value. Rev. Daniel Cantor declared, “God loves you. You have dignity and worth, and your life is the priority here.” For Dr. Bossen, this demonstrates how liberalizing religion is not limited to Christianity but now includes Jews (especially in Reform and Reconstructionist traditions), Hindus, Buddhists, and even non-religious people committed to pluralism and individual conscience.

The Lawsuit: Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD

The lawsuit against SB10, formally titled Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, exemplified this broader coalition. The plaintiffs included 22 adults and their children: nine Jewish, five Protestant, one Hindu, one Unitarian Universalist, and six non-religious individuals. Even atheists framed their objections in terms consistent with liberalizing religion. One couple argued that they wanted their child “to independently develop decisions on religious matters” rather than have one religious worldview imposed by the state.

The coalition did not withdraw into private schooling or homeschooling; instead, they sought to reform public institutions to ensure pluralism. Judge Biery’s ruling reflected this perspective. He warned against the dangers of “majoritarian government and religion joining hands,” invoking both religious and secular thinkers who advanced pluralist principles. Strikingly, he even suggested that instead of the Ten Commandments, Texas classrooms might post excerpts from Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, a popular book associated with Unitarian Universalist moral teaching.

Christian Nationalist Backlash

Unsurprisingly, the ruling provoked backlash from Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, a staunch Christian nationalist. Paxton claimed: “From the beginning, the Ten Commandments have been irrevocably intertwined with America’s legal, moral, and historical heritage.” He dismissed the plaintiffs as “woke radicals” bent on erasing American history—ignoring the fact that most were religious individuals advancing a theological vision at odds with his own.

Dr. Bossen noted that Paxton’s rhetoric exemplifies the Christian nationalist refusal to recognize liberalizing religion as genuinely religious. Instead, it delegitimizes pluralistic theologies by branding them as secular, elitist, or radical.

Political Theology and Populism

Dr. Bossen argued that this clash is best seen through the lens of political theology—the incorporation of theological concepts into state structures. In Texas, the question is whether the state will enshrine the theology of Christian nationalism or liberalizing religion.

He connected this to broader debates on populism: “Elsewhere, populist movements can be understood as efforts to create forms of collective identity that seek to answer the question of who ‘the people’ are for a given polity.” Christian nationalism aligns with white supremacist populism, defining “the people” as white, Christian, and native-born. Liberalizing religion, by contrast, aligns with a pluralist populism that imagines “the people” as multiracial, multiethnic, and religiously diverse.

Thus, the Texas case is more than a local legal battle. It reflects a national struggle over identity, belonging, and democracy. Will the United States be defined by exclusionary Christian nationalist theology or by an inclusive pluralist theology rooted in liberalizing religion?

Toward a Broader Framework

Dr. Bossen concluded by noting that his project is still developing. He expressed interest in deepening the theoretical framework connecting religion, law, and liberal statecraft. “My examination of the contest between Christian nationalism and liberalizing theology, white supremacist and pluralistic populism in my state of residence, is just at its beginning,” he said. “I look forward to perspectives that will help me develop a richer framework around the connections between religion and law.”

For now, however, the Texas case offers a vivid window into how religious freedom, constitutional law, and political theology are being contested in the United States. The struggle is not between religion and secularism, Bossen concluded, but between two rival theologies—one exclusionary, majoritarian, and authoritarian, the other pluralistic, voluntarist, and democratic.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

Dr. Simon P. Watmough (Freelance Researcher; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ECPS)

Serving as discussant, Dr. Simon P. Watmough offered a wide-ranging and integrative commentary that placed the three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—into comparative and global perspective. He praised the panelists for providing “three rich case studies” that at first glance might seem disjointed, yet clearly “strike a common thread” in demonstrating the politicization of religious freedom as a tool of illiberalism.

Linking Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas

Dr. Watmough began by highlighting how the Hungarian and Slovak cases reveal the ways in which religious freedom has been instrumentalized as a wedge issue. In Hungary, he noted, post-2010 politics under Viktor Orbán have become the “classic exemplar of the culture war on a European stage.” Initiatives such as Hungary Helps, described in Dr. Marc Loustau’s presentation, exemplify how religion is used simultaneously to mobilize domestic constituencies and divide opponents at the EU level.

Here, Dr. Watmough posed a provocative question: “Does heritage status make religious freedom a national possession rather than a universal right?” If illiberal actors succeed in nationalizing religious freedom, it undermines its universality. He wondered whether EU universalism—anchored in rights-based frameworks—might provide a counter-strategy: “This whole Christian nationalism thing breaks down at some point when you confront it with universal rights and universal values.”

Turning to Slovakia, Dr. Watmough observed striking similarities with Hungary. Robert Fico, he argued, is “kind of Orbán redux”—a political entrepreneur who has reinvented himself across ideological lines, shifting from a socialist orientation to illiberal nationalism. Like Orbán, Fico demonstrates how populist leaders act as political chameleons, continually reshaping their platforms in response to perceived voter demand. “Give the customers what they want, sell, sell, sell, and make a tidy political profit,” Dr. Watmough remarked, framing such politics as a business model of pragmatic populist entrepreneurship.

The Texas Case in Historical Perspective

Addressing Colin Bossen’s Texas case, Dr. Watmough noted both continuity and divergence with Central Europe. The battle over displaying the Ten Commandments in schools represents not only a contemporary struggle but one deeply embedded in “a big strand of traditional American contestation about what America means, going back 250 years.” Whereas Hungary and Slovakia showcase the appropriation of religion for nation-building in post-socialist and EU contexts, Texas reflects long-standing American debates about religious establishment, pluralism, and the meaning of the First Amendment.

Dr. Watmough predicted that such state-level efforts at religiously inflected lawmaking would soon face scrutiny from the US Supreme Court: “There’s no more dodging. The Court is going to have to weigh in on these contestations in American politics very soon.” The question, he suggested, is whether Texas represents an outlier or a bellwether for broader US trends toward illiberal theocracy.

Cross-Cutting Themes

Dr. Watmough then drew out several themes that cut across all three cases. First, he underscored the instrumentalization of law as a mechanism of illiberal politics. Whether through constitutional amendments in Slovakia, legal initiatives in Hungary, or bills in Texas, religious freedom is mobilized not as a universal safeguard but as a weapon to entrench exclusionary visions of the polity.

Second, he returned to the theme of populist political entrepreneurship. Orbán, Fico, and actors in the US all display what he termed a capacity for pragmatic adaptation, reshaping ideology in order to maximize political profit while keeping illiberal projects intact.

Third, Dr. Watmough raised the question of pluralism’s future. Illiberal actors instrumentalize religion to define narrow and exclusionary conceptions of “the people.” In contrast, liberal-democratic traditions struggle to sustain universalist frameworks capable of resisting these wedge strategies.

The International Dimension

Finally, Dr. Watmough emphasized the importance of transnational linkages. He reminded the audience that ECPS has consistently highlighted the “illiberal internationale”—a loose but increasingly coordinated network of right-wing populists, illiberal regimes, and oligarchic funders who reinforce and legitimate one another across borders. He cited Russian financing of European far-right parties, the spread of disinformation campaigns, and the diffusion of Orbán’s governance model to Poland and Slovakia as examples. “The question we can ask ourselves,” he concluded, “is whether this is more than elective affinity. Are we talking about systemic international linkages?”

Dr. Watmough’s intervention provided a powerful comparative and global frame for the panel. By situating Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas within shared dynamics of lawfare, populist entrepreneurship, and transnational illiberal collaboration, he illuminated both the distinctiveness of each case and the broader structural forces connecting them. His remarks pressed the panelists to consider not only the national specificities of religious politicization but also its implications for the future of pluralism, the resilience of liberal universalism, and the rise of an illiberal international order.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium)

In his discussant remarks, Dr. Erkan Toguslu offered a thoughtful synthesis of the panel’s three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—focusing on how religion and the principle of religious freedom are being redefined and instrumentalized in contemporary illiberal politics. While acknowledging the contextual diversity of the cases, he highlighted common dynamics that reveal religion not as a neutral principle, but as a powerful tool of political entrepreneurship and symbolic politics.

Religion as Instrument and Symbol

Dr. Toguslu began by underscoring that “protecting religious freedom is not a neutral right.” Rather, across the cases, it emerges as a form of political entrepreneurship and the domestication of religion into political projects. In Hungary, for instance, programs such as Hungary Helps link the defense of persecuted Christians abroad to the narrative of Christianity being eroded at home by secular elites. This fusion of domestic and foreign policy, he argued, exemplifies how religious freedom is recast as a cultural weapon in ongoing symbolic battles.

Such strategies, he suggested, challenge the liberal assumption that public space is neutral and open to all. Instead, religion is increasingly imposed in arenas that should remain pluralistic—schools, constitutions, and civic institutions—transforming freedom itself into a contested object.

Redefining Freedom in Illiberal Politics

A key theme in Dr. Toguslu’s comments was the paradoxical role of religious freedom in illiberal settings. “What does it mean,” he asked, “if religious freedom is used to defend a majority rather than a minority, or to impose a single interpretation on the public?” The very principle meant to protect pluralism and diversity is turned into a justification for restricting them.

In Slovakia, as Dr. Juraj Buzalka showed, this dynamic is tied to what Dr. Toguslu called “hybrid ideologies.” Former communists turned Catholics, or ex-socialists aligning with religious conservatism, illustrate a “strange rationality of contradictions.” Yet, such contradictions are sustained by a post-peasant social imaginary in which rural memory and cultural conservatism provide a sense of moral superiority. Here, religion becomes a moral anchor against liberal modernity, even when articulated by actors with seemingly incompatible ideological pasts.

Liberal Democracies and Illiberal Politics

Turning to the United States, Dr. Toguslu emphasized the broader lesson of the Texas case: even within a liberal democratic regime, illiberal politics can take root. The Ten Commandments bill illustrates how legal and theological struggles play out in ostensibly secular institutions. He argued that this should not be seen simply as a clash between secularism and religion, but as “a confrontation between two theologies: Christian nationalism and liberal, individualistic religion.”

The case demonstrates how religious freedom is mobilized both by those seeking to impose a homogenous religious identity and by those defending pluralism. As in Hungary and Slovakia, law becomes a central battleground—whether through constitutional amendments, federal injunctions, or symbolic legislation.

Broader Theoretical Reflections

In closing, Dr. Toguslu connected his observations to broader critiques of secularism advanced by scholars like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad. Their insights remind us that secular institutions themselves are never neutral; they can also be hegemonic frameworks that shape politics in particular ways. “Doesn’t matter if it’s liberal or illiberal,” he remarked, “somehow religion becomes a political strategy.”

Linking his comments back to Dr. Watmough’s intervention, Dr. Toguslu emphasized that the instrumentalization of religion in public space—whether in Europe or the United States—reflects a common strategy of illiberal actors. It is less about protecting diversity than about mobilizing cultural symbols for political power.

 

Q&A Heighlights

A “God, Guns, and Trump” sign displayed on an old military bus following the 2020 presidential election in November 2020, Tampa, Florida. Photo by Florida Chuck.

The Q&A session following the panel presentations provided a dynamic exchange of perspectives that deepened the central themes of religion, illiberalism, and populism. Moderated discussion was interspersed with audience interventions, and much of the dialogue focused on the intersections of religion, nationalism, and coalition-building across diverse contexts.

Cross-Religious Alliances and Conservative Convergence

The first question came from Dr. Bülent Keneş, who observed that despite deep doctrinal differences, religious groups across Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism often converge on conservative social issues—particularly around family values, gender roles, and LGBTQ+ rights. He noted that this convergence was evident in the support some Muslim migrants in the United States had shown for Donald Trump. He asked whether there is potential for “a broader cross-religious alliance among conservative religious constituencies” that could collectively challenge liberal democracy.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen responded affirmatively: “The short answer is yes. I think that is the major project that a great number of Christian nationalists are trying to engage in.” He pointed to efforts in Texas by leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, who not only mobilize around opposition to LGBTQ+ rights but also stoke fears of Islam by manufacturing what he called a “Muslim scare.” For Dr. Bossen, such strategies are designed to “unify that coalition of evangelicals and conservatives” by creating a common enemy. This, he argued, is not merely a possibility but an active project that is already undermining liberal democratic structures.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu added nuance, drawing on European examples. He recalled studies showing that Muslim voters in Belgium and elsewhere had shifted from supporting Socialist or Green parties to aligning with Christian Democrats due to shared traditionalist values. “These moral backgrounds come up during elections, always,” he noted, suggesting that shared cultural conservatism does create “easy connection points.” However, he remained cautious about whether this amounted to a genuine, coordinated cross-religious coalition.

Constitutional Limits and the Role of the Supreme Court

The next intervention came from Dr. Simon Watmough, who picked up on themes from his earlier feedback. He asked Dr. Bossen whether constitutional limits might constrain Christian nationalist projects, and whether the US Supreme Court would ultimately act as arbiter: “Is it going to be the Supreme Court that is going to be the arbiter of that, do you think?”

Dr. Bossen was skeptical. He described Texas as a testing ground for illiberalism in the United States, where state laws are intentionally crafted to provoke Supreme Court review. Drawing parallels to the long-term legal strategy that led to the overturning of Roe v. Wade, he warned that conservative activists are now honing similar approaches on issues like gender rights. “Law is becoming less and less a matter of reasoning, and more and more a matter of power,” Dr. Bossen argued. He foresaw a growing fragmentation of the United States into illiberal and liberal states, with the Supreme Court unlikely to hold the line: “I’m skeptical that the Court, as it is currently constituted, is going to maintain those limits.”

Youth, Education, and Coalition-Building

Nina Kuzniak raised the issue of young people, noting the increasing presence of theologically grounded values in US public schools. She asked Dr. Bossen whether religious freedom could serve as an antidote to Christian nationalism and how young people might be supported in resisting state-sponsored religious conservatism.

Dr. Bossen responded that the key lay in coalition-building across differences. He acknowledged the difficulty of interfaith dialogue but pointed to the diverse coalition of plaintiffs in the SB10 lawsuit—Jews, Protestants, a Hindu, a Unitarian Universalist, atheists, and agnostics—as a model. “Is there a way to expand that coalition to really push back against Christian nationalism on religious freedom as the unifying thread?” he asked. He also suggested that youth-focused initiatives, such as interfaith programs, could be a promising space for cultivating pluralistic values: “It’s a really interesting question to explore… something that we could even think about here in Houston.”

Christian Nationalism, Whiteness, and Inclusion

Finally, Erkan Toguslu returned with a probing question about the racial dynamics of Christian nationalism. He asked how non-white groups, particularly Black Americans, fit into a movement that appears to be overwhelmingly white.

Dr. Bossen acknowledged the centrality of whiteness to Christian nationalism: “The coalition of people that are Christian nationalists are overwhelmingly white.” Yet he also emphasized its fluidity, noting how European immigrant groups once outside whiteness were eventually incorporated. He suggested that some non-Black minorities, including Southeast Asians and Mexican Americans in Texas, may be seeking partial inclusion into whiteness by aligning with Christian nationalist politics. “They’re trying to perform a certain kind of whiteness and be incorporated into that system,” he explained. This dynamic, he argued, reflects how Christian nationalism continues to equate citizenship with whiteness, while offering conditional entry to groups willing to embrace its ideological framework.

Taken together, the Q&A highlighted the complex entanglement of religion, race, law, and politics across contexts. Dr. Bossen underscored the polarization of American religion into two competing camps: one rooted in Christian nationalism, the other in liberalizing religion. Dr. Toguslu and Dr. Watmough, meanwhile, stressed the transnational resonances, with parallels in Central Europe’s religious conservatism and the use of legal instruments to entrench illiberal values.

The Q&A session ended with a sense of both urgency and possibility: the urgency stemming from the active undermining of liberal democracy through cross-religious conservative coalitions, and the possibility residing in countervailing alliances of pluralistic religious and secular actors. As Dr. Bossen put it, the struggle is not merely legal but a contest over what kind of nation—and what kind of people—the United States, and by extension other democracies, will become.

 

Concluding Reflections by Dr. Marietta van der Tol

Christians raise their hands in worship during a church service. Photo: Joshua Rainey.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol offered a wide-ranging analysis that drew together the themes of the panel while situating them within broader questions about religion, illiberalism, and the fragility of constitutional democracy. She emphasized the importance of examining both the fragmentation of political life and the ways in which thin, flexible ideologies can sustain surprising alliances across religious and political divides.

Fragmentation and the Allure of Populist Rhetoric

Dr. van der Tol began by reflecting on the ways fragmentation enables individuals to selectively engage with populist rhetoric without assuming responsibility for its more dangerous implications. “One can identify with one part of the conversation, and sort of not be responsible for the other parts of that same conversation that might be appealing to others,” she observed. This selective embrace, she argued, helps explain the “marriage between Christian nationalism and far-right politics,” as well as the increasing openness to extremist groups in contexts such as the UK and the Netherlands.

From her conversations with those sympathetic to Christian nationalism, she noted that individuals often acknowledge problematic elements of the rhetoric but dismiss them as irrelevant: “They don’t think it is about them, or that it is about somebody else… it’s not in their immediate reference framework, so therefore it’s not that important.” This dynamic, she suggested, provides a crucial clue for understanding both the endurance of such politics and the challenge of dismantling the alliances it sustains.

Thin Ideologies and Transnational Coalitions

A key theme of her remarks was the fluidity of conservative religious and nationalist discourses. She described them as a “thin ideology”—adaptable to varied cultural contexts and capable of mobilizing disparate constituencies. Issues like abortion, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights can be reframed as “anti-liberal,” “anti-Western,” or “anti-secular,” depending on the audience. “These issues can rally very different groups of people who may not normally see eye to eye,” she explained.

This flexibility helps explain how secular nationalists, Christian conservatives, Muslims, and Hindus sometimes converge in transnational coalitions. Yet Dr. van der Tol cautioned against assuming such actors share identical motivations. “Some people might vote for restrictions of abortion on biblical grounds. That is a very different argument from somebody who says we need the reproduction of the nation to be sped up,” she stressed. Recognizing these distinctions, she argued, is essential both for analytical clarity and for identifying potential fractures within alliances.

At the same time, she remained skeptical of the durability of these coalitions, pointing to their Western—and particularly American—centrism. Many alliances, she argued, are “dominated by Americans, often dominated by American funding.” This creates structural imbalances: non-Western actors may be symbolically included but not taken seriously. She recalled a case where Hindu nationalists were relegated to a marginal panel chaired by an Anglo-American figure, remarking: “It’s an uneven alliance… some of these alliances might not be as long-lived as people would like them to be.”

The Central Role of Law and Constitutionalism

Dr. van der Tol then turned to the role of law in these struggles. She highlighted how right-wing intellectuals often elevate the constitution as the “heart of the nation,” citing Roger Scruton’s claim that constitutionalism itself embodies national identity. This, she argued, explains why culture wars so often manifest through legal battles: “If people are trying to identify and determine what the heart of the nation is, one of the first places they will go is the law, and the Constitution.”

While this focus may seem circular, it is also dangerous. She expressed concern that illiberal actors are not merely amending constitutions but transforming constitutional interpretation itself. Subtle shifts in legal reasoning, rather than headline-grabbing amendments, may prove most consequential. “Paying attention to these technical changes at the level of interpretation requires legal skill, but it cannot live outside the analysis of sociologists, theologians, and political scientists,” she warned. For her, the erosion of constitutionalism risks destabilizing democracy more profoundly than episodic political crises.

Democracy, Pacification, and Religious Freedom

Finally, Dr. van der Tol raised sobering questions about the future of democratic stability. Whereas earlier eras relied on constitutional settlements or compromises—what she called “pacification, where people might exchange certain constitutional goods to pause the culture war”—today’s conflicts may resist such resolution. She cautioned that democracy itself is being redefined, not merely challenged: “The question now is even what is the measure of democracy that the far right thinks is necessary?”

In her conclusion, she reflected on the paradoxical role of Christianity in these processes. It is particularly troubling, she noted, that Christianity—historically a force for constitutional settlement after Europe’s religious wars—is now invoked to undermine constitutionalism. “It’s quite sad to see how Christianity is being used for some of these processes,” she remarked. Yet she also underscored that religious freedom remains key to renewing democratic legitimacy. Even conservative religious communities that are skeptical of liberal democracy have historically accepted it because of guarantees of religious liberty. “Whatever the future of democracy looks like, it’s going to have to take religious freedom seriously to the point where it allows these communities to buy in again.”

Dr. van der Tol’s closing assessment thus underscored the interdisciplinary challenge of analyzing religion, law, and populism in contemporary politics. She highlighted the fragility of alliances, the centrality of legal contestation, and the unsettling transformations of constitutionalism underway. Most of all, she reminded the audience that the stakes are not abstract: “There’s something at stake. Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Her reflections left the audience with both caution and urgency: caution, in recognizing the thin and fragile nature of many transnational illiberal alliances; and urgency, in grappling with the profound implications of constitutional and cultural transformations for the future of democracy itself.

 

Conclusion

Session 3 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series made clear that the entanglement of religion, populism, and illiberalism is neither accidental nor confined to any one region. Across Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas, the panelists showed how appeals to religious freedom—once a cornerstone of liberal democracy—are increasingly being redefined as instruments of exclusion, mobilization, and power consolidation.

Dr. Marc Loustau demonstrated how Hungary reframes religious freedom to defend Christian identity at home while projecting humanitarian solidarity abroad, thereby transforming a liberal principle into an illiberal cultural weapon. Dr. Juraj Buzalka revealed how Slovakia’s “post-peasant” cultural economy and opportunistic leadership have enabled the pragmatic politicization of religion, blending global conservative funding with local traditions. Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, meanwhile, highlighted the US case of Texas, where religious freedom is contested not between secularism and faith, but between two theologies—Christian nationalism and liberalizing pluralism.

The discussants, Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, drew the threads together, underscoring how religion is domesticated into politics through lawfare, culture wars, and symbolic politics. Both stressed that these developments form part of a wider “illiberal internationale,” linking actors across borders through shared narratives, funding, and strategies.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol warned that these shifts point to deeper transformations of constitutionalism itself. If the constitution becomes not a neutral framework but the very terrain of ideological struggle, then democracy’s foundations may be unsettled in ways more enduring than electoral swings. As she cautioned, “Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Ultimately, the session underscored both the fragility and urgency of democratic resilience. Understanding how illiberal actors instrumentalize religion is not only an academic task but a political imperative for safeguarding pluralism, constitutionalism, and the future of democracy.

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz is a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Dr. da Cruz: Brazilian Society Will No Longer Tolerate Attacks on Democracy

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officers for plotting a coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazil’s democratic history. For the first time, both a former president and high-ranking commanders have been held accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. In her interview with the ECPS, Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz calls this a “historic” cultural shift: “Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy.” She emphasizes that this resilience stems from institutional maturity and judicial independence. By focusing on concrete evidence rather than rhetoric, Brazil’s Supreme Court set a vital precedent: authoritarian populism meets its legal limit when courts remain credible veto players.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officials for plotting a coup marks a watershed moment in the country’s democratic trajectory. For the first time in Brazil’s history, both a former head of state and high-ranking military leaders have been held criminally accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. This unprecedented development raises fundamental questions about judicial independence, civil–military relations, and the resilience of democratic institutions under populist pressure.

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz—a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison—describes the moment as “historic.” As she emphasizes, “I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.”

This “cultural shift,” she argues, reflects both institutional maturation and societal change. For decades, Brazil had maintained a tradition of impunity for military elites. “When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law,” Dr. da Cruz explains. “Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.”

For Dr. da Cruz, this is not only about judicial assertiveness but also about broader institutional cooperation: “It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome.” This inter-institutional collaboration, she suggests, has been vital in resisting authoritarian populist attempts to erode democratic checks and balances.

Yet, the trial has also exposed risks. Justice Alexandre de Moraes emerged as the central figure in Bolsonaro’s prosecution, raising concerns about over-personalization of judicial power. While Dr. da Cruz acknowledges that this could fuel narratives of “judicial dictatorship,” she maintains that the verdict will likely enhance trust: “If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court… it shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.”

Ultimately, Brazil’s experience highlights both the vulnerabilities and strengths of democracies confronting authoritarian populism. By focusing on hard evidence—charges of armed conspiracy and constitutional subversion—rather than rhetoric or political speech, Brazil’s Supreme Court has set a precedent of judicial accountability rooted firmly in due process. As Dr. da Cruz underscores, “There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is now constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept.”

This interview situates Brazil’s democratic resilience in comparative perspective, with lessons for other democracies confronting populist threats.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

A Historic Break with Brazil’s Tradition of Impunity

Alexandre de Moraes, Justice of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a press conference in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 5, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Bolsonaro has been sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup—the first time in Brazil’s history that a president and military leaders involved in such an attempt have been convicted. How does this break with Brazil’s tradition of impunity, and what does it reveal about the maturation of its democratic institutions?

Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz: Thank you so much for having me. It’s such a pleasure to be here. As you just said, this is the first time something like this has happened in the history of Brazil, and it marks a huge break with the tradition of impunity. When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law. Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.

For me, this demonstrates two things above all. First, judicial independence: our Supreme Court has shown that it can and will enforce the Constitution whenever necessary. But perhaps even more importantly, other institutions have matured as well. It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome. Finally, I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.

Legitimacy Gained, Risks Remain

Justice Alexandre de Moraes meticulously built the case for over two years, defying Bolsonaro’s claims of judicial persecution. From your perspective on judicial politics, does this verdict strengthen long-term trust in the Supreme Federal Court (STF), or risk deepening narratives of “judicial dictatorship”?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is the hard question that we are all asking right now, because it can cut both ways. If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court, raising both levels of trust and legitimacy, because it is another instance of the court showing it can act under pressure. COVID was the first such instance in the recent past. During COVID, everyone in the government was against the Supreme Court’s measures, yet the Court was able to enforce the Constitution, and it has done the same now. This shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.

But, there might be a second possibility. Justice Alexandre de Moraes became the face of this prosecution, the face of the inquiry and the conviction. In my opinion, this is problematic for the Court, because it personalizes such an important verdict in one person, which should not be the case. The main verdict involved other justices, of course, but he became the highly visible player in this case. This can fuel arguments of “judicial dictatorship,” which could play out negatively.

That said, if I were to bet, I think this will ultimately be positive for the Supreme Court. The population will see that the Court stands firm, even when the government is not siding with it. But we will have to wait and see.

Authoritarian Populism Meets Its Legal Limit

Bolsonaro’s conviction included charges of armed criminal conspiracy and attempted abolition of the democratic rule of law. How do these charges fit into the conceptual vocabulary of authoritarian populism—are they an appropriate legal reflection of political subversion?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think they are. For me, this is one of the most important points here, because we could have had a conviction based on opinion or public statements that Bolsonaro made. That would have risked a much more politicized trial. Instead, the court chose to focus only on the concrete facts, which were mainly about the armed conspiracy—an organized and violent attempt against important political figures such as President Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes. They focused on the coup plot itself. They didn’t dwell on rhetoric, social media posts, or other statements that might have raised accusations of politicization.

This goes directly to the heart of authoritarian populism. There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept. In that sense, the court acted appropriately by applying the criminal code in the most strictly legal way possible.

Bolsonaro and his lawyers insist the trial was politically motivated, echoing populist claims of “witch hunts.” How should scholars distinguish between legitimate judicial accountability and lawfare in cases involving populist leaders?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: If we can take Brazil as an example, the most important guarantee courts should focus on is due process. This is exactly what our Supreme Court did. Every time the defense asked for information or made requests, they were granted, even though there is a strong argument that trying these individuals in the highest instance of the judiciary violates the right to defense. The court, however, had several precedents showing this was not the case, and this was not the first instance in which people were tried in the Supreme Court. Due process was observed at every step. Alongside this, there was strong factual evidence and credible witnesses—in our case, even a whistleblower—that demonstrated this was not a conspiracy or a witch hunt, but a legitimate trial conducted with due process and proportionality. That is the key: showing that the law is being upheld, and that the law allows for this punishment to happen.

Dissent as Democratic Strength, Not Judicial Weakness

Luiz Fux, Justice and President of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a presentation in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on July 31, 2018. Photo: Joa Souza.

The STF split 4–1, with Justice Luiz Fux voting to absolve Bolsonaro on procedural grounds. Could such dissents provide legal ammunition for appeals and, more broadly, do fragmented judicial opinions undermine institutional legitimacy in high-stakes political trials?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I heard a lot, and I read a lot about this during the last few weeks, and I side with the people who think that this is actually positive and beneficial for our democracy. By having a strong dissent like we had with Justice Fux, it shows that justices are allowed to think otherwise, that there was evidence, and that there were arguments from the defense that could persuade justices to think differently, and that the court is not hunting someone at any cost. So, this dissent demonstrates that the court can dissent, that it can have different arguments, and this is actually positive in a high court such as the Supreme Court.

In terms of appeals, I don’t think this is a huge problem here. We have a specific appeal that would be possible if this decision were a 3–2 decision. So if we had two justices siding with Bolsonaro, then he would have a specific appeal that would apply to this case. With only one dissent, this appeal does not apply, so the idea that it opens the ground for the defense to explore more possibilities of appeals doesn’t apply in this case specifically. In my view, the dissent was too long—it took the entire day to read the vote, and it was much more procedural than based on evidence itself—but it plays in favor of the Supreme Court. It shows that, unexpectedly, someone dissented completely on the verdict, and this demonstrates that the Supreme Court can have a debate, which is positive.

The Militarization of Bureaucracy Was a Legal Process

Then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro attends the 74th Anniversary of the Parachutist Infantry Battalion at the Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo Rodrigues.

Your research shows Bolsonaro strategically militarized bureaucracies while eroding public trust in the Armed Forces. How does the sentencing of senior officers alter Brazil’s civil–military equilibrium, and could it delegitimize the armed forces as political actors?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: We have always had this problem with civilian control over the military. Since the dictatorship, when the new constitution was drafted, so much power was given to the military that we could almost never say they were not allowed to play a specific role. What I call the militarization of bureaucracy was, in fact, a legal process—and this is the problem for me. There were laws that allowed the military to occupy primarily political positions. I’m not just talking here about the Ministry of Health, where a general was appointed to a political position. That was highly problematic; we had never before seen active-duty military in such a high office, and it was questionable.

But that is not the only issue. I’m talking about positions at all levels of the political bureaucracy that the military was allowed to occupy by law. Several changes in federal legislation permitted military personnel to serve up to four or even six years outside of strictly military posts and instead take politically appointed positions. Bolsonaro knew how to exploit this in his favor. An unprecedented number of military officers occupied his bureaucracy, and this undoubtedly laid the groundwork for him to secure the support he needed when the time came.

So, in order to rebuild civilian control over the military, much more is needed than simply changing the Ministry of Defense and appointing a civilian instead of a general. What is needed is legal reform that critically examines and justifies, for example, why we would need a sergeant in the Ministry of Health, or why it would be important to place a soldier in the Ministry of Education. Do these assignments make sense? That is the most important issue right now. We should be questioning the very reasons why legislation allows people to leave military functions and assume civilian roles.

Resilience and Fractured Loyalties Coexist

Bolsonaro’s failed coup was partly foiled because top military commanders withheld support. Should this be read as evidence of institutional resilience, or as a sign of fractured loyalties within Brazil’s security establishment?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think it’s actually both. If we had the Ministry of Defense plus the three commanders in Brazil—which in the US we would call the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Navy—if all of them, along with the Minister of Defense, had said, no, we cannot side with this, it would have been a stronger sign of resilience. But that’s not what happened. In this trial, we had the conviction of the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Defense. Both sided with Bolsonaro very strongly, saying, we support you, we’ll be by your side. Only the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force said otherwise.

So yes, it’s resilience, because two of the main players showed they don’t want to compromise or play completely political roles anymore. But it’s also fractured loyalties, because out of four, Bolsonaro still managed to get two on his side. The point here is that he could have had all of them siding with him, had he chosen the right commanders, so to speak. So this is resilience, but it is also fractured loyalty—and that’s the problem. If loyalties fracture, the outcome could be very different, and that’s what we don’t want. We want an institution that no longer sides with political groups at any cost.

Military Must Stay in Military Roles

Having served as a legal advisor in the Air Force, how do you assess the prospects of rebuilding robust civilian control in the defense sector after this episode of politicization and militarization?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I guess I will repeat myself a little bit, because from my experience, what I see is that there is a legal foundation—federal rules that allow the military to serve outside of strictly military positions. This means they can serve basically anywhere, as you can imagine. You can have a military officer in the Ministry of Education, or a soldier in the Ministry of Construction or Agriculture, in specific cases. For me, this is what takes control over the military out of the hands of civilians. The military should be serving in essentially military positions.

We could question, for example, why we have military officers serving in a superior military court. Some may think they are needed there, that they can provide an important perspective in those cases, but we should have a civilian structure capable of handling anything that is not entirely military. That civilian structure becomes fractured when you allow the military to leave the barracks, leave their military functions, and take on civilian posts. During Bolsonaro’s government, we had military personnel spread across virtually every civilian and public position you could imagine, and this, in my view, is the biggest problem with civilian control.

As I said, this is about much more than simply changing the Minister of Defense and placing a civilian in charge. What we need is legal reform—legislation that clearly defines when, if ever, the military can leave their military functions for civilian roles. In my view, this is what should not be happening.

Crisis Moments Can Reinforce Judicial Trust

In your article on courts and democracy, you highlight how crises can paradoxically bolster judicial trust. Do you see Bolsonaro’s conviction producing a similar “crisis effect,” strengthening institutional legitimacy, or will it reinforce distrust among his base?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: That’s precisely correct. In my article, I analyzed this crisis effect during COVID. When the federal government opposed vaccination and isolation measures, the court said “no.” It emphasized the need to give autonomy to municipalities and states so they could decide on their own isolation measures—something Bolsonaro was completely against. In that moment, the court upheld the Constitution, even though this meant going against the president of Brazil during a crisis. This proved positive for the court, as the population sided with it for defending constitutional principles.

I think this could be precisely the case here. Right now, the population can—and, if I’m correct, will—recognize that even under strong pressure against the verdict, the court relied on constitutional guarantees to rule and to uphold the Constitution, despite street protests and pressure from Bolsonaro’s side. So, this crisis effect may well be unfolding again in the near future.

Bolsonaro’s Son Fueled Misinformation in the US

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Trump has denounced Bolsonaro’s conviction, raised tariffs, and framed the trial as a parallel to his own legal troubles. How might this US intervention reshape Brazil’s democratic trajectory, and what does it reveal about transnational populist solidarity?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not a specialist in American politics—I work mostly on Brazilian politics. Here is my personal opinion: there is a transnational solidarity among leaders who face similar situations, but in this specific case, there was enormous pressure from one of Bolsonaro’s sons, a federal deputy who now lives in the US. He was feeding false information to the US government, and because of this misinformation and the pressure to side with Bolsonaro, I think that was the main reason for the outcome—raising tariffs, public speeches against the Supreme Court in Brazil, punishing Supreme Court judges by revoking visas, etc. This congressman, who is irregular—not completing his functions in Congress and living in the US—was the major player in this huge mess surrounding the verdict.

Courts Must Remain Veto Players Against Populism

From a comparative perspective, what lessons does Brazil’s trial of a former president and generals offer for other democracies facing populist challenges, such as the US, Israel, Turkey, or Hungary?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: The best comparison we can make here is between Brazil, Turkey, and Hungary—I would add Israel as well, given the major reformulation of its judicial system. In those cases, the failure was in guaranteeing that the main body overseeing the Constitution had the independence it needed to do its job. When a populist comes and gradually cuts every possible check the court can exercise over the executive, step by step, by the time you need the court to act, it cannot do so anymore because it is no longer powerful, no longer a veto player. That is what happened in those three cases.

In Brazil, whenever Bolsonaro tried to impeach a judge or push measures that would curb the court, the court showed clearly that this was unconstitutional, not allowed, and it was able to rally popular support against such moves. In this way, the court managed to remain legitimate, even under heavy pressure. In the other countries, however, the curbing was gradual and consistent, to the point where it could no longer be reversed. And when the court was finally needed, it was no longer truly operational.

Brazil Shows How Judicial Independence Can Resist Populism

Bolsonaro’s rhetoric mirrors Trump’s in portraying judicial accountability as elite persecution. Do you see Brazil’s case as a model of democratic resilience, or does it risk setting a precedent where judicial overreach becomes a populist rallying cry?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is a question I don’t really have a clear answer for right now, because it will take time for us to understand. What I can say is that internationally, public attention has portrayed Brazil as doing what the US could not do, what the US Supreme Court could not do—that Brazil is a sign, an example of resilience. The main reason for this resilience, I will repeat myself, is that we were able to keep judicial independence throughout Bolsonaro’s tenure. He was not able to change the court in the way he intended, so the court remained independent. This is what we want to show to the world. We had a populist leader who tried attacking the court, but the court survived, and it was able to uphold the Constitution against him shortly thereafter. This is the precedent we want to set. Whether this will create a perception of, or a cry of, judicial overreach is too soon to say. It certainly can, and it probably will, but will that be stronger than the claim that the court was strong? I don’t think so.

And lastly, Dr. Da Cruz, in the US, Trump floated deploying the National Guard in major cities under the guise of “law and order.” From your research on Brazil’s bureaucratic militarization, what hidden agenda do you see behind such proposals—are they about restoring order, or normalizing military involvement in domestic politics?

Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not an expert in American politics, so what I can say is about what happened in Brazil. The moment we saw those numbers of military bureaucratization growing was during the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. From that intervention, the military received control over the police in Rio de Janeiro because of claims of drugs and crime, etc. That was something we could not stop anymore. Years later came Bolsonaro and his Minister of Defense, who had once been “the interventor” in Rio de Janeiro, so every military politician traces back to this intervention in the police in Rio de Janeiro that happened years before Bolsonaro’s tenure. When we decided to do this, it backfired against our democracy. So, this is what I can say: it is very problematic when you bring the military into issues and problems that are not meant for the military to handle.

Dr. Cristian Cantir is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University.

Assoc. Prof. Cantir: Moldova’s Election a Victory for EU, Defeat for Kremlin

by Editor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeInterviewsMigration

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Cristian Cantir (Oakland University) described Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections as “a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin.” Despite massive Russian interference—including vote-buying, cryptocurrency transfers, and efforts to incite unrest—Moldovan institutions responded with unprecedented consistency, demonstrating what Dr. Cantir calls a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience.” Yet, he warns that Moscow remains influential through populist narratives exploiting poverty and weak institutions. The results, he argues, reflect both the enduring popularity of EU integration and the failures of pro-Russian opposition parties. For Dr. Cantir, Moldova offers a striking example of how Russian influence faces diminishing returns when met with institutional strength and sustained Western support.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The outcome of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections has been widely interpreted as a defining moment in the country’s European trajectory and its long struggle to resist Russian influence. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Cristian Cantir, Associate Professor of Political Science at Oakland University, framed the results in stark geopolitical terms: “At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.”

Dr. Cantir’s assessment reflects not only the electoral success of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party (PAS), but also the broader resilience of Moldova’s democratic institutions in the face of Moscow’s sustained interference campaigns. International observers judged the elections to be generally free and fair, even amid bomb threats, electoral violations, and widespread attempts at corruption. As Dr. Cantir explains, this points to a “confirmation of Moldova’s democratic resilience,” if not yet full consolidation, as state institutions and law enforcement demonstrated an increased capacity to respond to hybrid threats.

Russia’s interference toolkit—long tested in Moldova—appeared less effective in this cycle. The Kremlin poured more resources into the effort, funding political actors, experimenting with cryptocurrency transfers, and attempting to stoke unrest. Yet, Dr. Cantir argues, these strategies delivered “diminishing returns” in a political environment where institutions had grown more proactive. “Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the extent to which Moldovan institutions have now responded in such a consistent way to Russian interference,” he observes. The shift suggests that the Kremlin’s approach is increasingly constrained by its own reliance on disinformation and narratives fed by loyal pro-Russian politicians, which often fail to reflect the realities of Moldovan society. As Dr. Cantir notes, “some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary… you wonder whether they actually believe them, because they don’t even work as propaganda.”

Still, Russia remains a formidable actor in Moldova’s domestic politics. Populist narratives that exploit socioeconomic hardship, corruption, and weak institutions continue to resonate with segments of the population, leaving Moldova’s pro-European course vulnerable to authoritarian retrenchment. Dr. Cantir highlights the need for PAS and other pro-EU forces to demonstrate tangible benefits of integration to disengaged citizens, warning that otherwise they may fall “much more easily to populist messaging” that is Eurosceptic and pro-Russian in nature.

Ultimately, the Moldovan case illustrates both the persistence and limitations of Russia’s hybrid influence operations in the post-Soviet space. Unlike Ukraine or Georgia, where Moscow has resorted to military force, Moldova demonstrates how resilience is possible when domestic institutions respond effectively and Western partners provide consistent support. As Dr. Cantir emphasizes, this election represents more than just a partisan victory—it is a symbolic moment of geopolitical realignment: a triumph for Europe, and a setback for the Kremlin.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Cristian Cantir, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

Moldova’s Elections Confirm Democratic Resilience

A man casts his ballot during parliamentary elections in Moldova, in front of the national flag. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Cristian Cantir, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the broader significance of Moldova’s 2025 parliamentary elections, particularly in the light of the pro-European Action and Solidarity Party’s (PAS) ability to withstand unprecedented Russian interference campaigns? To what extent can this outcome be read as a genuine consolidation of Moldova’s democratic resilience, and to what degree is it contingent upon extraordinary external support from the EU and its allies?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Thank you very much for inviting me. It’s a pleasure to be here, and I’m always glad to talk about Moldova—a topic that doesn’t usually get much attention in international affairs. At a macro level, I would say this election represents a major win for the European Union and a major defeat for the Kremlin. I think it’s fair to frame it in those terms as a general way of understanding what happened.

To the extent that it was generally a free and fair election, according to most international observers—even in the face of massive Russian interference—it was consistent with Moldova’s tradition of holding competitive elections since independence. I would take this as a positive sign of the relative health of Moldovan democracy. The process was conducted competently, with electoral authorities and law enforcement responding promptly to challenges, including bomb threats, reported violations, and instances of electoral corruption. From that standpoint, it serves as a solid example—not necessarily a consolidation, but certainly a confirmation—of Moldova’s democratic resilience. Of course, there remain significant challenges to Moldova’s democratic consolidation, but overall the outcome is good news for the country’s democracy.

I do think the election results can be partly attributed to external EU support, but it’s important to refine this point by highlighting one individual in particular—Moldovan President Maia Sandu. Sandu is a unique figure, not only in Moldova’s political history but also in the broader Central and Eastern European context. She has consistently been a popular, anti-corruption, reformist, pro-European leader. Many of the criticisms and attacks directed at her by the pro-Russian opposition have not gained much traction. She has remained highly popular within Moldova, due in part to her strong international reputation, especially among EU politicians. In this sense, when we talk about external influence, it is really a combination of two factors: Sandu’s personal popularity and the EU’s admiration for, and support of, her during this campaign. That said, I would not be so confident in giving the ruling party, PAS, too much credit for the victory. There remain fundamental issues with PAS as a pro-EU force, which we can also discuss further.

Moldovans Voted for Europe, Not PAS

Do the results primarily reflect a deepening consolidation of Moldova’s pro-European trajectory, or are they better understood as a rejection of entrenched pro-Russian elites such as Igor Dodon and his allies? In other words, should we interpret the outcome as an ideological commitment to Europe or as an electoral repudiation of discredited political actors?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: We could start by noting that EU integration is genuinely popular with a majority of the Moldovan population. Most polls confirm this, and even the 2024 referendum—though decided by a razor-thin margin—pointed to its broad appeal. That narrow margin can be attributed, at least in part, to vote-buying allegations and to the pro-Russian opposition framing the referendum as a judgment on PAS, the ruling party, rather than on the EU itself. Since PAS has become almost synonymous with the pro-EU position, this image has limited the viability of any other pro-European force. As a result, most pro-EU Moldovans voted for PAS, even if they were frustrated with the party’s slow response to major challenges such as poverty or judicial reform. To some extent, then, the outcome reflects support for EU integration combined with the absence of credible alternatives. Much of the vote was strategic: it did not necessarily indicate satisfaction with PAS as a party or with its performance, but rather the lack of any real choice.

The other parties in the election can also be faulted for failing to develop a narrative that offered a genuine alternative to PAS. Many claimed to support some degree of EU integration—even pro-Russian parties promised to negotiate more with Brussels. They tried to emphasize sovereignty and introduced socially conservative themes aimed at countering what they viewed as the EU’s liberal values. Yet this did not resonate with most Moldovans, as it came across as vague messaging—essentially, “we will slow down EU integration,” without explaining what that would mean or why it was necessary. By contrast, tangible benefits such as visa-free travel or lower roaming fees—everyday concerns tied directly to EU integration—proved far more compelling. As a result, the opposition’s alternative was unclear and largely reduced to a promise of “we are not the current political elites.”

The results, therefore, can be attributed both to the continuing popularity of the EU and to the weakness of the opposition leaders. Their campaigns were driven more by resentment of the ruling party and calls to “purge the system,” or what they called “the regime,” than by any proactive or positive electoral platform.

Moldovan President Maia Sandu speaks at a press conference following her meeting with Bulgarian President Rumen Radev in Chișinău, Moldova, on October 27, 2022. Photo: Dreamstime.

Diaspora Has Become the Backbone of Moldova’s Pro-EU Course

The Moldovan diaspora appears to have played a decisive role in shaping the electoral outcome. How should we understand the implications of this phenomenon for the transnationalization of Moldovan democracy, particularly regarding questions of sovereignty, external leverage, and the construction of a political community that extends well beyond national borders?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The question of the Moldovan diaspora is particularly interesting, as it has been essential in consolidating Moldova’s pro-EU course, especially in recent years. Voting has also become much easier for diaspora members, particularly in Western countries, which is where most diaspora ballots are cast. As a result, the Moldovan diaspora is strongly pro-Western in its orientation—overwhelmingly so, judging by the last few elections.

With some exceptions, the Moldovan diaspora is relatively recent, with the first wave beginning in the 1990s. Attachments to the homeland remain very strong, and personal connections are still close. Travel has also become much easier—for example, low-cost airlines have made going back and forth far more accessible. And because most Moldovans abroad now reside legally, there is far less fear than in the 1990s and 2000s, when many migrated illegally or crossed borders without visas and were hesitant to return. For all these reasons, the diaspora’s ties to Moldova remain particularly strong.

The diaspora has not yet developed a separate identity; it remains very much rooted in Moldova. For example, if you visit Moldova in August, it is striking—you hear Moldovan children speaking with Portuguese accents in shops, and it becomes difficult to get a dentist appointment because so many diaspora members return home for treatment. This illustrates how deeply the diaspora remains part of Moldovan society. The ruling PAS, like other parties, has been very friendly and encouraging toward the diaspora. There are events organized exclusively for them, success stories highlighted in the media, and programs inviting them to return and share their experiences. There is also considerable gratitude for remittances, which have helped offset some of the country’s socioeconomic inequalities.

It is also important to remember that Moldovans’ understanding of sovereignty has always carried a transnational dimension. Many have looked to Romania for cultural and ethnic identity markers, while others have looked to Russia. As a result, Moldovans are more accustomed to hybrid and multiple identities. They can remain deeply connected both to the countries where they now live and to Moldovan politics—connections that are further strengthened by technology such as Facebook, online news, and live-streamed broadcasts.

The picture becomes more complicated when we look at the politicization of the diaspora, particularly by pro-Russian forces. Because the diaspora is strongly supportive of pro-Western groups, pro-Russian politicians have advanced a narrative—especially visible in recent years—that Moldovans inside the country oppose PAS, while those abroad support it. The argument is that Moldova’s diaspora is effectively holding those who remain at home hostage to the PAS regime. Pro-Russian groups have been trying to inflame tensions between these two communities. Igor Dodon, Moldova’s most prominent pro-Russian politician, has even described the diaspora as a “parallel electorate.” Another pro-Russian politician, Irina Vlah, has pursued what can only be described as an unusual campaign, promoting narratives such as asking Moldovans to “adopt” a fellow citizen inside the country who is suffering under the pro-EU PAS. I would not be surprised if such narratives continue to spread and further deepen tensions between diaspora communities and Moldovans still at home.

Finally, one more point: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its interference in Moldovan politics has highlighted an unresolved issue concerning the Moldovan diaspora in Russia. Estimates of the diaspora there range from about 100,000 to several hundred thousand people. Because of Russian interference, Moldovan authorities have opened only a minimal number of polling stations, most of them in Moscow. Given the vast size of Russia, this makes it much more difficult for Moldovans living there to cast their ballots. Authorities argue that this limitation is necessary to ensure ballot security, but it leaves unresolved the broader problem of how to guarantee equal voting rights for all members of the diaspora, regardless of where they reside. This remains a pressing question that Moldovan politicians will eventually have to address, even though, for now, it has been overshadowed by Russia’s interference.

Former Moldovan President Igor Dodon attends a Party of Socialists meeting in Bălți, Moldova, on October 17, 2021. Photo: Iuri Gagarin.

Low Turnout Makes Moldova Vulnerable to Populist Messaging

With voter turnout just above 50%, what does the relative disengagement of a significant portion of the electorate reveal about the legitimacy and durability of PAS’s mandate? To what extent does persistent electoral apathy constrain the prospects for long-term democratic consolidation and weaken the societal foundations of Moldova’s pro-European orientation?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: I want to make a quick statistical note first. The 2024 Moldovan Census identified about 2.3 to 2.4 million Moldovans in the country with stable residency. Meanwhile, the electoral rolls from the Central Electoral Commission list close to 300,000 Moldovans abroad, which doesn’t quite capture reality. In fact, there are many more Moldovans who still hold residency but live or work abroad. This makes turnout somewhat harder to assess in Moldova, given the fragmented data we have.

That said, the general premise of the question still holds, because the turnout percentage does indicate a degree of disengagement. This poses a problem for PAS and for Moldova’s pro-European orientation. People who are disengaged—who don’t feel invested in Moldova’s pro-EU path or don’t perceive clear benefits from EU integration—are much more susceptible to populist messaging. In Moldova, such messaging tends to be Eurosceptic and pro-Russian. As a result, these citizens may be more easily mobilized by populist politicians, giving those actors greater institutional power to undermine EU integration.

For this reason, demonstrating the tangible benefits of EU integration to more apathetic groups should be a key part of PAS’s strategy. Otherwise, we may see rising support for populist politicians. A few have already begun to gain visibility—there are two in particular I could highlight—but the broader risk of growing populist appeal is certainly there.

Russia May Be Falling Victim to Its Own Propaganda in Moldova

Observers have described Moldova as a “laboratory” for Russia’s hybrid interference strategies. In your assessment, what does the 2025 electoral cycle reveal about both the adaptive capacities and structural limitations of Moscow’s toolkit of influence? Can we speak of a paradigmatic shift in the Kremlin’s approach, or are we witnessing the persistence of familiar strategies with diminishing returns?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a really good question. The simplest answer is that we don’t know yet, and there’s a reason for that. The 2025 election was marked by greater intensity and a wider range of Kremlin interference efforts. They invested more money, backed more political actors, and became more involved in attempts to stoke violence and protests. Yet none of these efforts proved particularly effective.

There are a couple of points to keep in mind here. First of all, Moldovan law enforcement and the broader institutional response have become more active, dealing more effectively—even compared to 2024—with clear cases of electoral interference. This included vote buying, the use of cryptocurrency to transfer funds, and the use of cash for illegal financing. Another important factor in understanding the Kremlin’s difficulties in Moldova is that, for a long time, Russia had grown accustomed to acting with relative impunity there. Even when pro-European or centrist coalitions were in power, Moldovan institutions and politicians were rarely proactive in curbing Russian influence. At best, they ignored Moscow’s efforts; at worst, pro-Russian politicians openly reinforced them. I think Moscow has been somewhat taken aback by the consistency with which Moldovan institutions have now responded to Russian interference.

So, I don’t know if we are going to see a full shift in the Kremlin’s approach, but I do think there is more re-evaluation and discussion about how it might adjust its strategies. One additional point is that the Kremlin actually knows a great deal about Moldova—more so than many in the West. The problem, however, is that it continues to rely heavily on information fed by pro-Russian politicians, who often promote narratives that are simply inaccurate. For example, the claim by some pro-Russian groups that EU integration is not popular in Moldova is simply not true. It’s difficult to tell whether the Kremlin and its allies are falling victim to their own narratives, which distort their understanding of Moldovan dynamics and render their strategies less effective. That’s something I’ve often thought about, because some of the claims you see in Russian propaganda are so laughable and rudimentary. You start to wonder whether they actually believe them, since they don’t even work effectively as propaganda. That’s how rudimentary they are.

Pro-Russian supporters attend Victory Day celebrations on May 9 in Chișinău, Moldova. Alongside World War II veterans displaying their medals, members of the public dressed in Soviet-era military uniforms highlighted the enduring strength of Russian influence. Photo: Dreamstime.

Moldova Now Frames Itself as Belonging in Europe

In the light of your previous work on Moldova’s foreign policy balancing, how would you assess Chisinau’s current capacity to resist Moscow’s strategies of destabilization, particularly given Russia’s reliance on authoritarian-style tactics such as elite capture, patronage networks, and the exploitation of populist narratives?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: When it comes to balancing, we’ve seen a noticeable shift. The perception of the EU as a counterbalance to Russia—once more prominent among pro-Russian or centrist groups—was grounded in the idea that Moldova should extract benefits from all its major geopolitical partners. That view has given way to a more cultural and identity-based argument. The ruling pro-European group now frames Moldova as inherently European, emphasizing that the country “belongs in Europe” and should “go home” to Europe.

As a result, the EU is now articulated less as a strategic tool for Moldova’s foreign policy goals and more as a natural place of belonging for Moldovans. Pro-Russian parties still advance the balancing argument, but it has been severely undermined by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. They have not substantially re-evaluated or adjusted their rhetoric since then, but the post-2022 context is fundamentally different. Thus, the balancing argument no longer carries the same weight. While it still registers some support in polling data, it is far less compelling from a political standpoint.

With respect to elite capture, the Kremlin is beginning to understand that Moldovan institutions are responding more coherently to Russian threats. Some of its old patronage networks or elite-capture strategies are not working as effectively because Moldovan law enforcement is pushing back. One example of this would be Russia’s attempts to infiltrate Moldovan politics or encourage spying, which the Moldovan Secret Service has been more proactive in addressing. I’m not sure how the Kremlin will deal with this particular problem.

That said, the Kremlin still retains significant power when it comes to the populist narratives, and the vulnerabilities they exploit. Given Moldova’s socioeconomic issues, including high rates of poverty, these vulnerabilities can be easily leveraged by populist politicians, and consequently by pro-Kremlin groups as well.

Odessa Looms Large in Moldova’s Strategic Calculus

What does the Moldovan case tell us about Russia’s evolving approach to influence operations in the post-Soviet space, especially compared to its tactics in Ukraine or Georgia?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: One of the key differences between Ukraine and Georgia is that, where Russia lacks either the ability or the immediate interest to engage in military action—as opposed to what it is doing in Ukraine or what it did in Georgia—its influence operations become less effective when faced with strong institutional responses and consistent support from Moldova’s allies. Because direct military threats are not immediate, Moldova has more space to resist Russian influence.

This dynamic is often reflected in discussions by Moldovan politicians about Odessa. Odessa looms large in Moldovan politics, because if the city were to fall, the strategic calculus would change significantly. If Odessa does not fall, and if Ukraine continues to resist the Russian army in southern Ukraine and around Odessa specifically, it will be considerably easier for Moldova to counter influence operations without the constant pressure of an imminent military threat.

Hybrid Warfare Is a Transnational Problem—It Requires a Transnational Response

Russian military expert at a government operations base, engaged in cyber activities aimed at spreading disinformation and hybrid warfare propaganda. Photo: Dragos Condrea.

How sustainable is Moldova’s reliance on Western partners for countering hybrid threats, given the country’s domestic vulnerabilities such as corruption, weak institutions, and economic hardship?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: That’s a good point. Ideally, you would want a sovereign state with strong institutions, fewer socioeconomic problems, and a consistent fight against corruption. That would give it the capacity to resist Russian influence more effectively without significant outside support. The European Union also needs to focus on those factors—tackling corruption, strengthening institutions, and addressing economic hardship.

At the same time, Moldova’s reliance on Western partners to counter Russian hybrid warfare is unavoidable, because this is not only Moldova’s problem. To the extent that it is a transnational challenge, it requires a transnational and coordinated response. Moldova cannot and should not handle this alone. Long-term, institutionalized cooperation with the EU is essential—both because Russian hybrid attacks extend beyond Moldova and because Moldova’s own capacities remain limited. Even if Moldova had strong governance and robust institutions, it would still need to work closely with the European Union to meet this particular threat.

Polarization in Moldova Is Fluid, Not Fixed

How realistic is Moldova’s aim to achieve EU accession by 2030, given both the demanding structural reforms and potential geopolitical vetoes within the Union, and in what ways might deep internal polarization between pro-European and pro-Russian constituencies undermine the legitimacy of this process by opening space for populist mobilization and authoritarian retrenchment?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: Internal geopolitical polarization is a serious problem in Moldova, but it is also important to remember that polarization is a fluid phenomenon. Polling, for instance, used to show much stronger support for integration with Russian projects even 10 or 20 years ago, and much less support for NATO membership. This shows that polarization can shift over time.

The strategy of Moldovan authorities has been to make a compelling economic, or quality-of-life, case for EU integration, even in regions where the political dimension of integration is less popular. In places like Gagauzia and parts of northern Moldova, the aim is to erode polarization by demonstrating the tangible economic benefits of closer ties with the EU. If successful, this could help offset some of the effects of geopolitical polarization by easing tensions.

So, the biggest question isn’t really polarization, but whether pro-EU forces can articulate and illustrate the benefits of EU integration clearly to more people, including those in pro-Russian propaganda bubbles. To a large extent, integration by 2030 is driven more by the speed with which Moldovan authorities can enact reforms, by developments in the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and also by the situation in Transnistria—which we can talk about—and what exactly Moldovan authorities are going to do with that separatist region.

The Cyprus Model Is a Real Option for Moldova

Monument to Vladimir Lenin in front of the Parliament building in Tiraspol, Transnistria, Moldova. Photo: Dreamstime.

Given the persistence of Russian troops in Transnistria, how does the unresolved status of the region constrain Moldova’s European ambitions and its sovereignty more broadly?

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The number of Russian troops in Transnistria isn’t sufficient to threaten Moldova’s European ambitions or its sovereignty. Greater risks could come from a hypothetical mobilization of a large part of the Transnistrian population during a potential conflict, but that scenario carries its own difficulties. Nor does the Russian military presence pose an immediate threat to sovereignty in the sense that Moldova is able to control most of its territory fairly effectively, aside from Transnistria. In that respect, it is not an urgent danger.

The war in Ukraine has also constrained Transnistria’s potentially aggressive orientation, or even its foreign policy toward Ukraine, Moldova, and the EU more broadly. Within Moldova, there is a growing sense that EU integration must move forward and can happen without Transnistria. Moldovan authorities have explicitly stated that it is possible for Moldova to join the EU first, using the Cyprus model. Cyprus is a common example cited by Moldovan officials and has even been echoed by former EU leaders. José Manuel Barroso, for instance, recently affirmed that the Cyprus model is indeed a possibility for Moldova.

At this stage, Chișinău does not view Transnistria as an obstacle to EU integration. Instead, it argues that pre-integration measures demonstrating the economic benefits of EU membership will gradually draw Transnistria closer. If necessary, Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria and then work toward integrating the region into the Union over the longer term.

Populists Give Moscow Veto Power over Moldova’s EU Path

Lastly, Professor Cantir, what scenarios do you consider most plausible for the future of the Transnistria conflict: gradual reintegration under EU auspices, continued limbo, or renewed escalation tied to Russia’s strategic setbacks in Ukraine? And in any of these scenarios, how might populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalize the issue domestically to challenge Moldova’s European orientation? 

Assoc. Prof. Cristian Cantir: The most important point to note—the elephant in the room—is that everything depends on how Russia’s invasion of Ukraine unfolds. If Ukraine manages to resist in the south and hold Odessa, then what we are most likely to see, at least in the short term, is the maintenance of the status quo. The EU would continue efforts to trade with, develop, and engage local organizations in Transnistria—essentially trying to connect the region more closely to Europe, with the long-term goal of gradual reintegration. That will be the general orientation, or at least the attempt, always contingent on developments in Ukraine and particularly in Odessa.

When it comes to the question of populist or authoritarian actors instrumentalizing the issue, one of the biggest patterns to watch in the next few years in Moldova is how they frame the argument about the Cyprus model. PAS has argued that Moldova can join the EU without Transnistria first. By contrast, many other actors—including pro-Russian politicians in the Patriotic Bloc, the largest opposition group in Parliament, as well as Alternativa, a centrist, self-defined pro-EU bloc—have insisted that Moldova must not enter the EU without Transnistria. In effect, this position grants Transnistria—and, to some extent, Moscow—veto power over Moldova’s EU integration aspirations.

So, populist politicians and authoritarian actors in Moldova will seek to instrumentalize the Transnistria issue by insisting that the country must not—and cannot—join the EU without first resolving the conflict. This, of course, significantly prolongs the timeline and effectively ties Moldova’s European integration to Moscow’s willingness to settle the dispute.

Illustration by Lightspring.

Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches

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Virtual Programme: September 4, 2025 – April 16, 2026 via Zoom 

Between 2012 and 2024, one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared. During this period, “us vs. them” rhetoric and divisive politics have significantly eroded social cohesion. Yet in some instances, democracy has shown remarkable resilience. A key factor in both the rise and decline of liberal democracies is the use—and misuse—of the concept of “the people.” This idea can either unify civil society or deepen social divisions by setting “the people” against “the others.” This dichotomy lies at the heart of populism studies. However, the conditions under which “the people” become a force for democratization or a tool for majoritarian oppression require deeper, comparative, and interdisciplinary analysis. Understanding this dynamic is crucial, as it has profound implications for the future of democracy worldwide. This programme aims to foster a broad and interdisciplinary dialogue on the challenges of democratic backsliding and the pathways to resilience, with a focus on the transatlantic space and global Europe. It aims to bring together scholars from the humanities, arts, social sciences, and policy research to explore these critical issues.

Organiser 

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) 

Partners

The Humanities Division, Oxford University

Rothermere American Institute

Oxford Network of Peace Studies (OxPeace) 

European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College, Oxford University

Oxford Democracy Network

 

Special thanks to Phil Taylor, Pádraig O’Connor, Freya Johnston, Heidi Hart, David J. Sanders, Clare Woodford, Anthony Gardner, Liz Carmichael, Harry Bregazzi, Hugo Bonin, Benjamin Gladstone, Doris Suchet, Jenny Davies, Justine Shepperson, Daniel Rowe, Katy Long, Julie Adams, Réka Koleszar, Stella Schade, Louise Lok Yi Horner, Jacinta Evans, Contestation of the Liberal Script (SCRIPTS), Network for Constitutional Economics and Social Philosophy (NOUS), and Centre for Applied Philosophy, Politics and Ethics (CAPPE).

 

Session 1  

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World 

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne; Editor-in-Chief, Populism & Politics). 

Introduction

David J. Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus).  

Speakers 

“The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”  by Dinesh Sharma, Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota (Fordham University, NYC), Amartya Sharma (Student, George Washington University, D.C.)

“Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists shape Public Opinion,”  by Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) and Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri). 

“From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism,” by Akis Kalaitzidis, (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) and Akis Kalaitzidis (Professor of Political Science, Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri).  

Discussant

João Ferreira Dias (Researcher at the International Studies Centre of ISCTE, in the Research Group Institutions, Governance and International Relations).

 

Session 2

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford).

Speakers

“Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas,” by Joanna Kurczewska (Professor in the humanities, Head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences).
 
“Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire,” by Kamil Jonski (Economist, PhD in law at the University of Lodz). 
 
“Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights,” by Malgorzata Fuszara (Professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS), University of Warsaw). 
 
“Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law,” by  Jacek Kurczewski (Professor of humanities in the field of Sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw). 
 

Discussants

Magdalena Solska (Assistant Professor, Department of European Studies and Slavic Studies, University of Fribourg).

Barry Sullivan (Professor, Institute For Racial Justice, Loyola University Chicago School of Law).

Krzysztof Motyka (Professor, Institute of Sociological Sciences, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)

 

Session 3 

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

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Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol (PhD, Landecker Lecturer, Faculty of Divinity, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College)

Speakers 

“Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian iIliberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” by Marc Loustau (PhD., Independent Scholar).

“Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia,” by Juraj Buzalka (Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University).  

“Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law,” by Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen (First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford).

Discussants

Simon P. Watmough (Freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).

Erkan Toguslu (PhD, Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

 

Session 4 

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:15 (CET)

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Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni (Professor, Political Science, University of Lausanne). 

Speakers 

“We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” by Samuel Ngozi Agu (Ph.D., Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria).

“Uses and Meanings of ‘the People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil,” by Eleonora Mesquita Ceia (Professor at the National Faculty of Law of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil). 

“The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” by Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani).

“We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” by Mouli Bentman, Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel). 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (Associate Professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology, SMBA University, Fes; Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University). 

Azize Sargin (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Heidi Hart (PhD, Arts Researcher and Practitioner based in Utah, US and Scandinavia). 

Speakers

“The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders’ Narratives between 2010-2020,” by Gheorghe Andrei (PhD Student, University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales, Paris). 

“The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy,”  by Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Postdoctoral Fellow, Technische Universität Dresden). 

“The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa,” by Melody Chindoga (Postdoctoral fellow, Midlands State University, Gweru Zimbabwe). 

“Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist,” by Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews). 

Amedeo Varriela (PhD, University of East London). 

 

Session 6

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World,”  by Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute).

“Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy,” by João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (Member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education).

“Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-politics and Post-democracy,” by Andreea Zamfira (Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest). 

“Overcoming the Demagogic Impasse: The Historical Benefits of Democratic Populism,”
by Thibaut Dauphin (Postdoctoral Fellow at University of Bordeaux).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University). 

Speakers

“Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism,” by Elif Başak Ürdem (PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University).

“Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization,” by Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University).

“Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective,” by Maria Giorgia Caraceni (PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought, Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome; Researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V).

“Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism,” by Bosco Lebrun (PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, Rome).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)


Speakers

Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia,” by Paul Joosse (Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong).

“Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage,” by Saga Oskarson Kindstrand (PhD candidate, Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, Sciences Po). 

“Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right,” by Jaime Roque, (PhD candidate, Center for Social Studies – University of Coimbra (CES-UC)). 

 “The Evolution of the Rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: A Comparative Analysis of the Election Campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024,”  by Artem Turenko (PhD Candidate, Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow).

Discussants

Helena Rovamo (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Eastern Finland).

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Click Here to Register

Chair

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

Speakers

“From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism,”by Christopher N. Magno (Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University). 

“The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies,” by Russell Foster (Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies) and Murat Aktas (Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University).

“Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust,” by Santiago López Rodríguez (Postdoctoral Fellow, Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University).

“Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview,” by Roberta Astolfi (Postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the SCRIPTS of the Free University Berlin). 

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Resilience in Market Democracy,”  by Peter Rogers (Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University).

“The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy,” by Pierre Camus(Postdoctoral Fellow, Nantes University).

“The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism,” by Soheila Shahriari (École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, (EHESS)).

“Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile,” by Ecem Nazlı Üçok (PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“When Identity Politics and Social Justice Procedures Contribute to Populism,” by Saeid Yarmohammadi (University of Montreal).

“Why Do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies,”by Ariel Lam Chan (PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University).

“Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development,”  by Dr Dieudonne Mbarga (Independent Researcher).

“Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities,” by Ali Ragheb (PhD., University of Tehran).

Discussants

Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St. Andrews).

  

Session 12 

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” by Yves Valéry Obame (The University of Bertoua, Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab) and Salomon Essaga Eteme (The University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc)).  

“Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa,” by Geoffrey Nwaka (Professor of History, Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria). 

“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom,” by Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University).

“Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya, by Asenath Mwithigah (PhD Candidate, United States International University-Africa).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 13

 Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

 Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

 “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by Jasmin Hasanović (Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science).

“The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together,” by Théophile Pénigaud (postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS, Yale University). 

 “Institutionalizing the Assembled People,” by Sixtine Van Outryve (Postdoctoral Researcher, Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain).

“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,” by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 14  

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation  

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

Brian Ball (Associate Professor, Northeastern University London & University of Oxford,Faculty of Philosophy). 

Speakers

“Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us?” by Joan Font (Research Professor, Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC).   

“How Does ChatGPT Shape European Cultural Heritage for the Future of Democracy?” by Alonso Escamilla (PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation, The Catholic University of Ávila in Spain) and Paula Gonzalo (Researcher, University of Salamanca, Spain). 

“The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness,” by Aly Hill, (PhD candidate, Department of Communication at The University of Utah).  

“Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world,” by Amina Vatreš (Teaching Assistant, Department of Communication Studies and Journalism, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Sarajevo).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 15 

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy   

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers 

“Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics,” by Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor, History Faculty,University of Illinois, Springfield).

“Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing?” by Robert R. Traill (PhD in Cybernetics/Psychology at Brunel). 

“The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism,” by Lorenzo Viviani (Professor, Political Sociology, Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy).

“The Exclusionary Identity of ‘The People’ in Radical Right Populism,” by Cristiano Gianolla (Researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra; Lisete S. M. Mónico (Associate Professor, Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences, the University of Coimbra) and Manuel João Cruz (Post-doctoral researcher, Center for Social Studies, University of Coimbra).

Discussants

(TBC)

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

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Chair

(TBC)

Speakers

“Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s Contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belonginess,” by Mitja Stefancic (Independent Researcher, Civil Servant, Italy).

“The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema,” by Devapriya Raajev (MA candidate, Sociology, South Asian University, New Delhi). 

“’ I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy,” by Ciara Torres-Spelliscy (Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University). 

“State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military,”  by Niva Golan-Nadir (Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University) and Michael Freedman (Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Hebrew University of Jerusalem).

Discussants

(TBC) 

 

 

Biographies & Abstracts

Session 1 

The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World

Date/Time: Thursday, September 4, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor in political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne where he leads the Research Observatory for regional research. He is currently the principal investigator the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University.

His works have been published in several peer-reviewed journals as European Politics and Society, Government and Opposition, Political Studies, Party Politics, Swiss Political Science Review, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, Territory, Politics, Governance, Comparative European Politics, Contemporary Italian Politics, Socio-economic Review, Regional and Federal Studies, Journal of Borderlands studies, Revue française de Science politique, and Populism amongst others. He has published 45 books in 4 languages (English, Italian, French and German). His latest volumes include “The People and the Nation. Populism and Ethno-Territorial Politics in Europe (ed. with R. Heinisch and E. Massetti Routledge 2019), “Political Populism. Handbook of Concepts, Questions and Strategies of Research” (ed. with R. Heinisch and C.Holtz-Bacha, Nomos, 2021); “Sovereignism and Populism : Citizens, Voters and Parties in Western European Democracies” (ed. with L. Basile, Routledge 2022); “National Populism and Borders: The Politicisation of Cross-border Mobilisations in Europe” (Elgar 2023); “Populism and Key Concepts in Social and Political Theories” (ed with. C. De la Torre, Brill, 2023), and “Territory and Democratic Politics. A Critical Introduction” (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2024).

He was the principal investigator of many research projects, including four funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. He has pursued an interdisciplinary educational path, earning a degree in sociology and anthropology, as well as a PhD in contemporary history, from the universities of Lausanne and Turin. He was a visiting professor and research fellow at the Universities of Columbia, Laval, Geneva, Groningen, Torino, Sorbonne-Panthéon- Paris, Science-Po-Paris, Valencia, Salzburg, European University Institute of Florence, Cornell University, and La Tuscia. His interests are devoted on political parties, populism, nationalism, regionalism, and Swiss politics in comparative perspective.

Introduction

David J. Sanders is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Essex. Professor Sanders is an internationally renowned expert on British politics and was appointed the UK’s first Regius Professor of Political Science. Professor Sanders has been a key figure in the achievements of Essex’s Department of Government, which has topped the UK politics rankings for the quality of its research in every national research assessment in the last 25 years.

After studying at Essex as a postgraduate student, Professor Sanders started teaching politics at the University in 1975. He is author of numerous influential books and articles on UK politics, including Lawmaking and Cooperation in International Politics, 1986 and Losing an Empire, Finding a Role, 1990. He co-authored Political Choice in Britain, 2004, Performance Politics and the British Voter, 2009, Affluence, Austerity and Electoral Change in Britain, 2013 and The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain, 2013.

He also co-edited the top UK political science journal, the British Journal of Political Science, between 1990 and 2008.

Professor Sanders is a Fellow of the British Academy and received a Special Recognition Award from the Political Studies Association in 2012 for his commitment to outstanding research, which has shaped public understanding of politics. From 2000 to 2012, he was a Principal Investigator for the British Election Study, which is conducted at every General Election to study electoral behaviour and how elections contribute to the operation of our democracy. This prestigious study was based at Essex from 1974 to 1983 and from 2000 to 2012.

Paper 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?

Abstract: Both India and the US seem to be in the grip of a populist movement that seems to share power with political dynasties and big business. How is this possible in a democracy? We examine this question by comparing families and dynasties in both countries — Kennedy vs Gandhi, currently out of power; Trump vs Modi, now in power. Both nations claim to be vibrant democracies, where populist nationalists have swept into power. Historically, India has been led by charismatic members of one dynastic family, namely the Gandhis; while the US definitely has political families (such as the Adams, Bushs, Rockerfellers, Clintons and now Trumps) it has not been dominated by one or two family dynasties in the way Asian democracies have been after colonialism ended.

Similarly, businesses have played a major role in politics of India and the US, but the business takeover of democratic institutions has had a bigger hand in the US politics than in India until recently; India was a quasi-socialist country till the 1990s. Both polities seem to be moving closer to big business, playing a major role in shaping policy and trade. Thus, we ask the question: are democracies at this populist moment in global politics controlled by the patricians (robber barons, big-tech, oligarchs) – big business and political dynasties? Our methodological approach is psycho-historical and biographical, while staying abreast of demographic data.

We compare the Kennedys vs. the Gandhis; and Trump vs Modi. The Gandhi family has dominated Indian politics for half of its modern history since gaining independence from British rule in 1947; while at least one member of the Kennedy family has been in power for at least the past fifty years in local or federal office, they’ve never held power in the way the Gandhi family did in India. Here we compare women leaders in both family histories, Indira Gandhi vs Kennedy female leaders. In comparing Trump vs. Modi we see a clear difference between two societies; Modi is not a billionaire, unlike Trump, rather a tea-seller from very humble origins. Yet, their populist governments have given power sharing arrangements to the big-business and big-tech oligarchs. When we compare the narrative of these two leaders we see a strong nationalistic streak that mobilizes populism in favor of nativism and an anti-globalist agenda.  The key question is are these societies converging or diverging? On the question of authoritarianism and populism they are converging, as India rises as an economic power and the US tries to remain a global democratic power, even though their local cultural politics are remarkably different.

Dinesh Sharma,Ph.D., is a social scientist with a Doctorate from Harvard University in human development and psychology. He is currently Director and Chief Research Officer at SteamWorksStudio in Central-Southern Jersey (an edu-tech venture), consultant at Fordham Institute for Research Service and Teaching (FIRST), and contributing faculty at Walden University. He was associate research professor at the Institute for Global Cultural Studies, Binghamton University, SUNY; a senior fellow at the Institute for International and Cross-Cultural Research in New York City; and a columnist for Asia Times Online, Al Jazeera English and the Global Intelligence among other syndicated publications. His biography, titled “Barack Obama in Hawaii and Indonesia: The Making of a Global President,” was rated a Top 10 Book of Black History for 2012 by the American Library Association. His next book, “The Global Obama” has been widely reviewed and received the Honorable Mention on the Top 10 Black History Books for 2014. His book on Hillary Clinton examined the rise of women politicians before the “Me Too” movement, “The Global Hillary: Women’s Political Leadership in Cultural Context” (Routledge, 2016) and was favorably reviewed.

Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich, is a graduate student from New York City, currently studying at Fordham’s Graduate School of Education. Her academic interests focus on the psychological impacts of early-life trauma and the integration of mindfulness techniques in clinical settings to support emotional, cognitive, and physical integration. She is also engaged in research exploring the relationship between trauma and democracy. Shoshana is passionate about bridging psychological theory with real-world practice and plans to pursue a career in clinical psychology. 

Paper 2: Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion

Abstract: Populist leaders claim they are the true representative of “the people” against corrupt elites and various out-groups (very often immigrants) who are thought to threaten the well-being of the nation. If this is so, the leader is simply reflecting the will of the people as they ascend to power and carry out their agenda. From this view, the populist leader answers the call of the people and uses power to protect and restore the country by targeting the elites and out-groups that threaten it. However, populist leaders do not just reflect the will of the people, they actively cultivate public support for their political agenda. From this view, populist leaders deploy their rhetorical powers to persuade, and even manipulate, the people, by tapping into anxieties that build public support for the populist leader’s agenda. Moreover, the power of populist leaders to focus the attention of voters on the threats to their well-being enables them to tap into in-group fears of various socio-demographically different out-groups. Indeed, truly gifted populist orators can manufacture fear and anxiety by targeting specific out-groups as the “cause” of the economic, social, or political problems that, in their view, threaten the nation. 

In this paper, we examine results from a nationally representative survey conducted in the U.S. in October of 2024 to measure the ability of U.S. President Donald Trump to influence public opinion. We examine his ability to increase or decrease public support for a range of policies, specifically refugees and trade. Our survey allows us to compare how respondents view refugees depending on whether those refugees are from Ukraine or from Gaza, and how respondents view trade from Europe or from China. Moreover, our survey allows us to assess whether public opinion is more readily shaped by the cues provided by political leaders (what we call “follow-the-leader” effects) or by the social attributes of the “out-group” (what we call “social attributes” effects), both of which are important components of populist rhetorical appeals.

Michael Makara is an Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations. He received his Ph.D. and M.A. in Political Science from the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, and his B.A. from Virginia Tech. Professor Makara’s research focuses on politics in authoritarian regimes and civil-military relations, with a regional focus on the Middle East. His research appears in Democracy and Security, Defense and Security Analysis, and the Journal of the Middle East and Africa. At UCM he teaches a variety of courses related to comparative politics and politics of the Middle East. Every year, he leads a study abroad program to Jordan and Israel that aims to challenge students’ perceptions of the region. He recently published an article in the Journal of Political Science Education (with Kinsey Canon) that explores the impact of this program on the extent to which students adhere to common stereotypes of the Middle East. Dr. Makara also sits on the Board of Directors for the International Relations Council (IRC) of Kansas City and is the director the Mideast meets Midwest project to expand opportunities for university students to pursue Middle Eastern Studies.University of Central Missouri & Dr. Gregory W. Streich, University of Central Missouri. 

Gregory W. Streich is Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages. He has published on a range of topics, including democratic theory, social capital, justice, and American Exceptionalism. Most notably, he has authored or co-edited three books: Justice Beyond “Just Us”: Dilemmas of Time, Place, and Difference in American Politics, U.S. Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide, and Urban Social Capital: Civil Society and City Life. Additionally, he has won several awards for his teaching and research, including the Distinguished Faculty Award from the College of Arts, Humanities, and Social Sciences. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Wisconsin–Madison.

Paper 3: From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism

Abstract: This paper is meant to be a comparative study between four international crises: the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, Argentina’s 2001, the US’s Great Recession of 2008, and Greece’s Great Depression of 2010. It has been argued by economists, historians, and political scientists that economic crises produce populist movements in the countries that experience them (Kindleberger, 2005; Ferguson, 2012; Hartleb, 2012). Kindleberger argues that all economic crises are a product of a “bubble” or a “mania” and as such the corrective response is an economic crisis in the country that experiences such market inflation. As an economist, however, he says nothing of the impact of the crisis on the politics of the country or the responses to said crisis.

Generally speaking, populism has been at the forefront of countries with great inequalities in places like Latin America or India or in countries under severe socio-economic stress such as Weimar Germany. Yet the European Union may be in a recession but it could hardly be justification for the multitude of populist (anti-EU, anti-globalization, xenophobic, and racist) movements that have sprung up even in countries with solid economies such as Finland, Denmark, and UK. It is thus important to analyze the types of responses to these crises and the types of populism, if any, each country experiences as a result of a given crisis, accounting for its severity and the administrative and decision-making capacity of the state apparatus.

The association of economic crisis and populism seems to hold true in modern times in many areas of the world. In Thailand after the catastrophic collapse of the Thai Baht in 1997, in Argentina in 2001, and in the US after 2010, one can debate whether the bursting of the dot com bubble constitutes a crisis, but mostly after the collapse of the real estate market bubble of 2008 and more recently in Greece in 2010. Yet, in all those countries the experience with populism is different and the pressure created by the economic condition on the ground leads to different outcomes in the politics of those countries. In Thailand, the reaction to post-crisis populism was a coup, in Argentina was an extended period of “Kirchnerismo” , in the US the rise of what Hofstadter the “Paranoid Style in American Politics”, as well as the more traditional non-party political movements hat put enormous pressure on the traditional party structure pushing liberal democracy to the brink, while in Greece populism which is more associated with European populist tradition as experienced in most pre-and post-WWII countries created a hybrid nationalist-leftist populism more akin to early twentieth century European Corporatism. This research intends to highlight the political processes, Institutions, and leaders who have influenced the course of politics and argue that in all four cases, the best predictor for post-crisis behavior is the national political culture.

Akis Kalaitzidis is a professor of political science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Studies, University of Central Missouri. He received his B.A. from the University of Tennessee-Knoxville in Economics and Political Science, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Temple University in Philadelphia in Political Science. He joined the UCM faculty in 2004. He teaches a variety of classes, including American Government, The European Union, World Politics, International Organizations, and American Foreign Policy. He was Rotary Peace Fellow at the Rotary Peace Center Chulalongkorn University’s Program in Conflict Resolution and has been the director of the Missouri Ghana program (2011) and Missouri Greece program (2015). He is the author of Europe‘s Greece: A Giant in the Making, published by Palgrave McMillan (2010) and co-edited with Dr. Streich US Foreign Policy: A Documentary and Reference Guide (Greenwood 2012) among others. His work appears in a variety of journals, book reviews/contributions, and conference publications.

Paper 4: Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou

Abstract: This paper explores the role of populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state under the leadership of Andreas Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential political figures. Papandreou served as Prime Minister from 1981 to 1989 and again from 1993 to 1996. His tenure coincided with a period of profound political and economic transformation following the restoration of democracy in 1975. His governance combined populist rhetoric with clientelist practices, crafting a distinctive political strategy that left a lasting impact on Greek politics. At the core of Papandreou’s political success was his ability to mobilize popular support through populist appeals, emphasizing social justice, nationalism, anti-Americanism, and the welfare state. He positioned himself as a champion of the common people, presenting the Socialist Party as the defender of workers’ rights and national sovereignty, even as he reversed course on many of his programmatic policies.

Papandreou’s populism resonated deeply with the large segment of the Greek population that right-wing establishments had marginalized following the Greek Civil War (1946-1949) and the collapse of the military junta (1967-1974). As these disenfranchised groups leaned politically to the left, Papandreou shifted his stance from the center to the left, incorporating a more left-wing faction within his party. His message of social and economic justice empowered these communities, offering them a sense of inclusion and challenging the longstanding dominance of conservative elites. In parallel with his populist narrative, Papandreou employed clientelism as a tool for political stability. The distribution of state resources and public sector jobs—particularly after Greece acceded to the EEC and the influx of investment funds—was often based on loyalty rather than merit. This system of patronage not only secured votes but also fostered a political culture of dependence on the state for material rewards.

This study explores the interaction between populism and clientelism in shaping the Greek state. It investigates Papandreou’s policies’ influence on Greece’s political culture, governance frameworks, and public administration and their enduring effects on the nation’s journey within the European Union. The analysis ultimately provides a critical evaluation of how populist rhetoric and clientelist strategies reinforced democratic institutions in Greece and altered state-society dynamics during the late 20th century.

Elizabet Kosmetatou is a Professor of History at the University of Illinois Springfield. 

 

Session 2 

The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989-2025 Poland

Date/Time: Thursday, September 18, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Abstract: In principle, the Polish transition to democracy initiated in 1981 was understood as liberation from Soviet colonialism, Communist totalitarian state ideology at the national level and “the resurrection of rights” (Kurczewski, 1993) at the individual level.

In practice, it quickly became controversial how the “will” of the nation should be determined and whose rights should be resurrected. The problem was nicely captured by a Christian member of the Polish Parliament, voicing objection to the abortion referendum on the grounds that such fundamental and morally-loaded issues could not be decided by “the accidental society” (in other words, the voting public).

Two decades later, opening debate that will be called “the four hours of anti-philosophy of law” (Safjan, 2015) the honorary speaker of Polish Parliament proclaimed that “law shall serve us. Law that does not serve the nation is lawlessness”. “Poland’s constitutional breakdown” (Sadurski, 2019) dutifully followed, beginning with “war” with the Constitutional Tribunal and ordinary courts.

Panellists will discuss:

-the concept of nation – civil and national} underpinning “Solidarity’s” resistance to the communist rule, and its evolutions after the 1989 breakthrough (Joanna Kurczewska),

-the shifting patterns of the political polarization and its impact on key liberal-democratic institutions like Parliamentary law-making process, Presidency and the Constitutional Court (Kamil Jonski),

-the sociological dimensions of the “rule of law” including the democratic transition, post-2015 backsliding and post-2023 restoration in context of doctrine of separation of powers (Jacek Kurczewski),

-the implications for the protection of human rights, with particular emphasize on woman’s rights (including access to the abortion) and minorities rights (Malgorzata Fuszara).

Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of “Solidarity” 1980-1989 in Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas

Joanna Kurczewska is a full professor in the humanities and head of the Sociology and Anthropology of Culture Team at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Graduated University of Warsaw, Ph.D. at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences (The Problem of the Nation in Polish Sociology at the Turn of the 19th and 20th Centuries. A Comparative Analysis of Selected Concepts), habilitated doctor (Technocrats and the Social World – Analysis of Technocratic Ideas).

In 1981, co-operated with the Centre for Social and Professional Work at the National Commission of NSZZ “Solidarity” Trade Union as co-chair of the Union History Group.

A corresponding member of the Second Faculty of History and Philosophy of the Polish Academy of Arts and Sciences (since 2011) and vice-president, formerly president of the Commission on Civilization Threats of the above Academy, a member of the Warsaw Scientific Society (since 2009), In 2007, she was awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Selected publications: National Identities vis-a-vis Democracy and Catholicism – The Polish Case after 1989 (2005), Researcher vis-a-vis the Local Community (2008), Squeezing Brussels Sprouts? On the Europeanization of Local Communities in the Borderlands (2009).

Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire

Kamil Joński is an economist who graduated from SGH Warsaw School of Economics with a Ph.D. in law at the University of Lodz (Constitutional Tribunal and the Political Conflict – Law & Economics Perspective). He is an assistant at the Collegium of Socio-Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics. He works at several research projects financed by Polish National Science Centre, at Cracow University of Economics, SGH Warsaw School of Economics and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan. Jónski worked on Regulatory Impact Assessments (RIA) in Polish Ministry of Justice (2012-2016) and on economic analysis of judicial system in MoJ’s supervised Institute of Justice (2016-2017). Since 2017, he is employed at Polish Supreme Administrative Court. 

Selected papers: Return to Power: The Illiberal Playbook from Hungary, Poland and the United States (2024), Legislative inflation in Poland: bird’s eye view on three decades after the the1989 breakthrough (2024), Evidence-Based policymaking during the COVID-19 Crisis: Regulatory Impact Assessments and the Polish COVID-19 Restrictions (2023), Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method (2023). Co-author of the 2022 report summarizing European Network of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) survey of European judges about their independence.

Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights

Małgorzata Fuszara is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Institute of Applied Social Sciences (IASS) University of Warsaw, habilitated doctor in the Sociology of Law, Ph.D. in law. Served two terms as Director of the IASS, joint founder of Poland’s first Gender Studies Program at IASS, head of its Sociology and Anthropology of Custom and Law Chair. In 2014-2015 Plenipotentiary of Polish Government for Equal Treatment. President of Council of Women’s Congress Association, Chairwoman of the Women’s Council under the Mayor of Warsaw, Rafał Trzaskowski, awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Authored, co-authored and edited numerous publications in Polish, English, French and German, among others: Polish Disputes and Courts (2004), Women in politics (2007), New men? Changing models of masculinity in contemporary Poland (2008), Cooperation or conflict? The State, the Union and Women (2008), Women, elections, politics (2013), Disputes and their resolution (2017), Mass Aid in Mass Escape. Polish Society and War Migration from Ukraine (2022).

Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law

Jacek Kurczewski is full professor of humanities in the field of sociology, Lecturer at the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of Customs and Law at the University of Warsaw. Editor-in-chief of Societas/Communitas. Specializing in the sociology and anthropology of law and customs, continuator of the Leon Petrażycki’s Polish school of sociology, a student of Adam Podgórecki. Former Academic Director of the Oñati International Institute for the Sociology of Law. Member of Warsaw Academic Society.

In 1980–1992 an advisor on Rule of Law to the “Solidarity” Trade Union, member of Lech Wałęsa’s Citizens Committee, participant of the Round Table negotiations of 1989 (sub-table for freedom of association). Judge of the Tribunal of the State (1989-1991). Member of Parliament and Deputy Speaker of the Sejm of the Republic of Poland of the first term (1991–1993). Coauthor of the draft laws: limiting censorship (1981), the law on counteracting drug addiction (1987), the law on assemblies (1990) and the Civil Service Code (2003). In 2007 awarded the Officer’s Cross of the Order of Polonia Restituta. Member of the Program Councils of the Polish public TV broadcaster and pollster CBOS Foundation. Author of The Resurrection of Rights in Poland (1993) and numerous research papers.

Chair

Mavis Maclean is a Senior Research Fellow of St Hilda’s College and a Research Associate at Department of Social Policy and Intervention. She has carried out Socio Legal research in Oxford since 1974, and was a founding director of OXFLAP in 2001. She has acted as the Academic Adviser to the Lord Chancellor’s Department, and served as a panel member on the Bristol Royal Infirmary Inquiry between 1998 and 2001, a major public inquiry into the National Health Service. Commander of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire

Discussants

Dr. Magdalena Solska is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Fribourg. She currently directs the research project “Political opposition in post-communist democracies and authoritarianisms,” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (PRIMA Grant) in the period of 2023-2027. Her research focuses on political systems after communism and specifically on forms, strategies and institutionalization of opposition in selected countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Barry Sullivan is the Raymond and Mary Simon Chair in Constitutional Law and the George Anastaplo Professor of Constitutional Law and History. Before joining the Loyola faculty, Professor Sullivan had a varied career in the private practice of law, government legal practice, the teaching of law and public policy, and university administration. Professor Sullivan was Dean of the School of Law at Washington and Lee University from 1994 to 1999 and Vice-President of the University in 1998-99. He was also a long-time litigation partner at Jenner & Block (1981-94, 2001-09), where he focused on appellate practice.

Professor Krzysztof Motyka is a legal philosopher and sociologist of law, Chair of Human Rights and Social Work (earlier: Sociology of Law and Morality) at John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin. Fulbright senior scholar in the Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of California, Berkeley (1994/1995), visiting researcher at the George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (July-October 2015). Member of the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ Advisory Board on Human Rights (2001 -2002) and of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (2007-2012). Editor of “KUL Research Bulletin,” organizer of annual “Human Rights Days Conference.”

 

Session 3

Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 2, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Marietta D.C. van der Tol is Landecker Lecturer at the Faculty of Divinity, Affiliated Lecturer in Politics and International Studies, and Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Trinity College, Cambridge.

She studied law and history at Utrecht University (LLM, MA) and the history of Christianity at Yale (MAR) before completing her PhD at Cambridge (2020) on Politics of Religious Diversity, examining tolerance and visibility of religion in constitutional law and politics in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

She has held research and teaching positions at Oxford (Blavatnik School of Government, St Peter’s, Lincoln College) and Cambridge (Leverhulme Early Career Fellow, 2024–25).

Her current projects include leading interdisciplinary networks on religion, nationalism, and democracy, and co-directing research on Protestant political thought. She has co-edited special issues in Religion, State & Society and The Journal of the Bible and its Reception and convenes the annual Political Theologies conference series.

Discussants

Simon P. Watmough (PhD) is a freelance academic researcher and editor and serves as a non-resident research fellow in the research program on authoritarianism at ECPS. He was awarded his Ph.D. from the European University Institute in April 2017 with a dissertation titled “Democracy in the Shadow of the Deep State: Guardian Hybrid Regimes in Turkey and Thailand.” Dr. Watmough’s research interests sit at the intersection of global and comparative politics and include varieties of post-authoritarian states, the political sociology of the state, the role of the military in regime change, and the foreign policy of post-authoritarian states in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Erkan Toguslu (PhD) is a researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium. He received his M.A. and Ph.D. in sociology from Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research focuses on transnational Muslim networks in Europe, the emergence of Islamic intellectuals, interfaith dialogue, the debate on public-private Islam, and the nexus of religion and radicalization.

ErkanToguslu is co-editor of Journal of Populism Studies (JPS) and the editor of Everyday Life Practices of Muslims in Europe (Leuven University Press); Europe’s New Multicultural Identities (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman and I. M. Sezgin); and Modern Islamic Thinking and Islamic Activism (Leuven University Press and co-edited with J. Leman). His recent publications on violent extremism and Muslim extremism include: “Caliphate, hijrah, and martyrdom as a performative narrative in ISIS’ Dabiq magazine,” Politics, Religion and Ideology, 20 (1), 94-120; and “Capitalizing on the Koran to fuel online violent radicalization: A taxonomy of Koranic references in ISIS’s Dabiq,” Telematics and Informatics, 35 (2), 491-503 (co-authored).

Paper 1: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Abstract: In 2025, the Hungarian government announced it was creating a “Religious Freedom” caucus in the European Parliament. Domestically, Hungary has claimed a special relationship to the value of religious freedom since at least 2020, when the Hungarian parliament voted to enshrine religious freedom as an intangible value of Hungarian heritage (Hungarikum). On the one hand, the rising prominence of this discourse of religious freedom was precipitated by immediate political concerns as the Hungarian government has tried to distract attention from negative judgements at the European Court of Human Rights. On the other, this paper will go beyond journalistic accounts of political strategizing in order to sketch an outline of the emerging illberal political institutionalization of religious freedom. I will focus on the network of Hungarian institutional political actors that enact this discourse at the European and domestic levels, and detail the forms of publicly acceptable religious practice enabled by these institutions.

Marc Loustau is a cultural anthropologist and journalist reporting on religion and nationalism in Eastern Europe. Based in Budapest, Hungary, he is fluent in English and Hungarian and proficient in Romanian. His reported features and commentary have appeared in major U.S. and European newspapers and magazines. Drawing on his academic research, he provides smart and surprising fact-based commentary on contemporary events. He has delivered invited lectures at universities across Europe and North America and has presented at numerous international conferences. His book Hungarian Catholic Intellectuals in Romania: Reforming Apostles examines how contemporary Hungarian Catholic intellectuals are forging an ethical concept of nationhood.

Paper 2: Religious or Secular Freedom? On Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-socialist Slovakia

Abstract: Since 1989, elements of radical Christian activism in Slovakia that have been frequently characterized as representing the ‘culture of life’ have been challenging the regime of post-socialist liberal constitutionalism represented by the European status quo. This challenge has primarily consisted of accusations that the latter suppresses newly acquired religious freedoms. The most significant counterpart of this radicalism – secular progressivism – has been arguing against expanding ecclesiastical privileges in the sphere of financing, education, and culture. Traditional social-confessional divisions in Slovak society have weakened, reshaping the discussion away from political freedom for all and toward a debate about who is suffering more oppression. In this conflict, the most profitable have been political entrepreneurs, especially current Prime Minister Robert Fico, who utilizes “culture war” discourse in his populist mobilizations.

Juraj Buzalka is Associate Professor of Social Anthropology at Comenius University in Bratislava, Slovakia, where he has taught since 2006. His research focuses on the anthropology of political movements, exploring intersections of nationalism, populism, religion, and politics, particularly in Eastern and Central Europe. He is also interested in the politics of memory and the cultural dimensions of wine and food movements. Since 2013, he has been based at the Institute of Social Anthropology within the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences. 

Paper 3: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? The Incorporation of Evangelical Christian Theology into State Law

Abstract: This year, Texas marks three consecutive decades of governance by the Republican Party. In that time, the party has built up what can be described as a theocratic illiberal regime. The theological positions of many of the state’s evangelical Christians have been incorporated into state law, often under the guise of religious freedom. In his paper, our third panelist, the Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, himself a Texas-based clergyman, will reflect how the rhetoric of religious freedom has been used to further the construction of an illiberal state within the United States federal system, eroded supposed the separation of church and state, and undermined freedom of religion itself.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford. He earned a Ph.D. in American Studies and an A.M. in History from Harvard University. A graduate of Meadville-Lombard Theological School, he was ordained by the Unitarian Universalist Church of Long Beach in 2007. Since 2018, he has served the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston. Before moving to Texas, he served congregations in California, Massachusetts, and Ohio. He has held non-residential fellowships at Rice University and Princeton University. A scholar and social justice activist he has helped organize multiple labor unions—including acting as one of the founders of the Harvard Graduate Student Union. He currently has three books under contract. The first is on contemporary Unitarian Universalist theology (Brill). The second collects his 2019 Minns lectures on American Populism and Unitarian Universalism (Palgrave Macmillan). And the third is focused on the political theologies of populism (Wayne State University Press).

 

Session 4

Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 16, 2025 – 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Chair

Oscar Mazzoleni is a professor of political science and political sociology at the University of Lausanne, where he leads the Research Observatory for Regional Research. He is currently the principal investigator of the international project “Populism and Conspiracy” funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Austrian Science Fund. He is co-director of the international research laboratory ‘Parties, political representatives, and sustainable development, at the University of Lausanne in collaboration with Laval University. 

Discussants

Abdelaaziz El Bakkali is an associate professor of Media and Cultural Anthropology at SMBA University in Fes, Morocco, and a Post-Doc Fulbright visiting scholar at Arizona State University in the US (2024/25), a PhD Joint-Sup at SIU, Illinois (2009/10), and a US Dept of State Fulbright Visiting P4T at UD Delaware (2007/2008). He obtained his PhD (2014) in media and communication from MVU, Rabat. His works focus on cultural studies and anthropology, primarily in the areas of media, gender, and religious studies. He has edited some books in these related research areas. Aziz has also written many articles in these related fields. El Bakkali has conducted other educational research, having taught English for over 24 years. He has published numerous articles in this field, which are featured on Publons, Google Scholar, SSRN, and other highly indexed works. 

Azize Sargin is an independent researcher and consultant on external relations for non-governmental organisations. She holds a doctorate in International Relations, with a focus on Migration Studies, from the Brussels School of International Studies at the University of Kent. Her research interest covers migrant belonging and integration, diversity and cities, and transnationalism. Azize had a 15-year professional career as a diplomat in the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where she held various positions and was posted to different countries, including Romania, the United States, and Belgium. During her last posting, she served as the political counsellor at the Permanent Delegation of Turkey to the EU.

Paper 1: We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches 

Abstract: Democracy is often celebrated as a governance system that ensures citizen participation and accountability. However, in practice, centralized power structures often alienate the people and limit genuine participation, leading to political exclusion, inefficiency, and social unrest. This paper advocates for bottom-up approaches to governance as essential for realizing inclusive democracy and sustainable development. Using Nigeria as a case study, it highlights the limitations of top-down governance, as seen in widespread corruption, economic disparities, and rising public discontent. The study explores key strategies for enhancing participatory governance, including decentralization, civic education, community-based development, digital democracy, and legislative reforms. By shifting decision-making closer to the grassroots, these approaches empower citizens, enhance transparency, and promote equitable resource distribution. Empirical evidence from global case studies, such as participatory budgeting in Brazil and decentralized governance in Uganda, supports the argument that bottom-up models lead to improved governance outcomes. It further demonstrates the interdependence of participatory governance and sustainable development, as nations that prioritize inclusivity experience greater political stability, economic growth, and social cohesion. The persistent challenges in Nigeria – ranging from separatist movements to youth-led protests like #EndSARS – underscore the urgent need for governance reforms that integrate local voices into policymaking. Ultimately, this paper advocates for a fundamental shift in governance – one that places the power of decision-making in the hands of the people. By adopting citizen-driven governance, nations can close the gap between leaders and the governed, ensuring greater accountability, inclusivity, and democratic integrity.

Samuel Ngozi Agu is a distinguished academic and the Dean of the MJC Echeruo Faculty of Humanities at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. With a Doctor of Philosophy in Social and Political Philosophy from the University of Port Harcourt, he is also an Inaugural Lecture Laureate, recognized for his impactful scholarship. He holds a postgraduate certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Central European University, Budapest, and a Professional Certificate in Mediation and Democratic Dialogue from the Benjamin Cardozo and Hamline Universities’ Schools of Law, in collaboration with the American Bar Association. With over 16 peer-reviewed journal articles, 15 contributions to university research books, seven authored books, and two co-authored books, Professor Agu’s work spans critical areas in social and political philosophy, with a focus on democracy, good governance, logic, critical thinking and youth entrepreneurship. He has presented his research at numerous national and international conferences, reflecting his commitment to advancing thought leadership in his fields. Professor Agu had served as Director of the Business Resource Centre (Entrepreneurship) and Director of the University Examination Centre at Abia State University. His leadership and academic endeavors continue to shape both the intellectual and administrative landscape of the institution.

Paper 2: Uses and Meanings of ‘The People’ in Service of Populism in Brazil 

Abstract: The implementation of populism is not homogenous among South American countries so populism in this particular region has many variations. Yet, they are similarly determined by episodes of political and social transition – for instance, the crisis of traditional political elites and the appearance of new political actors – along with variables of economic force or instability. Brazil serves as a good example. From the classical populism of Getúlio Vargas in the decade of 1930s until the far-right authoritarian populism of Jair Bolsonaro, all populist experiences in Brazil are linked to important changes in society. 

Brazil has experienced several particular populist leaders: some with marked populist features than others; some exposing a reactionary antagonism while others a mitigated one. This empirical variation produced different uses and meanings of “the people” in service of populism in order to try to secure political support and gain elections. But is this variation observed in the rhetoric of the same populist leader over time? Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a democratic and liberal populist leader, is in his third presidential term (2003-2006; 2007-2010; 2023-). He faced three presidential campaigns forged by the particular contexts and crises of each period. The goal of the paper is to identify and explain the uses and meanings of “the people” by Lula in his three political moments. Do they vary according to social demands and the political context of each period, or does the content of the idea of “the people” remain unchanged because it is used by the same populist leader? 

As to the methods, the qualitative approach is adopted based on bibliographic and documentary research, including online news materials, official campaign speeches and political programmes. This empirical research aims to contribute to the debate on the concept of ‘people’ as a discursive construction, drawing on the work of Ernesto Laclau. Moreover, the paper argues that the Lula case offers complexity that challenges the view within populism studies that populism is committed to opposing liberal democracies.

Eleonora Mesquita Ceia is a Doctor of Law at the Faculty of Law and Economics, Saarland University, Saarbrücken, Germany. Professor of State Theory at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil. Professor in the Postgraduate Program in Contemporary Legal Theories at UFRJ. Currently her research focuses on transitional justice, constitutionalism, democracy, and populism. Her most recently published article was ‘Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?’ in Populism and Time: temporalities of a Disruptive Politics edited by Andy Knott.

Paper 3: The idea of ‘People’ within the domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

Abstract: Democracy is considered to be as motherhood and apple pie of any political system (Adam Swift,2014). Till a few years ago, this assumption was challenged mainly by Islamic countries, who were predominantly of the opinion that the West was imposing a liberal democratic set-up on their countries through coercion. Interestingly, during the second decade of the 21st century, the critique of democracy emerged not externally but from the internal system of the democratic political framework. 

The socio-political context of this internal critique is Populism of specific variety. It was the origin of a process of disaffection and disgust with liberal institutions, manifested in the increasing level of abstention and apathy (Chantal Mouffe, 2018). From the triumph of liberal democracy to its failure and its insufficient response toward the aspirations of the public, it created an apolitical social sphere. This vacuum was filled up by populist forces in India in 2014.

This upsurge of Hindu Nationalism is a variant of populism based on the emotional appeal to the psychological dimension of Indian society. Along with the failure of the liberal elites, the subalternisation of the political culture has created fertile ground for this variant of populism to develop (Ashutosh Varshney, 2022). Just like all other variants, Hindu Nationalism is essentially anti-institutionalist and restructuring the logic of liberal institutions is one of its objectives (Ajay Gudavarthy,2019). One of the specificities of this populism in India is its organic emergence from the Unconscious domain of Indian society (Ashis Nandy, 2020). Gradually, it acquires authoritarian tendencies of unique character, which we haven’t witnessed till now.

It is in this context this paper will try to delve on the four sets of questions. Firstly, How the political mobilisation of Hindutva is based on politics of emotion? Secondly, in what ways Populist politics within the framework of Hindu Nationalism is unique (authoritarian) in its form and content? Thirdly, can we think of any ‘alternative’ of Populism within the context of India in particular and the world in general? Lastly, theoretically, what would be the sphere of the revolutionary subject (the idea of people) within the space of re-imagined progressive politics (alternative) that this paper intends to think through?

Shiveshwar Kundu is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kalyani, West Bengal. His academic interests encompass political philosophy, Indian politics, and psychoanalysis. Kundu has contributed opinion pieces and scholarly articles to publications such as Forward Press, Newslaundry, and The Telegraph India, where he addresses issues related to democracy, caste, and ideological movements in India.

Paper 4: We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Abstract: This paper examines the populist redefinition of We, the People and its implications for liberal democracy. Historically an inclusive foundation for democratic citizenship, the phrase has been appropriated by populist movements to delineate a “true people” in opposition to perceived outsiders. Rather than viewing this shift as mere rhetorical manipulation, the paper argues that it reflects a deeper crisis within the liberal-democratic tradition itself. The erosion of a shared conception of citizenship and the common good—exacerbated by identity-driven politics and post-liberal critiques—has facilitated this populist reinterpretation. While populist leaders exploit these fractures, their rise is symptomatic of broader ideological shifts in liberalism, which increasingly prioritizes particular identities over universal democratic ideals. Engaging with contemporary political theory and populism studies, this paper advocates for reclaiming We, the People as a genuinely inclusive democratic principle, emphasizing equality, pluralism, and civic participation as essential to the resilience of liberal democracy.

Mouli Bentman is a researcher and lecturer at Sapir Academic College, specializing in political philosophy and democracy studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a DEA from the École des hautes études en sciences sociales (EHESS) in Paris. His research explores the philosophical foundations of democracy, the relationship between political authority and legitimacy, and the intersection of classical and contemporary political thought. Dr. Bentman’s academic work engages with fundamental questions in political philosophy, including the nature of sovereignty, the evolution of democratic governance, and the role of political myths in shaping collective identities. His scholarship examines both historical and contemporary theories of democracy, with a particular focus on Political Imagination. At Sapir Academic College, he teaches courses on political theory, democratic institutions, and the philosophical underpinnings of modern politics, emphasizing critical engagement with canonical and contemporary texts.

Michael Dahan received his PhD in political science from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2001. Currently his research focuses on two primary areas – the impact of technology on democracy as well as big data, algorithmic regimes and political participation. He provides grounded analysis on a regular basis in both areas and advises on policy issues in his areas of expertise. He is a regular contributor to the media on issues related to technology and politics. Dr. Dahan has extensive first-hand experience in the security and development fields in both policy and practice. At present he lectures on the political and social aspects of hacking and cyber warfare, politics and technology and political populism. He is a senior lecturer in the departments of Public Policy and Public Administration, and Communication Studies, Sapir College, Israel. He has also taught at the Hebrew University, Ben Gurion University, Bar Ilan University, and the University of Cincinnati. 

 

Session 5

Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions 

Date/Time: Thursday, October 30, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Dr. Heidi Hart is an arts researcher and practitioner based in Utah, US and Scandinavia. She holds an M.F.A. from Sarah Lawrence College and a Ph.D. in German Studies from Duke University. She is a Pushcart Prize-winning poet who has also received an ACLS-Mellon Fellowship and local funding for a 2019 conference on the Anthropocene. She completed a postdoc at Utah State University and is a regular guest instructor at Linnaeus University in Sweden.   

Dr. Hart has a dual research focus, on political music during and after the Nazi period, and on sound in environmental media today. Her publications include two recent monographs, Hanns Eisler’s Art Songs and Music and the Environment in Dystopian Narrative. She also does curatorial work and coordinates the Ecopoetic Salon, an international platform for artists and researchers in the environmental humanities. She is currently working with the 68 Art Institute in Copenhagen to develop a project on climate grief and new imaginaries for the future.

Discussants

Dr. Amedeo Varriale  earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled“The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries. Currently, he is also an “affiliated researcher” for the Centre for the Study of Global Nationalisms (CSGN).

Paper 1: The Romanian and Hungarian People in Populist Leaders Narratives between 2010-2020

Abstract: The paper will analyze the construction of the Romanian and Hungarian people in the speeches of the political leaders of the ruling parties in the two countries between 2010-2020. Considering the centrality of the concept of the people for populist theory, the main question of the paper is how it was constructed and what resources were used in this construction. The hypothesis suggested is that the political leaders used narratives about the past which reflect a historical clash between two visions about how the Romanian and Hungarian people to be built. In order to test the hypothesis will be used the qualitative analysis in a deductive approach. The analysis will try to unravel the narratives and expose the characteristics attributed to the Romanian and Hungarian people. The speeches will be selected considering the significance of the moment when were delivered, like national commemorative or celebration days as well as during electoral campaigns or related to important events.

Gheorghe Andrei is a PhD Student at University of Bucharest and Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris. His research interests include comparative analysis, social studies, local development, and case studies. He has authored a publication titled Discursive Strategies of a Populist Leader in 2020 Romanian Legislative Elections: The Rhetoric and Political Style of George Simion, which examines the rhetorical approaches of populist leaders in Romania.

Paper 2: The Application of the Concepts of ‘People’ and ‘Nation’ in Recent Political Developments in Germany: Theoretical Sensitivities and Their Implications for Democracy

Abstract: This study analyzes the concept of “people” and “nation” within the social and political context of recent years in Germany, focusing on how these concepts have been employed by right-wing groups to create social divisions, particularly in East Germany. The use of these concepts as tools for reinforcing identity distinctions has led to the emergence of “us vs. them” social dichotomies, presenting threats to social cohesion and democracy. This process, particularly in the context of social crises such as the migration crisis, has contributed to the erosion of democratic structures.

Drawing on the philosophical anthropology of Arnold Karl Franz Gehlen, this research emphasizes the human condition of vulnerability and the necessity for social and cultural institutions. This need for belonging, in specific contexts, can transform into a tool for establishing authoritarian orders, while simultaneously holding the potential to significantly strengthen democratic capacities. The study highlights this duality and examines how groups, without fully considering this theoretical sensitivity, have employed the concepts of “people” and “nation,” often inadvertently weakening democratic frameworks.

A deeper understanding of the theoretical foundations of Gehlen’s work has been significantly advanced through the opportunity to engage in scholarly dialogues and academic collaborations with Professor Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, the final assistant of Arnold Gehlen and editor of his collected works, in the Chair of Theoretical Sociology at the University of Dresden. This intellectual engagement facilitated a more profound exploration and development of Gehlen’s concepts in philosophical anthropology, while also linking them to their broader political and social implications for democracy.

Yazddan Keikhosrou Doulatyari is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Technische Universität Dresden. As the first place in the Tehran University Entrance Written Exam for the PhD Program in “Iranian Studies” (2010), and studied in the field of “International Relations” at Allameh Tabataba’i University (2017)’; Keikhosrou Doulatyari mainly dealt with the topic of “Emancipation of Human Subjects” during his PhD period. These engagements led him to the completion of a book in 4 volumes “Avay-e-lasst Dar Gûlistan-e-allast”; The essence of his experience in the decade 2010-2020 also included correspondence and active collaboration with Some prominent university professors. His project at the Technical University of Dresden focuses on indicators of social integration. Finding integration indicators and testing the criteria with the principles of MIPEX (The Migrant Integration Policy Index): Basic rights, Equal opportunities, and a Secure Future. Parallel to these criteria, the features of host countries are also crucial, which is why the project also offers preliminary insights into similarities with regard to a historical perspective.

Paper 3: The Role of Nativism in Shaping Populist Movements: Implications for Democracy and Social Integration in Africa

Abstract: Populism emerged in the nineteenth century as a response to the evolving concept of democracy, encapsulated in the phrase “government of the people, for the people, and by the people.” In recent decades, populism has gained traction in Africa, with political leaders employing populist strategies to galvanize support through charismatic leadership, anti-elitist rhetoric, and the promise of social inclusion. A significant aspect of African populism is the incorporation of nativist ideologies, which have been used as tools for political mobilization, often through strategies such as anti-imperialism, land redistribution without compensation, and opposition to “White monopoly capital.” These nativist elements resonate deeply with the historical legacy of colonialism and apartheid, which have shaped Africa’s socio-political landscape. In this context, nativism acts as a form of resistance, aimed at countering the colonial legacy and restoring African identity through the reclamation of cultural and political autonomy. However, when nativism is intertwined with populist rhetoric, it poses challenges to democratic values by fostering political polarization, excluding certain groups from the national identity, and undermining social cohesion. This paper explores the role of nativism in shaping populist movements in Africa, analyzing its impact on democratic processes and social integration. It argues that while nativism serves as a means of addressing historical injustices, it also risks reinforcing exclusionary practices that could threaten the future stability of African democracies. The paper calls for policies that promote inclusivity, equality, and integration to counter the divisive effects of nativist populism.

Melody Chindoga is a Research Fellow at the Centre for Public Policy and Devolution at Midlands State University in Zimbabwe. She earned her PhD in Political Science from the University of Fort Hare, where she also completed her Master’s and Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science, as well as a Bachelor of Administration in Public Affairs .Dr. Chindoga’s research interests encompass international relations, peace and governance, comparative politics, democracy, gender and politics, the politics of populism, and climate change . Her scholarly work includes co-authored articles such as “A Comparative Analysis of Nativism in Rural South Africa and Zimbabwe,” which examines how nativist discourse has been utilized by political factions in both countries to maintain power , and “Perceptions of Eastern Cape Rural Citizens on the Zuma-led Faction’s Nativist Discourse in South Africa,” which explores rural citizens’ responses to nativist politics in South Africa. Dr. Chindoga contributes to the academic discourse on post-colonial politics and governance in Southern Africa through her research and publications.​

Paper 4: Ripping off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-fist

Abstract: This paper argues that contemporary populism is characterised by three oppositional stances: its being anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-intellectual. This is then offset by an exaggeratedly pro-people stance that contemporary populism assumes. This is far from being a faithful representation of the people and is more of a deceitful caricaturing. This caricaturing of the people is actually a point borrowed from Hannah Arendt’s 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism. The people caricatured, quickly assume the form of an ochlocracy that again, to borrow from Arendt’s argument, form a temporary alliance with the elite. The paper further argues that the anti-elitism of contemporary populism tends to displace an earlier established elite with a new, often worse one, this becoming the proverbial case of the people falling out of the frying pan and into the fire. 

For purposes of historical analysis, the paper will divide populism into two phases. The first was an early to mid-twentieth century phase of predominantly Latin American and more specifically Argentinian populism (Laclau 2005); and the second, a contemporary, 21st century phase of populism. The conceptual distinction between these phases is in terms of a lose fiscally profligate earlier 20th century Latin American form and a tight fiscally prudent 21st century populism. An instance of a more recent fiscally profligate Latin American populism in the first decade of the 21st century would be the significant redistributive element in Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela.

Recent examples of populism induced by fiscal prudence that will particularly form the focus of the paper are the Brexit referendum that according to Thimo Fetzer (2019) was created by the austerity cuts of the David Cameron led Conservative government; and the brutal ‘chainsaw’ austerity cuts of Xavier Milei in Argentina (Ovyat, Oncu & Rabinovich, 2025), the transference of which we are witnessing to the US in the Elon Musk led Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). The paper will also bring into consideration the populism of Narendra Modi’s India, where the government’s stance is typically pro-populist in terms of targeting elites and intellectuals, and at the same time partakes of the fiscal prudence that it is argued is a hallmark of contemporary 21st century populism. The Modi government has created a class of beholden beneficiaries of its welfarist largesse that in Hindi are called labharthis who are likely to continue voting for the government. What the Modi government’s populism has done is to transform welfarism from redistributive egalitarian to minimal subsistence.

Amir Ali has been a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi since 2007. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University, New Delhi for three years. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His work has been published in journals such as Economic and Political Weekly, Ethnic and Racial Studies and the Journal of Human Values. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. He has written over 30 book reviews in varied publications.

 

Session 6 

Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 13, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World

Abstract: For much of the modern era, the world has viewed the United States as a paragon of liberal democracy, standing in contrast to developing democracies that struggle with institutional weaknesses, corruption, and executive overreach. However, recent patterns of democratic backsliding suggest a fundamental shift: As American institutions erode under polarization, populism, and elite norm-breaking, the United States is de-exceptionalizing and beginning to resemble the very democracies it was once contrasted against. At the same time, many developing democracies—while still flawed—are showing signs of institutional strengthening, electoral integrity, and greater civic engagement. This paper argues that these two trends represent a global realignment of democratic norms, in which the traditional hierarchy between “established” and “emerging” democracies is increasingly outdated. As Laurence Whitehead suggests, democratization is an “open-ended” process subject to reversals and detours. The erosion of democracy in developed countries like the United States demonstrates that democratic institutions in all contexts—whether long-standing or newly emerging—are vulnerable to similar pressures and should be studied accordingly.

Jonathan Madison is a historian and political analyst specializing in democracy, elections, and governance in Latin America and the United States. He holds a PhD in Global and Imperial History from the University of Oxford, where his research focused on 20th-century democracy in Brazil. His dissertation, The Fourth Republic and the Practicing of Democracy in Brazil, 1930-1968, reexamines Brazil’s post-war democratic experiment and its impact on the country’s political trajectory. Jonathan is currently a Governance Fellow at the R Street Institute, where he researches and advocates for election reforms aimed at improving candidate quality and political incentives. He also provides analysis on political risk, foreign policy, and democratization. His writing appears in Democracy’s Sisyphus, his Substack newsletter, where he explores foreign policy as well as historical and contemporary challenges to democratic governance. He has also contributed to multiple media outlets, podcasts, and newspapers in both the United States and Brazil. Additionally, Jonathan is part-time history instructor at Brigham Young University.

Paper 2: Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy

Abstract: Public discussion about the crisis of democracy has been focused on the institutional approach of politics, normally leading to a dichotomic diagnosis either affirming that we live in an authoritarian tendency, or that the institutions are proving to be resilient, safeguarding democracy. That approach helps to diagnose the present situation of existing democracies. Still, it doesn’t explain the causes of democratic crisis and the non-institutional causes for democratic erosion. This work intends to articulate the institutionalist approach with a sociological interpretation of the causes of the democratic crisis. Drawing back to the construction of democratic State and institutions as a product of modernization, the sociological approach interprets the present crisis as a turning point in the dynamics of social reproduction and trends of social change. It thus analyses populist action as a disruptive force that tries to mobilize popular support in deconstructing institutions and mechanisms of checks and balances for gathering power and excluding opponents. An analysis of populist discourse provides empirical evidence of how populist discourse constructs an image of “the people” as a morally pure and identifiable entity, using it in such a mobilization against democratic institutions. The analysis should not only point to aspects already discussed in the literature about populism, such as the counterposition of “us vs. them”, but also reconstruct how populist discourse gives meaning to the inherent, structural contradictions of modern society to direct political action, outlining a theoretical framework for the interpretation of democratic crisis.

João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho is a Brazilian social scientist. He earned his Ph.D. in Social Sciences in 2019, at the State University of São Paulo (Unesp), where he also taught Political Theory. He is a member of the Research Committee of Sociological Theory at the International Sociological Association (ISA) and a researcher at LabPol/Unesp and the GEP Critical Theory: Technology, Culture, and Education. Currently, he is researching populism and political authoritarianism, focusing on the emergence of the new radical right and its form of online mobilization, as well as the impact of digital media on democracy. His main research interests are Sociological Theory and Political Theory.

Paper 3: Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to a multicausal, comprehensive analysis of the erosion of (representative) democracy, and of the relationship between this process and the one of rising (new) populism in Europe, by exploring mainly the theoretical perspectives advanced by two important political scientists, Daniel Barbu and Peter Mair. In their search for an in-depth understanding of this regressive process of de-democratization, Barbu and Mair have observed and described in detail a series of unexpectedly comparable changes, that have occurred in Western, respectively post-communist countries, since the 1990s: the precarization of the relationship between politics and society; the destructuring and delegitimization of parties as representative bodies; the de-parliamentarization and the tendency towards apoliticism; the personalization of political will; the weakening or hollowing out of res publica; the emergence of new “wooden languages” and “civil religions” (such as the one of “the rule of law”); the pre-eminence of the market logic in relation to the democratic constitutional order; the increasing recourse to unelected entities; the “government by cartel”; the curtailment of individual freedoms and of people’s sovereignty, etc. Against the already general (research) practice, Mair and Barbu suggested that (new) populism needed to be examined first as an associated symptom of the decline of politics and of representative institutions, and second as a cause.

Andreea Zamfira is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Bucharest, an associate researcher at the Regional Centre for Advanced Francophone Studies in Social Sciences, and a member of the editorial board of Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review and Studia Securitatis. She conducted research and completed professional internships at Sciences Po Paris, the University of Lyon, and the Free University of Brussels, among others. Her research interests focus on democracy studies (competing conceptions of democracy, the erosion of party democracy, transnationalization and de-democratization of politics) and ethnic studies (nation-building, nationalism, national minorities, national/ethno-cultural identities, politics of identity). She has a PhD in political and social sciences at the University of Bucharest and the Free University of Brussels. 

Paper 4: Overcoming the Demagogic Impasse: The Historical Benefits of Democratic Populism

Abstract: In recent years, the rise of elitist and demagogic discourses alike has posed significant challenges to democratic institutions worldwide. This phenomenon, characterized by divisive rhetoric and the erosion of public trust, has led many to question the resilience of liberal democracies. However, amidst this crisis, a countervailing force is emerging: democratic populism. This paper seeks to explore the radical benefits of democratic populism as a means to overcome the demagogic impasse and revitalize democratic governance.

Democratic populism, rooted in the principles of inclusivity, accountability, and grassroots participation, offers a compelling alternative to the top-down, exclusionary politics of demagoguery. History of ideas shows how this path can achieve great success: most of our liberal institutions indeed come from populist demands, populist stances or even populist movements, such as the three revolutions of liberty in England, USA and France (Raynaud, 2009). By empowering citizens and fostering a more responsive political culture, democratic populism can reinvigorate civic engagement and restore faith in democratic processes. This paper will delve into the theoretical underpinnings of democratic populism as defined by Margaret Canovan, examining its historical antecedents and contemporary manifestations.

Thibaut Dauphin is a French political scientist specializing in Enlightenment political philosophy, comparative politics, and the intellectual history of republicanism and nationalism. He earned his PhD in Political Science from the University of Bordeaux, where his dissertation, titled Le comparatisme politique dans l’œuvre de Voltaire, re-evaluated Voltaire’s political thought through a comparative lens, challenging the notion that Voltaire lacked a coherent political theory. Currently, Dr. Dauphin serves as a postdoctoral researcher at the CNRS-affiliated UMR 6240 LISA at the University of Corsica and is an associate researcher at the Institut de Recherche Montesquieu (IRM) at the University of Bordeaux . His research interests include Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu; the evolution of republican ideas; populism; and the role of sovereignty in modern democracies.

 

Session 7

Rethinking Representation in an Age of Populism 

Date/Time: Thursday, November 27, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University. He holds a Ph.D. in Criminal Justice from Indiana University Bloomington, with research focusing on criminology, spatial justice, and state violence. His work examines the epidemiology of violence, the intersection of crime and politics, and the criminalization of poverty and race. He coined the term criminal populism to describe how politicians exploit crime as political capital, a concept explored in his publication Criminal Populism: Crime as Political Capital in the Philippines and the United States. His Epidemiology of Violence project has mapped over 7,000 cases of extrajudicial killings in the Philippines using GIS. His research is published in leading criminology journals, and his forthcoming article, From Sociology of Poverty to Criminology of the Elite, explores elite criminality. Dr. Magno has served as a Research Fellow at Philippine Normal University and a Visiting Research Associate at Ateneo de Manila University. A dedicated educator, he has received multiple teaching and service awards for student engagement and community-based learning.

Discussants

(TBC)

Paper 1: Beyond Fairness: Meritocracy, the Limits of Representation, and the Politics of Populism

Abstract: Meritocracy is often celebrated as a fair mechanism for social mobility, yet it functions as a legitimizing ideology that deepens inequalities and restricts democratic representation. By positioning education as both an equalizer and a sorting mechanism, meritocracy imposes an impossible paradox—tasking education with ensuring fairness while simultaneously justifying exclusion. This paper critically examines meritocracy’s political function, arguing that its promise of delayed justice transforms demands for equality into technocratic concerns rather than political struggles. 

Building on Clare Chambers’ “moment of equal opportunity,” I show how meritocracy distorts the purpose of education, shifting its role from emancipating individuals to fitting them into predetermined social and economic hierarchies. Instead of empowering people to voice demands and contest inequalities, education under meritocracy serves as an instrument for maintaining the status quo. Drawing on Jacques Rancière’s argument that equality is an axiom rather than an outcome, I argue that meritocracy’s reliance on future-oriented fairness masks its ongoing reproduction of structural exclusion. 

This paper’s original contribution is to reframe meritocracy as a mechanism of depoliticization, not only by justifying inequality but by restricting political representation itself. Using Nancy Fraser’s framework of redistribution, recognition, and representation, I demonstrate how meritocratic discourse forecloses egalitarian demands within technocratic governance, making them inexpressible through institutionalized politics. As a result, these unmet demands resurface through populist mobilization, not as a rejection of democracy, but as an attempt to reclaim representation from meritocratic elites. Following Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist articulation, I theorize how populism emerges as a re-politicization of grievances that meritocracy systematically silences. By foregrounding the conceptual contradictions of meritocracy as a political ideal, this paper offers a political theoretical account of how stratified education systems sustain hierarchies, depoliticize inequality, and ultimately contribute to democratic destabilization.

Elif Başak Ürdem is a PhD candidate in political science at Loughborough University, specializing in political theory and data science. Her research explores the intersections of meritocracy, populism, and democratic representation, with a particular focus on how meritocratic ideals legitimize inequalities and depoliticize social struggles. Drawing on theories of justice, recognition, and redistribution, their work critically examines how stratified education systems shape political agency and democratic participation. Başak holds an MA in Legal and Political Theory from University College London (UCL), by being funded by the Jean Monnet Scholarship, and a BA in Political Science from Istanbul Bilgi University, graduating top of their class. She has previously worked as a Senior Child Protection Officer at Refugee Rights Turkey and has research experience at Bilkent University and Infakto Research Workshop. Her broader interests include democratic theory, refugee rights, and the philosophy of education. 

Paper 2: Memetic Communication and Populist Discourse: Decoding the Visual Language of Political Polarization

Abstract: This study explores how memetic communication serves as a critical tool for understanding the core dynamics of populist discourse in contemporary politics. Focusing on right-wing populist movements in Latin America—specifically Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador—the research examines how memes produced and disseminated using generative AI tools (e.g., Stable Diffusion, DALL-E, MidJourney) encapsulate and propagate the central narratives of populism.
Through the analysis of visual data collected between September 2022 and February 2024, this research identifies how memes simplify complex political ideas into emotionally resonant messages that mobilize supporters and reinforce the dichotomous “us vs. them” framework central to populist rhetoric. These memes not only polarize public opinion but also act as bridges, transferring violent and exclusionary narratives into offline political arenas, including parliamentary discourse.

By combining digital ethnography with fieldwork, this study highlights how populist movements utilize generative AI to craft a visual language that dehumanizes marginalized groups—such as women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and racialized communities—while amplifying their populist agendas.This research contributes to understanding the role of digital communication in shaping and sustaining populist discourse, offering insights into how these visual narratives resonate with audiences and impact political processes in under-researched regions.

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at the Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and social sciences. His research focuses on the so-called “far right” and current polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Gabriel has worked in European and Latin American contexts. He has taught regular and master classes at various international centers. He has been a Newton International Fellow of the British Academy at the University of London, and a Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Gabriel Bayarri also has applied political experience working with the United Nations in Rio de Janeiro and as a councilor in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. He is involved with the following research groups and centers: the COMMRADES Group at Rey Juan Carlos University, the Centre for Right-Wing Studies (University of California, Berkeley), the Centre for Research into Global Power, Inequality and Conflict (RGPIC, Macquarie University), the Psychosociology of Social and Gender Violence research group (Complutense University), and the Technopolitics research group (Open University of Catalonia). Gabriel Bayarri has been a member of the editorial board of the Journal of Iberian and Latin American Research (JILAR) since 2020.

Paper 3: Populism and the Evolution of Popular Sovereignty: A Long-Term Theoretical Perspective 

Abstract: The literature on populism, especially that produced by political scientists and sociologists, is rich with empirical studies focusing on individual cases. In all these studies, when faced with the need to explain the emergence and success of populist politics, scholars tend to refer to the socio-economic transformations that have affected liberal political systems for the past few decades. On the other hand, political theory has tried to contribute by attempting to overcome the fragmentation caused by this vast amount of case-specific studies and deepen the understanding of this heterogeneous phenomenon, trying to identify general concepts through which it can be described. My research, situated within the framework of theoretical studies, aims to take a further step by adopting a long-term perspective. Starting from the assumption that populism can be considered part of the evolutionary history of the concept and practices of popular sovereignty, and using interpretative categories from the history of political thought, I analyse populism as a peculiar answer to the dialectic between the need to affirm or recognize the principle of popular sovereignty, and the need to limit it in order to avoid its excesses. This tension originated with the establishment of the modern principle of sovereignty, which occurred following the modern revolutions. It can be traced back to the earliest theoretical and political reflections on the topic, which can be attributed to Rousseau and Madison. Keeping this in mind, it is possible to transcend explanations based solely on the analysis of contingencies and enrich our understanding.

Maria Giorgia Caraceni a PhD Candidate in the History of Political Thought at Guglielmo Marconi University of Rome and a contract researcher at the Institute of Political Studies San Pio V. She conceived and launched the Permanent Transdisciplinary Seminar for PhD candidates and early-career researchers, held annually since 2024 at Guglielmo Marconi University in collaboration with the University of Foggia. In this context, she coordinates both organizational and scientific aspects, and oversees the publication of the seminar proceedings. Maria earned her B.A. and her M.A. cum laude in Philosophy from the University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she also obtained a post-graduate diploma. After graduation, she taught courses in History of Philosophy and Political Philosophy at the People’s University of Rome for four years.  Additionally, she serves as an editor for two academic journals: “Dialegesthai”, an online journal of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tor Vergata, and “Power and Democracy. International Journal of Politics, Philosophy, and Law”, a journal of the Centro Studi Tocqueville-Acton. Her research interests focus on Political Theory, particularly Democratic Theory and the History of Concepts in Political and Democratic Lexicon.

Paper 4: Win-Win Politics: Beyond Political Liberalism and Agonistic Pluralism

Abstract: According to Chantal Mouffe (2000; 2005, 227–28), Rawls’s political liberalism (1989, 1996) overlooks the antagonistic undercurrents inherent in the pluralism of values. This is why Mouffe rejects “a ‘win-win politics’ that goes beyond the adversarial model by promoting solutions that supposedly benefit all people in society” (2000, 108–28). Should we indeed give up on the idea to conduct win-win politics, that is to find and carry solutions which benefit all people in society? I argue that the agonistic rejection of win-win politics is inappropriate because solutions which benefit all people in society can exist and their promotion is a valuable alternative to political liberalism and agonistic pluralism.

I identify three aspects which are essential to Mouffe’s theory but prove to be erroneous. The first one is the idea that “us” implies always to delineate “them”; the second one is the idea that the nature of the relationship “us/them” is necessarily conflictual; and the third one is a rigid reading of values and visions of goods which is assumed to be fixed over time. I argue that empirical science offers examples of political developments benefiting all people in society. I go on by explaining that not only win-win solutions exist, but their promotion is valuable too. The inevitability of conflict implied by agonistic pluralism has a cost for all parties, in terms of energy, well-being and opportunity. Political liberalism does not promote solutions benefiting all people in society, but only some specifically liberal views. Win-win politics avoids both pitfalls.

Bosco Lebrun is a PhD candidate in Politics at Luiss University, in Rome. After a double training in philosophy and international relations, he specialized in political theory and in particular in democratic theory. His research interests include disagreement, social cohesion, and democratic innovations. The provisional title of his PhD dissertation is: “Weighted Voting: Addressing Disagreements on the Desirability and Feasibility of a Refined Allocation of Voting Rights Based on Affectedness”.

 

Session 8

Fractured Democracies: Rhetoric, Repression, and the Populist Turn  

Date/Time: Thursday, December 11, 2025 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)  

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

Helena Rovamo is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Eastern Finland. In her doctoral thesis, she studied lay people’s perceptions of populism in Finland, focusing particularly on how voters for the radical-right populist Finns Party and other parties constructed social divisions in interview material.
 
In her studies, Dr. Rovamo utilizes qualitative methods and discursive analytical approaches. She is particularly interested in examining, through qualitative research, how people’s representations of themselves and others shape their actions in society and in intergroup relations.
 
Currently, Dr. Rovamo is working on a research project, “Intergroup relations and local encounters,” that examines how Ukrainian, Middle Eastern, and Finnish young people living in the Savo area perceive one another, their lives, and their futures in multicultural Savo

Paper 1: Charismatic Populism, Suffering, and Saturnalia

Abstract: This paper draws on the Nietzschean underlay to Weber’s theory of charismatic revolution—specifically, the saturnalian reversal of values that occurs under the influence of ressentiment—in order to account for the ability of Trump and his followers to undercut and reinvent American moral culture. Reversing what Weber called the “theodicy of good fortune,” charismatic leaders frequently adopt postures of moral abjection within present value systems while at the same time envisioning new social arrangements that will lift them into positions of authority. The condemnation of opponents is key to this process: from the devotionally-skewed perch where charismatic sightlines originate, such rebukes from moral authorities are rendered in parallax view, gaining a function that is opposite to condemnation’s intended purpose insofar as it authenticates the righteousness of the one being condemned. In such circumstances, new charismatic identities are forged, existing amid an exclusive intimacy between leader and follower. Drawing on fieldwork and interviews with Trump supporters throughout the 2024 Presidential campaign, the presentation examines the salience of “garbage” to Trump’s moral entrepreneurship. The case displays the importance of ressentiment for interpreting charismatic revolution, and it illustrates the reactive “thinness” of charismatic identitarian content. Recognition of this feature is, in turn, important for integrating charisma studies with studies of populism (which is itself usually characterized as being ideologically “thin”).

Paul Joosse is an Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Hong Kong.  His work examines Weber’s theory of domination as it interacts with social movement theory and (critical) criminology.  Recent projects have included theorizing the link between gender and charismatic power, using the example of Trump to develop a typology of charismatic counter-roles, and weaving Stanley Cohen’s concept of moral panic with Weber’s theory of charisma to show how charismatic acclamation is intimately liked to the aspersion of ‘folk devils.’  This work has been published in Social Forces, Sociological Theory, Theory and Society, Journal of Classical Sociology, and Sociology of Religion, among others.  In connection with his sociological work, he is Chair of the American Sociological Association’s Section for the History of Sociology and Social Thought and he currently serves on the executive board of the International Sociological Association’s Sociological Theory research cluster (RC16).

Paper 2: Going, Going,… Going Populist? Revitalising Membership-Based Politics through Populist Linkage

Abstract: This paper contributes to recent research showing that, contrary to the view of populist parties embodying direct, unmediated representation, some European PRRPs are cultivating robust local networks and reintroducing elements of the 20th-century mass party. While documented across Europe, its implications for populist theory remain unresolved. One key antimony remains unresolved: while the mass party is celebrated as the epitome of representative democracy, defined by party-based linkage, the populist form of representation—with its ‘anti-institutional impulse’—is associated with direct, unmediated forms of linkage. 

To address this tension, I advance the concept of ‘linkage’ as a key framework for understanding how this seemingly contradictory party model functions in practice, focusing on members’ perceptions of their role within the party and the wider democratic system. It draws on an ethnographic study of the PRRP the Sweden Democrats, including interviews and participant observations of party meetings. The analysis concludes that it was the fundamentally populist party-member relationship that most strongly echoed the ethos of the 20th-century mass party, positioning the party as an intermediary between citizens and the state. This raises the broader question of whether populism, emphasising the unity and common interests of ‘the people’ against perceived elites, may provide a foundation for mass-party-like structures to re-emerge, even under postmodern conditions often associated with declining political engagement and partisan identification. By uniquely uniting empirical data with populist theory, this study not only enriches our understanding of how PRRPs mobilise citizens but also offers new insights into the intersection between populism and party organisation.

Saga Oskarson Kindstrand is a first-year doctoral candidate at Sciences Po’s Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics, supervised by Professor Colin Hay. His research examines how political parties function as intermediaries between society and the state, with a particular focus on how European populist radical right parties (PRRPs) develop party-based linkages. He explores how these parties mobilise active memberships despite broader trends of political disengagement and how their claim to represent ‘the people’ is reflected in party organisation.

Paper 3: “Socialism Betrayed Portugal”: Authoritarian Populism and the Far-right

Abstract: During the fiftieth anniversary of the Portuguese Revolution, the Chega party received around one million votes and more than quadrupled its parliamentary bench. This development as been mostly viewd from the prism of the populist leader’s discursive performances, i.e., an anti-systemic threat to liberal democracy risen from outside the social mainstream. This paper challenges that view by arguing that the far-right’s “politics of fear” is, in reality, deeply imbedded in the economic and cultural logics of neoliberal ideology. Anchored in Stuart Hall’s concept of authoritarian populism, this hypothesis is explored through a frame analysis of the front pages of the first 100 issues of Folha Nacional (Nacional Sheet) – a weekly newspaper published by Chega. The framing of the main social themes found in the sample – corruption, (in)security, and economic failure – reveals a dialectic between societal crisis and authoritarian solutions containing parallels with the post-fascist far-right and the legacy of Thatcherism. In other words, Chega’s ideological repertoire did not emerge from the margins of society, but represents a radicalization of a long political tradition based on market liberalism and moral discipline under the guise of popular grievances.

​Jaime Roque is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, where he also earned his BA and MA in Sociology from the Faculty of Economics (FEUC). His doctoral research, funded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology (FCT), examines the parliamentary practices of the Portuguese far-right party Chega, focusing on how its discourse and strategies intersect with neoliberalism and authoritarian populism. ​Roque has presented his work at international conferences, including the UNPOP International Colloquium, where he analyzed Chega’s use of media narratives around insecurity as part of a broader “politics of fear.”  He is also a contributing author to the Populism and Emotions Glossary, with a chapter on authoritarian populism. In addition to his research, Roque serves as a guest lecturer at FEUC, teaching the undergraduate course “Poder, Política e Governação” (Power, Politics, and Governance). His academic interests include far-right movements, populism, neoliberalism, political parties, and parliamentary sociology.

Paper 4: The evolution of the rhetoric of the “Alternative for Germany”: a comparative analysis of the election campaigns for the European Parliament in 2019 and 2024 

Abstract:  The article focuses on the transformation of the rhetoric of the “Alternative für Deutschland” (AfD) during two election campaigns to the European Parliament – 2019 and 2024. The author proceeds from the assumption that there is a certain relationship between electoral success and the level of populism expressed in terms of the language the party uses. The populist party will soften its rhetoric during the election campaign when it does not expect electoral success to expand the potential electorate. Otherwise, the rhetoric will be tougher when the party is expected to win. This is clearly the case in the 2024 campaign, when the political weight of the AfD in the European arena has increased compared to 2019. Using various kinds of content analysis, among which sentiment analysis is of key importance, the author points out that the rhetoric shown in electoral programs and posters is in line with the positions of the party and fraction “Identity and Democracy” that is being scrutinized in the article as well. The negative sentiment prevailed in two campaigns, but it has changed slightly. The thematic focus of both programs has not altered much. A distinctive feature of the rhetoric of right-wing populists is still the focus on migration issues. The received results at the junction of linguistics, political science and international affairs may be applicable for a more complex study of the campaigns to the European Parliament employing data from 2014. This article could also be a help for research on German populism, especially in the context of entering the mainstream by a populist actor.

Artem Turenko is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. His thesis examines “The impact of electoral cycles on the rhetoric of right-wing parties: transformations of the populist agenda (the case of the Alternative für Deutschland). 

 

Session 9

Populism, Crime, and the Politics of Exclusion

Date/Time: Thursday, January 8, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: From Crime Shows to Power: The Rise of Criminal Populism

Abstract: This study examines criminal populism, a political strategy where leaders gain popularity by exploiting crime, both through direct involvement and by shaping public perceptions of law, justice, and disorder. While many populist politicians use their legal troubles to bolster their outsider image, others leverage media platforms, such as crime-focused television and radio programs, to build public trust and legitimacy before transitioning into political power.

The study explores the rise of politicians who, before holding office, hosted crime and dispute-focused media programs, portraying themselves as champions of justice and order. By sensationalizing crime, offering simplistic solutions, and positioning themselves as the voice of the people against corrupt elites, these figures cultivate a loyal following that translates into electoral success. Case studies include figures from the Philippines and beyond, demonstrating how media-driven crime narratives fuel political ambition.

By blurring the lines between crime reporting, entertainment, and governance, criminal populism subverts democratic institutions and reshapes public perceptions of law and justice. This study critically assesses the long-term implications of media-driven criminal populism, highlighting its role in eroding institutional trust and legitimizing authoritarian tendencies under the guise of law and order.

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor in the Department of Justice Studies and Human Services at Gannon University.  Also see page 43. 

Paper 2: The Legitimization Process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s Migration Policies

Abstract: The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs-FPÖ), one of the first radical right and populist parties established in Europe after World War II, and the National Rally (known as the Front National from 1972 to 2018) exhibit notable differences due to their distinct historical, cultural, and political backgrounds. However, these two radical right and populist parties, both founded by politicians associated with the Nazis, also share significant commonalities. This is one of the key reasons why we place them at the centre of our research. These two political parties were among the first radical right and populist parties to emerge in the EU member states after World War II, serving as models for their peers. For instance, the Front National was the first radical right party to win local government in 1983. It was also the first radical right party to enter the national parliament after World War II, securing 35 seats in 1986. Similarly, the FPÖ became the first radical right party after World War II to win an election in 1999 and subsequently form a coalition government in an EU member state. Also, both radical right and populist parties gained legitimacy through the support of mainstream political parties. Although they initially embraced anti-communist and anti-Semitic rhetoric and policies, they gradually shifted their focus toward targeting Muslim immigrants, marking another point of convergence. This paper examines the legitimization process of the FPÖ’s and the NR’s migration policies and their electoral success through the lens of Gramscian hegemony theory.

Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies. He has an interdisciplinary academic background. From 2003 to 2006, he studied history at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, specializing in modern European political history and imperial history. He later earned MA degrees in international politics and human geography from Newcastle University (2008–2010). From 2015 to 2016, Russell was a Marie Skłodowska-Curie International Fellow at the University of Amsterdam’s Department of European Studies, researching the relationship between the EU’s symbols and European identity. From 2016 to 2019, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, where he studied nationalism, European identity, and Brexit. His current research focuses on the relationship between the far right and European identity, the far right and LGBTQ+ politics, the legacy of the British Empire in contemporary politics, and the evolving relationship between identity and politics in the UK, the EU, and beyond.

Murat Aktas is a Professor of Political Science at Mus Alparslan University, Department of Political Science and Public Administration. He graduated from Istanbul University, Faculty of Economics, Department of Public Administration in 2000. In 2004, he completed his master’s degree in the Department of Information and Communication Science at Paris 10 Nanterre University. He completed his PhD at the University of Paris 7, Diderot, in Sociology of Politics, in 2011. His PhD focused on the European Union and Turkey. From 2017 to 2018 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Ecole des Haut Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, researching on the National Front (Front National-FN) and Immigrants. He has authored and edited several books, including The European Union and Turkey; The Information Society Globalization and Democracy; The Arab Spring; and Conflict Resolution and Peace. He also served as guest editor of a special issue for International Sociology on “The Rise of the Far Right and Populist Movements in Europe.” His current research focuses on radical right and populist movements in Europe, Artificial Intelligence, techno oligarchy, human rights and democracy.

Paper 3: Every Man for Himself: Racism and Sephardism in Spain’s Imaginary and the Holocaust

Abstract: This paper explores the racialized construction of the “Sephardic Jew” as a cultural and political trope in 19th-century Spain and its enduring repercussions throughout the 20th century, particularly during the Holocaust. The idea of the Sephardic Jew was shaped through a contradictory mixture of philosephardism and antisemitism, where Spain claimed a unique historical connection to Sephardic communities while simultaneously reinforcing exclusionary and racialized narratives. This discourse fostered a vision of Sephardic Jews as both culturally Spanish and irrevocably other, which shaped Spain’s diplomatic and social responses during times of crisis.

By examining Spain’s attitudes toward the Sephardic diaspora and the racial arguments embedded in its philosephardic policies, the paper traces how these perceptions influenced the self-identification and survival strategies of Sephardic communities in Europe during the Holocaust. In moments of extreme danger, some members of the Sephardic community internalized this racialized discourse, emphasizing their perceived cultural proximity to Spain as a means of securing protection. Yet despite these efforts, they often faced rejection and abandonment by the very nation that claimed to safeguard them. This duality underscores the tragic consequences of a racialized identity imposed from without and, at times, embraced from within.

Through an interdisciplinary approach that draws on historical analysis, critical race theory, and Holocaust studies, this paper seeks to contribute to the broader discussion on how racialized imaginaries shape national policies and community dynamics. It also reflects on the contemporary implications of this legacy for understanding exclusion, identity, and memory in democratic societies today.

Santiago López Rodríguez (Salamanca, 1991) is a postdoctoral fellow at Uppsala Centre for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Uppsala University (2021-2023), where he is conducting a research project entitled funded by the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond: “Witnessing the Holocaust: Spain and Portugal during the Second World War” (2023-2026). His research deals with Franco’s regime and the Holocaust, the focus being on the diplomatic role of Spain in occupied countries. He taught at the University of Extremadura (2017-2020) and was also a visiting researcher at the Complutense University of Madrid (2017-2018) as well as at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris (2019). He graduated in History and Historical Heritage at the University of Extremadura (2009–2013), where he also finished two Masters: one in Teaching (2014) and the other in Research and Humanities (2015). He completed his Ph.D. dissertation “Spanish Foreign Office during the Holocaust in Occupied France (1940-1944)” with a National Research Grant (2016–2020) which obtained the distinctions of Summa Cum Laude, International Mention, and Extraordinary Doctorate Award (2021).

Paper 4: Us, Them, and the (Hidden) Borders of the Socio-Political World: Art (and Discomfort) Against the Oversimplified Populist Worldview

Abstract: We can think about populism as a potentially authoritarian phenomenon that, despite its anti-liberal features, finds a place in a liberal, democratic framework, earning from it part of its legitimacy by electoral consensus. This consensus focusses on the leader and their acclamation. All these factors root in (the need for) an oversimplified worldview strongly linked to a Manichean division between “we, the (real, good) people” and “they, the (evil, corrupted) others”. This division reflects Schmitt’s “friend-foe” interpretation of politics and leads to a society in which the gap between “us” and “them” is impossible to fill. This impossibility inhibits an open political discussion and, thus, the liberal democratic process itself. 

My political-philosophical analysis concentrates on how art and aesthetics can make us aware of borders and limits of the Political and thereby of its plurality but also its grey zones, where the borders between “us” and “them” become clearer and affects us the most. 

I will approach these borders by pointing out (1) how the definition of our socio-political world and our divisions in “us” and “them” depend (also) upon our aesthetic approach, and (2) how the capacity of art—more specifically, of the aesthetical reactions of discomfort—to confront a large number of people with discriminating, excluding, or oppressive phenomena considered “normal” before makes art relevant for addressing the apparently insuperable division between “friends” and “foes” in a plural, changing, and challenging society and therefore for sublating the heavy hurdles that populism presents for a democratic political process. 

Roberta Astolfi is a postdoctoral researcher and the academic coordinator of the Research Unit “Orders” at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS) of the Free University Berlin as well as a lecturer at the “Center of Political and Legal Theory” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science of the same University. I gained my doctorate in Political Philosophy and Philosophy of Law at the Georg-August-University Göttingen and my MA with highest honours in (Political) Philosophy at La Sapienza University (Rome). Before holding my current position, I was a research assistant at the professorship for Political Theory, History of Ideas, and Political Culture of the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel and also a lecturer at both the “Center of Political Theory and Philosophy” of the Otto-Suhr-Institute for Political Science (Free University Berlin) and at the Department of Philosophy of the Georg-August-University Göttingen, as well as a SCRIPTS postdoctoral fellow. My current research focuses on the relationship between politics and aesthetics and, more specifically, on the epistemic-critical power of aesthetics in confronting the limits of our socio-political world. Before that, I researched on populism, technocracy, and the impoverishment of the individuals’ political role.

 

Session 10

Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times  

Date/Time: Thursday, January 22, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Resilience in Market Democracy

Abstract: Many people speak about democratic decline and the resilience of democracy in hard times. In this discussion, resilience has gained traction but consistently defies attempts to unify theories or confine the concept to a singular research or policy portfolio. Instead of seeking to unify resilience, this paper draws on a theory of polysemy to tease out the diversity of encounters one may have. Findings over a decade of research into resilience of different types are used to reframe resilience as an ’emergent institution’ of democracy today. The emerging resilience is becoming a many-headed-hydra – or, in theoretical terms, a ‘polysemic institutional characteristic’ of contemporary democracies. Should we engage with this as a research agenda then futures research into resilience should emphasise the transformative potential, for good or ill, of a fundamental challenge traditional democratic values posed by an ‘institutionalised’ sense of resilience.

Peter Rogers is a Professor in the Department of Linguistics at Macquarie University. A medical graduate from the University of Sydney, he received his PhD from the School of Communication Sciences and Disorders at the University of Sydney in 2003. Drawing upon his dual backgrounds in medicine and applied linguistics, his research interests lie in the broad area of health communication, with a particular focus on topics relating to linguistic diversity.  Peter also has a research and PhD supervision profile in the area of second language acquisition, where his specific interests concern the links between language learning, motivation and identity, particularly as these issues relate to today’s rapidly globalising world. His fields of research endeavour are united by the common themes of linguistic diversity and social inclusion.

Paper 2: The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the future of Democracy

Abstract: Today in France, local elected officials have two training rights to facilitate the execution of their mandates and contribute to the renewal of the local political class. Two funding mechanisms coexist: a collective right funded directly by local authorities, and an individual right of €400 per year, with a maximum cumulative limit of €800. The training market is controlled by the French state, which accredits 240 training providers.

Training of elected officials is regularly presented as a tool for “re-enchanting” local democracy, as it aims to make holding office accessible to everyone. In this sense, it would serve as a skills equalizer, theoretically enabling anyone to “level up” to assume the role. The primary beneficiaries would be those citizens who are less predisposed to handle political responsibilities, finding in it a way to compensate for “gaps” and to catch up with those who can just rely on tacit socialization once in office. 

Nevertheless, the training of elected officials carries a paradox. In seeking to re-enchant political engagement, it also contributes to disenchantment. On one hand, it validates the very principle it aims to combat. By claiming to make holding local office accessible to all, it inherently suggests a prerequisite of skills. Local functions would not be accessible to just anyone without prior preparation or continuous training. On the other hand, since this training is reserved solely for local elected officials, it contributes to the distinction between elected officials and the rest of the citizens by reinforcing their specialization through the acquisition of specific knowledge and skills.

Ultimately, based on statistical data related to the training practices of local elected officials in France in recent years (n=30 000) and several dozen interviews, the aim of this contribution is to show that, although the training of elected officials represents a strategic project to strengthen democracy, its implementation contributes to reinforcing the weak representativeness of local elected officials compared to the rest of the population by reserving the knowledge related to the management of local authorities for a certain “elite.”

Pierre Camus is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Nantes University. He holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Nantes – CENS (UMR 6025). He is also co-president of the National Observatory for the Training of Local Elected Officials (ONFEL).

Paper 3: The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism 

Abstract: This article investigates the rise of a women-led radical democracy in the region known as Rojava within the context of the Syrian civil war since 2012. Governed under the framework of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), this development is widely referred to by scholars as the “Rojava Revolution.” This shift has unfolded through a bottom-up political project known as democratic confederalism, sustained by diverse forms of civil society resistance in Rojava. This has occurred despite the broader context of war-torn Syria, which has become a battleground for various Islamist opposition groups such as Islamist State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, Hurras al-Din and Al-Tawhid Brigade all of whom have fought both each other and the government of Bashar al-Assad. Despite their nuanced ideological and tactical differences, all these groups share the common objective of establishing an Islamic state founded on Sharia law, marked by gender inequality.

Despite the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and the escalation of political violence and chaos, many studies have proved successful and responsive feminist interventions made by Kurdish women activists and academics in Rojava.  These interventions have been accompanied by a strong receptivity to the Rojava project among all its national minorities, as well as “the fierce loyalty of its defenders and its people.”  Rojava has survived significant challenges, including civil war, the fight against the ISIS, enduring occupation, embargoes, a challenging humanitarian situation, and ongoing Turkish invasions. Rojava remains firmly opposed to the former Baath regime, underlying the maximalist involvement of all national minorities in society. This includes engagement in a wide range of local and social activities, “from communes and councils to work in the health sector, women’s movements, and self-defense structures.”   So much so that academics such as Michel Knapp, Anja Flach, and Ercan Ayboga have described Rojava as “one of the most radically progressive societies on the planet.”    

This article argues that the global decline of democracy, particularly in the West, led to the abandonment of Rojava’s nascent democracy, despite Rojava having been a Western ally in the fight against Islamist extremism and sharing democratic values with the West, during the two major Turkish invasions in 2018 and 2019. Despite these challenges, the people of Rojava have continued to resist maintaining their democracy. 

Soheila Shahriari holds a doctorate in political science, awarded by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in 2024. Her PhD thesis, entitled “Transnational political engagement and gendered reconfiguration of the national imaginary among Kurds in the West in the post-Rojava revolution era”, examines the underlying rationales behind commitment to Rojava by looking at the political socialization of research participants, the rearrangement of the Kurdish political spectrum and the multifaceted dynamics shaping Kurdish political engagement in the transnational context in the aftermath of the Rojava revolution. She has identified three central dynamics: the vigorous mobilization of Kurdish diaspora communities in the West to advocate the removal of the PKK from Western terrorist lists, the transformative ripple effects of the Rojava revolution across the Middle East and its role in the feminization of Kurdish politics, and the emergence of Kurds as an emphatic driving force behind democratization in the region. Furthermore, she brings to the fore the transformative power of the gender revolution in Rojava, in relation to its deep influence on reshaping the Kurdish national imaginary in the West around the principles of gender equality, pluralism and secularism, marked by a decisive rejection of patriarchy, political intolerance, Islamism and Sharia law. Shahriari holds  two master’s degrees: one in sociology from Tehran University in Iran and another in political sociology from Sorbonne University Paris in France.

Paper 4: Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile

Abstract: This paper examines feminist migrant activism in Poland and Turkey against the backdrop of rising authoritarianism and anti-gender policies (Gwiazda, 2021; Özkazanç, 2020). Under the PiS government in Poland and the AKP regime in Turkey, intensified attacks on gender equality, LGBTQ+ rights, and feminist movements have created increasingly hostile environments, forcing many activists into self-exile. This study examines how these activists, through their migration, cultivate new forms of feminist solidarity that transcend national borders while responding to the distinct political contexts of their home and host countries. Drawing on 40 in-depth interviews and three focus groups, the study examines how these women navigate the dual pressures of political repression and displacement, crafting spaces of resistance that challenge both patriarchal norms and nationalist ideologies. These activists embody a transformative politics of possibility (Escobar, 2020), fostering networks of care, solidarity, and alternative visions of belonging in their diasporic communities. The study draws on frameworks of pluriversal political praxis (Escobar, 2020) and prefigurative politics (Monticelli, 2022) to analyze how these women envision and enact futures beyond exclusionary systems. By focusing on the personal and collective experiences of feminist migrant activists, this paper highlights the resilience and creative strategies they employ to reclaim political agency. It emphasizes how their activism not only confronts oppressive structures in their countries of origin but also contributes to reshaping the sociopolitical landscapes of their new environments, offering insights into the broader implications of feminist diaspora activism in times of political uncertainties.

Ecem Nazlı Üçok is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University in Prague. She holds a Master of Science in Sociology and Gender Studies from Lund University, Sweden, and teaches both master’s and bachelor’s level courses at Charles University and ARCHIP. She has been a doctoral fellow at the University of Vienna and Scuola Normale Superiore, Italy. Her research interests include political sociology and psychology, urban sociology, social movements, political activism, anti-gender movements in Europe, far-right politics, transnational migration, and the study of men and masculinities.

 

Session 11

Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Date/Time: Thursday, February 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: When identity politics and social justice procedures contribute to populism

Abstract: The ethnographic perspective as modern initiator of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, identity politics as upside-down governing power and the popular formation of social justice principles are three paths, among others, through which the expansion of populist discourses in liberal democratic contexts could be explored. Although ethnography, the tradition of studying ‘others’ in their respective contexts, and later sociological methodology, has shifted slightly towards Western societies, it has retained its colonial perspective. Identity politics, meanwhile, by essentializing their core values and ignoring others, reinforces the ‘us’ and ‘them’ dichotomy, which might be juxtaposed with other approaches to otherness, such as that of Carl Schmitt et al. (2005). The third factor is the increasing challenge for bottom-up movements to contribute to principles of social justice. The failure of this process is reflected in a “worldwide erosion of liberal democratic norms, soaring inequality, and intensified anger and anomie” (Lefebvre, 2021). In this ‘zombie liberalism’ scenario, which lies between dead and living states, fundamental human rights are violated, including by public institutions. As a result, a ‘spiritual exercise’, as Rawls (1971) describes it, aimed at seeking principles of justice is problematized and, by undermining people’s agency, the impact of civil society on the liberal democratic sphere diminishes.
Identifying We the People and others as distinct groups, as well as identity politics and the problematic popular quest for principles of social justice, provide fertile ground for populism. By synthesizing these processes, this paper seeks to provide an interdisciplinary analysis of the future of democracy.

Saeid Yarmohammadi is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal, Canada. He is currently writing a thesis on individual understandings of social justice in the Iranian context among Shiite Muslim adults living in Tehran. His areas of interest include politics and religion, culture and religion, social inequalities and social justice in its various forms, including the origins and history of this notion. His dissertation proposes an analysis of theories of social justice in different contexts, including liberal democracies, to provide a portrait of the place given to this notion in the context of my research. His thesis project includes an assessment of politics of identity in the context of Iran, which contribute to understandings of social justice in this context. Having training in political science and anthropology in addition to my areas of study and adopting a multidisciplinary approach, he is interested in the analysis of social justice in political contexts, including liberal democracies. Talking about conference participation, He has taken part in several international conferences organized by the International Sociological Association and by different universities in Canada and elsewhere.

Paper 2: Why do We Trust The DMV? Exploring the Drivers of Institutional Trust in Public-facing Government Agencies

Abstract: Scholars widely agree that institutional trust is in crisis across Western developed countries, yet the causes of this decline remain elusive. While extensive research has examined institutional performance and procedural fairness, far less attention has been given to the frontline federal workers who serve as the face of government in daily citizen interactions. This study posits that public trust is not solely a function of institutional structure but is also shaped by the characteristics and behavior of government workers. To assess institutional trust, this study employs a conjoint experimental design, varying six institutional attributes: (1) efficiency, (2) expectations, (3) transparency, (4) accountability, (5) perceived moral disposition of workers, and (6) political affiliation of workers. This study hypothesizes that efficiency will be the strongest predictor of institutional trust, operationalized by the public’s preference to seek assistance from one agency over another. Additionally, it anticipates that citizens will prefer bureaucrats who are perceived as caring and personal, yet politically neutral and impersonal. As institutional legitimacy is increasingly contested in an era of political polarization and social fragmentation, this research highlights the need for governance strategies that go beyond structural reforms, emphasizing the critical role of street-level bureaucrats in fostering public institutional trust.

Ariel Lam Chan is a third-year PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University. Her current research focuses on understanding the causes of institutional trust in U.S. public-service agencies, exploring how factors such as bureaucratic performance, internal processes, and moral/ political disposition of workers influence public confidence in government institutions. Additionally, Ariel is working on a comparative study of Hong Kong’s educational landscape, particularly examining the National Security Law’s impact on curriculum reform and how it shapes students’ critical thinking and understanding of national identity. In addition to her work on educational policy, Ariel is also conducting research on the consequences of nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) in cases of sexual harassment and discrimination in the workplace. Her study investigates how NDAs silence survivors and hinder their ability to seek justice, while also impacting their career trajectories, financial situations, and emotional well-being. Ariel’s interdisciplinary research blends sociological theory with practical policy implications, and she is dedicated to addressing pressing issues of governance, institutional trust, and social justice.

Paper 3: Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development

Abstract: This research explores the relevance of active citizenship in supporting processes of transformation and sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa. It starts from the observation that democratic and governance deficits stem from non-inclusive public policies (in their formulation, implementation and assessment), leading to corruption, social inequalities and undermining peace. In response, she proposes to consider active citizenship as a strategic lever. By valuing non-state social actors, this concept is likely to strengthen participatory dynamics and promote inclusive governance. Active citizenship is thus emerging as an essential paradigm and mechanism for improving the development performance of sub-Saharan African states. A benchmarking  of relevant experiences of active citizenship in the West and elsewhere (such as in Canada, the United States or Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall), is the approach envisaged for its achievement. 

Dieudonne Mbarga is an Independent Researcher.

Paper 4: Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized “the People” Against Minorities

Abstract: The Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), often celebrated as a foundational moment for democracy in the Middle East, paradoxically entrenched exclusionary notions of “the people” that resonate with contemporary challenges to liberal democracies. This study interrogates how constitutionalist rhetoric, while invoking unity and citizenship, systematically marginalized religious minorities, ethnic groups, and the working class—a dynamic mirroring modern populist discourses that pit “the true people” against “others.” Employing Pierre Machery’s concept of “the unsaid” and historical discourse analysis, this article examines parliamentary debates, protest narratives, spy reports, photographs and memoirs to reveal how revolutionary elites instrumentalized a vague, Persian-centric nationalism to exclude minorities and consolidate power. Findings demonstrate that the constitutionalists’ strategic ambiguity around “the people” enabled majoritarian oppression, sidelining religious groups (e.g., Zoroastrians, Jews) as sectarian pawns, suppressing labor voices in favor of merchant elites, and erasing ethnic identities (e.g., Kurds, Azeris) from national imaginaries. By situating Iran’s revolution within global patterns of democratic erosion—where appeals to “the people” fracture civil society—this research underscores the enduring tension between democratization and exclusion. It argues that inclusive democratic resilience requires confronting historical legacies of ideological erasure, offering lessons for contemporary struggles against illiberal majoritarianism and divisive populism. 

Ali Ragheb is a sociologist with a PhD, Master’s, and Bachelor’s degree from the University of Tehran, Iran. Ranked 1st in the national PhD entrance exam (2019) and 4th in the Master’s exam (2015), he is a recognized talent by the Iranian National Elites Foundation. His research explores economic inequality, cultural sociology, and critical theory, focusing on Iran’s urban middle class. He is the author of Pasdaran-e Nabarabari (Guardians of Inequality), Mashrute-ye Hamegan (The Constitutional Revolution for All), and Tohi-Shodan az Mashrute (The Erosion of Constitutionalism), alongside numerous peer-reviewed articles. He has also translated works on democracy, digital divides, and Max Weber’s sociology of religion. Ali serves as a regional editorial board member for Global Dialogue (ISA) and is a member of the ISA’s Research Committee on Social Stratification. He is a member of the Iranian Sociological Association (since 2017) and has held editorial roles, including assistant editor of the Journal of Sociology of Art and Literature (University of Tehran, 2021-2022). As president of the University of Tehran’s Sociology Student Scientific Association (2018-2019), he managed the journal Sareh. His work bridges critical cultural studies, historical sociology, and political economy, offering insights into inequality and social transformation.

 

Session 12

Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC) 

Paper 1: Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy

Abstract: In a context in which African democracies struggle to consolidate, communal and identity-based populism plays an ambivalent role, serving both as a force of contestation and a tool for reinforcing power. This panel examined its influence on elections, political transitions, and democratic institutions in Africa. Three main areas structure the discussion: the study of populist strategies during electoral periods and their connections to identity-based mobilisations and clientelism; the analysis of populism’s role in political polarisation and the contestation of electoral outcomes; and the exploration of digital media as platforms for the dissemination of populist discourses and political radicalisation. Drawing on case studies and comparative approaches, this panel aims to understand how populism fluctuates between strengthening democratic participation and threatening institutional stability while proposing ways to enhance democratic resilience in the face of the rise of identity-based populism in Africa.

Yves Valéry Obame is a sociologist, holding a doctorate/Ph.D in political sociology obtained from the University of Yaoundé I in 2022. Lecturer-Researcher at the University of Bertoua in the Department of Political Science and also Associate Lecturer in the Department of Sociology at the University of Yaoundé I in Cameroon, he is also a member of the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).His research focuses primarily on how electoral technologies (particularly biometrics), public policies and, more generally, socio-technical transformation processes structure electoral governance, the dynamics of citizenship and political behavior. A Swiss Confederation Excellence Scholar, he joined the Geneva Africa Lab and the Global Studies Institute to lead a postdoctoral project entitled “The making of citizen monitoring of voting in the era of biometrics in Cameroon: the experience of the ’11 Million Citizens’ Movement.” He examined, at ground level, the way in which an associative actor works, in an unprecedented way, to fight against electoral fraud to guarantee the authenticity of the results from the ballot boxes in a context deemed constrained and despite the biometric reform introduced into the electoral process in 2013. More broadly, this project reports on the dynamics of institutionalization of electoral biometrics and the contemporary transformations of political citizenship that they induce, revealing how, in Cameroon, the dominant group in power governs through biometrics.

Salomon Essaga Eteme is a sociologist with a Ph.D. in sociology. He serves as a lecturer at the University of Ngaoundere and an associate lecturer at the Catholic University of Central Africa (UCAC). His research adopts an interdisciplinary approach, focusing on the intersections of social dynamics, environmental issues, and development. He is a researcher at the CERESC Laboratory at the University of Yaoundé I and an associate researcher at the Centre for Environment and Development (CED). Dr ESSAGA ETEME also works as a social engineer and environmental consultant, offering his expertise to field-based projects that integrate social science insights with ecological challenges. He is currently a postdoctoral fellow under the RESSAC project, implemented by the CIFOR–ICRAF–GDA–UYI consortium, where he contributes to the sociological analysis of relationships between local communities and natural resource management policies.

Paper 2: Towards Decolonizing the Drive for Democracy in Nigeria and Africa

Abstract: The paper argues that the practice of democracy in Africa should integrate the traditional knowledge and institutions of local communities in the continent, and that Africa should search within its own knowledge systems for appropriate ideas and approaches to its democratization and development. African knowledge systems have for a long time been undervalued because of the dominance of Eurocentric mindsets and practices. Critics now blame state failure and the development crisis in 

Africa on the “disconnection between formal institutions transplanted from outside, and indigenous institutions born of traditional African cultures”. The prevailing Western model of liberal democracy, especially in the form  introduced in Africa by some authoritarian military and civilian regimes, has not served the continent well; instead it has tended to alienate rather than motivate and mobilize the people. There is now a search for a virile democratic alternative that can reconcile the traditional and the modern, in a partnership that will ensure popular participation, cultural self-determination and democratic legitimacy. Marshall Sahlins has rightly emphasized the need for all peoples “to indigenize the forces of global modernity and turn them to their own ends” as the real impact of globalization depends on the responses developed at the local level.

The paper discusses Nigeria’s recent experience with democracy, especially with respect to the role of traditional leaders and institutions; and in relation to the ongoing debates about a suitable system of democratic local government that will expand the political space, and strengthen the capacity of indigenous institutions and other organizations of civil society at the village/grassroots level.  A number of current government policies are based on the misguided assumption that the position of African traditional rulers and institutions is incompatible with democratic practice. The paper considers how successive post-colonial governments and constitutions in Nigeria have tried to evolve a suitable chieftaincy policy, and to manage relations with traditional leaders at the state and local levels. As well, governance reforms in the country have tended to concentrate on regulating party politics and competitive elections, protecting civil and political rights, anti-corruption and so on. The major gap in the good governance agenda appears to be at the local government level where the major challenges of democratic decentralization and poverty alleviation remain largely unaddressed.

Geoffrey I. Nwaka is an urban historian. He graduated and worked in England and in Canada, and is currently Professor of History at Abia State University, Uturu, Nigeria. He has had several years of teaching and research experience in the Nigerian university system, and was at various times guest researcher/visiting scholar at a number of universities and research institutes in Europe, Australia and North America. His research interests are in historical and contemporary urban issues, environmental protection, and African development. He has travelled and published widely and served in government during 1990/91 as Special Adviser to the Governor of Imo State.

Paper 3: Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom

Abstract: One-fifth of the democracies saw erosion between 2012 and 2024, with ‘us or them ‘ polarisation rising. At the heart of this process lies using ‘the people’ as a unifying force of civil society or as a divider. This paper aims to discuss the contribution of the people in either the democratization process or majoritarian domination, using Nigeria and the United Kingdom as reference countries. The failure of Nigeria to diversify its economy and the UK’s transition to renewable resources are examples of contrasting experiences of resource nationalism impacting environmental structural adjustment. Drawing from the decolonial environmentalism perspective, this paper explored how coloniality persists in shaping resource management, democracy, and socio-spatial injustice. This study adopts a qualitative research methodology through a systematic review of existing literature, policy documents, and case studies on Nigeria and the United Kingdom. 

Using a decolonial environmentalism lens, the paper critically analyzes scholarly debates, reports, and empirical findings to assess democracy, resource governance, and socio-environmental justice. Through focusing on community-based conservation in Nigeria and energy transition in the UK, the paper stresses the social inclusion of indigenous people’s knowledge base in development processes. The studies examined strengthen the principles of decolonial environmentalism in negating the division of the North from the South and the demission of despotic policies as opposed to egalitarianism. Thus, this paper has called for policy reforms in Nigeria’s resource governance, utilization of renewable energy, and fair international cooperation. By positioning justice at the centre of a pyrrhic vision, this paper presents a critical view of what democracy and post-colonial, ecologically just and sustainable environments can mean in the future.

Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research focuses on addressing plastic waste pollution, promoting environmental sustainability, and advancing development and green practices. Mr. Busayo Olakitan Badmos is a postgraduate student in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University. His research interests span sustainability studies, environmental crime, deforestation, conflict, illegal mining, and development. He is committed to exploring the complex intersections between environmental sustainability and socio-economic challenges, contributing to research that informs policy and promotes sustainable development.

Paper 4: Viral but Powerless? Digital Activism, Political Resistance, and the Struggle for Governance Reform in Kenya

Abstract: As digital activism reshapes civic engagement globally, African Gen Z activists are leading a new wave of political resistance. In Kenya, movements like #RejectFinanceBill2024 and #OccupyParliament have leveraged social media to challenge state policies, mobilising unprecedented digital dissent. Yet, despite their viral success, these movements struggle to translate online mobilisation into tangible governance reforms. This paradox, persistent digital resistance versus limited institutional change, raises urgent questions about the effectiveness of digital activism in strengthening democratic accountability. This study offers a theoretical examination of Kenya’s digital activism through a tri-theoretical lens: Political Process Theory (PPT), Digital Contention Theory (DCT), and Connective Action Theory (CAT). It critically investigates:
• What structural barriers and political opportunities shape the trajectory of digital activism in Kenya?
• Why digital movements persist online despite repression but struggle to institutionalize change?
• How Gen Z activists challenge traditional leadership models by mobilising through
decentralised digital networks?
By situating Kenya’s digital activism within broader global debates on digital resistance, governance, and democratic resilience, this theoretical inquiry develops a conceptual framework for understanding the evolving relationship between online political engagement and structural constraints. It provides insights relevant not only to Africa but also to global policymakers, scholars, and activists seeking to bridge the gap between digital mobilisation and sustainable political transformation.
This paper will provoke critical discussions on the future of digital resistance-can online activism move beyond momentary disruption to drive lasting institutional change?

Asenath Mwithigah is a Graduate student, United States International University-Africa. She is a social development expert with over 10 years of professional experience in working with non-profits organizations nationally, and internationally to strengthen their programming and unlock the organizational potential on Environmental, Social and Governance sectors to contribute to the Development Goals. She is currently the Technical Director of a national youth organization working to document the progress made by young people in Kenya in various sectors contributing to SDGs.  

 

Session 13

Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 5, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC)

Paper 1: Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Abstract: The study aims to present the multifaceted nature of ‘the people’ within the ethnopolitical context of contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Departing from the traditional focus on ethno-nationalism in the populist framing of ‘the people’ in BiH, the main argument is that understanding ‘the people’ in BiH requires a dialectical relationship encompassing three forms of populism: inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic. While inter-ethnic populism constructs ‘the people’ through an agonistic frontier among ethnic groups in the most common sense, intra-ethnic populism establishes agonistic frontiers within them, positioning ‘the people’ in opposition to their political elites. Finally, cross-ethnic populism seeks to construct ‘the people’ around populist demands that transcend ethnic divisions, uniting groups through shared claims that cannot be expressed within the ethnic framework. By tracing these patterns, this approach offers new insights into conceptualizing populism, seeing it not as a disruptive force but as a potential catalyst for democratic renewal. It highlights how populism may enhance political pluralism by challenging the status quo and affirming democratic capacities around new subjectivities beyond ethnicity.

Jasmin Hasanović is an Assistant Professor and researcher at the Department for Political Science at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Science. His field of research encompasses social and political movements, socialism, (post)Yugoslav studies as well as geopolitics and cyberpolitics. He is also interested in critical political theory, dealing with contemporary debates on democracy and the relationship between activism and the idea of emancipation in contemporary political theory. 

Paper 2: Institutionalizing the Assembled People 

Abstract: For centuries, the task of establishing a democratic system has been monopolised by specialists. The task of making decisions on public affairs has also been reserved for a professional political ruling class. This paper is based on the hypothesis that, in the face of this monopolisation of both instituting and instituted political activity, ordinary individuals are able not only to decide but also to decide how they are going to decide – in other words, to create their own rules collectively.

The contribution will test this hypothesis based on fieldwork conducted over two years within the radical democracy movement in Commercy (Meuse), from the start of the Gilets jaunes assemblies in November 2018 to the presentation of a list in the March 2020 municipal elections, aimed at empowering the popular assembly gathering local residents. Mobilising ethnography, semi-directive interviews and collation of materials, this paper aims to reconstruct the direct democracy system of assemblies both imagined and instituted by Commercy’s actors to replace representative democracy. Since the start of the Yellow Vests movement, the group has carried out extensive theoretical imagining of how this new system might work, the practical problems the assembly would face, as well as the fundamental rules that would frame the assembly’s exercise of power. The aim here is to give an account of this instituting activity by the movement, based on its practice of direct democracy in assemblies. 

While their direct democracy practices of assemblies have been instituted since the beginning of the Gilets Jaunes movement, it is in its electoral phase that the movement will institutionalise what the democratic system it practices could look like if it came to power. It would do what representative government has always refused to do: “give an institutional role to the assembled people”, according to Bernard Manin in Principles of Representative Government. During the election campaign, the Commercy group thus collectively drafted a local Constitution and a Charter of Commitment, created from their practices during the Yellow Vests, which aimed to organise the exercise of power by the popular assembly if their list were to be elected. The group thus reinterpreted fundamental political concepts through the prism of assembly direct democracy. If the concepts of constituent paradox, constituent power, constitutional text (both its interpretation and revision), but also self-limitation, deliberation, representation, execution of decisions and participation, have a particular meaning under representative government, the aim here is to explore the meaning attributed to them in the context of this experiment in assembly direct democracy, and to see how they relate to other democratic conceptions. This chapter therefore takes the actors’ reflections on these fundamental political concepts seriously, as they represent a movement’s reinvention of the political, based on its own practices.

By showing the system devised by the Commercy group, this paper takes seriously Castoriadis’ injunction that “creating forms of democracy that are not alienating, where people participate in modern society, can only be the work of the whole people, not of a theorist”. It aims to show how a movement can create new forms of democracy and answer institutional questions traditionally left either to theorists or to policy-makers, in a perspective of democratising the theorisation of the political.

Sixtine Van Outryve is a J.S.D. candidate at Yale Law School, where she obtained her LL.M. degree as a BAEF fellow in 2018. She is also a lecturer at Radboud Universiteit in The Netherlands, teaching political theory to master’s students. In March 2024, Sixtine defended her Ph.D. in Law at the Centre for Philosophy of Law of U.C.Louvain in Belgium, her home country. In her dissertation, she developed a normative theory of communalist direct democracy – defending that public power be exercised by the assembled people at the local level – and analyzed its practice by social movements through qualitative research methods. During her doctoral journey, she was a visiting researcher at the School of Social and Political Science of Edinburgh University in the United Kingdom (2021-2022) and at the CERAPS of Université de Lille in France (Spring 2023). She also holds a master’s degree in Law from K.U.Leuven in Belgium (2015), as well as a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy (2014) and in Law (2013), both from U.C. Louvain, where she became a teaching assistant in Law at the beginning of her career. 

Paper 3: The Two Peoples: Why Deliberating and Voting don’t Belong Together

Abstract: There is a widely shared sense—rightly or wrongly—that the grip of (sound) arguments on public debate has waned in recent years. Donald Trump’s victory and Brexit in the UK in 2016 have spurred inquiries about alleged dysfunctions in public communication, including the spread of “fake news,” algorithmically curated social networks, or populist rhetoric. In this paper, I suggest that the problem may run deeper. From the beginning, deliberative democrats have overlooked a crucial distinction: that between deliberating and voting, as well as the fundamentally different rationales that underpin them. In other words, it has been recklessly assumed that the virtues of public deliberation would carry over to voting. Yet many reasons for voting for or against a proposal may be entirely rational and understandable irrespective of the merit of arguments. Conversely, the motivating power of public justification is considerably muted as soon as one enters the voting booth. In this paper, I argue that the impact of public deliberation on voting decisions has remained undertheorized, mainly postulated or inferred from the success of heterogeneous settings, such as deliberative mini-publics (Jürgen Habermas 2006). While some proponents of deliberative democracy have worked out the internal relationship between deliberating and voting (Chambers and Warren 2023), there remains a disconnect between the public forum and the voting booth. In response, I attempt to sketch out a voter-centered, realistic, and context-sensitive approach to democratic deliberation.

Théophile Pénigaud is a postdoctoral researcher at the ISPS at Yale. He specializes in political theory, and his research interests include the history of political thought, democratic theory, the theories of justice, and political epistemology. His book The People’s Deliberations: Context and Concepts of Rousseau’s Political Philosophy was published in French by Classiques Garnier in 2024. He holds a Ph.D. from the École Normale Supérieure de Lyon. Just before coming to Yale, he directed a Junior Laboratory on “Changes and Current Trends in Democracies” at the École Normale Supérieure and was a lecturer at Lyon 3 University.

Paper 4: Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Abstract: This paper examines representation and the right to diplomacy as fundamental pillars of democracy, emphasizing their role in ensuring the meaningful inclusion of all peoples in policy formulation and decision-making processes. Diplomacy is often reserved to sovereign states, leaving many unrepresented nations, indigenous groups, and minority communities without access to critical international and institutional platforms. The exclusion of these groups from diplomatic engagement undermines democratic principles by reinforcing a model that fails to reflect the diversity of political and cultural identities.

By analyzing cases where communities are denied representation, this study will focus on the Hmong community in Laos, who face systemic discrimination through an indigenous rights lens; the Ogoni in Nigeria, whose lack of representation is tied to environmental and climate justice struggles; and the people of Guam, who remain disenfranchised under the U.S. territorial rule, highlighting the challenges of decolonization and self-determination. The study will also explore the institutionalization of representation through case studies of organizations such as the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and Minority Rights Group (MRG), which seek to secure spaces for participation and representation. 

The closure of spaces diplomatic spaces contributes to the erosion of democratic participation, the silencing of historically marginalized voices, and reinforces unequal power structures in global governance. Recognizing diplomacy and representation as fundamental rights strengthens democratic resilience by fostering dialogue, inclusion, and peaceful conflict resolution.

This paper argues that establishing frameworks for broader participation is essential for the future of democracy, advocating for mechanisms that go beyond state-centered diplomacy and amplify all voices.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is is a human rights advocate with experience in international advocacy, civil society engagement, and diplomatic affairs. She is global advocacy officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization where she works directly with representatives of minority communities to support their advocacy efforts. Nieves has experience in consular affairs, particularly on migration issues, as well as in cooperation for development and youth participation in public policy-making. She holds an MSt in Diplomatic Studies from the University of Oxford and has a background in diplomatic engagement, focusing on capacity-building, advocacy, and international cooperation. She is also the co-author of the chapter “The Border Issue: From Policy to Cultural Identity” in Continuum Investigativo y diversidad lingüístico-cultural del sur de México (2021), which examines how the delineation of borders has shaped national identities at a nation-state level, often marginalizing identiteis that do not align with political boundaries.

 

Session 14

From Bots to Ballots: AI, Populism, and the Future of Democratic Participation 

Date/Time: Thursday, March 19, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Conceptions of Democracy and Artificial Intelligence in Administration and Government: Who Wants an Algorithm to Govern Us? 

Abstract: This paper examines how varying conceptions of democracy influence citizens’ support for the use of artificial intelligence (AI) at different levels of decision-making authority. We draw on original survey data (June 2023) from over 3,000 individuals in Spain. The survey was designed to capture participants support for AI‐based decision-making across different levels of authority: from administrative tasks to informing political decisions or standing for election. In general, respondents are sceptical about this possibility and show low support for almost all the situations posed – except for routine administrative tasks, where there is a (slim) majority of respondents who would support it. We analyse to what extent distinct democratic conceptions shape support for algorithmic decision-making at these levels, while controlling for other relevant socio-demographic and attitudinal variables (including personality and self-perception). Our findings reveal that individuals who endorse representative and populist-oriented conceptions of democracy are significantly less inclined to support AI in political decision-making, with the former supporting it only for the administrative level and the latter in any case. Conversely, those with authoritarian-oriented conceptions exhibit a higher level of support when AI is used at higher levels of decision-making. Finally, individuals endorsing expert-oriented conceptions support algorithmic decision-making at all levels. These results broadly align with prior research (except in the case of expert-oriented conceptions) and suggest that scepticism towards AI in governance is not uniform but is crucially mediated by citizens’ normative views on democracy.

Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC). His research interests involve any of the different ways public administrations have to know citizen preferences, including elections, surveys, local participation processes, citizen juries, deliberative polls, referendums or advisory councils. His papers about participatory institutions have been published in journals as European Journal of Political Research, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Politics, Public Administration, Political Studies, Politics & Policy or Administration & Society. His books include Font, J, della Porta, D and Sintomer, Y (eds) (2014): Participatory democracy in Southern Europe: causes, characteristics and consequences, Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield or Font, J and Méndez, M (eds) (2013): Surveying ethnic minorities and immigrant populations: methodological challenges and research strategies, Amsterdam University Press Research series, Amsterdam. 

Paper 2: How does ChatGPT shape European cultural heritage for the future of Democracy? 

Abstract: Cultural heritage plays an essential role in shaping our identities and understanding our past, present, and future. However, it is also fragile and vulnerable to the ravages of time, conflict, natural disasters, and now, artificial intelligence. 

The launch of ChatGPT has sparked immense interest both in the opportunities it offers and for the risks involved in its generative artificial intelligence linguistic model. To date, research has been conducted on its use in various fields, from natural language processing to customer service or content creation, as well as in the education and public health sectors. Nevertheless, little has been addressed in the field of cultural heritage.

Based on the above, this article presents the results of a study in which ChatGPT-4 was commissioned to generate thoughts, written representations and visual productions about the importance of European Cultural Heritage values in the future of Democracy. To this end, a battery of tests was developed to assess their interaction, understanding, production and dissemination in relation to European Cultural Heritage and democratic values. 

According to an interpretive-comparative analysis of 30 interactions, ChatGPT-4, while providing answers of sufficient quality to address European Cultural Heritage, is unaware of the values underlying this heritage and the future importance of its preservation for European identity and democracy.

Alonso Escamilla is Manager of European Projects and Research at the Catholic University of Ávila (Spain). For this same institution, he is a PhD Student on Cultural Heritage and Digitalisation and a Member of the Research Group: Territory, History and Digital Cultural Heritage. He have successfully designed, implemented and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: Council of Europe, European Commission, European Trade Union Confederation, Foundation for European Progressive Studies, European Youth Forum, and United Nations Development Programme.

Paula Gonzalo is Projects Coordinator of the Foundation for Cooperation and Community Development of El Salvador (CORDES) and Researcher at the University of Salamanca (Spain). She has successfully designed, implemented, and evaluated numerous projects for, among others, the following international organisations: the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the European Trade Union Institute, the SALTO Participation and Information Resource Centre, and the Ibero-American Social Security Organisation.

Paper 3:  The New Elite: How Big Tech is Reshaping White Working-Class Consciousness

Abstract: While Silicon Valley elites were once synonymous with liberal, white-collar startup culture, big tech has strategically realigned with the political right during the second Trump Administration. Elon Musk’s leadership in the Department of Government Efficiency highlights the consequences of this shift on U.S. conservatism. Drawing on three case studies—the Trump administration’s mass firing of federal workers, DOGE’s takeover of key government systems, and DOGE’s mass emails to federal employees—I examine how Musk’s outsized role in the second Trump Administration has challenged the working-class consciousness and white identity politics that have fueled Trump’s contemporary success. 

I argue that Musk’s reliance on tech-driven logics of efficiency and optimization to purge so-called ‘elites’ from the federal government has simply replaced technocrats with technology itself, reinforcing the very institutional and bureaucratic structures the political right opposes. By prioritizing technological efficiency at the expense of low- and middle-income federal employees, I show how these logics challenges Trump’s alignment with his white working class by substituting a people-versus-elite framework with an emerging people-versus-tech alternative. The resulting bipartisan dissatisfaction underscores the limits of right-wing populism in the age of big tech.

Aly Hill is a third-year Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Communication at The University of Utah. She specializes in political extremism, harassment, and mass shootings, with a focus on democratic institutions and public discourse. She has published and presented on topics including the Alt-right, QAnon’s digital migration, mass shooting news coverage, the U.S. anti-immigration movement, online harassment, and far-right memes. Aly holds an M.A. in Communication with a concentration in political communication from Johns Hopkins University and a B.S. in Political Science and Communication from The University of Utah. Outside of academia, Aly collaborates with experts in education, government, public policy, and data science to develop frameworks aimed at improving diplomacy and community investment.

Paper 4:  Bubbles, Clashes and Populism: “The People” in an algorithmically mediated world

Abstract: This paper examines how algorithms perpetuate the “us/them” antagonism by creating filter bubbles that isolate users in echo chambers and filter out clashes that intensify conflict between opposing groups. It investigates the implications of these dynamics in the digital realm and their spillover into analogue democratic interactions. By shaping information flows, algorithms redefine collective identity and challenge the cohesion of democratic societies. Populism amplifies these effects by harnessing algorithmic divisions to mobilize support, yet it also serves as a lens to understand how people seek representation in fragmented publics. Focusing on insights from communication science, the aim is to illuminate populism’s complex role in an algorithmically mediated world.

Amina Vatreš is a teaching assistant at the Department of Communication Studies/Journalism at the University of Sarajevo – Faculty of Political Sciences. She was awarded with the “Silver Badge of the University of Sarajevo” twice for academic excellence, as one of the best students of both undergraduate and MA studies. Currently she is a PhD candidate enrolled in the interdisciplinary doctoral program, with her dissertation focusing on the field of artificial intelligence and its communicological-philosophical implications. She is the author and co-author of several scientific papers and book reviews indexed in international scientific databases, and has actively participated in a significant number of organizational committees for both international and domestic conferences, as well as in conducting PR activities and promoting numerous scientific events. Her research interests encompass critical topics at the intersection of communication, technology, and society, including algorithmic censorship, the societal impact of artificial intelligence, AI-driven disinformation, and the sociopolitical challenges posed by advanced machine learning systems.

 

Session 15

From Populism to Global Power Plays: Leadership, War, and Democracy  

Date/Time: Thursday, April 2, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET) 

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Pericles’ Funeral Oration: A Populist Rhetoric for War and Politics

Abstract: Pericles’ Funeral Oration, delivered in 431 BCE during the Peloponnesian War, is often celebrated as a powerful tribute to Athenian democracy, extolling the virtues of the city-state’s political system and its citizens. However, this paper argues that the oration should not be viewed solely as a celebration of democratic ideals, but rather as a populist and manipulative rhetorical strategy employed by Pericles to justify his failure to achieve a swift resolution to the war, which he had initially promised when persuading the Athenians to engage in the conflict.

Pericles is traditionally depicted as the ideal democratic leader whose populism did not fuel ochlocracy. His nuanced emotional appeal to the Athenian demos, whose decision-making he controlled, ensured that governance remained structured and reasoned.

Drawing on political philosophy, particularly the concept of populism, this paper posits that Pericles’ speech was a political maneuver designed to sustain his authority and maintain public support for a war that was escalating beyond his initial expectations. Political philosophy often reveals how, in the early stages of war, politicians frame it as a manageable, short-term endeavor with limited costs. However, wars frequently spiral out of control, becoming protracted and costly due to miscalculations, shifting political realities, and unforeseen consequences. 

Having initially convinced the Athenians that the Peloponnesian War would be a quick victory, Pericles faced mounting criticism as the war dragged on. In this context, the Funeral Oration was not so much a celebration of democratic values but rather a tactical effort to rally the populace by evoking patriotic sentiments and framing the sacrifices of the dead as part of a noble and necessary cause. By emphasizing the greatness of Athens and its citizens, Pericles attempted to redirect public dissatisfaction, portraying the war as essential to preserving Athenian ideals, even though it was straying further from the swift, decisive victory he had once promised.

In this way, the oration serves not so much as an exaltation of democracy, but as a populist tactic designed to manipulate the masses into supporting a war that was increasingly seen as spiralling beyond the leader’s control. Consequently, Pericles’ rhetoric shifts from celebrating democracy to prioritizing the consolidation of power and shaping public opinion in the face of an escalating and uncontrollable conflict.

Elizabeth Kosmeratou is a Professor in the History Department at the University of Illinois, Springfield.

Paper 2: Can Democracy (or Anything Else) Rescue Civilization While the Rules Keep Changing? 

Abstract: This paper explores the decision-making process as described by Ross Ashby in his “Design for a Brain”.  This explains how we can build a simple decider-mechanism into a highly adaptive brain-like system, and indeed it tallies with Piaget’s developmental hierarchy of human development.  Stafford Beer showed the same development for “collective brains” of social groups.  On these models, I discuss (i) the thinking and voting processes within democracy, especially the “panic” (populist) choice, when none of the options available seem relevant, and (ii) the options for authoritarian rulers (benign or otherwise) plus their likely decisions, and the reasons for them.  I also consider conflicts of interest within a democracy; and (following Aslaksen) I extend the Ashby/Beer model into international politics — with a table comparing all three. I then apply this approach to two key problems (barely-solvable politically): (1) Climate-change and (2) Limits-to-Growth, and argue that these two causes are largely responsible for ●immigration difficulties, ●minor wars,

●Cost-of-living — and are hence THE CAUSE OF POPULIST “PANICS”.  Next, I consider the power of Mega-Companies, and how we might deal with them — preferably at an international level.

 I conclude by endorsing some basic revisions of democratic procedures, including  

●use of AI (to overcome some serious obstacles such as objections to universal pensions), 

●Ranked choice voting, and 

●Compulsory voting (which also makes identity and fraud checks much easier).                                                  

Robert R. Traill has a PhD in Cybernetics and Psychology at Brunel, while also serving a one-year fellowship in the social sciences at Birmingham University. While teaching science in high schools, he developed an interest in the shortcomings of the political system. Thus, he went back to Melbourne University to do a BA in Economics, Political Science, Psychology, after which he worked in the corporate world. At North Thames Gas Board in London, he negotiated a Buyer-Decision-Model project with Professor Gordon Pask and his “System Simulation” company.  Within NTGB, he also worked in Market Research, and on the side, attended a course on “Biological Bases of Behaviour” with the Open University. He published in the Journal of Psychiatry and Psychiatric Disorders and developed his research interests in Economics and Sociology. 

Paper 3: The Politics of Manipulated Resonance: Personalised Leadership in Populism

Abstract: This article examines the role of personalised leadership in populism, focusing on its impact on the construction of political hegemony within the process of signifying the people. Adopting a political sociological perspective, it integrates theoretical frameworks on the personalisation of politics, leadership, disintermediation, and populism, exploring how populist leaders construct an imagined ‘people’ and establish direct, emotionally charged connections with them. The study highlights how populist leadership represents a specific trajectory within the broader phenomenon of personalisation, shaped by its distinctive conception of politics and democracy. Through the strategic manipulation of resonance, populist leaders politicise social resentment and frame ‘the people’ as a symbolic and homogeneous community, characterised by anti-elitism and anti-pluralism. This dynamic is reinforced through symbolic and performative strategies that unify fragmented societies, leveraging the politics of similarity to forge strong, direct bonds with their constituencies.

A key example of this dynamic is Donald Trump’s leadership, which exemplifies how populist leaders engage in disintermediation, bypassing traditional institutions and media filters to establish an unmediated connection with their supporters. Trump’s rhetoric and communicative style—marked by anti-establishment narratives, the rejection of political correctness, and the strategic use of social media—illustrate how populist leaders transform disintermediation into a challenge to liberal democracy.

While primarily theoretical, this article lays the groundwork for further empirical investigations into the mechanisms and consequences of populist leadership across different cultural and political contexts. By advancing the discourse on political sociology, it offers a nuanced understanding of how populist leaders manipulate resonance and redefine political representation, shedding light on the broader implications of populism for contemporary democracy.         

Lorenzo Viviani is Full Professor of Political Sociology at the Department of Political Science, University of Pisa, Italy. He serves as Secretary of the Political Sociology Section of the Italian Sociological Association (AIS) and is an active member of several other international sociological associations. Currently, he is the Editor-in-Chief of Società Mutamento Politica – Italian Sociological Review (Class A, ANVUR). His recent publications include books, book chapters, and journal articles focusing on the rise of populism in the context of post-representative democracy, with a particular emphasis on the sociology of political parties and leadership.

Paper 4: The exclusionary identity of ‘the People’ in Radical Right Populism

Abstract: The growth of radical right politics raises concerns about authoritarian and exclusionary scenarios, while populism is understood as a logic that articulates democratic demands and strengthens political engagement. There is a lack of research on the democratic views of radical right populism. Moreover, the burgeoning literature on these phenomena generally examines either the supply or demand side of politics, neglecting the narrative dimension that emerges from the two intertwining. This article aims to fill these gaps by using the heuristic of the “emotion narrative” that circulates between the supply and demand sides of radical right populist parties to examine their political culture. 

Assuming that populism creates social identities through the affective articulation of popular demands, focusing on the “narrative of emotions” (and not only on the narrative dimension of particular emotions) allows us to analyse how social and political objects, facts, ideas, and scenarios generate political culture. Through a mixed-methods comparative study of Portugal and Italy, this article assesses the emotion narratives of the parties Chega and Fratelli d’Italia. The dataset includes 14 semi-structured interviews with MPs and an original survey with 1,900 responses regarding political realities (on the democratic system, power structures, ethnic diversity, political history, and role of the media) and hypothetical scenarios (on authoritarianism, the rise of migration and diversity, anti-corruption, securitisation of the state, and expanded use of referendums). The emotion narratives of radical right populist political cultures engender democratic visions rooted in exclusionary identities with positive affection for centralism, authoritarianism, and securitisation of the state, as opposed to innovation and participation.

Cristiano Gianolla is a researcher at the Centre for Social Studies (CES) of the University of Coimbra (UC), where he integrates research thematic line on Democracy, Justice and Human Rights. He obtained a PhD in Sociology and Political Science (cum laude) from Coimbra and Sapienza University of Rome, with a dissertation on Gandhi’s democratic theory and a comparative study of emerging political parties in India and Italy. Cristiano is the Principal Investigator and Work Package leader of PROTEMO (Horizon Europe, 2024-2026) and CO3 (Horizon Europe, 2024-2027, with Vanda Amaro Dias) projects. He was the Principal Investigator (PI) of the UNPOP project (FCT, 2021-2025) and a team member of the ECHOES (H2020, 2018-2021), ALICE (ERC, 2011-2016), and FRANET (2021-2022) projects. He is a co-founding and co-coordinating member of the ‘Inter-Thematic group on Migrations’, editor of e-cadernos scientific journal and a reviewer for scientific journals. Cristiano coordinates the PhD course ‘Democratic Theories and Institutions’ and the MA course ‘Critical Intercultural Dialogue’ at the Faculty of Economics of the UC, where he also teaches on the PhD course ‘State, Democracy and Legal Pluralism’. His publications include authored and edited books, chapters, and articles on democratic theory, populism, emotion, narrative, postcolonialism, intercultural dialogue, citizenship, and migration.

Lisete S. M. Mónico is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences of the University of Coimbra, Portugal, Ph.D. in Social Psychology from University of Coimbra, European Diploma of Advanced Studies in Social Psychology (DEEAPS, Università degli Studi di Bari), teaches courses in Research Methods and Social Psychology since 1999. Mobility Coordinator (2017-2023) and Coordinator of the BSc in Psychology (2021-) at the Faculty of Psychology and Education Sciences. Member of The Center for Research in Neuropsychology and Cognitive and Behavioral Intervention (CINEICC), dedicates her professional activity to research in the field of Social Sciences. Author of several books, book chapters, and articles in international peer-reviewed journals.

Manuel João Cruz has a PhD in Communication Sciences and is a post-doctoral researcher at the Center for Social Studies (CES) at the University of Coimbra (UC), where he is part of the Democracy, Justice and Human Rights thematic line. His research focuses on the instrumentalization of trauma in political communication. At CES, Manuel João Cruz was part of the project “UNPOP: Dismantling Populism: Comparing the formation of narratives of emotion and their effects on political behavior”, which has already been completed, and is currently collaborating on the project CO3 – COntinuous COnstruction of resilient social COntracts through societal transformations. He has published on populism, narrative and affect in politics. Her main research interests include Media, Populism, Democracy and Narrative Studies.

 

Session 16 

Voices of Democracy: Art, Law, and Leadership in the Era of Polarization 

Date/Time: Thursday, April 16, 2026 – 15:00-17:00 (CET)

Chair

(TBC) 

Discussants

(TBC)  

Paper 1: Cultivating Democracy through Art: Laibach’s contribution in Analyzing Nationalisms and Feelings of Ethnic Belongness

Abstract: My paper aims to discuss the role of the arts in both shaping feelings of belonginess and preventing the rise of nationalisms and populisms. To achieve this goal, the role of Laibach’s artistic contribution in staging nationalist feelings and ideas of ethnic belonginess is analyzed. Indeed, it can be suggested that, as Laibach were effective in criticizing the corrupted form of socialism in former Yugoslavia during the 1980s, so they were effective in exposing the origins of nationalist feelings and populism throughout their activity (1980-2020). In the past, Laibach responded to criticisms by arguing that they are “fascists as much as Hitler was a painter”. Moving from this argument, this article aims to understand Laibach’s strategy and the band’s past achievements. In addition, in the final part it furtherly asks what are the lessons that can be nowadays drawn from Laibach’s successful artistic engagement. 

Mitja Stefancic is a fully Independent Researcher and Civil Servant in Italy. He holds an MPhil in “Modern Society and Global Transformations” from the University of Cambridge and a BA in Social Sciences from the University of Essex. His PhD research focuses on the corporate governance and regulation of cooperative banks. He presented his research endeavours at scientific conferences, including EURICSE’s conference on cooperative banking and sustainable finance in Trento, Italy; the ICA 2014 Research conference in Pula, Croatia; and at the 2013 “Potential and Limits of Social Solidarity” conference in Geneva, Switzerland. His scientific contributions are published in journals such as Studi Economici, the Journal of Entrepreneurial & Organizational Diversity, the International Business & Research Journal, and has a forthcoming paper on coop banks in the ICA Review of International Co-Operation.

Paper 2: The Hidden Agenda of Bollywood: The Rise of Hindutva Narratives in Indian Cinema

Abstract: The last decade has witnessed the growing ascendancy of Hindutva nationalism in India, as evident in various government policies, political statements, and social movements. Leaders from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and right-wing groups like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have increasingly referenced the concept of Akhand Bharat—a vision of a united Indian subcontinent encompassing present-day Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other neighbouring regions under Hindu cultural hegemony. Statements from BJP leaders and affiliated groups have fueled religious polarisation, with rising incidents of communal violence, cow vigilantism, and attacks on minorities. The arts, such as literature, film, music, and cultural artefacts, have always been crucial in manufacturing national consciousness and collective identity in accordance with the ruling class ideology. 

Bollywood-the multi-million Hindi cinema industry emerging as a potent space for the generation and proliferation of this nationalist as well as religiously charged narratives. These are reflected in several movies, including The Kashmir Files (2022) and The Kerala Story (2023), which campaign for the ruling establishment’s political persuasion in some of their content. The development of these religiously laced and politically driven narratives in Bollywood is a crucial part of the much more significant paradigm shift toward right-wing nationalism. Movies depicting specific communities as the enemy within, contribute to furthering the divides between different communities. This destroys the very spirit of communal harmony and undermines the pluralistic nature of Indian society. The growing politicisation of Bollywood has exacerbated religious polarisation, leading to a more divisive and less tolerant India. In this paper, I aim to critically analyse the content of religious and nationalist narratives in Indian cinema in the last decade and explain how such cinemas have evolved into a tool that contributes to the polarisation of religious identities, casting religious minorities as the vilified ‘other’, thereby disrupting the secular nature of Indian democracy. The paper concludes by arguing that the politicisation of Bollywood has contributed to the bias towards right-wing nationalism, creating tensions among religious communities and eroding communal spirit.

Devapriya Raajev is currently pursuing my MA in Sociology at South Asian University, New Delhi. Her academic interests lie at the intersection of culture, media, democracy, gender studies, and intersectionality. She conducted fieldwork with the Human Rights Commission and tribal schools. She was also a member of the survey team for the Garima Project on women’s safety, conducted in association with the Gujarat Police. These experiences have shaped her understanding of structural inequalities and informed my academic inquiries. This paper reflects her ongoing engagement with questions around representation, power, and identity in contemporary media landscapes.

Paper 3: ‘I Miss My Name’: Why Black American Election Workers Like Ruby Freeman Turn to Defamation Law to Defend Democracy

Abstract: After the 2020 election, President Trump’s personal lawyer Rudy Giuliani said many outrageous statements about the election which eventually led to his disbarment in two jurisdictions.  Giuliani also defamed two election workers in Georgia named Ruby Freeman and Shaye Moss, concocting a bizarre and untrue conspiracy that they added suitcases of outside ballots into the official count in Georgia. They had done nothing of the sort. But based on this defamatory lie, these women’s lives were turned upside down. They faced verbal and physical threats. 

This paper will explore the approach by the legal nonprofit Protect Democracy to fight disinformation by using defamation law in the United States and plaintiffs who are election workers, including Freeman and her daughter Moss. Protect Democracy found that disinformation about the 2020 election was being spread online by a handful of superspreaders like Giuliani, who had large followings on social media. This legal approach on relying on defamation law has been criticized by First Amendment scholar Professor RonNell Jones. Still, this piece will argue that defamation law is an important and effective tool in fighting disinformation like the Big Lie that Donald Trump was the true winner of the 2020 presidential election. 

The victory that Freeman and Moss won against Rudy Giuliani was so eye-poppingly large at over $145 million that it serves as a potent deterrent for other would-be defamatory election deniers. And in a world where other mechanisms of accountability, like the criminal justice systems at the state and federal levels, have been slow or ineffective at holding those who tried to overthrow the 2020 election liable, several defamation cases about 2020 have either settled or ended with impactful judgments. This piece will also note how the attacks on Ms. Freeman and her daughter were racialized and why having access to compensation is particularly needed for middle- and lower-class Black victims of defamatory campaigns. 

Ciara Torres-Spelliscy is a Brennan Center Fellow and Professor of Law at Stetson University. She was counsel in the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law and an associate at Arnold & Porter. She is a graduate of Harvard and Columbia Law. She has testified before Congress as an expert on campaign finance. She has also helped draft Supreme Court briefs. She is the author of the books Corporate Citizen (Carolina 2016) and Political Brands (Elgar 2019), and Corporatocracy: How to Protect Democracy from Dark Money and Corrupt Politicians (NYU 2024). She published over 20 law review articles and hundreds of legal op-eds. She was a legal contributor to CNN for the 2024 election. She has been published in Washington Post, New York Times, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Review, Roll Call, Business Week, Forbes, The Atlantic, USA Today, San Francisco Chronicle, The Hill, Huffington Post, Judicature, The Nation, Salon, Talking Points Memo, Tampa Bay Times, The Progressive, Medium, and Shondaland. She has also been quoted by the media in Wall Street Journal, The Economist, Time, Bloomberg, Mother Jones, SCOTUS Blog, Politico, Slate, L.A. Times, Boston Globe, NBC.com, Vox, VICE, Sirius Radio, NPR, Fox, CSPAN, DNA TV, and NY1.

Paper 4: State Institutions in Divided Societies: Religious Policy and Societal Dissatisfaction in the Israeli Military

Abstract: This study examines state institutional dissatisfaction in democracies, focusing on military institutions in religiously divided societies. We argue that all-encompassing societal dissatisfaction occurs when a state institution in a heterogeneous society applies a single policy to diverse groups with discretion and secrecy. Using a mixed methods design and an original survey, we investigate the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) as a case study in a democracy without full separation of state and religion. Our findings reveal significant dissatisfaction with the IDF’s religious practices among both secular and religious Israeli Jews. Paradoxically, this shared dissatisfaction may contribute to institutional stability by preventing any group from feeling privileged. The study contributes to understanding policy implementation in divided societies and has implications for military integration strategies in diverse contexts.

Niva Golan-Nadir is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Reichman University. She  received her Ph.D. from the school of Political Science at the University of Haifa, where she further completed a post-doctoral fellowship at the division of Public Administration and Policy. She is currently a Research Associate at the Center for Policy Research, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs & Policy, The University at Albany and at the Institute for Liberty and Responsibility at Reichman University. Her research focuses on a comparative analysis of enduring gaps between public preferences and legal-institutional arrangements in democracies. Her research interests also include comparative politics, public administration, state-religion relations and Israel studies. Her recent book, ‘Public Preferences and Institutional Designs: Israel and Turkey compared’ (2022, Palgrave Macmillan), has been awarded final list and honorary mention (second place) by the Azrieli Institute of Israel Studies and Concordia University Library. During 2024-2025, she is a visiting scholar at the Taub Center for Israel Studies at New-York University.

Michael Freedman is a postdoctoral fellow in the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from MIT. His research focuses on religion and conflict in Israel and the Muslim world, examining the political behavior of religious actors – including rabbis, imams, and religious social movements – and inquires how they perceive the state, whether they collaborate with it, and how they behave towards actors they perceive as enemies. His research uses sermons and legal rulings produced by religious leaders to explain why some leaders confer the state with legitimacy while others choose to challenge it.

Memorial for Charlie Kirk outside Turning Point USA Headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, following his fatal shooting while speaking at Utah Valley University in Orem, Utah. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the Tea Party to MAGA – How White Christian Nationalism Is Taking Control of the US

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHome

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias traces the rise of white Christian nationalism from Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” and Reagan’s Moral Majority to the Tea Party and today’s MAGA movement. He argues that what appears as grassroots populism is, in fact, a carefully engineered project to transform fringe radicalism into a national force. Electoral restrictions, demographic anxieties, and evangelical mobilization have converged to produce a politics that is ever more exclusionary, authoritarian, and puritanical. Dr. Dias asks: Is MAGA truly the majority, or is it the triumph of minority rule through strategic manipulation?

By João Ferreira Dias

The Charlie Kirk Memorial was a turning point in the American ideological trajectory for the next decade, leaving the US in a state of social fracture only comparable to the civil rights era and the Vietnam War. We are witnessing the “great awakening” of nationalist evangelism, reminiscent of the peak of that authoritarian fusion between evangelical Christianity and political power in the 1930s, so vividly portrayed in the Perry Mason television series.

Indeed, Jason Stanley (2018) argued early on that Donald Trump revived the 1930s, precisely the period when fascist ideals were in vogue in the United States, with the cult of the “nation” and the strong leader, moral panic, and pamphleteering attacks against minorities and immigrants, as well as the cult of radically conservative religious values.

But is the MAGA movement truly a majority in the US, or are we witnessing a power grab by a minority through carefully engineered political strategy, with Trump serving merely as its face?

From a sociological perspective, there are clear demographic, cultural, and political changes fueling a socio-economic panic over the loss of social status—what Barbara Ehrenreich (1989) called the “fear of falling.” This has led to radicalization around ethnonationalist values, broadly classified in Political Science as nativism (see Art, 2022; Betz, 2019, 2017).

Nowhere has this shift been more evident than in the US, with a well-identified turning point: the civil rights movement, which transformed the Republican Party into what one of its strategists, Stuart Stevens, called the “de facto white party,”its key base being Southern whites, historically Democrats.

Richard Nixon and later Ronald Reagan capitalized on the Southern white vote with the rhetoric of “law and order.”Reagan went further by adding a Christian dimension to the white front, giving rise to the Moral Majority. From then on, the Republican Party was captured by what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2024) call the “racially conservative base,” responding to demographic changes in the US from the 20th to the 21st century, as the white population fell to just 58% by 2020 and the proportion of non-white members of Congress quadrupled. A new racial order emerged in America, and the white majority entered into demographic and social panic, exacerbated by progressive shifts in American society.

With non-white Americans voting in growing numbers, Black voter turnout surpassed white turnout for the first time in US history in 2012. Faced with these profound changes, the Republican Party had two options: change its rhetoric/strategy or change the electoral map. It chose the latter. This was done through state-level legislative changes, such as requiring photo ID to vote, disproportionately affecting poor, Black, and Latino citizens—Blacks are twice as likely and Latinos three times as likely not to have photo identification. In Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida, those with a criminal record cannot vote, a maneuver that once again disproportionately impacts racial minorities, in a country marked by racialized incarceration and sentencing disparities. Additionally, attempts were made to pass laws shortening early voting and preventing election extensions in cases of long lines—measures struck down in court for deliberately targeting the African-American electorate.

Yet restrictions continued, with seven of the eleven states with majority African-American electorates and twelve states with majority Hispanic electorates adopting mechanisms that effectively disenfranchised these populations.

Amid demographic change, the Republican Party skillfully read and instrumentalized the fears of a shrinking white population. Many whites interpreted these demographic shifts, combined with changes in the social pyramid, as a threat. A 2015 poll found that 72% of white evangelicals believed America had changed for the worse since the 1960s, alongside another poll showing a growing perception of “anti-white prejudice.”

It was in this context that the Tea Party (Formisano, 2012) — a reactionary movement of mostly middle-aged white evangelicals — emerged in 2009 after Obama’s election, spreading quickly under the slogan of “taking the country back.” The old social order of Jim Crow laws (Tischauser, 2012) was remembered with nostalgia. The Tea Party’s social impact was crucial in shaping the MAGA movement, decisively rooting white Christian nationalism as a core identity marker of Republican politics in America.

Therefore, the answer to the question posed in this text is clear: we are witnessing an electoral and political engineering process that has transformed radicalized fringe electorates into a national electoral force, steering the country toward white Christian nationalism—ever more exclusionary, ever more puritanical, ever more authoritarian.

 

References

Art, D. (2022). “The myth of global populism.” Perspectives on Politics, 20(3), 999-1011.

Betz, H. G. (2019). “Facets of nativism: a heuristic exploration.” Patterns of Prejudice, 53(2), 111-135.

Betz, H. G. (2017). “Nativism across time and space.” Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 335-353.

Ehrenreich, B. (1989). Fear of falling: The inner life of the middle class. New York: Pantheon Books.

Formisano, R. P. (2012). The Tea Party: a brief history. JHU Press.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2024). Tyranny of the minority: Why American democracy reached the breaking point. Random House.

Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

Tischauser, L. V. (2012). Jim crow laws. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma is a researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney and sessional academic at the University of Tasmania, Australia.

Dr. Bishwakarma: Nepal’s Uprising Has Shaken Institutions, Not Transformed Them

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mom Bishwakarma reflects on Nepal’s September 2025 uprising, widely described as a Gen Z revolution. While youth mobilization toppled a government and ignited debates on corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that deeper inequalities remain untouched. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change,” he stresses. Despite promises of inclusion in the 2015 constitution, caste discrimination and elite dominance persist, leaving Dalits marginalized. Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, he cautions that without dismantling entrenched structures, Nepal risks repeating cycles of revolt and disappointment rather than achieving a genuine democratic transformation.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The September 2025 youth-led uprising in Nepal, widely framed as a Gen Z revolution, has generated global debate about the prospects for democratic renewal in post-conflict societies marked by entrenched inequality and elite capture. To probe the deeper social and political implications of this moment, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney and sessional academic at the University of Tasmania, Australia. A specialist on caste politics and Dalit struggles for justice, Dr. Bishwakarma situates the uprising within Nepal’s broader trajectory of populist-authoritarian bargains and incomplete democratic transformation.

At the heart of the movement, he explains, was not caste or identity politics but a narrowly defined resistance against corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege. As he notes, “To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities… Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of ‘Nepo baby’ privilege and the elitism of the ruling class.”This narrow focus, centered especially on the government’s attempt to ban social media, created mobilization energy but left deeper structures of inequality intact.

Digital platforms played a pivotal role, enabling new forms of youth subjectivity while simultaneously constraining the scope of protest. “Youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems,” Dr. Bishwakarma observes, yet he underscores the limits of such digitally mediated politics in a semi-feudal society where caste discrimination remains pervasive. For Dalit youth in particular, visibility remained minimal: “We can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement… This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal.”

The uprising also revealed the fragility of Nepal’s federal constitutional order. Despite provisions for inclusion, everyday discrimination remains widespread, with law enforcement institutions often biased and ineffective. For Dr. Bishwakarma, this gap underscores a sobering conclusion: “One legal provision alone does not guarantee rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide.”

Above all, he stresses that the uprising has not yielded the systemic change many anticipated. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.”

Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that Nepal too risks sliding into cycles of disappointment unless its youth movements move beyond symbolic anti-elite populism toward a deeper confrontation with caste, inequality, and authoritarian legacies.

Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, lightly edited for clarity and readability.

The Uprising Changed the Government, But Not the System

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Bishwakarma, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts frame the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution. From your perspective, how did entrenched caste-based inequalities and elite hegemony intersect with rising youth discontent to generate this rupture? And to what extent should we interpret this upheaval as a repudiation of Nepal’s long-standing populist-authoritarian bargains between ruling elites and marginalized publics?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this opportunity. Of course, we have to look at the recent political uprising in Nepal from different perspectives. From the point of view of caste inequality, this movement could certainly have done much more. To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities. Basically, Gen Z started this movement against corruption and against any form of elite hegemony in Nepal’s ruling system. In that sense, it was broadly against discrimination, but more specifically it focused on corruption and on the government’s attempt to ban social media.

In this regard, I should say that caste issues have not been central to the Gen Z movement, and they have not been explicitly addressed. I know this is a very difficult and important issue in Nepal, but at this stage Gen Z could not directly confront caste inequalities. Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of “Nepo baby” privilege and the elitism of the ruling class. As a result, the movement did not specifically take up the concerns of marginalized communities. So, I would conclude that the uprising was not directed against caste discrimination or other forms of discrimination per se. It was mainly targeting corruption in Nepal.

Much of the mobilization was digital and youth-led. How do you interpret the relationship between Nepal’s semi-feudal social order and the emergence of digitally mediated political subjectivities among Gen Z, particularly in light of global debates on how new media both enables and disciplines democratic dissent?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Looking at Nepal’s recent development process, social media has been one of the areas where there has been massive change — a significant digital transformation, we might say. Basically, access to phones and social media has been a really important shift. That is the main reason why Gen Z became affiliated with each other in different groups, formed associations, and started creating resistance against corruption and other issues.

But looking at society itself, Nepal is still semi-feudal, with persistent discrimination and many challenges yet to be addressed. Digitalization, moreover, has not penetrated rural areas or many other parts of society. So yes, young people are very comfortable with social media, and they are using this tool to raise issues and push for change. Essentially, youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems. However, they have not fully engaged with the deeper social issues or the root causes behind them. They could have raised concerns about caste inequalities, other forms of inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, or unemployment — all of which would have been valuable. Instead, they focused mainly on two issues: corruption and the government’s attempt to ban social media.

This narrow focus has not created a real chance for broader change in Nepal, nor has it produced significant transformation in other areas. Yes, of course, the uprising changed the government, but at the end of the day, we are not seeing the outcomes that many people in Nepal were hoping for or expecting.

Nepo Babies Have Been Resisted, But Caste Discrimination Has Been Left Untouched

The discourse against “nepo kids” suggests a moral economy of resentment. Do you see this as a continuation of older struggles against caste privilege and elite reproduction, or as a qualitatively new form of digitally amplified populist class politics rooted in spectacle and affect?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: This Nepo babies movement is essentially rooted in social media. Of course, it stands against any form of elite hegemony in the country, but it is not directly addressing the issue of caste discrimination. We can see that in the leadership of the Gen Z movement, not many youths from so-called marginalized or lower-caste groups are represented. They are not in leadership positions, nor are they given that opportunity.

Many young people from different classes and communities may have joined the resistance, but they remain outside leadership roles. So, in essence, this is more of a symbolic resistance against elite hegemony or authoritarian governance, rather than a movement that specifically addresses caste or other marginalized groups. It is, in effect, resistance against political leaders, Nepo babies, and elite authoritarianism in Nepal.

With symbols of state power set ablaze, some argue the uprising reflected anarchic nihilism, while others see a democratic re-founding. Do you interpret this as a destructive rejection of institutions, or as the embryonic formation of what might be called a post-elitist and post-authoritarian democratic imagination?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: We have to look at this from two perspectives. Yes, of course, we can see it as post-elitist, or an anti-elitist movement, and there is a reimagining of a new democratic process in Nepal. But the way it has unfolded in the political system, particularly after the uprising and the formation of the interim government, shows that they are still working within the current constitution, and there has not been much change in the governance system.

Gen Z demanded a directly elected prime minister or a directly elected president, reforms in the electoral system, and strict action against corrupt political parties, but not much of this is happening. After the uprising, an interim government was formed, led by the former Chief Justice and other independent leaders who are very well known in the country, but they are still operating under the articles of the existing Constitution. This means there has been no suspension of the Constitution.

There is no guarantee of a directly elected prime minister or president. There is no guarantee of a new electoral process that would ensure representation of all communities, including marginalized groups. In other words, there has not been a real outcome from this process. So, basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.

What Nepal Needs Is Total Reformation, Not Symbolic Change

A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.

Your book stresses the twin imperatives of redistribution and recognition in the struggle for Dalit justice. Do you see Nepal’s Gen Z revolution as embodying these imperatives—or does its populist anger risk collapsing recognition into resentment and redistribution into vague anti-elitist rhetoric?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you for this question as well. I would again like to emphasize that, yes, we are expecting much more change, deeper change, or reformation. As I stated in my book, to address the issues of Dalit and other marginalized groups in Nepal, there must be total reformation — both redistribution of state resources and recognition of communities like the Dalits in Nepal. But after this youth-led or Generation Z-led uprising, we are still not seeing much redistribution, nor is total reformation likely to happen in the country.

This means there is still a great deal to be done, even though the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 addressed a wide range of issues — for example, social inclusion, the republican system, and different forms of governance, such as local, federal, and state government. Many things were introduced with that new constitution, but there has not been real change regarding caste discrimination and other forms of exclusion.

Young people, in particular, are looking for rapid change and fast development in Nepal, which has not materialized, either after 2015 or, if we look back further, after 2006, when the republican system was introduced in 2008. People expected much more meaningful change so that there would be development, opportunities, and inclusion. Yes, there was some symbolic inclusion in Parliament and in other mechanisms — Dalits and other marginalized groups were included, as were women and other communities — but in rural areas, ordinary people did not feel the impact.

There has continued to be high unemployment and high corruption. So, from that perspective, yes, there is still much to be done in Nepal, and what is needed is total reformation rather than symbolic change. This particular uprising is indeed a revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, but it is not producing meaningful change, nor is it bringing about the kind of total reformation Nepal needs.

Despite legal prohibitions, everyday caste discrimination persists. To what degree do Gen Z protests transcend entrenched caste boundaries, and how do you assess whether Dalit youth achieved disproportionate visibility—or conversely remained marginal—in this anti-authoritarian mobilization?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this very good question. As I stated before, Dalits once again seemed to be marginalized in this process, because we can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement. If you look at the composition of Gen Z leaders, I don’t see any Dalit in that position. Of course, there were a couple of people killed during the protest, and there are other incidents as well, but in terms of leadership, I can’t see any Dalit member included in that process. This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal. It was more focused on anti-corruption and the ban on social media. Yes, of course, that is really important for the development of the nation, but when it comes to issues like caste inequalities, other forms of discrimination, and many broader social concerns, they have not really been addressed at this stage. That’s why I am again saying that, in the case of caste and other forms of discrimination, we need another form of revolt or resistance that truly addresses the issue of caste, so that there will be no discrimination, and marginalized communities will have more opportunities and be able to develop in Nepal.

Without Effective Mechanisms, Discrimination Persists Nationwide

Federal restructuring and the 2015 constitution promised inclusive representation, yet inequalities remain deeply institutionalized. Did the 2025 uprising expose the limitations of Nepal’s federalism as a tool for substantive equality, or was it more a populist indictment of the state’s moral legitimacy?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: I’ve already mentioned this issue before, but I would like to emphasize again that, yes, the 2015 Constitution specifically addressed social inclusion. Because of that constitution, there is representation of marginalized groups, including Dalits, women, and other ethnic communities, in Parliament as well as in local and state government. But it has not directly addressed caste inequalities or everyday discrimination.

Discrimination remains widespread across the country. The government’s law enforcement mechanisms are either ineffective or deeply biased, which is why existing laws are not being properly implemented. Yes, there is legislation against caste-based discrimination — an act from 2000 that was enforced after 2011 — and the 2015 Constitution also clearly states that caste discrimination is illegal.

There are rights on paper for Dalits and other marginalized communities, but one legal provision alone does not guarantee those rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide. What is needed is an effective implementation mechanism, such as police and administrative institutions, that take the issue of discrimination seriously. At the moment, such mechanisms are absent, and there is also a lack of Dalit representation within law enforcement itself. This creates a vacuum and leaves little hope for people, especially those from lower-caste and Dalit communities in Nepal.

Critics warn that anti-corruption and anti-nepotism discourses can be easily co-opted by authoritarian populists who claim to “purify” politics while entrenching new hierarchies. Do you see parallels between the risks inherent in caste-based identity mobilization and the dangers of these new anti-elite narratives?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Of course, I agree with that point, because this present youth uprising, or Gen Z movement, is against elite authoritarian government systems and the leaders who were running the government in Nepal. But there is always the issue of caste identity and representation. Most of the leaders of the Gen Z movement are again from higher castes, and there are not many Dalits or other marginalized groups included in leading positions or processes. This clearly shows that caste inequality and caste identity have not been specifically addressed through this uprising, even though they could have been. The core issues of the movement were essentially anti-corruption and opposition to the social media ban. This means they did not give much attention to other social problems, such as caste discrimination, unemployment, and broader structural inequalities. That is why there is always a risk: if the youth and others involved in such movements do not fully understand Nepal’s social fabric, history, and the deeper changes needed, their mobilization risks remaining superficial.

Another point I want to emphasize is that, even though these young people are driven by social media and digital transformation, their mindset is still shaped by their families, parents, and society. Many come from elite backgrounds and continue to enjoy caste privilege. That is the real risk and danger. It means that, in the future, even if they come to power — whether as ministers or prime ministers — they are unlikely to directly address caste discrimination or other forms of marginalization. That remains a serious danger in Nepal’s current context.

People Expected Faster Progress on Corruption and Development

Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.

Nepal’s Maoist insurgency once mobilized Dalits and marginalized groups in large numbers, but its legacy was one of institutional capture and elite circulation. How do today’s youth movements relate to—or explicitly repudiate—this Maoist populist-authoritarian inheritance?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Many people now view the Maoist revolt as another form of elite authoritarian process, and in that sense, it did not fulfill expectations. But we also need to look at it from a historical perspective. Nepal was then ruled by a king, opportunities were very limited, and although there was democracy, there was little real progress and no meaningful inclusion. After the Maoist movement, however, many things did change.

For example, the issue of inclusion was strongly raised, and afterward a new constitution was promulgated. That constitution guaranteed social inclusion, secularism, and a republican federal system in the country. Still, these gains did not translate into substantial improvements on the ground. Change was happening, but people were expecting much faster progress in addressing corruption, unemployment, and development. Corruption, in particular, was a major issue, and while the Maoists attempted to address it when they came to power, they ultimately fell short.

This led to political shifts. The main parties, like the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, came together, formed a coalition, and removed the Maoists from power. So elite resistance was strong. At the same time, many argued that the Maoists themselves had become elitist, were involved in corruption, and failed to deliver real change. That became a major criticism of the Maoist Party.

Another structural issue was the electoral system. The Maoists favored a full proportional system, but the 2015 political settlement established a first-past-the-post system. This system made it almost impossible for any single party to win a full majority, leading to frequent coalition governments and instability. That is also why the recent youth uprising demanded reforms: a directly elected prime minister or president, a different electoral system, and a state-funded electoral process.

But even after this uprising, none of these demands have materialized. With Parliament dissolved, constitutional amendments cannot move forward. We now have to wait and see what the interim government does. One of its mandates is simply to hold another election. After that, we will see whether a single party can secure a majority, or whether a youth-led party will emerge and participate in the elections. These are the developments we will need to watch in the future.

Dalit Politics Requires Both Recognition and Redistribution

Your scholarship emphasizes Dalit demands for recognition alongside material redistribution. Do you think the revolutionary anger of Gen Z risks dissolving such group-specific claims into a homogenized “anti-elite” populism that reproduces old exclusions under new slogans?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: While doing my research, I argued for two key points. First, for Dalit communities in Nepal, there must be total reformation and recognition of the Dalit community. Within the Dalit community itself, there are many different groups, and there is not much unity. To bring them together around their common concerns, there should be recognized group politics. That is why I argued that group politics for the Dalit community should be formally acknowledged by political parties and state institutions.

The second point is redistribution — the redistribution of state resources and state positions, including, for example, land reform and other measures. But even the 2015 Constitution of Nepal did not truly address either redistribution or recognition. Yes, to some extent it recognized Dalit issues, but only superficially.

In terms of representation, because the constitution did not establish a fully proportional electoral system, there is no guarantee of 13% representation for the Dalit community, even though Dalits make up around 13% of the population. In this sense, I always argue that there must be total reformation — one that meaningfully addresses caste discrimination, lack of representation, unemployment, poverty, and related issues. The 2015 Constitution addressed some of these concerns only partially.

The recent uprising and the new process have not specifically addressed caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination. So, I am not very hopeful that the new process — meaning the new election and new parliament — will directly address inequality, since no new constitution is likely to emerge. I don’t know which political parties will return to power or form a government, whether there will be an absolute majority for one party, or whether a youth-led government will emerge. At this stage it is not clear. That is why I am not fully confident that the new process will specifically address caste inequalities or Dalit concerns.

Nepal Risks Sliding Into the Same Disappointments as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh

Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister’s office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Lastly, Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising both toppled governments but slid toward renewed authoritarian populism or elite restoration. What lessons should Nepal’s Gen Z revolution draw from these trajectories if it is to avoid similar cycles of disappointment?

Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: You’re right that the recent examples from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as other forms of civic resistance in different parts of the world, show that even when there is revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, the outcomes are often disappointing. That is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, and in Nepal. The similarities are clear: young people want total reformation, development, and change. That is what the youth in Bangladesh demanded as well, but at the end of the day, the political process did not move in that direction.

In Bangladesh, for instance, there was a revolt against the government, the prime minister fled to India, and a new interim government was installed. Yet elections have still not been held. The same risks exist in Nepal. Here, an interim government was also formed, and young people demanded an independent figure as prime minister. That is why the Chief Justice was appointed as interim prime minister, with a mandate to organize elections by the given deadline. But looking at the current political process, it is not moving in the right direction. Whether elections will even take place on time is uncertain, and many people are openly speculating about delays.

The problem is that dialogue with political parties has not yet begun. At the end of the day, democracy requires political parties to be central stakeholders. Without them, a democratic election cannot be organized. Elections cannot simply be carried out without agreement among the political parties.

For this reason, I am not hopeful that there will be real change, or that the core demands of the Gen Z movement will be addressed either by the interim government or by the new government after elections. Yes, the uprising was a real resistance against elite authoritarianism in Nepal, but the results so far are not heading in a positive direction. The outcome is not what the people of Nepal had hoped for.

I am also not optimistic that the new process will address deeper issues such as caste inequalities or caste-based discrimination. Until and unless the caste system in Nepal is dismantled, discrimination will persist. If there is no new constitution, or at least no specific program aimed at uprooting the caste system, then marginalized groups such as Dalits will continue to face severe discrimination in the future. We will have to wait and see what happens, but at this stage, it remains very unclear what kind of change will come even after new elections in Nepal.

Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer speaking and gesturing in the House of Commons, UK Parliament, at Westminster Palace in London, UK, on February 7, 2024. Photo: Tennessee Witney.

How Should Mainstream Parties Respond to Populism? The Internal Debates of Britain’s Labour Party under Starmer

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & PersonaVoice of Youth

When Keir Starmer denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” in July 2024, he became the first British Prime Minister to attack it so explicitly in a major parliamentary speech. Yet inside Labour, the strategy is contested. Should populism be called out as corrosive to democracy, or quietly disarmed by fixing everyday grievances? Starmer prefers direct confrontation; his strategist Morgan McSweeney stresses delivery — “potholes, not populism.” Luke Malhi’s interviews with MPs, aides, and journalists reveal a party caught between naming the threat and co-opting parts of its language to blunt Reform UK’s rise. The debate echoes dilemmas across Europe, underscoring a central question: how can mainstream parties defend institutions without alienating the voters populists claim to represent?

By Luke Malhi

On a warm July morning in 2024, as parliament resumed for the first time following the election, Keir Starmer stood at the dispatch box and denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” that promised easy answers but could deliver only division (Starmer, 2024a). It was the first time a British Prime Minister had attacked populism so explicitly in a set-piece moment of national politics. For some, it sounded like the steady voice of reason after years of turbulence. For others, it risked reinforcing the image of a detached mainstream elite who scold rather than persuade the most dissatisfied in society.

Behind the scenes, Labour figures admit the party is still working out how best to handle the populist threat presented by Reform UK, a populist radical right (PRR) party which secured 14.3% of the vote in 2024, and is now polling at around 34% (Ipsos, 2025). In January of 2025, I conducted interviews with MPs, strategists, and senior journalists, with the promise of anonymity to encourage them to speak candidly. What emerged was a picture of a party that both fears the corrosive potential of populist politics and struggles with how directly to confront it.

Exploring these tensions matters because Britain is hardly alone. Across Europe, mainstream parties face the same dilemma of how they should respond to populists who thrive on frustration with the status quo. Do they call out populism as dangerous, risking charges of elitism? Do they try to quietly address the grievances that fuel it? Or do they attempt to co-opt aspects of the populist policy platform and rhetoric in an attempt to diffuse their appeal? Labour’s struggle with this balance offers a case study in how mainstream parties might navigate this populist age, and what that means for the future of democracy.

Labour’s Response to Populism

When asked how Labour’s inner core thinks about populism, one party strategist sighed: “It’s the problem we can’t ignore, but we can’t talk about it either.” On the surface, Starmer has not been shy about naming populism. In his New Year speech, he condemned “the politics of the easy answer” and accused right-wing populists of offering “grievances, not solutions” (Starmer, 2024c). In the King’s Speech, he branded populism a “snake oil charm” that divided communities (Starmer, 2024a). On a train to the 2025 party conference, he described a battle with the “populist Right Reform” for “the soul of the country” (Starmer, as quoted in BBC, 2025, 03:00). Several MPs told me this reflected his genuine conviction that populism corrodes democracy. One said: “he really does think it’s dangerous. He sees it as a slide toward US-style democratic backsliding.”

Yet many Labour elites worry that naming populism head-on risks alienating voters. As one backbencher put it: “You can’t just tell people they’ve been conned. That sounds like you’re calling them stupid.” A Labour strategist was even more blunt: “That was the Remain mistake. They shouted about how bad Brexit would be and people told them to sod off. If we repeat that with populism, we’ll lose again.”

These doubts are rooted in recent history. The failure of the “Stronger In” campaign during the 2016 referendum still looms large. Its warnings of economic collapse were dismissed by many voters as fearmongering, and that experience has left strategists wary of repeating the mistake of lecturing voters. Several MPs pointed out that even the term “populist”risks alienating audiences, since it is almost always used in a pejoratively charged manner, often shorthand for “irrational” or “ignorant.”

This tension has produced what insiders describe as a split between Starmer and his chief strategist, Morgan McSweeney. Starmer leans toward confrontation, “naming and shaming” populists in the words of one MP, while McSweeney takes the opposite view. According to a Labour aide, “Morgan thinks delivery is the only answer. Fix the potholes, raise living standards, and you’ll take the wind out of Reform’s sails. That’s the fight.”

But delivery is only part of the story. McSweeney’s strategy was said to increasingly involve borrowing selectively from populists where feasible, adopting their language on issues like patriotism or immigration, and co-opting policy themes that resonate with disaffected voters. One journalist explained: “It’s not just about competence. Morgan’s theory is giving people some of the populist framing but strip out the nastiness. Show them you hear their anger but redirect it.” 

The difference between the two men is not just tactical but stylistic. Starmer prefers sober warnings about the dangers of populism. McSweeney is more interested in whether voters feel their everyday concerns are being met. As one Labour organiser summarised: “Keir wants to talk about democracy. Morgan wants to talk about potholes. And that’s the real debate inside Number 10.”

Journalists I spoke to consistently described Starmer’s style as technocratic. Some called him “prosecutorial,” others “old-fashioned” or “statesmanlike.” Even sympathetic insiders conceded that he can come across as an “enforcer of the status quo.” Several argued that this style is both personal and political: it reflects Starmer’s legal training, but also Labour’s deliberate attempt to ‘detoxify’ after Jeremy Corbyn. One campaign aide said: “We knew we couldn’t win if we looked like we were promising the moon again. Voters didn’t want grand visions. They wanted someone boring enough to fix the basics.”

That instinct shaped the 2024 campaign. Unlike Boris Johnson, who thrived on flamboyant gestures, or Corbyn, who rallied crowds with populist appeals to the “many not the few,” Starmer positioned himself as the steady alternative. His rhetoric avoided spectacle. His speeches focused on detail, compromise, and delivery. A senior journalist put it this way: “The whole pitch was: ‘We’ll be dull but competent.’ After fifteen years of drama, dull sounded good.”

At times, this meant deliberately lowering expectations. Multiple insiders recalled that Starmer instructed the party to avoid language that might create impossible promises. One MP said: “He didn’t want a repeat of 2017 or 2019, when we wrote cheques we couldn’t cash. He genuinely fears that broken promises feed populism.”

Starmer’s Worldview and the Parliamentary Party

Starmer’s instinct to treat populism as a moral threat is rooted in his background. As a barrister and former Director of Public Prosecutions, he was steeped in the idea that rules and institutions hold society together. Starmer’s choice to appoint Richard Hermer as attorney general in July 2024 was a clear example of this, and something which required ‘considerable effort’ according to one political journalist (Rodgers, 2025). Soon after his appointment, Hermer (2024) gave a speech which made clear his concern about populism and his plans to counter it:

‘We are increasingly confronted by the divisive and disruptive force of populism… We face leaders who appeal to the ‘will of the people’ – as exclusively interpreted by them – as the only truly legitimate source of constitutional authority. Their rhetoric conjures images of a conspiracy of ‘elites’ – an enemy that is hard to define but invariably including the people and independent institutions who exercise the kind of checks and balances on executive power that are the essence of liberal democracy and the rule of law… I hope you take some comfort in the fact that the importance of the rule of law and the constitutional balance is embedded in my DNA and that of a Prime Minister who not only rose to the top ranks of the Bar but served his country as DPP.’

Political journalist Ian Dunt correctly observed that it is rare for British politicians, especially attorney generals, to demonstrate “the kind of political and philosophical depth shown in that speech.” Given their shared history, Dunt (2025) claimed Starmer “had clearly authorised him to do the work they both believed in [to counter populism], in a much more robust and outspoken way.”

Labour’s MPs generally echoed Starmer and Hermer’s worldview. In interviews, many brought up Cas Mudde’s (2017) definition of populism unprompted, describing it as a worldview that pits a virtuous “people” against a corrupt “elite.”They consistently rejected this framing as corrosive to democracy. One MP told me: “The idea that politics is just a battle between good, ordinary people and a corrupt elite goes against how democracy really works – I think we’ve tried to push against that.” Indeed, Labour interviewees’ comments echoed many of the inherent dangers of populism for democracy identified by political scientist Jan Werner Muller (2016). They stressed that compromise and pluralism are essential, that it is impossible to distil the will of the people into a single viewpoint, and that institutions such as the judiciary and Parliament are safeguards, not obstacles. One insider remarked: “Respect for institutions is what sets us apart from the populists. I think for everyone here, that is absolutely key.”

This worldview shaped Labour’s stance on contentious issues. When the Conservatives tried to override the Supreme Court on the Rwanda deportation scheme, Yvette Cooper (2024) chastised a party that wanted to “stop all courts.” When Boris Johnson was accused of breaking lockdown rules during Partygate, Angela Rayner (2024) argued that the Prime Minister had “degraded” Britain’s institutions. When Conservative MPs criticised the International Criminal Court (ICC) for issuing an arrest warrant for Benjamin Neteyahu, David Lammy (2025) passionately argued that the UK’s duty was to uphold international law, no matter what.

For MPs, these moments weren’t simply opportunistic attack lines. Rather, they reflect an institutionalist ethos that sets Labour apart from its populist rivals. Several interviewees contrasted this with both right-wing populism and left-wing ‘Corbynism,’ which, at times, they claimed, flirted with a Manichean and binary view of “the people versus the elite”described by the ideational definition of populism (Mudde, 2017). As one journalist observed: “Starmer doesn’t do binaries. He does compromise. That’s his politics.” This rejection of populism runs deep within the identity of the Parliamentary Labour Party. MPs and advisers alike saw their role as defending the structures and norms of democracy against the polarising logic of populism.

A Compromise Strategy

Despite these convictions, Labour’s public-facing stance has been more muted. The compromise between Starmer and McSweeney means explicit attacks on populism are largely confined to Starmer’s speeches, whilst the wider party message stresses competence and delivery. At the same time, McSweeney’s strategy has steered Labour toward selective co-option of populist themes, borrowing rhetoric on sovereignty, fairness, and security when it helps shore up support against the PRR Reform UK.

MPs are divided over this balancing act. Some welcomed Starmer’s willingness to call out populism explicitly, saying it reassured the new intake that the party was willing to “name the problem.” Others warned that in Leave-voting constituencies such rhetoric could backfire.

A similar divergence in opinion appeared when MPs were asked about McSweeney’s push for Labour to co-opt populist policies and rhetoric in certain areas. Some Labour elites felt that, although it was uncomfortable, it was necessary to reduce the electoral appeal of Reform UK. However, others felt it risked legitimising right-wing populists and alienating their voter base on the left.

Indeed, recent research highlights that mainstream parties risk alienating their core voter bases when co-opting populist policies or rhetoric. A 2024 study on mainstream partisans’ responses to populist radical right parties found that even tactical forms of cooperation can provoke feelings of betrayal among core supporters, while outright exclusion may conversely reassure them that democratic boundaries are being defended (van der Brug et al., 2024). In other words, accepting far-right actors as legitimate competitors may backfire by alienating loyal voters, reinforcing the dilemma that ignoring populism allows it to grow, but engaging with it risks damaging mainstream parties’ own legitimacy.

The result is a fractured Labour elite, and a party that highlights it is not populist, but is simultaneously cautious about declaring itself against populism. As one senior journalist told me: “They’ll quietly fix things, and when it helps, they’ll borrow the populist language.”

The European Dilemma

Labour’s balancing act is part of a wider European story. Both the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) frequently denounce the Freedom Party (FPÖ) as a right-wing populist force that threatens democratic stability. They highlight the FPÖ’s history of extremism and corruption scandals to argue it is unfit to govern. However, some analysts suggest that this moralising tone has also reinforced the FPÖ’s image as an outsider persecuted by the political establishment (Greilinger, 2024). 

In France, Emmanuel Macron has pitched himself as the rational bulwark against Marine Le Pen. His rhetoric helped him win two presidential elections, yet his reputation as the anti-populist “president of the elite” has also fuelled the resentment that benefits her party (Alduy, 2024). 

And in Slovakia, opposition leaders stress the importance of defending institutions against Robert Fico, though appeals to democratic norms often fail to resonate with voters who are more concerned about wages or security (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 2025).

Labour’s interviews echo these patterns. Starmer’s decision to call populism a “snake oil” resembles Macron’s confrontational stance, while McSweeney’s “pothole theory” mirrors the German CDU’s instinct to quietly address material grievances. And his tactic of co-opting populist themes recalls centre-left parties across Europe that have edged rightward on migration or nationalism in hopes of undercutting their rivals. Both approaches highlight the same paradox: ignoring populism lets it grow but confronting it risks alienating dissatisfied voters drawn to populist ‘common sense’solutions.

Conclusion: Lessons for Democracy

Labour’s struggle over how to deal with populism reflects a central dilemma facing European democracies. Mainstream parties increasingly recognise that populism threatens democratic norms, yet they are torn between exposing it and addressing the grievances that fuel it.

My interviews reveal a party uneasy about this balance. Starmer is inclined to call out populism for what it is. McSweeney and other strategists argue that delivery, not denunciation, is what keeps populists at bay – along with carefully borrowing some of their language and themes. MPs, often caught in between, worry about how rhetoric plays in their constituencies.

Since my research in January 2025, Starmer appears to have shifted closer to McSweeney’s view. He has grown more willing to co-opt populist policy positions and language in the hope of winning back voters tempted by Reform UK. A YouGov poll in early 2025 showed Reform UK as likely to be the largest party in parliament if a snap election were called, underscoring how desperate party elites have become. But comparative research suggests that Labour’s gamble may backfire. Political scientist Tarik Abou-Chadi has shown that when mainstream parties adopt aspects of populist policies from the far-right, they rarely succeed in winning over these voters. Instead, they might risk normalising the very politics they sought to resist.

Labour’s experience illustrates the challenge facing mainstream parties: how to safeguard democratic principles while competing in a political landscape reshaped by populism. These are not uniquely British problems, but global ones. For young people inheriting these democracies, the question is urgent: how can political actors who genuinely care about democracy confront populism without alienating voters or belittling their grievances?

 

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