“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump,” argues Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University in a wide-ranging interview with ECPS. He warns that the United States is “in the middle stages of democratic backsliding,” driven by Trump’s effort to “capture the referees” through loyalist appointments across the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense. Dr. Truex cautions that framing opponents as “enemies from within” is a classic precursor to authoritarian repression, even as recent mass protests—“the largest in American history”—underscore civic resilience. While electoral results in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York signal public fatigue with Trumpism, Dr. Truex maintains that meaningful reversal hinges on Republican elites: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses.”
“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump” — this stark warning from Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University underscores the fragility of institutional constraints in the United States amid the continued rise of Trumpist politics. In an extended conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Truex situates the contemporary US experience within a comparative framework, drawing on scholarship on democratic backsliding, authoritarian power consolidation, and the erosion of norms.
An expert on authoritarian governance—particularly in China— Dr. Truex argues that the United States is currently “in the middle stages of a process political scientists call democratic backsliding,” a trajectory in which formally democratic institutions are gradually transformed into mechanisms of asymmetric competition that systematically disadvantage opponents. While he stops short of declaring the US an autocracy, Dr. Truex emphasizes that Trump should be seen as “a proto-autocrat—someone with authoritarian ambitions whose ability to realize them remains uncertain.”
The most distinctive and dangerous dimension of the current moment, Dr. Truex suggests, is Trump’s systematic personalization of power—particularly his effort to sweep aside neutral bureaucratic oversight in favor of loyalists. Appointments at the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense reflect what Dr. Truex calls a classic strategy of “capturing the referees.” As he notes, “You really can’t have people around you who are going to stand up to you and check your power.” These dynamics have intensified under a second Trump administration.
The danger, however, is not limited to institutional subversion. Dr. Truex identifies a rhetorical shift that strikes at the heart of democratic culture: the demonization of political opposition. He warns that branding rivals “enemies from within” constitutes a foundational step toward authoritarian politics: “Anytime you see a phrase like ‘enemies from within’ or ‘enemy of the people,’ this is usually a precursor to some form of political violence or authoritarian crackdown.”While mass demonstrations in response—remarkably “the largest protest in American history”—have illustrated the resilience of civil society, the stakes remain high.
Against this backdrop, Dr. Truex underscores the critical role of Republican elites in determining the country’s democratic trajectory. The 2024 elections in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York (notably Zohran Mamdani’s victory) demonstrate, in his view, public “dissatisfaction with Trump and the Trump policy agenda.” These results also raise the possibility of a strategic recalibration within the GOP. As Dr. Truex puts it, the key question is “at what point [Republican members of Congress] will begin to try to distance themselves from Trump.” His appeal is unambiguous: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses. We need people to begin to check Trump.”
Whether such realignment will occur remains uncertain. But as Dr. Truex stresses, US democracy’s fate hinges not only on electoral outcomes but also on whether the institutional and normative guardrails that once constrained executive overreach can be rebuilt—and restored.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sarah de Lange of Leiden University cautions that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 led by Rob Jetten revitalized the political center, Professor de Lange stresses that “the total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished—it’s just more fragmented.” She argues that Dutch politics is shaped less by populism than by nativism, which has “seeped so much into the mainstream.” Despite the PVV’s exclusion from government, Professor de Lange warns that illiberalism remains a significant threat, while the defense of liberal democracy has only recently become “more salient for mainstream parties and more visible to citizens.”
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Sarah de Lange, Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University’s Institute for Political Science, offers a sharp and nuanced interpretation of the 2024 Dutch elections, warning that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 emerged as the largest party, Professor de Lange argues that this outcome reflects both a revival of the political center and the continuing normalization of populist discourse within Dutch democracy.
According to Professor de Lange, the election results underscore a complex duality: “We can conclude that both things are happening at the same time.” Although centrist and Christian Democratic parties gained ground, the radical right bloc remains as strong as before—only more fragmented. This persistence, she notes, illustrates not the decline of populism but its adaptation: “The total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished; it’s as strong as it was in the 2023 elections—it’s just more fragmented.”
Professor de Lange cautions against the view that the PVV’s losses signal a populist retreat. Instead, she interprets them through “traditional political science theories about governing and negative incumbency effects.” Geert Wilders’ participation in government, she explains, produced electoral backlash, but his influence on mainstream parties remains unmistakable—particularly regarding migration and national identity, now central themes even for the conservative-liberal VVD. “The VVD moved so close to the PVV in the campaign that it even supported some proposals by the radical right that had anti-constitutional implications,” she observes, underlining how populist narratives have reshaped the Dutch mainstream.
What truly defines this political transformation, Professor de Lange insists, is not merely populism but nativism. “It is this nativism that has seeped so much into the mainstream, rather than the populism,” she explains, pointing to the xenophobic nationalism that has become a structural feature of Dutch political discourse.
Reflecting on the broader European context, Professor de Lange rejects the notion that populism has been “domesticated.” Despite Wilders’ exclusion from coalition talks, she warns that illiberalism remains deeply entrenched. “There is still clearly a threat of illiberalism,” she notes, citing violent demonstrations and political intimidation during the campaign. Yet, she also detects a countermovement: “Defending liberal democracy and the rule of law has become more salient for mainstream parties… making citizens more aware of how vulnerable liberal democracy actually is.”
Ultimately, Professor de Lange’s analysis situates the Dutch case within the wider European struggle between liberal resilience and populist endurance, emphasizing that the current equilibrium represents neither populism’s decline nor liberalism’s triumph—but rather, a tense coexistence shaping the future of democratic politics in Europe.
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 5: Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00117
Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series examined how populist movements across different regions construct “the people” as both an inclusive democratic ideal and an exclusionary political weapon. Moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, the session featured presentations by Dr. Amir Ali, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari, and Andrei Gheorghe, who analyzed populism’s intersections with austerity politics, linguistic identity, and post-communist nationalism. Their comparative insights revealed that populism redefines belonging through economic moralization, linguistic appropriation, and historical myth-making, transforming pluralist notions of democracy into performative narratives of unity and control. The ensuing discussion emphasized populism’s adaptive power to manipulate emotion, memory, and discourse across diverse democratic contexts.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On October 30, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 5 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled“We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This ongoing series (September 2025–April 2026) explores the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of populism’s impact on democratic life across diverse global contexts.
Titled “Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions,” the fifth session brought together scholars from political science, sociology, and linguistics to interrogate how populist movements construct and mobilize “the people” as a moral, cultural, and emotional category. The discussion illuminated the multiple ways in which populist discourse reshapes collective identity, redefines sovereignty, and challenges democratic pluralism.
The session was moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, an arts researcher and practitioner based in Utah and Scandinavia, whose expertise in cultural narratives and affective politics enriched the workshop’s interpretive lens. Three presentations followed, each approaching the notion of “the people” from a distinct analytical angle. Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) examined the paradox of austerity populism, arguing that fiscal conservatism has become a populist virtue masking economic dispossession. Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Technische Universität Dresden) turned to the linguistic life of democracy in Germany, tracing how words like Volk, Leute, and Heimat encode competing visions of community, inclusion, and exclusion in the contemporary public sphere. Andrei Gheorghe (University of Bucharest and EHESS, Paris) presented a comparative analysis of Romanian and Hungarian populisms, exploring how leaders from Viktor Orbán to Traian Băsescu construct national identity through historical memory and moral dualism.
The session also featured two discussants whose critical reflections deepened the dialogue: Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St Andrews) offered comments that emphasized conceptual clarity, methodological coherence, and the comparative breadth of the papers. Dr. Amedeo Varriale (PhD, University of East London) provided incisive observations connecting the economic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of populism, situating the presenters’ work within wider debates on ideology, nationalism, and discourse.
Throughout the session, Dr. Hart guided the discussion and er moderation fostered an interdisciplinary dialogue among presenters and discussants, drawing attention to the intersections of economy, discourse, and collective memory. Ultimately, Session 5 revealed that the populist construction of “the people” is not merely a rhetorical act but a performative process—one that transforms democratic ideals of equality and representation into instruments of control and exclusion.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Simon P. Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University, argues that the 2025 Dutch elections signaled not the decline but the reconfiguration of populism. “What was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics,” he notes. While JA21 seeks governmental influence and FvD appeals to conspiratorial electorates, the overall radical-right bloc remains stable. Dr. Otjes warns that a broad centrist coalition could “reproduce the very disaffection it seeks to contain,” fueling further populist resurgence. Far from a post-populist era, he concludes, “we’re still very much inside this populist moment.”
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Simon Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University, offers a penetrating analysis of the evolving dynamics of populism, centrism, and democratic governance in the Netherlands and Europe. His reflections, delivered in the aftermath of the 2025 Dutch elections on October 29, illuminate the cyclical nature of populist mobilization and the institutional resilience of liberal democracy in an era of fragmentation and recalibration.
For Dr. Otjes, the Dutch political landscape exemplifies a persistent alternation between “almost technocratic, centrist governments… being interrupted by brief periods of radical right-wing governments,” a pattern visible over the past three decades. He observes that while populist radical-right parties such as PVV, JA21, and FvD have become structurally entrenched, their participation in government remains precarious and short-lived. “Populists enter government, those governments prove to be unstable, and then there’s a response from the center,” he notes, emphasizing that this oscillation does not represent a post-populist phase but rather “an enduring populist moment.”
The 2025 elections, in Dr. Otjes’s view, marked not the decline but the reconfiguration of populism. “What was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics,” he explains. While JA21 seeks policy influence within coalition frameworks, FvD appeals to conspiratorial electorates “in news environments very different from the mainstream media.” This diversification, Dr. Otjes warns, “is the key explanation of why [the radical right] remains so stable—their ability to attract very different electorates by diversifying their offerings.”
At the same time, Dr. Otjes cautions that a centrist grand coalition—combining GroenLinks–PvdA, D66, VVD, and CDA—could inadvertently deepen democratic alienation. Such an arrangement, he argues, would lead to “quite centrist compromises that lack the change these parties promised,” thereby driving dissatisfied voters back to the populist right. While this centrist stability may project pragmatism, it risks “reproducing the very disaffection it seeks to contain.”
On the European front, Dr. Otjes underscores that despite D66’s pro-European rhetoric under Rob Jetten, Dutch European policy is unlikely to shift dramatically. “The Netherlands won’t necessarily be a particularly progressive government on this issue,” he remarks, given the enduring influence of conservative fiscal and migration stances within the coalition.
Ultimately, Dr. Otjes’s analysis situates the Netherlands within a broader European pattern: an ongoing alternation between pragmatic centrism and reactive populism, rather than a linear progression beyond it. In his words, “We’re still very much inside this populist moment.”
In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Juan Bautista Lucca of the National University of Rosario (UNR) analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei. He argues that Milei’s project represents “a radicalized hybrid—ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.” For Professor Lucca, Milei has transformed neoliberalism into a moral crusade, “sacralizing the market” while turning politics into “a permanent apocalyptic theater.” He views Milei’s alliance with Donald Trump as part of a broader “geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South,” where sovereignty is redefined through ideological, not strategic, ties. Following Milei’s sweeping midterm victory—with La Libertad Avanza winning 41% of the vote—Professor Lucca warns that Argentina stands in a Gramscian “interregnum,” facing both consolidation and disillusionment.
In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Juan Bautista Lucca, a leading political scientist at the National University of Rosario (UNR) and Independent Researcher at CONICET, offers a comprehensive analysis of the Javier Milei phenomenon, situating it within Argentina’s longer populist tradition while revealing its radical departures from the past.
Reflecting on Milei’s sweeping midterm victory, Professor Lucca rejects the idea that the results represent a referendum on economic policy. Rather, he sees them as “an expression of the president’s capacity to maintain a narrative of radical rupture and moral regeneration.” For Professor Lucca, Milei’s strength lies not in delivering material results but in sustaining an affective narrative of moral renewal, one that continues to mobilize polarized sectors of society while leaving centrist voters disengaged. “People in the center,” he observes, “are not very motivated to vote… participation was one of the lowest in the last 40 years of democracy in Argentina.”
Professor Lucca identifies a deeper “normalization of populist discourse” in Argentina’s political mainstream, in which neoliberal orthodoxy is now “celebrated as an act of moral courage.” Unlike past neoliberal leaders such as Carlos Menem or Mauricio Macri, who concealed their economic programs, Milei “doesn’t want to hide this economic agenda; he even sacralizes it.” This, Professor Lucca argues, represents the sophistication of neoliberal populism, where austerity and moral regeneration are fused into a coherent political language.
Asked whether Milei’s libertarian project fits within existing typologies, Professor Lucca insists it marks a qualitative rupture: “He is ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.” Milei’s “libertarian populism,” he explains, blends market maximalism and anti-establishment radicalism with “messianic performativity.” His leadership, characterized by a “rock-star persona and apocalyptic imagery,” transforms politics into what Professor Lucca calls “a permanent apocalyptic theater,” where representation depends less on programs than on emotional intensity.
From a geopolitical perspective, Professor Lucca sees Milei’s alliance with Donald Trump and symbolic alignment with Israel as evidence of a “geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South”—a transnational ideological coordination that redefines sovereignty through shared cultural codes rather than strategic alliances. In this worldview, “external financial dependence is reframed as liberation,” an inversion of Argentina’s traditional narratives of autonomy and self-determination.
Looking ahead, Professor Lucca warns that Argentina stands “in an interregnum—what Gramsci called the time when monsters appear.” Whether Milei’s Leviathan endures or gives rise to “a Behemoth from populist Peronism” remains uncertain. Yet, he notes, the greatest danger lies in a growing “third Argentina”—a disenchanted electorate that “simply doesn’t want to participate in politics.”
Milei’s midterm triumph underscores the urgency of Professor Lucca’s diagnosis. With La Libertad Avanza capturing nearly 41% of the vote, securing 13 of 24 Senate seats and 64 of 127 lower-house seats, Argentina’s president has consolidated his grip on power. The landslide—hailed by supporters as a rejection of Peronism and condemned by critics for deepening inequality—marks a pivotal moment in Argentina’s democratic experiment: one where chainsaw economics meets populist spectacle, reshaping both the country’s political grammar and its social contract.
In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Ivan Llamazares of the University of Salamanca analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei, whose recent midterm victory consolidated his power and emboldened his radical austerity agenda. Professor Llamazares argues that while Milei’s libertarian populism intensifies Argentina’s ideological divisions, it does not fundamentally alter them. “It’s a modification, an intensification—but the underlying structure is still there,” he explains. Rejecting comparisons to Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism, he insists that “authoritarianism is very weak in Argentina, whose popular culture is deeply democratic.” For Professor Llamazares, Milei’s experiment embodies an “extreme illustration” of global right-wing populism—yet remains distinctly Argentine, rooted in enduring social cleavages, economic crises, and democratic resilience.
Argentina’s President Javier Milei has consolidated his grip on power after his party, La Libertad Avanza, won nearly 41% of the vote in the midterm elections, securing 13 of 24 Senate seats and 64 of 127 lower-house seats. The landslide victory marks a major political endorsement of Milei’s radical austerity program, dubbed “chainsaw politics,” defined by deep spending cuts, deregulation, and free-market reforms. The results will allow him to advance his agenda more easily after facing frequent legislative resistance in his first two years in office. Supporters have hailed the win as a rejection of decades of Peronist economic management, while critics warn of deepening poverty, unemployment, and inequality as a result of sweeping cuts to education, healthcare, pensions, and social programs. Despite stabilizing inflation and restoring investor confidence, Milei’s reforms have sparked widespread hardship and a risk of recession. Meanwhile, a record-low turnout of 67.9% reflects rising public apathy and disillusionment with Argentina’s political class.
Against this backdrop of economic turbulence and populist consolidation, Professor Ivan Llamazares, a leading scholar of political science at the University of Salamanca, reflects on the deeper ideological and institutional dynamics shaping Argentina’s political transformation in an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Known for his research on ideological structuring and party system dynamics in Latin America, Professor Llamazares situates Milei’s rise within Argentina’s longstanding ideological fault lines—the enduring struggle between Peronist interventionism and neoliberal technocracy.
Professor Llamazares cautions against viewing Milei’s ascent as a structural rupture. “It’s a modification, an intensification,” he explains, “but the underlying structure is still there.” In his view, Mauricio Macri’s victory in 2015 marked a more significant political realignment, introducing a coherent center-right, pro-business coalition that shifted the ideological balance of Argentine politics. Milei, he argues, has merely intensified this trajectory, infusing it with “a new rhetoric, a new style,” and a libertarian flair.
While comparisons to Bolsonaro and Fujimori are unavoidable, Professor Llamazares stresses the limits of authoritarianism in Argentina. “Authoritarianism is very weak… even the authoritarian project itself must be very weak,”he observes. This weakness, he suggests, is rooted in Argentina’s deeply democratic popular culture, shaped by the trauma of the last dictatorship and the political learning processes that culminated in the country’s 1983 democratic restoration. Unlike Bolsonaro, Milei “hasn’t taken significant steps toward building authoritarian institutions.”
At the same time, Professor Llamazares acknowledges that Milei represents “an extreme illustration” of a global populist trend that merges moral populism, economic deregulation, and cultural grievance. Yet, he underscores that many aspects of Milei’s project are “very typically Argentine,” reflecting specific socio-economic tensions—between export-oriented elites and protectionist sectors, between dollarization and social protection, and between a cosmopolitan upper class and the working poor.
Ultimately, Professor Llamazares interprets Milei’s moment not as a new ideological paradigm, but as a cyclical populist insurgency within Argentina’s enduring political structure. “Milei represents something new in style,” he concludes, but the deeper ideological foundations of Argentine politics remain intact.
In an in-depth and sobering interview with the ECPS, Princeton historian Professor Sean Wilentz warns that the United States has moved “beyond a constitutional crisis” into a state of “constitutional failure.” He argues that the Supreme Court’s presidential immunity ruling has “turned the presidency into a potential hotbed of criminality,” effectively dismantling the rule of law. “We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime,” he cautions. Linking America’s democratic decline to a “highly coordinated global problem emanating from Moscow,” Professor Wilentz calls for a “democracy international” to counter what he terms a “tyranny international.” Despite his grim assessment, he expresses cautious faith that “most Americans will vindicate America itself” before it is too late.
In a sobering and wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Sean Wilentz, one of America’s most prominent historians and the George Henry Davis 1886 Professor of American History at Princeton University, delivers a stark assessment of the United States’ political trajectory under Donald Trump’s renewed presidency. “We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime,” he warns, adding that “we’re no longer living under the rule of law, that’s for sure.”
Tracing the roots of this democratic unraveling, Professor Wilentz argues that the United States has moved beyond a constitutional crisis into what he calls “constitutional failure.” In his words, “The Constitution has failed to withstand the attacks upon it that are undermining certain basic American values and basic American rights.” At the center of this failure, he identifies the Supreme Court’s presidential immunity ruling—an “extraordinary” and “completely invented”doctrine that grants the president near-total impunity for acts committed in office. The decision, he contends, “fundamentally changed the character of the federal government,” turning the presidency “into a potential hotbed of criminality.”
For Professor Wilentz, this crisis is not merely legal or institutional but global in scope. He situates America’s democratic backsliding within a “highly coordinated global problem” emanating from Moscow. “You lift the lid and you see Putin’s influence everywhere—whether it’s Marine Le Pen or others, there he is. And certainly in the case of Trump… there are strong intimations that this is what’s happening.” He describes this network as a “tyranny international”—a transnational front of illiberal collaboration linking figures like Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, and Donald Trump. To counter it, Professor Wilentz calls for a “democracy international” built on solidarity among democratic societies: “We can no longer afford to be divided… We have to think of this as something like an NGO, perhaps—a movement, an expression of something we’ve never needed before, but now, we truly do.”
Throughout the interview, Professor Wilentz situates Trumpism within a long American tradition of minority rule and reactionary politics, connecting today’s populist-authoritarian coalition to the legacies of Reconstruction’s overthrow and the racialized backlash against the Voting Rights Act. Yet, he also stresses the unprecedented nature of the current moment: “What we’re seeing today is unparalleled in American history… the authoritarians, the reactionaries, have actually taken power and are holding it.”
Still, despite his grim diagnosis, Professor Wilentz insists on retaining a measure of faith in the endurance of democratic habits. “It’s an enormous test,” he concedes, “but I still believe most Americans will vindicate America itself.”
This interview stands as one of the most forceful scholarly warnings yet about the erosion of democracy in the United States—and the urgent need for a coordinated, global democratic response.
In a wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Deusto, examines the endurance and contradictions of Javier Milei’s populist-neoliberal experiment in Argentina. She interprets Milei’s strong midterm showing as “an endorsement of his government—but not a blank check,” warning that he and his followers “might interpret this electoral support as a green light to override institutional constraints.” Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism, the influence of US backing, and Milei’s alignment with transnational far-right networks. While his administration remains formally democratic, she cautions that Argentina’s “democratic coexistence” is under pressure from rising intolerance and exclusion, calling on observers to “remain vigilant.”
In the wake of Argentina’s pivotal midterm elections—widely regarded as a referendum on President Javier Milei’s two years in office—Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto, offers a penetrating analysis of Argentina’s evolving political landscape in her interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Dr. Sendra explains that Milei’s strong electoral performance, with La Libertad Avanza securing over 40 percent of the national vote, can be seen as “an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary.” Yet, she cautions, “this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei.” According to her, many voters sought to avert economic instability following US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s suggestion that Washington’s financial support might be withdrawn if Milei performed poorly.
In assessing the opposition’s weakness, Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism and its credibility crisis. After years of alternating rule and recurring scandals, “the movement does not have the legitimacy to point out Milei’s own mistakes,” she notes, arguing that “people simply do not see them as a credible alternative.”
The interview delves into Milei’s fusion of radical market liberalism and populist rhetoric, a dynamic Dr. Sendra explored in her co-authored study “Is Milei a Populist?” She calls this a conceptual “puzzle,” since neoliberalism “dismantles the idea of ‘the people’ as a collective subject,” whereas populism depends on it. Milei, she observes, reframes the shrinking of the state “not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative.”
Addressing Milei’s international alignments, Dr. Sendra underscores the significance of “the Trump factor” and US financial intervention, which she describes as “a form of foreign interference.” However, she distinguishes Milei from nativist far-right leaders, arguing that “his ideology is not nativist” but rooted in a nostalgic vision of Argentina’s 19th-century prosperity.
At the institutional level, Dr. Sendra warns that Milei’s growing concentration of power and confrontational leadership style could erode democratic safeguards. “Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints,” she cautions. Still, she notes that Argentinian civil society and political elites retain “the institutional resources to push back if he crosses certain lines.”
Looking ahead, Dr. Sendra predicts that Milei’s model could endure if inflation continues to decline and middle-class sectors remain shielded from austerity. Yet she foresees long-term risks: “His policies will produce inequality and exclusion,” she concludes, “but we will see that in the long term.”
On 21 October 2025, the ECPS, in partnership with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, held the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. Titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” the event gathered scholars, journalists, and activists to examine how historical hierarchies continue to shape European migration discourses and governance. Panels led by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Prof. Ilhan Kaya, and Dr. Reda Majahar, among others, explored the politics of representation, power asymmetries in knowledge production, and decolonial approaches to migration policy. The workshop concluded with group discussions emphasizing the need to decolonize migration narratives, amplify migrant voices, and promote inclusive, rights-based policy frameworks across Europe.
Participants engage in a panel discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On 21 October 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels. The event, titled “The Impact of Colonial Legacies on European Migration Policies,” brought together scholars, journalists, civil society representatives, and activists to critically examine how historical hierarchies and colonial frameworks continue to influence migration discourses and policy across Europe.
The workshop opened with welcoming remarks from the project partners, followed by Maria Jesús Zambrana Vega, Project Coordinator at Oxfam Intermón, who presented the goals and structure of the UNTOLD Europe Project. She highlighted the project’s mission to uncover the enduring impact of colonial histories on European migration governance and to promote inclusive, rights-based narratives.
The introductory panel, “Who Tells the Story? Power, Perspective, and the Politics of Migration,” explored the intersection of history, power, and representation in shaping migration narratives. Professor Ilhan Kaya (Ghent University) discussed the importance of reclaiming the “right to tell” within European contexts, emphasizing memory and agency in migration storytelling. Journalist Nawab Khan reflected on the shortcomings of EU migration policy in his talk, “Why the EU Migration Policy Has Failed Till Now?”, Doctoral ResearcherMarwa Neji (Ghent University) examined power asymmetries in knowledge production, while Ahsen Ayhan (Solidarity With Others) discussed the emotional and gendered dimensions of displacement in “Home We (Can’t) Carry: Migration, Gender and the Politics of Inclusion.”
The second session, “Migration Experiences – Voices and Perspectives,” foregrounded personal testimonies and lived experiences. Professor Ilias Ciloglu shared “My Personal Journey of Building a New Life in Belgium from the Ground Up,” while Becky Slack (Your Agenda) addressed the media’s role in framing migration and gender. Dr Reda Majahar (University of Antwerpen) critically examined “Global North–South Hierarchies in Refugee Research under European Funding Regimes.”Katerina Kočkovska Šetinc (Peace Institute Slovenia) and Mojca Harmandić (Pandora’s Path Institute) reflected on integration and systemic barriers in their speech “In Between Journeys and Belonging: Intersections of Migration, Integration, Support, and Systemic Barriers in Slovenia.”
After lunch, participants turned to comparative perspectives in the Country Case Studies session. Presentations explored how colonial logics inform contemporary migration frameworks: Andriana Cosciug (Romania), César Santamaría Galán (Spain), Fouzia Assouli (Morocco), and Anissa Thabet (Tunisia) each presented on their respective contexts.
The final part of the workshop was dedicated to interactive case study discussions. Participants, divided into small groups, analyzed country-specific materials and collaboratively developed alternative framings for migration narratives. They identified recurring colonial logics in European migration management, discussed missing voices, and drafted practical recommendations for EU policymakers.
Participants engage in interactive group discussions during the final session of the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
The workshop concluded with group presentations and a lively plenary discussion. Participants emphasized the need to decolonize policy discourses, amplify migrant and gendered perspectives, and foster communication strategies rooted in equality and human rights.
ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole contributes to the final plenary discussion during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
The UNTOLD Europe Workshop offered a rich space for cross-sectoral dialogue, combining critical academic insights with creative and policy-oriented reflection. As part of the broader UNTOLD Europe Project, the event marked an important step toward reimagining how Europe narrates migration—beyond colonial legacies and toward inclusive, humane, and forward-looking policy frameworks.
Group photo of participants at the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives, held at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Umit Vurel.
On October 23, 2025, Deakin University hosted the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics” at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, in collaboration with the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). The event convened leading scholars from across the globe to examine how unelected state institutions—from militaries to judiciaries—adopt populist idioms to claim legitimacy “in the name of the people.” Opening the conference, Professor Simon Tormey reflected on the indeterminacy of populism as both ideology and style, while Dr. Nicholas Morieson’s keynote advanced a framework distinguishing between populism’s exogenous capture and endogenous discourse. Through three thematic panels, participants explored how bureaucratic, military, and judicial populisms reshape governance, authority, and democratic accountability worldwide.
On October 23, 2025, scholars, researchers, and practitioners from around the world convened both in person at Deakin Downtown, Melbourne, and online via Zoom for the International Conference on “Bureaucratic Populism: Military, Judiciary, and Institutional Politics.”Jointly organized by Deakin University, the Deakin Institute for Citizenship & Globalisation, the Deakin Digital Life Lab, POLIS (Politics & International Studies), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), the event brought together comparative, theoretical, and empirical perspectives to interrogate the rise of populism within unelected state institutions.
The conference opened with welcoming remarks from Professor Simon Tormey, who acknowledged the Wurundjeri people as the traditional custodians of the land and extended respect to Elders past, present, and emerging. In his opening speech, Professor Tormey reflected on the evolving state of populism research from a political theorist’s perspective, highlighting the fluidity and indeterminacy of the term. He traced conceptual approaches—from Cas Mudde’s ideological framing to Margaret Canovan’s notion of “the people” and Ernesto Laclau’s discourse-based theory—while raising critical questions about the nature of populism in bureaucratic and technocratic settings. Professor Tormey proposed that populism, far from a fixed ideology, operates as a style or mode of political communication that traverses both elected and unelected institutions.
Setting the intellectual tone for the day, Professor Tormey argued that the enduring puzzle in populism studies lies in its conceptual elasticity—its ability to appear simultaneously as a critique of power and a mode of authoritarian legitimation. He invited participants to consider whether bureaucracies and technocracies, often viewed as non-populist domains, might themselves harbor populist impulses—mobilizing claims to “the people” to defend authority, moral order, or institutional sovereignty.
Following the opening address, Dr. Nicholas Morieson delivered the keynote speech, presenting the conference’s concept paper on bureaucratic populism. His framework identified two faces of the phenomenon: exogenous capture, where populist leaders co-opt bureaucratic, judicial, or military institutions to serve partisan ends; and endogenous discourse, where institutions themselves adopt populist rhetoric, positioning their interventions as expressions of popular will against corrupt elites. Dr. Morieson demonstrated how this dual dynamic blurs the boundary between populism and guardianism, enabling unelected institutions to assert custodial power in the name of “the people.”
Through comparative analysis of cases in Brazil, Indonesia, and Pakistan, Dr. Morieson illustrated how militaries and judiciaries invoke democratic legitimacy while constraining popular sovereignty. His address underscored the need for a discourse-centered approach to detect when bureaucratic language shifts from technocratic neutrality to populist moralization—an analytical challenge of growing global relevance.
With panels devoted to bureaucratic, military, and judicial populism, the conference offered a vital forum for exploring how populist logics travel across state institutions and reshape democratic governance. As Professor Tormey aptly noted, the day’s discussions would not only deepen understanding of populism’s multiple faces but also probe one of the most pressing questions of our time: how the very institutions meant to safeguard democracy may increasingly speak—and act—in the name of the people.
Panel 1 – Bureaucratic Populism and its Implications
Paper 1:“No Public Service, No Democracy. Why Populist Administrations are Dismantling the Professional Public Service,” byMark Duckworth (Co-Director of the Centre for Resilient and Inclusive Societies; a Senior Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation).
Paper 2:“A Different Populism: Anglophone, New World, Frontier,” byProfessor Stephen Alomes (Adjunct Associate Professor at RMIT University).
Paper 3:“Compliance and Capture: Bureaucratic Transformation under Populism in India and Hungary,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Survival, Sovereignty and Destiny: Centralized Power in Putin’s Russia Through Bureaucratic Populism,” by Lachlan Dowling (Student at Deakin University).
Paper 5:“Bureaucratic Populism and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: A Study of Institutional Populism and Hybrid Governance,” by Kashif Hussain (PhD candidate in Peace and Development Studies from the University of New England).
Panel 2 – Military Populism in Comparative Perspective
Paper 1:“The Making of a People’s General: Military Populism and the Discursive Legacy of Soedirman in Indonesia,” by Hasnan Bachtiar (PhD candidate at Deakin University), Azhar Syahida (A Researcher at the Center of Reform on Economics (CORE) Indonesia)& Ahalla Tsauro (PhD student at Université Laval, Canada).
Paper 2:“Military Populism in Egypt, Pakistan, and Thailand: An Empirical Analysis,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University).
Paper 3:“The Re-Emergence of Military-Populist Governance in Indonesia under Prabowo Subianto,” by Wasisto Raharjo Jati (A Researcher at the Center for Politics within Indonesia’s BRIN (National Research and Innovation Agency) in Jakarta).
Paper 4:“Militarized Populism and the Language of Conflict: A Discourse-Historical Analysis of the India–Pakistan May 2025 Standoff,” by Dr. Waqasia Naeem (Associate Professor in School of English at Minhaj University Lahore).
Paper 5:“Hybrid Regimes and Populist Leaders: A Case Study of Imran Khan’s Trajectory from Parliament to Prison,” byFaiza Idrees (Independent Researcher from Pakistan) & Muhammad Rizwan (PhD Candidate in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University).
Panel 3 – Judicial Populism and Competing Narratives of Authority
Paper 1:“How can courts be populist?” by Mátyás Bencze (Former Judge and a Professor of Law at the Universities of Szeged and Győr, Hungary).
Paper 2:“Judging the State of Exception: The Judiciary in the Israeli Populist Project,” by Dr.Elliot Dolan-Evans(Lecturer in the Faculty of Law at Monash University).
Paper 3:“Judicial Populism in Pakistan: Discourse and Authority in the Panama Papers Judgments,” by Muhammad Omer (PhD Candidate in Political Science at the Deakin University) & Prof. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations, and Chair of Islamic Studies at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Deakin University).
Paper 4:“Populism and the Noxious Relationship Between Political and Intelligence Elites in Post-Communist Czechia, Slovakia, and Romania,” by Bohuslav Pernica (Lieutenant colonel (ret.), co-editor of the White Paper on Defence, Czechia) & Emilia Șercan (Assistant Professor in the Journalism Department at the University of Bucharest).
Paper 5:“Competing Populisms in Pakistan: Politicians’ Anti-Military Narratives and Bureaucratic Counter-Narratives,” byZaffar Manzoor (MPhil Scholar at the Department of English Linguistics and Literature, Riphah International University Islamabad, Pakistan) & Dr. Muhammad Shaban Rafi (Professor of English at Riphah International University Lahore, Pakistan).
