Axel Klein

Prof. Klein: It Is Difficult to Label Japanese PM Takaichi a Populist, Despite Her Nationalism and Anti-Feminism

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In this incisive interview for the ECPS, Professor Axel Klein offers a nuanced assessment of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s ideological profile. While her blend of nationalism, anti-feminism, and strong-leader rhetoric has led some observers to categorize her as a populist, Professor Klein cautions against this simplification. As he notes, “nationalism and anti-feminism… are trademarks of a conservative or right-wing politician, but they are not necessarily populist phenomena per se.” Instead, he situates PM Takaichi within Japan’s broader political culture—one shaped by nostalgia, stability-seeking voters, and the enduring dominance of the LDP—arguing that her conservatism reflects continuity more than populist rupture.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Sanae Takaichi’s rise to the premiership marks one of the most significant ideological shifts in Japanese politics in recent decades. Her ascent has sparked debates not only within Japan but also among scholars of comparative populism who are examining whether her blend of nationalism, anti-feminism, and assertive leadership constitutes a new populist moment in East Asia. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Axel Klein— Professor for Social Sciences of East Asia / Japanese Politics at Institute of East Asian Studies and Faculty of Social Science, University of Duisburg-Essen and one of Europe’s leading specialists on Japanese politics and populism—offers a nuanced interpretation of her leadership style and ideological positioning.

Reflecting on the definitional complexities of populism, Professor Klein begins by cautioning against the automatic classification of PM Takaichi as a populist merely because she deploys rhetoric familiar from global right-wing movements. As he notes, “I think you would find it difficult to label her a populist… nationalism and anti-feminism… are trademarks of a conservative or right-wing politician, but they are not necessarily populist phenomena per se.” This observation forms the conceptual backbone of the interview. It foregrounds a tension between PM Takaichi’s affective, backward-looking appeals and the analytical criteria political scientists typically use to identify populist actors.

Several sections of the interview explore the symbolic and strategic dimensions of her conservatism. PM Takaichi’s frequent invocation of Margaret Thatcher, for instance, is not simply an ideological alignment but part of a deliberate performance of decisiveness and moral clarity. Professor Klein situates this “Thatcherian” posture within Japan’s evolving political culture, noting that a significant segment of the electorate has come to desire a strong, assertive leader capable of cutting through bureaucratic inertia. Her rejection of feminist policy is similarly framed as part of a broader moral and nostalgic project rather than a carefully structured ideological program.

The interview further scrutinizes PM Takaichi’s positioning in domestic and international contexts: her recourse to economic protectionism toward China, her appeal to Japan’s aging conservative base, and her relationship to emergent right-wing actors such as Sanseito. Professor Klein’s long-term analysis of Japanese democratic institutions raises critical questions about whether her brand of conservative moralism represents a stabilizing force or a potential risk for democratic quality. While Japan’s electoral patterns and party system differ markedly from Western cases of democratic backsliding, Professor Klein argues that structural conservatism, low youth engagement, and a dominant-party landscape may create conditions in which moralizing politics can flourish without substantial opposition.

Taken together, the interview provides an analytically rich and contextually grounded assessment of PM Takaichi’s leadership, situating her not as a straightforward populist but as a figure whose political significance lies in the interplay between nostalgia, nationalism, and Japan’s institutional continuity.

 

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Axel Klein, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Jan Kubik

Professor Kubik: Populism in CEE Is Rooted in Deep Feudal Structures Rather Than in the Communist Past

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In a compelling interview with ECPS, Professor Jan Kubik challenges one of the most persistent assumptions about Central and Eastern Europe: that right-wing populism is primarily a legacy of communism. Instead, he argues, its roots lie in far older social hierarchies. “Many people say populists are stronger in East-Central Europe because of communism. I think that misses the point. It is much deeper. It is actual feudalism… long before communism,” he explains. Professor Kubik outlines how these deep-seated structures—traditional authority patterns, weak middle classes, and historically delayed modernization—interact with neo-traditionalist narratives deployed by parties like PiS and Fidesz. The result, he warns, is a durable populist ecosystem requiring both organic civic renewal and, potentially, a dramatic institutional reset.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging and analytically rich conversation, Distinguished Professor Jan Kubik—a leading scholar of political anthropology and Central and Eastern European (CEE) politics—offers a profound rethinking of the foundations of right-wing populism in the region. Drawing on insights from two major European Commission–funded projects, FATIGUE and POPREBEL, Professor Kubik challenges one of the most enduring explanations for the region’s democratic backsliding: the legacy of communism. Instead, he underscores that the roots run far deeper. As he succinctly puts it, “Many people say populists are stronger in East-Central Europe because of communism. I think that misses the point. It is much deeper. It is actual feudalism, in a sense, and the structural composition of these societies… which started forming long before communism.”

The interview traces how this neo-feudal inheritance—characterized by hierarchical authority structures, traditionalist cultural norms, and weakly developed middle classes—interacts with the neo-traditionalist narratives mobilized by contemporary right-wing populists. Professor Kubik describes neo-traditionalism as a deliberate attempt to revive or manufacture tradition, often through cultural engineering, to legitimize a new political–economic order. In this context, parties like Fidesz and PiS sacralize national identity through education, religion, heritage, and memory politics, exploiting societies in which, as he notes, “authority is… male-chauvinistic… and that person simply belongs there… because this is how it is.” These deeply rooted cultural logics, he argues, help explain why symbolic interventions resonate so powerfully in Poland and Hungary, but far less in an urbanized and secularized Czech Republic.

Professor Kubik also provides conceptual clarity on the interdependence of political and economic power in right-wing populist regimes. POPREBEL identifies a “neo-feudal” regime type marked by weak business actors, strong political actors, and legitimation through neo-traditionalist, anti-market narratives. Programs such as Poland’s 500+—which “dramatically reduced childhood poverty”—are not merely economic interventions but cultural–political tools for consolidating authority.

A significant part of the interview concerns the durability of these systems. Professor Kubik warns that entrenched cultural substructures and polarized value systems make right-wing populism unusually resilient. This resilience is reinforced institutionally through the capture of courts, media, and cultural institutions—producing distinct patterns in Poland, Hungary, and Czechia.

Finally, the interview concludes with a discussion of democratic renewal. Professor Kubik’s twin proposal combines “organic, society-wide work”—especially civic education from an early age—with, on the other hand, “a dramatic institutional reset.” While the latter may sound radical, he argues that moments of deep crisis sometimes require systemic reinvention, citing Charles de Gaulle’s 1958 constitutional overhaul as precedent.

Taken together, Professor Kubik’s insights offer a compelling and ambitious reframing of populism in CEE—not as a post-communist aberration, but as a twenty-first-century expression of far older structural legacies.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Jan Kubik, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

DamonLinker

Dr. Linker: Trump Is the Worst Possible Example of a Right-wing Populist

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In this interview for the ECPS, Dr. Damon Linker delivers a stark assessment of Trumpism’s place in the global surge of right-wing populism. Dr. Linker argues that Donald Trump is “the worst possible example of a right-wing populist,” not only for his ideological extremism but for a uniquely volatile mix of narcissism, vindictiveness, and disregard for constitutional limits. Central to his warning is Trump’s assault on what he calls the democratic “middle layer”—the professional civil servants who “act as a layer of defense” against executive tyranny. By “uniting the bottom and the top to crush that middle layer,” Dr. Linker contends, Trumpism pushes the United States toward an authoritarian model unprecedented in its modern political history.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Damon Linker—Senior Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania, Senior Fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center, columnist, and author of The Theocons and The Religious Test—offers one of the clearest and most sobering analyses of Trumpism’s evolving place within the global wave of right-wing populism. Across the conversation, Dr. Linker advances a central contention: Donald Trump is “the worst possible example of a right-wing populist,” not only because of ideological extremism but because of a personally distinctive mix of narcissism, vindictiveness, and strategic opportunism that intensifies the authoritarian tendencies inherent in contemporary populist governance.

A recurring theme in the interview—and the one that speaks most directly to the headline—is Dr. Linker’s argument that Trumpism seeks to eliminate what he calls the “middle layer” of democratic states. In his formulation, liberal democracies depend on “informed, intelligent, educated… people in that middle layer of the state” who carry out laws, uphold norms, and prevent the executive from “acting like a tyrant.” Trump, by contrast, “tries to unite the bottom and the top in an effort to crush that middle layer—leaving only ‘the people’ and the strongman running the country.” This dynamic, Dr. Linker warns, places the United States closer to the logic of authoritarian rule than at any point in the modern era.

The interview situates Trumpism within both historical cycles and global patterns. Dr. Linker argues that the Republican Party is returning to an older “rejectionist” impulse rooted in its reaction to the New Deal. Yet Trump’s version is more expansive and more radical, because what the right now seeks to overturn is far larger: the post-war regulatory, administrative, and cultural state. At the same time, Dr. Linker stresses that while Trumpism shares features with “authoritarian populism” abroad, Trump himself stands out for being “personally irresponsible… rage-fueled… corrupt… [and] willing to use state power… to hurt his enemies and help his friends.”

The interview also maps the institutional consequences of this project. Dr. Linker shows how Trumpism simultaneously directs bottom-up grievance and top-down coercion to pressure universities, law firms, media, bureaucratic agencies, and cultural institutions. Some actors, he notes, resist, while others “capitulate” under threat of political or financial retaliation. The overall pattern reveals an increasingly fragmented institutional landscape marked by selective vulnerability rather than systemic resilience.

Finally, Dr. Linker reflects on the future of American party politics. If Democrats cannot adapt—by embracing a modestly populist reformism and distancing themselves from the “old, discredited establishment”—they risk long-term marginalization. Yet he remains cautiously optimistic: “As long as we have free and fair elections… my very strong suspicion is [the Democrats] will win again. We just have to be a little patient about it.”

This interview thus offers a penetrating, historically informed account of Trumpism as both a symptom and accelerant of democratic decay in the US—and a warning about what may come next.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Damon Linker, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

VirtualWorkshops-Session6

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: “Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice”

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Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 13, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00118

 

On November 13, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the sixth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada), the session featured Dr. Jonathan Madison, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho, and Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira, who examined how populism both mirrors and magnifies democracy’s crisis of representation. Their analyses, complemented by insightful discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, generated a vibrant dialogue on institutional resilience, digital disruption, and the reconfiguration of democratic legitimacy in an age of populist contention.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 13, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 6 of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice,” brought together a distinguished group of scholars from political science, sociology, and democratic theory to examine one of the defining questions of our age—how populism both reflects and reshapes the crisis of democratic representation.

Under the capable and engaging chairmanship of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Visiting Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada; formerly of Yildiz Technical University, Turkey), the session unfolded with remarkable intellectual rigor and fluidity. Professor Kaya’s moderation ensured a balanced and inclusive dialogue among the presenters, discussants, and participants, fostering an atmosphere of critical reflection and open exchange.

The session featured three compelling presentations. Dr. Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow, R Street Institute) opened with “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World.” His paper challenged conventional hierarchies between “established” and “emerging” democracies, arguing that institutional resilience—particularly the robustness of liberal institutions—rather than wealth or longevity, determines a democracy’s ability to withstand populist pressures.

Next, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (LabPol/Unesp and GEP Critical Theory, Brazil) presented “Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy.” His intervention explored populism as a sociological manifestation of democracy’s structural contradictions, emphasizing the interplay of economic inequality, charismatic leadership, and digital communication in the destabilization of representative institutions.

Finally, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira (University of Bucharest) delivered “Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy.” She advanced a sophisticated conceptual framework distinguishing between democratic and strategic populisms and called for reclaiming political science’s critical vocation amid the hollowing of democratic politics in the neoliberal era.

The presentations were followed by incisive discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London) whose reflections broadened the theoretical and comparative scope of the session. Their critiques and elaborations inspired an engaging debate that continued into the Q&A session, where Professor Kaya adeptly guided a lively, cross-regional discussion on the transnational diffusion of populism and the institutional responses to democratic backsliding.

In sum, Session 6 stood out as an exemplary exercise in interdisciplinary dialogue—anchored by Professor Kaya’s thoughtful moderation and enriched by a diverse array of perspectives that collectively illuminated the multifaceted relationship between populism, representation, and the evolving fate of democracy in the twenty-first century.

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LauraRovelli2

Dr. Rovelli: Milei’s Anti-Science and Denialist Policies Undermine Argentina’s Scientific Institutions

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Argentina is facing an unprecedented assault on its scientific and educational institutions under President Javier Milei’s libertarian administration. Sweeping budget cuts, halted research careers, and the dismantling of science and human rights agencies have destabilized the country’s knowledge ecosystem. As Dr. Laura Rovelli warns, “the government has deployed anti-science and denialist rhetoric that seeks to discredit and undermine the institutions of science and higher education.” This interview explores how Milei’s radical anti-statist agenda erodes academic autonomy, weakens evidence-based policymaking, and reshapes public education amid growing attacks on universities accused of being “ideologically captured.” Dr. Rovelli also highlights emerging networks of resistance—unions, students, feminist groups, and scholars—mobilizing to defend academic freedom, public knowledge, and democratic life.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Argentina is experiencing one of the most turbulent periods for its scientific, educational, and democratic institutions since the return of democracy in 1983. The administration of President Javier Milei—elected on a platform of radical libertarianism, state retrenchment, and market fundamentalism—has initiated sweeping transformations that profoundly reshape the country’s knowledge ecosystem. As part of these reforms, universities, research councils, and scientific bodies have faced defunding, institutional downgrading, and political delegitimization. According to Dr. Laura Rovelli, an independent researcher at CONICET and Professor at the National University of La Plata (UNLP), the government’s approach is not merely administrative restructuring but a broader ideological project. As she warns, “the government has deployed anti-science and denialist rhetoric that seeks to discredit and undermine the institutions of science and higher education.”

In this extensive interview, Dr. Rovelli analyzes how Milei’s program of market deregulation, dollarization, and shrinking of the state challenges the very idea of knowledge as a public good in Argentina’s democracy. She describes a context in which political fragmentation and austerity policies deepen long-standing inequalities and erode the social meaning of rights—especially the right to education. University autonomy, she explains, is being weakened through severe budget cuts, salary reductions, canceled scholarships, and halted research careers, leaving more than 1,200 approved researchers unable to take up their positions.

Beyond material erosion, Dr. Rovelli highlights the symbolic and epistemic dimensions of the crisis. The dismantling of ministries and agencies devoted to science, gender equality, and human rights is accompanied by a discursive offensive aimed at delegitimizing academic expertise. Denialist narratives—targeting gender, climate change, inequality, and public health—have become central to Milei’s political identity and echo global far-right trends linked to Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro. This, she argues, represents a broader pattern of “global anti-statist populism,” even as Milei introduces a uniquely Argentine “anti-national component.”

Yet, amid the crisis, Dr. Rovelli identifies emerging forms of resistance and democratic renewal. Trade unions, student organizations, feminist movements, and academic networks have mobilized nationwide and internationally. Universities remain “privileged loci of dispute and possibility,” capable of defending epistemic diversity and rebuilding the common good through legal challenges, collective action, and alliances with social movements.

By foregrounding the struggles surrounding knowledge, education, and public goods, this interview offers a timely and nuanced perspective on Argentina’s democratic future. It reveals how the battle over science and universities has become a defining arena in the contest between neoliberal retrenchment and democratic-popular visions of society.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Laura Rovelli, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

KoenVossen2

Dr. Vossen: The Anti-Islam Core Is the Most Important Part of Wilders’s PVV

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In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Koen Vossen, political historian and lecturer at Radboud University, analyzes the ideological evolution and endurance of Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV). He stresses that “The anti-Islam core is absolutely the most important part of this party,” noting that despite tactical moderation, its fundamental worldview remains unchanged. According to Dr. Vossen, the PVV’s “one-man structure” and lack of internal democracy make it both flexible and fragile. Wilders’s “clash of civilizations” narrative, rooted in his early attachment to Israel, continues to shape his politics. As Dr. Vossen observes, media normalization, cultural anxieties, and declining institutional barriers have allowed the PVV to become a lasting—though polarizing—force in Dutch politics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) following the Dutch general elections of October 29, 2025, Dr. Koen Vossen, a political historian and lecturer in political science at Radboud University, offers a nuanced analysis of the ideological evolution, strategic positioning, and organizational structure of Geert Wilders’s Party for Freedom (PVV). Dr. Vossen, a leading scholar on Dutch populism and right-wing movements, situates the PVV within a broader European radical-right context while emphasizing its distinctly Dutch trajectory.

As Dr. Vossen underscores, “The anti-Islam core is absolutely the most important part of this party.” While the PVV has, over time, expanded its platform to include positions on welfare, housing, and law and order, these remain secondary to its central ideological fixation. The PVV, he explains, “is really basically one man… It is purely a matter of what Wilders wants, what he does, and what he likes.” This personalization of power, combined with the party’s lack of internal democracy, explains both its tactical flexibility and its chronic difficulty in governance.

Dr. Vossen traces Wilders’s ideological consistency to what he calls a “clash of civilizations” worldview, deeply informed by his “special connection with Israel.” Having worked on a kibbutz as a young man, Wilders came to see Israel as “the main buffer against Islamization.” This perspective not only anchors the PVV’s foreign policy but also shapes its domestic narrative of cultural defense. According to Dr. Vossen, Wilders’s “absolute core ideology is this anti-Islam ideology,” while his steadfast pro-Israel stance serves as both a symbolic and programmatic pillar in PVV discourse.

On the domestic front, Dr. Vossen attributes the PVV’s durability to a combination of structural and contingent factors: the decline of pillarized institutions, the fragmentation of the Dutch party system, and the normalization of far-right rhetoric through mediaamplification. “Over the last ten years,” he notes, “we’ve seen the clear emergence of a very right-wing media… strongly conservative and very much anti-left. ‘Left’ as a word, as a concept, has almost become an insult in the Netherlands.” The weakening of social intermediaries and the culturalization of political conflict, he argues, have made space for a stable radical-right electorate of roughly 30%.

Despite periodic moderation—what Wilders once called putting his ideas “in the freezer”—Dr. Vossen believes the PVV’s ideological substance remains intact. Even temporary participation in government, he argues, only suspends rather than transforms its radicalism. The 2025 elections, he concludes, show both the limits and persistence of Dutch populism: a movement still revolving around one man, one message, and one enduring enemy.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Koen Vossen, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Monika de Silva

Dr. de Silva: Anti-Gender Narratives Are Highly Interlinked and Interconnected Across Borders

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“Anti-gender discourses are very interlinked and interconnected; we see these floating narratives repeated across countries like Latvia, Poland, and Russia,” says Dr. Monika de Silva. She explains that populist actors strategically exploit linguistic ambiguity around concepts such as gender, transforming technical legal terms into polarizing political symbols. “Language is never neutral… this linguistic openness is used to argue that because gender replaces the word sex, we can no longer talk about men and women,” she notes. The Istanbul Convention—intended to prevent violence against women—has thus been reframed as an LGBTQ+ threat or “radical feminist project.” Yet Dr. de Silva stresses the importance of civic resistance: Latvia’s mass protests “undoubtedly shaped” the president’s decision to return the withdrawal bill to parliament.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In recent weeks, Latvia has become a focal point in Europe’s ongoing struggle over gender equality, human rights, and democratic resilience. On October 31, 2025, the Saeima (Latvian Parliament) voted 56–32 to withdraw from the Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention—only a year after ratifying the treaty designed to prevent and combat violence against women. The move relied heavily on claims that the Convention promotes “radical feminism” and “gender ideology,” echoing narratives with well-documented transnational origins. President Edgars Rinkēvičs soon returned the bill to parliament for reconsideration, warning that overturning ratification within a single legislative term would send “a contradictory message… to Latvian society and Latvia’s allies internationally.” He urged postponement until after upcoming elections, noting that Latvia risked becoming the first EU member state to renounce a human-rights treaty.

The backlash triggered the country’s largest civic protests since the 1990s. On November 6, 2025, more than 10,000 demonstrators gathered in Riga under the slogan “Let’s Protect Mother Latvia,” signaling a groundswell of civic resistance. At stake is not only the institutional integrity of gender-equality policy but also the credibility of Latvia’s constitutional and international commitments, especially given that the EU itself acceded to the Convention in 2023, making certain provisions binding regardless of national withdrawal.

It is against this turbulent backdrop that the European Center for the Study of Populism (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Monika de Silva, a political scientist at the University of Gothenburg. Her research, situated at the intersection of international relations and EU studies, examines how contested normative frameworks travel across borders. Her 2025 doctoral dissertation, “‘Gender Wars’ in Europe: Diplomatic Practice under Polarized Conditions,” traces how bilateral diplomacy and Council of the EU negotiations have been reshaped by conflicts over gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. She is also affiliated with the Gender and Diplomacy project (GenDip) and the Centre for European Research (CERGU).

In the interview, Dr. de Silva argues that anti-gender discourse is best understood as a transnationally circulating narrative rather than merely a domestic reaction: “Anti-gender discourses are very interlinked and interconnected… we see manifestations of that as floating narratives that are very similar, whether we look at Latvia, Poland or Russia, etc.”

She identifies both supply and demand factors driving the spread of “gender ideology” rhetoric across Europe, noting that populist radical right actors strategically translate technical legal language into ideologically charged frames, exploiting linguistic ambiguity: “Language is never neutral… this linguistic openness is definitely used to advance such narratives.”

Dr. de Silva further highlights how withdrawal debates are reframing the Istanbul Convention away from its core purpose—preventing violence against women—toward narratives that depict it as an LGBTQ+ threat or “radical feminist project.” These interpretations, she warns, are not new; similar tropes have circulated across Europe for nearly a decade.

Yet her analysis also highlights agents of democratic resilience. Civil society mobilization, she observes, has already influenced decision-making: “The president… decided to return the  law to parliament, and I am sure that seeing the largest protests in Latvia helped shape this decision.”

Finally, she issues a clear warning about governance consequences. Withdrawal would remove Latvia from GREVIO’s monitoring regime, generating critical transparency and implementation gaps: “A state not part of the Convention would not report to GREVIO… whatever it does is therefore less transparent, especially internationally.”

This interview thus offers rich insight into how legal, discursive, and geopolitical forces converge to shape contemporary anti-gender mobilization—and how democratic institutions and civil society may yet respond.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Monika de Silva, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Erica Frantz3

Assoc. Prof. Frantz: The Rise of Personalist Leaders Is Fueling Unpredictable Global Conflict

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In an interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Erica Frantz warns that the growing rise of personalist leaders worldwide is undermining democratic institutions and increasing the risk of international conflict. Personalist systems—where power is concentrated around a single dominant figure—erode checks and balances, distort party structures, and heighten foreign-policy miscalculation. Reflecting on the United States, she notes that Donald Trump has transformed the GOP into a “personal political vehicle,” enabling rapid consolidation of executive power. As domestic constraints weaken, Dr. Frantz cautions, “we are increasingly setting the stage for more volatile and unpredictable conflict behavior in the international arena.” She identifies leader-created parties and media-driven mobilization as critical warning signs of emerging personalist capture.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Erica Frantz of Michigan State University offers a penetrating analysis of the global resurgence of personalist politics and its destabilizing implications for democracy and international security. A leading scholar of authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and strongman rule, Dr. Frantz situates recent developments in the United States within broader cross-national trends, underscoring how personalist leaders erode institutions, centralize power, and elevate the risk of domestic and international conflict.

Reflecting on recent US electoral outcomes in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York, Dr. Frantz stresses that it is “too soon to tell whether this trend will last,” though she notes the results offer “at least a small glimmer of hope for the Democrats” after months of erosion under Trump. Yet she cautions that such gains do not signify a reversal of democratic decline. Personalist rule—defined by her as governance backed by leader-centered parties—has advanced markedly under Trump. His second administration, she argues, is marked by consolidated control over the executive and a legislative majority, patterns “consistent with what research would anticipate” in cases of democratic erosion.

Personalism, Dr. Frantz warns, not only weakens democratic institutions but also escalates international danger. She emphasizes that leaders who face minimal domestic constraints are more prone to foreign policy miscalculation, explaining that “the absence of domestic constraints makes it very difficult for the two sides to figure out what the real red lines are. That potential for miscalculation elevates the chance of conflict.” Drawing on international relations scholarship, she identifies audience-cost dynamics as critical to crisis stability—factors severely undermined under highly personalized regimes. As she concludes, “as we see personalism on the rise globally, we are increasingly setting the stage for more volatile and unpredictable conflict behavior in the international arena.”

Dr. Frantz underscores that Trump’s transformation of the Republican Party represents a paradigmatic shift toward personalist structure. Though he did not found the GOP, by 2024 the party had become “fully under his control,” with elites aligning themselves behind his false election narratives. Trumpism has thus reshaped partisan dynamics in ways that may outlast his tenure.

Looking to the future, Dr. Frantz identifies leader-created parties as a key early warning sign of personalist capture—now increasingly visible in democracies and autocracies alike. She argues that the changing media environment has dramatically lowered the cost of personalist mobilization, enabling wealthy outsiders to build movements rapidly and bypass organizational constraints.

Taken together, Associate Professor Frantz’s insights illuminate how personalism—far from a regional aberration—is now a global pattern, with the United States neither insulated nor exceptional.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Erica Frantz, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

RoryTruex

Assoc. Prof. Truex: We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump

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“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump,” argues Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University in a wide-ranging interview with ECPS. He warns that the United States is “in the middle stages of democratic backsliding,” driven by Trump’s effort to “capture the referees” through loyalist appointments across the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense. Dr. Truex cautions that framing opponents as “enemies from within” is a classic precursor to authoritarian repression, even as recent mass protests—“the largest in American history”—underscore civic resilience. While electoral results in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York signal public fatigue with Trumpism, Dr. Truex maintains that meaningful reversal hinges on Republican elites: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump” — this stark warning from Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University underscores the fragility of institutional constraints in the United States amid the continued rise of Trumpist politics. In an extended conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Truex situates the contemporary US experience within a comparative framework, drawing on scholarship on democratic backsliding, authoritarian power consolidation, and the erosion of norms.

An expert on authoritarian governance—particularly in China— Dr. Truex argues that the United States is currently “in the middle stages of a process political scientists call democratic backsliding,” a trajectory in which formally democratic institutions are gradually transformed into mechanisms of asymmetric competition that systematically disadvantage opponents. While he stops short of declaring the US an autocracy, Dr. Truex emphasizes that Trump should be seen as “a proto-autocrat—someone with authoritarian ambitions whose ability to realize them remains uncertain.”

The most distinctive and dangerous dimension of the current moment, Dr. Truex suggests, is Trump’s systematic personalization of power—particularly his effort to sweep aside neutral bureaucratic oversight in favor of loyalists. Appointments at the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense reflect what Dr. Truex calls a classic strategy of “capturing the referees.” As he notes, “You really can’t have people around you who are going to stand up to you and check your power.” These dynamics have intensified under a second Trump administration.

The danger, however, is not limited to institutional subversion. Dr. Truex identifies a rhetorical shift that strikes at the heart of democratic culture: the demonization of political opposition. He warns that branding rivals “enemies from within” constitutes a foundational step toward authoritarian politics: “Anytime you see a phrase like ‘enemies from within’ or ‘enemy of the people,’ this is usually a precursor to some form of political violence or authoritarian crackdown.”While mass demonstrations in response—remarkably “the largest protest in American history”—have illustrated the resilience of civil society, the stakes remain high.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Truex underscores the critical role of Republican elites in determining the country’s democratic trajectory. The 2024 elections in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York (notably Zohran Mamdani’s victory) demonstrate, in his view, public “dissatisfaction with Trump and the Trump policy agenda.” These results also raise the possibility of a strategic recalibration within the GOP. As Dr. Truex puts it, the key question is “at what point [Republican members of Congress] will begin to try to distance themselves from Trump.” His appeal is unambiguous: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses. We need people to begin to check Trump.”

Whether such realignment will occur remains uncertain. But as Dr. Truex stresses, US democracy’s fate hinges not only on electoral outcomes but also on whether the institutional and normative guardrails that once constrained executive overreach can be rebuilt—and restored.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Rory Truex, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Sarah de Lange

Professor de Lange: D66’s Victory in Dutch Elections Cannot Be Presented as a Victory over Populism

by MultimediaVideos

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sarah de Lange of Leiden University cautions that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 led by Rob Jetten revitalized the political center, Professor de Lange stresses that “the total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished—it’s just more fragmented.” She argues that Dutch politics is shaped less by populism than by nativism, which has “seeped so much into the mainstream.” Despite the PVV’s exclusion from government, Professor de Lange warns that illiberalism remains a significant threat, while the defense of liberal democracy has only recently become “more salient for mainstream parties and more visible to citizens.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Sarah de Lange, Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University’s Institute for Political Science, offers a sharp and nuanced interpretation of the 2024 Dutch elections, warning that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 emerged as the largest party, Professor de Lange argues that this outcome reflects both a revival of the political center and the continuing normalization of populist discourse within Dutch democracy.

According to Professor de Lange, the election results underscore a complex duality: “We can conclude that both things are happening at the same time.” Although centrist and Christian Democratic parties gained ground, the radical right bloc remains as strong as before—only more fragmented. This persistence, she notes, illustrates not the decline of populism but its adaptation: “The total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished; it’s as strong as it was in the 2023 elections—it’s just more fragmented.”

Professor de Lange cautions against the view that the PVV’s losses signal a populist retreat. Instead, she interprets them through “traditional political science theories about governing and negative incumbency effects.” Geert Wilders’ participation in government, she explains, produced electoral backlash, but his influence on mainstream parties remains unmistakable—particularly regarding migration and national identity, now central themes even for the conservative-liberal VVD. “The VVD moved so close to the PVV in the campaign that it even supported some proposals by the radical right that had anti-constitutional implications,” she observes, underlining how populist narratives have reshaped the Dutch mainstream.

What truly defines this political transformation, Professor de Lange insists, is not merely populism but nativism. “It is this nativism that has seeped so much into the mainstream, rather than the populism,” she explains, pointing to the xenophobic nationalism that has become a structural feature of Dutch political discourse.

Reflecting on the broader European context, Professor de Lange rejects the notion that populism has been “domesticated.” Despite Wilders’ exclusion from coalition talks, she warns that illiberalism remains deeply entrenched. “There is still clearly a threat of illiberalism,” she notes, citing violent demonstrations and political intimidation during the campaign. Yet, she also detects a countermovement: “Defending liberal democracy and the rule of law has become more salient for mainstream parties… making citizens more aware of how vulnerable liberal democracy actually is.”

Ultimately, Professor de Lange’s analysis situates the Dutch case within the wider European struggle between liberal resilience and populist endurance, emphasizing that the current equilibrium represents neither populism’s decline nor liberalism’s triumph—but rather, a tense coexistence shaping the future of democratic politics in Europe.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Sarah de Lange, slightly revised for clarity and flow.