Data center campus.

Data and Drought: A Community Fights Back

by CommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

As artificial intelligence drives an unprecedented expansion of data-center infrastructure, questions of climate sustainability, democratic accountability, and technological governance are becoming increasingly urgent. In this timely commentary, Dr. Heidi Hart examines the controversy surrounding Utah’s proposed Stratos Project, a massive AI data-center complex planned for a drought-stricken region of the American West. Moving beyond conventional debates about innovation and economic growth, Dr. Hart explores how concerns over water scarcity, environmental degradation, energy consumption, and surveillance technologies have galvanized an unlikely coalition of local residents. Bringing together insights on climate politics, technocracy, populism, and grassroots mobilization, the commentary highlights how resistance to AI infrastructure is creating new political alignments and raising fundamental questions about who gets to decide the future of technology, land, and democratic participation.

By Heidi Hart

In the steppe geography of northern Utah in the US, sagebrush carries a spicy, resinous scent after a rare rainstorm. Cattle ranchers eye the land for better grazing amid historic drought. A dark rock cluster marks a 500-year-old Indigenous burial site. The northern tip of the Great Salt Lake, where Robert Smithson’s famous Spiral Jetty once disappeared underwater, now resembles a moonscape. Toxic dust from decades of industrial pollution blows across the valleys toward the heavily populated foothills of the Wasatch Mountains. 

In this already stressed land, a hyperscale data center project – originally planned to be the largest in the world, at over twice the size of Manhattan – has drawn international attention. At a time when the UN is warning about the environmental costs (including and extending beyond greenhouse emissions) of AI infrastructure, a recent study has shown that most data centers are being proposed for drought-stricken lands, and US legislatures debate the economic benefits versus costs to local communities’ quality of life, the Stratos Project in Utah has become a flashpoint for imagining the future of AI ecosystems. An unexpected side-effect of these debates has been a growing grassroots protest movement across political divides, from rural Trump-voter communities in the US South to the NAACP.

The Stratos project in Utah, conceived by Kevin O’Leary of Shark Tank fame and railroaded past any local or environmental review under the guise of military necessity, was first proposed at over 40,000 acres (62.5 square miles or 162 sqare kilometers). It would create a thermal load of close to 16 gigawatts or “the equivalent of about 23 atom bombs worth of energy … every single day,” according to Utah State University physics professor Robert Davies. With no existing electrical grid and plans to draw on the Ruby Pipeline for natural gas, the project would affect northern Utah’s already poor air quality and increase carbon emissions by 55% to 75%.  At or above 90 decibels, noise from data centers is notorious for causing hearing loss, insomnia, and even nausea in humans, not to mention the effects on wildlife in precarious desert ecosystems. 

The problem of water looms largest over the Stratos plan. Though the county government’s information site, which reads like marketing copy, estimates around 2,000 acre feet for year drawn from groundwater in a “closed-loop system,” that water is not an infinite resource, even in wetter periods, and environmental groups are only now making some headway in efforts to protect the shrinking Great Salt Lake. With global heating and atmospheric weather changes, the occasionally low-snow winters that have reduced spring runoff in the past could become the norm. Rapid population growth before and during the Covid years has also increased stress on Utah’s water supply. From irrigation and watering restrictions to the toxic dust problem, everyone in the crowded northern part of the state senses the scarcity. Add to this a massive power- and water-draining data complex, with its additional function as a surveillance machine, and locals have a reason to rise up. 

When the project was first announced earlier this year, Utah’s Republican governor Spencer Cox expressed enthusiasm for what O’ Leary called “Wonder Valley Utah” – and frustration with critics calling out the lack of review, discussion, and transparency. After finding that state leaders had approved a massive project that would affect their communities and ecosystems for generations to come, around 80 protesters confronted the Box Elder County Commission to decry lack of public input. The protests spread to the Utah State Capitol, where, on May 23, 2026, concerned citizens from across the political spectrum voiced their anger, as well as some humor about accusations that they were being paid by China. 

As a result of this pushback, and a poll finding that a majority of Box Elder County residents oppose the Stratos project, Governor Cox softened his stance in favor of public discussion and environmental review. O’Leary has agreed to scale down the project by 20,000 acres, a reduction by half. Still, local activists are not convinced. Nearly 700 protests have been filed with the Utah Division of Water Rights, a time-consuming process that has resulted in the withdrawal of two water rights applications for the data center. As of this writing, Box Elder County has approved a 180-day moratorium on data centers. 

The Stratos fight is far from over, but as in other US states, and in this one, where religious and political divides run deep, the data center threat has brought together unlikely collaborators. While not the form of populism that usually makes the news (the recent cage-fighting spectacle in front of the White House as a case in point), Utah’s anti-technocracy protest movement brings out cattle ranchers, university professors, hunters, eco-activists, churchgoers and nonbelievers, Republicans and Democrats. It’s hardly a cozy coalition, but it opens up a broader space for “the people” in a traditionally deep-red state. 

The movement also calls on Indigenous perspectives to ground its efforts. Darren Parry of the Northwest Band of the Shoshone Nation, interviewed for ECPS in 2021, has been a vocal opponent of the Stratos project, noting the Hansel Valley’s fragile ecosystem and rock-mound burial sites in the area. Parry has shared contrasting images of the high-desert valley (his own photograph) and the planned complex dominating the scene with glowing glass rectangles and steaming cooling towers. The sci-fi quality of the image is partly its point. AI can generate imaginary utopias or doomscapes, but it will take a messy, persistent human movement to keep the land itself alive.  

Social Media

The Politics of Attention: Visibility, Legitimacy, and the Transformation of Democratic Competition

by CommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHome

As digital platforms increasingly shape how citizens encounter politics, longstanding assumptions about democratic competition are being challenged. In this insightful commentary, Yacine Boubia argues that attention has emerged as a distinct and increasingly decisive political resource, reshaping the foundations of legitimacy, influence, and power in contemporary democracies. Drawing on democratic theory, media studies, and political communication, he traces the historical transformation from an era of informational scarcity to one of informational abundance, where political success depends increasingly on the ability to command visibility. The commentary explores the rise of the influencer politician, the structural relationship between attention and populism, and the democratic consequences of communication systems optimized for engagement rather than deliberation. It offers a timely contribution to debates about democracy, media, and political power in the digital age.

By Yacine Boubia 

The dominant frameworks for understanding contemporary democratic politics remain, in their essential structure, remarkably stable. Elections are interpreted as contests between competing ideological visions. Political success is attributed to organizational strength, policy credibility, or the capacity to mobilize voters around shared material and cultural concerns. Institutions are evaluated according to their capacity to translate popular preferences into governing outcomes. These frameworks capture real and important dimensions of political life, and the scholarship they have generated—from electoral sociology to institutional analysis to the study of political communication—constitutes an indispensable foundation for understanding how democracies function.

Yet they have proven increasingly insufficient for explaining a transformation that has reshaped the terms of democratic competition over the past two decades: the emergence of attention as an autonomous political resource, distinct from votes, organizational capacity, or policy credibility, and increasingly determinative of political influence, legitimacy, and power.

This insufficiency is not accidental. The frameworks that dominate political analysis were developed within a communication environment that no longer fully exists. They assumed, often implicitly, that political information was relatively scarce, that citizens encountered it through a limited number of institutionally mediated channels, and that political competition was therefore primarily a competition for votes organized around the capacity to persuade.

The contemporary communication environment inverts each of these assumptions. Information is not scarce but superabundant. Citizens encounter political content through a multiplicity of channels whose institutional character has been progressively dissolved by commercial and algorithmic logics. And political competition, while still ultimately organized around the capacity to win elections, increasingly unfolds as a prior competition for something that votes cannot capture: the capacity to command public attention, to dominate communicative space, and to shape the political reality that citizens encounter before they have formed the preferences that democratic theory assumes they bring to the political process.

Understanding this transformation requires not a new theory of voting behavior but a historical account of how attention became political currency—and what its ascendancy has done to the conditions of democratic governance.

The Scarcity That Democracy Lost

Democratic theory has always assumed a particular relationship between citizens and political information. The deliberative tradition associated with Habermas (1989) posited a public sphere in which citizens encounter competing arguments, evaluate them against shared standards of reasonableness, and form political judgments through processes of communicative exchange. The aggregative tradition associated with electoral democracy assumed that citizens arrive at preferences through exposure to political alternatives and cast votes that translate those preferences into governing authority. Both traditions assumed, in different ways, that the problem confronting citizens was insufficient information — that the challenge of democratic participation was obtaining enough of the right kind of political content to make informed judgments. This assumption structured the institutional architecture of twentieth-century mass democracy: public broadcasting obligations, fairness doctrines, editorial standards, and regulatory frameworks governing media ownership were all, in different ways, responses to the perceived problem of informational scarcity and the democratic imperative to address it.

That problem no longer describes the condition of citizens in advanced democracies. The average American adult is estimated to encounter between six and ten thousand advertising messages per day — a figure that captures only a fraction of the total informational environment within which political content now competes for attention. News alerts, social media feeds, podcasts, video streams, online commentary, and the continuous production of digital content have created an environment not of informational scarcity but of informational superabundance — what the cognitive scientist Herbert Simon (1971) identified, with considerable prescience, as a condition in which the abundance of information creates a corresponding scarcity of attention.

The political implications of this inversion are profound and have been insufficiently theorized. When the scarce resource is not information but attention, the competition that matters is no longer primarily the competition to inform. It is the competition to be noticed—and the rules governing that competition are structured not by the norms of democratic deliberation but by the commercial and algorithmic logics of the platforms and media systems within which it takes place.

How Attention Became Political Capital

The transformation of attention into political capital did not occur suddenly with the emergence of social media platforms. It was prepared by a longer history of media commercialization whose political consequences were identified by critical scholars well before the digital age confirmed them empirically. The postwar settlement that organized mass media in most Western democracies rested on a partial and contested separation between commercial and civic imperatives: broadcasting was regulated as a public good, journalism maintained professional norms that distinguished it from entertainment, and the political information environment was organized, however imperfectly, around standards of balance, accuracy, and democratic accountability. These arrangements were neither neutral nor without their own distortions. But they embedded within the media system a set of institutional resistances to the pure logic of attention maximization that the subsequent decades of deregulation and commercialization systematically dismantled.

The consequences of that dismantling were theorized with particular clarity by scholars working at the intersection of media studies and democratic theory. Neil Postman’s (1985) diagnosis of television’s restructuring of public discourse—its substitution of image, emotion, and entertainment for the sustained argumentative exchange that print culture had historically demanded — identified the fundamental mechanism through which commercial media logic reshapes political communication. Guy Debord’s (1967) account of the society of the spectacle, developed within a different theoretical tradition, converged on the same structural observation: that the commercialization of communication progressively elevates visibility above substance, appearance above reality, and the capacity to capture attention above the capacity to govern. Daniel Boorstin’s (1961) earlier identification of the pseudo-event—the manufactured occurrence designed primarily for media coverage rather than emerging from genuine social processes—provided the most concrete institutional illustration of how the logic of attention transforms political communication from within. 

Writing in different contexts and from different theoretical perspectives, each of these scholars identified the same underlying dynamic: that media systems organized around the capture and monetization of attention progressively reward political actors who can supply what those systems demand, regardless of whether that supply serves the informational requirements of democratic citizenship.

The digital revolution accelerated and intensified this dynamic rather than reversing it. Social media platforms did not introduce the logic of attention maximization into democratic politics. They industrialized it—providing the technical infrastructure to measure attention with unprecedented precision, optimize content for its capture with algorithmic efficiency, and distribute the results at a scale and speed that no previous communication system had achieved. 

The political consequences of this industrialization were not the product of platform design choices made in bad faith. They were the structural output of commercial systems optimizing for engagement in an environment where engagement is measured by emotional activation, identity confirmation, and conflict — the precise communicative register that political communication organized around attention maximization has always, as Postman (1985) and Debord (1967) recognized, tended to favor.

Visibility, Legitamcy, and the Influencer Politician

The transformation of attention into political capital has produced consequences that extend beyond the familiar observations about media spectacle and political performance. Its deepest implication concerns the structural relationship between visibility and legitimacy in democratic politics — a relationship that has been quietly but fundamentally altered by the communication systems within which contemporary democratic competition takes place. Democratic legitimacy has historically been understood as deriving from a set of sources that are, in principle, independent of communicative visibility: electoral mandate, institutional position, policy expertise, party authority, and the capacity to govern effectively. These sources of legitimacy did not require continuous public attention to remain operative. An effective administrator, a competent legislator, or a credible party organization could exercise significant political authority while maintaining a relatively modest public profile.

The contemporary attention economy has disrupted this relationship in ways whose full implications are still being worked out. When political information reaches citizens primarily through platforms that rank content by engagement rather than by institutional authority or deliberative relevance, visibility itself becomes a source of legitimacy—not merely an instrument for communicating it. 

The political actor who commands sustained public attention acquires a form of democratic authority that is structurally independent of, and in some contexts more immediately potent than, the authority derived from institutional position or electoral mandate. This is not simply because attention-commanding actors reach more citizens, though they do. It is because the continuous presence in citizens’ informational environments that platform-mediated visibility provides constitutes, in itself, a form of political relationship—an ongoing communicative connection that substitutes, at the level of felt political reality, for the institutional relationships through which democratic authority has traditionally been organized and experienced.

The emergence of what might be termed the influencer politician represents the clearest institutional manifestation of this shift. Political authority has traditionally derived from the mediating structures of democratic governance: parties, legislatures, bureaucracies, and the formal processes through which citizens delegate authority to representatives accountable to collective institutions. The influencer politician — a figure whose political authority derives substantially from direct audience relationships built through continuous digital communication, personal branding, and the cultivation of online communities — represents a structural departure from this model that existing frameworks of democratic accountability were not designed to address. 

The boundaries separating political communication from celebrity culture and digital content creation have become genuinely blurred, not as a cultural curiosity but as a political-institutional development with significant consequences for how authority is constructed, legitimized, and challenged in contemporary democracies. Zeynep Tufekci’s (2017) account of how digital tools have transformed political organizing captures part of this dynamic, but the influencer politician phenomenon represents a further development: not merely the use of digital tools to organize existing political constituencies, but the construction of political authority itself through the logic of platform visibility.

The Communication Advantage and Its Democratic Costs

The history of modern democratic politics offers a consistent and instructive pattern: political leaders who master the dominant communication technologies of their era acquire advantages that transcend the specific content of their policy programs or the strength of their organizational support. Roosevelt’s fireside radio addresses exploited the intimacy of broadcast audio in ways that opponents trained in the conventions of print-era political oratory were unprepared to match. Ronald Reagan’s command of television — his capacity to project emotional warmth, moral clarity, and direct personal address within a medium that rewarded image and affect over argumentative substance — redefined the terms of presidential communication for a generation, demonstrating that the political resources derived from communication mastery could, in the right conditions, substantially compensate for weaknesses in policy credibility or institutional support. The pattern these cases illustrate is not merely that new media create new political opportunities. It is that new media restructure the entire field of political competition, altering the relative value of different political resources and systematically advantaging actors whose communicative capacities align with the demands of the new environment.

The political actors who have most effectively navigated the attention economy have demonstrated an intuitive understanding of this pattern. Donald Trump’s political communication represented not merely an adaptation to social media but a recognition—more explicit and more strategically deliberate than his opponents acknowledged—that the communication environment had undergone a structural shift whose implications mainstream political practice had not yet absorbed.      

His capacity to generate continuous attention through provocation, conflict, and the deliberate violation of communicative norms that the previous media environment had enforced was not a deviation from rational political strategy. It was a precise calibration to the incentive structures of platforms optimized for engagement, in an environment where engagement is disproportionately generated by content that is emotionally activating and conflict-driven. The platform algorithm did not produce his political style. But the convergence between that style and the reward structures of the attention economy gave him communicative resources that the institutional logic of democratic competition was not equipped to neutralize.

The democratic costs of this dynamic are real but require careful specification to avoid the twin errors of technological determinism and institutional nostalgia. The attention economy does not make deliberative democracy impossible. Citizens retain the capacity to evaluate political arguments, hold leaders accountable, and form political judgments that resist the simplifications that attention-maximizing communication encourages. What the attention economy does is alter the cost structure of different forms of political communication—making conflict cheaper than consensus, simplicity cheaper than complexity, and emotional activation cheaper than deliberative persuasion—in ways that systematically disadvantage the communicative forms that democratic theory has historically associated with informed political participation. This is not a claim about citizen irrationality. It is a claim about institutional design: that communication systems optimized for commercial engagement create structural incentives that are, at their core, in tension with the communicative requirements of democratic governance, and that this tension has political consequences that compound over time.

Attention, Populism, and the Restructuring of Democratic Competition

The relationship between the attention economy and the contemporary rise of populism is neither causal nor coincidental. It is structural. Populism, understood as a discursive political logic that constructs a frontier between an authentic people and a corrupt elite (Laclau, 2005), has always depended on communicative forms that the attention economy systematically rewards: emotional intensity, adversarial simplicity, the clear identification of enemies, and the cultivation of a direct affective relationship between leader and followers that bypasses the mediating institutions of representative democracy. These communicative requirements are not incidental features of populist politics. They are, as Laclau (2005) argued, constitutive of its discursive logic—the means through which diverse and otherwise disconnected grievances are articulated into a unified political identity capable of challenging established power. What the attention economy has done is not create these requirements but dramatically lower the cost of meeting them, providing the technical infrastructure through which populist communication can reach mass audiences at a scale and speed, and with a directness and emotional intensity that previous communication systems did not permit.

The implications extend beyond the electoral fortunes of specific populist movements. The deeper consequence is the progressive restructuring of democratic competition itself around the logic of attention—a restructuring that affects not only explicitly populist actors but all political actors operating within the same communication environment. When visibility becomes a prerequisite for political influence, all political actors face pressure to adapt their communication strategies to the demands of the attention economy, regardless of their ideological commitments or governing ambitions. 

The result is a gradual convergence of political communication styles toward the emotional, the conflictual, and the spectacular—a convergence that the attention economy rewards and that democratic deliberation, in its classical sense, cannot easily survive. Margaret Canovan’s (1999) observation that populism represents the permanent shadow of democracy acquires particular resonance in this context: the communication systems through which contemporary democracy operates have created conditions in which that shadow falls more heavily, and more continuously, than the institutional architecture of liberal democracy was designed to accommodate.

Conclusion: Attention, Democracy, and the Question of Institutional Design

The transformation of attention into political capital is not a temporary disruption produced by the novelty of digital platforms or the exceptional character of specific political figures. It reflects a structural shift in the communication environment within which democratic politics operates — a shift whose origins lie in the deregulation and commercialization of media that began in the 1980s and whose acceleration through platformization has produced a political information environment organized around fundamentally different imperatives than those that shaped the institutional architecture of postwar liberal democracy. 

The political consequences of this shift—the premium on visibility over competence, the restructuring of political legitimacy around audience relationships rather than institutional authority, the systematic rewarding of communicative forms that are in tension with deliberative democratic norms — are not the product of technology alone. They are the product of choices about how communication systems are designed, regulated, and governed, choices that reflect and reproduce particular distributions of power and particular understandings of what democratic communication is for.

The conventional responses to these developments — calls for platform regulation, media literacy education, the reform of campaign finance, or the restoration of public broadcasting — each address real dimensions of the problem without capturing its structural depth. The challenge is not merely to correct specific malfunctions within the existing communication environment but to recover a prior question that the attention economy has rendered increasingly difficult to ask: what kind of communicative infrastructure does democratic self-governance actually require? 

Habermas’s account of the public sphere as a constitutive condition of democratic legitimacy remains analytically indispensable here, not as a nostalgic ideal to be restored but as a standard against which the communicative conditions of contemporary democracy can be evaluated and found wanting. The public sphere that democratic theory requires is one in which citizens can encounter competing political arguments, evaluate them against shared standards of evidence and reason, and form political judgments through processes of collective deliberation. The communication environment that the attention economy has produced systematically undermines each of these requirements — not through overt censorship or deliberate political manipulation, but through the structural logic of systems optimized for engagement rather than understanding, visibility rather than accountability, and emotional activation rather than deliberative exchange.

The question facing contemporary democracies is therefore not simply who commands attention — though that question has become, as this analysis has argued, increasingly central to the distribution of political power. It is whether the institutional conditions can be reconstructed under which attention follows argument rather than precedes it, under which visibility derives from democratic accountability rather than substituting for it, and under which the communicative requirements of self-governance take precedence over the commercial imperatives of the platforms through which democratic politics now predominantly unfolds. That reconstruction is among the most consequential institutional challenges of the present democratic moment — and it cannot be addressed without first understanding, in its full historical depth, how attention became the currency it has.

 

References

Boorstin, D. J. (1961). The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America. Harper & Row.

Canovan, M. (1999). “Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy.” Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Debord, G. (1967). La Société du spectacle. Buchet-Chastel. [English translation: The Society of the Spectacle, Zone Books, 1994.]

Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. MIT Press.

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. London: Verso (new edition, 2018).

Postman, N. (1985). Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. Viking.

Simon, H. A. (1971). “Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World.” In: M. Greenberger (Ed.), Computers, Communication, and the Public Interest. Johns Hopkins University Press.

Tufekci, Z. (2017). Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest. Yale University Press.

Richard Giragosian

Giragosian: Russia Is Increasingly Seen as Part of the Problem by Armenians Rather Than the Solution

by MultimediaVideos

As Armenia navigates the aftermath of war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a far-reaching geopolitical realignment, one question looms large: Can democratic resilience survive amid regional insecurity and great-power competition? In this compelling ECPS interview, Richard Giragosian—Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, the democratic implications of Nikol Pashinyan’s populist leadership, and the country’s strategic turn toward Europe. Giragosian argues that many Armenians now view Russia as “part of the problem rather than part of the solution,” while emphasizing that Armenia’s recent election represented a mandate for peace, normalization, and democratic continuity. The conversation explores populism in power, post-war identity transformation, Armenia–Turkey normalization, democratic institution-building, and the future of the South Caucasus. Ultimately, Giragosian suggests that Armenia may be less a model than “an accidental exception” in an era of democratic backsliding and geopolitical upheaval. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Armenia emerges from one of the most turbulent periods in its modern history, the country stands at the intersection of democratic resilience, geopolitical realignment, and post-war transformation. The aftermath of the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, deepening estrangement from Russia, and ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan have profoundly reshaped Armenian politics and strategic thinking. Against this backdrop, the 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a referendum not only on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership but also on Armenia’s future place between Russia, Europe, and the wider region.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Richard Giragosian—Armenian-American academic, security analyst, and Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines the forces driving Armenia’s remarkable political trajectory. He argues that the election result reflected far more than a geopolitical choice. It represented a mandate for democratic continuity, political stability, and the pursuit of diplomatic normalization with Armenia’s neighbors. As Giragosian notes, the vote marked Armenia’s “third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote,” underscoring the country’s democratic consolidation despite war, insecurity, and external pressure.

A central theme of the conversation concerns the evolution of populism in power. Emerging from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan embodied a rare case of successful anti-establishment mobilization driven by nonviolent popular protest. Yet Giragosian argues that the qualities that enabled Pashinyan’s rise have not necessarily translated into effective governance. While acknowledging the historic significance of the revolution as “a rare victory of nonviolent people power,” he contends that Pashinyan remains “as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless,” while public policy continues to be “overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office.” In Giragosian’s assessment, the populist style that propelled Pashinyan to power now coexists with persistent institutional weaknesses and governance challenges.

The interview’s most striking insights, however, concern Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia. According to Giragosian, the war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh fundamentally altered Armenian perceptions of Moscow. Russia is no longer widely viewed as Armenia’s indispensable protector. Instead, he argues, many Armenians increasingly regard Russia as “dangerously unreliable,” adding that the conflict has led them to see Russia “as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.” This shift reflects not simply a foreign policy adjustment but a broader reassessment of Armenia’s security assumptions and strategic dependencies.

The discussion also explores Armenia’s efforts to balance relations with Europe and Russia, prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Turkey, democratic institution-building, and the emergence of a more civic and pragmatic understanding of patriotism. Yet Giragosian remains cautious about presenting Armenia as a model for others. Indeed, he suggests that Armenia may be “less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception”—a rare convergence of democratic mobilization, geopolitical opportunity, and regional recalibration. Whether that exception can endure may prove to be one of the defining questions for the future of the South Caucasus.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Richard Giragosian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

by EconomicsECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeUpcoming Events

CASE COMPETITION INFO-PACK


Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) – Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Lecturer: Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).

Moderator: Sonali Chowdhry (Ph.D., Research Associate, DIW Berlin, Fellow, Kiel Institute for the World Economy).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) – Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Lecturer: Kent Jones (Professor Emeritus of Economics, Babson College).

Moderator: Dr. Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group).

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –  Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).

Moderator: Elaine Fahey (Professor of EU Law, City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) – Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).

Moderator: Jessica Lawrence (Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law).

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture Five: (14:00-15:30) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Lecturer: Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).

Moderator: TBC.

Lecture Six: (16:00-17:30) – The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Lecturer: Giulio Pugliese (Director of the EU-Asia Project, European University Institute + Associate Fellow Istituto Affari Internazionali, and King’s College London).

Moderator: Anita Tusor (Researcher in International Relations, Charles University, Prague). 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) – US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Lecturer: Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford). 

Moderator: Andrea Carteny (Professor of History of International Relations, Sapienza University of Rome). 

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Lecturer: Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).

Moderator: Sebastien Goulard (Ph.D., Manager of Cooperans, Consultant in EU-Asia connectivity projects).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Lecturer: Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University).

Moderator: Camille Nessel (Ph.D., Lecturer in Political Science Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-CEVIPOL). 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for application submissions has been extended to June 26, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

 

 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Day One: Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento. He obtained a PhD from the University of Bologna, was a post‐doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp (2009-2013), and held positions as an Assistant professor at the LUISS Guido Carli (2013-2016) and the University of Bologna (2016). His research interests are in the area of International Political Economy, with particular emphasis on the politics of trade and investments, transnational advocacy at the global and EU-levels, and international regulatory cooperation. Recently, he expanded his research agenda to include analyses of how globalization-induced economic distress affects individual- level preferences and political behavior. He is the author of five monographs and his research has been published in journals such as International Organization, Regulation & Governance, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Studies, the European Political Science Review and Review of International Organizations.

Reading List

Bauerle Danzman, S., and Meunier, S. (2024), ‘The EU’s Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator’,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 62: 1097–1115

De Bièvre D. and Poletti A. (2014), ‘The EU in trade policy: From regime shaper to status quo power’, in Falkner, G. and Müller, P. (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping or taking international regimes? London and New York: Routledge

Dür A., Eckhardt J. and Poletti A. (2020), ‘Global Value Chains, the Anti-Globalization Backlash and EU Trade Policy: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6): 944-956.

Poletti A. (2025), ‘Trade‘, in Lucarelli S. and Sperling J. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Dr. Sonali Chowdhry is a trade economist and Research Associate (tenure-track) based at the Firms and Markets Department, DIW Berlin. Her research investigates global supply chains, firm heterogeneity and the distributional implications of trade policy shocks. To study these issues, she analyses detailed transactions-level customs databases using modern econometric methods.

She also teaches international trade at the Hertie School in Berlin as a Guest Lecturer. In 2025, she was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Harvard Growth Lab and has been affiliated with the Trade Policy Research Centre at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy since 2019. Over 2022-2023, she was awarded the Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship by the European University Institute to analyse the effect of sanctions on global trade networks.

She completed her PhD in Economics (with distinction) from LMU Munich in 2022, funded by the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme. Prior to this, she worked as a Junior Economist with the Ifo Institute’s Center for International Economics and pursued the MPhil in Economics from University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from India.

Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Kent Jones, Dr. es sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria. In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State.

Abstract:  The GATT-WTO trading system emerged during the post-World War 2 period as a multilateral institution led by the United States that supported mutually recognized rules of trade policy, negotiations for trade liberalization, day-to-day contact among trade diplomats and dispute settlement among participants through third-party adjudication.  These functions generated positive externalities in trade relations based on coordination, cooperation, reciprocity, and a mutual recognition of the goals and benefits of trade liberalization. The system fostered eight successful rounds of trade negotiations from 1947 to 1994.  Yet the increasing diversity of its participants, along with globalization-driven adjustment crises in many countries, rapidly advancing technology and geopolitical conflict, began to erode the legitimacy of GATT-WTO rules.  Compounding these challenges, the trade policy of populist US President Donald Trump precipitated a major crisis as he abrogated numerous GATT-WTO system rules and norms, weakening its legitimacy.  Unilateral nationalist protectionism replaced multilateral cooperation as the US abandoned the core principle of non-discrimination in trade relations and abandoned previously negotiated tariff levels with its trade partners.  The shock was all the more devastating as the US had been the erstwhile leader and champion of the GATT-WTO system.  As President Trump approaches the mid-term elections of his second and final term in office, supporters of a rules-driven trading system are contemplating the possibilities and challenges of restoring the WTO’s legitimacy through reforms and initiatives, new leadership and increased flexibility in liberalizing trade in a diverse and divided world economy.

Reading List

Kent Jones (2023), Populism, Globalization, and the Prospects for Restoring the WTO, Politics and Governance, vol. 11 (1): 181-192).

Judith Goldstein and Alan Sykes (2025).  The Perils of Institutional Rigidity, or How the WTO Helped to Sow the Seeds of Trump.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 481-489.

Patrick Low and George Riddell (2025).  Trump’s Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 489-497.

Bernard Hoekman (2025). Plurilateral cooperation in response to aggressive unilateralism?  Asia and the Global Economy, vol. 5 (2).

Dr. Neo Shithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Instituteand Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe. Professor Jones is author of The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (2002), Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States (2008), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (2012 — with Dana H. Allin), The Year the European Crisis Ended (2014), and From Club to Commons: Enlargement, Reform, and Sustainability in European Integration (2025 — with Veronica Anghel). He is editor or co-editor of more than thirty books and special issues of journals on topics related to European politics and political economy, including reference works like The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (2012) and The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics (2015). Professor Jones is also co-editor of Government and Opposition.

Elaine Fahey is Professor of EU Law at the City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London and Deputy Head of Department (academic programmes). She is co-convener of the Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), City Law School. She has been a Senior Land Steiermark Fellow of Law and Innovation at the University of Graz, Austria, a visiting Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, Emile Noël Fellow at New York University (NYU) Law School and a visiting professor at Keio University Law School, Tokyo, Japan as well as other visiting positions. She has worked as a Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Amsterdam Centre for European Law & Governance (ACELG), University of Amsterdam, as a Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute (EUI), Florence and Assistant Lecturer and Lecturer in Law in Ireland (Dublin Institute of Technology; Trinity College Dublin). She has practised as a Barrister and was Chairperson of the Irish Society for European Law. She has been a stagiaire at the CJEU, Luxembourg, a Judicial Research Assistant, Four Courts, Dublin and a Judicial Extern, Los Angeles Federal District Court (9th Circuit). Her research interests span the relationship between the EU as a global digital actor, EU external relations, EU law and global governance, trade, transatlantic relations, cybersecurity and the EU’s AFSJ.

Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Alasdair Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017– 2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015– 2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years. Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission.

Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War the United States and Europe have pursued trade liberalization, initially through multilateral negotiations and subsequently through less successful bilateral cooperation.  As a result, the transatlantic economy is very valuable and deeply interpenetrated.  The transatlantic economic relationship has periodically been characterized by tensions and disputes, but these were of limited duration or narrowly contained.  During President Trump’s second term the US has reversed the process of closer economic integration and coerced the European Union into a lopsided trade agreement.  Trump ran in part on a populist anti-trade message and his policy ostensibly pursues that agenda, but the populist message on trade has been complicated by the perceived adverse impact of higher tariffs on consumers.  This lecture will situate recent US transatlantic trade policy in historical perspective, making clear what a departure from past practice it has been in both substance and form.  It will also explain why the EU accepted a lopsided agreement and assess whether the policy has realized US objectives.  It will also consider where transatlantic economic relations might go from here.

Reading List

Baldwin, R. (2026), World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order, Rapid Response Economics 7, CEPR Press, pp. 7-14

Mutz, D.C. (2021), “How Americans Think About Trade: Winners, Losers, and the Psychology of Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, 30 July.

Young, A.R. (2025), “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During Trump 2” in M. Riddervold, G. Rosen, & J.R. Greenberg, (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026, 128-141.

Moderator: Prof Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law

Jessica Lawrence is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law. Dr Lawrence’s research focuses on issues relating to international economic integration, including at the WTO, in regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and within the EU internal market. She has a particular interest in the interaction between economic and non-economic public policy goals, and in the ways in which trade and investment agreements take into account their impacts on human rights, labour, sustainable development, environmental protection, and gender. Her work often takes a critical perspective, applying tools drawn from constructivist international relations theory, post-Foucauldian governmentality studies, and other strands of post-positivist thought to examine the impact of discourses and framing devices on politics and law. Prior to joining the University of Essex, Dr Lawrence was Associate Professor at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. She holds a PhD in Transnational Legal Studies from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a JD in Law from the University of Georgia in the United States. In addition to her academic work, Dr Lawrence has held various positions at NGOs, think tanks, and universities in the US, EU, India, New Zealand, and Costa Rica, and continues to provide research and training for governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues related to trade and investment agreements and their impact on social policy goals.

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Reuben held the first Jean Monnet Chair in Singapore (2013–2016) and was NUS’ Associate Vice-President, Global Relations (2021– 2023). His publications have focused on EU foreign policy. They include The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), National and European Foreign Policies (co-edited with Christopher Hill, Routledge, 2011), and journal articles in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Politique Européenne, the Asia Europe Journal, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and the EU External Affairs Review. He has held visiting positions at Cambridge University, the LSE European Institute, the Stimson Center (Washington, D.C.), the East Asian Institute (Singapore), and Humboldt University. He consults and teaches summer school in Paris and Beijing. Reuben raises four children to help arrest Singapore’s declining total fertility rate.

Abstract: I will trace the EU’s search for strategic autonomy and how it has been challenged by both the U.S. and China.  I will also suggest how Europe could be more strategic in its dealings with the U.S. and China, and work on better understanding its own identity/interests and those of its interlocutors. 

Reading List

European Parliament (2021), EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – Council conclusions (16 April 2021), in “A Stronger Europe in the World” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-stronger-europe-in-the-world/file-indo-pacific-strategy

R. Wong (2026) “EU–US–China Security Relations”, in Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (eds), Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS, January 20), pp.71-83. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00140 | https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DOWNLOAD-CHAPTER-3.pdf 

ECFR 2026 video- https://ecfr.eu/event/beijing-holdem-2-0-european-cards-against-chinese-coercion/

Brice Didier, The European Union’s navigation of the United States–China rivalry: muddling through, or strategizing?, International Affairs, Volume 102, Issue 3, May 2026, Pages 767–785, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag030⁠https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/102/3/767/8550802

DGAP (2026) Report on Allies and Partners; the future of Relations with China. on https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/DGAP%20Report_No-3_MAR-2026_15pp._1.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com

The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Dr. Giulio Pugliese is Lecturer in Strategic Communications at King’s College London and the Director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute. He specialises in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific with a focus on Japan, China and the United States. He has presented and published on academic, policy-oriented and commercial themes, including in International Affairs, The Australian Journal of International Affairs, The Asia-Pacific Journal, East Asian Policy, Pacific Affairs, The Pacific Review, Defence Strategic Communications. He is a regular contributor to Asia Maior, Italy’s leading journal on contemporary Asian affairs, and author of Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, also available in Korean).

Dr Pugliese earned a Laurea (B.A.) in Political Science and East Asian Studies at the University of Naples, “L’Orientale” (cum laude), an M.A. in International Economics and International Relations (concentrating on East Asian Studies) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, graduating with Honors and passing the final exam with Distinction. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge. He was a Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Department of Chinese Studies in Heidelberg University, a Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, a Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford, and a recipient of a British Academy post-doctoral fellowship. He has held visiting scholar positions at GRIPS, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, and George Washington University. In 2023, he was awarded the Nakasone Incentive Award for his research on Japanese diplomacy.

Abstract: How best to explain the EU and member states’ quiet security and economic recalibration of relations vis-à-vis China and Asia? Reactiveness to Chinese assertiveness, the need to achieve economic security, as well as the emergence of interlinkages between the East Asian and European security theatres following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is accompanied by economic interests in what is the region that is fast becoming the locomotive of the world economy, including in its procurement market. US demand signals and the emulation of practice from local players, such as Japan, have also driven the process.  As the Transatlantic alliance faces a rupture under the second Trump administration, this lecture also probes the tenability of alternative routes to salvage Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation and engagement towards the so-called “Indo-Pacific”, suggesting potential solutions and ways to manage policy expectations.

Reading List

Angela Pennisi di Floristella and Giulio Pugliese. “The Historical Evolution of Relations between the European Union and Asia”, in Thomas Christiansen, Evi Fitriani, Emil Kirchner, and Youngah Guahk [eds.], The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations (2nd Edition), Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026, Chapter 1.

Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, “How to use the maximum of potential for the EU-Taiwan cooperation – what can the EU learn from the US and other actors?”, in-depth policy study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 26 November 2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2025)754482

Giulio Pugliese, “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 31 (4), 2024, pp. 17-44.

Giulio Pugliese. “Japan’s China Grand Strategy: A Blueprint for Transatlantic Players?” in Rogier E. Creemers, Silvia Menegazzi, Neysun A. Mahboubi [eds.] Transatlantic Perspectives on China, London and New York: Routledge, 2026, Chapter 6.

Giulio Pugliese short interview – March 2026, Japan and Europe in the Face of US-China Geopolitical Rivalry https://cgpbalancingact.substack.com/p/japan-and-europe-in-the-face-of-us

Anita Tusor is a PhD Student in International Relations at Charles University, Prague, specializing in security and strategic studies. She holds a Double Master’s Degree in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University of China, as well as an MA in Applied Linguistics and a BA in Hungarian and Chinese Studies. Her professional experience includes research and policy work with NATO Allied Command Transformation, the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the European Center for Populism Studies, and the European Values Center for Security Policy. Her research interests focus on Chinese cognitive warfare, foreign malign influence operations, populist constitutionalism, and Asia-Pacific security.

 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Kristi Govella is Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Govella specializes in the intersection of economics, security, and governance, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Japan. Her research has examined topics such as economic statecraft, government-business relations, regional institutional architecture, military alliances, non-traditional security, and the governance of the global commons. Prior to joining the University of Oxford, Dr. Govella held positions at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Harvard University, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the United States has intensified its focus on Asia due to the region’s strategic importance for both economics and security. In 2011, the “pivot to Asia” was announced, and during the course of the Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden administrations, the U.S. gradually redefined the region as the “Indo-Pacific” and attempted to enhance its engagement. However, the role of trade in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has become increasingly complex, as “America first” concerns about trade deficits, reshoring, and industrial revitalization have gradually weakened the economic pillar of U.S. regional policy. This lecture will examine the evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy with particular attention to the changing role of economic engagement and implications for regional and global trade.

Reading List

U.S. Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision” (November 2019). Available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” (February 2022). Available at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (November 2025). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Andrea Carteny is a Professor at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he teaches International Relations History, Nationalisms and Minorities at the SARAS (History Anthropology Religions Arts Spectacle) Department. He is a Fullbright Alumni and Director of the Hungarian Studies Review (RSU) and he focused his research on national minorities, nationalities and nationalisms in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area during the 19th- 20th Centuries. He is a member of the Italian Society of International History (SISI) and a participant in the main conventions and conferences on nation studies, national minorities and nationalisms history. He is author of many articles and books in this field, among them the editions Il Mar Nero. Identità nazionali e dinamiche di sicurezza (with G. Natalizia, 2023), Il Pan-nazionalismo in Eurasia e il mito del Turan (with P. Pizzolo, 2023), A New Continent Called Europe (2005), and the monographs La questione transilvana nel periodo interbellico (2020) and Dal micro-nazionalismo all’Europa (2011).

EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Axel Berkofsky is Associate Professor at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Fellow/Senior Advisory at the Asia Centre at the Milan-based Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). Axel Berkofsky is also Chairman of the Selection Committee and Vice-Chairman Executive Committee of the Canon Foundation Europe, Executive Committee Board Member at the Stockholm-based European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and Research Affiliate at the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics. Previously, Dr. Berkofsky was Senior Policy Analyst, Associate Policy Analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) and Research Fellow at the Brussels-based European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS). At the EPC in Brussels, Axel Berkofsky has – in his capacity as the Director of the EPC’s former EU-Asia programme – worked and interacted on a de facto daily basis with EU officials, policymakers and diplomats. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has in the recent years been involved – as scholar, researcher and moderator – in numerous panels, workshops and seminars on EU-Japan relations, EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations. In his capacity as Board Member of the Stockholm-based Europen Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN), Dr. Berkofsky has since 2008 co-organized numerous conferences, seminars and workshops on EU-Japan relations at numerous think tanks and universities in Europe and Japan. Dr. Berkofsky is a fluent Japanese speaker and has altogether lived three years in Japan. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has taught and lectured at numerous universities and think tanks in Japan, Mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, The Philippines, Singapore etc. In addition, Axel Berkofsky has for several years worked as freelance journalist at the Hong Kong-based Asia Times. Axel Berkofsky has published and edited numerous books and has authored and published more than 250 journal articles, newspaper articles, essays, policy papers and policy briefings. Prof. Berkofsky is a regular consultant, speaker and presenter at conferences, seminars and workshops organized and sponsored by the European Union (EU).

Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the manager of Cooperans, a public affairs and project management consultancy specialized in EU-Asia connectivity projects. Sebastien Goulard is also the editor of the Global Connectivities platform which aims to analyse the development of corridors around the world. During his doctoral studies at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences), Paris Sebastien Goulard participated in several European research programs dealing with sustainable urbanization in China. Sebastien Goulard holds a BA (hons) degree in international politics (ESE, Nottingham Trent University), a MA degree in international relations (IRIS, France) and a MA degree in social sciences (EHESS).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Prof. Dr. Markus Kotzur, LL.M. (Duke Univ.) studied law in Freiburg and Bayreuth. In 1993, he passed the First State Examination and subsequently obtained the title “Legum Magister” (LL.M.) at Duke University (North Carolina). In 2002, after completing his legal traineeship, he received his doctorate from the University of Bayreuth. This was followed in 2002 by his habilitation with a thesis on “Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe”. In 2005, he was appointed Professor of European and International Law and Public Law at the University of Leipzig. Since 2011, he has been head of the Master’s programme “European and European Legal Studies” and since 2018 president at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg. Since 2012, he has held the professorship for Public Law, European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and is Deputy Director of the Institute for International Affairs. From October 2015 to March 2020 he was vice Dean for Studies and Teaching and since April 2020 Vice Dean for International relations of the Faculty.

Abstract: This lecture ties in with the current debate surrounding the so-called ‘strategic autonomy’ of the European Union. It aims to critically examine, on the one hand, whether the EU possesses the political capacity to act autonomously in strategic matters and, on the other hand, whether the constitutional framework of primary Union law provides the necessary normative foundations for this. In particular, the question will be raised as to whether the Union’s self-description as a ‘normative power’ is tenable and is underpinned by appropriate policy tools. Finally, a possible transformation from ‘normative power’ to ‘military power’ will be examined from a legal perspective.

Camille Nessel holds a Ph.D. in political science and is currently a lecturer at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), teaching within the Centre d’étude de la vie politique (Cevipol). Her research focuses on EU perceptions in trade, particularly regarding the EU’s relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as on the “China threat” construction in EU economic security strategy. Camille was awarded a doctoral fellowship from FNRS and is now preparing a postdoctoral project on the construction of the “China threat” in EU economic policies. Having gained research experience in Southeast Asia while living in both Indonesia and Vietnam, she has acquired valuable expertise in the region. She has also worked for the European Commission, served as a political advisor for the Chair of the International Trade Committee in the European Parliament, and gained experience in the NGO sector, combining theory and practice in her teaching and research.

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Giragosian: Russia Is Increasingly Seen as Part of the Problem by Armenians Rather Than the Solution

by Editor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeInterviews

As Armenia navigates the aftermath of war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a far-reaching geopolitical realignment, one question looms large: Can democratic resilience survive amid regional insecurity and great-power competition? In this compelling ECPS interview, Richard Giragosian—Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, the democratic implications of Nikol Pashinyan’s populist leadership, and the country’s strategic turn toward Europe. Giragosian argues that many Armenians now view Russia as “part of the problem rather than part of the solution,” while emphasizing that Armenia’s recent election represented a mandate for peace, normalization, and democratic continuity. The conversation explores populism in power, post-war identity transformation, Armenia–Turkey normalization, democratic institution-building, and the future of the South Caucasus. Ultimately, Giragosian suggests that Armenia may be less a model than “an accidental exception” in an era of democratic backsliding and geopolitical upheaval. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Armenia emerges from one of the most turbulent periods in its modern history, the country stands at the intersection of democratic resilience, geopolitical realignment, and post-war transformation. The aftermath of the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, deepening estrangement from Russia, and ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan have profoundly reshaped Armenian politics and strategic thinking. Against this backdrop, the 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a referendum not only on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership but also on Armenia’s future place between Russia, Europe, and the wider region.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Richard Giragosian—Armenian-American academic, security analyst, and Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines the forces driving Armenia’s remarkable political trajectory. He argues that the election result reflected far more than a geopolitical choice. It represented a mandate for democratic continuity, political stability, and the pursuit of diplomatic normalization with Armenia’s neighbors. As Giragosian notes, the vote marked Armenia’s “third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote,” underscoring the country’s democratic consolidation despite war, insecurity, and external pressure.

A central theme of the conversation concerns the evolution of populism in power. Emerging from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan embodied a rare case of successful anti-establishment mobilization driven by nonviolent popular protest. Yet Giragosian argues that the qualities that enabled Pashinyan’s rise have not necessarily translated into effective governance. While acknowledging the historic significance of the revolution as “a rare victory of nonviolent people power,” he contends that Pashinyan remains “as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless,” while public policy continues to be “overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office.” In Giragosian’s assessment, the populist style that propelled Pashinyan to power now coexists with persistent institutional weaknesses and governance challenges.

The interview’s most striking insights, however, concern Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia. According to Giragosian, the war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh fundamentally altered Armenian perceptions of Moscow. Russia is no longer widely viewed as Armenia’s indispensable protector. Instead, he argues, many Armenians increasingly regard Russia as “dangerously unreliable,” adding that the conflict has led them to see Russia “as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.” This shift reflects not simply a foreign policy adjustment but a broader reassessment of Armenia’s security assumptions and strategic dependencies.

The discussion also explores Armenia’s efforts to balance relations with Europe and Russia, prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Turkey, democratic institution-building, and the emergence of a more civic and pragmatic understanding of patriotism. Yet Giragosian remains cautious about presenting Armenia as a model for others. Indeed, he suggests that Armenia may be “less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception”—a rare convergence of democratic mobilization, geopolitical opportunity, and regional recalibration. Whether that exception can endure may prove to be one of the defining questions for the future of the South Caucasus.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Richard Giragosian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Armenians Endorsed Peace, Stability, and Democratic Continuity

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Mr. Giragosian, welcome! To begin, the 2026 Armenian election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic reorientation away from Russia and toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a geopolitical choice, a democratic mandate for peace, or a vote of confidence in Pashinyan’s leadership despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good opening question. The answer is actually all of the above, to varying degrees. In other words, there was undeniably a geopolitical context to this election. But I do think there are two other important elements behind the re-election of the Pashinyan government in Armenia. 

First, it is an important mandate for sustaining the positive momentum of the Armenian government’s policies of diplomatic engagement and normalization with its neighbors. This represents a significant post-war adjustment to a new reality. 

Second, and this is often underestimated, the election marked the country’s third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote. That is extremely important for the further deepening of democracy and the consolidation of these democratic gains. 

So, basically, yes, there was a geopolitical context. But this election was much more a mandate for the government to move forward.

Public Policy Remains Too Centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office

Pashinyan emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment reformer challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent does he still embody a populist political project, and how has governing transformed the character of his populism?

Richard Giragosian: What we see, as you correctly identified, is a specific aspect of populism in practice. In 2018, we witnessed a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia. Nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails. In this context, it was a unique achievement.

However, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s advantages, assets, and political acumen that allowed him to come to power do not necessarily serve him well in governing the country. In other words, as leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan remains as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless. There is also a degree of inefficiency in governance. Public policy remains overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office and in the Prime Minister’s hands. So, in this regard, the element of populism that swept him into power does not necessarily make him an effective leader.

Nationalism No Longer Resonates as Strongly in Armenian Politics

Comparative studies often suggest that military defeat weakens incumbents and fuels political backlash. How do you explain Pashinyan’s ability to survive the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the subsequent political crises while still securing electoral legitimacy?

Richard Giragosian: The re-election of the Armenian government under Prime Minister Pashinyan, despite losing the war, is difficult to explain. But I do have an observation. And it is an observation that remained relevant in the recent election. Simply put, the reality is that there is no alternative to Pashinyan or his government. The opposition then, and the opposition now, remains deeply unpopular, discredited, and too closely tied to the previous authoritarian government. It is also rather weak, given its inability, as an opposition force, to propose any alternative strategy. Simply opposing normalization requires the presentation of an alternative strategy, and that is something the opposition has been unable to offer.

The opposition also reflects the reality that nationalism no longer resonates in Armenia. There are a pronounced acceptance and recognition of the need to normalize relations with Turkey and to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the surprising re-election of the Pashinyan government after losing the war remains an impressive achievement and has sparked a degree of jealousy among many Western leaders.

Armenia Has Passed the Point of Returning to the Pre-War Status Quo

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

You have argued that Armenia has embarked on its most decisive strategic reorientation since independence. Following the election, how irreversible is this shift toward Europe, and what factors could still derail it?

Richard Giragosian: Very good question, Selçuk. What we see is that Armenia has now gone past the tipping point. There is little real risk or danger of returning to the old reality, to pre-war arrogance and a pre-war aggressive posture. We are past that danger. However, it is not necessarily a matter of embracing the Western European model versus escaping the Russian orbit. It is more about Armenia seeking, delicately and under conditions of fragility, to strike a balance within the West-versus-Russia paradigm. This is driving Armenia to diversify and to seek a number of security partners. For example, the only arms procurement deal since the war of 2020 was with India. Very much on purpose—not with the West, but with a partner that is less provocative to Russia. What Armenia is seeking to do is risky, because it may fail. But it would be a greater failure not to try. That means seeking to challenge Russia, while avoiding an overreaction from Russia and carefully choosing its battles.

At the same time, it represents a return to the region. It is a realization that Armenia, like every country, does not choose its neighbors. We have no choice, no alternative, but to build a relationship with Azerbaijan, to normalize relations with Turkey, and to deal with Iran to the south and Georgia to the north. There is no real alternative to geography.

Russian Influence Has Changed, Not Disappeared

You have described Russia as suffering from both geopolitical distraction and declining power projection following its invasion of Ukraine. Has the recent election confirmed the erosion of Russian influence in Armenia, or does Moscow retain significant leverage through economic, security, and social channels?

Richard Giragosian: The short answer is both. The longer answer is yes. Russia remains overwhelmed and distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. But that is rather temporary. We do expect a resurgent Russia to return to the South Caucasus and seek to regain its diminished power and influence.

In the case of Russia-Armenia relations, Russian leverage remains strong, although it is different from what it was in the past. Previously, Russian leverage was based on security dependence, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serving as an instrument of influence. Now, however, Armenia’s vulnerability to Russia lies primarily in economics and trade. Russia is Armenia’s largest import-export partner. Armenia also remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, to cite two examples.

But if we look at Armenia-Turkey normalization, it underscores the importance and necessity of reopening that border—not only to lower transit costs, but also to create new economic opportunities capable of countering Russian dominance. At the same time, I do think Armenia has an advantage: a rare degree of legitimacy and stability, unlike many countries within the Russian orbit.

The Armenian Sense of Betrayal by Russia Is Deeply Entrenched

Critics of Pashinyan accuse him of fostering anti-Russian sentiment, while supporters argue that Armenia is simply responding to Russia’s failure to honor its security commitments. Is Armenia witnessing the rise of genuine Russophobia, or merely a more realistic assessment of Russia’s reliability as an ally?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest and candid, I think the Armenian government is quite correct, as is the majority of Armenian public opinion, in recognizing the threat from Russia. Russia has, belatedly but now quite markedly, come to be seen as dangerously unreliable. There is a deeply entrenched Armenian sense of betrayal by Russia. The war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh have led many Armenians to view Russia as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. I think this is a realistic assessment. 

I also think the lessons from the relationship with Russia illustrate the absence of any real choice or contest. For example, the European Union and the broader West are engaging with Armenia on the basis of attraction and persuasion. Russian policies toward Armenia, by contrast, have been rooted in coercion and pressure. There is really no contest here.

At the same time, I do think Russia’s arrogance, and its tendency to take Armenia for granted, actually contributed to this pre-existing tension in the relationship. I think Armenia’s future is much more closely tied to self-sufficiency, independence, and its regional role, and much less to being a Russian client, as it was in the past.

Russia’s Election Interference Failed to Deliver the Outcome It Wanted

Reports surrounding the election suggested attempts by Moscow and pro-Russian actors to influence public opinion. How should we understand Russian influence operations in Armenia today, and why did they fail to prevent a pro-Western electoral outcome?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a good question because there is an interesting paradox. Russia’s interference in the election generally failed to achieve any meaningful impact or result. However, we do see a vehemently pro-Russian political opposition garnering seats in the new Armenian Parliament. Two specifically pro-Russian parties were able to secure a significant minority share of the vote. This is an indication that we cannot become complacent about overcoming Russian influence, and that we must also recognize the challenge from within. The old-guard nationalist opposition, which continues to look to Russia, will undermine Armenian independence and challenge its policies toward its neighbors. So, we should not be overly complacent.

At the same time, I do think Russia is quite satisfied with the election result. There was little direct Russian support for the opposition, which would have been a much riskier move. But, for example, Russia is reassured that Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, while Armenia’s room to maneuver toward the West remains relatively limited and constrained. For that reason, I think the next challenge for Armenia will be to succeed in managing this new transactional relationship with Russia.

The European Union Has Become an Important Anchor for Reform

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

In your writings, you have emphasized that Armenia’s democratic development and European engagement are deeply interconnected. Can the European Union become a genuine democratic anchor for Armenia, or does Brussels still lack the strategic commitment necessary for long-term influence?

Richard Giragosian: I would say this is a rare example of the success of the European Union on the ground in Armenia. Certainly, it has served as an anchor for reform. But even more than that, we are witnessing an unprecedented level of EU engagement in Armenia. We see the deployment of EU monitors along the Armenian border with Azerbaijan to help stabilize the security situation. We also see unprecedented security assistance being provided to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF).

What makes this so remarkable is that Armenia still hosts a Russian military base, remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, and is also part of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. Despite these three realities, none of them has prevented the EU from deepening its engagement.

Part of the reason is the reality that Armenia has overtaken Georgia as the leading democracy in the region. There is also, to some degree, a European Union expectation that Armenia—and Armenia’s normalization with its Turkish partner—could help the EU achieve a broader geopolitical objective. In other words, Armenia–Turkey normalization is seen as a positive game changer not only for Armenia, but for the European Union as well.

And finally, Armenia has to be careful not to be used by the European Union or drawn into the broader paradigm of conflict between the EU and Russia that has intensified since the war in Ukraine. Armenia has to be somewhat cautious. But yes, the European Union’s engagement represents an important new element for Armenia.

The South Caucasus Is Unlikely to Remain a Long-Term US Priority

The United States has become increasingly involved in Armenian-Azerbaijani diplomacy. How do you assess Washington’s growing role in the South Caucasus, and could Armenia emerge as a new arena of strategic competition between the United States and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: I’m rather skeptical. I am skeptical about Armenia and the South Caucasus being a sustainable priority within the American national interest. Moreover, if we consider the unpredictability of the Trump administration, I also question the durability of its commitment to, and interest in, the region.

At the same time, Armenia’s diplomatic achievements with Azerbaijan owe much more to the leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and to their bilateral efforts. They were not solely the result of Western or American involvement. In fact, Armenia and Azerbaijan, acting on their own—without Russia and without the West—were able to achieve much more than before.

That said, there has been one very important achievement in terms of the American connectivity initiative. This modestly named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity envisions road and rail connections through southern Armenia, linking Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and onward to Turkey. This is important not only for the restoration of trade and transportation, but also for the return of deterrence, changing the strategic calculus and significantly reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.

So, when looking at American engagement, the record is mixed. But overall, it is a net positive. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, it would be a mistake to assume or rely too heavily on American involvement going forward.

Free Elections Are Necessary, but They Are Not Sufficient

You have often argued that democratic legitimacy is itself a strategic asset. To what extent has Armenia’s democratic trajectory strengthened its international standing, especially when compared with the authoritarian models represented by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: There are two concrete and practical advantages that we have seen emerge from Armenia’s legitimacy and democratic credentials. First, there has been a significant improvement in the investment climate. This helps explain the breakthrough agreements in the IT sector, Armenia’s establishment of data centers, its growing use of artificial intelligence, and advances in chip production. AI and chip diplomacy are a direct result of this improved investment climate.

A second notable achievement is that Armenia has come to be recognized as a predictable and reliable interlocutor. That is important both for Ankara and Baku—for Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia is increasingly accepted as a dependable, reliable, and predictable partner. In this part of the world, that is a rare achievement, and in many ways, it is even more important than democratic credentials alone.

Now, the bad news. Armenia’s institutional weakness in terms of democracy still needs to be addressed, and strengthening those institutions is just as important as holding free and fair elections. An election is not the answer, nor is it the complete recipe for democracy. Armenia still needs to strengthen its democratic institutions.

Concessions Can Contribute to Peace, but They Cannot Be Unilateral

Aliyev and Erdoğan.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attend TEKNOFEST in Istanbul, Turkey, on April 29, 2023. Photo: Evren Kalinbacak / Dreamstime.

Pashinyan has presented peace with Azerbaijan as a prerequisite for Armenia’s future security and prosperity. Does the election provide him with a stronger mandate to finalize a peace agreement, or do major domestic and external obstacles remain?

Richard Giragosian: Clearly, yes. The government’s re-election provides a renewed mandate to continue engaging with Azerbaijan and to move the process forward. However, there are still significant challenges, especially regarding the Azerbaijani demand that Armenia amend its constitution, as well as the fact that the bilateral peace treaty has been initialed but not yet signed.

The real difference here, however, is that Armenia has been willing to accept its weakness and embrace its defeat, while also turning the page and moving forward with a much less provocative and much less aggressive posture toward all of its neighbors. So, there is reason for justified optimism. But it also takes two countries to achieve bilateral peace and stability.

Therefore, the next move will have to come first from Azerbaijan and then from Turkey in terms of normalizing relations. Armenian concessions and compromises are important, but they should not be unilateral.

The Constitution Will Remain a Potential Source of Friction

One of the unresolved issues concerns constitutional changes sought by Azerbaijan as part of a final settlement. How politically feasible are such reforms after the election, and do they risk creating a new wave of nationalist mobilization inside Armenia?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good point, because despite the re-election of the government, with a working majority and a renewed mandate, the government still fell short of a two-thirds majority in Parliament. That would have been much more helpful for constitutional amendments. The government’s working majority will therefore present a challenge in moving forward with a referendum on constitutional change.

However, we do see a demonstrable climbdown on the Azerbaijani side. They have retreated from their previously maximalist position, and the Azerbaijanis have become much more patient and far less demanding regarding the constitutional change requirement. It is no longer such an immediate prerequisite, which suggests there may be some flexibility, as well as an understanding in Baku that the Armenian government lacks the parliamentary majority necessary to guarantee this demand. So, I do think there is room for flexibility. But yes, it will remain a potential source of friction going forward.

Azerbaijan Continues to Shape the Limits of Turkish Policy

You have argued that normalization between Turkey and Armenia represents a rare opportunity for regional stabilization and economic development. Has the election increased the prospects for genuine rapprochement, or does Azerbaijan remain the decisive variable shaping Ankara’s policy?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, despite the positive re-election of the Armenian government, there had already been notable progress before the election between Armenian and Turkish officials in moving incrementally closer to reopening the border. In this regard, when it comes to Armenian-Turkish normalization, the physical border has not yet opened. But the mental border has, and the issue has become much less poisonous and politically toxic within Turkey. 

However, unfortunately, the Turkish side remains hostage to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s approval and consent remain necessary for the fulfillment of normalization. Much to the frustration of the Erdoğan government, it is Azerbaijan that continues to limit Turkish options in the region. That reality is also rooted in the economic and commercial influence of SOCAR, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company, within the Turkish economy.

Nevertheless, we are seeing growing support and broader constituencies on the Turkish side in favor of reopening the border. And this is not about the Turkish economy in general. It is about the regional economy of eastern Turkey, particularly the underdeveloped and largely Kurdish-populated areas of the east. For the Turkish state, reopening the border is important not only for economically stabilizing the region but also for countering the PKK through jobs and economic opportunity rather than relying solely on police action. So, there is a clear security dimension as well. 

At the end of the day, even for Azerbaijan, Armenia-Turkey normalization represents a rare positive game changer—a genuine win-win.

Armenia May Influence Its Neighbors More Than Its Neighbors Influence Armenia

Armenia’s normalization efforts necessarily involve deeper engagement with two increasingly centralized and authoritarian neighboring states. Do you have concerns that closer political, economic, and institutional ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan could contribute to democratic erosion in Armenia? More specifically, just as Russia has long sought to project its political influence and governance model across the post-Soviet space, is there a risk that Ankara and Baku may also seek to export elements of their own illiberal political models to Armenia? Or do you believe that Armenia’s democratic institutions and growing engagement with Europe are sufficiently resilient to prevent such authoritarian diffusion?

Richard Giragosian: I’m less worried about the potential risk posed by neighboring Turkey or Azerbaijan in terms of eroding the Armenian democratic model, simply because it would be very difficult for Armenia’s population to accept any kind of role for either Turkey or Azerbaijan in shaping Armenia’s political development. The greater risk comes from Russia’s potential external interference.

At the same time, Armenia’s institutions remain rather fragile, vulnerable, and not yet sufficiently resilient. But I do think we are on a positive trajectory. And I also believe that the development of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Armenia and Turkey, can contribute positively to the democratic outlook of those countries.

So, I would reverse the question and focus on Armenia’s potential positive influence on its neighbors, rather than on the risk of intervention, interference, or democratic erosion emanating from Armenia’s neighbors and affecting Armenia itself.

Normalization Is Only the Foundation for Future Reconciliation

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh has forced Armenia to reconsider long-standing assumptions about identity, security, and statehood. Are we witnessing the emergence of a new civic understanding of Armenian nationalism, and how might this reshape populist politics in the future?

Richard Giragosian: We are witnessing a sea change in terms of identity. And in this regard, it is not nationalism that resonates. Rather, it is a more mature evolution toward a new concept of patriotism. Specifically, from an Armenian perspective, nationalism can also be very negative, rooted in hatred of the enemy. Patriotism, in contrast, is much more positive. It is based on pride in history rather than hatred of rivals, opponents, or enemies. So, I do think there is a healthy and constructive movement in the right direction.

Nevertheless, it is still grounded in a painful reminder that Armenia was dangerously arrogant, especially in relation to Azerbaijan. There were too many missed opportunities for diplomacy. But Armenia is now cutting its losses and learning painful lessons. And I think the outlook moving forward remains positive. Because for Armenia, the first challenge was recognizing the problem. And that was the first stage in this evolution toward patriotism. It is also about normalization, and understanding what normalization with neighbors is—and is not. For example, in relation to both Turkey and Azerbaijan, this is not reconciliation. It is not even a rapprochement. It is normalization. It is the first step. It is also the basic currency of neighborly relations and the foundation for subsequent reconciliation.

This is why much of the past, including the events of 1915 and the genocide issue, is not part of the normalization process. These issues are not relevant to normalization. They will come later, once that foundation has been put in place.

Armenia May Be Less a Model Than an Accidental Exception

And lastly, at a time when democratic backsliding, authoritarian populism, and geopolitical revisionism are reshaping international politics, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the post-Soviet space. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience under conditions of war, external pressure, and geopolitical uncertainty?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, I’m not sure. Armenia may be less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception. In other words, beginning with the change of government in 2018, it was a rare victory of nonviolence, of people power. Despite everything, despite later losing a war, despite Russia, what was the recipe for Armenia? I’m not quite sure. It could have been almost an accident of history.

But theoretically, we would say, sadly, that it took the loss of the war and the subsequent loss of Nagorno-Karabakh before Armenia could begin to rebound. At the same time, much of this opportunity also exists because Russia was distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. So, it is somewhat of an accidental convergence of interests.

At the same time, we do see Ankara, Yerevan, and Baku accidentally sharing similar concerns about Russia. There is an understanding that a regional identity, without any third-party involvement, is perhaps the real key to stability in terms of post-war adjustment. 

So, the short answer is: I’m not quite sure I have the answer.

Cengiz Aktar

Prof. Aktar: The EU Is Systematically Giving False Hopes to Armenia

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In this timely ECPS interview, Professor Cengiz Aktar examines the political, geopolitical, and democratic implications of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections. While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic resilience in an authoritarian neighborhood, he challenges prevailing narratives about the country’s westward turn, arguing that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains profound. Describing the European Union as “the greatest populist actor in this game,” Professor Aktar contends that Brussels is fostering expectations it cannot realistically fulfill. The interview explores Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, post-Karabakh politics, democratic backsliding, normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russian influence, and the enduring significance of historical memory. At its core lies a fundamental question: how can a fragile democracy survive amid competing geopolitical pressures?

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a pivotal moment in the country’s post-Karabakh trajectory. Taking place amid the aftermath of military defeat, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and growing tensions between Russia and the West, the elections raised fundamental questions about democratic resilience, populism, sovereignty, and geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Cengiz Aktar—adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, guest lecturer at Yerevan State University, and one of the foremost analysts of Turkey-Armenia relations, memory politics, and regional geopolitics—offers a provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic future and its increasingly complex international environment.

While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic achievements, Professor Aktar stresses the extraordinary constraints under which the country operates. As he observes, Armenia remains “the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region,” a small, landlocked state surrounded by authoritarian neighbors and exposed to intense geopolitical pressures. Yet he warns that many assumptions currently shaping discussions of Armenia’s future rest on unrealistic expectations regarding Europe’s role and capacity.

The most striking theme of the interview concerns Armenia’s growing rapprochement with the European Union. Contrary to prevailing narratives that portray Armenia’s recent political direction as a decisive shift toward Europe, Professor Aktar argues that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains overwhelming and cannot be easily replaced. In his view, European policymakers are encouraging expectations that they cannot realistically fulfill. “None of this can be replaced by the European Union,” he argues. “Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill.”

Professor Aktar is equally skeptical of assumptions that Armenia faces a straightforward geopolitical choice between Russia and Europe. While recognizing the country’s genuine democratic aspirations and strong cultural connections with Europe, he contends that geography, energy dependence, trade networks, and security realities continue to bind Armenia closely to Moscow. For this reason, he warns that unrealistic promises of European integration may ultimately prove counterproductive, potentially undermining Armenia’s stability while provoking Russian backlash.

The interview also explores Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, the politics of peace and normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, democratic backsliding, Russia’s continuing influence, historical memory, and the unresolved legacy of the Armenian Genocide. Throughout, Professor Aktar returns to a central dilemma confronting Armenia today: how a fragile democracy can preserve its autonomy and democratic character while navigating an increasingly hostile regional environment shaped by authoritarian power politics and great-power competition.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Cengiz Aktar, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Stephan Haggard

Prof. Haggard: Democratic Institutions Survive Only When Citizens Support Them

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Professor Stephan Haggard, one of the world’s leading scholars of democratic backsliding and authoritarianism, argues that the survival of democracy depends not only on constitutional safeguards but also on sustained public commitment to democratic institutions. In this timely ECPS interview, he examines how populism, polarization, judicial erosion, and attacks on electoral integrity are reshaping democratic politics across the globe. Distinguishing between populism as a “thin ideology” and democratic backsliding as an institutional process, Professor Haggard warns that elected leaders increasingly challenge democracy from within. The conversation explores the weakening of horizontal checks, the rise of anti-institutional rhetoric, the diffusion of illiberal strategies across borders, and the growing importance of democratic resilience. As he cautions, democracy faces its greatest danger when populist movements cease to respect rights, the rule of law, and the integrity of elections.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic institutions are under mounting pressure from populist movements, partisan polarization, and growing distrust in public authority, understanding how democracies erode—and how they endure—has become one of the most urgent challenges in political science. Few scholars have contributed more to this debate than Professor Stephan Haggard, Research Professor and Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor Emeritus at the University of California San Diego. Over a distinguished career spanning comparative politics, political economy, authoritarianism, and democratic governance, Professor Haggard has produced some of the most influential scholarship on democratic transitions, institutional change, and regime durability.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Haggard reflects on the relationship between populism, democratic backsliding, judicial erosion, polarization, and the resilience of democratic institutions. Challenging simplistic understandings of democratic decline, he argues that contemporary autocratization increasingly unfolds not through military coups or abrupt regime collapses, but through gradual institutional weakening carried out by elected leaders operating within formally democratic systems.

One of the interview’s central themes is the fragility of democratic institutions when public support begins to erode. As Professor Haggard observes, “courts operate as checks only to the extent that there is support for courts operating as checks,” emphasizing that “democratic institutions survive only when citizens support them.” For him, the durability of democracy ultimately depends not only on constitutional design, but also on the willingness of political actors and citizens alike to defend the norms and institutions that sustain democratic rule.

Throughout the discussion, Professor Haggard distinguishes between populism as a political ideology and democratic backsliding as an institutional process. Drawing on Cas Mudde’s concept of populism as a “thin ideology,” he argues that populism becomes dangerous when commitments to majoritarian rule are accompanied by efforts to weaken rights, judicial independence, oversight of institutions, and other components of liberal democracy. “Populism is a kind of motivating ideology that can drive backsliding,” he explains, while democratic erosion manifests itself through concrete institutional consequences.

The interview also explores the growing challenge posed by anti-institutional rhetoric, attacks on electoral integrity, transnational networks of illiberal cooperation, and the emergence of authoritarian regional organizations that seek to reshape global governance. Particularly striking is Professor Haggard’s candid assessment of the contemporary United States. Reflecting on the resilience of advanced democracies, he acknowledges that he is “beginning to have doubts”about earlier assumptions that consolidated democracies are largely immune from authoritarian drift. Indeed, he remarks that if asked whether the United States remains a democracy, he would “have to scratch [his] head over that question.”

At once sobering and illuminating, this interview offers a powerful examination of the institutional foundations of democracy and the conditions under which they can be preserved—or lost.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Stephan Haggard, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Professor Cengiz Aktar.

Prof. Aktar: The EU Is Systematically Giving False Hopes to Armenia

by Editor’s ChoiceForeign PolicyHomeInterviews

In this timely ECPS interview, Professor Cengiz Aktar examines the political, geopolitical, and democratic implications of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections. While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic resilience in an authoritarian neighborhood, he challenges prevailing narratives about the country’s westward turn, arguing that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains profound. Describing the European Union as “the greatest populist actor in this game,” Professor Aktar contends that Brussels is fostering expectations it cannot realistically fulfill. The interview explores Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, post-Karabakh politics, democratic backsliding, normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russian influence, and the enduring significance of historical memory. At its core lies a fundamental question: how can a fragile democracy survive amid competing geopolitical pressures?

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a pivotal moment in the country’s post-Karabakh trajectory. Taking place amid the aftermath of military defeat, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and growing tensions between Russia and the West, the elections raised fundamental questions about democratic resilience, populism, sovereignty, and geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Cengiz Aktar—adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, guest lecturer at Yerevan State University, and one of the foremost analysts of Turkey-Armenia relations, memory politics, and regional geopolitics—offers a provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic future and its increasingly complex international environment.

While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic achievements, Professor Aktar stresses the extraordinary constraints under which the country operates. As he observes, Armenia remains “the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region,” a small, landlocked state surrounded by authoritarian neighbors and exposed to intense geopolitical pressures. Yet he warns that many assumptions currently shaping discussions of Armenia’s future rest on unrealistic expectations regarding Europe’s role and capacity.

The most striking theme of the interview concerns Armenia’s growing rapprochement with the European Union. Contrary to prevailing narratives that portray Armenia’s recent political direction as a decisive shift toward Europe, Professor Aktar argues that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains overwhelming and cannot be easily replaced. In his view, European policymakers are encouraging expectations that they cannot realistically fulfill. “None of this can be replaced by the European Union,” he argues. “Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill.”

Professor Aktar is equally skeptical of assumptions that Armenia faces a straightforward geopolitical choice between Russia and Europe. While recognizing the country’s genuine democratic aspirations and strong cultural connections with Europe, he contends that geography, energy dependence, trade networks, and security realities continue to bind Armenia closely to Moscow. For this reason, he warns that unrealistic promises of European integration may ultimately prove counterproductive, potentially undermining Armenia’s stability while provoking Russian backlash.

The interview also explores Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, the politics of peace and normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, democratic backsliding, Russia’s continuing influence, historical memory, and the unresolved legacy of the Armenian Genocide. Throughout, Professor Aktar returns to a central dilemma confronting Armenia today: how a fragile democracy can preserve its autonomy and democratic character while navigating an increasingly hostile regional environment shaped by authoritarian power politics and great-power competition.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Cengiz Aktar, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Armenians Were Tired of War, and Pashinyan Successfully Capitalized on That Fatigue

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Aktar, welcome! You recently argued that the 2026 elections would reveal the direction of Armenian democracy after the trauma of Karabakh and the pressures of regional geopolitics. How should we interpret Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election? Does it represent a democratic endorsement of his peace agenda, or merely a choice of the “least risky” option in a constrained political environment?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Before going into the details of the Armenian political microcosm, we should underline that this small country— less than 30,000 square kilometers after all—completely landlocked and surrounded by two enemy nations, Azerbaijan and Turkey, is the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region. This is something that people tend to forget. They are doing their best to remain a democracy. It is not easy because they have to deal with anti-democracies. But so far, they have been doing all right.

We will see how the final results of these elections play out. They are not final yet, and there are many issues—we will come to them. We will see the outcome and how the authorities address some of the serious questions that have arisen after the elections.

That being said, the people have re-elected the Prime Minister and, at the end of the day, endorsed his views. This is quite a remarkable achievement because, normally, when a leader loses a war and, moreover, loses a territory—which is the case with Nagorno-Karabakh, a historic Armenian land that was given by the Soviets to Azerbaijan and later reclaimed by Azerbaijan through war with Armenia, openly and extensively supported by the Turkish armed forces—the political consequences are severe. The reality was therefore quite harsh for a prime minister seeking a new mandate. Yet he succeeded. Of course, this may seem contradictory or paradoxical, but it is not.

There are two elements at play here. We could talk for hours about this. As you know, I have written extensively on the subject in Turkish for Agos, the Armenian newspaper published in Turkey in both Turkish and Armenian.

The first and foremost reason is that the people of Armenia are tired of fighting. There is a clear war fatigue. Although we cannot compare it to what is happening in our region, in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, this sense of insecurity has been very real. The Prime Minister used—and abused—this feeling extensively, essentially saying: if you do not vote for me, we will go to war. That was, of course, highly manipulative and a very populist way of dealing with such a sensitive issue as peace and security. Nevertheless, it worked.

The second element is that this country is virtually unrecognizable. I have been going there since 1990, and today Armenia is experiencing a boom in personal spending and consumption. It is becoming a mass-consumption society of the kind we saw in Western Europe after 1945. This, of course, is music to the ears of the Armenian public. I visit regularly, but this time I was genuinely amazed by the number of brand-new cars. There are hardly any old cars left in the city. Everybody seems to have a new one. Where does this money come from? Of course, no one asks such questions. But the main source of these finances, as in other countries of the region—including Turkey, Georgia, and others—comes from sanctions-busting.

The West—the United States and the European Union—sanctioned Russia, first after the annexation of Crimea and then following the full-scale war against Ukraine. Yet many countries have been circumventing these sanctions. This is not speculation. There are extensive reports on the matter, including in leading newspapers such as the Financial Times, documenting the flow of goods and cash to and from Russia. Russian gold, for example, moves through the South Caucasus and then to China and India, where it is processed and made marketable before returning to Russia. As one can imagine, this trade is extremely lucrative, and we see its effects in the economy of Yerevan.

So, all in all, the people have voted—although not for a full majority, and we will come to that. They voted for a different type of future. That is understandable. But is it sustainable? I think that is the real question.

Who Is Not Populist When Seeking Re-Election?

Pashinyan originally emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment figure challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent can he still be understood as a populist leader, and how has his populism evolved from opposition mobilization to governing power?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Who is not populist, Selçuk? Especially when one is running for re-election. It is almost compulsory to be a populist, unfortunately. Nikol Pashinyan was in full swing when it came to populist moves, actions, speeches, and narratives. That is all true. But it worked. The question is whether he really represents a future for the country. Some observers say so, but at what price? That is the real issue, the real problem that Armenians will have to confront sooner or later.

What he has managed to achieve with Turkey and Azerbaijan—two longstanding foes of Armenia—is not yet fully accomplished, but it is on track; it is in the pipeline. However, it has been pursued through, once again, a very populist way of handling highly sensitive matters. It has been achieved by making huge concessions to both countries, without really receiving anything in return. This is very dangerous in the sense that one cannot ignore the imbalance involved.

I often think of a famous observation by Henry Kissinger, who was not exactly a commendable figure. He used to say that the best and most sustainable peace deals are those concluded by parties that leave the negotiating table equally dissatisfied with the outcome. That is very true. Yet in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan—and also Turkey—that did not happen, and it will not happen, because Azerbaijan and Turkey do not have much to offer in return, except perhaps opening the border in Turkey’s case, and maybe Azerbaijan’s as well.

Even then, there are enormous conditions attached before anything concrete can happen. As you may have noticed, there has been much discussion in the Turkish media about the possibility that the two land border crossings could open during the summer. We will see whether Azerbaijan will allow Turkey to move forward with this symbolic—or perhaps concrete—opening of the border, which has been closed since 1993. That is a very long time.

As of today, the 12th of June, only five days after the elections, there remains a great deal of uncertainty. The Prime Minister did not get everything he wanted, and the opposition actually performed quite well. Does that mean that those who voted for the opposition are pro-Russian or anti-Western? I do not think so. That would be far too hasty a conclusion.

Frankly, I remain quite skeptical about the future, and there are some very unpleasant developments unfolding at the moment. But we will come to those in due course. 

People Were Willing to Sacrifice Almost Anything for Peace

Armenia protest.
Anti-government protesters gather in front of the Armenian government building in Yerevan on December 9, 2020, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Photo: Corneius Brandt / Dreamstime.

Comparative scholarship often suggests that military defeats weaken populist governments. Yet Pashinyan survived both the 2020 war and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. What explains his resilience, and what does it tell us about the relationship between populism, accountability, and democratic legitimacy?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Democratic legitimacy is a big word. But frankly, as I said at the beginning, the appeal of a consumer society and the symbolic peace narrative played a major role. Pashinyan used this message effectively, even adopting the little heart as the symbol of his campaign, which is totally un-Armenian. It is not something that is commonly used in Armenia, nor in the Caucasus. Anyhow, these two elements—peace and consumption apparently worked. That is the reality. But again, are they sustainable? That is the question.

It worked perfectly. Elderly people were appearing on television, in street interviews and similar formats, saying remarkable things about the importance of peace at any cost. They were prepared to give up almost anything in exchange for peace and greater consumption. So, once again, the question remains: is it sustainable? I do not think so.

The Dominant Geopolitical Orientation Remains Russia, Not Europe

Many observers described the election as a referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation. Do you think Armenian voters primarily voted on domestic democratic concerns, or was this fundamentally a choice between Russia and Europe?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: In Armenia, since the Velvet Revolution of 2018, there has been a genuine sense of democratic aspiration within society. Of course, not every individual is pro-democracy or democratic—that exists nowhere in the world—but overall, the aim, the tendency, and the willingness are there. Armenians want to build a democratic society.

But there are major impediments. It is a very small and a very dependent country. Despite the strong Western tropism that developed during the election campaign, particularly through the major event that took place in Yerevan at the beginning of May—the annual meeting of the so-called European Political Community, which was revived by Macron after an earlier French initiative had been abandoned in 1954—the reality remains quite different. The European Political Community is not a binding European institution; it is essentially a talk shop. Yet during this gathering, the whole of Europe was present, along with Canada, and they all delivered very warm messages to the Armenians. The message was essentially: “You are now part of Europe. You are welcome,” and so on.

But the reality is not quite that. The dominant and determining geopolitical orientation of Armenia remains Russia, not the West. Everything that happened during May before the elections—including these Western visits and those from the United States as well; the Vice President was there in March, carried the same message: “Armenia, we love you, and you are one of us.”

What explains this sudden affection? It is rooted in the anti-Russian policies of the West. In a sense, Armenia has been used for that purpose. Now tensions are emerging with Russia, which remains by far Armenia’s most influential neighbor. Armenia depends on Russia on an unbelievable scale. This dependence cannot be replaced or superseded by any European initiative, however well-intentioned. Geographically, historically, politically, and economically, it is impossible.

You have read what I have written about this dependency. More than 82 percent of Armenia’s gas and energy needs are covered by Russia, at an extraordinarily low price—$177.5 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. There is nothing comparable anywhere else. If Russia were to change that arrangement unilaterally, Armenia would face tremendous difficulties. Not to mention Metsamor, the country’s only nuclear power plant, located near the Turkish border. It was built by the Russians, and Rosatom supplies its fuel. Nor should we forget the petrol and oil products that Armenians use every day in their new cars. There is also the enormous Russian market for Armenian products such as fruits, vegetables, and flowers.

None of this can be replaced by the European Union. Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill. People are now even talking about future EU membership for Armenia. But that is out of the question. One of the indispensable conditions for EU membership is territorial continuity. So where is the territorial continuity? It simply does not exist. It will not happen. There is no realistic chance whatsoever. Yet people are buying into this rhetoric without fully understanding the realities involved, and in the process they are jeopardizing the country’s relations with Russia. That is where we find ourselves today.

Russia Remains the Ultimate Game Changer in Armenia

You have repeatedly emphasized Moscow’s declining credibility in Armenia after its failure to prevent the loss of Karabakh. Has Russia now lost its position as Armenia’s primary external reference point, or does it still possess significant instruments of influence inside the country?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Of course, as I said, yes. Russia remains the game changer in Armenia. Armenians are certainly not in love with Russia, particularly since the Russians did nothing to stop the Azeris and the Turks from taking back Nagorno-Karabakh. So, every Armenian has reason to be unhappy about what Russia did. But, the reality is something else. As I explained, the country remains highly dependent on Russia, and that dependence will not change from one day to the next.

Moscow May Have Felt No Need to Interfere

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

Several reports suggested Russian attempts to influence the election through economic pressure, disinformation, and support for pro-Russian actors. How should we understand these efforts within the broader framework of transnational authoritarian influence and democratic resilience?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was there. The ODIHR has a specialized body that monitors elections in OSCE member states, and it was present during these elections as well. According to ODIHR, there was no interference whatsoever. There was a great deal of fake news on the subject, but neither the Electoral Commission nor the independent media found any substantial evidence of vote-buying or influence operations orchestrated by Russia.

On the contrary, there were reports concerning officials from Civil Contract, Nikol Pashinyan’s party, exerting pressure on civil servants to vote for Civil Contract. A civil servant is, after all, an obedient servant, so if the boss says, “Go and vote for me,” he or she generally will. These kinds of irregularities were noted.

Overall, however, I do not think that Russia intervened in the Armenian elections. If I put myself in the position of Russian decision-makers, I would say that they are probably so confident in their leverage over the Armenian economy that they felt no need to intervene directly in order to influence the outcome of the elections.

European Tropism Is a Myth and a Pipe Dream

The election result appears to strengthen Armenia’s rapprochement with Europe. In your view, is this shift primarily strategic and security-driven, or does it also reflect a deeper normative commitment to liberal democracy and European political values?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: No, as I said, this European tropism is a myth. It is a myth. Armenians are not discovering Europe. Armenia is, in a way, a very European country. Just look at the diaspora. The European Armenian diaspora is very strong and remains highly present in Armenia itself. If you compare the two countries, for instance Azerbaijan and Armenia, Armenia is by far more European than Azerbaijan, which has virtually no connection to Europe whatsoever. There is no significant Azeri diaspora in Europe. That is not the case with Armenia. Armenia knows what Europe means, in a way.

But, having said that, I repeat: this European tropism is a pipe dream. It is a personal choice, but it will not have any real consequences for the development of Armenian democracy in the foreseeable future. They are not there, and they will not be there.

The Americans are another matter altogether. They are much more focused on transactionalism. They buy and sell, and they do not care at all about the democratic future of any country in the world—including their own.

Autocratic Tendencies Are Clearly Visible

Some critics argue that Pashinyan has displayed increasingly personalized leadership tendencies and a growing concentration of power. Do you see signs of democratic erosion under his government, or are such concerns exaggerated given Armenia’s broader regional context?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The trend is troubling. There have been some anti-democratic and illegal actions directed against the opposition, but not only against the opposition. Let me give you the example of the director of the Genocide Museum in Yerevan. This lady offered a book to the American Vice President during his visit to Yerevan. The book dealt with the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. As you know, 150,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh. She was subsequently sanctioned by the Prime Minister, who forced her resignation. This is far from any democratic way of handling public affairs. The lady was compelled to resign and was replaced by a bureaucrat close to the Prime Minister who has no real understanding of the history of the Armenian genocide.

He is also challenging the role of the Church. Etchmiadzin, the Holy See, is systematically under pressure from the government. That is not the role of a government—to intervene in the affairs of the Church, whatever the circumstances. There may be all sorts of accusations against the head of the Church, Karekin, involving embezzlement and other matters, but that is not the role of a government.

During the campaign as well, there were some quite worrisome developments targeting opposition figures, and these developments are still continuing.

Moreover, the election results are not yet entirely clear, because we still do not know whether a fourth party will make it into Parliament. Unfortunately, since the closure of voting on the night of the 7th June, there has been considerable pressure on election officials to ensure that this fourth party remains below the 4 percent threshold and does not enter Parliament. By cheating, of course. 

And now the scandal is completely out in the open. All opposition parties are protesting loudly. They are taking the matter to the Electoral Commission and will probably proceed to the Constitutional Court afterwards in order to seek a proper resolution, because this party’s votes have been cancelled. The objective has been to ensure that it does not enter Parliament and remains below the 4 percent threshold. We cannot call this democratic. It is anti-democratic, it is illegal, and it challenges the principle of free and fair elections. So, are there autocratic tendencies? Yes, definitely. They are very much there. Are they widespread? No. But the danger is there.

Concessions Without Reciprocity Create Fragile Peace

Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey flags.
Photo: Dreamstime.

Pashinyan campaigned explicitly on a message of peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey. Is this the emergence of a new political cleavage in Armenia between peace-oriented pragmatism and nationalist revisionism?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: It is a good question. National revisionism, okay—but revise what? Those who challenge the Prime Minister’s positions, policies, actions, and narratives are saying something that is very meaningful. They say: “We are not against peace.” After all, who can be against peace? Who can be in favor of war? That is a form of universal wisdom. But they are asking a different question: How did you achieve that peace? What do you receive in return when you make concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey? 

That is the real question. It is fascinating to observe that a very similar dynamic is unfolding in Turkey with the Kurds. The Kurds speak about peace, a peace process here and a peace process there. But what do they receive in return from the Turkish state? In line with their longstanding demands—for example, the freedom of the Kurdish language and the recognition of Kurdish as an official language in Turkey—they receive nothing.

It is the same in Armenia. The practice is exactly the same. Everybody talks about peace, but when you ask what they receive in return for their concessions, the answer is: nothing. They say they receive peace. But this peace exists entirely under the shadow and control of the other parties, who can challenge it at any moment. They have not given anything themselves, and therefore they can always come back and say: “No, we want more.”

That is precisely what is happening now. As you may know, before the elections—more specifically on May 15—there was an important development. The Azerbaijani ambassador to Ankara openly and quite happily declared that the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia was directly linked to the so-called peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that Baku and Ankara were coordinating their moves and policies. 

He was speaking on behalf of Baku, and the condition for this so-called peace process was—and still is—a change to the Armenian Constitution. Specifically, Azerbaijan wants the removal of the provision concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, which is referred to in the Armenian Constitution as an Armenian territory, or as a territory inhabited by Armenians. In other words, Baku wants Yerevan to eliminate this provision, and this remains the principal condition for accepting a lasting peace with its neighbor.

The problem is that, in order to do that, the Prime Minister needs a two-third qualified majority in Parliament, which he did not obtain. Now, with all the controversy surrounding vote-rigging and alleged manipulation concerning the fourth party I mentioned earlier, I do not see how he can satisfy the Azerbaijani demand by amending the Constitution and removing the reference to Nagorno-Karabakh. This means that the prospects for peace with Azerbaijan—and, consequently, with Turkey—are in serious difficulty.

They are compromised, and no one can foresee the outcome at this stage because we still do not have the final count, nor do we know exactly how many parties will ultimately enter Parliament. But in any case, even if the fourth party fails to enter Parliament, the ruling Civil Contract party still lacks the necessary majority to amend the Constitution. So, we are facing a deadlock, and no one really knows how it will evolve.

The Perversion of Justice Starts With the Denial of Memory

Professor Aktar, you have often argued that Turkey cannot become a fully democratic society without confronting its historical crimes, particularly the Armenian Genocide. How does the current normalization process affect questions of historical justice, memory, and democratic reconciliation?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: This is a question that really deserves a separate discussion, but in a nutshell, I can offer an example. Turkey is in dire straits. Turkish democracy does not exist. In fact, I would argue that it never truly existed. But the rule of law, for which Turks have struggled since 1923—and especially since the end of the Second World War—is now gone as well.

These are structural problems, even structural diseases. I do not particularly like using that term, but this is what we are dealing with: a dysfunction that goes back to the founding sin of the state—the Armenian Genocide and the Syriac Genocide, which are inseparable and which occurred more than a century ago.

A country that does not come to terms with such a painful and sinful past can easily digest other sins, as is the case today, including sins that are far less serious and far less painful than what happened 111 years ago.

What I am saying is not abstract. I am not talking about ghosts. I am talking about the perversion of the sense of justice in this country. And I am quite sure that Turkey will not make it through the remaining decades of the twenty-first century without recognizing, reflecting upon, and recalling this tragic past, which ultimately resulted in the disappearance of the entire non-Muslim population of Anatolia. We are talking about three million people.

So, it is really a matter of either-or. What is the significance of an embezzlement scandal involving a Turkish politician—for instance, Erdoğan—when compared with genocide? It is nothing. It is peanuts.

Therefore, a population, a polity, a society, and a state that do not wish to remember what happened a century ago—which was carried out by Turks and Kurds —can easily digest, accept, and live with far less serious wrongdoings, as we see happening today.

This is simply a normal consequence of this absence of memory, or rather this voluntary loss of memory and de-memorization of the past. It is very dangerous, and it is very unhealthy.

False European Hopes May Push Armenia Back Into Moscow’s Orbit

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Aktar, at a time when much of the post-Soviet space is characterized by authoritarian consolidation, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the region. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience, populism, and geopolitical pressure in the twenty-first century?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Interestingly, we began our discussion with this point, and we will conclude with it as well. Armenia remains the only country in its immediate neighborhood that is genuinely trying to remain a democracy. The next democratic country, after all, is Greece, which is quite far away.

It is doing its best to preserve democratic governance. But it is extremely difficult to survive in a non-democratic, and even anti-democratic, environment when you are surrounded by countries that do not share the values, principles, and norms of democracy.

This is not merely a theoretical issue; it is a practical one. Non-democracies and anti-democracies can conclude agreements with democratic countries, sign them, and then simply ignore their commitments. Because they are not accountable. A non-democratic or anti-democratic regime is not accountable to its population. It simply does not care.

Take Russia, for example. I mentioned earlier the figure of $177 for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas. That gas is supplied under an agreement between Moscow and Yerevan. But Moscow, as a non-democratic—indeed, a totalitarian—state, can simply say: “We are no longer bound by that agreement. We are raising the price to the international market level of $600. Take it or leave it.” This illustrates the difficulty of operating—and indeed surviving—in such an environment. I sincerely hope that the Armenians will manage and succeed.

The problem is that the false hopes offered by European countries and by the European Union itself are not helpful. In fact, they indirectly push Armenia back into Moscow’s orbit and deeper into Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russians are already deeply upset with the Europeans, not least because of what is happening in Ukraine. And they are unlikely to tolerate what they would perceive as a second strategic setback in their immediate neighborhood. After all, the Caucasus is their backyard.

There is one final point. Anyone interested in the South Caucasus should take a serious and analytical look at what happened in Georgia. Georgia went through a very similar process—loosening its ties with Russia and moving closer to the West. In the end, it failed. The country ended up with two portions of its territory effectively invaded and, while not formally annexed, indirectly administered by Russia. Meanwhile, all the Western hopes and aspirations of eventually joining the European Union have faded away. They are gone. Finished. Today the country is governed by a tycoon who is completely infatuated with Moscow.

This, unfortunately, is the reality of the South Caucasus. We will see how things evolve. I wish the very best to Armenia, but the task before it is not easy at all.

Street scene in Douala, Cameroon’s largest city.

Communaucratic Populism: Rethinking Identity-Based Electoral Mobilization in Postcolonial Africa

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

The authors introduce communaucratic populism as a novel conceptual framework for understanding a form of political mobilization in which electoral competition is structured less by ideological programs than by competing claims of communal belonging—ethnic, regional, or identitarian—to a state conceived as a collective patrimony. Drawing on Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election, the commentary argues that the dominant ideational, discursive, and strategic approaches to populism capture only fragments of postcolonial African electoral dynamics. Situated between ethnic populism and clientelism, communaucratic populism describes a moral economy of intercommunal rotation through which both incumbents and challengers seek legitimacy. The article identifies four constitutive dimensions of the concept, illustrates them empirically, and outlines a broader comparative research agenda on postcolonial democratic pluralism.

By Yves Valéry Obame*, Salomon Essaga Etémé** & Armand Leka Essomba***

Across sub-Saharan Africa, three decades of multiparty competition have produced a paradox that mainstream populism theory still struggles to name. Elections are held; oppositions mobilize; voters turn out, and yet executive turnover remains rare, while political contestation increasingly maps onto communal cleavages rather than programmatic ones. Cameroon offers an unusually clear instance of this puzzle. Since the 1990 return to multipartyism, no presidential alternation has occurred. The 2025 presidential election, which renewed the mandate of an incumbent in power since 1982, again unfolded along a familiar grammar: candidates summoned regional, ethnic, and identitarian solidarities; voters interpreted the state apparatus less as an instrument of policy delivery than as a collective resource to be conquered or defended; and post-electoral disputes were framed less as procedural grievances than as zero-sum struggles over communal access to power.

Such dynamics resist the standard analytical vocabulary of populism studies. They cannot be reduced to the binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite” (Mudde, 2004), nor fully captured by discursive theories of antagonism (Laclau, 2005), nor by strategic accounts centred on the unmediated personal leader (Weyland, 2001). Nor are they exhausted by the literature on ethnic politics or neo patrimonial clientelism. This commentary proposes a new analytical category – communaucratic populism – to designate this distinctive mode of political mobilization, and to begin specifying what its study requires.

Why African Electoral Politics Requires a New Conceptual Vocabulary

The three leading approaches to populism—ideational, discursive, and strategic—each illuminate a distinct facet of African electoral politics. Yet none adequately accounts for its defining feature: the routinized framing of elections as contests among communities for control of the state. The ideational approach (Mudde, 2004; Müller, 2016; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017) defines populism as a thin-centred ideology pitting a “morally pure people” against a “corrupt elite.” But in many postcolonial African contexts, the morally charged unit of political contestation is not “the people” as singular sovereign but a plurality of communities, each laying claim to representation. The Manichean cleavage runs not vertically (people against elite) but horizontally (community against community) with the state positioned as the contested prize.

The discursive approach (Laclau, 2005) is more accommodating: its emphasis on the construction of equivalently chains and antagonistic frontiers allows for the emergence of a “people” out of heterogeneous demands. Yet Laclau’s framework still presupposes that successful populist articulation generates a singular popular subject. Communaucratic mobilizationworks differently. It does not seek to dissolve communal particularities into a higher unity; it preserves them, and indeed instrumentalizes them, as the very currency of electoral legitimacy. Each candidate becomes a community’s standard-bearer; coalitions take the form of inter-communal arithmetic rather than ideological synthesis.

The strategic approach (Weyland, 2001) emphasizes the unmediated personalistic appeal of a leader to an atomized mass. This captures certain aspects of postcolonial leadership cultures, but overlooks what is most salient in cases such as Cameroon: the leader is not unmediated. He is, on the contrary, deeply mediated by community elders, regional notables, diaspora figures, customary chiefs, and digital opinion-makers who function as relays of communal endorsement. The leader is not “of the people” in Weyland’s sense, he is of his people, and recognition by other communities must be politically negotiated. To these blind spots one might add a fourth: existing accounts of ethnic populism (Brubaker, 2017) and African ethnopolitics (Posner, 2005; Lynch, 2011) treat communal mobilization either as a derivative of ethnicity or as an effect of strategic elite manipulation. Communaucratic populism, by contrast, designates a logic of political signification in its own right. 

The Four Constitutive Dimensions of Communaucratic Populism

Communaucratic populism is here understood as a mode of political mobilization in which electoral competition is structured around competing claims of communal belonging (ethnic, regional, religious, generational, or identitarian) to a state apparatus conceived as a collective patrimony to be distributed among groups. The concept articulates four constitutive dimensions.

The first is communitarian: Politics is organized around morally bounded we-groups that pre-date the electoral moment and persist beyond it. Communities are not residual identities awaiting modernization (Chabal & Daloz, 1999); they are political units in their own right, mobilized strategically but anchored in long-running histories of belonging (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Geschiere, 2009).

The second is identitarian: Communal claims do not function as raw expressions of ethnic interest but as moral narratives of dignity, recognition, and historical reparation. The demand is not merely for redistribution but for symbolic acknowledgment, the recognition that one’s community has been excluded long enough and deserves its turn.

The third is governmental: The state is figured not as a programmatic apparatus delivering public goods, but as a res communis, that is a common good to be circulated among communities. Incumbency by a single community is delegitimized over time not because policies fail, but because rotation has not occurred. Conversely, the incumbent’s coalition defends continuity through a symmetrical communal grammar: the defence of “our turn,” the avoidance of “their revenge.”

The fourth is discursive: Communaucratic mobilization deploys a distinctive vocabulary of patrimony, balance, equilibrium, and “the turn of others.” It produces a moral economy of electoral expectation in which losing is not merely defeat but exclusion, and winning is less mandate than custodianship. Communaucratic populism is therefore neither reducible to clientelism – which describes a transactional logic of patron-client exchange (Bach & Gazibo, 2012) – nor to ethnic populism in Brubaker’s (2017) sense, which presupposes a discursive construction of the people as ethnically delimited. It names a populism whose “people” is plural, whose antagonism is horizontal, and whose telos is rotation rather than rupture.

Cameroon’s 2025 Election as a Case of Communaucratic Mobilization

Cameroon’s 2025 presidential election illustrates each of these dimensions. With more than 250 ethnic communities and a long-standing regional cleavage structure – Northern, Centre-South, Western, Anglophone (Konings & Nyamnjoh, 2003) – electoral politics has long operated as a tacit accounting of communal weight. The incumbent’s longevity is itself read communaucratically: a particular regional constituency is perceived to have “had its turn” for too long, while others have not. This perception fuels mobilization not principally against authoritarianism per se, but against the retention of communal access to state power.

Three patterns observed during the 2025 electoral cycle substantiate the concept. First, alliance formation among opposition candidates followed a logic of inter-communal pooling: when a prominent Anglophone figure was excluded from the ballot, segments of his regional base redirected support not on ideological grounds but on the calculus of which alternative candidate could best aggregate non-incumbent communities. Second, digital political discourse – captured through nethnographic observation of social media debate – was saturated with communal markers: regional naming, ancestral references, and historical claims about precedence and exclusion. Third, post-electoral contestation, while invoking procedural irregularities, was decoded by participants and observers alike through a communaucratic frame: which group had been overrepresented in the tally, which underrepresented, and how the result would be received in each region.

Crucially, this is not “mere” ethnic politics. The communal grammar is articulated in the language of democratic legitimacy itself: rotation as fairness, balance as inclusion, alternation as the test of pluralism. Communaucratic populism does not reject democracy, it reinterprets it as a procedure for inter-communal distribution of state office (Bayart, 1989; Mbembe, 2001). This reinterpretation enriches existing analyses in three respects. i) Against the trope of failed transitions (Cheeseman, 2015), it specifies a coherent – if costly – logic of democratic operation under conditions of pluralism without programmatic differentiation. ii) Against the diagnosis of ethnic voting as informational shortcut, it highlights the moral and historical depth of communal claims. iii) And against the assumption that populism is a Northern import to be measured by Northern criteria, it foregrounds an indigenous configuration with its own conceptual demands (Resnick, 2014).

The Scope, Limits, and Future of the Concept

Communaucratic populism is not a universal key. Its analytical purchase depends on three contextual conditions: a politically salient pluri-communal structure; a state apparatus historically central to redistribution; and a democratic procedure understood – across the political spectrum – as a vehicle of inter-communal recognition. Where these conditions hold, the concept should travel productively: across the Gulf of Guinea (Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Gabon), into the Great Lakes region, and into postcolonial democracies beyond Africa where communal pluralism intersects with statist political economies.

Several limits should be acknowledged. The concept does not, on its own, account for coercion, electoral manipulation (Schedler, 2002), or the international determinants of incumbency. It works best in combination with – not as a replacement for – institutional and political economy analyses. Nor does it claim that ideology and policy are absent from African electoral life; it claims only those communal frames are routinely the dominant idiom through which they are translated. The agenda this opens is comparative and methodological: how to measure communaucratic intensity across cases? How to distinguish it operationally from clientelism and ethnic populism? And how to register its mutations under conditions of urbanization, digital mediation, and generational change?

Communaucratic populism is offered here as a working concept, not a finished theory. It seeks to render intelligible a political grammar that resists translation into the dominant categories of populism studies, and to do so without reducing African pluralism to deviation from a Northern norm. If populism describes, in its most general sense, a politics that makes the construction of “the people” its central operation, communaucratic populism names a variant in which that construction is irreducibly plural: where “the people” is always already a “people of peoples,” and where the democratic question is less who governs than whose turn it is to govern. The wager of the concept is that postcolonial pluralism deserves its own categories rather than borrowed ones. The discussion is only beginning.

The case of Cameroon is just a display of this reality since 1990. The initial idea has been that the Northern communities, through president Ahidjo have passed a turn to the Southern population of Cameroon through President Paul Biya. According to them, political power is supposed to go back to the North after Biya. In the year 1992, the ideology behind the Biya must go slogan was that it is the turn of the Anglophones. The Francophones have been managing power since independence. In 2018, the Bamileke populations, with in mind the ideology of Dongmo, the author of the Bamileke dynamism, stating that the Bamileke population must grab the power by demography, actually were convinced that it was their turn. The score of Issa Tchiroma Bakary in 2025, was partially due to a communaucratic coalition between the Bamileke and some Northern population, and some communacratic allies, who thought that communaucratic alliance could be the solution to overthrow the power of the Fang-Beti and Bulu. Politics in Cameroon has almost always been a matter of which is the new community to get into power? Whose turn is it?

 

(*) Dr. Yves Valéry Obame is affiliated with the University of Bertoua, the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC), and the Geneva Africa Lab (GAL).

(**) Dr. Salomon Essaga Etémé is affiliated with the University of Yaoundé I and the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).

(***) Professor Armand Leka Essomba is affiliated with the University of Yaoundé I and the Cameroonian Laboratory for Studies and Research on Contemporary Societies (CERESC).

 

References

Bach, D. C. & Gazibo, M. (Eds.). (2012). Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond. Routledge.

Bayart, J.-F. (1989). L’État en Afrique: La politique du ventre. Fayard.

Brubaker, R. (2017). “Why Populism?” Theory and Society, 46(5), 357–385. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7

Chabal, P. & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. Indiana University Press

Cheeseman, N. (2015). Democracy in Africa: Successes, Failures, and the Struggle for Political Reform. Cambridge University Press.

Dongmo, J-L. (1981). Le dynamisme Bamiléké. Yaoundé: CEPER.

Geschiere, P. (2009). The Perils of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. University of Chicago Press.

Konings, P. & Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2003). Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon. Brill.

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso.

Lynch, G. (2011). I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya. University of Chicago Press.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.

Müller, J.-W. (2016). What Is Populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Dongmo, J.-L. (1981). Le Dynamisme Bamiléké. (Vol. 1-2). Université de Yaoundé.

Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2006). Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa. Zed Books.

Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa. Cambridge University Press.

Resnick, D. (2014). Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies. Cambridge University Press.

Schedler, A. (2002). “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 36–50. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0031

Weyland, K. (2001). “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics.” Comparative Politics, 34(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412

Residents flee burning homes in Belfast.

When Integration Falters, Nativism Advances: Europe’s Liberal Dilemma

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryExtremism & RadicalisationHomeMigration

Dr. João Ferreira Dias argues that the rise of anti-immigrant unrest across Europe reflects not simply tensions over migration, but a deeper crisis of democratic integration. In this timely commentary, he contends that diversity alone cannot sustain social cohesion without strong institutions capable of transforming difference into common citizenship. Drawing on scholarship by Robert Putnam, David Goodhart, Yascha Mounk, and others, Dr. Dias examines how weakening civic institutions, declining social trust, and unresolved integration challenges create fertile ground for nativist mobilization. Rather than framing the debate as a choice between openness and exclusion, he calls for renewed attention to the civic foundations that make pluralism politically sustainable. At stake, he argues, is Europe’s ability to reconcile diversity, solidarity, and democratic stability.

By João Ferreira Dias

Recent episodes of anti-immigrant unrest in cities such as Southampton and Belfast are often interpreted through the lens of public order, criminality, or political extremism. Yet these events may also be symptomatic of a deeper challenge confronting liberal democracies across Europe: the growing tension between openness and social cohesion.

One of the defining assumptions of the late twentieth-century liberal order was that increasingly open societies would naturally generate greater inclusion. Diversity, mobility, and multiculturalism were frequently treated not merely as compatible with democratic stability, but as self-evident expressions of it. What this assumption overlooks, however, is that openness alone does not produce integration.

Democratic societies require more than legal frameworks and economic opportunities. They depend upon a shared civic foundation capable of sustaining trust, cooperation, and political legitimacy. As Robert Putnam (2007) argued in his influential work on diversity and social capital, heterogeneity can enrich societies in the long term, but it may also create short-term challenges for social trust when institutions fail to mediate difference effectively.

The fragility of contemporary liberal democracies lies not in diversity itself, but in the weakening of the mechanisms that transform diversity into common citizenship. Schools, political parties, trade unions, local associations, and public institutions historically played a crucial role in integrating individuals from different backgrounds into a shared civic culture. When these mediating institutions weaken, identities that might otherwise coexist within a broader political community increasingly become sources of social fragmentation (Judt, 2010).

Immigration policy illustrates this dilemma particularly clearly. Contemporary European migration regimes often emerge from the intersection of several legitimate objectives: humanitarian obligations, historical responsibilities, labor market demands, and demographic decline. Yet political debate frequently neglects a more uncomfortable question: the absorptive capacity of receiving societies.

The notion that democratic states must continuously assess their capacity to integrate newcomers is often portrayed as morally suspect, as if limits necessarily imply exclusion. Yet a growing body of scholarship suggests the opposite. Sustainable inclusion requires not merely access, but incorporation into a common civic framework defined by rights and responsibilities, constitutional norms, linguistic participation, gender equality, and democratic values (Mounk, 2022; Miller, 2016).

Without such a framework, diversity risks evolving from pluralism into segmentation. Social groups become increasingly disconnected from one another, trust declines, and political entrepreneurs find fertile ground for mobilizing resentment. It is under these conditions that nativist movements gain traction.

The appeal of contemporary nativism rests on a powerful narrative: that European societies are losing control over their cultural continuity, historical identity, and political sovereignty. Whether empirically accurate or not, this perception acquires political force when citizens conclude that mainstream institutions are either unwilling or unable to address concerns related to integration, social cohesion, and public order.

Importantly, the rise of nativism should not be understood as a simple reaction to immigration itself. Such explanations are analytically insufficient. The same levels of migration can produce dramatically different political outcomes depending on the strength of institutions, the effectiveness of integration policies, and the degree of social trust present within a society (Goodhart, 2017; Krastev & Holmes, 2019).

The danger emerges when individual acts of crime, disorder, or social conflict cease to be interpreted as the actions of particular individuals and instead become symbolic markers of collective identity. In such contexts, immigrants are increasingly viewed as representatives of an undifferentiated out-group, while native populations come to see themselves as members of a threatened in-group. The resulting dynamic resembles what social psychologists have long identified as the transition from individual judgment to group-based political cognition.

History suggests that democracies become particularly vulnerable when they lose the ability to interpret and respond to the anxieties of their own citizens. Polarization thrives when complex social challenges are reduced to simplistic moral binaries, dividing societies into opposing camps of “us” and “them.” In this environment, both exclusionary nativism and uncompromising forms of ideological universalism feed off one another, narrowing the space for pragmatic democratic solutions.

The challenge facing Europe today is therefore not simply whether to accept more or fewer immigrants. It is whether liberal democracies can rebuild the institutional and civic foundations necessary to transform diversity into solidarity. The question is not openness versus closure, but whether openness can remain politically sustainable without a renewed commitment to integration.

The events witnessed in Southampton, Belfast, and elsewhere may not signal the inevitable triumph of nativism. They do, however, suggest that the political center is increasingly squeezed between competing certainties: on one side, an understanding of inclusion that often underestimates the importance of social cohesion; on the other, a nativist reaction that seeks belonging through exclusion.

Europe’s democratic future may well depend on its ability to recover the difficult middle ground between these two positions.

References

Goodhart, D. (2017). The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics. London, UK: Hurst.

Judt, T. (2010). Ill Fares the Land. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Krastev, I., & Holmes, S. (2019). The Light That Failed: A Reckoning. London, UK: Allen Lane.

Miller, D. (2016). Strangers in Our Midst: The Political Philosophy of Immigration. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Mounk, Y. (2022). The Great Experiment: Why Diverse Democracies Fall Apart and How They Can Endure. New York, NY: Penguin Press.

Putnam, R. D. (2007). “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century.” Scandinavian Political Studies, 30(2), 137–174.