Session13

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis

Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political arenas. Chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Oxford School for Global and Area Studies), the panel brought together interdisciplinary perspectives on populism, democratic participation, and representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović analyzed the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve explored how participants in France’s Yellow Vests movement sought to institutionalize grassroots assembly-based democracy. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez examined the exclusion of stateless and marginalized communities from international diplomacy, arguing for a “right to diplomacy.” Together, the contributions illuminated the evolving and contested meaning of “the people” in contemporary democratic politics.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, March 5, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the thirteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” Bringing together scholars from political science, democratic theory, and critical diplomacy studies, the session addressed one of the most urgent questions in contemporary political analysis: how “the people” are imagined, institutionalized, contested, and reconfigured across different political settings. From post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and assembly-based democratic experiments to the exclusions embedded in international diplomacy, the panel examined the shifting boundaries of political representation in a time of democratic strain and institutional transformation.

The participants of the session were introduced by Reka Koleszar, ECPS intern. Chairing the session, Dr. Leila Alieva of the Oxford School for Global and Area Studies framed the discussion as the product of an increasingly mature and sophisticated intellectual agenda within the workshop series. As she observed, by the thirteenth session the series had reached a “quite intricate level of analysis,” with all three presentations deeply interconnected in their exploration of “the genesis, evolution, and formation of populism, and concepts and images related to that.” She underscored the broader strengths of the ECPS project—above all its multidisciplinary, comparative, and constructivist orientation. In a post-Cold War environment marked by uncertainty, complexity, and multiple interacting forces across political, social, and international levels, such a broad approach is particularly necessary. The rise of populism, she suggested, cannot be adequately understood within the limits of a single discipline; rather, it must be approached through the combined lenses of political science, international relations, democratic theory, and broader social inquiry.

Under Dr. Alieva’s chairmanship, the panel featured three speakers whose papers illuminated distinct yet overlapping dimensions of democratic representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović (University of Sarajevo) explored the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering a new framework for understanding inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms within a post-Dayton consociational order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve(Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain) examined how participants in the Yellow Vests movement in France sought to institutionalize direct democracy through popular assemblies, thereby pushing beyond protest toward constituent democratic experimentation. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (UNPO) extended the discussion into the international arena by arguing that diplomatic representation itself must be rethought as a pillar of democracy, especially for unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, and politically marginalized communities.

The session also benefited from the incisive engagement of its two discussants, Associate Professor Christopher N. Magno (Gannon University) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London). Their interventions not only drew out the conceptual strengths of the presentations but also situated them within wider comparative debates on populism, democratic innovation, sovereignty, and political exclusion. Together, chair, speakers, and discussants produced a rich exchange that revealed both the diversity of contemporary democratic struggles and the common tensions that run through them. As Dr. Alieva noted in her concluding reflections, the discussion demonstrated that populism often functions as a sign of deeper institutional pressure—an indication that inherited political forms are struggling to respond to changing social realities. Session 13 thus offered a compelling interdisciplinary inquiry into how democratic subjects are made, constrained, and reimagined across multiple arenas of political life.

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Gas mask in the aftermath of chemical warfare.

War Beyond the Battlefield: Environmental and Human Security in Iran

In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the often-overlooked ecological consequences of modern warfare. Moving beyond traditional analyses focused on military strategy and territorial control, he argues that contemporary conflicts produce long-lasting environmental damage that can destabilize societies for decades. From contaminated farmland and polluted water systems to devastated ecosystems and forced migration, war’s environmental fallout directly undermines human security. Drawing on historical examples such as Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Kuwaiti oil fires during the 1991 Gulf War, the commentary highlights how ecological destruction persists long after hostilities end. Dr. Solaja ultimately calls for stronger international environmental governance and greater integration of environmental protection into global security and peacebuilding frameworks.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

Thinking About War in an Ecological Framework

When war is finished in terms of battles, water systems remain polluted, nature destroyed, and infrastructure shattered—and continues to shape the ways in which societies survive and exist. Whereas the majority of scholarly focus concerning warfare centers on issues of military victory, deterring enemies, or controlling territory, the environmental consequences of war can often produce effects that can persist over decades (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019; UNEP, 2009). The current confrontation between the United States, Iran, and Israel, for instance, should be understood not merely as a geopolitical conflict, but as an ecological disaster, as well. The bombing and attack on industrial and energy infrastructure result in more than mere destruction of physical property; these incidents produce ecological disarray, which can lead to widespread contamination of landscape, livelihood and inhabitants, even long after the end of hostilities (Foster et al., 2010; Ide, 2021).

Understanding war in relation to ecology and displacement is one way of looking at the long-term consequences of military combat. Destruction to environment can create instability for societies by contaminating farmland, polluting water sources, or even eliminating the natural resource base required to survive. Therefore modern warfare reaches beyond the battlefield to create different forms of insecurity that may exist in the environment for generations (Nixon, 2011). Hence a sociological study of war, examining both strategic and environmental results of battle, should be adopted in understanding conflict in the 21st century. In an age of increasing environmental crises and security concerns, treating war as an ecological affair can become as significant as viewing it as the domain of military actions (Foster et al., 2010).

Environmental Effects of Modern Warfare

Even though destruction of the environment has historically been a factor of warfare, it often goes overlooked in analyses of security. It can create massive ecological devastation, not just exacerbate humanitarian crises within a warzone, but create an environmental crisis for surrounding regions as well (UNEP, 2009; Lawrence & Stohl, 2019). Aerial bombardment of infrastructure can spread poisons into the air, water sources and natural habitat required for sustenance. Industrial buildings and energy sources—refineries, chemical plants, water treatment plants—are sometimes prime targets. When these sites are destroyed, dangerous pollution can linger in land, air and ground water long after fighting has ended, with effects on human security far reaching (Ide, 2021).

Toxic lands may become unfit for farming and public health will be compromised by contaminants and the food supply jeopardized. It can often take decades to repair the environmental damage so that it may become safely habitated again (UNEP, 2009). Attacks on Iranian oil refineries and petrochemical industries, for example, could cause catastrophic environmental degradation over a wide region of the Middle East, compromising public health and damaging natural ecosystems of the area (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019).

Historical Evidence of Environmental Destruction during War

The long-term humanitarian effects have historically been a characteristic of war-induced ecological damage. Between 1961 and 1971, the US deployed large quantities of Agent Orange across Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Large portions of farmland and forest became useless while their soils were contaminated with toxins. In addition to long-lasting health problems, communities continue to deal with the aftermath of these chemicals (Vo & Ziegler, 2018). 

Also, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi troops burned hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells in an attempt to deter advancing forces. Large quantities of pollutants were released into the air, and oil slicks devastated marine life (Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). As in Vietnam, long-lasting human security issues and a devastated ecosystem resulted from environmental disaster during wartime. The widespread destruction of natural and manmade landscapes caused during conflict does not end immediately and the need for their repair is a long-term challenge that often prolongs instability within nations affected by war. Such environmental harm frequently unfolds gradually and invisibly, what Nixon describes as “slow violence,” in which ecological destruction continues to affect communities long after the immediate conflict has ended (Nixon, 2011).

War, Environmental Degradation and Human Security

Seeing war as a source of ecological devastation helps to better understand the link between war and human security. Attacks on water systems, farms or factories can harm societies through ecological harm which causes social consequences. An attack on an ecosystem could destroy farms, harm public health through pollution of water sources and prompt migration as farming has no longer become an option. These elements—war, environment, displacement—can therefore be described as having a circular relationship, where destruction to one aspect of existence directly fuels destruction in another. 

Rural communities are particularly susceptible, since their entire way of life is contingent on their surrounding environment. Without the existence of healthy ecosystems, a livelihood becomes unsustainable and this leads to forced migration in order to survive (Ide, 2021). Homer-Dixon has emphasized the importance of the environment as the driver of conflict through its impact on resource availability and human security; with widespread ecological destruction during conflict, this connection is intensified, creating an even more dire situation (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Implications for International Environmental Governance

The ecological devastation that war leaves in its wake makes clear the need for international action to help govern the conduct of war so that environment is not harmed so severely and, hopefully, at all. Although international laws of armed conflict are already in place to help alleviate the harm inflicted upon the environment during war, their enforceability has not been successfully maintained (UNEP, 2009). The long-lasting results of ecological destruction often are not considered and may never be compensated for or rectified in the absence of stronger governance structures. 

The establishment of environmental monitoring systems, strict liability laws for states or parties engaged in warfare that are responsible for ecological damage, and inclusion of environmental restoration within peacebuilding initiatives would all serve to diminish the long-term negative effects of war on ecology (Ide, 2021). Making protection of the environment a component of security strategy will make policies aligned with global security concerns, and address issues of ecological sustainability as well.

Conclusion

The conflict with Iran highlights the vast ecological consequences of modern warfare. It is a process that not only brings conflict to lands and peoples, but can reshape entire landscapes. Its consequences, historically in war zones such as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, show that it can be a far more destructive phenomenon to ecosystems than merely battlefield action, lasting far into the future of human habitation (Vo & Ziegler, 2018; Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). Considering war an ecological threat has made it easier to grasp its entire meaning, and looking at warfare from a strategic and environmental perspective allows for a far greater understanding of warfare itself. In an age of increasing geopolitical turmoil, it may soon become just as significant as military victories, if not more so, to understand the environmental threat war poses.


 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.


 

References 

Al-Dabbous, A. & Kumar, P. (2014). “Environmental impacts of the Gulf War oil fires.” Environmental Pollution, 189, 59–68.

Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. Monthly Review Press.

Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton University Press.

Ide, T. (2021). “Environmental peacebuilding and the impact of war on ecosystems.” Global Environmental Politics, 21(1), 1–12.

Lawrence, M., & Stohl, A. (2019). “The impact of military emissions on climate change and air pollution.” Nature Communications, 10(1), 1–9.

Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press.

UNEP. (2009). Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law. United Nations Environment Programme.

Vo, M., & Ziegler, A. (2018). “Agent Orange and the environmental legacy of the Vietnam War.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 13(2), 1–28.

People.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 9, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00144

 

Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political arenas. Chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Oxford School for Global and Area Studies), the panel brought together interdisciplinary perspectives on populism, democratic participation, and representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović analyzed the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve explored how participants in France’s Yellow Vests movement sought to institutionalize grassroots assembly-based democracy. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez examined the exclusion of stateless and marginalized communities from international diplomacy, arguing for a “right to diplomacy.” Together, the contributions illuminated the evolving and contested meaning of “the people” in contemporary democratic politics.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, March 5, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the thirteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” Bringing together scholars from political science, democratic theory, and critical diplomacy studies, the session addressed one of the most urgent questions in contemporary political analysis: how “the people” are imagined, institutionalized, contested, and reconfigured across different political settings. From post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and assembly-based democratic experiments to the exclusions embedded in international diplomacy, the panel examined the shifting boundaries of political representation in a time of democratic strain and institutional transformation.

The participants of the session were introduced by Reka Koleszar, ECPS intern. Chairing the session, Dr. Leila Alieva of the Oxford School for Global and Area Studies framed the discussion as the product of an increasingly mature and sophisticated intellectual agenda within the workshop series. As she observed, by the thirteenth session the series had reached a “quite intricate level of analysis,” with all three presentations deeply interconnected in their exploration of “the genesis, evolution, and formation of populism, and concepts and images related to that.” She underscored the broader strengths of the ECPS project—above all its multidisciplinary, comparative, and constructivist orientation. In a post-Cold War environment marked by uncertainty, complexity, and multiple interacting forces across political, social, and international levels, such a broad approach is particularly necessary. The rise of populism, she suggested, cannot be adequately understood within the limits of a single discipline; rather, it must be approached through the combined lenses of political science, international relations, democratic theory, and broader social inquiry.

Under Dr. Alieva’s chairmanship, the panel featured three speakers whose papers illuminated distinct yet overlapping dimensions of democratic representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović (University of Sarajevo) explored the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering a new framework for understanding inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms within a post-Dayton consociational order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve(Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain) examined how participants in the Yellow Vests movement in France sought to institutionalize direct democracy through popular assemblies, thereby pushing beyond protest toward constituent democratic experimentation. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (UNPO) extended the discussion into the international arena by arguing that diplomatic representation itself must be rethought as a pillar of democracy, especially for unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, and politically marginalized communities.

The session also benefited from the incisive engagement of its two discussants, Associate Professor Christopher N. Magno (Gannon University) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London). Their interventions not only drew out the conceptual strengths of the presentations but also situated them within wider comparative debates on populism, democratic innovation, sovereignty, and political exclusion. Together, chair, speakers, and discussants produced a rich exchange that revealed both the diversity of contemporary democratic struggles and the common tensions that run through them. As Dr. Alieva noted in her concluding reflections, the discussion demonstrated that populism often functions as a sign of deeper institutional pressure—an indication that inherited political forms are struggling to respond to changing social realities. Session 13 thus offered a compelling interdisciplinary inquiry into how democratic subjects are made, constrained, and reimagined across multiple arenas of political life.

 

Assist. Prof. Jasmin Hasanović: “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 

Dr. Jasmin Hasanović, Assistant Professor and researcher in the Department of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo.

Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović presented a theoretically informed analysis of populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposing a conceptual rethinking of how “the people” are politically constructed within the country’s ethnically structured post-conflict order. Moving beyond dominant interpretations that treat populism as a thin ideology attached to ethno-nationalism, Dr. Hasanović advanced a discursive and relational understanding of populism grounded in Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical framework. His presentation examined how populist logics interact with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutionalized ethnic power-sharing system, producing multiple and sometimes contradictory constructions of the political subject known as “the people.”

Dr. Hasanović began by situating the Bosnian political system within its historical and institutional context. The end of the Bosnian war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement established a complex power-sharing arrangement among the country’s three dominant ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The agreement institutionalized a consociational structure that translated wartime territorial and political balances into a post-war governance framework characterized by parity, consensus mechanisms, and territorial division into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. This arrangement, while designed to stabilize a deeply divided society, also embedded ethnic identity into the very architecture of political representation and competition.

Within this institutional environment, political life has largely been structured through ethnically segmented arenas. Electoral competition and party organization tend to operate primarily within ethnic constituencies, resulting in parallel political subsystems rather than a fully integrated national political sphere. Existing scholarship, Dr. Hasanović observed, has therefore tended to interpret Bosnian politics through the lenses of ethnic nationalism, power-sharing institutions, or the challenges of democratic consolidation. When populism is discussed, it is frequently conceptualized either as “ethnic populism” or as a thin ideological layer attached to ethno-nationalist politics.

Dr. Hasanović challenged this prevailing approach by proposing that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina should instead be understood as a political logic that discursively constructs collective political subjectivities. Drawing on Laclau’s conceptualization, he defined populism not by its ideological content but by its form: a discursive strategy that constructs a political frontier between “the people” and an antagonistic order of power. In this perspective, populism does not mobilize a pre-existing people; rather, it actively constructs the people by linking heterogeneous social demands into what Laclau calls a “chain of equivalence.” When one demand temporarily comes to represent a wider set of grievances, it becomes an “empty signifier” capable of symbolically unifying those demands and establishing a political frontier between the people and those perceived as responsible for their grievances.

Building on this theoretical foundation, Dr. Hasanović argued that the ethnicized power-sharing system itself generates populist dynamics by producing persistent unmet political demands across society. Rather than viewing populism as an external threat to democratic institutions, he suggested that populist logics emerge from within the structural tensions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict governance system. In order to capture these dynamics, he identified three interconnected forms of populism operating within the Bosnian political landscape: inter-ethnic populismintra-ethnic populism, and cross-ethnic populism.

The first and most visible form is inter-ethnic populism, which largely corresponds to what earlier research describes as ethno-nationalist populism. In this configuration, the populist frontier is constructed horizontally across ethnic groups rather than vertically between the people and elites. Political actors mobilize discourses that distinguish “our people” and “our elites” from “their people” and “their elites,” reinforcing antagonism among ethnic communities. Here, the “empty signifier” that unifies social demands is constrained by ethnic identity, meaning that only demands framed through ethnic belonging can enter the chain of equivalence. As a result, the political subject constructed through this form of populism is an ethnicized people whose grievances are directed toward perceived injustices within the constitutional order established after the war. Dr. Hasanović emphasized that ethnicity in this context is not simply a cultural category, but a politically constructed subject formed through populist articulation of dissatisfaction with the post-Dayton system.

The second form, intra-ethnic populism, emerges within the segmented political arenas created by the power-sharing arrangement. According to Dr. Hasanović, because electoral competition takes place largely within monoethnic constituencies, populist rhetoric frequently develops inside ethnic communities rather than across them. In this case, the populist frontier assumes a vertical form, opposing “our people” to “our corrupt elites.” Opposition parties and splinter political movements often deploy such narratives, accusing established ethnic leaders of monopolizing representation, capturing state institutions, and exploiting public resources through clientelistic networks. These actors frame themselves as authentic representatives of the people against entrenched political insiders. Yet despite its vertical orientation, intra-ethnic populism remains bounded by the ethnic framework. The political subject it constructs is still defined ethnically, and the critique of elites does not transcend the segmented structure of the political system.

The third and most fragile form identified by Dr. Hasanović is cross-ethnic populism, which attempts to construct a political subject that transcends ethnic divisions altogether. Unlike the previous forms, cross-ethnic populism articulates the people primarily as citizens rather than members of ethnic groups. It mobilizes grievances that cut across ethnic boundaries, including socio-economic inequality, corruption, demands for justice, and broader calls for institutional accountability. Dr. Hasanović pointed to civic protests, grassroots mobilizations, and civil society initiatives as examples of this form of populism. One illustrative moment occurred during the protests of 2013–2014, when demonstrators adopted the slogan “We are hungry” expressed simultaneously in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. By articulating a shared experience of economic hardship across linguistic variations, the slogan attempted to construct a unified citizenry opposed to an unresponsive political establishment.

Despite its emancipatory potential, however, cross-ethnic populism faces significant structural obstacles. Ethno-national elites frequently reinterpret cross-ethnic mobilizations as threats to their respective communities, portraying them as externally driven attempts to undermine group interests. Such reframing disrupts the formation of a durable chain of equivalence capable of unifying heterogeneous demands across the broader population. Consequently, cross-ethnic populist initiatives have struggled to produce a stable and lasting political subject capable of challenging the entrenched ethnopolitical order.

In conclusion, Dr. Hasanović argued that these three forms of populism interact dialectically within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system. Inter-ethnic populism reinforces ethnic fragmentation and inadvertently stabilizes the existing power-sharing framework, even when it rhetorically criticizes it. Intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities, challenging the dominance of entrenched elites while remaining confined to monoethnic arenas. Cross-ethnic populism, by contrast, represents an attempt to destabilize the entire hegemonic configuration by constructing a new political subjectivity beyond ethnic identity.

To Dr. Hasanović, these dynamics suggest that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be understood simply as a democratic threat or a corrective force. Rather, it operates as a political logic embedded within the structural conditions of a post-conflict power-sharing system. The Dayton constitutional order continuously generates antagonistic frontiers that shape how political actors construct and mobilize “the people.” As Dr. Hasanović emphasized, the concept of the people is never neutral or pre-given; it is always discursively mediated and shaped by the institutional and social dynamics of a particular society. His analysis therefore contributes to a deeper understanding of how populist logics function within divided post-conflict states and how the very meaning of “the people” remains contested, constructed, and continuously renegotiated in political practice.

 

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve: “Institutionalizing the Assembled People

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve
Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve is Postdoctoral Researcher at Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain.

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve presented a theoretically and empirically grounded exploration of grassroots democratic experimentation under the title “Institutionalizing the Assembled People.” Drawing on research derived from her doctoral dissertation, Dr. Van Outryve examined how ordinary citizens engaged in radical democratic practices during the Yellow Vests movement in France attempted not merely to deliberate collectively but also to institutionalize direct democratic governance. Her analysis offered an important contribution to contemporary debates on democratic theory by investigating how political actors outside formal institutions conceptualize and attempt to institutionalize forms of self-government.

The presentation began by situating the problem historically. For centuries, the processes of instituting democratic systems and making decisions on public affairs have largely been monopolized by professional political elites. Representative institutions, while formally democratic, have tended to concentrate both constitutive and decision-making authority in a specialized political class. Against this background, Dr. Van Outryve advanced the central hypothesis guiding her research: that ordinary citizens are capable not only of deciding on public affairs but also of determining the institutional procedures through which those decisions should be made. This hypothesis challenges the conventional model of democratic innovation, which typically proceeds from top-down reforms initiated by states or policymakers.

Dr. Van Outryve examined this proposition through extensive fieldwork conducted in the town of Commercy in northeastern France during and after the emergence of the Yellow Vests (Gilets Jaunes) movement in 2018. Over the course of two years, she undertook a comprehensive ethnographic study of local democratic practices that developed within the movement. Her research methods included participant observation in assemblies, demonstrations, and meetings; two rounds of interviews conducted before and after the municipal elections of 2020; a collective interview session lasting two days; and the collection of approximately 2,500 documents produced by the movement. Through this combination of qualitative methods, Dr. Van Outryve sought to reconstruct how participants themselves conceptualized and institutionalized their democratic experiment.

The theoretical orientation of the research was articulated through what Dr. Van Outryve termed “inductive political theory.” This approach seeks to bridge normative political theory and empirical research by deriving theoretical insights from the practices and reflections of political actors engaged in real-world democratic experiments. Her doctoral project pursued two parallel objectives: the elaboration of a normative democratic theory based on assembly-based direct democracy—what she refers to as “communist direct democracy,” inspired by the ideas of Murray Bookchin—and the empirical reconstruction of how such democratic practices were attempted by grassroots actors. By allowing participants themselves to address fundamental questions about democracy and self-government, the project aimed to generate a political theory grounded in lived democratic practice.

The empirical core of Dr. Van Outryve’s presentation focused on the case of Commercy, a town of roughly 5,400 inhabitants that became a notable site of democratic experimentation within the Yellow Vests movement. Like many other local groups across France, activists in Commercy initially organized daily assemblies in which participants gathered to deliberate collectively on political grievances and strategies. These assemblies operated according to principles of direct democracy: equality of participation, one person–one vote, and open deliberation without permanent leadership. Instead of formal leaders, the assemblies appointed rotating spokespersons tasked with conveying collective decisions. The assemblies also sought to coordinate with other similar groups, forming confederated networks of local assemblies.

At this early stage, these practices functioned primarily as prefigurative politics—that is, attempts to enact the democratic forms participants wished to see in society at large. However, the trajectory of the Commercy group evolved when some participants decided to contest the municipal elections in March 2020. Their objective, to Dr. Van Outryve, was not to assume traditional representative authority but rather to institutionalize the direct democratic practices that had emerged during the movement. The electoral list they presented proposed to transfer effective political authority to a popular assembly open to the residents of the town. Elected officials would remain formally responsible for administrative tasks, but their mandate would be strictly tied to decisions made by the assembly.

This transition from prefigurative activism to institutional design marked a crucial stage in the movement’s development. During the electoral campaign, participants engaged in what Dr. Van Outryve described as a constituent process, drafting several foundational documents intended to define the institutional architecture of this proposed system. Among these were a local constitution and a commitment charter specifying the relationship between elected officials and the popular assembly. Through this process, participants confronted a series of classical questions in political theory, including the nature of sovereignty, the boundaries of political authority, and the mechanisms through which democratic decisions should be made and revised.

One of the central theoretical dilemmas addressed by the group concerned what Dr. Van Outryve referred to as the “constituent paradox.” This refers to the problem of how a political community decides on the procedures through which it will decide—in other words, how to “decide on how to decide.” Participants grappled with this issue by collectively debating the rules governing deliberation, participation, and decision-making within the assembly. These discussions extended to practical questions such as where assemblies should be held, how information should be shared with the broader population, and how to address the challenges of participation and self-selection among citizens.

The resulting proposals envisioned the assembly as the central locus of political power. The assembly would deliberate on municipal issues, organize specialized commissions, determine decision-making procedures, and supervise the actions of elected representatives. At the same time, participants were acutely aware of the potential risks associated with direct democracy, including the possibility that assemblies might adopt decisions that could be perceived as unjust or undesirable. This concern led to the development of self-limiting institutions designed to regulate the exercise of collective power.

Dr. Van Outryve highlighted this dimension as a particularly significant aspect of the experiment. Drawing inspiration from historical precedents in ancient Greek democracy—particularly the institution of graphe paranomon, which allowed citizens to challenge laws adopted by the assembly—participants devised mechanisms through which decisions could be reviewed. One such mechanism involved the creation of a Citizens’ Constitutional Council, whose members would be selected by lot. This body would examine whether decisions taken by the assembly were compatible with the principles articulated in the preamble of the local constitution. If a decision were found inconsistent with these principles, it would be returned to the assembly for reconsideration.

Importantly, the safeguards envisioned by participants were not intended to constrain democratic debate or impose ideological boundaries on the assembly. Rather, they reflected a commitment to what Dr. Van Outryve described as the democratization of dissensus. Participants explicitly rejected the idea that assemblies should strive for unanimity or suppress political disagreement. Instead, they emphasized that conflict and disagreement are inherent features of democratic politics and should be managed collectively by citizens rather than monopolized by party competition within representative institutions.

This perspective also shaped their understanding of political neutrality and partisanship. While the movement sought to remain non-partisan and unaffiliated with established political parties, this stance did not imply the absence of political conflict. On the contrary, participants insisted that assemblies must remain open spaces where diverse viewpoints could be expressed and debated. The aim was therefore not to eliminate disagreement but to create institutional conditions in which political conflict could be deliberated among citizens themselves.

Throughout the presentation, Dr. Van Outryve underscored that the Commercy experiment represented a broader attempt to rethink foundational concepts in democratic theory through lived political practice. Participants revisited questions concerning representation, deliberation, participation, and constitutional authority, seeking to rearticulate them within a framework centered on assemblies rather than elected representatives. In doing so, they attempted to move beyond a model of democracy based primarily on consent to authority toward one in which citizens collectively exercise political power.

In concluding, Dr. Van Outryve emphasized that the creation of democratic institutions enabling widespread participation cannot be designed solely by theorists or political elites. Echoing the reflections of Cornelius Castoriadis, she argued that the development of non-alienating forms of democracy must ultimately emerge from the collective creativity and practical experimentation of the people themselves. The Commercy assemblies thus illustrate how grassroots movements can contribute to democratic theory by demonstrating that citizens are capable not only of governing themselves but also of collectively determining the institutional frameworks through which self-government may be realized.

 

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez
Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is a Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez presented an ambitious and conceptually rich paper that examined democratization from a diplomatic perspective. Her presentation, “Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,”proposed that diplomacy should not be understood merely as a technical instrument of interstate relations, but as a normative and institutional domain deeply implicated in the realization—or denial—of democratic participation. In doing so, she shifted the discussion of democracy beyond domestic institutions and electoral representation toward the international arena, where questions of voice, visibility, recognition, and participation remain profoundly unequal.

The central argument of the presentation was that the exclusion of unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, minority communities, and non-sovereign political actors from meaningful diplomatic engagement constitutes a structural failure of democratic governance at both national and international levels. Drawing on critical and post-positivist approaches to diplomacy, Cancela Sánchez argued that diplomatic representation should be regarded as a foundational pillar of democracy rather than as an external or secondary concern. Her intervention therefore sought to expand the conceptual boundaries of democracy by foregrounding the institutions and practices through which political communities seek recognition, negotiate their futures, and participate in decisions that affect their lives.

The presentation opened with a reflection on the well-known phrase that begins the United Nations Charter: “We the Peoples of the United Nations.” This rhetorical commitment to peoples rather than merely states served as a point of departure for a critical inquiry into the actual functioning of multilateral diplomacy. Cancela Sánchez asked to what extent contemporary diplomatic institutions live up to this promise. While diplomacy has undoubtedly changed over recent decades—with broader issue agendas, the increasing involvement of multiple governmental and non-governmental actors, and expanding forums for participation—she emphasized that these developments have not eliminated the deep inequalities that shape access to diplomatic representation. Spaces of participation may have widened, but they remain uneven, contested, and structurally constrained.

A key contribution of the presentation lay in its conceptual discussion of diplomacy itself. Cancela Sánchez traced an evolution from classical, state-centric definitions toward broader and more socially embedded understandings. Traditional definitions present diplomacy as the conduct of business between states or as communication through official channels in a system of states. By contrast, post-positivist scholars have redefined diplomacy as a practice of representation structured through institutions and processes that manage relations among human beings more broadly. Particularly important for her argument was the idea that diplomats, like elected representatives, function as agents entrusted by principals. This analogy enabled her to draw a direct conceptual link between diplomatic representation and representative democracy.

On this basis, Cancela Sánchez explored the nexus between democracy and diplomacy. Although the two may pursue different immediate objectives—democracy oriented toward equality and freedom, diplomacy toward the peaceful advancement of interests—they nevertheless share important underlying principles, including participation, negotiation, representation, and cooperation. The question, then, is whether diplomacy can genuinely claim democratic legitimacy if it fails to reflect the full diversity of those in whose name it operates. Her answer was clearly negative: where entire peoples are denied meaningful access to diplomatic arenas, democracy is compromised at its foundations.

The presentation further argued that the absence of diplomatic representation has serious normative and legal consequences. Exclusion from diplomatic spaces silences communities in settings where decisions affecting their future are made. This, Cancela Sánchez suggested, compounds violations already recognized in international legal instruments concerning civil and political rights, Indigenous rights, labor rights, and participation. Such exclusions thus cannot be dismissed as procedural oversights; they represent systematic denials of political agency. In response, she drew on the recently developed concept of the right to diplomacy, which provides the normative framework for her analysis.

As presented by Cancela Sánchez, the right to diplomacy goes beyond mere presence or symbolic inclusion in international forums. It requires meaningful participation, including the right to be consulted, to negotiate, to provide free, prior, and informed consent, and to contribute to shaping the legal and institutional arrangements that govern one’s community. This framework challenges the hierarchical, state-centered organization of diplomacy by insisting that actors beyond sovereign states possess legitimate claims to diplomatic agency. Democratizing diplomacy, in this view, requires both normative and institutional transformation.

To illustrate the practical relevance of this argument, Cancela Sánchez examined the case of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991 to address the exclusion created by the formal requirement of recognized statehood for participation in international decision-making. UNPO, she argued, functions as an institutional workaround that enables unrepresented peoples and minority communities to engage international institutions, gain visibility, and mediate relationships with the broader international community. Yet it also reveals the limits of informal or substitute forms of representation when access to binding diplomatic power remains restricted.

Her first case study, Tibet, demonstrated the constraints of diplomatic action without sovereignty. The Tibetan government in exile has created institutional structures resembling a foreign ministry and established offices abroad to represent Tibetan interests. Tibetan representatives have engaged in negotiations and have, in some cases, received forms of ambassadorial recognition. Yet these interactions remain fundamentally precarious and unofficial. Governments may engage Tibet informally while avoiding formal recognition of its right to diplomatic participation. As Cancela Sánchez showed, Tibet’s diplomatic efforts therefore remain confined to the margins, illustrating the profound limitations imposed by the denial of formal standing.

The second case, East Timor, offered a contrasting example of what diplomatic representation can achieve when political space is opened. During the Indonesian occupation, East Timorese representatives used platforms such as UNPO to sustain international visibility, engage foreign governments and civil society, and keep humanitarian concerns on the global agenda. This sustained diplomatic representation contributed to the eventual conditions under which the East Timorese people could participate in a UN-supervised referendum in 1999. For Cancela Sánchez, East Timor demonstrated that diplomatic representation can make politically visible what would otherwise remain excluded from international negotiation and resolution.

The third case, the Chamorro people of Guam, revealed the paradoxes of disenfranchisement within a formal democratic order. Although Chamorro people are citizens of the United States, they lack full political representation within the institutions that govern them. At the same time, their appeals to international institutions regarding military expansion, decolonization, and cultural survival have encountered resistance. Through Guam, Cancela Sánchez underscored that diplomatic exclusion is not limited to non-state peoples external to democratic states; it can also affect communities formally located within them.

In conclusion, the presentation argued that exclusion from diplomatic spaces is a structural and democratic problem with far-reaching implications for self-determination, human rights, and cultural survival. While organizations such as UNPO provide valuable frameworks for advocacy and visibility, they cannot substitute for full diplomatic standing. Cancela Sánchez therefore called for a rethinking of both democracy and diplomacy, insisting that meaningful diplomatic participation should be recognized as a democratic right of all peoples. Her presentation made a compelling case that democratizing diplomacy is not peripheral to democratic theory but essential to any serious account of inclusive political representation in a deeply unequal international order.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Assoc. Prof. Christopher Magno

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University.

Serving as discussant for Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Associate Professor Christopher Magno offered a series of reflections and critical questions engaging with the three presentations delivered in the panel. His comments highlighted the conceptual contributions of the papers while situating them within broader debates on populism, democratic innovation, and diplomatic representation. Rather than offering extensive critique, Assoc. Prof. Magno focused on identifying key analytical insights and raising questions that could further develop the presenters’ arguments.

Assoc. Prof. Magno began with a brief summary of Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted that the paper addressed an important puzzle: how populism operates in a post-conflict society where politics is already structured around ethnic power-sharing arrangements. Unlike many studies of populism that focus on Western democracies and conceptualize populism primarily as a vertical conflict between “the people” and political elites, Bosnia presents a distinct configuration in which political competition is embedded within a tri-ethnic institutional framework. Assoc. Prof. Magno highlighted Dr. Hasanović’s typology of inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populism as a useful analytical framework for understanding these dynamics. In this context, populism does not appear as a singular political logic but as a multi-layered phenomenon shaped by ethnic competition between groups, political rivalry within groups, and occasional civic mobilization across ethnic boundaries.

Expanding on this point, Assoc. Prof. Magno emphasized that inter-ethnic populism remains the dominant form in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as political actors often frame politics as a struggle between ethnic communities. Political elites mobilize historical grievances, wartime memories, and narratives of collective threat in order to maintain political support. In contrast, intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities by challenging the authority of established leaders and accusing them of corruption or betrayal. Cross-ethnic populism, while comparatively weaker, attempts to articulate common socio-economic grievances—such as unemployment, corruption, and inequality—across ethnic divisions. However, Assoc. Prof. Magno observed that the institutional structure of the Bosnian political system continually redirects political competition back into ethnic categories, thereby constraining the development of broader civic mobilization.

Building on Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Assoc. Prof. Magno proposed an additional analogy drawn from contemporary digital politics. He suggested that similar dialectical dynamics of identity formation can be observed in online communities shaped by algorithmic sorting and psychographic profiling. Social media platforms often cluster users into identity-based networks that reinforce shared narratives and ideological affinities. Within these networks, horizontal conflicts between different online “tribes” mirror the dynamics of inter-group populism, while internal disputes between members and community leaders resemble intra-group populist tensions. Although presented as an illustrative parallel rather than a direct theoretical claim, this observation pointed toward possible connections between identity-driven populism and digitally mediated political environments.

Assoc. Prof. Magno then turned to Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve’s presentation on the institutionalization of popular assemblies emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. He framed the paper around a central question: whether grassroots democratic practices can be transformed into durable governing institutions. The case of the Commercy citizens’ assembly, he noted, represents an attempt not merely to protest representative democracy but to construct an alternative institutional model grounded in direct citizen participation. By drafting a local constitution and designing institutional mechanisms linking elected officials to the citizens’ assembly, participants effectively acted as a constituent power seeking to redefine how political authority should be exercised.

In discussing the analytical contribution of the paper, Assoc. Prof. Magno identified three central challenges associated with institutionalizing assembly-based democracy. The first concerns the boundaries of political participation—that is, who constitutes “the people” in such assemblies. While the Commercy model opened participation to all residents, voluntary participation raises questions about representativeness and the risk of self-selection bias. The second challenge relates to deliberative procedures. Assemblies initially served as spaces for expressing grievances but gradually evolved into arenas for collective deliberation in which preferences could be revised through discussion. Assoc. Prof. Magno connected this process to broader theories of deliberative democracy, including the idea of the public sphere as a space where citizens transform private concerns into collectively debated public issues. The third challenge involves the limits of power, particularly the tension between radical democratic experimentation and the existing institutional framework of representative government. Even when assemblies claim political authority, they must operate within established legal and electoral systems, raising questions about whether such initiatives can transform existing institutions or whether they will ultimately be absorbed by them.

Finally, Assoc. Prof. Magno briefly addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He highlighted the paper’s effort to rethink the relationship between diplomacy and democracy by questioning whether state diplomacy genuinely reflects the diverse populations it claims to represent. In democratic theory, diplomacy is often assumed to aggregate the will of a population through state representation. Yet in practice, Assoc. Prof. Magno noted, states frequently operate as strategic actors pursuing national interests rather than consultative representatives of internal constituencies. This tension, he suggested, creates a gap between a consultative model of diplomatic representation and a sovereignty-driven model in which governments act autonomously in international negotiations. The “right to diplomacy” framework discussed in the presentation seeks to address this gap by proposing that communities inadequately represented by states—including Indigenous peoples and non-self-governing territories—should gain more direct or mediated access to diplomatic platforms.

Across his remarks, Assoc. Prof. Magno concluded by posing several questions intended to stimulate further discussion among the presenters. These included whether populism might strengthen democratic participation under certain conditions, whether assembly democracy can realistically function as a governing system, and how diplomatic representation might be reimagined to better reflect the voices of marginalized communities. Through these interventions, his commentary framed the session as a broader exploration of how “the people” are constructed, represented, and institutionalized across different political arenas—from post-conflict societies and grassroots democratic movements to the structures of international diplomacy.

 

Feedback by Dr. Amedeo Varriale

Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism.

Serving as second discussant for Session 13, Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered thoughtful reflections on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His commentary emphasized the analytical contributions of the papers while situating them within broader comparative debates on populism, democratic experimentation, and diplomatic representation. Drawing on his own comparative research on political ideology and populism, Dr. Varriale focused particularly on the conceptual frameworks advanced by the presenters and their potential applicability beyond the specific cases examined.

Dr. Varriale began by addressing Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He commended the paper’s effort to conceptualize populism within the context of a post-Dayton political system characterized by externally imposed power-sharing institutions and deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. In his view, the principal strength of the work lies in its proposed typology distinguishing inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms. This categorization, he argued, provides a useful analytical framework for understanding how populist mobilization operates in Bosnia’s consociational political environment.

Beyond its immediate empirical application, Dr. Varriale emphasized the broader analytical value of the typology. He suggested that these categories possess considerable “travelability,” enabling scholars to apply them to different political contexts outside the Balkans. For example, he noted that dynamics resembling inter-ethnic populism can be observed in cases where political actors mobilize territorial or cultural divisions within a state. He pointed to early iterations of the Northern League in Italy as a case in which political mobilization drew upon regional divisions between northern and southern Italians while simultaneously employing anti-elitist rhetoric.

Similarly, the concept of intra-ethnic populism resonated, in his view, with developments associated with several left-wing populist movements across Europe. Parties such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, and Syriza in Greece have often framed their political discourse in terms of reclaiming democratic power from corrupt or detached elites and returning agency to ordinary citizens. In such cases, populist rhetoric may contribute to enhancing political participation by giving voice to constituencies that perceive themselves as excluded from established decision-making processes. Cross-ethnic populism, although less common, can also appear in transnational or supra-national initiatives that attempt to mobilize citizens across national boundaries, such as the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 associated with Yanis Varoufakis.

While praising the conceptual innovation of Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Dr. Varriale also raised a question regarding the relative weight of populism in certain Bosnian political parties. Specifically, he wondered whether some parties often categorized as populist might more accurately be understood primarily as ethno-nationalist formations that employ populist rhetoric instrumentally. Parties such as the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) may rely heavily on ethnonationalist narratives, with populism functioning as a secondary strategic component rather than the core ideological element. This observation, he suggested, may represent a fruitful avenue for further reflection within the broader theoretical framework proposed in the paper.

Turning to the presentation by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France, Dr. Varriale highlighted the paper’s relevance for understanding contemporary debates about democratic participation. At a time when representative democratic institutions are often perceived as increasingly detached from ordinary citizens, the case examined in the paper illustrates how grassroots movements attempt to operationalize alternative democratic forms at the local level.

Dr. Varriale emphasized that one of the principal contributions of the research lies in its detailed reconstruction of how direct democratic practices can be translated into institutional arrangements. While the concept of direct democracy is well known in theoretical discussions, empirical studies examining its practical implementation remain comparatively rare. In this respect, the paper’s analysis of the Citizens’ Assembly in Commercy provides valuable insights into the institutional design, deliberative processes, and practical challenges associated with such democratic experiments. In particular, he noted that the tensions described between the Citizens’ Assembly and the municipal council illustrate a long-standing theoretical dilemma: the coexistence—and often conflict—between radical forms of direct democracy and the institutional structures of representative liberal democracy.

Dr. Varriale also observed several parallels between the democratic practices described in the paper and developments associated with European left-wing populist movements. Mechanisms such as imperative mandates, the principle of one person–one vote, and participatory decision-making processes resemble organizational features adopted by parties such as Italy’s Five Star Movement. These parallels suggest that contemporary movements seeking to revitalize democratic participation frequently converge around similar institutional innovations, even when operating in distinct political contexts.

While commending the sophistication of the theoretical and methodological framework—particularly the extensive fieldwork underpinning the study— Dr. Varriale suggested that future research might further situate the case within the broader political context of France. Additional discussion of the political conditions that facilitated the emergence of the Yellow Vests movement, as well as the reactions of state institutions, could enrich the analysis. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the paper successfully demonstrates how social movements can function as laboratories for democratic experimentation.

Finally, Dr. Varriale addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He noted that the case studies presented—Tibet, Timor-Leste, and Guam—highlight different forms of political exclusion within the contemporary international order. The example of Guam, in particular, drew his attention as a striking illustration of democratic contradiction within an established democratic state. Despite holding US citizenship, residents of Guam lack voting representation in Congress and cannot participate in presidential elections, revealing a gap between democratic principles and constitutional structures.

Dr. Varriale observed that among the cases examined, Timor-Leste represents the most evident example of diplomatic success, as international engagement ultimately culminated in a referendum enabling self-determination. This outcome illustrates how diplomatic advocacy and international visibility can, under certain conditions, contribute to political transformation.

Concluding his remarks, Dr. Varriale reflected on the tension between sovereignty and democratic inclusion in international diplomacy. Sovereignty, he noted, provides a framework of order and legitimacy that structures diplomatic relations among states. Yet, at the same time, the formal authority associated with sovereignty may obscure the political voices of communities that lack recognized statehood. The challenge, therefore, lies in reconciling the stability provided by the sovereign state system with the normative imperative to expand political voice and representation within international decision-making processes.

 

Responses

Response by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez

In her brief response to the discussants’ remarks, Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez elaborated on several aspects of her research concerning diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy,” while clarifying the broader scope of her study beyond the case studies presented during the session.

Cancela Sánchez first addressed comments regarding the role of the UNPO. She emphasized that the examples discussed in her presentation represent only a small portion of the organization’s broader membership and historical trajectory. Over the years, UNPO has included communities with diverse political aspirations, ranging from groups seeking full statehood to those primarily concerned with securing recognition, representation, and voice in international decision-making processes. In some cases, UNPO has served as a platform through which political entities later achieved internationally recognized statehood. Estonia and Latvia, for example, were once members before eventually becoming sovereign states. These trajectories demonstrate that UNPO can function both as a diplomatic platform for stateless nations and as a transitional space within broader processes of political recognition.

At the same time, Cancela Sánchez stressed that not all members pursue independence. For many communities—such as the Chamorro people of Guam—the central objective is not statehood but meaningful political representation and the ability to articulate their interests in national and international arenas. Such cases illustrate the diversity of political claims that exist beyond the state-centered diplomatic order.

Responding further to methodological questions, Cancela Sánchez clarified that the “right to diplomacy” framework, developed by Costas Constantinou and Fiona McConnell in 2023, forms the conceptual foundation of her research. This framework builds on post-positivist and critical approaches to diplomacy, seeking to rethink diplomatic practice by emphasizing the representation of peoples rather than exclusively sovereign states. As she noted, the framework is still relatively recent, and ongoing research—including her own work—aims to contribute to its further theoretical and empirical development.

Finally, Cancela Sánchez briefly addressed the broader structural context of international diplomacy. Contemporary diplomatic institutions remain fundamentally state-centered, and even the limited mechanisms created to include non-state actors often impose significant barriers to meaningful participation. Forums such as ECOSOC consultative mechanisms, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and the UN Forum on Minority Issues provide important avenues for engagement, yet they remain uneven and insufficient to guarantee direct diplomatic representation for all affected communities. Her research therefore seeks to highlight these structural limitations while exploring pathways toward a more inclusive and representative diplomatic order.

 

Response by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve

In her response to the discussants’ remarks, Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve elaborated on several conceptual and practical issues raised during the discussion of her paper on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. Her reflections focused primarily on the questions of participation, institutional feasibility, and the democratic risks associated with direct forms of governance.

Addressing first the issue of participation, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that the legitimacy of an assembly-based democratic system fundamentally depends on sustained citizen involvement. If only a small number of participants attend assemblies, the democratic claim of such institutions would be weakened. However, she emphasized that participants in the Commercy experiment did not conceptualize participation merely in numerical terms or as a short-term challenge. Rather, they viewed it as a long-term political process. According to this perspective, meaningful participation becomes more likely when citizens perceive that their deliberations have real political consequences. In contrast, participatory initiatives that lack decision-making authority often experience declining engagement over time.

Dr. Van Outryve illustrated this dynamic by referring to the French Citizens’ Climate Convention, which demonstrated the capacity of ordinary citizens to deliberate effectively but ultimately saw several of its proposals set aside by the government. For activists in Commercy, such outcomes underscored the importance of granting assemblies genuine decision-making power. When citizens recognize that their contributions directly influence policy outcomes, the motivation to participate is expected to increase. Empirical experiences from nearby municipalities experimenting with similar institutional models suggest that high levels of engagement are possible. In one neighboring locality where participatory institutions were introduced, approximately half of the population attended assemblies, indicating that even non-activist residents may become involved when participatory mechanisms are institutionalized.

Dr. Van Outryve further explained that the solutions proposed by activists to address participation barriers emerged directly from their practical experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization. Recognizing the social constraints faced by working-class participants—such as irregular work schedules, family responsibilities, and limited free time—the movement explored various institutional adaptations. These included organizing multiple assemblies on the same topic at different times, creating mechanisms to synthesize and circulate deliberative arguments across meetings, and allowing citizens to vote either in person or through accessible channels. Additional measures such as childcare services, transportation assistance, and flexible meeting schedules were also considered to facilitate broader participation.

Another institutional mechanism designed to compensate for potential low attendance was the introduction of a local citizens’ referendum. Under this arrangement, if a specified portion of the electorate—approximately ten percent—challenged a decision adopted by the assembly, the issue could be referred to a broader vote. This mechanism aimed to ensure that decisions retained broader democratic legitimacy even when participation in assemblies fluctuated.

Turning to the broader question of whether assembly-based democracy could realistically function as a governing system, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that significant structural obstacles currently exist. Assemblies attempting to exercise political authority must operate within the framework of representative institutions that continue to dominate contemporary political systems. Nevertheless, she emphasized that the long-term strategy envisioned by participants extends beyond isolated municipal experiments. Inspired by traditions of communalist political theory, activists envisioned a network of self-governed municipalities confederated through delegated and recallable mandates. Such a configuration would create a form of dual power between existing state institutions and a confederation of locally governed communes.

Dr. Van Outryve also noted that similar governance structures have been attempted in other contexts, citing the example of the Kurdish political experiment in Rojava as an illustration of how assembly-based forms of governance can operate at larger territorial scales under particular historical conditions. However, she acknowledged that the pathways leading to such transformations differ significantly depending on political context.

Finally, responding to concerns about the potential risks associated with direct democracy—including the possibility of authoritarian or exclusionary outcomes—Dr. Van Outryve emphasized the central role that deliberation plays in the democratic vision articulated by participants in Commercy. For activists involved in the movement, collective deliberation is not simply a procedural step but a transformative political practice capable of reshaping citizens’ perspectives. Their experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization reinforced the belief that sustained dialogue among citizens can challenge entrenched political divisions and foster mutual understanding.

In this sense, the Commercy experiment reflects a broader conviction that democratic renewal may depend not only on institutional reform but also on the creation of participatory spaces in which citizens engage directly with one another in the ongoing process of collective self-government.

 

Response by Dr. Jasmin Hasanović

In his response to the discussants’ comments, Dr. Jasmin Hasanović elaborated on several conceptual aspects of his framework for analyzing populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Addressing questions raised by the discussants, he clarified both the theoretical foundations of his argument and the structural conditions that shape the forms of populism observed in the country’s post-conflict political order.

Dr. Hasanović began by reflecting on the broader question of whether populism inherently deepens political division. In his view, political division should not be regarded as an anomaly but rather as an intrinsic feature of political life. From this perspective, populism does not generate social antagonisms ex nihilo; rather, it operates as a political logic that articulates and organizes existing tensions within society. Drawing on a discursive approach inspired by Ernesto Laclau, Dr. Hasanović emphasized that populism links disparate grievances into a chain of equivalence through which a political subject—the people—is constructed in opposition to a perceived adversary.

Within the Bosnian context, however, the construction of “the people” has been profoundly shaped by the institutional architecture established after the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to Dr. Hasanović, the consociational power-sharing arrangement effectively replaced a civic conception of sovereignty with an ethnically structured system of political representation. Instead of the demos functioning as the primary bearer of sovereignty, political subjectivity has largely been organized around ethnically defined collectivities. In this sense, Bosnia and Herzegovina operates less as a conventional liberal democracy than as an ethnocratic system in which ethnic identity constitutes the central axis of political competition.

This institutional configuration helps explain why inter-ethnic populism remains more prominent than cross-ethnic forms of mobilization. Political actors frequently construct antagonistic narratives that position one ethnic community against others, thereby reinforcing horizontal divisions within society. Dr. Hasanović noted that such dynamics cannot be understood independently of the broader institutional and territorial arrangements established after the war. The country’s administrative divisions, including the highly autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, correspond largely to ethnically homogeneous territories that emerged through wartime processes of ethnic cleansing and displacement.

Furthermore, the logic of consociational democracy itself reinforces ethnic segmentation. As theorized by Arend Lijphart, such systems grant ethnic groups significant autonomy in matters considered central to their identity, including cultural, linguistic, and religious affairs. While intended as mechanisms of conflict management, these institutional arrangements also contribute to the entrenchment of ethnic political identities. Over time, the ethnic principle has extended beyond representation to shape broader patterns of social and political life, producing what Dr. Hasanović described as a deeply pillarized society.

Within this framework, Dr. Hasanović also addressed the question raised by discussants regarding the relationship between populism and ethnonationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather than treating populism as a fixed ideological label, he proposed understanding it as a political logic through which actors construct antagonistic boundaries. From this perspective, ethnonationalist parties may employ populist discourse when mobilizing their constituencies against perceived adversaries, even if ethnonationalism remains their primary ideological foundation.

Given these structural constraints, Dr. Hasanović suggested that the most realistic arena for democratic transformation may lie within intra-ethnic political competition. In the current institutional setting, political contestation largely unfolds within ethnically segmented party systems. Strengthening pluralism and ideological differentiation within these arenas could create conditions for more substantive democratic competition. Over time, the emergence of ideologically convergent actors across different ethnic constituencies might facilitate more cooperative forms of power-sharing and potentially open space for broader cross-ethnic political projects.

In this sense, Dr. Hasanović concluded that the reconstruction of “the people” as a democratic political subject remains a central challenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Expanding pluralism within existing political arenas may represent an incremental pathway through which more inclusive forms of democratic politics could eventually emerge.

 

Closing Remarks by Dr. Leila Alieva

Dr. Leila Alieva
Dr. Leila Alieva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA).

In her closing remarks, Dr. Leila Alieva reflected on the key themes and insights that emerged from the thirteenth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series. She expressed appreciation to the presenters, discussants, and audience for what she described as a rich and intellectually stimulating discussion that not only addressed important questions but also generated new avenues for inquiry.

Dr. Alieva emphasized that the presentations collectively highlighted populism as a broader political signal—an indicator of underlying tensions and contradictions within contemporary political systems. In this sense, populism can be understood as a symptom of institutional arrangements that increasingly lag behind evolving societal, political, and economic dynamics. The session’s contributions illustrated how such pressures often manifest through contested relationships between society, political actors, and institutional frameworks.

Reflecting on the individual presentations, Dr. Alieva noted how Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s analysis illuminated the enduring influence of institutional legacies in shaping the construction of “the people” within post-conflict political systems. Similarly, the work presented by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve shed light on tensions between different models of democracy, particularly the contrast between established representative institutions and emerging participatory practices through grassroots assemblies. These dynamics illustrated how societies may attempt to compensate for perceived institutional shortcomings by experimenting with alternative forms of democratic organization.

Dr. Alieva also highlighted the importance of the comparative perspective raised during the discussion. As noted by the discussants, examining cases across different regions—from Eastern and Western Europe to post-Soviet contexts—revealed both shared patterns and distinctive trajectories in the relationship between populism, democracy, and institutional change. Finally, she underscored the significance of Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez’s contribution, which addressed the often-overlooked question of representation and inclusion within diplomatic institutions. 

 

Conclusion

Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered an interdisciplinary exploration of how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political contexts. By examining cases that ranged from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict constitutional order to grassroots democratic experimentation in France and the diplomatic marginalization of stateless or underrepresented communities, the panel illuminated the multiple arenas in which the meaning of popular sovereignty is negotiated. Collectively, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is neither a stable nor a self-evident political category; rather, it is continuously shaped through institutional arrangements, political struggles, and discursive practices.

The discussions also revealed a shared analytical thread across the three papers: the recognition that contemporary democratic tensions often arise from mismatches between evolving social demands and the institutional frameworks designed to represent them. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing structures constrains the formation of broader civic political subjects. In the French case, grassroots assemblies reflect citizens’ attempts to reclaim agency in the face of perceived distance between representatives and the represented. In the international arena, the exclusion of unrepresented peoples from diplomatic participation exposes structural limitations within a state-centered global order that formally invokes “the peoples” while largely privileging sovereign states.

In sum, the session underscored that debates about populism, democratic participation, and representation cannot be confined to a single institutional domain. Instead, they span local, national, and international levels, revealing interconnected struggles over voice, legitimacy, and political inclusion. By bringing these diverse perspectives into dialogue, Session 13 contributed to a deeper understanding of the dynamic processes through which democratic subjects are formed and contested. In doing so, it reinforced the broader aim of the ECPS workshop series: to provide an interdisciplinary platform for critically examining the evolving meanings of democracy and “the people” in a rapidly changing political world.

Ice Hockey Women’s Team USA warms up before its preliminary round Group B match against Finland at the Milano Ice Park in Rho, Milan, during the 2026 Milano–Cortina Winter Olympics. The United States defeated Finland 5–0. Photo:  Walter Arce | Dreamstime.

March 8th: For Every Victory That Was Not Considered Important

In this reflective Voice of Youth (VoY) commentary for International Women’s Day, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how gender hierarchy persists not only through overt exclusion but through the subtle normalization of unequal recognition. Using the contrasting reactions to the US men’s and women’s hockey gold medals at the 2026 Winter Olympics, she argues that women’s athletic success is still too often treated as supplementary rather than self-evidently equal. The issue, she suggests, lies less in explicit insult than in the quiet cultural codes that frame male achievement as the default and female achievement as the exception. By focusing on laughter, tone, and seemingly minor acts of dismissal, Papapavlou offers a sharp critique of how misogyny survives in normalized everyday reactions, revealing the distance that still separates formal equality from genuine social recognition.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

At the 2026 Winter Olympic Games, the United States won two gold medals in hockey. One by the men’s team. One by the women’s team. Same sport, same flag on the chest, same summit. A few hours later, in a conversation with the President of the United States, it is announced that the men’s team will be invited to the White House to be honored for their victory. And in the flow of the conversation, comes the phrase, “we have to invite the women too.” The players burst into laughter. A spontaneous, collective, light laugh.

It was not an insult. It was not an attack. Nothing explicitly degrading or offensive was said. And yet, in those few seconds, something deeper was revealed. Because the women’s victory entered the sentence as a footnote. As a reminder. As something that “also” happened.

A gold medal has no gender. The flag is raised the same way, the anthem sounds the same, while on paper, in official statements, in medal tables, the two achievements are absolutely equal. And yet, in our collective reaction, they are not. The men’s category is considered the default version of sport. The women’s is the special category. The men’s is the prototype, while the women’s is treated as its variation.

And this was not born in that room. It did not begin with a joke. It is the product of a culture that has learned to treat male success as a given and female success as an exception. As something worthy of congratulations, but not of the same unquestioned recognition. As something that “it would be good to honor as well.”

We live in 2026 and sport remains deeply male-dominated. Not only in terms of funding and visibility, but in symbolism. The hero, the captain, the leader, the warrior. Think about it. The images that accompany these words are still male. When a woman wins, we often describe her journey as “inspiring,” her endurance as “moving,” her presence as a “role model.” When a man wins, we speak of dominance, power, greatness. One victory moves us. The other confirms expectations.

What is most troubling, however, is not the difference in adjectives. It is that the laughter caused no discomfort. There was no pause. No split second of silence suggesting something was off. It felt natural. And that sense of naturalness is the problem. So why did it feel so natural in the first place?

Misogynistic mentality today rarely appears through shouting. It does not openly declare that “women are worth less.” It shows up in subtle tones. In inflections. In glances. In “jokes” that pass unnoticed. In the familiar “come on, don’t take it so seriously.” In an invitation framed like an obligation. In an achievement treated as an addition rather than as an unquestioned equal.

These small things, which seem insignificant, are what sustain the larger structure. As with every form of gender inequality, the root does not lie only in extreme incidents. It lies in what we have learned to consider normal. In the fact that unequal treatment no longer surprises us. In the fact that it does not bother us enough to react. In the fact that we laugh too or remain silent.

That is how hierarchy is built without ever naming it. Through small concessions. Through subtle diminishments. Through a society that speaks of equality on paper, yet in practice continues to place the male experience at the center and the female one at the margins. If the medal is equal, why isn’t the reaction?

And today, on International Women’s Day, we will once again speak about rights, achievements, and struggles that were fought to get us here. We will honor the women who fought to stand on fields that did not want them, in competitions that did not count them, in societies that preferred them silent. For every woman who spent countless hours training, who endured doubt, mockery, less funding, less coverage, less recognition. For every woman who reached the top knowing that even there she would have to prove her worth all over again, only for the very country she represented to remind her, the next day, with a laugh, that her effort and her victory were not quite as important.

This is not about oversensitivity. It is not about “political correctness.” It is about value. If a woman’s success requires a reminder in order to be acknowledged, then it is not considered self-evident. If inclusion provokes laughter, then equality has not taken root. It has merely been legislated.

So the question is not whether someone had bad intentions. The question is why diminishment fits so easily inside a joke. Why the idea that “we have to invite the women too” sounds like an add-on rather than an obvious part of the sentence. Why, even today, female success requires clarification.

Perhaps because our sense of normal has not changed as much as we think. Perhaps because the equality we proclaim has not yet moved from law into consciousness. And until it does, we will continue to encounter misogyny not only in the loud and blatant moments, but in the small, smiling ones.

The issue is not to stop laughing. The issue is to start asking ourselves what exactly we find funny.


(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Dr. Amir Ahmad iArian.

Dr. Arian: Neither Foreign Powers nor Clerical Elites Represent the Iranian People

In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian offers a penetrating account of Iran at a moment of war, repression, and political uncertainty. As the Israel/US–Iran conflict deepens and succession struggles intensify in Tehran, he argues that the central issue is the systematic erasure of Iranian popular agency. For Dr. Arian, the Islamic Republic has evolved from an ideological revolutionary order into an increasingly militarized system—“basically a killing machine”—while external intervention risks further marginalizing the people in whose name it claims to act. Moving from everyday micropower and censorship to the IRGC’s rise, social humiliation, and the politics of war, he underscores a stark reality: neither foreign powers nor clerical elites genuinely represent the Iranian people.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian—Iranian American writer and journalist, and Assistant Professor of Creative Writing at Binghamton University—offers a powerful and deeply textured analysis of Iran’s current condition at a moment of extraordinary peril. As the Israel/US–Iran war expands into a broader regional conflict marked by bombardment, civilian displacement, and intensifying regime-change rhetoric, Dr. Arian cautions against narratives that erase the agency of the Iranian people themselves. In a context where President Donald Trump has demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” openly declared an interest in shaping the country’s postwar leadership, and where succession debates have reportedly intensified following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Dr. Arian’s central warning is stark: “neither of them has anything to do with the Iranian people.”

That insistence on popular agency—and on its systematic denial—runs through the interview as a whole. For Dr. Arian, Iran’s predicament cannot be reduced either to foreign pressure alone or to a simplistic image of “clerical rule.” Rather, he describes a political system that has evolved over 47 years from an ideological revolutionary order into something far more militarized, coercive, and socially corrosive. What began with “a very strong ideological core, surrounded by a security apparatus,” he argues, has gradually become “less and less ideological and more and more militarized.” In his starkest formulation, the regime today is “basically a killing machine,” one whose relationship to society has been reduced to a binary of “friend and enemy.”

Yet Dr. Arian’s account is not confined to the spectacular violence of war and mass repression. One of the interview’s greatest strengths lies in its insistence that authoritarian domination in Iran is reproduced through everyday practices, cultural control, and administrative routines. Recalling his own childhood and youth, he explains that in the 1980s and 1990s one “felt the presence of the state almost on your skin.” From school rituals and anti-American iconography to compulsory hijab and the disciplining of bodies, the regime exercised what he calls a “very Foucauldian kind of presence of power in daily life.” The same logic extended into literature and language: censorship, exile, and the weakening of Persian literary culture did not merely restrict expression but also narrowed the horizons of political imagination itself.

At the same time, Dr. Arian foregrounds the uneven social distribution of repression. The Islamic Republic, he notes, presents itself internationally as a defender of “the poor, the wretched of the earth, the underdog,” yet “nobody has suffered at its hands more than the poor.” Women, Baha’is, workers, and peripheral communities have borne disproportionate burdens of exclusion, persecution, and violence. 

Against this backdrop, his analysis of the current war is especially sobering. If military intervention deepens, he warns, “the will of the people becomes the last thing that counts.” The core question, then, is not simply whether the regime survives, but whether Iranians themselves can recover political agency from both authoritarian rulers and external powers claiming to act in their name.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Assistant Professor Amir Ahmed Arian, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian.

Dr. Arian: Neither Foreign Powers nor Clerical Elites Represent the Iranian People

In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian offers a penetrating account of Iran at a moment of war, repression, and political uncertainty. As the Israel/US–Iran conflict deepens and succession struggles intensify in Tehran, he argues that the central issue is the systematic erasure of Iranian popular agency. For Dr. Arian, the Islamic Republic has evolved from an ideological revolutionary order into an increasingly militarized system—“basically a killing machine”—while external intervention risks further marginalizing the people in whose name it claims to act. Moving from everyday micropower and censorship to the IRGC’s rise, social humiliation, and the politics of war, he underscores a stark reality: neither foreign powers nor clerical elites genuinely represent the Iranian people.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian—Iranian American writer and journalist, and Assistant Professor of Creative Writing at Binghamton University—offers a powerful and deeply textured analysis of Iran’s current condition at a moment of extraordinary peril. As the Israel/US–Iran war expands into a broader regional conflict marked by bombardment, civilian displacement, and intensifying regime-change rhetoric, Dr. Arian cautions against narratives that erase the agency of the Iranian people themselves. In a context where President Donald Trump has demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” openly declared an interest in shaping the country’s postwar leadership, and where succession debates have reportedly intensified following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Dr. Arian’s central warning is stark: “neither of them has anything to do with the Iranian people.”

That insistence on popular agency—and on its systematic denial—runs through the interview as a whole. For Dr. Arian, Iran’s predicament cannot be reduced either to foreign pressure alone or to a simplistic image of “clerical rule.” Rather, he describes a political system that has evolved over 47 years from an ideological revolutionary order into something far more militarized, coercive, and socially corrosive. What began with “a very strong ideological core, surrounded by a security apparatus,” he argues, has gradually become “less and less ideological and more and more militarized.” In his starkest formulation, the regime today is “basically a killing machine,” one whose relationship to society has been reduced to a binary of “friend and enemy.”

Yet Dr. Arian’s account is not confined to the spectacular violence of war and mass repression. One of the interview’s greatest strengths lies in its insistence that authoritarian domination in Iran is reproduced through everyday practices, cultural control, and administrative routines. Recalling his own childhood and youth, he explains that in the 1980s and 1990s one “felt the presence of the state almost on your skin.” From school rituals and anti-American iconography to compulsory hijab and the disciplining of bodies, the regime exercised what he calls a “very Foucauldian kind of presence of power in daily life.” The same logic extended into literature and language: censorship, exile, and the weakening of Persian literary culture did not merely restrict expression but also narrowed the horizons of political imagination itself.

At the same time, Dr. Arian foregrounds the uneven social distribution of repression. The Islamic Republic, he notes, presents itself internationally as a defender of “the poor, the wretched of the earth, the underdog,” yet “nobody has suffered at its hands more than the poor.” Women, Baha’is, workers, and peripheral communities have borne disproportionate burdens of exclusion, persecution, and violence. 

Against this backdrop, his analysis of the current war is especially sobering. If military intervention deepens, he warns, “the will of the people becomes the last thing that counts.” The core question, then, is not simply whether the regime survives, but whether Iranians themselves can recover political agency from both authoritarian rulers and external powers claiming to act in their name.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Assistant Professor Amir Ahmed Arian, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Iran Regime’s Presence Felt Omnipresent

Billboard depicting Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei and Imam Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini on a building wall in Tehran, Iran, April 2018. The portraits honor the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini (Supreme Leader 1979–1989), and his successor Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader 1989–2026), whose images frequently appear in public spaces as symbols of the regime’s ideological authority. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Amir Ahmed Arian, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Having grown up and begun your literary career inside Iran, how would you describe the everyday texture of life under Iran’s clerical-authoritarian system? At the level of routines—schooling, workplaces, gender norms, religion, and bureaucracy—how do these micro-practices reproduce obedience, negotiation, or subtle forms of resistance?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: In Iran, one caveat I have to give at the beginning—which will apply to all my answers—is that when we talk about the Islamic Republic, we are talking about 47 years of rule by this political system, and it has evolved and changed a lot over time. So, the practices that you mentioned—the way they were conducted in the 1980s and the 1990s—are very different from those in 2000 or 2010. The rulers have changed a lot as well. Depending on who the president was, society changed dramatically. And even more importantly, Iranian society itself sheds its skin very quickly, generation after generation.

What you see among young people now—this generation—has very little to do with my generation. People who were born around the time of the revolution are now middle-aged, and the twenty-somethings today do not really listen to us or care much about what we think. So, what I am saying is mainly founded on my own personal experience growing up there. I left Iran in 2011, and over the last fifteen years the country has changed quite dramatically. So, what I say is less a comprehensive analysis of what is going on in Iran and more an account based on my own personal experience.

To answer your question, growing up in Iran in the 1980s and the 1990s, you really did feel the presence of the state, because that was the strictest period after the revolution. After the reformist movement in the late 1990s, things began to open up. But in those first two decades, you felt the presence of the state almost on your skin.

It was overwhelming and omnipresent all the time. To give you one example, the way they tried to inculcate their foreign policy in the mind of a child was that throughout my education—during elementary school, high school, and later in college, when I attended the University of Tehran—there were massive flags of the US and Israel painted on the ground in front of the gates of all those institutions.

So, when you walked into the school or through the university gate, you could not even enter without stepping on them. Imagine doing that for twelve years in school and then five years in college—almost every day. Not just me, but millions of children across the country stepped on the US and Israeli flags in order to enter school. Just imagine what that does to your unconscious mind—how it shapes the way you see the world unwittingly, beyond what you consciously know or learn.

For women especially, there was another, much more aggressive layer, which was the compulsory hijab. This started in elementary school. Six-year-old girls had to wear uniforms and maghnaeh, these tight scarves, and they had to keep them on throughout the day. Of course, in public spaces there was also a very strict dress code for women. Women could not appear in the street without complying with it. I do not think anything embodies the aggressive presence of the state in all aspects of daily life as clearly as the compulsory hijab.

These are just two small examples.

The way the system worked was that, instead of relying only on a top-down system of propaganda, there was also the presence of micropower spread throughout society. These mechanisms were designed to strictly control bodies and constantly remind you that the state is here, and the state is watching you. So, it was a very Foucauldian kind of presence of power in daily life.

Iran’s System Is Not Just Clerical Rule—It Is a Militarized Security State

Analysts often reduce Iran’s system to “clerical rule,” yet your work suggests a far more complex configuration of institutions. How should we conceptualize the Iranian regime today—as a theocratic regime, a bureaucratic-security state, or a hybrid authoritarian system combining ideology, patronage networks, and coercive institutions?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: It’s basically all of the above. From the beginning of the revolution, the system has had a very strong ideological core, surrounded by a security apparatus. And you have the Revolutionary Guards, which constitute a very complicated and vast network of people. Within it, there are individuals who are completely cynical and technocratic, or those who are there to run their own businesses through military means, as well as truly apocalyptic warriors who want to bring about Armageddon and believe they are involved in some sort of end-of-the-world battle.

In between, you have all kinds of government bureaucracies and institutions that try to find a foothold in this network.

But the point is that, as time has gone on—from the beginning of the revolution to now, over these 47 years—the Iranian government has become less and less ideological and more and more militarized. So right now, more than anything, it resembles something like a European fascist regime in the 1930s and 1940s, one that was completely reduced to security forces. It is basically a killing machine. And the last moment when we saw that very clearly was this January.

On January 8 and 9, they opened fire with live ammunition on unarmed protesters all over the country and killed at least 8,000 people. I know that number is very contested, but at this point we have 8,000 names identified without a shadow of doubt. The organization that documented this is also working on verifying 11,000 more names. Many of them are already partially verified, but the process of full verification is ongoing. So even if half of that is true, we are looking at a five-digit death toll in basically 36 hours, which would make it the bloodiest massacre a state has committed against its own population in modern history.

That alone should make it very clear that the ideological façade and the bureaucratic elements are collapsing. The ideological façade is gone, because what they did then cannot be justified by any religious doctrine—or, frankly, by any ideological doctrine other than some form of fascism, perhaps something like Shia fascism. And the bureaucratic veneer is also very thin now; I would even argue that it has largely disappeared. Because no reasonable governing entity—whether a state or any other governing body—would do that simply to control society. You only do that when you see your own people as the enemy. There is really no other explanation.

So right now, the system has been reduced to a very hardcore security corps composed of armed elements of the Basij, the Revolutionary Guards, and parts of the police. And their relationship with the Iranian people is essentially one of friend and enemy. You are either in their camp, or you are not. And if you are not, they are out there to eliminate you. They do not really want you to exist anymore. So, of all the political systems that have existed, from what little I know of European history, they remind me of Franco’s regime in Spain—something that functions in a very similar way or resembles certain forms of 20th-century fascism.

The Revolutionary Guards Have Become a Military–Political–Economic Juggernaut

Platoon of Iranian army soldiers carrying the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the international military competition ARMY-2018 in Pesochnoye, Kostroma Region, Russia, June 2018. Photo: Dreamstime.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps occupies a central position in Iran’s political and economic life. Should the IRGC be understood primarily as a military institution, a security apparatus, a sprawling economic conglomerate, or even a ruling class? What does its economic embeddedness mean for reform, regime durability, or potential transition?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: So again, that’s another case with the IRGC, or the Sepah. It started off as a military organization at the beginning of the revolution, mainly to help the official army during the Iran–Iraq War. It was almost exclusively military in the beginning. Then, as time went on, it started consolidating power, accruing more and more influence through the decades. This became especially evident during the reformist movement, because the commanders of the IRGC were opposed to Khatami and the reformists in power, as well as to the political elite that came to power in the late 1990s. After that, they decided to become increasingly involved in politics.

Another turning point came later with the economic sanctions imposed after the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Following these disputes, Western countries began imposing some of the harshest sanctions in the world on Iran. As we know, such conditions often become a recipe for corruption. In my view, these sanctions cast something like a net over Iran’s economy. They disrupted the natural flow of exports and imports, especially oil exports. However, there was a significant hole in this net: Iran’s access to China. China was simply too powerful to fully comply with the sanctions and follow the United States’ lead, so it continued to purchase oil from Iran. Because China has an enormous and constant appetite for energy, Iran could sell oil to it below market price and still sell large volumes. As a result, even under very harsh sanctions, Iran was still able to generate a considerable amount of revenue through oil sales to China.

The problem, however, was that this revenue flowed through only one channel: the Revolutionary Guards. As a result, large segments of the economy gradually became concentrated in their hands, which almost inevitably led to corruption. Over time, within the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards, you can see an oligarchy beginning to take shape. And not just within the Revolutionary Guards—the broader political elite, especially their children and relatives, also joined this oligarchic network. Perhaps a few thousand people became involved in the export and import of oil with very little accountability. As a result, they began making themselves extremely rich, often at the expense of the well-being of ordinary Iranians and their daily lives.

At that point—perhaps by the mid-2010s—you could see that the Revolutionary Guards, which had started as a military organization and later evolved into a military–political organization, were becoming a military–political–economic juggernaut. It became something like an octopus, with tentacles reaching into almost every aspect of Iranian society, and that has continued to be the case until now.

Humiliation Is One of the Main Engines of Protest in Iran

Your writings frequently evoke emotions such as humiliation, anger, fear, and exhaustion. How do these affective dimensions shape political mobilization in Iran? In particular, how do humiliation and generational frustration interact with social fatigue to influence the timing and intensity of protest movements?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think humiliation is really key, especially if you watch the state media in Iran. It is a relentless and non-stop process of insulting your intelligence through the way propaganda is produced. It is really as absurd as looking at the sky in broad daylight while the TV tells you that it is nighttime. And they say it very aggressively, with zero respect for the intelligence and dignity of their audience.

Iranians are very well aware of the source of their problems. They know that the main source of their misery is their rulers, the Islamic Republic. Yes, sanctions have contributed heavily. The hostility from Israel, all the stories about the nuclear program—some exaggerated, some fabricated—and the accusations coming from a state that possesses far more nuclear weapons than Iran will ever have all contain a degree of hypocrisy. Iranians recognize that. But when you look at the political landscape of Iran, it is very clear to everyone that most of what we have gone through is the responsibility of the Islamic Republic. And the rulers know that too. It is not a secret to them.

But for 47 years, you look at their behavior and see that they have not taken a single step toward the people of Iran. Not one. They have never shown any willingness to make concessions to civil society or to protesters in the streets. They have never demonstrated any real interest in listening to them. Every time people have come out to protest, the regime initially responded with batons, and as protests intensified, with bullets. And we saw just last month what a wholesale massacre was essentially.

Even today, they continue to deny most of their responsibility for the absolute disaster they have inflicted on Iranian lives. So, when you look at this while living inside Iran, you see a government responsible for the immiseration of multiple generations yet unwilling to take even a shred of responsibility for what it has done. They have shown no willingness to change course.

This is the frustration, the rage, and the humiliation that it instills. And it can very easily boil over and drive people into the streets.

Iranians know how brutal their rulers are, how willing the regime is to kill them, and yet protests continue. In fact, you have rarely seen street protests as frequently anywhere in the world as in Iran over the past 10 or 15 years. Every couple of years there is a major wave of mass protest—whether over economic conditions, the compulsory hijab, or other issues.

Each time, people know they will be met with extreme violence, with bullets and batons. Every time they go out into the streets, they know they may never return home. Yet they still do it, because the sense of humiliation and frustration runs so deep that, in their minds, risking death can feel worthwhile simply to express it publicly.

Iranian woman standing in middle of Iranian protests for equal rights for women. Burning headscarves in protest against the government. Illustration: Digital Asset Art.

Women, Minorities, and the Poor Bear the Heaviest Burdens of Repression

For those who challenge the regime—writers, activists, workers, or ordinary protesters—what does the spectrum of repression look like in practice? How are risks such as censorship, economic exclusion, detention, torture, or exile distributed across class, gender, ethnicity, and geography?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: Probably the biggest irony of the Islamic Republic is that its outward presence to the world—its public face—and unfortunately many in the West buy into that, especially people on the left, is that it presents itself as standing up for the poor, for the wretched of the earth, for the underdog, for the downtrodden, and so on. So, it defines itself as one of the few states in the world that stands with the underdog. But when you go inside Iran, nobody has suffered at its hands more than the poor, working people, and those who do not have the means to make ends meet.

And this has been the case for decades, at least since the 1990s. You could argue that in the 1980s the regime implemented some policies aimed at creating a degree of economic equality. But definitely since the 1990s, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, it has essentially operated as an economic system that consistently favors the rich while suppressing the poor. It has only worsened over time, and as I mentioned earlier, the sanctions have also contributed to this dynamic.

So if you are poor—and there is a reason why in more recent demonstrations and protests you see more working people and poor citizens from the margins of society, from smaller towns near the borders where poverty is particularly severe—those are often the people who take to the streets and risk their lives more than people in the major cities. That was not the case back in 2009 during the Green Movement.

Then, of course, there are religious minorities, especially the Baha’is. It is actually a principle of their religion not to engage in political activism, so they have never posed any significant threat to the political order in Iran. Yet, because of the dogmatism and fanaticism of the Shia clerics in power, that community has been persecuted more savagely than almost any other group.

So, you have the persecution of the poor through economic means, the persecution of the Baha’is for religious reasons, and of course the situation of women, who have effectively been treated as second-class citizens since the beginning of the revolution. They have been fighting for very basic rights for a very long time. And just three years ago, during the Women, Life, Freedom movement, they finally managed to force the state to abandon the enforcement of compulsory hijab—though at enormous cost—after months of civil protests across the country.

So, this is also a form of gender apartheid. You have extreme economic discrimination against the poor, religious discrimination against minorities, and what amounts to a flat-out system of gender apartheid from which women have suffered enormously over the last half century.

Iran Regime Is Not a Well-Oiled Machine, It Is Corroded by Corruption

You have often suggested that repression in Iran operates through mundane institutional routines rather than overt ideological fanaticism. To what extent does this resemble Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil,” where ordinary bureaucratic practices normalize authoritarian violence?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think there is an important difference there. In Arendt’s articulation of the banality of evil, it emerges from a bureaucratic machine that actually functions extremely well. You have a system whose cogs rotate together very efficiently. The Nazi extermination process was, in that sense, a highly organized and well-oiled machine. Every officer was a small cog within that machine, carrying out their assigned tasks without really reflecting on the consequences of what they were doing.

In the case of Iran, however, what you see is incompetence—sheer incompetence. Part of the problem is that the state has essentially collapsed, and its bureaucratic institutions are no longer functioning properly. There is so much corruption, so much nepotism, and so much discrimination based on factors such as religious beliefs, social background, or political loyalty—especially when it comes to employment in government institutions, even in very basic administrative matters.

Over time, this has corroded the system of governance to such an extent that it simply no longer works effectively. Even very simple things—like renewing a driver’s license or dealing with routine banking procedures—can become extremely frustrating experiences when you live inside Iran.

So, the way government authority grates on people’s nerves stems less from a highly efficient bureaucratic machine and more from pervasive incompetence and corruption, rather than from a system operating smoothly but devoid of moral reflection.

No One Has Damaged Persian Literature More Than the Islamic Republic

Drawing on your own experience with literary censorship, how does the state’s control over cultural production shape not only what can be said publicly but also what can be imagined politically? In other words, how does censorship function as a technology of power over narrative and collective imagination?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: There is another irony here. The state in Iran has always prided itself on having a kind of nationalist element. They made a great deal out of independence when you go back to the beginning of the revolution. The main slogan was “Independence, freedom, the Islamic Republic.” So, independence came first. There was always a kind of Islamic nationalism embedded within the discourse. And the Persian language was always part of that. Especially Mr. Khamenei, the supreme leader who was recently killed—he was very much into Persian poetry. He was a very skilled orator, a very good speaker, and he knew Persian very well. They were enamored with Persian literature and the history of Persian poetry, and so on. Yet no one has damaged the Persian language or launched such a profound assault on Persian literature as the Islamic Republic has through censorship.

I am just one example. Until I was 30 years old, I was a writer in Iran. I published a number of books and many articles, and I loved writing in my mother tongue. But they basically forced me out of Iran. At some point after the Green Movement, it became impossible to continue living there. So, I had to move out of Iran—first to Australia and then to the United States—and I had to switch to writing in English.

I am just one small example. I could have contributed to that language and to that literary culture. I could have added something to it. I was doing well there as a writer. But over extremely small and trivial issues, the censorship office started banning my books, and they effectively took away my job as a newspaper writer. So, I had to leave. And I am just one example among thousands of writers like me who loved that language and that culture and were more than willing to contribute to it and devote their lives to it. But the state did not want us around.

Through censorship, what has happened is an extreme weakening of the Persian language itself. When you talk about political imagination, language is crucial. When a language is battered for so long—when it has been depleted of its resources through censorship for half a century—it inevitably loses many of its tools. Its toolbox becomes depleted.

Some of those tools have started to return since the emergence of the internet, but it is very different to have a formal written culture in a society than to have a writing culture mainly on social media. These are two very different phenomena.

What the state has done is to erode the abilities and capabilities of the Persian language, which historically has been a very strong force in maintaining the fabric of Iranian society. Through that erosion, they have negatively affected not only Iranian culture and literature but also the broader cohesion of Iranian society as a whole.

Military Intervention Often Pushes the Will of the People to the Margins

Large poster of Mahsa Amini displayed by the Iranian Diaspora Collective in the Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan, New York City, November 23, 2022. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph / Dreamstime.

In the context of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the US–Israel alliance, how might external military pressure reshape internal political dynamics? Historically, do wars weaken authoritarian regimes by exposing their fragility, or strengthen them by mobilizing nationalism and securitizing dissent?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: It is very hard to say now. We are right in the middle of the war, and it is very unclear how it will turn out—at least it is unclear to me. Right now, there are so many contradictory accounts and reports about who has the upper hand, whose military is in a weaker position, who is running out of ammunition, and who is running out of defensive shields, and so on. So, it is very difficult to draw conclusions at this point.

But at the end of the day, we have many examples of military intervention, especially in Middle Eastern countries, and none of them have ended well. The way events are unfolding now can already be seen in the recent quarrel over the selection of the next Supreme Leader.

The Assembly—the council of elders, as it is sometimes called in Iran—consists of the people who choose the next leader. There are about 80 very old clerics, all men and all clerics. They are very old and do not represent Iranian society in any meaningful way. In fact, they are about as far removed from Iranian society as possible, yet they are tasked with choosing the next leader. So, whoever they choose will have nothing to do with the Iranian people. It does not matter who it is; it is simply not a democratic process.

On the other hand, you have Donald Trump, who just yesterday said that he wants to have a say in choosing the next Supreme Leader of Iran. He almost sounded as if he meant it, so I will take him at his word. He said something like, “I need to be there when they choose the next Supreme Leader. I want to have a say.”

So, you see two entities talking about selecting the Supreme Leader—the highest political position in Iran—and neither of them has anything to do with the Iranian people. This is often what happens in the aftermath of military intervention. The will of the people becomes the last thing that counts. The agency of the Iranian population is already pushed aside, unless, after this war, they somehow manage to reclaim it.

A Political Vacuum Could Activate Long-Dormant Ethnic Fault Lines

One of the most catastrophic scenarios involves state fragmentation, separatist mobilization, and armed conflict across border regions. Given Iran’s complex ethnic landscape—including Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, Azeris, etc.—how real is the risk of civil conflict if state authority weakens, and what might a pluralistic settlement look like in such conditions?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: That’s another thing I can’t really say. I have no idea how that will turn out. Iran is a little different from other Middle Eastern countries that have this sort of ethnic tension, in that it has existed within roughly the same borders for about 400 years now. I mean, it has lost some territories over time, but since the Safavid era in the 17th century, Iran has largely remained the same territorial entity that it is today. It is smaller than it was back then, but the core of the country has remained intact.

In this area, all of the ethnic minorities you mentioned have been living together fairly peacefully for hundreds of years. So, Iran is not a colonial construction in the same way that Syria or Iraq are. Because of that, there is more cohesion and a greater possibility of coexistence. Civil war and ethnic conflict are probably less likely in Iran than people sometimes assume, given the long history of these communities living together for many centuries.

But when you have a political vacuum at the center, combined with a deep accumulation of discontent and rage toward the central government, anything can happen. When you bring down a sledgehammer on a society—or a double-stage sledgehammer, both from the government and from a foreign invader—you activate all these fault lines that may have been dormant for centuries, perhaps even millennia. Those fault lines can then produce tremors and earthquakes here and there. How destructive they might become is anyone’s guess. But they could potentially end up destroying this political entity that has existed for many centuries.

When Soldiers Defect, the End of the Regime May Be Near

Lastly, Professor Arian, looking ahead over the next months, what early-warning indicators should observers watch—elite defections, labor strikes, inflation thresholds, prison dynamics, clerical positioning, IRGC cohesion, or international mediation—to determine which trajectory Iran is moving toward? And do you see the emergence of a “fifth scenario,” a hybrid outcome that analysts currently underestimate?

Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think defection, definitely. Defection—and also what you mentioned about IRGC cohesion, which is kind of synonymous with defection. As I said before, the government in Iran has been reduced to a security force. Right now, more than anything, it is essentially a military entity that is fighting both its own people and the United States and Israel. So, labor strikes are a fantasy at this point. Under bombs, no one can organize a labor strike.

And what the clerics say or think really does not matter anymore. In this situation, you always have to look at the armed forces—the people in uniform. If you see any form of substantial defection in their ranks, both in terms of rank and numbers—meaning defections among high-ranking officers as well as a significant number of personnel—then I think that would be the strongest indication that regime collapse is imminent. But as long as you do not see that, other scenarios should still be considered. I think defection is the key sign we should be looking for.

Kazi Huda

Assoc. Prof. Huda: Bangladesh’s Democratic Future Depends on How Political Parties Exercise Power

In this interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda offers a nuanced assessment of Bangladesh’s post-2026 political transition. Reflecting on the first general election after the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina, he argues that a landslide electoral mandate alone cannot resolve the country’s democratic deficit. What matters, he emphasizes, is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.” Dr. Huda warns that preventing a “reverse norm cascade” depends less on electoral formalities than on how political actors behave in power—especially the ruling party. Stressing trust, institutional restraint, and freedom of criticism, he argues that Bangladesh’s democratic future will hinge on whether political parties govern responsibly, inclusively, and within genuinely pluralist constitutional limits.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Bangladesh’s February 2026 general election marked the country’s first national vote since the Gen Z-led uprising of August 2024 that toppled Sheikh Hasina after fifteen years in power. That uprising, which followed a violent crackdown on protesters that reportedly left around 1,400 people dead, was widely interpreted as a decisive rupture with one of South Asia’s most entrenched hybrid regimes. The election that followed was therefore more than a routine transfer of power: it was a test of whether Bangladesh could move from revolutionary mobilization to institutional politics. With turnout approaching 60 percent and many voters describing the experience as an opportunity to cast ballots “without fear,” the election appeared to signal at least a partial reopening of democratic space.

Yet, as Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda from the University of Dhaka makes clear in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), electoral change alone does not resolve the deeper crisis of democratic legitimacy. While the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returned to power with a commanding parliamentary majority and the Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance emerged as the principal opposition, Assoc. Prof. Huda cautions against equating electoral victory with democratic repair. “A landslide victory helps, but it is not everything,” he argues, insisting that such a result “does not by itself wash away the democratic deficit.” For Assoc. Prof. Huda, what ultimately matters is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.”

This emphasis on institutional and relational legitimacy is central to the interview’s broader argument and directly underpins its headline claim: Bangladesh’s democratic future depends less on who wins power than on how power is exercised. In Assoc. Prof. Huda’s formulation, the post-2026 order will be judged not simply by the fact of electoral competition, but by whether political actors—above all the ruling party—act with restraint, responsibility, and democratic seriousness. “Whether Bangladesh avoids returning to previous patterns—or prevents a reverse norm cascade—largely depends on how political parties behave,” he says. Most pointedly, he stresses that “the greatest responsibility rests with the ruling party,” especially in protecting freedom of speech and ensuring that opposition parties can criticize the government.

Assoc. Prof. Huda’s analysis gains further relevance in light of the new political landscape. Alongside the parliamentary vote, citizens endorsed the reform-oriented July Charter, which proposed constitutional reforms including term limits, bicameralism, and stronger judicial independence. At the same time, Bangladesh remains marked by unresolved tensions: the Awami League was barred from contesting the election, Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India, and debates over justice, accountability, Islamist mobilization, and political inclusion continue to define the fragile post-uprising order. 

Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Huda offers a sober but cautiously hopeful assessment. “If the current political parties—those in power and those in the opposition—behave responsibly, then we do not have to retreat,” he observes. The decisive question, then, is not whether Bangladesh has entered a new era, but whether its political class can transform a moment of rupture into a durable democratic settlement.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Dr. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda

Assoc. Prof. Huda: Bangladesh’s Democratic Future Depends on How Political Parties Exercise Power

In this interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda offers a nuanced assessment of Bangladesh’s post-2026 political transition. Reflecting on the first general election after the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina, he argues that a landslide electoral mandate alone cannot resolve the country’s democratic deficit. What matters, he emphasizes, is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.” Dr. Huda warns that preventing a “reverse norm cascade” depends less on electoral formalities than on how political actors behave in power—especially the ruling party. Stressing trust, institutional restraint, and freedom of criticism, he argues that Bangladesh’s democratic future will hinge on whether political parties govern responsibly, inclusively, and within genuinely pluralist constitutional limits.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Bangladesh’s February 2026 general election marked the country’s first national vote since the Gen Z-led uprising of August 2024 that toppled Sheikh Hasina after fifteen years in power. That uprising, which followed a violent crackdown on protesters that reportedly left around 1,400 people dead, was widely interpreted as a decisive rupture with one of South Asia’s most entrenched hybrid regimes. The election that followed was therefore more than a routine transfer of power: it was a test of whether Bangladesh could move from revolutionary mobilization to institutional politics. With turnout approaching 60 percent and many voters describing the experience as an opportunity to cast ballots “without fear,” the election appeared to signal at least a partial reopening of democratic space.

Yet, as Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda from the University of Dhaka makes clear in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), electoral change alone does not resolve the deeper crisis of democratic legitimacy. While the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returned to power with a commanding parliamentary majority and the Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance emerged as the principal opposition, Assoc. Prof. Huda cautions against equating electoral victory with democratic repair. “A landslide victory helps, but it is not everything,” he argues, insisting that such a result “does not by itself wash away the democratic deficit.” For Assoc. Prof. Huda, what ultimately matters is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.”

This emphasis on institutional and relational legitimacy is central to the interview’s broader argument and directly underpins its headline claim: Bangladesh’s democratic future depends less on who wins power than on how power is exercised. In Assoc. Prof. Huda’s formulation, the post-2026 order will be judged not simply by the fact of electoral competition, but by whether political actors—above all the ruling party—act with restraint, responsibility, and democratic seriousness. “Whether Bangladesh avoids returning to previous patterns—or prevents a reverse norm cascade—largely depends on how political parties behave,” he says. Most pointedly, he stresses that “the greatest responsibility rests with the ruling party,” especially in protecting freedom of speech and ensuring that opposition parties can criticize the government.

Assoc. Prof. Huda’s analysis gains further relevance in light of the new political landscape. Alongside the parliamentary vote, citizens endorsed the reform-oriented July Charter, which proposed constitutional reforms including term limits, bicameralism, and stronger judicial independence. At the same time, Bangladesh remains marked by unresolved tensions: the Awami League was barred from contesting the election, Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India, and debates over justice, accountability, Islamist mobilization, and political inclusion continue to define the fragile post-uprising order. 

Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Huda offers a sober but cautiously hopeful assessment. “If the current political parties—those in power and those in the opposition—behave responsibly, then we do not have to retreat,” he observes. The decisive question, then, is not whether Bangladesh has entered a new era, but whether its political class can transform a moment of rupture into a durable democratic settlement.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

A Landslide Victory Cannot by Itself Eliminate the Democratic Deficit

Bangladesh elections.
A woman casts her ballot at a polling station during Bangladesh’s general election in Dhaka, January 7, 2024. Photo: Mamunur Rashid / Dreamstime.

Professor Kazi Huda, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin with the first question: After years of competitive authoritarianism and the post-2024 rupture in Bangladesh, how should we evaluate the legitimacy of the new order? Does a landslide electoral mandate reduce the democratic deficit, or is legitimacy contingent on deeper institutional reconstruction and renewed civic trust?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Thank you for having me. A landslide victory helps, but it is not everything, and it does not by itself wash away the democratic deficit that you mentioned. A landslide victory helps a political party—it gives the party a certain level of comfort in ruling or governing. It provides some confidence that people are with them. At the same time, what is actually important is whether there is procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, or what I would call sociological legitimacy.

When election procedures are fair, we can easily claim that the victory is fair—that is procedural legitimacy. If there is constitutional legitimacy, then we can say that power is structured legitimately. On the other hand, sociological legitimacy concerns the relationship with the opposition and the broader political environment—a kind of politically professional relationship.

So, I do not think a landslide victory resolves everything when it comes to the democratic deficit. It may take you some distance along the path of democratization, but what ultimately matters are whether procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.

Without Political Trust, Elections Risk Becoming Procedural Rituals

In the post-2026 context, what minimum institutional guarantees are necessary to prevent a “reverse norm cascade”—where elections remain procedurally competitive yet politically hollow, especially under conditions of parliamentary supermajority?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: To understand whether the post-2026 election context can prevent what is called a reverse norm cascade, we first need to understand why Bangladesh held an election in 2026 at all.

As you know, Bangladesh experienced a mass uprising in 2024 that ousted an authoritarian regime. After five or six weeks of bloodshed, a government that had been in power from 2009 to 2024 came to an end. During that long period, Bangladeshi people experienced disappearances, killings, and many other abuses that should never have occurred. The mass uprising created a new aspiration among citizens that Bangladesh might finally develop a political landscape that would not revert to authoritarian tendencies—what we often describe as democratic backsliding.

To prevent a reverse norm cascade, it is essential to ensure a relationship of trust among all political parties. Equally important is a trusting relationship between political parties and the general public. Why did people protest in 2024? Because they had lost trust in the existing political parties. As a result, the general public came out into the streets to take matters into their own hands, believing that mainstream political parties had failed for the past 15 years—or at least the past decade.

One of the key reasons the 2024 mass uprising succeeded was that it was led by a non-partisan student body rather than by any political party. Political parties joined the movement in large numbers, but they did not act under their own banners when they took to the streets. Instead, they followed the leadership of the student body that organized and led the uprising.

Now, in the post-2026 election context, if political parties fail to regain people’s trust—or if there is no trust among the political parties themselves—then there is a real possibility of returning to the conditions we experienced before. This includes a lack of trust between the ruling party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the opposition party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the student-led National Citizen Party.

So, what is required in this context? The primary responsibility lies with the ruling party, the BNP. As we know, power comes with responsibility. Since they are now in government, they must behave responsibly and in ways that support a democratic and sustainable political environment.

Whether Bangladesh avoids returning to previous patterns—or prevents a reverse norm cascade—largely depends on how political parties behave. Among them, the greatest responsibility rests with the ruling party: whether it seeks to control everything, whether it protects freedom of speech, and whether it ensures that opposition parties have the opportunity to criticize the government—conditions that are fundamental to any democratic environment. If the ruling party, together with other political parties, can uphold these principles and fulfill their responsibilities as they should, then I believe Bangladesh has a very promising future ahead.

Legitimacy in Transition Depends on Both Reform and Timely Elections

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

You have cautioned that elections without credible reform can reproduce dysfunction. How would you design a sequenced transition that preserves electoral legitimacy while avoiding the destabilizing vacuum and contestation that prolonged interim rule can generate?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: This is a difficult question: how can we design a sequenced transition that ensures a timely election while also guaranteeing that meaningful reforms are implemented?

In my view, what was needed was a time-bound interim government. Initially, when the interim government came to power on 8 August 2024, it was unclear how long it would remain in office or when the election would be held. Many expected that elections might take place within the first six or seven months.

However, as time passed, the interim government realized that this uncertainty was creating confusion among the public. People were in the dark about whether an election would occur at all, and pressure was mounting from major political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. At some point they announced that elections would be held in the first half of April (2025). In fact, as you know, the election eventually took place this year on February 12.

A time-bound interim government is therefore essential for the kind of sequenced transition you mention. Such a government should also have a clear agenda—one that specifies what it intends to do, what it will not do, and how it plans to proceed. Because this was an interim administration, people placed a certain degree of trust in it to carry out reforms, and in some respects it did so. It facilitated dialogue among political parties, excluding the Bangladesh Awami League, which had been the previous ruling party.

As a result of these dialogues, what came to be known as the July National Charter was produced and broadly agreed upon by most active political parties in Bangladesh, although there were some dissenting views—something that could be discussed separately.

The key point is that an interim government should have a clear reform agenda. This might include constitutional reform, police reform, or other institutional reforms. At the same time, it must remain strictly time-bound and pursue these reforms within a clearly defined time frame.

Finally, the interim government must organize an election that is widely accepted—both domestically and internationally. In this respect, I think the Bangladeshi interim government was largely successful, and it deserves recognition for arranging an election that was, to a considerable extent, fair.

Public Trust Is the Foundation of Any Neutral Electoral Administration

Bangladesh’s recurring crisis over “who runs the election” seems to reflect a deeper legitimacy problem. What would a constitutionally durable, neutral election-time administration look like—one that cannot be easily abolished, captured, or informally intimidated by incumbents?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: A durable and neutral election-time government must, above all, be a government that people can trust. Trust is crucial here. If people perceive that there is an election-time administration—whether it is called a caretaker government, an interim government, or something else—and if they believe that those responsible for organizing the election cannot conduct it impartially, then the system simply will not work.

Therefore, during the caretaker or interim period, the election-time government must be able to command public trust. How can it achieve that? This is where the broader state apparatus becomes relevant.

Individuals appointed to positions within such a government—whether as advisers, election commissioners, or in other roles—are not elected; they are selected. Therefore, it is essential to select individuals from civil society and from different sectors of society who have strong professional reputations, personal integrity, and respected public standing.

The first priority should always be appointing individuals whom the public can trust and rely upon. In situations like this, public perception matters enormously. Second, during the caretaker government period, the administration must have a certain degree of authority over key institutions, including the security forces, the civilian bureaucracy, and the military bureaucracy.

At the end of the day, the caretaker government is responsible for governing the country during the election period. If it lacks authority over these institutions, then its directives will not be taken seriously.

For that reason, an election-time government must consist of strong personalities—individuals who possess both credibility and the capacity to act decisively. At the same time, they must also be impartial.

Bicameralism Only Makes Sense if It Provides Genuine Institutional Balance

Activists of Bangladesh Nationalist Party form a human chain to mark International Human Rights Day as they protested human rights violations against leaders and activist in Dhaka, December 10, 2023. Photo: Mamunur Rashid.

How do you assess the reform proposals (e.g., bicameralism and proportional representation in an upper chamber) as remedies to Bangladesh’s recurrent winner-takes-all dynamic? Under what conditions could these reforms actually constrain executive concentration rather than be circumvented?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: The question you just raised will likely become one of the major points of contention in the coming months in Bangladesh. As I mentioned, the July National Charter includes 47 or 48 proposals for constitutional reforms. One of them, as you noted, is bicameralism and the creation of a proportional representation (PR)-based upper chamber.

The basic proposal is that the distribution of seats in the upper chamber should be proportionate to the public votes received in the lower chamber. However, the major political party, the BNP—which is now the ruling party—has expressed its dissent, arguing that the seats of the upper chamber should instead be proportionate to the shares of seats in the lower chamber.

If that position is accepted, then the structure would be quite different. One important point to note is that in the charter, proposals that are not agreed upon by all political parties—such as the proposal regarding the upper chamber—include formal notes of dissent. The BNP expressed such a note.

There is also a provision stating that if a dissenting political party wins the election on the basis of an election manifesto that clearly mentions this dissent, then after winning the election it may proceed according to its own position. In other words, it is not strictly bound by the proposal.

Therefore, the ruling party—the BNP—can potentially argue that it expressed its dissent, included this position in its election manifesto, and after forming the government should now be able to proceed accordingly.

Interestingly, however, the referendum ballot did not mention this dissent. The referendum ballot only stated that there should be a PR-based upper chamber. Because of this, I assume there will be debates and contestation in Parliament—and possibly even in the streets—over how the upper chamber should be formed: whether it should be based on public votes or on lower-chamber seat shares.

If you ask for my own view, I do not agree with the BNP’s position regarding the formation of the upper chamber. In fact, I do not see a strong necessity for bicameralism or for an upper chamber in a country like Bangladesh. We already have around 300 members in our National Assembly. Adding another 100 members in an upper chamber and bearing the associated costs is quite burdensome for a country with Bangladesh’s economic conditions.

However, if one still believes that an upper chamber is necessary, then it should not simply become a replica of the lower chamber. If it merely replicates the lower chamber, there is little point in having it at all.

The BNP has also expressed dissent on several other proposals. Some of those points are understandable, but particularly regarding the PR-based upper chamber, I do not think their position makes much sense.

Collective Blame Risks Undermining Democratic Inclusion

Post-authoritarian transitions often elevate “accountability” into a mandate. How can Bangladesh pursue accountability for past repression while avoiding collective punishment, party bans, or exclusionary practices that risk undermining democratic inclusion and long-term stability?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Accountability is important. It is important in personal life, and it is also important when it comes to governing the state and conducting politics. However, if accountability is interpreted as collective responsibility, then this is something we should question. Collective responsibility—or collective culpability—can exclude an entire political party from the political landscape. What we need instead is individualized culpability. We need fair trials, and we need institutional reforms so that we do not return to the previous situation. As you mentioned, we should avoid a reverse norm cascade.

Therefore, what happened before August 2024 should not be addressed through collective blame. We should not claim that a political party as a whole is responsible for particular crimes. Rather, through fair trials, we should identify the individuals who were involved in these crimes and bring them to justice, instead of stigmatizing an entire political party.

Political Actors Often Convert Grievances into Moral Mandates

In your critique of populist narratives, you emphasize how symbolic indignation can displace problem-solving governance. What are the main discursive mechanisms through which Bangladeshi actors convert grievances (justice, sovereignty, moral renewal) into mandates for exclusion, retribution, or institutional bypass?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: The use of discursive mechanisms through which political actors convert grievances into mandates is not unique to Bangladesh. It happens worldwide, as many political actors try to capitalize on grievances in order to garner public support. Bangladesh is no exception.

In Bangladesh, we see such mechanisms in practices like invoking martyrdom—what I would call Shahidhood. Sometimes, when you criticize a particular political party, you may be labeled as anti-nationalist. You might be branded as pro-Pakistani, pro-Indian, pro-American, and so on. Political parties also frequently portray their opponents as traitors while presenting themselves as morally pure. At times, they even act as though they are the sellers of a “ticket to heaven.”

These are the kinds of discursive mechanisms we observe in Bangladesh today. Another important pattern—visible both under the previous regime and even now—is that some political actors try to capitalize on narratives of victimhood. In effect, they market victimhood in order to mobilize public support and secure electoral mandates.

The Post-Uprising Divide Reflects Competing Visions of Justice and Reform

Bangladesh elections.
Voters line up outside a polling station in Feni during Bangladesh’s 13th national election on February 12, 2026. The scene reflects the high voter turnout of approximately 59.44% in this historic “Gen Z-inspired” election held under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. Photo: Belayet Hossain / Dreamstime.

Revolutionary coalitions often mobilize around a shared enemy but fragment after victory. How does this dynamic apply to the 2024 student-led uprising, and what risks follow when “people vs regime” narratives persist into the period of institution-building?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: In 2024, not surprisingly, Bangladeshi people had only one enemy: the ruling authoritarian regime. After successfully removing that regime, however, the coalition that had formed during the uprising began to show many fractures. We now observe that it has divided into different groups.

This division—or, as you noted, fragmentation after victory—depends on several factors, particularly in the Bangladeshi context. One form of fragmentation is based on ends, specifically the question of justice and how it should be ensured. One group believes that justice can be achieved through reform. If the constitution is sufficiently reformed, they argue, Bangladesh may avoid returning to a regime-like situation in the future. Others believe that those responsible must be brought into the justice system and punished. There is also another group that advocates a mechanism of reconciliation and healing.

Thus, some groups are divided based on ends. At the same time, there are also divisions based on means, and these groups often overlap. Groups defined by their goals and those defined by their strategies frequently intersect. Among those divided by means, some political parties and individuals believe that elections should come first, with reforms following afterward. Another group argues that before holding elections, the constitution and various institutions and sectors of the state should first be reformed.

We also see fragmentation shaped by identity-based narratives—whether someone is labeled nationalist or anti-nationalist, whether they are described as pro-Indian, and so on, as I mentioned earlier.

This fragmentation is therefore quite widespread. The coalition that emerged during the mass uprising has now divided into different groups. I think this is a normal development after a successful movement, because different interest groups pursue different priorities, and people tend to divide according to their interests.

Islamist Parties Can Participate in Democracy if They Respect Constitutional Limits

With Islamist actors gaining unprecedented parliamentary weight, how should we distinguish analytically between (a) democratic inclusion of religious parties, (b) rightward drift of the political center, and (c) programmatic Islamization that constrains pluralism—particularly on gender equality, minority rights, and academic freedom?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Personally, I do not have any problem with the democratic inclusion of religious political parties. Unless they are too extreme, every ideology—whether religious or political—has the right to participate in politics in a liberal democratic system, provided that they operate within constitutional limits, respect equal citizenship, and do not violate human rights.

I also have a particular view regarding the rightward drift of the political center. The political center is never fixed; it shifts depending on circumstances. Sometimes it tilts toward the right, and sometimes toward the left. Therefore, if a leftward drift of the center is not considered problematic, then a slight drift to the right should not necessarily be seen as a problem either.

If we try to analytically identify a rightward drift of the political center in Bangladesh, we can observe that even secular political parties often use religious symbolism when campaigning for votes. We see politicians wearing religious caps or clothing, praying with people, and engaging in similar practices. Even some leftist political figures have done this recently. Bangladesh is a country where about 90 percent of the population is Muslim, so even so-called secular politicians often resort to such symbolism during elections in order to connect with Muslim voters.

Regarding the third issue—programmatic Islamization that constrains pluralism—the rise of religion-based political parties is not unique to Bangladesh. It is a global phenomenon. We see similar developments in Europe and other parts of the world, where religion-based political parties are gaining visibility and influence in political discourse.

In such contexts, both the state and society must play an important role. By society, I mean civil society organizations, other political parties, and the government itself. All of them have responsibilities to ensure that religious political actors do not undermine gender equality, minority rights, or other democratic principles.

If we want to assess whether programmatic Islamization is increasing in Bangladesh, we should examine whether these parties are gaining popularity. Indeed, they are becoming more prominent. For example, a major religion-based political party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, received around 32 percent of the vote. However, this outcome was achieved partly through alliances with other political parties—many of which are also religious—and partly through cooperation with the National Citizen Party, a student-led political movement.

One interesting aspect of Jamaat-e-Islami is that it appears to be trying to reshape itself in order to operate within a liberal democratic framework. We can observe changes in its language. In the past, the party frequently used strongly religious terminology, but during the recent election it appeared to adopt more liberal political language rather than explicitly religious rhetoric.

So, we do see some changes within these political parties. If they are allowed to operate within a liberal political sphere, they may gradually adapt themselves to that environment. For this reason, I do not currently see a major risk that Bangladesh will soon experience a sharp rise in extremism or a dramatic escalation of religion-based politics.

Responsible Political Leadership Can Still Secure Bangladesh’s Democratic Future

And lastly, Professor Huda, looking ahead to the next decade, what are the most plausible political trajectories for Bangladesh? Do you envision a pathway toward democratic consolidation anchored in institutional reform and pluralist consensus, or does the current configuration—marked by populist mobilization, Islamist resurgence, and intense polarization—risk entrenching a new hybrid order where competitive elections coexist with ideological majoritarianism and periodic instability? What key indicators should scholars and policymakers watch to assess which trajectory is unfolding?

Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: So, you mentioned three trajectories: one is a consolidation pathway, another is a hybrid order, and the third is a cycle of instability. As a person, I am an optimist. I think that if the current political parties—those in power and those in the opposition—behave responsibly, then we do not have to retreat. This is a moment that we should seize and use to look forward to a better future.

However, to understand whether we are moving forward or backward, we need to look at certain indicators. For example, we need to see whether elections in Bangladesh take place regularly, whether those elections are fair, and how opposition parties are treated by the ruling party. We also need to observe whether security forces behave impartially or whether the government uses security forces to pursue its own political agenda.

Another important factor is whether the bureaucracy functions properly and whether citizens are able to enjoy their fundamental and human rights. If we examine these indicators over the next two or three years, we will be able to predict where Bangladesh is actually heading.

If we see that these indicators are improving and functioning well, then we can hope for and predict a democratic and sustainable future. In that case, Bangladesh may develop into a stable democracy that does not repeatedly slip into instability.

Samzir Ahmed

Samzir Ahmed: Institutionalization Is an Acid Test for Populist Politics in Bangladesh

Bangladesh’s 2026 election—the first since the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina—has been widely framed as a democratic turning point. Yet in this interview with the ECPS,  Samzir Ahmed, a Bangladeshi politics expert, argues that the moment should be interpreted more cautiously. Rather than a democratic restoration, he describes the upheaval primarily as “a restoration of politics itself,” following what he calls a long period of depoliticization.  Ahmed contends that the institutionalization of actors such as Jamaat-e-Islami represents a critical turning point, emphasizing that “institutionalization is an acid test for populist politics.” While populist and Islamist movements often thrive outside formal power structures, their integration into institutional politics may fundamentally reshape their strategies—and expose new constraints on their influence.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Bangladesh’s February 2026 general election marked the country’s first national vote since the Gen Z–led uprising of August 2024 that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after fifteen years in power. The uprising followed a violent crackdown on protesters that, according to UN reporting, left around 1,400 people dead and precipitated the collapse of one of South Asia’s most entrenched hybrid regimes. Widely viewed as a test of whether Bangladesh could transition from revolutionary protest to institutional politics, the election unfolded largely peacefully. Turnout approached 60%, and many voters described the moment as an opportunity to cast ballots “without fear” after years of elections marred by intimidation and allegations of manipulation.

The results reshaped the country’s political landscape. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman—who returned to Bangladesh in December 2025 after seventeen years in exile—won a sweeping victory with roughly 212 parliamentary seats, returning the party to power after two decades. The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami–led alliance secured about 77 seats, marking its strongest parliamentary showing and establishing it as the principal opposition. Alongside the parliamentary vote, citizens also endorsed the reform-oriented “July Charter” in a referendum, which proposes significant constitutional reforms, including term limits for the prime minister, bicameralism, and strengthened judicial independence. Yet the broader political transition remains contested: the Awami League was barred from contesting the election, Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India following a war-crimes conviction, and debates over justice, accountability, and political inclusion continue to shape Bangladesh’s fragile post-uprising order.

Against this volatile backdrop, the incoming BNP government faces daunting challenges: rebuilding institutions weakened by years of authoritarian consolidation, restoring law and order after a turbulent transitional period, reviving an economy strained by inflation and youth unemployment, and navigating complex regional diplomacy as India, the United States, and Pakistan recalibrate relations with Dhaka. These overlapping pressures raise a deeper question about whether the 2026 election represents a genuine democratic turning point—or merely the beginning of another cycle in Bangladesh’s long history of majoritarian power and polarized politics.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Samzir Ahmed, Lecturer at the Department of Bangla at Netrokona University, offers a sobering interpretation of this moment. Drawing on his concept of the “compromised strongman,” Ahmed argues that the election should not be interpreted as a democratic restoration. Rather, he situates the upheaval within a deeper historical pattern in which Bangladesh oscillates between depoliticization and renewed political mobilization. As he explains, the country had been experiencing “a long trend of depoliticization,” and the July uprising marked a rupture that represents primarily “a restoration of politics itself.” In his words, “democracy, however, remains far away.”

Ahmed also highlights the structural dynamics behind the BNP’s victory and the reconfiguration of Bangladesh’s ideological landscape. While the election signals a rightward shift in political gravity, he notes that such a development reflects a longer process that accelerated during the final years of Hasina’s rule. At the same time, the institutionalization of Islamist political forces—particularly the emergence of Jamaat-e-Islami as the main parliamentary opposition—signals a transformation in how populist and religious movements operate within Bangladesh’s political system. For Ahmed, this transition is crucial because “institutionalization is an acid test for populist politics.” Populist movements, he suggests, often flourish when they remain outside formal power structures but face new constraints once they become embedded within institutions.

More broadly, Ahmed situates the country’s current uncertainties within the unresolved dual nationalist structure that has shaped Bangladeshi politics since independence. With the Awami League banned and its leadership in exile or imprisoned, the political vacuum raises unresolved questions about representation and polarization. Whether secular constituencies will eventually reorganize under a revived Awami League, find accommodation within the BNP, or generate a new political formation remains uncertain.

Moreover, Ahmed reflects on the generational dynamics unleashed by the student-led uprising that triggered the transition. The protests, he argues, reflected “generational frustration with traditional patronist-centric politics.” Yet the digital hyperconnectivity that enabled rapid mobilization against authoritarian rule may simultaneously complicate the creation of durable political alternatives. In one of the interview’s most striking observations, Ahmed captures this dilemma succinctly: “The present is denied, but the future is not invited either.”

Ahmed’s reflections suggest that Bangladesh is entering another phase of intense political contestation rather than a settled democratic transition. Whether the July Charter reforms, ideological reconciliation, and institutional reconstruction can transform this turbulent moment into genuine democratic consolidation remains, for now, an open question.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Samzir Ahmed, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Oil Tanker

Energy Geopolitics from Hormuz to Lagos: Commodity Shocks and African Vulnerability

In this analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how geopolitical tensions around the strategic oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz transmit economic shocks across the global political economy and disproportionately affect African states. Because many African economies remain highly dependent on commodity exports and imported energy, oil price volatility quickly translates into inflation, fiscal stress, and social pressure. Even oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria face paradoxical effects, benefiting from higher crude revenues while simultaneously suffering from rising domestic fuel costs. These inflationary pressures can fuel economic discontent, weaken government legitimacy, and create fertile ground for populist mobilization. Dr. Solaja argues that recurrent commodity shocks expose deep structural vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for economic diversification, energy transition, and stronger regional integration to build resilience.

By Oludele Solaja*

Geopolitical conflicts rarely stay within their battlefield boundaries. In a world with integrated economy, war in strategic energy corridor would swiftly lead to inflation, political instability and governmental pressures far from conflict. Geopolitical tensions in the strategic energy corridor are central to the functioning of the global political economy. The Strait of Hormuz holds a peculiar important position in the transit routes among all. Some one fifth of the global petroleum liquids passes through the narrow maritime passage in between Iran and Arabian Peninsula (US Energy Information Administration, 2023), hence the perception of armed conflict even if it’s just the rumor of one in the area would lead to an immediate volatility shock in the global oil market.

Not just the physical supply disruptions but the uncertainty itself would create price volatility. Higher cost of insuring the vessels, shifting of the routes and market responses all contribute to the volatility as well. Scholars of energy politics have always acknowledged that oil markets are intrinsically connected with national security and strategic rivalry (Bridge & Le Billon, 2017). As such, conflict occurring in energy producing areas could have economic impact across nations without any boundaries.

The effects on the developing nations would be even worse. World Bank warns that such shocks from the Middle Eastern energy supply chains could push the oil prices beyond $100/barrel, creating inflation pressure and fiscal burden upon developing nations. In an integrated global economy, a geopolitical shock will be transmitted across the commodity supply chain. Energy supply, food production, transportation network and capital flow are all interconnected.

Inflation Transmission and African Political Economy

When energy prices shock happens in African countries, typically there are two related effects: windfall profit to oil exporters, and inflationary pressure to domestic markets.

On one hand, oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria could profit from rising crude oil prices through high export revenues and balance of payments surplus. In theory, windfalls can stabilize fiscal conditions and support increase development expenditure. Nevertheless, political economy literature argues that commodity windfalls often reproduce and strengthen existing vulnerabilities of the economies, which fail to transform into sustainable development instead of generating rent-seeking behavior without firm institutions and diversified economies (Auty, 2001; Ross, 2012).

On the other hand, rising global oil prices will transmit inflation through the domestic economies. Transportation costs rise with higher fuel prices, pushing the price up of goods including foods, which need logistics and transportation, as well as costs for manufactured goods and fertilizers for farming. Electricity costs are also higher and so forth.

In Nigeria, this paradox is crystal clear. Despite being one of Africa’s biggest exporters of crude oil, Nigeria needs to import its supply of refined petroleum products as its own refining capacity is insufficient. This creates two divergent effects at the same time: Nigeria has to pay high fuel import costs from imported refined oil, while export revenue is expected to rise with higher crude prices. Informal sector workers who are in the vast majority in Nigerian labor market would experience increasing cost of living.

The consequences for oil-importing African countries are even harsher. Rising costs of fuel import not only leads to greater trade deficit and depreciation of national currency but also increase countries’ exposure to sovereign debt distress.

Commodity Shocks and Politics of Economic Discontent

The macroeconomic impact beyond energy sector can reshape the domestic political landscape by raising costs of living especially in the vulnerable societies. Political scientists have noted that a sudden increase in living costs can cause popular unrest, weaken government legitimacy, and contribute to the emergence of populism (Rodrik, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

In this case, a global economic shock would have translated into domestic political pressure. When confronting with inflation pressures, African governments often are compelled to subsidize the consumption of oil or enforce price caps, which have proven to undermine fiscal positions and postpone necessary structural adjustments. Repeated commodity shocks in institutionally weak economies can reproduce the same vicious cycles of economic discontent and political instability.

Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors therefore do more than creating turbulence for economies. They challenge domestic political legitimacy by accentuating conflicts between different strata of society about inflation, social welfare, and commodity distribution.

Structural Vulnerability in Commodity-dependent Economies

All of the aforementioned highlights the inherent structural vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent economic systems. Dependency theorists have consistently asserted that countries that depend on exports of primary commodities are exposed to volatility in international commodity markets (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1976). Moreover, the “resource curse” debate emphasizes rent seeking, volatility, and limited industrial development in extracting economies (Ross, 2012).

Energy geopolitical shock can only intensify this vulnerability. Shipping disruptions or higher freight costs resulting from higher insurance fees due to conflict at Persian Gulf can be re-routed around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, further intensifying the costs borne by all importing nations, especially those relying on food imports, manufactured goods and agricultural inputs. In such cases, the impacts of wars fought at energy corridors are redistributed across the commodity markets that link the Strait of Hormuz to consumers across a faraway land.

Policy Implications: Building Resilience

Mitigating vulnerability of geopolitical commodity shocks requires a long-term perspective beyond ad hoc management strategies. The first thing for African countries is to speed up economic diversification (industrialization and value adding in agriculture), because it will lead to sustainable development not only by reducing dependence on the exports of oil. Secondly, investment in infrastructure and on renewable energies will lead to energy sustainability in African countries and reduces the reliance on imported refined goods. Third, strengthen the social safety net (cash transfers, food security program, etc.) can shield the poorest households from inflationary shocks. Fourth, expand intra-African trade using the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make the region reduce dependence on unstable international commodity market.

Conclusion

Volatility in strategic energy corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz is a manifestation of geopolitical tensions’ spread across the global political economy. For Africa’s commodity-dependent economies, it amplifies the persistent structural vulnerabilities that are embedded in extraction-based development strategies. Short term export gains associated with rising prices rarely outweigh the subsequent inflationary pressures and fiscal instability in the longer run. Unless these development strategies are actively reformed to emphasize diversification, energy transition and resilience, each commodity shock following every conflict will result in the similar outcomes: temporary windfall gains followed by inflation-induced hardship and fragile development. Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors, hence, are not just regional security issues; they are fundamentally tests of structural resilience in the development agenda of the Global South.


(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.


 

References

Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Monthly Review Press.

Auty, R. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press.

Bridge, G., & Le Billon, P. (2017). Oil. Polity Press.

Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.

Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press.

Rodrik, D. (2018). “Populism and the economics of globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33.

Ross, M. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023). World oil transit chokepointshttps://www.eia.gov

World Bank. (2023). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.