Dr. Louis Kriesberg is the Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies and Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Syracuse University. He has published widely on diverse areas of sociology and social conflicts, including the US-Soviet Cold War, Israeli-Palestinian-Arab relations, non- governmental organizations, and social movements. His recent work focuses on constructive ways of fighting, conflict transformation, and conflict resolution methods. Kriesberg has been highly active in regional, national, and international associations of sociology, conflict resolution, and international peace, for which he has received numerous awards. He was also the founding director of the Program on the Analysis and Resolution of Conflicts (PARC) at Syracuse University. He received his PhD in Sociology at the University of Chicago in 1953.
Populism is variously defined. For the purposes of this analysis, it refers to non-governmental people taking direct actions trying to change the conduct of some other resistant group. They are in conflict. In all human societies there are procedures to pursue and settle many such conflicts – the procedures are embodied in legal and political institutions. However, members of one or more contending parties often choose to take actions which are deemed populist. Often, the actions are intended to influence the conduct of members of established institutions. In this presentation, Professor Kriesberg examines the actions of people engaged in conflicts resorting to populist conduct. He discusses cases in the United States, in European states, and in other countries. In accord with work in the field of conflict resolution, he assesses their degree of being constructive or destructive. This is based on his many years of research and publications on this matter. Constructiveness varies in the nature of the inducements employed in a conflict, persuasion, promised benefit, and coercion. Usually all are employed in varying degree over time. Persuasion varies in different degrees of presumed effectiveness. Promised benefits relate to the terms of settlement being sought. Coercion varies in severity and therefore destructiveness, in varying degrees of violence and denial of benefits. Constructiveness also varies by the conception of each side has of itself and of its antagonists. Finally, constructiveness varies with the degree of differences each side has about the terms of a conflict settlement. In addition to assessing varying degrees of constructiveness, I will discuss how conflict destructivity can be reduced.
Moderator Dr. Alexandra Homolar is Professor of International Security at the University of Warwick. Homolar has taught and researched at universities in Germany, the US, and the UK. She currently holds a Leverhulme Research Fellowship for her project ‘Populist FantasylandLink opens in a new window‘ (RF-2021-527/7), and from 2013-2017 she was the Principal Investigator of the ESRC Future Research Leaders project ‘Enemy Addiction‘ (ES/K008684/1). At Warwick, Homolar is the academic lead of Speaking International Security at Warwick (SISAW) and the co-lead of the interdisciplinary Research in Global Governance Network (RiGG NetLink opens in a new window) as well as the organizer of the Annual Masterclass in CSS/IR. She served as Director of Research Degrees and on the PAIS Senior Management Team in 2018-2020. Homolar received her Diplom [BA Hons., MA] in Political Science, Law, History, and Empirical Research Methods as well her Dr. phil [PhD] from J.W. Goethe University Frankfurt.
Lecturer: Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski (Lecturer at Coventry University).
Moderator: Dr Ajay Gudavarthy (Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University).
Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski is a Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University. Previously, he was a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow in the School of Global Affairs, King’s College London. His research interests are foreign policy analysis, populism and the far right, world order, poststructuralist IR and critical security studies. His research has been published or is forthcoming in International Affairs, International Relations, International Studies Review, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Journal of International Relations & Development, among others. He is the author of the books ‘The Inter- and Transnational Politics of Populism: Foreign Policy, Identity and Popular Sovereignty’ (Cham: Palgrave, 2023) and ‘India’s Foreign Policy Discourse and its Conceptions of World Order: The Quest for Power and Identity’ (London: Routledge, 2018).
This lecture discusses the relationship between Populism, Hindu Nationalism and Foreign Policy in India. It unpacks the major ideological themes and issues of Hindu nationalism and outlines the Hindu Nationalist foreign policy outlook. Drawing on discourse-theorical approaches to populism and nationalism, it then shows how populism and nationalism are related and can be used to construct and mobilize collective political identities such as ‘the people’ in the realm of foreign policy. It discusses how the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Prime Minister Narendra Modi used foreign policy issues for the purpose of political mobilization and rallying ‘the people’ behind their political project. At the same time, it discusses the impact of Hindu Nationalism and populism on India foreign policy. Finally, the lecture looks at Modi’s outreach to fellow populist radical right politicians in the United States and Europe and sheds light on the rationale and effects of this international collaboration.
Dr. Bertjan Verbeek is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Political Science at Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands. He publishes on the impact of populism on foreign policy; on crisis decision making; and on the role of intergovernmental organizations in contemporary world politics.
In this seminar we will discuss the interrelationship between populism and the external relations of the EU. On the one hand, the stronger the presence of populists in EU member states governments and the EU’s institutions, the more likely it is that the EU’s external relations are reflecting populists’ foreign policy preferences. However, this requires us to first discuss whether such a thing as a populist foreign policy preference exists in the first place. On the other hand, the EU’s external relations may have an impact on the position of populist parties within its member states. We will address these topics by focusing on the EU’s worldwide promotion of democracy as well as on the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war on populism‘s strength within the EU.
Moderator Dr. Ana E Juncos Garcia is Professor at the University of Bristol. Her primary research interest lies in European foreign and security policy, with a particular focus on the development on the EU’s conflict prevention and crisis management capabilities and its role in conflict resolution. Her previous research project examined the EU’s intervention in the Western Balkans since the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991. This study looked into the coherence and effectiveness of EU foreign policy over time and assessed the EU’s contribution to post-conflict stabilisation and peacebuilding in Bosnia. In other work, she has examined EU security sector reform and the institutionalisation of EU foreign policy, in particular, in relation to the newly created European External Action Service. Her current research examines EU peacebuilding in the neighbourhood, including the shift towards resilience approaches at the EU level.
Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045
Abstract
In the Hungarian context, the term ‘diaspora’ can refer to two types of communities: those formed through emigration and those emerging from the Treaty of Trianon redrawing borders in 1920. While emigrant-diasporas increasingly adopt migration as a political stance, transborder Hungarians’ strong desire to uphold their national identity aligns them with Fidesz’s nationalist narratives. It highlights their potential as agents of Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. In this paper, I explore how and to what results the two remarkably different experiences of national identity are bridged by Hungary in attempts to revive the historic nation through emigrant-diaspora engagement.
“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians outside the borders,” reported the 24.hu online portal after the 2022 Hungarian elections. This statistic might seem surprising for those familiar with recent emigration from Hungary. In response to the autocratic and populist government, which increasingly infringes on democratic principles, politically motivated emigration has slowly but steadily replaced the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 financial crisis (Sampson, 2021; Örkény, 2018; Moreh, 2014; Ayodele, 2018). Hallmarked by events such as the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like Central European University, the aggressive campaign pushing women into traditional childbearing roles, and severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ community, many Hungarians opted to start a new life abroad driven by a yearning for a more liberal political environment. For this reason, recent Hungarian migrants can be increasingly interpreted as having ‘voted with their feet’, a concept Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) used to describe resistance to the regime underlying the decision to leave. As such, the Hungarian communities forming in Western Europe can be seen as counter-diasporas, as highlighted by Szily’s 2018 report, which shows that only 7% of those living in London would vote for Fidesz. Similarly, a 2022 poll by the 21 Research Center involving 5000 Hungarians abroad found that only 11% supported the governing party (Rutai, 2022).
Therefore, it is vital to understand the people behind the 94%. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that result from people crossing borders and those that emerge from borders crossing people. When the Treaty of Trianon that closed World War I in 1920 detached two-thirds of Hungary’s territory and attached them to surrounding countries, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves under the sovereignty of another state overnight. As Feischmidt (2020: 130) argues, memory politics fuelled by the Trianon cult “became the engine of new forms of nationalism.” In 2004, a national vote was held on whether transborder Hungarians[1] should be granted Hungarian citizenship but failed due to low turnout. Despite this, when Fidesz came to power in 2010, they passed legislation granting dual citizenship to transborder Hungarians, followed by voting rights in 2011. The intergenerational trauma of being separated from Hungary, despite a strong Hungarian identity, made people living on these territories keen to support Fidesz’s nationalist agenda. As such, they became allies of the Orbán government’s nation-building efforts, not least when Fidesz turned its attention to the recently emigrated population through large-scale diaspora outreach.
The past decades have seen growing interest among social scientists in how home countries exert control over their emigrated populations transnationally. State-led transnationalism is defined by Goldring (2002: 64) as “institutionalized national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state’s political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory.” While the forms, goals, and extent of such involvement may vary (Levitt, 2001), Portes (1999) emphasizes that state-led transnationalism is driven by economic and political gains from the diaspora, leveraging emigrants’ feelings of belonging to encourage remittances, investment, voting, or lobbying in favour of their home state. According to Margheritis (2007), state-led transnationalism is typically implemented through political discourse that reinforces national ties and recognizes those living abroad as part of the nation. Gamlen (2008) further notes that diaspora narratives empower migrants by constructing transnational collective identities, elevating people who once saw themselves as minorities to being part of a global network.
With half of the world’s states estimated to engage in some form of diaspora outreach (Gamlen et al., 2013), research on diaspora engagement has become a key area of enquiry for the social sciences, which has been conducted with the primary aim of analyzing the contributions emigrants make within such frameworks. However, less attention has been paid to the micro-level implementation of these schemes, including the role of facilitators and the affective responses evoked in the targeted population. These responses are crucial in understanding how autocratic systems relying on populist narratives achieve their goals, as populism depends on provoking relevant emotions. In my ethnographically inspired paper, I focus on incorporating transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. I am interested in how their cultural identity is used to promote Hungary’s nation-building efforts, what narratives accompany their presence from the side of the home state, and what response this prompts in the emigrant-diasporas. I undertake the enquiry to uncover how the two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland amongst transborder Hungarians and emigrants from Hungary are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the historic nation. The data used in this paper was collected in London, UK, in 2022/23 and Dublin, Ireland, in 2016/17. All proper names, including those of organizations, are pseudonyms.
‘Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced by Hungarians’
It was my first visit to the Hungarian House, one of London’s longest-standing and most prestigious Hungarian diaspora institutions. The occasion was Whit Sunday, for which a ball with a three-course dinner, folk dancing, and live music had been organized. As I did not know anyone, I booked a randomly assigned seat. Once everyone arrived, we took our places and did a round of introductions. When it was my turn, my short monologue prompted one of my tablemates to jokingly comment: “We can hear from your accent that you are not from beyond the borders, but don’t worry, we will still talk to you.” It was then that I realized that on my table of 14, I was the only person who had migrated from within the current borders of Hungary. As my research unfolded, it became somewhat of an ethnographic commonplace to find transborder Hungarians dominate Hungarian events in London, even though most of them had never lived in Hungary. Some did not even hold Hungarian citizenship. While I initially found their overwhelming participation surprising, it can be explained by the place they have historically occupied in their respective home countries as ethnic minorities. Since the Treaty of Trianon attached two-thirds of Hungary’s territories to surrounding countries in 1920, transborder Hungarians cultivated their Hungarian identity under often oppressive regimes of the bordering countries, which have limited their freedom to practise their culture, most notably through restrictions imposed on the use of their mother tongue. Seeking out the company of other Hungarians for cultural preservation activities has thus become a crucial aspect of their lives. Moreover, they have been the beneficiaries of Hungary’s outreach for much longer than the emigrant population, with many schemes aimed at emigrant-diasporas modelled on initiatives successful in transborder communities.
At the core of diaspora politics is a concept shaped by the state that defines which groups constitute the nation, how co-nationals are connected, and what role the state fulfils in their lives. Verdery (1994) explains that the term ‘nation’ can refer to citizenship comprised of shared sovereignty rooted in political participation. However, it can also denote an ethnic connectedness, whereby a nation consists of individuals sharing a common language, history, or culture. In an ethnic understanding of the nation, political identity is defined by shared language and culture, while in a civic one, by shared citizenship and loyalty to political institutions. Verdery (1998) claims that unlike democratic constitutions in the West, where sovereignty resides with individual citizens, Eastern European constitutions often grant sovereignty to an ethno-nation. Although no state’s borders contain an ethnically uniform population, nations in Eastern Europe have historically been imagined around ethnocultural homogeneity, which members of the nation are expected to maintain. These expectations have often led to political measures, with Hayden (1992) proposing ‘constitutional nationalism’ to describe legal processes that privilege members of an ethno-nation.
Hungary is a clear example of a state that assigns national belonging on an ethnic basis. Since the turnover, there has been a strong emphasis on ethnic similarity as the organizing principle of the nation, with transborder Hungarians playing a crucial role. This was reflected in the 1989 amendment of The Fundamental Law of Hungary, which included a new section on the state’s commitment to them: “Bearing in mind that there is a single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of transborder Hungarians, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary” (Article D of The Fundamental Law of Hungary).
After Fidesz came to power in 2010 with a clear nationalist agenda, the Constitution and The Fundamental Law of Hungary were amended again to reflect a stronger sense of interconnectedness with Hungarians outside the borders, including transborder Hungarians and emigrants. While the old Constitution already stated that the president of Hungary represents the voice of all the world’s Hungarians inside and outside Hungary (Verdery, 1994), the new documents went further, emphasizing a ‘single Hungarian nation’ that transcends borders. The new Constitution includes the oath “to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century” (Körtvélyesi, 2012).
As illustrated by Hungary’s severe response to the refugee crisis of 2015, despite the alarming decrease in Hungary’s population due to outmigration, ageing, and declining birth rates, Hungary seeks to compensate for these numbers exclusively through ethnically Hungarian people. As Viktor Orbán stated at the 9th plenary session of the Hungarian Diaspora Council in 2019, “Hungarians can only be replaced with Hungarians” (kormany.hu). Joppke (2005) argues that right-wing nationalist parties engage co-ethnic populations abroad to counterbalance growing immigration and sustain the dominant national group’s claims over the state. Since 2010, 1374 billion HUF has been spent on national politics (kormany.hu). Notable schemes include the Bethlen Gabor Fund, which provides financial support for transborder and emigrant communities (Kántor, 2014); the Rákóczi camps organized to provide an opportunity for young people in the diaspora to visit the homeland; the Balassi Programme that enables Hungarian language training in Hungary; the Diaspora Scholarship, which brings talented young people of Hungarian roots to Hungary for study; ReConnect Hungary, the Hungarian birthright program; and the Julianus and Mikes Kelemen Programmes, which focus on preserving material culture in the diasporas.
Exemplary Communities of National Consciousness
In 2013, the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy introduced a new scheme called the Kőrösi Programme, which soon evolved into the flagship project of Hungarian diaspora engagement. Aimed at strengthening national identity in Hungarian emigrant-diasporas worldwide and consolidating ties between Hungary and its population abroad, young intellectuals have been delegated to locations with significant Hungarian populations. The Hungarian state had previously mapped independently emerging ethnic organizations to offer them state-affiliated status, which the facilitators would support. They would be in charge of organizing the community, disseminating knowledge, and conducting educational activities, which include teaching language classes, folk dancing and traditional instruments, facilitating scouting, and organizing events to commemorate national holidays. Facilitators are recruited through a competitive selection process and are required to “possess outstanding professional expertise relevant for the Hungarian diasporas and to have actively engaged in community organizing, traditionalist activities” (website of the Kőrösi Programme, 2018).
Transborder Hungarians have played a crucial role in the Kőrösi Programme. A quick look at the profiles listed on the programme’s website highlights that since its inception, around 60% of facilitators have been from transborder territories each year. Some had never lived in Hungary before their assignment and may struggle to provide in-depth knowledge about contemporary life in Hungary. However, their expertise in traditional cultural forms has often been prioritized, because, as described in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), transborder Hungarians “to the universal Hungarian culture is invaluable.” Amongst the detached territories, Waterbury (2023: 32) underlines explicitly the role of Transylvania in the nation’s cultural identity, describing the region as having a ‘mythical significance’ to Hungary, considered the ‘cradle’ of Hungarian civilisation […] and the Transylvanian rural Hungarian populations as the makers and carriers of ‘real’, ‘archaic’ and ‘authentic’ Hungarian culture.”
Their adequacy for these tasks was widely acknowledged. In a conversation with the first Kőrösi facilitator sent to Dublin in 2015, she confided in me her sentiment that she would never be as good at the job as transborder Hungarians, although she noted that some of these feelings stemmed from how the state labelled the two groups: “In my opinion, the ideal candidate was [mentions the name of the delegate sent to a different location in the same year of the programme], because on the one hand, she is from Transylvania, so that is somehow important. These days those who are not from Hungary are often considered more Hungarian than us, excuse me for my honesty. But yes, her identity is different from mine as somebody from Budapest. For me it is like I am Hungarian and then what? I am that and full stop. But for her, she and her parents and grandparents all had to fight for it. To keep it alive. So, it is crucial to her identity.”
Pogonyi (2015) argues that, unlike most diaspora schemes globally, Hungary’s outreach to its emigrated population was not devised to mobilize people for political or economic gain but to folklorize the emigrated population to strengthen Fidesz’s nationalist image. Analysing diaspora as a claims-making tool (Brubaker, 2005), Pogonyi defines Hungarian diaspora outreach as a non-instrumental identity project. Its principal goal is to reverse assimilatory tendencies, prevent intermarriage, and promote Hungarian national identification through education programs and a network of institutions reinforcing national identity. This is echoed in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), which claims that “the borders of the nation stretch as far as the influence of the national institutions, which help maintain the national identity”.
To incentivize Hungarians to (re-)cultivate their Hungarianness, the state has identified transborder Hungarians as indispensable. According to Fidesz’s discourse, transborder Hungarians are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, workshy rabble” (Kunz, 1985: 102) in the 1950s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), transborder Hungarians have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Placing them at the centre of diaspora schemes thus applauds them for preserving national consciousness for over a century despite often repressive circumstances. Hence, their presence communicates the Hungarian state’s expectations to all its citizens abroad.
As Kiss and Barna (n.d.) highlighted in the early 2010s, transborder Hungarians increasingly fail to consider Hungary as the primary destination of their emigration projects and, instead, tend to venture further afield. For people in the transborder territories without European Union membership when Hungary joined the EU in 2004 or under labour movement restrictions like Romanians after accession in 2007, Hungarian citizenship served as a passport to the West. Consequently, a growing number of transborder Hungarians decided to migrate to countries that they perceived as economically more viable than Hungary. Still, once in the country, they often sought out Hungarian diaspora organizations to join for sentimental reasons. It is therefore essential to highlight that while the involvement of transborder Hungarians in diaspora communities generally occurred out of their own will and enthusiasm, their presence is often interpreted through the lens of dominant Fidesz narratives, which influences not only their reception and integration opportunities in the community but also the extent to which their views are welcomed.
My fieldwork revealed that their presence often exacerbated resistance from the emigrant community against the government. On the one hand, they played a cultural revitalization role that was appreciated by families with young children and sensitized Hungarians to the fact that the ability to practise one’s identity, language, and culture should not be taken for granted. However, precisely the fervent practice of culture and strong national identity repelled emigrant Hungarians. Outbursts of appreciation for being Hungarian often made Hungarians from Hungary cringe, with critical remarks about what was commonly perceived as ‘magyarkodás.’ ‘Magyarkodás,’ a word that means the active cultivation of being Hungarian, denotes an overly zealous attitude towards expressing one’s Hungarian cultural identity. My informants saw ‘magyarkodás’ as irritating and something to be avoided, mainly due to its close association with the Orbán government and its expropriation of national symbols.
Such sentiments frequently translated into discriminatory remarks from Hungarians. While they welcomed the transborder Hungarians’ efforts to ensure the continuity of events, they complained that they were pushing them out of an organization that was supposed to be theirs. When I inquired into such feelings, I found that many had held resentment towards transborder Hungarians since their time in Hungary. Common reasons included the feeling that they were taking jobs and opportunities meant for locals, with many believing transborder Hungarian networks were strong and helped them get ahead quickly. Additionally, a large part of the resentment stemmed from the perception that these people received priority treatment from the Hungarian state, which seemed to care more about them than its citizens. For example, when the Hungarian state replaced the beloved priest of the community with a Csángó [ethnic Hungarians of Roman Catholic faith mainly living in the Romanian region of Moldavia] priest, it resulted in tangible resistance from the community, who complained about his unusual choice of Hungarian words, but most of all, his incorporation of nationalist sentiments in his sermons.
During my fieldwork, the Hungarian House was undergoing a slow but steady transition. Originally a refuge for all Hungarians who left their homeland after the World Wars, it became a vibrant place for Hungarian social and religious life since 1956, with the arrival of refugees fleeing the revolution against Soviet occupation. To this day, the leadership primarily consists of people who left Hungary during that time. They hoped to pass on roles to Hungarians who arrived post-accession. Still, since this group enjoyed a transnational lifestyle involving frequent trips home, they did not feel a strong need to cultivate their culture through diaspora organizations. Eventually, the group that took the initiative were transborder Hungarians, much to the dismay of the older generation. According to a transborder Hungarian committee member, the biggest challenge they faced was creating peaceful coexistence with older members, who viewed transborder Hungarians with growing suspicion. Despite this, the Hungarian House inevitably shifted towards becoming a predominantly transborder Hungarian organization, which ensured its continuity and gave it a cultural character that many of my informants from Hungary found hard to identify with.
Tapping the Diaspora’s Political Remittance Potential
On 2nd October 2016, the new Kőrösi facilitator in Dublin organized a memorial walk in the Glendalough mountains to honour Áron Márton, the bishop of Transylvania who dedicated his life to promoting Hungarian culture despite the oppressive Romanian government. As the facilitator came from a region of Serbia with a large ethnic Hungarian population, everybody understood that this commemoration was a project of personal importance to her. However, few understood why the meeting point was in front of the Hungarian Embassy in Dublin. As we later discovered, it was the day of the referendum on vetoing Brussels’ proposal to distribute incoming asylum seekers across the EU. As soon as the cars started arriving, the facilitator would quickly usher everyone into the Embassy, emphasizing that it was the duty of everyone with any national feelings to cast a vote.
Transborder Hungarians and the European Union (EU) represent two opposing poles in Fidesz’s thinking. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), populism divides society into two homogenous groups: the ‘pure people,’ associated with the nation, and the ‘corrupt elite,’ which hinders the nation’s unity. Populism’s belief that the people’s will is clear fosters authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on perceived threats to national homogeneity. Populist leaders argue that real power lies not with democratically elected officials but with illegitimate forces like organizations and bureaucracies undermining the people’s will. Hungarian populist discourses stem from a fear of external threats to national unity, often framed through the memory of Trianon. Anti-elite sentiments target foreign or supranational institutions, like the EU, frequently blamed for promoting a globalized outlook that conflicts with the national one. Like other xenophobic populists in Europe, Hungary views the EU as representing the interest of ‘aliens’ that threaten the nation’s purity, from which ‘the people’ must be protected. In this logic, if the EU is the villain, transborder Hungarians are glorified as the ‘true’ people who can save the nation.
The Orbán government has long relied on transborder Hungarians for support in national elections and referenda by making voting significantly easier, effectively allowing them to tilt the results. As Herner-Kovács (2020) explains, transborder Hungarians have come to represent a potent political remittance potential to the state as “politically active and organized communities with strong and effective ties to Hungary” (1161). Since they represent a predictable voter base, those with non-resident Hungarian citizenship – and thus the right to vote – have been granted access to letter voting. After Fidesz enabled ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship, nearly half a million have benefitted from the opportunity. Patakfalvi-Czirják (2017) argues that this created a moral obligation, and transborder Hungarians’ overwhelming support can be seen as a ‘vote of gratitude.’ Their perceived duty to defend Fidesz became especially evident during the 2022 campaign when the opposition leader was rejected by local representatives of several transborder territories (Bereznay, 2022).
Recent Hungarian emigrants to Western Europe, often perceived as critical of the Orbán regime and likely to vote for the opposition, face limitations in their election participation. In 2022, Hungarians in the United Kingdom were restricted to only three polling locations despite the 15 that the community lobbied for (Czinkóczi 2022), which meant a 1000-kilometre journey for some voters. Outraged by these arrangements, the Hungarian diaspora self-organized itself to fundraise money to support the travel costs of those who wanted to vote but could not afford to travel. The discrepancy between the opportunities given to transborder communities and emigrant-diasporas to exercise their democratic rights is apparent. This led Waterbury (2023: 1) to assert that the “2022 Hungarian parliamentary election highlights the phenomenon of competing external demoi, a situation that emerges when an incumbent government differentially enfranchises and mobilizes different external national communities for electoral purposes, thus triggering a competing mobilization of external voters by nonincumbent political actors.”
Incidents of transborder Hungarians incentivizing emigrant-diaspora members to vote have not been well received among the emigrant-diasporas. The unequal arrangements have generated feelings of jealousy and a sentiment that the Hungarian state prioritizes transborder Hungarians’ preferences about the direction in which the country is headed. Hungarians from Hungary find it unfair that people who may have never lived in Hungary would decide on issues affecting those living there. Among the emigrant-diaspora in London, three attitudes emerged toward voting. Some stated that they did not want to impact the outcome since they had committed to the UK. Though not planning to return, others felt responsible for the fate of their families and friends still in the country and found it important to vote. The third group insisted on voting, emphasizing that they would consider the return if Fidesz lost power. As such, to make sense of Fidesz’s overwhelming victory in the 2022 elections, a frequently uttered evaluation amongst emigrant Hungarians was that ‘Hungarians had no chance as the transborder Hungarian allies of Orbán decided the outcome,’ even if, their numbers are too small to have a significant impact.
‘The Carpathian Basin Coming Together’
Frigyes was impossible to miss in the Hungarian community in Dublin, not only because his manners were reminiscent of early 20th-century Hungarian novels – a literary period that inspired him greatly. Having initially migrated for economic reasons from the Hungarian-speaking region of Slovakia, Frigyes spent nearly a decade in low-paid service jobs, but eventually, he decided it was time to reap the benefits of his hard work: he registered as unemployed and committed himself entirely to the diaspora community. His enthusiasm was driven by a sense of finally being recognized as Hungarian after having experienced repression as a minority in Slovakia and as inferior in Hungary: “Borders have disappeared. It is a huge thing that for example at the [mentions specific event in Dublin] there are almost as many people from the transborder territories like from the mother country. […] Here, the fact that everybody is Hungarian is so natural that it is not even a question. Just like it is evident for you that you are Hungarian, not a question and is something that you take for granted. For me, it is a huge thing to see the Carpathian basin coming together, that the nation has come together and to see that this is not something unimaginable, but something that can actually function.”
Once facilitators began arriving in his community, Frigyes recognized himself as a Kőrösi facilitator: having dedicated years to supporting the diaspora community in Dublin, he was confident that he could excel at the task and thus decided to apply for the position. The application process was not straightforward, as it required first acquiring Hungarian citizenship, which posed a challenge. Slovakia, in opposition to Hungary’s policy of granting citizenship to transborder Hungarians, did not recognize dual citizenship. Despite this, Frigyes was determined and, in a bold move, gave up his Slovakian citizenship. Although he hoped to be assigned back to Ireland, he was open to taking on the role in any Hungarian diaspora community worldwide, indicating that his commitment was ultimately not to his host country but to the newfound freedom to be Hungarian fostered by emigrant-diaspora spaces. Shortly after, another transborder Hungarian from the Dublin diaspora followed suit and stayed in the job with her assigned community ever since.
Transborder Hungarians thrived in every diaspora community I studied, often attributing their success to the emigrant-diaspora space, which allowed them to express their Hungarian identity fully. Placing a great emphasis on national identity and cultural practices, they regularly attended diaspora events, which they described as giving them a sense of integration into the nation for the first time. Although some had spent much of their lives in Hungary, they described facing xenophobia and resistance from locals. One participant explained that identities are born out of people’s need to differentiate themselves from the people around them based on the ‘us vs them’ formula. Nonetheless, as the population of Hungary is relatively homogenous, there is not much option to create such distinctions. Therefore, as he put it, discrimination is often not based on fundamental differences but on perceptions that “paint one with the colours of the nation and the other one with the colours of distance.” In Ireland, however, where all Hungarians became a minority, it was a natural instinct to come together to maintain their identity, forming a unified community. While many transborder Hungarians initially arrived in Ireland to return to Hungary, their participation in the diaspora led them to reconsider that intention, as their connection to the home community conflicted with the fulfilment that emerged from being part of a cohesive Hungarian group abroad.
Rooted in this experience, in Ireland, transborder Hungarians felt that with their presence, they were actively contributing to a new definition of national unity, which involved the spreading of irredentist ideologies. As one of my participants explained, she had plans to bring her experience back home to Transylvania, but she often felt side-tracked by feelings experienced in her diaspora community. She explained, “They seem to like the thought of big Hungary and appreciate people from these territories a lot. And I find it fantastic to get this feeling. I always get goosebumps”—such processes aligned with Fidesz’s agenda. As Lowe and Peto (2013) emphasize, irredentist narratives are forever present in modern Hungarian politics. While Orbán has never specifically claimed to intend to re-attach the lost territories to Hungary, he consistently peeves neighbouring countries with the close ties he maintains with transborder Hungarians, not least by designating 4th June – the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon – as a ‘day of national unity.’ Lowe and Peto also note that Hungarian everyday life is scattered with allusions to the detached territories inherently belonging to Hungary, including the generalised use of the term ‘mai Románia területén’ [on the territory of current-day Romania] and weather forecasts showing temperatures for the detached territories. As Sava (2020) further illustrates, since 2018, Hungary has also opposed Europe’s celebration of the end of the two World Wars as moments of reconciliation and European integration, instead hoarding resentment against Western states for letting the Trianon Treaty happen.
At the New Year’s Eve ball at the Hungarian House, as the clock struck midnight, three anthems played to usher in the New Year: The Hungarian national anthem, the British national anthem, and finally, the anthem of the Székely people, an ethnic Hungarian group primarily living in Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș counties of Romania. I was already accustomed to hearing this anthem at Hungarian church services, so I did not question its inclusion in such an event. However, a fellow participant was visibly confused and asked, “What is this? Is this something from here? I’ve never heard it before!” When another person explained what it was, the first person sighed and made a face, clearly disapproving of the choice. When I inquired with the operating director of the event, he explained that the decision was personal, as he felt the anthem was meaningful and dear to many attendees. Other transborder Hungarian attendees justified the inclusion by referring to Fidesz’s decision to replace the European Union flag with the Székely flag on the National Parliament—an act many Hungarians from Hungary saw as provocative and irredentist. The incident highlighted the complex dynamic that Hungarian diaspora members often faced. By practicing their culture at the Hungarian House, they were forced to navigate the delicate balance between balancing a cosmopolitan European identity, which had helped their integration into the UK, and the growing nationalist and irredentist sentiments within the diaspora community, which suddenly seemed like a pre-condition to keeping their traditions alive.
Conclusion
Populism is a tool of isolation that works well with the restrictive ideologies of nationalism as illustrated by the recent political processes unfolding in Hungary. Nationalism centres on the nation as a community with shared values, culture, and identity and emphasizes the importance of sovereignty and independence. It frames the country as being threatened by external or internal forces, such as immigration, foreign influence, or globalization, to which the antidote is people loyal to the nation-building process through their insistence on the practice and preservation of the authentic culture pertinent to the nation. In the Hungarian context, Fidesz has identified transborder Hungarians as key allies for their patriotic feelings regarding Hungarian culture that evolved due to a century’s worth of being a minority.
In this paper, I enquired into one specific context in which their help in promoting nationalist narratives was relied on, namely the diaspora outreach programmes of the Hungarian state targeting recently emigrated Hungarians to the West of Europe. In line with the goals of diaspora engagement, their involvement was aimed to boost nationalist pride and cultivate Hungarian culture, incentivize voting behaviour on the side of Fidesz, and an irredentist approach. Further to the government being invested in mobilizing transborder Hungarians for such purposes, what enhanced their collaboration was that these people found a unique haven of identity preservation in emigrant-diasporas. In London and Dublin, transborder Hungarians thrived in emigrant-diaspora communities, primarily due to the deterritorialised nature of diaspora spaces. The territorial detachment from their country of origin and from Hungary rid them of the resistance of the states whose territories they used to reside on and the resistance of Hungarians in Hungary, who often perceived them as unwanted migrants. While, on the one hand, this new space empowered them to cultivate their Hungarian identity without limitations, at the same time, it reinforced their alignment with the Hungarian state’s goals: regardless of whether they supported Fidesz, their participation took places within dominant Fidesz narratives and as such, through their presence, Fidesz found a way to penetrate emigrant-diaspora spaces.
Nonetheless, the response was mixed. While the two communities studied were geographically not too far apart, the context differed: the Irish diaspora community in 2016/17 consisted of recent emigrants who were only trying to find their feet in the country. Most of these emigrants identified as economic migrants with plans to return. Thus, they were keen to stay in touch with their Hungarian roots and identified membership in the community of compatriots as a pre-condition to their success in the country. As such, the atmosphere in diaspora spaces was more community-oriented and forgiving of differences. However, in the case of the Hungarian House in London, which principally emerged out of political migration, people were less welcoming of state narratives and often penalized individuals who were seen to represent the home state’s ideologies. Nonetheless, in a community where most people lived transnational lives and felt equally invested in their host country, transborder Hungarians were often the only people motivated enough to invest time into keeping the community of Hungarians alive. By taking on such roles, they were transforming the very texture of what being part of an emigrant-diaspora meant: spaces of political resistance transformed into venues expressing nationalistic sentiments, reproducing Fidesz’s narratives. While on the surface, aligning transborder Hungarians with Hungarian diaspora outreach highlights a clever political move, it remains to be seen what impact this strategy can achieve. From the evidence gathered, it seemed that the long-term effect might be counter-productive and might result in the withdrawal of Hungarians from spaces dedicated to the preservation of Hungarian culture as they increasingly fail to identify with the state-led processes unfolding in them, thus undermining the very goal of diaspora outreach.
(*) Judit Molnar is a PhD researcher of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, where her research focuses on the correlations between home state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity amongst first-generation Hungarian and Venezuelan migrants to London, the United Kingdom. Judit holds a research Master’s in Cultural and Social Anthropology from the University of Vienna and another Master’s in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews. Judit has engaged with Hungarian diasporas in Ireland, Argentina, and the United Kingdom. Before coming to Oxford, she was a diaspora facilitator of the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy. She has also worked with the UN’s International Organization for Migration, focusing on the Venezuelan migration crisis, and the European Commission’s Cabinet for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, researching ways to foster a pan-European identity.
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[1] In academic literature, the term ‘kin-state minorities’ is also frequently employed.
Lecturer:Dr. Georg Loefflman (Assistant Professor at Queen Mary University of London).
Moderator:Dr. Jonny Hall (Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science).
Dr. Georg Loefflman is Assistant Professor at Queen Mary University of London. Previously, he was Assistant Professor in War Studies and US Foreign Policy at the Department of Politics and International Studies (PAIS) at the University of Warwick (until March 2023). Before that, he undertook a three-year Early Career Fellowship (2018-2021) funded by the Leverhulme Trust with a research project on the interlinkage of security discourses and populist rhetoric in the United States under the Trump presidency.
Moderator Dr. Jonny Hall is a Lecturer at Department of International Relations at London School of Economics. Prior to being an LSE Fellow, he was a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the University of Surrey. He previously completed his PhD in the International Relations department at LSE before spending a year as an IRD Fellow.
ECPS organized its fourth virtual Summer School on July 1-5, 2024, focusing on the relations between populism and foreign policy. The goal was twofold: to examine the theories related to the influence of populism on international relations and analyze case studies such as the US, Turkey, India, Brexit, and Israel to see how leaders use populist instruments in external politics. The second lecture on the first day of Summer School was given by Dr. Angelos Chryssogelos. He examined the global rise of populism and how it sparked debate about its impact on the liberal international order. He argued that a deeper understanding of populism is needed to appreciate its varied effects on the international system.
The opening lecture by Professor Destradi examined the international implications of populism, first by outlining how populism has been conceptualized in comparative politics and political theory. It also introduced the current state of research on the global effects of populism, particularly its potential impact on foreign policy, international disputes, contributions to global public goods, participation in multilateral institutions, and the formation of partnerships with authoritarian and populist governments.
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0092
Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.
Africa has become the focal point of a new great power struggle, reminiscent of the Cold War but with a distinctly civilizational dimension. Unlike the colonial powers of the past, today’s major actors—Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC)—position themselves as allies of the Global South, presenting alternative paths to modernization that challenge Western dominance. This competition is driven by the pursuit of Africa’s vast natural resources, strategic geographic positions, and potential economic partnerships.
The new great power competition in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political, economic, and security landscape. Unlike the colonial era, this competition is characterized by a narrative of anti-Western solidarity, TRIC states present themselves as alternatives to the Western model of development. Each position itself as a partner of Africa, offering infrastructure investments, trade, and security assistance without the liberal democratic conditions often attached to Western aid. At stake are billions of dollars in trade, access to critical minerals, and influence over strategic regions.
Turkey leverages its Ottoman heritage and cultural ties, combining soft power initiatives like education and humanitarian aid with increasing defense exports. Russia, through its Wagner Group and strategic partnerships, combines military assistance with anti-colonial rhetoric. India emphasizes historical ties and South-South cooperation while expanding its trade and energy partnerships across Africa. China leads this competition with extensive infrastructure projects, debt financing, and its Belt and Road Initiative, offering a model of authoritarian modernization.
These nations share a common goal: diminishing Western influence and promoting a multipolar world order. Their efforts resonate in Africa, where Western powers are criticized for their colonial past and for attaching conditions to aid. However, the involvement of these new great powers is not purely altruistic. Their strategies often involve competing among themselves for resources, markets, and geopolitical influence, with some adopting hard power tactics that echo the imperialism of the past.
This report provides actionable recommendations for policy makers, NGOs, and academics in both liberal democracies and African nations, aiming to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape while prioritizing Africa’s autonomy and development goals. It underscores the importance of collaboration, transparency, and shared values to ensure a balanced and equitable future for Africa in the global order.
Shared Motivations: Turkey, Russia, India and China seek to diminish Western influence, particularly that of the United States, in Africa. Each nation emphasizes a historical absence of colonial exploitation in Africa, contrasting their engagement with the imperialist history of the West.
Civilizational Narratives: China and Turkey assert the superiority of their civilizational values over Western norms, presenting themselves as models of development without liberal democratic constraints. Russia and India leverage their shared anti-colonial history with Africa, portraying themselves as partners in the broader fight against Western imperialism.
Strategies: Soft Power – All four nations employ development aid, infrastructure projects, and educational programs to gain influence. China leads in infrastructure, while Turkey and India focus on cultural and educational ties. Hard Power – increasing military engagements, such as China’s Djibouti base and Turkey’s defense agreements with African states, demonstrate a willingness to use force to secure interests. Russia’s Wagner Group and India’s naval presence underscore their strategic ambitions.
Opportunities and Risks: These powers offer no-strings-attached aid and economic partnerships, appealing to African leaders wary of Western conditionality. However, their growing use of hard power raises concerns about neo-imperialism, resource exploitation, and authoritarian influence, challenging the narrative of altruistic partnership.
Competing Interests: Despite a shared goal of diminishing US hegemony, China, Russia, Turkey, and India increasingly compete with one another for influence, creating potential flashpoints in regions like East Africa.
The new great power competition in Africa represents a complex struggle involving economics, geopolitics, and ideology. While China, Russia, Turkey, and India align in their opposition to Western dominance, they also vie against each other for strategic advantage. This competition challenges the liberal democratic order, offering Africans alternative development models rooted in authoritarian governance and civilizational narratives.
As these powers expand their presence, the risk of militarization and resource-driven exploitation grows, underscoring the complexity of Africa’s geopolitical landscape. For liberal democracies, this competition highlights the need for a recalibrated approach to African engagement. Transparent partnerships, infrastructure investments, and strengthened support for democratic institutions can counterbalance authoritarian models.
For African nations, this dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. Leveraging this competition to secure fairer terms for trade, development aid, and security assistance is essential to preserving sovereignty and fostering sustainable growth. Engaging with these emerging powers could accelerate development, but it may also erode democratic governance and foster dependency.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must reassess their strategies to remain relevant in a multipolar Africa. This evolving contest reflects a broader global shift toward multipolarity, with Africa positioned as a pivotal arena in the battle to reshape the post-Cold War world order.
Statue of a child slave in Zanzibar. Photo: Shutterstock.
In the 19th century, the competition among Europe’s major powers led to the invasion and colonization of almost the entire African continent. However, drawing a direct analogy between today’s great power competition in Africa and the colonial era oversimplifies the dynamics at play. Unlike the previous scramble for Africa, the so-called “New Scramble for Africa” (The Economist, 2019) might bring tangible benefits to ordinary Africans.
Africa, despite being the poorest inhabited continent, remains a region of immense potential. Its vast oil and mineral wealth, coupled with significant agricultural resources, are juxtaposed with widespread poverty. Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism about Africa’s future. The continent is increasingly recognized as a region of strategic importance by global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States, as well as regional actors like Turkey and India. Africa’s importance is rooted in its rapidly growing population—projected to be the largest globally by the end of the century—and its abundant natural resources, including minerals essential for emerging technologies like electric vehicles and mobile phones. While much of the developed world grapples with aging populations and declining fertility rates—some, like China, even confronting the paradox of growing old before achieving widespread prosperity—Africa’s demographic trends point to a youthful and dynamic future.
Between 2000 and 2020, African nations experienced stable economic growth (Zajączkowski & Kumar, 2020), a trend that has continued largely uninterrupted in sub-Saharan Africa, except during the COVID-19 pandemic. By the mid-2010s, Africa’s economic performance surpassed that of other developing regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2014, 2015). This growth has often been driven by internal demand, including private consumption, public infrastructure investment, and expanding trade ties with emerging markets (African Development Bank, 2019). Projections estimate that by 2060, Africa’s middle class will reach 1.1 billion people—approximately 50% of the continent’s population (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2012).
Despite these promising trends, Africa currently accounts for just 3% of global trade (African Development Bank, 2012; UNECA, 2013). However, the continent’s youthful population, rapid urbanization, and expanding educated middle class are transforming it into an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. Nations such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, the United States, and European powers are deepening their engagement with Africa, driven by a mix of strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.
The competition among these major powers has the potential to create a win-win scenario for Africans. By leveraging rivalries, African nations could secure better investment deals and improved terms of engagement. However, there are risks. This competition could result in increased external support for corrupt or oppressive leaders as foreign powers prioritize their strategic goals over good governance. Nevertheless, the potential benefits are evident: increased investment can create jobs, improve infrastructure, and enhance Africa’s influence within global institutions. For emerging global powers, Africa represents an opportunity not only to boost national wealth and secure access to critical raw materials but also to expand their global influence and military reach, often at the expense of established powers like the United States.
China, Russia, Turkey, and India, in particular, are deepening their economic, diplomatic, and military ties with African states using a mix of soft power, sharp power, and, occasionally, hard power.
The civilizational populism promoted by emerging powers like Turkey, China, and others provides a distinct alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. These nations seek to position themselves as “civilization-states,” claiming to reconnect with the values and traditions that historically made their societies great. This strategic positioning not only challenges the hegemony of liberal democratic norms but also resonates with African states seeking development paths that reject Western-imposed conditions and values.
In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan exemplifies this civilizational populism. Erdogan’s leadership employs a dual narrative: domestically, he positions himself as the defender of Islamic values against secularist elites, and internationally, he portrays Turkey as the protector of Muslim interests against Western dominance (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). By framing Turkey as the heir to Ottoman-Islamic civilization, Erdogan not only consolidates his domestic support but also positions Turkey as a leader of the Muslim world (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Central to this strategy is the AKP’s rhetoric, which invokes collective historical traumas and fears. This securitization narrative portrays Turkey as a nation under constant threat from internal and external enemies, including Western powers, secularists, and minority groups (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021). By doing so, Erdogan legitimizes authoritarian measures, silences dissent, and garners support for Turkey’s active role in global anti-Western coalitions (Yilmaz, Shipoli, & Demir, 2021).
In addition, civilizational populism heavily relies on narratives of victimhood. Erdogan’s political strategy has evolved to incorporate both national and manufactured victimhood narratives, which resonate deeply with his base. These narratives amplify historical grievances and create a sense of solidarity among supporters, portraying the AKP and its leader as the only forces capable of defending the “true” Turkish identity (Morieson, Yilmaz, & Kenes, 2024). These strategies extend beyond domestic politics to foreign policy. By aligning with anti-colonial sentiments and emphasizing solidarity with historically marginalized nations, Turkey appeals to African states as a partner that understands their struggles. Unlike the West, which ties aid and investment to democratic reforms, Turkey offers “no-strings-attached” assistance, furthering its influence in regions seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). This model of civilizational populism not only undermines liberal democratic norms but also demonstrates the AKP’s ability to adapt its messaging to different audiences. By emphasizing shared grievances and cultural pride, the AKP constructs a narrative of unity and resistance that resonates globally while reinforcing its domestic authority (Yılmaz, 2021).
These civilization-states emphasize anti-colonial solidarity and highlight their success in achieving economic growth without adhering to Western norms. Their strategies are designed not only to challenge American hegemony but also to position their governance models as viable alternatives to liberal democracy.
This report examines the strategies employed by China, Russia, Turkey, and India in Africa, focusing on their use of soft and hard power and their framing of themselves as civilization-states offering alternatives to Western liberalism. By analyzing their approaches, this report seeks to understand how these powers influence Africa’s development trajectories and what this means for the future of global power dynamics.
The Turkish Islamist humanitarian aid foundation IHH serves as one of the key instruments of the Erdogan regime’s policies in Africa. African children participate in activities promoting IHH in Niamey, Niger, on December 20, 2017. Photo: Burak Tumler.
Turkey’s Erdogan-led AKP government has demonstrated unprecedented interest in Africa, establishing 26 new embassies and 12 consulates across the continent since 2010, bringing the total to 44 (The Economist, 2019). This outreach aligns with Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which portrays Turkey as both a defender of Islam and the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023). For Erdogan, Africa represents a region with deep-seated resentment toward Western powers and a positive perception of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, offering opportunities to cultivate trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international bodies, including the United Nations.
Historically, Turkey’s engagement with Africa was limited. While the Ottoman Empire maintained ties with North Africa, the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect was shaped by Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that placed much of Africa under American or Soviet influence.
Erdogan has contrasted Turkey’s approach with that of Western powers, emphasizing solidarity over exploitation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he criticized Europe’s failure to provide vaccines to Africa, contrasting it with Turkey’s medical aid (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). He has frequently highlighted Europe’s selective application of universal values, pointing to the neglect of African refugees and Western double standards on human rights. According to Erdogan, “The EU is not in a position to defend all its self-proclaimed universal moral values while it turns a blind eye to sinking boats in the Mediterranean, building wire fences, and adopting a push-back policy” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Erdogan positions Turkey as a country free from colonial baggage, committed to anti-imperialism, and sharing values with Africa. He frames Turkey’s engagement as rooted in sincerity, brotherhood, and solidarity, rejecting “old colonial practices with new methods” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). Erdogan’s rhetoric emphasizes a “unique economic and development model” that Turkey can export to help Africa prosper without adopting exploitative or neo-colonial practices.
This narrative blend promises of mutual economic growth with appeals to shared values and opposition to the West. Erdogan adeptly connects Europe’s colonial legacy with its modern policies, particularly in redistributive justice. For instance, he has contrasted Turkey’s pandemic aid with Europe’s vaccine withholding, presenting Turkey as a genuine partner in Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Turkey’s African policy underwent a significant transformation in the post-Cold War era. After the European Union (EU) rejected Turkey’s membership, Ankara adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, moving away from exclusive Western alignment (Tepecikliogu, 2017). The “Opening to Africa Policy” of 1998 marked the beginning of this shift, with economic priorities playing a growing role. This approach intensified under the AKP government, which, after facing resistance to EU membership, turned to cultivating alliances in non-Western regions, including Africa.
In 2005, Erdogan’s government declared “The Year of Africa,” with Erdogan becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s economic growth under AKP leadership enabled the country to pursue a proactive foreign policy, focusing on the African continent as a region of strategic importance (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Today, Turkey positions itself as a reliable partner, offering an alternative to Western dominance while strengthening its presence in Africa through economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives.
Turkey’s soft power initiatives in Africa have been complex, leveraging humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, and infrastructure development. This aligns with President Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which frames Turkey as both a defender of its people and Islam, as well as a spokesperson for the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). In Africa, Erdogan perceives a continent harboring understandable resentment toward Western powers and views it as a region where Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are remembered positively. This creates opportunities for Turkey to gain trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international organizations such as the United Nations.
Historically, the Ottoman Empire maintained close ties with North Africa, but the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect stemmed from Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that left Africa under American or Soviet influence. However, Turkey’s interest in Africa increased following the Cold War, particularly as its relevance to the US and Europe waned and its bid for EU membership was rejected. In 1997, Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, diversifying its alliances beyond the West (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This shift included the 1998 “Opening to Africa Policy,” which coincided with the rise of a new Turkish bourgeoisie influencing foreign policy through economic priorities.
Under the Erdogan-led AKP government, which came to power in 2002, efforts to enhance trade and relations with non-Western states, including African nations, accelerated. When it became clear that the EU was reluctant to accept majority-Muslim Turkey, Erdogan sought to build alliances in regions like Africa. Economic growth under AKP rule enabled a proactive foreign policy, and 2005 was declared “The Year of Africa.” Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, signaling Turkey’s increasing focus on the continent.
In a 2011 speech in Mogadishu, Erdogan underscored Turkey’s commitment to Africa, describing the continent as “the cradle of civilization and one of the epicenters of the future of humanity.” He expressed support for “African ownership of African issues” and highlighted Turkey’s role as a “strategic partner of the rising Continent of Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This rhetoric emphasized Turkey’s distinction from Western powers often viewed as exploitative (Voice of America, 2024). Unlike Western nations, Turkey’s aid comes with few or no conditions regarding governance or human rights reforms, a stance that resonates with many African governments (GIS Reports, 2024). Erdogan has presented Turkey as an alternative to the West, emphasizing sincerity and partnership rather than exploitation (Voice of America, 2024).
Turkey’s engagement in Africa has primarily centered on humanitarian aid and development assistance, which complement its commercial interests (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Selin Gucum of the Observatory of Contemporary Turkey noted that Turkey has capitalized on African efforts to reduce reliance on former colonial powers for aid and security (Voice of America, 2024). Analysts like Teresa Nogueira Pinto highlight that Turkey avoids making its assistance conditional on governance or human rights, a key factor distinguishing it from Western aid models (GIS Reports, 2024).
Education has played a pivotal role in Turkey’s soft power strategy. Initially, the Gulen movement opened schools across Africa, but following the failed 2016 coup, which the AKP blamed on Gulen, these schools were replaced by the Maarif Foundation, which now operates 140 schools in Africa, educating 17,000 students (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, approximately 60,000 African students currently study in Turkey, fostering cultural and educational ties (TRT Africa, 2023).
Religion is another significant element of Turkey’s approach, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or those with sizable Muslim minorities. Turkey-funded mosques and schools promote socially conservative values that resonate with many Africans, especially in opposition to Western liberal norms. Erdogan’s rhetoric against LGBTQ+ rights and his emphasis on traditional family values often find a receptive audience in Africa (Voice of America, 2024).
Media has become an avenue for Turkish influence, with state broadcaster TRT reaching African audiences in multiple languages, including local African dialects. This allows Turkey to promote pro-Turkish narratives and portray itself as a friend to Africa while casting its adversaries as enemies of the African people.
Turkey has also invested in diplomatic training to strengthen ties with African nations. Since 1992, its Diplomacy Academy has trained 249 African diplomats through its International Junior Diplomats Training Program, aimed at capacity building and enhancing human resources upon requests from African foreign ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).
Infrastructure development further cements Turkey’s presence in Africa. Turkish Airlines (THY), for example, flies to 62 African cities, including Mogadishu, Somalia, where its planes land at an airport built with Turkish funds and expertise. This demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to connecting Africa with global markets and boosting tourism (Němečková & Varkočková, 2024).
Humanitarian aid, particularly disaster relief, has been another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. During Somalia’s 2011 famine, Turkey provided substantial aid, with Erdogan himself visiting the country to highlight the crisis and Turkey’s role in alleviating it. This not only improved Turkey’s image but also opened doors for Turkish businesses and NGOs to contribute to Somalia’s reconstruction. Somalia became a litmus test for Turkey’s Africa policy, with Ankara playing a mediating role in the country’s internal conflicts (Tepecikliogu, 2017).
Turkey’s initiatives extend beyond aid. It is exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in partnership with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like other rising powers, Turkey’s involvement in Africa is driven by both economic ambitions and a desire to expand its influence on the continent.
Erdogan’s rhetoric and policies have effectively positioned Turkey as a unique and reliable partner for African nations, contrasting sharply with Western approaches and emphasizing shared values, solidarity, and mutual growth. Through complex soft power initiatives, Turkey has carved a significant role for itself in Africa’s development narrative while pursuing its broader geopolitical and economic interests.
Turkey’s engagement in Africa extends well beyond disaster and famine aid. Today, Turkey is actively exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in collaboration with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like the BRICS group and Western powers, Turkey’s initiatives in Africa aim to achieve both economic gains and growing geopolitical influence on the continent.
Turkey has earned a reputation as a reliable partner in delivering major projects on time, which has enhanced its value across Africa. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Africa trade reached $34.5 billion annually in 2022, up from $5.4 billion in 2003—an extraordinary increase that underscores the economic rise of African nations and Turkey’s expanding interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). President Erdogan’s anti-colonial rhetoric further positions Turkey as a trusted ally of Africa, contrasting its sincerity with the perceived exploitation by Western powers. Erdogan also emphasizes Turkey’s unique economic model as a potential roadmap for Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit 2023).
Turkey’s hard power approach became more prominent in the 2010s, particularly during the Arab Uprisings and subsequent conflicts. The 2020 Libyan civil war marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, as Ankara supported the Tripoli-based government by deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval forces to counter Russian-backed factions. This intervention showcased the effectiveness of Turkish military technology, especially drones, which have since become highly sought after by African nations (GIS Reports, 2024).
The defense industry has been a major beneficiary of improved Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has increasingly signed arms deals with African governments, leading to a fivefold growth in defense and aerospace exports to the continent—from $82.9 million in 2020 to $460.6 million in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022; Demirdirek & Talebian, 2022). While still a small fraction of total arms sales to African states, this growth highlights Turkey’s expanding role as a defense partner. Despite its focus on humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships, Turkey’s security and defense sectors see Africa as a growing market for military goods.
Turkey’s intervention in Libya likely had two main objectives: securing access to the Libyan coast and maritime boundaries, and countering Arab and Russian influence in the region. Turkey’s successful defense of the Tripoli government relied heavily on-air superiority and UAV technology, demonstrating both the effectiveness of its military prowess and the utility of its hardware in modern conflicts.
Following the Libya intervention, Turkish UAVs gained popularity in Africa. Analysts note that Turkish defense products offer significant advantages to African countries—they are affordable, reliable, and battle-tested in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine (GIS Reports, 2024). For nations grappling with insurgent movements, porous borders, and under-resourced armies—such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia—Turkey’s drones and counterterrorism expertise have become especially valuable.
Turkey is primarily a supplier of arms and military training rather than an active combatant in Africa’s wars. It has signed defense agreements with countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, with expected agreements in Uganda and Mozambique. These agreements often encompass security provisions, technical support, and arms sales, though some, like the Mozambique deal, also involve sharing military intelligence (GIS Reports, 2024).
Somalia remains Turkey’s closest partner in Africa. In 2017, Turkey established a large foreign military base in Mogadishu and has since provided extensive training to Somali soldiers engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda (Atlantic Council, 2024). Such defense agreements serve not only Turkey’s strategic interests but also reinforce its image as a significant ally of African stability. Alper Aktas, Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia, remarked, “[Turkey] never considered Somalia’s stability separately from our own country’s stability” (ADF, 2024). Erdogan describes Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian” country, sharing common values and interests with African nations (Politics Today, 2022).
Turkey has positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russia, China, France, and the United States in supplying arms to Africa. Abel Abate Demissie, an associate fellow at Chatham House, observes that “Turkey provides a means of actually purchasing military hardware” (DW, 2022a). African nations are particularly interested in Turkish-manufactured armored vehicles, naval equipment, infantry weapons, and drones (DW, 2022a).
By deepening its defense partnerships and increasing arms sales, Turkey not only enhances its influence in Africa but also pushes back against competing powers like Russia and China. These efforts underscore Turkey’s broader strategy to carve out its sphere of influence on the continent while presenting itself as a reliable and cooperative partner to African states.
T-shirts for sale at Windhoek Market alongside a portrait of Putin in Windhoek, Namibia, on March 26, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
Russia developed strong relationships with African states during the Soviet era, competing with the United States to gain influence across the continent and spread its communist ideology. The Soviets offered development aid and, crucially, solidarity with leftist regimes fighting colonialism and Western imperialism, effectively capitalizing on widespread anti-Western sentiment in Africa (Bienen, 1982). After the collapse of communism, however, Russia struggled to compete with the United States in terms of soft and hard power, as it lacked the resources and global reach of its Soviet predecessor. Nonetheless, because Russia had minimal involvement in the colonization of Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it continued to be perceived by many Africans as a friend to their people and an opponent of Western colonialism and exploitation.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has consistently sought to maintain its influence in Africa, with efforts expanding significantly under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Putin’s government emphasizes Russia’s historic ties to Africa and its opposition to Western colonialism. For instance, at the second annual Russia–Africa Summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2023, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, declared that Russia would “pursue avenues that would liberate sovereign states from their colonial heritage.” This statement underscored Russia’s ongoing strategy of supporting anti-Western dictatorships and regimes that defy liberal norms. In exchange for Russian development and military aid, these regimes provide diplomatic backing for Russian initiatives in international bodies, including the United Nations Security Council.
In a 2022 speech in Moscow, Putin elaborated on his anti-Western narrative, blaming the “West,” particularly the “Anglo-Saxons,” for colonialism and the slave trade (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). He portrayed the Soviet Union and Russia as leaders of the 20th-century anti-colonial movement—a legacy, he argued, that the West has never forgiven. Putin framed Russia’s current opposition to Western liberalism and atheism as a continuation of its historic resistance to colonialism. According to this narrative, the West seeks to eradicate traditional ways of living and religious practices, while Russia, as a civilization-state, stands as a protector of Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and other faiths (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022).
Putin further claimed that the promises of democracy and wealth from the West have consistently led to poverty, imperialism, and the erosion of cultural and religious traditions in societies they influence. He argued that the West’s quest for “total domination” drives it to eliminate “sovereign centers of global development,” even by force if necessary (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). While this rhetoric may not carry the same ideological weight as it did during the Soviet era—when communism provided a compelling alternative to capitalism—it resonates in regions like Africa, where anti-Western sentiments remain strong, and where Western promises of democracy and development often fail to meet expectations.
In Africa, Putin’s anti-Western narrative finds an audience, particularly in areas with strong religious conservatism and enduring memories of colonial humiliation. Russia’s framing of itself as a champion of traditional values and a defender against Western imperialism bolsters its appeal, even as its actual resources and influence remain limited compared to its Soviet predecessor. This narrative continues to shape Russia’s engagement with African states, aligning with its broader geopolitical goals of challenging Western hegemony and asserting its role as a sovereign center of global influence.
The Putin regime does not, of course, rely solely on rhetoric to spread its influence across the African continent. Instead, it employs a range of soft and hard power programs designed to elicit support and back friendly nations in Africa. However, the institutions that Russia builds across Africa consistently promote a narrative blaming the West for Africa’s challenges and portraying Russia as an opponent of Western imperialism.
Russia’s overall strategy in Africa can be summarized as a combination of stabilizing the region to facilitate mineral extraction, opening alternative markets for its energy exports, and leveraging anti-colonial rhetoric and aid to win the support of African nations. While Russia does not actively seek to suppress democracy in Africa, the Putin regime has no qualms about supporting repressive regimes and often prefers dealing with authoritarian governments over democracies. Russia is particularly interested in competing with other global powers, including the United States, France, China, and Turkey, for influence in Africa. To this end, it portrays itself as a long-standing ally of the African people, emphasizing its history of supporting independence movements.
The Putin regime maintains ties with friendly African states by fostering collaboration between Russian and African educational institutions, building schools and training facilities, and assisting in securing mining operations and combating insurgencies. This latter aspect often involves the Wagner Group, whose activities in Africa have a mixed record. In 2024, the Wagner Group’s operations were incorporated into Russia’s Ministry of Defense’s African Corps.
Russia’s soft power efforts in Africa primarily focus on spreading Russian culture and language. Russian cultural centers operate in over 80 countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, offering Russian language courses and promoting Russian literature. Since 2019, Russia has expanded its language education initiatives to include 28 nations, with a goal of reaching at least 50. It also aims to follow the lead of China and France in admitting talented Africans to its universities to strengthen Africa-Russia ties.
Although Russia has succeeded in garnering support from some African states, including abstentions during votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would be misleading to assume uniform support across the continent or consistent alignment with Russia in UN General Assembly voting (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Russia’s popularity is not universal in Africa. Despite mostly positive relationships with some countries, it faces competition from wealthier nations better equipped to facilitate development.
Since 2003, Russia has established physical Russian language schools in Africa under the Russky Mir Foundation (Russian World Foundation). These schools teach Russian language and culture, often in collaboration with African governments and universities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Namibia (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). In return, Russia has pledged to teach African languages in Moscow schools, signaling respect for African cultures and languages (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024).
Russia has also increased its engagement with higher education institutions in Africa, launching the Russian-African Network University consortium in 2023. This initiative includes agreements with various Malian institutions, such as the National School of Engineering, the University of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Private University Ahmed Baba (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). These projects complement earlier Soviet-era initiatives, such as the university established in Egypt in 1960, underscoring Russia’s historical and ongoing interest in African education.
Olena Snigyr argues that Russian educational and cultural initiatives aim to expand a shared knowledge base and foster ideological alignment. Educational cooperation, Russian language and culture programs, and journalist training are central to Russia’s strategy of disseminating its narratives and ideas (FPRI, 2024). According to Snigyr, Russia’s narrative of “modernization with Russia” appeals to African nations struggling with poverty despite resource wealth, offering a partnership model distinct from the conditional aid frameworks of Western countries.
Russia positions itself as a protector of African interests, advocating for fairer representation in international organizations such as the UN, opposing foreign interference in political regimes, and supporting traditional values in African societies (FPRI, 2024). However, its impact remains limited. Only about 35,000 African students are currently enrolled in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University involves just 75 Russian and 27 African institutions, with significant participation from Zimbabwe (FPRI, 2024). Nonetheless, initiatives like the Consortium of Universities “Subsoil of Africa” at St. Petersburg Mining University, which includes over 130 organizations from 42 African countries, demonstrate Russia’s ambition to deepen collaboration with Africa on its own terms (FPRI, 2024).
In 2023, Russia diversified its educational initiatives, including courses in religion and journalism. For example, it signed an agreement with Burkina Faso to collaborate on secular and Islamic education to combat radical Islam (Russian Mufties Council, 2023). Additionally, partnerships with Nigeria focus on advanced technological education, such as robotics, microelectronics, and 3D printing, while negotiations with South Sudan involve constructing a refinery (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). Events like robotics and astronomy workshops in Tanzania, which featured a cosmonaut and attracted 800 students, further underscore Russia’s investment in portraying itself as a technological power in Africa (RT, 2023; Daily News, 2023).
These soft power efforts, while not unique to Russia, are integral to its strategy of portraying itself as a non-imperialist, anti-colonial partner to Africa. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized Russia’s appreciation for African states that resist Western pressure, framing the partnership as one of mutual respect and shared interests (Kornegay, 2023). This rhetoric has helped Moscow persuade some African states to resist Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. However, many African states continue to trade with Russia out of necessity, as food and energy shortages leave them little choice but to prioritize their immediate needs over geopolitical alignments.
Russian use of hard power in Africa has become increasingly prominent since 2017, largely through the activities of the Wagner Group, a private military company advancing Russian interests across the continent, often in opposition to Western priorities. The Wagner Group has been active in several African states, most notably the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya.
The Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, gained prominence during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. While commonly referred to as a single entity, it is better described as a complex network of businesses and mercenary groups operating in conflict zones and even in alleged peacekeeping operations worldwide (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Before 2023, the Wagner Group operated somewhat independently of the Kremlin. However, following its apparent rebellion against the Putin regime and Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an air crash, the group has operated as an instrument of the Russian state, with much of its operations absorbed into the Ministry of Defense in 2024. Even prior to these events, the Wagner Group was closely aligned with Kremlin objectives, despite its profit-driven motivations.
In Africa, the Wagner Group has approximately 5,000 personnel, including former Russian soldiers, convicts, and foreign nationals (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Among its most significant campaigns is its involvement in CAR, where Wagner soldiers were deployed in 2018, initially as military instructors. Their numbers later swelled to 1,500–2,000, transforming into a fighting force tasked with securing the country’s lucrative mining industry and protecting the pro-Russian government from rebels (Granta, 2024).
In 2019, Wagner began stationing forces around gold mines in central and eastern CAR and later expanded its presence to the north. Russian officials claim their operations have brought “peace and security” to CAR, but these claims are contested. The US State Department reports that Wagner has engaged in indiscriminate killings, abductions, and sexual violence in its efforts to control mining areas near Bambari (US State Department, 2024). UN experts further accuse Wagner of harassing journalists, aid workers, and international peacekeepers (OHCHR, 2021).
For instance, in October 2024, Wagner forces reportedly executed at least a dozen civilians in the gold-mining town of Koki, allegedly targeting artisanal miners. Witnesses recounted how Russian paramilitaries arrived by helicopter, indiscriminately opening fire on locals (Al Jazeera, 2024). Such violence is not isolated; it aligns with a broader pattern of Wagner’s operations, where violence often accompanies lucrative mining agreements between Russian companies and the CAR government. For example, the CAR government revoked mining licenses from a Canadian company and awarded them to Midas Resources, a Wagner-affiliated entity (Al Jazeera, 2024).
At times, Wagner’s priorities in CAR appear more focused on securing mineral resources than protecting the government. Wagner reportedly collaborated with the rebel group Union for Peace (UPC) to ensure the safety of its mining operations but later turned against the group, launching a counteroffensive targeting both rebels and local civilians (Al Jazeera, 2024).
CAR’s former Prime Minister Martin Ziguele expressed regret over inviting Wagner into the country, describing the group as a “criminal organization” now dominating CAR’s economic, security, and political spheres (BBC, 2023). Despite these criticisms, many in CAR view Wagner’s presence favorably, believing it has brought a degree of stability. In Bangui, the CAR government erected a monument honoring Wagner forces, depicting Russian troops protecting a woman and her children, accompanied by tributes to Yevgeny Prigozhin (BBC, 2023).
The Wagner Group’s activities in CAR exemplify both the potential and the pitfalls of Russia’s paramilitary strategy in Africa. On one hand, it highlights the failure of US and European initiatives to bring security and democracy to the continent. On the other hand, it demonstrates how Russian soft power effectively garners local support for the presence of its hard power. This growing influence strengthens Russia’s alliances in Africa, securing votes in the UN General Assembly and helping to shield Russia from Western economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. However, these developments also underscore the precarious balance between Russian objectives and the well-being of African states under Wagner’s shadow.
India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi greets heads of delegations at the alighting point during the 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi on October 29, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
India’s relationship with post-colonial Africa is longstanding and predates that of many other nations, including Turkey. Since the 1950s, India has actively engaged with African nations, with Prime Minister Nehru famously describing Africa as a “sister” continent. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which included India and all African nations except South Sudan, further solidified this bond. Shared opposition to European colonialism provided a strong foundation for collaboration, fostering a sense of solidarity and shared purpose.
In the post-World War II period, India and African states were united by their mutual aspiration to chart independent foreign policies, a vision that became even more pronounced during the Cold War era (Kidwai, 2023: 359). During this time, both India and African nations sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to advance their collective interests. India has been a consistent partner, offering humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and cooperating on defense and security matters. For example, as early as 1956, Emperor Haile Selassie requested India’s assistance in establishing a military academy in Harar, marking the beginning of India’s significant security cooperation with African states (Kidwai, 2023: 359).
Since the end of the Cold War, India’s engagement with Africa has deepened, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2014. Modi has portrayed himself as a leader of the ‘Global South’ and has positioned India as a steadfast ally of developing nations. This approach has been reflected in Modi’s initiatives, such as his advocacy for the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 during India’s presidency of the group. Modi’s rhetoric underscores the importance of Africa in India’s global strategy. “When we say we see the world as a family, we truly mean it,” Modi stated, emphasizing Africa’s significance in shaping a more inclusive global dialogue (CNN, 2023).
The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 was, according to Modi, a “significant stride towards a more inclusive global dialogue” (X., 2023). While this move demonstrated India’s commitment to amplifying African voices on the global stage, India’s interest in Africa is not purely altruistic. Like other major powers, India seeks to bolster its influence and expand trade relations with Africa to further its own strategic and economic interests.
Africa has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner among global regions. Trade between India and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly, rising from $47 billion in 2012 to nearly $90 billion in recent years (African Business, 2023). Total trade with all African nations reached $98 billion in 2024 (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2024). Energy is a cornerstone of this relationship, with African nations supplying roughly a quarter of India’s crude oil imports. Nigeria, in particular, has become India’s largest supplier of oil (African Business, 2023).
This increasing dependency on African energy resources underscores the continent’s importance to India’s economic security and growth. Consequently, the Indian government has prioritized building stronger ties with African nations through trade, security partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. India’s strategy also seeks to challenge the influence of other powers, such as the United States, China, Europe, and Russia, in the region. Africa’s growing economic potential and its strategic significance make it a focal point for India’s foreign policy ambitions.
India’s soft power in Africa is rooted in a shared history of anti-colonialism, trade, and humanitarian assistance. While India has historically provided aid to African nations, its primary focus has been on neighboring countries or, paradoxically, on receiving aid itself, such as from Great Britain. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly directed aid to African nations, particularly Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique—countries where China also has a significant aid presence. This reflects growing competition between India and China for influence in Africa.
Prime Minister Modi emphasizes that India’s engagement in Africa is aimed at fostering cooperation rather than rivalry. He stated, “As global engagement in Africa increases, [India and Africans must work] together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). This sentiment underscores India’s aim to position itself as a sincere partner to Africa, untainted by exploitative motives.
India’s foreign aid to Africa has grown significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 22% over the past decade. Initiatives like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program exemplify this approach, offering training and education to leaders and scholars from developing countries. With 40,000 alumni globally, ITEC serves as a soft power tool to cultivate goodwill and a generation of leaders with favorable views of India.
India’s soft power also extends to trade. Modi has often emphasized that India’s development partnership with Africa will be guided by African priorities. For example, he remarked that India’s support will “liberate your potential and not constrain your future” (Nantulya, 2023). India seeks to leverage its expertise in areas like the digital revolution to support Africa’s development, including expanding financial inclusion, improving education and health services, and mainstreaming marginalized communities.
Although trade between India and Africa is growing, it remains overshadowed by China-Africa trade. In 2023, China-Africa trade amounted to $282 billion, significantly surpassing India’s $90 billion in trade with sub-Saharan Africa and $98 billion overall (Indian Confederation of Industry, 2024). Nevertheless, certain sectors illustrate the growing depth of India-Africa economic ties. India imports significant amounts of minerals from Africa, while African nations benefit from India’s mining expertise and investment. Conversely, African countries import pharmaceuticals from India, with $3.8 billion worth of medicines and healthcare products purchased in 2020-2021.
India’s trade imbalance with Africa, particularly in manufacturing, is utilized as a soft power advantage. Modi has promised to keep Indian markets open to African goods and to support Indian industries investing in Africa. Furthermore, India is making strides in exporting green energy technology to Africa, positioning itself as a valuable partner in addressing climate change.
One of India’s unique advantages in Africa is the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Seychelles, South Africa, and Mauritius. Modi’s visits to African countries with large Indian communities underscore this connection. Under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, India has sought to engage the diaspora to advance its foreign policy objectives, including addressing security concerns and facilitating trade. However, Modi’s message to African audiences diverges from his focus on Hindu civilizational rejuvenation for the diaspora. Instead, he portrays himself as a leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity with Africa in advocating for a “just, representative and democratic global order” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
In sum, India’s soft power in Africa is a mix of historical ties, developmental cooperation, and strategic engagement. While India’s initiatives are dwarfed by China’s influence, they are nonetheless significant in cultivating goodwill and expanding India’s footprint across the continent. Through trade, aid, and a focus on shared aspirations, India positions itself as a genuine partner and advocate for Africa on the global stage.
India is not a major military power in Africa. Instead, its strength lies in its soft power—the perception that India is a trustworthy and benevolent partner to African nations—which gives it an advantage over rivals like China and the United States. Nevertheless, as India’s economic power grows, so too does its military capacity, and it is increasingly likely that India will expand its hard power presence in areas of strategic importance, including parts of Africa.
India’s hard power in Africa is primarily focused on the Indian Ocean region, which acts as a strategic corridor between the African continent and the Indian subcontinent. Indian military facilities have been established in key locations, including Madagascar, which hosts a radar and listening facility; Oman, where Indian Navy vessels have docking rights; Mauritius, where India is constructing an airfield and facilities for stationing soldiers; and the Seychelles, where India has installed a surveillance system to monitor surrounding waters (Military Africa, 2023; Voice of America, 2024; Deccan Herald, 2024; The Geostrata, 2021). These facilities, while modest compared to the expansive presence of the United States or even Russia in Africa, serve critical functions. They help India secure its interests in the region, combat piracy, and contribute to the stability of vital maritime routes.
India’s hard power initiatives are deeply tied to its aspirations as an Indo-Pacific power. The Modi administration has emphasized the importance of securing Indian influence in the region to counter the expanding presence of China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. India’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific includes establishing partnerships with African nations along the eastern shores of Africa, particularly in areas near the Indian Ocean.
Indian military engagements in Africa also highlight its collaborative approach to regional security. Prime Minister Modi has underscored India’s commitment to addressing shared security concerns, stating that India will prioritize “strengthen[ing] …cooperation and mutual capabilities [between India and Africa] in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). Modi’s rhetoric often emphasizes that Indian military activities are driven by the need for stability and collaboration rather than competition, asserting that “the world needs cooperation and not competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
While India’s military footprint in Africa is currently limited, its actions signal a gradual but deliberate increase in its regional hard power. India’s presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to expand further, as the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global maritime security and a counterbalance to Chinese and American influence in the region. Partnerships with African nations on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and peacekeeping missions will likely be pivotal in shaping India’s military strategy in Africa.
A Chinese yuan placed on a map of Africa symbolizes trade, tourism, economy, and investment between China and African countries. Photo: Oleg Elkov.
China’s rise is arguably the most consequential event of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Before the 2000s, it was commonplace in Western capitals to believe that China’s embrace of market capitalism would inevitably transform the country into a liberal democracy. This ahistorical and naïve belief shaped American policy towards China throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated China’s economic growth by dismantling barriers to trade. However, this approach failed to transform China into either a democracy or a reliable ally of the United States. Instead, following a period of economic reform and relative social liberalization under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s leadership has transformed China into a surveillance state governed by an authoritarian populist regime, which portrays itself as the culmination of “5,000 years of Chinese civilization” (Liu Qingzhu, 2023).
China’s growing economic strength, while it has created a large middle class, has not led to its transition into a liberal democracy. Although China’s middle class enjoys economic freedom, it remains either unwilling or unable to demand freedom of expression and other liberal reforms. From one perspective, it would seem irrational for Chinese citizens to challenge a regime that has delivered unprecedented prosperity. Indeed, China is arguably the world’s largest economic powers and its second greatest military power, giving its citizens a sense of prestige and influence not experienced for centuries. The Communist Party of China (CCP) continuously reinforces this narrative of national ascendancy, framing China’s increasingly assertive behavior in Asia—including its claims over maritime territories belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines—as part of a legitimate effort to reclaim territories historically taken from China by imperial powers (Zhang, 2019).
Simultaneously, China positions itself as a model for the Global South and is instrumental in building economic blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), aimed at countering the influence of the US and EU in global economic affairs (Char, 2024). For the CCP and its supporters, China’s rise is evidence of the superiority of its civilizational model over Western civilization and proof that modernization can occur without Westernization (Char, 2024). The CCP adopts a deeply civilizational perspective on global affairs and has repeatedly urged the US to respect civilizational differences and cease imposing liberal democratic values on non-Western nations (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).
China appears to recognize that liberal democracies tend to act peacefully toward one another but view the rise of non-liberal powers as existential threats, often responding with hostility. Xi Jinping has warned the US not to provoke a “clash of civilizations” by attempting to stifle China’s rise. Instead, he has called for an acceptance of China’s autocratic system and its hegemony in Asia as natural outcomes of its civilizational rejuvenation. To achieve harmony between civilizations, Xi advocates replacing “estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence” (Zhang, 2019: 19).
China’s rise serves as an inspiration to many developing nations, particularly in Africa, as it demonstrates rapid development achieved without capitulating to Westernization. Aware of this, China leverages its position as a rising non-Western power through soft power initiatives, presenting itself as a non-Western civilization that has risen above the West. The CCP claims that China is inherently more peaceful and civilized, emphasizing that it has never colonized or invaded other nations. While this narrative is not entirely accurate, it resonates with many Africans who continue to feel the historical pain of colonization. China’s claim of never having invaded African territory is particularly appealing, as it contrasts sharply with the history of European colonial powers.
China’s relationship with Africa is shaped by this self-image. The CCP portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a rejuvenated 5,000-year-old civilization capable of serving as a role model for other developing, non-Western societies. By positioning itself as an alternative to Western imperialism, China fosters goodwill and deepens its influence across the African continent.
Chinese soft power in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is considerable. China has opened more than 50 embassies across the continent—more than the United States—and has become the most significant trade and aid partner for a variety of African nations (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China provides infrastructure, including roads and railways, in areas where the US often does not, and facilitates development through aid and debt forgiveness. However, China also offers a different path to development and modernity, one that does not insist on compliance with liberal democratic norms and at times challenges, rather than imitates, Africa’s former colonial masters.
China is heavily involved in infrastructure development in Africa. For instance, in Kenya, China was responsible for the construction of the Nairobi to Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway, a project costing $4.7 billion, with plans to build industrial parks connected by the railway, which was also supposed to extend to Uganda (BBC, 2023). However, the railway is underused and widely considered unnecessary, leading to accusations that China has deliberately trapped Kenya in unmanageable debt to gain influence over the African state (BBC, 2023). Despite this, only 19.4% of Kenya’s debt is owed to China (BBC, 2023).
In Ethiopia, China has invested in hundreds of projects valued at over $4 billion (Cabestan, 2019). China has been instrumental in constructing roads and railways. Beyond infrastructure, China supported the Ethiopian government in December 2021 by voting against a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in the Tigray region (South China Morning Post, 2021).
China also constructed the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of $200 million (South China Morning Post, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the building was reportedly bugged, and its servers were regularly hacked by CCP operatives (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, China continues to build critical infrastructure across the continent. In 2018, China announced plans to build the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria (Xinhua, 2022). In 2022, China completed construction of the African Centre for Disease Control Headquarters (CIDCA, 2023). Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have built or financed dozens of presidential, prime ministerial, and other government buildings throughout Africa (Heritage Foundation, 2020).
China is also seeking control over African ports. For instance, Djibouti nationalized its Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China owns 25% of the port, gaining significant control over regional shipping. Chinese companies have also established large cargo facilities near the port, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers are stationed there. The People’s Liberation Army Navy uses the terminal for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations and likely other intelligence and power-projection activities (Bloomberg, 2018).
Reports suggest that China is looking to build a large maritime base, potentially in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, or Gabon (The Diplomat, 2024). Although these plans have not yet materialized, they indicate China’s intent to expand its military power in African waters to protect its lucrative fishing industry and extend its influence over African states (The Diplomat, 2024).
China has also invested in space programs in nine African states as part of its Belt and Road Space Information Corridor. China launches satellites for African states and trains Africans to work in the space industry (United States Institute of Peace, 2023).
Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications technology company, is thought to provide around 70% of Africa’s telecommunications and information infrastructure (DW, 2022; Feldstein, 2020). Across the continent, Chinese companies build telecommunication networks, including government networks. Nine African countries have adopted Chinese-designed and built surveillance projects as part of China’s “Smart City Surveillance” initiative, involving the installation of vast numbers of cameras. Whether the CCP has access to these cameras remains unclear (Financial Times, 2021; The Wall Street Journal, 2019).
China does not merely build infrastructure in Africa but also invites Africans to live and study in China, often at the Chinese state’s expense. This effort aims to create a generation of educated African elites with favorable opinions of China and its development model. For example, Xi Jinping’s approach to Africa, articulated in an editorial by China’s ambassador to the Seychelles, emphasizes “South-South cooperation” and building a China-Africa community based on “sincerity, real results, amity, and good faith” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Seychelles, 2023).
China’s efforts to develop relationships with emerging African elites align with its broader goal of exporting the “China model” of development, which emphasizes industrialization and modernization without democratization or the adoption of Western liberal values. Initiatives like the Sino-Africa Political Party Leaders program bring young African politicians to China for training in governance and economic development based on Chinese principles (Brookings, 2016). Additionally, in 2022, the CCP financed the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, which educates political leaders from six Southern African countries (FPRI, 2022).
Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, are widespread in Africa, though they have been criticized for spreading CCP propaganda. China has overtaken the United States in hosting African students, making it the second most popular destination after France for Africans pursuing higher education.
China measures its success in Africa partly by examining voting patterns in international organizations. African states are increasingly aligning with China in the UN, with many voting against resolutions critical of Beijing’s policies, such as its South China Sea claims or human rights abuses in Xinjiang (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China’s growing popularity in Africa reflects its strategy of combining infrastructure development, educational outreach, and alignment with African priorities. Despite criticisms of its authoritarian model and accusations of debt-trap diplomacy, many Africans view China as a reliable partner offering an alternative path to development. As African nations increasingly adopt aspects of the “China model,” it becomes evident that China’s influence in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political and economic landscape.
Military relations between the People’s Republic of China and Africa began during the Cold War, as China sought to combat both Soviet and American influence across the continent and portray itself as a fellow non-white society resisting white global power. During this period, China encouraged national liberation and socialist movements in Africa. Although it no longer attempts to foment communist revolutions in Africa, China continues to present itself as a non-white power naturally aligned with and sympathetic to Africans.
Under Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a policy of “hiding our capabilities” and projecting a friendly or benign face to the world. This approach meant that, while China was a significant arms supplier to African nations, it rarely involved itself directly or indirectly in African conflicts. Xi Jinping has broken with this policy, declaring that “China now stands tall and firm in the East” and should “take center stage” in global affairs (Nantulya, 2019).
As a result, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia and along its border with India, largely driven by efforts to reclaim land and maritime territories that once belonged to the Chinese Empire (e.g., Taiwan and the South China Sea). At the same time, China has long been involved in African conflicts and is eager to assert its military might in support of its national interests, as well as to “protect” ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living in Africa. China’s use of hard power in Africa is deeply tied to the CCP’s civilizational rejuvenation project, its conception of all Chinese globally as belonging to the “Chinese people,” and its efforts to restore China to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. For example, Xi (2017) emphasizes China’s “more than 5,000 years of civilized history,” portraying the Chinese as a people who “created a brilliant civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and became a great nation of the world.” Xi claims that the Chinese people are now being “rejuvenated” and will soon achieve a “moderately prosperous society” while becoming a global power.
Expanding its hard power influence in Africa helps China present itself as a global power and a civilization with its own development models and norms, which other nations may follow to achieve similar prosperity. Furthermore, this expansion allows China to protect friendly African regimes, prevent American-led coups or interventions, and secure its strategic interests.
China is also exporting its governance model to African states, most notably to Ethiopia, often referred to as the “China of Africa.” Many African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, have made “observable changes to their governance styles and models as a result of these deepening engagements.” These changes reflect the adoption of elements from the Chinese development model, including strong export-led growth, significant state involvement in the economy, and the promotion of labor-intensive industries (Nantulya, 2018). China is also believed to be exporting principles like “democratic centralism,” the establishment of special economic zones, and the concept that the military should remain loyal to the ruling party rather than the state or its citizens (Nantulya, 2018).
Despite considerable attention to China’s military footprint in Africa, it remains relatively small compared to that of the United States, which maintains military bases in 26 African nations under the auspices of the United States Africa Command. In contrast, China has just one military base in Africa, located in Djibouti. Nevertheless, given China’s global ambitions, it is likely to establish additional bases in Africa to defend its interests and challenge US, Russian, and Turkish influence in the region.
Though China has only one base in Africa, it has conducted military drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria. Its military medical units have collaborated with counterparts in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to improve combat casualty care as part of long-standing relationships involving arms sales and intelligence cooperation (Nantulya, 2019). China is also developing military ties with Burkina Faso, which recently ceased recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state (Nantulya, 2019).
In 2018, China held a Defense and Security Forum with officials from 50 African nations, resulting in a comprehensive security framework. Through this framework, China pledged to provide military and intelligence support to combat pirates, terrorists, and criminals, as well as to participate in peacekeeping operations. China committed $100 million toward building the African Union Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and contributed to the China-UN Peace and Development Fund and various training programs (ISPI, 2018).
China’s increasing interest in African security and defense reflects its desire to protect friendly regimes, facilitate trade, ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and safeguard ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals in Africa. While China’s actions often align with African interests, such as infrastructure development and security enhancement, the establishment of Chinese police stations and other security facilities across Africa is also part of projecting China as a civilization-state that protects Chinese people globally and maintains their loyalty to the CCP.
China has openly expressed its intentions in Africa. A 2015 Chinese policy paper emphasized “deepened military engagement, technological cooperation, and capacity building for Africa’s security sectors” (Nantulya, 2019). As a result, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest weapons supplier (SIPRI, 2018). Its exports include not only small arms but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and artillery (Nantulya, 2019).
China is also deeply involved in educating African military officers. Approximately 2,000 African officers train annually with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with an additional 500 attending the PLA Naval Medical University and another 2,000 receiving policing and law enforcement training at China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) schools (Nantulya, 2023). The PLA and PAP, as extensions of the CCP, advance the party’s ideological and political goals in Africa.
While China avoids direct military intervention in Africa, it increasingly leverages UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) to expand its influence. In West Africa, China has steadily increased the number and variety of personnel it contributes, including medics, engineers, and armed infantry. In Mali, China’s involvement in the MINUSMA mission is seen as symbolic but marks a new willingness to deploy combat troops (Merics, 2020). China’s peacekeeping activities are not politically neutral. Instead, they aim to promote a “Chinese approach” to peacekeeping, prioritizing regime stability and economic development while avoiding interventionism and democratization (Merics, 2020).
Not all Africans welcome China’s growing influence. For example, Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement, once complained that “China is trading petroleum for our blood” (Pant & Haidar, 2017). Anti-China violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Mali, and other nations, demonstrating that China’s activities are not universally accepted. Nonetheless, China continues to strengthen its position in Africa, often at the expense of democratic norms. These developments are part of the CCP’s broader civilizational rejuvenation project, aimed at reshaping the global order in favor of a multipolar world with China at its center.
The Debswana Jwaneng Diamond Mine pit in Jwaneng, Botswana, on November 15, 2022. Photo: Bashi Kikia.
The new great power struggle for influence in Africa contains a distinct civilizational element. However, rather than claiming to bring civilization to Africa, each non-African nation involved in this struggle presents itself as a representative of a broader civilization in conflict with the West, offering a new, non-Western path to development. At stake in this competition are billions of dollars in trade revenue, access to vital minerals, and control over key military staging points and geographically strategic areas.
Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC) share a common goal: to expand their influence across the African continent and weaken Western—particularly American—power in Africa. Their advantage over the West lies in their relatively untarnished history with Africa, their lack of a colonial legacy tainted by bloodshed, and their ability to point to their own economic successes as evidence that nations can achieve wealth and power without adhering to Western norms and governance models.
Each of these nations offers Africa—often addressing it as though it were a monolithic culture—friendship and ostensibly “no-strings-attached” development aid and direct investment, something the liberal West has traditionally refused to provide. They frequently cite the evils of the colonial period and the West’s insistence that aid be contingent on liberal democratic reforms as examples of Western arrogance and imperialism.
Turkey and China claim that their own civilizations possess values superior to those of the West, demonstrated by their peaceful engagement with Africa. Meanwhile, Russia and India emphasize their shared anti-colonial struggle and present themselves as allies of the Global South in its resistance to Western imperialism. All four nations position themselves as voices for the Global South in its ongoing struggle against the global North.
Yet, these nations are not altruistic actors. They, too, seek Africa’s mineral wealth and view the continent as a key territory for expanding their influence. Although their methods are not as violent or oppressive as those of the European colonial powers, their actions reveal a similar underlying motivation. The increasing reliance on hard power by Turkey, Russia, India and China in Africa highlights that these “new” great powers are not so different from the old ones.
Ultimately, the competition for influence in Africa pits Turkey, Russia, India and China not just against the West but also against one another. Yet, these four nations share a critical objective: constructing a multipolar world in which American power is no longer hegemonic. Winning greater influence in Africa is integral to this project, as is persuading Africans to reject reliance on Western assistance for economic growth and infrastructure development. Instead, the emerging powers argue that Africans should turn away from the values of their former colonial masters and draw on the experiences of rising civilization-states to develop their economies and construct vital infrastructure. Given the West’s failure to facilitate African development and the ongoing challenges faced by liberal democratic societies globally, it would not be surprising if Africans began to distance themselves from liberal democratic norms.
However, the United States remains by far the most powerful foreign nation in Africa, capable of projecting hard power across the continent at a level unmatched by any other nation.
From an Anglo-American—and broadly Western—perspective, the competition between the West and its old and new rivals may appear to be a confrontation between democratic and autocratic regimes. To some extent, the language used by states like TRIC, when presenting themselves as “civilization-states” with unique values, serves to legitimize authoritarianism. However, these regimes perceive the competition differently. They view it as a struggle to construct a new world order in which the US is no longer the central power and the ancient civilizations of TRIC regain the power and prestige they enjoyed before.
These nations are serious about displacing the US and dismantling the liberal norms and global order that have defined the world since the end of the Cold War. They, along with their growing number of allies, believe this shift is desirable, marking the end of Western imperialism and the notion that Western values—such as liberal democracy—are universal. At the same time, they compete with one another in Africa. For instance, if China’s base in Djibouti signals plans to establish further bases in East Africa, India may feel compelled to respond by increasing its military presence to counter Chinese influence, lest it risk an East Africa dominated by China and potentially hostile to Indian interests.
While it is possible that TRIC could find avenues for cooperation in Africa, it is far more likely that their competition will intensify. Despite sharing the common goal of diminishing American power in Africa and globally, their conflicting interests are likely to make Africa a critical arena of rivalry among these new global powers.
– Liberal democracies should emphasize the unique value of transparent, accountable governance and rule of law as part of their development partnerships.
– Shift from conditionality-based aid to partnerships that prioritize mutual benefits without sacrificing democratic values.
Strengthen Infrastructure Investments!
– Compete with China and others by funding large-scale infrastructure projects with transparent terms to counter debt-trap diplomacy narratives.
– Prioritize renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport networks to align with Africa’s long-term goals.
Increase Support for Democratic Governance!
– Offer robust support for democratic institutions in Africa through capacity-building programs for judiciary, electoral, and civil society.
– Collaborate with African governments to counter the spread of authoritarian governance models, such as China’s “democratic centralism.”
Develop Cultural and Educational Ties!
– Expand scholarships and exchange programs for African students in liberal democracies to compete with Chinese and Turkish educational initiatives.
– Support local language media and cultural initiatives to counter disinformation and propaganda from authoritarian states.
Enhance Military Cooperation!
– Strengthen military partnerships focused on combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime while avoiding neo-imperialist optics.
– Support African-led peacekeeping missions and regional security initiatives to offer alternatives to Russian mercenary involvement.
Collaborate with African Nations on Resource Management!
– Promote sustainable development models by partnering with African nations on equitable resource extraction and environmental conservation.
– Ensure that development initiatives include local community benefits to counter the exploitative practices of other powers.
Support Multipolar Engagement!
– Avoid framing the engagement as a “new Cold War”; instead, focus on inclusive global partnerships where African nations have agency in decision-making.
– Advocate for reforms in international institutions (e.g., UN, IMF) to increase African representation.
– Use the competition between great powers to negotiate better terms for aid, trade, and investment agreements.
– Insist on infrastructure projects that prioritize local employment, technology transfer, and long-term sustainability.
Diversify Economic Partners!
– Avoid over-reliance on any single country (e.g., China) by fostering diversified trade relationships with liberal democracies, BRICS nations, and regional blocs.
– Strengthen intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to reduce dependence on external powers.
Protect Sovereignty and Avoid Dependency!
– Resist pressures to adopt authoritarian governance models in exchange for development aid.
– Develop robust legal frameworks to prevent resource exploitation and ensure fair terms for foreign investments.
Invest in Regional Security Cooperation!
– Strengthen African Union (AU) and regional security mechanisms to reduce reliance on external military support, such as Russia’s Wagner Group.
– Build partnerships with global allies that respect African sovereignty and promote peacekeeping capabilities.
Promote Transparency in Aid and Trade Deals!
– Publicize the terms of agreements with external powers to foster public accountability and prevent corruption.
– Work with civil society organizations to monitor the social and environmental impacts of foreign-funded projects.
Expand Educational and Technological Opportunities!
– Collaborate with all partners to build higher education institutions, vocational training centers, and tech incubators.
– Develop programs to train a new generation of African leaders who can engage strategically with global powers.
Strengthen Civil Society and Democratic Institutions!
– Support NGOs and academic institutions to monitor and counter authoritarian influences from foreign actors.
– Foster dialogue on governance models that prioritize African values while safeguarding individual freedoms.
Build Alliances with Liberal Democracies!
– Partner with liberal democracies to balance authoritarian influences and ensure that Africa’s development aligns with global democratic values.
– Engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure African nations have a greater voice in multilateral forums like the G20 and UN Security Council.
These recommendations aim to balance the opportunities presented by the new great power competition with safeguards against exploitation, authoritarianism, and loss of sovereignty. Both liberal democracies and African nations must work collaboratively to create a mutually beneficial, sustainable, and democratic framework for Africa’s development.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.
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Abstract
Welfare states have acted as societal equalisers. They have reduced poverty, improved living standards, promoted equality, and supported democracy. However, their alignment with market imperatives and exclusionary definitions of deservedness threatens the welfare state’s role as a social equalising force. This paper aims to diagnose a challenge facing welfare states through two arguments. The first is that four recalibrations have taken place within welfare states: settling for universality, redefining universality, outsourcing, and reducing public spending. These recalibrations aim for market compliance, savings, and competitiveness. The second is that welfare states may prevent unequal distributions and promote equity by focusing beyond universality and prioritising socially liberal policies. By examining OECD countries and beyond, the paper highlights the pitfalls: a myopic focus on universality exacerbates inequalities; neoliberal criteria that align welfare states with populism and lend credence to welfare chauvinism; and outsourcing and privatisation that increase costs without improving service quality, weakening democratic capacity due to reliance on private providers.
(Received June 7, 2024, Published December 6, 2024.)
By Jellen Olivares-Jirsell*
Introduction
The establishment of welfare states has significantly impacted societies. The incredible achievements in social equality that welfare states have created cannot be overlooked. The package of wealth redistribution, services, and programmes has successfully reduced poverty in the places where it has been implemented (Kenworthy, 1999), thereby improving the living standards of millions of people.[1]
Welfare states record of success includes transforming democracies’ form and character (King, 1987) by producing high levels of income and gender equality (Swank, 2000) as well as supporting the consolidation of democratic rule (Pestoff, 2006). The role of the welfare state as a societal equaliser and creator of a critically engaged populous, confident in challenging and scrutinising policy, is widely acknowledged and understood (Patrick, 2017); the inclusion of Target 1.3 – ‘Social Protection Systems for All’ in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is evidence of this ideological consensus of welfare states as essential for society.
However, welfare states currently survive precariously and face the consistent and erroneous idea that deficits are always bad, and that the welfare state is an expensive luxury that can only exist in exchange for sacrificing economic competition(Wren-Lewis, 2018). They have nonetheless endured and—mostly—remained in place (King, 1987), lifting their populations out of poverty and protecting them from external shocks, especially during crises (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018), but they sacrifice much in the process.
When we think about the most celebrated welfare systems, we may consider their universal provision. Our minds may also drift to generous parental leave, free healthcare, education, and support. Unfortunately, this rosy picture of welfare states describes a non-existent utopia, as even the most celebrated welfare states now face issues with their provision.
This paper makes two main points: First, welfare states are not retrenching due to austerity but are recalibrating to align more with market imperatives. This recalibration, often mistaken for austerity, has shifted the focus from real accountability to delivering provision. It has narrowed perceptions such that funding issues are considered the only reason welfare states struggle to support their citizens. Second, this paper argues against the conventional view of the universality of provision as a north star for welfare states. Instead, the analysis guides the argument by focusing beyond universality and towards the prioritisation of socially liberal policies. Specifically, welfare states may prevent unequal distributions and promote equity within universal welfare programs. In doing so, welfare states may also prevent populists and neoliberals from redefining their inclusion criteria. The specific dynamics of these redefinitions will also be elaborated upon.
The goal of this paper is not prescriptive; welfare states are as varied as countries. Hence, a generic solution would not address local needs. Alternatively, it highlights the maladies our communal abandonment of liberalism and prioritisation of market imperatives have caused.
The two main arguments challenge the idea that citizens should accept subpar support, as welfare states are adequately funded. Social spending takes up more than a quarter of the GDP of OECD countries (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Instead, they argue that welfare states may effectively safeguard their citizens if liberal priorities precede market competition.
The paper challenges the notion that welfare states are expendable luxuries, advocating instead for a reimagined role beyond essential provision, which can address deeper societal needs beyond mere bodily survival. After providing an overview of the debate around social public expenditure, this point is demonstrated by examining changes in public spending, the move towards outsourcing, and the redefined criteria of deservedness. Using examples within the OECD and beyond, emphasising Northern European countries, the paper illustrates how welfare states are recalibrating rather than simply cutting back. It underscores the essential role of welfare states in protecting the most vulnerable and maintaining social stability. The paper also critiques overemphasis on universality, arguing that this metric alone can mask underlying inefficiencies and exclusions in welfare provision. Instead, it calls for a broader evaluation of welfare states based on their impact and outcomes, not just their coverage.
A Few Words on Welfare States and Austerity
Welfare states are complex and multifaceted, sometimes seen as burdens or saviours, expendable or essential depending on the observer. In a first understanding of the welfare state, as King (1987) described, the welfare state embodies non-market criteria. It exists only to provide essential public goods and services to gain or maintain at least minimal well-being standards in a population. In a compromise between capitalist and socialist ideologies, welfare states look after their citizens so that they can be part of a healthy, educated and capable society, with the added benefit that healthy, educated and capable individuals make great contributors to the financial markets and democracies (Begg et al., 2015; Crosland, 1964). This represents a mutually beneficial relationship between citizens, markets and states. Another view on the welfare state is that it is costly, inefficient, creates dependence on government, and burdens markets, hence needs transforming to serve the market, generate growth and benefit society through generalised economic prosperity (Alesina et al., 2019).
Neither the idealised nor vilified version of the welfare state exists. Welfare states compile liberal goals of social protection and betterment with older themes, including the ubiquitous condemnation of the ‘unworthy poor’. At one point, these notions were used to justify the ‘progressive opinion’ that saw eugenics as a legitimate tool for raising the general quality of the population (Pierson & Leimgruber, 2010).
Moreover, welfare states determine who is part of society and deserves safety and security. This creates a sense of inclusion and trust for those considered members. At the same time, those outside are excluded, fitting well with the political manifestos of populists (Bergman, 2022; Busemeyer et al., 2021). As Zakaria (2007) warns, liberalism, the progressive force behind inclusive and fair societies and democracies, which endorses social justice and the expansion of civil and political rights, has been slowly extracted from liberal institutions such as welfare states. These ideas over the deservedness of some over others led over thirty years ago, to coining the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ to describe some Norwegians and Danes’ belief that welfare services should be restricted to the country’s own (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). In short, welfare states are complex and multifaceted, capable of much good but also capable of reproducing and sustaining unfair structures.
In a purely economic sense, the welfare state costs countries large chunks of their GDP (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023), and at times, when welfare states do not uphold liberal values, they can solidify or even widen societal cleavages (Kenworthy, 1999; Parolin et al., 2023). This means that despite the good they do, they are imperfect institutions that are both essential and need improvement.
Overall, welfare states are state institutions that deliver interventions that help a population achieve or maintain at least minimal well-being standards. Their aims, however, may vary. Variously, it focuses on protecting the population, the market, the societal order, or something else. These differences are defined by the social and political priorities governing the state at that moment in time, as the upcoming examples will shortly show. In truth, welfare states are intrinsically political entities, defining acceptable and deserving versions of their citizens and responding to political priorities as they occur. This means that welfare states are subject to the ebb and flow of politics and the changing norms around deservedness, the role of the state in individual life and the multiple political priorities of contemporary politics.
Among said political priorities, governments may be concerned with creating surpluses in their cyclical primary balance adjustments (austerity), requiring – among other measures – reduced social spending. As hinted in the introduction, the constant push and pull between economic and social needs have caused significant changes to welfare states; these economic forces permeate politics and democratic institutions. Austerity measures have been one of the most favoured economic interventions since the normalisation of neoliberal economics in the 1980s.
There are different forms of austerity measures governments can introduce. Although raising or decreasing taxes is part of the austerity arsenal (Union of International Associations, 2024), we have come to understand austerity to mean cuts in spending rather than tax adjustments. The general idea of austerity measures is to cut down on luxuries and unnecessary spending, work on paying back debt, and even create a surplus in the budget. However, especially in countries like the UK, the everyday use of austerity is almost always equated with spending cuts (The Guardian, 2024). It rarely includes consideration of tax increases or reductions in the public lexicon. This leads to a frequent conflation of austerity with cuts to the welfare state.
Despite this frequent confusion, austerity measures refer to policies that aim to reduce government budget deficits by decreasing spending but may also involve tax increases, decreases, or a combination of these. The creation of surplus or reduction of deficit that austerity measures aim to create can be pretty confusing, as at times, it may even include increasing funding of certain areas of the economy – for example, by providing subsidies to industries that are expected to create growth (GOV.UK, 2023) – and cuts in other areas not deemed to help with economic growth – typically social spending. However, it is essential to understand that austerity measures aim to reduce budget deficits.
The effectiveness of austerity policies is subject to much debate. According to Keynesian economists, since one person’s spending is another person’s income, reductions in government spending during economic downturns worsen economic crises (Fazzari et al., 2013). Further, these reductions pass down debt to the working classes (Blyth, 2013) and severely affect physical and mental health (Barr et al., 2015; Loopstra et al., 2016; Patrick, 2017). Others believe reducing government budget deficits through spending cuts is more effective than increasing taxes. They argue that such policies demonstrate a government’s financial discipline to creditors and credit rating agencies, making borrowing easier and less expensive (Alesina et al., 2019).
Austerity is engaged with here because welfare states are often written and discussed in relation to austerity. This is central to the argument about recalibration. Austerity means more than cuts to the social spending budget; it has become a shorthand for welfare states’ funding challenges. In this paper, it is put forth that the issue lies beyond cuts to public social spending and that austerity (colloquially understood as cuts to the welfare state) is not the cause of the perceived retrenchment of welfare states; instead, recalibration is.
This paper aims to diagnose a challenge facing welfare states. The idea that welfare states have been reduced to nothing due to a lack of funding is as pervasive as the idea that deficits are bad. Both these ideas have severe implications for welfare states and their operations. However, as this paper argues, the strategies adopted to keep welfare states alive are geared around four central recalibrations: settling for universality, redefining universality, outsourcing and monetising public provision and reducing public spending on social protection. All these recalibrations are, in one way or another, based on the idea that welfare states ought to comply with market imperatives, making savings and operating competitively. To analyse welfare state recalibration empirically, some examples of countries facing these challenges are reviewed to assess how these recalibrations have taken shape.
The Recalibration Strategies
Settling for and Redefining Universality
Welfare states are permanently forced to justify their existence based on market imperatives due to the pervasive idea that governments should always grow, maintain a surplus and avoid debt at all costs (Wren-Lewis, 2018). There is a consistent thread of welfare provision as a value-for-money exercise: citizens are trained and kept sheltered and healthy to become productive members of society, but these protections must always cost less than citizens produce.
Considering this, welfare states are constituted as providers of social protection floors, overlooking their potential role in promoting liberalism through equality (Swank, 2000) and democracy (Patrick, 2017; Pestoff, 2006). Following the UN’s SDG, welfare states have been correctly lauded as basic protection floors with universal distribution as a deterrent to poverty and inequality.
The absence of a safety net can predispose the most vulnerable populations to extreme poverty; thus, implementing a basic yet universal provision may effectively mitigate this risk. However, in welfare states that have (or aim to have) universal coverage of those deemed deserving, citizens miss out on the broader societal benefits that welfare states provide when they instead focus on basic universal provision. Moreover, inequality and poverty may go unnoticed in places where universality of coverage exists as long as universality alone is the metric used to assess our welfare state outcomes (Patrick, 2017).
A case in point is that of the Netherlands, a country with a very high social expenditure budget and one of the most celebrated welfare states in the world. This country, however, has the highest level of outsourcing of social provision globally (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). It is also a place with very high levels of wealth inequality (Van den Bossche, 2019), a growing opportunity gap in education based on ethnicity and socio-economic class and issues of accessibility for service users due to significant restrictions to cover, resulting in the duality of provision, known as welfare chauvinism (de Koster et al., 2013).
In the Netherlands, for-profit nursing home care is banned, but changes in the policy have enabled for-profit nursing homes to circumvent the for-profit ban. This leads to exclusionary practices. For example, selecting clients based on the severity of their disease and not hiring expensive staff for specialist care, then moving people out if they become too ill and need specialist care (Bos et al., 2020). Similarly, childcare was privatised in 2005 to make provision efficient. However, there is inequality in childcare use by family type, and the quality of provision has decreased since privatisation and outsourcing started (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2014).
In the case of the Netherlands, the services are technically more widely available than before, at least in terms of spaces in nursing homes or childcare; thus, the universality of provision has yet to be challenged. However, even as the provision of nursing homes and childcare has increased since the private sector incursion (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2014; Bos et al., 2020), the examples evidence, universality is caveated to exclude those very sick from nursing homes or certain family groups from childcare. In this case, it is clear that the goal of universality has been kept, but focusing only on universality alone obscures important aspects of accessibility for specific groups.
Sweden provides another example of this duality of high social expenditure with disparities in outcomes. This country has privatised and outsourced much of its schooling provision and now observes a significant drop in the performance of these schools (OECD, 2023; West, 2014). The metric of universality is met since Sweden provides universal coverage to its population (Janlöv et al., 2023). However, considering the performance variations between schools in low and high-income areas, especially since 2003 (OECD, 2015), the universal provision of education clearly evidences a Matthew Effect, whereby provision is most beneficial to those who need it the least (Bonoli & Fabienne, 2018). Besides the inequitable distribution of public goods, an additional challenge in the Swedish educational landscape is the establishment of lobbying. Private actors have evolved from holding purely economic roles to being strong political actors engaged in policymaking, adversely affecting transparency and democracy (Jobér, 2023). Moreover, this type of lobbyism can enhance existing socio-economic divisions, as schools with the capacity to lobby for more resources are also those in the wealthier areas.
The point here is not to minimise the achievements of welfare states; both the Netherlands and Sweden boast some of the best social well-being metrics in the world. Indeed, these two countries have some of the most acclaimed welfare systems in the world (Hutt, 2019; OECD, 2024a; OECD, 2024b). Sweden, particularly, was seen as the model for most welfare states in the post-war era for the rest of Europe. However, as the above examples show, the universality of public provision does not equate to better outcomes, and, at times, it may even perpetuate or exacerbate unequal societal constructions.
Moreover, the Netherlands and Sweden are not isolated cases. In the EU, native workers obtain the highest economic prosperity and employment returns from education, followed by EU workers, leaving non-EU workers last. Similar trends can also be observed in the US between natives and non-natives (Gamito, 2022). The universality of provision, therefore, does not signify equality in outcomes when inequity is built into the infrastructure of provision. Thus, universal provision may enhance societal cleavages and create or enhance a Matthew Effect.
This Matthew Effect exists in various forms in all welfare states (Heckman & Landersø, 2021; Pavolini & Van Lancker, 2018). If anything, the Netherlands and Sweden have been somewhat protected from adverse outcomes because of the societal duress and resilience created before these services were privatised and outsourced (OECD, 2018) and their goals were rearranged.
I have so far argued that welfare states have adopted universality as their central goal, even though focusing on universality conceals issues with exclusionary practices that may perpetuate and even enhance social crevices. I will build upon this argument on universality as a central goal and posit that, besides focusing on universality as a central goal, welfare states have also redefined universality, at least to some degree, due to producerism.
Producerism emphasises the importance of productive labour and the contributions of producers to society (Bergman, 2022). It often advocates for policies and attitudes that prioritise the interests of producers, such as workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs, over consumers or other groups. Producerism can manifest in various forms, including support for protectionist trade policies, subsidies for domestic industries, and efforts to promote self-sufficiency and national economic independence. It also lends credence to exclusionary forms of provision.
This emphasis on work participation within welfare programs dovetails producerism, underscoring the significance of productive labour and workers’ contributions to society through increasing adherence to workfare initiatives. Workfare refers to government programs or policies requiring individuals receiving welfare benefits to participate in some form of work or job training as a condition of assistance (Crisp & Fletcher, 2008). Unlike traditional welfare programs, which may provide financial support without a work requirement, workfare aims to promote self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on government assistance by encouraging recipients, via specific participation requirements, to gain job skills and enter the workforce. These requirements are often a combination of activities intended to improve the recipient’s job prospects and force the unemployed to contribute to society through unpaid or low-paid work comparable to community work (Ibid.). Forms of workfare programs include job placement services, subsidised employment, and mandatory community service or work assignments. Through workfare programmes, governments seek to enhance recipients’ employability and instil a sense of societal obligation to be productive members of society.
While employment can have a positive effect on well-being, the issue is not that the workfare approach may find jobs for those who want them; rather, it lies in that liberal protections are taken out of the equation as the main point of the welfare state, creating perverse incentives for the welfare state to become the surveyor and punisher of uncompliant citizens. This approach discourages fairness and social justice (Bonoli, 2010) because if all that matters is productivity, pensions serve little purpose, as does education beyond vocational training and services that cover sectors of the population that cannot access employment, such as those caring for family members and those with disabilities that prevent them from gaining employment. The issue is not that people will be encouraged to work but that this becomes a primary consideration of the welfare state, putting all others aside. In other words, welfare states have been recalibrated towards market imperatives and stripped of liberal notions.
Producerism can be said to be the ideological force behind workfare policies and is linked to welfare chauvinism (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Geva (2021), Cinpoeş and Norocel (2020) identify a producerist shift that coexists with welfare chauvinism in some post-communist countries. These authors argue that with the fall of the Soviet Union, post-communist countries like Poland, Hungary, and Romania aimed to shed anything resembling communism, hurriedly embracing neoliberal values to better fit into the rest of Europe. This symbolic return to Europe was so complete that the reconstructions of national membership and identity were combined with notions of entrepreneurship and self.
The vilification of people with low incomes is evidenced in Romania with the use of ‘asistat’ as a slur, a term referring to social assistance recipients; in Hungary, a Roma-specific welfare policy targeted Roma minorities who were construed as unwilling to work and carry their weight in society; and in Poland, this was articulated as lazy guests freeloading onto their hard-working hosts (Ibid.).
Other times, producerism can work to articulate the caveats of universality by allowing proxy exclusions. That is to say, producerism has redefined what universality is. Moral gymnastics have always surrounded universality considerations; at another time in history, being impious may have rendered someone unworthy of assistance and access to an almshouse (Lambeth Archives, 2024). What is novel about the redefinition of universality is that it is underpinned by neoliberal ideas, which claim to be unbiased and rational approaches to defining deservedness (Davies, 2014). By claiming rationality, producerism can help implement exclusionary policies that might otherwise create a political backlash by liberals and progressives.
Of course, it was a matter of economic competition. In that case, a purely homo-economicus approach to the ageing population challenges in many countries would involve welcoming migrants in any country they wished to work in, as they would contribute to the competitiveness of the nation and pay into the tax systems that fund the welfare state (Marois et al., 2020). However, producerism has been used to legitimise exclusionary welfare provisions that may ultimately operate against market efficiency. These neoliberal justifications for exclusion are most efficient as they sanitise and depoliticise prejudiced views under economic imperatives. The depoliticisation of prejudice enables governments to exclude significant portions of their residents from support. For instance, they may deny some individuals access to legal work and then claim those individuals are ineligible for assistance because they lack contributions or the required legal status.
Denmark, for example, currently has a two-tiered welfare system, one for Danish citizens and another for the rest (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Denmark prides itself on its universalist welfare regime; however, the universality of its provisions is truly exclusionary when considering that only some residents are included within this universal provision.
In the UK, the government, on the one hand, takes part in women empowerment campaigns (UN Women, 2023) and actively implements gender equality in the workplace regulations (UK Legislation, 2023) while at the same time actively restricting women from seeking help when experiencing domestic violence when they are not UK nationals and are stamped ‘no recourse to public funds’ in their passports. These actions can be justified under producerism because these groups are excluded only due to their lack of contributions (Pennings, 2020).
Producerism suggests that workers are virtuous and hard-working but are being squeezed by non-productive others both above them, such as bureaucrats, politicians, elites, bankers, and international capital, and below them, such as immigrants and undeserving poor who rely on benefits paid for by the labour of others. Moreover, it articulates and justifies divisions in a language many understand as unbiased and rational.
According to Larsen (2008), how welfare regimes are structured can impact how the public views those who are poor or unemployed. Van der Waal et al. (2013) have observed that various welfare regimes handle the provision/restriction duality differently but that, for the most part, producerist ideas of deservedness come to the fore. Guentner et al. (2016) find that groups framed as economically unproductive start to be considered a kind of human surplus and are, therefore, undeserving. In a UK example, a group of low-income individuals were pushed out of London’s social housing, resulting in their displacement because they were considered not to contribute sufficiently to the city to maintain their place in it (ibid.). Jingwei He (2022) finds the same concerning Chinese people’s attitudes toward welfare entitlements for rural-to-urban migrants.
Ward and Denney (2021) document a consistent rhetoric of abuse towards migrants framed around myths of them as less productive than nationals. Thus, we see here that producerist logic has been amalgamated with populism to create a type of welfare chauvinism that is both economic and cultural. This is crucial because, as argued, welfare states undergo producerist reconstructions whereby market-based logics are applied to social provision. This reconstructs the welfare state and the definition of universal provision upon caveated universal criteria – where universal does not mean everybody but those considered deserving. Hence, it is essential to re-examine welfare policies to ensure they promote fairness and social justice universally.
This section has discussed the evolution and challenges of welfare states, with a particular focus on the idea of universality in social protection. The argument is that welfare states have increasingly prioritised market-driven goals such as productivity and cost-efficiency over liberal objectives like equality and democracy. This shift has led to welfare systems that, while offering universal social protection, may fail to address underlying issues of inequality and poverty. Additionally, producerism was introduced as a factor contributing to the narrow and exclusive redefinition of universality. It rationalises social provisions that are only accessible to those considered deserving based on their productivity.
Outsourcing, Monetising and Reducing Public Spending on Social Protection
Thus far, this paper has mentioned privatisation and outsourcing only in relation to the universality of provision. Welfare states have undergone recalibrations that have made them settle for the simple goal of extended coverage. However, this may conceal issues with the quality of provision. I have argued that welfare states have always had an exclusionary criterion of deservedness disguised as logical and unbiased; the current iteration has been based on economic competition, best encapsulated under producerism. This has lent credence to policies of exclusion that affect the range, coverage and quality of welfare provisions.
In this section, I argue that welfare states have become privatised and outsourced to continue to exist. In the process, they have prioritised market imperatives instead of the liberal protections liberal democracies declare to prioritise. Nevertheless, this shift has not necessarily resulted in cost savings, improved service quality, or decreased public spending.
Public-private partnerships are becoming increasingly popular among governments to finance, design, build, and operate infrastructure projects and outsource goods and services, sometimes fully delivered by third parties but financed by governments (Jobér, 2023). The idea that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector and hence services ought to be outsourced, or else be done poorly and at more cost by the state, has prompted commissioning and subcontracting structures that are not necessarily more supportive of people’s needs, as I will shortly elaborate. Moreover, these outsourced services are not ipso facto cheaper than direct provision. This has resulted in for-profit companies becoming the primary or exclusive providers of public employment services in several countries (McGann, 2023) and failing to deliver the expected reduction in public spending on social protection.
Between 2005 and 2010, the total value of partnership projects in low and middle-income countries more than doubled (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). In OECD countries, around 36 per cent of total general spending is dedicated to public social protection, of which around 9 per cent is outsourced to private providers (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). In other words, a significant portion of OECD countries’ GDP is outsourced to the private sector. Swank (2000) argues that the structural transformations of welfare states include privatisation, decentralisation of authority, segmentation of benefit equality, and an increased emphasis on outsourcing provisions to non-state actors such as charities or private organisations through publicly commissioned services and are taking place worldwide. These changes align social policy with market-oriented values, emphasising work and market efficiency.
Whether these changes can be considered efficient depends on their goal. A 2018 OECD report showed that the rationale for privatising public provisions has mainly been geared towards economic stabilisation, improving the efficiency of the markets, or raising fiscal resources. The criteria for privatisation are based on two critical assumptions. First, it assumes that private markets are the most efficient way to provide public services. Second, it assumes that privatisation is the default option; those against it are tasked to prove why public services should remain state-owned (OECD, 2018).
With that in mind, the goal has been largely achieved if the rationale for privatising public provision is to improve market structures or economic efficiency. The state has effectively subsidised the private sector by providing extensive and profitable government contracts. Public sector privatisation and outsourcing have created millionaires and significant money transfers from the public to the private sector, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic (Lilly et al., 2020).
The OECD report is interesting because it presents how disjointed the rationales for privatisation are from public protection. The report shows evident market prioritisation over the protection of liberal values that countries in the OECD area may otherwise claim to prioritise.
The second argument in this section is that the goal of reducing public spending on social protection through privatisation and outsourcing of social protection has not materialised. As shown in the examples above, public spending is at its highest despite recent fluctuations. While raising fiscal resources by making savings in social public spending may be one of the rationales provided for privatisation, the outcomes do not necessarily give the taxpayer the opportunity for a discount (OECD, 2018). Countries continue to dedicate large sections of their GDP to social spending, but the savings expected due to the privatisation and monetisation of welfare provision have not been fulfilled. Moreover, welfare provision has not improved either; headlines abound about funding losses and service deterioration (Bambra, 2019; Boylan & Ho, 2017; Konzelmann, 2019; Pentaraki, 2017).
This increase in privatisation and outsourcing of public provision means that the state has less direct control over the provision of public services but oversees the delivery of these services through monitoring and surveillance. Many local authorities in the UK have shifted to commissioning-only or at least commissioning-heavy provisions (Dickinson, 2014), with staff overseeing the contracts and ensuring goals are met. Commissioning aims to decrease the government’s involvement in providing services. This encourages public authorities to act as enablers with a strategic oversight function that assesses the needs of defined populations and the outcomes delivered by third parties. The commissioning economy comprises an extensive network of public bodies, private firms, and third sector organisations that are variously involved in providing services (Macmillan & Paine, 2021). The state has thus reconfigured its mission as a regulator rather than a direct provider of welfare and other crucial services (Yeung, 2010).
This shift from rowing to steering (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) has had two notable outcomes; the first is that, as we have seen, no saving has occurred. Since 1995, government social spending has increased in many countries (The World Bank, 2024). While several countries appear to be decreasing their social spending recently, they have maintained a very high level of social expenditure (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Governments still have to employ people to manage the commissioned services, and these private contracts are not cheaper for the public purse or better for the service user, as seen in the Swedish and Dutch examples.
The Netherlands is a valuable reminder of this reality as the country has a very high social expenditure budget and the highest level of outsourcing of social provision globally (ibid.). It has been very active in privatisation for around 30 years; between 1980 and 2015, the expenditure on health was around 5 per cent. Around the late 1990s, when privatisation and outsourcing began in earnest, the country spent around 1% less on health than it had a decade before. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, the number increased to around 6 per cent, peaking at 6.5 per cent in 2015, and currently at around 5.7 per cent (OECDc, 2024).
At the same time, the service provision became conditional and monetised, resulting in all persons residing in the Netherlands and all non-residents working in the Netherlands being required to buy private healthcare insurance (Pennings, 2020). In short, the Netherlands pays more now for a health provision that requires insurance premiums and deductibles (co-pays) to access (Government of the Netherlands, 2024). This diminished (in terms of accessibility) health provision is paid twice, once through taxes and again directly when patients require provision.
The second notable outcome is the loss of democratic capacity. The capacity-building exercise of democratic institutions occurs daily when providing goods and services to its citizens. When managing these social goods and services is outsourced, so is the daily exercise of liberal provision. As a result, welfare states lose their ability to maintain the liberal institutions that underpin democracies. Capacity building is essential for successfully navigating, adapting, and flourishing in a rapidly changing world (United Nations, 2024). When this is outsourced, governments become dependent on private provision and lose the ability to deal with complex challenges.
In the UK, outsourcing accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the government contracted various private providers to manage the logistics of and store personal protective equipment, the national drive-in testing centres and super-labs, run the contact tracing programme, build the COVID-19 datastore and onboard returning health workers (British Medical Association (BMA), 2020). The BMA report (Ibid.) shows that continued outsourcing of the national health service in the UK significantly limited the government’s ability to mount a coordinated response during the public health emergency. Paradoxically, outsourcing was used to fill gaps created by sustained outsourcing and privatisation.
Of course, the changes in privatisation and outsourcing of public provision are not unique to the Netherlands, the UK, or health. Indeed, this process is taking place widely (Jobér, 2023) and over various areas of social protection spending (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Meanwhile, private sector involvement in public provision trend is on the rise with no apparent slowdown on the horizon (British Medical Association, 2020; OECD, 2018); all the while, public spending on social protection has stayed at very high levels, and state capacity has become dependent on the private sector.
This section has examined the trend of privatisation and outsourcing in welfare states, arguing that these practices have shifted the focus from liberal protections to market imperatives. Welfare states, driven by the belief in the private sector’s efficiency, have increasingly turned to public-private partnerships and outsourcing to deliver public services. This shift has not necessarily resulted in cost savings or improved service quality. Instead, as commissioning and outsourcing increase, so does public spending, with significant portions of GDP now directed to private providers, furthering a disconnect between the goals of economic efficiency and the quality of social protection. Welfare states have increasingly become commodification engines, prioritising market-driven goals such as productivity and cost-efficiency over liberal objectives such as equality and democracy.
Moreover, the reliance on private sector provision has undermined democratic capacities by reducing the state’s direct control over public services and eroding the daily exercise of liberal provision. This dependence on private providers has also compromised the state’s ability to handle complex challenges. Privatisation and outsourcing have thus not achieved the intended economic efficiencies or service quality improvements. Instead, public spending remains high, and state capacity has become increasingly reliant on the private sector, raising concerns about the future of social protection and democratic governance.
Conclusion
Welfare states are complex and multifaceted. They have inherent issues, and their goals of social betterment coexist with older themes, including the condemnation of the ‘unworthy poor.’ Moreover, welfare states are costly, consuming significant portions of GDP, and can sometimes reinforce societal divides instead of bridging them. Welfare states are intrinsically political, defining acceptable and deserving versions of citizens.
However, they are also essential for equality and democracy and for lifting many out of poverty. This paper acknowledged that welfare states’ strengths are more potent than their weaknesses and aimed to identify the nature of the challenges facing them today.
Welfare states have fared rough neoliberal waters in some ways through recalibration strategies. By submitting to market imperatives and focusing on and redefining universality, outsourcing, and monetising public provision, they have managed to keep their place in society. However, these recalibrations have not met the promised savings to the taxpayer nor the desired liberal outcomes in protecting society’s most vulnerable. Welfare states have kept their places in society, but much has been lost in adapting to market imperatives.
These recalibrations have aligned welfare states with market imperatives, emphasising cost savings and competitive operation and forfeiting liberal priorities in the following ways. For example, focusing solely on universality has obscured and exacerbated existing inequalities. Second, by redefining universality through neoliberal criteria, welfare states have lent credence and inadvertently aligned themselves with the populist ‘us versus them’ criterion of difference. Third, outsourcing has led to higher costs without improved service quality. Lastly, such outsourcing has eroded democratic capacity as governments become dependent on private providers, losing the ability to manage social challenges independently.
In this paper, two main points were presented. The first is that the welfare state is undergoing recalibration, not austerity. This was illustrated through explanations around social public expenditure, the move towards outsourcing, and the redefined criteria of deservedness. Despite some small recent dips, the expenditure has increased overall. Social public spending is among the highest it has ever been, but what has changed is how it is spent. With that in mind, the issue is not austerity. Thus, the problem is that social spending is financing the private sector through outsourcing contracts instead of focusing on improving its provision.
As articulated here, welfare states are not luxuries; they can reduce poverty, protect citizens against shocks, and embolden citizens to be capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy, especially during crises and economic downturns. However, the essential liberal values that welfare states aim to protect are compromised when market imperatives become the priority. The public sector has effectively subsidised the private sector through commissioning contracts that do not necessarily provide cheaper or better support for service users compared to what governments can offer. This is because the primary incentive for the private sector is profit-making and contract renewal rather than focusing on reducing poverty and inequalities, protecting citizens from shocks, or empowering citizens to be capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy.
We now know that outsourcing and privatising public provision have not resulted in savings for the taxpayer; decades of data show that welfare states are not spending less (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). However, when citizens inquire about what has happened to their community services, schools, or health services, a word frequently used is austerity. Used colloquially, austerity refers to budget cuts for public social spending. Still, if these budgets have expanded, then this means that the challenges faced by welfare states are not only due to austerity.
In the second point, I have demonstrated that governments’ focus on the universality of welfare states is at the expense of achieving liberal goals. The universality of provision, as shown, may create the illusion that it is worth having a welfare state just for its own sake, even if it barely functions as a social equaliser and poverty-reducing tool.
I reiterate that my argument is not for eliminating universality in welfare states but rather for implementing policies that prevent the unequal distribution of benefits within universal welfare programs. Specifically, I posited that governments might reconsider financing the private sector via outsourcing contracts and instead exercise their liberal muscle by working on improving their provision, not just coverage.
So much institutional knowledge has been lost through outsourcing, knowledge that may help adapt services to assist better those slipping through the cracks. By creating or rebuilding their institutional capacity, governments are better placed to deal with emerging crises instead of relying on the private sector, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. By engaging with and prioritising market imperatives, liberal values have been put to one side, and producerism has entered welfare provision, shaping welfare programmes and objectives. However, this focus on universality is a recalibration emerging from an erroneous understanding that welfare states must trim their goals due to limited funding.
The two arguments presented challenge the idea that citizens must settle for scraps, as welfare states are suitably funded to provide the required provisions. Since the issue is not austerity, I suggest that citizens consider whether their welfare states suitably protect them under the current provision or if market imperatives have been prioritised.
The recalibration of welfare states often comes at the expense of service quality, equity, and democratic capacity, raising concerns about welfare states’ future direction. In truth, citizens are paying dearly for a poor product and are losing their capacity as capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy to reject a poor deal.
Confusion over the real cause of welfare state retrenchment obscures potential solutions. This diagnosis and the suggestion that welfare states may look beyond universality and stop working towards market imperatives are more straightforward said than done, as welfare states are intrinsically political and politicised entities. Still, I propose that by suitably diagnosing the issue, societies might have a fighting chance to save welfare states and, in turn, strengthen liberal democracies
(*) Jellen Olivares-Jirsell is a Doctoral candidate in Politics at Kingston University London. Her scholarly contributions include publications in the Global Affairs and Populism journals. Research activities include roles with the Trust Lab project at Swansea University and EUscepticOBS and Populism in the Age of COVID-19 at Malmo University. Research interests encompass politics, norms and ideologies, populism, neoliberalism, welfare states, trust, and polarization.
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[1]Acknowledgement: I am grateful for the feedback this paper received during and after the workshop and the anonymous reviewers. I am also incredibly thankful for Hannah Geddes’s full engagement as a discussant.
Tostes, Ana Paula. (2024). “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.” Populism & Politics (P&P).European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 5, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0043b
Abstract
The article seeks to investigate the EU crises impacting electoral support for new right-wing and left-wing extremist ideologies with populist characteristics. We examine populist political parties’ performances in national elections in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of specific and diffuse Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Finally, we confirm that Euroscepticism increases in periods of crisis and can be identified as expressions of those contesting EU policies related to the economy, specifically, or social and political integration when it encompasses a more generalized attitude against the EU.
Keywords: populism, Euroscepticism, EU crises
(Received June 6, 2024, Published December 5, 2024.)
By Ana Paula Tostes*
Introduction
Despite the ambiguities of the concept of populism (Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2012), in this article, we discuss its emergence in the context of the EU integration process, reflected in the increase in Euroscepticism. Popular support for EU institutions and policies has been the primary measure of the legitimacy of the authority of the European institutions, as it provides greater transparency on the coherence between the expectations and perceptions of European citizens and EU governance (Cmakalová & Rolenc, 2012). Public opinion and voter preference for pro-European political parties have been considered relevant in the conditions under which direct elections are held only for the European Parliament, and supranational institutions have been created without public participation and sufficient understanding of the European public.
For this study, we used the national electoral results of extremist political parties from the time the new European far-right ideology emerged in the late 1980s to 2023. We examined the electoral platforms, political strategies, and electoral support of populist political parties in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of Euroscepticism in the region and extremist far-right and far-left political parties.
There is a significant amount of literature about the impact of regional integration on European societies, domestic politics, and party systems. Scholars have engaged in lengthy debates on its impact levels, limits and importance (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992; Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 2007; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996). Taggart (1998) and Marks et al. (2002, 2006) examined voter preferences in national elections based on the level of support for regional integration. They found that national political parties’ position on the regional integration process in Europe is an important variable in explaining voter preferences. Marks et al. (2002, 2006) rated European electors’ ideological and party positions according to the level of support for integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Issues related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” elements in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters.
Since the early single market consolidation until the euro crisis in 2008-2009, views that strongly oppose economic integration, such as the ones voiced by far-left political parties, have not received much support from voters. Criticisms of the liberal model for a single market have not been enough to convince citizens that the integration process could cause actual harm, especially those who are distant from it and do not feel that it threatens economic losses. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, the countries affected the most by the 2008 financial crisis benefitted from the European Structural Funds resource transfers. The situation was similar during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in an unprecedented economic contraction in 2020. In both cases, the EU transfer of benefits and funds was fast, forceful and well-coordinated at all levels.
The same cannot be said about the opponents of social and political integration, the same groups in European societies that see the migration crisis as a critical element causing intolerance and populism to grow in the region. Since the European migration crisis began in 2015, there has been a considerable increase in the politicization of the defence of national identity and culture due to the stances of new far-right political parties.
We have researched public documents and sources and political party manifestos to classify populist political parties by country and, according to Marks et al. (2002, 2006), scale for the consideration of ideological positions impacting the support for integration in the economic sphere and the political and social spheres. Then, we collected the number of votes each party received in each national (Parliamentary) election in the 15 Western European countries to apply the dimensions of Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).[1]
EU Contestation and Populism
No crisis in the history of the European Union (EU) compares to the massive wave of migration to Europe, which reached its highest point in 2015 and has not yet come to an end. The EU is a complex and long-term construction, which would only be possible to build continuously or without route changes. There have been essential crises in recent decades, including the Maastricht crisis in the 1990s, the attempt to approve the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the series of crises triggered by the economic and financial collapse that affected all the countries in the eurozone in 2009. The EU’s crises have been the object of research and theories to explain different features, contexts, and impacts on the legitimacy and stability of its institutional structure and policies (Brack & Gürkan, 2020). However, a common consequence of the economic and migration crises was the growth of political radicalism and EU contestation. Over the last two decades, the resurgence of terrorism and political radicalism has contributed to the emergence of a socio-political scenario that has become a new normal for Europe: one fraught with assuming populisms and nationalisms that have chosen the EU as a target of criticism.
This article does not ignore a broader, global wave of conservatism that uses populist political platforms, affecting political environments across the Americas, from the United States to Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries. However, in the case of the EU, which represents the most critical and successful regional organization and is mentioned as a model for other regions such as South America, it is important to understand under which political circumstances greater integration among states generates opposition. In other words, when does support for regional institutions and norms turn into criticism and skepticism?
Populism found fertile ground to develop during the two major recent crises in the EU: when the euro crises shook the eurozone’s member states (2008-2009) and during the peak in European immigration levels (2015). Although this new acceptance and recognition of criticisms of the excesses of EU institutionalization and the distance between it and national civil society sectors had different effects on different groups, EU contestation was a common strategy for many of them. Criticisms about accountability and participation in building European architecture have always existed. Still, the “nudges” (Sunstein, 2020) are not capable of generating a new set of critical positions articulated around a narrative that accuses elites and representative models of usurping nativist and identity preferences. We now know, especially after the Brexit experience, that criticism of the EU is stronger among portions of the UK population that do not feel that they benefit from globalization or integration, not even the way they facilitate the circulation of people, goods, services and capital within the European Single Market region.[2] Disapproval of the representative model, which extends to the EU, has come mainly from those who possibly (or apparently) perceive themselves as having been harmed by European regional integration or not benefitting from it, even if their dissatisfaction with political, social or economic issues are not related to regional integration itself.
Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) examined voter preferences in national elections and the relations, if any, to regional integration. The authors rated voters’ ideological and party positions according to their level of support for European integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Themes related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” issues found in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters. Based on their categorization of political parties’ party family by ideology (Mair & Mudde, 1998; Marks et al., 2002), we expect that economic crises are more likely to affect voters with critical views from the left and alternative side of the ideological spectrum, while those related to immigration affect more conservative and nationalist voters, whose ideological preferences are similar to those of the new extreme right-wing political parties.
In both cases, parties at the opposite ends of the political spectrum promise immediate and easy solutions to complex problems, which they frame in similar, comparable scenarios while evoking “fears,” “frustrations,” “anger,” or “resentments” (Müller, 2016, p. 12). Although populism is on the rise in different social and political contexts around the world, this article discusses a possible correlation between critical events associated with EU politics and policies and the increase in votes for populist electoral platforms fueled by social groups related to the new political cleavages identified with the extreme left and the extreme right (Marks et al., 2002; Kurt, 2013). When we look at national electoral results, we find that political and social turmoil is conducive to the success of populist strategies in EU member states’ national elections.
For this article, we used data from the 15 Western European member states (EU15) on electoral support for extremist political parties over nearly 40 years. These countries allow us to consider similarities in their political party ideologies and systems, as the period of the research enables us to identify changes in support for extremist political parties in national elections, as it goes from the time the new European far-right parties emerged in the 1980s (Ignazi, 1996) in the EU15 to recent days.[3]We do not consider their success in obtaining seats in national parliaments, but rather the votes they obtained to indicate voter support for the extremists’ platforms.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
The EU represents the status quo for liberal democracy, and it claims to be the promoter of the rule of law and Western values, both within the region of integration and outside it, through its international relations policies and strategies. Anti-establishment voters who fuel criticisms of representative institutions in national elections ground their positions on the regional model of EU institutionalization based on representation without any mechanisms for direct participation. The European Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, and the European Parliament elections are seen as “second-order” (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif & Norris, 1997) and less important than national ones. To support our argument, we revisited the literature on populism to find signs of populist political strategies in national elections that feed on dissatisfaction with supranational governance and regional integration.
Euroscepticism and Populisms
Euroscepticism has become a “catch-all term” (Bertoncini & Koenig, 2014) broadly used by society and the media, but also by the academic world that seeks to classify and conceptualize it to clarify positions on and the dimensions of skepticism towards Europe and its model of economic and political integration. As a result, there is a point where Euroscepticism and populism overlap. The latter is an older concept with several historical and methodological variations but no single unambiguous definition. Thus, in recognition of the conceptual difficulties related to the term “populism”, it is necessary to clarify how the term will be used and the limits of its use in this article. While we do not consider Euroscepticism a subcategory of populism, Eurosceptic parties have used populist strategies in their campaigns and accused Brussels of many economic problems and the migration crisis.
Although there is no single definition of populism, two common affirmations in the literature are that the term is generally used to discredit political opponents associated with an elite that has expropriated the power of the people and that the populist leader appears as an alternative for reclaiming legitimacy and the authority to represent the “popular will” (e.g., Taggart, 2000, 2002; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Stanley, 2008; Müller, 2016).
Political scientists use the term “populism” to refer to the call for the “people” to assume their place as historical actors. The social sciences field originally coined the term “populism” in the Weberian sense of “charismatic” leadership: in other words, a populist is a leader who seeks to have his actions legitimized directly by the people and replace institutions. Even so, new populism aims to use public consultations strategically to restore democratic legitimacy. A common conclusion in the literature is that populists attract voters who are “frustrated” with traditional politics and “angry” with or “resentful” towards elites that allegedly did not heed their demands (Müller, 2016). This helps to understand why populists demand public consultations to evade institutional control. This is not a novelty in the contemporary world, as Max Weber had already identified back in the 19th century in England (in “Politics as a Vocation”, published in 1919 in Germany) the practice of “charismatic leaders” holding direct consultations with the people. These leaders use plebiscitary democracy and direct dialogue with the masses, without the intermediation of institutions, to seek legitimacy to bypass procedures and representative institutions. Therefore, the most significant danger of contemporary populism is that it adopts democratic procedures and values to denounce the illegitimacy of democracy. They promise to rescue the people’s “will” while opposing an “elite”.
The “real” power of the people will not, however, be “democratically rescued” by promises of ongoing political participation nor by an “open-ended process of deliberation among actual citizens to generate a range of well-considered popular judgments” (Müller, 2016, p. 29). Populists use referendums to ratify what populist leaders have already chosen as the real issue for people to approve or disapprove to regain their lost identity (Müller, 2016). Popular participation is to substitute the action of representative institutions. It should be noted, however, that populism is not necessarily a prerogative of populist leaders or parties but rather a strategy that mainstream political groups can adopt. For instance, David Cameron’s promise to hold the British referendum on Brexit during the 2014 campaign to guarantee his victory in 2015 has been classified as a populist act committed by a non-populist leader.
Another example is the referendum held on July 5, 2015, in Greece, in which the “no” to the European bailout plan won. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, promoted the referendum while he continued to negotiate austerity packages for Greece. Tsipras opposed leaving the EU but allowed the referendum, as he did not believe the popular consultation would produce the outcomes it did. The people of Greece did not realize that the agreements on the rescue plan were already on the negotiating table with the Troika and that the alternative to austerity measures was the Grexit. Those who voted against the measures did not necessarily support the idea of Greece withdrawing from the EU. This is a clear case, then, where the oversimplification of an issue during a referendum can produce results that go against the people’s will and threaten the future of the EU. In any case, the strategic use of plebiscitary democracy in the EU to gain popularity and power is a topic of research that warrants further study.
Finally, populism is based on the promise of salvaging morality. The moralization of political discourse and the idea of recovering dignity lost or threatened by corrupt or mistaken politicians justify replacing institutions and procedures with calls for the people to make general decisions on often complex and multifaceted problems. Müller (2016) describes well the difference between “participation” and “the use of referendums” to approve predetermined ideas that do not always reflect the complexity of the solution to a political problem.
A Perfect Match: The EU’s Institutional Complexity and Populist Strategies
The EU is one of the most vital innovations in international relations in the 20th century, mainly due to its institutional network and the regionalization of domestic policies. The creation of the EU intensified diplomatic ties in the region and increased intergovernmental cooperation on national policy issues such as justice and security. It also established a supranational legal framework and regional governance. However, this institutional development was not accompanied by a proportional increase in the different societies’ understanding and information about the European model of integration’s impacts on the social and political life of the citizens of EU member states.
Created only in the 1990s, nearly four decades after the first steps towards regional integration were taken, European citizenship was to contribute to the consolidation of social integration. The existence of European citizenship was to generate a compelling connection between individuals and supranational institutions, such as European Community Law, which organizes not only relations between member states but also between the EU, its institutions and individuals. All this institutional construction was, however, the result of diplomatic action between national governments without the direct participation of the European public. Public consultations were rare, and significant reforms and regional policy innovations were carried out without efforts to raise public awareness about the impacts they would have on national societies.[4] Intergovernmental and diplomatic negotiations used the instruments of representation and indirect democracy to their fullest. This partly explains why mistrust and rejection of European policy grows as EU institutions become more consolidated and visible to citizens.
Ignazi (1996; 2003) and Kitschelt (1994, 1995) associate the force of the new extreme right in Europe with the significant changes in the political spectrum in the region. These authors consider the new European far-right parties a by-product of post-industrial societies and thus classify them as “anti-system parties”. Stefano Bartolini (2007) highlights another critical event in the development of post-industrial European societies. The author sustained that no other issue in “post-war electoral history” has had the same broad and standardizing effects across the European party system as the regional integration process has.
In this integration scenario, when immigration started to increase considerably, we witnessed anti-immigration policies become one of the main points on the platform of new far-right populist parties in the region when they reformulated the focus of their arguments and criticism of democratic institutions. At a lower level, anti-immigration attitudes have emerged since the signing and implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1985,which generated the slow (but consistent) growth of this new far-right ideology throughout the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1999, in response to the occupancy of seats in the EP by representatives of the far-right, racism and xenophobia began to be monitored regularly in the region, which led to the publication of the first report on the issue in June 1999.[5] It was clear, then, that European citizens’ coexistence with different cultures and nationalities generated social integration and defensive and xenophobic reactions. Around that time, the National Front, the most consolidated political party of the new far-right in Europe, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen (father of Marine Le Pen, president of the party since 2011), began to win seats in the French parliament in 1986. Jean-Marie Le Pen was elected to the European Parliament for the first time in 1984 and has not lost electoral support to represent French extremists in the EU since then.[6]
There is a wealth of theoretical works and empirical studies that establish definitions for and characterize a new right-wing ideology that emerged in Europe in the 1980s and its refinement and organization into parties in the 1990s (e.g., Ignazi, 1996; 2003; Kitschelt, 1988; 1994; 1995; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Taggart, 1996, 1998). While regional integration has undeniably impacted domestic politics, societies and party systems in Europe, there are different views. Scholars eventually reached a consensus that national political parties’ position on regional integration is essential in explaining voter preferences (Taggart, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; 2006).
The literature identifies a “new political cleavage” from industrial capitalism’s transformation into post-industrial capitalism (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1996; Marks et al., 2002). As this cleavage resulted from positions critical of globalization and the liberal model of representative democracy, the region of European integration became fertile ground for new ideas on identity and demands related to the expropriation of sovereignty by “an elite” or threats to local and national culture. Common populist rhetorical strategies seek to incorporate these ideas in their justification for alternatives to liberal democracy based on representation and the rule of law.
In the early 2000s, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) used the cleavage theory (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) to create a new definition of transnational cleavage. Later, transnational cleavage was accepted by the literature related to the rise of the supranational governance of the EU and the benefits and criticisms of the high level of regional institutionalization (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). They argue that contestation on European integration can structure political competition focusing on two faces of the EU: political (and social) integration and economic (liberal) integration. The result is that on the far-left, Euroscepticism appears stronger concerning measures of economic integration (the far-left is firmly against economic integration and moderately against political integration). Euroscepticism appears diffusely on the far-right (or the “new” far-right, as the authors described). In other words, no support is expected at all for the EU policies from the new far-right.
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) identified two categories of European scepticism that complement the classification of the European political parties described above: diffuse Euroscepticism and specific Euroscepticism. Looking at national elections in Europe in recent decades, we see that the difference between the two sides of Euroscepticism is reproduced in the Eurosceptic ideological positions defended by the left and the right. Diffuse Euroscepticism refers to a “support for general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300), which is more present in the ideas and platforms of the far-right parties. In contrast, in the case of the far-left, we found more specific criticisms of the EU by denoting support for reforming more general practices or rules. The critics are about “the EU as it is and as it is developing” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). In other words, they can demand reforming the EU politics but not eliminate it (specific Euroscepticism).
Analysis & Discussion
Analyzing the national elections of the 15 Western European countries that were part of the EU before 2004—known as the EU-15—provides a clearer understanding of the changes in European voters’ positions regarding extremist and populist political parties and potential future changes in voter preferences. The exclusion of Eastern European countries in this article is justified by the need for different approaches for East and West countries.
We classified extremist political parties according to the party family typology proposed by Marks et al. (2002) and the identification of a new transnational cleavage in the EU region (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). However, in the case of the far-left, we excluded traditional communist parties aligned with a clear ideology advocating changes in the economic model as they are not necessarily populist. We are interested here in the emergence of a new far-left populism.
Selection Criteria and the Lists of Political Parties
During the time frame chosen for this study, political parties emerged, while others disappeared, and some changed their names. Tables 1 and 2 below list all extremist parties that received more than 1% of votes in elections between the late 1980s and 2023 by country. We did not describe the history of each political party in detail, which would require a large amount of space.[7] The selection criteria were based on two sources of classification: i) recognition of the party as far-right or far-left and as having populist characteristics in the literature, and ii) examination of political party manifestos (when available in the Manifesto Project’s data[8] or on the political parties’ official websites).
There are cases of what Ignazi (1996; 2003) refers to as the “renewal of political parties”. This is when, without changing their name, a few political parties became more radical and started to designate themselves as the new (and no longer traditional) extreme right, as was the case of the Portuguese National Renewal Party (NRP). From 2009 onwards, the NRP started to assume more populist characteristics and changed its political orientation, describing itself as a “new right-wing”. The same thing happened on the far-left, although in fewer cases. Here, we consider political parties far-left based on their adoption of rhetoric and themes such as anti-elitism, opposition to the establishment and other signs of anti-systemic stances. Some are openly nationalist, anti-immigrant, sovereigntist (radical), and in favor of the country leaving the European Union, while others identify as Eurosceptic and anti-EU.
Table 1- List of far-left parties
Country
Political parties*
Lifetime (first year they received votes/or the few years in which the party received votes)*
Austria
N/A
N/A
Belgium
N/A
N/A
Denmark
N/A
N/A
Finland
N/A
N/A
France
La France Insoumise (FLI/FI)Left Front
since 2017since 2012
Germany
Die Linke
since 2009
Greece
SYRIZA
since 2004
Ireland
United Left Alliance (more traditional left)
since 2011
Italy
M5SPRCProletarian Democracy
since 20131992-20061983, 1987
Luxembourg
N/A
N/A
Netherlands
N/A
N/A
Portugal
B.E.
since 1999
Spain
PodemosUnidos Podemos (electoral alliance of left-wing parties)
2015since 2016
Sweden
N/A
N/A
United Kingdom
N/A
N/A
* Only political parties that received more than 1% of the votes are listed, and the table only contains the years within the article’s time frame.
Populist Characteristics and Their Impact on Support for the EU
As well summarized by Carlos de la Torre (2019), right- or left-wing populists share the same anti-institutional political logic, which is “based on the construction of a political frontier” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 66) between people and institutions. Despite their different narratives on who “the people” are, both right-wing and left-wing populist leaders and political parties use “similar politicizations of grievances and emotions” and they “aim to rupture exclusionary institutional systems to give power back to the people” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 68). The difference is in how they define “the people.”
“Right-wing populists use essentialist criteria of ethnicity to exclude minority populations. The people as constructed by Donald Trump, for example, face ethnic and religious enemies such as Mexicans, Muslims, or militant African American activists (de la Torre, 2017). Similarly, rightwing European populists defend the ordinary people against those below, such as immigrants, refugees, and former colonial subjects, and the privileged cosmopolitan New Class above. An alternative conceptualization of the people is primarily political and socioeconomic. Left-wing populists construct the category of the people as the majorities of their nations that were excluded by neoliberal policies imposed by supranational organizations like the IMF or the Troika. Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Pablo Iglesias, and Alex Tsipras face the oligarchy.” (de la Torre, 2019, 67
We then calculated the votes cast for all political parties classified as far-right and far-left in national elections over the last 40 years.[9] Populist parties on the far-right were selected based on criteria used in the literature on this subject (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Ignazi, 2003; Marks et al., 2002; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996), especially the terms they use in their political platforms. In some cases, the parties openly label themselves as the “new far-right”. For other parties that were not as forthcoming, we analyzed their history and platforms first to determine what the “new” and “old style” of far-right is (such as Nazi and antisemitic political parties, although the latter were not included in our analyses) and we classified them accordingly. Far-left populist parties were selected based on their demagoguery and their promises of simplistic solutions to complex problems and crises, often accusing neoliberal policies and the EU market of being responsible for the social and economic ills of member countries.
The election results were selected for far-left parties (FLPs) and far-right parties (FRPs) for approximately 40 years –from the first elections held in the early 1980s in the EU-15 until recent elections. After collecting data, to illustrate our findings and give a broader overview of the impact of crises on the shift in behavior in the countries studied, we divided the countries into two groups to identify the growth of votes on populist political parties from the left and the right: i) the countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland), and ii) the countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom).
The international crisis had the most significant impact on the eurozone countries between 2009 and 2013. Table 3 includes countries with four years of negative growth, measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product), between 2009 and 2013, plus Ireland. Ireland was an exception in this group because it suffered from the effects of the economic crisis earlier, experiencing negative growth as early as 2008 (as did Italy). It had the highest negative growth rate (-7.8% in 2009).
Table 3- Growth of populist votes in countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis
Votes for FLPs
Votes for FRPs
GreeceTend to a more specificEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of migration crisis
ItalyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis(syncretic with economic platform)
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
From the election results of the group of countries in Table 3, we conclude that once the euro crisis erupted in the region in 2008-2009, voters who supported left-wing ideology became more critical of EU austerity policies and rules (specificEuroscepticism). However, as the economy returned to a certain degree of normality and the migration crises emerged as a new source of regional instability, left-wing populist parties began to lose strength in most EU 15 countries, and far-right populism gained ground.
In cases such as in Portugal and Greece, it is essential to say that once far-left party leaders had been elected to government or stabilized themselves in coalitions to govern, they changed their strategies. Previously considered populist leaders, they lost space in their political parties or abandoned old narratives that accused the EU of all their ills and started to defend responsible policies as soon as they arrived in government. A new scenario followed the euro crisis in these two countries. The political parties of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) in Portugal could no longer be classified as populist since they gained the government coalition. The old populist narratives in economic promises have been replaced by a responsible government that maintained leadership in the country until recently. A similar situation was seen in Greece when the split in Syriza generated by the rupture between Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, the minister of finance, occurred during the peak of the sovereignty crisis and the impasses in the negotiations with the Troika.[10] The result can be interpreted by what Judis (2016) has developed very well and de la Torre (2019) has considered as a de-radicalization of Syriza since 2015 and Podemos since 2018.
Ireland was the only country from Table 3 whose results showed no Euroscepticism in political parties’ positioning (considering the selection criteria of the political parties and level of public support). Until a few years ago, many questioned why Ireland seemed immune to the influence of populism. The country has far-right parties, such as the National Party, but they exist on the margins and have never won seats in the Irish Parliament. As for the new migration crisis, there was a kind of cooperation and an attitude of shared responsibility by the political elites and society. There is a general feeling of national pride and solidarity with refugees in the Irish public opinion.
More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generated an influx of Ukrainian refugees and asylum seekers to Ireland. While many welcomed them, an increase in anti-immigrant protesters in the country has been reported. Far-right populists saw this as an opportunity to spread feelings of rejection towards refugees and to be more critical of European and national governments due to a devastating housing crisis in the country.
Italy and Spain were cases of diffuse Euroscepticism that appeared among countries in Table 3. Left-wing populism in Spain (as in Greece and Portugal) found space in the government coalition in 2016, becoming less radical and less populist. Although Italy was significantly impacted by the immigration crisis, even before 2015, we highlight that far-right ideology in the country has already existed since the 1980s. It is also important to emphasize that Italy was the only case in which we saw the emergence of a populism already associated with the left (as shown in the table). Still, it is better associated with a syncretic position, as the more alternative and anarchist Italians self-designated themselves. A syncretic populist spectrum grew significantly during the euro crisis, behaving as a good example for the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) spectrum of the new political alignments addressed by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002). Here, we emphasize that we consider the votes for the Five Star Movement (M5S) not aligned with a left/right dimension of political ideology. Exceptionally, in our research, the movement professed the desire to “stay to change the Union from within” with a populist and economic platform, as the defence of a referendum on the euro in Italy (Zotto, 2017), but with a more GAL political dimension designed by the M5S’ leaders as a “syncretic” position.
We investigate the influence of a second dimension, a new political dimension that we conceive as ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). We find that this dimension is the most general and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration.
As explained above, the countries in Table 4 are selected as those that were (comparably in the EU15 region) least affected by the euro crisis, having presented less than four years of growth, measured by negative GDP, between 2009 and 2013. Also, the countries in Table 4 appeared to have been more impacted by the migration crisis, which reached its highest point in 2015, than the economic one. In this case, the far-right ideology legitimated intolerant attitudes and xenophobia in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that Europe was in the middle of.
Table 4 – Growth of populist votes in countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis
Votes for FLPs
Votes for FRPs
AustriaTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of migration crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
BelgiumTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
DenmarkTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of migration crisis
FinlandTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
FranceTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
GermanyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
LuxembourgTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
NetherlandsTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
Most of the countries, as expected, presented a trend to increase vote preference for FRPs during the immigration crises. They tend to have a more diffuse Euroscepticism.[11] Also, Although Belgium presented no growth of votes for FLPs during the period of the euro crisis, we saw an increase of FRPs in the two moments of crises considered in this article. Austria appeared as an outsider. The Austrians presented a new trend to vote for the populist far-left during the immigration crisis. However, there has been a decrease in radical votes since the legislative election of 2019, when the Free Party of Austria (populist far-right) lost 20 seats in the Parliament.
The UK results show a clear relationship between populists of the far-right and the referendum that resulted in Brexit, followed by a quick decrease in support after the June 2016 event. Interestingly, the strength of populism in the country was evident in public manifestation, and the use of the media to promote an oversimplified view of the social problem raised by the rise in immigration in the country was not reflected in elections for the British Parliament. Even so, the case of the Brexit referendum is the clearest example of the influence of populism on electoral behavior and its consequences. The post-referendum shifts in public opinion from criticism to support for the EU revealed an apparent lack of understanding of the brutal consequences of Brexit for the British.[12]
Finally, when we look at the impact of migration crises on voter behavior, tables 3 and 4 illustrate that populism explains the growth of the far-right more than the economic crisis does. By separating the countries into ones affected the most and ones affected the least by the financial crisis (tables 3 and 4), we found that although the far-left grew more significantly in countries that suffered the most from the economic crisis, in most cases, left-wing radicalism tended to lose ground after the crises. While the rise of the far-right is prevalent during crises in general, the increase in votes for far-right parties occurred in 13 of the 15 countries analyzed during the migration crisis. Support for the far-left, however, increased during the migration crisis in Austria, France and Italy only.
Concluding Remarks
The article aims to investigate if and to what extent two decisive crises in the region affected support for political parties with Eurosceptic characteristics, which are more commonly aligned with extremist right or left-wing populist positions. The article sought to identify patterns in the growth of far-right and far-left populist parties to confirm the general perception that Euroscepticism and populism benefit from regional crises. We thus aimed to further the discussion on the risk of crises in the EU contributing to the increase in Euroscepticism and the tendency to vote for political parties that can weaken the European model based on the principles of liberal democracy, representation and the rule of law. The best predictor of the growth of Euroscepticism is migration issues. Our findings revealed the growing resistance in EU societies to the increasing number of immigrants in the region.
Also, in general, the results of this study show that populist agendas (both from the left or the right) found fertile ground in environments where support for democratic measures based on liberal institutions and representation was on the decline, “revealing hidden preferences that might have existed all along, but individuals were discouraged from making them public” (Brescia, 2019). We have seen a decline in the approval of EU institutions and norms and the emergence of intense hostility towards representative politics in countries during the period when populism was on the rise. However, to understand variations in the performances of populist political parties radically opposed to the EU, we analyzed them in the context of the two most significant crises challenging EU policies and politics in the last 40 years. Each country’s electoral findings in this article deserve a more in-depth analysis that could be better explored and developed in future works.
EU crises are seen as events that impact the behavior of European voters, and we assume that the growth of populism is harmful to democracy, even when populist parties and leaders are not elected (Müller, 2016). This is because the ability to spread ideas that discredit politics and representation as a norm of democracy has been dramatically strengthened by digital media, enabling populists to coordinate and promote these ideas transnationally, often linking them to conspiracy theories and denialism. In this context, the EU bureaucracy and its complex governance model are a clear target of populists. The EU adds supranational and intergovernmental institutional constraints to national ones (Müller, 2016, p. 95) and becomes an easy ‘punching bag’ for populist rhetoric.
We conclude that in a wave of growth of support for far-left parties in Western Europe, there are now signs of a bonanza for specific Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is more centered on criticisms of typical changes and reforms in the EU’s economic model of integration and more specific EU politics affecting the far-left political platforms. However, DiffuseEuroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is associated with a general contestation of the EU, involves its representative model of integration with supranational institutions and policy coordination. This side of Euroscepticism seems to be more closely associated with far-right populist narratives that are very much alive in the region.
(*) Dr.Ana Paula Tostes is Jean Monnet Chair at the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Brazil. Professor at the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP/UERJ) and the Department of International Relations (DRI/UERJ). She is a Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI) and was a visiting researcher at the Free University of Berlin (FUB). She holds a PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ/IESP) and a Postdoc at the University of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting researcher (2016-2017) at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) and an associate professor at Michigan State University (MSU). Currently, she is the coordinator of the Project for International Cooperation (PROBRAL CAPES/DAAD, 2023-2026) between IESP/UERJ and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany. Results of research supported by the European Union (JMC Project EUgac n. 101127443), Productivity Scholarships from FAPERJ (Prociência/UERJ) and CNPq (n. 316785/2021-0).
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[3] This includes national elections held up until the writing of this article.
[4] Since the 1970s, the Eurobarometer has been measuring the European public’s level of knowledge about regional integration. It shows that the level of information increased when the EU was in operation and its supranational institutions were being consolidated.
[6] Le Pen is currently in his tenth consecutive mandate. He was elected during the last EP elections, which were held in 2014.
[7] We included the data of the first general election in which the political party received support (but did not necessarily win seats in a national parliament). The information in the database constructed to conduct the analyses on the votes cast in each election for each political party in each country is broader and more complex than what is shown in Tables 1 and 2. However, they provide minimal information to show why the parties were selected.
[8] Cf. MANIFESTO PROJECT. (2024) MARPOR: Manifesto Research On Political Representation. WZB. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ (accessed on September 30, 2024).
[9] Parties that did not obtain more than 0.01% of votes were excluded from our calculations.
[10] Syriza is a party created in 2013, based on an anti-EU agenda and a populist narrative. In 2012, the country’s GDP had collapsed by 25%, unemployment reached almost a third of the population (28%) and hundreds of thousands of companies went bankrupt. Between 2010 and 2015 alone, Greece received three emergency rescue packages from the European Union (EU), totalizing more than 320 billion euros. After such negotiations, Prime Minister Tsipras accepted the EU’s conditions as a better option than bearing the consequences of leaving the eurozone. Despite the disappointment of many of populist leaders associated with Syriza, Greek voters chose to vote for moderate politicians without populist narratives than to take risks with the old elites or baseless promises.
[11]Sweden deserves to be studied as a separated case. A report (Demos Report), conducted by an Open Society Foundations initiative represents a pilot project tackling innovative approaches to keeping societies open in Europe. Findings revealed that since 2010, when far-right populists in Sweden entered the national parliament, their voters already showed a different profile from the rest of Europe. A large proportion of voters for the Swedish far-right, especially those who already followed the populist party Sweden Democrats on Facebook, were young people between 16 and 20 years old. In a 2010 survey, 63% of the party’s Facebook followers (the main social media platform at the time in the country) voted for the party – leaving out mainly those who were not old enough to vote in the country. (see Benfield, Jack. Populism in Europe: Sweden. Open Society Foundations. February 2012. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/populism-europe-sweden accessed on September 27, 2024).
