This paper examines the intricate relationship between populism, culture wars, and fundamental rights. It explores how the rise of populist movements and the intensification of culture wars reshape the interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, often polarizing societal values and threatening democratic principles. By delving into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena, the paper highlights how populism amplifies ideological divides, leveraging culture wars to contest principles of equality, freedom of expression, and social justice. The study categorizes populism into economic, political, and cultural strands, analyzing their combined effects with culture wars on the discourse and practices of democracy. Using examples such as the rollback of reproductive rights in the United States and the use of nationalist narratives in Brazil and India, the paper underscores the tangible consequences of these dynamics. This exploration reveals the challenges these contentious forces pose to the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, as well as their influence on competing democratic models: liberal, majoritarian, and minoritarian.
Keywords: populism, culture wars, fundamental rights, democracy.
By João Ferreira Dias
Introduction
Populism, characterized by its dynamic appeal to ‘the people’ against perceived elite or establishment forces, has gained significant traction worldwide, manifesting in diverse forms. These range from economic populism, with its emphasis on wealth redistribution and anti-establishment sentiments, to political populism, which focuses on governance and anti-elite narratives, and cultural populism, which capitalizes on identity politics and nationalistic sentiments. Each strand intersects uniquely with culture wars, conflicts that revolve around competing values, beliefs, and identities, deepening societal polarization.
The synergy between populism and culture wars presents substantial challenges to interpreting and protecting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, equality, and the right to privacy—cornerstones of democratic and human rights principles. Within this polarizing framework, these rights are contested, their interpretation shaped by ideological biases that reflect broader political struggles.
Furthermore, this dynamic interplay fuels competing concepts of democracy. The traditional model of liberal democracy, defined by individual rights, checks and balances, and inclusive governance, now contends with majoritarian democracy, which emphasizes the will of the majority, and minoritarian democracy, which seeks to protect marginalized groups and their social identities over common ground.
This paper aims to explore the intricate connections between populism and culture wars and their collective impact on fundamental rights. By examining how these forces challenge the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, we provide a framework for understanding and addressing the threats they pose to safeguarding fundamental rights in an era marked by these ideological confrontations.
Olivares-Jirsell, Jellen. (2024). “Recalibration, Not Austerity: Welfare States and the Struggle for Liberalism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 6, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0044
Abstract
Welfare states have acted as societal equalisers. They have reduced poverty, improved living standards, promoted equality, and supported democracy. However, their alignment with market imperatives and exclusionary definitions of deservedness threatens the welfare state’s role as a social equalising force. This paper aims to diagnose a challenge facing welfare states through two arguments. The first is that four recalibrations have taken place within welfare states: settling for universality, redefining universality, outsourcing, and reducing public spending. These recalibrations aim for market compliance, savings, and competitiveness. The second is that welfare states may prevent unequal distributions and promote equity by focusing beyond universality and prioritising socially liberal policies. By examining OECD countries and beyond, the paper highlights the pitfalls: a myopic focus on universality exacerbates inequalities; neoliberal criteria that align welfare states with populism and lend credence to welfare chauvinism; and outsourcing and privatisation that increase costs without improving service quality, weakening democratic capacity due to reliance on private providers.
(Received June 7, 2024, Published December 6, 2024.)
By Jellen Olivares-Jirsell*
Introduction
The establishment of welfare states has significantly impacted societies. The incredible achievements in social equality that welfare states have created cannot be overlooked. The package of wealth redistribution, services, and programmes has successfully reduced poverty in the places where it has been implemented (Kenworthy, 1999), thereby improving the living standards of millions of people.[1]
Welfare states record of success includes transforming democracies’ form and character (King, 1987) by producing high levels of income and gender equality (Swank, 2000) as well as supporting the consolidation of democratic rule (Pestoff, 2006). The role of the welfare state as a societal equaliser and creator of a critically engaged populous, confident in challenging and scrutinising policy, is widely acknowledged and understood (Patrick, 2017); the inclusion of Target 1.3 – ‘Social Protection Systems for All’ in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) is evidence of this ideological consensus of welfare states as essential for society.
However, welfare states currently survive precariously and face the consistent and erroneous idea that deficits are always bad, and that the welfare state is an expensive luxury that can only exist in exchange for sacrificing economic competition(Wren-Lewis, 2018). They have nonetheless endured and—mostly—remained in place (King, 1987), lifting their populations out of poverty and protecting them from external shocks, especially during crises (Bhambra & Holmwood, 2018), but they sacrifice much in the process.
When we think about the most celebrated welfare systems, we may consider their universal provision. Our minds may also drift to generous parental leave, free healthcare, education, and support. Unfortunately, this rosy picture of welfare states describes a non-existent utopia, as even the most celebrated welfare states now face issues with their provision.
This paper makes two main points: First, welfare states are not retrenching due to austerity but are recalibrating to align more with market imperatives. This recalibration, often mistaken for austerity, has shifted the focus from real accountability to delivering provision. It has narrowed perceptions such that funding issues are considered the only reason welfare states struggle to support their citizens. Second, this paper argues against the conventional view of the universality of provision as a north star for welfare states. Instead, the analysis guides the argument by focusing beyond universality and towards the prioritisation of socially liberal policies. Specifically, welfare states may prevent unequal distributions and promote equity within universal welfare programs. In doing so, welfare states may also prevent populists and neoliberals from redefining their inclusion criteria. The specific dynamics of these redefinitions will also be elaborated upon.
The goal of this paper is not prescriptive; welfare states are as varied as countries. Hence, a generic solution would not address local needs. Alternatively, it highlights the maladies our communal abandonment of liberalism and prioritisation of market imperatives have caused.
The two main arguments challenge the idea that citizens should accept subpar support, as welfare states are adequately funded. Social spending takes up more than a quarter of the GDP of OECD countries (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Instead, they argue that welfare states may effectively safeguard their citizens if liberal priorities precede market competition.
The paper challenges the notion that welfare states are expendable luxuries, advocating instead for a reimagined role beyond essential provision, which can address deeper societal needs beyond mere bodily survival. After providing an overview of the debate around social public expenditure, this point is demonstrated by examining changes in public spending, the move towards outsourcing, and the redefined criteria of deservedness. Using examples within the OECD and beyond, emphasising Northern European countries, the paper illustrates how welfare states are recalibrating rather than simply cutting back. It underscores the essential role of welfare states in protecting the most vulnerable and maintaining social stability. The paper also critiques overemphasis on universality, arguing that this metric alone can mask underlying inefficiencies and exclusions in welfare provision. Instead, it calls for a broader evaluation of welfare states based on their impact and outcomes, not just their coverage.
A Few Words on Welfare States and Austerity
Welfare states are complex and multifaceted, sometimes seen as burdens or saviours, expendable or essential depending on the observer. In a first understanding of the welfare state, as King (1987) described, the welfare state embodies non-market criteria. It exists only to provide essential public goods and services to gain or maintain at least minimal well-being standards in a population. In a compromise between capitalist and socialist ideologies, welfare states look after their citizens so that they can be part of a healthy, educated and capable society, with the added benefit that healthy, educated and capable individuals make great contributors to the financial markets and democracies (Begg et al., 2015; Crosland, 1964). This represents a mutually beneficial relationship between citizens, markets and states. Another view on the welfare state is that it is costly, inefficient, creates dependence on government, and burdens markets, hence needs transforming to serve the market, generate growth and benefit society through generalised economic prosperity (Alesina et al., 2019).
Neither the idealised nor vilified version of the welfare state exists. Welfare states compile liberal goals of social protection and betterment with older themes, including the ubiquitous condemnation of the ‘unworthy poor’. At one point, these notions were used to justify the ‘progressive opinion’ that saw eugenics as a legitimate tool for raising the general quality of the population (Pierson & Leimgruber, 2010).
Moreover, welfare states determine who is part of society and deserves safety and security. This creates a sense of inclusion and trust for those considered members. At the same time, those outside are excluded, fitting well with the political manifestos of populists (Bergman, 2022; Busemeyer et al., 2021). As Zakaria (2007) warns, liberalism, the progressive force behind inclusive and fair societies and democracies, which endorses social justice and the expansion of civil and political rights, has been slowly extracted from liberal institutions such as welfare states. These ideas over the deservedness of some over others led over thirty years ago, to coining the term ‘welfare chauvinism’ to describe some Norwegians and Danes’ belief that welfare services should be restricted to the country’s own (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990). In short, welfare states are complex and multifaceted, capable of much good but also capable of reproducing and sustaining unfair structures.
In a purely economic sense, the welfare state costs countries large chunks of their GDP (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023), and at times, when welfare states do not uphold liberal values, they can solidify or even widen societal cleavages (Kenworthy, 1999; Parolin et al., 2023). This means that despite the good they do, they are imperfect institutions that are both essential and need improvement.
Overall, welfare states are state institutions that deliver interventions that help a population achieve or maintain at least minimal well-being standards. Their aims, however, may vary. Variously, it focuses on protecting the population, the market, the societal order, or something else. These differences are defined by the social and political priorities governing the state at that moment in time, as the upcoming examples will shortly show. In truth, welfare states are intrinsically political entities, defining acceptable and deserving versions of their citizens and responding to political priorities as they occur. This means that welfare states are subject to the ebb and flow of politics and the changing norms around deservedness, the role of the state in individual life and the multiple political priorities of contemporary politics.
Among said political priorities, governments may be concerned with creating surpluses in their cyclical primary balance adjustments (austerity), requiring – among other measures – reduced social spending. As hinted in the introduction, the constant push and pull between economic and social needs have caused significant changes to welfare states; these economic forces permeate politics and democratic institutions. Austerity measures have been one of the most favoured economic interventions since the normalisation of neoliberal economics in the 1980s.
There are different forms of austerity measures governments can introduce. Although raising or decreasing taxes is part of the austerity arsenal (Union of International Associations, 2024), we have come to understand austerity to mean cuts in spending rather than tax adjustments. The general idea of austerity measures is to cut down on luxuries and unnecessary spending, work on paying back debt, and even create a surplus in the budget. However, especially in countries like the UK, the everyday use of austerity is almost always equated with spending cuts (The Guardian, 2024). It rarely includes consideration of tax increases or reductions in the public lexicon. This leads to a frequent conflation of austerity with cuts to the welfare state.
Despite this frequent confusion, austerity measures refer to policies that aim to reduce government budget deficits by decreasing spending but may also involve tax increases, decreases, or a combination of these. The creation of surplus or reduction of deficit that austerity measures aim to create can be pretty confusing, as at times, it may even include increasing funding of certain areas of the economy – for example, by providing subsidies to industries that are expected to create growth (GOV.UK, 2023) – and cuts in other areas not deemed to help with economic growth – typically social spending. However, it is essential to understand that austerity measures aim to reduce budget deficits.
The effectiveness of austerity policies is subject to much debate. According to Keynesian economists, since one person’s spending is another person’s income, reductions in government spending during economic downturns worsen economic crises (Fazzari et al., 2013). Further, these reductions pass down debt to the working classes (Blyth, 2013) and severely affect physical and mental health (Barr et al., 2015; Loopstra et al., 2016; Patrick, 2017). Others believe reducing government budget deficits through spending cuts is more effective than increasing taxes. They argue that such policies demonstrate a government’s financial discipline to creditors and credit rating agencies, making borrowing easier and less expensive (Alesina et al., 2019).
Austerity is engaged with here because welfare states are often written and discussed in relation to austerity. This is central to the argument about recalibration. Austerity means more than cuts to the social spending budget; it has become a shorthand for welfare states’ funding challenges. In this paper, it is put forth that the issue lies beyond cuts to public social spending and that austerity (colloquially understood as cuts to the welfare state) is not the cause of the perceived retrenchment of welfare states; instead, recalibration is.
This paper aims to diagnose a challenge facing welfare states. The idea that welfare states have been reduced to nothing due to a lack of funding is as pervasive as the idea that deficits are bad. Both these ideas have severe implications for welfare states and their operations. However, as this paper argues, the strategies adopted to keep welfare states alive are geared around four central recalibrations: settling for universality, redefining universality, outsourcing and monetising public provision and reducing public spending on social protection. All these recalibrations are, in one way or another, based on the idea that welfare states ought to comply with market imperatives, making savings and operating competitively. To analyse welfare state recalibration empirically, some examples of countries facing these challenges are reviewed to assess how these recalibrations have taken shape.
The Recalibration Strategies
Settling for and Redefining Universality
Welfare states are permanently forced to justify their existence based on market imperatives due to the pervasive idea that governments should always grow, maintain a surplus and avoid debt at all costs (Wren-Lewis, 2018). There is a consistent thread of welfare provision as a value-for-money exercise: citizens are trained and kept sheltered and healthy to become productive members of society, but these protections must always cost less than citizens produce.
Considering this, welfare states are constituted as providers of social protection floors, overlooking their potential role in promoting liberalism through equality (Swank, 2000) and democracy (Patrick, 2017; Pestoff, 2006). Following the UN’s SDG, welfare states have been correctly lauded as basic protection floors with universal distribution as a deterrent to poverty and inequality.
The absence of a safety net can predispose the most vulnerable populations to extreme poverty; thus, implementing a basic yet universal provision may effectively mitigate this risk. However, in welfare states that have (or aim to have) universal coverage of those deemed deserving, citizens miss out on the broader societal benefits that welfare states provide when they instead focus on basic universal provision. Moreover, inequality and poverty may go unnoticed in places where universality of coverage exists as long as universality alone is the metric used to assess our welfare state outcomes (Patrick, 2017).
A case in point is that of the Netherlands, a country with a very high social expenditure budget and one of the most celebrated welfare states in the world. This country, however, has the highest level of outsourcing of social provision globally (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). It is also a place with very high levels of wealth inequality (Van den Bossche, 2019), a growing opportunity gap in education based on ethnicity and socio-economic class and issues of accessibility for service users due to significant restrictions to cover, resulting in the duality of provision, known as welfare chauvinism (de Koster et al., 2013).
In the Netherlands, for-profit nursing home care is banned, but changes in the policy have enabled for-profit nursing homes to circumvent the for-profit ban. This leads to exclusionary practices. For example, selecting clients based on the severity of their disease and not hiring expensive staff for specialist care, then moving people out if they become too ill and need specialist care (Bos et al., 2020). Similarly, childcare was privatised in 2005 to make provision efficient. However, there is inequality in childcare use by family type, and the quality of provision has decreased since privatisation and outsourcing started (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2014).
In the case of the Netherlands, the services are technically more widely available than before, at least in terms of spaces in nursing homes or childcare; thus, the universality of provision has yet to be challenged. However, even as the provision of nursing homes and childcare has increased since the private sector incursion (Akgunduz & Plantenga, 2014; Bos et al., 2020), the examples evidence, universality is caveated to exclude those very sick from nursing homes or certain family groups from childcare. In this case, it is clear that the goal of universality has been kept, but focusing only on universality alone obscures important aspects of accessibility for specific groups.
Sweden provides another example of this duality of high social expenditure with disparities in outcomes. This country has privatised and outsourced much of its schooling provision and now observes a significant drop in the performance of these schools (OECD, 2023; West, 2014). The metric of universality is met since Sweden provides universal coverage to its population (Janlöv et al., 2023). However, considering the performance variations between schools in low and high-income areas, especially since 2003 (OECD, 2015), the universal provision of education clearly evidences a Matthew Effect, whereby provision is most beneficial to those who need it the least (Bonoli & Fabienne, 2018). Besides the inequitable distribution of public goods, an additional challenge in the Swedish educational landscape is the establishment of lobbying. Private actors have evolved from holding purely economic roles to being strong political actors engaged in policymaking, adversely affecting transparency and democracy (Jobér, 2023). Moreover, this type of lobbyism can enhance existing socio-economic divisions, as schools with the capacity to lobby for more resources are also those in the wealthier areas.
The point here is not to minimise the achievements of welfare states; both the Netherlands and Sweden boast some of the best social well-being metrics in the world. Indeed, these two countries have some of the most acclaimed welfare systems in the world (Hutt, 2019; OECD, 2024a; OECD, 2024b). Sweden, particularly, was seen as the model for most welfare states in the post-war era for the rest of Europe. However, as the above examples show, the universality of public provision does not equate to better outcomes, and, at times, it may even perpetuate or exacerbate unequal societal constructions.
Moreover, the Netherlands and Sweden are not isolated cases. In the EU, native workers obtain the highest economic prosperity and employment returns from education, followed by EU workers, leaving non-EU workers last. Similar trends can also be observed in the US between natives and non-natives (Gamito, 2022). The universality of provision, therefore, does not signify equality in outcomes when inequity is built into the infrastructure of provision. Thus, universal provision may enhance societal cleavages and create or enhance a Matthew Effect.
This Matthew Effect exists in various forms in all welfare states (Heckman & Landersø, 2021; Pavolini & Van Lancker, 2018). If anything, the Netherlands and Sweden have been somewhat protected from adverse outcomes because of the societal duress and resilience created before these services were privatised and outsourced (OECD, 2018) and their goals were rearranged.
I have so far argued that welfare states have adopted universality as their central goal, even though focusing on universality conceals issues with exclusionary practices that may perpetuate and even enhance social crevices. I will build upon this argument on universality as a central goal and posit that, besides focusing on universality as a central goal, welfare states have also redefined universality, at least to some degree, due to producerism.
Producerism emphasises the importance of productive labour and the contributions of producers to society (Bergman, 2022). It often advocates for policies and attitudes that prioritise the interests of producers, such as workers, farmers, and entrepreneurs, over consumers or other groups. Producerism can manifest in various forms, including support for protectionist trade policies, subsidies for domestic industries, and efforts to promote self-sufficiency and national economic independence. It also lends credence to exclusionary forms of provision.
This emphasis on work participation within welfare programs dovetails producerism, underscoring the significance of productive labour and workers’ contributions to society through increasing adherence to workfare initiatives. Workfare refers to government programs or policies requiring individuals receiving welfare benefits to participate in some form of work or job training as a condition of assistance (Crisp & Fletcher, 2008). Unlike traditional welfare programs, which may provide financial support without a work requirement, workfare aims to promote self-sufficiency and reduce dependency on government assistance by encouraging recipients, via specific participation requirements, to gain job skills and enter the workforce. These requirements are often a combination of activities intended to improve the recipient’s job prospects and force the unemployed to contribute to society through unpaid or low-paid work comparable to community work (Ibid.). Forms of workfare programs include job placement services, subsidised employment, and mandatory community service or work assignments. Through workfare programmes, governments seek to enhance recipients’ employability and instil a sense of societal obligation to be productive members of society.
While employment can have a positive effect on well-being, the issue is not that the workfare approach may find jobs for those who want them; rather, it lies in that liberal protections are taken out of the equation as the main point of the welfare state, creating perverse incentives for the welfare state to become the surveyor and punisher of uncompliant citizens. This approach discourages fairness and social justice (Bonoli, 2010) because if all that matters is productivity, pensions serve little purpose, as does education beyond vocational training and services that cover sectors of the population that cannot access employment, such as those caring for family members and those with disabilities that prevent them from gaining employment. The issue is not that people will be encouraged to work but that this becomes a primary consideration of the welfare state, putting all others aside. In other words, welfare states have been recalibrated towards market imperatives and stripped of liberal notions.
Producerism can be said to be the ideological force behind workfare policies and is linked to welfare chauvinism (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Geva (2021), Cinpoeş and Norocel (2020) identify a producerist shift that coexists with welfare chauvinism in some post-communist countries. These authors argue that with the fall of the Soviet Union, post-communist countries like Poland, Hungary, and Romania aimed to shed anything resembling communism, hurriedly embracing neoliberal values to better fit into the rest of Europe. This symbolic return to Europe was so complete that the reconstructions of national membership and identity were combined with notions of entrepreneurship and self.
The vilification of people with low incomes is evidenced in Romania with the use of ‘asistat’ as a slur, a term referring to social assistance recipients; in Hungary, a Roma-specific welfare policy targeted Roma minorities who were construed as unwilling to work and carry their weight in society; and in Poland, this was articulated as lazy guests freeloading onto their hard-working hosts (Ibid.).
Other times, producerism can work to articulate the caveats of universality by allowing proxy exclusions. That is to say, producerism has redefined what universality is. Moral gymnastics have always surrounded universality considerations; at another time in history, being impious may have rendered someone unworthy of assistance and access to an almshouse (Lambeth Archives, 2024). What is novel about the redefinition of universality is that it is underpinned by neoliberal ideas, which claim to be unbiased and rational approaches to defining deservedness (Davies, 2014). By claiming rationality, producerism can help implement exclusionary policies that might otherwise create a political backlash by liberals and progressives.
Of course, it was a matter of economic competition. In that case, a purely homo-economicus approach to the ageing population challenges in many countries would involve welcoming migrants in any country they wished to work in, as they would contribute to the competitiveness of the nation and pay into the tax systems that fund the welfare state (Marois et al., 2020). However, producerism has been used to legitimise exclusionary welfare provisions that may ultimately operate against market efficiency. These neoliberal justifications for exclusion are most efficient as they sanitise and depoliticise prejudiced views under economic imperatives. The depoliticisation of prejudice enables governments to exclude significant portions of their residents from support. For instance, they may deny some individuals access to legal work and then claim those individuals are ineligible for assistance because they lack contributions or the required legal status.
Denmark, for example, currently has a two-tiered welfare system, one for Danish citizens and another for the rest (Van der Waal et al., 2013). Denmark prides itself on its universalist welfare regime; however, the universality of its provisions is truly exclusionary when considering that only some residents are included within this universal provision.
In the UK, the government, on the one hand, takes part in women empowerment campaigns (UN Women, 2023) and actively implements gender equality in the workplace regulations (UK Legislation, 2023) while at the same time actively restricting women from seeking help when experiencing domestic violence when they are not UK nationals and are stamped ‘no recourse to public funds’ in their passports. These actions can be justified under producerism because these groups are excluded only due to their lack of contributions (Pennings, 2020).
Producerism suggests that workers are virtuous and hard-working but are being squeezed by non-productive others both above them, such as bureaucrats, politicians, elites, bankers, and international capital, and below them, such as immigrants and undeserving poor who rely on benefits paid for by the labour of others. Moreover, it articulates and justifies divisions in a language many understand as unbiased and rational.
According to Larsen (2008), how welfare regimes are structured can impact how the public views those who are poor or unemployed. Van der Waal et al. (2013) have observed that various welfare regimes handle the provision/restriction duality differently but that, for the most part, producerist ideas of deservedness come to the fore. Guentner et al. (2016) find that groups framed as economically unproductive start to be considered a kind of human surplus and are, therefore, undeserving. In a UK example, a group of low-income individuals were pushed out of London’s social housing, resulting in their displacement because they were considered not to contribute sufficiently to the city to maintain their place in it (ibid.). Jingwei He (2022) finds the same concerning Chinese people’s attitudes toward welfare entitlements for rural-to-urban migrants.
Ward and Denney (2021) document a consistent rhetoric of abuse towards migrants framed around myths of them as less productive than nationals. Thus, we see here that producerist logic has been amalgamated with populism to create a type of welfare chauvinism that is both economic and cultural. This is crucial because, as argued, welfare states undergo producerist reconstructions whereby market-based logics are applied to social provision. This reconstructs the welfare state and the definition of universal provision upon caveated universal criteria – where universal does not mean everybody but those considered deserving. Hence, it is essential to re-examine welfare policies to ensure they promote fairness and social justice universally.
This section has discussed the evolution and challenges of welfare states, with a particular focus on the idea of universality in social protection. The argument is that welfare states have increasingly prioritised market-driven goals such as productivity and cost-efficiency over liberal objectives like equality and democracy. This shift has led to welfare systems that, while offering universal social protection, may fail to address underlying issues of inequality and poverty. Additionally, producerism was introduced as a factor contributing to the narrow and exclusive redefinition of universality. It rationalises social provisions that are only accessible to those considered deserving based on their productivity.
Outsourcing, Monetising and Reducing Public Spending on Social Protection
Thus far, this paper has mentioned privatisation and outsourcing only in relation to the universality of provision. Welfare states have undergone recalibrations that have made them settle for the simple goal of extended coverage. However, this may conceal issues with the quality of provision. I have argued that welfare states have always had an exclusionary criterion of deservedness disguised as logical and unbiased; the current iteration has been based on economic competition, best encapsulated under producerism. This has lent credence to policies of exclusion that affect the range, coverage and quality of welfare provisions.
In this section, I argue that welfare states have become privatised and outsourced to continue to exist. In the process, they have prioritised market imperatives instead of the liberal protections liberal democracies declare to prioritise. Nevertheless, this shift has not necessarily resulted in cost savings, improved service quality, or decreased public spending.
Public-private partnerships are becoming increasingly popular among governments to finance, design, build, and operate infrastructure projects and outsource goods and services, sometimes fully delivered by third parties but financed by governments (Jobér, 2023). The idea that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector and hence services ought to be outsourced, or else be done poorly and at more cost by the state, has prompted commissioning and subcontracting structures that are not necessarily more supportive of people’s needs, as I will shortly elaborate. Moreover, these outsourced services are not ipso facto cheaper than direct provision. This has resulted in for-profit companies becoming the primary or exclusive providers of public employment services in several countries (McGann, 2023) and failing to deliver the expected reduction in public spending on social protection.
Between 2005 and 2010, the total value of partnership projects in low and middle-income countries more than doubled (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). In OECD countries, around 36 per cent of total general spending is dedicated to public social protection, of which around 9 per cent is outsourced to private providers (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). In other words, a significant portion of OECD countries’ GDP is outsourced to the private sector. Swank (2000) argues that the structural transformations of welfare states include privatisation, decentralisation of authority, segmentation of benefit equality, and an increased emphasis on outsourcing provisions to non-state actors such as charities or private organisations through publicly commissioned services and are taking place worldwide. These changes align social policy with market-oriented values, emphasising work and market efficiency.
Whether these changes can be considered efficient depends on their goal. A 2018 OECD report showed that the rationale for privatising public provisions has mainly been geared towards economic stabilisation, improving the efficiency of the markets, or raising fiscal resources. The criteria for privatisation are based on two critical assumptions. First, it assumes that private markets are the most efficient way to provide public services. Second, it assumes that privatisation is the default option; those against it are tasked to prove why public services should remain state-owned (OECD, 2018).
With that in mind, the goal has been largely achieved if the rationale for privatising public provision is to improve market structures or economic efficiency. The state has effectively subsidised the private sector by providing extensive and profitable government contracts. Public sector privatisation and outsourcing have created millionaires and significant money transfers from the public to the private sector, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic (Lilly et al., 2020).
The OECD report is interesting because it presents how disjointed the rationales for privatisation are from public protection. The report shows evident market prioritisation over the protection of liberal values that countries in the OECD area may otherwise claim to prioritise.
The second argument in this section is that the goal of reducing public spending on social protection through privatisation and outsourcing of social protection has not materialised. As shown in the examples above, public spending is at its highest despite recent fluctuations. While raising fiscal resources by making savings in social public spending may be one of the rationales provided for privatisation, the outcomes do not necessarily give the taxpayer the opportunity for a discount (OECD, 2018). Countries continue to dedicate large sections of their GDP to social spending, but the savings expected due to the privatisation and monetisation of welfare provision have not been fulfilled. Moreover, welfare provision has not improved either; headlines abound about funding losses and service deterioration (Bambra, 2019; Boylan & Ho, 2017; Konzelmann, 2019; Pentaraki, 2017).
This increase in privatisation and outsourcing of public provision means that the state has less direct control over the provision of public services but oversees the delivery of these services through monitoring and surveillance. Many local authorities in the UK have shifted to commissioning-only or at least commissioning-heavy provisions (Dickinson, 2014), with staff overseeing the contracts and ensuring goals are met. Commissioning aims to decrease the government’s involvement in providing services. This encourages public authorities to act as enablers with a strategic oversight function that assesses the needs of defined populations and the outcomes delivered by third parties. The commissioning economy comprises an extensive network of public bodies, private firms, and third sector organisations that are variously involved in providing services (Macmillan & Paine, 2021). The state has thus reconfigured its mission as a regulator rather than a direct provider of welfare and other crucial services (Yeung, 2010).
This shift from rowing to steering (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) has had two notable outcomes; the first is that, as we have seen, no saving has occurred. Since 1995, government social spending has increased in many countries (The World Bank, 2024). While several countries appear to be decreasing their social spending recently, they have maintained a very high level of social expenditure (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Governments still have to employ people to manage the commissioned services, and these private contracts are not cheaper for the public purse or better for the service user, as seen in the Swedish and Dutch examples.
The Netherlands is a valuable reminder of this reality as the country has a very high social expenditure budget and the highest level of outsourcing of social provision globally (ibid.). It has been very active in privatisation for around 30 years; between 1980 and 2015, the expenditure on health was around 5 per cent. Around the late 1990s, when privatisation and outsourcing began in earnest, the country spent around 1% less on health than it had a decade before. However, at the beginning of the 2000s, the number increased to around 6 per cent, peaking at 6.5 per cent in 2015, and currently at around 5.7 per cent (OECDc, 2024).
At the same time, the service provision became conditional and monetised, resulting in all persons residing in the Netherlands and all non-residents working in the Netherlands being required to buy private healthcare insurance (Pennings, 2020). In short, the Netherlands pays more now for a health provision that requires insurance premiums and deductibles (co-pays) to access (Government of the Netherlands, 2024). This diminished (in terms of accessibility) health provision is paid twice, once through taxes and again directly when patients require provision.
The second notable outcome is the loss of democratic capacity. The capacity-building exercise of democratic institutions occurs daily when providing goods and services to its citizens. When managing these social goods and services is outsourced, so is the daily exercise of liberal provision. As a result, welfare states lose their ability to maintain the liberal institutions that underpin democracies. Capacity building is essential for successfully navigating, adapting, and flourishing in a rapidly changing world (United Nations, 2024). When this is outsourced, governments become dependent on private provision and lose the ability to deal with complex challenges.
In the UK, outsourcing accelerated during the COVID-19 pandemic, when the government contracted various private providers to manage the logistics of and store personal protective equipment, the national drive-in testing centres and super-labs, run the contact tracing programme, build the COVID-19 datastore and onboard returning health workers (British Medical Association (BMA), 2020). The BMA report (Ibid.) shows that continued outsourcing of the national health service in the UK significantly limited the government’s ability to mount a coordinated response during the public health emergency. Paradoxically, outsourcing was used to fill gaps created by sustained outsourcing and privatisation.
Of course, the changes in privatisation and outsourcing of public provision are not unique to the Netherlands, the UK, or health. Indeed, this process is taking place widely (Jobér, 2023) and over various areas of social protection spending (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). Meanwhile, private sector involvement in public provision trend is on the rise with no apparent slowdown on the horizon (British Medical Association, 2020; OECD, 2018); all the while, public spending on social protection has stayed at very high levels, and state capacity has become dependent on the private sector.
This section has examined the trend of privatisation and outsourcing in welfare states, arguing that these practices have shifted the focus from liberal protections to market imperatives. Welfare states, driven by the belief in the private sector’s efficiency, have increasingly turned to public-private partnerships and outsourcing to deliver public services. This shift has not necessarily resulted in cost savings or improved service quality. Instead, as commissioning and outsourcing increase, so does public spending, with significant portions of GDP now directed to private providers, furthering a disconnect between the goals of economic efficiency and the quality of social protection. Welfare states have increasingly become commodification engines, prioritising market-driven goals such as productivity and cost-efficiency over liberal objectives such as equality and democracy.
Moreover, the reliance on private sector provision has undermined democratic capacities by reducing the state’s direct control over public services and eroding the daily exercise of liberal provision. This dependence on private providers has also compromised the state’s ability to handle complex challenges. Privatisation and outsourcing have thus not achieved the intended economic efficiencies or service quality improvements. Instead, public spending remains high, and state capacity has become increasingly reliant on the private sector, raising concerns about the future of social protection and democratic governance.
Conclusion
Welfare states are complex and multifaceted. They have inherent issues, and their goals of social betterment coexist with older themes, including the condemnation of the ‘unworthy poor.’ Moreover, welfare states are costly, consuming significant portions of GDP, and can sometimes reinforce societal divides instead of bridging them. Welfare states are intrinsically political, defining acceptable and deserving versions of citizens.
However, they are also essential for equality and democracy and for lifting many out of poverty. This paper acknowledged that welfare states’ strengths are more potent than their weaknesses and aimed to identify the nature of the challenges facing them today.
Welfare states have fared rough neoliberal waters in some ways through recalibration strategies. By submitting to market imperatives and focusing on and redefining universality, outsourcing, and monetising public provision, they have managed to keep their place in society. However, these recalibrations have not met the promised savings to the taxpayer nor the desired liberal outcomes in protecting society’s most vulnerable. Welfare states have kept their places in society, but much has been lost in adapting to market imperatives.
These recalibrations have aligned welfare states with market imperatives, emphasising cost savings and competitive operation and forfeiting liberal priorities in the following ways. For example, focusing solely on universality has obscured and exacerbated existing inequalities. Second, by redefining universality through neoliberal criteria, welfare states have lent credence and inadvertently aligned themselves with the populist ‘us versus them’ criterion of difference. Third, outsourcing has led to higher costs without improved service quality. Lastly, such outsourcing has eroded democratic capacity as governments become dependent on private providers, losing the ability to manage social challenges independently.
In this paper, two main points were presented. The first is that the welfare state is undergoing recalibration, not austerity. This was illustrated through explanations around social public expenditure, the move towards outsourcing, and the redefined criteria of deservedness. Despite some small recent dips, the expenditure has increased overall. Social public spending is among the highest it has ever been, but what has changed is how it is spent. With that in mind, the issue is not austerity. Thus, the problem is that social spending is financing the private sector through outsourcing contracts instead of focusing on improving its provision.
As articulated here, welfare states are not luxuries; they can reduce poverty, protect citizens against shocks, and embolden citizens to be capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy, especially during crises and economic downturns. However, the essential liberal values that welfare states aim to protect are compromised when market imperatives become the priority. The public sector has effectively subsidised the private sector through commissioning contracts that do not necessarily provide cheaper or better support for service users compared to what governments can offer. This is because the primary incentive for the private sector is profit-making and contract renewal rather than focusing on reducing poverty and inequalities, protecting citizens from shocks, or empowering citizens to be capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy.
We now know that outsourcing and privatising public provision have not resulted in savings for the taxpayer; decades of data show that welfare states are not spending less (Ortiz-Ospina & Roser, 2023). However, when citizens inquire about what has happened to their community services, schools, or health services, a word frequently used is austerity. Used colloquially, austerity refers to budget cuts for public social spending. Still, if these budgets have expanded, then this means that the challenges faced by welfare states are not only due to austerity.
In the second point, I have demonstrated that governments’ focus on the universality of welfare states is at the expense of achieving liberal goals. The universality of provision, as shown, may create the illusion that it is worth having a welfare state just for its own sake, even if it barely functions as a social equaliser and poverty-reducing tool.
I reiterate that my argument is not for eliminating universality in welfare states but rather for implementing policies that prevent the unequal distribution of benefits within universal welfare programs. Specifically, I posited that governments might reconsider financing the private sector via outsourcing contracts and instead exercise their liberal muscle by working on improving their provision, not just coverage.
So much institutional knowledge has been lost through outsourcing, knowledge that may help adapt services to assist better those slipping through the cracks. By creating or rebuilding their institutional capacity, governments are better placed to deal with emerging crises instead of relying on the private sector, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic. By engaging with and prioritising market imperatives, liberal values have been put to one side, and producerism has entered welfare provision, shaping welfare programmes and objectives. However, this focus on universality is a recalibration emerging from an erroneous understanding that welfare states must trim their goals due to limited funding.
The two arguments presented challenge the idea that citizens must settle for scraps, as welfare states are suitably funded to provide the required provisions. Since the issue is not austerity, I suggest that citizens consider whether their welfare states suitably protect them under the current provision or if market imperatives have been prioritised.
The recalibration of welfare states often comes at the expense of service quality, equity, and democratic capacity, raising concerns about welfare states’ future direction. In truth, citizens are paying dearly for a poor product and are losing their capacity as capable, educated, and healthy protectors of democracy to reject a poor deal.
Confusion over the real cause of welfare state retrenchment obscures potential solutions. This diagnosis and the suggestion that welfare states may look beyond universality and stop working towards market imperatives are more straightforward said than done, as welfare states are intrinsically political and politicised entities. Still, I propose that by suitably diagnosing the issue, societies might have a fighting chance to save welfare states and, in turn, strengthen liberal democracies
(*) Jellen Olivares-Jirsell is a Doctoral candidate in Politics at Kingston University London. Her scholarly contributions include publications in the Global Affairs and Populism journals. Research activities include roles with the Trust Lab project at Swansea University and EUscepticOBS and Populism in the Age of COVID-19 at Malmo University. Research interests encompass politics, norms and ideologies, populism, neoliberalism, welfare states, trust, and polarization.
References
Andersen, J., & Bjørklund, T. (1990). Structural Changes and New Cleavages: The Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway. Acta Sociologica, 33(2), 195-217. https://doi.org/10.1177/000169939003300303
Akgunduz, Y., & Plantenga, J. (2014). Childcare in the Netherlands: Lessons in privatisation. European Early Childhood Education Research Journal, 22(3), 379–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350293X.2014.912900
Alesina, A., Favero, C. & Giavazzi, F. (2019). Austerity: When It Works and When It Doesn’t. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Bambra, C. (2019). Health in Hard Times: Austerity and Health Inequalities. Bristol: Policy Press.
Barr, B., Kinderman, P., & Whitehead, M. (2015). Trends in Mental Health Inequalities in England During a Period of Recession, Austerity and Welfare Reform 2004 to 2013. Social Science & Medicine, pp. 147, 324–331. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2015.11.009
Begg, I., Mushövel, F., & Niblett, R. (2015). The Welfare State in Europe, Visions for Reform. Chatham House. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/20150917WelfareStateEuropeNiblettBeggMushovelFinal.pdf
Bergman, M., (2022). Labour Market Policies and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties: The Role of Nostalgic Producerism, Occupational Risk, and Feedback Effects. European Political Science Review, 14(4), 520–543. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175577392200025X
Bhambra, G., & Holmwood, J. (2018). Colonialism, Postcolonialism and The Liberal Welfare State. New Political Economy, 23(5), 574-587. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2017.1417369
Blyth, M. (2013). Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bonoli, G. (2010). The political economy of active labour market policy. Working Papers on the Reconciliation of Work and Welfare in Europe, RECWOWE Publication, Dissemination and Dialogue Centre, Edinburgh. https://era.ed.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1842/3290/REC-WP_0110_Bonoli.pdf
Bonoli, G., & Fabienne, L. (2018). Good Intentions and Matthew effects: Access Biases in Participation in Active Labour Market Policies. Journal of European Public Policy, 25(6), 894-911. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1401105
Bos, A., Kruse, F., & Jeurissen, P. (2020). For-Profit Nursing Homes in the Netherlands: What Factors Explain Their Rise? International Journal of Health Services, 50(4), 431-443. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020731420915658
Boylan, R., & Ho, V. (2017). The Most Unkindest Cut of All? State Spending on Health, Education, And Welfare During Recessions. National Tax Journal, 70(2), 329–366. https://doi.org/10.17310/ntj.2017.2.04
Busemeyer, M., Rathgeb, P., & Sahm, A. (2021). Authoritarian Values and the Welfare State: The Social Policy Preferences of Radical Right Voters. West European Politics, 45, 77 – 101. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2021.1886497
Crisp, R., & Fletcher, D. (2008). A Comparative Review of Workfare Programmes in the United States, Canada and Australia. Department for Work and Pensions. https://www.shu.ac.uk/-/media/home/research/cresr/reports/r/review-workfare-usa-canada-australia.pdf
Crosland, C. (1964). The Future of Socialism. Michigan: University of Michigan.
Davies, W. (2014). Neoliberalism: A Bibliographic Review. Theory, Culture & Society, 31(7/8), 309–317. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276414546383
de Koster, W., Achterberg, P., & van der Waal, J. (2013). De Koster, W., Achterberg, P. and van der Waal, J. (2013). ‘The New Right and the Welfare State: The Electoral Relevance of Welfare Chauvinism and Welfare Populism in the Netherlands’,. International Political Science Review / Revue Internationale de Science Politique, 34(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512112455443
Dickinson, H. (2014). Public Service Commissioning: What Can be Learned From the UK Experience? Australian Journal of Public Administration, 73(1), 14–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8500.12060
Fazzari, S., Ferri, P., Greenberg, E., & Variato, A. (2013). Aggregate Demand, Instability, and Growth. Review of Keynesian Economics, 1(1), 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-011-9277-8
Gamito, C. (2022). Returns-to-Education Gaps Between Native and Migrant Workers: The Influence of Economic Integration on Their Drivers. Are Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) an Effective Remediation Tool? A Case Comparison: Italy, Germany, Denmark and Cyprus. Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series, 56, 63–81. https://doi.org/10.12775/bgss-2022-0013
Geva, D. (2021). Orban’s Ordonationalism as Post-Neoliberal Hegemony. Theory, Culture & Society, 38(6), 71–93. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276421999435
GOV.UK. (2023). Billions of Investments for British Manufacturing to Boost Economic Growth. Retrieved 07 03, 2024, from https://www.gov.uk/government/news/billions-of-investment-for-british-manufacturing-to-boost-economic-growth
Government of the Netherlands. (2024). Standard Health Insurance. Retrieved 09 05, 2024, from https://www.government.nl/topics/health-insurance/standard-health-insurance
Guentner, S., Lukes, S., Stanston, R., Vollmer, B., & Wilding, J. (2016). Bordering Practices in the UK Welfare System. Critical Social Policy, 36(3), 391–411. https://doi.org/10.1177/0261018315622609
Heckman, J., & Landersø, R. (2021). Lessons for Americans from Denmark About Inequality and Social Mobility. Labour Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.labeco.2021.101999
Hutt, R. (2019). Sweden is a Top Performer in Well-Being. Here’s Why. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/05/sweden-is-a-top-performer-on-well-being-here-s-why/
Janlöv, N., Blume, S., Glenngård, A., Hanspers, K., Anell, A., & Merkur, S. (2023). Sweden: Health System Review 2023. Health Systems in Transition, 25(4). https://eurohealthobservatory.who.int/publications/i/sweden-health-system-review-2023
Jingwei He, A. (2022). The Welfare Is Ours: Rural-to-Urban Migration and Domestic Welfare Chauvinism in Urban China. Journal of Contemporary China, 31(134), 202-218. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2021.1945735
Jobér, A. (2023). Private Actors in Policy Processes. Entrepreneurs, Edupreneurs and Policyneurs. Journal of Education Policy, 39(1), 20–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2023.2166128
Kenworthy, L. (1999). Do Social-Welfare Policies Reduce Poverty? A Cross-National Assessment. Social Forces, 77(3), 1119–1139. https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/77.3.1119
King, D. (1987). The State and the Social Structures of Welfare in Advanced Industrial Democracies. Theory and Society, 16(6), 841–868. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138071
Konzelmann, S. (2019). Austerity. Cambridge, UK : Polity.
Lambeth Archives. (2024). Behind the Blue Doors. Brixton, London: Lambeth Archives. https://www.lambeth.gov.uk/events/behind-blue-doors
Larsen, C. (2008). The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes Influence Public Support. Comparative Political Studies, 41(2), 145–169. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006295234
Lilly, A., Tetlow, G., Pope, T., & Davies, O. (2020). The Cost of Covid-19 The impact of Coronavirus on the UK’s Public Finances. London: Institute for Government. https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/cost-of-covid19.pdf
Loopstra, R., McKee, M., Katikireddi, S., Taylor-Robinson, D., Barr, B., & Stuckler, D. (2016). Austerity and Old-Age Mortality in England: a Longitudinal Cross-Local Area Analysis, 2007–2013. Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine, 109(3), 109–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0141076816632215
Macmillan, R., & Paine, A. (2021). The Third Sector in a Strategically Selective Landscape – The Case of Commissioning Public Services. Journal of Social Policy, 50(3), 606–626. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0047279420000355
Marois, G., Bélanger, A., & Lutz, W. (2020). Population Aging, Migration, and Productivity in Europe. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences PNAS, 117(14), 7690–7695. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918988117
McGann, M. (2023). The Marketisation of Welfare-to-Work in Ireland Governing Activation at the Street-Level. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
Norocel, C., & Cinpoeş, R. (2020). Nostalgic Nationalism, Welfare Chauvinism, and Migration Anxieties in Central and Eastern Europe. In C. Norocel, A. Hellström, & M. Jørgensen (Eds.), Nostalgia and Hope: Intersections between Politics of Culture, Welfare, and Migration in Europe. Springer open /IMISCOE research series. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-41694-2_4
OECD. (2015). Improving Schools In Sweden: An OECD Perspective. OECD.
OECD. (2018). Privatisation and the Broadening of Ownership of State-Owned Enterprises 2008-2018. OECD. Retrieved 09 09, 2024, from https://www.oecd.org/corporate/Privatisation-and-the-Broadening-of-Ownership-of-SOEs-Stocktaking-of-National-Practices.pdf
Ortiz-Ospina, E., & Roser, M. (2023). Government Spending. Retrieved 04 16, 2024, from https://ourworldindata.org/government-spending
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. New York: Penguin Books.
Parolin, Z., Desmond, M., & Wimer, C. (2023). Inequality Below the Poverty Line since 1967: The Role of the U.S. Welfare State. American Sociological Review, 88(5), 782–809. https://doi.org/10.1177/00031224231194019
Patrick, R. (2017). For Whose Benefit? The Everyday Realities of Welfare Reform. Bristol: Bristol: University Press.
Pavolini, E., & Van Lancker, W. (2018). The Matthew Effect in Childcare Use: A Matter of Policies or Preferences? Journal of European Public Policy, 25(6), 878-893. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1401108
Peck, J., & Theodore, N. (2010). Recombinant Workfare, Across the Americas: Transnationalizing “Fast” Social Policy. Geoforum, 41(2), 195–208. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2010.01.001
Pennings, F. (2020). Migrants’ Access to Social Protection in the Netherlands. In J. Lafleur, & D. Vintila (Eds.), Migration and Social Protection in Europe and Beyond (Volume 1) Comparing Access to Welfare Entitlements. IMISCOE Research Series.
Pentaraki, M. (2017). “I Am in a Constant State of Insecurity Trying to Make Ends Meet, like Our Service Users”: Shared Austerity Reality between Social Workers and Service Users—Towards a Preliminary Conceptualisation. The British Journal of Social Work, 47(4), 1245–1261. https://doi.org/10.1093/bjsw/bcw099
Pestoff, V. (2006). Citizens and Co-Production of Welfare Services: Childcare in Eight European Countries. Public Management Review, 8(4), 503–519. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719030601022882
Pierson, C., & Leimgruber, M. (2010). The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State. In F. Castles (Ed.), Intellectual Roots (pp. 32–44). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9515.2011.00775_1.x
Swank, D. (2000). Social Democratic Welfare States in a Global Economy: Scandinavia in Comparative Perspective. In R. Geyer, C. Ingebritsen, & J. Moses (Eds.), Globalization, Europeanization and the End of Scandinavian Social Democracy?. London: Palgrave Macmillan
The Guardian. (2024). The latest News and Comments on Economic Austerity. Retrieved 07 03, 2024, from https://www.theguardian.com/business/austerity
The World Bank. (2024). DataBankWorld Development Indicators. The World Bank. https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators
UK Legislation. (2023). The Equality Act 2010 (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations 2017. Retrieved 05 18, 2023, from https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2017/9780111152010
UN Women. (2023). Partner spotlight: United Kingdom. Retrieved 05 17, 2023, from https://www.unwomen.org/en/partnerships/donor-countries/top-donors/united-kingdom
Union of International Associations. (2024). Austerity | The Encyclopedia of World Problems. Retrieved 04 19, 2024, from http://encyclopedia.uia.org/en/problem/austerity
United Nations. (2024). Capacity-Building. Retrieved 06 05, 2024, from https://www.un.org/en/academic-impact/capacity-building
Van den Bossche,, C. (2019). Inequalities in the Netherlands. Women Engage for a Common Future. https://www.sdgwatcheurope.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/10.1.a-factsheet-NL.pdf
Van Der Waal, J., De Koster, W., & Van Oorschot, W. (2013). Three Worlds of Welfare Chauvinism? How Welfare Regimes Affect Support for Distributing Welfare to Immigrants in Europe. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 15(2), 164-181. https://doi.org/10.1080/13876988.2013.785147
Ward, P., & Denney, S. (2022). Welfare Chauvinism Among Co-Ethnics: Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment in South Korea. International Migration, pp. 60, 74–90. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12937
West, A. (2014). Academies in England and Independent Schools (‘Fristående Skolor’) in Sweden: Policy, Privatisation, Access and Segregation. Research Papers in Education, 29(3), 330–350. https://doi.org/10.1080/02671522.2014.885732
Wren-Lewis, S. (2018). ‘Mediamacro’ Why the News Media Ignores Economic Experts. In The Media and Austerity. London: Routledge.
Yeung, K. (2010). The Regulatory State. In R. Baldwin (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Regulation (pp. 64–84). https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560219.001.0001
Zakaria, F. (2007). The Future of Democracy. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New York: W.W. Norton.
[1]Acknowledgement: I am grateful for the feedback this paper received during and after the workshop and the anonymous reviewers. I am also incredibly thankful for Hannah Geddes’s full engagement as a discussant.
Tostes, Ana Paula. (2024). “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.” Populism & Politics (P&P).European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 5, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0043b
Abstract
The article seeks to investigate the EU crises impacting electoral support for new right-wing and left-wing extremist ideologies with populist characteristics. We examine populist political parties’ performances in national elections in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of specific and diffuse Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Finally, we confirm that Euroscepticism increases in periods of crisis and can be identified as expressions of those contesting EU policies related to the economy, specifically, or social and political integration when it encompasses a more generalized attitude against the EU.
Keywords: populism, Euroscepticism, EU crises
(Received June 6, 2024, Published December 5, 2024.)
By Ana Paula Tostes*
Introduction
Despite the ambiguities of the concept of populism (Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2012), in this article, we discuss its emergence in the context of the EU integration process, reflected in the increase in Euroscepticism. Popular support for EU institutions and policies has been the primary measure of the legitimacy of the authority of the European institutions, as it provides greater transparency on the coherence between the expectations and perceptions of European citizens and EU governance (Cmakalová & Rolenc, 2012). Public opinion and voter preference for pro-European political parties have been considered relevant in the conditions under which direct elections are held only for the European Parliament, and supranational institutions have been created without public participation and sufficient understanding of the European public.
For this study, we used the national electoral results of extremist political parties from the time the new European far-right ideology emerged in the late 1980s to 2023. We examined the electoral platforms, political strategies, and electoral support of populist political parties in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of Euroscepticism in the region and extremist far-right and far-left political parties.
There is a significant amount of literature about the impact of regional integration on European societies, domestic politics, and party systems. Scholars have engaged in lengthy debates on its impact levels, limits and importance (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992; Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 2007; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996). Taggart (1998) and Marks et al. (2002, 2006) examined voter preferences in national elections based on the level of support for regional integration. They found that national political parties’ position on the regional integration process in Europe is an important variable in explaining voter preferences. Marks et al. (2002, 2006) rated European electors’ ideological and party positions according to the level of support for integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Issues related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” elements in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters.
Since the early single market consolidation until the euro crisis in 2008-2009, views that strongly oppose economic integration, such as the ones voiced by far-left political parties, have not received much support from voters. Criticisms of the liberal model for a single market have not been enough to convince citizens that the integration process could cause actual harm, especially those who are distant from it and do not feel that it threatens economic losses. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, the countries affected the most by the 2008 financial crisis benefitted from the European Structural Funds resource transfers. The situation was similar during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in an unprecedented economic contraction in 2020. In both cases, the EU transfer of benefits and funds was fast, forceful and well-coordinated at all levels.
The same cannot be said about the opponents of social and political integration, the same groups in European societies that see the migration crisis as a critical element causing intolerance and populism to grow in the region. Since the European migration crisis began in 2015, there has been a considerable increase in the politicization of the defence of national identity and culture due to the stances of new far-right political parties.
We have researched public documents and sources and political party manifestos to classify populist political parties by country and, according to Marks et al. (2002, 2006), scale for the consideration of ideological positions impacting the support for integration in the economic sphere and the political and social spheres. Then, we collected the number of votes each party received in each national (Parliamentary) election in the 15 Western European countries to apply the dimensions of Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).[1]
EU Contestation and Populism
No crisis in the history of the European Union (EU) compares to the massive wave of migration to Europe, which reached its highest point in 2015 and has not yet come to an end. The EU is a complex and long-term construction, which would only be possible to build continuously or without route changes. There have been essential crises in recent decades, including the Maastricht crisis in the 1990s, the attempt to approve the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the series of crises triggered by the economic and financial collapse that affected all the countries in the eurozone in 2009. The EU’s crises have been the object of research and theories to explain different features, contexts, and impacts on the legitimacy and stability of its institutional structure and policies (Brack & Gürkan, 2020). However, a common consequence of the economic and migration crises was the growth of political radicalism and EU contestation. Over the last two decades, the resurgence of terrorism and political radicalism has contributed to the emergence of a socio-political scenario that has become a new normal for Europe: one fraught with assuming populisms and nationalisms that have chosen the EU as a target of criticism.
This article does not ignore a broader, global wave of conservatism that uses populist political platforms, affecting political environments across the Americas, from the United States to Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries. However, in the case of the EU, which represents the most critical and successful regional organization and is mentioned as a model for other regions such as South America, it is important to understand under which political circumstances greater integration among states generates opposition. In other words, when does support for regional institutions and norms turn into criticism and skepticism?
Populism found fertile ground to develop during the two major recent crises in the EU: when the euro crises shook the eurozone’s member states (2008-2009) and during the peak in European immigration levels (2015). Although this new acceptance and recognition of criticisms of the excesses of EU institutionalization and the distance between it and national civil society sectors had different effects on different groups, EU contestation was a common strategy for many of them. Criticisms about accountability and participation in building European architecture have always existed. Still, the “nudges” (Sunstein, 2020) are not capable of generating a new set of critical positions articulated around a narrative that accuses elites and representative models of usurping nativist and identity preferences. We now know, especially after the Brexit experience, that criticism of the EU is stronger among portions of the UK population that do not feel that they benefit from globalization or integration, not even the way they facilitate the circulation of people, goods, services and capital within the European Single Market region.[2] Disapproval of the representative model, which extends to the EU, has come mainly from those who possibly (or apparently) perceive themselves as having been harmed by European regional integration or not benefitting from it, even if their dissatisfaction with political, social or economic issues are not related to regional integration itself.
Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) examined voter preferences in national elections and the relations, if any, to regional integration. The authors rated voters’ ideological and party positions according to their level of support for European integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Themes related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” issues found in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters. Based on their categorization of political parties’ party family by ideology (Mair & Mudde, 1998; Marks et al., 2002), we expect that economic crises are more likely to affect voters with critical views from the left and alternative side of the ideological spectrum, while those related to immigration affect more conservative and nationalist voters, whose ideological preferences are similar to those of the new extreme right-wing political parties.
In both cases, parties at the opposite ends of the political spectrum promise immediate and easy solutions to complex problems, which they frame in similar, comparable scenarios while evoking “fears,” “frustrations,” “anger,” or “resentments” (Müller, 2016, p. 12). Although populism is on the rise in different social and political contexts around the world, this article discusses a possible correlation between critical events associated with EU politics and policies and the increase in votes for populist electoral platforms fueled by social groups related to the new political cleavages identified with the extreme left and the extreme right (Marks et al., 2002; Kurt, 2013). When we look at national electoral results, we find that political and social turmoil is conducive to the success of populist strategies in EU member states’ national elections.
For this article, we used data from the 15 Western European member states (EU15) on electoral support for extremist political parties over nearly 40 years. These countries allow us to consider similarities in their political party ideologies and systems, as the period of the research enables us to identify changes in support for extremist political parties in national elections, as it goes from the time the new European far-right parties emerged in the 1980s (Ignazi, 1996) in the EU15 to recent days.[3]We do not consider their success in obtaining seats in national parliaments, but rather the votes they obtained to indicate voter support for the extremists’ platforms.
Theoretical and Conceptual Framework
The EU represents the status quo for liberal democracy, and it claims to be the promoter of the rule of law and Western values, both within the region of integration and outside it, through its international relations policies and strategies. Anti-establishment voters who fuel criticisms of representative institutions in national elections ground their positions on the regional model of EU institutionalization based on representation without any mechanisms for direct participation. The European Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, and the European Parliament elections are seen as “second-order” (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif & Norris, 1997) and less important than national ones. To support our argument, we revisited the literature on populism to find signs of populist political strategies in national elections that feed on dissatisfaction with supranational governance and regional integration.
Euroscepticism and Populisms
Euroscepticism has become a “catch-all term” (Bertoncini & Koenig, 2014) broadly used by society and the media, but also by the academic world that seeks to classify and conceptualize it to clarify positions on and the dimensions of skepticism towards Europe and its model of economic and political integration. As a result, there is a point where Euroscepticism and populism overlap. The latter is an older concept with several historical and methodological variations but no single unambiguous definition. Thus, in recognition of the conceptual difficulties related to the term “populism”, it is necessary to clarify how the term will be used and the limits of its use in this article. While we do not consider Euroscepticism a subcategory of populism, Eurosceptic parties have used populist strategies in their campaigns and accused Brussels of many economic problems and the migration crisis.
Although there is no single definition of populism, two common affirmations in the literature are that the term is generally used to discredit political opponents associated with an elite that has expropriated the power of the people and that the populist leader appears as an alternative for reclaiming legitimacy and the authority to represent the “popular will” (e.g., Taggart, 2000, 2002; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Stanley, 2008; Müller, 2016).
Political scientists use the term “populism” to refer to the call for the “people” to assume their place as historical actors. The social sciences field originally coined the term “populism” in the Weberian sense of “charismatic” leadership: in other words, a populist is a leader who seeks to have his actions legitimized directly by the people and replace institutions. Even so, new populism aims to use public consultations strategically to restore democratic legitimacy. A common conclusion in the literature is that populists attract voters who are “frustrated” with traditional politics and “angry” with or “resentful” towards elites that allegedly did not heed their demands (Müller, 2016). This helps to understand why populists demand public consultations to evade institutional control. This is not a novelty in the contemporary world, as Max Weber had already identified back in the 19th century in England (in “Politics as a Vocation”, published in 1919 in Germany) the practice of “charismatic leaders” holding direct consultations with the people. These leaders use plebiscitary democracy and direct dialogue with the masses, without the intermediation of institutions, to seek legitimacy to bypass procedures and representative institutions. Therefore, the most significant danger of contemporary populism is that it adopts democratic procedures and values to denounce the illegitimacy of democracy. They promise to rescue the people’s “will” while opposing an “elite”.
The “real” power of the people will not, however, be “democratically rescued” by promises of ongoing political participation nor by an “open-ended process of deliberation among actual citizens to generate a range of well-considered popular judgments” (Müller, 2016, p. 29). Populists use referendums to ratify what populist leaders have already chosen as the real issue for people to approve or disapprove to regain their lost identity (Müller, 2016). Popular participation is to substitute the action of representative institutions. It should be noted, however, that populism is not necessarily a prerogative of populist leaders or parties but rather a strategy that mainstream political groups can adopt. For instance, David Cameron’s promise to hold the British referendum on Brexit during the 2014 campaign to guarantee his victory in 2015 has been classified as a populist act committed by a non-populist leader.
Another example is the referendum held on July 5, 2015, in Greece, in which the “no” to the European bailout plan won. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, promoted the referendum while he continued to negotiate austerity packages for Greece. Tsipras opposed leaving the EU but allowed the referendum, as he did not believe the popular consultation would produce the outcomes it did. The people of Greece did not realize that the agreements on the rescue plan were already on the negotiating table with the Troika and that the alternative to austerity measures was the Grexit. Those who voted against the measures did not necessarily support the idea of Greece withdrawing from the EU. This is a clear case, then, where the oversimplification of an issue during a referendum can produce results that go against the people’s will and threaten the future of the EU. In any case, the strategic use of plebiscitary democracy in the EU to gain popularity and power is a topic of research that warrants further study.
Finally, populism is based on the promise of salvaging morality. The moralization of political discourse and the idea of recovering dignity lost or threatened by corrupt or mistaken politicians justify replacing institutions and procedures with calls for the people to make general decisions on often complex and multifaceted problems. Müller (2016) describes well the difference between “participation” and “the use of referendums” to approve predetermined ideas that do not always reflect the complexity of the solution to a political problem.
A Perfect Match: The EU’s Institutional Complexity and Populist Strategies
The EU is one of the most vital innovations in international relations in the 20th century, mainly due to its institutional network and the regionalization of domestic policies. The creation of the EU intensified diplomatic ties in the region and increased intergovernmental cooperation on national policy issues such as justice and security. It also established a supranational legal framework and regional governance. However, this institutional development was not accompanied by a proportional increase in the different societies’ understanding and information about the European model of integration’s impacts on the social and political life of the citizens of EU member states.
Created only in the 1990s, nearly four decades after the first steps towards regional integration were taken, European citizenship was to contribute to the consolidation of social integration. The existence of European citizenship was to generate a compelling connection between individuals and supranational institutions, such as European Community Law, which organizes not only relations between member states but also between the EU, its institutions and individuals. All this institutional construction was, however, the result of diplomatic action between national governments without the direct participation of the European public. Public consultations were rare, and significant reforms and regional policy innovations were carried out without efforts to raise public awareness about the impacts they would have on national societies.[4] Intergovernmental and diplomatic negotiations used the instruments of representation and indirect democracy to their fullest. This partly explains why mistrust and rejection of European policy grows as EU institutions become more consolidated and visible to citizens.
Ignazi (1996; 2003) and Kitschelt (1994, 1995) associate the force of the new extreme right in Europe with the significant changes in the political spectrum in the region. These authors consider the new European far-right parties a by-product of post-industrial societies and thus classify them as “anti-system parties”. Stefano Bartolini (2007) highlights another critical event in the development of post-industrial European societies. The author sustained that no other issue in “post-war electoral history” has had the same broad and standardizing effects across the European party system as the regional integration process has.
In this integration scenario, when immigration started to increase considerably, we witnessed anti-immigration policies become one of the main points on the platform of new far-right populist parties in the region when they reformulated the focus of their arguments and criticism of democratic institutions. At a lower level, anti-immigration attitudes have emerged since the signing and implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1985,which generated the slow (but consistent) growth of this new far-right ideology throughout the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1999, in response to the occupancy of seats in the EP by representatives of the far-right, racism and xenophobia began to be monitored regularly in the region, which led to the publication of the first report on the issue in June 1999.[5] It was clear, then, that European citizens’ coexistence with different cultures and nationalities generated social integration and defensive and xenophobic reactions. Around that time, the National Front, the most consolidated political party of the new far-right in Europe, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen (father of Marine Le Pen, president of the party since 2011), began to win seats in the French parliament in 1986. Jean-Marie Le Pen was elected to the European Parliament for the first time in 1984 and has not lost electoral support to represent French extremists in the EU since then.[6]
There is a wealth of theoretical works and empirical studies that establish definitions for and characterize a new right-wing ideology that emerged in Europe in the 1980s and its refinement and organization into parties in the 1990s (e.g., Ignazi, 1996; 2003; Kitschelt, 1988; 1994; 1995; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Taggart, 1996, 1998). While regional integration has undeniably impacted domestic politics, societies and party systems in Europe, there are different views. Scholars eventually reached a consensus that national political parties’ position on regional integration is essential in explaining voter preferences (Taggart, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; 2006).
The literature identifies a “new political cleavage” from industrial capitalism’s transformation into post-industrial capitalism (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1996; Marks et al., 2002). As this cleavage resulted from positions critical of globalization and the liberal model of representative democracy, the region of European integration became fertile ground for new ideas on identity and demands related to the expropriation of sovereignty by “an elite” or threats to local and national culture. Common populist rhetorical strategies seek to incorporate these ideas in their justification for alternatives to liberal democracy based on representation and the rule of law.
In the early 2000s, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) used the cleavage theory (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) to create a new definition of transnational cleavage. Later, transnational cleavage was accepted by the literature related to the rise of the supranational governance of the EU and the benefits and criticisms of the high level of regional institutionalization (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). They argue that contestation on European integration can structure political competition focusing on two faces of the EU: political (and social) integration and economic (liberal) integration. The result is that on the far-left, Euroscepticism appears stronger concerning measures of economic integration (the far-left is firmly against economic integration and moderately against political integration). Euroscepticism appears diffusely on the far-right (or the “new” far-right, as the authors described). In other words, no support is expected at all for the EU policies from the new far-right.
Kopecky and Mudde (2002) identified two categories of European scepticism that complement the classification of the European political parties described above: diffuse Euroscepticism and specific Euroscepticism. Looking at national elections in Europe in recent decades, we see that the difference between the two sides of Euroscepticism is reproduced in the Eurosceptic ideological positions defended by the left and the right. Diffuse Euroscepticism refers to a “support for general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300), which is more present in the ideas and platforms of the far-right parties. In contrast, in the case of the far-left, we found more specific criticisms of the EU by denoting support for reforming more general practices or rules. The critics are about “the EU as it is and as it is developing” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). In other words, they can demand reforming the EU politics but not eliminate it (specific Euroscepticism).
Analysis & Discussion
Analyzing the national elections of the 15 Western European countries that were part of the EU before 2004—known as the EU-15—provides a clearer understanding of the changes in European voters’ positions regarding extremist and populist political parties and potential future changes in voter preferences. The exclusion of Eastern European countries in this article is justified by the need for different approaches for East and West countries.
We classified extremist political parties according to the party family typology proposed by Marks et al. (2002) and the identification of a new transnational cleavage in the EU region (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). However, in the case of the far-left, we excluded traditional communist parties aligned with a clear ideology advocating changes in the economic model as they are not necessarily populist. We are interested here in the emergence of a new far-left populism.
Selection Criteria and the Lists of Political Parties
During the time frame chosen for this study, political parties emerged, while others disappeared, and some changed their names. Tables 1 and 2 below list all extremist parties that received more than 1% of votes in elections between the late 1980s and 2023 by country. We did not describe the history of each political party in detail, which would require a large amount of space.[7] The selection criteria were based on two sources of classification: i) recognition of the party as far-right or far-left and as having populist characteristics in the literature, and ii) examination of political party manifestos (when available in the Manifesto Project’s data[8] or on the political parties’ official websites).
There are cases of what Ignazi (1996; 2003) refers to as the “renewal of political parties”. This is when, without changing their name, a few political parties became more radical and started to designate themselves as the new (and no longer traditional) extreme right, as was the case of the Portuguese National Renewal Party (NRP). From 2009 onwards, the NRP started to assume more populist characteristics and changed its political orientation, describing itself as a “new right-wing”. The same thing happened on the far-left, although in fewer cases. Here, we consider political parties far-left based on their adoption of rhetoric and themes such as anti-elitism, opposition to the establishment and other signs of anti-systemic stances. Some are openly nationalist, anti-immigrant, sovereigntist (radical), and in favor of the country leaving the European Union, while others identify as Eurosceptic and anti-EU.
Table 1- List of far-left parties
Country
Political parties*
Lifetime (first year they received votes/or the few years in which the party received votes)*
Austria
N/A
N/A
Belgium
N/A
N/A
Denmark
N/A
N/A
Finland
N/A
N/A
France
La France Insoumise (FLI/FI)Left Front
since 2017since 2012
Germany
Die Linke
since 2009
Greece
SYRIZA
since 2004
Ireland
United Left Alliance (more traditional left)
since 2011
Italy
M5SPRCProletarian Democracy
since 20131992-20061983, 1987
Luxembourg
N/A
N/A
Netherlands
N/A
N/A
Portugal
B.E.
since 1999
Spain
PodemosUnidos Podemos (electoral alliance of left-wing parties)
2015since 2016
Sweden
N/A
N/A
United Kingdom
N/A
N/A
* Only political parties that received more than 1% of the votes are listed, and the table only contains the years within the article’s time frame.
Populist Characteristics and Their Impact on Support for the EU
As well summarized by Carlos de la Torre (2019), right- or left-wing populists share the same anti-institutional political logic, which is “based on the construction of a political frontier” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 66) between people and institutions. Despite their different narratives on who “the people” are, both right-wing and left-wing populist leaders and political parties use “similar politicizations of grievances and emotions” and they “aim to rupture exclusionary institutional systems to give power back to the people” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 68). The difference is in how they define “the people.”
“Right-wing populists use essentialist criteria of ethnicity to exclude minority populations. The people as constructed by Donald Trump, for example, face ethnic and religious enemies such as Mexicans, Muslims, or militant African American activists (de la Torre, 2017). Similarly, rightwing European populists defend the ordinary people against those below, such as immigrants, refugees, and former colonial subjects, and the privileged cosmopolitan New Class above. An alternative conceptualization of the people is primarily political and socioeconomic. Left-wing populists construct the category of the people as the majorities of their nations that were excluded by neoliberal policies imposed by supranational organizations like the IMF or the Troika. Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Pablo Iglesias, and Alex Tsipras face the oligarchy.” (de la Torre, 2019, 67
We then calculated the votes cast for all political parties classified as far-right and far-left in national elections over the last 40 years.[9] Populist parties on the far-right were selected based on criteria used in the literature on this subject (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Ignazi, 2003; Marks et al., 2002; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996), especially the terms they use in their political platforms. In some cases, the parties openly label themselves as the “new far-right”. For other parties that were not as forthcoming, we analyzed their history and platforms first to determine what the “new” and “old style” of far-right is (such as Nazi and antisemitic political parties, although the latter were not included in our analyses) and we classified them accordingly. Far-left populist parties were selected based on their demagoguery and their promises of simplistic solutions to complex problems and crises, often accusing neoliberal policies and the EU market of being responsible for the social and economic ills of member countries.
The election results were selected for far-left parties (FLPs) and far-right parties (FRPs) for approximately 40 years –from the first elections held in the early 1980s in the EU-15 until recent elections. After collecting data, to illustrate our findings and give a broader overview of the impact of crises on the shift in behavior in the countries studied, we divided the countries into two groups to identify the growth of votes on populist political parties from the left and the right: i) the countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland), and ii) the countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom).
The international crisis had the most significant impact on the eurozone countries between 2009 and 2013. Table 3 includes countries with four years of negative growth, measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product), between 2009 and 2013, plus Ireland. Ireland was an exception in this group because it suffered from the effects of the economic crisis earlier, experiencing negative growth as early as 2008 (as did Italy). It had the highest negative growth rate (-7.8% in 2009).
Table 3- Growth of populist votes in countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis
Votes for FLPs
Votes for FRPs
GreeceTend to a more specificEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of migration crisis
ItalyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis(syncretic with economic platform)
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
From the election results of the group of countries in Table 3, we conclude that once the euro crisis erupted in the region in 2008-2009, voters who supported left-wing ideology became more critical of EU austerity policies and rules (specificEuroscepticism). However, as the economy returned to a certain degree of normality and the migration crises emerged as a new source of regional instability, left-wing populist parties began to lose strength in most EU 15 countries, and far-right populism gained ground.
In cases such as in Portugal and Greece, it is essential to say that once far-left party leaders had been elected to government or stabilized themselves in coalitions to govern, they changed their strategies. Previously considered populist leaders, they lost space in their political parties or abandoned old narratives that accused the EU of all their ills and started to defend responsible policies as soon as they arrived in government. A new scenario followed the euro crisis in these two countries. The political parties of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) in Portugal could no longer be classified as populist since they gained the government coalition. The old populist narratives in economic promises have been replaced by a responsible government that maintained leadership in the country until recently. A similar situation was seen in Greece when the split in Syriza generated by the rupture between Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, the minister of finance, occurred during the peak of the sovereignty crisis and the impasses in the negotiations with the Troika.[10] The result can be interpreted by what Judis (2016) has developed very well and de la Torre (2019) has considered as a de-radicalization of Syriza since 2015 and Podemos since 2018.
Ireland was the only country from Table 3 whose results showed no Euroscepticism in political parties’ positioning (considering the selection criteria of the political parties and level of public support). Until a few years ago, many questioned why Ireland seemed immune to the influence of populism. The country has far-right parties, such as the National Party, but they exist on the margins and have never won seats in the Irish Parliament. As for the new migration crisis, there was a kind of cooperation and an attitude of shared responsibility by the political elites and society. There is a general feeling of national pride and solidarity with refugees in the Irish public opinion.
More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generated an influx of Ukrainian refugees and asylum seekers to Ireland. While many welcomed them, an increase in anti-immigrant protesters in the country has been reported. Far-right populists saw this as an opportunity to spread feelings of rejection towards refugees and to be more critical of European and national governments due to a devastating housing crisis in the country.
Italy and Spain were cases of diffuse Euroscepticism that appeared among countries in Table 3. Left-wing populism in Spain (as in Greece and Portugal) found space in the government coalition in 2016, becoming less radical and less populist. Although Italy was significantly impacted by the immigration crisis, even before 2015, we highlight that far-right ideology in the country has already existed since the 1980s. It is also important to emphasize that Italy was the only case in which we saw the emergence of a populism already associated with the left (as shown in the table). Still, it is better associated with a syncretic position, as the more alternative and anarchist Italians self-designated themselves. A syncretic populist spectrum grew significantly during the euro crisis, behaving as a good example for the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) spectrum of the new political alignments addressed by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002). Here, we emphasize that we consider the votes for the Five Star Movement (M5S) not aligned with a left/right dimension of political ideology. Exceptionally, in our research, the movement professed the desire to “stay to change the Union from within” with a populist and economic platform, as the defence of a referendum on the euro in Italy (Zotto, 2017), but with a more GAL political dimension designed by the M5S’ leaders as a “syncretic” position.
We investigate the influence of a second dimension, a new political dimension that we conceive as ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). We find that this dimension is the most general and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration.
As explained above, the countries in Table 4 are selected as those that were (comparably in the EU15 region) least affected by the euro crisis, having presented less than four years of growth, measured by negative GDP, between 2009 and 2013. Also, the countries in Table 4 appeared to have been more impacted by the migration crisis, which reached its highest point in 2015, than the economic one. In this case, the far-right ideology legitimated intolerant attitudes and xenophobia in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that Europe was in the middle of.
Table 4 – Growth of populist votes in countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis
Votes for FLPs
Votes for FRPs
AustriaTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of migration crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
BelgiumTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
DenmarkTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of migration crisis
FinlandTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
FranceTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
GermanyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisis
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
LuxembourgTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
NetherlandsTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism
growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
Most of the countries, as expected, presented a trend to increase vote preference for FRPs during the immigration crises. They tend to have a more diffuse Euroscepticism.[11] Also, Although Belgium presented no growth of votes for FLPs during the period of the euro crisis, we saw an increase of FRPs in the two moments of crises considered in this article. Austria appeared as an outsider. The Austrians presented a new trend to vote for the populist far-left during the immigration crisis. However, there has been a decrease in radical votes since the legislative election of 2019, when the Free Party of Austria (populist far-right) lost 20 seats in the Parliament.
The UK results show a clear relationship between populists of the far-right and the referendum that resulted in Brexit, followed by a quick decrease in support after the June 2016 event. Interestingly, the strength of populism in the country was evident in public manifestation, and the use of the media to promote an oversimplified view of the social problem raised by the rise in immigration in the country was not reflected in elections for the British Parliament. Even so, the case of the Brexit referendum is the clearest example of the influence of populism on electoral behavior and its consequences. The post-referendum shifts in public opinion from criticism to support for the EU revealed an apparent lack of understanding of the brutal consequences of Brexit for the British.[12]
Finally, when we look at the impact of migration crises on voter behavior, tables 3 and 4 illustrate that populism explains the growth of the far-right more than the economic crisis does. By separating the countries into ones affected the most and ones affected the least by the financial crisis (tables 3 and 4), we found that although the far-left grew more significantly in countries that suffered the most from the economic crisis, in most cases, left-wing radicalism tended to lose ground after the crises. While the rise of the far-right is prevalent during crises in general, the increase in votes for far-right parties occurred in 13 of the 15 countries analyzed during the migration crisis. Support for the far-left, however, increased during the migration crisis in Austria, France and Italy only.
Concluding Remarks
The article aims to investigate if and to what extent two decisive crises in the region affected support for political parties with Eurosceptic characteristics, which are more commonly aligned with extremist right or left-wing populist positions. The article sought to identify patterns in the growth of far-right and far-left populist parties to confirm the general perception that Euroscepticism and populism benefit from regional crises. We thus aimed to further the discussion on the risk of crises in the EU contributing to the increase in Euroscepticism and the tendency to vote for political parties that can weaken the European model based on the principles of liberal democracy, representation and the rule of law. The best predictor of the growth of Euroscepticism is migration issues. Our findings revealed the growing resistance in EU societies to the increasing number of immigrants in the region.
Also, in general, the results of this study show that populist agendas (both from the left or the right) found fertile ground in environments where support for democratic measures based on liberal institutions and representation was on the decline, “revealing hidden preferences that might have existed all along, but individuals were discouraged from making them public” (Brescia, 2019). We have seen a decline in the approval of EU institutions and norms and the emergence of intense hostility towards representative politics in countries during the period when populism was on the rise. However, to understand variations in the performances of populist political parties radically opposed to the EU, we analyzed them in the context of the two most significant crises challenging EU policies and politics in the last 40 years. Each country’s electoral findings in this article deserve a more in-depth analysis that could be better explored and developed in future works.
EU crises are seen as events that impact the behavior of European voters, and we assume that the growth of populism is harmful to democracy, even when populist parties and leaders are not elected (Müller, 2016). This is because the ability to spread ideas that discredit politics and representation as a norm of democracy has been dramatically strengthened by digital media, enabling populists to coordinate and promote these ideas transnationally, often linking them to conspiracy theories and denialism. In this context, the EU bureaucracy and its complex governance model are a clear target of populists. The EU adds supranational and intergovernmental institutional constraints to national ones (Müller, 2016, p. 95) and becomes an easy ‘punching bag’ for populist rhetoric.
We conclude that in a wave of growth of support for far-left parties in Western Europe, there are now signs of a bonanza for specific Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is more centered on criticisms of typical changes and reforms in the EU’s economic model of integration and more specific EU politics affecting the far-left political platforms. However, DiffuseEuroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is associated with a general contestation of the EU, involves its representative model of integration with supranational institutions and policy coordination. This side of Euroscepticism seems to be more closely associated with far-right populist narratives that are very much alive in the region.
(*) Dr.Ana Paula Tostes is Jean Monnet Chair at the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Brazil. Professor at the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP/UERJ) and the Department of International Relations (DRI/UERJ). She is a Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI) and was a visiting researcher at the Free University of Berlin (FUB). She holds a PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ/IESP) and a Postdoc at the University of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting researcher (2016-2017) at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) and an associate professor at Michigan State University (MSU). Currently, she is the coordinator of the Project for International Cooperation (PROBRAL CAPES/DAAD, 2023-2026) between IESP/UERJ and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany. Results of research supported by the European Union (JMC Project EUgac n. 101127443), Productivity Scholarships from FAPERJ (Prociência/UERJ) and CNPq (n. 316785/2021-0).
References
Benfield, Jack. (2012). Populism in Europe: Sweden. Open Society Foundations. February 2012. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/populism-europe-sweden (accessed on September 27, 2024).
Betz, Hans-Georg. (1994). Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. New York, St. Martin’s Press.
Borzel, Tanja & Risse, Thomas (2009). “Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe”. In: Featherstone, Keith & Radaelli, Claudio (eds.) The Politics of Europeanization. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brack, Nathalie & Gürkan, Seda. (2020) Theorising the Crises of the European Seda. New York: Routledge.
Brescia, Raymond H. (2019-2020). “On Tipping Points and Nudges: Review of Cass Sunstein’s How Change Happens”. Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, vol. 55, n. 3. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3389471 (accessed September 24, 2024).
Cmakalová, K. & Rolenc, Jan Martin. 2012. “Actorness and legitimacy of the European Union”. Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 47, n.2, pp.260-210 doi:10.1177/0010836712443176
Gabel, M. J. (2000). “European Integration, Voters, and National Politics.” West European Politics. vol. 23, n. 4, pp. 52–72. doi.org/10.1080/01402380008425400
Hooghe, Liesbet; Marks, Gary; Wilson, Carole J. (2002). “Does Left/Right structure party positions on European Integration?” Comparative Political Studies. vol. 35, no 8, pp. 965-989. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511492013.008
Ignazi, Piero. (1996). “The Intellectual Basis of Right-Wing Anti-Partytism”. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, no 3, pp. 279–296. doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00653.x
_____. (2003), Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
_____. (1992), “The silent counter‐revolution: Hypotheses on the emergence of extreme right‐wing parties in Europe”. European Journal of Political Research vol. 22, n.1. pp. 3- 34.
Judis, John B. (2016). The Populist Explosion. How the Great Recession Transformed American and European Politics. Columbia Global Reports: New York.
Kaltwasser, C. Rovira. (2012) “The ambivalence of populism: threat and corrective for democracy.” Democratization. vol. 19, no 2, pp. 184-208. doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2011.572619
Kitschelt, Herbert. (1994). The Transformation of European Social Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.
_____. (1995), The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.
______. (2002), “Popular Dissatisfaction with Democracy: Populism and Party Systems”. In: Mény, Y & Y. Surel, Y. (ed.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York: Palgrave.
Kopecky, Petr & Mudde, Cas. (2002) “The Two Sides of Euroscepticism. Party Position on European Integration in East Central Europe.” European Union Politics. vol. 3, no 3, pp. 297-326. doi:10.1177/1465116502003003002
Lipset, Seymour M. & Rokkan, Stein. (1967). “Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: An Introduction” In LIPSET, Seymour M. & Rokkan, Stein. (eds.) Party System and Voter Alignments: Crossnational Perspectives. New York: Free Press.
Laclau, Ernesto. (2005). On Populist Reason. London, New York: Verso.
MANIFESTO PROJECT. (2024). MARPOR, Manifesto Research On Political Representation. WZB. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ (accessed on September 30, 2024).
Mair, P. (2005). “Popular democracy and the European Union polity.” Working Paper, European Governance Papers C-05-03 https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/3292 (accessed September 24, 2024).
______. (2007), “Political opposition and the European Union.” Government and Opposition, vol. 42, 1, pp. 1-17.
Marks, Gary; Hooghe, Liesbet; Nelson, Moura; Edwards, Erica. (2006), “Party Competition and European Integration in East and West. Different Structure, Same Causality”. Comparative Political Studies, vol. 39, no 2, pp. 155-175. doi.org/10.1177/0010414005281932
Mudde, Cas & Kaltwasser, C. Rovira. (2017) Populism. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mudde, Cas. (2017). “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe Today”. In: Abromeit, John; Chesterton, G. Marotta; Norman, York. (eds.) Transformations of Populism in Europe and the Americas. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 295–307.
_______. (2016) On Extremism and Democracy in Europe. New York: Routledge.
______. (2007), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Müller, Jan-Werner (2016), What is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.Norris, Pippa; Inglehart, Ronald. Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Poguntke, Thomas & Scarrow, Susan. (1996). “The Politics of Anti-Party Sentiment: Introduction”. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 29, no 3, pp. 257–262. doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1996.tb00651.x
Reif, Karlheinz & Schmitt, Herman. (1980). “Nine Second-Order Elections – A Conceptual Framework for Analysis of European Elections Results” European Consortium for Political Research, vol. 8, pp. 3-44. doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00737.x
Reif, Karlheinz; Norris, Pippa; Schmitt, Hermann. (1997). “Second-order elections”. European Journal of Political Research. vol. 31, pp. 109-124. doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1997.tb00768.x
Risse, Thomas. (2003). “The Euro between National and European Identity”. Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no 4, pp. 487–505. doi.org/10.1080/1350176032000101235
Stanley, Ben. (2008). “The Thin Ideology of Populism” Journal of Political Ideologies. vol. 13, no 1, pp.95-110. doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289
Sunstein, Cass R. (2020). How Changes Happen. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
Taggart, Paul. (1998). “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems”. European Journal of Political Research, vol. 33, no 3, pp. 363–388. doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.00387
________. (1996), The New Populism and the New Politics. Chippenham: Antony Rowe Ltd.
________. (2000), Populism. Buckingham, PA: Open University Press.
________. (2002), “Populism and the Pathology of Representative Politics”. In: Mény, Y. & Surel, Y. (ed.) Democracies and the Populist Challenge. New York: Palgrave.
Weyland, Kurt. (2013). “The Threat from the Populist Left” Journal of Democracy. Vol 24, pp. 18–32. doi:10.1353/jod.2013.0045
[3] This includes national elections held up until the writing of this article.
[4] Since the 1970s, the Eurobarometer has been measuring the European public’s level of knowledge about regional integration. It shows that the level of information increased when the EU was in operation and its supranational institutions were being consolidated.
[6] Le Pen is currently in his tenth consecutive mandate. He was elected during the last EP elections, which were held in 2014.
[7] We included the data of the first general election in which the political party received support (but did not necessarily win seats in a national parliament). The information in the database constructed to conduct the analyses on the votes cast in each election for each political party in each country is broader and more complex than what is shown in Tables 1 and 2. However, they provide minimal information to show why the parties were selected.
[8] Cf. MANIFESTO PROJECT. (2024) MARPOR: Manifesto Research On Political Representation. WZB. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ (accessed on September 30, 2024).
[9] Parties that did not obtain more than 0.01% of votes were excluded from our calculations.
[10] Syriza is a party created in 2013, based on an anti-EU agenda and a populist narrative. In 2012, the country’s GDP had collapsed by 25%, unemployment reached almost a third of the population (28%) and hundreds of thousands of companies went bankrupt. Between 2010 and 2015 alone, Greece received three emergency rescue packages from the European Union (EU), totalizing more than 320 billion euros. After such negotiations, Prime Minister Tsipras accepted the EU’s conditions as a better option than bearing the consequences of leaving the eurozone. Despite the disappointment of many of populist leaders associated with Syriza, Greek voters chose to vote for moderate politicians without populist narratives than to take risks with the old elites or baseless promises.
[11]Sweden deserves to be studied as a separated case. A report (Demos Report), conducted by an Open Society Foundations initiative represents a pilot project tackling innovative approaches to keeping societies open in Europe. Findings revealed that since 2010, when far-right populists in Sweden entered the national parliament, their voters already showed a different profile from the rest of Europe. A large proportion of voters for the Swedish far-right, especially those who already followed the populist party Sweden Democrats on Facebook, were young people between 16 and 20 years old. In a 2010 survey, 63% of the party’s Facebook followers (the main social media platform at the time in the country) voted for the party – leaving out mainly those who were not old enough to vote in the country. (see Benfield, Jack. Populism in Europe: Sweden. Open Society Foundations. February 2012. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/populism-europe-sweden accessed on September 27, 2024).
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. November 27, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0022
Andy Knott’s Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics offers a groundbreaking exploration of populism through the lens of time, challenging traditional spatial and ideological frameworks. Knott and his contributors delve into the temporal dimensions of populism’s emergence, persistence, and transformation, drawing on historical, philosophical, and regional perspectives. The volume’s innovative use of metaphors and analyses sheds light on populism’s ability to navigate crises and disrupt hegemonic norms. By examining regional variations and the interplay between technology and populist dynamics, the book provides fresh and valuable insights. It is an essential resource for scholars, redefining populism as a diachronic force shaping contemporary politics.
In Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics, editor Andy Knott and contributing authors offer a compelling exploration of the relationship between populism and temporality, an often overlooked yet crucial aspect of this political phenomenon. While the spatial dimensions of populism have dominated much of the academic discourse, this volume distinguishes itself by situating populism within the framework of time, presenting fresh theoretical insights into its emergence, persistence, and impact.
The collection originated from an idea for a workshop that ultimately took place online during the COVID-19 lockdown. Keynote speakers María Esperanza Casullo and Simon Tormey laid the groundwork for the book’s rich intellectual inquiry. Comprising ten chapters organized into three thematic parts, the book addresses historical, technological, and regional dimensions of populism. Contributions from scholars such as Tormey, Clare Woodford, and Casullo tackle critical questions: What triggers populism’s explosive emergence? Why does it seem to thrive in particular historical moments? And how do technological advancements reshape populist dynamics? Why does populism arise in advanced democracies? What role does algorithmic interference play in forging populist solidarities? And why are populist leaders so resilient in power? These inquiries are enriched by conceptual frameworks like cyclicality, spatiotemporality, and populist constitutionalism, offering a nuanced lens to examine populism’s global manifestations.
Knott’s introduction critiques teleological frameworks that dismiss populism as a fleeting anomaly. He instead situates it as a dynamic, diachronic force capable of disrupting hegemonic political norms. Drawing on the philosophical insights of Nietzsche and Heidegger, alongside Machiavelli’s interplay of necessity and contingency, the volume investigates populism’s ontology, asking whether its recurrence stems solely from the politicization of “the people” or deeper ontological parameters that shape modern politics. Particularly compelling is the volume’s focus on regional specificity, especially in Latin America. Scholars such as Paula Biglieri and Eleonora Mesquita Ceia analyze how populism in the region navigates the dual pressures of rupture and institutionalization, challenging its characterization as inherently unstable.
The first chapter of the book titled “Introduction: Populism, Metaphor, Temporality” penned by editor Knott, highlights the neglect of temporality and seeks to address this gap by advancing a nuanced, interdisciplinary framework for understanding populism through the lens of time. Knott begins by critiquing the predominant spatial focus in populism studies, which has been shaped by disciplines such as comparative politics and international relations. He notes that global and regional analyses often overlook how populism operates within temporal frameworks, an omission that limits the depth of our understanding. This chapter ambitiously aims to reframe populism not as a static anomaly but as a dynamic, time-sensitive phenomenon with implications for political stability and transformation.
Central to Knott’s analysis is the role of metaphors in shaping perceptions of populism’s temporal character. The tidal metaphor, for example, suggests cyclicality and permanence, aligning with the ebbs and flows of political phenomena. In contrast, the wave and eruption metaphors evoke disruption, irregularity, and transformative power, underscoring populism’s capacity to challenge established political orders. These metaphors reveal populism’s temporal flexibility, adapting to various contexts while disrupting hegemonic political structures.
Knott further draws on philosophical perspectives, engaging with Martin Heidegger’s notions of temporality, Jacques Rancière’s plural modernities, and Niccolò Machiavelli’s interplay of necessity and contingency. By linking these theoretical insights to populism, Knott presents a compelling argument for understanding populism’s emergence, persistence, and evolution as deeply rooted in temporal contexts. Knott’s introduction effectively situates populism within a broader temporal framework, offering fresh insights into its ontology and dynamics. By bridging philosophy, history, and political theory, this chapter not only reframes populism as a diachronic phenomenon but also invites readers to reconsider its role in shaping contemporary political trajectories. It sets the stage for a rich exploration of populism’s temporalities throughout the volume.
In the second chapter titled “On Populism’s Beginnings,” Knott embarks on an ambitious exploration of the origins of populism, mapping out three distinct historiographical approaches while critiquing their methodologies and assumptions. This chapter serves as a foundational inquiry into the historiography of populism, bridging disciplines such as history, political science, and theory to illuminate how populism’s beginnings have been conceptualized. Knott identifies three frameworks: the first locates populism within specific historical case studies, such as the People’s Party in late 19th-century America and Russia’s narodniki movement. These case-based approaches often tie populism to particular social and economic conditions, such as industrialization and urbanization. The second framework, exemplified by Federico Finchelstein, elevates populism as a transnational regime with its roots in mid-20th-century politics, positioning it alongside liberal democracy, fascism, and communism. Lastly, theorists like Margaret Canovan and Ernesto Laclau trace populism back to antiquity, framing it as a persistent political logic grounded in the antagonistic relationship between “the people” and elites. Knott’s interdisciplinary analysis critically interrogates these approaches, highlighting tensions between populism as a historical phenomenon and as a timeless political form. By weaving together historical narratives and theoretical insights, Knott not only questions the adequacy of existing historiographies but also underscores the need for more nuanced, transdisciplinary research.
Clare Woodford’s chapter “Populism, Impossible Time, and Democracy’s People Problem” is a scathing critique of prevailing populism scholarship, exposing its foundational contradictions and its often-unacknowledged complicity in undermining democracy. Central to her argument is the bold assertion that much of the literature on populism perpetuates a flawed conceptualization of “the people” and “democracy,” framing the former as a perpetual threat to the latter. Woodford dismantles this perspective, arguing that such scholarship narrows democratic possibilities and inadvertently bolsters authoritarian tendencies. Woodford critiques the dominant binary framework that pits populism against democracy. Scholars, she argues, have too readily labeled populism as anti-democratic, ignoring the complexity of its interactions with democratic processes. By casting populism as inherently problematic, these academics, whom Woodford does not hesitate to criticize as gatekeepers of an elitist liberal-democratic orthodoxy, distort the political landscape into a restrictive populism-vs-democracy dichotomy. This oversimplification delegitimizes left-wing alternatives and conflates democratic expressions with anti-democratic tendencies, thereby shrinking the space for meaningful political discourse.
Her engagement with theorists like Rancière, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe underscores the necessity of redefining populism. Woodford particularly emphasizes the aesthetic moment of democracy, where competing definitions of the people coexist, making politics an ongoing, transformative process rather than a static structure. By rejecting the “false dichotomy” of liberal minimalism versus right-wing authoritarianism, she challenges scholars to embrace the pluralistic, dynamic nature of democracy. Woodford’s chapter is a clarion call for populism scholars to abandon their entrenched biases and reconsider their theoretical foundations. Her critique is not merely an academic exercise but a plea for a renewed commitment to democracy that respects the people’s role as its central actors.
Adrià Porta Caballé’s chapter, titled “Politics and Time: The Nostalgic, the Opportunist and the Utopian. An Existential Analytic of Podemos’ Ecstatic Times,” offers a profound exploration of Podemos’ political trajectory in Spain, reframing its internal conflicts through the lens of temporality. By weaving Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s philosophies into his analysis, the author develops a compelling framework to dissect the tensions within Podemos, which he categorizes as nostalgic, opportunist, and utopian – aligned with the past, present, and future, respectively. Caballé’s critique challenges traditional analyses that confine themselves to ideology, class, or politics, arguing that they neglect the crucial role of time in understanding political movements. His temporal framework posits that the internal factions within Podemos – Pablistas (nostalgic), Errejonistas (opportunist), and Anticapitalistas (utopian) – represent distinct, albeit incomplete, relationships with temporality. This fragmentation, Caballé argues, was both the source of Podemos’ initial success and its eventual decline.
The chapter excels in its integration of Heidegger’s existential temporality and Nietzsche’s historical triad, applying these abstract concepts to a concrete political case. Particularly striking is Caballé’s assertion that Podemos’ fragmentation mirrors the disunity of political temporality itself, where prioritizing one temporal mode over the others inevitably leads to imbalance and conflict. This approach not only sheds light on Podemos but also provides a heuristic for analyzing broader left-populist movements. Caballé’s work is a masterclass in blending philosophy and political analysis, offering an original perspective on the existential dynamics of time in politics. His call for an “authentic politics” that integrates nostalgia, opportunism, and utopia underscores the necessity of temporal unity for sustainable political action.
Simon Tormey’s chapter, titled “Populisation: Populism – Temporary Dysfunction or Modernity’s Revenge?” offers a comprehensive and provocative exploration of populism’s entrenchment in modern politics, challenging conventional narratives that view it as a transient phenomenon. Tormey’s core argument positions populism not as an aberration but as a symptom of deeper systemic crises in liberal democracy and late modernity. Through his concept of “populisation,” he illustrates how populism has evolved into a normalized and persistent feature of the political landscape. The chapter critically interrogates the dominant frameworks in populism studies – treating it as a regime, strategy, or event – and instead reframes it as a product of endemic tendencies within late modernity. These tendencies, including globalization, media transformation, and the erosion of traditional authority, create fertile ground for populist movements and leaders. Tormey’s analysis links populism to the cultural and economic grievances exacerbated by modernity’s rapid changes, offering a nuanced explanation of its rise across the political spectrum.
Particularly compelling is the chapter’s assertion that populism thrives on the pervasive sense of crisis, amplified by new media technologies that foster immediacy, emotionality, and a demand for simplistic solutions. Tormey argues that these conditions have entrenched a style of politics characterized by spectacle, hyper-representation, and an “outsider” ethos that increasingly defines democratic engagement. Thus, Tormey positions populism as a response to, and symptom of, late modernity’s failures – a reflection of systemic anxiety and dislocation rather than a temporary disruption. His insights provide a vital framework for understanding populism’s permanence and its implications for democratic systems.
In his chapter, titled “Populism and the Mirror of Technology,” author Michaelangelo Anastasiou’s presents a critical intervention in populism studies by scrutinizing the predominance of synchronic analyses. He argues that such approaches reduce populism to static, episodic snapshots, neglecting its diachronic evolution and the political dynamics underlying its (re)constitution in time. This critique challenges the established methodologies within the field, which often favor universal definitions or linear cause-effect reasoning. Anastasiou identifies two significant shortcomings in current populism scholarship: first, the reliance on fixed typologies that fail to capture populism’s fluid and context-dependent manifestations; and second, the under-theorization of the political practices that enable populism’s emergence and evolution. By equating populism with a series of static outcomes, according to Anastasiou, these studies overlook its historical and temporal dimensions, thus underemphasizing the creative agency and disruptive potential inherent in populist politics.
The chapter advances a compelling theoretical framework grounded in post-Marxist thought, linking populism’s spatiotemporality to the affordances of modern technology. Technology, Anastasiou argues, acts as both an enabler of spatial connectivity and a catalyst for temporal disruption, thereby broadening the scope of populist possibilities. Through this lens, populism is positioned as a political logic rooted in the interplay of space and time, facilitated by the indeterminacy and dislocation characteristic of modern social configurations. The exploration of populism’s ontological ties to technology in this chapter offers an innovative perspective on its historical emergence and its adaptability across contexts. By situating populism within the broader socio-technological dynamics of modernity, Anastasiou provides a critique of synchronic methodologies, calling for a more nuanced, diachronic understanding of populist politics.
Jamie Ranger’s chapter, titled “Populism, Social Media and the Technospheric,” critically examines the intersection of populism, social media, and the “technospheric condition.” Drawing on Bernard Stiegler and Hartmut Rosa, Ranger argues that the technospheric condition—a sociotechnical milieu accelerating since the Industrial Revolution—reshapes politics by distorting democratic contestability into technical expertise. This environment fosters public distrust in political institutions and contributes to the resonance of populist rhetoric, which opposes “the people” against technocratic elites.
The chapter explores how the technospheric, underpinned by social media and the attention economy, intensifies political polarisation and disrupts traditional political processes. Ranger critiques the algorithmic steering of political affinities on platforms, arguing that chains of equivalence, central to populism, are increasingly shaped by algorithmic interference rather than authentic political will. This phenomenon, termed “semi-automated politics,” complicates the authenticity of populist solidarities, raising questions about the agency behind contemporary digital populism.
Ranger highlights the dual potential of social media as both a counter-hegemonic tool for progressive change and a breeding ground for reactionary forces. He emphasizes the risks of fragmented political subjectivities in the hyperconnected technospheric world, where misinformation and algorithm-driven partisanship challenge cohesive political mobilization. This chapter offers a deep analysis of the technospheric’s role in reshaping modern politics, making it a vital contribution to understanding populism’s rise in the digital age.
María Esperanza Casullo’s chapter, titled “Antagonism, Flexibility, and the Surprising Resilience of Populism in Latin America,” provides an incisive analysis of the resilience of Latin American populism, challenging dominant narratives that depict populism as a fleeting political phenomenon. By focusing on the leftist populist presidencies of Hugo Chávez, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa, and Fernando Lugo, Casullo highlights how flexibility in antagonistic narratives and the capacity for rapid public mobilization underpin the endurance of these leaders in a politically volatile region.
Casullo effectively argues that populist leaders construct a compelling “myth” centered on a heroic leader, a villainous antagonist, and a damaged collective identity. This myth fosters unity among diverse constituencies and enables populists to adapt antagonistic rhetoric to shifting political contexts. Furthermore, she underscores the role of street mobilization as a critical tool for countering threats, illustrating how mass demonstrations often shield populist leaders from impeachment, protests, or coups. Her chapter also addresses objections to populist resilience, including arguments that attribute their longevity to favorable economic conditions or the absence of opposition. Casullo counters these claims by emphasizing the strategic nature of populist politics, which leverages antagonism and mobilization to navigate crises. Casullo’s exploration situates populism as a rational and effective political strategy, offering valuable insights into its persistent presence in Latin America’s political landscape.
Chapter 9 by Paula Biglieri and Gloria Perelló, titled “Populist Temporality in Latin America,” offers a theoretical exploration of the temporal and spatial dynamics of Latin American populism. Anchored in the works of Laclau and Mouffe, the authors argue that populism embodies an irreducible tension between rupture—a dislocation of established order—and spatialisation, the institutionalisation of new configurations. This duality, they contend, defines the “heart” of populist politics.
The chapter’s strength lies in its nuanced analysis of populist temporality as a moment of radical reactivation that disrupts entrenched practices, creating space for new possibilities. Biglieri and Perelló underscore how populist leaders connect this rupture to historical struggles, constructing a lineage that situates present movements as heirs of past resistance. This linkage not only legitimises their causes but also sustains popular mobilization by blending hope for the future with a reimagining of the past.
The authors also highlight how spatialisation translates populist ideals into institutional frameworks, such as constitutions that challenge neoliberal or colonial legacies. However, they argue that this institutionalisation never fully resolves the rupture, leaving an open-ended struggle that ensures the continuous evolution of populist politics.
Eleonora Mesquita Ceia’s chapter titled “Populism and Constitutionalism in Brazil: : An Enduring or Transitional Relationship in Time?” provides a comprehensive analysis of the interplay between populism and constitutionalism in Brazil’s political history. Through case studies of key populist leaders—from Getúlio Vargas to Jair Bolsonaro—the chapter examines how populist projects have alternately reinforced and challenged liberal-democratic constitutionalism. The chapter argues against the simplistic binary often drawn between populism and constitutionalism in Global North scholarship. Ceia highlights the diverse constitutional engagements of Brazilian populist regimes, noting how some, such as Lula’s and Dilma Rousseff’s administrations, upheld liberal-democratic principles, while others, like Vargas’s and Bolsonaro’s governments, pursued constitutional reforms and institutional capture to consolidate power.
Particularly striking is the chapter’s discussion of populism’s dual nature in Brazil, where it emerges as both a response to crises and a tool for political inclusion. Vargas’s reforms integrated the working class into the political process, while Bolsonaro’s far-right populism weaponized constitutional mechanisms to deepen societal divisions. Ceia underscores that these approaches reflect not populism as a monolith but its variability across time and contexts. A key takeaway from the chapter is the distinction between populism and authoritarian populism: while both can challenge liberal-democratic norms, only the latter consistently undermines constitutional protections and institutions. By contrasting different administrations’ approaches, Ceia offers an insightful critique of the notion of a “permanent populist constitutionalism” in Brazil. This chapter underscores the resilience of Brazil’s 1988 constitution, which has withstood authoritarian populist pressures, reaffirming the importance of institutional integrity in democratic systems.
Andy Knott’s concluding chapter titiled “Time for More? Populism’s Prospects” offers an examination of populism’s future by juxtaposing theoretical models with real-world contexts. Rather than presenting definitive answers, Knott embraces the speculative nature of his subject, framing populism as a contextual phenomenon shaped by crises and historical transitions. The chapter effectively contrasts Tormey’s populisation thesis, which views populism as a permanent feature of modern politics, with the cyclical model, which situates populism within recurring patterns of hegemonic breakdown and reconstruction. Knott’s use of sociological and ontological approaches enriches his exploration of populism’s adaptability and persistence. By grounding these models in historical examples from Europe and Latin America, the chapter avoids abstract theorizing, offering a nuanced understanding of populism’s dynamics. The critique of anti-populist narratives adds depth, challenging the dismissal of populism as an aberration.
Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics is a thought-provoking exploration that repositions populism within the framework of time, challenging traditional spatial and ideological analyses. By delving into the temporal dimensions of populist emergence, endurance, and transformation, Knott and his contributors provide a groundbreaking interdisciplinary perspective on this political phenomenon. The book’s innovative use of temporal metaphors, alongside rigorous engagement with historical, philosophical, and regional contexts, illuminates populism’s dynamic interaction with crises and hegemonic transitions.
Knott’s editorial vision is particularly commendable for bridging philosophical insights and political realities, effectively situating populism as a phenomenon deeply intertwined with historical and temporal conditions. While some chapters revisit familiar theoretical debates, the collection as a whole offers fresh and innovative perspectives, especially through its focus on regional variations and the transformative interplay between technology and populist dynamics. This volume is an essential resource for scholars and students of political theory, providing a deeper and more nuanced understanding of populism as a diachronic force shaping contemporary politics. Ultimately, the book stands as a timely and significant contribution to the ongoing debate on populism’s evolving role in influencing and redefining political trajectories in the modern world.
Andy Knott (eds). (2024). Populism and Time: Temporalities of a Disruptive Politics. Edinburgh University Press. 272 pp. Hardcover $103,12, ISBN-10: 139952772X, ISBN-13: 978-1399527729
Please cite as: Koskina, Stavroula. (2024). Populism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0088
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring insights from six distinguished scholars, the event focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, offering a detailed analysis of their respective political landscapes. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, this session underscored the broader implications of populist and authoritarian trends on regional stability and global democracy.
The 16th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS) “Mapping Global Populism” panel series, aimed at creating a comprehensive understanding of populism worldwide, was held online on October 31, 2024. Titled “The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia),” the session featured insights from distinguished scholars on various manifestations of populism and authoritarianism and the state of democracy in these countries. This report provides an overview of the topics analyzed, with some accounts of each speaker’s contributions.
The panel was moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS. Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, discussed the level of autocracy in Azerbaijan and its regional implications. Dr. David Aprasidze, Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University, Georgia, explored the evolution of populism in Georgia, while Dr. David Matsaberidze, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, presented on “The Rotating Populist Discourses of Post-Soviet Georgia – From Nationalist Populism to Conservative Populism.”
Dr.Jody LaPorte, from the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, analyzed hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan. Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan, Professor and Chair of Political Science at the Faculty of International Relations, Yerevan State University, focused on post-war Armenia’s democratization and European integration under the shadow of populism. Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, provided an overview of the state of democracy and populism in Armenia during the session.
The panelists emphasized how populism contributes to democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. While each country reflects unique manifestations of populism, shared patterns include the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the increasing fusion of political and economic power within ruling elites.
The discussions highlighted how regional actors navigate shifting global power structures, particularly under the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These external pressures exacerbate domestic challenges, influencing political strategies and policy orientations across the region.
Country-Specific Analyses
Tom de Waal’s presentation provided a comprehensive analysis of Azerbaijan’s political trajectory and its broader implications for the South Caucasus. He highlighted Azerbaijan as a model of hegemonic authoritarianism, emphasizing its consolidation of power through a fusion of political and economic interests within the ruling elite. He noted Azerbaijan’s skepticism toward multilateral institutions and its alignment with illiberal regional actors like Russia and Turkey. De Waal underscored the Azerbaijani regime’s strategic use of sovereignty discourse to legitimize its dominance while curtailing civil liberties, media freedom, and opposition activity. He also addressed the geopolitical influence of the Ukraine war on the region, arguing that Azerbaijan’s approach reflects a broader trend of illiberalism gaining ground globally. Finally, he pointed to Azerbaijan’s vulnerabilities, including its reliance on declining oil revenues and the absence of mechanisms for political feedback, which pose challenges to the sustainability of its centralized authoritarian model.
Dr. David Aprasidze’s presentation critically assessed the damaging impact of populism on democracy in Georgia, particularly under the Georgian Dream Party. He argued that populism undermines democratization in hybrid regimes by eroding weak institutions, corrupting political actors, and suppressing opposition forces. Tracing the Georgian Dream’s transformation from a progressive, left-leaning populist movement into a conservative, nationalist entity, he highlighted its increasing alignment with illiberal models, such as that of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. This shift has been accompanied by attacks on the European Union, restrictions on civil society and media, and the systemic manipulation of institutions to consolidate power. Dr. Aprasidze underscored that populism in hybrid regimes exacerbates public demoralization, weakens democratic resilience, and facilitates authoritarian consolidation. He concluded that the Georgian Dream’s trajectory exemplifies the broader risks of populism in hybrid regimes, portraying Georgia’s democratization as increasingly fragile and imperiled.
Dr. David Matsaberidze’s analysis explored the evolution of populism in Georgia through the concept of the “empty signifier,” tracing its progression from nationalist mobilization during the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the current rule of the Georgian Dream Party. He identified a pattern in Georgian politics of leaders utilizing populist narratives to consolidate power, emphasizing shifts from Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist independence rhetoric to Eduard Shevardnadze’s focus on order and stability, and later Mikheil Saakashvili’s anti-corruption crusade. Dr. Matsaberidze highlighted the Georgian Dream’s strategic pivot from left-leaning populism to conservative nationalism, blending Orthodox Christian values with populist sovereignty discourse to challenge the European Union’s liberal framework. He also criticized the party’s institutional manipulation, drawing parallels with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, noting the use of restrictive legislation, anti-LGBTQ+ policies, and attacks on NGOs and academia to erode democratic spaces. The party’s success, he argued, lies in its ability to exploit public concerns while fostering ambiguity between aligning with Brussels or Budapest, thereby undermining Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. Concluding with a pessimistic outlook, Dr. Matsaberidze warned that the Georgian Dream’s populist tactics and institutional control present significant obstacles to democratization and resistance by the opposition.
Dr. Jody LaPorte’s presentation examined Azerbaijan’s political regime, categorizing it as a hegemonic authoritarian model distinct from competitive authoritarianism due to the absence of meaningful opposition or electoral competition. She highlighted how Azerbaijan’s leaders, particularly President Ilham Aliyev, consolidated this regime through the marginalization of inherited opposition parties, extensive use of formal and informal mechanisms to suppress political activities, and active repression of emerging opposition groups. The regime’s centralized political economy, heavily reliant on oil revenues and controlled by the ruling elite, has further entrenched its authority by linking economic opportunities and upward mobility to political loyalty. Dr. LaPorte also noted the regime’s proactive measures to adapt to changing circumstances, including investments in green energy and economic diversification, which aim to sustain its authoritarian model amid declining oil revenues. While discussing potential vulnerabilities such as socioeconomic inequalities and the finite nature of hydrocarbon resources, Dr. LaPorte emphasized the regime’s strategic efforts to reinforce its stability. Reflecting on the populism theme, she argued that Azerbaijan’s case is characterized more by a disconnect between politics and the populace than by populist appeals, with citizens largely feeling unrepresented by any political party.
Dr. Ashot Aleksanyan’s presentation analyzed the impact of hybrid populism on postwar Armenia, its democratization efforts, and European integration. He employed a theoretical framework rooted in post-Soviet populist studies, drawing from definitions by scholars like Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau to highlight populism’s ideological and moral dimensions. Dr. Aleksanyan emphasized the unique challenges faced by Armenia, including the lack of robust political party infrastructure, weak ideological foundations, and an underdeveloped civil society, all exacerbated by the fallout from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. He identified hybrid populism as a critical factor in Armenian politics, characterized by divisive rhetoric framing issues through binary oppositions such as war versus peace, pro-Western versus pro-Russian, and democracy versus authoritarianism. He also explored the influence of external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and regional pressures from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which have collectively hindered Armenia’s European integration and democratization. Using a textual analysis of political speeches and party rhetoric, Dr. Aleksanyan demonstrated how populist discourse destabilizes democratic institutions, undermines reform efforts, and fuels societal polarization. He concluded by stressing the importance of addressing Armenia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening its political and societal structures to advance its European integration and democratic aspirations.
Dr. Nerses Kopalyan‘s presentation analyzed the limited influence of populism in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia, emphasizing the country’s democratic resilience despite its challenging geopolitical environment. He highlighted three primary factors that have curtailed populism: a robust civil society acting as a safeguard, the development of a democratic political culture, and the transitional government’s deliberate avoidance of populist rhetoric and practices. Unlike other contexts where populism thrives on anti-establishment and nationalist narratives, Armenian leaders have refrained from scapegoating elites, ethnicizing conflicts, or exploiting societal cleavages for political gain. Instead, the government has pursued pragmatic, often unpopular decisions, such as emphasizing peace and concessions, which reinforce democratic consolidation. Dr. Kopalyan contrasted Armenia’s approach with illiberal populist leaders elsewhere, noting the absence of tactics like undermining institutions, exploiting nationalism, or promoting cultural wars. He concluded that Armenia’s unique governance model, anchored in civil society, democratic norms, and a refusal to weaponize populism, has strengthened its democratization process and served as a critical component of its security architecture amid external pressures from Azerbaijan and Russia.
The panel provided critical insights into the destabilizing effects of populism and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Across the region, the confluence of weak institutions, contested sovereignty, and geopolitical pressures fosters environments where populism thrives, further undermining democratic governance and societal resilience.
The event underscored the need for targeted international engagement to bolster democratic institutions, support civil society, and promote regional cooperation. Recognizing the distinct challenges faced by each country, panelists stressed the importance of tailored strategies that address both domestic vulnerabilities and external influences.
Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 29, 2024. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0059
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated. In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum.
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far-left and far-right of the spectrum. All available data of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s. Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion.
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. The electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues, it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
In this context, the analysis of the European Parliament elections in June 2024 provides a unique opportunity to assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states simultaneously. With elections occurring around the same time, we can examine this wave of pan-European populism more closely and comparatively, assessing its scale, dynamics, and impact on national politics and, ultimately, on the EU. Thus, this report by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing on country-specific analyses by local experts, the report evaluates populist party performance across all EU member states and discusses the challenges populist politics pose for European institutions and the future of Europe.
The ECPS report illustrates the diversity of populism and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. The report see that the modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration, to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36%. Populists came first in the elections in six countries, with radical right populists winning in four countries, while centrist populists topped the polls in another two countries. Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament.
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament. With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Right-wing populists are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR, PfE, and ESN. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-inscrits (NI). Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, the report anticipates a growing influence on political debates and policy decisions in areas such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine. It also foresees more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than cohesive positions and policy proposals. The legitimation of radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and national politics is expected to continue. While the current EP majority may effectively maintain a cordon sanitaire around both the far-right and far-left, an overall shift to the right, in both rhetoric and policy, is already evident.
Each chapter of the report provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. October 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0020
In “Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries,” authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri argue that Islamist parties, at their core, are political entities that prioritize practical governance over strict ideology when necessary, leaving them vulnerable to voter rejection if they fail to address economic and social issues effectively. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy often takes precedence over Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic contexts. While it occasionally includes a wealth of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach offers a valuable resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism, and democracy on a global scale.
In the book titled Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries, authors Ihsan Yilmaz and Syaza Shukri explore the multifaceted strategies of Islamist parties operating within democratic and semi-democratic settings across various Muslim-majority countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. The book examines how these parties adapt ideologically and pragmatically to maintain influence, highlighting a shift from traditional opposition roles to coalition-building and power-sharing with secular or non-Islamist entities. The authors underscore that while Islamist parties share a religious foundation, their approaches to governance and democracy are diverse, challenging simplistic views that position them solely as anti-democratic.
Yilmaz and Shukri aim to provide a nuanced understanding of how these parties manage power, respond to crises, and navigate issues like minority rights and foreign policy, particularly in today’s globalized and interconnected political landscape. The introduction of the book under the title of “Islamist Parties Operating in Democracies,” sets the stage by examining the multifaceted nature of Islamist movements, defining them as entities aiming to incorporate Islamic principles into political and social realms. The authors clarify that while these groups are often perceived as monolithic, they are, in fact, a “diverse array of voices” with varying ideological and strategic priorities shaped by unique regional contexts.
One key strength of the introduction is its contextual framing of Islamist parties not just as ideological entities but as pragmatic actors responsive to “evolving conditions and societal expectations.” Yilmaz and Shukri discuss how these groups, while rooted in shared religious values, exhibit adaptability by forming coalitions and engaging in “power-sharing and coalition-building” with secular or even oppositional parties, particularly when in governance roles. This approach marks a significant departure from previous literature, as the authors aim to present Islamists as dynamic participants in democratic systems rather than static opponents to democratic principles.
Furthermore, the introduction highlights the book’s comparative methodology, which sets it apart from similar works that typically focus on a single region. By juxtaposing cases from countries like Turkey, Indonesia, and Tunisia, the authors aim to draw broader insights into “the complex dynamics” of Islamist governance. Yilmaz and Shukri suggest that understanding these dynamics is crucial for a “nuanced understanding” of Islamist politics that moves beyond reductive assumptions. Thus, the introduction promises a rich comparative analysis, shedding light on the strategic adaptability of Islamist parties and their potential to balance ideological goals with pragmatic governance in diverse political settings.
Islam and Politics
In Chapter 2 which is titled “Islam and Politics in Democratic Muslim-Majority Countries,” Yilmaz and Shukri present an insightful analysis into the complexities of Islamism and its intersection with democratic politics across diverse Muslim-majority nations. By grounding the discussion in scholarly debate, they explore how Islamist movements navigate between mainstream and extremist strands and examine the adaptive strategies employed by these parties in response to their unique political environments.
The chapter explores a critical dichotomy within Islamism, distinguishing between mainstream Islamists who participate in elections and seek gradual reform through democratic means and more extremist groups that often reject democratic processes. This distinction underlines the authors’ main argument about the adaptability of Islamist parties, emphasizing that while many engage in democratic processes, others lean toward authoritarian tendencies. This adaptation, as the authors argue, is driven by both political and socio-economic pressures, shaping Islamist strategies across different contexts.
Moreover, Yilmaz and Shukri delve into the ideological tensions within Islamist politics, such as the potential for majoritarianism and religious hegemony. They caution that unchecked Islamism could risk eroding minority rights and compromising democratic principles, especially in polarized societies. The authors support this claim by discussing the experience of Turkey under the Justice and Development Party (AKP), where populist tendencies and majoritarianism have raised concerns about the preservation of democratic institutions.
Finally, the chapter addresses the broader implications of Islamist governance and the complex role of political Islam. By examining case studies in countries like Tunisia, Indonesia, and Morocco, the authors provide a robust framework for understanding how Islamist parties balance religious principles with governance. This nuanced examination makes Chapter 2 a foundational overview for readers, highlighting both the potential and challenges of Islamism within democratic contexts.
PAS and Malaysia
In Chapter 3, Yilmaz and Shukri provide a comprehensive examination of Malaysia’s Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) under the title of “Seven Decades of PAS in Malaysian Politics,” tracing its strategic evolution across the nation’s politically complex landscape. The authors explore PAS’ adaptability and pragmatism within Malaysia’s semi-democratic environment, highlighting how PAS has shifted from conservatism to moderate pluralism and, recently, to ethno-religious populism.
The chapter outlines PAS’ historical journey, from its foundation in 1951 as an offshoot of UMNO, focused on Malay-Muslim identity, to its modern status as a dominant Islamist party. PAS’ relationship with UMNO, marked by both rivalry and cooperation, underscores the party’s flexibility. The authors note that PAS has shifted between opposing UMNO’s secular nationalism and forming alliances under banners of “Muslim unity,” depending on political needs. Yilmaz and Shukri point to PAS’ success in adapting its ideology to suit changing political climates, illustrating its willingness to collaborate across the political spectrum for electoral gains.
According to the book, PAS’ governance of Kelantan since 1990 serves as a case study in implementing an Islamist agenda within a multicultural society. Despite advocating for “shariazation” policies, PAS has shown restraint at the federal level, balancing Islamic values with the realities of Malaysia’s diverse demographics. This pragmatic approach, the authors argue, has allowed PAS to maintain its influence, especially during its brief time in federal power from 2020-2022.
Further, the authors discuss PAS’ strategic response to global and national crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, which bolstered its populist appeal through welfare measures. Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that PAS’ electoral flexibility and populist tactics have solidified its position among conservative Malay-Muslims, marking it as a key player in Malaysia’s evolving political landscape. The chapter demonstrates how PAS’ resilience and adaptability, despite operating within Malaysia’s semi-authoritarian framework, have contributed to its growing strength in Malaysian politics.
PKS and Indonesia
Chapter 4 of the book offers a nuanced analysis of Islamism within Indonesia’s multiparty political system under the title of “PKS in Indonesia’s Multiparty System,” by spotlighting the evolution of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) and its role as a major Islamist party. The chapter contextualizes PKS within Indonesia’s post-1998 democratization efforts, focusing on how the nation’s rich cultural diversity and democratic constitution impact the moderation of Islamist agendas. Yilmaz and Shukri highlight PKS’s pragmatic approach, noting its blend of Islamic values with democratic ideals as it navigates Indonesia’s secular and religious pluralism.
The authors emphasize that PKS has achieved influence without strictly seeking to impose sharia law, contrasting with more radical movements like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI). PKS’s stance on social justice, anti-corruption, and minority rights demonstrates a commitment to Indonesia’s Pancasila foundation, balancing Islamic identity with pluralist values. This adaptability has allowed PKS to participate in coalition governments while maintaining a distinct Islamist identity.
The chapter also explores PKS’s responses to regional and global Islamist trends, highlighting that PKS favors a moderate stance on Islamic solidarity, promoting peaceful international relations and opposing extremist ideologies. However, as the authors note, PKS faces rising pressures from conservative Islamic populism, which challenges Indonesia’s secular state model. They point to the complex balancing act of PKS as it negotiates between religious values and national priorities amid Indonesia’s diverse electorate.
Chapter 4 presents PKS as an example of Islamist pragmatism within a democratic framework, stressing its role in maintaining Indonesia’s status as a moderate Muslim-majority nation. The analysis showcases PKS’s strategic positioning within Indonesia’s political landscape, where moderation often proves more sustainable than radicalism.
Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and Pakistan
In Chapter 5 of the book, authors Yilmaz and Shukri provide an in-depth exploration of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), one of Pakistan’s most influential Islamist parties. This chapter, which is titled “A Faithful Force: Jamaat-E-Islami and Islamist Politics in Pakistan,” examines JI’s evolution from a supporter of military regimes to a unique voice advocating social development within an Islamic framework. Describing JI as a “faithful force,” the authors highlight the party’s struggle to reconcile its foundational principles with the realities of ‘Pakistani democracy,’ illustrating both its successes and limitations in influencing national politics.
Initially, JI supported Pakistan’s military leadership, particularly during General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime, which advanced the Islamization process in Pakistan. The authors emphasize how JI’s alliance with Zia enabled it to push for Islamic laws, giving JI a rare moment of influence. However, as the chapter reveals, JI’s strict Islamist stance limited its broader appeal, especially as it encountered Pakistan’s diverse political landscape and increasing calls for pluralism.
Yilmaz and Shukri delve into JI’s organizational structure, describing it as both a strength and a “double-edged sword.” JI’s internal hierarchy, according to the authors, deeply rooted in discipline and loyalty, provides a solid foundation, yet its rigid framework hinders adaptability. Despite its “commitment to democratic principles” and holding intra-party elections, JI has struggled to expand its influence beyond its core supporters, often failing to capture significant electoral success on a national level.
The authors explore JI’s stance on the controversial blasphemy law and its impact on Pakistan’s democracy, particularly in relation to minority rights. JI’s call for the law’s strict enforcement has complicated its image, as it aligns the party with hardline interpretations of Islam that conflict with Pakistan’s aspirations for a more inclusive society. While JI advocates for “social justice, anti-corruption, and anti-imperialism,” its approach has been criticized for not sufficiently addressing the needs of Pakistan’s minority communities, a factor that limits its broader political appeal.
In discussing JI’s ideological adaptability, the authors argue that JI has recently shifted towards a “second-generation Islamism,” with an emphasis on social development and community welfare. The chapter notes JI’s active involvement in charitable work through its Al-Khidmat Foundation, an outreach strategy that has helped it maintain influence despite its limited political successes. This evolution highlights JI’s pragmatic side, as it aligns its goals with broader social issues while retaining an Islamic identity.
Yilmaz and Shukri conclude that JI’s trajectory exemplifies Pakistan’s complex relationship with Islam and democracy, where Islamist parties face the challenge of preserving religious identity while adapting to democratic norms. They suggest that while JI has struggled to secure a dominant political position, it remains a potent force due to its strong organizational base and grassroots support. Ultimately, Chapter 5 sheds light on the “delicate balance” between faith-based politics and the realities of Pakistan’s evolving democratic landscape.
PJD and Morocco
In Chapter 6, titled “Islamist PJD and the Monarchy in Morocco,” the authors delve into the dynamics between Morocco’s monarchy and the Justice and Development Party (PJD), focusing on Morocco’s unique Makhzen system. This system, led by the king as emir al-mu’minin or “commander of the faithful,” establishes him as both a secular and religious authority, allowing the monarchy to manage Islam as an integral part of Morocco’s national identity. The chapter emphasizes how this framework has been crucial in tempering “the potency of political Islamism” and limiting the PJD’s influence, even as it formed a government following its 2011 electoral success.
The chapter examines the PJD’s decade in power, a tenure punctuated by moments of compromise and concession. Initially, the party enjoyed significant popular support, riding the wave of Arab Spring reforms that included expanded parliamentary power. However, as the chapter illustrates, the PJD quickly encountered the limits of its influence. The authors highlight how the monarchy’s interventions in key government functions, especially in “sensitive roles and veto powers,” underscored the persistence of monarchical authority, often stifling the PJD’s ability to implement its agenda fully.
The COVID-19 pandemic further strained the PJD’s position, contributing to its electoral decline in 2021 and symbolizing the end of its era of Islamist governance in Morocco. This chapter argues that the monarchy’s symbolic Islamic leadership, combined with its political authority, successfully framed itself as the true custodian of Moroccan identity, relegating the PJD to “a second-generation Islamist party forced to work within the system.” This analysis reveals that the PJD’s journey reflects the complex interplay of religious and political authority in Morocco, where Islam is strategically woven into the fabric of governance, ultimately ensuring that power remains centered in the monarchy.
Ennahda and Tunisia
Chapter 7, titled “Ennahda as Tunisia’s Muslim Democratic Party,” delves into the rise, evolution, and challenges faced by Tunisia’s Ennahda party, highlighting its remarkable adaptability within the country’s political landscape. Initially, Ennahda emerged from Tunisia’s conservative Muslim roots, but, in the wake of the Arab Spring, it evolved into what the authors describe as Tunisia’s “Muslim Democratic Party.” This transformation underscores Ennahda’s pragmatism and its attempt to blend religious principles with democratic ideals. After winning Tunisia’s first democratic elections in 2011, Ennahda adapted its stance to suit a diverse political landscape, opting for “a practical kind of national reconciliation”with secular parties, which became crucial for political stability.
The authors highlight Ennahda’s ideological moderation, particularly when it decided not to impose Sharia as the foundation of the 2014 constitution. This choice, according to Yilmaz and Shukri, reflected Ennahda’s understanding of “the importance of Maqasid al-Sharia over specific rules,” showcasing the party’s evolving position on Islamic law to resonate with a broader national identity. The shift was further reinforced during the 2016 Tenth General Congress, where Ennahda officially prioritized politics over religious preaching, effectively becoming “a conservative political force capable of handling governance.”
The chapter also sheds light on the recent strain in Tunisian democracy, exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis, which impacted Ennahda’s reputation and led to widespread disapproval. Ennahda’s subsequent absence from the 2023 elections reflects a shift in its strategy, possibly spurred by President Kais Saied’s consolidation of power. In sum, Chapter 7 paints a nuanced picture of Ennahda’s transformation and challenges, illustrating its continued struggle between ideological values and the demands of a pragmatic political approach in Tunisia’s ever-shifting political terrain.
AKP and Turkey
Titled “Islamist Populist AKP and Turkey’s Shift Towards Authoritarianism,” Chapter 8 of the book presents an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring its journey from “Muslim democrat” roots to an authoritarian populist regime. Initially, the AKP championed democratization, economic reform, and EU membership; however, its trajectory shifted post-2011, notably after the “Gezi protests of 2013” and the controversial 2016 coup attempt. These events, according to the authors, paved the way for a clampdown on dissent, particularly targeting journalists, activists, and opposition politicians, marking a stark turn towards authoritarianism.
Erdogan’s leadership has progressively consolidated power, transforming Turkey’s democratic infrastructure into what the authors describe as a “competitive authoritarian regime.” With the 2017 constitutional referendum, the office of the prime minister was abolished, granting the president sweeping executive powers, leading one observer to note that “Erdogan [became] the virtually unassailable ruler of Turkey.” By diminishing checks on presidential authority, Erdogan’s AKP harnessed Islam and nationalism to foster a narrative that secures his base while casting opposition voices as foreign-controlled threats to national unity.
In this chapter, Yilmaz and Shukri also examine the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet), highlighting its instrumental role in promoting the AKP’s vision of Islam as a component of Turkish identity. This vision extends internationally, where Turkey navigates a complex geopolitical landscape. According to the authors, through selective alliances, including with Russia and China, the AKP leverages religious and nationalist rhetoric to mitigate Western criticism, particularly regarding human rights issues. Yet, its economic policies, based on unorthodox monetary approaches, have led to high inflation and decreased living standards. The authors note that Erdogan’s insistence on low-interest rates, justified by Islamic teachings against usury, has led to what the text calls an “accelerated currency devaluation” that further strains Turkey’s economy.
In sum, Chapter 8 paints the AKP as a party that, while initially promising democratic reform, has instead pursued populist authoritarianism. This has strained Turkey’s democratic structures and polarized its society, positioning Erdogan as a powerful, divisive figure whose policies reflect both the aspirations and challenges of modern Turkish Islamism.
Trajectory of Islamist Parties
In Chapter 9, the authors overview “Trajectory of Islamist Parties” and synthesize the book’s key findings, examining how various Islamist parties navigate the balance between Islamism and democracy. The chapter delves into how Islamist parties, when allowed political participation, engage in governance yet often struggle with the tension between God’s sovereignty and popular sovereignty. This complex relationship has led to a diversity of outcomes, ranging from authoritarian shifts in Turkey under the AKP to democratic engagement in Malaysia, Morocco, and Tunisia.
The authors highlight the significance of “strategic interaction theory,” which suggests that an Islamist party’s moderation is contingent upon its relationships with secular forces and the military. “Credibility of signals sent by the Islamist party” is crucial in establishing trust with non-Islamist actors, although, as in the AKP’s case, prolonged power can erode democratic practices. The chapter notes that the AKP’s “immoderation was the result of dismantling institutional checks and balances” due to political crises like the Gezi protests and the 2016 coup attempt.
Through comparative analysis, the authors argue that some Islamist parties adapt to electoral losses, as seen in Tunisia and Morocco, where they have “accepted defeat albeit with some resistance.” However, once in power, these parties tend to favor pragmatism over strict adherence to religious principles to sustain governance. This adaptability is essential, particularly in Muslim-majority secular states like Indonesia, where the “balance between Islamic identity and democratic diversity” is necessary for political survival.
The authors suggest in brief that Islamist parties are, at their core, political entities that prioritize practical governance over ideology when necessary, making them susceptible to voter rejection if they fail to deliver on economic and social issues. This adaptability underscores the book’s central argument that policy efficacy outweighs Islamist rhetoric, shaping the evolution of Islamist parties within democratic frameworks. While it occasionally includes abundance of historical details that may seem excessive, the book’s nuanced approach provides an insightful resource for understanding the intersections of Islamism, Islamist populism, authoritarian Islamism and democracy on a global scale.
Ihsan Yilmaz & Syaza Shukri. (2024). Islamist Parties and Power in Democratic Nation-States: A Comparative Analysis of Six Muslim-Majority Countries. Palgrave Macmillan. 313 pp. Hardcover: EUR 139.09. ISBN-10: 9819743427, ISBN-13: 978-9819743421.
Please cite as: Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0060
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
By Gilles Ivaldi*(Sciences Po Paris–CNRS (CEVIPOF), France) & Emilia Zankina* (Temple University, Rome, Italy)
Introduction
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated (Moffit, 2017; De la Torre, 2019). In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum (FEPS, 2024).
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far left and far right of the spectrum (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The PopuList database of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion (Muldoon & Herman, 2018; Schwörer, 2021; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) show, electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021), it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
The analysis of the European Parliament elections of June 2024 thus provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. With European Parliament (EP) elections all taking place at about the same time, we can look more closely and comparatively at the current wave of pan-European populism, its size, dynamics and impact on national polities and, ultimately, on the EU.
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU.
In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
Mapping European populism(s)
Mudde (2004) defines populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ that ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Populist parties champion the cause of the ‘common man’ against what is perceived as a detached and self-serving political elite. While there are other ontological approaches to populism – e.g., political discourse (Laclau, 2005), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), and performance (Ostiguy et al., 2020) – these different traditions of research generally converge towards the same common essential attributes underpinning populism (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Moreover, the ideational approach allows one to connect the supply and demand side of populism and to study the diversity of its manifestations across Europe.
In the European political landscape, populism manifests itself in a variety of parties across the political spectrum, from left to right (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Taggart & Pirro, 2021). In Eastern and Central Europe, populism may also be found across a range of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties located inside and outside the mainstream (Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such diversity is shown in Table 1, which provides an overview of the leading populist parties in the current European political landscape.
Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
On the radical right, populism is typically combined with exclusionary nativism and authoritarianism, whereby the people and the elite are primarily defined along cultural lines (Mudde, 2007). Radical-right populist parties essentialize migration not only in their nativist rhetoric but also portray it with terrorism and crime, and in this way, it is put forward as a security issue, as was the case during the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015–2016 (Mudde, 2019). Such populism is found in parties like France’s National Rally (RN), Lega (formerly Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) in Italy, and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The nativist and authoritarian ideology of the PRR is also found in ‘radicalized’ conservative parties such as Poland’s Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Hungary’s Fidesz, which have turned to a populist radical right strategy over time (Buštíková, 2017: 575).
The populist radical left has, on the other hand, a universalistic profile embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, who are essentially pitted against the economic elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Lisi et al., 2019). In Europe, left-wing populism has been particularly electorally successful in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2020). Economic issues, bailouts, and austerity programs were the main driving forces behind a transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018).Parties such as the Spanish Podemos, SYRIZA in Greece, or Germany’s Die Linke (The Left) are examples of this phenomenon. In those countries, however, there has been a decline in the electoral support for parties of the populist left since 2019 (Ivaldi, 2020).
Finally, in CEE, populism often manifests itself in the form of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties (Učeň, 2007; Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such parties operate in the more volatile party system of the former Communist bloc, where political instability is a long-term phenomenon. They focus on challenging the existing political elite and fighting corruption, and they can be found across the entire political spectrum, both within and outside the ideological mainstream (Engler et al., 2019). This type of populism is found in parties such as Slovakia’s Ordinary People and Independents (OL’aNO), the movement of Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz) in Poland and Change Continues (Prodalzhavame Promyanata, PP) in Bulgaria. Looking more specifically at the Czech Republic, Havlík (2019) sees the rise of the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) as a case of ‘centrist technocratic populism’ based on a denial of political pluralism, anti-partyism, resistance to constitutionalism and the embrace of majoritarianism. In Western Europe, the Italian M5S has been seen as a case of ‘centrist populism’, which does not display the typical ideological profile (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Pirro & Van Kessel, 2018).
The populism-Euroscepticism nexus
Given their inherent anti-elite and anti-established stance, populist parties in the European context are also often Eurosceptic. Kneuer (2018) emphasizes such a ‘tandem’ of populism and Euroscepticism as one unifying feature of all successful populist parties in Europe, reflecting in her view the formation of a new transnational cleavage cross-cutting the traditional left-right axis.
A recent study examining parties in 30 European countries from 2018 to 2024 (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2024) finds 77 parties to be both Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that the growth of European integration and its association with a series of crises, such as migration, the Eurozone, Brexit and COVID-19, has bred discontent that fostered anti-establishment positions and the demonization of the EU. At the same time, the study found clusters of parties that are anti-establishment but not Eurosceptic and parties that are Eurosceptic but not anti-establishment, arguing that the link is not always straightforward.
Meijers and Zaslove (2021) also examine populist parties’ positions towards European integration, similarly arguing for a nuanced picture, with some populist parties rejecting the EU outright while others are taking a reformist position. According to their study, populist parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Golden Dawn in Greece and Lega in Italy are highly Eurosceptic. Populist left parties, on the other hand, tend to be more moderate, with the Five Star Movement (M5S) being moderately Eurosceptic and Podemos and SYRIZA having moderate pro-EU positions.
Similarly, Pirro, Taggart and Kessel (2018) find differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism. Examining the economic and financial crisis (the ‘Great Recession’), the migrant crisis and Brexit, they find left-wing populists attacking the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ agenda and austerity measures, while right-wing populists criticizing the EU on account of increased immigration and multiculturalism. Brexit, on the other hand, is portrayed ‘by various kinds of populist parties as a victory for the ordinary people against unresponsive elites and a rejection of the undemocratic and technocratic decision-making process at the EU level’ (Pirro, Taggart and Van Kessel, 2018). While Euroscepticism is not limited to populist parties alone, neither are all populist parties Eurosceptic. We see a strong correlation between anti-EU positions and populist parties, which is more pronounced to the right than to the left.
More recently, however, there has been a moderating shift in populist Eurosceptic politics both left and right of the spectrum. In the wake of the Brexit referendum of 2016, many populist parties have strategically abandoned their previous plans to drop the Euro or leave the EU altogether, turning to more nuanced or ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration in order to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters, and to collaborate with mainstream parties. As Van Kessel et al. (2020) note, the difficulties in the Brexit process may have dampened public demand for leaving the EU elsewhere in Europe, thus reducing the viability of ‘exit strategies’. Other studies suggest that populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions. Right-wing nationalist populist parties have adopted ‘alt-Europe’ counternarratives reflecting ‘a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European “community of sovereign states”, “strong nations” or “fatherlands”, that abhors the EU’s “centralized” United States of Europe’ (McMahon, 2021: 10). ‘Taking back control from Brussels’ has been observed to be a common stand of radical right-wing populist parties on the way to the 2024 EP elections (Braun & Reinl, 2023).
As McDonnell and Werner (2018) argue, populist radical right parties ‘remain flexible to perform significant shifts’ on the issue of European integration because of its relatively limited salience. The dampening of their Euroscepticism by populist parties may also be associated with office-seeking strategies. As Ivaldi (2018b) suggests, in the case of the French FN, governmental credibility and coalition potential have been two strong incentives for the FN to tone down its Euroscepticism since the 2017 presidential election.
Drivers of populism: structural and short-term factors
The economic crises of the past decade, coupled with the perceived threats posed by globalization and immigration, have created circumstances that allow for a surge in populist sentiments across various European nations. Populism, characterized by a general distrust towards traditional political institutions and an increasing polarization of society, is fuelled by a complex interplay of socioeconomic, cultural and political factors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021).
Different varieties of populism operate on different types of grievances and issues across the economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition, however. Socioeconomic issues have traditionally been identified as critical factors of left-wing populism at both the party and the voter level (Charalambous & Ioannou, 2019) and have become increasingly relevant for right-wing populist parties since the 2008 financial crisis (Ibsen, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021). Immigration has long been identified by research as a critical issue for populist radical right parties, and it is typically associated with authoritarian views of society (Mudde, 2007).
While sharing similar populist attitudes, populist voters diverge when it comes to the host ideologies to which their populism is attached (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Populist radical right voters are primarily concerned with cultural issues of immigration and law and order and show stronger nativist and authoritarian attitudes. Voters on the populist radical left tend to embrace more egalitarian and universalistic values while often supporting a libertarian agenda on social issues. Finally, centrist populist voters exhibit strong anti-establishment attitudes and are primarily characterized by protest voting but do not generally show the nationalist attitudes found in right-wing populism (Ivaldi, 2020; 2021). Such parties in CEE often take an anticorruption stance, making this the focus of their electoral appeal (Haughton, Neudorfer & Zankina, 2024).
As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) demonstrated, the effect of these different sets of long-term, structural determinants is also conditioned by short-term political discontent, most notably when populist parties are in opposition. Such short-term factors are particularly relevant to studying populism in European elections. EP elections are generally considered ‘second-order elections’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). That is, citizens give more weight to national elections than European ones on a range of different variables: political trust, interest in politics, attachment and complexity of politics. In European elections: (a) voters tend to trust national institutions instead of European ones; (b) they have a stronger connection to their own nation rather than the EU, and; (c) they think that European politics is too difficult to grasp and that domestic issues are more compelling than European ones (Braun, 2021).
Looking at party-level data from all European elections between 1979 and 2019, Ehin and Talving (2021) find that the second-order election model continues to wield significant explanatory power, with lower participation rates in EP elections compared with first-order national elections and incumbency being associated with electoral losses in most EP election years.
Because of the increasing politicization of European integration, however, the viability of the second-order election model has been called into question, reflecting the growing salience and resonance of EU-related issues in mass politics and party competition (Hutter et al., 2016). The recent analysis of EU issue voting in the 2019 EP election by Goldberg et al. (2024) concludes that such issues matter for all EP political groups under scrutiny (both mainstream and more radical), which speaks against the idea of conditional mobilization by Eurosceptic parties.
Moreover, while Ehin and Talving (2021) see the ‘second-order type as constituting a base for a fragmented parliament with a strong representation of populist and extremist parties, other studies, such as Wondreys (2023), find only limited evidence for a boost in electoral support for extreme parties in European elections. This finding is particularly salient when considering the size of those parties and their changing role and status in European party systems. As Wondreys (2023: 7) argues: ‘[G]iven the overall increase in size, the role of many extreme parties in their respective party systems may have changed…. Voters already vote for these parties in [first-order elections], and thus have fewer incentives to subsequently vote for them in [second-order elections] as well.’
At the same time, several European countries held elections at multiple levels concurrently from 7–9 June 2024. These included Belgium, which held federal elections alongside European Parliament elections; Bulgaria, which held another early national parliamentary election on the same date as the EP one; and several countries that held local elections alongside the European ones (i.e., Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania). In these cases, we can expect to see European issues merge, rendered secondary or disappear altogether as domestic issues take precedence.
Looking back at the 2019 EP elections
The 2019 EP elections took place in the wake of the migration crisis shaped by an unprecedented refugee flow to European countries, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, which peaked in 2014–2016. The crisis fed into the populist parties’ Eurosceptic, nativist and nationalist narratives, which were even embraced by mainstream parties (Mudde 2019; Capozzi et al., 2023; Rodi et al., 2023). With the associated cultural sensitivities and economic, social and demographic concerns, European public interest has always been high in the political discourses on migration. In this sense, how the EU managed the refugee influx stood at the heart of discussions between 2015 and 2019. In parallel with Eurosceptic and populist concerns around European integration and migration, the economic agenda remained prominent during the 2019 EP election (Braun & Schafer, 2022). Finally, Brexit remained an important issue, serving as a benchmark of evaluation for citizens to reflect on the benefits of European membership to their own countries (Hobolt et al., 2022). In this regard, debates on the legitimacy of supranational governance, as heightened in the framework of sovereignty, were the most exploited narrative by populists against the EU (Ruzza and Pejovic 2019).
However, the predicted surge in support for populism did not fully materialize in the 2019 EP elections (Ivaldi, 2020). Despite a slowdown of economic activity, the economic context was somewhat less favourable to populist mobilization, as unemployment and inflation remained relatively low across much of Europe. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU migration crisis that had fuelled support for right-wing nationalist populists seemed to wane: economic issues dominated the 2019 European election agenda, together with climate change and promoting human rights and democracy, while immigration ranked fifth (European Parliament, 2019).
Moreover, in a context of high political uncertainty, polls showed more substantial support for the EU across member states. In the Spring 2019 Eurobarometer survey, 61% of EU citizens said that EU membership was good for their country, a figure at its highest since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Eurobarometer, 2019). Meanwhile, interest in the election was much higher than in 2014, and voter turnout increased in 20 of the then-28 EU member states, most substantially in countries such as Poland (+22 percentage points), Romania (+19), Spain (+17), Austria (+15), and Hungary (+14).
In the 2019 elections, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their majority for the first time since 1979, securing 182 and 154 seats, respectively. A significant number of voters dissatisfied with Europe’s ruling grand coalition turned to the Greens and Liberals. The Greens won a total of 74 seats, making significant gains in Western European countries such as Germany, France, Ireland and the UK. Pro-EU liberals secured 108 seats, which made Renew Europe the third largest group in the European Parliament.
Meanwhile, populist parties rose to a total of 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament at the time, as opposed to 211 seats (28%) five years earlier. However, the election showed mixed performances for populist party families across EU member states.
The outcome essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist right: together, these parties won 168 seats in 2019 – their best result ever – compared with 131 seats five years earlier. Support for right-wing populist parties significantly rose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Sweden and Belgium and they dominated the polls in countries such as France, Italy and the UK. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega was the big election winner, with 34.3% of the vote compared with only 6.2% in 2014. The National Rally (RN, formerly Front National) topped the polls in France with 23.3% of the vote. In the UK, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party made an impressive breakthrough with 30.5% of the vote, taking over as the main Eurosceptic outfit, a role formerly held by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).
In Eastern Europe, ruling conservative parties consolidated electorally: in Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) won 45.4% of the vote, increasing its previous support by 13.6%; in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz dominated the polls with no less than 52.6%. Smaller, extreme right-wing parties also made gains in Greece and Slovakia. In Greece, Golden Dawn retained two of its previous four seats. In Slovakia, the neo-nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), headed by Marian Kotleba, won 12.2% of the vote and two seats. In Cyprus, the National Popular Front (ELAM) increased its support to 8.3% (+5.6 percentage points) but failed to secure one of the island’s six seats in the European Parliament.
In contrast, there was a significant drop in support for the populist left, from 43 seats in 2014 to 37 in the 2019 election. Left-wing populist parties had made substantial gains in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, particularly in countries such as Greece and Spain, hit hardest by austerity policies (see Kriesi & Pappas, 2015: 23). In the 2014 elections, the populist radical left surged in Greece, Spain and Ireland and such parties made significant inroads in Portugal, Italy and France (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). In 2019, against the backdrop of a timid economic recovery and lower unemployment, these parties lost ground across most EU member states, most notably in countries like Greece, Spain and France. In Eastern and Central Europe, the populist left remained relatively marginal electorally.
Finally, in 2019, centrist populist parties secured 32 of their previous 33 seats. Centrist populists lost momentum in countries of the former Communist bloc, such as Latvia, where Who Owns the State? (KPV) collapsed to less than 1% of the vote, as opposed to their 14.3% showing in the 2018 national elections. In Estonia, the Estonian Centre Party (EK) fell by 8.6%. In the Czech Republic, the governing ANO and its highly controversial leader, Andrej Babiš, took just 21.2% of the vote, down 8.4 percentage points from its previous result. In Bulgaria, electoral support for the ruling GERB fell by 2 percentage points, although Boïko Borissov’s party remained the most potent force in Bulgarian politics with 30.9% of the European election vote. Centrist populist parties also performed badly in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Croatia. In Western Europe, the Five Star Movement (M5S) was the biggest loser of the 2019 Italian EP election, losing 15.6% compared to the 2018 national election.
With a specific reference to Euroscepticism, the 2019 elections were a real success. In almost all member states, except Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Romania, anti-EU movements won seats. The 2019 elections formed a parliament where more than 28% of MEPs belonged to populist or Eurosceptic parties (Treib, 2021: 177).
The context of the 2024 EP elections
The 2024 EP elections were held in a context characterized by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about the EU’s handling of migration and refugee issues, the deteriorating economic situation and inflation crisis in member countries, security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the newly erupted Israeli–Hamas war in the Middle East.
The EU faced unprecedented challenges due to the COVID-19 crisis and is still dealing with its economic and social consequences. It adopted a €750 billion recovery fund called NextGenerationEU to support member states’ recovery efforts. However, the implementation of this fund was delayed by political disputes and legal challenges, potentially fuelling political discontent – an issue that also carried onto the 2024 EP elections.
Concerning migration and asylum policy reform, the EU has been struggling to find a common approach to address the influx of migrants and asylum seekers, especially from Africa and the Middle East. The current system, based on the Dublin Regulation, has been criticized for putting too much pressure on the frontline states, such as Greece, Italy and Spain and for failing to ensure solidarity and responsibility-sharing among member states. To address this, the European Commission proposed a new pact on migration and asylum to create a more balanced and comprehensive framework for managing migration flows (European Commission, 2024). The proposal took a long time to go through the necessary legislative process due to the opposition from some member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Austria, who rejected mandatory relocation quotas and favoured stricter border controls.
Challenges were not limited to domestic issues; the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a litmus test for the common foreign and security policy of the Union. The EU was confronted with a deteriorating security situation in Eastern Europe as Russia intensified its military aggression against Ukraine and threatened to cut off gas supplies to Europe. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia, but disagreement elicited among the member states on the extent of support and related issues like grain imports from Ukraine. The ECPS report on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on populism in Europe concluded that populist radical right parties exploited the war as an opportunity to voice their anti-EU rhetoric with sovereigntist arguments. In this vein, their common stance towards the sanctions had been hesitancy and scepticism, illustrating them as not really in line with economic and security-related national interests (Ivaldi & Zankina, 2023).
Furthermore, the recent terrorist attack of Hamas on Israel and the subsequent outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war bore high risks not only for the Middle East but also for other parts of the world, including Europe. Considering the heavy historical and political baggage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict held, it seemed like a convenient topic to be exploited by populist parties ahead of the elections. Instances such as the terrorist attack in Brussels, in which two Swedish citizens were killed in the days after the start of the war, provided room for populists’ rhetoric in the form of xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-migration.
However, this ‘polycrisis’ was expected to play out differently in each country. The survey by Krastev and Leonard (2024a), which was conducted in September and October 2023 in 11 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), suggests that the crises of the economy, security, health, climate and migration, have created distinct political responses and opinions across Europe. While immigration was the key issue in Germany, France and Denmark, people in other European countries identified climate change as the most important crisis. Italians and Portuguese, in turn, pointed to global economic turmoil, while in Spain, Great Britain and Romania, the COVID-19 pandemic was the principal issue. Estonians, Poles and Danes considered the war in Ukraine to be the most serious of crises.
In such context, the 2024 European elections represented a crucial test for both the EU and national governments, as voters would evaluate their handling of the pandemic and the recovery and how they planned to address the long-term challenges of climate change, digital transformation, and social cohesion (Bassot, 2023).
However, public opinion data showed relatively positive views toward the Union among EU citizens. Trust in the EU has increased by 6 percentage points since 2019 and now stands at 49%. The perception of the situation of the European economy has improved since autumn 2023, with 47% of respondents rating it as ‘good’, the highest level since 2019. Nearly two-thirds (62%) also said they were optimistic about the future of the EU, which is a slight increase (+4 percentage points) compared to five years earlier. Feelings of being ‘citizens of the EU’ dominated for 74% of the respondents, the highest level in over two decades. Meanwhile, a majority of respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (58%) and in the EU (57%) (Eurobarometer, 2024).
An anticipated rise in support for right-wing populists across the EU
Populist parties have gained traction in recent years, reflecting a broader trend of rising populism across the continent. This surge in popularity has been particularly noticeable among right-leaning populist parties (Ivaldi & Torner, 2023). Such rise in support has been exemplified by the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) triumph in regional elections in eastern states of Germany, the remarkable success of Le Pen’s NR in the 2022 French elections, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI breakthrough in the 2022 Italian election, as well as by the performances of the Sweden Democrats and Finns Party in the last parliamentary elections, which all point to a further increase in the representation of right-wing populist parties in the next EP. In Italy, Meloni’s FdI and Salvini’s Lega, respectively part of the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) and Identity and Democracy (ID), were also seen as potentially decisive actors in the alliance formation of the next European Parliament (Massetti, 2023; Maślanka, 2023).
Elsewhere in Europe, right-wing populist parties have become established in countries like Portugal and Spain, and they have topped the polls in Austria and Belgium. In CEE, right-wing populism has been on the rise in Estonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz secured another term in government in the 2022 elections with a clear victory, putting the contested topics between the party and the EU, like the supremacy of the rule of law, immigration, the Russia–Ukraine War, on the agenda of the EP elections. Moreover, Fidezs’s suspension by the EPP and then its departure from this political group has led the party to search for new coalitions after the elections, with talks of joining the ECR group. In Poland, the October 2023 national elections resulted in the opposition parties’ coalition winning over the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) and the new government of pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While such an outcome will undoubtedly improve relations between Poland and the EU, PiS has maintained its support at around 30% of the vote, together with Confederation, a heterogeneous extremist group at about 10% of the vote.
Analysts predicted ‘a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats’ (Krastev & Leonard, 2024b). Anti-European populists were expected ‘to top the polls in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) and come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden)’ (Ibid.)
The European Parliament and party groups
While reflecting the existing balance of strength across national contexts, populist party performances at the EU level may significantly impact the configuration of party groups within the EP, which is a key legislative body of the EU, working alongside the Council of the European Union to adopt European legislation following proposals by the European Commission. The EP comprises 705 members (MEPs) – 720 in the new EP – making it the second-largest democratic electorate in the world. These MEPs are elected every five years by the citizens of the EU through universal suffrage.
The structure and operation of the EP are governed by its Rules of Procedure, and the political bodies, committees, delegations and political groups guide EP activities. The representation of citizens is ‘degressively proportional’, with a minimum threshold of six members per member state and no member state having more than 96 seats. Degressive proportionality means that while seats are allocated based on the population of the member states, more populous member states agree to be under-represented to favour greater representation of less populated ones.
Political groups within the EP can be formed around a single European political party or can include more than one European party as well as national parties and independents. Prior to the 2024 EP elections, the existing political groups in the EP were the EPP, the Progressive Alliance of S&D, Renew Europe (previously ALDE), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), ECR, The Left in the EP (GUE/NGL), and ID.
The outgoing EP was home to both left-wing and right-wing populist parties, that is, while Brothers of Italy (FdI), Vox of Spain, Sweden Democrats, Fidesz of Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) of Poland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), the AfD, the National Rally of France, stood on the right side of the spectrum, Podemos of Spain and SYRIZA of Greece represented left-wing populism in the 2019–2024 EP. Regarding political group membership, right-wing populist parties tend to choose different political groups, preventing them from having a common voice in the EP. After the 2019 elections, however, their seeking of collaboration has become more evident, especially under the umbrella of ID and ECR.
Questions addressed in the report
Under the auspices of the European Center for Populism Studies(ECPS), this report examines the electoral performances and impacts of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Based on a compilation of country-specific analyses by local experts, the report looks at populist party performances across all EU member states, and it discusses the challenges of populist politics for European institutions as well as for the future of Europe.
Each chapter provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump : le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
References
Bale, T. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (eds) (2021) Riding the Populist Wave. Europe’s Mainstream Right in Crisis, Cambridge University Press.
Braun D. (2021), The Europeanness of the 2019 European Parliament elections and the mobilising power of European issues, Politics, 41:4, 451–466.
Braun D. & Reinl A. K. (2023), Who holds the union together? Citizens’ preferences for European Union cohesion in challenging times. European Union Politics, 24:2, 390–409.
Braun D. & Schafer C. (2022), Issues that mobilize Europe: the role of key policy issues for voter turnout in the 2019 European Parliament election. European Union Politics, 23:1, 120–140.
Buštíková, L. (2017) The radical right in Eastern Europe. In: J. Rydgren (Ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right(pp. 565–581), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Capozzi et al. (2023), The Thin Ideology of Populist Advertising on Facebook during the 2019 EU Elections. Proceedings of the ACM Web ConferenceMay 1–5, 2023, Austin, TX, USA, https://doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583267
Charalambous, G., & Ioannou, G. (Eds.) (2019) Left radicalism and populism in Europe, Routledge studies in radical history and politics. New York: Routledge.
De la Torre, C. (Ed.) (2019). Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, London, Routledge
Ehin P. & Talving L. (2021), Still second-order? European elections in the era of populism, extremism and Euroscepticism. Politics, 41:4, 467–485.
Engler, S., Pytlas, B., & Deegan-Krause, K. (2019) Assessing the diversity of anti-establishment and populist politics in Central and Eastern Europe. West European Politics, 42:6, 1310–1336.
FEPS (2024) The transformation of the mainstream right and its impact on (social) democracy, Policy Study, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), April.
Goldberg, A. C., van Elsas, E. J., & De Vreese, C. H. (2024). The differential impact of EU attitudes on voting behaviour in the European parliamentary elections 2019. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 1–20.
Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro, M., & Plaza-Colodro, C. (2018). Populist Euroscepticism in Iberian party systems. Politics, 38(3), 344–360.
Guriev, S. & Papaioannou, E. (2020) The Political Economy of Populism, CEPR Discussion Paper DP14433.
Halikiopoulou D. & Vasilopoulou S. (2014), Support for the Far Right in the 2014 European Parliament Elections: A Comparative Perspective. The Political Quarterly, 85:3, 285–288. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12102
Hanley, S. & Sikk, A. (2016) Economy, corruption or floating voters? Explaining the breakthroughs of anti-establishment reform parties in Eastern Europe. Party Politics 22, 522–533.
Haughton, T., Neudorfer, N., and Zankina, E. (2024). ‘There Are Such People: The Role of Corruption in the 2021 Parliamentary Elections in Bulgaria’, East European Politics, 40:3, 521–546.
Havlík, V. (2019) Technocratic Populism and Political Illiberalism in Central Europe. Problems of Post-Communism, 66:6, 369–384.
Hernández, E. and Kriesi, H-P. (2016). The electoral consequences of the financial and economic crisis in Europe. European Journal of Political Research, 55: 203–224.
Hobolt et al. (2022), The Brexit deterrent? How member state exit shapes public support for the European Union. European Union Politics, Vol 23(1), 100–119.
Hutter S., Grande E. & Kriesi H. (Eds.) (2016) Politicising Europe: Integration and Mass Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ibsen, Malte Frøslee. 2019. The Populist Conjuncture: Legitimation Crisis in the Age of Globalized Capitalism. Political Studies 67:3, 795–811.
Ivaldi, G., Lanzone, M.E., Woods, D. (2017). Varieties of Populism Across a Left-Right Spectrum: the case of the Front National, the Northern League, Podemos and Five Star Movement, Swiss Political Science Review, 23:4, 354–376.
Ivaldi, G. (2020) Populist Voting in the 2019 European Elections, Totalitarianism and Democracy, 17:1, 67–96.
Ivaldi, G. (2021). ‘Electoral basis of populist parties’, in R. Heinisch, C. Holtz-Bacha, O. Mazzoleni (eds.) Political Populism. A Handbook, 2nd Edition (pp. 213–224), Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Ivaldi G. & Zankina E. (2023), The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. Brussels: European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Katsambekis, G. & Kioupkiolis, A. (eds) (2020) The Populist Radical Left in Europe, Routledge
Kneuer, M. (2018). The tandem of populism and Euroscepticism: a comparative perspective in the light of the European crises. Contemporary Social Science, 14:1, 26–42.
Kriesi, H., and S. Pappas, T.S. (Eds.) (2015). European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession, Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.
Kriesi H. & Schulte-Cloos J. (2020) Support for radical parties in Western Europe: Structural conflicts and political dynamics. Electoral Studies 65, 102138
Lisi, M., Llamazares, I., Tsakatika, M. (2019) Economic crisis and the variety of populist responses. Evidence from Greece, Portugal and Spain. West European Politics, 42:6, 1284–1309.
Mach E. M. (2023), Right-wing populism, Euroscepticism and neo-traditionalism in Central and Eastern Europe., (IN) The Right-Wing Critique of Europe. Nationalist, Sovereignist and Right-Wing Populist Attitudes to the EU. Routledge, London.
McMahon, R. (2021) Is Alt-Europe possible? Populist radical right counternarratives of European integration. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 30(1), 10–25.
Maślanka L. (2023), Realism or Radicalisation: Meloni Walks Fine Line on European Policy. PISM Bulletin, No. 39 (2158).
Massetti E. (2023), From Europhilia to Eurorealism: The 2022 General Election in Italy. Journal of Common Market Studies, pp. 1–12.
McDonnell D. & Werner A. (2020), International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament., Oxford University Press.
Meijers, M. J., & Zaslove, A. (2021). Measuring Populism in Political Parties: Appraisal of a New Approach. Comparative Political Studies, 54(2), 372–407, https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414020938081
Moffit, B. (2017) The Global Rise of Populism: Performance, Political Style and Representation, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
Mosca, L. & Tronconi, F. (2019) Beyond left and right. The eclectic populism of the Five Star Movement, West European Politics, 42:6, 1258–1283.
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge.
Mudde C. (2019), The 2019 EU elections: moving the center, Journal of Democracy 30:4, 20–34.
Mudde, C. and Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018) Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. Comparative Political Studies, 51:13, 1667–1693.
Muldoon, J. & Herman, L.E. (Eds) (2018) Trumping the Mainstream: The Conquest of Democratic Politics by the Populist Radical Right, London: Routledge.
Munoz A. & Ripollés C. (2020), Populism Against Europe in Social Media: The Eurosceptic Discourse on Twitter in Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom during the Campaign of the 2019 European Parliament election. Frontiers in Communication, 5:54, https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2020.00054
Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019) Cultural backlash. Trump, Brexit and authoritarian populism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Olivas Osuna, J.J. (2021), From chasing populists to deconstructing populism: A new multidimensional approach to understanding and comparing populism. European Journal of Political Research, 60: 829–853.
Pirro, A. L., Taggart, P., & van Kessel, S. (2018). The populist politics of Euroscepticism in times of crisis: Comparative conclusions. Politics, 38:3, 378–390, https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718784704
Pirro, A. L. & van Kessel, S. (2018) Populist Eurosceptic trajectories in Italy and the Netherlands during the European crises. Politics, 38:3, 327–343.
Reif, K. & Schmitt, H. (1980), Nine second-order national elections – a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results. European Journal of Political Research, 8: 3–44.
Rodi P., Karavasilis L. & Puleo L. (2023), When nationalism meets populism: examining right-wing populist & nationalist discourses in the 2014 & 2019 European parliamentary elections. European Politics and Society, 24:2, 284–302.
Rodrik, D. (2021) Why Does Globalization Fuel Populism? Economics, Culture and the Rise of Right-Wing Populism. Annual Review of Economics 13:133–170.
Rooduijn, M., Pirro, ALP, Halikiopoulou D., et al. (2023). The PopuList: A Database of Populist, Far-Left, and Far-Right Parties Using Expert-Informed Qualitative Comparative Classification (EiQCC). British Journal of Political Science. Published online 2023:1–10. doi:10.1017/S0007123423000431
Ruzza, C. & Pejovic, M. (2021), Populism at work: the language of the Brexiteers and the European Union. In: F. Zappettini, M Krzyżanowski (Eds.),‘Brexit’ as a Social and Political Crisis: Discourses in Media and Politics (pp. 432–448), Routledge, London.
Schwörer, J. (2021) The Growth of Populism in the Political Mainstream. The Contagion Effect of Populist Messages on Mainstream Parties’ Communicatio, Cham, Springer.
Szczerbiak A & Taggart P. (2024). Euroscepticism and anti-establishment parties in Europe. Journal of European Integration, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2024.2329634
Taggart, P., & Pirro, A. L. P. (2021). European populism before the pandemic: ideology, Euroscepticism, electoral performance and government participation of 63 parties in 30 countries. Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana Di Scienza Politica, 51:3, 281–304.
Treib O. (2021). Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections. Journal of European Public Policy, 28:2, 174–189.
Učeň, P. (2007). Parties, Populism and Anti-Establishment Politics in East Central Europe. The SAIS Review of International Affairs, 27(1), 49–62.
Van Hauwaert, S.M. & Van Kessel, S. (2018). Beyond protest and discontent: A cross-national analysis of the effect of populist attitudes and issue positions on populist party support. European Journal of Political Research, 57: 68–92.
Van Kessel, S., Chelotti, N., Drake, H., Roch, J., & Rodi, P. (2020). Eager to leave? Populist radical right parties’ responses to the UK’s Brexit vote. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 22(1), 65–84.
Wondreys, J. (2023) Unpacking second-order elections theory: The effects of ideological extremity on voting in European elections, Electoral Studies, 85, 102663, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2023.102663
Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Conclusion.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism.(eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0087
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics.
This report has examined the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. The collection of country chapters provides a unique source of information to understand the electoral dynamics of populist parties across Europe, highlighting similarities and differences in the economic, social and political context of the European elections in the 27 EU member states. Here, we summarize the main findings from the individual chapters and provide some general conclusions.
The diversity of the European populist scene
The individual country chapters illustrate the diversity of populism in Europe and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The findings in this report corroborate the vast literature on populism, which has long identified the plurality of articulations between the ‘thin’ ideology of populism and the ‘thicker’ host ideologies to which it attaches itself. As suggested in the individual chapters, in Western Europe, populism is essentially found to the left and right of the spectrum, while in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we see a more diverse array of populist actors.
Some individual countries provide a good illustration of such diversity. The Netherlands has long been a breeding ground for populism. Over the years, there has been a succession of populist parties, ranging from right-wing nativist and left-wing populist to agrarian populist. Similarly, Spain has experienced both left and right-wing populism with Podemos and Vox. In Belgium, there are two cases of populist radical parties to the left (PTB–PVDA) and right (VB) of the ideological spectrum. Italy has been described as nothing less than a ‘populist paradise’, hosting a wide range of populist parties. Such diversity is also found in countries like France and, more recently, Germany, with the rise of the BSW to the left of the party spectrum. While in Greece, left–populist parties have been dominant with Syriza and KKE, the populist radical right has long been present with parties such as Golden Dawn and, most recently, with EL and the Democratic Patriotic Movement or ‘Niki’.
There is even more diversity when looking at the populist scene in Central and Eastern Europe. Populists in the centre dominated the elections in Bulgaria, with GERB gaining over 24% of the vote, and in the Czech Republic, with ANO securing 26%. The centrist Prodalzhavame promyanata (PP) and ITN in Bulgaria also registered strong results, with 14% and 6% of the vote, respectively. In Slovakia, it was the left populists of SMER who carried the day, securing 25% of all votes cast. The radical right fared well in all three countries, with Vazrazhdane gaining over 14% in Bulgaria, Hnutie Republika attracting 13% in Slovakia, and Přísaha a Motoristé registering over 10% of the vote in the Czech Republic.
Diversity is also found in the interpretation of populism by populist parties. While populism is still seen as a core feature of the populist right across most cases, there seems to have been a shift away from populist narratives and themes in some parties of the populist left, such as Podemos in Spain, the SP in the Netherlands, and the SF in Denmark. In Spain, for instance, there has been a decline in the use of populist ideas by Podemos, which has turned more clearly to radical-left ones. Moreover, there seems to be less consensus about the populist nature of radical-left parties, as illustrated by Die Linke in Germany, the Left Wing Alliance (VAS) in Finland, the Left Party in Sweden, and the Left Bloc (BE) in Portugal, which may also signal a move away from populism towards a more classic radical-left agenda. The Bulgarian GERB has also significantly moved away from populist narratives, focusing primarily on pro-EU rhetoric. While the Romanian AUR remains Eurosceptic, it has been focusing on specific issues rather than on criticizing the European project itself.
Together with their different locations on the party spectrum, populist parties also diverge in their issue positions. As the country chapters show, this is particularly true of the populist right where substantial differences are found, for instance, in terms of those parties’ economic policies.
In a context marked by rising prices and the inflation crisis, right-wing populist parties have adopted a wide array of economic positions, reflecting diverging economic strategies and the adaptation by populist parties to different contextual opportunities. In France, for example, the RN has significantly moved to the economic left, advocating redistributive policies. In Denmark, the DF combines welfare-chauvinist positions with a good portion of nostalgia. In the Netherlands, the PVV takes a protectionist and welfare-chauvinist position aimed at voters with lower incomes who are most hit by high energy prices. In Cyprus, ELAM supports left-wing economic policies aimed at wealth redistribution and increased state intervention in market regulation. In Estonia, EKRE focuses on economic welfare and regional disparities, as does the EL in Greece, although it combines welfare chauvinism and government interventions with calls for low taxation. Welfare chauvinism and socialist nostalgia have been the trademarks of radical-right populist parties in Bulgaria, but they have also been explored by left populists such as SMER in Slovakia.
In contrast, other right-wing populist parties are found on the economic right. The Dutch FvD, for instance, is more free-market-oriented than the PVV and most other populist radical-right parties in Europe. In Finland, the Finns Party has recently turned to the right on the economy. In Luxembourg, the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR) exhibits a national-conservative profile and generally maintains a distrust of big government. In Greece, Niki is more free market and low taxation than EL. In Romania, AUR has increasingly introduced neoconservative elements.
Finally, the analysis in this report shows that populist parties differ widely with regard to their political status within their respective political systems. Parties such as the French RN and German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are still political pariahs. In Germany, the AfD remains deeply unpopular, and the party has faced strong criticism for its many controversial statements and positions regarding immigration, Islam and the Second World War. In France, despite Marine Le Pen’s de-demonization strategy, the persistence of the RN’s profile as a political pariah was exposed in the 2024 legislative elections where the traditional Republican Front – that is, ad hoc alliances of parties or voters (or both) across the spectrum whenever the RN is likely to win a decisive round – was revitalized. In contrast, Mélenchon’s populist left LFI has managed to establish itself as a coalition partner to the rest of the left. Another case of a cordon sanitaire around the populist radical right is that of Belgium, where leaders of the N-VA continue to close the door to the Vlaams Belang. In Central and Eastern Europe, extreme parties such as Revival in Bulgaria, AUR in Romania or Hnutie Republika in Slovakia are still kept outside mainstream politics despite growing electoral support.
Elsewhere, however, the current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. Such dual process has been well documented in the recent populism literature (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn, 2016; Herman and Muldoon, 2019; Mondon and Winter, 2020; Mudde, 2019) and the country chapters in this report corroborate both the centripetal move by a number of populist parties from the margins to the centre of national politics and the accommodation of populism by mainstream actors.
Populist accommodation by parties of the mainstream is traditionally found in countries such as Italy and Austria. In CEE, such cooperation has been found in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria during the 2017–2019 government. This has more recently been the case, for instance, in the Netherlands, where the change in VVD party leadership has produced a change of strategy towards the PVV, with the new VVD party leader Dilan Yeşilgöz openly suggesting that her party would no longer exclude a government with Wilders. In Sweden, the cordon sanitaire was breached before the 2022 parliamentary election when three of the centre-right parties expressed a more open stance towards the Sweden Democrats. In Cyprus, despite its radical positions and extreme right-wing roots, ELAM has managed to integrate into the political mainstream, collaborating with other parties on specific issues in the House of Representatives since 2016.
Populists against Europe? The strategic moderation of populist Euroscepticism
The modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration. The country chapters illustrate such a dampening of Eurosceptic politics, both left and right of the populist spectrum. In many cases, the analysis shows that populist parties have recently abandoned their previous hard Eurosceptic plans to exit the Euro or the EU, often adopting ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration and a softer tone vis-à-vis the EU. As discussed in the introduction of this report, this represents a strategic move by populists to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
In France, the RN has abandoned its previous policy of “Frexit”, while de-emphasizing European issues to increase its appeal to moderate voters. Like the RN, LFI has toned down its Euroscepticism in recent years, moving away from its previous call to leave the EU and that France should disobey the European treaties. In Sweden, the SD have moderated their Euroscepticism and dropped their demand for a referendum on EU withdrawal. Such a move has also been visible in the Netherlands, where Wilders has successfully presented himself as a more moderate candidate, no longer calling for a Nexit but promising to reform the EU from within. In Portugal, Chega has articulated some soft Euroscepticism in its European election manifesto. In Italy, Fratelli d’Italia advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the European Union. A similar dampening of Eurosceptic policies and themes has been found in the Lega and M5S since 2018. In Finland, the Finns Party has abandoned its long-term goal of withdrawing from the EU. A stronger support for the EU is found in Luxembourg, where the ADR explicitly acknowledges the great advances the EU had given to Europe in terms of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe while praising the positive benefits the EU and immigration have brought to the country. In Greece, the left-populist Syriza put forward a version of soft Euroscepticism, criticizing the EU’s democratic deficit. The right-wing populist EL has been advocating for a Europe made of nation-states, but it has not been openly calling for Grexit, and neither has the other new right-wing populist party, Niki. The FPÖ clearly stated that it would not aim for an ‘Öxit’, although it called for cuts in the EU budget and institutions and a Union based on subsidiarity and federalism.
In Western Europe, the German AfD stands out for its hard Eurosceptic positions. The most radical faction has dominated the AfD since 2017. In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the party initially called for the dissolution of the European Union in its manifesto but dropped this demand from the final manifesto after facing public backlash. The Dutch FvD similarly favours Nexit. In Greece, the communist KKE has similarly maintained a hard Eurosceptic stance (as well as an anti-NATO stance), supporting Greece’s exit from the EU and accusing it of being imperialistic, anti-democratic, capitalist and exploitative.
Populists in Central and Eastern Europe widely vary in their level of Euroscepticism. The Croatian right-populist DL, for example, exhibits a soft Eurosceptic orientation, framing the EU as a confederation of sovereign states and never advocating for closer relations with ‘alternative partners’ in global politics, such as Russia, China or the BRICS. The DL expresses a strong opinion against further EU enlargement due to Serbia’s candidacy status, while the Romanian AUR, on the contrary, advocates for EU memberships for Moldova. By contrast, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane urges for an immediate exit from NATO and the EU, while centrist populist parties in Bulgaria, such as GERB and PP, are ardently pro-European. Czech populists from the centre and the right expressed different levels of criticism towards the EU. ANO, which has been in opposition since 2021, gradually shifted from a mildly pro-European stance towards soft Euroscepticism. The SPD, on the other hand, has sustained its uncompromisingly anti-immigration and hard Eurosceptic rhetoric, describing the EU as a ‘dictatorship in Brussels’ dominated by ‘non-elected bureaucrats’ who produce ‘directives that are against the interests of our state and our people’. Euroscepticism is extremely limited in Estonia, where 77–78% of the population supports EU membership.
Similarly, in Latvia, voters tend to support sober, politically experienced personalities to represent Latvia’s national (rather than party) interests in the European Parliament, leaving little room for Eurosceptic rhetoric. In Romania, AUR has softened its Euroscepticism, while the new SOS prides itself in being the first to advocate for a ‘Ro-exit’. In Slovakia, the ruling SMER claims to support EU membership despite its many shortcomings, while ĽSNS argues that the EU cannot be reformed. Consequently, its party leader promised to ‘lay the groundwork for Slovakia’s exit from the European Union and break the EU from within.’
Populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions, emphasizing an intergovernmental vision of a community of sovereign and independent states, now claiming to reform the EU ‘from within’ while opposing further enlargement of the EU. As the country chapters in this report show, right-wing populist parties across Europe continue to vilify a ‘bureaucratic EU’. ‘Taking back control’ from Brussels has become a common theme of right-wing populist narratives. In Belgium, the VB has been using the ‘taking back control’ tagline while denouncing EU leaders as ‘extremists’, bureaucrats and technocrats. In the Netherlands, the PVV’s European electoral program emphasized the need to reform the EU from within rather than to leave the Union. In Italy, while cooperating with the EU, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI continues to engage in ideological struggles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality and EU constitutional matters. The Danish DF claims the EU needs to be strongly downsized to safeguard national sovereignty, a similar claim to that of the Denmark Democrats, which ask for ‘less EU’ and more national sovereignty.
Were the 2024 EP elections another ‘populist’ moment?
Rather than showing a new wave of populism, the results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2019, taking all groups together, populist parties had won 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36% (see Figure 1, Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. Based on the delineation of populism in the country chapters, no less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament. In June 2024, the largest contingents of populist MEPs came mainly from the populist right in the more populated European countries, in particular from France’s Rassemblement National (30 seats), Fratelli d’Italia (24 seats), the Polish PiS (20 seats), the German AfD (15 seats) and Hungary’s Fidesz (11 seats). In the populist left, the largest contingent came from France’s LFI (9 seats). For centrist populist parties, the largest delegations were elected in Italy with the M5S (8 seats) and in the Czech Republic, where ANO received seven seats.
Asymmetrical populist performances
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe.
The populist right has established its presence in virtually all EU member states – there are no fewer than 50 such parties in Europe. Right-wing populist parties have done particularly well in countries such as France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Netherlands; in many countries, the populist right-wing scene is made up of two, three and sometimes more parties.
There has also been a diversification of the populist right with the emergence of new actors. Alongside the major established players, new parties have emerged, including the Danish Democrats (DD), Latvia First (LPV), Chega in Portugal, the EL and Niki in Greece, the AUR and SOS in Romania, and the Czech Přísaha and PRO. In Lithuania, a populist radical-right politician and his party TSS made a breakthrough, gaining a seat in the EP for the first time.
Other movements have disappeared or been replaced by new populist parties. This is particularly true in Central and Eastern Europe, where party systems traditionally remain more fluid. The Bulgarian Ataka, long represented in the national assembly and the European Parliament, has all but disappeared since 2021, only to be replaced by Vazrazhdane. Golden Dawn, which came third in the 2015 elections in Greece, practically disappeared by 2019 when it failed to enter the national parliament. Its leadership was subsequently imprisoned following a prolonged trial on charges of running a criminal organization. Although the party disappeared, its ideology and electorate were easily picked up by EL, which has been represented since 2019 both in the national and in the European parliaments. Interestingly, small extreme right-wing-wing anti-immigration parties (i.e., the Irish Freedom Party, National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People) have surfaced in a country like Ireland, which has traditionally been more immune to far-right populism in the past, suggesting that the immigration issue has acquired more resonance in Irish politics in recent years.
Altogether, parties of the populist right won 177 seats, making up about a quarter (24%) of all 720 seats in the new European Parliament, an increase on their previous performances in 2019 –168 seats out of 751, that is about 22% (see Figure 1). Amongst the biggest winners were the French RN, the Italian Fratelli d’Italia, the FPÖ in Austria, the VB in Flanders, the Slovenian Democratic Party, the AUR in Romania and the National Alliance in Latvia, which all saw a significant rise in electoral support in the 2024 European elections. Let us also note that the 2024 elections have seen the rise of extreme right-wing nationalist parties across a number of EU member states, as illustrated by the electoral success of Vazrazhdane in Bulgaria, the Confederation in Poland, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, ELAM in Cyprus, and Domovinski Pokret (DP) in Croatia. Altogether, parties that may be classified as ‘extreme right-wing’ won 15 seats in the European Parliament, significantly increasing their presence since the 2019 elections, where the extreme right-wing had received only 4 seats.
Such a wave of support for right-wing populists has been far from uniform, however, as a number of those parties have suffered losses across Europe. In Portugal, Chega lost nearly 783.000 votes from its general election tally, down to 9.8% of the vote. In Spain, while clearly improving its results from the 2019 EP elections, Vox lost significant support when compared with the 2023 general elections. In Sweden, the SD fell far behind the result of the 2022 parliamentary election. Fidesz in Hungary lost 2 seats despite winning the elections, facing a serious challenge by the new opposition party Tisza. Although PiS and Konfederacija collectively attracted almost half of the votes, PiS lost 9 seats in the EP – the biggest reversal in support in its history.
Compared with their right-wing counterparts, the parties of the populist left have been comparatively less successful, although they have somewhat improved their performance from five years ago. As Figure 1 shows, the populist left won a total of 46 seats in the new European Parliament in June, which represented just over 6% of all 720 seats. This result compared with 37 seats (about 5%) in the previous Parliament. As was the case for the populist right, left-wing populist party performances varied substantially across countries.
In countries such as Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain, there was a drop in support for the populist left, reflecting the more general decline in support for those parties since the 2008 financial crisis. In Ireland, Sinn Féin suffered significant losses, seeing much of his previous support going to independent or small-party candidates. In the Netherlands, the SP received a mere 2.2% of the vote, showing a decline since its success in 2014 when it had obtained almost 10% of the vote. The Spanish Podemos only received 3.3% of the vote, compared with 20% in 2016 –in alliance with Izquierda Unida (IU) at the time. In the case of Podemos, such decline reflected a variety of factors, including government participation and the recovery of macroeconomic indicators. In Greece, Syriza lost about 3 percentage points on its score in the June 2023 general election, down to 14.9% of the vote, although EKK maintained its 2 MEP seats, as well as representation in the national parliament.
In countries like Belgium and France, there were mixed performances for the populist left. The progress of the Belgian PTB–PVDA was asymmetrical, with the party making more significant gains on the Dutch-speaking side, almost doubling its score. In France, Mélenchon’s left-wing populist LFI won 9.9% of the vote, which represented a gain of 3.6 percentage points on its previous result in the 2019 EP elections, yet far lower than Mélenchon’s performance at 22% in the 2022 presidential election.
Support for the populist left rose, on the other hand, in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland. The Danish Red-Green Alliance won 7% of the vote (+2 percentage points compared to the legislative elections of November 2022). In Finland, the biggest surprise came from the Left Alliance (VAS), which came in second with 17.3% of the vote and three seats as opposed to one in the previous parliament. In Slovakia, SMER managed to regain political control in the 2023 national elections and increase its representation in the European Parliament from 3 to 5 seats – a major comeback for Robert Fico, who survived an assassination attempt just a month before the EP elections.
Finally, the 2024 European elections have confirmed centrist populism as a relatively marginal political phenomenon, essentially concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe. In June 2024, only 26 seats were won by centrist populist parties, making up just under 4% of all seats in the new European Parliament, which was very close to those parties’ performances five years ago (32 seats representing just over 4%).
While well-established centrist populist parties such as ANO in the Czech Republic and GERB in Bulgaria managed to secure their electoral support from the previous national elections, winning 7 and 5 seats, respectively, other centrist populist parties performed less well. In Bulgaria, PP lost heavily on their previous performance in the April 2023 elections and secured only two seats in the new European Parliament. This was also the case with the Darbo Partija in Lithuania, which lost most of its support from the last general election and failed to capture a single seat in the EP. Other parties’ results oscillated, such as for ‘There is Such a People’ in Bulgaria, which won the July 2021 early national elections, disappeared from the national parliament in the early national elections in 2022 and reappeared in 2023, gaining a single sear in the EP at the 2024 elections. New centrist populist parties, such as the Czech Přísaha, managed to surpass the threshold, sending one MEP to Brussels. Others, such as Stabilitātei! in Latvia and OL’aNO and SaS in Slovakia, failed to pass the threshold at the European Parliament elections despite gaining representation in the national parliaments in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In Italy, the results of the 2024 elections have attested to the continuing electoral decline of the M5S. The party received 10% of the vote and eight seats, significantly losing ground from its previous performances in the 2019 European (17.1% of the vote cast) and 2022 general elections (15.4%).
A regional divide?
As mentioned earlier, the distribution of populism across Europe shows a regional divide (see Table 1). In the 2024 European elections, left-wing populism was primarily found in Western Europe, where 13 of those parties were in competition, as opposed to only 2 in Eastern and Central Europe (i.e., SMER in Slovakia and Levica in Slovenia). Conversely, centrist populism was essentially located in CEE countries, which had nine of those parties, as opposed to only two in Western Europe (i.e., the M5S in Italy and the BBB in the Netherlands). Populist radical-right parties were in the majority, and they were predominantly found in Western European countries (21 as opposed to 12 in CEE). Finally, the regional distribution of populism shows the rise of extreme right-wing parties in countries of the former Soviet Union, with no less than 11 of those parties competing in the 2024 European elections, as opposed to only one (ELAM in Cyprus) in the western part of the EU.
Table 1. Number of parties by populist family across Western and Eastern Europe
Countries
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Total
Eastern
11
2
9
4
12
11
38
Western
15
13
2
2
21
1
39
26
15
11
6
33
12
77
Source:Compiled by the authors based on Rooduijn et al. (2023) and 2024 EP election data.
Such an uneven distribution of populism makes it difficult to accurately evaluate regional differences in populist party electoral support across Western and Central and Eastern Europe. As the country chapters clearly illustrate, there was a significant amount of variation in the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections, both across and within regions. Moreover, no less than 27 populist parties were new parties that had not run in the 2019 European elections, thus rendering the analysis of change in populist party support even more difficult.
Table 2. Average electoral support by populist party family across Western and Eastern Europe
Average % of vote 2024 European elections and change from most recent national election
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Eastern
29.5*
9.36
1.21
14.61
5.65
Change
(+1.1)
(–3.3)
(+0.9)
(+1.4)
(+1.8)
Western
7.28
7.69*
10.67*
11.63
11.19*
Change
(–0.2)
(–2.4)
(+2.0)
(+0.9)
(+4.4)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on 2024 EP election data.
* These results should be interpreted with caution due to the small number of parties (n ≤ 2).
Table 2 shows the mean electoral support for populist parties in the 2024 European elections and the change from the most recent general election. The data are broken down by region and populist party family. Because of such heterogeneity, the data in Table 2 should be taken with caution. These data confirm, however, that centrist and left-wing populist parties have lost ground on average in the 2024 European elections compared with their performances in the last general election in their respective country and that such decline was visible in both Eastern and Western European countries. On average, the populist radical right has made progress across both regions: +1.4 percentage points in CEE countries and +0.9 percentage points in Western Europe, again bearing in mind that there was substantial variation in party performances within each region. Finally, the data show that extreme right-wing ultra-nationalist movements have made gains in Eastern Europe, winning an additional 1.8 percentage points on average on their previous performance in the last general election.
Overall, with all limitations in mind, the data do not show a clear regional divide in terms of populist party performances in the 2024 European elections but rather point to the diversity of populist manifestations and variation of their electoral performances within each region. At the country level, the German case illustrates a more striking regional pattern as all three populist parties were much more successful in the eastern states, reflecting the multi-faceted legacy of the GDR and the political impact of the shock and aftermath of the transformation in the 1990s.
Diverse drivers of populism in the EP elections 2024
Across Europe, the popularity of populist movements is rooted in the ‘polycrisis’ to which EU citizens have been exposed since 2008 – the financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and now the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Fidesz’s electoral slogan, ‘No migration, no gender, no war!’ succinctly captures the division lines not only between populists and non-populists but also among populists from the left, the centre, and the right and even within those subcategories. In Austria, the polycrisis amalgam was perfectly summed up by the FPÖ’s slogan in the run-up to the vote: ‘Stop European chaos, the asylum crisis, climate terror, warmongering and Corona chaos’. In Italy, the multiple crises have led to increased opposition to the EU. In France, since 2012, support for the RN has been fuelled by feelings of economic alienation mediated by cultural concerns over immigration and strong anti-elite sentiments.
However, this polycrisis has played out differently in each country. Belgium illustrates such differences: the political debate in Flanders saw more focus on migration, law and order and public finances, whereas, in French-speaking Belgium, the focus was more on energy, civil rights and work. Immigration issues have become more salient in countries such as Cyprus, which is the first country in the EU to move to per capita applications for asylum. This has led to Euroscepticism and discontent in relation to the EU’s management of immigration. In contrast, in Sweden, immigration was less significant than it had been in both the previous European election and the Riksdag election of 2022. In Greece, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis, with populists both from the right and the left cashing in on economic decline and regional disparities. In Austria, the FPÖ focused on migration, the war in Ukraine, climate change and, notably, the COVID-19 pandemic. Amongst those four, migration was the most important issue in the campaign. In Latvia, populist parties campaigned around the war in Ukraine, the Green Deal and its economic impact, and the defence of traditional family and Christian values, opposing progressive, liberal ideals in Brussels, including LGBTQ+ rights. Opposition to LGBTQ+ rights was typical for most of the radical-right populists, including in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. LGBTQ+ rights were countered with arguments on religion and traditional family values, including criticisms of political correctness and limiting the freedom of speech. By contrast, some left–populist outfits (such as the Greek KKE) have been defenders of LGBTQ+ rights and socially progressive in general.
Economic uncertainty as a common driver of populism
Beyond such variation, the economic context has heavily weighed on public opinion and has fuelled frustration and anger around the rising cost of living in many countries. Economic fears clearly dominated the campaign in France, creating a propitious context for populist politics across the board. The Denmark Democrats have made significant inroads in rural areas where voters feel neglected and left behind. In Germany, the AfD continued to push their core issues — first and foremost immigration, but also the economic impact of the war on Germany, climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. To the left, populist parties have also politicized the economic crisis. In Ireland, support for Sinn Féin rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist approach combined with a strong focus on economic issues. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned strongly on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters.
Luxembourg serves as a counterexample here. Public opinion data show that compared to the EU average, Luxembourgers were far more satisfied with their economic situation and the EU, and they felt much better off economically and also had much higher levels of trust in their national government and the EU. The fact that populists enjoyed more support in rural areas and among the less educated in the Czech Republic and Romania, among others, further indicates the importance of economic uncertainty as a driving factor.
Immigration and refugees
In many cases, the populist radical right has capitalized on insecurities linked to immigration and asylum seekers, which was a key issue in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary, Poland and France. Germany had accepted more than a million Ukrainian refugees after the 2022 attack, which brought the issue of immigration back onto the agenda in 2023 after its salience had been low for several years. In France, next to inflation, immigration emerged as the second most salient issue, followed by law and order. In Flanders, the immigration agenda has been particularly favourable to the populist radical parties such as the VB. Immigration represented a key focus for all right-wing populists (EL, FL, and Niki) in Greece. In Austria, The FPÖ rejected the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum and the mandatory distribution of asylum seekers across the EU, calling instead for a ‘Pact on Re-Migration’. In Italy, the populist governing coalition of FdI, Lega, and Forza Italia prides itself on the migration deal signed with Albania that aims to relocate immigrants arriving in Italy to Italian-operated refugee centres in Albania. The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, has further succeeded in pushing for EU-wide agreements with North African countries that envision limiting the flow of migrants in exchange for financial assistance.
Immigration issues were also prominent in Eastern and Central European countries. In the Czech Republic, populists from the centre and the right framed migration in security terms, rejecting the EU Pact on Migration, highlighting the so-called “no-go zones” where women are at risk and Islamic minorities have brought crime, terrorism and the domination of Sharia law. In Poland, migration has been a major focus of both PiS and Konfederacija. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has provided fertile ground for populist discourses. While the PiS government had initially embraced Ukrainian refugees, the prolonged war and the sheer number of refugees resulted in a backlash with time and fervent opposition against the EU’s Migration Pact, which was labelled the ‘Trojan horse of Europe’. The governing SMER party in Slovakia has similarly criticized the Pact on Migration and Asylum and opposed compulsory relocation schemes, proposing measures in the country of origin instead.
Such rising salience of immigration issues may account for the decline in support for left-wing populism. In Ireland, for example, the 2024 European Parliament elections came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to address such issues despite trying to change its discourse on the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on social services. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the inability of the SP to attract economically left-wing and welfare-chauvinist voters may be seen as a consequence of the party’s lack of commitment to an anti-immigrant stance. In Italy, similarly, M5S has lost support also due to its inability to address the migration problem.
Populist polarization over climate change and the green transition
There has also been a backlash against the European Green Deal, with populist radical-right parties attacking the environmental transition as being “punitive”. Right-wing populist parties’s scepticism about climate change and hostility to low-carbon energy policies has been well documented in the literature (Lockwood and Lockwood, 2022). The recent study by Forchtner and Lubarda (2023) suggests that right-wing populist parties generally claim that climate policies should not harm the economy and jobs and that such parties most effectively perform as defenders of the nation’s economic well-being.
In Flanders, the VB opposes further enlargement and positions itself against the interference of the EU in the national politics of illiberal democracies, as well as against EU policies in terms of climate and agriculture. In Luxembourg, the ADR party has prioritized the preservation of the combustion engine, more generally opposing green politics. The Finns Party has been the Eurosceptic party in Finnish EP elections, promoting an agenda opposed to the EU, immigration and climate change policies. In the Netherlands, the PVV vehemently called for opt-out possibilities for the Netherlands regarding asylum seekers and migration and relaxing obligations with respect to climate change, especially nitrogen. The Austrian FPÖ demands a stop to the European Green Deal, the EU Nature Restoration Law, and the scheduled ban on combustion engines. In Poland, the European Green Deal has been criticized both by PiS and Konfederacija as an ideological project of EU elites aimed against ordinary citizens. Both parties have highlighted the high prices of energy, transport and agriculture to ordinary Poles. The European Green Deal was similarly criticized by right-wing populists in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, to name a few.
In contrast, left-wing populist parties have been taking up environmental issues, and they have endorsed an agenda of green transition (Duina and Zhou 2024). Parties such as LFI in France and Podemos in Spain have placed environmental issues at the core of their political platform while blaming political and economic elites for the environmental crisis. In Italy, Movimento 5 Stelle’s electoral platform emphasizes anti-austerity measures, public healthcare defence, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek. SMER is a notable exception in the left–populist camp, as it has vehemently criticized the Green Dea, labelling it an “extreme environmental initiative” pushed through by “Eurocrats with no accountability” and rejecting the target of reducing emissions by 55% by 2030.
Such a populist divide over climate change is most visible in France, where radical right-wing populist parties such as the RN and Reconquête clearly oppose the European Green Deal and play with climate-sceptic themes to sway voters most affected by the economic cost of the green transition. In contrast, the left-wing populist LFI has adopted an eco-socialist and ambitious green transition agenda, championing the fight against climate change (Chazel and Dain, 2024). We see a similar divide in Italy: Lega’s platform focuses on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. In contrast, the M5S has put environmental protection and green transition policies at the core of its electoral platform. In Denmark, the left-wing populist SF has spearheaded the call to accelerate decarbonization efforts and implement policies to achieve concrete results quickly, given the urgency of the climate crisis. In contrast, the populist right-wing, led by the DF and the Denmark Democrats, opposed environmental regulations, which they believed would harm the competitiveness of Danish agricultural products in the European market.
In Germany, on the other hand, the government’s green transition policies are strongly opposed by populist parties across the board. These parties also sided with large-scale farmers’ protests against some cuts to agrarian subsidies that eventually forced a government U-turn. The AfD continued to push climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. Both AfD and BSW will likely vote against any policies related to the ‘green transformation.’
Finally, the ecological divide is found across other types of populism. In the Netherlands, for example, the BBB typically pits ordinary citizens and farmers against ‘oat milk cappuccino drinking’ city dwellers and unresponsive politicians from the major cities in the west of the country (the so-called Randstad). BBB’s core issues centre around support for farmers and opposition to radical climate policies. Similarly, in Romania, the SOS emphasized the protection of farmers and agriculture workers, criticizing EU product regulations, advocating for Romanians’ rights to continue using traditional energy sources like firewood and natural gas, and demanding the reopening of coal mines. In the Czech Republic, the European Green Deal has been rejected by both the ANO and the SPD. While ANO accused Brussels of committing ritual suicide, the SPD attacked the reduction of combustion engines by placing a former racing driver at the top of its electoral list.
Gaza and the Israel–Hamas war
The Israel–Hamas war and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have provoked diametrically opposed reactions among populists from across the political spectrum. The conflict has featured much more prominently in political discourse in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe, where the war in Ukraine has taken precedence.
France is a good illustration of such a divide. French lead candidates show deep splits over recognition of a Palestinian state. Left-leaning contenders, from the Communists to the social democrats, are clearly in favour of a ‘two-state solution’, while the French far right, in a break with the past, now supports Israel. Marine Le Pen and RN President Jordan Bardella joined pro-Israeli protests, blaming left-leaning forces for allegedly failing to condemn the 7 October attacks. The LFI, by contrast, has taken a pro-Palestinain position, calling for sanctions against the Israeli government, an embargo on the shipping of weaponry and artillery, an end to the 2000 EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. Mélenchon and members of LFI were accused of antisemitism for declining to condemn Hamas as a terrorist group.
Overall, voters of left-wing forces were more concerned about war in Palestine than Ukraine and were more likely to support the Palestinian cause. This concern was particularly visible among Podemos voters, as well as KKE supporters in Greece. Yet, some right-wing populists have also sided with Palestine and not with Israel, including the Belgian PTB–PVDA and the Irish PBP. Romanian SOS leader Șoșoacă has been accused of antisemitism for her controversial remarks. For instance, during a joint session of parliament dedicated to the Day of Solidarity and Friendship between Romania and Israel in May 2024, Șoșoacă complained that this day should serve to commemorate Romanian martyrs from communist prisons, criticizing what she viewed as an incorrect focus on antisemitism. She protested that Romania saved over 400,000 Jews during the Second World War. Vazrazhdane’s leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, has also been highly critical of Israel, although acknowledging the terrorist attack of Hamas and advocating for a two-state solution.
Other right-wing populists have firmly defended Israel. Chega claimed that Netanyahu’s government was entitled to ‘neutralize the threat’ and was the only parliamentary party to decline to join calls for a ceasefire. In Germany, a knife attack by an Afghan man left a police officer dead just days before the election, triggering a fresh debate about immigration, Islamism and the longstanding policy against deportations to Afghanistan. The anti-Islam stance was also important for the Czech SPD, which has been a stalwart defender of Israel.
Ukraine and Russia
The outbreak of the war in Ukraine resulted in diverse responses by populist parties. Many populists on the right, especially in Western Europe, initially distanced themselves from Putin and cooled off their usual pro-Russian stance. Others, on the contrary, became even more pro-Russian (Ivaldi and Zankina, 2023). Such diversity can be explained by specific geostrategic and historical factors, including geographical proximity to Russia, past conflicts, cultural proximity or trade relations.
Some of the most vehement defenders of Russia in the West have been the AfD and FPÖ, which have denounced their respective governments’ support for Kyiv, accusing them of ‘warmongering’. The AfD has a longstanding association with Russia, repeatedly voicing sympathy for Putin and his regime. Although the party toned down its statements immediately after the February 2022 attack, it has since highlighted the economic consequences of the war and the sanctions for Germany, reinventing itself as a party of “peace”, even adopting the classic dove symbol. The BSW took an even more pro-Russian stance than the AfD, with its leader Wagenknecht routinely claiming that the US and the collective Western block a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for reasons of their own. BSW’s 20-page manifesto mentions sanctions 14 times, depicting them as harmful to Germany while having no effect on Russia itself. The FPÖ criticized the EU’s support for Kyiv, calling for an immediate end to financial and military aid to Ukraine and abolishing sanctions against Russia due to their detrimental effects on the economy. The Austrian government, in turn, was criticized for a breach of the country’s constitutional obligation of neutrality. The Dutch FvD has also propagated a pro-Russia and pro-Putin line, as did the Swedish SD. SD’s leader Åkesson stated that there is an upper limit to how much support Sweden should give to Ukraine, while the party’s top candidate, Charlie Weimers, suggested that their own party group, ECR, should be open to cooperating with parties in the ID group, whose stance on Russia has been characterized as relatively friendly. The Irish PBP has taken positions that are less in tune with popular opinion and are often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks.
Putin has enjoyed even more support in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Orbán’s campaign made the war in Ukraine its centrepiece. He used fear-mongering to build a Manichean narrative where anybody failing to vote for Fidesz was part of the ‘pro-war’ camp, accusing the Hungarian opposition of carrying out the demands of its international financiers in Brussels and Washington. Orbán repeatedly blamed the EU for wrongdoing and claimed that because of the incompetent leadership in Brussels, ‘instead of peace, we have war, instead of security we have a rule-of-law ruckus, instead of prosperity we have financial blackmail’. The Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, have been stark defenders of Putin to the extent of reaching comical proportions. Kostadinv is widely known in the country as ‘kopeikin’, referring to the Russian coin currency. His rallies feature more Russian than Bulgarian national flags. He frequently travels to Moscow, and his party is known to be funded by Putin (Zankina, 2024). The Czech SPD has become one of the most vocal anti-Ukrainian voices following Russia’s 2022 invasion, as did the newly emerged SOS in Romania. SOS’s leader Șoșoacă was declared ‘Personality of the Year’ in 2021 by Sputnik. She asserted that Europeans and Americans aim to destroy Russia and argued that Ukraine illegally occupies territories, including some that rightfully belong to Romania. The left–populist SMER in Slovakia, in turn, has called for a halt of all military assistance to Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression and for a more neutral stance toward Russia. SMER blamed the EU for ‘prolonging war in Europe’ by supporting Ukraine.
In contrast to such support for Putin, a number of parties across Europe have adopted a pro-Ukraine position. In Finland, for example, support for Ukraine has been almost unanimous, including by the Finns Party, which has criticized Putin’s Russia, expressing strong support for Ukraine. Similarly, the Danish People’s Party and the Denmark’s Democrats are declaredly pro-Ukraine. In Portugal, Chega also aligned with most mainstream parties, adopting a pro-Ukraine position. The Croatian DP has expressed firm solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, drawing parallels between Croatia’s Homeland War (1991–1991) and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although Sinn Féin has often blamed the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin, with the invasion of Ukraine, the party stood firmly behind Ukraine, although it continued to abstain on aid packages in the EP.
Many parties struggled to take a clear stance, expressing ambiguous positions. The RN, for example, has significantly moderated its attitude. Le Pen said her only ‘red line’ on Ukraine was stopping France from becoming a ‘co-belligerent’ in the conflict via the use of long-range French missiles against targets on Russian soil. French far-right leader Jordan Bardella said he backed Ukraine’s right to defend itself against Russia, but if elected prime minister, he would not provide Kyiv with missiles that would allow it to strike Russia’s territory. He also said he would stand by France’s commitments to NATO if he became prime minister. In Germany, the Left’s manifesto for the European elections also reflected ambiguity.
On the one hand, the document is highly critical of the US and NATO and even claims that the eastern enlargement of NATO has “contributed to the crisis”. On the other, it highlights Ukraine’s right to self-defence, condemns the attack as a war crime, and demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. The Dutch PVV supported the strengthening of defence, however, without singling out Russia as the main threat. Populists in Latvia took similarly ambivalent positions on Russia. S! refused to blame Russia for the invasion, arguing instead for ‘peace’. The LPV initially denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but subsequently softened its stance, advocating for the need for negotiations, peace and the renewal of economic relations with Russia – a position also adopted by SV, which primarily appeals to Russian speakers. The Romanian AUR has taken nuanced positions. While denouncing Russia’s interference as a significant obstacle to unification with Moldova, the party also criticizes Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Romanians.
Multiple Factors of populist performances across EU member states
As the individual chapters illustrate, beyond differences in issue salience across countries, there were a variety of political factors that may account for differences in populist party electoral performances in the 2024 European elections.
National cycle
Such performances may be first related to the location of the EP elections in each country’s national political cycle. The analysis in this report corroborates studies that show that party performances in European elections are mediated by the time of these elections in the national electoral cycle, that government parties lose support in EU elections, especially during the midterm of a national parliamentary cycle, and that opposition parties may benefit from this (Hix and Marsh 2007).
In Germany, the 2024 European election saw devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Liberal Democrats (FDP). The so-called “progressive coalition” and its policies have been deeply unpopular, and the radical-right AfD was the main beneficiary of this discontent. In France, political protest and anti-incumbent sentiments were key to populist voting across the spectrum: over two-thirds of RN voters said they essentially voted to manifest their opposition to the President and the Government, and it was 53% among LFI voters. In the Netherlands, the results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands were intimately related to the fall of the Rutte IV government in the Summer of 2023 and the outcome of the subsequent national elections on 22 November 2023, which saw a rise in support for the PVV. In Poland, the governing coalition, which managed to take power away from PiS in 2023, saw a decline in its support. While PiS lost 12 MEP seats, it did regain some of its support compared to the 2023 national election. In Slovakia, SMER, which managed to take back power from OL’aNO in the 2023 national election, lost some of its support in the EP elections, coming second after the liberal Progressive Slovakia (PS). In Hungary, while Fidesz won the elections, it lost some support and faced an unprecedented challenge by a new political party that reshuffled the power balance in the opposition.
The country chapters also find evidence of another key element of the ‘second order’ model that has been applied to European elections since the early 1980s, which is that voters typically make judgements about national political issues in those elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In many countries, the 2024 European elections were fought over domestic rather than European issues and populist parties often played the national card. In Spain, for example, the number and relevance of ongoing national-level political issues often sidelined European ones during the 2024 campaign. In Portugal, Chega’s manifesto proposals were mostly domestic; European-level proposals were scarce despite a broader media agenda focused on European immigration, defence and EU enlargement. In Germany, domestic actors and attitudes dominated the campaign, with only a minority of populist voters saying that “Europe” was more important for their decision than “Germany”, particularly AfD supporters who were more inward-looking and more Eurosceptic than the BSW’s. In Greece, domestic issues dominated, with election results representing an anti-government protest vote. This was also the case in the Czech Republic, where many voters supported populist parties out of frustration with national politics and the government’s performance.
The European elections further coincided with national and local elections in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania. The 2024 elections in Belgium were a triple election for the European, federal and regional levels. In this context, European elections were clearly second-order elections. In Bulgaria, the elections coincided with early national elections (the sixth in two years). Thus, European issues were subsumed by overall political instability and infighting, polarizing discourse and a record-low voter turnout.
Populists in government
Populists in government have had varying success in the 2024 European elections. While the FdL in Italy managed to maintain its dominance, including within the governing coalition, the Finns Party saw a sharp drop in support due to its participation in government. While Fidesz maintained its grip on power, it was challenged by a new opposition party, losing two seats in the EP.
In Italy, all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, thus enjoying a “honeymoon” period of the government elected two years before, reflecting a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level. Meloni was heavily involved in the European campaign, enabling her party to benefit from her relatively intact popularity as the head of government since September 2022. In Croatia, the right-wing populist DP was already in the position of kingmaker after coming third in the national parliamentary elections in April 2024 and becoming part of the governing coalition. In the EP elections, the DP maintained its support, thus reaffirming its leverage in domestic and European politics.
Elsewhere, populists in government lost ground. In Hungary, despite Fidesz’s victory in the election, a new challenger, Tisza, posed significant challenges, attracting former Fidesz party member Péter Magyar and gaining seven seats in the EP, while Fidesz lost two. Although Fidesz came in first in the EP elections with 44.82% of the votes, the result was considered the party’s worst performance in an EP election. In Finland, the Finns Party paid for its participation in the government and fell back sharply, losing 6 points compared to 2019. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party had supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. In Sweden, the 2024 European Parliament election was the first election in which the Sweden Democrats participated while having formal influence over the government. The party performed the worst in mobilizing voters in the week leading up to the election, and its support for the centre-right government could possibly explain such an electoral setback.
Political discontent as a driver of populist voting
In countries where populists were in the opposition, these parties benefited from political discontent with national governments dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic, the energy and high inflation crisis, and the many political and economic ramifications of the war in Ukraine.
In Spain, Vox’s electoral campaign was essentially framed as a referendum against Sánchez. In France, both the RN and LFI sought to capitalize on political discontent by making the election a referendum for or against Emmanuel Macron and the government. In Belgium, populist radical parties, both left and right, positioned themselves as political outsiders and presented themselves as the alternative vote to an unpopular federal government. In Cyprus, ELAM strongly campaigned against corruption, entering the political scene as the new political force that would hold traditional parties accountable. In Portugal, Chega’s leader, André Ventura, nominated himself as ‘the real leader of the opposition’. In Germany, after the initial rally-round-the-flag effect following Russia’s fresh attack on Ukraine, the government’s popularity began to decline as a result of high inflation and worries about (energy) security, resulting in a protest vote in favour of populist actors such as the AfD and BSW.
Similarly, in Greece, there was a strong anti-government protest vote, with the key message of the election being political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise. In Poland, PiS (now in opposition) criticized the government’s opposing measures to stop illegal migration adopted by the previous PiS government. In Romania, AUR has criticized the government and mainstream parties for being subservient to the EU and betraying national interests. In an interview for a Russian newspaper, the leader of the more radical SOS party declared that Romania is essentially a ‘colony within the EU.’
Populist competition
Another factor of varying populist performances was changes in the populist political scene across Europe and new patterns of competition between populists. The recent wave of populism has seen new parties challenge the more established players (Ivaldi, 2023). Such divisions began to appear in countries such as Austria and France in the late 1990s, and more recently, populist competition has been observed in a number of European countries but in different configurations.
While countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Bulgaria and Italy have a variety of populist actors distributed across the political spectrum, there has also been an increasing fragmentation of the populist right in a number of countries in recent years, with two or three of those parties competing with one another for votes, possibly affecting the balance of forces within that party family.
Such a split of the populist right is illustrated in Spain, which has seen the emergence of a new populist radical-right party, Se Acabó La Fiesta (SALF), competing with Vox, which partly accounts for the latter’s loss of support in the 2024 EP elections when compared with the 2023 general elections. In the Netherlands, there has been an increase in parties competing for the populist vote, forcing these parties to profile themselves not only vis-à-vis mainstream parties but also each other. In Poland, the PiS lost 12 points and 8 seats in five years, suffering from competition from Confederation (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), which established itself at the heart of the Polish right. In Hungary, Orbán’s party is facing competition from the far-right Our Homeland Movement (MHM). In Romania, AUR is competing for votes with the splinter party SOS. France now has two electorally relevant populist radical-right parties competing with one another, namely, Marine Le Pen’s RN and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête! In Germany, the AfD is also facing competition on its left flank from the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) on similar anti-immigration policies. In Denmark, the recently formed Denmark’s Democrats compete directly with the Danish People’s Party. As one final example, in Italy, there has been a clear shift in the balance of power between the Lega and FdI, with Meloni’s party taking over the right-wing bloc.
While populist competition essentially concerns the populist right, Ireland provides an interesting case of populist competition to the left of the political spectrum. As the Irish chapter shows, Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s collapsing coalition, and it did so by calling more clearly for controls on immigration and by opposing the EU migration pact.
Political profile and candidates
Other factors of variations in populist party performances in the 2024 European elections may be found in the political profile of those parties and lead candidates, as well as in specific campaign events that may have dampened or increased support for those parties.
While some of those parties have taken a path towards normalization, others have maintained a more radical ideology and discourse that may alienate moderate voters. In France, while Le Pen’s RN has been continuing its strategy of “de-demonization” in order to achieve governmental credibility and detoxify its far-right reputation, Zemmour’s Reconquête has come closer to the old extreme right. In Bulgaria, GERB has been moderating its populist appeal, while Vazrazhdane has bet on increasing polarization and extreme right-wing and populist rhetoric. In Ireland, Sinn Féin has transitioned to become a more credible party of government, taking more mainstream positions on a number of issues. In Italy, despite their historical roots in the neo-fascist milieu, Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia have successfully achieved their transformation into a party of government, taking over Forza Italia’s role as the dominant party within the right-wing bloc. As discussed earlier, other parties, such as the Dutch PVV and the Sweden Democrats, have recently undergone a modernization process to increase their coalition potential and increasingly win over the moderate electorate.
In countries like Spain and Finland, on the other hand, the campaign of the 2024 European elections was dominated by public concerns over the rise of the far right in Europe and its possible impact on future alliances in the European Parliament. In Finland, in particular, people’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was a salient theme in campaign debates, which may have contributed to diminished electoral support for the Finns Party.
As clearly illustrated in the country chapters, the choice of lead candidates in the 2024 European elections somewhat reflected such variation in the political pedigree of populist parties. In Denmark, for example, the DF nominated hardliner and former MEP Morten Messerschmidt despite his being still under investigation for fraud in the so-called MELD and FELD case concerning the misuse of EU funds. In Germany, the controversies surrounding the party’s ‘re-migration’ project and Maximilian Krah’s statements about the SS clearly outraged some voters. In Italy, the Lega’s campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, known for his homophobic, racist and sexist comments. In Portugal, Chega’s lead candidate, António Tânger Corrêa, was strongly criticized for endorsing conspiracy theories such as the ‘great replacement’ and for his using of antisemitic tropes, like accusing the Mossad of forewarning American Jews of terrorist attacks on 9/11. In Finland, the most successful Finns Party candidate, Sebastian Tynkkynen, represented the provocative and radical faction of the party. Another example of strong populist rhetoric and style is found in Romania, where former AUR leader and now a member of SOS Romania, Diana Șoșoacă, is taking her populist rhetoric to new extremes by using tough homophobic, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and anti-European messages.
Finally, we should mention specific events that may have altered the course of the 2024 elections. One such example is the failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico of SMER, which took place in mid-May 2024, shocking the country and impacting the campaign and elections both directly and indirectly, as both SMER and SNS blamed the opposition and independent media for the attempt, claiming it resulted from a polarized political environment allegedly created by them.
At times, political scandals punctuated the 2024 EP election campaign. In Sweden, the election campaign took a new turn when, about a month prior to the election, it was revealed that the SD’s communications department was hosting a so-called troll factory in which anonymous social media accounts were spreading disinformation and derogatory portrayals of other politicians.
Populist parties and groups in the European Parliament
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased.
The mainstream forces of the European Parliament – the EPP, S&D, and Renew – have maintained a majority with just over 55% of the seats in the new parliament. The conservative right united within the EPP and reaffirmed its dominance within the European institutions, both in the EP and the Council, with 11 seats compared to only 4 for the left and 5 for Renew. Despite the economic crisis, the European left was unable to establish itself as an alternative force during the election. Finally, the Greens and Renew’s liberals emerged as the big losers of the June 2024 elections, with 53 and 77 seats, respectively, a sharp decline compared to 2019 (70 and 98 seats, respectively) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Political groups in the European Parliament as of July 2024
Political groups
Number of seats
Share of seats (%)
EPP–Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
188
26.11
S&D–Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
136
18.89
PfE–Patriots for Europe
84
11.67
ECR–European Conservatives and Reformists Group
78
10.83
Renew Europe–Renew Europe Group
77
10.69
Greens/EFA–Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
53
7.36
The Left–The Left group in the European Parliament–GUE/NGL
Following the elections, the centre of gravity of the new parliament shifted to the right. In addition to the strong performances of conservative parties, the European election results confirmed the anticipated rise of populist and Eurosceptic right-wing parties.
However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament, where they are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR (78 seats), PfE (49), and ESN (25), which have replaced the two previous right-wing populist groups, i.e., ECR and Identity and Democracy. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-attached (NA) (see Table 4).
Table 4. Populist parties by political groups in the 2024 European Parliament
Country
Type
Party
Seats won
% of vote
EP Group
Bulgaria
Centrist
Ima takav narod
ITN
1
6.20
ECR
Croatia
Extreme Right
Domovinski pokret
DP
1
8.84
ECR
Cyprus
Extreme Right
Ethniko Laiko Metopo
ELAM
1
11.19
ECR
Denmark
Radical Right
Danmarksdemokraterne
DD
1
7.39
ECR
Estonia
Radical Right
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond
EKRE
1
14.86
ECR
Finland
Radical Right
Perussuomalaiset/Finns
PS/Finns
1
7.60
ECR
Greece
Radical Right
Elliniki Lysi
EL
2
9.30
ECR
Italy
Radical Right
Fratelli d’Italia
FdI
24
28.76
ECR
Luxembourg
Right
Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party)
ADR
1
11.76
ECR
Poland
Radical Right
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
PiS
20
36.16
ECR
Romania
Radical Right
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor
AUR
6
14.95
ECR
Sweden
Radical Right
Sverigedemokraterna
SD
3
13.19
ECR
Bulgaria
Centrist
Graždani za evropejsko razvitie na Bǎlgarija
GERB
5
24.30
EPP
Italy
Right
Forza Italia
FI
8
9.58
EPP
Netherlands
Centrist
BoerBurgerBeweging
BBB
2
5.40
EPP
Slovenia
Radical Right
Slovenska demokratska stranka
SDS
4
30.65
EPP
Bulgaria
Extreme Right
Vazrazhdane
Vazrazhdane
3
14.40
ESN
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Svoboda a přímá demokracie
SPD
1
5.73
ESN
France
Radical Right
Reconquête!
REC
5
5.46
ESN
Germany
Radical Right
Alternative für Deutschland
AfD
15
15.89
ESN
Hungary
Extreme Right
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom
MHM
1
6.75
ESN
Lithuania
Extreme Right
Tautos ir teisingumo sąjunga (The People and Justice Union)
TTS
1
5.45
ESN
Poland
Extreme Right
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość
Konf
3
3,19
ESN
Slovakia
Extreme Right
Hnutie Republika
Hnutie Republika
2
12.53
ESN
Germany
Left
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht
BSW
6
6.17
NA
Greece
Radical Right
Dimokratikó Patriotikó Kínima
NIKI
1
4.37
NA
Greece
Left
Plefsi Eleftherias
PE
1
3.40
NA
Greece
Left
Kommounistiko Komma Elladas
KKE
2
9.30
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Nowa Nadzieja
Nowa Nadzieja
2
2.79
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Ruch Narodowy
Ruch Narodowy
1
2.57
NA
Romania
Radical Right
S.O.S. România
SOS RO
2
5.04
NA
Slovakia
Left
SMER – sociálna demokracia
SMER-SD
5
24.77
NA
Spain
Radical Right
Se Acabó La Fiesta
SALF
3
4.59
NA
Austria
Radical Right
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FPÖ
6
25.36
PfE
Belgium
Radical Right
Vlaams Belang
VB
3
22.94
PfE
Czech Republic
Centrist
Akce nespokojených občanů
ANO 2011
7
26.14
PfE
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Přísaha a Motoristé
Přísaha a Motoristé
2
10.26
PfE
Denmark
Radical Right
Dansk Folkeparti
DF
1
6.37
PfE
France
Radical Right
Rassemblement national
RN
30
31.47
PfE
Greece
Radical Right
Foni Logikis
FL
1
3.04
PfE
Hungary
Radical Right
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség
Fidesz
11
44.69
PfE
Italy
Radical Right
Lega
Lega
8
8.98
PfE
Latvia
Radical Right
Latvija pirmajā vietā
LPV
1
6.23
PfE
Netherlands
Radical Right
Partij voor de Vrijheid
PVV
6
16.97
PfE
Portugal
Radical Right
Chega
Chega
2
9.79
PfE
Spain
Radical Right
Vox
Vox
6
9.63
PfE
Bulgaria
Centrist
Prodalzhavame Promjanata-Democratichna Bulgaria
PP-BD
2
14.45
Renew(PP)EPP(DB)
Belgium
Left
Parti du Travail de Belgique-Partij van de arbeid
PTB–PVDA
2
11.76
The Left
Denmark
Left
Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne
Enhl., Ø
1
7.04
The Left
France
Left
La France Insoumise
LFI
9
9.87
The Left
Germany
Left
Die Linke
Die Linke
3
2.74
The Left
Greece
Left
Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
SYRIZA
4
14.92
The Left
Ireland
Left
Sinn Féin
SF
2
11.14
The Left
Italy
Centrist
Movimento 5 Stelle
M5S
8
9.98
The Left
Spain
Left
Podemos
Podemos
2
3.28
The Left
Sweden
Left
Vänsterpartiet
V
2
11.04
The Left
Source: Compiled by the authors based on election results data from the European Parliament (https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/). Notes: Blue indicates radical-right populist; pink radical-left populist; and white, centrist populist.
Such a reconfiguration of populist groups in the EP reflects a wide array of factors, from national and geopolitical issues to party strategies and political profiles and mutual populist exclusion. The case of Hungarian Fidesz illustrates such complexity. Despite one of the most significant victories across the EU, Orbán’s party faced the challenge of allying with others on the European scene. Initially, Orbán strived to join Meloni’s ECR but ultimately rejected this option to avoid coalescing with the anti-Hungarian AUR in Romania. Additionally, there was a cleavage on the Russia-Ukraine War with Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński but also smaller members of the ECR from Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, holding diametrically opposed views to Orbán’s. After weeks of negotiations, Orbán succeeded in forming a new coalition based on the former Identity and Democracy group, initially with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Czech ANO, which was ultimately led by the French National Rally (RN). Although the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is the third-largest faction in the European Parliament, it could not secure any significant positions, and thus, Fidesz’s political isolation continues.
Along with the new PfE and previous ECR groups, other right-wing populist parties have found political shelter in the newly formed Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group. These are essentially extreme right-wing parties such as Our Homeland in Hungary, Reconquête! in France, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and Czech SPD. The German AfD leads the group following its expulsion from the former Identity and Democracy faction in the EP in the lead-up to the European elections in May 2024, which was the result of the controversial statements made by the AfD’s lead candidate Maximilian Krah about members of the Nazi SS. The ESN currently has 25 members in the EP.
With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. The Left currently has 46 seats, which represents a slight increase on its previous share of 37 seats in the outgoing parliament. After talks of creating a new group with the German BSW, the Italian M5S has joined the European Left, which, as the country analysis has shown, is consistent with the ideological and strategic move to the left by the party in Italian politics.
Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups. The Czech ANO has joined the new populist radical-right PfE along with Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary and Le Pen’s RN in France. Other centrist populists, such as the Dutch BBB and GERB in Bulgaria, are found in the right-wing conservative EPP, while the Bulgarian ITN has joined Meloni’s ECR. ANO’s decision to leave the liberal Renew group and join the PfE alongside Fidesz and FPÖ poses a curious example. Since the PfE has been excluded from the allocation of posts in the EP committees and subject to cordon sanitaire by the EP majority, ANO is likely to have much less leverage in the new European Parliament.
The impact of populism on EU politics
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, we can expect a growing impact on the political debate and policy decisions. We have already seen such impact in areas such as migration policy, where the ECR and the ID have already left their mark with policies on outsourcing immigration control through a series of agreements with neighbouring nations, particularly in Northern Africa, and with the securitization of the migration debate, framing it as a security threat with a primary focus on border control and deportations, as opposed an effective system of burden-sharing and protection of human rights for refugees and asylum seekers.
Climate change is another area where we may see rollback and obstructionism. Although the Green Deal has been finalized, implementation may be at risk, particularly in areas such as phasing out combustion engines, restoration of nature reserves and green energy investment. Such rollback is likely to impede the ability of the EU to act as a global leader in what is pronouncedly a transnational policy issue.
EU enlargement is another topic that may take the backseat, both when it comes to the Western Balkans, as well as Ukraine. Parties such as PVV, RN, FPÖ and AfD are strongly opposing further enlargement, as are many of the right-wing populists in Central and Eastern Europe. Exceptions are PiS and AUR and their support for EU membership for Ukraine and Moldova, respectively, due to historical and ethnic factors.
Foreign policy is expected to be a point of major contention for the far right in the EP, although the expected impact may be overestimated, at least in the short term. The 19 September 2024 resolution adopted by the European Parliament on lifting the restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory presents a case in point. The resolution was passed with 425 votes in favour, 131 against and 63 abstentions. The EP majority, including the EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe, voted in support, with additional support from many members of the Green/EFA and the ECR. Dissenting voices came from the PfE and the ESN, but also from ECR’s FdI, as well as French leftists and Irish, Austrian and Maltese MEPs across the political spectrum reflecting their countries’ neutral (non-NATO) status.
The impact of the populist left is likely to have a more limited impact, given its modest representation, although there may be issues where we may see the populist left and right coalesce, such as the war in Ukraine, for example, or aspects of welfare policy. The BSW is a good illustration of this merging of left and right populism on specific policy topics.
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics. We have clearly seen this effect in Austria, where after winning the EP elections, the FPÖ increased its support even more, winning the national legislative elections. While the current EP majority may be able to effectively exercise cordon sanitaire over both the far right and the far left, an overall shift to the right, both in terms of rhetoric and policy, is already a reality. This prolonged tendency has the potential to contribute to the future growth of the far right in the subsequent European Parliament, as well as to the continued mainstreaming of far-right policies, as the current majority is trying to push through its priorities. The inclusion of Rafaele Fitto (FdI-ECR) as the Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms in the new European Commission signals such a tendency and is but one instance of attempts to draw the ECR closer.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and thecomparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
References
Akkerman T, de Lange S, Rooduijn M (eds) (2016) Radical Rightwing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream. London: Routledge.
Chazel, L., & Dain, V. (2024). Left-Wing Populism and Environmental Issues: An Analysis of La France Insoumise’s ‘Popular Environmentalism’. Political Studies, 72(3), 1223–1249.
Duina, F., & Zhou, H. X. (2024). The populist discourse on the environment: framework and evidence from Europe and the Americas. Journal of Political Ideologies, 1–25.
Forchtner, B., & Lubarda, B. (2023). Scepticisms and beyond? A comprehensive portrait of climate change communication by the far right in the European Parliament. Environmental Politics, 32(1), 43–68.
Herman LE, Muldoon J (eds.) (2019) Trumping the Mainstream: The Conquest of Democratic Politics by the Populist Radical Right. London: Routledge.
Hix, S. and Marsh, M. (2007), Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections. Journal of Politics, 69: 495–510.
Ivaldi, Gilles (2023) When far-right parties compete: a case study of Éric Zemmour and Marine Le Pen in the 2022 French presidential election, French Politics, online first 13 July 2023 (https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41253-023-00219-y)
Ivaldi, Gilles and Emilia Zankina, eds., The impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). 8 March, 2023. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0010
Lockwood, B., & Lockwood, M. (2022). How do right-wing populist parties influence climate and renewable energy policies? Evidence from OECD countries. Global Environmental Politics, 22(3), 12–37.
Mondon A, Winter A (2020) Reactionary Democracy: How Racism and the Populist Far Right Became Mainstream. London: Verso.
Mudde C (2019) The Far Right Today. Cambridge: Polity.
Reif, Karl-Heinz; Hermann Schmitt (1980). Nine 2nd-Order National Elections – A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results. European Journal of Political Research 8(1 ): 3–44.
Rooduijn, M., Pirro, ALP, Halikiopoulou D., et al. (2023). The PopuList: A Database of Populist, Far-Left, and Far-Right Parties Using Expert-Informed Qualitative Comparative Classification (EiQCC). British Journal of Political Science. Published online 2023:1–10.
doi:10.1017/S0007123423000431
Zankina, Emilia (2024). “The Consequences of the War in Ukraine in Bulgaria: Political, Economic, and Cultural Divides.” In: Mörner, Ninna (ed.), A World Order in Transformation? A Comparative Study of Consequences of the War and Reactions to These Changes in the Region. CBEES State of the Region Report 2024, pp. 82–90. https://sh.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1846696&dswid=1173
Rybář, Marek. (2024). “Slovakia: Mixed Results of Populist Parties in the 2024 EP Elections.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0082
Since Slovakia’s EU accession in 2004, populist parties have dominated national politics, although they are less influential in European Parliament (EP) elections. While Smer–Slovak Social Democracy led five national elections and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) triumphed in 2020, populist parties performed weaker in EP elections. Progressive Slovakia (PS) won in 2019 and 2024, signalling different electoral dynamics. The rise of populism in Slovakia reflects a shared narrative of a virtuous people vs. a corrupt elite, although each party incorporates populism differently. Smer, led by Robert Fico, has shifted towards far-right nationalism, while OĽaNO evolved into Movement Slovakia (MS), with a focus on anti-corruption. The neo-Nazi Kotlebists (ĽSNS), initially successful, has splintered, losing its foothold in national politics. The 2024 EP elections, held amid an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Fico, reflected the political tensions. Smer placed second with 24.8%, while MS and ĽSNS underperformed. These results highlight the varied impact of populist parties on national and EU politics in Slovakia.
Keywords: populism; Slovakia; European elections; Smer; Movement Slovakia
By Marek Rybář*(Department of Political Science, Masaryk University, Czech Republic)
Background
Since Slovakia’s accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004, populist political parties have largely dominated the national political landscape. In countries with proportional electoral systems, electoral success is typically determined by the ability to form interparty alliances that command a majority in the national parliament. Nevertheless, in Slovakia, it has consistently been a populist party that has secured the largest share of parliamentary seats. Direction–Slovak Social Democracy (Smer) achieved this outcome in five elections, while the Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) – rebranded as ‘Movement Slovakia’ (MS) in late 2023 – emerged as the leading party in 2020. In five out of six cases, the victorious populist party also became the largest party controlling the government.
However, populist parties are notably less dominant in EP elections. While Smer emerged victorious in two EP elections (2009 and 2014), the now-defunct Slovak Democratic and Christian Union won the first EP elections in 2004, and Progressive Slovakia (PS) secured wins in both 2019 and 2024. These results demonstrate that the electoral dynamics in EP elections differ from those in national contests. The second-order status of EP elections contributes to this difference, with lower voter turnout and opposition parties effectively mobilizing voters against the incumbent government. However, mainstream opponents of populist parties tend to be more supportive of European integration, and their supporters are generally more motivated to express this stance at the ballot box, with consequences for the results of EP contests.
Populism is an elusive concept, often used not only to describe political phenomena but also as a value-laden term to discredit opponents. For the purposes of this briefing, I define ‘populist’ parties as those identified in the authoritative PopuList 3.0 database (https://popu-list.org/applications/). The latest edition identifies Smer, OĽaNO (now MS), We Are Family (SR), and Kotlebists – People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS) as the party-political embodiments of populism in Slovakia. The four parties differ in their ideologies, degree of popular support, stances on the European integration and many other important aspects. What they have in common is their depiction of society as being divided into two opposing groups: the virtuous people and the corrupt political elite, with the latter seen as betraying the interests of the former.
It is also worth mentioning that none of the populist parties analysed here has ‘populism’ as the sole defining characteristic feature. In fact, populism is understood as a thin ideology that can coexist with a host of other ideologies and may play only a secondary role in the party’s profile.
Smer is a case in point. Established in the late 1990s as a left-leaning statist party, it has transformed into a far-right party. Smer managed to return to power in 2023 after three years in opposition, during which its popular support plummeted and its parliamentary caucus suffered a break-up, after which the Voice-Social Democracy (Hlas), led by the former prime minister, Peter Pellegrini, formed as a separate entity. Although Smer has always featured nationalist, Eurosceptic and illiberal standpoints, from 2021 onward, Fico focused on building alliances with ‘alternative media’, extra-parliamentary opposition and far-right groups. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis fostered a critical public sentiment (such as anti-vaxxers and pro-Russian authoritarians) that was opposed to the government, which Fico effectively harnessed. By collaborating with far-right politicians and organizing joint anti-government rallies, he further strengthened the nationalist elements of Smer’s message (Haughton, Cutts and Rybář, 2024). Although nominally social democratic, Fico has effectively moved the party towards the illiberal far right.
In contrast, OĽaNO (now Movement Slovakia) began as an openly populist party, positioning itself as the voice of ‘the ordinary people’ against a self-serving and corrupt political establishment. Since it entered the national parliament in 2010, the party has centred its political agenda on anti-corruption rhetoric. Initially a loose coalition of anti-corruption and pro-life activists, it evolved into a Christian conservative populist movement with a fluid organizational structure centred around its leader and founder, Igor Matovič. In a surprising outcome, the party won the 2020 national elections, capitalizing on the disillusionment of voters drawn to its sharp criticism of corruption and clientelism associated with the Smer-led government. Following its electoral success, the party managed to form a four-party coalition government, with Matovič assuming the role of prime minister. However, the new government, composed of mostly inexperienced ministers, encountered significant governance challenges, including managing the global COVID-19 pandemic and responding to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Matovič’s unpredictable governing style, characterized more by performance and sensationalism than well-considered policymaking, further exacerbated the government’s declining popularity. His approach led to numerous personal conflicts, not only with the opposition but also with his coalition partners. After one year, Matovič swapped positions with Finance Minister Eduard Heger, becoming the new Finance Minister himself. However, this move eventually failed to prevent the withdrawal of support from one of the coalition partners, resulting in a successful vote of no confidence in parliament. Consequently, the OĽaNO-led cabinet was replaced by a caretaker government appointed by President Zuzana Čaputová to lead the country toward early elections in September 2023.
Finally, the Kotlebists (ĽSNS) started as an extreme-right party that has used anti-establishment populist appeals combined with radical nativist ideology from its inception. The party managed to enter the Slovak parliament in 2020 and the EP a year earlier. However, the party caucus broke up in 2021, and the breakaway faction established a new party called Republika (Republic). It elected MEP Milan Uhrík as the party leader and distanced itself from what they portrayed as increasingly autocratic practices of the ĽSNS leader Marian Kotleba. Since then, popular support for ĽSNS has sharply declined; most former voters of the party turned to Republika, as did other far-right supporters, leaving ĽSNS out of the national parliament in 2023.
The political context of the 2024 EP elections
The campaign and the results of the EP elections in Slovakia in 2024 were significantly shaped by two factors. Firstly, the elections took place just weeks after the direct presidential elections (held at the turn of March and April 2024) and several months after the national parliamentary elections of September 2023. Because of their temporal proximity, all three electoral contests were related. Secondly, the elections were organized in the shadow of the assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico of Smer that took place in May 2024. The assassination attempt shook the country and impacted the campaign and elections both directly and indirectly.
In the national parliamentary elections of September 2023, Smer emerged as the leading party, securing a plurality with 22.9% of the votes. The party formed a coalition government with Hlas, a splinter faction from Smer, and the Slovak National Party (SNS), which managed to re-enter the national parliament after being absent in the previous electoral cycle, with Robert Fico appointed as prime minister. The socially liberal PS finished second, securing 18% of the vote. During post-election negotiations, PS made an unsuccessful attempt to dissuade Hlas from aligning with Smer, offering its leader Peter Pellegrini the position of prime minister in exchange for joining a government with other opposition parties. However, Smer provided a more favourable offer: Hlas would receive an equal number of ministries as the significantly larger Smer, and Pellegrini would gain Smer’s backing for his bid in the directly elected presidential race. As a result, the presidential election effectively became a second round in the contest for control over national institutions.
The former governing parties faced a devastating defeat: two failed to secure any parliamentary seats, while OĽaNO, led by former prime minister Igor Matovič, saw its vote share diminish to less than one-third of its 2020 result. Only Freedom and Solidarity (SaS), an economically liberal junior coalition partner of OĽaNO, maintained its performance from 2020. Additionally, the Christian Democratic Movement (KDH) succeeded in winning parliamentary seats for the first time since 2012.
Shortly after its formation, the new government embarked on a political course that, in many respects, starkly contrasted with that of the 2020–2023 administrations. The official Government Program included, among other things, plans to dismantle the national public broadcaster RTVS, abolish the Special Prosecution Office responsible for investigating the most serious criminal cases (including high-profile corruption cases), and overhaul the penal code, which would directly affect dozens of ongoing investigations. It also suggested preparing a special law targeting ‘foreign agents’, namely non-governmental organizations receiving grants from international donors.
Internationally, the new government pledged to halt all military assistance to Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression and adopt a more neutral stance toward Russia. Significantly, many of these changes were set to be implemented not only without consultations with relevant stakeholders but also by using a special legislative procedure to fast-track the measures through parliament in a very short timeframe. The opposition criticized these plans and legislative proposals, arguing that they would obstruct the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases during the previous Smer-led administration. Furthermore, some measures appeared to enable the new government to bypass existing legislative safeguards and take control of independent public bodies.
In an effort to counter these legislative moves by the new parliamentary majority, opposition parties appealed to the European Commission and their partners in the EP to urge the Slovak government to reconsider its plans. However, the government made few changes and instead accused the opposition of damaging the country’s reputation internationally. Consequently, the period following the parliamentary and presidential elections was marked by intense confrontation between the governing parties and the parliamentary opposition.
Although the opposition-backed independent candidate won the first round of the presidential elections, Pellegrini ultimately prevailed in the runoff and was elected president. His victory had two significant consequences for the dynamics of interparty competition. First, since Slovak presidents traditionally renounce their party membership and strive to maintain a non-partisan role, Pellegrini’s departure as its founder and most trusted representative weakened the Hlas party. Second, it provided additional impetus for the opposition, particularly PS, to mobilize its supporters in the EP elections with the slogan ‘they cannot have everything’, a reference to the governing parties. Boosting its electoral prospects, PS ‘recruited’ Ľudovít Ódor, the former prime minister of the 2024 caretaker government and former Vice-Governor of the Central Bank, to lead its party list in the EP elections.
Assassination attempt on Robert Fico and the campaign
Just before the most intense phase of the campaign was set to begin, the trajectory of domestic politics was dramatically altered by a failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico. On 15 May, while Fico was addressing a crowd of his supporters in the small town of Handlová, a 71-year-old man fired five shots at him, four of which struck Fico, causing gunshot wounds to his abdomen. Shortly afterwards, several leading representatives of Smer and SNS blamed the opposition and independent media for the attempt, claiming it resulted from a polarized political environment they allegedly created. They further suggested that unspecified measures were necessary to increase government control over the media and regulate the right of assembly to enhance public safety. While there were moderate voices within the government advocating for de-escalation, the coalition parties’ primary message was to blame their political opponents. Although the assassin had no record of links to any political party, some government representatives attempted to associate him with PS, alleging he had attended opposition rallies in the months preceding the attack.
In response to the assassination attempt, PS and other opposition parties suspended their election campaigns and proposed a meeting of the highest representatives of all parliamentary parties, but the governing parties rejected this proposal. Similarly, President Čaputová and President-elect Pellegrini jointly suggested a national roundtable involving all major parties, but some government representatives also rejected this initiative.
Whatever campaign strategy Smer had prepared for the EP election was eventually reduced to two slogans: ‘For Peace in Europe’ and ‘For Robert Fico’. The party sought to promote the narrative that the previous government had falsely criminalized Fico and his associates, and upon Smer’s return to power, justice needed to be restored. Furthermore, Smer conveyed to its voters the message it had promoted in the 2023 national campaign: peace in Europe is endangered because previous governments (and the EU) supplied weapons to Ukraine. According to Smer, Slovakia should remain neutral, and such neutrality would restore peace. The Smer manifesto stated: ‘We want to be the extended arm of Robert Fico’s government, which will face increasing attacks from Brussels’ warmongers for striving for peace and refusing to send weapons to Ukraine’ (Smer 2024). Additionally, Smer attacked what it called ‘extreme progressive gender ideologies’ and sought to associate them with PS. Following the assassination attempt, Smer leaders and candidates attempted to rhetorically link ‘progressivism’ with ‘extremism’ to discredit their primary opponent.
Although PS, along with other opposition parties, initially suspended its campaign, it soon resumed its activities. The party sought to mobilize its supporters by arguing that the Smer-led government had undermined Slovakia’s position within the EU and that its policies could lead to Slovakia’s isolation or even result in the suspension of EU funds due to non-compliance with rule-of-law criteria. It also contended that achieving national reconciliation after the assassination attempt should not imply that the opposition would abandon its primary role of holding the government accountable for its actions and proposals.
The main campaign issues and stances of populist parties
Smer, as the leading representative of party-based populism, produced a five-page manifesto summarizing its central positions concerning several crucial EU policies. It consistently promoted the key manifesto stances in public rallies, media interviews and on social networks. As mentioned, Smer blamed the EU for ‘prolonging war in Europe’ by supporting Ukraine. As in the past, the party questioned the rationale of sanctions against Russia and has been critical of the EU foreign policy against other authoritarian regimes by calling it ‘a patronizing approach’ and ‘the imposition of the European liberal model’ towards countries that ‘have the right to their own historical path’ (Smer 2024).
The party also rejected the recently adopted EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, particularly the scheme that includes the relocation of asylum seekers among the EU countries. It proposed no concrete measures but only generally stated that the EU external border should be protected more and that illegal migration should be dealt with in the country of origin. The opposition to compulsory relocation schemes has been central to the party’s stance since the mid-2010s. Smer also claimed it would initiate reopening the European Green Deal, which was labelled as an ‘extreme environmental initiative’ and claimed it was pushed through by ‘Eurocrats with no accountability’. It specifically rejected the target of reducing emissions by 55% by 2030 (Smer 2024).
Smer linked the EU’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic to control by supranational elites, particularly ‘multinational corporations and pharmaceutical companies’, leading to the ‘imposition of experimental vaccinations’ and the ‘criminalization of people for their opinions’ (Smer 2024). Since first gaining representation in the EP, Smer’s Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have been part of the leading Socialist group (Socialists & Democrats, S&D). However, in the previous parliament, their membership was suspended due to their alliance with the far-right Slovak National Party (SNS) (Euronews 2023). The examples above demonstrate that Smer itself has shifted towards the far right.
It is instructive to compare Smer’s position with that of another populist party, the far-right neo-Nazi Kotlebists – People’s Party Our Slovakia (ĽSNS). Although now electorally marginal, ĽSNS was represented in both the national (2016–2020) and European (2019–2024) parliaments. The party did not produce an official EP election manifesto in 2024 but instead promoted its views on various social media platforms.
The primary difference between the two populist parties in 2024 was their stance on Slovakia’s EU membership. Smer claimed to support EU membership despite its many shortcomings. In contrast, ĽSNS argued that what it sees as the drawbacks of EU membership are inherent to how the EU operates and that the EU cannot be reformed. Consequently, it advocated for Slovakia’s exit from the EU (ĽSNS 2024). The party leader stated that, if elected to the EP, ĽSNS would ‘lay the groundwork for Slovakia’s exit from the European Union and break the EU from within’ (ĽSNS 2024).
However, the positions of Smer and ĽSNS were quite similar regarding their assessment of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Green Deal and the COVID-19 pandemic. While their reasoning differed, their objectives overlapped:
ĽSNS opposed any military support for Ukraine, claiming it ran counter to efforts to achieve peace. It further argued that the ultimate goal of the EU was to escalate the conflict, with the final aim of full and open participation of European countries in the conflict (RTVS 2024). ĽSNS also blamed the West for the conflict, citing its overall unfair stance towards Russia and its legitimate interests.
Regarding their opposition to the Green Deal, Smer argued that it would harm Slovakia’s automotive industry. In contrast, ĽSNS contended that the proposed measures were misguided: strict protection of water, soil and forests should occur at the national level. However, a clear nativist tone was evident in their proposed measures, suggesting that ‘the fundamental solution was to prevent the purchase of land by foreigners’ (Hlavný denník 2024).
Finally, ĽSNS’s rejection of the EU’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic was similar to Smer’s, but its reasoning was more extreme and conspiratorial. The party suggested that vaccination campaigns and deals with pharmaceutical companies were part of a broader plan to transform Europe. ĽSNS claimed that the EU was attempting to destroy the Christian tradition in Europe by promoting mandatory vaccinations that would prevent young Europeans from having their own children. This move, they argued, would align with the EU’s alleged goal of ‘replacing the original inhabitants of Europe with migrants brought in from all corners of the world’ (ĽSNS 2024).
The positions of the third populist party, MS (formerly OĽaNO), differed most significantly from those of Smer and ĽSNS in the area of international politics. MS argued that the conflict in Ukraine was a result of Russia’s imperial ambitions and that it was the duty of European democracies to help Ukraine defend itself. The party claimed that Ukraine was also fighting for ‘our freedom and democracy’ (Hnutie Slovensko 2024).
MS was also critical of the Green Deal but proposed a revision that would involve postponing the timeline for key targets, arguing that ‘reckless and hasty implementation of electromobility will lead to greater poverty and reduced mobility for vulnerable groups’ (Hnutie Slovensko 2024). The party’s positions on other contentious issues, such as immigration and the COVID-19 pandemic, were vaguer. Instead, its manifesto prioritized the need to combat disinformation and corruption at the EU level in an attempt to link its opponent, Smer, to these issues.
The results and implications of the EP elections
The elections were held on a single day, 8 June and their results were remarkable in several respects. The turnout of 34.4%, although the fourth lowest among all EU countries, was the highest ever recorded in EP elections in Slovakia, an increase of nearly 12 percentage points compared to 2019. Of the three populist parties, only Smer managed to gain parliamentary representation, finishing a close second after PS with 24.8% of the vote, thereby expanding its EP representation from three to five MEPs. The other two populist parties failed to cross the 5% threshold, receiving just 2% (MS) and 0.5% (ĽSNS), respectively.
In the absence of exit polls or other opinion data, it is difficult to determine the factors that led to these results. As discussed, the outcomes were decisively influenced by the fact that this was the third nationwide electoral contest within nine months and by the assassination attempt on Robert Fico, the leader of Smer. The two electoral defeats of the parliamentary opposition and the polarizing effects of these losses likely bolstered support for PS, whose electoral base is strongly aligned with Slovakia’s EU membership (Haughton et al., 2024). The assassination attempt likely increased sympathy for Fico and his party, prompting some voters of non-parliamentary opposition parties (other than Smer) to support Smer in the EP elections. Smer’s two coalition partners performed poorly, with SNS failing to gain any seats despite its party list featuring all major figures, including the party leader. Since a sizeable share of their supporters view Fico favourably, they likely voted for Smer (Hopková 2024). In contrast, ĽSNS was electorally weakened by the departure of Republika, its breakaway faction, which performed well in the EP elections. Finally, Movement Slovakia’s low support probably reflected disappointment with its performance in the 2020–2023 government.
The election results put the Slovak government in an awkward position, as none of its six MEPs (five from Smer and one from Hlas) are likely to sit in a major faction in the EP. In contrast, the parliamentary opposition parties will join the Renew (six from PS) and European People’s Party (EPP) (one from KDH) groups in the EP. This constellation is likely to further alienate the Slovak government from its European partners.
Table 1: Results of the most recent national and EP elections
Party
EP 2019 (%)
EP 2019 (seats)
NR SR 2023 (%)
EP 2024 (%)
EP 2024 (seats)
PS
20.1
4
17.96
27.8
6
Smer
15.7
3
22.94
24.76
5
Republika
–
–
4.75
12.53
2
Hlas
–
–
14.7
7.18
1
KDH
9.7
2
6.82
7.14
1
ĽSNS
12.1
2
0.84
0.48
0
SaS
9.6
2
6.32
4.92
0
MS (OĽaNO)
5.3
1
8.89
1.98
0
SNS
4.1
0
5.62
1.9
0
Source: www.statistics.sk. Electoral threshold of 5% applies for a single party in both types of elections. All parliamentary parties represented in at least one parliament are listed
(*) Marek Rybář is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies and the International Institute of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno, the Czech Republic. He has written numerous journal articles and book chapters on political parties, politico-administrative relations and executive political institutions in Central Europe. marek.rybar@mail.muni.cz, ORCID: 0000-0001-5242-2895
Rybář, M. 2020. Slovakia. In V. Hloušek and P. Kaniok (eds.) The European Parliament Election of 2019 in East-Central Europe. Houndmills: Palgrave, pp. 229–251.
Smer. 2024. Program strany SMER–SSD do volieb do Európskeho parlamentu 2024.