Members of the All India Muslim Students Federation (MSF) protest against the Karnataka Government's Hijab ban in educational institutions, at Delhi University, New Delhi, India, on February 9, 2022. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

Professor Tanweer Fazal: Otherization is a Deliberate Project in India

Professor Tanweer Fazal emphasizes that “otherization is primarily a deliberate process rather than something inherently embedded in a culture.” He explains how this systematic targeting involves mobilizing economic, cultural, historical, and political resources to marginalize specific communities. Reflecting on the state’s role, Professor Fazal critiques its evolving relationship with secularism and justice. He notes a shift in the post-2014 political landscape, observing, “The state has increasingly abandoned its efforts to project a secular or morally incorruptible image,” instead embracing a majoritarian framework.

Interview by Mukesh Kulriya*

In this engaging and insightful conversation, Professor Tanweer Fazal, a distinguished sociologist from the University of Hyderabad, discusses the intricate and deliberate process of otherization in India. As part of the podcast Countering Religious Hate: Music as Mitigation Strategy, hosted by Mukesh Kulriya and supported by the Initiative to Study Hate at UCLA, the interview delves into the intersections of communal violence, state practices, cultural initiatives such as music festivals to counter hate, and the persistent challenges of justice and reconciliation in South Asia.

Professor Fazal emphasizes that “otherization is primarily a deliberate process rather than something inherently embedded in a culture.” He explains how this systematic targeting involves mobilizing economic, cultural, historical, and political resources to marginalize specific communities. Drawing from his extensive research, he highlights historical examples, such as the plight of the Meo Muslims in Rajasthan during the 1940s, and connects them to contemporary practices, such as the exclusionary mechanisms of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the National Register of Citizens (NRC).

Reflecting on the state’s role, Professor Fazal critiques its evolving relationship with secularism and justice. He notes a shift in the post-2014 political landscape, observing, “The state has increasingly abandoned its efforts to project a secular or morally incorruptible image,” instead embracing a majoritarian framework. He underscores how this transformation impacts justice delivery, reconciliation, and the ability of cultural interventions, such as Sufi music or Kabir performances, to counter hate and divisiveness.

The discussion also explores the concept of the “national public” and its symbolic, context-dependent emergence. Professor Fazal argues that the idea of a unified national public in India is more a constructed narrative than an objective reality. “In India, when we talk about the public, we must actually consider ‘publics,’” he remarks, highlighting the country’s linguistic, cultural, and communal diversity. He further elaborates on the disparity in how nationalistic expressions—such as advocating for Khalistan versus calling for a Hindu state—are treated within India’s legal and political frameworks.

Through this thought-provoking conversation, Professor Fazal illuminates how the state, public, and cultural practices intersect to shape and perpetuate the process of otherization in India. This interview offers a critical lens for understanding the broader implications of these dynamics and the potential paths forward in addressing hate and fostering inclusivity.

Professor Tanweer Fazal, a distinguished sociologist from the University of Hyderabad.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Tanweer Fazal with some edits.

Otherization Is Not a Fixed or Stable Phenomenon

Thank you so much, Professor Fazal, for joining me today. It’s truly an honor to have you here. While I’ve been following your public talks for over a decade, this is the first time I’ve directly connected my research to your work, and it has made me realize just how relevant your book is. My project primarily focuses on music, but I’ve come to understand that it’s impossible to study music in isolation from the broader societal context. This particular study is part of a larger initiative called the Initiative to Study Hate. It involves interdisciplinary efforts across fields like media studies, history, and neuroscience, aiming to understand how processes of otherization and hate operate. To set the stage, could you provide a brief overview of the process of otherization? I understand it’s a broad question, but a historical perspective would help our audience better understand the foundations and dynamics of otherization.

Professor Tanweer Fazal:  In my view, otherization is primarily a deliberate process rather than something inherently embedded in a culture. It is actively driven by agents or proponents who target specific groups, aiming to marginalize or exclude them from various facets of social life—economic, cultural, historical, and political. Otherization, therefore, involves a deliberate mobilization of resources across these domains to target a group or community.

Importantly, otherization is not a fixed or stable phenomenon. The groups that become targets can shift over time, and the relationships between those who are otherized and those who perpetrate the process can also change, depending on power dynamics and the mobilization of political resources. History provides numerous examples of this.

For instance, in my study of Sikh politics, I found that Sikhs were once seen as integral to the imagination of Indian nationhood. However, during events like the Punjabi Suba Movement in the 1960s and the violence surrounding 1984, we witnessed a shift, where the Sikh community was otherized and subjected to systemic violence. This transformation demonstrates how power relations and political circumstances can alter the dynamics of otherization.

Similarly, in contemporary contexts, otherization remains a deliberate and strategic process. A clear example is the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), which is designed to reshape citizenship laws in a way that marginalizes a particular community—in this case, Muslims. The immediate impact is seen in groups like the Muslim Bengalis excluded from the National Register of Citizens (NRC) in Assam. This legal framework exemplifies how otherization operates in specific contexts today. 

The Role of Selective Histories and Symbols in Constructing Exclusion

You’ve provided a broad perspective, and I’d like to focus on a couple of specific aspects. Could you elaborate on the historical and cultural dimensions of this process? From my limited understanding and experience in the field, it seems that the social circumstances of a community—in this case, Muslims—have been weaponized by the Hindu right-wing. They appear to draw upon their interpretation of history and culture, using these narratives to validate and reinforce their biases. Could you expand on this interplay and how historical and cultural narratives are mobilized in this way?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: If you’d like me to be specific, let me take the example of Rajasthan, particularly the events in the 1940s, around 1945-46, in the Alwar and Bharatpur regions. During this period, a very targeted campaign of violence was directed against a section of Muslims known as the Meo Muslims. The Meos, who originate from Rajasthan, have a unique history. At some point, they chose to convert to Islam for various reasons while maintaining syncretic practices. Within families, they often observed both Hindu rituals and Islamic traditions. Some even adopted dual names—one Sanskritic and another Arabic or Persian.

Alwar and Bharatpur, then princely states, came under the influence of organizations like the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (then the Hindu Mahasabha). As the process of decolonization began and discussions about a new independent nation gained momentum, Muslims in this region, particularly the Meos, became targeted. This was also the time when the Pakistan movement had gained traction, fueling an atmosphere of hate. The Meos, despite their deep integration with local customs and practices, were increasingly portrayed as part of the “Pakistan project.”

A concerted effort was made to either force the Meos to convert entirely to Hinduism—through processes like Shuddhi—or to drive them out. Many who resisted were subjected to violence, with an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 killed. Those who did not wish to migrate to Pakistan were often forced to do so. However, after arriving in Pakistan, many Meos immediately sought to return to India due to their cultural and historical ties to the Mewat region. Bureaucratic hurdles, like the permit system described in Vazira Zamindar’s work, made their return nearly impossible.

The tragic irony lies in how a community, so closely aligned in customs, practices, and even worship with the local Hindu population, was systematically otherized. Selective histories and symbols were used to construct a narrative of exclusion and vilification. This is the power of otherization: it selectively targets communities, weaponizes history, and imposes identities that may not align with the community’s own understanding of itself.

Even today, the Mewat region remains a hotspot for communal targeting. Reports of lynching by Gau Rakshaks (cow vigilantes) are frequent, with these groups often supported by the state machinery, including the Rajasthan police. During my interviews with some BJP MLAs from the region, they perpetuated allegations against the Meo community, accusing them of being aligned with international Islamic designs, linked to terror networks, and receiving foreign funding for madrasas. These narratives are repeated in public discourse to justify ongoing targeting and violence, making extermination appear acceptable. 

So, in a sense, what we are speaking of all the history is not a history, it is present in a sense?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: Yes, you are right!

The experience of the Meo Muslims in 1946 is significant, but it didn’t start then, nor did it end there—it began earlier and continues to this day. In your writing, you’ve described this process as cumulative, a phenomenon that builds over time and persists. I recall speaking to a few singers in the Jodhpur region around 2015-16, including a singer named Chidia Bai, who used to perform songs dedicated to Hindu goddesses. She shared how, during communal violence, her patron pointed out her Muslim identity. That moment marked the first time she realized her identity as a Muslim was not fluid—it was something imposed on her by others. Until then, her identity had been much more open; she identified as a Muslim but was equally accepted as a singer for goddesses. This highlights how cultural practices once characterized by openness and fluidity have been overshadowed by rigid identity constructs imposed by external forces. It underscores that this is not just a historical phenomenon but an ongoing project that continues to shape lives and communities.

Professor Tanweer Fazal: History is never truly in the past; it is often more present than we realize. It continues to shape our understanding and experiences today, influencing how we comprehend both the past and the present. This is especially true in the case of the Muslims in Rajasthan, particularly those from specific regions.

Since 2014, the Indian State Has Shifted Away from Projecting a Secular Image

India’s Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi visits Gurdwara Rakabganj Sahib to pay tribute to Guru Teg Bahadur, in New Delhi on December 20, 2020. Photo: Shutterstuck.

Otherization is a long and continuous process, but at times, it escalates into collective violence. The terminology we use to describe these events—be it riots, pogroms, or collective violence—also shapes the political and social understanding of such phenomena. Given that the state is the custodian of law and order, how does it operate in these situations? While the state may not always intervene in the everyday process of otherization, its role in instances of targeted violence is crucial. Historically, what has the state’s role been in such cases, particularly when it comes to enabling or preventing these acts of violence?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: My book, which you referred to, examines the practices of the state, focusing on how it operates as a structure with a network of institutions, legal frameworks, hierarchies, and codified rules. This gives us an image of the modern state as a rational actor. However, alongside this idealized notion, it is essential to analyze the state in terms of its practices, where we often find discrepancies between the ideal and the real.

For example, when we consider the Indian Constitution, it presents itself as an ideal document—framing India as a secular state, outlining a socialist pattern of the economy, and offering a framework for governance. Yet, in practice, the state frequently fails to uphold these ideals, often only coming close or falling short entirely. This discrepancy is particularly evident when analyzing the state’s role in cases of otherization, minoritization, and collective violence.

Looking at the colonial state, its approach to inter-religious or inter-community conflicts was often driven by the imperative to maintain public order. To preserve the status quo, the colonial state avoided disrupting long-standing traditions or practices. For example, disputes over religious processions and their routes were often resolved by adhering to established practices, such as ensuring processions followed routes that had been used for generations, even if they passed through minority areas. This approach aimed to avoid conflict by maintaining societal equilibrium, even if it perpetuated existing inequalities.

In the post-independence period, the Indian state grappled with competing ideological forces. On the one hand, leaders like Nehru championed a secular ideological framework. On the other hand, nationalist leaders with right-wing tendencies often sought to address what they perceived as historical injustices against the majority community. For example, cases like the reopening of the Somnath temple and the Ayodhya dispute reveal how nationalist leaders, such as Govind Ballabh Pant, played roles in decisions that catered to these sentiments.

Thomas Blom Hansen provides a useful framework to understand this dynamic, describing the state as having two cultural constructions: the “sublime state” and the “profane state.” In instances of collective violence, the state often projects its “sublime” image—a just state committed to protecting victims and upholding morality. This is evident in measures like the institution of commissions of inquiry or efforts to prosecute perpetrators, which help the state maintain its moral high ground.

However, the everyday experience of vulnerable communities often reflects the “profane” state—a reality characterized by systemic violence, police brutality, and discrimination. For marginalized groups, such as slum dwellers or minorities, encounters with the state are frequently marked by oppression and injustice.

Post-2014, there appears to be a shift in the state’s approach. The state has increasingly abandoned its efforts to project a secular or morally incorruptible image. Instead, it has embraced a majoritarian, triumphalist framework, openly signaling its commitment to upholding the supremacy of dominant ideologies. This shift is evident in the state’s response to hate crimes, such as lynching. Perpetrators often receive bail, are celebrated, or even elevated to positions of political power. Figures like Sadhvi Pragya exemplify this trend, where those associated with divisive or violent acts are celebrated rather than censured.

Music Has Often Been Used as an Instrument of Polarization

The Hindu New Year Parade (Gudhi Padva) is an annual celebration held on Girgaon, South Mumbai, featuring musicians, dancers, and artists from various parts of India on March 18, 2018. Photo: Snehal Jeevan Pailkar.

This discussion has provided valuable insight into how the dynamics of violence and the state’s role have evolved. You mentioned religious processions as a point of contention. I’d like to delve deeper into this. Historically, colonial records often attribute communal violence to disputes over religious processions and their routes. Julian Anthony Lynch argues that music was not merely a factor of animosity but actively used as a tool to differentiate Hindus and Muslims. From my fieldwork and limited reading, I’ve observed that music tends to be more accepted within popular and even orthodox Hinduism, whereas in Islam, it is embraced in popular practice but not necessarily within orthodox frameworks. For example, in 1893, when Tilak initiated the Ganesh Chaturthi and Shivaji celebrations, the songs sung during these events often contained anti-Muslim rhetoric. This continuity in rhetoric can also be seen in today’s Hindutva pop music, which, while quantitatively and qualitatively different, still carries similar themes. Could you elaborate on the intersection of politics, processions, religion, and culture, and how these elements have historically contributed to communal tensions and violence?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: You’ve raised an important point. Music, like any form of communication, is a powerful medium that can be used in multiple ways. Its impact depends on the intent behind its use. There are countless examples where music has served as a bridge between cultures, fostering fusion, borrowing, and adaptation of lyrics and customs to create harmony. However, music has also been employed in highly divisive ways.

You’re absolutely right that music has often been used as an instrument of polarization. Historically, and even today, communal tensions have erupted due to the use of loud music during sensitive times, such as the namaz, or through provocative processions. For instance, processions during Ram Navami continue to deliberately pass through areas prone to conflict, playing inflammatory content, which often leads to skirmishes or even outright violence. This strategy has been revived by right-wing groups but has roots in colonial practices where such processions were tools to provoke unrest.

I would argue that we should view this within the context of the emergence of electoral politics. Electoral politics inherently require the mobilization of people, and processions serve as a convenient tool for this purpose. For instance, if one engages in class politics or politics based on social justice, it necessitates a process of raising consciousness as part of the political effort.

In contrast, divisive politics—often based on religion or similar forms of hate-driven polarization—operates at a more primal level, appealing to basic instincts. These instincts stem from being born into a particular culture or community, often accompanied by latent prejudices about “the other.” Such prejudices are then cultivated and amplified, with boundaries drawn and myths created to reinforce these divisions.

Music, in this context, plays a supporting role. It is a powerful instrument that can be harnessed to serve these broader political agendas. While music alone cannot incite violence, it can contribute to the atmosphere of polarization and hate when intertwined with a political strategy centered around division and conflict.

This brings me to the idea of culture—a shared experience among people living in a particular space and time, even if they belong to different castes, classes, or genders. While this shared culture provides common ground, it also comes with its own complexities. In this context, what are your thoughts on the use of music by the state or police departments as a tool to counter religious hate? For instance, there have been instances where the police have used the same locations where baton charges or water cannons were employed to host musical events, seemingly as an attempt to rewire the collective memory of those spaces. On the surface, this appears to be a creative and positive initiative. However, how do you view the use of music with specifically religious contours in this context? I’m not referring to strictly Hindu or Muslim music but devotional or Sufi music, which carries elements of collective culture but is also deeply tied to religion. How do you perceive the police employing such music as a tool? And more specifically, how do you interpret the use of religiously influenced music to counter hatred rooted in religious differences?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: On the surface, it appears to be a noble exercise, and there is no harm in trying and testing such initiatives. However, as I mentioned, music is merely a means of communication. Music itself cannot bring peace, nor can it incite violence, but there is a politics surrounding its use. Unless the police department addresses the underlying politics of violence, this will remain an artificial exercise. It may be symbolic, but it does not address the experiences of those who have suffered violence. In fact, I suspect it might suggest that people should forget what happened in the past, erase it from their memory, and instead focus on the alternative narratives being offered.

However, as observed in various instances of violent eruptions, if the question of justice remains unaddressed, no amount of reconciliation will be effective. Reconciliation may temporarily mitigate conflict, but the tensions could erupt again unless justice is delivered. Justice must be a collective process—clearly communicated in terms of why it is being delivered, the principles behind it, and how it is being implemented.

For instance, those arrested in events like Karsewa should fully understand why they were arrested, the nature of the crime, and the rationale for the actions taken against them. This approach would also help restore the image of the state as a just entity that upholds the rule of law and stands above societal power dynamics. The state must not be perceived as taking one side over the other.

In cases of caste violence, for example, it is often a foregone conclusion among lower castes that the police and the local state will intervene on behalf of the upper castes. As long as this perception persists, no amount of reconciliatory effort will change the situation unless there is a genuine effort to ensure justice. 

So, I would argue that justice must accompany all symbolic efforts. Without it, such initiatives will not succeed, and I don’t believe they will have the desired impact.

Symbolic Struggles Risk Benefiting the Hindutva Project

Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

I have two questions related to this initiative—one focusing on its conception and the other on its outcomes. When this initiative was conceptualized, it seems to have drawn inspiration from global policing practices that address communities perceived as moving toward fundamentalism. One observation I’ve made is the apparent lack of contradiction, for some, between participating in events like the Rajasthan Kabir Yatra and aligning with the Hindutva ecosystem. For them, figures like Kabir and related practices are seen as part of their cultural and religious heritage. Given this, how slippery is the use of religious elements, such as devotional music or cultural icons, to counter religious hate? The challenge lies in the fact that we cannot control how these texts, songs, or symbols are received, no matter how well-argued or well-intentioned the initiative may be. What are your thoughts on this tension, and how might such initiatives navigate this ambiguity?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: That’s where I was trying to suggest that while the exercise can be noble and the intention good, it must address what is fundamentally missing. Without doing so, it will remain a one-off exercise that could go in any direction. Even then, one cannot be certain of how it will be received, as reception depends on various factors: the history of violence, the history of inter-community relationships, and the extent to which those relationships persist. This is especially true in dominant versus non-dominant relationships.

You’re right to point out the issue with de-radicalization projects. These initiatives often fail to consider the radicalization of the majority and instead focus on elements within the minority. However, the reasons for minority radicalization often lie in the larger social or political context, which these projects overlook. Without addressing the broader socio-political factors, the assumption that individuals can simply be brought back into the mainstream is flawed.

While processes toward radicalization exist in all communities, they gain attention and followers only when a conducive larger context exists. If the larger context is accommodating and inclusive, radicalization efforts are less likely to succeed. Take the Zakir Naik phenomenon, for instance. Naik, as a televangelist, gained a following in India but did not incite political action along those lines. This, I believe, was partly due to the earlier phase of Indian nationalism, which, while not entirely empowering for minorities, was to some extent accommodative of their cultural expressions. This inclusivity extended not only to religious minorities but also to linguistic ones, which is why linguistic separatist nationalism did not pose a significant challenge in most parts of India, with exceptions like Kashmir or parts of the Northeast.

However, this accommodative framework has altered. Today, the predominant socio-political atmosphere is highly prejudiced—a condition that has been politically produced and therefore needs a political response. Cultural processes can contribute, but they cannot succeed on their own while the political project remains unchanged.

This is where efforts must focus. The police, for instance, could rise above partisan considerations and present themselves as enablers for those targeted by violence. Reports from states like Jharkhand, however, often highlight police inaction and partisanship, which undermines trust. Addressing these issues could make symbolic efforts like promoting Sufi music helpful. But on their own, such initiatives are unlikely to succeed.

Regarding Kabir Panthis, there has long been a belief, especially among comrades from UP and elsewhere, that countering Hindutva requires embracing cultural practices and critiques emerging from within Hinduism itself. These include anti-Brahminical traditions and sects, which have historically challenged orthodox Hinduism. However, many of these movements have now been co-opted into the Hindutva project.

Hindutva, as I see it, is not a Brahminical philosophy. Brahminical philosophy is traditionalist and conservative, and at times, Hindutva is uncomfortable with it. Hindutva is a nationalist project that seeks to co-opt various tendencies within the broader framework of a majoritarian Hindu nation. For instance, it does not oppose Scheduled Caste reservations; on the contrary, the Hindu right within the Constituent Assembly was vociferously in favor of reservations, believing they would integrate ex-untouchables into the Hindu fold. Similarly, Hindutva has co-opted Kabir Panthis, Namashudras in Bengal, Aadharmis, and other similar groups.

If symbolic struggles remain merely symbolic, they risk benefiting the Hindutva project, as everyone seeks inclusion in a larger enterprise. Hindutva must be understood primarily as a political project. Therefore, a political alternative must be developed. While cultural initiatives can be an important resource in this effort, they cannot be the sole or most significant resource. Cultural activists may differ in their perspectives, but this is my understanding.

Hindutva Project Draws Inspiration from German Fascism

Member of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Or RSS workers take a part in a route march on January 12, 2020 in Jodhpur, Rajasthan.

I’d like to shift the conversation to the 1980s and ’90s, during the period leading up to the Babri Masjid demolition and its eventual execution. During that time and beyond, a persistent debate emerged, arguing that Western-style secularism was failing and that we needed to return to our roots. We know that from the 1980s onward, groups like SAHMAT and others initiated a surge of Kabir performances in cities and elsewhere. For a moment, let’s assume the critique is valid—that Western-style secularism didn’t work. But clearly, this alternative approach isn’t working either. So, what comes next?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: I would say that Indian secularism cannot necessarily aim to emulate Western secularism because the realities are different. In the West, particularly in Europe, you have relatively homogeneous societies. Recently, some diversity has been introduced due to the arrival of immigrants, which has disturbed the established consensus within Western societies, leading to a crisis. They are struggling to manage this. The older history of secularism, which fought against the ecclesiastical authority of the church, is now becoming counterproductive because it is not a majoritarian ideology and does not accommodate minority cultural needs. That model may not work in India, and that is entirely correct. However, completely rejecting it and adopting an alternative model, as some suggest—Yogendra Yadav being one proponent, along with my teacher Abhijit Pathak and Ashish Nandy, who have also written on these lines—presents its own set of challenges.

One issue is that the Hindutva project has successfully co-opted communities like the Kabir Panthis, the Namashudras, and others, without requiring them to abandon their cultural ideologies. For instance, these groups may continue to identify as Kabir Panthis or Namashudras while simultaneously aligning themselves with the Hindutva framework. This highlights a misunderstanding of the Hindutva project when viewed through a narrow lens. Many, as the Ambedkarite critique suggests, perceive it as a Savarna or upper-caste Brahminical project. However, this is not necessarily the case. While it may maintain certain caste hierarchies, it also actively incorporates other groups into the broader Hindu fold. 

The Hindutva project is fundamentally focused on creating a majoritarian cultural niche. In this sense, it draws inspiration from German fascism. While it may not always employ equally aggressive strategies, it adapts its approach based on the context. Consequently, secularism, with its accommodative pluralism, faces its own set of challenges in countering this.

First, this kind of pluralism is easily absorbed into the Hindutva project, making it difficult to convince these communities to detach themselves from Hindutva and seek a better alternative. Second, it essentializes culture, reducing everything to the domain of culture while ignoring the critical role politics plays. Kabir Panthis, for instance, have their own political dynamics, and the Namashudras may also have distinct political agendas. Failing to address these political dimensions leaves the field wide open for Hindutva to dominate. 

What evolved in India, however, was a version of secularism that created a flexible “wall of separation” between religion and politics. This model did not strictly adhere to a complete separation; instead, it adapted to the context. At times, the state intervened in religious matters, such as banning untouchability or ensuring temple entry. At other times, it kept itself detached from religion where intervention was not necessary. This approach allowed minorities to feel less threatened by majoritarian religion.

While this model had its limitations, such as insufficient focus on personal empowerment, it emerged organically. By design, it might have aspired to be like the French secular state, but it recognized that this was not feasible in India due to its diversity. Instead, it developed an approach rooted in Indian diversity while committing to the modern philosophy of secularism, the rule of law, and the state as a neutral arbiter.

I believe this model, if its flaws are addressed, remains a far better framework to practice. There is still room to accommodate the religious right within the constitutional space, ensuring that Indian secularism continues to function effectively.

Like on the line of multiculturalism or…

Professor Tanweer Fazal: That is the issue with multiculturalism—it is fine in principle, but when it comes to how the state engages with a multiplicity of cultures, the state cannot be perceived as favoring one over the other. In such cases, it must maintain a certain degree of neutrality where necessary.

There Are Multiple Publics in India

I think one of the final things I’d like to understand from you is this: while we talk about the state and the political project, there is also the public—the citizens, the people. Some scholars, like Kajri Jain, have referred to this in the Indian context as the “politico-devotional public.” She specifically discusses public monuments and the way people view political figures with a sense of devotion. How should we understand the role of the people in this context? It’s one thing to analyze power structures and political frameworks, but at the center of it all are the people themselves. How do we interpret their agency, their perspective, and their role in shaping or responding to these structures?

Professor Tanweer Fazal: I have also discussed the concept of the national public in my book. I argue that minoritization occurs at the crossroads of a triad where the state is at the center, the national public endorses it, and a community is otherized. This happens within a triangular, triadic relationship.

The idea of the public emerges with the system of nation-states, which thrives on cultural homogeneity. In this context, the public is culturally similar, speaks the same language, and often shares the same religion, facilitating active communication among its members. While this public may have class and gender distinctions, there are unifying elements like common history, shared philosophy, and language.

However, this is not the case in India. In India, when we talk about the public, we must actually consider “publics.” There are diverse communities, and because of the linguistic division of provinces and states, political mobilization takes different forms. A truly national public, in my view, is symbolic—it emerges only in specific circumstances.

For example, the national movement was one such situation where a national public emerged, united around the symbolic goal of expelling foreign rulers. Once that goal was achieved, the sense of a unified national public dissipated. Similarly, during communal situations, a specific kind of national public can emerge.

Consider the current context with Sikh nationalism. If a Sikh nationalist declares, “We want Khalistan,” they are immediately labeled seditious and could face trial. In contrast, if someone identifies as a Hindu nationalist and openly advocates for a Hindu state—as a prominent political leader did before becoming Prime Minister—there is no threat of incarceration, arrest, or sedition charges. This disparity reflects how the national public perceives and endorses certain ideologies over others, based on the prevailing dominant narrative.

This may not always have been the case, nor will it necessarily remain so. The national public, being symbolic, is constructed and shaped by the politics of the time. Objectively, there are multiple publics. What we think of as a national public emerges only in specific contexts of symbolic associations, which shift and change over time depending on the nature of the political landscape.

(*) Mukesh Kulriya is a Ph.D. candidate in Ethnomusicology at UCLA, whose research examines the intersection of popular music, communal violence, and forms of public religiosity in India.

Dr. Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University.

Professor Levinson: Elon Musk Must Choose Between Government Role and Control of X

Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Professor Paul Levinson cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.” He elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.” Levinson also voiced his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a riveting interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University, discussed pressing concerns about the intersection of technology, politics, and democracy. Professor Levinson’s insights are especially timely, given Elon Musk’s rising influence as the owner of X (formerly Twitter) and his potential role in a second Trump administration. Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Professor Levinson cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.”

Professor Levinson elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Professor Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Levinson addressed the broader implications of concentrated power in technology. Despite concerns about billionaires like Musk or the owners of Facebook, Levinson pointed out that their influence has not yet stifled democratic impulses. “Social media provides a unique platform for individuals to disseminate the truth widely, even as it enables lies and fascism,” he noted, striking a balance in his evaluation.

On the issue of disinformation and algorithms, Professor Levinson argued that the negative impact of these technologies is often overstated. He acknowledged their role in targeted advertising, referencing Facebook’s data-sharing with Cambridge Analytica during the 2016 US election. However, he emphasized, “The blame lies not with the algorithms themselves but with the disinformation they are used to spread.”

Professor Levinson’s critique of governmental overreach was particularly sharp. Drawing historical parallels, he warned, “When governments gain such control, they can jeopardize democratic systems, even those that have existed for hundreds of years.” He cited the Thatcher administration’s suppression of unfavorable news during the Falklands War as a case study in the dangers of government-controlled communication.

Reflecting on Trump’s weaponization of “fake news,” Professor Levinson described it as a hallmark of fascism, akin to tactics used by Stalin and Hitler. He lamented, “It amazes me how many people have fallen for this tactic, despite the lessons we should have learned from history.”

Professor Levinson shared his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.” From absurd appointments to calculated assaults on institutions, Professor Levinson’s insights underline the precarious state of democratic governance in the digital age.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Paul Levinson with some edits.

Democratic Impulses Persist Despite Billionaires’ Control Over Social Media

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Professor Levinson, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you perceive the influence of hi-tech oligarchs, such as Elon Musk, on the digital public sphere? Does the concentration of digital platforms in the hands of a few individuals pose a unique threat to democratic discourse? 

Professor Paul Levinson: Let me answer the second part of your question first. Everything new in communications can potentially threaten a democratic society. However, so far in our history—both the history of the United States and the history of democracies in general—new forms of communication have largely benefited democracy. In fact, they have often undermined dictatorships, autocracies, and oligarchies.

A notable example I often cite is the White Rose group in Germany during World War II. This courageous group of college students used a primitive Xerox machine to disseminate the truth about Nazi atrocities to the German public. Their efforts have always left a profound impression on me. Another example is from the final decade of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. There was something called Samizdat Video, a primitive video technology by today’s standards, but it was instrumental in undermining the autocracy of the Soviet regime, even under Gorbachev, who was probably the most enlightened Soviet leader.

With this historical perspective in mind, while I am always concerned about new technologies, I don’t believe social media presents an insurmountable threat to democracy. In fact, it cuts both ways. Social media enables lies, fascism, and the suppression of truth, which are central to fascistic systems. At the same time, social media provides a unique platform for individuals to disseminate the truth widely.

Now, regarding Elon Musk and other billionaires like those controlling Facebook, despite their unprecedented control over social media platforms, this has not yet prevented democratic impulses from finding expression through these platforms. 

The Negative Impact of Algorithms and AI Is Often Overrated

How do you address concerns about the unchecked power of tech companies to shape public discourse, especially when their decisions significantly influence political narratives? In what ways do algorithms on social media platforms amplify populist narratives, and how much responsibility should platform owners like Musk take for the political polarization these technologies can create?

Professor Paul Levinson: First, we’ve heard a lot about algorithms, and more recently, about AI. I think the negative impact of these technologies is often overrated. One area where algorithms have proven particularly effective is targeted advertising. This was evident during the 2016 election in the United States when Facebook provided Cambridge Analytica with detailed data about users—what they were sharing, liking, and discussing on the platform. This data allowed the Trump campaign—who, in this regard, were ahead of the Democrats in recognizing its potential—to tailor their ads to specific audiences. For instance, the ads weren’t wasted on someone like me, who wouldn’t have voted for Trump under any circumstances because I already understood him for what he was.

This approach overcame one of the limitations of traditional advertising, where ads are broadcast to a wide audience via television, newspapers, or billboards, with no way to ensure they reach the right people. A significant portion of the ad spend is wasted because many viewers or readers are not the intended target audience. Algorithms, on the other hand, allowed for precision targeting, which made advertising far more efficient in this context.

The use of such algorithms in 2016, which allowed Facebook to share user data, is something that should be and has been controlled to some extent in the United States by agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. Preventing social media platforms from selling user data is an important step, and it does not interfere with free speech or the First Amendment.

As for algorithms spreading disinformation, the blame lies not with the algorithms themselves but with the disinformation they are used to disseminate. This raises the question of what can and should be done about disinformation on platforms like Twitter—now known as X—and other social media outlets.

Let me introduce an important concept here. In the United States, the First Amendment has never been intended, nor can it be used, to protect criminal communication. For example, if a group uses social media to plan a bank robbery, kidnapping, or murder, that communication is not protected. The government has a vested interest in preventing crimes before they occur.

So, the question is, what are the algorithms spreading? If they are spreading deliberate lies—such as disinformation about COVID-19—that result in harm or death, I believe that constitutes a crime and must be stopped. However, if they are spreading statements like, “Oh, we love Donald Trump! He was such a great President,” even though I strongly disagree with that sentiment, it is still acceptable. That is simply a part of the democratic system.

Do you believe governments or international bodies should regulate hi-tech oligarchs to prevent potential misuse of their platforms for political manipulation? If so, what should such regulations prioritize?

Professor Paul Levinson: This is another central topic. The real question here is: which is worse—the enormous power held by corporations and oligarchs, or governments regulating them?

The reason I frame it this way is that Trump has repeatedly made it clear that, if he returns to office, he plans to target cable media, broadcast media, and social media platforms that, in his distorted view, are spreading lies about him. For Trump, anyone who criticizes him is accused of delivering fake news and lying. He’s essentially attempting to flip the narrative.

The critical difference between the power held by the government and that wielded by massive corporations or billionaires like Elon Musk is that the government controls the military. In my view, this is the most significant threat to democratic systems. Trump has also spoken about using the National Guard to break up protests and take other actions that represent substantial steps toward establishing a fascist state in the United States.

While I don’t like billionaires having so much power, what concerns me even more is the government having the ability to stop communication and prevent people from sharing their ideas—whether or not I agree with those ideas—in the public sphere for others to read and comment on.

Once the government starts regulating communication, it’s a very short step to punishing dissent, arresting people, and throwing them in jail—exactly what the Nazis did in the 1930s. That’s a road I’m deeply concerned about.

Counter Lies with Truth, Not Suppression

Illustration: Shutterstock.

Digital technologies have been tools for both democratic and populist movements. In your opinion, how can society harness these technologies to strengthen democratic values while mitigating their misuse by authoritarian populist leaders?

Professor Paul Levinson: This is a very long-standing issue. John Milton addressed it 400 years ago in his Areopagitica tract, where he argued for keeping the marketplace of ideas open. Milton believed that allowing both truth and falsity to exist in the same marketplace enables people to identify the truth and distinguish it from lies.

When you start regulating what can enter that marketplace, the government—or anyone trying to regulate it—could easily make a mistake or even deliberately suppress the truth while presenting it as false. This prevents people from making rational decisions. That, again, is what fascists do—they attempt to control the public sphere. By keeping the truth out of the public sphere, they can masquerade as truth-tellers while propagating lies.

Much more recently, here in the United States, one of the greatest Supreme Court justices in history, Louis Brandeis—so influential that a university in Massachusetts was named after him, Brandeis University—expressed a similar idea. Brandeis famously said that the best way to combat a lie is not to suppress it but to counter it with the truth. That’s how you destroy lies—by presenting the truth clearly and rationally.

Of course, some people are hopeless; no matter what you say, they won’t change their minds. But I’m an optimist and believe that most human beings are rational. Like John Milton and Louis Brandeis, I think the best way forward is to keep the marketplace of ideas as open as possible. This openness allows the truth to emerge and shine a light on the lies.

A Clear Line Must Be Drawn When Speech Leads to Criminal Activity or Endangers Lives

With Elon Musk’s vision of Twitter as a “public square” open to all opinions, how should social media platforms navigate the tension between upholding free speech and preventing the spread of harmful disinformation? How should actors like Musk balance their personal ideologies with their ethical responsibilities toward maintaining a fair and inclusive digital space?

Professor Paul Levinson: Well, again, the first question has to be addressed by considering whether the communication in question constitutes criminal activity. Are lives put in jeopardy because of such communication? If the answer is yes, then that communication should not be allowed on any platform.

The challenge, of course, lies in defining what constitutes criminal communication. Consider the example of Trump and the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, which he incited after losing the 2020 election. Trump has since been indicted in multiple cases for criminal activity related to that attack. However, he maintains his innocence, and tragically, if he were to regain the presidency, he could potentially ensure that these cases are dismissed-a deeply unfortunate prospect.

That said, the Capitol attack was, in my view, unequivocally a criminal activity. The individuals involved were not patriots; they were part of a group that believed they could overturn the results of a democratically conducted election through violence, including threats to hang the Vice President for allowing the certification of electoral votes.

First, we must establish a consensus on what constitutes a crime. For example, during a pandemic that has already claimed millions of lives, deliberately spreading lies and deceiving the public about false cures is a clear case of criminal activity. In such instances, figures like Elon Musk have an ethical obligation to prevent this content from being shared on their platforms. If they fail to act, I believe the government has a duty to intervene to stop such harmful communication.

This brings us to the debate on the limits of free speech. Elon Musk presents himself as an absolutist regarding free speech, and we can certainly debate how far I or anyone else leans toward free speech absolutism. Personally, I draw a clear line when speech leads to criminal activity or endangers human lives. It is not difficult to identify such communications online, and when Musk fails to remove this kind of content, I believe he is culpable.

In such cases, the government—though certainly not under Trump, as he and Musk appear to be allies—has a responsibility to engage with Musk and press him to adopt more responsible policies.

Government Intervention in Communication Is Far More Dangerous

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

You argue that it’s concerning that tech executives can exercise so much power over who can use their platforms. But the alternative – government intervention – could be much worse. You argued this before Elon Musk was appointed to a significant post in the second Trump administration. Do you still think the same?

Professor Paul Levinson: Yes, because, as I mentioned, the government wields military power. While corporations can be problematic, and it is undeniably concerning for the richest person in the world to hold so much power that they can essentially do whatever they want—even if they lose millions of dollars and still remain the wealthiest—it is far more dangerous for the government to be involved in communication.

Let me give you another example of this—a relatively minor one, but still important. Some people may remember the Falklands War in the 1980s. Argentina wanted the United Kingdom to relinquish control of the Falkland Islands, which are located off Argentina’s coast. Understandably, Argentina questioned why the UK was still holding on to these islands, which they had seized during the colonial era.

At that time, Margaret Thatcher was the Prime Minister of the UK. She wanted to project toughness and refused to give up the islands, leading to war. The BBC, the British Broadcasting Corporation, unlike media systems in the United States, is not independent of the government. It is part of the British government, and naturally, it reported on the war.

One day, the Argentine forces inflicted significant damage on the British Expeditionary Force in the Falklands. The British government, under Thatcher, didn’t want the British public to know about this, fearing it would provoke public outrage. So, they instructed the BBC not to broadcast or report the news.

This demonstrates the immense power of governments, even in democracies like the United Kingdom. The government effectively told the nation’s primary broadcasting organization, “Don’t report that.” This is precisely the kind of government overreach that concerns me here in America and across Western democracies, where fascist tendencies have been gaining ground.

When governments gain such control, they can jeopardize democratic systems, even those that have existed for hundreds of years. This is why I continue to believe that government intervention in communication is far more dangerous than the unchecked power of tech executives.

Violating the Spirit of the First Amendment Is Not as Severe as Violating the First Amendment Itself

You declare yourself a First Amendment radical, i.e., a staunch supporter of the First Amendment, which says Congress shall make no law abridging free speech. Yet, you have supported Twitter’s ban on Donald Trump. Don’t you think there is a contradiction between these two positions? Where should the ethical line be drawn for social media platforms when balancing freedom of expression with the risk of harm caused by certain types of speech?

Professor Paul Levinson: First of all, I’d like to draw a distinction between the First Amendment itself and what I call the spirit of the First Amendment.

The First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or the press.” Through the 14th Amendment, which was enacted after the Civil War in the 1800s, this prohibition on federal government interference with communication was extended to state governments and, in general, to municipalities, including cities. Over the years, the Supreme Court has correctly ruled that no government can interfere with communications—again, unless it involves some kind of criminal activity. That’s the First Amendment.

Now, let’s take an example like the Grammy Awards. These awards, given for the best music in a given year, are broadcast on American television stations like CBS. During a rap artist’s performance, where cursing and vulgarity are often part of the genre, viewers might hear bleeps censoring certain words. What’s happening there? CBS is bleeping those words because they fear their sponsors might object, or that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) might penalize them by refusing to renew their license.

For the record, I believe the FCC is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment—it’s a government agency that interferes with communication. Nevertheless, CBS’s actions, while cowardly in my opinion, do not violate the First Amendment. Instead, they violate the spirit of the First Amendment because CBS is not the government.

Similarly, when Elon Musk or, before him, the previous owners of Twitter banned Donald Trump from the platform, they were not acting as representatives of the government. In Trump’s case, his tweets were rightly perceived as contributing to the instigation of the attack on the Capitol in January 2021—a criminal activity. For this reason, I believe banning him from the platform was the correct decision. However, this action was taken by a private social media company, not the government. As such, while it may have violated the spirit of the First Amendment, it did not violate the First Amendment itself.

In general, my position is that the spirit of the First Amendment should be respected, as censorship is rarely beneficial. However, violating the spirit of the First Amendment is not as severe as violating the First Amendment itself.

To illustrate a clear violation of the First Amendment, consider when President Richard Nixon attempted to prevent The New York Times and The Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers. Nixon argued that publishing the papers would undermine his war effort in Vietnam. Fortunately, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that such an action would violate the First Amendment and voted against Nixon, affirming that a US president cannot impose restrictions on what newspapers can publish. This case represents a classic and correct application of the First Amendment.

The Danger of Elon Musk Holding Power in Both Government and Social Media

Elon Musk, founder, CEO, and chief engineer of SpaceX; CEO of Tesla; CTO and chairman of X (formerly Twitter); and co-founder of Neuralink and OpenAI, at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) in Paris, France, on June 16, 2023. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

You suggest that market forces can effectively counterbalance the dominance of tech giants, as seen with Microsoft’s decline in influence. Do you believe similar market corrections are plausible for current tech behemoths like Twitter or Amazon, given their role as gatekeepers of global communication?

Professor Paul Levinson: Yes, I do. Let’s go back to what I was saying about Microsoft. This happened in the 1990s when Microsoft was at its peak, and Bill Gates was probably the richest man in the world. There was a lot of talk about breaking up Microsoft—claims that it had a monopoly, too large a market share, and that this dominance was unhealthy for the intellectual and economic well-being of the country.

Even back then, I said, “Take it easy.” The market will regulate itself; there’s no need to rush into breaking up the Microsoft corporate system. People were reacting to something that had only happened in the last year or two. I suggested we wait and see what would happen. Sure enough, by the late 1990s and into the 21st century, Microsoft’s influence had already started to decline, and new giants like Amazon were beginning to grow.

Once again, I am more concerned about the government regulating any communication system than I am about the damage caused by such systems. Consider Donald Trump returning to the White House—he’s already naming some of the bizarre people (and that’s putting it kindly) he plans to appoint to important positions in his cabinet and administration.

The last thing I want to see is a scenario where the government goes after MSNBC, an important progressive voice in cable television, or NBC as a whole, claiming they have too much power and must be broken up. That kind of government intervention poses a greater threat to democracy than allowing corporate systems to continue operating.

Now, I’m not saying I’m thrilled about the power Elon Musk holds. In fact, I need to emphasize this point: Trump has stated he wants to put Musk in charge of a new government agency tasked with making the government more efficient. While I’m all for making the government more efficient, I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X (formerly Twitter) also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.

As for Musk, I’m not overly concerned about most of the things he’s done so far. What does concern me is the idea of him simultaneously being a member of the new administration and maintaining his powerful position at X. If Musk were a true believer in free speech, he would either divest himself of X or refuse the government post. But I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.

Projection Is a Hallmark of Fascism

You argue that Donald Trump turned the concept of “fake news” into a tool to undermine legitimate media. What long-term impact do you think this has on public trust in journalism and the democratic process? 

Professor Paul Levinson: It’s already had a very negative effect, and it’s one of the worst things Donald Trump has done. I remember watching television back in January 2017, shortly after Trump had been elected president in the 2016 election. As president-elect, he was holding a news conference here in New York City. At the end of the conference, reporters raised their hands to ask questions.

A prominent CNN reporter, Jim Acosta, raised his hand, and Trump looked at him and said, “I’m not going to call on you. You’re with CNN, right? You’re fake news.” I remember thinking, “Wow, that’s a pretty clever thing Trump is trying to do.”

CNN was not spreading fake news in any way. It was truthfully reporting on things that made Trump look bad. For Trump, however, anything that embarrasses or criticizes him is automatically labeled as “fake news.” Whether the idea originated with Trump or one of his advisers, it’s a brilliant but dangerous way of undermining criticism.

This tactic reflects what Sigmund Freud called projection. When we look at the world and disagree with someone, we project our own intentions onto them, accusing them of doing what we plan to do. This, in turn, justifies actions against them. Projection is a hallmark of fascism. It’s something Hitler did. It’s something Stalin did. Stalin referred to the press as the “enemy of the people,” which is another favorite term of Trump. In Nazi Germany, during the 1930s, Joseph Goebbels popularized the term Lügenpresse, meaning “lying press”—essentially, fake news.

What amazes me is how many people have fallen for this tactic in 2024, and indeed, over the past decade, despite the lessons we should have learned from the 1930s. Unfortunately, it highlights just how ignorant many people are of history.

The Greatest Threat to American Democracy Since the Civil War

How do you think American people and American institutions will react to second Trump administration?

Professor Paul Levinson: I don’t know, and I have to tell you, I am deeply concerned. I think the United States of America is facing the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.

The election results obviously surprised and stunned a lot of people. I’ll just note, parenthetically, that once again, the polls were off. They predicted a razor-close race. While Trump didn’t win by a landslide, he did secure an impressive victory. Even here in New York State, where the Democrats won, they did so by a smaller margin than Joe Biden or even Hillary Clinton had achieved.

This election revealed a significant aspect of American life and I thought that many, including myself, didn’t fully recognize before the election. It’s a deeply troubling realization. As historians know, it’s not as though Germany had an autocratic system in place before Hitler’s rise to power. The Weimar Republic was actually a strong democracy with a robust constitution.

Fascism often doesn’t seize power through a coup d’état—though that can ultimately happen—but rather by undermining democratic systems and turning them against themselves. That’s what makes this such a deeply concerning time.

I’m an optimist, so I hope that the worst won’t happen. But at this point, it just remains to be seen.

Trump’s Appointments Are Not Just Concerning, They Border on Absurdity

Independent presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy introduced his running mate, Nicole Shanahan, during a campaign event in Oakland, California, on Tuesday, March 26, 2024. Photo: Maxim Elramsisy.

And lastly, Professor Levinson, there are those who are deeply concerned about the future of American democracy under a second Trump administration. Some argue that American democratic institutions may not survive. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Paul Levinson: Well, as I just said, I’m very worried. During Trump’s first administration, many of the people he appointed seemed to operate under the mistaken belief that, while Trump might be a little unhinged, they could keep him in check. They thought they knew what was right and would steer him accordingly. Trump’s response to that? He fired anyone who disagreed with him.

He famously dismissed James Comey, the FBI director, and Rex Tillerson, his Secretary of State. Trump became infamous for firing people, both in his presidency and on The Apprentice. This time around, however, he’s being much more calculated in his appointments.

The only person he has appointed so far who, in my view, is not completely unfit for the role is Marco Rubio, a senator from Florida who is now Secretary of State. While I don’t agree with Rubio’s policies, at least he’s not irrational. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for many of Trump’s other appointees.

For example, Matt Gaetz, recently appointed Attorney General, was until recently a member of the House of Representatives. He resigned to take this post despite being the subject of an investigation involving allegations of sex trafficking, including minors. The idea of someone with such a history holding the top legal position in the country is deeply troubling.

Then there’s Dr. Mehmet Oz. Yes, he’s an MD, but he hasn’t practiced medicine in years and is better known as a television personality. He’s been appointed to lead the CDC or a similar health organization—it’s hard to keep track.

Or take Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who has been appointed Secretary of Health. While he’s Robert F. Kennedy’s son, his anti-vaccine stance goes against the very measures that saved millions of lives during the COVID pandemic. These appointments are not just concerning; they border on absurdity.

At this point, I’m holding out hope that the Senate, which is currently split 50-50 between Democrats and Republicans, might reject some of these nominees. However, it’s unclear whether that will happen. I don’t have a crystal ball, but if I did, I’d see nothing but clouds and stormy weather ahead. Unfortunately, I can’t see through the storm.

Republican presidential nominee, former U.S. President Donald Trump arrives to speak during a campaign rally at Suburban Collection Showplace on October 26, 2024 in Novi, Michigan. Photo: Anna Moneymaker.

Trump 2025: Dystopia and Fascism – The Rise of Authoritarianism in the New Government?

Donald Trump’s first campaign and election were not merely a triumph for populism but a “game-changer,” bringing it to the forefront not just as an ideology but as a method of governance. Trump’s rise reshaped Western democracies, fostering a culture where political norms were no longer stable foundations but tools to be discarded when inconvenient. This commentary seeks to analyze Trump’s prospective second administration and its potential to deepen existing fractures in governance. By examining the cabinet figures, controversies, and projected policies, this analysis will explore their implications for the balance of powers, climate policy, immigration, justice, and international relations.

By João Ferreira Dias

The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 raises profound concerns about the future of democracy in the United States. With a cabinet composed of figures associated with populism, climate denial, extreme nativism, and allegations of serious criminal conduct, the emerging government signals a shift towards authoritarianism.

Authors like Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2019) and Yascha Mounk (2018) have noted the far-reaching impact of Trump on contemporary politics. His first campaign and election were not merely a triumph for populism but a “game-changer,” bringing it to the forefront not just as an ideology but as a method of governance. Trump’s rise reshaped Western democracies, fostering a culture where political norms were no longer stable foundations but tools to be discarded when inconvenient.

This commentary seeks to analyze Trump’s prospective second administration and its potential to deepen existing fractures in governance. By examining the cabinet figures, controversies, and projected policies, this analysis will explore their implications for the balance of powers, climate policy, immigration, justice, and international relations.

Populism, Resentment, and the White Working Class

The literature on populism emphasizes the “us vs. them” dichotomy as central to the ideology and practice of populist movements. This narrative is not merely rhetorical but structural, enabling populist leaders to redefine democratic politics around exclusionary lines. As Mondon and Winter (2020) observe, male anxiety—rooted in fears of economic insecurity and immigration—was pivotal in mobilizing support for both Brexit and Trump’s 2016 election. This anxiety, framed as a defense of cultural and economic stability, has become a powerful driver of populist coalitions.

Yascha Mounk (2018) identifies the declining economic security of the white working class as a critical backdrop to this shift. This demographic, comprising rural laborers and displaced urban workers, has been profoundly affected by globalization and industrial outsourcing, which have hollowed out the economic foundations of entire communities. These “losers of globalization,” marginalized by liberal economic policies, have turned to populist leaders who promise to restore not just jobs but dignity and identity. Begum, Mondon, and Winter (2021) argue that this group has become the symbolic “people” populist radical-right movements claim to represent. This realignment echoes historical fascist strategies, where economic grievances were redirected into nationalist and exclusionary frameworks, undermining class solidarity in favor of cultural antagonism.

Trump’s “Make America Great Again” (MAGA) slogan was the masterstroke that consolidated these sentiments, offering a promise of cultural revival that transcended purely economic appeals. Fukuyama (2018) notes that this shift reflects a reconfiguration of the political spectrum, as economic discontent has increasingly been reframed as a cultural battle. The rise of “culture wars” (Hunter, 1991; Hartman, 2019) has enabled populist leaders like Trump to weaponize moral and cultural grievances, portraying the left as a threat to traditional values and national identity. Concepts such as “woke culture” (McWhorter, 2021) and “cultural Marxism” (Jamin, 2014) are invoked to delegitimize progressive movements, presenting them as enemies of the “common man.”

The “cultural backlash” phenomenon, as described by Norris and Inglehart (2019), plays a crucial role here. By amplifying fears of moral alienation and cultural displacement, Trump crafted a coalition that opposed not only the policies of the left but the foundational principles of liberal democracy itself. This backlash was not an aberration but a calculated strategy to consolidate power, mobilizing resentment to erode the very norms that sustain democratic institutions.

The Collapse of Democratic Norms and the Dismantling of Checks and Balances

Levitsky and Ziblatt’s (2019) framework on democratic backsliding highlights how democracies often erode through gradual institutional decay rather than abrupt authoritarian takeovers. Trump’s presidency exemplified this process, as his persistent attacks on the judiciary, the media, and electoral integrity undermined the legitimacy of these institutions.

Trump’s rhetoric, especially his false claims of election fraud, was not merely an expression of personal grievance but a deliberate strategy to delegitimize the rule of law. These narratives culminated in the January 6th Capitol riot, an unprecedented attack on democratic governance in the modern United States. By encouraging insurrectionist behavior, Trump signaled his willingness to destabilize institutions rather than accept their role as checks on executive power.

Policies such as mass deportations further illustrate this erosion of norms, creating an environment of fear and division that undermines trust in governance. At the same time, Trump’s environmental agenda—typified by proposals to expand oil drilling in Alaska—exemplifies his administration’s disdain for scientific expertise. As Mondon and Winter argue, this confluence of environmental degradation and exclusionary nationalism, or “bio-cultural nativism,” reflects a broader authoritarian project that sidelines expertise in favor of ideological loyalty.

Nativism, Class, and the Fragmentation of Liberal Democracy

Mondon and Winter (2020) highlight the centrality of nativism in Trump’s political strategy. For the white working class, nativist rhetoric offers both cultural validation and a channel for economic grievances, reinforcing the “us vs. them” framework. Trump’s appeal lies in his ability to present himself as the protector of “real Americans” against perceived threats from immigrants, elites, and progressive activists.

Mounk (2018) warns that the separation of democracy from liberalism creates fertile ground for authoritarianism. While democracy centers on majority rule, liberalism safeguards minority rights and institutional checks on power. Under Trump, this decoupling fosters a dangerous “tyranny of the majority,” in which populist policies—such as border walls and mass deportations—erode the pluralism that underpins liberal democracy.

This fragmentation of liberal democracy has broader implications, as populist leaders exploit cultural and economic insecurities to dismantle the institutional norms that sustain democratic governance. The result is a political landscape where nativism and exclusionary policies are not fringe elements but central features of mainstream governance.

Trump’s Cabinet: A Microcosm of Authoritarian Drift

Trump’s prospective 2025 cabinet crystallizes his administration’s authoritarian tendencies. Jason Stanley (2018) identifies the vilification of out-groups and the consolidation of power among loyalists as hallmarks of authoritarian regimes. Trump’s cabinet appointments reflect this dynamic, blending ideological extremism with personal loyalty at the expense of institutional norms and expertise.

J.D. Vance emerges as a key figure in this trajectory. As an intellectual voice for the radical right, Vance bridges populist grievance with the cultural warfare central to Trump’s appeal. His rhetoric, centered on the “decline of traditional values,” positions him as an architect of the culture wars that sustain Trump’s coalition. Vance’s influence extends beyond policy, shaping a narrative that frames the MAGA movement as the defender of American identity against the perceived excesses of progressivism.

Elon Musk, another prominent figure in Trump’s circle, wields outsized influence as both a deregulation advocate and a media magnate. Through his dominance of platforms like X (formerly Twitter), Musk amplifies misinformation, weakening public trust in institutions and expertise. His inclusion in the cabinet signals a shift toward governance driven by individual power rather than institutional accountability, further undermining democratic norms.

Robert F. Kennedy Jr., a vocal climate change skeptic, exemplifies the administration’s disregard for scientific consensus. Kennedy’s presence underscores Trump’s strategy of sidelining expertise in favor of ideological alignment, with significant implications for environmental policy and institutional credibility.

Finally, figures like Matt Gaetz, despite their legal controversies, illustrate Trump’s prioritization of loyalty over ethical standards. This normalization of controversial and compromised figures signals a broader erosion of accountability, mirroring the dynamics of historical authoritarian regimes.

Conclusion: The Authoritarian Future of Liberal Democracy

Trump’s cabinet is not just a collection of individuals; it is a reflection of his administration’s authoritarian vision. By prioritizing ideological conformity, cultural grievance, and personal loyalty, Trump’s appointments deepen the erosion of democratic norms and institutional credibility. The profiles of figures like Vance, Musk, and Kennedy illuminate how populism and nativism are reshaping the American political landscape, with long-term consequences for the principles of liberal democracy.

Resisting this drift requires more than institutional safeguards; it demands a societal recommitment to pluralism, expertise, and the rule of law. Without such efforts, the United States risks cementing a political model where authoritarianism thrives under the guise of democratic legitimacy.


 

References

Begum, N., Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2021). “Between the ‘left behind’ and ‘the people’: Racism, populism and the construction of the ‘white working class’ in the context of Brexit.” In: Routledge handbook of critical studies in whiteness(pp. 220-231). Routledge.

Cammaerts, B. (2022). “The abnormalisation of social justice: The ‘anti-woke culture war’ discourse in the UK.” Discourse & Society, 33(6), 730-743.

Duffy, B., Gottfried, G., May, G., Hewlett, K., & Skinner, G. (2023). Woke vs anti-woke? Culture war divisions and politicshttps://doi.org/10.18742/pub01-163.

Hartman, A. (2019). A war for the soul of America: A history of the culture wars. University of Chicago Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture wars: The struggle to define America. Basic Books.

Hunter, J. D. (1993). Before the shooting begins: Searching for democracy in America’s culture war. Free Press.

Jamin, J. (2014). Cultural Marxism and the radical right. In The post-war Anglo-American far right: A special relationship of hate (pp. 84-103).

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2019). How democracies die. Crown.

McWhorter, J. (2021). Woke racism: How a new religion has betrayed Black America. Penguin.

Mirrlees, T. (2018). “The Alt-right’s discourse on “Cultural Marxism”: A political instrument of intersectional hate.” Atlantis: Critical Studies in Gender, Culture & Social Justice, 39(1), 49-69.

Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2020). “Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States.” In: Whiteness and Nationalism (pp. 10-28). Routledge.

Mounk, Y. (2018). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Paternotte, D., & Verloo, M. (2021). “De-democratization and the politics of knowledge: Unpacking the cultural Marxism narrative.” Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society, 28(3), 556-578.

Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House.

llustration by Spiral Design for International Nelson Mandela Day, via Shutterstock.

ECPS Book Talk: Remembering Democracy and Peace Building Process of South Africa in the Context of Global Political Climate

Date/Time: Wednesday, November 20, 2024 – 18:00 (CET)

 

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Speaker

Revd. Dr. Liz Carmichael (Emeritus Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford)

Discussants

Dr. Henning Melber (Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences/University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies/University of the Free State in Bloemfontein and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London).

Dr. Palesa Nqambaza (Postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds).

Organizator and Presenter

Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. Ph.D. researcher at the University of Szeged, Hungary).

 

Objective

In a time when democracies are being tested, understanding how peace-building and democratic transitions succeed is more crucial than ever to remember and think collectively about the democratisation process, ECPS invites you to join the talk to explore Dr. Liz Carmichael’s Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994.

The case of South Africa in negotiating peace and democracy teaches us about resilience and unity and has global significance, especially in today’s world. Thus, this book is more than a historical account. It provides timeless insights into how diverse communities, including businesses, civil groups, religious organizations, and political parties, overcame political violence and fostered a shared vision of national peace. Carmichael shows that even in deeply divided societies, peace and democratization are only possible when carried by the people and not as top-down government projects.

Brief Biographies

Revd. Dr. Liz Carmichael MBE is an Emeritus Fellow at St John’s College, Oxford. Born in England, Liz was a doctor at Baragwanath Hospital, Soweto 1975-1981, then studied Theology at Oxford and worked in the Anglican Diocese of Johannesburg 1991-1996, being ordained priest and serving on peace committees under the National Peace Accord. She was Chaplain and Tutor in Theology at St John’s College 1996 -2011, and then held an Emeritus Research Fellowship, 2011-2023, which enabled her to research and write Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa. The National Peace Accord 1991-1994.

Dr. Henning Melber is an Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences/University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies/University of the Free State in Bloemfontein and a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London. Melber came to Namibia as a son of German immigrants in 1967, where he joined the anticolonial movement SWAPO in 1974. He was Director of The Namibian Economic Policy Research Unit in Windhoek, Research Director of the Nordic Africa Institute and Director of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, both in Uppsala/Sweden.

Dr. Palesa Nqambaza is a scholar specializing in gender studies, political theory, and African philosophy. She is currently a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of Political Studies at the University of the Witwatersrand and a Visiting Research Fellow in the School of Philosophy, Religion, and History of Science at the University of Leeds. Dr Nqambaza’s research engages deeply with contemporary South African politics through cultural expressions, particularly the Amapiano music genre, which she explores as a lens for understanding the socio-political perspectives of young South Africans post-1994. 

Neo Sithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.

 

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Digital

Authoritarian Information Manipulation and Dissemination — National, Transnational, and International Perspectives

 

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The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.

In response to these challenges, a workshop which is a collaborative effort organized on November 7-8, 2024, by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium. The workshop aimed to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop also examined the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.

Moreover, the workshop addressed strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It also focused on countering disinformation through activism and explored everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event discussed necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.

The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.

Round Table 1 – Foreign Interference Campaigns on Social Media: Insights from Field Theory and Computational Social Science

Keynote by Dr. Robert Ackland (Professor, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 2 – Manipulating Truth: Authoritarian Strategies of ‘Attention Bombing’ and ‘Epistemic Modulation’ in Hybrid Media Systems

Keynote by Dr. Timothy Graham (Associate Professor, Queensland University of Technology)

 

Round Table 3 – The Dark Side of Social Media: Misinformation, Negativity, and Polarization

Keynote by Dr. Jason Weismueller (Assistant Professor, University of Western Australia)

 

Round Table 4 – The Influence of Familiarity and Identity Relevance on Truth Judgements

Keynote by Dr. Li Qian Tay (Postdoctoral Fellow, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 5 – Countering State-Sanctioned Information Operations: The #FreeYouth Movement in Thailand

Keynote by Dr. Aim Sinpeng (Associate Professor, The University of Sydney)

 

Round Table 6 – Investigating Everyday Online Experiences with Misinformation and Responding with Evidence-Informed Media Literacy Education Initiatives

Keynote by Dr. Tanya Notley (Associate Professor, Western Sydney University)

 

Round Table 7 – Reforming the Curriculum to Counter Disinformation, Toxicity, and Polarization

Keynote by Dr. Mathieu O’Neil (Professor, The University of Canberra; Honorary Associate Professor, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 8

Ignore, Rebut or Embrace: Political Elite Responses to Conspiracy Theories

Keynote by Dr. Zim Nwokora (Associate Professor, Deakin University)

And

Disinformation in the City Response Playbook

Keynote by Dr. Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg (Research Fellow in City Diplomacy at the Melbourne University)

 

A group of migrants entered the U.S. from Mexico through an opening in the border fence near Sasabe, Arizona, and turned themselves in to a waiting CBP agent on July 15, 2023. Photo: Aaron Wells.

Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. November 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0021

 

Immigration Realities is a thorough, research-based analysis that examines and debunks widespread myths surrounding immigration while highlighting the contributions of immigrants. Authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione present an alternative view to common misconceptions by contextualizing migration within broader global frameworks. While the book’s perspective may not align with all viewpoints, its well-supported insights make it a valuable resource for readers interested in a nuanced, evidence-based understanding of migration, encouraging a thoughtful approach to policy and public dialogue.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

In their recently released book, Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions, authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione address some of the most pervasive and misleading assumptions about immigration, inviting readers to critically examine often-repeated beliefs with fresh, research-backed insights. They deconstruct prevalent myths about immigration, providing a research-informed perspective to clarify these misconceptions. Each chapter explores a central question, such as “Is the US-Mexico border truly dangerous?” and “Would a border wall keep undocumented immigrants away?” Further questions tackled include whether immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, if they avoid learning English, and if they are disproportionately dependent on welfare and other government programs. The book also addresses critical issues like remittances and the debate on whether they drain the host economy, the supposed “refugee crisis,” and the broader relationship between globalization and migration.

The book then extends its focus to key questions around Brexit’s impact on immigration to the United Kingdom, examining “Will the decision to leave the European Union stop immigration?” Finally, the authors explore whether immigrants integrate into host societies and what lessons can be learned from different cities and countries regarding immigrant integration. Through these questions, the book provides a robust foundation for a more nuanced understanding of migration issues.

Through this rigorous analysis, Immigration Realities not only dispels common myths but also contextualizes immigration as part of larger global and historical processes. Castañeda and Cione emphasize that migration is not merely a legal issue but a human experience shaped by complex dynamics, including exclusion and belonging. By discussing concepts such as emigration and immigration, they examine how the realities of migration are affected by issues like crimmigrationxenophobic stereotypes, and pushbacks. These discussions are balanced with an exploration of themes such as assimilationsocial integration, and cosmopolitanism, revealing how migrants navigate inclusion and exclusion in host societies.

The authors further address how broader forces—globalization and deglobalization, for instance—impact migration patterns and individual experiences, while examining the effects of isolationism in shaping migration policies and public opinion. In this work, readers will encounter discussions of migradollars (remittances sent by immigrants to their home countries) and social remittances (the transfer of ideas and practices across borders), highlighting the multidimensional impact of migration on both host and origin countries.

By integrating these varied concepts, Immigration Realities seeks to bridge the gap between academic research and public understanding, making complex ideas accessible for readers who may be new to contemporary migration studies. This comprehensive approach underscores the importance of viewing migration through a lens that recognizes both its socio-political challenges and its contributions to society.

In the introduction, the authors argue that immigration, especially in the United States, is highly politicized and frequently portrayed in a way that alarms native-born populations. Misleading stereotypes about immigrants, particularly those of color, have fueled negative perceptions, creating an “us vs. them” mentality that often casts immigrants as threats to social and economic stability. The authors emphasize that these misconceptions are not only harmful but also lack factual basis, as only around 3.5% of the global population lives outside their country of birth. Castañeda and Cione also advocate for a broader understanding of migration beyond legal frameworks, viewing it as a fundamentally human experience. 

They emphasize that migration is part of larger historical and global processes, including globalization, cosmopolitanism, and deglobalization. This introductory section lays the groundwork for an in-depth exploration that challenges readers to critically engage with the nuanced realities of migration, making the topic accessible without sacrificing complexity. By framing each chapter around a misconception, the authors aim to equip readers with a factual, empathetic perspective on immigration, positioning the book as both a scholarly work and a timely resource for anyone interested in understanding the multifaceted nature of migration.

Chapter 1 of Immigration Realities, titled “The Southern Border is Safe, but Border Enforcement Makes it Unsafe for Many,” challenges the common portrayal of the US-Mexico border as a dangerous, lawless region. Through secondary data, published research, and surveys of El Paso residents, Castañeda and Cione argue that this image is largely a media-driven myth. In fact, border cities are some of the safest in the US, with lower crime rates than other areas due to heavy surveillance and Border Patrol presence. However, the authors highlight a stark contrast in experiences: while White Americans generally feel secure, migrants and minority communities face disproportionate threats of violence, detainment, and deportation, intensified by far-right rhetoric that criminalizes immigrants.

The authors underscore how populist rhetoric, notably from figures like Donald Trump, has fueled xenophobia and support for restrictive border policies. They link these policies to a border security industry that profits from a militarized approach, reinforcing exclusionary ideologies that endanger marginalized groups and undermine human rights. The chapter invites readers to question the prioritization of safety in border security discourse and raises awareness of the human rights violations inherent in populist-driven enforcement policies.

Chapter 2 of the book, titled “Border Walls Do Not Keep Immigrants Out of a Country,” offers a critical analysis of border walls’ ineffectiveness as immigration deterrents and the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts they impose. Castañeda and Cione argue that these walls, rather than serving functional purposes, act as symbolic tools driven by far-right ideologies equating border security with national identity preservation. Tracing the political momentum for a US-Mexico border wall from Reagan and Clinton through Trump’s administration, they contend that these policies stem more from ideological stances than practical immigration control.

The authors illustrate how Trump’s portrayal of immigration as an “invasion” fueled nationalist fears, leading to measures like the 2019 government shutdown over wall funding. They reveal that border walls, despite their high costs, fail to stop illegal immigration or drug trafficking, which primarily occurs at legal entry points, while also causing severe environmental damage. This chapter critiques the financial interests underlying the wall agenda, noting that private contractors, security firms, and detention centers profit from the manufactured perception of crisis. Castañeda and Cione advocate for redirecting resources toward humane immigration policies that recognize immigrants’ economic and social contributions, underscoring the need for cooperation over confrontation.

In Chapter 3, Castañeda and Cione dismantle the persistent myth that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than native-born Americans. Through a comprehensive examination of crime data, historical analysis, and social research, the authors argue that this misconception is not only false but rooted in long-standing stereotypes and xenophobic biases. They emphasize that foreign-born individuals, especially Hispanic immigrants, tend to have lower crime rates than their native-born counterparts. For example, border cities like El Paso, which have significant immigrant populations, consistently report lower crime rates than comparable non-border cities. Additionally, immigrants contribute to safer neighborhoods, likely due to strong social networks and a desire to avoid interactions with law enforcement that could endanger their immigration status.

The authors further explore how political rhetoric has fueled the criminal immigrant stereotype, particularly through statements by figures like Trump, who in his 2016 campaign described Mexican immigrants as “bringing crime” and “rapists.” Castañeda and Cione reveal that such narratives are not only misleading but strategically used to justify exclusionary policies. They describe how these stereotypes perpetuate a “crimmigration” system that criminalizes immigrants, with laws such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) intensifying immigrant detentions and deportations, often for minor infractions that would not result in criminal penalties for US citizens. By debunking the idea that immigration increases crime, the authors point out that as immigration has risen, national crime rates have simultaneously dropped. They advocate for a critical examination of these stereotypes, urging readers to question how political agendas shape public perceptions. 

In Chapter 4 of the book the authors this time confront the prevalent myth that immigrants refuse to learn English and fail to integrate into American society. The authors argue convincingly that immigrants are, in fact, highly motivated to acquire English language skills, viewing it as essential for social and economic mobility in the US. However, they also highlight the many barriers immigrants face, including limited access to language education, financial constraints, and systemic discrimination. They reveal how immigrants often experience prejudice in the classroom and discrimination in daily interactions when speaking their native languages. This “language shaming,” they argue, leads many immigrants to avoid using their native tongues in public, despite the strong desire to maintain a connection to their cultural heritage. 

By addressing the structural factors that limit language learning—such as the high cost of classes, lack of time, and socioeconomic status—the authors debunk the stereotype of the “unwilling immigrant.” They argue that rather than resisting integration, immigrants are often forced to prioritize immediate survival over language acquisition. The chapter makes a compelling case for more robust support systems to assist immigrants with language learning and challenge readers to reconsider simplistic narratives around language and integration, urging empathy and policy reforms to foster a more inclusive society.

The following chapter addresses the widespread misconception that immigrants rely heavily on welfare programs. The authors provide a compelling analysis backed by historical and contemporary data to demonstrate that immigrants generally access fewer social services than native-born individuals, even when eligible. This chapter examines the social and political dynamics that contribute to this myth, such as policies from the Trump administration, which attempted to block “undesirable” immigrants based on financial criteria, using misleading statistics to justify these actions. The authors delve into the structural barriers that limit immigrants’ access to welfare, such as the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which reduced immigrants’ eligibility for programs like Medicaid and SNAP. They highlight that these restrictions disproportionately affect low-income immigrant families and have lasting effects on their well-being, as they often forgo essential services out of fear of jeopardizing their immigration status.

The chapter also expands the discussion to international contexts, including European Union countries and Australia, revealing similar patterns of limited welfare use among immigrants globally. By addressing racial and ethnic stereotypes, such as the stigmatization of Black and Latin American immigrants as “welfare abusers,” Castañeda and Cione illustrate how these prejudices fuel public opposition and restrictive policies. Thus, they challenge readers to reconsider the welfare myth surrounding immigrants, urging for data-driven policies that acknowledge immigrants’ contributions, such as their role in the labor force and taxes, while promoting equitable access to social services. The authors effectively debunk the stereotype of the “dependent immigrant,” emphasizing instead the resilience and economic independence of immigrant communities.

In Chapter 6, Castañeda and Cione tackle the misconception that remittances—money sent by immigrants to family in their countries of origin—drain host economies. The authors highlight that remittances, contrary to popular belief, do not deplete economic resources in host countries but rather enhance the global economy and contribute to local economies in multiple ways. The chapter addresses arguments from political figures, such as Trump, who claimed that remittances should be taxed to fund projects like the US-Mexico border wall. The aurhors argue that such taxes would not only be burdensome to implement but would also drive remittance flows underground, leading to informal, unregulated channels. Furthermore, the authors clarify that the income immigrants remit has already been taxed in the host country, making additional taxation on remittances an unfair “double taxation.” 

Additionally, they emphasize that remittances are not equivalent to foreign aid, as remittances are private, intra-family transactions that meet immediate needs, such as food, education, and health care. These funds contribute directly to the welfare of recipient families without government or bureaucratic interference, unlike traditional aid. While remittances can bolster struggling economies, they are not designed to function as development tools or replace structural support. The authors advocate for respecting the economic agency of immigrants and the crucial support remittances provide to families and economies globally.

In Chapter 7, the authors critique the narrative of a “refugee crisis” as a social construct rooted in xenophobic and colonial attitudes. They argue that labeling refugee arrivals as a “crisis” frames them as societal issues, distracting from the underlying causes of displacement, such as war, imperialism, and economic exploitation by Western powers. This chapter also delves into the impacts of historical and ongoing imperialism, illustrating how Western interference in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has destabilized nations, leading to migration and asylum-seeking. The authors point out that Western countries often resist responsibility for these displacements, even as they benefit from economic arrangements that perpetuate inequality. For instance, the term “crisis” is frequently used by media and politicians to justify strict immigration controls rather than address the systemic issues creating forced migration. The chapter advocates for a reframing of refugee discourse, emphasizing the need for policies that prioritize humane treatment and cross-cultural support for refugees, recognizing their agency and dignity. 

The authors explore the often misunderstood relationship between globalization and migration in Chapter 8, emphasizing their independence. They argue that, while globalization and migration can appear interlinked, they are largely distinct processes. According to them, historical evidence shows that economic globalization—characterized by trade liberalization and capital movement—does not necessarily increase migration. Yet, the public often assumes a direct connection between these phenomena due to political rhetoric that conflates them. The chapter discusses how economic downturns, like the 2008 financial crisis, intensified backlash against globalization, which is sometimes unfairly directed at immigrants instead of economic policies. Castañeda and Cione illustrate how globalization’s impact on labor markets has led some politicians to blame immigrants for economic issues, reinforcing xenophobic sentiments rather than addressing systemic inequalities. By dissecting globalization’s influence, the authors advocate for a nuanced understanding that separates migration policy from global economic trends. 

In Chapter 9, the authors critically analyze Brexit’s impact on immigration to the UK. They argue that Brexit’s promise to reduce immigration, championed by anti-EU campaigners, is largely a misconception. Although Brexit allows the UK to impose stricter regulations on European Union immigrants, it has not significantly decreased immigration rates. Instead, Brexit has complicated the legal status of many EU nationals in the UK and disrupted the lives of British expatriates across Europe. In this chapter, the authors explore how Brexit, fueled by xenophobic rhetoric and a desire for “sovereignty,” reflects a deeper issue of misinformation about immigration’s economic and social impact. They underscore that immigrants, especially highly educated ones, contribute positively to the UK’s economy, addressing labor shortages and raising GDP. Despite Brexit’s restrictive policies on EU immigrants, non-EU immigration remains largely unchanged due to existing points-based systems. Thus, the authors challenge the belief that restricting EU immigration will “take back control” of British borders. Instead, it highlights Brexit’s potential for economic drawbacks, such as labor shortages, while debunking myths about immigrants’ supposed drain on resources.

According to the authors, immigrants can effectively integrate into their host societies without sacrificing their cultural identities. They explore in Chapter 10 the concepts of assimilation, acculturation, and integration, highlighting how each affects the immigrant experience differently. Unlike assimilation, which expects immigrants to abandon their heritage, integration allows for cultural coexistence and mutual respect, fostering a more inclusive society. Drawing on case studies from New York, Paris, and Barcelona, the authors illustrate how local policies and civil initiatives can significantly shape immigrants’ sense of belonging and success. For example, according to the authors, New York City’s multicultural framework and high tolerance for diversity make it a model of inclusion, contrasting with the more rigid and assimilationist policies seen in places like Paris. In Barcelona, public policies support cultural differences, helping immigrants maintain their identities while participating actively in society. Castañeda and Cione emphasize the role of cities and civil organizations in promoting integration, encouraging local governments to adopt policies that respect immigrants’ rights and cultural heritage. 

Immigration Realities offers a well-researched, comprehensive analysis that dismantles common myths about immigration while championing immigrants’ rights and contributions. Castañeda and Cione provide a valuable counter-narrative to mainstream misconceptions, effectively contextualizing migration within global economic, political, and social frameworks. However, the book’s left-leaning perspective, though clear and thought-provoking, may limit its appeal to readers with differing political views. The focus on systemic critiques—while essential to understanding many challenges facing immigrants—sometimes overshadows a nuanced discussion on how diverse perspectives might contribute to more balanced immigration policies. Nonetheless, the book’s grounded research and emphasis on compassion make it a crucial resource for readers seeking a deeper understanding of migration beyond divisive rhetoric. By bridging academic insights with accessible language, Immigration Realities encourages readers to see immigration as a multifaceted, enduring human experience that merits both empathy and informed policy reform.


 

Ernesto Castañeda & Carina Cione. (2024). Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions. Columbia University Press. 368 pp. Paperback $30, Hardcover $120, ISBN: 9780231203753, ISBN: 9780231203746

A moment from the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific,’ held in a hybrid format from Melbourne on September 25-26, 2024.

International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’

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Explore the insightful discussions from the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific, held on September 25-26, 2024, in a hybrid format from Melbourne. This conference brought together a diverse coalition of experts, hosted by leading institutions across the Indo-Pacific and Europe, including the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University, Universitas Indonesia, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Universitas Gadjah Mada, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, International Islamic University Malaysia, UIN Salatiga, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).

The conference delved into how digital technologies, though transformative, have become tools for disinformation, political manipulation, and digital authoritarianism, posing serious challenges to democracy and social unity. This issue is particularly urgent in the Indo-Pacific, where misinformation on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp has fueled divisions and where political forces sometimes restrict access to vital digital spaces to consolidate control.

Attendees, including scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, shared perspectives on how digital disinformation affects the region and discussed strategies for promoting digital literacy, inclusivity, and democratic resilience.

Generously supported by the Australian Research Council, Gerda Henkel Foundation, ECPS, and the Alfred Deakin Institute, this conference aimed to foster collaboration and shed light on countering disinformation in today’s digital age.

Don’t miss the opportunity to engage with these compelling sessions—watch the full conference videos here:

Video 1

Video 2

Video 3

Video 4

Video 5

 

Data protection concept featuring binary code overlayed with the European Union flag. Photo: KB-Photodesign.

Future Resilience of the European Technology Security Policy Paper

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Please cite as:

Miguel De Vera, Anton; Hamaiunova, Viktoriia; Koleszár, Réka & Pasquettaz, Giada. (2024) “Future Resilience of the European Technology Security.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0004

 

Abstract

This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.

Keyword: Populism, EU, Framing, US, China, Technology

 

Authored by Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz

Introduction

In the increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate, the European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of maintaining its technological resilience while protecting its security and autonomy. The fast-paced international competition for technological leadership is closely tied to the bloc’s economic competence and has consequences for its security. Given the importance of transatlantic cooperation in this domain, the upcoming US elections, and the possibility of a second Trump administration should urge policymakers to focus on strengthening the EU’s preparedness. This paper addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the EU’s technological security through the exemplary case of Huawei and outlines recommendations on how to tackle them.

Connectivity, one of the critical technologies of the rapid Fourth Industrial Revolution, has been at the center of heated discussions in recent years. Several nations identified connectivity to be an essential part of their competitiveness and development and, among others, Huawei emerged at the forefront of advanced technologies. The Chinese-owned ICT provider was among the world leaders in rolling out their next-generation telecommunication networks worldwide. Within the EU, the choice of 5G providers has generated crucial debates. Next to the obvious economic interests, building telecommunication networks came with important security considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensified under President Trump, the EU faced an important vulnerability.

Donald Trump’s trade war with China, a key component of his “America First” agenda, had significant repercussions for the EU. By imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Trump sought to counter what he perceived as unfair trade practices by China. This conflict disrupted global trade and impacted the EU’s economy, which is heavily dependent on stable supply chains.

For the EU, the escalating US-China trade tensions presented both challenges and opportunities. While the trade war resulted in market volatility, it also provided Europe with a chance to strengthen its trade relationships with China. The two reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) in 2020 – although it was later put on hold due to the tit-for-tat sanctions. The prospect of deepening ties with China posed a risk of straining transatlantic relations, particularly as Trump urged European nations to collaborate with the US in pressuring Beijing. Trump’s populist trade policies thus compelled the EU to carefully balance its relationships with both the US and China while prioritizing its own economic and security interests. It is in this context that the debate around Huawei and the EU’s technological security is situated in.

The EU’s 5G Rollout:  Rhetoric Coercion and Uneven Progress

The European Commission identified the possibilities of 5G early on and adopted an action plan in 2016 to launch 5G services in all member states by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2024). Although some experts warned that the EU is falling behind in technological transformation, member states quickly began catching up and published their roadmaps. However, progress was uneven and fragmented (5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2, 2019). At that time, Huawei was in a prime position in the European market to support the 5G rollout and was already working with several European providers. By 2019, the Chinese company signed memorandums of understanding with wireless providers in at least 9 EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and France (5G Observatory, 2021). For many, it seemed evident that for the EU to stay competitive and meet the plans for 5G coverage, Huawei was the answer.

In parallel, however, concerns about the security of Huawei equipment began circulating. Against the backdrop of the escalating trade war between the US and China, the former began prompting allies to exclude Huawei from their networks (Woo & O’Keeffe, 2018). President Trump labelled Huawei a security risk and threatened to cut off intelligence and information-sharing with allies using the ‘untrustworthy’ 5G vendor (Business Standard, 2020).

US Policy towards China under Donald Trump: Framing as a Strategic Tool

Donald Trump’s political rise is often analyzed through the lens of populism and framing theory, both of which help explain his appeal and communication strategies. Populism, broadly defined, refers to a political approach that pits the “common people” against a perceived corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Trump’s rhetoric embodies this populist style, as he frequently claims to speak for ordinary Americans against the political establishment. His 2016 campaign, for instance, centered on “draining the swamp” in Washington, positioning himself as an outsider who would challenge entrenched elites. During the 2024 election, he is still using this populist communication, by portraying himself as “one of the people”, like in one of his recent tweets where he works for one shift in McDonalds.

One of the key aspects of Trump’s populism is his use of framing. He does not only use it on a national level for criticizing his opponents but also in relation to foreign policy issues. Framing theory, as defined by Entman (1993), involves highlighting certain aspects of a reality while downplaying others, effectively shaping how an issue is understood by the public. Trump’s framing of China is a prime example. Throughout his presidency and during his campaigns, Trump consistently framed China as a threat to American economic interests and national security. By doing so, he shaped public discourse and channeled public frustrations about job losses and trade imbalances into hostility toward China.

A prominent example of Trump’s framing of China came during his trade war with the country. He portrayed China as an “unfair” player in global trade, accusing it of “stealing” American jobs and intellectual property. In a 2019 speech, Trump stated, “China has taken advantage of the United States for many, many years. And those days are over.” This framing was effective in galvanizing his political base, particularly among working-class voters who felt economically marginalized by globalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). By framing the issue as a battle between patriotic Americans and a foreign adversary, Trump reinforced his populist credentials.

Trump’s framing of China intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, where he repeatedly blamed China for the spread of the virus, referring to it as the “China virus” and the “Kung flu” (The New York Times, 2020). By doing so, he shifted public discourse to portray China as responsible not only for the economic challenges faced by the US but also for the public health crisis, a narrative that resonated with many of his supporters.

A notable example of this framing came in March 2020, when Trump tweeted, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” This statement reported widely in the media, sparked accusations of racism and xenophobia (CNN, 2020). However, Trump defended his rhetoric, arguing that it was necessary to hold China accountable for the pandemic’s global spread. His framing successfully linked the frustrations over COVID-19 to broader concerns about China’s role in the world economy, feeding into his populist narrative of protecting American interests.

Framing theory is particularly relevant here because it highlights how political actors shape public perception by focusing on certain narratives. As Entman (2007) notes, framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in communication. Trump’s framing of China as both an economic competitor and a national security threat played a significant role in justifying his tariffs and aggressive foreign policy stance. Moreover, Trump’s use of this frame was amplified by the media, contributing to rising anti-China sentiments in the US (Goffman, 1974).

By framing China as a direct threat to American prosperity, Trump not only advanced his populist message but also reshaped political discourse, making foreign policy a central issue for many voters. Through this, he created the basis of US trade policy against foreign companies deemed as a threat and towards allies who seemed hesitant to follow this approach.

With all this, the EU faced a two-fold dilemma: giving in to Trump’s strategy and losing out on competitiveness while appearing to have little strategic autonomy or seizing the opportunities with Huawei but straining the transatlantic relationship while potentially endangering critical infrastructure. As of 2024, the EU’s answer has been fragmented and disunited. Only 10 of the 27 member states have excluded Huawei and although almost all states put in place some kind of restrictions, only a handful of them implemented it (European Commission, 2023a). President Trump’s approach of pressuring allies and threatening to cut off intelligence-sharing may have been counterproductive, but it exposed an important weakness of the EU. 

What Next – The Way Forward

With the US elections approaching, the EU has a window of opportunity to address this dilemma. The possibility of a second Trump administration brings the risk of further aggravating the US-China ties and putting the EU into an even more uncomfortable position. The war in Ukraine has heightened the EU’s need and dependence on intelligence-sharing with the US Upcoming challenges in transatlantic relations are likely to have significant repercussions for the EU’s security. At the same time, the EU-China relations are also at a heightened risk of entering into a trade war as the latest developments around the export of Chinese electric vehicles demonstrate. The economic vulnerability of certain European member states to Chinese pressure adds another dimension to the complex nature of achieving united European approaches. Essentially, the EU needs to safeguard its autonomy against unilateral actions while maintaining its competitiveness and ensuring the security of its critical infrastructure. To do that, policymakers should consider the following scenarios and the presented policy recommendations.

If Trump Wins

First, in case of a Trump victory, Europeans have to embrace another period of uncertainty. A second Trump Administration will renew concerns about US support for NATO while the protectionist policies will put direct pressure on transatlantic trade relations. It is expected that President Trump will continue his previous hardline approach towards China leading to an intensified trade war and a bigger volume of Chinese exports being dumped on the European market. All the while, Europeans will increasingly be pulled into a trade and technology war with the Eastern power amid calls from the US to reduce relations. In this scenario, Trump’s rhetorical pressure, as in the previous case of calling to exclude Huawei from the 5G rollout to maintain intelligence-sharing, might turn into actual policies. In 2025, this would come with a huge price given the EU’s dependence on the American intelligence infrastructure to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s war. Any threats thus must be taken seriously and addressed accordingly.

Next to that, internally, Trump’s success would galvanize far-right, populist figures and movements. His ideological allies in Europe, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda would be emboldened to continue their path after a Trump victory. Far-right, populist politicians would find renewed reassurance to oppose more European integration. Consequently, reaching unity on crucial foreign policy questions might further be hindered.

Faced with the prospect of this challenging situation, European policymakers would do well to address the potential pitfalls early on. Given the foreseeable fragmentations, the EU must strengthen and implement the framework it already has agreed upon (such as the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the Digital Services Act). According to the latest assessment of the 5G Toolbox, which was adopted to mitigate security risks, only 10 out of the 27 Member States have restricted or excluded high-risk suppliers from their 5G networks (European Commission, 2023b). Based on its own and Member States’ independent analyses, the European Commission considers Huawei along with another Chinese company, ZTE, to ‘pose materially higher risk than other 5G providers.’ Dependency on these providers for critical infrastructure, which the 5G network is considered, creates a serious risk across the Union. Considering the level of interconnectedness between EU networks, a fragmented policy could jeopardize the entire bloc’s security. For instance, last year Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó highlighted Hungary’s development of 5G networks with the help of Huawei, next to signing additional cooperation agreements with the company (Szijjártó Péter, 2023).  

To address the diverging approaches, the EU should develop a mechanism to actively encourage Member States to implement the existing framework and use the available tools. It should also hold Member States accountable for doing so. Considering the weight of risks in the EU’s technological security, policymakers should call for an EU-wide regulation with clear and urgent deadlines. This would support the EU’s autonomy in making security-related decisions as assessments of risks are done both by Member States and by the European Commission. Transatlantic relations are likely to become more friendly as a result and the EU’s security would increase. One of the downsides of this approach, however, is the expected response from Beijing. China is likely to retaliate for a European policy naming and restricting its companies from the market. Besides, reaching this agreement on a European level will not be easy as Member States’ security priorities and relations with China differ significantly. Nevertheless, this approach offers the EU a starting point to be a proactive actor.

If Harris Wins

If Americans choose a Harris administration for the next four years, the EU would find itself in a similar position as they were during Biden’s administration assuming that Harris will take up a similar approach against China. Despite their opposition to each other, President Joe Biden had taken a similar approach to his Republican predecessor. Biden ordered heavy tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items such as semiconductor chips while diversifying its sources for imports such as the EU and Mexico (Davis, 2024; Lovely et al., 2024). In doing so, the United States has become less dependent on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data (Lovely et al., 2024). 

The EU and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods” (Lovely et al., 2024). As such, the EU could potentially clash with the US by maintaining this dependence which showcases some form of limited autonomy. On the one hand, the EU exercises its agency to shift towards maintaining and deepening ties with China. However, on the other hand, the EU’s agency is somewhat limited given its trade dependency with China which may compel it to act in favor of Beijing on certain issues.

A Harris administration would likely maintain the use of tariffs, particularly targeting China, to counter perceived unfair competition as emphasized by Trump, and to drive progress in the US energy transition, supporting its emissions reduction goals. This was evident during the presidential debate between Harris and Trump in September 2024. She highlighted Trump’s failed attempt to subdue China as an economic powerhouse arguing that “under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military” (Butts, 2024). She concluded with the statement, ″[he] basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century” (Butts, 2024). This comment indicates to the EU and other US allies that Harris is likely to continue Biden’s approach if she wins the presidential race.

In this scenario, the EU faces a more predictable transatlantic landscape. This, however, may prove more perilous. Albeit Harris will follow a hardline approach to China and the pressure on allies to not share advanced technology with Beijing will remain, she is unlikely to strongly push the EU. In contrast to the Trump administration, instead of coercive rhetoric, she is likely to use softer means of persuasion. This carries in itself the risk that the EU will sit on its hands for too long instead of addressing the legitimate security threats that China poses. To ensure that the resilience of technological security remains a priority, the European Parliament should establish a sub-committee of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The sub-committee should deal with the security considerations that come with technologies and equipment from third countries and should ensure that the interests of European citizens are considered in tech security-related questions. This would address the risks of de-prioritization and would contribute to enhanced and more nuanced debates. Considering the viewpoints of Members of the Parliament directly through the sub-committee could help the European Commission to propose regulations that are more likely to enjoy support. The only constraining factor to consider is the budget of setting up the sub-committee but the importance of this issue should outweigh that.

Conclusion

This paper highlighted the importance of European technology security and looked at different scenarios European leaders will face during the US presidential election. The example of the rollout of the 5G technology in the EU and the debates around using Chinese Huawei as the technology provider illustrated the EU’s vulnerability when it comes to maintaining its autonomy and competitiveness in the tech sector. In the rapidly changing global landscape, EU leaders are facing a crucial dilemma about the way forward. To maintain technological competitiveness, the EU may have no choice but to rely on Chinese partners while to ensure the continent’s security and stability, it cannot afford to alienate its key transatlantic partner. At the same time, legitimate security risks should not be overlooked and considered as subordinate to trade relations.

This paper offers a concise depiction of the main factors EU leaders should consider as Americans head to the polls. In either scenario, what is crucial for the EU is to be prepared and engage in collective planning. A second Trump administration is likely to bring about a more hectic and turbulent period. His framing of China as a security threat could lead to more pressure on European allies to cut ties with Beijing while his victory could galvanize European populists making it harder to achieve consensus on the European level. To offset this, the paper recommends taking concrete steps to implement the already existing framework and strengthen the available toolbox. In case of a Harris victory, the EU can expect reasonable continuity. Perhaps an important challenge the bloc will face will be finding the impetus to keep the technology security issue in focus. The paper argues that one way to do that would be to set up a dedicated sub-committee within the European Parliament to keep the issue on the agenda and ensure the interests of European citizens.


 

Authors’ Biographies

Anton Miguel De Vera is an MA student in International Business and Economic Diplomacy at IMC FH Krems. He previously earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Central European University in Vienna, where he specialized in International Relations and Economics. His thesis examined the dynamics of Philippine agency within the US-Philippine security alliance and its nuanced relationship with China, entitled “The Faces of Philippine Agency in Foreign Affairs: The Philippines and the United States Security Alliances”. Currently based in Vienna, Anton works at Raiffeisen Bank International, where he combines his academic expertise with practical experience in finance and international relations.

Viktoriia Hamaiunova is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University (UK), where she investigates the role of legal culture in shaping fair trial standards within ECHR member states, focusing on the integration of mediation into judicial systems to enhance human rights protections. Her research combines doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches, incorporating thematic analysis and insights from interviews with ECtHR judges to examine how legal culture influences judicial reform and access to justice. Viktoriia Hamaiunova holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, enriched by academic exchanges at Masaryk University and Comenius University.  Her legal career includes in-house experience and ECtHR  traineership. An accredited mediator and published author, Viktoriia Hamaiunova has presented her work at prominent conferences, including SLSA Annual Conference and the Human Rights Law Conference at the University of Cambridge. With extensive teaching experience, she leads discussions on topics spanning international law to mediation practices. As an interdisciplinary researcher, Viktoriia Hamaiunova is committed to culturally informed legal reforms, fostering development and facilitating discussions on effective judicial systems and dispute resolution. 

Réka Koleszár is an independent researcher focusing on the relations between the European Union and Asia, in particular East Asia. Her experience spans international organizations and think tanks including working for the Council of the European Union and the European Policy Centre. Réka holds an MSc in Political Science from Leiden University, an MA in International Relations specializing in East Asian studies from the University of Groningen, and a diploma in the Art of Diplomacy from the European Academy of Diplomacy.

Giada Pasquettaz is a doctoral student at the Chair of Political Science and International Politics of Prof. Dr. Dirk Leuffen since October 2023. Her interests are mainly in political communication, international relations, political behavior, comparative politics and quantitative methods. She holds a master’s degree in mass media and politics with a focus on international social movements’ communication from the University of Bologna. She also completed her bachelor’s degree in Sociology at the University of Bologna with a specialization in migration frames used in media. She completed semesters abroad at the University of Sundsvall (Sweden), at UCLouvain (Belgium) and at the UIT Tromsø (Norway).


 

References

— (2016, May 2). “Trump accuses China of “raping” US with unfair trade policy.” BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2016-36185012

— (2020). “Trump threatens to cut intelligence-sharing ties with nations over Huawei.” Business Standard. https://www.business-standard.com/article/pti-stories/trump-threatens-intelligence-block-over-huawei-us-diplomat-120021700106_1.html

— (2020, March 19). “Trump again defends use of the term ‘China virus’” CNN. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/17/politics/trump-china-coronavirus/index.html

— (2020, March 18). “Trump defends calling coronavirus the ‘Chinese virus’.” The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/us/politics/china-virus.html

— (2021). “Major European 5G trials and pilots.” 5G Observatory. https://5gobservatory.eu/5g-trial/major-european-5g-trials-and-pilots/

Bose, N., & Shalal, A. (2019, August 7). “Trump says China is ‘killing us with unfair trade deals’.” Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/world/trump-says-china-is-killing-us-with-unfair-trade-deals-idUSKCN1UX1WU/

Butts, D. (2024, September 11). “Harris says Trump “sold us out on China”: Highlights from the presidential debate on trade and tariffs.” CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2024/09/11/harris-vs-trump-on-china-debate-highlights-on-trade-and-tariffs.html

Davis, B. (2024, October 28). “How Washington Learned to Stop Worrying and Embrace Protectionism.” Foreign Policyhttps://foreignpolicy.com/2024/09/10/us-protectionism-biden-trump-tarrifs-harris-china/

Entman, R. M. (1993). “Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm.” Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Entman, R. M. (2007). “Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power.” Journal of Communication, 57(1), 163-173. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00336.x

European Commission. (2019). “5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2.” http://5gobservatory.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/80082-5G-Observatory-Quarterly-report-2-V2.pdf

European Commission. (2023a). “5G security: The EU case for Banning High-risk suppliers: Statement by commissioner Thierry Breton.” https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_3312

European Commission. (2023b). “Communication from the commission: Implementation of the 5G cybersecurity toolbox.” https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/communication-commission-implementation-5g-cybersecurity-toolbox

European Commission. (2024). “5G.” https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/5g

Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Northeastern UP.

Gordon, J. (2024, September 30). “Kamala Harris and trade: Better than the alternative, but not much.” Lowy Institute. https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/kamala-harris-trade-better-alternative-not-much

Lovely, M. E. & Yan, J. (2024, August 27). “While the US and China decouple, the EU and China deepen trade dependencies.” PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/while-us-and-china-decouple-eu-and-china-deepen-trade-dependencies

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic

have-nots and cultural backlash.” Harvard Kennedy School Faculty Research Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541-563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Szijjártó Péter. (2023). “Magyarország élen jár a digitalizáció területén és ebben a Huaweinek meghatározó szerepe van.” https://www.facebook.com/szijjarto.peter.official/posts/776242160635746?ref=embed_post

Greve, Joan E. (2020, July 29). “Trump says ‘nobody likes me’ when asked about Fauci’s absence – as it happened.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/live/2020/jul/28/covid-19-coronavirus-deaths-donald-trump-news-latest

Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2020, March 16). The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1239685852093169664

Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2024, October 21). MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1848133172459970889

Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2024, October 21). MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN [Tweet]. X. https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1848133172459970889

Woo, S., & O’Keeffe, K. (2018). Washington asks allies to drop Huawei. https://www.wsj.com/articles/washington-asks-allies-to-drop-huawei-154296510

Digital

Hybrid Workshop: Authoritarian Information Manipulation and Dissemination — National, Transnational, and International Perspectives

Date/Venue: November 7-8, 2024 — Deakin Burwood Corporate Centre (BCC)

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The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.

In response to these challenges, our workshop aims to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop will also examine the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.

The workshop, a collaborative effort organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium, will also address strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It will focus on countering disinformation through activism and explore everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event will discuss necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.

The organizing team, led by Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, encourages all participants to actively engage in discussions and share insights throughout the workshop. The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.

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Headquarters of the populist radical-right Chega party in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal, on April 4, 2021. Photo: Nuno M. Maia.

Portugal in Cultural War: Racism, Security, and the Social Contract at Stake

Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives. 

By João Ferreira Dias

James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.

However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.

Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical. 

In summary:

i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);

ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).

iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.

To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).

The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.

Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.

The Cultural War over the Police State

While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.

Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.

Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.

Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.

Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.

Conclusion

The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.

As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.

Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.


 

References

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.

Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.

Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.

Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.

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