The sea port of Barcelona in Spain.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Arlo Poletti: The Evolution of EU Trade Policy and the Global Trade Order

How has the European Union’s trade policy evolved from championing liberal multilateralism to pursuing strategic autonomy in an era of geopolitical rivalry? In his opening lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Arlo Poletti examines the historical transformation of EU trade policy against the backdrop of globalization, China’s rise, populist contestation, and the growing weaponization of economic interdependence. Moderated by Dr. Sonali Chowdhry, the session demonstrates that contemporary trade policy can no longer be understood solely through the lens of market liberalization but must increasingly be viewed as an instrument of geopolitical strategy, economic resilience, industrial policy, and European strategic autonomy.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The accelerating transformation of the international political economy has fundamentally reshaped the role of trade in global affairs. Once understood primarily as a vehicle for market integration, economic efficiency, and multilateral cooperation, trade policy has increasingly become intertwined with geopolitical competition, technological rivalry, economic security, and democratic politics. The resurgence of great-power rivalry, the weaponization of economic interdependence, the fragmentation of global supply chains, and the rise of populist and nationalist movements have challenged many of the assumptions underpinning the post-war liberal trading order. As governments increasingly employ tariffs, industrial policy, sanctions, export controls, and investment screening as instruments of strategic statecraft, understanding contemporary trade policy requires a broader analytical perspective that integrates economics, international relations, and political science.

These developments provided the intellectual backdrop for the opening lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the theme Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from around the world, the programme explored how profound geopolitical, economic, and political transformations are reshaping Europe and the wider international order. Within this context, Professor Arlo Poletti delivered a wide-ranging lecture, “The Evolution of EU Trade Policy and the Global Trade Order,” examining how the European Union has evolved from one of the principal architects and defenders of the liberal multilateral trading system into an increasingly geoeconomic actor seeking to balance openness with resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security. Combining insights from international political economy, European integration studies, and comparative political economy, Professor Poletti demonstrated that contemporary EU trade policy can no longer be understood solely through the lens of market liberalization but must increasingly be analyzed as an instrument of foreign policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical influence. 

The session was thoughtfully moderated by by Dr. Sonali Chowdhry, Research Associate at DIW Berlin and Fellow at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, whose own scholarship on global value chains, international trade, sanctions, and the distributional consequences of trade policy provided an ideal intellectual framework for the discussion. She observed that the rules-based multilateral trading order that had long provided the foundation for European prosperity could no longer be taken for granted. Rising geopolitical rivalry, intensifying technological competition with China, increasingly protectionist trade policies emanating from the United States, and the disruption of global energy markets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have collectively transformed the strategic environment within which European trade policy operates. 

She further explained that understanding Europe’s response requires looking beyond individual trade agreements or tariff disputes. Instead, participants needed to appreciate the historical trajectory through which European trade policy evolved—from an instrument primarily concerned with market liberalization into one increasingly intertwined with questions of industrial policy, technological competitiveness, economic resilience, and national security. This broader perspective, she argued, would enable participants to understand not only contemporary EU trade policy but also the wider transformations affecting the international economic order itself. 

By situating Professor Poletti’s presentation within the broader transformations affecting the global political economy, Dr. Chowdhry emphasized why the evolution of European trade policy has become central to understanding Europe’s strategic position in an era marked by intensifying geopolitical competition and growing uncertainty. Her moderation effectively established the conceptual foundations for a lecture that encouraged participants to rethink trade not merely as an economic policy domain, but as one of the principal arenas through which power, security, and international order are increasingly contested. 

Understanding EU Trade Policy as an Interaction of Institutions, International Structure, and Domestic Politics

Professor Arlo Poletti.
Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento.

Professor Poletti began by proposing a conceptual framework through which the entire historical evolution of European trade policy could be understood. Rather than presenting trade policy as a sequence of isolated policy choices, he argued that its development reflected the interaction of three fundamental dimensions: the institutional architecture governing European trade policy, the changing international environment, and the domestic political coalitions shaping policy preferences. 

Although institutional rules have evolved over time, Professor Poletti explained that they have remained relatively stable compared to the profound transformations experienced by international politics and domestic political competition. Consequently, while institutional arrangements provide the structural foundation for European trade policy, it is primarily shifts in the international distribution of power and changes in domestic political conflict that explain the major strategic transformations observed over the past seven decades.

He therefore encouraged participants to think historically rather than episodically. Trade policy, in his view, represents the product of continuous interaction between relatively stable institutional structures and dynamic political and economic environments. Understanding this interaction, he argued, allows scholars to explain why the European Union has repeatedly redefined its external economic strategy while preserving many of its institutional foundations.

The Institutional Foundations of European Trade Power

Before turning to the historical evolution itself, Professor Poletti briefly examined the institutional foundations that have historically made the European Union one of the world’s most influential trade actors.

He identified three institutional characteristics that have consistently strengthened the Union’s negotiating position. First, trade policy has constituted a supranational competence almost since the very beginning of European integration. Member states delegated authority to negotiate external trade agreements to the European Commission, thereby allowing Europe to speak with a single voice in international negotiations. This institutional arrangement significantly enhanced Europe’s bargaining power compared with what individual member states could have achieved independently. 

Second, the creation of a common external tariff transformed the European Community—and later the European Union—into one of the largest integrated markets in the global economy. Market size itself became a powerful source of leverage. Foreign governments seeking access to the European market faced strong incentives to negotiate with European institutions, enhancing the Union’s capacity to influence international trade rules.

Finally, Professor Poletti discussed what scholars have described as the “paradox of weakness.” Although European trade negotiations require extensive consensus among member states and often involve complex decision-making procedures with multiple veto points, this apparent institutional rigidity has paradoxically strengthened the Union’s negotiating position internationally. Because European negotiators are constrained by member-state mandates, foreign governments often recognize that the Commission has limited flexibility during negotiations. Rather than weakening the Union, this constrained bargaining position has frequently increased its credibility and leverage.

From Embedded Liberalism to Globalization: The European Union as a Regime Shaper

Having established the institutional foundations of European trade policy, Professor Poletti proceeded to examine the historical circumstances under which the European Union emerged as one of the principal architects of the post-war liberal trading order. He argued that the trajectory of European trade policy cannot be understood without first appreciating the broader political and economic settlement that emerged after the Second World War. Rather than viewing trade liberalization as an isolated economic objective, policymakers embedded it within a wider institutional architecture designed simultaneously to promote economic openness, domestic stability, and international peace. 

Professor Poletti explained that the postwar international order rested upon what political economist John Ruggie famously described as “embedded liberalism.” Unlike the laissez-faire globalization of the late 19th century, the post-1945 order sought to reconcile international market openness with governments’ capacity to pursue domestic social protection and macroeconomic stability. International trade was therefore promoted not as an end in itself but as one component of a broader political compromise that recognized the legitimacy of state intervention while preventing the return of destructive economic nationalism.

Within this emerging international framework, Western Europe became one of the principal beneficiaries of expanding multilateral trade. The creation of the European Economic Community complemented rather than challenged the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Professor Poletti emphasized that European integration itself should be understood as a regional manifestation of the broader liberal international order, with both projects reinforcing one another through reciprocal commitments to openness, rules-based cooperation, and institutionalized dispute resolution.

Rather than pursuing protectionism, European governments increasingly viewed economic interdependence as a source of prosperity and political stability. Trade liberalization reduced barriers among member states while simultaneously strengthening Europe’s position within the broader multilateral trading system. This institutional convergence, Professor Poletti argued, allowed Europe gradually to evolve from a collection of national economies into one of the world’s most influential commercial actors.

Trade Policy as Foreign Policy

Professor Poletti noted that European trade policy gradually acquired significance beyond commercial negotiations alone. As European integration deepened, access to the common market became an increasingly valuable diplomatic resource that allowed the European Community—and later the European Union—to project influence well beyond its borders.

Trade agreements increasingly incorporated political conditionality, regulatory convergence, environmental provisions, labor standards, and development objectives. Commercial policy thus became an important instrument of external governance through which the European Union sought to diffuse its regulatory preferences internationally. This gradual expansion of policy objectives reflected Europe’s growing confidence in the attractiveness of its own institutional model. Rather than relying upon traditional military power, the European Union increasingly exercised influence through economic incentives and regulatory standards. Professor Poletti observed that access to the European market became one of the Union’s most powerful foreign policy instruments, encouraging neighboring countries and trading partners alike to adopt European regulatory norms.

This process, frequently described as the “Brussels Effect,” enabled the European Union to shape global markets even without formal international agreements. Firms seeking access to Europe’s large consumer market often adopted European standards voluntarily, subsequently applying those standards globally because maintaining multiple regulatory systems proved economically inefficient.

The European Union as a Defender of Multilateralism

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

Professor Poletti argued that throughout much of the post-Cold War period the European Union increasingly came to view itself as the principal defender of the multilateral trading order. While the United States had initially played the dominant leadership role during the creation of GATT, Europe gradually assumed greater responsibility for maintaining and expanding international trade institutions.

The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 represented the culmination of decades of multilateral cooperation. Unlike GATT, the WTO created stronger legal mechanisms for dispute settlement, broader institutional competencies, and more comprehensive commitments covering services, intellectual property, and investment-related measures. Professor Poletti emphasized that the European Union enthusiastically supported this institutional strengthening because multilateral rules protected medium-sized powers by reducing arbitrary exercises of economic power by larger states.

For Europe, multilateralism was never merely an abstract normative preference. It served concrete strategic interests. A predictable, legally binding trading system protected export-oriented European economies while reducing uncertainty for firms deeply integrated into global production networks. Stable rules also prevented major powers from using unilateral economic coercion to secure political concessions.

Consequently, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, European trade policy remained firmly committed to expanding and deepening the multilateral trading order. Successive enlargements of the European Union reinforced this orientation, bringing additional member states into a shared institutional framework built around openness, legal predictability, and international cooperation.

Globalization and the Expansion of European Trade

Professor Poletti then situated European trade policy within the broader acceleration of globalization that characterized the final decades of the twentieth century. Falling transportation costs, advances in information technology, financial liberalization, and the fragmentation of production processes transformed the structure of the world economy. Trade increasingly consisted not simply of finished products crossing national borders but of complex global value chains in which production stages were distributed across multiple countries. European firms became deeply embedded within these international production networks, relying upon cross-border investment, intermediate goods, and integrated supply chains.

This transformation substantially altered the political economy of trade. Large multinational firms became increasingly supportive of trade liberalization because their competitiveness depended upon efficient international production networks. Export-oriented industries similarly benefited from expanding foreign market access. Professor Poletti observed that under these conditions, globalization appeared largely compatible with both European economic interests and broader political objectives. The dominant policy consensus therefore viewed further liberalization as both economically efficient and politically desirable.

Emerging Political Tensions beneath the Surface

Yet Professor Poletti cautioned participants against interpreting this period as one of uncontested globalization. Even while international trade expanded rapidly, underlying political tensions gradually accumulated within many advanced industrial democracies. The benefits of globalization were distributed unevenly across regions, industries, and social groups. Highly skilled workers, internationally competitive firms, and urban export-oriented regions often experienced substantial gains. Conversely, workers employed in import-competing industries, economically vulnerable regions, and sectors exposed to international competition frequently experienced economic insecurity, employment losses, or stagnant wages.

Although these distributional tensions remained politically manageable for much of the 1990s, Professor Poletti argued that they gradually eroded domestic support for trade liberalization. Economic globalization increasingly became associated—not universally but among significant segments of the population—with deindustrialization, inequality, declining economic security, and reduced national policy autonomy.

Importantly, these emerging tensions did not initially transform European trade policy itself. Institutional commitments to multilateralism remained robust, and mainstream political parties largely continued supporting economic openness. Nevertheless, Professor Poletti suggested that the foundations of the postwar liberal consensus had begun to weaken long before they became politically visible.

Domestic Politics and the Rise of Contestation

Professor Poletti emphasized that trade policy can never be understood independently from domestic political coalitions. Governments negotiate internationally, but they remain accountable to domestic constituencies whose preferences evolve over time. As globalization generated increasingly uneven outcomes, political entrepreneurs began mobilizing those left behind by economic transformation. New political cleavages emerged that extended beyond traditional divisions between labor and capital or left and right. Questions concerning globalization, national sovereignty, migration, identity, and international integration increasingly became interconnected within broader political conflicts. This development proved especially significant because it fundamentally altered the political context within which European trade policy operated. Whereas trade liberalization had previously attracted broad cross-party consensus, it now became increasingly contested by populist movements questioning both globalization and European integration itself.

Professor Poletti stressed that this transformation should not be understood merely as an economic phenomenon. Rather, it reflected the interaction of material grievances with broader political narratives concerning sovereignty, democratic accountability, and national identity. These domestic changes would eventually intersect with profound shifts in the international system itself, creating an environment fundamentally different from the one that had sustained Europe’s multilateral trade strategy for decades.

Professor Poletti had demonstrated that the European Union’s emergence as a regime-shaping trade power rested upon a unique historical constellation: a stable liberal international order, expanding globalization, broad domestic support for openness, and institutional mechanisms that amplified European bargaining power. Yet the very forces that had enabled this success were beginning to generate new political tensions whose consequences would become increasingly visible during the following decade. These developments, he suggested, marked the beginning of a much more contested era in which Europe’s longstanding commitment to liberal multilateralism would face unprecedented political and geopolitical challenges. 

The Crisis of the Liberal Trade Order and the Rise of Geoeconomics

Having traced the European Union’s emergence as one of the principal architects and defenders of the postwar liberal trading order, Professor Poletti turned to what he described as the most significant transformation in contemporary international political economy: the gradual erosion of the assumptions that had sustained globalization for more than three decades. The world that had allowed Europe to pursue trade liberalization as both an economic and political project, he argued, had fundamentally changed. The result was not merely an adjustment of trade policy but a profound reconceptualization of trade itself—from an instrument of economic integration into an increasingly strategic component of geopolitical competition. 

Professor Poletti emphasized that this transformation did not occur suddenly. Rather, it emerged through the interaction of multiple structural developments that gradually undermined confidence in the liberal international order. These included the changing distribution of global economic power, the rise of China as a systemic competitor, the weakening of multilateral institutions, growing skepticism toward globalization within advanced democracies, and the increasing tendency of states to view economic interdependence through the prism of national security rather than economic efficiency. Rather than representing isolated developments, these trends collectively altered the very logic underlying international trade governance.

China’s Rise and the Transformation of Global Competition

Photo: Shutterstock.

Among these developments, Professor Poletti identified the spectacular rise of China as perhaps the single most consequential structural change affecting the international economic system during the twenty-first century. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 had originally been interpreted by many Western policymakers as confirmation that expanding economic integration would gradually encourage political liberalization and reinforce the rules-based international order. Economic engagement was expected to produce convergence—not only economically but eventually politically. Reality unfolded rather differently.

Professor Poletti explained that China’s remarkable economic transformation dramatically altered global patterns of production, investment, and technological competition without producing the anticipated political convergence. Instead, China’s state-capitalist model demonstrated that rapid economic modernization could coexist with strong state intervention, industrial policy, and centralized political authority. This development fundamentally challenged many assumptions underpinning the liberal trading system.

Unlike earlier emerging economies, China rapidly became both an indispensable trading partner and an increasingly formidable geopolitical competitor. European firms benefited enormously from access to Chinese markets and production networks, yet simultaneously faced growing competitive pressures from Chinese industrial expansion supported by extensive state intervention. The consequence was a growing tension between economic interdependence and strategic competition.

Professor Poletti stressed that European policymakers increasingly found themselves confronting a dilemma for which traditional trade policy offered few satisfactory solutions: how could Europe remain committed to open markets while responding to the strategic implications of China’s expanding technological, industrial, and geopolitical influence?

The Growing Politicization of Global Value Chains

A second major theme of Professor Poletti’s lecture concerned the transformation of global value chains from purely economic arrangements into objects of strategic political concern. For decades, increasingly fragmented international production had been celebrated as evidence of globalization’s efficiency. Firms located different stages of production wherever costs were lowest or capabilities strongest, creating highly integrated transnational production systems that substantially increased productivity. However, Professor Poletti argued that recent crises fundamentally altered perceptions of these global production networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities associated with excessive dependence upon geographically concentrated supply chains. Medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and numerous intermediate goods suddenly became difficult to obtain as production disruptions spread across international markets. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further demonstrated how energy dependence and commodity supply could become instruments of geopolitical coercion. These experiences fundamentally changed the political discourse surrounding globalization. Where policymakers had previously emphasized efficiency, they increasingly began discussing resilience. Where cost minimization had previously dominated policy debates, security of supply emerged as an equally important objective. Trade policy therefore became inseparable from broader discussions concerning economic security.

Professor Poletti observed that concepts such as friend-shoring, near-shoring, de-risking, and strategic resilience rapidly entered the vocabulary of both policymakers and scholars. Each reflected an important conceptual shift: globalization would no longer be evaluated solely according to economic efficiency but also according to geopolitical reliability.

Populism and the Domestic Politics of Trade

Professor Poletti next examined how international structural changes interacted with domestic political transformations across Europe and other advanced democracies. Trade policy, he emphasized, increasingly became entangled with broader political debates surrounding sovereignty, immigration, national identity, democratic accountability, and economic inequality. The globalization consensus that had characterized much of the 1990s and early 2000s gradually weakened as populist movements successfully mobilized constituencies who believed themselves disadvantaged by economic integration. 

Professor Poletti carefully distinguished between legitimate socioeconomic grievances and the political narratives through which these grievances were interpreted. Many communities genuinely experienced industrial decline, employment insecurity, or reduced economic opportunities resulting from structural economic transformation. Yet populist actors frequently reframed these complex developments through simplified political narratives that attributed responsibility to globalization, supranational institutions, international trade agreements, or political elites. 

Trade therefore ceased to function as a largely technocratic policy domain.Instead, it became highly politicized. Economic openness increasingly symbolized broader questions concerning national sovereignty and democratic control. This politicization significantly constrained policymakers’ room for maneuver. Whereas earlier governments often negotiated trade agreements with relatively limited public attention, contemporary trade negotiations increasingly generated intense political contestation. Professor Poletti suggested that understanding contemporary European trade policy requires recognizing this changing domestic political environment as much as the evolving international system.

The Decline of Multilateralism

Photo: Dreamstime.

Another central theme of the lecture concerned the weakening of the multilateral institutions that had previously governed international trade. Professor Poletti noted that the WTO experienced increasing difficulties in fulfilling its traditional functions. Negotiations under the Doha Development Round effectively stalled. Consensus among an expanding membership became increasingly difficult to achieve. Perhaps most significantly, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism encountered severe institutional paralysis following disagreements over judicial appointments. For a political entity such as the European Union—whose prosperity had long depended upon predictable international rules—this institutional weakening represented a profound strategic challenge.

Professor Poletti emphasized that Europe remained rhetorically committed to multilateralism. However, policymakers increasingly recognized that defending multilateral principles alone would prove insufficient if other major powers adopted more unilateral or coercive approaches. Consequently, European trade policy gradually began adapting to a world characterized by greater geopolitical competition and weaker international institutions. Rather than abandoning multilateralism altogether, Europe increasingly supplemented multilateral commitments with bilateral trade agreements, new defensive instruments, and broader industrial policy initiatives.

Strategic Autonomy as a New Policy Paradigm

Professor Poletti devoted considerable attention to the emergence of strategic autonomy as perhaps the defining concept shaping contemporary European economic policy. He explained that strategic autonomy should not be interpreted as economic isolation or protectionism. Rather, it reflects an effort to preserve openness while simultaneously reducing excessive dependence upon potentially unreliable external partners. The objective is therefore selective resilience rather than comprehensive disengagement. 

This distinction, Professor Poletti argued, is crucial. Europe remains deeply integrated within the global economy. Its prosperity continues to depend upon international trade, investment, and technological exchange. Yet policymakers increasingly acknowledge that complete dependence upon external suppliers in strategically important sectors creates vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored. Strategic autonomy therefore seeks to reconcile two objectives that increasingly appear in tension: i) maintaining economic openness; and ii) strengthening geopolitical resilience. Professor Poletti suggested that this balancing act will likely define European trade policy for years to come.

From Liberal Trade Policy to Geoeconomic Statecraft

Perhaps the most important conceptual contribution of Professor Poletti’s lecture was his argument that Europe is witnessing not merely a revision of trade policy but a broader transformation toward geoeconomics. Trade, investment, technology, industrial policy, export controls, sanctions, and supply-chain governance increasingly operate as interconnected instruments of strategic competition. Economic policy itself has become an instrument of foreign policy.

Professor Poletti emphasized that this transformation does not necessarily imply abandoning liberal economic principles. Rather, it reflects recognition that economic relations now operate within a far more competitive geopolitical environment than the one that characterized the immediate post-Cold War decades. Consequently, policymakers must simultaneously pursue prosperity, security, resilience, and political influence. These objectives often complement one another—but increasingly they also generate difficult trade-offs.

Throughout this section of the lecture, Professor Poletti encouraged participants to move beyond simplistic binaries opposing free trade and protectionism. The more significant transformation, he argued, concerns the changing purposes assigned to trade policy itself. Where European trade policy once primarily sought efficiency, market access, and rule-based cooperation, it must now also address technological rivalry, supply-chain resilience, industrial competitiveness, economic coercion, and geopolitical uncertainty. This evolution represents one of the most important structural transformations currently reshaping both the European Union and the international political economy more broadly.

The European Union’s Emerging Geoeconomic Toolbox

In the concluding substantive part of his lecture, Professor Poletti examined how the European Union has begun translating its changing understanding of international political economy into concrete policy instruments. Having demonstrated that trade policy has evolved from a predominantly liberalizing enterprise into an increasingly strategic one, he explained that this conceptual transformation has been accompanied by the gradual development of a new geoeconomic toolkit. These instruments, he argued, reflect Europe’s attempt to reconcile its long-standing commitment to an open global economy with the realities of an increasingly competitive and fragmented international system. 

Professor Poletti emphasized that this policy evolution should not be interpreted as a wholesale abandonment of liberal trade principles. Rather, it represents an effort to update the Union’s external economic strategy to meet challenges that did not exist when the contemporary multilateral trading system was established. In today’s international environment, governments increasingly employ economic instruments not simply to pursue prosperity but also to advance geopolitical objectives, secure technological leadership, protect critical infrastructure, and influence the strategic behavior of other states. Against this backdrop, the European Union has sought to develop instruments capable of responding to economic coercion while remaining broadly consistent with its preference for rules-based international cooperation.

One of the most notable developments discussed during the lecture was the adoption of the Anti-Coercion Instrument, designed to provide the European Union with mechanisms to respond collectively when third countries seek to pressure individual member states through economic means. Professor Poletti explained that this initiative reflects lessons drawn from recent international experiences, particularly instances in which economic dependence was deliberately weaponized to influence sovereign political decisions. The emergence of such instruments illustrates how economic security has become inseparable from broader questions of European strategic autonomy. Rather than assuming that commercial interdependence automatically generates political stability, policymakers increasingly recognize that asymmetric dependencies can themselves become sources of vulnerability.

Balancing Openness and Security

Throughout this part of the lecture, Professor Poletti repeatedly returned to what he identified as the central dilemma confronting contemporary European policymakers: how can Europe remain one of the world’s most open economies while simultaneously protecting itself against strategic risks? He argued that simplistic solutions—whether complete protectionism or unrestricted globalization—fail to capture the complexity of today’s international environment. Europe’s prosperity continues to depend fundamentally upon international trade, investment, technological exchange, and participation in global production networks. Attempts to disengage from globalization entirely would therefore impose enormous economic costs and undermine European competitiveness.

At the same time, recent crises have demonstrated that excessive dependence in strategically sensitive sectors may expose governments to unacceptable political and economic risks. The challenge, Professor Poletti suggested, lies not in choosing between openness and security but in designing policies capable of balancing both objectives simultaneously. This balancing exercise increasingly shapes European debates concerning semiconductors, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, critical raw materials, pharmaceuticals, energy security, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing. Across these sectors, policymakers are seeking to strengthen resilience without undermining the economic benefits generated by international integration.

Professor Poletti emphasized that such decisions inevitably involve difficult political trade-offs. Measures that improve resilience frequently impose higher economic costs. Conversely, policies maximizing efficiency may increase geopolitical exposure. Contemporary trade policy therefore requires continuous negotiation between competing priorities rather than straightforward pursuit of a single objective.

Industrial Policy Returns to the Center of European Strategy

Another significant theme concerned the renewed importance of industrial policy within the European Union. For much of the post-Cold War era, industrial policy occupied a relatively modest place within mainstream European economic thinking. Market competition, regulatory harmonization, and trade liberalization were generally viewed as the principal drivers of competitiveness. Professor Poletti argued that this intellectual consensus has shifted considerably. Governments increasingly recognize that technological leadership, innovation capacity, and industrial resilience cannot always be left exclusively to market forces, particularly when competing powers actively employ industrial subsidies, state investment, and strategic planning. The European Union’s recent industrial initiatives therefore represent not merely economic policy but components of a broader geoeconomic strategy.

Professor Poletti cautioned, however, against viewing industrial policy simply as a return to traditional state intervention. Contemporary industrial strategy seeks to strengthen technological competitiveness while remaining compatible with European competition rules, environmental objectives, and international commitments. Achieving this balance remains one of the central policy challenges confronting the Union.

Europe’s Position Between the United States and China

Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Poletti also reflected on Europe’s increasingly delicate position between the world’s two largest economic powers. Unlike the Cold War bipolar system, today’s international economy remains characterized by deep commercial interdependence even as geopolitical rivalry intensifies. Europe consequently faces pressures from multiple directions. The United States increasingly encourages closer coordination among democratic allies in areas such as technology controls, investment screening, and supply-chain security. China remains simultaneously an indispensable economic partner, a major export market, an important source of investment, and an increasingly significant strategic competitor.

Professor Poletti argued that navigating these overlapping relationships requires a high degree of strategic flexibility. Rather than aligning unconditionally with either pole, the European Union seeks to preserve its own capacity for independent decision-making while maintaining productive economic relationships with both. This aspiration partly explains the growing emphasis placed upon strategic autonomy throughout recent European policy documents.

Conclusion

Professor Arlo Poletti concluded his lecture by demonstrating that the evolution of European Union trade policy reflects far more than successive changes in commercial strategy. Rather, it mirrors the transformation of the international political economy itself. From the postwar embedded liberal order through the expansion of globalization to today’s era of geopolitical rivalry and geoeconomic competition, European trade policy has continuously adapted to changing domestic, institutional, and international conditions.

A central message of the lecture was that the European Union’s identity as a trade power has fundamentally evolved. While Europe remains committed to international openness and multilateral cooperation, these objectives are increasingly pursued alongside concerns for resilience, strategic autonomy, technological competitiveness, and economic security. Trade policy has therefore become inseparable from broader questions of foreign policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical positioning.

Professor Poletti cautioned against simplistic narratives portraying either globalization or deglobalization as inevitable historical trajectories. Instead, he encouraged participants to recognize that the current period is characterized by selective reconfiguration rather than wholesale retreat from international economic integration. The challenge confronting Europe is not whether to participate in globalization but how to shape globalization under conditions of growing strategic competition.

In sum, the lecture offered participants a sophisticated framework for understanding one of the defining transformations of contemporary international political economy. By integrating institutional analysis, historical development, domestic political dynamics, and geopolitical change, Professor Poletti demonstrated that European trade policy now occupies the intersection of economics, security, and global governance. His presentation underscored that the future of the European Union’s external economic strategy will depend upon its ability to preserve the benefits of openness while developing the resilience necessary to navigate an increasingly uncertain and contested international order. Under Dr. Sonali Chowdhry’s thoughtful moderation, the session provided participants with both a rich historical perspective and an analytical toolkit for understanding how trade has become one of the principal arenas through which power, security, and political authority are exercised in the twenty-first century. 

Michael Shifter

Prof. Shifter: Anti-Establishment Politics, Not Ideology, Drove Colombia’s Election

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election has reignited fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative democracy in Latin America. Is the country experiencing a conventional ideological shift, or does the election reveal a deeper transformation in democratic politics? In this ECPS interview, Professor Michael Shifter argues that Colombia’s election was driven less by ideology than by widespread anti-establishment sentiment rooted in persistent insecurity, weak state capacity, and public frustration with successive governments’ failure to deliver results. Examining the rise of security populism, the erosion of political moderation, the resilience of Colombian democratic institutions, and the evolving relationship with the United States, Professor Shifter offers a nuanced assessment of Colombia’s political trajectory and its broader implications for comparative studies of populism and democratic governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election marks one of the most consequential political turning points in contemporary Latin America, raising fundamental questions about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative government. The election of Abelardo de la Espriella, following the historic presidency of Gustavo Petro, has frequently been interpreted as evidence of a regional shift from the left toward the populist radical right. Yet such an interpretation, while politically intuitive, risks overlooking the deeper structural forces reshaping democratic politics across the hemisphere. Is Colombia witnessing an ideological realignment, or does the election reveal something more profound about the changing nature of democratic representation itself? As insecurity, organized crime, institutional distrust, and dissatisfaction with political elites intensify across Latin America, electoral competition increasingly appears to revolve less around competing ideological projects than around public demands for effective governance, security, and political renewal.

Few scholars are better positioned to interpret these developments than Professor Michael Shifter, Adjunct Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. For decades, his scholarship has examined the intersections of democratic governance, state-building, political violence, US–Latin American relations, and institutional development. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Shifter offers a nuanced interpretation of Colombia’s election that challenges conventional narratives about ideological polarization and instead places anti-establishment politics at the center of democratic change.

Professor Shifter argues that the conventional interpretation of Colombia’s 2026 election as simply a shift from left to right overlooks a deeper transformation taking place in the country’s democratic politics. “The conventional narrative… is that we’re seeing a turn to the right… I think that’s only part of the story,” he explains. “If we focus only on that, we’re missing something more profound and more fundamental,” namely “profound discontent, widespread anger, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment.” In his view, Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory represents not merely a rejection of Gustavo Petro’s left-wing government but the continuation of the same anti-establishment dynamic that first brought Petro himself to power in 2022. “It is not simply a shift from the left to the right,” he observes, “but a continuation of anti-establishment politics.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Shifter explores how declining confidence in traditional political parties, the rise of social media-driven campaigning, persistent insecurity, and frustration over governments’ inability to deliver tangible results are transforming democratic competition throughout Latin America. He explains why contemporary electoral behavior is increasingly shaped by emotional appeals rather than coherent political programs; why “security populismhas become an increasingly powerful electoral force; why the apparent rise of a unified global populist right often conceals significant ideological differences among its leaders; and why Colombia’s political center continues to erode under the combined pressures of institutional failure and rejectionist voting. At the same time, he cautions against reducing contemporary Latin American politics to simplistic ideological categories, emphasizing instead the diversity of populist experiences across the region.

Despite his concern about growing populist pressures, Professor Shifter ultimately offers a measured assessment of Colombia’s democratic future. One of the most important—and, in his view, most overlooked—developments of the Petro years was “the resilience of Colombian institutions: Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press.” While acknowledging the serious challenges posed by insecurity, polarization, and anti-establishment politics, he concludes on a cautiously optimistic note, expressing confidence that Colombia’s democratic institutions remain capable of preserving constitutional order and maintaining effective checks and balances in the years ahead.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Michael Shifter, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Pakistan, MWM

Beyond Islamo-Populism: Religious Framing and Sectarian Mobilization among the Far-Right Islamist Parties in Pakistan

DOWNLOAD ARTICLE

Please cite as:
Ali, Karrar & Urooj, Aamina. (2026). “Beyond Islamo-Populism: Religious Framing and Sectarian Mobilization among the Far-Right Islamist Parties in Pakistan.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 07, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0055

Abstract 

Pakistan’s far-right Islamist political parties hold a significant space in the electoral and mobilizational base, yet their scholarly examination is quite limited in the existing literature. Although these parties have different doctrinal positions and unique political agendas, the existing literature treat them all under broad umbrella terms assuming that they share a common narrative and have homogeneous logic. This paper challenges this assumption by conducting a first systematic comparative framing analysis of three far-right Islamist parties that represent three different sectarian constituencies namely the Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdate-e-Muslimeen (MWM) representing Barelvi, Deobandi, and Shia sects respectively. The study applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framing theory that constitute three core framing tasks and four frame alignment processes. For data sources, the study relies on party manifestos, campaign slogans, party leadership statements, and documented public discourse spanning from the period of 2015 till 2024. The chosen time period starts from the point when TLP was formed, till 2024 that marks the latest elections in the country. The findings of the study reveal that although all three parties conduct their activities within the same political environment and invoke Islamic symbols, but they manifest different political logics and mobilization strategies. TLP’s positioning is built upon religious populism that centers on Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality of prophethood), constructing a moral antagonism between the pious people and corrupt elites. JUI-F operates through Islamist conservatism, pursuing the state to institutionalize Sharia in the country, and MWM mobilizes through sectarian minority identity politics, constructing their political narrative around Karbala symbolism to frame Shia Muslims as a persecuted community demanding protection and recognition. These distinct logics of each party are shaped by sectarian identity and historical grievances which demonstrate that religious political mobilization in Pakistan is internally differentiated in ways that umbrella categorization does not reveal. The findings of this study contribute to how scholars theorize religious populism in Muslim-majority states and help understanding the structural sources of political polarization and sectarian tension in Pakistan. 

Keywords: Pakistan, Far-right Islamist parties, Sectarian mobilization, framing analysis, religious populism, Islamist conservatism, minority politics.

 

By Karrar Ali & Aamina Urooj[1]

Introduction 

PTI supporter at Jinnah Cricket Stadium during a political rally of cricketer turned politician Imran Khan on March 23, 2012 in Sialkot, Pakistan. Photo: Jahanzaib Naiyyer.

The far-right Islamist landscape in Pakistan presents an analytical puzzle, manifested by three political parties: Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), which operate within the same religious-political field, draw on the same Islamic tradition, and all deploy religious symbols to construct political narratives and mobilize public support. Yet, they do through strikingly different strategies, targeting different constituencies, invoking different symbols, and constructing different political logic. TLP shows their support from the Barelvi sectarian tradition, JUI-F from the Deobandi tradition, and MWM from the Shia community. This paper argues that these differences are not incidental but are analytically significant. Through a systematic comparative framing analysis grounded in Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework, this study examines how each party strategically constructs its political narrative through religious symbols and what those differences reveal about the internal differentiation of far-right Islamist mobilization in Pakistan.

The involvement of far-right Islamist parties in the political sphere in Pakistan has remained significant since its inception. They have played an important part in Islamization of the state and society especially since late 1970s under the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. To legitimize his military rule, he reorganized governance around “Islamic” norms, most notably through the Hudood Ordinances (1979) and the creation of the Federal Shariat Court (1980). These strategies soon became an enforceable state policy that strengthen the role of religious parties and clerical networks extending their leverage into the public life, law, and political bargaining (Kennedy, 1990: 65). The Islamic provisions in the constitution of 1956, 1962, and 1973 are one such manifestation of their involvement (Roy, 1994: 23). This Process did not redefine constitutional language, but it normalized the use of Islamic symbolism in political discourse and opened institutional space for religious parties to claim moral authority in the public sphere. 

The Islamist political parties under focus of this study have emerged in different times having different objectives to come into politics, but they all share common popular strategies to remain in power and have significant voter base. JUI-F, Pakistan’s largest Islamist political party currently holds fourth-most seats in the Senate and fifth-most in the National Assembly and has proven street power, largely drawn from the students of madrassas (Rahimullah, 2021). TLP became 4th largest party in Pakistan following the 2024 general election, securing nearly 2.89 million votes (Gallup Pakistan, 2024). Although still struggling to make significant presence in the political space, MWM has also secured seats in both national assembly and senate in 2024 general election (Hussain, 2024).

An initial step toward an understanding of these parties is the scholarship on religious populismwhich is helpful but insufficient. The scholars of religious populism such as Mudde (2004), Yilmaz, Batool and Shakil (2023), and Hadiz (2014) have demonstrated how Islamist movements use the same rhetoric by replacing the term “the people” with “ummah” and the term “political opposition” with “moral and theological opposition.’ TLP fits this description quite well; it builds a moral dichotomy between the righteous and the corrupt, it defines blasphemy as an existential threat to the civilizational values of Islam and it sees itself as the true voice of the Barelvi Muslim community against what it considers to be the secular, corrupt, and morally bankrupt government. 

The situation becomes much more complicated, however, if JUI-F and MWM are viewed the same way. JUI-F’s politics are not directed against the political system but toward its completion on Islamic lines, it doesn’t involve protesting against the corrupt elite but the creation of Sharia institutions in the current political system. The dominant discourse on the other hand, which MWM is best known for, is one of sectarian community protection, in which Shia Muslims are portrayed as a persecuted minority that deserves recognition, security and representation from a government “ignoring their plight.” These are different political logics, and it is important to consider them as different, otherwise the comparative analysis will lose the value of comparing the differences that make it possible.

Though the use of populism and religious symbolism has been researched in other contexts, such as Hindu populism in India (Jaffrelot, 2021: 85) and Christian populism in Europe (Brubaker, 2017: 1191–1226), few in-depth scholarly studies have explored how far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan use framing strategies to mobilize popular support. This research seeks to address that gap. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no systematic comparative study of far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan. Much of the existing scholarship has explored these actors separately, mainly as a religious populist movement (e.g., Sabat et al., 2020; Zahid et al., 2022; Yilmaz & Shakil, 2022), and has not considered the possibility of their doing the same political work with other symbols, or of them representing truly different styles of religious political mobilization. This paper goes to the heart of the issue.

At the outset, it should be noted that framing analysis, though analytically useful, is not a full account of the political career of these parties. But the framing is not the only key to success or failure; structural conditions are, as well. In addition to framing strategies, outcomes are influenced by resource access, organizational capacity, political opportunity structures and institutional patronage. In TLP, Javid (2021) has shown that although the party was able to mobilize its supporters on street, its clientelist nature and competition among the religious right limited its electoral success. This paper does not assert that the only forces behind these parties’ political paths are framing. Instead, it uses framing analysis as a fruitful tool for examining how they shape political meaning, build their constituencies and position themselves in relation to each other; something that structural approaches are unable to do.

The key research question of this paper is: How do far-right Islamist political parties in Pakistan strategically use religious symbolization and framing to construct political narratives and mobilize public support, and what do differences in their framing strategies reveal about the differentiation of religiously inflected political mobilization within Pakistan? A related sub-question follows: Why do these groups, despite operating within the same political context and drawing on the same Islamic tradition, construct different political logics, and to what extent do sectarian identities explain these differences?

The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework presents Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework, including the three core framing tasks (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) and the four framing processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation). It also defines the type of discourse employed in this study. The methodology explains the case selection, data sources, time period, and analytical process. The discussion is organized thematically, with an emphasis on comparative analysis rather than a party-by-party examination. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings, discusses the study’s theoretical implications for understanding religious populism in Muslim-majority states, and outlines its limitations.

Theoretical Framework

Framing theory, conceptualized by Benford and Snow (2000: 611–639), has emerged to be one of the foundational frameworks for understanding the dynamics of social and political movements. It focuses on how movements construct, articulate, and disseminate meanings in efforts towards mobilization. Movements do this by addressing three primary framing tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. These empower a movement to create resonance with its target audience and to translate grievances into actionable agendas.

Diagnostic framing involves the identification of social problems, attributing specific actors or structures with blame. While the specific targets of diagnostic framing vary across movements, secular elites, minority communities, foreign powers, or rival sects there are an underlying logic remains consistent: identifying a threat, assigning blame, and constructing a moral boundary between those who belong and those who do not.

Prognostic framing offers solutions to the grievances thus identified. In most cases, these solutions may be found within the ideological or cultural ethos of the movement. For instance, in the case of the JUI-F, the framing of Shariagovernance as the missing panacea for corruption and inequality is rooted in religious ideology. The credibility of prognostic framing depends on its alignment with the movement’s broader ideological identity; the proposed solution must appear morally necessary within the movement’s own normative universe.

Moreover, motivational framing inspires action by appealing to moral obligations and evoking emotional resonance. This framing task often contains religious, historical, and cultural symbols to galvanize collective action. In religiously inflected movements, motivational framing shows particularly on sacred history, martyrdom narratives, and divine obligation, transforming political participation into an act of faith and collective moral duty.

In addition to core framing task, Benford and Snow (2000) underlines frame alignment processes as key devices by which movements link their frames with wider societal discourses. It is through processes of frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation that movements reveal strategic responsiveness to shifting political and social terrains.

While frame bridging refers to the linking of disconnected but congruent grievances or stories, it allows movements to expand their scope by linking their goals to interests in society (Van Dijk, 2023: 153–178). Frame bridging itself is particularly consequential in fragmented political contexts, where each movement must stitch together disparate constituencies by demonstrating that their specific demands serve broader shared interest.

Frame amplification involves heightening the salience of specific values or issues to enhance their relevance and urgency. Through amplification, movements can elevate particular grievances above others, constructing a hierarchy or urgency that channels collective energy toward specific symbolic and political objectives.

Frame extension broadens the scope of a movement’s narrative by incorporating additional issues to appeal to a wider audience. Frame extension reflects a movement’s strategic awareness of its own limits, by reaching beyond its core constituency which trades ideological purity for broader coalition appeal.

Frame transformation redefines existing narratives, creating new meanings that resonate with changing sociopolitical contexts. Frame transformation is the most ambitious of the alignment process, because it requires movements to reinterpret the established meanings.

There is a need for a theoretical clarification before moving on. The definition of populism by Mudde (2004) is a thin-centered ideology, namely a rather coherent body of ideas about society organized around the moral polarity between the pure people and the corrupt elite. This is an ideological conception that is not the discursive approach followed in this paper. This study views framing as a strategic communicative action whereby political actors are actively shaping meaning, defining problems, solving them, and calling them to action, following the example of Benford and Snow (2000) and Entman (1993). The distinction is significant: in this paper, the idea of party is not understood as an ideology merely in advance of the evidence but is rather analyzed as the kind of story each party tells, who they’re going to fight, what they’re going to offer as a solution, and the people they’re going to rally behind. This is how the empirical differences between the three parties come out of the analysis and not assumed as a prerequisite, which is the reason the comparative results are possible.

In this study, Benford and Snow (2000) model is used to examine political communication by TLP, JUI-F, and MWM.Importantly, the discussion section is not party by party, but rather thematically. All three parties are compared to one another in each framing task so that the framework can shed light on the similarities and differences in the way they make sense of the political position. It is this comparative thematic structure that enables the paper to go beyond description to an explanatory argument as to why these parties frame their political positions in such different ways, despite the fact that they operate within the same political reality. The methodological decisions that provide the basis for this analysis are described below.

Research Methodology

This study used a qualitative research design, with framing analysis as the primary analytical technique. In line with Benford and Snow (2000), framing analysis is understood as the systematic investigation of how political actors, through public communication, create meaning by defining a problem, identifying those responsible, proposing a solution, and calling for collective action. The study is situated within the broader field of political discourse but does not adopt discourse analysis as a method per se, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995) or Discourse-Historical Analysis (Wodak, 2001). Instead, framing theory is employed as the specific analytical tool through which the discourse of the three selected parties is examined. This distinction highlights two important differences: first, framing analysis focuses on the strategic and purposeful dimensions of political communication; second, it is particularly useful for studying parties that consciously employ religious symbols to construct political narratives and mobilize constituencies (Snow et al., 1986: 464).

Case Selection 

The three groups selected for this study—Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)—were chosen based on two explicit selection criteria. First, they each represent different sectarian constituencies within Pakistan’s far-right Islamist landscape: TLP mobilizes the Barelvi-Sunni community, JUI-F mobilizes the Deobandi-Sunni community, and MWM mobilizes the Shia community in Pakistan. This sectarian variation constitutes the key variable for explaining differences in the framing strategies employed by the three parties, and it is this variation that the paper seeks to explain. Second, during the study period, all three groups were actively engaged in political mobilization and maintained a public presence across all three modes of participation—electoral politics, street mobilization, and public communication—thereby providing a sufficient basis for the systematic analysis of their discourses.

The most important omitted case requiring explanation is Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). On theoretical grounds, JI is excluded because, unlike the three selected parties, it does not mobilize a specific sectarian constituency but instead represents a pan-Islamist ideological platform that transcends sectarian boundaries. Its organizational model and discursive logic are therefore fundamentally different from the sectarian community-based mobilization that constitutes the analytical focus of this study. Including JI would introduce a different type of case that could not be analyzed using the same analytical dimensions as the three selected cases. Likewise, smaller organizations such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan were not included because they lacked sufficient publicly documented discourse during the study period to permit systematic analysis.

The inclusion of MWM warrants particular comment because its electoral presence is relatively limited. However, electoral size is not the key consideration here; rather, it is its discursive distinctiveness. MWM is the only organized Shia political party within Pakistan’s far-right political landscape and mobilizes a Shia community that has received far less scholarly attention than Sunni Islamist parties (Rajani, 2013). Its inclusion is therefore both theoretically justified and empirically meaningful, as it allows us to examine whether Shia political mobilization follows the same framing logic as Sunni Islamist parties or instead reflects a distinct form of religious political mobilization.

Data Sources and Time Period

This analysis is based on publicly available political communications produced by the three political parties and their leaders between 2015 and 2024. The starting point, 2015, was chosen because it marks the founding of TLP, which laid the foundation for the contemporary far-right Islamist contest in Pakistan. The end point, 2024, represents the most recent general election cycle and encompasses a complete period of contemporary political mobilization for each of the three parties.

The data corpus consists of four types of sources. First, it includes official party documents, such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s Election Manifesto 2024 (2024), and documented party materials, such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s Official Anthem 2018 (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018). Second, it draws on the verbatim speeches of party leaders as reported in Pakistan’s leading national newspapers—Dawn, The Express Tribune, The News International, and Business Recorder—which serve as the principal public archive of political communication in Pakistan. Third, it incorporates party social media content, including verified hashtag campaigns and documented social media slogans used by all three parties on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. Fourth, it draws on academic studies that directly cite and analyze party discourse, particularly the works of Sabat et al. (2020), Zahid et al. (2022), Yilmaz and Shakil (2022), and Javid (2021).

This corpus has certain limitations. The analysis relies heavily on reported statements rather than on a comprehensive collection of primary texts. However, full transcripts of leaders’ speeches are not always available in digital or searchable formats, nor are many Urdu-language primary sources, such as party newspapers like Sada-e-Wahdat published by the MWM. Consequently, the findings are based on credible journalistic and academic sources that document the parties’ public political communication rather than on an exhaustive corpus of primary source materials.

Analytical Procedure

The analysis is conducted at two levels. First, the publicly documented discourse of each party is analyzed according to the three fundamental framing tasks identified by Benford and Snow (2000): diagnostic framing, in which each party defines the problem and assigns blame; prognostic framing, in which each party proposes solutions; and motivational framing, in which each party constructs moral and emotional appeals for collective action. Second, the four frame alignment processes—bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation—are employed to examine how each party connects its core frames with broader societal concerns and adapts its framing practices to changing political environments (Snow et al., 1986).

The study adopts a thematic comparative analysis rather than a party-by-party analysis. In other words, the discussion does not examine all three framing tasks for each party individually; instead, it compares how the three parties approach each framing task. This design is intentional, as it highlights the comparative logic of the analysis and allows convergences and divergences among the parties to become clearly visible at each analytical stage, rather than being merely inferred from three separate case descriptions.

The coding of party discourse was carried out deductively, with the framing tasks and frame alignment processes serving as the principal analytical categories for coding the data. Recurring religious symbols—such as Khatm-e-Nabuwwat for TLP, Sharia governance for JUI-F, and Karbala for MWM—were identified as the symbolic anchors around which each party organizes its diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing in its public communication.

Discussion: Comparative Framing Analysis of Far-Right Islamist Parties in Pakistan

The following analysis applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framing framework comparatively to the three parties examined in this study: TLP, JUI-F, and MWM. The discussion is organized thematically around the three core framing tasks. The following subsections examine each party’s approach to the issues it emphasizes. The analysis focuses on the problems each party identifies, the solutions it proposes, and the motivational appeals it employs to mobilize collective action. It also examines how these frames align with broader societal discourses. This structure makes it possible to identify both the convergences and divergences that distinguish these parties on analytical grounds. The preliminary study of all parties suggests that even though all three parties deploy Islamist symbols strategically, they do so from a different political logic that dictate their behavior shaped by their distinct sectarian identities and historical grievances.  

Diagnostic Framing: Identifying the Problem and Assigning Blame

Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of social problems and the attribution of blame. It is the fundamental process through which political actors derive their political identity and demarcate the boundary that separates them from their opponents, thereby constructing the distinction between “us” and “them” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 615). Examining each party through the lens of diagnostic framing reveals that they identify strikingly different problems, assign blame to different actors, and construct distinct categories of enemies. These differences are not arbitrary; rather, they reflect the sectarian identities of each party and the specific grievances of the constituencies they seek to mobilize.

Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)

A large numbers of people gathered to attend funeral prayer of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, Chief of TLP, held at Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore on on November 21, 2020. Photo: Asianet-Pakistan.

TLP emerged in 2015 as a major political force in Pakistan. It was established by Khadim Hussain Rizvi. TLP claims that it is the true herald of the deep-rooted Barelvi school of thought and is one of the proudest fighters of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat, which is also the ideology that underpins the very existence of TLP. The party became popular quite quickly because it raised a monumental rally against principles threatening its existence by the Ahmadi community, calling them Ahmadis alongside all such incidents of alleged blasphemy (UK Visas and Immigration, 2025). It employs a combination of street protests, social media campaigns, and religio-symbolic imagery to mobilize conservative Muslim constituencies under the banner of saving Islamic values from the secular political machinations of Pakistan’s sociopolitical scene.

In this regard, TLP has claimed that they have diagnosed the real problems of society, such as the failure of true spirit of Islam and undue lenience towards acts of blasphemy. In this way, these factors have been indicated as the causes of societal disintegration and moral decay in Pakistan. These narratives are strongly propagated through their party anthem, which is filled with religious fervor, designating the party as the sole savior of Pakistan, bringing Sharia into the political system, and categorically alienating the previous governments and political parties as looters, and corrupt, and label them as one and the same group who are dividing Pakistan. The anthem is filled with rhetorical lines such as “Pakistan banaya tha, Pakistan bachana hai (We created Pakistan, and we have to save it),” “deen ko takhat par lana hy (we have to bring religion to govern),” “watan ko katne wale sabhi ye aik chakoo hain (those dividing the country are all one group),”alluding that we are going to come and be the sole savior of the country by bringing religious rule (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018).   

The party particularly identifies the Ahmadi community as its primary target, declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims (IHRC, 2024). The central basis for this allegation is the sanctity of Khatm-e-Nabuwwat, as Ahmadis believe in a prophet after Muhammad. This is not merely a theological disagreement but is presented as an attack on the very political identity that TLP has built around defending the doctrine of the Finality of Prophethood.

Ahmadis have been affected by TLP campaigns directed against them, with cases such as Mubarak Sani, who was lynched on suspicion of blasphemy in 2014, cited by TLP as exemplary cases against Ahmadis (Mahmood, 2024; Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 2022). This incident was similarly framed by TLP as a successful expression of public piety against heresy, reinforcing its claim that social grievances stem from the ineffective implementation of blasphemy laws (Jalil, 2024).

TLP thus diagnoses the fundamental ills of society—namely, the erosion of the true spirit of Islam and undue leniency toward acts of blasphemy—as the causes of social disintegration and moral decay in Pakistan. The outrage expressed by TLP leaders following the acquittal of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman convicted on blasphemy charges, was particularly intense. At a protest in Lahore, TLP leader Afzal Qadri declared: “The judges who have ordered the release of the accursed Asia are all liable to be killed under religious edict” (Al Jazeera, 2018; Khan, 2018).

For diagnostic framing through social media, TLP employed hashtags such as #Tajdar_Khatam_e_Nabuwat and #Labbaik_Ya_Rasoolallah. These slogans were instrumental in constructing a narrative of moral urgency that resonated strongly with its support base. This emphasis further reinforced an “us versus them” dichotomy, portraying the party’s supporters as the pious defenders of Islam in opposition to secular elites, Ahmadis, and Western influences (Mahmood, 2024).

During protests demanding the expulsion of the French ambassador, TLP demonstrators were confronted by law enforcement agencies. In response, Khadim Rizvi questioned the ideological foundations of the Pakistani state, stating: “We cannot forgive the enemies of the Prophet (PBUH). While traveling to Islamabad, I wondered whether we could send back the French Ambassador. [Alas] the Muslims living in France can protest, but in the state, which was achieved in the name of Islam, the nation is not allowed to protest for the honor of the Prophet. Now, we have to ask a question about the type of leadership we have been led by for the last 72 years. Had Labbaik (TLP) been ruling the country, it would have executed them [blasphemers],” (Zahid et al., 2022).

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)

JUI-F has its roots in the Deobandi movement, which sticks to some rigid fundamentals of the Sharia and Sharia legalism over literalism and puritanical reforms. JUI-F has possessed both a religious and an organizational face in Pakistan ever since its inception as a party. The party entered the political limelight by taking advantage of its communication network of religious institutions, called madrassas, and aligning itself with the conservative Muslim culture and belief system of the voting population (Karamat et al., 2019: 29–36). Throughout the years, JUI-F has sustained its political relevance by masquerading as a protector of Islamic values amidst perceived threats posed by secular and liberal ideologies. In the political context, JUI-F uses its political symbol, the book, referring to the Quran, the holy book of Muslims, and its candidates refer to their audiences by saying that not stamping its symbol is equivalent to rejecting the holy book (Nazar, 2013).

In this broader context, JUI-F traces the root of the crises affecting society to the inability of others to properly implement Islamic law. The party continuously criticizes secular models of governance for promoting corruption, inequality, and moral decline (Khan, 2019). At a 2016 press conference, Fazlur Rahman stated that he would “not let Pakistan become secular,” asserting that secular legislation was “in conflict with the Holy Quran, the life of Prophet Muhammad, the Constitution of Pakistan, and the values of our country” (Express Tribune, 2016). This framing was reiterated during the 2024 election campaign, with the party urging voters to support JUI-F as the party committed to Islamic values and governance (Express Tribune, 2024b).

In 2019, during the Azadi March, Fazlur Rahman argued that the policies adopted by the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government had undermined the country’s Islamic traditions. He framed the actions of the ruling government as being entirely contrary to the injunctions of the Sharia (Batool, 2019). During the march, he portrayed the PTI government as an existential threat to both the constitutional order and Islamic governance, declaring that the march aimed to “protect the Constitution, democracy and Pakistan” from a government that had made “the Constitution a joke” and put “the survival of the country at risk” (Shaikh & Hussain, 2019). This narrative resonates with JUI-F’s core constituency, which views the party as a representative of conservative Muslims.

Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)

MWM came into being in 2009 to fight against the systematic persecution and escalating violence targeting Shia Muslims in Pakistan (Shah, 2019). Guided by the tenets of Shia Islam, especially those rooted in the history of Imam Hussain and his martyrdom at Karbala, MWM serves both as a force for the protection of Shia rights and as a force for unity among Pakistan’s Muslim communities. The ideological foundation of the party is thus deeply embedded in notions of justice, sacrifice, and resistance, which are represented by its electoral emblem, the Khama (the tent)—the tent of Imam Hussain (Naqvi, 2025). This reinforces MWM’s claim to follow in the footsteps of Imam Hussain and his struggle for truth and justice. Additionally, in recent elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has been a political ally of Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM) (BR Web Desk, 2024). Allama Raja Nasir Abbas, the Chairman of MWM, was elected to the Senate in the 2024 elections and was nominated as the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate with the support of PTI at a time when PTI Chairman Imran Khan was incarcerated (Sadozai & News Desk, 2026).

Within this frame of reference, MWM identifies sectarian violence, institutionalized discrimination, and foreign interference as the causes of social unrest in Pakistan. The party often refers to the Quetta Hazara killings (Baloch, 2021) and the Parachinar bombings (Mehdi, 2024) as examples of the state’s failure to provide security for Shia Muslims. Through slogans such as “Pakistan Banya Tha – Pakistan Bachyanga (“Pakistan was made, and Pakistan will be saved”),” MWM underlines its role as a guardian of the country’s ideological and territorial integrity.

It further draws on the legacy of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who was claimed to be a Shia Muslim, to give legitimacy to its position as the protector of Pakistan’s Islamic identity. This becomes a narrative not only within the Shia community but also in broader nationalist sentiments, presenting this as a collective responsibility toward the ideals on which Pakistan was founded.

Although all three parties possess a clear religious narrative, the diagnostic framing reveals a fundamental divergence in how they construct political antagonism. TLP’s diagnostic frame clearly alludes to Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism: it constructs a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular elite that is complicit in blasphemy and moral decay. JUI-F’s diagnostic framing stands in contrast to that of TLP, targeting secularism as an ideological failure of statecraft rather than political elite corruption. It identifies the absence of divine governance as the enemy, rather than the political elite per se, which reflects a conservative rather than a populist logic. MWM’s diagnostic framing is categorically different from that of its counterparts. It identifies the Shia community as a persecuted minority within a hostile majority environment and views sectarian enemies and state negligence as blameworthy, rather than a generalized corrupt elite, as TLP does. This framing reveals that the convergent factor among all three parties is the use of Islamist referents to frame grievance, while they differ in the structure of the antagonism they construct and the identity of the enemy they identify.  

Prognostic Framing: Proposing Solutions

Prognostic framing concerns how actors advance solutions to the problems they have diagnosed (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). The analysis of each party highlights that the proposed solutions are closely tethered to their diagnostic frames, showing the logical connection between the defined problems and the solutions proposed. Examining these solutions comparatively not only reveals what each party wants but also sets out its vision for the political project it seeks to implement.

Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)

TLP believes the remedy for the real moral and social crises in the fine land of Pakistan is the lawful, strict, and complete application of blasphemy laws and the exclusion of Ahmadis from the public domain. It has demanded the full implementation of laws concerning crimes against the Holy Prophet Muhammad. For instance, during one of the sit-ins at Faizabad in 2017, TLP demanded the resignation of the lawmakers responsible for amending the electoral oath relating to Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Dawn, 2017). The government’s surrender to TLP’s demands at Faizabad, including the resignation of the minister responsible for the oath amendment, was framed by the party as strong proof that street pressure grounded in religious obligation could force the state to comply with Islamic imperatives. Its ritualized symbolic practices at public gatherings, including collective prayers and recitations, further reinforced its prognostic framing by embedding its political demands within a register of religious observance and constructing compliance with the party’s agenda as an act of devotion rather than a simple act of political choice (Sabat et al., 2020).

Designating the government and opposing state institutions as mere stooges of the West, the TLP leadership proposes a solution by expressing its intention that “once we are in power, we will treat them (the West) with an iron fist” (Zahid et al., 2022). Its solutions are mostly emotive rather than based on rational or practical grounds. For instance, at a public gathering, the firebrand Rizvi proposed launching a missile attack against the USA and the IMF if they asked Pakistan to repay its loans, stating, “Lo ji fer aaya je Ghauri (here comes the Ghauri missile to hit you)” (Zahid et al., 2022).

Designating the government and opposing state institutions as a mere stooge of the West, TLP leadership proposes a solution by expressing their intentions as “once we are in power, we will treat them (West) with an iron fist,” (Zahid et al., 2022). Their solutions are mostly emotive rather than based on rational or practical grounds. For instance, in a public gathering, firebrand Rizvi proposed to launch a missile attack against the USA and IMF if they ask Pakistan to pay back its loan stating “Lo ji fer aaya je Ghauri (here comes the Ghauri missile to hit you) (Zahid et al., 2022)

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)

JUI-F prefers the implementation of Sharia law as the ultimate solution to the governance issues in Pakistan. The party’s rhetoric has consistently emphasized that only an Islamic model of governance can overcome the deeply ingrained problems of corruption, inequality, and societal discord. Additionally, it presents itself as the protector of democracy and the guardian of the sanctity of the Constitution, while portraying others as diminishing its value (Dawn, 2024a).

Election campaigns are often marked by calls to establish an “Islamic state” as a moral imperative (Dawn, 2024b; Karamat et al., 2019). Symbolic actions, such as leading prayers at political gatherings, further reinforce this vision and create a sense of urgency among supporters to rally behind the party’s agenda.

Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)

The prognostic framing by MWM can be reduced to three main postulates that it propagates: the unification of all sects, the strict application of the law in dealing with extremist groups and increased political representation for Shia Muslims. The electoral campaigns frequently feature the slogan “Life for Hussain—Vote for Hussain,” which alludes to tying political action to religious devotion. This framing helps MWM present its political platform as a continuation of Imam Hussain’s struggle for justice, playing a catalytic role in mobilizing its followers to view voting as a religious and moral obligation.

Pakistan, MWM, Khama (tent)
Image credit: Taken from the party’s Facebook page. The flyer was produced by MWM for the 2013 general election campaign, in which the Khama (tent) represents the party’s political symbol, while the slogan at the top reads, “Life for Hussain, Vote for Hussain.”

The party advocates for an independent foreign policy, free from Western influence, as can be witnessed eloquently in its slogans, such as “Down Down America” and “Down Down Israel” (Hasan, 2012). These slogans demonstrate MWM’s resistance to liberal, Western-appeasing policies, which, according to the party, are against the Islamic identity of Pakistan. The emphasis on self-reliance and resistance to foreign dominance reinforces the party’s populist appeal among the ranks of nationalist and religiously conservative voters.

The prognostic frames are different for each party, further illuminating their distinct political logics as their proposed solutions correspond to the problems identified earlier. TLP emphasizes the implementation of strict blasphemy laws, the expulsion of Ahmadis from public life, and taking strict action against the perceived enemies of the Prophet. These reflect a rupture logic in its prognostic framing that alludes to the existing order being morally compromised and, hence, needing to be purged. 

JUI-F’s proposed solutions are different. They reflect a completion logic by calling for the institutionalization of Sharia within the existing state. It points to a political order that, in its view, should not be dismantled but rather fulfilled along Islamic lines, which puts forward a fundamentally conservative rather than populist orientation. 

Meanwhile, MWM’s proposed solutions, including sectarian unity, legal accountability for anti-Shia violence, and increased Shia political representation, reflect a recognition logic, in which the party is not seeking to transform the political order outright but instead wants to secure a legitimate place within it for a marginalized community. 

These three qualitatively different political projects reflect distinct political logics advanced by different actors, all expressed in the shared language of Islamic governance.

Motivational Framing: Mobilizing Collective Action

Motivational framing revolves around how actors push for action based on the narrative they have been creating. It concerns how movements translate diagnostic and prognostic frames into calls for collective action by constructing moral obligations and emotional imperatives that drive participation (Benford & Snow, 2000: 617). All three parties demonstrate the use of religious symbols in constructing motivational framing. It is here that the specific symbolic repertoires of each sectarian tradition are most directly deployed to generate emotional zeal and a sense of duty among those who support their cause.

Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)

Their solutions are often filled with emotive zeal, pushing their followers to take to the streets, incite violence, and, at worst, lynch people on accusations of blasphemy. Their aggressive fervor motivates their supporters to champion the cause of defending the blasphemy laws in Pakistan and the finality of the Prophet.

TLP’s motivational framing for mass protests is centered on calling upon religious zeal and defining a common identity. Thus, the party relies on slogans such as #Member_o_Mahrab_Se_Siyasat (Politics from the Pulpit) as evidence of how the authority of religious leaders shapes the boundaries of political discourse. The tradition of Prophet Muhammad, together with that of other Islamic martyrs, is extensively used to build emotional and spiritual commitment among TLP supporters.

Social media is at the center of all motivational action by TLP. Through public campaigns using hashtags such as#Labbaik_Ya_Rasoolallah, the party encourages its followers to mobilize for protests and political rallies, presenting participation as a communal duty. Digital platforms further expand the party’s community, drawing more people to the message it espouses through these calls to action.

The “us versus them” framing presents the secular elite, liberal policies, and Ahmadis as existential threats to Islamic unity, as reflected in TLP’s political rhetoric. The sentence handed down to Mubarak Sani provided a significant opportunity to highlight what TLP portrayed as a moral victory over the Ahmadis by drawing attention to their alleged heretical status (Mahmood, 2024a). Such narratives not only carry the potential for grassroots mobilization but also marginalize minorities by portraying them as enemies of Islam.

Their criticism extends beyond the influence of Western cultural traits, which they perceive as corrupting values and eroding the Islamic identity of Pakistan. Their focus relies more on the dichotomy of “pious defenders” and “corrupt elites,” through which they legitimize their populist claims and strengthen their support among conservative constituencies. In practice, symbolic mobilization means that TLP makes effective use of religious congregations, media, and Madaris (madrassas) to spread its narrative. Mass protest events, such as the 2017 Faizabad sit-in, have demonstrated how the party is able to transform symbolic mobilization into concrete political power. Madaris serve as sites of ideological dissemination, providing a steady supply of activists committed to the mission of TLP.

Symbolic mobilization of TLP through social media has therefore turned out to be completely essential. Tweets carrying the hashtag #Tajdar_Khatame_Nabuwat and numerous widely shared posts across social media platforms have allowed the party to promote its agenda broadly. Through both conventional and new media, TLP sustains its populist appeal and defines itself as the defender of Islamic Shariah (Zahid et al., 2022: 276–295).

Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)

Motivational framing serves as a primer for the conditions that enhance the potential for large-scale mobilization, and JUI-F demonstrates considerable capacity in this respect. The “book” as the electoral symbol is portrayed as the Holy Quran, and thus, for any religious Muslim, voting for anyone other than JUI-F would be sinful to their faith. In another instance, JUI-F takes time to remind people of various episodes in Islam and, at times, of the great sacrifices of leaders who fought for Islam in order to evoke a particular emotional response that influences their political choices. Such framing rebrands election campaigns as a religious mission and cultivates, with great vigor, a powerful sense of identity and purpose among its supporters (Dawn, 2025).

Additionally, JUI-F uses the “us vs. them” dichotomy as a tool for maintaining its hard core and demarcating its territory and identity. It portrays secular forces as the enemies of unity among Islamic states, while presenting the liberal elite and other sects as enemies of the correct Islamic values, and portrays itself as the defender of the correct Islamic values (Ashfaq, 2024). This not only mobilizes its supporters but also dismisses opposition groups as enemies of Islam. For instance, JUI-F has blamed secular elites for their penchant for embracing Western culture and easily portrays such groups as symbols of corruption and moral decadence. This type of narrative increases polarization and simplifies the binary between the sacred and the profane.

Symbolic mobilization is at its best in JUI-F’s religious meetings, madrassah network, and media presence, all of which speak to the organization’s commitment to symbolic action. Party structures enable the diffusion of party narratives as well as the reinforcement of its identity as the defender of Islam. Like all political parties, madrassas are an integral part of JUI-F’s organizational setup and a strategically important component in terms of ideological indoctrination and network mobilization. The framing strategies are further developed and disseminated through media appearances and speeches. These practices not only facilitate JUI-F’s political mobilization but also solidify the party’s ties with its religious voter base.

Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)

MWM is able to marshal its base through effective motivational framing, coupling religious symbolism with nationalist rhetoric. Its “Khama” electoral symbol turns out to be a very potent reminder of the sacrifice of Imam Hussain and evokes the feeling among its followers that political participation is part of their religious duty. Slogans such as “Life for Hussain – Vote for Hussain,” displayed on campaign materials, reinforce this message by framing political choice as a matter of faith.

MWM also resorts to emotive slogans such as “Pakistan Ka Matlab Kya? La Ilaha Illallah” (What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but Allah) to mobilize the people (Iqbal, 2014). These slogans link national identity with Islamic principles, thereby constructing a shared identity among Pakistan’s Muslim population while excluding those perceived as “others”: the liberal elite, foreign influences, and extremist groups threatening Shia Muslims.

MWM has engaged in several symbolic practices to mobilize its base. Religious gatherings during the months of Muharram and Ashura, considered the most prominent, are crucial for the party in reaching out to the Shia community and propagating its narratives. These events provide ample opportunity for MWM leaders to underline issues of resistance and justice, drawing parallels between the sacrifices of Imam Hussain at Karbala and present-day struggles (Rajani, 2013).

The motivational frames of the three parties draw on distinct sectarian symbolic traditions that help construct different modes of political duty among their targeted constituencies. TLP mobilizes through what can be characterized as sacred outrage, invoking narratives of blasphemy as an existential civilizational threat that demands an immediate, emotionally charged response (Sabat et al., 2020; Zahid et al., 2022). 

JUI-F places religious incumbency at the center of its motivational framing, presenting electoral participation as a religious obligation and positioning its candidates as stewards of Islamic governance, while bringing the Quran as a reference book that equates voting for the party with affirming one’s faith (Nazar, 2013). 

MWM’s mobilizing strategy revolves around martyrdom solidarity, drawing on the Karbala narrative. It helps construct political participation as a continuation of Imam Hussain’s struggle against injustice, transforming the act of voting into an act of religious remembrance and communal resistance that supporters perceive as a religious duty (Rajani, 2013). 

Each mode of motivational framing is thus culturally specific and sectarianly grounded, appealing to the particular audience of its targeted constituency. This is why the symbols are not used interchangeably across parties, as Karbala cannot motivate Barelvi constituencies in the way Khatm-e-Nabuwwat can, and vice versa. 

Frame Alignment Processes: Strategic Adaptation and Broadening 

Supporters of the religious political party TLP chant slogans during a protest following the Supreme Court decision on Pakistani Christian woman Asia Bibi in Lahore on November 02, 2018. Photo: A.M. Syed.

Beyond the three core framing tasks identified by Benford and Snow (2000), their framework also stipulates four frame alignment processes. These refer to the ways in which movements link their frames to wider societal discourses and adapt strategically to shifting political contexts. The four frame alignment processes include frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986). Examining these processes across the three parties reveals the ways in which each expands its reach beyond its core sectarian constituency and responds to changing political opportunities.

Frame Bridging 

Frame bridging refers to grievances that are otherwise disconnected from religious appeals but affect the parties’ voter base. All three parties employ frame bridging differently, while commonly attaching it to their proposed solutions to the identified problems.

JUI-F, for instance, bridges economic grievances such as poverty, unemployment, and IMF-imposed austerity with its demand for Sharia governance, arguing that material deprivation exists because of the absence of divine law (Khan, 2019; Express Tribune, 2025). Through this bridging, JUI-F becomes able to appeal to economically marginalized populations who might not be primarily motivated by theological concerns. 

TLP, on the other hand, bridges blasphemy politics with broader nationalist sentiment, arguing that a state that loses the ability to honor the Prophet has forfeited its Islamic legitimacy. By doing this, it connects a specific religious grievance to a wider crisis of national identity (Zahid et al., 2022). 

MWM bridges Shia-specific sectarian grievances with broader Pakistani nationalist narratives by invoking Jinnah’s claimed Shia identity. By doing so, it argues that a state persecuting Shia Muslims is actually demonstrating a betrayal of Pakistan’s founding vision, connecting minority rights claims with majoritarian national sentiment (Iqbal, 2014). 

Frame Amplification 

Frame amplification refers to the heightening of the salience and urgency of specific issues. It is highlighted in each party’s treatment of its central symbol. 

TLP amplifies Khatm-e-Nabuwwat from a theological doctrine into an existential civilizational crisis requiring an emergency response, arguing that any perceived compromise on the finality of prophethood would pose a catastrophic threat (Shakil & Yilmaz, 2021). The deployment of hashtags such as #Tajdar_Khatame_Nabuwat and the 2017 Faizabad sit-in are instances of this amplification, elevating a specific doctrinal issue to the level of a national emergency. 

JUI-F amplifies the moral authority of its clerical leadership by conflating electoral choice with religious observance, placing them side by side to amplify a political act into a matter of faith and sin. 

MWM amplifies incidents of anti-Shia violence into clear evidence of a systematic existential threat to the Shia community by citing the Quetta Hazara killings and the Parachinar bombings. By doing so, it constructs a sense of urgency around a situation that might otherwise be understood as a localized security failure (Baloch, 2021; Mehdi, 2024).

Frame Extension 

Frame extension helps broaden a movement’s narrative to incorporate additional issues and appeal to wider audiences. In the case of these three parties, it reflects each party’s attempt to transcend its sectarian base. 

TLP extends its blasphemy-centered frame to encompass anti-Western foreign policy positions, linking the sanctity of the Prophet to resistance against Dutch politicians, French cartoonists, and Western cultural imperialism more broadly (Zahid et al., 2022). This extension takes TLP beyond its Barelvi base to constituencies of Muslims who perceive Western secularism as a threat to Islamic identity. 

JUI-F extends its Sharia governance frame to encompass constitutional democracy. By doing so, it paradoxically positions itself as both the defender of Islamic law and the protector of the democratic process against military interference. This places the party in a strategic position that broadens its appeal to anti-establishment voters as well (Dawn, 2024a). 

MWM’s frame extends beyond its Shia-centric grievances to encompass inter-sectarian unity. This extension positions the party within a broader Muslim solidarity base, framing its struggle not merely as a Shia cause but as a defense of justice and pluralism within the Pakistani state (Rajani, 2013).

Frame Transformation

Frame transformation occurs when a movement tries to redefine an existing narrative to create new meaning that resonates with changing contexts. All parties use frame transformation from time to time, but it is most visible in MWM’s treatment of the Karbala narrative. The Battle of Karbala is specifically associated with a Shia historical event commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussain in 680 CE. MWM transforms this sectarian religious event into a universal symbol of resistance in the face of injustice. It does not limit Karbala merely to Shia heritage; rather, it constitutes a moral framework applicable to all communities facing persecution (Naqvi, 2025). This transformation not only speaks to the Shia audience but also potentially expands to communities beyond it. 

TLP has also engaged in frame transformation over time. Its earlier framing was centered narrowly on blasphemy enforcement, but it has progressively transformed into a broader civilizational discourse about the moral corruption of the Pakistani state and its subservience to Western powers, as is evident from a comparison of its 2018 and 2024 electoral manifestos (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018; Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, 2024).

Comparative Synthesis: Convergence, Divergence, and What it Means 

The comparative analysis of all three parties presents a picture of Pakistan’s far-right Islamist landscape that is more internally differentiated than the umbrella categories in the literature suggest. At the level of surface convergence, all three parties deploy religious symbols, construct “us vs. them” narratives, and invoke religious duty to motivate their supporters toward political participation. These strikingly similar strategies explain why they are often treated as variants of the same phenomenon. However, a deeper analysis through the framing framework shows that, beneath these surface similarities, lie three structurally distinct political logics.

TLP employs a logic of religious populism by constructing a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular establishment, calling for a rupture with the existing moral order, and mobilizing through sacred outrage. This positioning places TLP within the analytical category of religious populism as defined by Mudde (2004) and Yilmaz et al. (2023): a movement that channels popular anger simultaneously against internal elites and external civilizational enemies, with the ummah serving as the populist people.

JUI-F operates through a logic of Islamist conservatism that does not seek to dismantle the current political order but to complete it under the guidance of divine law. It does not portray the corrupt elite, in the populist sense, as its enemy but rather an ideologically misguided system of governance that has failed to implement God’s law in the land. JUI-F does not remain isolated from the current system; rather, it works within democratic institutions, forms coalitions across the political spectrum, and frames its demands as those that, in its view, will fulfill Pakistan’s constitutional identity. This positioning is closer to what scholars of political Islam describe as institutional Islamism (Roy, 1994), reflecting a conservative rather than a populist logic.

MWM occupies a very different place on this spectrum. Rather than posing a people-vs.-elite antagonism, its primary frame revolves around communal persecution, recognition, and protection, providing a picture that is closer to a logic of sectarian minority identity politics than a populist one. The Karbala narrative does not construct a populist people; rather, it speaks directly to a suffering community that experiences political persecution and injustice. This positioning is closer to the minoritarian political logic identified in the comparative literature on identity-based movements (Brubaker, 2017).

The explanatory variable for these differences is the sectarian identity. It suggests that framing strategies cannot be interchangeably used for these parties, as they are anchored in specific theological tradition, communal grievances, and historical memory that is attached to the sectarian constituency it mobilizes. Barelvi theology emphasizes the personal sanctity of the Prophet, which perpetuates TLP’s blasphemy-centered outrage politics. Deobandi theology promotes jurisprudential governance, which underpins JUI-F’s Sharia institutionalism. The foundational martyrdom narrative of Shia Islam informs MWM’s Karbala-centered solidarity politics. This backdrop demonstrates that sectarian identity does not merely provide background information; rather, it structurally embeds these parties’ framing strategies and determines their content, logic, and tone.

Conclusion

This paper examines the space and scope of far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan that use religious symbols and framing strategies to construct political narratives and mobilize public support. The comparative analysis of these parties’ framing strategies reveals that, although they are often referred to as uniform religious groups under the generalized term Islamo-populism, far-right religious parties exhibit significant internal differentiation that shapes their political mobilization. 

This study applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework to TLP, JUI-F, and MWM, which represent the Barelvi, Deobandi, and Shia sectarian constituencies, respectively. The framing analysis of these parties reveals that, despite operating within the same political environment and drawing on a shared Islamic tradition, they construct fundamentally different political logics. TLP’s framing contours suggest a religious populist positioning, mobilizing Barelvi constituencies through sacred outrage centered on Khatm-e-Nabuwwat and constructing a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular establishment. JUI-F’s positioning resonates more with Islamist conservatism, seeking the institutionalization of Sharia within the existing state structure rather than mobilizing outright against the corrupt elite. MWM operates through sectarian minority identity politics, calling for the protection of minority rights within a majority environment. It derives its political stance from the Karbala narrative to frame the Shia community as a persecuted minority demanding recognition, security, and political representation from a state that is not paying heed to its suffering. Their divergent political logics demonstrate that these are three structurally distinct political projects expressed in the shared language of Islamic governance.

The findings of this study extend substantive implications for the study of religious populism in Muslim-majority states. The existing literature on religious populism treats all religious groups from a monolithic viewpoint by arguing that Islamist movements adapt the populist logic of people-vs.-elite antagonism, where the ummah represents the people, framing political conflict in moral and theological terms (Mudde, 2004; Yilmaz et al., 2023; Hadiz, 2014). This paper’s comparative findings suggest that, although this framework provides a useful analytical lens for cases such as TLP, it does not offer a general account of far-right Islamist mobilization. Not all religious parties that deploy Islamic symbols, invoke religious duty, and construct a general us-vs.-them narrative engage in populism; rather, some are engaged in advancing conservatism, while others pursue identity politics, and these differences are important for making analytical distinctions. Applying the term “Islamo-populism” indiscriminately to religious parties risks obscuring the internal variation that provides a comparative logic for understanding these parties. Given this context, this paper proposes that sectarian identity is not merely background information but plays the role of a structural variable that shapes not only the symbols these parties use but also the political logic they carry. This finding calls for a more rigorous analysis of the sectarian foundations of Islamist mobilization rather than treating religious framing as analytically equivalent across cases.

Applying this framing model to Pakistan’s case demonstrates a diverse political landscape that the existing literature has not sufficiently addressed. The far-right Islamist space that scholars often view as a shared entity does not constitute a monolithic bloc united by a common Islamo-populist project; rather, it is a fragmented and internally competitive field in which parties mobilizing different sectarian communities pursue different political objectives by employing different framing strategies. This context makes understanding internal differentiation important and helps explain the political polarization and sectarian tension in Pakistan. Diagnostic framing not only highlights existing sectarian divisions but also reveals an active and systematic political structure that assigns blame to different entities, identifies different enemies, and builds political identity around different symbolic repertoires. The four frame alignment strategies, especially frame extension and frame transformation, further reveal that these parties make deliberate attempts to transcend their sectarian space and appeal to larger constituencies. This suggests that the boundaries between sectarian communities are not static but are porous and susceptible to expansion. For civil society actors and policymakers working to understand and address religious mobilization, these findings underscore the importance of disaggregating the far-right Islamist landscape rather than treating all its actors under unified labels.

This study has several limitations that invite further research to address them. First, the analysis largely relies on leadership statements as documented in reputable journalistic sources and existing academic studies rather than on a fully systematic corpus of primary texts. While this approach is defensible given the scattered and largely non-digitalized nature of primary party documentation, it creates the possibility of selection bias, as the statements receiving journalistic coverage may not fully represent the broader discursive stance of the party. Future research could construct a systematic primary corpus using empirical evidence from Urdu-language party publications, archived social media content, and direct speech transcripts. Second, this study is confined to a single case study, which limits the possibility of establishing the generalizability of its findings. The relationship between sectarian identity and framing logic observed in this study may take different forms in other Muslim-majority states with different sectarian configurations and political opportunity structures. Third, this study treats framing as a discursive practice and does not examine the organizational, institutional, or financial factors that affect each party’s ability to disseminate its frames. This dimension can be further explored by applying structural approaches to social movements (Javid, 2021). These limitations do not undermine the paper’s core findings; rather, they mark the boundaries of what can be claimed on the basis of the evidence presented here.

These findings open several directions for future research on this issue. The most immediate is a systematic primary source study of all parties’ Urdu-language communications, including party newspapers, manifestos, madrassa curriculum materials, and social media archives, which will allow the framing analysis conducted here to be rigorously tested against a comprehensive empirical corpus. A second important direction would be extending comparative research across Muslim-majority states with similarly fragmented sectarian landscapes, including Indonesia, Lebanon, and Iraq. This will reveal whether sectarian identity functions as an explanatory variable shaping Islamist framing strategies in other national contexts, as it appears to do in Pakistan. Finally, the relationship between the parties’ framing strategies and their constituencies deserves empirical attention: how do the recipients of these parties’ framing strategies internalize and interpret the frames constructed by the party leadership? Survey-based and ethnographic approaches will provide pertinent answers to these questions, which framing analysis of public discourse alone cannot address.


 

Corresponding author Karrar Ali and Aamina Urooj are from Universitas Islam International Indonesia (UIII). Email: karrar.ali@uiii.ac.id 

 

References

Aikins, M. (2015, March 23). “United we sit.” Herald Magazine. https://herald.dawn.com/news/1152861/united-we-sit

Al Jazeera. (2018, October 31). “Pakistan clears Christian woman in landmark blasphemy case.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/12/1/pakistan-party-leaders-in-blasphemy-case-charged-with-terrorism

Ali, K. (2012, April 23). “New Shia party emerging.” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/712899/new-shia-party-emerging

Ali, K. (2017, December 3). “Who is Khadim Hussain Rizvi?” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1374182

Ali, K. (2024, January 7). “TLP’s manifesto has much more to offer.” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1803745

Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official. (2018, July 16). New tarana | Deen ko takht pe lana hai | Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi 2018 [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LnjU8SJLEjE

Ashfaq, M. (2024, December 9). “Fazl says he won’t accept govt’s interference in seminaries.” Dawn.https://www.dawn.com/news/1877584

Azam, M. (2022). “Political activism and religiosity: An appraisal on Tehrik-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) and Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) in Pakistan.” South Asian Studies, 37(2), 399–408.

Baloch, S. M. (2021, April 5). “’Every year we dig mass graves’: The slaughter of Pakistan’s Hazara.” The Guardian.https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/apr/05/mass-graves-pakistan-shia-minority-hazara-slaughter-imran-khan

Batool, F. (2019, November 8). “The Azadi march in Pakistan: Testing the PTI’s prudence.” South Asian Voices.https://southasianvoices.org/the-azadi-march-in-pakistan-testing-the-ptis-prudence/

Behuria, A. K. (2025). The unending conflict: Dilemmas of dealing with sectarianism in Kurram. Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses. https://idsa.in/publisher/monograph/the-unending-conflict-dilemmas-of-dealing-with-sectarianism-in-kurram

Benford, R. D. & Snow, D. A. (2000). “Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment.” Annual Review of Sociology, 26, 611–639. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.26.1.611

BR Web Desk. (2024, February 13). “PTI announces alliance with Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen in centre, Punjab.” Business Recorder. https://www.brecorder.com/news/40288635

Brubaker, R. (2017). “Between nationalism and civilizationism: The European populist moment in comparative perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies, 40(8), 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700

Butt, I. Z., & Malik, A. (2024). “The role of right-wing political parties in politics of Pakistan: An exploratory study.” Annals of Human and Social Sciences, 5(4), 264–276.

Dawn. (2017, November 25). “How the Islamabad protests happened.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1372800

Dawn. (2024a, February 23). “JUI-F to hold nationwide protests against ‘rigging’.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1816447

Dawn. (2024b, February 7). “How religious does your party have to be to win an election in Pakistan?” https://www.dawn.com/news/1811894

Dawn. (2025, June). “JUI-F to launch agitation after Eid.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1914568

Entman, R. M. (1993). “Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm.” Journal of Communication, 43(4), 51–58. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1993.tb01304.x

Express Tribune. (2016, March 1). “Will not let Pakistan become secular, says Fazlur Rehman.” The Express Tribune.https://tribune.com.pk/story/1057133/will-not-let-pakistan-become-secular-says-fazlur-rehman

Express Tribune. (2024b, February 3). “PTI ruined country economically: Fazl.” The Express Tribune.https://tribune.com.pk/story/2455323/pti-ruined-country-economically-fazl

Express Tribune. (2025, August 26). “JUI-F leader wants Sharia law implemented in merged districts.” The Express Tribune. https://tribune.com.pk/story/2563408/jui-f-leader-wants-sharia-law-implemented-in-merged-districts

Fairclough, N. (1995). Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Longman.

Gallup Pakistan. (2024, March 12). Gallup Pakistan — Pakistan’s foremost research lab.https://gallup.com.pk/post/36181

Hadiz, V. R. (2014). “A new Islamic populism and the contradictions of development.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 44(1), 125–143. https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2013.832790

Hasan, S. (2012, September 16). “Movie backlash: Anti-US protesters get more than they had bargained for.” The Express Tribune. https://tribune.com.pk/story/437784/movie-backlash-anti-us-protesters-get-more-than-they-had-bargained-for

Hussain, A. (2024, February 10). “MWM enters mainstream politics with a crucial win from Kurram.” Business Recorder.https://www.brecorder.com/news/40288146

Iqbal, A. (2014, July 26). Pakistan ka matlab kya – II. Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1121773

Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy. Princeton University Press.

Jalal, A. (2009). Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia. Cambridge University Press.

Jalil, X. (2024, June 2). “TLP threats to Ahmadi community creates new wave of panic.” Voicepk.net.https://voicepk.net/2024/06/tlp-threats-to-ahmadi-community-creates-new-wave-of-panic/

Javid, H. (2021). “The limits and possibilities of religious politics: The case of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik in Pakistani Punjab.” Sociological Bulletin, 70(4), 502–521. https://doi.org/10.1177/0038022921103827

Karamat, S.; Shah, A. S. & Liaqat, B. B. (2019). “Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (F) Pakistan: From political conservatism to modernity 2002–2018.” Global Regional Review, 4, 29–36.

Kennedy, C. H. (1990). “Islamization and legal reform in Pakistan, 1979–1989.” Pacific Affairs, 63, 62–77.

Khalid, Z. & Hussain, M. (2017). “Politics of symbols & slogans: Its impact on elections of 1970.” Journal of Historical Studies, 3(2).

Khan, O. F. (2018, November 1). “Pakistani Islamists are on the boil over acquittal of Asia Bibi.” The Times of India.https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/pakistani-islamists-are-on-the-boil-over-acquittal-of-asia-bibi/articleshow/66463406.cms

Khan, R. (2019, June). “Understanding the JUI-F movement.” Weekly Cutting Edge.https://weeklycuttingedge.com/understanding-the-jui-f-movement/

Library of Congress. (2018). Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimin — Shia political party in Pakistan.https://www.loc.gov/item/lcwaN0008428/

Mahmood, A. (2024a, July 29). “Govt condemns attempt to incite violence against top functionary.” Dawn.https://www.dawn.com/news/1848673

Mahmood, A. (2024b, August 15). “Analysis: The tide of intolerance.” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1852361

Mehdi, S. E. (2024). “Understanding attacks on the Shias in Parachinar.” International Centre for Peace Studies.https://www.icpsnet.org/comments/Understanding-on-the-Shias-in-Parachinar-141224

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Murtaza, H. (2024). “Influence of religio-political parties on Pakistan’s foreign policy.” Journal of Politics and International Studies, 10(2), 57–68.

Naqvi, S. (2025, August 2). “Tents of Muharram.” The India Observer. https://theindiaobserver.com/tents-of-muharram/

Nazar, S. (2013, February 6). “New, people-friendly election symbols.” Dawn.https://www.dawn.com/news/784063/people-friendly-new-election-symbols

Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community. (2022, October). TLP’s modus operandi concerning Ahmadis.https://persecutionofahmadis.org/briefs/incitement-to-hatred-how-are-ahmadis-persecuted/2023/09/26/tlps-modus-operandi-concerning-ahmadis/

Rahimullah, R. (2021). “A revolt within JUI-F.” The News International. https://www.thenews.com.pk/tns/detail/771177-a-revolt-within-jui-f

Rajani, L. (2013, January). “Heart of darkness: Shia resistance and revival in Pakistan.” Dawn Herald.https://herald.dawn.com/news/1153276

Roy, O. (1994). The failure of political Islam. Harvard University Press.

Sabat, A.; Shoaib, M. & Qadar, A. (2020). “Religious populism in Pakistani Punjab: How Khadim Rizvi’s Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan emerged.” International Area Studies Review, 23(4), 365–381. https://doi.org/10.1177/2233865920962667

Sadozai, I. & News Desk. (2026, January 20). “PTI-nominated MWM chief Raja Nasir Abbas appointed Senate opposition leader after months-long delay.” Dawn. https://www.dawn.com/news/1968027

Shakil, K. & Yilmaz, I. (2021). “Religion and populism in the global South: Islamist civilisationism of Pakistan’s Imran Khan.” Religions, 12(9), 777. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12090777

Snow, D. A.; Rochford, E. B. Jr.; Worden, S. K. & Benford, R. D. (1986). “Frame alignment processes, micromobilization, and movement participation.” American Sociological Review, 51(4), 464–481. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095581

Solahudin, D. & Fakhruroji, M. (2019). “Internet and Islamic learning practices in Indonesia: Social media, religious populism, and religious authority.” Religions, 11(1), 19. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11010019

Tanveer, R. (2012, July). “Thousands demand end to sectarian violence.” The Express Tribune.https://tribune.com.pk/story/402210/thousands-demand-end-to-sectarian-violence

Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan. (2024). Manifesto. https://tlyp.org.pk/downloads/manifesto_tlp_en_2024.pdf

Ubaidullah Shaikh and Javed Hussain. (2019, October 29). “’No retreating now,’ says Fazl as JUI-F’s Azadi March enters Punjab.” https://www.dawn.com/news/1513413

UK Visas and Immigration. (2025, March). Country policy and information note: Ahmadis, Pakistan. GOV.UK. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pakistan-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-ahmadis-pakistan-march-2025-accessible

Van Dijk, T. A. (2023). “Analyzing frame analysis: A critical review of framing studies in social movement research.” Discourse Studies, 25(2), 153–178.

Wodak, R. (2001). “The discourse-historical approach.” In: R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds.), Methods of critical discourse analysis (pp. 63–94). SAGE.

Yilmaz, I. & Shakil, K. (2022). “Religious populism and vigilantism: The case of the Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.” Populism & Politics. European Center for Populism Studies. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0001

Yilmaz, I.; Batool, F. & Shakil, K. (2023). “Pakistan: Islamist civilizational populism.” In: Civilizational populism in democratic nation-states (pp. 137–168). Springer Nature Singapore.

Zahid, M.; Sial, T. A. & Rana, H. A. (2022). “Religious populism in Pakistan: A case study of Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan.” Pakistan Journal of International Affairs, 5(3), 276–295.


[1] Statement of Acknowledgment: The authors would like to express sincere gratitude to the faculty members and mentors at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII) for their academic guidance and intellectual support during the development of this research. The authors also acknowledge the valuable insights gained through scholarly discussions and institutional resources that contributed to the completion of this study. Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the authors.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and former US President Donald Trump met to discuss the betterment of the relations of India and US at Heydrabad House in New Delhi on February 25, 2020. Photo: Madhuram Paliwal.

The Orphan Paradox in India and the USA

Please cite as:
Sharma, Dinesh & Streich, Gregory W. (2026). “The Orphan Paradox in India and the USA.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). July 06, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000128



Abstract

Why do some societies repeatedly elevate leaders marked by childhood loss, trauma, and adversity during periods of national crisis, while at other times they prefer leaders from established political, economic, and social elites? The Orphan Paradox explores a psychological, cultural, and developmental theory of democratic leadership that integrates developmental science, political history, economics, and personality theory to explain this recurring pattern in the United States and India. Drawing on biographical analyses of presidents and prime ministers from the eighteenth century to the present, the paper distinguishes between traumagenic outsiders—leaders whose identities were shaped by parental loss, family disruption, poverty, or other forms of early adversity—and patrician insiders, who emerged from stable, privileged, and institutionally embedded backgrounds. The central argument is that democratic electorates respond not only to policy preferences and economic conditions but also to symbolic narratives of resilience, authenticity, and continuity. During periods of war, economic inequality, institutional crisis, or social upheaval, voters are more likely to identify with leaders whose life histories embody hardship and recovery. Conversely, during periods of stability and prosperity, electorates tend to favor experienced insiders who represent institutional continuity, expertise, and elite governance. This dynamic produces a recurring epistemic or structural oscillation in democratic leadership between outsider reformers and insider custodians, which is not just a political phenomenon but a deeply psychological process.

Keywords: 
Orphan Paradox, Democratic Leadership, Political Psychology, Populism, Political Dynasties, Democratic Resilience, India, United States, Leadership

 

By Dinesh Sharma & Gregory W. Streich

Dynastic Politics in India and the USA

In both India and the United States, political dynasties have played a defining role in shaping democratic leadership, revealing how personal lineage and inherited legitimacy continue to intersect with modern electoral politics (Dal Bó et al., 2009; Hess, 2016).[1] In India, the Nehru–Gandhi family has dominated Congress Party politics for decades, serving as the symbolic and organizational center of the party since independence (Brass, 1994; Guha, 2007). Beyond the Congress, regional parties often mirror this pattern, functioning as quasi-familial enterprises in which leadership succession passes through kinship lines—examples include the Yadavs in Uttar Pradesh, the Thackerays in Maharashtra, and the Karunanidhi family in Tamil Nadu’s Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) (Jaffrelot & Verniers, 2016; Wyatt, 2013; Palshikar & Kumar, 2004). These familial structures often blur the boundaries between public service and private inheritance, creating networks of loyalty that reinforce both political continuity and resistance to internal reform (Chandra, 2016).

The United States, though formally committed to competitive primaries and elections with open political participation, exhibits its own dynastic patterns. The Kennedys, Bushes, Roosevelts, and Adams–each representing distinct political eras and ideological lineages—have used family name recognition, donor networks, and the symbolic capital of service and sacrifice to sustain their influence across generations (Hess, 2016; Feinstein & Masur, 2020). More recently, the Trump family’s growing presence within Republican politics underscores how populism, too, can potentially become dynastic, converting media visibility and brand identity into a new form of hereditary legitimacy (Saldin & Teles, 2020; D’Antonio, 2015). Trump may be the first modern president to combine outsider populism with explicit aspirations toward patrician and founder-level historical status. He attacks existing dynasties (Bush, Kennedy) yet simultaneously attempts to create a new one and to place himself in the symbolic lineage of Washington, Lincoln, and other nation-defining presidents such as Jackson and McKinley. 

Across both democracies, the enduring appeal of dynastic politics reflects a paradox: voters simultaneously profess faith in meritocracy while responding to the familiarity, continuity, and symbolic legitimacy that political families provide (Besley & Reynal-Querol, 2011). Dynasties persist by drawing upon accumulated forms of capital—symbolic, financial, social, and emotional (Bourdieu, 1986)—yet their influence often weakens during periods of public disillusionment, corruption scandals, economic distress, or generational fatigue (Vaishnav, 2017). Dynastic politics thus functions as both a stabilizing and destabilizing force within democracy, embodying the tension between inherited privilege and democratic renewal.

Yet the counterpart to the dynastic heir is the political orphan or the outsider—the individual who possesses neither inherited status nor established networks of privilege. In many democracies, moments of political upheaval create opportunities for leaders whose authority derives not from lineage but from narratives of adversity, resilience, and personal struggle. Among the most striking of these figures are those who experienced significant childhood loss through parental death, family disruption, abandonment, or displacement. The Orphan Paradox proposed here, which constitutes our main thesis, suggests that early experiences of rupture may cultivate psychological characteristics—such as independence, ambition, resilience, and a heightened sensitivity to insecurity—that can later translate into political leadership.[2] Whereas dynastic leaders inherit political capital, orphan leaders are often compelled to construct it. Their biographies resonate with citizens who perceive themselves as marginalized, overlooked, or excluded from established systems of power. It allows outsiders, such as orphans, to speak for the people against the establishment, as is evident in recent years in the populist turn and the rise of amateur politicians. In this sense, the orphan and the heir represent two competing pathways to political legitimacy: one rooted in inheritance and continuity, the other in adversity and self-creation.

The Orphan Paradox describes the condition of loss: the absence of foundational support—whether parental, institutional, cultural, or even genetic—creates a dual trajectory. On one hand, it heightens vulnerability to instability, alienation, and maladaptive coping; on the other, it can spark remarkable resilience, innovation, and self-determined leadership. This paradox applies across multiple domains of human experience, from individual psychology to political systems and technological development (Sharma, 2026, 2025).[3]

This paper examines these dynamics – the outsider and the heir, the orphan and the patrician – in two of the world’s largest and most populous democracies, India and the United States, both of which emerged from profound historical ruptures and continue to grapple with competing demands for continuity and change (Moffitt, 2016; Jaffrelot & Tillin, 2017). In particular, we connect the rise of Modi in India and Trump in the USA – two political populists, one of whom left home early as a teenager to seek spiritual renunciation and the other who carries the scars of a fraught relationship with his demanding and wealthy parents – with the current trend towards nationalists who take on corrupt elites on behalf of the people (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Ironically, while in both India and the USA, there is a turn away from the familiar, stable, dynastic family names, both Modi and Trump are examples of how populists position themselves as outsiders seeking to become establishment insiders by creating their own autocracies or dynasties.


 

Read the Full Text

 

Footnotes

[1]  This paper in large part is adapted from the forthcoming book, The Orphan Paradox (Sharma, 2026), which presents a detailed psychocultural, historical, and political analysis of leadership cycles in India and the US. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ECPS workshop on September 4. 2025. We thank Professor Akis Kalaitzidis for his comments on this paper and the book. We are also immensely grateful to Dr. Arturo G. Munoz, senior political scientist at RAND Corporation, Washington DC, for his commentary on this project. This paper was partly inspired by the contemporary rise of nationalism worldwide. An earlier version of the proposal was reviewed by Dr. Munoz, who suggested that the argument would benefit from a stronger engagement with current political developments. In particular, he encouraged a more explicit comparison between Narendra Modi and Donald Trump as contemporary leaders whose rise reflects broader global trends. 

Parts of this paper were originally developed for an edited volume on WEIRD psychology, which critiques the overreliance on Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic populations in psychological research (Joseph Henrich et al., 2010); the goal here is to show how democracy takes different forms in different contexts. 

[2] For a full treatment of the underpinning of psychological, cultural, and political arguments, see the book, The Orphan Paradox (Sharma, 2026).

[3] The idea of the Orphan Paradox is interdisciplinary. First, developmental perspectives in leadership studies suggest that early experiences of trauma and loss can shape resilience, ambition, and identity formation over the life course. Work in political psychology and leadership analysis (e.g., Jerrold M. Post, 2003) highlights how formative adversity often informs leadership style and worldview. Second, my professional experience in the pharmaceutical sector exposed me to the concept of “orphan drugs” and “orphan markets,” terms institutionalized through policy frameworks such as the Orphan Drug Act. These refer to conditions or markets that lack early institutional support yet later become sites of innovation and intervention. 

Greece protests.

From Economic Crisis to Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece

Please cite as:
Kalaitzidis, Akis. (2026). “From Economic Crisis to Democratic Backsliding: Evidence from Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). July 06, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000127



Abstract

Economic crises often serve as incubators of populism. When currencies collapse, or debts spiral out of control, mainstream parties lose credibility, creating openings for leaders who claim to defend “the people” against distant elites. The cases of Thailand, Argentina, the United States, and Greece illustrate how crises enable populism, how populists frame economic struggles, and use them to subvert the political order. In Thailand, the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis led to IMF-imposed reforms that hurt the rural poor. Thaksin Shinawatra rose on a populist platform of cheap healthcare and rural development, casting himself as defender of the countryside against Bangkok elites (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2009). In Argentina, the 2001–2002 default discredited neoliberal economic policies. Néstor and Cristina Kirchner mobilized popular anger against the IMF and creditors, mixing subsidies and protectionism with nationalist rhetoric (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008). In the United States, the 2008 financial crash produced dual populist currents: the Tea Party and Donald Trump on the right, and Occupy Wall Street and Bernie Sanders on the left, both targeting elites, including Wall Street and the Washington establishment (Skocpol & Williamson, 2012; Frank, 2016). In Greece, Syriza rose during the Eurozone crisis, opposing austerity and demanding sovereignty from the EU “Troika” (Pappas, 2019). Across these cases, populists reframed abstract economic shocks as moral struggles, pitting ordinary people against elites, technocrats, or foreign powers (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Their policies emphasized immediate relief—subsidies, redistribution, debt resistance—over fiscal orthodoxy. Yet each also confronted the hard limits of global capitalism, leading to compromise, backlash, or renewed instability (Dornbusch & Edwards, 1991; Kahler & Lake, 2013). Economic crises highlight the tension between national democracy and global markets; populism thrives in this gap, using it to decay institutions and norms in democratic states. I argue that economic crises lead to democratic backsliding.

Keywords: Populism, Economic Crises, Democratic backsliding, Greece, USA, Thailand, Argentina

By Akis Kalaitzidis[1]

Do economic crises necessarily lead to democratic backsliding? My argument in this paper is that it does. Economic crises lead to increased populism, which ultimately erodes public confidence in the political system and degrades not only democratic regimes (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008) but also authoritarian ones (O’Donnell, 1999; Schedler, 2013). Bunce and Wolchik (2011) argued that the exclusionary populist politics of Slobodan Milosevic destroyed the multicultural authoritarian regime in Yugoslavia. Others have argued it is not necessarily the economic crises that produce populism but the conflict between the “winners and losers” of said economic crisis, which increases the feeling of loss among the many, something in conflict studies we call the Relative Deprivation thesis (Gurr, 1970). Others argue that it is race and status that are responsible for the increasing populism worldwide (Palmer, 2019). Finally, some blame global migratory patterns for being zero-sum, arguing that every newcomer is a net negative for the country that receives them (Palmer, 2019). 

Populist regimes are, par excellence, illiberal, argues Pappas (2019). In this sense, democracies decline step by step, embracing new institutional structures that undermine the preceding democratic ones and replace them with illiberal ones. Often personalistic, these new regimes create institutions closer to authoritarianism than to actual democracy and dominate their countries for a long time, for example, Hungary, Turkey, Argentina, etc. 

In this paper, I will examine four cases, in the order of the economic crises that affected them: Thailand in 1997, Argentina in 2001, the US in 2008, and Greece in 2015. It is my argument that economic crises arising from global economic dislocations and contagion (Desai, 2003) produce populist regimes that wreak havoc on established institutions and lead countries to political backsliding (Foa & Mounk, 2017). I will explain how populism works in light of severe financial crises, addressing the key elements such as a) its social base, b) the policies associated with the regime, c) its rhetoric, d) the organizational strategy of the regime, e) its leadership style, f) the mobilization associated with regime change, and finally, g) the legacy of each regime. 

Populism and Its Discontents

What is populism? And how does it affect different countries? Before I analyze my case studies, it is important to examine how these populist movements form and what they mean. Considering the variation in regimes and political cultures that produce populism, as well as the nebulousness of the concept, it is essential to define it as precisely as possible. Generically, the definition of populism is “a thin center ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Although Ernesto Laclau (2005) argued that populism does not lead to authoritarianism, my research finds evidence to the contrary. In fact, using populism as an intermediary variable, one can see that economic crisis can lead to political backsliding that takes the form of authoritarianism (Thailand, the USA) or not (Argentina and Greece), depending on political culture. I agree with Laclau that populism is a form of politics, not an ideology, but unlike Laclau, I view populism as a challenge to democracy and argue it should be viewed as such. 

Benjamin Moffit describes the various approaches to defining the concept through the years with a) the ideational approach, b) the strategic approach, and c) the discussive performative approach (Moffit, 2020). The Ideational approach argues that populism is a worldview and an ideology. Populism, sure enough, increasingly appeals to even the younger generation and has made inroads in even the strongest liberal democracies. Roberto Stefan Foa and Yascha Mounk argue that there are signs of the deconsolidation of democracies across the board (Foa & Mounk, 2017). Americans have long been growing dissatisfied with the state of their political system. As survey researchers have chronicled over recent decades, an overwhelming majority of citizens now believe that the US is ‘headed in the wrong direction,” (Foa & Mounk, 2017). 

In Europe, the shock of Brexit was felt in the corridors of European capitals, and some decided to work against the established order. Several populist leaders, among them the leaders of Italy, Croatia, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, made an extra effort to dismantle liberal justice requirements and regress their country’s democracy (The Guardian, 3.30.2026). It remains to be seen whether the trend of democratic backsliding can be reversed following Viktor Orbán’s decisive defeat. 

In general, there are two forms of backsliding according to Nancy Bermeo (2016: 6): “Backsliding can take us to different end points at different speeds. Where backsliding involves rapid and radical change across a broad range of institutions, it leads to outright democratic breakdown and to regimes that are unambiguously authoritarian.” In one of my cases, a complete deconsolidation of democracy happened with the end of a populist regime in Thailand. Essentially, the end of the Thaksin experiment was the rise of the Thai military. In the other three cases, the backsliding has been much more gradual, and in those cases, Bermeo argues: “Where backsliding takes the form of gradual changes across a broad range of institutions, it is less likely to lead to all-out regime change and more likely to yield political systems that are ambiguously democratic or hybrid” (Bermeo 2016: 6). In other words, illiberal democracies. 

The last three cases here, Argentina, the US, and Greece, experienced a decline in democratic values, with the US doing the heavy lifting under the Trump Administration. Yet, even in the mild cases of Greece and Argentina, we have seen a serious weakening of democratic institutions, thus “Democratic backsliding can thus constitute democratic breakdown or simply the serious weakening of existing democratic institutions for undefined ends. When backsliding yields situations that are fluid and ill-defined, taking action to defend democracy becomes particularly difficult,” (Bermeo, 2016:6). So as Palacios (2025: 1832) notes, “a large body of studies has found that populism ‘in the real world’ also has detrimental effects on the quality of democracy. Due to their ambiguous relationship with democracy, once in power, many populist forces adopt an agenda of institutional change that seeks to better approximate their illiberal democratic ideals to the practice.” 

What I argue in this paper is that populism transforms economic woes into political and, especially, moral conundrums, pitting parts of society against one another for the benefit of the leadership. The result of populism’s divisiveness is frequent democratic backsliding, as seen in Thailand, where it led to a coup d’ etat against Thaksin and renewed authoritarianism. In Greece, the collapse of the party system and increased violence among people, and in the US, the establishment of an authoritarian pronged leadership. Only in Argentina have the populists from the left been replaced by the populists of the right, with no discernible end to their economic woes.

Read the Full Text

 


[1] Akis Kalaitzidis is a Professor of Political Science at the Department of Government, Law, and International Affairs, University of Central Missouri. Email: kalaitzidis@ucmo.edu

AzizHuq

Prof. Huq: The US Supreme Court Has Created the Conditions for Democratic Backsliding

As democratic backsliding increasingly unfolds through legal institutions rather than overt constitutional rupture, what distinguishes constitutional resilience from constitutional decline? In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Professor Aziz Huq of the University of Chicago examines how populism, executive power, judicial doctrine, digital platforms, and artificial intelligence are transforming liberal constitutionalism in the United States and beyond. Drawing on comparative constitutional law, he argues that contemporary democratic erosion often proceeds “under the cover of law,” while warning that populists are developing their own constitutional vision. From presidential immunity and democratic backsliding to algorithmic governance and AI-driven power concentration, Professor Huq offers a timely and sophisticated analysis of democracy’s evolving constitutional challenges in the twenty-first century.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the democratic world, constitutional democracy is undergoing a profound transformation. Contemporary democratic erosion rarely arrives through military coups or overt constitutional rupture. Instead, it increasingly unfolds through courts, legislatures, executive decrees, and formally legal mechanisms that gradually weaken institutional constraints while preserving the appearance of constitutional continuity. At the same time, digital platforms and artificial intelligence are reshaping the public sphere, altering the production and circulation of political information, and redistributing power between states, private technology companies, and citizens. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about the future of liberal constitutionalism, democratic resilience, and the capacity of democratic institutions to withstand both populist governance and technological disruption.

Few scholars have done more to illuminate these intersecting challenges than Professor Aziz Huq, Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. One of the world’s leading authorities on constitutional law, democratic backsliding, judicial independence, executive power, and the constitutional implications of artificial intelligence, Professor Huq has produced influential scholarship that bridges American constitutional law with comparative democratic politics. His work has fundamentally reshaped scholarly debates on constitutional resilience, the institutional foundations of liberal democracy, and the legal mechanisms through which elected governments may gradually undermine democratic competition without abandoning constitutional forms.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Huq argues that understanding contemporary democratic backsliding requires moving beyond conventional labels such as populism or authoritarianism toward a more institutional analysis of incentives, constitutional design, and political time horizons. Drawing on Mancur Olson’s theory of the “stationary bandit,” he suggests that “the crucial question” is not simply whether a leader is populist, but “what the time horizon of a populist leader is.” In his view, democratic stability depends heavily on whether political leaders remain constrained by long-term institutional incentives or instead pursue short-term extraction of political and economic rents.

Turning to the United States, Professor Huq contends that “American democratic erosion is proceeding under the cover of law.” Rather than dramatic constitutional breakdown, he identifies legal innovations—including aggressive partisan gerrymandering, expansive presidential authority, and recent Supreme Court jurisprudence—as mechanisms through which democratic competition is being incrementally weakened. Most strikingly, he argues that “the Supreme Court has been responsible for creating the conditions for democratic backsliding,” particularly through its broad conception of presidential immunity and its endorsement of constitutional doctrines that facilitate the concentration of executive power.

Yet Professor Huq’s analysis extends well beyond the American case. He argues that “populists have developed their own version of constitutionalism,” challenging the assumption that constitutionalism necessarily remains synonymous with liberal democracy. Rather than witnessing the disappearance of constitutional government, he suggests, democracies may instead be entering an era in which competing constitutional visions coexist and contest one another. Simultaneously, the digital transformation of politics introduces an additional layer of constitutional complexity. While acknowledging that empirical evidence remains incomplete, Professor Huq warns that contemporary information ecosystems reward emotional engagement over deliberation, observing that “the shift from reasoning to emotion favors populist politics.” He also cautions that, despite its transformative potential, artificial intelligence is currently reinforcing rather than reducing inequalities, concluding that “AI is concentrating power rather than leveling the playing field.”

Ultimately, Professor Huq offers neither fatalism nor easy optimism. Instead, he presents a sober institutional diagnosis of democracy’s contemporary challenges while emphasizing that democratic renewal will require rebuilding effective constitutional constraints, representative institutions, and political organizations capable of responding both to populist pressures and to the unprecedented constitutional questions raised by the digital age.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Aziz Huq, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Michael Shifter.

Prof. Shifter: Anti-Establishment Politics, Not Ideology, Drove Colombia’s Election

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election has reignited fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative democracy in Latin America. Is the country experiencing a conventional ideological shift, or does the election reveal a deeper transformation in democratic politics? In this ECPS interview, Professor Michael Shifter argues that Colombia’s election was driven less by ideology than by widespread anti-establishment sentiment rooted in persistent insecurity, weak state capacity, and public frustration with successive governments’ failure to deliver results. Examining the rise of security populism, the erosion of political moderation, the resilience of Colombian democratic institutions, and the evolving relationship with the United States, Professor Shifter offers a nuanced assessment of Colombia’s political trajectory and its broader implications for comparative studies of populism and democratic governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Colombia’s 2026 presidential election marks one of the most consequential political turning points in contemporary Latin America, raising fundamental questions about populism, democratic resilience, institutional legitimacy, and the future of representative government. The election of Abelardo de la Espriella, following the historic presidency of Gustavo Petro, has frequently been interpreted as evidence of a regional shift from the left toward the populist radical right. Yet such an interpretation, while politically intuitive, risks overlooking the deeper structural forces reshaping democratic politics across the hemisphere. Is Colombia witnessing an ideological realignment, or does the election reveal something more profound about the changing nature of democratic representation itself? As insecurity, organized crime, institutional distrust, and dissatisfaction with political elites intensify across Latin America, electoral competition increasingly appears to revolve less around competing ideological projects than around public demands for effective governance, security, and political renewal.

Few scholars are better positioned to interpret these developments than Professor Michael Shifter, Adjunct Professor at the Center for Latin American Studies (CLAS) at Georgetown University and Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue. For decades, his scholarship has examined the intersections of democratic governance, state-building, political violence, US–Latin American relations, and institutional development. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Shifter offers a nuanced interpretation of Colombia’s election that challenges conventional narratives about ideological polarization and instead places anti-establishment politics at the center of democratic change.

Professor Shifter argues that the conventional interpretation of Colombia’s 2026 election as simply a shift from left to right overlooks a deeper transformation taking place in the country’s democratic politics. “The conventional narrative… is that we’re seeing a turn to the right… I think that’s only part of the story,” he explains. “If we focus only on that, we’re missing something more profound and more fundamental,” namely “profound discontent, widespread anger, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment.” In his view, Abelardo de la Espriella’s victory represents not merely a rejection of Gustavo Petro’s left-wing government but the continuation of the same anti-establishment dynamic that first brought Petro himself to power in 2022. “It is not simply a shift from the left to the right,” he observes, “but a continuation of anti-establishment politics.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Shifter explores how declining confidence in traditional political parties, the rise of social media-driven campaigning, persistent insecurity, and frustration over governments’ inability to deliver tangible results are transforming democratic competition throughout Latin America. He explains why contemporary electoral behavior is increasingly shaped by emotional appeals rather than coherent political programs; why “security populism”has become an increasingly powerful electoral force; why the apparent rise of a unified global populist right often conceals significant ideological differences among its leaders; and why Colombia’s political center continues to erode under the combined pressures of institutional failure and rejectionist voting. At the same time, he cautions against reducing contemporary Latin American politics to simplistic ideological categories, emphasizing instead the diversity of populist experiences across the region.

Despite his concern about growing populist pressures, Professor Shifter ultimately offers a measured assessment of Colombia’s democratic future. One of the most important—and, in his view, most overlooked—developments of the Petro years was “the resilience of Colombian institutions: Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press.” While acknowledging the serious challenges posed by insecurity, polarization, and anti-establishment politics, he concludes on a cautiously optimistic note, expressing confidence that Colombia’s democratic institutions remain capable of preserving constitutional order and maintaining effective checks and balances in the years ahead.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Michael Shifter, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Real Story Is Colombia’s Deep Anti-Establishment Anger

President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella and Vice President-elect Jose Manuel Restrepo.
Credential-giving ceremony to President-elect Abelardo de la Espriella and Vice President-elect Jose Manuel Restrepo by the National Electoral Council in Bogota, Colombia on June 25, 2026. Photo: Anamaria Mejía / Dreamstime.

Professor Shifter, welcome! Let me begin with your recent New York Times essay, in which you describe Colombia’s 2026 presidential election not simply as a swing from left to right but as “a leap into the void.” Why do you believe this election represents something more profound than an ordinary alternation of power? What does it reveal about the current relationship between democratic representation, institutional legitimacy, and public demand for radical political change?

Professor Michael Shifter: The conventional narrative in Colombia, as well as in other recent elections in Latin America, is that we’re seeing a turn to the right, from governments of the left to governments of the right. I think that’s only part of the story. If we focus only on that, we’re missing something more profound and more fundamental, which is illustrated very clearly by Colombia’s recent election. That is the existence of profound discontent, widespread anger, and a strong anti-establishment sentiment.

If we look at the Colombian case in particular, we can go back to the elections four years ago, in 2022, with the election of Gustavo Petro from the left. It’s also worth remembering that his opponent in that election was Rodolfo Fernández, who was himself something of a political outsider and largely unknown. He lost the election, and Petro won, marking the first time Colombia had elected a leftist government. But that outcome clearly reflected widespread discontent with the establishment political parties and their failure to address the country’s profound problems.

Petro did some things that were positive. He put his finger on some legitimate grievances. He increased the representation and inclusion of previously excluded groups—Afro-descendants, Indigenous communities, women, and others who had long lacked access to political power in Colombia. That was an important achievement. But he also leaves behind a rather problematic record, particularly on the issue of security. We now see Abelardo de la Espriella tapping into that same discontent and anti-establishment sentiment, which is quite widespread in Colombia and elsewhere, and capitalizing on it very effectively and skillfully, principally through social media—not through a political party or any traditional organizational structure, but through social media.

So, I don’t think this is simply a turn toward a more conservative political option. It is, rather, a reflection of something much deeper: an anti-establishment sentiment that, in some ways, represents a continuity with Gustavo Petro. It is not simply a shift from the left to the right, but a continuation of anti-establishment politics.

Colombia demonstrated remarkable resilience under Petro, and the central question—which I try to highlight in that essay—is whether Colombia will be able to demonstrate the same resilience over the next four years under De la Espriella.

Frustration with Failed Governments Is Reshaping Democratic Competition

You argue that contemporary Colombian politics is increasingly driven by anti-incumbent sentiment rather than ideological commitment. To what extent does Colombia illustrate a broader transformation of democratic politics in which electoral behavior is shaped less by coherent political programs than by frustration, distrust, and a desire to punish governing elites?

Professor Michael Shifter: What we are witnessing, not only in Colombia but across Latin America and even globally, is politics that is driven and shaped less by coherent political platforms than by emotional appeals that tap into how people feel about not receiving the results that candidates promised on security, economic issues, and governance. It is also driven by the growing frustration that fundamental problems are not being addressed effectively or successfully. That’s precisely what we’re seeing in Colombia, and that’s why there was both an anti-incumbent and an anti-establishment sentiment, which De la Espriella very skillfully and astutely capitalized on to win the presidency.

Now, of course, we’ll have to see how he governs. But, more importantly, we’ll see whether Colombia’s institutions and civil society are truly up to the challenge of keeping in check any temptation to go beyond the country’s constitutional and institutional limits. That’s what we’ll be watching very closely. Hopefully, De la Espriella will prove to be someone who respects democratic norms and institutions. If so, that will lessen the burden on Colombia’s Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press. But we’ll simply have to wait and see.

Traditional Parties Failed to Learn the Lessons of 2022

Abelardo de la Espriella and Gustavo Petro emerged from opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, yet both successfully presented themselves as anti-establishment outsiders. Does this suggest that contemporary Colombian populism is increasingly ideologically flexible—less a coherent doctrine than a performative strategy built around anti-elite rhetoric, moral polarization, and promises of national redemption?

Professor Michael Shifter: Of the two candidates and political figures—Petro on the left and De la Espriella on the right—the more ideological is Petro. After all, I don’t think they should be put in the same category. Petro has a long political history. He’s been in Congress for many years, and he was the mayor of Bogotá. He is clearly an ideologue of the left.

De la Espriella, by contrast, is someone who is new to politics. He has held no political office and has no administrative experience. He saw an opportunity to embrace positions that are considered to be on the right. But he is less of an ideological figure than someone who is simply very skillful and, much like Donald Trump in some ways, adept at capitalizing on public discontent and championing issues that resonate with the Colombian people—in the case of 2026, the deterioration of the security situation in Colombia.

They belong to different categories of leaders. But, both of them were very astute in sensing anti-establishment sentiment and riding that wave. Petro rode it in 2022, and De la Espriella did so, this year. 

What I find astonishing—and unfortunate—is that some of the more centrist and traditional political parties and figures were not sufficiently responsive to the message that Petro sent in 2022. That message was that they had to become serious about addressing the country’s persistent problems of violence, inequality, and the lack of state presence across much of the country. They didn’t do that. Even if you look at the platforms in 2026, there was not sufficient attention to, or focus on, the social agenda. That is a clear lesson of Petro’s presidency that was not adequately heeded by the more traditional political figures and parties.

Strengthening State Capacity Remains Colombia’s Unfinished Democratic Project

Colombia, protest.
Protesters march peacefully through Bogotá calling for the impeachment of President Gustavo Petro and opposing the government’s proposed reforms on April 21, 2024. Photo: Anamaria Mejía / Dreamstime.

More than two decades ago, you warned that Colombia’s central challenge was not simply defeating insurgent groups but strengthening state capacity and public institutions. Looking back at your earlier work on state-building, do the 2026 election results suggest that Colombia’s institutional weaknesses remain fundamentally unresolved despite years of security gains?

Professor Michael Shifter: This is the perennial question in Colombia, one that nobody has been able to answer adequately: Why has it been so difficult to extend an effective and legitimate state presence across much of the country over such a long period of time? Is it a lack of capacity? A lack of political will? This remains a subject of enormous debate, and I don’t think there are any definitive answers.

It’s important not to be too sweeping in our criticism or assessment of Colombia, because one has to recognize that there were some gains—although they were too modest—under Uribe in the early 2000s, and later under the government of Juan Manuel Santos, who served as president for eight years and oversaw both a peace agreement and a peace process. Those efforts did address some of these long-standing structural problems, but clearly not enough. They were not completely successful, nor have they been sustained.

So, it’s important to acknowledge the progress that has been made, while also recognizing that it has not been sufficient and that something fundamental has remained lacking. Many of the issues I identified years ago remain unresolved today. In 2000, I wrote a report on Plan Colombia, which, on balance, I considered a positive initiative, although I was critical of many of its elements and aspects. In that report, I emphasized the importance of strengthening state capacity across much of the country. Unfortunately, the conclusions of that report remain remarkably relevant 26 years later.

Colombia’s Crisis Reflects Both Structural Weaknesses and Government Failure

Your scholarship has long emphasized that persistent violence, inequality, and weak state presence have undermined democratic legitimacy in Colombia. How much of today’s electoral volatility reflects unresolved structural problems rather than the successes or failures of any single government?

Professor Michael Shifter: One has to recognize that it’s a complex picture. There is a combination of longer-term, chronic structural problems in Colombia that persist, coupled with the inadequate—or simply poor—performance of particular governments, in this case the Petro administration. There certainly was a rejection of Petro by many voters. Many of them had concerns about De la Espriella, but they really did not want continuity—another four years of the Historic Pact, the leftist coalition created by Petro and from which Iván Cepeda, the candidate of the left, emerged.

So, I think it’s a combination of dissatisfaction with the government’s performance. Petro promised a great deal. He was a very good campaigner and a good orator, but he wasn’t very effective at governing or delivering results. That is clearly part of the explanation for why his candidate lost, although it should be emphasized that it was by a razor-thin margin. This was not a decisive victory for De la Espriella. The country is divided in two, and it’s important to keep that in mind.

But it also reflects a broader sense of discontent with yet another government that, like those preceding Petro, failed to deliver on its promises, as well as a desire to try something different—to see whether someone like De la Espriella, who had no record in government and about whom relatively little was actually known, might offer an alternative. Many Colombians seemed to think: we tried the traditional political parties, and that didn’t work very well; then we tried a leftist alternative, and that also wasn’t very successful. So, let’s go in another direction. I think that was the way many Colombians approached their vote.

Populism Is Often Better at Making Promises Than Delivering Them

Throughout Latin America, citizens increasingly appear willing to prioritize effectiveness over procedural liberalism. Are we witnessing the rise of a populist conception of democratic legitimacy, in which leaders claim direct authorization from “the people” to bypass institutional constraints if they can promise security, economic stability, and public order?

Professor Michael Shifter: This is unquestionably a global trend. People increasingly give priority to results and tangible benefits as a source of political legitimacy. It’s not that democratic norms or institutions are unimportant; rather, they are simply not as important as achieving results. We’ve seen this reflected for many years in polling and surveys across Latin America. When people are asked whether they would be willing to sacrifice some democratic safeguards in exchange for a government that effectively addresses security, economic problems, and other pressing issues, many of them say yes.

Perhaps the clearest example is El Salvador, where you have a president who enjoys approval ratings of 80 to 90 percent despite showing very little regard for democratic or human rights norms. So, I don’t think this phenomenon is peculiar to Colombia. Of course, we’re seeing it in my own country, the United States. I’m from the United States, and this fits very well with that analysis and interpretation. People want results, and they are willing to sacrifice some democratic protections in order to achieve them.

In that sense, populist legitimacy is defined by the ability to deliver. The problem is that populism, by its nature, is often very good at making promises but much less effective at delivering on them. As a result, the legitimacy gains that initially appear possible often fail to materialize because populist leaders—we see this in the case of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela—promise dramatic transformation but ultimately fail to govern effectively.

Look at Venezuela today. One can go back even before Maduro, to Hugo Chávez, who governed for 13 years and made enormous promises of transforming the country. Today, Venezuela is in a disastrous situation and is now trying to cope with the aftermath of these horrific and tragic earthquakes. That situation derives from the populism of Hugo Chávez, who was a great orator, promised a great deal, but did not know how to govern and failed to deliver.

So, populism generates legitimacy only if it produces concrete results that people can actually experience. But, with very few exceptions, I don’t think populism has a particularly strong record of providing that kind of legitimacy.

Law-and-Order Leaders Still Have to Deliver Results

The 2026 campaign unfolded amid worsening insecurity and renewed concerns about organized crime. How do rising levels of violence reshape democratic competition? Do they create fertile ground for law-and-order populism or penal populism, where candidates transform fear into demands for strongman leadership, militarized security policies, and executive concentration of power?

Professor Michael Shifter: I think no one denies that we’re seeing, in country after country across Latin America, the spread of what I would call security populism, driven by the expansion of organized crime and violence in many countries, including some that, until recently, were relatively safe and secure but are now facing enormous threats to public order. This tends to favor candidates with a more right-leaning agenda—the so-called mano dura, or iron-fisted, approach. We’re seeing political figures capitalizing on that. We saw it in Chile, we saw it in Ecuador, and, of course, we saw it in Colombia. We’ll also see what happens in Brazil in October. We saw it in Peru with the recent election of Keiko Fujimori. This issue, which is becoming increasingly salient and a greater concern for many voters, tends to favor candidates and political figures who advocate law-and-order policies and come from the political right.

That being said, they still have to deliver. They have to produce results. And I’m not sure why people assume that these political figures are necessarily going to be more effective than those from the center, or even the left, in reducing criminality and violence in their countries. If you set Bukele aside—which reflects the very particular circumstances of El Salvador, a small country with the specific phenomenon of gangs rather than the massive transnational organized crime you see in Ecuador, Colombia, Mexico, or Brazil, which are very different cases—you are not seeing many successful examples of these right-wing governments.

We’ll see what happens in Colombia, but certainly in Ecuador, which has become more militarized and where there has been greater cooperation and joint military operations with the United States, you’re not really seeing results. If there are no results, people will once again become frustrated and disappointed, and they’ll begin looking for other alternatives. Those alternatives could come from any point on the ideological spectrum.

I don’t think this is fundamentally an ideological question. It’s a question of effectiveness and efficacy. Some of these right-wing governments that are now coming to power may prove to be quite short-lived because people are impatient. They want results quickly, and when they don’t see them, they begin looking for other alternatives. So, there may be an immediate political effect stemming from the crisis of insecurity and organized crime in some countries, but it’s important to be cautious about interpreting this as a long-term trend that will necessarily reshape politics in Latin America for many years to come.

The Central Lesson of Petro’s Presidency Is That Competence Matters

Colombia's President Gustavo Petro.
Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have argued for many years that Latin American democracies often struggle to reconcile demands for social inclusion with effective governance. Looking at Gustavo Petro’s presidency, what lessons should future reformist governments draw about the relationship between ambitious political agendas, institutional constraints, and governing capacity?

Professor Michael Shifter: The central lesson of Gustavo Petro’s presidency is that competence matters. It’s not simply about ideology. You may have your heart in the right place. You may take important steps to include people who have long been excluded from power and incorporate them into the political process, and that’s an important achievement. But it’s not enough.

You also have to demonstrate governing capacity and competence, and that was lacking during Gustavo Petro’s presidency. His candidate carried the burden of that record into the 2026 election. Again, even though the election was extremely close, and even though there was a very strong political party—perhaps the strongest political party in Colombia today is the left-wing Pacto Histórico, which Petro created—the party machinery worked only up to a point. In the end, it was not enough to secure victory.

So, there does need to be a reformist agenda to tackle issues such as inequality, informality, and the other longstanding problems that have bedeviled Colombia and much of Latin America. But I’m not sure this was truly a reformist presidency. It was an administration that brought new voices to the table, and that deserves a great deal of recognition and credit. I’m hopeful that future Colombian governments will preserve that aspect of the Petro presidency while combining it with a genuine commitment to reform and a greater capacity to address the country’s long-term challenges. I don’t think the Petro administration was very successful in that regard, because achieving those goals requires a level of competence that this president did not demonstrate.

The Global Populist Wave May Be Losing Momentum

Donald Trump’s endorsement of Abelardo de la Espriella inevitably invited comparisons with the global circulation of right-wing populist ideas. To what extent are contemporary Latin American populisms becoming embedded within transnational populist networks that share anti-left, anti-elite, nationalist, and security-centered narratives?

Professor Michael Shifter: There has unquestionably been an increase in, and strengthening of, globalized networks. Latin American populist right-wing leaders have participated in meetings in Europe and elsewhere alongside other leaders of the right. But it’s important to make two qualifications. 

First of all, there may well be increased networking, greater contact, and more sharing of ideas and experiences. I’m not sure, however, that this has enormous significance in terms of effective policy coordination, because I don’t really see many signs of that. One thing is to talk about shared ideas and shared visions. Another is to work together effectively to address the problems these leaders articulate in their campaigns, and I don’t see much evidence of that happening, either within Latin America or in cooperation with other figures around the world, including President Trump.

The second point is that I’m not sure where this global swing toward populism stands at the moment. There have been some setbacks. We see the most striking case in Hungary. We also see changes in Donald Trump’s relationship with Prime Minister Meloni in Italy, and so on. So, the picture is much more complex. One really has to examine it on a country-by-country basis. I’m simply not sure where this trend stands at the moment. It may well be losing some momentum.

Again, there is a great deal of emphasis on performance, media, and projecting a sense of unity. But I don’t think that will be sufficient to generate broader support for these ideas unless these leaders can actually produce results. I don’t think they have been very effective in doing so. Donald Trump is a clear example. People are having a difficult time, and the promises he made during his 2024 campaign have not been fulfilled. As a result, there is considerable disillusionment, and every indicator we have—from opinion polls to other studies—points in that direction.

So, I’m just not sure about the strength or durability of this trend. Moreover, if you scratch beneath the surface and move beyond the superficial similarities, you find enormous differences among these leaders. To describe them as a single bloc, even within Latin America, is misleading. If you compare Bukele with Milei, for example, José Antonio Kast is very different from either of them, yet people tend to place him in the same basket as part of this broader shift to the right. But they are, in fact, very different. Daniel Noboa, President of Ecuador is also very different. A deeper analysis would show that there are at least as many differences as similarities among these so-called right-wing populist political figures.

Not All Populists Belong in the Same Category

Your work on Latin American populism has consistently cautioned against treating all populist leaders as a single phenomenon. How does the current Colombian experience refine our understanding of the similarities—and equally important differences—between left-wing and right-wing populism across the region?

Professor Michael Shifter: One thing we can say about the Colombian example is that De la Espriella, although he clearly had extensive contacts and some support from establishment figures during his campaign, and of course now that he’s president-elect, really is an outsider with virtually no political experience. So, we can make a lot of distinctions. Nayib Bukele was the mayor of San Salvador. José Antonio Kast served in Congress for many years. Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil was a member of Congress for many years. Even Javier Milei served in Congress. The backgrounds and biographies of each of these leaders are very different.

Obviously, Hugo Chávez was a military leader. Each of them comes from a different background, and that shapes, quite significantly, the way they approach the presidency and the way they govern.

De la Espriella is someone about whom there is a genuine debate among analysts. To what extent does he really hold strong ideological convictions, or is he simply a very skillful opportunist who saw an opening in Colombia, recognized widespread discontent, knew how to capitalize on it, and proved extremely effective in using social media and his considerable talents as a showman?

That is quite different from José Antonio Kast in Chile, who is not a showman but rather a more traditional conservative, clearly on the right, with long-standing ideological convictions. The same could be said, in different ways, of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil.

It’s understandable that there is a temptation to group all of these leaders together. That is valid in some respects. But, it’s important to look beneath the surface, because then you begin to see very different positions.

Take Javier Milei, for example, the president of Argentina, who is probably the leader most closely aligned with Donald Trump and who openly admires him. His foreign policy is largely in lockstep with Donald Trump’s. Yet they hold vastly different positions on economic and trade policy. Milei is a champion of free markets, whereas Donald Trump is a protectionist. Trump has said that his favorite word in the English language is “tariffs.” He calls it the most beautiful word, and, if there is one thing he has consistently believed in throughout his life, it is tariffs. That is diametrically opposed to Javier Milei’s economic philosophy. So, it is important to take these differences into account as well.

Traditional Parties Lost Credibility Because They Failed to Deliver

One striking feature of Colombia’s recent politics is the apparent collapse of the political center. What explains the declining electoral appeal of moderate, institution-oriented parties across Latin America, and is this erosion primarily driven by structural socioeconomic factors, institutional failures, or changing political communication?

Professor Michael Shifter: Political communication, particularly social media, is undoubtedly a new and growing factor shaping Latin American politics and global politics. I don’t think it favors centrist, sensible, moderate political options or political figures. Instead, it tends to favor the extremes and to radicalize sectors on both the hard left and the hard right, which contributes to increasing polarization. I think that is certainly a factor. It’s not the only explanation, but it is one that is hard to deny and has become increasingly important over the last five to ten years in shaping politics.

But I think the more important explanation is simply the failure of these traditional parties, which became calcified and discredited in the eyes of their constituents because people felt that they were not performing well, were not fulfilling their promises, and were not delivering results. As a consequence, people became disillusioned with those options and increasingly turned toward the more extreme alternatives that we are seeing across many countries.

What we’re also seeing in elections—and I think this is important to emphasize—is the growing importance of the anti-vote, or rejectionist vote. More and more people voted for De la Espriella because they feared the left remaining in power under Iván Cepeda and his agenda. At the same time, many people voted for Cepeda because they were fearful of what De la Espriella would mean for Colombia.

We saw the same pattern in Peru. A very strong anti-Fujimori vote explains why Roberto Sánchez, the candidate of the left, actually received more votes within Peru than Keiko Fujimori. She won because she received more votes from Peruvians living abroad. But much of her support also reflected fear of the left, fear of Roberto Sánchez, and fear of communism coming to Peru.

We’re seeing the same dynamic in the Brazilian election as well. There has always been an anti-vote that helps explain electoral outcomes, but it strikes me that it is becoming an increasingly important factor in explaining how voters make their decisions.

Bogotá and Washington Are Likely to Enter a Period of Closer Cooperation

US-Colombia
Photo: Dreamstime.

For many years you have examined the interaction between domestic political developments and US–Latin American relations. How might the return of a Trump-aligned government in Bogotá reshape bilateral relations, regional diplomacy, and Colombia’s role within the wider Western Hemisphere?

Professor Michael Shifter: There’s no question—and really no debate—that we’re going to see a stronger alliance between Bogotá and Washington, at least while Trump is in power and has control of Congress, which he does today, than we saw over the last four years under Gustavo Petro. There is going to be greater engagement and closer cooperation between the two governments. It’s not only President Trump, but there are also members of the US Congress, including Senator Bernie Moreno of Ohio and representatives from Florida, who are very enthusiastic about this new presidency and very relieved that they will not have to deal with Iván Cepeda. They see significant opportunities for deeper cooperation and collaboration.

That said, it’s important to be cautious. It’s easy to get carried away and become overexcited, but caution is warranted. Trump no longer has the political capital he enjoyed when he first came to power in the United States. He has lost a considerable amount of support, and many people have become disillusioned with him. Moreover, it appears most likely that Democrats will control the House of Representatives, and possibly the Senate as well, next January, meaning that De la Espriella will have to work with a Democratic-controlled Congress.

There may be a degree of irrational exuberance, to borrow an old phrase, surrounding this new relationship. It would be wise for the new government in Bogotá to take advantage of its alignment with Trump. There are clear benefits for Colombia. At the same time, however, it should avoid turning the relationship into an entirely partisan issue. For many years, Colombia has enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States. It would be extremely unfortunate and very damaging for both Colombia and the De la Espriella administration—if the relationship became tied exclusively to one party in an increasingly polarized US political environment, particularly one that is itself changing. It’s changing in a direction where Trump may no longer enjoy the complete control and dominance that characterized the first year and a half of his presidency.

I also think it’s important for Colombia to exercise caution from a regional perspective in its relations with other Latin American governments. It’s true that a number of leaders are now aligned with Trump, but there are also sharp differences among them. Some of them are hedging their bets. They are aligning themselves with Trump because they don’t want a confrontation or a fight with him—or with the United States—and that’s completely understandable. But Trump has also shown that he is not an entirely trustworthy partner. He can change his mind and turn on leaders at any moment.

It’s also unclear how many meaningful resources the United States will actually make available to assist governments struggling with an array of challenges, including organized crime and security. So, there are a great many caveats, and I hope the De la Espriella administration will develop a more sophisticated approach to managing its relationship with Washington.

Democratic Political Culture Remains the Strongest Defense Against Populism

Finally, Professor Shifter, stepping back from Colombia itself, what broader lessons does the 2026 presidential election offer for scholars of populism, democratic resilience, and political representation? Does Colombia represent an exceptional national case, or has it become an important window into the wider transformation of democracy taking place across Latin America and beyond?

Professor Michael Shifter: The 2026 elections in Colombia are very instructive in a number of ways. One is that they underscore the cost of failing to address long-standing problems by traditional, establishment-oriented, more centrist political parties and leaders.

This is what happens when you fail to heed what the electorate is telling you, which is clearly what voters were telling political leaders in 2022, if not earlier. Yet the inability to adjust and take those messages into account proved very costly. Colombia ended up with two options at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, even though many Colombians were not particularly happy with either of them. So, that is one important lesson.

On the more positive side—and I really want to emphasize this because I think it was perhaps the most underreported story of the Petro presidency—is the resilience of Colombian institutions: Congress, the courts, civil society, and the press. To me, that’s the other major lesson. 

Populism is emerging in places like Costa Rica, where one never would have expected it to emerge. It also emerged in Colombia, and there were various attempts by President Petro to go beyond the limits of his office, to interfere in government, and to disregard certain constraints and checks on his power. It certainly wasn’t for a lack of trying. What was striking, however, was the degree of pushback and resistance that Colombia demonstrated. That is an important lesson: democratic political culture is not trivial.

Countries that possess that democratic experience and tradition are going to be tested, just as Colombia was tested between 2022 and 2026, and they will continue to be tested in the years ahead. But I’m confident they will be able to preserve the democratic order and keep checks and balances intact, despite all the pressures and strains that will inevitably arise.

MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar

MEP López Aguilar: The Return Regulation Is a Violation of EU Fundamental Values

As the European Union implements its new Migration and Asylum Pact amid growing populist pressures, fundamental questions are emerging about the future of European constitutionalism. In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents “a violation of EU fundamental values” and warns that migration governance is increasingly being reshaped by radical-right narratives. Reflecting on the erosion of the cordon sanitaire, the “Melonization” of European migration policy, and the normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, MEP López Aguilar contends that “migration is a fact, not a crisis,” while insisting that “asylum is a right” that must remain protected. The interview offers a timely reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, human rights, and the future of European integration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when migration has become one of the most polarizing issues in European politics, the European Union finds itself confronting a profound constitutional dilemma. The implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, together with the Return Regulation, has reignited fundamental debates about sovereignty, solidarity, fundamental rights, and the future of European integration. Once conceived as a legal and political project founded upon supranational cooperation, shared responsibility, and the protection of human dignity, the European Union is increasingly facing accusations that it is redefining migration governance under the growing influence of populist radical-right politics. Against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, demographic change, electoral realignments, and increasingly contested debates over migration, the central question is no longer simply how Europe manages migration, but whether it can continue to do so without compromising the constitutional and humanitarian values upon which the Union itself was built.

Few policymakers are better positioned to reflect on these developments than Juan Fernando López Aguilar. A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Spain’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since 2009, López Aguilar previously served as Spain’s Minister of Justice and chaired the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) between 2019 and 2024. Trained as a constitutional lawyer and widely recognized as one of Europe’s foremost authorities on constitutionalism, the rule of law, migration governance, and fundamental rights, he has played a central role in shaping EU migration and asylum legislation over the past decade. His long engagement with the negotiations surrounding the Migration and Asylum Pact places him at the heart of one of the Union’s most consequential constitutional debates.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents far more than a technical adjustment to migration management. Rather, he contends that it constitutes “a violation of EU fundamental values” and departs from the legal architecture painstakingly constructed through the Migration and Asylum Pact. Rejecting the growing trend toward externalizing asylum responsibilities, he warns that “migration management cannot come at the expense of the rule of law,” insisting that migration must be addressed through a genuinely European response grounded in “shared responsibility and binding solidarity” rather than bilateral arrangements with third countries.

Throughout the interview, MEP López Aguilar situates the transformation of European migration policy within broader processes of democratic and political change. He argues that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) increasing cooperation with radical-right parties has effectively dismantled the traditional Brandmauer or cordon sanitaire, allowing what he calls the “Melonization” of European migration policy to become mainstream. In his assessment, attempts to externalize migration control, normalize return hubs, and securitize asylum are inseparable from the wider normalization of populist narratives within European politics. At the same time, he cautions that Europe risks undermining its own credibility as a global defender of human rights through increasingly visible double standards in both migration and foreign policy.

Perhaps most strikingly, MEP López Aguilar rejects the assumption that migration itself constitutes Europe’s principal challenge. “Migration is a fact, not a crisis,” he argues, insisting that “reducing migration to zero is not only impossible—it is stupid.” Likewise, he defends asylum as a non-negotiable legal obligation, declaring that “asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost.” For MEP López Aguilar, the real danger lies not in migration itself but in the gradual erosion of Europe’s constitutional identity through the normalization of policies and rhetoric that once belonged exclusively to the political fringes. The interview therefore offers not merely a critique of current migration policy, but a broader reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, constitutionalism, and the future of the European project itself.

Here is the revised version of our interview with MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Martin Tanaka.

Prof. Tanaka: Populism Remains a Risk in Peru, but It Is Far More Contained Today

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has reopened fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional decay, and constitutional governance in one of Latin America’s most politically volatile democracies. In this timely interview with the ECPS, Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies, argues that while “populism remains a risk,” it is “much more controlled and limited” than many feared. He explains why Peru’s democratic crisis stems less from executive authoritarianism than from party fragmentation, legislative dysfunction, and institutional weakness, while cautiously suggesting that the country’s new political balance may create opportunities for negotiation, institutional reform, and democratic stabilization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has once again thrust one of Latin America’s most fragile democracies into the center of international attention. A razor-thin presidential runoff, renewed allegations of electoral fraud, deepening institutional distrust, chronic party fragmentation, and mounting public insecurity have revived long-standing debates over democratic resilience, populism, political representation, and constitutional governance. While Peru has long been viewed as an outlier for combining macroeconomic stability with persistent political instability, the election of Keiko Fujimori has introduced a new layer of uncertainty by reopening unresolved questions about the country’s post-authoritarian trajectory. At a moment when many democracies are struggling with populist polarization and democratic erosion, Peru offers an important case for examining whether institutional recovery remains possible after years of political fragmentation and declining public confidence.

Few scholars are better positioned to assess these developments than Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies. Widely recognized for his pioneering scholarship on weak party systems, ‘brokered democracy’, clientelism, populism, and democratic deterioration, Professor Tanaka has spent more than two decades analyzing why Peru’s democratic institutions have struggled to consolidate despite sustained economic growth. His research has fundamentally shaped comparative debates on party institutionalization, democratic accountability, and the paradoxes of governance in contemporary Latin America.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tanaka offers a measured yet cautiously optimistic assessment of Peru’s political future. Although he acknowledges that the 2026 election reproduced many of the structural weaknesses that have characterized Peruvian politics over the last decade—including institutional fragmentation and declining trust—he nevertheless argues that the outcome may represent an important turning point. As he observes, “the results are much better than our worst expectations,” because many of the parties most closely associated with irresponsible populism and legislative obstruction suffered significant electoral defeats. Rather than signaling the consolidation of anti-system politics, the new Congress may create stronger incentives for negotiation and coalition-building.

Throughout the interview, Professor Tanaka challenges several conventional assumptions about Peru’s democratic crisis. He argues that Peru’s recent democratic erosion has been driven less by executive aggrandizement than by “the decay of parties and the control of parties by particular interests and very narrow interest groups.” Unlike many contemporary cases of democratic backsliding, Peru’s principal danger has not been excessive presidential power but institutional fragmentation, legislative clientelism, and the collapse of effective political mediation. Yet he also sees reasons for cautious hope, emphasizing that “the distribution of political forces puts on the agenda the need to negotiate and to achieve agreements between parties with different perspectives,” while noting that “the risk of the continuation of this populist logic still exists, but it is much more controlled and limited.”

The conversation also explores broader theoretical questions concerning the evolution of populism, democratic legitimacy, corruption, judicial activism, and institutional reform. Professor Tanaka reflects on Peru’s distinctive combination of economic orthodoxy and political instability, examines why anti-corruption campaigns have generated widespread public disappointment, and assesses whether bicameralism and a more structured party system can help restore democratic governance. 

Looking beyond the current electoral cycle, he concludes that rebuilding Peru’s democracy will ultimately depend on strengthening the state’s administrative capacity, professionalizing the civil service, and reconstructing political parties capable of reconnecting citizens with representative institutions. As he puts it, “state reform and civil service reform are the major issues in Peru,” alongside political reforms that can begin “to reverse the dynamic of deterioration that we have faced in recent years.”

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Martín Tanaka, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.