In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Andrew O’Donohue, Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University and Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines how political polarization, populist mobilization, and judicial institutions shape democratic backsliding. Drawing on comparative research across the United States, Turkey, Israel, and Brazil, Dr. O’Donohue argues that polarization becomes particularly dangerous when political divisions harden into antagonistic identities. He explores how populist leaders exploit these divisions, manipulate judicial institutions, and undermine democratic accountability. Challenging conventional assumptions about judicial independence, he warns that courts can themselves enable democratic backsliding. Yet he emphasizes that democratic resilience remains possible through opposition mobilization, institutional reform, and coalitions capable of defending constitutional safeguards against executive overreach.
Political polarization has become one of the defining challenges facing contemporary democracies, not merely because it divides electorates but because it can transform political competition into an existential struggle between antagonistic identities. Against the backdrop of renewed debates over executive power following the 2026 US midterm elections, mounting judicial pressure on Turkey’s political opposition, and Israel’s ongoing constitutional crisis, the relationship between polarization, populism, and democratic backsliding has acquired renewed urgency. Yet polarization is not inherently destructive. As Dr. Andrew O’Donohue observes, “Sometimes polarization can be highly democratizing.”The danger emerges when political disagreements harden into seemingly irreconcilable identities: “When polarization becomes an aspect of political identity, it can be very dangerous for democracy.”
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. O’Donohue, a Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University and a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines how polarization shapes democratic resilience and authoritarian consolidation across the United States, Turkey, Israel, and Brazil. Holding a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, O’Donohue specializes in law and courts, democracy and authoritarianism, and Middle East politics. His comparative scholarship, including the co-edited volume Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, challenges conventional assumptions about democratic institutions and the political consequences of polarization.
Dr. O’Donohue argues that polarization operates both as an independent driver of democratic backsliding and as a strategic instrument manipulated by political leaders. In today’s media environment, outrage reinforces partisan antagonism, while populist leaders exploit these divisions to justify institutional transgressions. Polarization, he warns, enables leaders “to get away with anti-democratic actions in the name of protecting one side” while encouraging supporters to overlook abuses committed by their own political camp.
This dynamic becomes especially consequential when courts enter the political battlefield. Through what he calls court baiting, populist leaders deliberately advance popular but legally vulnerable policies, forcing judges into a dilemma between tolerating executive overreach and appearing to obstruct the popular will. Yet Dr. O’Donohue cautions that judicial independence alone cannot guarantee democratic protection: “Independent courts can weaken citizens’ rights, overturn elections, empower unelected elites, or engage in anti-democratic behavior themselves.”
His comparative assessment also raises serious warnings about Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory, Israel’s competitive authoritarianism, and the limited effectiveness of prosecuting illiberal leaders in deeply polarized societies. Nevertheless, he rejects political fatalism, insisting that “polarization doesn’t mean stasis.” New political movements can disrupt entrenched divisions, while courts can resist executive aggrandizement when supported by elected officials, civil society, and international actors.
Ultimately, Dr. O’Donohue’s central message is that democratic resilience requires more than independent institutions: it demands political competition without existential antagonism, effective judicial allies, and sustained institutional reform.
“Manufacturing Political Outrage: Disinformation, Propaganda, and Digital Populism in Portugal,” byDr. Ana Filipa Joaquim (Director of the ECPS Digital Populism Research Program, Adjunct Professor at the Polytechnic Institute of Portalegre, Portugal).
Speakers
“Curating the Self in Polarized Digital Spaces: Social Media, Political Perceptions, and Youth Engagement,” by Dr. Catharina Vale (Senior Consultant in international cooperation working at the intersection of public affairs, institutional strategy, and sustainability governance).
“The Politics of Affect and Identification: Discourse, Antagonism, and Brazil’s Presidential Elections,” by Dr. Bianca Alighieri Luz Monteiro (Discourse Analyst and Journalist; University of Stavanger (PhD).)
Digital political communication presents a central democratic tension. Emotionally charged populist messages may foster visibility, political identification, and public engagement, while polarized information environments can also encourage selective exposure, conversational restraint, or withdrawal. This panel explores how political outrage is strategically produced, discursively articulated, and negotiated in everyday digital practices.
Drawing on research from Portugal and Brazil, the discussion brings together three complementary analytical perspectives. Dr. Ana Filipa Joaquim examines the construction of political indignation through disinformation, propaganda, and populist political marketing, with particular attention to the Portuguese party CHEGA. Dr. Catharina Vale investigates the relationship between social media, political perceptions, polarization, and young people’s practices of self-curation, including decisions about what to encounter, share, or silence. Dr. Bianca Alighieri Luz Monteiroexplores how affect, identification, and antagonism are constituted through political discourse, drawing on discourse theory, psychoanalytic political theory, and social semiosis in the context of Brazil’s 2022 and 2026 presidential elections.
Together, these contributions consider the connections and tensions between political mobilization and individual agency. The panel asks how outrage acquires political meaning, how emotionally resonant narratives shape collective identification, and how citizens respond to contested political information. Rather than assuming uniform effects or a direct causal progression from polarization to disengagement, it foregrounds the importance of sociopolitical context, mediated discourse, and differentiated forms of democratic participation.
Brief Biographies
Dr. Ana Filipa Joaquim
Ana Filipa Joaquim is a researcher and higher education lecturer whose work focuses on digital populism, political communication, disinformation, propaganda, political marketing, media literacy, and artificial intelligence in communication. She holds a PhD in Global Studies from NOVA University Lisbon. Her doctoral research examined the strategic use of disinformation in radical-right populist political marketing, focusing on the Portuguese party CHEGA across the 2019, 2022, and 2024 legislative elections.
Her current research extends this work through longitudinal and comparative approaches, including the 2025 electoral cycle and wider European cases. She teaches in Portuguese higher education and is the author of The Age of Digital Populism: How Disinformation and Propaganda Are Transforming Politics. Her contribution to this panel considers the ways in which political actors construct indignation and antagonistic identities through propaganda and platform-mediated communication.
Dr. Catharina Vale
Catharina Vale holds a PhD in Communication Sciences from Universidade Católica Portuguesa, awarded magna cum laude, a master’s degree in Intercultural Education from Freie Universität Berlin, and an MBA in Corporate Communication. Her research focuses on social media, political communication, interculturality, and youth, particularly the relationships between polarization, political perceptions, and the curation of digital experience.
She has more than 20 years of experience in strategic communication for international cooperation, including work with the United Nations, GIZ, the International Climate Initiative (IKI), and the Brazilian government. Her writing seeks to connect research and professional practice through accessible, journalistic language, building bridges between academia, public policy, and everyday life. Her panel contribution examines how individuals, especially younger users, negotiate political content and participation through self-curation in polarized digital environments.
Dr. Bianca Luz Monteiro
Bianca Alighieri Luz Monteiro is a Brazilian journalist and discourse analyst based in Texas, United States. She holds a PhD in Social Science and an MSc in Energy, Environment and Society from the University of Stavanger, Norway, as well as an MA in Media Processes from Unisinos, Brazil. Before entering academic research, she spent more than a decade working in Brazilian journalism and media, including the editing of consumer magazines and digital content.
Her research combines Essex School discourse theory, psychoanalytic political theory, and Eliseo Verón’s theory of social semiosis to examine affect, political identification, and antagonism, with particular attention to Brazil’s 2022 and 2026 presidential elections. She is affiliated with the CEL research group (Political and Electoral Discourses) at the Federal University of Paraná (UFPR) and works as an independent consultant in discourse audit. Her contribution explores the discursive and affective processes through which political narratives construct belonging and opposition.
In this commentary, Nikoletta Syvak examines Europe’s energy trilemma—the competing imperatives of affordability, energy security, and environmental sustainability—and how tensions between diversification and rising energy costs fuel populist politics. As the European Union seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition, populist actors exploit economic grievances by portraying Brussels’ energy policies as burdens imposed by distant elites on ordinary citizens. Drawing on developments in Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Germany, Syvak explores how affordability concerns challenge European solidarity and create opportunities for populist mobilization. She argues that addressing this dilemma requires targeted household compensation, greater transparency about diversification costs, and pragmatic energy policies that balance strategic independence with economic affordability and public trust.
By Nikoletta Syvak*
Energy insecurity has become an increasingly important driver of populist mobilization in Europe, exposing tensions between technocratic policymaking, socioeconomic grievances, and democratic legitimacy. As the EU balances energy diversification, affordability, and environmental sustainability, populist actors frame rising energy costs as evidence that Brussels prioritizes geopolitical ambitions over ordinary citizens’ needs. Yet these grievances reflect genuine economic pressures rather than merely populist narratives. The challenge is to address these concerns without undermining European solidarity or long-term energy security.
On October 29, 2026, speaking to the press in Luxembourg on the sidelines of the EU Energy Council, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen warned that the upcoming winter “will be a difficult period for many European citizens.” He noted that the situation had reached the point where EU citizens would simply be unable to pay their heating bills. The problem, he emphasized, lies not in a physical shortage, but in prices: if they cannot pay the bills, “then it doesn’t matter how much gas is available.”
According to Jørgensen, the current crisis is more significant than the shock of 2022, because it now affects not only gas but also oil and petroleum products, which turned out to be a consequence not only of the war in Ukraine and the damaged energy infrastructure but also of the situation in the Middle East. In essence, the commissioner described the main contradiction of European energy policy: the EU seeks to reduce its strategic dependence on other countries; EU citizens want energy to be affordable. These two goals intersect, but they are not the same, and the gap between them has become one of the most fertile grounds for populist politics in Europe.
This commentary asserts that it is not the populists who create the contradiction between affordability and diversification, but they can politicize this crisis. Whether the EU will be able to implement its energy security program depends on whether it manages to bridge this gap before the populists continue to exploit it.
Brussels Confronts the Energy Security–Affordability Dilemma
The European Commission’s assessment of the energy crisis currently unfolding in the EU can be judged by the meeting held in October 19 in Bratislava, which was attended not only by Jørgensen, a member of the European Commission for Energy, but also by the energy ministers of the Visegrád Group countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). During the press conference, Jørgensen noted that the EU was dependent on Russia, but now the Union is getting rid of this dependence. However, the problem is that, as Jørgensen added, the EU now depends on the global market, so events in the Middle East affect the situation with the energy crisis in Europe. According to the Ember analytical center, due to the rise in prices caused by the war involving Iran, wholesale electricity futures in Central Europe have increased in price by more than 60% compared to the pre‑crisis level.
During the European Council meeting (October 15–16, 2026), ministers drew attention to their request: they asked to postpone the introduction of Emissions Trading System 2 (ETS2) until 2030, to allocate funds from the EU budget for the development of oil and gas infrastructure, and to provide greater flexibility in the phased withdrawal from Russian gas. Seven EU member states insisted on making amendments to ETS2, but the leaders only asked the European Commissionto analyze the consequences of these changes. On October 28, Jørgensen added that over the past two decades, a quarter of oil refineries in the EU have closed, which has led to a reduction in domestic production capacity by approximately 10%, and that the diesel fuel market will be under pressure until at least 2027.
The European Commission’s response is logical: support should be targeted and temporary, and it should not hinder the transition away from imported fossil fuels. While this position is reasonable, it also implicitly acknowledges a fundamental reality: ending energy agreements with Russia did not free Europe from the risks associated with fossil fuel imports; it merely shifted their source, leaving households to bear the costs of this transition.
Two Approaches to EU Energy Policy
The first logic is responsible for diversification: according to the European Commission’s report on the state of the Energy Union for 2025, Russia’s share of EU gas imports decreased from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024 and 12% by August 2025. Regulation (EU) 2026/261, adopted on January 26, 2026, turns this into law: supplies of Russian LNG should end by the end of 2026, and pipeline gas supplies by September 30, 2027, with a possible extension until November 1, 2027. The Law on Zero-Emission Industries and the Law on Essential Raw Materials apply the same logic to environmentally friendly technologies.
The second approach is affordability: Draghi’s report says that EU companies pay two to three times more for electricitythan US firms, and four to five times more for gas. Households are not deprived of attention: according to Eurostat, in the second half of 2025, the average price of electricity for households in the EU was 28.96 euros per 100 kWh, which is a stable indicator, but still significantly higher than the level that existed before 2022.
In policy research, this is called the energy trilemma: security, affordability, and sustainability cannot be achievedsimultaneously. Diversification is a long-term insurance policy, but insurance premiums are already being paid due to newinfrastructure, more expensive supply routes and carbon prices. These surcharges are borne by households and industry,and they are visible on every account.
Where Tensions Arise: Supply Chains in the Clean Technology Sector
The same need to find a compromise is once again evident in the very process of the energy transition. According to theInternational Energy Agency, China’s share in each stage of the production of solar panels: polysilicon, ingots, plates,cells and modules-exceeds 80%, production costs there are about 35% lower than in Europe, and Chinese economies ofscale have helped reduce the cost of solar energy by more than 80%.
However, these data are primarily a structural feature of the market, not a threat in themselves. China is an indispensablesupplier for Europe during the transition period, and cheap environmentally friendly technologies are one of the mostreliable ways to reduce electricity prices in the long term. However, the EU’s sustainable development program: benchmarks for domestic production in accordance with the Zero Net Profit Industry Act, trade protection tools, andsupply diversification – increases initial costs to reduce the risk of concentration.
Thus, the dilemma surrounding natural gas and solar power takes the same form. Environmental sustainability is expensive today; tomorrow’s most affordable energy supply carries the risk of concentration. Neither of these options is wrong, but each results in losers who can be mobilized.
Populist Narratives
According to the ideological definition of Mudde (2024), populism divides society into “pure people” and “corrupt elite”. With regard to energy, this turns a political compromise into a moral conflict: ordinary people pay the bills, while distant Brussels pursues geopolitics or ideology at their expense. As Huber et al. (2021) show, populists in power tend to persist in seeking concessions and abandonment of EU energy and climate policies, often in conjunction with governments with unpopular views. The European Commission is not a populist player in this case. This is a technocratic analogue, against which a populist story is told.
Robert Fico, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, is a prominent figure in the world of populism. His government maintainsthat cutting off Russian energy supplies would cause severe harm to households and businesses. Slovakia and Hungary were the only two countries to vote against Regulation 2026/261, and on April 24, 2026, Slovakia filed a lawsuit to have this regulation declared invalid in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Fico promised that in 2026, energy prices for 90% of households would remain unchanged. The pattern is clear: cheap energy is presented as a symbol of national independence, which is defended through vetoes and legal proceedings.
Andrej Babiš, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, has taken a different approach. The Czech Republic has already reduced its reliance on Russian gas imports to 7% by 2023. The Babiš government has been more critical of the EU’s energy policy than its predecessor, and the Czech Republic has joined efforts to delay the implementation of ETS2. In areas where diversification has already been achieved, the focus has shifted from supply routes to climate and pricing instruments.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party represents an opposition position. Initially, its proposal to abolish the carbon dioxide emissions fee and the Building Energy Act was rejected, but in July 2026 it was reformed by the law on building modernization. The AfD speaker called the government’s policy “ineffective and inhumane”. Without accountability for the government’s actions, everything is simple: every euro spent on carbon fees is a cost imposed by the elites.
Hungary added a note: the Viktor Orbán administration filed a lawsuit against the gas ban in February 2026, but lost power in April. Nevertheless, in October, Hungary still supported the Visegrad Group’s call for flexibility regarding the Russian phase-out and the effort to modify the ETS2. The demand for affordability is not solely driven by populism: populists are simply the most successful entrepreneurs in this area.
Consequences for the European Union
The first risk is division: legal disputes, the threat of a veto, and demands for national exemptions, Italy reportedly soughta waiver from ETS2, similar to the one granted to Spain and Portugal in 2023, undermine the concept of a unified energy strategy, one exemption at a time.
The second risk is coalition-building: when it comes to affordability, populist governments are no longer isolated, they can join forces with mainstream governments under the pressure of fiscal and electoral considerations.
The third risk is external: the EU, which is struggling to maintain its own diversification rules, weakens its credibility in dealing with Russia and its negotiating position with other suppliers, including LNG exporters and manufacturers of clean technologies.
The Commission’s proposal for targeted and temporary assistance is essential, but not sufficient. The success of diversification will depend on the willingness of all citizens to share the burden.
To counter the appeal of populists, three measures are necessary: First, give priority to compensation. The funds from the Social Climate Fund and ETS2 should be distributed to low- and middle-income households, as the European Commission is already discussing with the European Investment Bank.
Secondly, it is important to ensure transparency of security costs: importance to clearly identify the costs of security measures, as well as the additional costs associated with the 2022 crisis, in order to fully assess the benefits of diversification.
Finally, it is necessary to apply a more practical approach to energy policy: reducing the risks of excessive dependence of the country on any one source, while ensuring access to imports at competitive prices, including from China. After all, Europe’s energy security depends not only on pipelines, terminals, and supply chains, but also on the support of its citizens.
In sum, the European Union’s energy dilemma is not merely a technical question of supply diversification, affordability, or environmental sustainability; it is also a political challenge with profound implications for democratic legitimacy and European integration. Populist actors do not create the structural tensions underlying energy policy, but they can transform economic grievances into narratives of elite indifference and national sovereignty. If the costs of diversification and the green transition remain unevenly distributed, public dissatisfaction may deepen political polarization and weaken support for common European policies. Addressing these risks requires transparent policymaking, targeted social protection, and a pragmatic approach to energy security. The EU’s long-term success will depend not only on reducing strategic dependencies but also on maintaining citizens’ trust and ensuring that the transition is socially sustainable.
(*) Nikoletta Syvak is a Graduate Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, East China Normal University (ECNU). Email: syvaknikoletta@gmail.com
In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the troubling intersection of antisemitism, political polarization, and the politics of historical memory through a controversy surrounding a proposed exhibition commemorating three centuries of Jewish life in Amersfoort, the Netherlands. Drawing on debates about collective responsibility, cultural exclusion, and multidirectional memory, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores how criticism of Israeli government policies can become entangled with perceptions of Jewish communities elsewhere. He argues that solidarity with Palestinians and recognition of Jewish historical suffering are not mutually exclusive, warning against the conflation of Jewish identity with Israeli state actions. The commentary underscores the importance of preserving inclusive historical remembrance amid contemporary geopolitical conflicts.
Should the history of a Jewish community in Europe become entangled in controversies over the policies of the Israeli government? The question exposes a troubling tension between legitimate criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza and the tendency to hold Jewish communities elsewhere symbolically accountable for those actions. When Jewish cultural heritage and historical remembrance become politically sensitive because of events in the Middle East, the boundary between political solidarity and collective stigmatization begins to blur. A recent controversy in the Dutch city of Amersfoort illustrates how this tension can affect even the commemoration of a centuries-old Jewish community.
Workmen were renovating the synagogue on Drieringensteeg when Alexander van Dijkhuizen spoke to the Dutch newspaper Trouw. The building was approaching its three-hundredth anniversary. For Van Dijkhuizen, chair of Amersfoort’s Jewish community, an exhibition at the city museum was intended to be one of the anniversary’s main events. However, the museum had withdrawn from the project. Its director, Paul Baltus, cited tensions over the Middle East.
Baltus was concerned about the 85 volunteers who interact with visitors. He told Trouw that there had been no specific threat of violence. The museum had neither consulted the police nor conducted a risk assessment, and the exhibition was still at the conceptual stage. A small museum must consider what its volunteers can reasonably handle. In this case, however, the subject itself was deemed a risk before the exhibition had even taken shape.
In one strand of the cultural left, the distinction between oppressors and oppressed has come to do more than explain who exercises power over whom in Gaza. It has become a framework for determining what Jews elsewhere are perceived to represent. One can honor the Jews murdered under Nazism while still placing a contemporary Jewish congregation on the side of the oppressor based on the actions of the Israeli government. David Schraub has examined a related problem in debates about race: when Jews are viewed primarily through their presumed proximity to power, the prejudice they face becomes harder to recognize. In debates over Gaza, even making space for Jewish history in a museum can come to be perceived as taking Israel’s side.
In May 2025, the Bristol venue Strange Brew canceled a concert by Oi Va Voi, a British band whose music draws on klezmer traditions. The Bristol Palestine Alliance had objected to the band’s previous performances in Israel. Campaigners also claimed to discern a coded Zionist message on the cover of a solo album by the band’s Israeli guest singer, Zohara, which depicted her surrounded by watermelons. The venue later acknowledged that the cancellation had been a mistake and that the band’s Jewish identity and its guest singer’s nationality had likely subjected them to a level of scrutiny that other performers would not have faced.
The reporting on the Amersfoort exhibition identifies no comparable campaign. The museum allowed a dispute over Israel to influence what it would exhibit before any confrontation had even occurred. Follow that logic far enough, and a Jewish family could have lived in Amersfoort for generations, yet its place in the city’s museum would still depend on how calm the news from the Middle East happened to be.
Amersfoort’s Council of Churches condemned Israeli violence in Gaza and the West Bank in the same letter in which it called on the museum to reinstate the exhibition. Michael Rothberg has explored how the remembrance of one history of violence can deepen recognition of another. The churches suggested that anger over Gaza need not prevent Amersfoort’s residents from learning about the Jewish families who had lived in their city for centuries.
On November 6, following a meeting convened by the mayor and the councillor for culture, the city announced that it would work with the museum and the Jewish community to find a way to hold the exhibition. Offers of assistance had alleviated some of Baltus’s concerns, although the venue had yet to be determined.
At Borneoplein, a light is illuminated for each of Amersfoort’s Jewish victims of the Second World War on the anniversary of their death. An exhibition could offer visitors a glimpse into the lives commemorated by those lights. Amersfoort once had a Jewish theater society. In 1941, the community established a school for Jewish children excluded from public education. The congregation was reestablished after the war, and by 1949, the synagogue’s damaged interior had been restored. This time, the workmen on Drieringensteeg were preparing the synagogue for a celebration.
The Amersfoort controversy raises a broader question: should Jewish communities in Europe bear the consequences of political conflicts involving Israel? Criticism of Israeli policies and solidarity with Palestinians should not come at the expense of Jewish historical memory or cultural belonging. As the Council of Churches demonstrated, these commitments are not mutually exclusive. A democratic society must be capable of acknowledging different histories of suffering without turning remembrance into a political endorsement. Commemorating three centuries of Jewish life in Amersfoort is not taking Israel’s side; it is recognizing that Jewish history is an inseparable part of the city’s own history.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, examines the consolidation of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its implications for liberal democracy. Challenging the interpretation of the AfD as merely a protest party, he argues that its electoral resilience reflects deeply rooted political alienation, anti-immigration attitudes, and dissatisfaction with democratic representation. Professor Lewandowsky explains how perceptions of economic crisis activate existing xenophobic sentiments, which the AfD amplifies through populist narratives and scapegoating. He also warns that mainstream parties may inadvertently strengthen the radical right by adopting its rhetoric. Ultimately, he emphasizes that restoring democratic confidence requires socioeconomic reforms, renewed political representation, and stronger democratic engagement.
Germany is undergoing a profound political realignment. Amid economic stagnation, immigration controversies, and growing distrust of established parties, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has consolidated its position as a major political force. Its unprecedented gains in the September 2026 state elections, particularly in eastern Germany, challenge the resilience of democratic institutions and the traditional Brandmauer against the radical right. While populist movements elsewhere have experienced electoral setbacks, the AfD continues to expand its appeal, raising fundamental questions about democratic representation, political alienation, and the normalization of radical-right politics.
In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, whose research focuses on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic politics, examines the structural foundations of the AfD’s electoral resilience and the challenges facing Germany’s liberal democracy.
Rejecting the conventional interpretation of the AfD as merely an expression of anti-establishment protest, Professor Lewandowsky argues that “the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.” Its electoral strength, he explains, reflects not only dissatisfaction with democratic institutions but also a durable alignment between voters’ ideological preferences and the party’s political agenda, particularly on immigration.
Central to his analysis is the relationship between economic insecurity, preexisting authoritarian attitudes, and populist crisis narratives. Rather than generating xenophobia independently, the AfD exploits perceptions of economic and cultural threat to reinforce existing prejudices. As Professor Lewandowsky emphasizes, “They do not create it, but they amplify it.” This dynamic becomes particularly consequential when mainstream parties adopt similar rhetoric, inadvertently strengthening the radical right’s ownership of migration as a political issue.
The interview also challenges assumptions about democratic dissatisfaction and electoral accountability. Drawing on experimental research, Professor Lewandowsky explains how voters may prioritize preferred policies over liberal-democratic principles, while AfD supporters display exceptional loyalty even when their party faces political scandals. His research further complicates the presumed relationship between loneliness and radical-right support, finding that social isolation is more closely associated with electoral abstention than with AfD voting.
Looking ahead, Professor Lewandowsky identifies political representation as central to democratic renewal. Criticizing mainstream parties for following rather than shaping the political agenda, he argues that economic and social reforms must address underlying grievances while rebuilding citizens’ confidence in democratic institutions. Above all, he insists that “political parties are at the center of saving democracy.”
In sum, the interview explores whether Germany’s established parties can reclaim their representative functions—or whether the AfD’s consolidation signals an enduring transformation of the country’s political landscape.
Here is our interview with Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
The AfD Has Never Been Just a Protest Party
The Alternative for Germany (AfD) booth in Görlitz, Germany, on August 16, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.
Professor Lewandowsky, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your research on the AfD’s evolution from a Eurosceptic protest party into a populist radical-right movement. Following its extraordinary gains in the September 2026 state elections, has the AfD become a structurally entrenched political force rather than a temporary expression of anti-establishment discontent?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: It absolutely has. Even early studies on the AfD showed that the driving force behind voters’ support for the party was not only protest against the establishment but also congruence with the AfD’s program, especially on the issue of migration. So, what I would say is that the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.
What we can see now is that AfD voters are among the most loyal in the party system. When we look at the propensity to vote and electoral availability, as studied by Aiko Wagner from the Free University of Berlin and me, we can see that AfD voters have the lowest probability of voting for another party. For example, if you vote for the CDU, there is a certain probability that you might also consider supporting the AfD. If you vote for the SPD, you have a certain propensity to vote for the Greens. But AfD voters have the lowest propensity to vote for any other party.
Why is that so? It has to do with the AfD being the only party that its voters trust. In other words, individuals who vote for the AfD do not trust any of the other parties. This distrust of the political system and its actors is not simply an expression of temporary protest. Rather, it has to do with discontent with democracy and the perception that democracy is in a state of crisis. That is something the AfD can really capitalize on, much like other parties with similar ideologies, such as the FPÖ, Rassemblement National, and others.
How would you distinguish the objective socioeconomic drivers of AfD support—economic stagnation, regional inequality, and insecurity—from subjective grievances involving cultural displacement and political alienation? Why have these factors proved particularly powerful in eastern Germany, where the legacies of reunification continue to shape political identities?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: Generally, the basic reasons individuals support the AfD are not so different between West and East Germany, just as they are not that different among AfD voters, FPÖ voters, and even Trump voters. There are certain driving factors that we find in almost all established democracies that explain why individuals vote for populist radical-right parties. These factors are the same in the case of the AfD.
So, to what extent does the economy come into play? The economy—macroeconomic factors—is a driving factor, but these factors essentially activate individual attitudes that are already in place. Let me explain. If you look at a former CDU voter or a non-voter, they might have a negative attitude toward migration. They might be skeptical about asylum seekers but remain non-voters or conservative voters, perhaps even SPD or Social Democratic voters, though to a much lesser extent, as we have seen in the work of Cas Mudde, Max Mitteregger, and Tarik Abou-Chadi.
What we do know is that the perception of an economic crisis—not necessarily being personally affected by that crisis but fearing that people like me could be affected in the future—can be a driving force behind voting for a party like the AfD. This is because such perceptions activate authoritarian or nativist attitudes that were already present but had not previously influenced voting behavior.
Parties like the AfD capitalize on this because they can take voters’ perceptions of crises and not only offer a simple solution but also engage in scapegoating, following a strategy of naming and blaming. They essentially say, “These are the people responsible for this crisis. It is those up there, and it is the ones they let in.”
So, what they capitalize on is an attitude of xenophobia. They do not create it, but they amplify it. And they have the opportunity to amplify it because there is a perception of an economic crisis. That is how these factors at the macro and micro levels work together.
Mainstream Parties Amplify the AfD’s Migration Narrative
AfD demonstrated with slogan “Stop Islamization” in Rostock on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany.
Immigration remains central to the AfD’s political mobilization, even where direct exposure to immigration is relatively limited. How does the party transform perceptions of cultural threat and demographic change into durable political identities, and why have mainstream parties struggled to counter this narrative?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, I wouldn’t necessarily say that the other parties struggle to counter the narrative. I would say that they struggle to imitate it. If you look at the work of Michael Bayerlein, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Werner Krause, and others, we can see that, in international comparison, conservative parties try to catch up. And it’s not only conservative parties; if you look at Denmark, Social Democratic parties do so as well, though to a much lesser extent. They try to catch up by adopting, to some extent, the narrative that outsiders pose a threat—not necessarily to national identity, but to security.
We know that when conservative parties do this, they strengthen their right-wing competitors. Parties like the AfD, the FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats have issue ownership over migration, particularly when it comes to taking certain positions and framing the issue in a particular way. When other parties shift to the right on this issue, migration remains prominent in political and media discourse, and its importance is amplified. As Abou-Chadi, Denis Cohen, and Krause have shown, right-wing populist parties either don’t lose votes or even gain votes.
So, what are these parties able to do? I think that connects to what I said before. We know that these parties can offer a particular interpretation of a crisis. A crisis, or the perception of one, must already exist. They cannot create the perception of a crisis; it must already be present within society. What they do is offer a particular framing and certain solutions.
Benjamin Moffitt pointed this out in a 2015 paper in which he analyzed how populist parties use and frame crises. This is what we’re seeing here. These parties take an existing perception of crisis—whether concerning the economy, migration, or asylum seekers, as in 2015—and amplify it, thereby becoming stronger.
Other parties then react, making the perception of crisis permanent. Everybody starts talking about the crisis, but right-wing populist parties retain issue ownership. This is how it works. It shows that, through their own strategies and the shifts of other parties, especially conservative parties, populist radical-right parties no longer remain pariahs. To some extent, they become part of the mainstream—or at least their issues, framings, and rhetoric become mainstream. This is what helps these parties establish their narratives.
AfD Voters Support Democracy but Distrust How It Functions
In your September 2026 interviews, you distinguished between ideologically committed far-right voters and a broader AfD electorate driven by populist resentment. Given your findings on voters’ willingness to trade liberal-democratic principles for preferred policies, does AfD support primarily reflect democratic disaffection, conscious illiberalism, or an increasingly powerful interaction between them?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: All of it. If you look at why individuals vote for the AfD, one factor is dissatisfaction with democracy. But to be dissatisfied with democracy, you also have to have an idea, at least to some extent, of what you expect from it. You cannot be dissatisfied if you never had an expectation. What we see is that AfD voters are dissatisfied with democracy as it currently functions. They do support the idea of democracy; they are not outright anti-democratic. But we also know that they have strong populist attitudes.
Let me give you an example of what that looks like. If you look at voters as a whole and want to determine whether the likelihood of voting for the AfD increases because individuals are right-wing or because they are populist, you find that right-wing individuals without strong populist attitudes do not have a particularly high probability of voting for the AfD.
However, when individuals are both right-wing and populist—when you examine the interaction between their right-wing positions and populist attitudes—we see that the probability of voting for the AfD depends on that interaction. So, it is not simply right-wing individuals, or even necessarily populist individuals, who vote for the AfD; it is individuals who are both right-wing and populist. Those who are right-wing but not populist might be more inclined to vote for the CDU. But I think populism is a very strong driver.
At the same time, what Michael Jankovsky and I found in our 2023 paper is something that, from a normative standpoint of democracy, can be somewhat concerning. We found that when individuals have the option of voting either for a liberal-democratic candidate whose positions on certain issues differ substantially from their own or for an illiberal candidate whose positions align closely with theirs on issues they consider important, they are highly likely to support the illiberal candidate if the alignment is sufficiently strong.
That finding applies across the board. It does not apply only to AfD voters; it applies to all voters. Populist and authoritarian attitudes strongly influence that behavior, but we still observe it across the board.
This means there is a certain willingness to support illiberal candidates, at least according to our experimental design, even among voters who do not themselves hold illiberal attitudes. We do not know whether this means that the AfD, for example, can capitalize on such willingness, because it does not have much to do with ideology. Rather, it concerns a willingness to abandon liberal attitudes or liberal democracy if you believe that the issues important to you will be addressed.
Loneliness Discourages Voting Rather Than Driving AfD Support
Your recent study with Anna-Sophie Heinze finds that loneliness primarily discourages electoral participation rather than increasing AfD support. What does this reveal about the relationship between social isolation, political alienation, and radical-right mobilization, particularly among younger voters?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, we looked at the 2025 German election, using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study. Since we are looking at just one point in time, our findings are basically correlational. But the important message is that we did not find what other scholars have claimed. We do not find that lonely voters are more inclined to support a right-wing populist party, nor do we find that young, lonely voters are more likely to vote for such a party. If anything, we find that loneliness decreases the likelihood of participating in an election in the first place.
This is an important finding, given the ongoing discussion about what some call a male loneliness epidemic and the claim that lonely young males are voting for the far right. At least we can say that we do not find this in the 2025 German election. Even though the AfD is pretty well established at this point, we still do not see it gaining the support one would expect based on claims that the male loneliness epidemic affects the political behavior of lonely young males. We simply do not find that to be the case.
This means that perhaps it would be more interesting to study what kind of loneliness we are actually looking at. I think, first and foremost, we have a problem measuring loneliness. We ask individuals, using the standard item battery, how lonely they have felt over the past few months, or something like that. What we are actually measuring is the feeling of loneliness, not social isolation.
Measuring social isolation and the perception of social isolation in a more complex, differentiated way is something we should look into. I do not doubt that, in some instances, loneliness affects political behavior. We do find that it has a significant effect on non-voting. But when it comes to cases where individuals do vote in a certain way, support the far right, or support authoritarian alternatives, we would need a more differentiated approach. Because if loneliness is a driving factor, we are not measuring it well enough.
Distrust of Mainstream Media May Protect the AfD from Scandals
Protest against the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Trier, Germany, on January 28, 2024. Demonstrators gathered in support of human rights, diversity, and a society free from discrimination and racism. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your research on voters’ loyalty to corrupt politicians emphasizes the importance of viable political alternatives. Does the AfD benefit from an electorate that increasingly considers mainstream parties unacceptable, making scandals, extremist rhetoric, and violations of democratic norms less electorally consequential?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The short answer is yes, but you’re not looking for a short answer, so let me put it this way. In our study, Christina-Marie Juen, Michael Jankowski, and I found that individuals who vote for the AfD do not punish the party when there is a scandal. Other voters do—Green voters, SPD voters, and CDU voters, all to varying degrees—but AfD voters don’t. So why is that the case?
It has to do with the AfD being the only alternative in terms of the issues that matter to its voters. Even when there is a scandal, the AfD remains the party closest to their own positions. This is consistent with other studies, including those by Aiko Wagner and me, which show that this perceived proximity between the AfD and its voters’ positions is extremely important in explaining their loyalty to the party. In this case, that proximity means voters do not defect. They stick with the AfD despite a scandal because no other party represents their demands as well as the AfD does.
Something we were unable to examine in our research is whether these voters believe the reports about the scandal. Many voters might learn about a scandal through the mainstream media, but because they do not trust those media outlets, they might not believe the scandal is true in the first place.
The AfD might frame the scandal as a lie fabricated by the mainstream media or by politicians seeking to hurt the party. Voters might be more inclined to believe that explanation. So, this is another factor that may come into play. Overall, we find that this provides further evidence of the loyalty of AfD voters.
For AfD Voters, Migration Overshadows Economic Grievances
While the AfD mobilizes grievances through nationalism, immigration, and cultural identity, Die Linke emphasizes social inequality, redistribution, and economic justice. To what extent do these parties compete for similarly alienated voters, and why do socioeconomic grievances increasingly translate into support for the radical right rather than the populist left?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The populist left is not only economically left-wing but also socially progressive. Many of its positions, for example, on migration, do not align with those of AfD voters. We do not find much overlap between AfD and Die Linke voters. In some states, there is voter exchange between these parties, but in general, the AfD mostly wins voters from the CDU, sometimes from the SPD, and from non-voters. That is the non-electorate, or the segment of the electorate that the AfD is able to mobilize.
Interestingly, there had been a widespread belief in Germany that Die Linke was pretty much finished. Then, shortly before the 2025 general election, the party was able to make a comeback. It did so, on the one hand, through its frontrunner, Heidi Reichinnek, who had a strong presence on social media, and, on the other hand, by focusing on certain social and economic issues, such as housing prices and rents.
When we look at voters and their propensity to vote, we see that there is little overlap between the AfD and Die Linke. The AfD does not focus much on economic issues. These issues are not particularly important to the party or its voters. The most important issue for these voters, or the main driving factor behind voting for the AfD, is migration. That is something we found even in the AfD’s early stages, when it was not yet a populist radical-right and, in part, right-wing extremist party.
There might be objective factors or conditions under which one might think that, for some voters who currently support the AfD, it would be more rational to vote for a left-wing party. But the problem is that these issues are not as salient to them. They often believe that migration is the major issue and that, once migration is addressed and the political elite is replaced, everything else will fall into place—or they have already lost the belief that everything else might fall into place to begin with.
There is a certain mindset among AfD voters, as among voters of other parties of this kind, that binds them to the AfD. Migration and a populist idea of democracy are at the center of that mindset. That is something that, at least at this point, other parties, including the left, have been struggling to counter.
The AfD Benefits from Its Position Outside Government
As right-wing populist movements have recently encountered electoral defeats or political setbacks in Brazil, Serbia, Hungary, Israel, and the United States, the AfD continues to gain support in Germany. What explains this divergence? Are Germany’s economic conditions, party-system dynamics, and political culture creating unusually favorable circumstances for the radical right?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: In the United States, for example, the radical right is in office and is creating grievances. In Brazil, the left and Lula were able to mobilize, for example, through social media during the second round of the presidential election. In Hungary and Poland, parties like Fidesz and PiS had been in office, so strong opposition movements emerged, capitalizing on the grievances these parties had created while in government.
What we see in Germany, however, is that the AfD remains excluded from government. There is still such a thing as the Brandmauer, or cordon sanitaire, but it is not as strong as it used to be—if it ever was. That is something one can discuss.
Another factor comes into play here, beyond the AfD’s position as an outsider that has not yet held office. It might enter government, most likely in Saxony-Anhalt in December. There is also an extremely unpopular federal government, an equally unpopular chancellor, and a conservative party that has, to some extent, lost its ability to integrate more right-wing voters. All these factors are comparable to those in other countries. The first country that comes to mind is Austria, where the situation is quite similar. Another is France, although there is an additional factor there: extreme polarization between the extreme left and the extreme right.
Overall, I don’t think Germany is necessarily a special case compared with these countries. With the establishment of the AfD, Germany has, at least to some extent, become a normal case in Europe. Its situation is now very similar to that of other countries in the region.
Restoring Democratic Trust Requires More Than Economic Reform
CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz speaks at a campaign event ahead of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election on May 15, 2022. Photo: Paul Ruesing | Dreamstime
And finally, Professor Lewandowsky, looking toward Germany’s next federal election and considering recent democratic developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States, what would be required to reverse the AfD’s rise? Can socioeconomic reform, renewed political representation, and democratic engagement restore confidence in liberal democracy, or has Germany entered a more enduring phase of radical-right political realignment?
Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: I would say all of it, including the last option. All these aspects are interconnected. Trust in liberal democracy is, to some extent, linked to confidence in economic well-being. A paper by economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, published in 2016, showed that, over the past hundred years, right-wing populist, extreme-right, or radical-right parties in democracies have mostly been successful under certain conditions of economic crisis. That is something we find here as well. The perception of an economic crisis, at least among some segments of the electorate, is associated with declining trust in democracy and government. So, I think these things are linked.
For the moment, the AfD has a certain momentum, especially after the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. In some eastern German states, the AfD is now polling at 40%. It has also scored more than 40% in the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. One crucial factor is that the other parties no longer see themselves as setting the agenda. Instead, they are essentially following—or chasing—the AfD.
What they need to try to do, although it is extremely difficult, is to address both grievances with liberal democracy and economic grievances through economic and social reforms that are also popular. I do not think Friedrich Merz is the person who can achieve that, nor do I think this government or coalition can do so. But Friedrich Merz believes that he does not need popular reforms. He believes he was elected as someone willing to do unpopular things that will eventually work out. However, as long as his policies remain unpopular, the AfD might gain votes. At this moment, I do not see that changing.
One last thing. What is crucial at this point—and something I have analyzed and argued in a paper coauthored with Anna-Lisa Neuenfeld for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, titled Parteien im Stresstest—is that political parties are at the center of saving democracy.
One aspect here is that the AfD has been able to establish a perception of itself as the representative of “the people.” It presents itself as a party that is present in certain areas, speaks a different language, comes from a different social background, and is able to offer social gatherings where other parties have failed to do so. This is especially important in certain areas of eastern Germany.
Representation through political parties is key to restoring faith in democracy because parties are the key players. At present, the AfD is the only party able, at least in the eyes of its electorate, to present itself as its representative—speaking in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s terms, symbolically, descriptively, and substantively. That is something the other parties might want to look at.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Andrew O’Donohue, Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University and Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines how political polarization, populist mobilization, and judicial institutions shape democratic backsliding. Drawing on comparative research across the United States, Turkey, Israel, and Brazil, Dr. O’Donohue argues that polarization becomes particularly dangerous when political divisions harden into antagonistic identities. He explores how populist leaders exploit these divisions, manipulate judicial institutions, and undermine democratic accountability. Challenging conventional assumptions about judicial independence, he warns that courts can themselves enable democratic backsliding. Yet he emphasizes that democratic resilience remains possible through opposition mobilization, institutional reform, and coalitions capable of defending constitutional safeguards against executive overreach.
Political polarization has become one of the defining challenges facing contemporary democracies, not merely because it divides electorates but because it can transform political competition into an existential struggle between antagonistic identities. Against the backdrop of renewed debates over executive power following the 2026 US midterm elections, mounting judicial pressure on Turkey’s political opposition, and Israel’s ongoing constitutional crisis, the relationship between polarization, populism, and democratic backsliding has acquired renewed urgency. Yet polarization is not inherently destructive. As Dr. Andrew O’Donohue observes, “Sometimes polarization can be highly democratizing.”The danger emerges when political disagreements harden into seemingly irreconcilable identities: “When polarization becomes an aspect of political identity, it can be very dangerous for democracy.”
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. O’Donohue, a Postdoctoral Fellow at Princeton University and a Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, examines how polarization shapes democratic resilience and authoritarian consolidation across the United States, Turkey, Israel, and Brazil. Holding a Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, O’Donohue specializes in law and courts, democracy and authoritarianism, and Middle East politics. His comparative scholarship, including the co-edited volume Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization, challenges conventional assumptions about democratic institutions and the political consequences of polarization.
Dr. O’Donohue argues that polarization operates both as an independent driver of democratic backsliding and as a strategic instrument manipulated by political leaders. In today’s media environment, outrage reinforces partisan antagonism, while populist leaders exploit these divisions to justify institutional transgressions. Polarization, he warns, enables leaders “to get away with anti-democratic actions in the name of protecting one side” while encouraging supporters to overlook abuses committed by their own political camp.
This dynamic becomes especially consequential when courts enter the political battlefield. Through what he calls court baiting, populist leaders deliberately advance popular but legally vulnerable policies, forcing judges into a dilemma between tolerating executive overreach and appearing to obstruct the popular will. Yet Dr. O’Donohue cautions that judicial independence alone cannot guarantee democratic protection: “Independent courts can weaken citizens’ rights, overturn elections, empower unelected elites, or engage in anti-democratic behavior themselves.”
His comparative assessment also raises serious warnings about Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory, Israel’s competitive authoritarianism, and the limited effectiveness of prosecuting illiberal leaders in deeply polarized societies. Nevertheless, he rejects political fatalism, insisting that “polarization doesn’t mean stasis.” New political movements can disrupt entrenched divisions, while courts can resist executive aggrandizement when supported by elected officials, civil society, and international actors.
Ultimately, Dr. O’Donohue’s central message is that democratic resilience requires more than independent institutions: it demands political competition without existential antagonism, effective judicial allies, and sustained institutional reform.
Here is our interview with Dr. Andrew O’Donohue, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Polarization Is Both a Driver and an Instrument of Democratic Backsliding
Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. O’Donohue, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your co-edited volume,Democracies Divided: The Global Challenge of Political Polarization. In this book, you identify severe polarization as a fundamental threat to democracy. Seven years later, has polarization become an independent driver of democratic backsliding, or does its destructive impact depend primarily on populist leaders exploiting existing divisions?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: As you pointed out, Selçuk, seven years ago, when my co-author, Thomas Carothers, and I published this book, our core insight was that polarization is not just an American problem; it’s a global problem. There are lessons to be learned from a comparative perspective about why political polarization is rising, not just in the United States but also in many democracies, from Brazil and Turkey to India, and about how to resist polarization.
To your question, polarization is both an independent driver of democratic backsliding—we’ve seen that very clearly across many democracies—and a dependent variable. It’s something that political leaders strategically ratchet up in order to intensify democratic backsliding.
The first thing is that polarization is a structural feature of modern politics, and a lot of that has to do with our information environment. There’s a company in Silicon Valley called Meta that makes $200 billion a year in revenue from the current information environment, and one thing that keeps us clicking and on our phones is the level of outrage and political polarization. That’s a key feature of the modern media ecosystem.
At the same time, polarization is something that populist and other political leaders often benefit from strategically. It’s a factor that enables them to get away with anti-democratic actions in the name of protecting one side and allows their voters to turn a blind eye to the abuses committed by their own side against the other.
The last thing I’ll say is that polarization does not mean political stasis. It doesn’t mean that things can’t change. What we’ve seen over the past several months, even in highly polarized societies, are remarkable political shifts.
We often think about polarization as gridlock or stasis, but what we’re seeing around the world are new political movements and new faces that have disrupted those polarized binaries. Think about Hungary, where Péter Magyar creates a new political party that defeats the existing Orbán government by over 10 percentage points. Think about Serbia, where the student list, a newly formed electoral list, rises and wins a parliamentary majority and defeats the list backed by the incumbent, Aleksandar Vučić. Or think about the United States, where an existing political party, the Democratic Party, runs a series of fresh faces, from Adam Hamilton to James Talarico, and is able to disrupt an existing polarized binary.
Polarization doesn’t mean stasis. In fact, there are numerous cases around the world where political parties overcome existing polarized binaries by disrupting them with new faces, ideas, and parties.
Polarization Is Not Intrinsically Bad
Your comparative research highlights the ways political entrepreneurs transform social divisions into antagonistic political identities. What distinguishes ordinary democratic polarization from the kind of pernicious polarization that enables institutional capture and authoritarian consolidation?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: One misconception many people have is that polarization is intrinsically bad. Tom Carothers and I argue the opposite in our book. Sometimes polarization can be highly democratizing. Think, for example, about the US Civil Rights Movement. That movement required decades of struggle in the United States. It was highly polarizing in public opinion, but it was also highly democratizing in the sense of enfranchising Black Americans and expanding access to voting rights.
At the same time, some degree of polarization is a necessary and positive feature of democratic politics. Voters need choices between meaningful political parties, different options, and different policies. When voters don’t have those choices, that can, in itself, create risks for democracy. An excellent example is Venezuela in the 1990s, before the rise of Hugo Chávez.
The main parties, AD (Acción Democrática) and COPEI (Comité de Organización Política Electoral Independiente), were basically operating as a cartel. There was very little that distinguished them. When an economic crisis emerged, voters decided, “Let’s get rid of the entire political system and replace it with a populist leader, Hugo Chávez.”
A similar thing happened in Tunisia in the 2010s. The political parties formed a sort of broad-tent coalition to build a new constitution, but they didn’t really differentiate themselves, especially on issues like economic policy. Then, when a populist leader, Kais Saied, entered the political scene, voters decided to throw out the existing establishment in favor of something that offered a new alternative.
So, polarization can actually be good for a political system. But it crosses the line when we see the emergence of these us-versus-them identity divides. When polarization becomes an aspect of political identity, it can be very dangerous for democracy.
Modern Democratic Backsliding Increasingly Happens Through Legal Means
The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.
Across the United States, Turkey, and Israel, political leaders have frequently portrayed institutional constraints as obstacles to the popular will. How does populist majoritarianism transform the judiciary from a constitutional safeguard into a perceived enemy of democratic legitimacy?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Your question cuts to a core theme in struggles over democracy in the modern world: courts are central actors. One reason is that courts have become substantially more powerful since the end of World War II. Another is that modern democratic backsliding increasingly occurs through legal means. Political leaders these days very rarely stage military coups in which they throw out the constitution. Instead, they act through legal means—what Kim Lane Scheppele calls autocratic legalism—to change constitutions. That makes courts crucial actors that can either constrain or enable political power grabs.
So, populist leaders have a very strong incentive to portray courts as anti-democratic actors that constrain the will of the people. How do they do that?
In my research, drawing on cases such as Turkey, Mexico, and the United States, I argue that one of their strategies is what I call court baiting. Populist political leaders around the world adopt policies that are popular with their voters but are very likely to be struck down by courts or deemed illegal. That puts courts in a lose-lose position: either they allow the illegal policy, thereby weakening constraints on the political leader’s power, or they strike it down, allowing the political leader to say, “I won an election. I’m trying to do what’s popular with my voters, and these illegitimate courts are blocking the will of the people.”
This is something that happened in Turkey during the 2000s under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In 2008, the AKP, then-Prime Minister Erdogan’s party, passed a very popular policy that gave Muslim women greater rights to wear headscarves at universities. This policy had 78% support among the public and 93% support among Erdogan’s party. But Turkey has a very secular constitution and a very secular court, so the court struck down this popular policy. Erdogan then turned to the court of public opinion and said, “Well, I represent the will of the people, ‘milli irade’ in Turkish, and this court is blocking me. So, we need to pass these constitutional changes in 2010 that increase the size of the court and give the elected government more say over the court.”
A very similar pattern occurred in Mexico. In the Mexican case, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) passed a clearly unconstitutional law to change the constitution through an ordinary piece of legislation, which is not constitutionally permissible. What he wanted to do was give the military control over the National Guard.
The court struck that down, and AMLO went to voters and said, “Look, I’m just trying to make the streets safer from drug violence and drug cartels, and this court is blocking me from getting the military involved and making the streets safer.” AMLO then turned around and passed constitutional changes, removed the entire Mexican Supreme Court, and now the entire Mexican Supreme Court consists of judges who were nominated by the ruling party.
The exact same pattern exists in the United States. The president’s most popular issue among his base is immigration, and what we’ve seen is the president doing things that are illegal, like attempting to restrict birthright citizenship by executive order, but that allow him to turn around and say, “These illegitimate judges are blocking me from deporting immigrants, and that’s what I campaigned on.”
Independent Courts Are Not Necessarily Defenders of Democracy
Your scholarship challenges the assumption that judicial independence necessarily protects democracy. Under what conditions can courts independent of elected governments nevertheless undermine democratic representation, civil liberties, or constitutional accountability?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: One of our core assumptions, certainly in the United States, is that independent courts are bulwarks of democracy. There’s a very old idea, going back to Alexander Hamilton, who argued that when courts are independent of the government, they will defend democracy against backsliding. In fact, what we’ve seen is that sometimes, even when courts are independent, they can engage in highly anti-democratic behavior.
A great example of this is Brazil. You had a very independent Supreme Court that resisted an executive power grab under Jair Bolsonaro. At the same time, one of the justices who was critical in constraining Bolsonaro was allegedly involved in a major corruption scandal—I should emphasize allegedly, because he hasn’t yet been tried in a court of law. He was allegedly communicating with a disgraced banker who was asking him for advice on how to avoid arrest and was paying millions of dollars to the justice’s wife.
We’ve seen independent courts engage in diverse types of anti-democratic behavior. Courts have sometimes overturned the results of free and fair elections. For example, in Egypt in 2012, the Supreme Court derailed the democratic transition by dissolving the elected parliament and later legitimizing the 2013 military coup.
Independent courts sometimes take away citizens’ rights rather than protecting them. The US Supreme Court is a great example of this. We have a historically independent Supreme Court, and in 1857, the Court denied citizenship rights to Black Americans under the US Constitution. In 1875, the Court ruled that women, even though they were citizens, could be denied the right to vote. The Court upheld racial segregation in 1896 in Plessy v. Ferguson.
So, there are many cases in which independent courts take away citizens’ rights or overturn free and fair elections. Courts sometimes enable military coups, as has happened in countries like Honduras, Thailand, and Pakistan.
Finally, courts sometimes engage in what Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt call excessive judicial review. You can have courts that are so independent that they actually restrict the ability of elected majorities to do things that are not threatening to democracy. Brazil is, again, a great example of this. In Brazil, it was the courts, not the legislature, that set policy on decriminalizing marijuana or regulating online speech.
So, courts can sometimes become so powerful that they take away the right of elected leaders to set policy in highly anti-democratic ways.
Turkey Shows How Court Capture Creates a Crisis of Democratic Legitimacy
Çağlayan Justice Palace, located in Şişli, Istanbul, Turkey. Opened in July 2011, it is one of Europe’s largest courthouses. Photo: M. Can Ciftci / Dreamstime.
In “Law versus Democracy,” you demonstrate how judicial selection arrangements enabled unelected elites to capture Turkey’s Constitutional Court. How did this earlier pattern of judicial intervention shape the subsequent transformation of the judiciary under Erdogan?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: This is a very exciting area because the institutions through which we choose judges are critical in shaping whether courts defend or undermine democracy. The institutions for selecting judges are something that we, as citizens, can change and control. A core part of my argument is that there are many different ways of selecting judges around the world.
Some systems concentrate power in the hands of one political party or group. Turkey, under the 1982 Constitution, is a great example. The president had almost unilateral power to appoint all the judges on the court. The president didn’t even need to consult with the elected parliament, let alone achieve some kind of supermajority or consensus. Predictably, those power-concentrating institutions for choosing judges enabled a president to capture the court, appoint personal friends, and appoint people who were politically loyal to him.
There’s a very similar and worrying system in the United States, where you only need a simple majority in the US Senate to appoint judges for life. That enables presidents and, for example, has enabled the current president of the United States to appoint his personal lawyer to a lifetime position on an appeals court. So, that kind of system makes courts structurally vulnerable to capture.
On the other hand, you can have institutions for choosing judges that disperse power. There are better models. For example, in Germany and Italy, there are supermajority requirements for choosing judges on the Constitutional Court. That means political parties can’t simply appoint whoever they want to the court; they need to compromise with other parties.
Other countries, like Colombia and Italy, also disperse power over judicial selection among multiple branches of government. So, the president has some power, Congress has some power, and the judiciary has some power over choosing judges.
Now, to your question, the Turkish case is one in which the institutions for choosing judges gave a great deal of power to one actor. That enabled court capture by one side—in the Turkish case, the secular side—from the 1980s until about 2010. That court capture created a real deficit of legitimacy. It meant that President Erdogan, then Prime Minister Erdogan, was able to go to voters and say, “This court has been captured by a secular, unelected elite. It is not democratically accountable; it’s not representative of the will of the people.”
The court in Turkey was also very closely associated with a historically powerful military, and the pitch Erdogan made to voters was, “These constitutional changes that give me more power over the court are about saying yes to the rule of law and no to the law of rulers like the military.” Erdogan was able to secure 58% support for the constitutional changes.
So, when courts have these power-concentrating institutions that enable court capture, they can generate real backlash and create a legitimacy deficit for courts.
Turkey Is Undergoing a Shift from Competitive to Full Authoritarianism
In your June 2026 congressional testimony, you warned that Turkey was moving from competitive toward full authoritarianism. How have the imprisonment of Ekrem Imamoglu and judicial interventions in the CHP changed the prospects for electoral competition and democratic recovery?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Turkey is undergoing a shift from competitive to full authoritarianism. What is competitive authoritarianism? It’s a system in which the incumbent abuses state power to gain an advantage over its opponents, but in which elections remain competitive.
From about 2015 to 2023, Turkey was a competitive authoritarian regime. There were elections, and those elections were unfair and slanted in favor of President Erdogan, but the opposition could still win them.
We have now entered a period marked by restrictions on media outlets, the imprisonment of the leading opposition candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, and judicial intervention against the main opposition party to remove its elected leader, Ozgur Ozel, and replace him with someone who is effectively a regime ally at this point, Kemal Kilicdaroglu. Turkey is shifting away from a competitive authoritarian regime in which electoral outcomes are genuinely competitive—or, at this stage, it is at least a highly repressive regime.
We don’t yet know. Turkey must hold presidential elections by 2028, and under the Constitution, President Erdogan is not able to run for reelection unless there are constitutional amendments or the parliament calls for early elections. The central question in my mind is whether a turnover of power in Turkey is still possible through elections. The next presidential election will be a crucial test.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.
Economic Crises Do Not Automatically Lead to the Defeat of Populist Leaders
Your research with Ahmet Akbiyik finds that Erdogan’s economic-competence rhetoric proved more persuasive than sociocultural diversion during the 2023 inflation crisis. What does this reveal about the resilience of authoritarian populism when economic performance deteriorates?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: The central question my colleague Ahmet Akbiyik and I asked was: At a time when Turkey was experiencing very high inflation, with estimates of inflation above 80%, why was Erdogan still so popular? To research this question, I attended President Erdogan’s rallies, for example, at the old Istanbul airport, and talked to voters. What we found was that economic nationalism was actually a key factor in why citizens continued to support Erdogan.
Erdogan’s appeals focused on how he had made Turkey great by building an electric car, the TOGG, in Turkey; how Turkey was building drones that were being used in military combat theaters around the world; and how the country was developing its domestic industrial base.
What we found was that there was a limit to the ability of sociocultural appeals, such as religion, to influence voters. Voters already knew that; it was not new information. But promises of economic benefits, such as “We’re going to build more housing; we’re making Turkey great in this economic nationalism sense,” were actually able to persuade swing or centrist voters, including people who had not previously voted for the regime.
So, what does that tell us? Our argument is that the economy is, of course, a major vulnerability for political leaders. We saw that in the United States, where the Iran war and the rising cost of living dealt a major defeat to the Republican Party. But political leaders can still use populist strategies, especially economic nationalism, to win over voters, even when economic times are hard. I think that speaks to our argument: You can’t simply assume that because the economy is bad, the populist leader is going to lose. That’s not necessarily true.
Another part of our argument is that these appeals to economic development and economic nationalism are strategies that opponents of populist leaders can also use. You mentioned Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul, who is now in prison. This was something Imamoglu also used very effectively, talking, for example, about how railway cars for the Istanbul subway, the metro, would be 100% made in Turkey. That’s a similar kind of populist policy that is actually very appealing to voters in the Turkish case.
So, our argument is that economic crises don’t automatically lead to the defeat of political leaders, particularly populist leaders. We need to examine the strategies political leaders use to understand why they sometimes survive these crises.
The last thing I’ll say is that when you’re a political leader like Erdogan in what was then a competitive authoritarian system, where you can fire the central bank governor and deploy economic policy at will, it’s much easier to use these types of appeals. You have a structural advantage because you’re able to implement your populist economic policies with relatively few constraints.
Democracy Needs Courts That Are Both Independent and Protective of Democratic Rights
Turkey’s experience illustrates how judicial institutions can first constrain elected governments and subsequently become repressive instruments of executive power. Does this trajectory expose a fundamental weakness in institutional theories that equate judicial independence with democratic resilience?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Yes, you’re exactly right that judicial institutions are, in many ways, important constraints on executive power, but independent courts are not necessarily pro-democratic. As I’ve pointed out, courts can be independent of governments while remaining dependent on other actors. Independent courts can weaken citizens’ rights, overturn elections, empower unelected elites, or engage in anti-democratic behavior themselves.
Judicial resilience can serve as a very important constraint on executive power grabs. When political leaders capture the courts, they’re often able to engage in much more serious anti-democratic behavior. So, what we should fight for is courts that are both independent and protective of democracy.
The US Supreme Court Has Significantly Expanded Executive Power
Following the November 3, 2026, US midterms, how would you assess the capacity of Congress, federal courts, and state governments to constrain executive aggrandizement under President Trump? Could electoral accountability reverse deeper processes of institutional erosion?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Yes, the election of an opposing party to Congress in the United States creates a check on presidential power. One finding from my comparative research on courts and judicial independence is that perhaps the strongest predictor of whether judicial independence survives an attack is whether there is an opposing party in Congress that can check the president. That prevents the president from passing legislation or taking actions that weaken the courts or seek to override them. So, the election of an opposing political party to Congress is usually a very important factor in strengthening those democratic institutions.
Now, there are clear limits to the capacity of opposition parties. In many ways, opposition parties in Congress rely on appealing to the court of public opinion. The United States has an extremely powerful executive branch, and the US Supreme Court has weakened key guardrails on executive power.
For example, the Court has allowed the president to dismantle independent agencies, increased the president’s ability to appoint officials to nonpartisan or independent agencies, and, of course, in the 2024 Trump v. United States case, weakened the president’s vulnerability to criminal prosecution for official acts performed while in office.
So, the challenge facing the Democratic Party in the United States is that, on the one hand, the Court has significantly expanded executive power, while, on the other, you have an executive branch that is very willing to exercise that power to the fullest extent.
Prosecuting Political Leaders Can Provoke Backlash Against Courts and Democratic Norms
University students protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul on March 24, 2025, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sadik Gulec.
Your research with Daniel Markovits finds that legal rhetoric surrounding Trump’s criminal prosecution had limited persuasive effects and sometimes generated backlash. Does affective polarization make legal accountability increasingly ineffective against popular illiberal leaders?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: This is a central question facing many democracies: After democratic backsliding, how do you hold political leaders accountable? To answer this question, I conducted two parallel studies: one in the United States on the prosecution of Donald Trump and the other in Brazil on the legal conviction of Jair Bolsonaro.
In both countries, what we find, in striking parallel, is what we call an accountability dilemma. In a highly polarized society, the prosecution of a political leader can change the minds of a very small group of swing voters—people who are less polarized. At the same time, those prosecutions provoke backlash, especially among the leaders’ supporters, who become much more distrustful of judicial and legal institutions, but also among a broader swath of voters who increasingly view democratic norms as merely partisan or political.
What our research shows is that in highly polarized societies, accountability has limited effects on public opinion. It changes the minds of only a small segment of the public while also creating risks for the courts, particularly by provoking backlash. That does not diminish the importance, of course, of enforcing the law or protecting democratic institutions.
What we’ve seen in Brazil is a growing movement for court reform. It’s partly driven by the political right and a sense that Bolsonaro was wronged, but it has increasingly become cross-partisan as allegations of corruption within Brazil’s Supreme Court have intensified calls for stronger ethics rules.
Judicial Opposition to Government Does Not Always Mean Democratic Protection
Your comparative work discusses Supreme Court decisions expanding presidential immunity and limiting judicial constraints on executive action. How should we distinguish legitimate constitutional interpretation from judicial behavior that facilitates democratic backsliding?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: This is a central question because, in many political cases, one side will argue that what the court did was anti-democratic, while the other side will say, “No, what you did was anti-democratic.” The first side will respond, “No, we think that what the court did was anti-democratic.” So, the challenge is that both sides can often make arguments that a court’s actions were either pro- or anti-democratic.
The key to getting to the bottom of these debates is to start with a clear definition of democracy. In political science, democracy is a multidimensional concept. It means free and fair elections, the right to vote, and protections for civil liberties, such as free speech. Democracy requires a level playing field between the political actors in power—the government—and their opponents. It also requires the absence of unelected authorities, such as an autonomous military, that might usurp the elected government’s power to govern.
Once you start with that detailed framework of what democracy means, you can begin to make much more precise arguments. For example, let’s look at a case like the Callais decision in the United States, which weakened provisions of the Voting Rights Act.
You could argue that this decision weakens free and fair elections by giving state governments more autonomy to gerrymander. You could also argue that it weakens the will of elected majorities because the Voting Rights Act was passed by Congress and subsequently reaffirmed. So, starting with that definition of democracy gives us the tools to make much more precise and defensible claims about exactly when and why courts undermine democracy.
The core point is that you can’t simply look at whether a court is ruling against the government to determine whether it is defending or undermining democracy. This is one of the core mistakes many analysts make: assuming that because a court rules against a government, it is necessarily constraining the government and protecting democracy.
That’s wrong. Look, for example, at the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Index, which has an indicator of judicial independence. The way V-Dem measures judicial independence is by asking whether the high court rules against the government, going against the government’s wishes. And the assumption is that this is good.
The problem is that when you look at specific cases, such as Poland, you see something different. Poland is a case where a right-wing political party came into power and packed the court.
So, judicial independence, by V-Dem’s measure, goes down because the court is aligned with the government and is no longer ruling against it. Then, when a new opposition government comes to power in Parliament, according to V-Dem, judicial independence shoots up because you now have a right-wing court that is very willing to rule against the new opposition government.
That doesn’t mean the court actually became more independent. It was still packed by a right-wing political party, Law and Justice (PiS), but the court is coded as more independent because it is now ruling against a government it doesn’t like.
So, I think the core point is that you can’t simply look at whether a court is ruling against the government. Sometimes courts rule against anti-democratic laws, such as laws that might restrict civil liberties, but sometimes they can rule against pro-democratic laws that might expand civil liberties. So, you need to look much more concretely at the substance of a case to understand whether courts are undermining democracy.
Courts Cannot Defend Democracy on Their Own—They Need Judicial Allies
The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Photo: Dreamstime.
In “How Courts Survive Democratic Backsliding,” you emphasize the importance of judicial allies outside the courts. What lessons can American democratic institutions draw from Brazil, Poland, and Israel about building effective coalitions to defend judicial independence?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: One core lesson for Americans is that courts cannot defend democracy on their own. Courts depend on allies—what I call judicial allies—who support them in constraining executive power grabs. So, let’s ask a simple question: If the president of the United States wants to defy or disempower the courts, what’s stopping him?
Judges alone can’t prevent that. They depend on allies. So, who are the allies that can ensure court rulings are obeyed and that courts retain their power? One type of ally is elected officials. Think about governors in the United States who control state governments or members of the US Senate.
The US Senate can block efforts to remove a judge because, under the US Constitution, removing a judge through impeachment requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate. Governors can also say, “We control our state government, and we are going to comply with the court’s ruling, even if the president says he is not going to comply.” So, that’s one way elected officials can serve as crucial judicial allies.
Other judicial allies include citizens, social movements, and civil society organizations, such as bar associations or legal nonprofits. Think, for example, about the protests against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) in Minneapolis.
Those protests may not have changed the president’s mind, although there’s some evidence that they did lead to a retreat in the president’s policy. But they may have inspired lawyers or judges to take a more active role in constraining abuses of political power by ICE.
So, there can be a positive feedback loop in which protests inspire judges to constrain abuses of power, and those judicial actions, in turn, give protesters a theory of change. They show protesters that there is an audience, even if it’s not the president, that is capable of responding to their concerns.
Finally, in many other countries, including Turkey and several European cases, international actors can also serve as allies of the courts. In Poland, for example, judges facing threats to judicial independence appealed beyond the national legal system to the Strasbourg Court, the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union.
So, elected officials, ordinary citizens, and sometimes even international actors can serve as allies of the courts, preventing political leaders from curbing their power.
Israel Is No Longer a Democracy but a Competitive Authoritarian Regime
In your October 2026 article with Oded Haklai, you argue that Israel has crossed into competitive authoritarianism. How have the politicization of security institutions, pressure on independent media, and Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul altered Israel’s democratic regime?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Our argument is that even if you focus on the territory within the Green Line, which is Israel’s internationally recognized, pre-1967 territory, Israel is not a democracy; it is a competitive authoritarian regime. Now, what do we mean by that? By competitive authoritarianism, we mean that elections in Israel are real and competitive. As we saw this October, it’s still possible for Netanyahu to lose his majority in the legislature, the Knesset. But Netanyahu’s abuse of state power as the incumbent has given him an advantage over his opponents.
Take one very simple issue. After the October 7 attack, the norm in Israeli politics for decades has been to establish a commission of inquiry—a state commission, an independent inquiry—to investigate what allowed such a catastrophic security failure. No such inquiry took place, so there was no accountability for the incumbent government regarding why this major national security failure occurred.
Another example of competitive authoritarianism is the politicization of the police under Itamar Ben-Gvir, the Minister of National Security. At Ben-Gvir’s insistence, the incoming government expanded the police minister’s control over the police. Ben-Gvir has allegedly interfered at a micro level in police promotions, for example, by asking police officers whether they would be personally loyal to him. The police have then been used to deploy force against opposition protesters, the Arab minority in Israel, and even opposition parliamentarians.
One problem with this is that, as the police have become increasingly politicized, a majority of Israelis no longer see them as politically neutral. Pro-government actors, such as Mordechai David, have even streamed themselves harassing opposition parliamentarians, judges, and protesters. These are examples of how the politicization of state institutions, such as the police, can create an asymmetric advantage for one political leader. The police are using force against opposition protesters but not against ultra-Orthodox protesters who are, coincidentally, part of the government’s base.
Our argument is not that Netanyahu can’t be defeated. He can be defeated, and President Herzog, the president of Israel, gave the opposition leader, Gadi Eisenkot, the opportunity to form a coalition government that could remove Netanyahu. However, Netanyahu has greater control over the police and Israeli security agencies, such as Shin Bet, and that gives him an advantage over his opponents that he can use to help stay in power.
Israel’s Supreme Court and the Collapse of Informal Norms
Students and academics join a protest march in Haifa on September 9, 2023, against Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your research on Israel identifies the interaction between judicial supermajority requirements and the informal Noah’s Ark appointment strategy as crucial to judicial independence. What happens when political leaders preserve formal institutional rules while dismantling the informal norms that sustain them?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: Central to my argument is that Israel’s Supreme Court, to this day, retains surprising independence from the Netanyahu government. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been in power for 19 of the last 30 years. That’s more than half of my lifetime. Nineteen years, and yet he still hasn’t captured Israel’s Supreme Court.
Let me give you a few examples. In 2024, after the government passed a law to weaken the powers of the Supreme Court, the Court struck it down. In 2025, when the government attempted to fire the Attorney General, who is prosecuting Prime Minister Netanyahu in various criminal cases, the Court prevented the Attorney General’s removal. In 2026, in the lead-up to the elections, Prime Minister Netanyahu attempted to appoint his personal lawyer, Michael Rabello, as state comptroller. The Supreme Court blocked that appointment. Again, in 2026, when the elections committee attempted to disqualify the Arab political parties, the Supreme Court blocked that as well.
So, why is this Court so independent of Netanyahu when he’s been in power for 19 of the last 30 years?
My argument is that Israel had institutions for choosing judges that constrained the government and dispersed power. One example, as you pointed out, is that Israel’s Judicial Selection Committee required a supermajority of 78%—a very high bar—to appoint a new Supreme Court judge. Because of that, political parties couldn’t simply agree on a single Supreme Court justice who would receive 78% support. Instead, they engaged in what political scientists call logrolling, appointing judges in groups.
One conservative judge, one liberal judge—we’ll put them together as a package, and then we’ll get 78% support for those judges. I call this the Noah’s Ark strategy because you’re appointing judges two by two, one from each side, to preserve a certain balance on the Court.
The problem, though, is that this formal or written institution—the supermajority requirement—depended on informal or unwritten norms of compromise. What we’ve seen, as polarization has increased in Israel, as it has in many other countries, is that these informal institutions have broken down.
So, Israel’s Justice Minister, Yariv Levin, has said, “I’m not going to appoint any new Supreme Court judges at all. I’m not going to compromise.” And that’s why there are four vacancies on Israel’s Supreme Court. When informal norms break down, the same formal rules that once forced compromise can actually enable obstruction and gridlock in ways that are very dangerous to judicial independence.
Condemning Bolsonaro Carries Significant Political Costs for His Own Allies
Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your recent research on Brazil identifies an accountability dilemma: prosecuting illiberal leaders may reduce their support while undermining confidence in courts and democratic norms. How can democracies pursue accountability without intensifying polarization or weakening judicial legitimacy?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: First, let me say that I was delighted to co-author this research with a former Brazilian judge, Jean Vilbert, and my colleague at Boston College, Fernando Bizzarro. I want to thank Jean and Fernando for bringing me into the Brazilian case and giving me the opportunity to conduct this very exciting research on democracy.
The core of our argument in the Brazilian case is that judicial interventions in politics create an accountability dilemma. On the one hand, they can turn citizens against an anti-democratic leader, but only to a very modest extent and at a significant cost. These judicial interventions can weaken support for the courts, trust in the courts, and support for democratic norms, such as the idea that the losers of elections should concede defeat peacefully.
Now, one thing I’ll mention that we haven’t yet discussed is that, in our Brazil study, Jean, Fernando, and I compare legal accountability—accountability through the courts—with accountability through elected elites. We compare the effect of a judicial conviction of Bolsonaro with condemnation by political party elites within Bolsonaro’s own political movement. Specifically, we look at what happens if Bolsonaro’s vice president were to condemn him. So, what do we find?
We find that a judicial conviction turns a very narrow segment of voters against Bolsonaro, but elite condemnation actually has no effect. What we find is that when an elite figure speaks out—when Bolsonaro’s vice president speaks out against him—it actually burns bridges with the political base. It doesn’t change the minds of Bolsonaristas. It increases the vice president’s popularity among liberal voters but turns off the conservative voters this politician needs to advance his political career.
And so, we argue that this is one reason why political party elites within the anti-democratic camp very rarely speak out against anti-democratic behavior. It’s because doing so sometimes makes relatively little difference to their voters while coming at a significant political cost: burning bridges with their own electoral base.
Defending and Reforming Courts Against Authoritarian Consolidation
And finally, Dr. O’Donohue, looking across the United States, Turkey, Israel, Brazil, and Poland, what determines whether courts become instruments of state capture or obstacles to authoritarian consolidation? Ultimately, which combination of institutional design, opposition mobilization, and democratic norms offers the strongest protection against executive aggrandizement?
Dr. Andrew O’Donohue: The policy takeaway for readers in your audience who may be concerned about how to protect and reform the courts is that the judiciary’s allies—pro-democracy forces—need to consider both short-term and long-term challenges.
When a political leader is attempting to defy or disempower the courts, what those courts need most is judicial allies. Courts need elected officials, citizens, and sometimes even international actors to protect judicial independence. So, when judicial independence is under attack, judicial allies need to step up, mobilize, and provide courts with the support they need to rule against a powerful leader. But the courts that judicial allies defend are rarely perfect. In the long term, the judiciary’s allies also need to consider a broader agenda of reform.
This is exactly what Brazil is dealing with today. On the one hand, during the Bolsonaro years, the judiciary’s allies stood up to protect and defend the courts. What was crucial in Brazil was that the president’s party did not have anything close to a majority in Congress. As a result, Congress was able to protect the courts, bring cases, argue that the government’s policies were unconstitutional, and protect judges from impeachment.
But now Brazil faces a second challenge: How do you reform the courts to make them more pro-democratic? My colleague Oliver Stuenkel at the Carnegie Endowment and I are considering several proposals.
The court desperately needs a binding ethics code. The president of the court has come out in favor of that, and the Brazilian Bar Association has proposed a model ethics code.
The court also desperately needs term limits for judges. Right now, in Brazil, six of the ten judges on the court were appointed in their 40s because presidents want to appoint young judges to secure long terms for them.
And the court desperately needs greater power sharing in how judges are selected to prevent political leaders from capturing the courts. One proposal from the Brazilian Bar Association is greater civil society involvement, such as public hearings, before judges are selected.
So, it’s a combination of factors. When courts are under attack, they need judicial allies. But the longer-term agenda for those judicial allies should be not only to defend the courts but also to reform them, ensuring that the courts live up to their democratic potential.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, examines the contrasting implications of Serbia’s student-led democratic breakthrough and Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 2026 elections. While Serbia’s Students’ List victory challenges entrenched authoritarianism, Bosnia’s results reveal the enduring resilience of ethnonational power-sharing. Professor Turčalo analyzes how Dayton’s institutional architecture reproduces ethnic divisions, how external patronage sustains Dodikism, and why democratic change in Belgrade could reshape regional politics. Emphasizing that Western Balkan societies are not condemned to tyranny and ethnonationalism, he advocates constitutional reform reconciling civic equality with collective cultural protections, offering a pathway from Dayton’s negative peace toward genuine constitutional democracy.
Serbia’s October 25, 2026, parliamentary elections marked a historic political turning point in the Western Balkans. Emerging from nearly two years of protests following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station tragedy, the student-led movement secured approximately 53% of the vote and 140 of 250 parliamentary seats, defeating Aleksandar Vučić’s political bloc. In contrast, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections revealed the enduring resilience of ethnonational politics: Denis Bećirović secured reelection to the Presidency, HDZ BiH consolidated its dominance among Croat voters, and Milorad Dodik’s SNSD maintained its hegemonic position in Republika Srpska.
While Serbia’s electoral breakthrough signaled the potential of civic mobilization to challenge entrenched political structures, Bosnia’s results demonstrated how electoral competition can reproduce rather than overcome ethnonational divisions. Together, these contrasting outcomes raise fundamental questions about whether civic mobilization, institutional accountability, and democratic pluralism can challenge authoritarianism and entrenched ethnonational power-sharing across the region.
In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Sead Turčalo, Dean of the Faculty of Political Sciences at the University of Sarajevo, examines the implications of Serbia’s democratic breakthrough for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. His research encompasses ethnonationalism, the far right, radicalization, historical revisionism, genocide denial, and the geopolitical pressures shaping the Western Balkans.
For Professor Turčalo, Serbia’s electoral transformation carries significance beyond its borders. “What it achieved in this election reminded the entire region that citizens in the Western Balkans are not culturally condemned to tyranny and ethnic nationalism,” he argues. “They want institutions that answer to the law rather than to a party boss.” He characterizes the Students’ List victory as a historic civic rupture, emphasizing its rejection of identity polarization in favor of the rule of law and institutional accountability.
Yet Professor Turčalo cautions against assuming that democratic change in Belgrade will automatically transform Bosnia’s political institutions. The October 4 elections exposed the enduring tension between electoral competition and deeply institutionalized ethnic politics. According to Professor Turčalo, Dayton’s consociational architecture continues to reproduce the very divisions it was designed to manage: “The system therefore does not merely reflect ethnic divisions; it actively reproduces them as a precondition for exercising state power in Bosnia.”
Serbia’s transition nevertheless offers an opportunity to reconsider the regional foundations of Dodikism. Professor Turčalo argues that ending Belgrade’s political, financial, and symbolic support for Milorad Dodik could fundamentally alter the balance between external patronage and domestic obstruction. However, entrenched nationalist networks and constitutional veto structures remain formidable obstacles.
Looking beyond immediate electoral developments, Professor Turčalo advocates “a sequenced, functionalist transition toward a hybrid model that reconciles individual civic equality with strictly bounded collective cultural protections.” His proposals include implementing European Court of Human Rights rulings, eliminating discriminatory electoral restrictions, narrowing ethnic veto powers, and strengthening judicial independence and EU conditionality.
In sum, Professor Turčalo sees Serbia’s democratic opening and Bosnia’s growing exhaustion with ethnonational partitocracy as potentially complementary forces for transformation—creating an opportunity to move “from Dayton’s negative peace toward a genuine constitutional democracy in our country.”
Here is our interview with Professor Sead Turčalo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Bosnia’s Elections Stabilized Rather Than Weakened Ethnonationalism
A voter casts a ballot against the backdrop of the flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Photo: Oleg Kachura / Dreamstime.
Professor Turčalo, welcome, and thank you for joining us. Let me begin with the overall picture: The October 4 elections returned Denis Bećirović, strengthened HDZ BiH, and preserved SNSD’s dominance in Republika Srpska. Do these outcomes represent political change within ethnic blocs rather than a weakening of ethnonationalism? Does Dayton’s consociational architecture continue to prevent domination while reproducing the ethnic divisions that obstruct democratic consolidation?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Thank you once again, Selçuk, for inviting me. It’s really a pleasure to be with you. To interpret the October 4 results accurately, we have to start by distinguishing rotation within a segment from fragmentation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system as a whole.
What we witnessed on October 4 was an asymmetrically distributed pluralization across three ethnic areas: fragmentation and competition primarily within the so-called Bosniak-majority electoral space, alongside the near-monopolistic consolidation of power within the Croat space under HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the preservation of SNSD’s hegemonic control in Republika Srpska.
That’s not a weakening of ethnonationalism. Rather, it’s the stabilization of a cartelized ethnoconsociational order that has existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina for almost 30 years, or at least 20 of those 30 years.
As we all know, Dayton was designed in 1995 as an instrument of conflict termination, not really as a democratic constitution. Its architecture rests on a permanent security dilemma and was intended to prevent any one constituent people from dominating the others. It sought to achieve this by institutionalizing veto points, entity voting, and parity mechanisms.
The real paradox is that the very mechanisms designed to prevent domination make ethnic insecurity the most profitable resource in politics. A party that wins in this system does so not by building cross-cutting civic coalitions, but by convincing its own ethnic electorate that rival blocs are preparing to strip it of its institutional safeguards and that only the most disciplined guardian of the ethnic veto can prevent that outcome.
The system therefore does not merely reflect ethnic divisions; it actively reproduces them as a precondition for exercising state power in Bosnia.
Institutions Shape Political Actors More Than Actors Reshape Institutions
Does Bećirović’s defeat of Bakir Izetbegović indicate a meaningful opening for civic politics, or does Bosnia’s institutional structure continue to force even nominally civic actors to operate within an ethnically defined electoral field?
Professor Sead Turčalo: The fact that Denis Bećirović was reelected, securing roughly 38% of the vote against Bakir Izetbegović’s 34%, with Samir Efendić receiving 25%, confirms that no single party owns the Bosniak presidential mandate by hereditary or historical right. That matters politically. Voters have demonstrated twice in a row, in 2022 and again in 2026, that they are willing to punish leadership fatigue and patronage at the top of the ballot.
But we should not confuse the defeat of an Izetbegović with a triumph of civic constitutionalism. Under the electoral rules, Bećirović ran, by constitutional definition, for the Bosniak seat on the Presidency, elected exclusively by voters in the Federation.
To prevail against both Izetbegović and a surging sovereigntist challenger like Efendić, a candidate from a social democratic party cannot campaign on a post-ethnic platform. He has to occupy the center of state patriotism, emphasize the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, match the rhetoric of national dignity, and reassure conservative and centrist voters that supporting the Social Democratic Party candidate will not weaken the Bosnian position vis-à-vis other political actors.
In other words, Bosnia’s electoral geography forces nominally civic actors to nationalize their discourse to remain competitive, while ethnonational parties appropriate state-building language to defend their own blocs. The institution shapes the actor far more than the actor reshapes the institution.
We have seen this over the past four years in the case of Denis Bećirović and the way he conducted his campaign. In this respect, his campaign no longer differed meaningfully from those of Izetbegović and Efendić.
Party Patronage Remains More Resilient Than Individual Political Leadership
Photo: Dreamstime.
Despite Izetbegović’s presidential defeat, the SDA performed strongly in the parliamentary elections. How do you explain this divergence between the electoral fortunes of individual political leaders and the continuing organizational resilience of ethnonational parties?
Professor Sead Turčalo: This divergence is one of the most revealing empirical facts of the 2026 election cycle. As you already pointed out, the SDA suffered a significant defeat in the presidential race but surged back to over 30% in the parliamentary elections.
The explanation lies in the difference between majoritarian presidential voting and the structural strength of party machinery. A presidential election is a personalized contest in which anti-incumbent sentiment or personal unpopularity can unite a broad, heterogeneous coalition of voters around a single challenger.
Parliamentary and cantonal elections operate according to an entirely different logic. What determines the outcome is party infrastructure on the ground: local municipal boards, veterans’ associations, various networks, public-sector employment ecosystems, and disciplined turnout operations across the ten cantons.
For the past four years, the Troika, formed around the SDP, NiP, and Naša stranka—three very different parties: one social democratic, another closer to the center-right of the political spectrum, and Naša stranka, a more liberal party—has governed the Federation under intense external pressure and internal constraints, often making concessions to HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina and SNSD at the state level.
Their voters interpreted these concessions as institutional retreats that failed to deliver the tangible socioeconomic and European integration benefits the Troika was seeking to achieve. The SDA used its time in opposition not to reform its leadership, which remained heavily personalized around Bakir Izetbegović, but to allow the governing coalition to absorb the costs of compromise while preserving its own grassroots base and ideological infrastructure.
Voters split their tickets—or, rather, the electorate fractured. A broader coalition rejected Izetbegović personally, while the SDA’s organizational machinery on the ground easily outmobilized a fragmented Troika in the proportional parliamentary elections.
That is precisely why we see this divergence between Izetbegović’s performance in the presidential race, and the SDA’s results in parliamentary elections at the cantonal and state levels.
When Ethnic Homogeneity Defines Legitimacy, Internal Pluralism Becomes Treason
Darijana Filipović’s victory for the Croat seat on the Presidency appears to strengthen HDZ BiH’s claim to “legitimate representation.” Does this outcome help resolve the longstanding dispute over Croat political representation, or further institutionalize the principle that democratic legitimacy must be ethnically authenticated?
Professor Sead Turčalo: First, we have to state clearly why Darijana Filipović won roughly 47% of the vote. Željko Komšić, the previous incumbent, was constitutionally barred from running after two consecutive terms. Once we remove the personal factor that determined the outcomes of the 2006, 2010, 2018, and 2022 races, the strong asymmetry between HDZ’s disciplined voter mobilization and the wider civic-left field becomes decisive.
Slaven Kovačević simply could not replicate Komšić’s personal voter base, and the Democratic Front lost half its parliamentary strength in the process.
Does this resolve the dispute over Croat representation? Tactically, it reduces tensions surrounding one specific grievance that HDZ BiH and Zagreb have internationalized for nearly 20 years. Strategically, however, it does not resolve the dispute; rather, it shifts the bargaining baseline.
For Dragan Čović and HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina, winning the Presidency seat under the existing rules does not mean those rules are now acceptable. It means they now control all the institutional levers: the Presidency, the veto mechanisms in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the State House of Peoples, and the critical financial ministries.
More importantly, the narrative surrounding Filipović’s victory reinforces a dangerous normative shift: the idea that democratic legitimacy in Bosnia is derived not from the individuals in power but from ethnic authentication certified by the dominant party of a constituent people.
When representation is considered legitimate only if it reflects pre-political ethnic homogeneity, pluralism within each group is treated as treason. That’s quite a dangerous normative shift.
Citizens who do not belong to the constituent peoples—the very citizens whose exclusion was addressed in the Sejdić–Finci case and subsequent European Court of Human Rights rulings—are erased from the constitutional conversation altogether. That is an additional consequence of the narrative surrounding Darijana Filipović’s victory.
Low Voter Turnout Strengthens the Clientelist Parties
With voter turnout at approximately 42%, should electoral abstention itself be interpreted as evidence of a deeper crisis of representation, reflecting citizens’ disillusionment not merely with political parties but with an institutional order that continues to structure political competition along ethnic lines?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Yes, and we need to consider two figures together: record-low official turnout, hovering around 40–43%, with turnout in the Federation’s parliamentary elections falling below 40%, and an invalid ballot rate of approximately 8%, if I remember correctly, in the parliamentary races.
When we combine these figures with an inflated voter register of 3.44 million people in a country whose resident population is substantially smaller due to sustained emigration, what emerges is a silent secession of the citizenry from the political process. Abstention on this scale is not political apathy in the classical sense. It is a rational judgment about the futility of the entire electoral process.
Consider what citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced over the last electoral cycle. Even when voters choose change, as many believed they did when the Troika replaced the SDA in executive power after 2022, or when new biometric technologies are introduced to prevent electoral fraud, as they were during this election cycle, the structural outcomes of the system barely change.
Because of the House of Peoples, vetoes, and entity voting, coalition formation after every election comes down to the same mathematical calculation: who will sit across the table from HDZ Bosnia and Herzegovina and SNSD? When citizens realize that elections can change the faces representing the Bosniak or civic quota without changing the extractive logic of the system, they respond in one of two ways: they abstain from voting, or they vote with their feet by leaving for the European Union.
Low turnout is the lifeblood of clientelist parties because, as the number of independent voters decreases, the relative weight of dependent, patronage-bound voters increases. We have seen this again in the overwhelming victories of HDZ and SNSD, as well as in what happened to the Troika. As I already pointed out, the Bosniak-dominated political arena remains the only one in Bosnia and Herzegovina where voters are willing to replace the familiar political figures they have seen year after year.
Dodikism Has Become an Institutionalized System of Patronage and Control
Milorad Dodik greets supporters in Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina, following a meeting and referendum on Republika Srpska’s National Day, September 25, 2016. Photo: Vladimir Stanisic / Dreamstime.
Željka Cvijanović’s reelection and SNSD’s continued dominance suggest that Dodikism retains considerable institutional strength. Has SNSD evolved beyond Milorad Dodik’s personalized leadership, or does it remain dependent on him? Could a future opposition victory in Republika Srpska produce genuine democratization if the new leadership remained committed to essentially the same Serb-nationalist project?
Professor Sead Turčalo: It remains personalized, with Dodik as its ultimate arbiter. Dodik still monopolizes strategic decision-making and external patronage links, but Dodikism has also become deeply institutionalized as a regime of resource distribution, media control, and administrative control across Republika Srpska. SNSD is not merely a charismatic movement. It is a deeply entrenched entity-level party apparatus that mediates access to public employment, municipal budgets, and public procurement.
As for the opposition in Republika Srpska, even when new coalitions, such as the Za pravdu i red movement, or SDS figures challenge SNSD over corruption and economic decline, we have to assess them in a particular way. In Bosnian Serb politics, opposition parties have consistently tried to outflank or match Dodik on questions of national sovereignty, historicism, and resistance to state-level institutions in Sarajevo to protect themselves against accusations of treason.
If an opposition coalition were to defeat SNSD solely by promising a cleaner, less corrupt defense of Republika Srpska’s autonomy, it might reduce patrimonial kleptocracy. That would be a step forward, but it would not produce genuine democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Democratization requires accepting the constitutional authority of state institutions and the rule of law across the entire territory, rather than merely managing an ethno-territorial system with better accounting, as the opposition in Republika Srpska promises. They cannot really win an election by competing solely on Milorad Dodik’s terrain and employing the same rhetoric he uses.
Three Forms of Ethno-Populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
At what point does ethnonationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina become populism? Is the defining mechanism the construction of an ethnically homogeneous “people” against corrupt elites, rival communities, Sarajevo’s institutions, or international actors, and how does this logic differ across Bosniak, Serb, and Croat political mobilizations?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Ethnonationalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina definitely crosses into ethno-populism. What makes Bosnia and Herzegovina fascinating is how this mechanism operates through three distinct grammars of grievance across the three ethnic communities.
In Serb ethno-populism, particularly under SNSD, the authentic people are the Serbs of Republika Srpska, while the corrupt, illegitimate elite is identified with political Sarajevo, the Constitutional Court, the Office of the High Representative, and Western liberal interventionism, alongside domestic opposition parties portrayed as Western proxies. It’s a form of sovereigntist, anti-institutional populism designed to justify autonomy and secession.
When it comes to Croat ethno-populism, articulated by HDZ, the discourse is legalistic and defensive against majoritarianism. The people are the constituent Croat community, while the enemy is Bosniak majoritarianism and unitarianism, personified by civic parties and Sarajevo institutions that allegedly subvert the spirit of Dayton. By framing internal pluralism among Croats as a demographic threat, this discourse turns HDZ’s party monopoly into an existential shield.
On the Bosniak side, populism operates through a moral narrative of statehood. Among Bosniaks, the people are framed as the state-preserving majority and the primary victims of aggression and betrayal. They are pitted against both secessionist enemies and domestic traitors who trade away state sovereignty for ministerial seats, while selective international interventions are portrayed as double standards directed against the Muslim-majority Bosniak population.
In all three cases, the populist move performs the same function: it depoliticizes socioeconomic issues and state capture by turning every policy dispute into an existential question concerning the collective survival of one of the ethnic groups.
Radicalization Begins in Parliamentary Institutions, Not Only among Fringe Groups
The flag of Bosnia and Herzegovina waves in front of the country’s Parliament in Sarajevo, a city scarred by war and the center of the nation’s political life. Photo: Jerome Cid / Dreamstime.
Your research demonstrates how Bosnia’s fragmented institutions and competing political priorities undermine coherent responses to radicalization. Can the same institutional fragmentation normalize more routine forms of ethnonational polarization, gradually shifting the boundaries of acceptable political discourse before explicitly extremist positions emerge?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Absolutely. In security studies, we make the mistake of examining radicalization only at the tail end of the continuum, when an individual or a fringe group crosses into violent extremism. But radicalization does not happen in a vacuum. It occurs in an ecosystem where the baseline temperature of the political system is constantly elevated by institutional fragmentation.
In Bosnia and Herzegovina, we have fragmented security agencies and 14 ministries of education across the cantons and entities that teach mutually exclusive historical narratives. We also have the phenomenon of two schools under one roof, which is the most visible physical manifestation of this separation of pupils.
We also have a fragmented media market. When the institutional architecture rewards politicians for portraying neighboring communities as ontological threats, what would be considered radical or extremist hate speech in a consolidated democracy becomes ordinary parliamentary rhetoric here.
The mechanism is cumulative. Each unpunished rhetorical breach or institutional provocation tests the system’s threshold for reaction. When there are no sanctions—and we haven’t witnessed any sanctions for this kind of political speech here because the prosecutor’s office is politically constrained or veto mechanisms block institutional responses—the exception becomes the norm.
Mainstream parties do the ideological heavy lifting of polarizing society, demonizing the other, as we witness daily with Milorad Dodik, and delegitimizing shared state institutions. Fringe extremist groups do not need to invent a worldview. They simply take the premises already validated by mainstream ministers, mayors, public figures, and public broadcasters and draw their literal, physical conclusions.
What we really have to focus on when discussing radicalization is the radicalization that occurs within parliamentary institutions and during political leaders’ press conferences, rather than looking only at fringe groups, as we have done in the past.
Parliamentary Ethnonational Parties Provide Institutional Shelter for the Far Right
In your research with Hikmet Karčić, you emphasize the relationship between far-right politics, historical revisionism, and genocide denial. Following the October elections, where should the analytical boundary be drawn between mainstream ethnonationalism and the far right, particularly when exclusionary narratives become embedded in established political parties?
Professor Sead Turčalo: To draw a comparison with Western Europe, for example, we used to track how cordon sanitaire arrangements broke down as center-right parties adopted far-right talking points on migration and identity. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as in the wider Western Balkans region, the trajectory was reversed. Narratives of ethnic cleansing, historical revisionism, and biological-territorial purity emerged at the center of state-building projects in the 1990s and never left the mainstream.
When an established governing party systematically denies the established facts of the Srebrenica genocide, as we have witnessed among parties in Republika Srpska, funds revisionists through, for example, independent commissions established to rewrite the history of the 1992–1995 war, or rejects the liberal democratic principle that all citizens have equal rights regardless of ethnic origin, we cannot call that moderate conservatism simply because the party sits in Parliament and is received in Brussels.
The boundary is no longer organizational, separating street movements such as Srpska akcija or the Chetnik Ravna Gora movement on one side from parliamentary parties in Republika Srpska, primarily SNSD, on the other.
Rather, the boundary is functional. Parliamentary ethnonational parties provide institutional shelter or a megaphone for the far right, while extra-parliamentary far-right groups serve as their street-level auxiliaries or transnational networking arms. That is how this relationship has operated in Bosnia and Herzegovina throughout the years.
Mainstream Glorification of War Criminals Threatens Democratic Stability
Ratko Mladić is depicted on a Serbian flag during a political rally in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 29, 2011. Mladić is a former Bosnian Serb military leader. Photo: Dreamstime.
The commemoration of convicted war criminal Ratko Mladić by political actors across the Bosnian Serb spectrum illustrates how historical revisionism and the glorification of war criminals extend beyond explicitly extremist organizations. Does the normalization of such narratives within mainstream politics make them more consequential for democratic stability than openly extremist movements?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Without question, mainstream normalization is far more dangerous to democratic stability than the activities of marginal extremist groups. An openly neo-fascist or fringe parliamentary group can be monitored by intelligence services, sanctioned, or socially isolated. But when the glorification of convicted war criminals, such as Ratko Mladić or Radovan Karadžić—and Ratko Mladić is a particularly relevant case, since we witnessed this just a month ago when he passed away—is practiced by mayors, members of parliament, university professors, and opposition leaders across the Bosnian Serb political spectrum, it ceases to be a subculture. It becomes a form of official civic pedagogy.
In our research, we call this the eleventh stage of genocide: not denial, which involves the defensive claim that a crime did not happen or was exaggerated, but triumphalism—the active celebration of perpetrators and the moral inversion through which genocide is recast as a heroic act of national liberation or preventive self-defense.
And what are the consequences for democracy?
When you socialize a new generation—children born 15 or 20 years after 1995—into believing that mass atrocity was a legitimate and necessary instrument for creating the political entity of Republika Srpska, where they live today, you destroy the normative foundation of democratic coexistence.
You create a moral framework in which any future violence against the out-group, against Bosniaks, is pre-justified as a defense of their ancestors’ legacy, while legal accountability, even after the 2021 Criminal Code amendments prohibiting genocide denial, is itself defined as an attack on national identity.
Anti-Bosniak Nationalism Has Become an Export Product for the Global Far Right
When anti-Bosniak discourse portrays Muslims as demographic, civilizational, or security threats, should it be understood primarily through the frameworks of ethnonationalism, Islamophobia, racism, or a distinctively Balkan form of far-right politics? What are the implications of these competing conceptualizations for understanding radicalization?
Professor Sead Turčalo: We should not treat those frameworks as mutually exclusive categories. What makes contemporary anti-Bosniak discourse so potent is precisely its synthesis of local nationalism, transnational Islamophobia, and cultural racism into a strategic export product.
Historically, anti-Bosniak ideology was rooted in 19th- and 20th-century ethnonationalist mythology that racialized Slavic Muslims as Ottoman remnants or renegades from Christian Europe. Over the last decade, we have seen this again, including in September of this year, when Milorad Dodik traveled to Jerusalem and invoked alleged terrorist threats. Similarly, years earlier, Dragan Čović and Zagreb portrayed a civic Bosnia as an Islamic state. Local ethnonationalist actors realized that purely parochial Balkan arguments no longer resonated in Western capitals.
They therefore repackaged their constitutional and territorial ambitions in the language of global counterterrorism, demographic replacement, and civilizational securitization. By portraying Bosniaks not as a European constituent people demanding equal citizenship but as a latent Islamist security threat on Europe’s borders, they connect directly with the ideological networks of the European and American radical right, from Viktor Orbán to conservative think tanks in Washington that support the MAGA movement, such as the Heritage Foundation.
And remember, this ideological exchange operates in both directions. Figures associated with the global far right, as we have seen with Anders Breivik and Brenton Tarrant, the Christchurch terrorist in New Zealand, explicitly drew inspiration from Bosnian Serb wartime mythology as a template for defending Christian Europe.
When local elites here in Bosnia securitize Bosnian Muslims to gain diplomatic access abroad, they simultaneously feed global white supremacist radicalization and generate real grievances and narratives at home. This approach became particularly intense in the two years following the global surge of the radical right and Donald Trump’s electoral victory in the United States.
Democratic Change in Belgrade Could Fundamentally Weaken Dodikism
Students and citizens protest against government corruption in Zrenjanin, Serbia, on January 25, 2026, demanding justice and accountability for the 16 victims of the tragic railway station canopy collapse in Novi Sad. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have characterized Bosnia and the Western Balkans as arenas of competing European, Russian, Chinese, and Turkish influence. To what extent has SNSD’s political resilience depended on external support, particularly from Russia and Serbia, and could democratic political change in Belgrade alter the regional balance between external influence and domestic institutional constraints?
Professor Sead Turčalo: The external actors you mentioned do not create Bosnia’s internal fractures, but they dramatically alter the expected costs of exploiting them. My argument has long been that Bosnia’s borders are better protected than the state’s ability to enforce decisions within them. Geopolitical competition matters most when it lowers the cost of domestic obstruction.
SNSD’s resilience has relied on a multivector external shield. Russia plays the role of a low-cost spoiler. Moscow lacks the geographic reach to offer Banja Luka a credible military guarantee, but at minimal financial cost, it provides diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council, energy leverage, and geopolitical validation.
Hungary, under Orbán, added a crucial new layer within the EU and NATO. Now, fortunately, Orbán has lost power. Hungary had even stepped in with financial lifelines and threatened to veto European sanctions. The opposition’s victory in Hungary has been a positive development in this particular case.
Meanwhile, in October 2025, we saw Dodik, some of his family members, and his political party associates removed from the OFAC sanctions list in Washington following intensive lobbying. We also witnessed divisions within the Peace Implementation Council after Christian Schmidt’s resignation in May 2026. This inconsistent Western conditionality taught domestic challengers that crisis bargaining and transactional access could secure relief without structural compliance.
Serbia, however, has always been the indispensable material, logistical, and symbolic anchor for Banja Luka because of geographic proximity, economic interdependence, and the doctrine of the Serbian World, codified in the June 2024 All-Serb Assembly Declaration. Belgrade has served as Dodik’s strategic backer.
Therefore, a genuine democratic transition following Vučić’s electoral defeat in Belgrade would represent the single most consequential shift in the regional balance of power—not because it would automatically rewrite Dayton, but because it would deprive SNSD’s strategy of autonomy without secession of its primary regional guarantor and its financial and political hinterland in Serbia.
The student protests in Serbia might therefore have an effect on Bosnian politics that we could even describe as tectonic, provided the new government decides to stop supporting Dodik and no longer serves as his strategic backer, as Vučić has done over the past 14 years.
Serbia’s Students Rejected Identity Polarization in Favor of the Rule of Law
Following the Students’ List victory in Serbia’s October 25 elections, could the movement’s emphasis on civic inclusion and political pluralism fundamentally reshape relations between the Serbian majority and Bosniak and Albanian minorities, particularly in Sandžak and the Preševo Valley? What institutional reforms would be necessary to translate this democratic opening into meaningful minority representation and protection?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Once again, I have to emphasize that the victory of the Students’ List represents a historic civic rupture in Serbia, the biggest since October 5, 2000, when a movement removed Slobodan Milošević from power. The Students’ List emerged from the moral and institutional outrage following the November 2024 Novi Sad railway station canopy collapse. The movement succeeded precisely because it refused to engage in identity polarization, centering its campaign instead on the rule of law, institutional accountability, and the principle that the state belongs to its citizens rather than a ruling party.
We witnessed powerful moments during the student marches and blockades, particularly when students from Novi Pazar, their Bosniak fellow students, came together under the slogan “Our Serbia.”
However, translating the moral solidarity of a protest movement into structural minority inclusion in Sandžak and the Preševo Valley requires moving beyond an anti-corruption consensus toward substantive institutional reform.
Under Vučić’s party, the SNS regime, minority politics was managed through the clientelist co-optation of favored local brokers, alongside structural neglect and the administrative passivization of voter registrations and residential addresses, particularly affecting Albanians in the Preševo Valley.
For the new government in Belgrade to fundamentally reshape majority-minority relations in Serbia, several essential reforms would be required. First, it needs to immediately end and reverse the administrative passivization of residential addresses in the Preševo Valley, which has functioned as a form of bureaucratic disenfranchisement of ethnic Albanians.
It also needs to decentralize public investment and depoliticize minority councils so that infrastructure, healthcare, and, for example, universities in Sandžak and southern Serbia are guaranteed through transparent fiscal formulas rather than through transactional loyalty to Belgrade’s ruling coalition, as was the case over the past 14 years.
I would also argue that breaking with security-oriented policies and judicial double standards, while ensuring proportional representation of Bosniaks and Albanians in the local judiciary, police, and state administration, is an essential step toward transforming majority-minority relations in Serbia.
If the Students’ List is able to achieve this, it will certainly create a Serbia that is more inclusive of its minorities and is perceived more positively by its neighbors than Serbia under Aleksandar Vučić.
The Real Test for Serbia’s New Government Is Its Relationship with Sarajevo
Vučić’s political alliance with Milorad Dodik reinforced a broader pattern of cross-border Serb ethnonationalism. Could Serbia’s student-led democratic transition weaken the political and ideological foundations of Dodikism in Republika Srpska, encouraging greater cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s state institutions? Or might entrenched nationalist networks and competing claims of Serb sovereignty limit the regional consequences of political change in Belgrade?
Professor Sead Turčalo: I expect we will see both effects simultaneously: an immediate disruption of the personal patronage links between Belgrade and Banja Luka, alongside continued structural resistance from entrenched nationalist networks. On the one hand, the Students’ List will disrupt the relationship Vučić built on a personal level. On the other hand, in attempting to do so, it will certainly face structural resistance from nationalist networks on both sides of the Drina River. Remember that, during the Serbian election campaign in October, the regimes in Banja Luka and Belgrade had already spent years reinforcing each other’s media propaganda and bringing voters by bus from Republika Srpska to Serbia to vote for Vučić’s party.
For the Students’ List parliamentary majority in Belgrade, Dodik is not a national guardian. Much of Serbia’s civic movement perceives him as a symbol of the very corrupt, authoritarian party-state system they fought for two years to overthrow. This means that the automatic political, media, and financial support Belgrade provided to SNSD has been disrupted.
At the same time, we must be realistic about the limits of the Students’ List’s ideological consensus. To win almost 54% of the vote against Vučić’s party, the students deliberately set aside divisive geopolitical and regional questions, including Kosovo, sanctions on Russia, and the status of Republika Srpska.
Serbia’s deep state—its intelligence services, the Serbian Orthodox Church, nationalist circles, and parts of the security apparatus—did not disappear on the night of October 25 or in the two weeks that followed. In the short term, these networks may even attempt to position Banja Luka as the last bastion of authentic Serbian nationalism against a civic-liberal Belgrade, leaning more heavily on Moscow.
But the real test for the new government in Belgrade will be whether it conducts relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina strictly through institutional channels in Sarajevo, ending the practice of quasi-state summits that treated Republika Srpska as a sovereign extension of Serbia. That will be the first decisive step for the Students’ List: how it approaches institutional, state-to-state relations between Belgrade and Sarajevo.
Serbia’s Democratic Transition Opens a Window for Change in Bosnia
Students and citizens protest against corruption and the Serbian government in Novi Sad, Serbia, on February 1, 2025. Photo: Srdjan Randjelovic / Dreamstime.
Could Serbia’s democratic breakthrough alter the relationship between Republika Srpska, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the central state by reducing external support for ethnonational confrontation? Might this create opportunities for constitutional reform and cross-ethnic cooperation, or will Dayton’s entrenched veto structures, competing conceptions of sovereignty, and persistent nationalist polarization continue to constrain democratic integration?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Certainly, a democratic, rule-of-law-oriented Belgrade changes the regional climate, and in conflict management, climate matters. When Belgrade stops acting as an amplifier of secessionist threats, the artificially manufactured atmosphere of crisis that fuels reciprocal ethnonationalism within Bosnia and Herzegovina loses one of its main drivers. This deprives SNSD of the credible threat of regional escalation while simultaneously depriving other ethnonationalists of the permanent emergency narrative they use to discipline their own voters.
Yet a favorable regional climate does not automatically dismantle domestic institutional vetoes. As we discussed at the beginning of this interview, the October 4 vote produced a parliamentary balance in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which SNSD and HDZ still hold decisive levers in the House of Peoples and can exercise control over the political system. These veto structures are self-reinforcing because they protect the material interests and legal immunity of domestic political cartels. That is not something that changes simply because of a political transition in Belgrade.
Even without Belgrade’s encouragement, political elites in Banja Luka and Mostar have powerful domestic incentives to engage in ethnically driven obstruction because a functional, independent state judiciary and transparent, EU-aligned public procurement threaten their economic survival. Belgrade’s transition therefore opens a window of opportunity by reducing external geopolitical pressure. But taking advantage of that opportunity still requires breaking the domestic impunity of Bosnia’s veto players.
The Western Balkans Are Not Condemned to Tyranny and Ethnonationalism
And finally, Professor Sead Turčalo, thirty-one years after Dayton, do Bosnia’s election results and Serbia’s emerging democratic transition suggest that the region has an opportunity to move beyond entrenched ethnonational power-sharing? Should Bosnia pursue further refinement of its consociational institutions, a gradual transition toward a more civic constitutional order, or an alternative framework reconciling individual citizenship with collective national protections?
Professor Sead Turčalo: Good question. Thirty-one years after Dayton, the central lesson is that we cannot transform a rigid ethnic consociation into a functional democracy simply by adding more ethnic locks to the door. Every attempt over the past three decades to refine constitutionalism through further territorialization or legitimate representation, as demanded by HDZ, has only enabled state capture and disenfranchised citizens who refuse to be herded into three ethnic camps.
Equally, we have to be realistic as political scientists. A sudden, maximalist leap toward a purely civic model cannot be imposed without triggering severe conflict dynamics, because 30 years of institutional socialization have entrenched deep collective fears that cannot easily be removed. These collective fears provide parties with an easy way to mobilize their ethnic groups. But the path forward has to involve a sequenced, functionalist transition toward a hybrid model that reconciles individual civic equality with strictly bounded collective cultural protections.
When we consider what that would look like in practice, the first step must be to implement the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights. There are many of them: Sejdić–Finci, Zornić, Pilav, Šlaku, and so on. Implementing these rulings would allow us to remove ethnic and residency-based restrictions on eligibility for the state Presidency and the House of Peoples, so that every citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina can run for and vote for any office, regardless of ethnicity or place of residence.
To achieve this goal of a functional state, we also have to narrow and clearly define the scope of the vital national interest, which is currently invoked in almost any imaginable situation. Everything is defined as a vital national interest.
Collective protections should exist in such a system, but they must be restricted to genuine questions of identity, such as language, culture, religion, and heritage. They should also be subject to strict constitutional review rather than serving as a general-purpose blockade on budgets, energy interconnectors, European integration laws, and judicial appointments. As we are a candidate for membership in the European Union, we should anchor domestic reform in credible external conditionality.
Just take the example of Serbia’s student movement. What it achieved in this election reminded the entire region that citizens in the Western Balkans are not culturally condemned to tyranny and ethnic nationalism. They want institutions that answer to the law rather than to a party boss.
And the European Union, first and foremost, alongside other actors such as the United States—I hope that after Trump leaves the White House, transatlantic relations will change for the better—should align their instruments to target the financial channels of obstructionist political actors rather than rewarding them with transactional compromises.
Then the combination of Serbia’s democratic opening and Bosnia’s own civic exhaustion with partitocracy can finally become the starting point for moving from Dayton’s negative peace toward a genuine constitutional democracy in our country.
(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.
In this commentary for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Amir Ali examines the resurgence of India’s student-led protests against the Modi government, linking concerns over electoral integrity, institutional independence, and democratic backsliding to the socioeconomic consequences of neoliberalism. Focusing on the Cockroach Janata Party’s mobilization, he explores growing youth disillusionment with political institutions, educational inequalities, and diminishing employment opportunities. Dr. Ali argues that India’s Generation Z must connect its democratic resistance to a broader critique of neoliberal economic policies that have deepened inequality and undermined public goods. Drawing comparative lessons from recent electoral developments in Brazil, Serbia, and the United States, he advocates reclaiming socialism and secularism as complementary foundations for India’s democratic renewal.
India’s young cockroach protesters were back on the streets of New Delhi in early October. This was just a little over two months after the late July showdown with the government that earned the rare resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan, when Delhi was experiencing the late-July humidity, occasionally relieved by monsoon showers. The October reemergence of the cockroaches happened when the Delhi weather was becoming milder as the onset of winter approached.
The Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) had called for a protest on October 10 and the Delhi Police, under the direct control of India’s powerful Home Minister Amit Shah, denied permission for the protests. Shah is a close associate of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi and has an image as a tough, uncompromising strongman. Events took a more dramatic turn when Abhijit Dipke, founder of the Cockroach Janata Party, along with two of his associates, was arrested as soon as the flight on which they were traveling landed in Delhi. The videos taken on cell phones from inside the plane and then posted on social media showed Delhi police personnel entering the aircraft. This reinforced the impression, now widespread in India, that the government was panicking. As protests were disallowed at the Jantar Mantar protest site in Central Delhi, a mushrooming of protest sites took place, wherever demonstrators found themselves being prevented from moving further by the police.
The Delhi Police’s crackdown on protesters and journalists covering these events was brutal and again reinforced the impression that the Modi government was nervous, increasingly on the back foot and resorting to desperate, knee-jerk measures.
In the previous round in July, young cockroach protesters expressed their frustration at the decrepit state of Indian entrance examinations that in turn was a larger reflection of the moribund state of public education. They targeted the Education Minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, and, as mentioned, were able to extract his resignation. In the October round of protests, they targeted the Chief Election Commissioner, Gyanesh Kumar over discontent with the implementation of an extensive electoral roll revision exercise and an overall feeling that he was kowtowing to the Modi government. The demand for Gyanesh Kumar’s resignation has, however, fallen on deaf ears.
Election Commissions Past and Present
The Election Commission of India, for many years before the advent of the Modi government, was a widely respected and fiercely independent institution whose autonomy was ensured through Article 324 of the Indian Constitution. It is headed by two elections commissioners and one Chief Election Commissioner. Some prominent Chief Election Commissioners became well known for their ability to stand up to the government of the day to ensure that no incumbent government had the temerity to bully the Commission. Back in the 1990s, a redoubtable Chief Election Commissioner like T. N. Seshan made his commitment to his constitutional role clear in no uncertain terms.
Less than a decade later, in 2002, the Chief Election Commissioner J. M. Lyngdoh prevented Narendra Modi, who was then Chief Minister of the western Indian state of Gujarat from holding early elections to the Gujarat provincial assembly. This was soon after the vicious communal violence that the state had experienced in the months of March and April that year. Mr. Modi had been accused of not doing enough to control the violence. Lyngdoh’s opposition to holding early elections was premised on the inability of many displaced victims living in refugee camps to vote, and who were likely to do so against Mr. Modi. This led to Mr. Modi mocking the Chief Election Commissioner for preventing the elections from taking place by emphasizing his full name, which is James Michael Lyngdoh. These insinuations invoked Lyngdoh’s Christian identity and reinforced Mr. Modi’s notorious minority baiting. The elections were held later that year, and Mr. Modi won.
More recent Election Commissioners who have resisted the Modi regime, such as Ashok Lavasa in 2019, have found themselves at the receiving end of the government’s ire. The controversial current Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar whose resignation, as mentioned earlier, became the focal point of this round of the cockroach campaign in October, seems far more malleable—indeed, compliant. Suggestions have been made that the Election Commission under him does the Modi government’s bidding, raising a question mark over the fairness of elections. A recent controversial piece of legislation, The Chief Election Commissioner and Other Election Commissioners (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act 2023 granted effective lifelong immunity for actions that Election Commissioners took in office. The legislation also altered the appointment process. Earlier a three-member committee consisting of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the Chief Justice of India selected election commissioners. This changed to replace the Chief Justice of India with a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister, giving the government of the day the decisive upper hand in selecting election commissioners.
One of the most controversial decisions that the Election Commission under Gyanesh Kumar has taken is to conduct the Special Intensive Revision of Rolls (SIR). The first state to conduct this exercise was Bihar in June 2025, just months before provincial assembly elections in that state were to be held in November 2025. The SIR has since been extended to many other parts of the country. The most disturbing aspect of the exercise is the Kafkaesque requirement of documentation where inclusion on the rolls depends on proving that a voter or the voter’s parents’ names figured in a previous electoral exercise conducted over two decades ago. This has led to people frantically looking for documents to ensure their inclusion on the current list by being ‘mapped’ on a two-decade-old list. The result, as has been widely reported, is the deletion and thereby disenfranchisement of 130 million people from the voter roll. More worryingly, the emphasis the Election Commission of India places on sanitized and ‘pure’ voter rolls is indicative of an almost ominous electoral cleansing.
The Indian Express Reported Dissent within the Election Commission
The Indian Express report tended to reinforce questions that had been raised over the conduct of the Election Commission. The Leader of the Opposition, Rahul Gandhi, had in several widely reported press conferences claimed that he had documentary evidence to back the damning claims he was making about electoral malpractices. The Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar took great umbrage at these attacks.
The Emergence of Youth and Student Leaders
In both the July and October rounds of protests, some prominent youth leaders have emerged. From the Cockroach Janata Party (CJP) have emerged its founder Abhijit Dipke, Sourav Das and Ashutosh Ranka. In the more recent round, the President of the left-wing All India Students Association (AISA) Neha Bora, a PhD candidate at New Delhi’s prominent Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), played a very significant role. While many of these protesters were detained and arrested, there were worrying reports of some violent counter protesters to whom the Delhi Police appeared to be turning a blind eye.
With the threat of violence looming, a successful march call was given by Rahul Gandhi, the leader of the opposition and head of India’s main opposition party, the Indian National Congress. The march saw large numbers of people participating on October 12 with no violence. It culminated in the filing of a petition at the Supreme Court of India.
Visible decline and dysfunction have taken hold in constitutional institutions in India like the Election Commission and even the judiciary, especially as the over 12 years of the Modi regime have progressed. India’s youth protests pointed towards this in a tangential sort of way. What they have achieved more centrally, through their irreverence, is to completely puncture the carefully curated image of Prime Minister Modi as a brand name spelling a strong, decisive leadership. This brand image was built up by preventing people from speaking out against him, enforced by a silencing of dissent, which youngsters have nonchalantly shrugged off.
The Future of Youngsters Shortchanged by Past Decades of Neoliberalism
What the cockroach protests have not been able to do, so far, is connect concretely to how the future of youngsters in India, and for that matter across the world, has been shortchanged by past decades of economic neoliberalism. India began resolutely on the path of economic neoliberalism in July 1991 when the finance minister Manmohan Singh, who subsequently became Prime Minister in 2004, announced these policies. These neoliberal economic policies are often referred to as LPG which is an acronym for Liberalization, Privatization and Globalization. These policies have been underway for the past 35 years and there has been a kind of consensus that has developed on them between the Congress and the currently ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Between them, these two parties have ruled for the lion’s share of the past three and a half decades. The Congress was in power for 15 of these 35 years, from 1991 to 1996 and then from 2004 to 2014. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has been in power for 18 of these 35 years and this covers the years 1998-1999, followed by 1999-2004 and 2014 to the present. The remaining two years form an interlude between 1996 and 1998 when a series of fractious coalitions tried unsuccessfully to stake out a politics that differed from the Congress and the BJP.
That two-year interlude ended in 1998 when Atal Bihari Vajpayee of the BJP came to power. The subsequent six years of BJP-led rule revealed how the party accepted the orthodoxy of economic neoliberalism, despite the commitment to a broad Gandhian socialism that found its way into the party’s constitution when it was founded in 1980. The BJP government under Vajpayee combined this new commitment to economic neoliberalism and its traditional Hindu nationalism. For the purposes of running and maintaining the coalition that he led, Vajpayee, reputed for wearing an emollient ‘liberal’ mask, was willing to put the central elements of the Hindu nationalist agenda on the back burner.
Keeping in mind the BJP’s adoption of economic neoliberalism, combined with a vague background commitment to Gandhian socialism, one notes something similar in the Congress. Fifteen years prior to its announcement of the 1991 neoliberal economic policies, the Congress back in 1976 under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, during the Emergency that clamped down on constitutional fundamental rights, had inserted, through the 42nd Constitutional Amendment, the word socialism into the Preamble of the Constitution alongside secularism. Both the Congress and the BJP have embraced economic neoliberalism while retaining an uneasy historical commitment to socialism—a contradictory and problematic legacy. This contradiction is more troubling in the case of the Congress. At the same time the BJP’s commitment to economic neoliberalism is far more aggressive. This article concludes by suggesting that the Congress under Rahul Gandhi will have to rescue and redeem that troubled legacy of socialism, if it wants to envision the contours of a post-Modi India.
Before arriving at that conclusion, it is important to do a quick assessment of how the past decades of neoliberalism have shortchanged the future of India’s youth who are potentially at the forefront of political change today. These past three decades of economic neoliberalism have yielded, for at least two decades, a considerable degree of economic growth. Throughout the decade of the 2000s with the BJP coalition under Vajpayee, succeeded by the Congress-led coalition, the Indian economy did grow at significant rates. Such growth over the 2000s also led to an uptick in employment and this was a significant reason for the Congress Party coming back to power in 2009 with an even more comfortable majority.
This is where the story of India’s economic growth under neoliberalism becomes complicated. The world economy was being roiled by the headwinds of the 2008 global financial crisis, just as the Congress was returned to power in 2009. From 2010 onwards, a series of exaggerated corruption allegations were made against the Congress government that were understandably amplified by the opposition BJP that was eager to come back to power. The BJP did come to power in 2014 with a hefty majority under Narendra Modi that ended almost two and a half decades of coalition era politics in India.
India’s Jobless Growth and Gen Z’s Revolt Against Neoliberalism
India’s growth story continued in the first years of the Modi government, but sceptics started pointing to the jobless nature of this growth. The most infamous aspect of the ending of India’s growth story was the controversial decision to demonetize high value currency notes that PM Modi surprisingly and shockingly announced on November 8, 2016, almost exactly ten years ago. The compliant electronic media, that has become notorious for never asking questions of the Modi government, sycophantically hailed it as a master stroke. The economist Jean Drèze offered a more sobering assessment that this was like shooting at and deflating the tires of a racing car. The outcome of this would be an economy that would careen out of control and, in doing so, jeopardize the careers of India’s Gen Z who were growing up and about to enter a job market that would prove to be non-existent for them.
India’s Gen Z protesters were born between the years 1997 and 2012. In other words, they were born between those years when India’s liberalization polices were being consolidated and then yielding whatever returns they had to, in terms of growth clocked throughout the decade of the 2000s. As Gen Z has grown up and increasingly entered the job market, the very same economic neoliberalism that was unfolding against the backdrop of their childhoods has condemned them to a bleak future of little or no prospects. India’s economic neoliberalism that was toasted and celebrated in India and across the world during their childhoods has mortgaged, foreclosed and shortchanged their future.
This is where the creative potential of Gen Z protests needs to be harnessed. These protests, if they are to have a meaningful impact, on the future of Indian politics and its redemption from the vagaries of the neoliberal market, must connect the dots of the orthodoxy of economic neoliberalism to the precarity of their future.
There is no reason why these obvious dots cannot be connected. A few weeks after the October cockroach protests, election results in Serbia showed how two years of student protests could topple the twelve-year-old government of Aleksandar Vucic. Very shortly after that, the US midterm elections revealed a rout of Trump’s Republicans. The Democrats’ blue tsunami was facilitated by a clear movement of the democrats to the left and the success of numerous Democratic Socialist and progressive candidates like Abdul el Sayed who ran for the senate seat from Michigan. El-Sayed has called for universal health care and health as a public good rather than the commoditized private good that it has been for so many years with the pervasive private health insurance market in the US.
In India health care and the role of the private sector is a ticking time bomb. It has not impacted the Gen Z youngsters, who may, however, be perceptive enough to see its impact on their parents and certainly grandparents. Indian youngsters between age 15-29 constitute a whopping 371 million and were once lauded by PM Modi as a ‘demographic dividend.’ They now look almost certainly poised to turn against him.
Conclusion: Redeeming Socialism, Secularism and Democracy
In US politics it seems that the word socialism has suddenly stopped being the unspeakable blasphemy it once was. Future politics in India, the US and many countries across the world may have to be built upon a viable socialism that combines itself with a meaningful democracy. The only way democracy can prevent itself from being hollowed out is to move away from the congruence that has been maliciously created between democracy and the free market.
The global backsliding of democracy is connected to the extension of neoliberal markets for goods like healthcare, education and housing. Gen Z protests will have to foster the overlap between democracy and socialist policies that will create public goods in healthcare, housing and education and most importantly, create employment. The redistributive presence of public goods can reduce widening inequality and sustain flourishing democracies in the 21st century, the opposite of democratic backsliding witnessed over the last decade. The election results in Brazil, where Lula defeated Flávio Bolsonaro, as well as those in Serbia and the US midterms are promising as they halt far-right populism. However, democratic waves can be notoriously fickle.
As far as India is concerned, one way of consolidating democracy is to go back to the year 1976, much before the current Gen Z was born and when some of their parents may have been toddlers and indeed may not even have been born. That year the Indira Gandhi regime during the Emergency wrote into the constitution’s Preamble the words ‘socialist’ and ‘secular,’ as mentioned earlier, a sordid legacy. India’s socialism has never been secular enough, as its socialist leaders, notably Jay Prakash Narayan, Ram Manohar Lohia and George Fernandes ushered in right-wing Hindutva nationalism in the name of claiming some notion of authentic Indian indigeneity
India’s secularists, many of them urbane liberals enthusiastically welcomed the role of neoliberal ‘free’ markets. The future of India’s young population may depend on whether its political institutions can reclaim and reinvigorate the principles of socialism and secularism. That would have to begin by realizing that India’s socialism was never secular enough and that her secularism was never socialist enough.
In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević of the University of Belgrade examines Serbia’s student-led electoral breakthrough and its implications for populism, competitive authoritarianism, and democratic renewal. Following the October 25, 2026, defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition, Professor Vladisavljević argues that the Students’ List represents an inclusive democratic movement rather than another manifestation of anti-establishment populism. Highlighting the movement’s commitment to political pluralism, minority inclusion, and the rule of law, he contrasts its grassroots mobilization with Vučić’s personalized authoritarianism, clientelism, and media manipulation. Yet he cautions that electoral victory alone cannot guarantee democratic consolidation. Serbia’s enduring challenge is translating popular resistance into accountable institutions, independent journalism, and sustainable democratic governance.
Serbia stands at a historic crossroads. Nearly two years of student-led protests, sparked by the November 2024 Novi Sad railway-station tragedy, culminated in the October 25, 2026, electoral defeat of Aleksandar Vučić’s ruling coalition. Yet the transition from authoritarian rule to democratic consolidation remains uncertain. Beyond the electoral breakthrough lies a fundamental question: Does Serbia’s student-led movement represent another manifestation of anti-establishment populism, or does it offer a genuinely inclusive alternative to personalized authoritarian rule?
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS),Professor Nebojša Vladisavljević, who teaches comparative and Serbian politics at the University of Belgrade and is a former President of the Serbian Political Science Association, examines the relationship between populism, authoritarianism, popular resistance, and democratic renewal. His research encompasses democratization, social movements, nationalism, ethnic conflict, and political communication.
Challenging interpretations that equate popular mobilization with populism, Professor Vladisavljević argues that Serbia’s student movement is fundamentally different from the exclusionary politics associated with Vučić’s personalized rule. “I wouldn’t describe this as an anti-establishment mobilization. The target was Vučić’s authoritarian, personalist rule,” he explains. Rather than rejecting democratic institutions, the movement seeks their restoration through political pluralism, institutional accountability, and the rule of law.
Professor Vladisavljević emphasizes that the movement’s organizational foundations distinguish it from conventional populist mobilization. Unlike Serbia’s democratic breakthrough in October 2000, when political parties dominated the opposition, the recent transformation placed students, universities, and their broader social allies at the center of political resistance. Its explicit goals, he explains, are “democratic renewal and the protection of political pluralism.”
The interview also examines how Vučić’s populist appeals gradually gave way to entrenched clientelism, media manipulation, and institutional abuse. Reflecting on the regime’s declining capacity to mobilize supporters voluntarily, Professor Vladisavljević concludes: “That tells you a great deal about how thin these populist appeals were throughout.”
Equally significant is the movement’s inclusive approach toward Serbia’s national minorities. Cooperation between Serbian and Bosniak students, particularly across Belgrade and Novi Pazar, has opened possibilities for bottom-up democratic integration, challenging longstanding patterns of ethnonational division.
Nevertheless, Professor Vladisavljević cautions that defeating authoritarianism does not automatically guarantee democratic consolidation. The Students’ List must transform its horizontal, deliberative movement into functioning representative institutions while safeguarding independent journalism, reforming the security sector, and dismantling corruption. As he warns, “short-term efforts obviously won’t be sufficient.”
Ultimately, Serbia’s experience raises broader questions for democratic movements confronting competitive authoritarianism elsewhere: whether inclusive civic mobilization can overcome personalized rule without reproducing its exclusionary logic, and whether electoral victory can become the foundation of lasting democratic transformation.
In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Mukulika Banerjee of the London School of Economics and Political Science warns that India’s controversial electoral-roll revisions risk transforming political citizenship into an instrument of exclusion. Describing the reported deletion of approximately 130 million voters as part of “the biggest assault on India’s electoral system that independent India has seen,” she highlights the disproportionate vulnerability of Muslims, Dalits, women, and other marginalized communities. Professor Banerjee examines how student-led protests are challenging democratic backsliding, political intimidation, and Hindu majoritarianism while forging broader alliances around electoral integrity. Drawing on her scholarship on everyday democracy, she argues that protecting political equality requires sustained civic participation, institutional accountability, vigilance, and collective democratic action.
India is witnessing a significant wave of youth-led protests challenging unemployment, educational injustice, and the erosion of democratic accountability. The emerging Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) has expanded its mobilization from examination irregularities to contested electoral-roll revisions, raising fundamental questions about political representation, citizenship, and the resilience of democracy under Narendra Modi’s Hindu nationalist government.
In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Mukulika Banerjee, Professor of Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science, offers a critical assessment of India’s democratic trajectory. Drawing on her influential scholarship on electoral participation, everyday citizenship, democratic culture, and the social foundations of political life, she examines how controversies surrounding electoral integrity threaten the principles of political equality and inclusive citizenship.
At the heart of Professor Banerjee’s analysis is the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls and reports of approximately 130 million deletions. Describing the controversy as “the biggest assault on India’s electoral system that independent India has seen,” she warns that the country’s historically inclusive electoral framework risks becoming an instrument of political exclusion. According to Professor Banerjee, the reported deletions have disproportionately affected Muslims, Dalits, indigenous communities, women, and other socially disadvantaged groups.
For Professor Banerjee, the consequences extend far beyond electoral competition. India’s democratic achievement has rested on the equalizing power of the ballot, particularly for citizens experiencing profound socioeconomic hierarchies. As she explains, “This equalizing power of the vote, of political equality, which is a very basic democratic right, is highly valued in India.” She cautions that electoral-roll revisions could undermine precisely this foundation of citizenship, transforming the right to vote from a universal democratic entitlement into a mechanism of selective political inclusion.
The interview also explores the emergence of student-led resistance as a potential counterweight to institutional democratic backsliding. Professor Banerjee argues that young protesters have challenged a pervasive climate of intimidation while bringing opposition parties, farmers’ unions, and civil society organizations together around electoral integrity. Their mobilization, she suggests, demonstrates that “in order to live in a democracy, you have to be an active citizen.”
Beyond India, Professor Banerjee situates these developments within broader debates over authoritarian populism, crony capitalism, Hindu majoritarianism, and transnational democratic resistance. Her analysis connects electoral exclusion to economic inequality and the erosion of institutional accountability.
Ultimately, Professor Banerjee’s warning is also a call for sustained democratic engagement. Drawing on her metaphor of democracy as a plant requiring constant care, she concludes: “In order to cultivate democracy, you need vigilance, you need patience, you need hard work, and you need hope.”