Protest in Istanbul

Dr. Tas: Coercion Has Become the Erdogan Regime’s Default Tool of Governance

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Hakki Tas argues that repression—not legitimacy—has become the Erdogan regime’s default mode of rule. Highlighting the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Taş contends that Turkey is moving further from competitive authoritarianism toward full authoritarian consolidation. As electoral legitimacy weakens, coercion fills the void, revealing a regime reliant on fear, control, and chrono-political narratives to survive. “Remaining in power,” Dr. Tas says, “is the only survival strategy.” This conversation explores the strategic logic behind repression, the shrinking political arena, and the uncertain future of ailing Turkish democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Hakki Tas, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, offers a sobering assessment of Turkey’s democratic trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Dr. Tas argues that “coercion has become the Erdogan regime’s default tool of governance,” signaling a shift in strategy where repression, rather than consensus or legitimacy, undergirds the government’s hold on power. This growing reliance on coercive mechanisms reflects not only the regime’s authoritarian drift but also its deepening vulnerability in the face of economic instability and eroding public support.

In Dr. Tas’s view, the political elite in Turkey face a stark reality: “remaining in power is the only survival strategy.” With dwindling economic resources, declining electoral popularity, and limited institutional buffers, Erdogan and his allies find themselves increasingly dependent on repressive tactics to maintain control. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, widely seen as the most viable opposition figure, exemplifies this logic. For Dr. Tad, such moves do more than target individuals; they erode fundamental democratic principles by narrowing the space for political competition and undermining voter choice.

Indeed, Dr. Tas highlights the regime’s systematic efforts to degrade electoral competitiveness. While Turkey has retained the formal trappings of multiparty elections, the conditions required for genuine democratic choice—such as “electoral vulnerability,” “electoral availability,” and “decidability”—have been steadily dismantled. The elimination of high-profile opposition figures like Imamoglu not only tilts the playing field but also challenges the very notion of Turkey as a competitive authoritarian regime. As Dr. Tas succinctly puts it, “calling Turkey’s regime ‘competitive’ is increasingly difficult to justify.”

Beyond specific political maneuvers, Dr. Tas situates these developments within a broader authoritarian logic—one that employs what he calls a “chrono-political strategy” to frame every election as an existential battle for the nation’s soul. Through an intricate weaving of past grievances, present insecurities, and imagined futures, Erdogan casts challenges to his rule as threats to the entire Turkish polity. This blend of populist narrative-building, strategic repression, and institutional erosion has enabled the regime to survive despite mounting internal and external pressures.

This interview explores the implications of Imamoglu’s arrest, the fragility of Erdogan’s political toolkit, and the possible futures of ailing Turkish democracy. At stake is not only the fate of one politician or election, but the broader question of whether Turkey can still lay claim to competitive politics—or whether it has entered a new phase of authoritarian consolidation.

Dr. Hakki Tas, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Hakki Tas with some edits.

Calling Turkey’s Regime ‘Competitive’ Is Increasingly Difficult to Justify

How does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu fit within the broader trajectory of democratic backsliding in Turkey, and does it signify a critical turning point toward full authoritarian consolidation, or does it remain within the bounds of competitive authoritarianism?

The competitiveness of the regime in Turkey has been in question not only today but throughout the last decade as well. While Turkish elections have long been marked by significant contentiousness, this indeed does not necessarily translate into genuine political competition. True competitiveness requires conditions such as electoral vulnerability (where incumbents can realistically be unseated), electoral availability (where voters are open to changing party preferences), and decidability (where parties offer distinct and clearly communicated platforms). 

Nevertheless, by potentially eliminating the most prominent challenger from the electoral arena, the jailing of Imamoglu further undercuts each of these core democratic prerequisites. While Turkey has not yet crossed into fully authoritarian rule, actions like arresting leading opposition figures push the system closer to outright authoritarian consolidation, and the adjective “competitive” to describe the current regime becomes increasingly tenuous.

For Turkey’s Ruling Elite, Staying in Power Is the Only Survival Strategy

To what extent can Imamoglu’s arrest be interpreted as a reflection of Erdogan’s growing political insecurity in anticipation of the 2028 elections, rather than an expression of consolidated authoritarian control?

These two dimensions—growing political insecurity and authoritarian tendencies—often intersect, since remaining in power is the only survival strategy for the current political elite. The insecurity itself is clear: with economic resources depleted, Erdogan can no longer dispense patronage to his base as effectively, nor can he weave compelling narratives that resonate with voters and align with his domestic or foreign policy choices. Consequently, if he cannot win the minds and hearts of the masses, coercion becomes his default instrument. Of course, such reliance on repression highlights the fragility of the regime. Repression may not be the most effective tactic, but it probably is the only remaining path to maintain power.

In the light of Erdogan’s declining popularity and the ongoing economic crisis, to what degree can the regime continue to depend on electoral legitimacy, or is it likely to increasingly abandon the electoral route in favor of more authoritarian mechanisms?

Erdogan faces a fundamental conundrum when it comes to sustaining electoral legitimacy amidst dwindling popularity and deepening economic woes. Unlike many of his autocratic counterparts, he cannot rely on a rentier economy to placate key constituencies, nor can he fully count on a steadfast, loyal military to neutralize dissent. In this context, elections—no matter how constrained—have long served as a principal source of legitimacy. The semblance of competitiveness has permitted Erdogan to maintain at least a façade of democratic governance, preserving his rule without incurring the immediate costs of blatant authoritarianism.

Yet this tactic cuts both ways. Without holding elections, Erdogan risks forfeiting any claim to popular legitimacy, leaving him reliant on repressive mechanisms that are by no means guaranteed to remain loyal. At the same time, the very act of putting his government to an electoral test brings the danger that genuine opposition could mobilize sufficiently to threaten his grip on power.

When Parties Fail, the Streets Speak

Protests in Turkey.
Thousands gathered in Istanbul on March 23, 2025, to protest the arrest of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sedat Gulec.

How might a potential state-led intervention in the CHP—modeled after kayyum-style trusteeship—reshape the Turkish party system and transform the landscape of opposition politics?

This would only underscore the fact that the traditional institutional mechanisms of political mediation have long been obsolete in Turkey and could further legitimize street-level mobilization. Dismantling the CHP’s autonomy would not only deepen the regime’s authoritarian tilt but also galvanize citizens to challenge the government outside the confines of a party framework, amplifying the prominence of direct action in shaping Turkey’s political future.

Given Imamoglu’s capacity to mobilize broad, cross-ideological support, what are the strategic implications of his removal for the Turkish opposition’s ability to mount a viable electoral challenge?

Imamoglu is one of the Turkish opposition’s most versatile and unifying figures, whose cross-ideological appeal had begun to transcend traditional fault lines; however, this broad support did not necessarily constitute a robust coalition committed to full democracy. Moreover, the regime has strategically sought to keep the political and ideological fissures among the opposition intact—most notably by attempting to reconcile with Kurdish political actors. Nonetheless, Imamoglu’s ability to attract diverse groups demonstrated a tangible path toward a more inclusive opposition discourse, one that could, at least temporarily, bridge political cleavages around a common goal. The opposition leaders have performed well so far.

From Twin Enemies to Universal Threats

How does the post-2016 securitization of political opposition compare to earlier state narratives targeting the Gulen movement, and in what ways is this logic now being extended to opposition figures such as Imamoglu?

The post-coup securitization narrative has intensified and broadened the regime’s ability to label virtually any dissent as a threat to national security, building on earlier campaigns against the Gulen movement and Kurdish groups. Historically, it was relatively straightforward to demonize these constituencies by invoking entrenched suspicions of political Islam and Kurdish nationalism—“twin enemies” in the public imagination. 

Compared to its anti-Gulen campaign, the government has deployed similar tactics—such as dehumanizing language, terrorism accusations, and show trials—; extending such rhetoric to figures like Imamoglu, however, proves more challenging, given his secular and broadly appealing profile. The scope of securitization continues to expand, as seen in the Gezi trials, and likely will intensify further, reinforcing polarization, when the support of the majority is not viable.

In what ways is the Erdogan regime deploying chrono-political narratives—fusing past, present, and future—to legitimize authoritarian measures against the opposition in the lead-up to the 2028 elections?

Currently, Erdogan lacks a popular grand narrative to frame recent developments. Instead, he taps into center-right and conservative sentiments with rhetoric about “street terrorism.” Meanwhile, pro-government media and figures recirculate default anti-Kemalist tropes, constantly reminding the AKP base of the 1997 “postmodern coup” and emphasizing the AKP’s role as the champion of an “Anatolian Revolution” against the vestiges of “Old Turkey” represented by the CHP. By melding past grievances with current insecurities, this chrono-political framing casts state crackdowns as the preservation of a people’s revolution rather than an assault on democratic norms, thereby embedding present events in a broader narrative of conflict between a secular Kemalist elite and Muslim Anatolian people.

In a Post-Truth Arena, Victimhood Becomes the Most Potent Political Weapon

What does the political discourse surrounding Imamoglu’s arrest reveal about Turkey’s ongoing shift toward post-truth politics, in which narrative construction increasingly overrides evidence-based governance?

The discourse surrounding Imamoglu’s arrest illustrates Turkey’s deepening post-truth environment, in which the regime’s narratives often eclipse factual evidence through a deluge of fake news, half-truths, and conspiracy theories. Despite its formidable control over media outlets and intensified censorship of opposition voices, the government’s ability to craft a cohesive, persuasive message appears weaker compared to earlier high-stakes moments like the 2013 Gezi Protests or the aftermath of the 2016 coup attempt. This relative disarray in the official narrative highlights the regime’s further reliance on post-truth tactics to obfuscate the truth.

How does Erdogan’s portrayal of Imamoglu align with populist strategies that frame challengers as enemies of “the people,” and how does this dynamic intersect with Imamoglu’s own populist appeal?

Erdogan’s populist messaging has long relied on a Manichean division that pits “the people” against an allegedly subversive elite. Initially aimed at the Kemalist establishment during the 2000s, this rhetoric evolved to target foreign “dark forces” and domestic opponents, situating any threat to the AKP’s dominance within a grand narrative of external conspiracies seeking to weaken Turkey. In presenting Imamoglu as insolent and dismissive of the popularly elected government, Erdogan reinforces this populist framework, albeit in a manner that appears increasingly strained. The irony lies in removing a democratically elected mayor through what many view as politically motivated charges while simultaneously accusing him of undermining democracy—a strategy meant to maintain Erdogan’s self-image as the authentic representative of the public’s will.

Imamoglu, however, employs a form of counter-populism by depicting Erdogan’s regime as the entrenched new establishment and urging disparate groups marginalized under the AKP’s rule to unite. In this sense, he challenges Erdogan on his own turf, effectively turning the populist dichotomy back against the incumbent. Moreover, the very act of arresting Imamoglu grants him the victimhood status that has historically served Erdogan well, endowing Imamoglu with the same potent political currency of victimhood and moral high ground.

How Erdogan Weaponizes Crisis to Sustain Power

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent is anti-Western rhetoric being utilized to domestically legitimize the arrest of Imamoglu, and how does this tactic align with the AKP’s broader strategy of politicizing foreign policy?

Despite the AKP’s reliance on anti-Western rhetoric to legitimize controversial domestic and foreign policy moves throughout the 2010s, Erdogan has been more circumspect in explicitly invoking such themes to rationalize Imamoglu’s arrest. Some pro-government outlets have circulated conspiracy theories linking Imamoglu to foreign plots; however, Erdogan currently appears to prioritize pragmatic relations with both the European Union and the United States. This shift partly stems from renewed Western interest in Turkey’s security partnership against Russia, as well as the transactional dynamic that characterized Erdogan’s rapport with US President Donald Trump. In other words, while anti-Western discourse remains a familiar tool in the regime’s arsenal, Erdogan has downplayed it in favor of current diplomatic gains and economic considerations.

Nevertheless, the broader AKP strategy of politicizing foreign policy remains evident in the potential use of external conflicts as a diversionary tactic. Historically, Erdogan has displayed a capacity to refocus domestic anxieties onto external threats, thereby consolidating his base. If Imamoglu’s arrest triggers wider unrest, the regime may revert to stoking regional tensions and rally the public under a unifying, antagonistic narrative. Given the volatile regional landscape—replete with ongoing conflicts—there is ample opportunity to leverage foreign policy crises to overshadow or justify heavy-handed measures at home.

Does Imamoglu’s arrest represent a calculated moment within Erdogan’s chrono-political strategy to frame the 2028 election as an existential national struggle, and how does this timing contribute to the construction of a long-term authoritarian myth?

Erdogan’s repeated depiction of every electoral contest—with remarkable examples such as the December 2015 general elections and the 2017 constitutional referendum—as an existential choice for the nation epitomizes a populist politics of time. In this framework, the present becomes a decisive juncture between a promised utopia of national triumph and an apocalyptic scenario of total annihilation, all hinging on the leader’s continued rule. Imamoglu’s arrest, then, can be seen as another attempt to situate the 2028 election within this broader chrono-political strategy. Erdogan is undoubtedly a master of chrono-populism, a skill that has helped him become one of the longest-serving populist leaders in world history.

However, sustaining perpetual vigilance among the public is costly. If Erdogan cannot deliver tangible rewards beyond the mere avoidance of catastrophe, voter fatigue over these endless existential crises may erode the very support he seeks to reinforce. The timing of Imamoglu’s arrest, therefore, not only reflects a calculated bid to sustain a grand authoritarian myth but also risks overextending the populist device of crisis mobilization—leaving the regime vulnerable to disillusionment from an electorate that grows weary of ever-present emergency narratives.

Ekrem Imamoglu, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Prof. White: Erdogan’s Arrest of Istanbul Mayor a Sign of Insecurity—And That Makes It More Dangerous

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a comprehensive interview with ECPS, Professor Jenny White calls the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu “absolutely… a sign of insecurity”—not strength. Professor White warns that this preemptive strike ahead of the 2028 elections reflects “regime fragility,” not confidence, adding: “If this stands… voting ceases to have any real meaning.” Drawing on her concept of “spindle autocracy,” she explains how personal loyalty has overtaken institutional merit, creating a brittle, fear-driven system. With Erdogan’s popularity fading and international pressure weakened, Professor White argues, “This is a line that has now been crossed”—one with dangerous consequences for Turkey’s democratic future.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jenny White—renowned anthropologist and scholar of Turkish politics at Stockholm University—explores the deeper implications of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu’s arrest and what it reveals about the current phase of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s authoritarianism. “Oh, absolutely—it’s a sign of insecurity,” Professor White declares. “And that makes it all the more dangerous, because this is a line that has now been crossed.”

This stark assessment lies at the heart of Professor White’s reflections on how Erdogan has evolved from a populist reformer to an embattled strongman. The arrest of Imamoglu—widely seen as the opposition’s most viable presidential contender in 2028—is not an act of confidence, but of regime fragility. “If this stands… and especially if the party itself is taken over, then voting ceases to have any real meaning,” she warns.

Professor White locates this shift within a broader trajectory of democratic erosion in Turkey. Drawing from her concept of spindle autocracy, she describes a system where loyalty to the leader has eclipsed merit and institutional integrity. “You cannot disagree. If you disagree, you are a traitor,” she says, noting that once individuals fall out of favor, they are discarded—spun out like raw wool from a political spindle.

Far from being the first rupture, Imamoglu’s arrest is a culmination of earlier moves: the post-Gezi crackdown, the co-optation of the judiciary, and the mass purges following the 2016 coup attempt. “At this point, there are really no institutions left around Erdogan that have competence, aside from loyalty to him,” Professor White states.

The sense of insecurity extends beyond domestic calculations. Professor White suggests that global shifts, including the return of Donald Trump, have reinforced Erdogan’s sense of impunity. “Erdogan has nothing to fear from US censure… I’m quite sure Trump would support that kind of move,” she notes. The European Union, too, finds itself in a bind—caught between supporting human rights and preserving strategic ties with Turkey.

Despite Erdogan’s waning popularity, the fear of retaliation—and the AKP’s entrenchment in every layer of society—limits open dissent. As Professor White concludes, “You can’t forget that Erdogan still has a lot of people willing to vote for him—not necessarily because they’re passionately in love with him, but because they’re afraid of what happens if he’s gone.”

This interview sheds urgent light on the authoritarian logic of fear—and what happens when that fear governs.

Professor Jenny White, renowned anthropologist and scholar of Turkish politics at Stockholm University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jenny White with some edits.

Turkey Is a Roller Coaster—Who’s on Top and Who’s Not Constantly Shifts

Professor White, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your articles, you describe Turkish political life as a “horizontal topography of action” rather than a vertical model of oppression and resistance. How does this framework help us better understand Erdogan’s consolidation of power post-2016 coup attempt?

Professor Jenny White: Well, I think of politics both in micro terms and over the long term. So, if you think of politics as just what’s happening now, you can try to clarify who’s on top and who’s on the bottom. But if you look at it even in just a slightly longer time frame, you see that the constituents of “Up” and the constituents of “Down” don’t stay the same. They, especially in a place like Turkey, are almost like a roller coaster. For a long time in the 20th century, the secular Kemalists were on top, and they were able to, or they tried to, determine how the rest of the population should live according to their standards. A lot of people went along with that because they also agreed with it. Those who didn’t were, you know, the religious, the peasants, the ones who lived in Turkey and tried to do well for themselves but often found that being religious or from the countryside was a drawback when it came to moving ahead. At some point, I think it was in the 1960s, you weren’t allowed to wear a headscarf in a civil service job or even to visit someone in a state hospital. Eventually, you weren’t allowed to wear a headscarf to go to university.

For many people who had been left out of the nation’s vision of progress, that was the ultimate insult. Not only were they kept down because they were peasants or migrants to the city, but they were also not allowed to practice their religion if they wanted to participate in modern society. There was this profound sense of being disenfranchised, being oppressed by the elites who, at the time, were trying to raise everyone up. So, depending on where you’re looking from, it’s determined by the observer. What’s the position of the observer in making the determination of who is oppressed or who is the oppressor? Then, of course, in the 1980s, the Islamist party started winning local elections and then national elections, representing these disenfranchised people. They came to power, and now we have the AKP. The AKP, in turn, decided to impose on the population their view of how one should live. It’s a different part of the population now.

Again, depending on who the observer is, you could either feel oppressed or say that those are the oppressors. It’s a roller coaster, with who’s on top and who’s not. Then, if you take it down another level, you look at people who are otherwise the same, like the followers of Fethullah Gulen and the members of the AKP. Before that, the Refah Party (RP) consisted of lower-middle-class merchants—not really merchants, but more like business people—and later on, they became wealthy. These were the people who had managed to step up in the new 1980s economy. They felt empowered, believing they were now on top. The Fethullah Gulen followers were heavily involved in all of this. They worked together with the government, had their own version of what they were doing, but in many ways, culturally and religiously, in terms of piety, they were indistinguishable from the AKP followers. So, you would think they wouldn’t be differentiated, but they fell afoul of the AKP, became the “bottom,” were hounded out of existence, and declared terrorists.

The scary thing for a lot of people was that you couldn’t actually know who was in and who was out, who was up and who was down. Your neighbor wore a headscarf, and you wore a headscarf. You were culturally identical and had known each other for years. How do you know who is on the up and who is on the down? There was also a culture of snitching. If you didn’t like your mother-in-law, you could snitch and claim she was a Gulenist, and then watch her fall. This is not the usual up-and-down scenario, which stems from a liberal leftist view that the world is divided into people who are oppressed—the poor, the minorities—and then the oppressors. In reality, the oppressed themselves can oppress others. It’s much more complicated than that. 

There Are No Institutions Left—Only Loyalty

In your analysis of “spindle autocracy,” you argue that personal loyalty to a leader has replaced institutional merit. How has this dynamic reshaped Turkey’s political institutions and public trust in them since the executive presidency was introduced?​

Professor Jenny White: Thank you. That’s a good question. But all I can think of right now is the US. This is so applicable. You can see the spindle forming, and just the idea of spindle autocracy, or spindle politics, as I ended up calling it, is that you move from being a country where people look at the politicians, and they may like or dislike the politician, but they look at the policies. “I like the policies of this politician, too. I like this politician.” To “I love this politician because this is an incredible outpouring of emotion, a passionate emotion that’s much more than simply liking your politician.” And I don’t really care what his policies are. I go with them because they are things that he wants us to do.

That’s an enormous difference, and the implications of that are also enormous. Because if you have a political leader who is a spindle autocrat, surrounding himself with people who are loyal as the first criterion, whether or not they are competent shouldn’t be beside the point, but often is. In the Kemalist era, there has always been a kind of big-man authoritarianism in Turkey, starting with Ataturk—the love of the leader. Atatürk is the beloved leader throughout, but whenever individuals like Menderes, Demirel, and Ozal, for example, came along, there was this attachment to particular leaders, including leftist leaders who are now icons.

So, I’m not saying this is something new with the AKP. These are old habits of power, big-man autocracy, and authoritarianism. All of this is wrapped up in a kind of patriarchy: “the devlet baba,” the state as your father, which is now personalized as Erdogan, your father figure. Intolerance of difference—people don’t like things that are different, or people who are different—has always been present in Turkey. But what is different now is the character of this central leader, right?

The styling. Another thing that’s been around for a long time is the styling, where the leader presents himself as both a hero and a victim—the heroic victim who is there to take care of you like a father. Erdogan embodies all of this, as did the leaders before him. But the difference now is that he has sort of forgotten the part where he takes care of the family. It’s almost as if remaining the leader has become a purpose in itself. All the pomp and circumstance surrounding the presidency now just feed resources and attention to the central figure. There are really no institutions left around Erdogan that have competence, aside from loyalty to him.

Obviously, not everyone is incompetent, but Erdogan has removed anyone he deemed disloyal. This started happening in the late 2000s. At one point, the Gulen movement, which had significant influence within the police, went after some of Erdogan’s family members for corruption and they wanted to arrest the government’s emissary who was traveling to Europe to negotiate a peace deal with the PKK. Erdogan didn’t like that, which caused a clash within the government.These individuals were part of government institutions, and the Gulen movement was singled out. Erdogan’s government then targeted the Gulen movement, leading to what became almost a feud—back and forth—culminating in the 2016 failed coup attempt. These were the people who had surrounded Erdogan at the beginning, and they moved down on the roller coaster, while the people who moved in were not necessarily known for their competence.

 One of the major consequences of a system like this is that nobody can disagree with the leader. In a normal political situation, even in an authoritarian context, you have advisors, right? They can discuss things with you and disagree. But in this case, because the relationships are all personal—based on loyalty and passionate devotion to the leader—you cannot disagree. If you disagree, you are a traitor. “Hain,” or traitor, is a term often thrown around in Turkey, and even though it’s used frequently, it’s always taken very seriously. If you are labeled a traitor in the newspapers, you could be arrested. It’s not something said lightly, but traitors emerge every minute, because people will disagree with what the leader is doing, and then they go down on the roller coaster.

So, it’s a very unstable system, even though it looks like it should be stable because of the strongman structure. But if you look closer at the micro level, there are always people moving in and out. If you think of the spindle, for those who don’t know, a spindle is a stick on a string that twirls, and you take raw wool and spin it until it turns into yarn that you can use to knit a sweater. Think of the raw wool coming from the sheep as the recruits who get involved around the leader, and as they do, they network and become obedient. They get “cooked in,” and then, as inevitable breakups happen, they split off. Even though it looks stable—with this leader who is always there—and if you look back in time, you’ll see many spindles, names of leaders, but you don’t see what was happening around the spindle, the people moving in and out.

Today It’s Gulenists, Tomorrow Someone Else

On 20 July 2016, Turkey’s Islamist-populist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared a state of emergency, enabling him and the AKP cabinet to bypass parliament and rule by decree. The crackdown on possible coup plotters has since been turned into an all-out witch-hunt not only against alleged Gulen sympathizers but also leftists, Kurds and anyone critical of the government.

You note that Erdogan’s regime revived the “threat paradigm” once used by Kemalists, but with updated targets like the Gulen movement. How do these manufactured inside/outside enemies influence popular support and the regime’s legitimacy?

Professor Jenny White: I think it’s something that is deeply embedded in the Turkish educational system. Children learn from a very early age that there are enemies. In the Kemalist days, that was quite overwhelming, and the enemies—there’s a whole list of them—were foreigners, the inside enemies. These were the non-Muslim minorities who, because they’re not Muslim, can’t possibly be loyal to the Turkish state and are probably working together with non-Muslim or Christian outsiders to undermine Turkey, as they had done in World War I. Some people call it the Sèvres syndrome.

So this is a serious issue that has affected the population, partly through the educational system but also through the media. It’s always present—it’s in everything, you know, even the soap operas. Even the Ottoman-era soap operas contain this underlying distrust of non-Muslim foreigners, especially Christians.

But again, on a micro level, it takes different forms, right? I’m just thinking of an example. One of the biggest threats to Turkish national unity in the 1980s and early 1990s, according to the Turkish military, was missionaries—Christian missionaries. There were almost no missionaries in Turkey. Why would this even be a thing, let alone one of the biggest threats to national unity?

It’s because it’s not really about the missionaries per se, even though some of them were actually killed or attacked by people. They were a symbol of a Christian West that is believed to be out to destroy Turkey. That’s what people believe. And you could be Jewish, you could be gay, you could be any one of the many categories of “other”—and still be lumped in. Or Armenian, right? So those are all kinds of insults when used in this way—as someone who is out to get Turkey. And they’re interchangeable.

So it’s not the particular people or the particular category that’s a threat. It’s the fact that there is this threat—it’s existential—and the category that belongs to the threat is constantly fungible. So you don’t ever hear about missionaries anymore. It’s as if that never happened, even though it was a serious thing for many years.

Now you hear about Syrians or the Gulenists—another new threat category. They’re considered an even greater threat because they are the enemy within: they are also Muslim and look just like you. So it’s a way to polarize the population. And in polarizing the population and the other political parties—because everyone feels like they have to take a stand on these issues—for many years, the CHP, the main opposition party, was in step with everyone else in demonizing both the external and internal enemies.

Well, they’ve moved away from that. Okay. But they still were—then they got on the bandwagon that everyone else was on, saying negative things about the Syrian refugees or the Kurds. Now there’s an attempt by the AKP to reach out to the Kurds in a way that I’m not sure is believable, because nothing has been given to the Kurds in return for Ocalan’s speech—or request—that the PKK lay down its arms.

But what this does is split the CHP. It also splits the Kurdish party, the DEM Party. It’s like—are they going to support the CHP candidate for president, or are they going to sit it out and see whether they can get anything in return from the AKP for what Ocalan said? 

So it’s not really a matter of fearing; it’s a matter of using fear to create division. And division is always useful in politics.

It’s Competitive—Unless There’s No More Competition

How would you characterize the current political regime in Turkey following the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu? Has the country now fully crossed the threshold into competitive authoritarianism—or something more consolidated?

Professor Jenny White: I think Turkey has been in a state of competitive authoritarianism for a long time now. Competitive authoritarianism means you have elections that are contested—parties like the CHP compete, other parties compete—but it’s not a level playing field.

Ninety percent of the media in Turkey is owned by pro-government businesses. So, if there’s an election, the CHP might—if they’re lucky—get a couple of minutes on TV, whereas the rest is all AKP, all the time. They’re not even allowed to put up posters. So, while technically competitive, the system is heavily skewed.

But it’s still “competitive” in the sense that you could, against all odds—very long odds—still win, as Imamoglu did. And then, of course, we know—was it in 2018? I’m bad with dates—but in the local election Imamoglu won, Erdoğan didn’t like the result, so he had it rerun. And then Imamoglu won again, with an even greater number of votes.

So, it is possible. But if you now arrest Imamoglu—and there’s been talk of appointing a kayyum, or the government effectively taking over the CHP, replacing its leadership with government-appointed trustees—then there’s no more competition.

Right? That’s it. It’s a competitive authoritarian regime—unless there’s no more competition.

Erdogan Will Do Whatever It Takes to Stay in Power

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.

Erdogan’s authoritarian turn has evolved in phases over the past two decades. What would you say distinguishes this current phase from earlier moments of democratic erosion, such as post-Gezi or post-2016?

Professor Jenny White: You know, I was doing research in Turkey at the time the AKP was elected, and I had already done a lot of work with the previous parties. But when the AKP first came to power, it was a completely different scenario.

There was a lot of talk about what kind of Islam they represented. It was framed as a personalized Islam—practical and pragmatic. The message was: we’re pious Muslims at home, but we make decisions in office based on practical concerns, not Islamic ethics. They emphasized that while their personal ethics might inform their conduct, policy decisions would not be based on religious doctrine.

That was the beginning. And Erdogan also reached out to non-Muslim minorities. There was a sense of progression, a feeling that genuinely heartened people—that finally, we had something different, a new way of doing politics.

It felt like, maybe for once, whoever was at the top wouldn’t force everyone to conform to their lifestyle or their values. That perhaps, finally, there could be some kind of pluralism.

But it didn’t last very long. The first major turning point came with the attempt by the police to arrest people in Erdogan’s close circle on corruption charges. That was a crucial moment—because his response was to essentially co-opt the judicial system. He transferred judges to remote parts of the country where they would be unable to act effectively. He fired prosecutors and lawyers, and replaced them—if I remember correctly, around 5,000 new lawyers were brought in. These were individuals who were, in a sense, in his pocket—closely aligned with him, loyal to the system he was building. They were, as it were, attached to the spindle—being drawn in and reshaped to fit a new judicial order.

So now, you don’t really have a free judicial system, as we see time and again. The same pattern occurred with people accused of being part of “FETO,” the Gulen movement. Once the movement was designated a terrorist organization, many individuals—some with no real connection to Gulen—were swept up in the crackdown.

They went through the process regardless, often without due process. Their passports were confiscated; they became social pariahs. People didn’t want to associate with them—even their own families distanced themselves out of fear of being implicated.

Many lost their businesses, which were taken over by the state. They lost access to social security. They became, in effect, non-people—despite the absence of any fair or reliable judicial process to prove wrongdoing.

Right? So then it just continued down that path. And I think the shift was driven largely by a reaction—a fear on Erdogan’s part that he was going to be overthrown.

If you remember, there was also Tahrir Square and other uprisings happening across the region. So when Gezi Protests happened, he interpreted it as part of the same wave of dissent. And then, of course, in 2016, there was an actual coup attempt.

I think all of this stems from a deep fear of falling—from a fear of being deposed. And so, he’s been willing to do whatever it takes to maintain power. As long as he could keep getting elected—which he did, because he remained quite popular—it wasn’t really a problem.

But now, he’s not so popular—largely because the economy has been in terrible shape for many years, due in part to his own brand of voodoo economics. Of course, some people have become very wealthy under this system, but the majority of Turks—regardless of background—are now at the bottom of the roller coaster.

Even if they haven’t been arrested, many are just barely managing to get by. Right? So I think his popularity has declined to such an extent that he knows if he were to go up against a candidate like Imamoglu, he would lose.

Voting Ceases to Have Any Real Meaning

Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu at the Gazi Race award ceremony at Veliefendi Racecourse in Istanbul, Turkey, on June 30, 2024. Photo: Evren Kalinbacak.

Many observers see the arrest of Imamoglu as a ‘preemptive strike’ against opposition in the lead-up to the 2028 elections. Do you see this as a sign of regime insecurity or confidence?

Professor Jenny White: Oh, absolutely—it’s a sign of insecurity. And that makes it all the more dangerous, because this is a line that has now been crossed. If this stands—if Imamoglu, who is the CHP’s candidate (and clearly targeted for that reason), and who would have won or likely will win an election—is arrested and removed from politics, and especially if the party itself is taken over, then voting ceases to have any real meaning.

From the beginning, Erdogan has taken great pride in being the voice of the people. “I am the voice of the people.” He’s long been proud of his popular support—“People love me.”

And again, thinking of the US as a parallel, the size of the crowds matters. The optics of mass support matter. So the fact that he can no longer rely on that is telling. Most importantly, it shows that he knows he can no longer rely on that. There’s no bringing the people back unless something dramatic happens—like an economic miracle.

So the other option is simply not to hold an election. If you can’t win it, don’t have one. But that would be a monumental step for Turkey. It might not seem so dramatic in countries without a strong tradition of democratic elections, but Turkey is different. For years, I’ve observed how proud Turks are of their elections—of having the ability to elect or remove their leaders. It means a great deal to them. It’s not something they could easily give up, and I think that pride is being reflected in the streets right now.

That said, it’s mostly young people who are out there—many others are not. And that’s because young people have nothing to lose. They truly have nothing. They see no future for themselves under this government, under a regime where, unless you know someone in the ruling party, it’s nearly impossible to secure a decent job—even with a good education.

Surveys show that around 50% of young Turks want to leave the country. This was from a couple of years ago, and I remember one survey that even looked at party affiliation—it turned out that many of those young people were AKP-affiliated. So even AKP youth want to leave, because the prospects are so bleak. Put simply: they have nothing to lose.

Their parents, on the other hand, have a lot to lose. Over the past 20 years, the AKP has embedded itself so deeply into the Turkish economy and society that many people’s livelihoods now depend on being affiliated with or supportive of the party.

Whether you’re working as a civil servant or one of the women hired to rake grass—as part of a charity-style initiative distributed by the municipality to earn a bit of money—the AKP is present at every level of interaction between the state and the citizen.

They have also co-opted much of civil society. So the fear people feel is quite realistic—if the AKP falls, if Erdogan loses the election and the CHP comes to power, what will happen to me? Will I still have a job? Will they do what everyone else has done—replace the old people with their own?

For many—especially the poor, who are just barely getting by—it’s an enormous risk. Right? So I think you can’t forget that Erdogan still has a lot of people following him or people willing to vote for him, but not necessarily because they’re passionately in love with him.

The Sense of Impunity Has Emboldened Authoritarians

And lastly, Professor White, how might the return of Donald Trump to the US presidency influence Erdogan’s authoritarian behavior? Would it embolden similar tactics and reduce external democratic pressure on Turkey?

Professor Jenny White: I think it already has. Apparently—though it wasn’t officially confirmed—Erdogan and Trump had a phone call just a few days before the arrest of Imamoglu. I’m almost certain Trump said something like, “Oh yeah, go ahead”—no problem. Why would he object?

This sense of impunity has emboldened authoritarians around the world. Erdogan has nothing to fear from US censure—no expectation that Washington will hold him accountable for his human rights record or for arresting political opponents. In fact, I’m quite sure Trump would support that kind of move.

The European Union is in a different situation. But it’s also connected to Trump—because now that he’s pulling back from the US’s commitments to European defense and traditional economic relations, Europe has to reassess its strategic alliances. It doesn’t have to, but I think it would be smart for Europe to recognize how important Turkey is—not only for European defense and NATO, but perhaps in other ways as well.

If the US is no longer a reliable partner, Europe needs to look elsewhere and build its own strong networks. And Turkey will always be a key player in any such network.

So Europe finds itself in a difficult position. Even though it genuinely cares about human rights, and about Imamoglu—who, for many, represents a liberal democratic future—they’re not in a position to speak out forcefully, because they need Turkey.

And Turkey also holds a very strong position in Syria right now. So, if Erdogan is going to take this kind of action, this is a strategic moment to do it.

Le Pen & Bardella

Professor Marlière: The Far Right Has No Free Pass to Establish a Dictatorship in France

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In this timely and incisive interview, Professor Philippe Marlière (UCL) discusses Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the limits of far-right populism, and the resilience of democratic institutions in France. While Le Pen’s narrative frames her disqualification as a “denial of democracy,” Professor Marlière warns against buying into this rhetoric. “Politicians are not above the law,” he asserts, adding, “The far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” A must-read on the legal, political, and symbolic stakes of France’s 2027 presidential race.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Philippe Marlière of University College London offers a trenchant analysis of Marine Le Pen’s conviction, the broader rise of the far right in France and Europe, and the fragile boundaries between democratic politics and authoritarian temptation. Known for his work on French and European politics, Professor Marlière opens the conversation by sharply distinguishing between fascism and the far-right populism embodied by Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN). “I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally as a far-right party,” he says, stressing that although it is “reactionary” and “nativist,” it is “not fascist” in the classical sense, since it operates within existing democratic institutions.

The interview takes on greater urgency in the wake of Le Pen’s conviction on corruption charges and her disqualification from running in the 2027 presidential election. According to Professor Marlière, the ruling represents a “major blow” not only to Le Pen personally—who was widely seen as a leading contender—but to the party’s claim of moral superiority over the political establishment. “The conviction is so clear-cut,” he notes, “and her defense so weak,” that overturning the verdict on appeal seems unlikely.

At the heart of the conversation is the far right’s delicate balancing act between anti-establishment rhetoric and the imperative to appear legitimate within democratic norms. Marlière cautions that while Le Pen and her allies may frame the ruling as “a denial of democracy,” they have not dared to attack the judiciary wholesale, because “if she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and being pushed back to the political fringe.”

This fragility, he argues, reveals the limits of populist authoritarianism in France. “In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary,” he insists, citing Montesquieu’s separation of powers. And that is why, he concludes, “the far right has no free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.” Voters may be willing to punish the mainstream, but they are not prepared to dismantle liberal democratic institutions in the process.

Dr. Philippe Marlière, Professor of French and European Politics at University College London.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Philippe Marlière with some edits.

RN Is Nativist, Reactionary, Far-Right—But Not Fascist

Professor Marliere, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: You’ve distinguished between authoritarianism and fascism in recent analyses. Given Le Pen’s ideological evolution and her party’s increasing parliamentary power, where would you situate her movement today?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, I would describe Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) as a far-right party. If you want to place it on the left-right axis, as political scientists typically do, it clearly falls on the far-right. That’s also how many people in France perceive it today. Le Pen herself resists the “far-right” label, as it implies being on the fringe or extreme end of the political spectrum. However, that is how pollsters and the media commonly categorize the party. So yes, it is far-right.

It’s not fascist. I don’t think the National Rally can be described as a fascist party. Fascism is something quite specific. You can find fascism today in some countries and in some parties, but I don’t think the National Rally is fascist. I would call it nativist. The main concern of the National Rally is the support, through policies, of the indigenous population—the French—as they describe it, as opposed to non-French people or migrants. So: nativist.

Probably reactionary. Much of the National Rally’s policy and ideology seems aimed at returning to a past—often an idealized or even mythical version of the past—that France, in reality, never fully experienced. A past, of course, with fewer migrants and fewer foreigners. In that sense, it is reactionary.

The party used to advocate policies that were decidedly illiberal. For a long time, it supported the death penalty, opposed abortion, and stood against LGBTQ rights. It has evolved on these issues, and that’s likely something we’ll discuss further. In sum: reactionary, nativist, far-right—that’s how I would describe it.

Fascism, as I’ve said, is different. It involves the attempt to establish a totalitarian regime. It can promote racial politics and undermine or directly challenge the rule of law. I don’t believe the National Rally is currently inclined to do that—although, of course, once in power, they might attempt to.

That said, within the current political context, the National Rally appears to be a party that, if elected, would operate within the main institutions of France and Europe. It would likely cooperate with European partners within the European Union. For all these reasons, it is a far-right party, but not a fascist one.

A Major Blow to the RN’s Anti-Establishment Credibility

How do you assess the political implications of Marine Le Pen’s conviction and subsequent disqualification from running for office in 2027? Given the National Rally’s efforts to portray itself as a respectable, anti-corruption alternative to the political establishment, to what extent does this judicial outcome represent a decisive rupture in the party’s quest for power—and could it destabilize its electoral momentum ahead of a crucial presidential race?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Le Pen’s conviction—alongside that of up to 20 party members, mostly elected representatives in the European Parliament—is undoubtedly a major blow. It’s especially significant for Le Pen herself. She might not be able to run in 2027. As far as I’m concerned, I don’t think the decision will be overturned on appeal. She likely won’t be a candidate, so someone else will have to step in.

For now, she’s fighting to clear her name, but the conviction is so clear-cut, the corruption charges so substantial, and both her defense and the party’s defense so weak, in my view, that overturning the verdict will be extremely difficult.

This is a serious setback for Le Pen, particularly because she was seen as having a strong chance of winning the 2027 presidential election. It now seems increasingly unlikely that she will be able to run.

But more broadly, it’s also a significant blow for the party. As you mentioned, it has increasingly been seen as a normalized political force—no longer on the extreme fringe, but rather as a party whose ideas, members, and officials have gradually gained a degree of legitimacy. I wouldn’t go so far as to say it fully belongs to the political mainstream—not yet, not entirely—but to some extent, it is certainly no longer the early National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen, the party that once frightened a large portion of the public.

So it’s a major blow for the party because part of its appeal lay in being increasingly perceived as no longer extreme by a majority of voters—or at least by a solid base of 37 to 40% of the electorate—while simultaneously remaining highly critical of the system; that is, the other mainstream parties, which it portrayed as corrupt and part of a de facto coalition responsible for poor governance in France and for the French people.

So, of course, being convicted and found guilty of corruption is a major blow, especially since much of Le Pen’s rhetoric has focused on attacking other parties—branding them as corrupt, accusing them of collusion, and portraying them as operating within a deeply flawed system. Now, that very charge is being applied to her.

There is evidence, and according to the first opinion polls, many people now view the National Rally as a corrupt party—or at least believe that the initial conviction handed down by the judges last week was justified.

Politicians Are Not Above the Law

Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

In a democracy, how should we balance judicial independence with the political fallout when a leading presidential contender like Marine Le Pen is barred from running due to financial crimes? Do you see this ruling as reinforcing or undermining public trust in French institutions? Moreover, is there a risk that—even if legally justified—it will fuel far-right conspiratorial narratives about ‘elites’ silencing dissent? How should mainstream parties navigate this moment without inadvertently legitimizing those populist frames?

Professor Philippe Marlière: As you would expect, Le Pen’s defense—and the party’s defense—was to claim that this is a denial of democracy, that the conviction was politically motivated, that the judges are politicized, and that the goal is to bar her from running because she would likely win. That’s what she said at a large rally last Sunday at Place Vauban in Paris. She made these claims, and throughout the week, Le Pen and her supporters have continued to repeat them. Of course, that is their narrative. But that doesn’t mean the narrative is true. In my view, it should be taken with a large pinch of salt and critically examined.

Let’s start with the heart of the matter. What is that? It’s the conviction of Le Pen and her supporters. She is guilty—guilty of a serious act of corruption. Several million euros of public funds were diverted to fake jobs. So we begin with that fact: she is guilty.

However, I believe that, with the support of some media outlets in France—not all, but some—the discussion has shifted away from Le Pen’s conviction and guilt toward a debate about politicized judges and an alleged denial of democracy. I remain very skeptical, if not outright critical, of Le Pen’s narrative, because it seems to me that the judges simply did their job: they applied the law.

By the way, who passed the law—the one that led to Le Pen’s conviction and its immediate effect? It was the lawmakers themselves. A bill was passed in Parliament in 2016. So it was people like Le Pen who voted for that law. They wanted to be extremely harsh on individuals convicted of acts of corruption.

That’s why I think it would be useful to bring the debate back to the heart of the matter: Le Pen’s conviction. She was found guilty of a serious act of corruption. And secondly, the judges simply did their job. To claim that they politicized the process is incorrect—they applied the law.

This also demonstrates something important: politicians are not above the law. They are treated like ordinary citizens—and rightly so. Why should a politician—even someone intending to run for the presidency, with a real chance of winning—be exempt from the law if condemned by French justice?

That’s the real issue. That’s what we should all be reflecting on, instead of defaulting to claims like “the judges are politicized,” and so on. In my view, that is the real question.

Undermining Justice Would Push Le Pen Back to the Political Fringe

Marine Le Pen has characterized her conviction and political ban as a ‘denial of democracy,’ echoing a broader far-right populist tactic of depicting institutions as tools of political repression. In the light of your critique of ‘political nudges’ like the ‘Islamo-gauchisme’ narrative, do you see a danger that the far right will now instrumentalize this legal verdict to delegitimize the French judiciary and fuel deeper mistrust in liberal democratic institutions?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I think it will be difficult to do that. They have probably already tried—particularly Le Pen. If you heard her speak last Sunday in Paris, when she addressed a rally of supporters, she was, of course, very harsh in her response to the judgment. She said, “Of course I’m innocent, this is a denial of democracy,” and so on. She also claimed that the judges who made the decision were politicized.

But she didn’t, so to speak, issue a broader criticism of the French judiciary. She didn’t say, for example, that the entire justice system is corrupt. She avoided that, because doing so would amount to directly challenging the French judicial system as a whole—and that would be quite serious.

It would indeed be highly problematic for a leading contender for the highest office in French politics to undermine the judiciary through such criticism. In a democracy, when you are a politician, you must respect the decisions of the judiciary. Failing to do so means interfering with justice—and that is a very serious matter.

The French political philosopher Montesquieu, in the 18th century, wrote about the separation of powers—executive, legislative, and judiciary—and he said that no power, executive or legislative, should be in a position to interfere with or encroach upon the power of the judiciary. If you do that, it’s no longer a democracy; it’s a tyranny. So justice must remain independent.

That’s why Le Pen will be very careful before launching a broader attack on the justice system. So far, she hasn’t done that. Some of her supporters have likely been less cautious, but she herself has been careful not to place blame on the judiciary as a whole. Instead, she has focused on specific individuals—the judges who issued the ruling—claiming, for instance, that the presiding judge was a leftist.

But this is a difficult line for Le Pen to walk. She cannot push too far in that direction. If she does, she risks being seen as undermining French justice and, as a consequence, being pushed back to the political fringe. Her opponents will say, “Look, you’re clearly not part of the mainstream. If you were ever elected, you would interfere with the justice system.” And that, of course, would be very serious.

Le Pen Must Defend Herself Without Undermining the Rule of Law

Given your work on the ‘dé–diabolisation’ or “de–demonization” of the Rassemblement National and the normalization of the far right in France, do you think Marine Le Pen’s conviction and political ban will disrupt this process—or could it paradoxically bolster her image as a political martyr and reinforce the RN’s anti-establishment appeal? Does this verdict pose a serious challenge to the RN’s attempt to position itself as a credible party of governance, or might it instead deepen its populist narrative of being targeted by a hostile elite?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Again, this is a difficult situation for Le Pen to handle, because she will, of course, try to defend herself. She has already filed an appeal, and I believe it will proceed very quickly—much faster than it would for ordinary citizens. Normally, an appeal takes two to three years, but in this case, it is scheduled for next year, which is unusually swift.

Why next year? Because it allows time for a decision to be made before the presidential election. This gives Le Pen one last chance to run—if she is cleared on appeal. In that sense, it also serves as further evidence that the judges, or the French justice system more broadly, are not conspiring against her. On the contrary, the legal process is offering her another opportunity to stand as a candidate.

So it’s a very difficult situation, because they have to be extremely moderate in their criticism of the justice system; otherwise, they risk being seen as a party that challenges the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. They simply can’t afford to do that. Someone like Donald Trump may be doing so in the US and getting away with it for now—but in France, where Trump is, by the way, quite unpopular, that approach would not be well received.

So the room for maneuver for Le Pen and her party is quite limited. She can say, “I’m innocent, I’m going to appeal, the judges who made the decision were unfair,” but they cannot go much further than that. They cannot openly criticize the judicial system as a whole.

That’s why I think, in terms of image—since that’s your question—if we look at the initial opinion polls, of course, these will need to be confirmed over time. But according to the polls, people don’t seem to have changed their minds. The party remains quite high in the rankings, and Jordan Bardella appears to have, roughly speaking, the same level of support as Le Pen.

There are two distinct points here. First, it’s clear that the National Rally is currently the leading party in French politics. That was evident in the last two elections—the 2024 European election and the general election—where the party came out ahead of all others.

That’s one thing. The other is the judicial decision. And I think, overall, the opinion polls show that the French public believes the decision was fair. That’s why Le Pen can’t make too much noise about it. It’s seen as a fair judgment. French voters appear to believe that no one should be above the law—including national politicians. If they’ve done something wrong, they should be punished like anyone else would be in similar circumstances.

A Far-Right International Is Emerging—But It Won’t Help Le Pen

In the light of the vocal support Marine Le Pen has received from international right-wing figures like Donald Trump and Elon Musk, to what extent does this signal the emergence of a transnational populist narrative centered on judicial persecution or ‘lawfare’? Are we witnessing a growing global solidarity among populist leaders who frame legal accountability as political victimization by elite institutions and the consolidation of a transnational illiberal alliance?

Professor Philippe Marlière: Well, very likely. The initial signs suggest that there is a kind of de facto reactionary or far-right international that has rallied in support of Le Pen. I think all the major figures—key leaders of that movement in Europe—came out: Orbán in Hungary, Salvini in Italy, Trump, J.D. Vance, Bolsonaro. Many of them made public statements. Even Trump tweeted.

He probably doesn’t know Le Pen very well—perhaps not at all—but someone likely mentioned the case to him, so he tweeted in her support. Of course, he did so because these kinds of far-right leaders seek to undermine the rule of law in liberal democracies. They challenge judicial decisions whenever those decisions go against them, and that’s precisely what Trump has been doing in the US. So, this was more of an opportunity for them to do just that, rather than a genuine expression of support for Le Pen herself.

But yes, there is a de facto far-right international. And every time a decision appears to deprive far-right politicians of power—or simply goes against them—they tend to rally in support of that politician, as they did in this case.

What does that mean, concretely? I think this kind of reaction doesn’t clearly indicate what the future holds, one way or another. It remains very uncertain. When I refer to a far-right international, it shouldn’t be compared to something like the Socialist International, where organized parties met regularly and committed to shared policies. It’s not that structured. It’s more at the level of national leaders or heads of state issuing statements, especially via social media.

So yes, she received that support. But what does it mean for Le Pen in France? I don’t think it means much. As I mentioned, Trump is deeply unpopular in France—on both the left and the right. Almost no one likes him. So I don’t believe receiving support from those far-right figures will benefit Le Pen. I think she has to be very careful. Le Pen wants to be seen as more mainstream, so if she appears to be in cahoots with, or too close to, highly controversial politicians abroad, I don’t think it will help her.

Far Right Is Rising—But Too Divided to Replace Le Pen Easily

Le Pen & Bardella
Leaflets featuring candidates for the 2024 legislative elections in Versailles, France, on June 28, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the French perspective, does Le Pen’s downfall create space for a new figure on the European far-right, or is her symbolic centrality too embedded in the populist narrative across Europe to be easily replaced?

Professor Philippe Marlière: This highlights the central challenge facing the far-right in Europe. The far-right has been steadily growing—making electoral gains, winning elections, and even holding power in several countries. To start with Europe: they were in power in Poland; they remain in power in Hungary and Italy—a major EU country—and Le Pen and her party are performing very well in France. The AfD in Germany has also been doing well. So there is a clear, steady rise of the far-right, marked by significant gains in the most recent European elections.

That’s one of the reasons why the far-right is no longer seriously considering leaving the EU if it were to come into power. They’ve realized they can fight from within and attempt to redirect the EU’s political course.

So that’s good news for the far-right. However, does this translate into greater coordination or cohesion among far-right parties and governments in Europe? Not necessarily. For example, there are at least two parliamentary groups in the EU that include far-right parties. They were unable to form a single group, which, of course, weakens their influence because their efforts are divided across multiple blocs.

It’s also well known that far-right leaders do not necessarily get along well; they do not necessarily work together. For instance, Marine Le Pen is close to Salvini and La Lega but doesn’t get along well with the Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni—which is strange, because Giorgia Meloni has a legacy that is more similar to Le Pen’s. They both come from far-right parties initially. Of course, they’ve evolved somewhat and are now a little bit different. But whereas La Lega initially wasn’t a far-right party when it was created in the 1990s, it became a far-right party. So it’s very strange, and I can’t necessarily explain the logic of these de facto alliances between far-right leaders and parties.

I think it often comes down to their positions on policy, but it’s also about whether the leaders get along personally. I believe it’s more the latter. And that, in itself, is telling. Political scientists often say that the left has trouble uniting—and if you look at the French left right now, that’s clearly the case. They can’t come together.

But it seems the far right also struggles to unite, for similar reasons: ideological differences and personal rivalries. So this is where things stand at the moment. The far right has become more successful recently, but it remains divided. It is not a unified movement. Instead, it’s a collection of far-right parties spread across various parliamentary groups in the European Parliament—groups that don’t necessarily cooperate well or work together effectively.

Bardella Isn’t a Le Pen—But He May Be Even More Radical

Jordan Bardella, Le Pen’s protégé, is poised to become her replacement. Based on your analysis of generational shifts within the European far right, do you see Bardella as a mere avatar of Le Penism by remaining dependent on the Le Pen name, or does he represent a potentially more radical or technocratic trajectory?

Professor Philippe Marlière: There are differences between Le Pen and Bardella. First of all, he’s not a Le Pen. If Bardella runs in 2027, it will be the first time since Jean-Marie Le Pen launched the National Front in 1972 that no Le Pen is running for the FN/RN party. That’s the first difference.

There’s also a generational difference. Le Pen is 56, and Bardella’s youth could be appealing—particularly to younger voters—by presenting a new, youthful face of leadership. But of course, there’s a downside: he is politically untested and very inexperienced. He’s not known as a strong debater or a skilled orator. Reaching that level in politics takes time—it requires years of experience. Le Pen has improved over the years, and with Bardella, it would be a very different proposition.

There are also political differences. I think Le Pen has been—and still appears to be—more supportive of the de-demonization strategy. Unlike her father, she hasn’t attempted to shift the party to the center—the National Rally remains firmly on the far right—but she has worked to make some of its flagship policies on immigration, Islam, and the interpretation of French laïcité more acceptable to a broader segment of voters.

To make them more acceptable to other parties as well, because de-demonization works both ways. It involves you, as a far-right party, refraining from using aggressive rhetoric or making racist statements—things that generally do not resonate well with the electorate. But it also involves your opponents shifting to the right and adopting some of your policies, particularly on issues like immigration.

So there are differences, as Bardella appears to be somewhat more radical on those issues. His economic policies also differ; he’s more like Jean-Marie Le Pen of the 1980s and 1990s—more neoliberal, more supportive of laissez-faire economics than Marine Le Pen. So, you might think these are merely cosmetic differences.

And who knows what will happen if we assume that Le Pen won’t run? Bardella seems to be in a good position—he holds a strong position as the party leader. But who knows? Something might change. Other candidates might try to enter the race, and there could even be a primary election within the party.

Think, for instance, of Marion Maréchal, the niece of Marine Le Pen. She left the party a few years ago to join Éric Zemmour, but now she seems to have taken a step back from him as well. She attended the rally on Sunday in Paris in support of Le Pen. Who knows? She’s very popular among party voters. She’s a Le Pen, even though she no longer uses the name—she’s Marion Maréchal-Le Pen—and for that reason, her presence could be significant. She’s also a better orator than Bardella.

So, who knows what might happen? Bardella appears to be the front-runner to replace Le Pen, but we might be in for a surprise.

Marion Maréchal and Éric Zemmour
Portrait of French politician Éric Zemmour with Marion Maréchal (formerly Le Pen), leader of the Reconquête party, seen in Toulon during a protest against the arrival of the migrant rescue ship Ocean Viking. Photo: Laurent Coust.

Le Pen’s Legal Struggles Will Have a Limited Impact on Europe’s Far-Right Strategy

And lastly, Professor Marlière, what ripple effects might Le Pen’s conviction and framing as a martyr have on sister far-right movements in Europe, especially in states like Italy, Hungary, and Germany? Could it embolden them or shift their strategies? Do you think this case and its framing could be used by other European populists to delegitimize legal institutions, especially in countries where the rule of law is already under strain?

Professor Philippe Marlière: I might be a little optimistic on this, but I don’t think it will have a significant impact on the political situations in other countries. Of course, some will use Le Pen’s case to talk about so-called politicized judges, to claim a denial of democracy, to argue that the “true patriots”—as they describe themselves—are being sanctioned by their opponents, that they can’t speak the truth to the people, that they are restricted and constrained. You know, all the usual arguments.

I think they might refer to the Le Pen case in national debates to make those points. But I’m optimistic in the sense that each national context is different. And besides, the pace of politics today is very fast. In a few months, who will still be talking about Le Pen’s conviction?

There will be the appeal, so in a year or so, it may come back onto the agenda. But if the appeal is upheld, I think people will move on—there will be a replacement, another candidate, probably Bardella—and Le Pen will be quickly forgotten.

That’s one thing. The other reason I’m optimistic is that, as I said earlier, Le Pen has to be very careful about criticizing the judges and the justice system—not to be seen as undermining the rule of law—because that would be an extreme move. It would place her in a very radical position, one that most of the electorate, particularly conservative voters who are not far-right, would likely reject.

These are the voters who, in the second round of a presidential election, might be tempted to vote for Le Pen or someone from the National Rally against, for instance, a left-wing candidate—if one were to make it to the runoff. This electorate is conservative, right-wing, but not far-right. The National Rally needs to keep them on board and continue appealing to them. If they can’t—if they lose that electorate—they will never get elected. That’s why they have to be extremely cautious. And I think the situation is the same across most European countries—Italy, probably—with one exception: Hungary.

Hungary has been governed by Orbán for a long time, and many people say that while elections still take place, they are not very fair. It’s a highly authoritarian regime—illiberal. So, probably with the exception of Hungary, where the opposition is now quite weak due to all the laws passed by Orbán’s government, I think in other countries there are still counterpowers—opposition parties, trade unions, the media, and most importantly, the public—the electorate.

It’s not because the electorate is putting the National Rally ahead in France that they want an authoritarian regime. It’s a very complex reality to grasp. I think supporting the far right in France today means, above all, rejecting the other parties—both left and right. People believe those parties were once in power and failed. They tried Macron, and they believe he failed too. So it’s more about the idea: let’s try the only party that has never governed—the National Rally.

But that doesn’t mean voters want an authoritarian regime, or a government that will curb public freedoms or take extreme measures. That’s why Le Pen can’t see herself as the new Trump. I don’t think being a Trump figure would go down well in France. Then again, you might say, in the US, who could have predicted what happened there?

You see, that’s why I’m optimistic. But of course, things can sometimes go wrong very quickly. Still, that’s my view. I think that for Le Pen and the party to be successful and ultimately win an election, they will have to stick to their strategy of de-demonization—which means no longer being seen as an extreme or threatening party—so that enough people will be willing to vote for them.

Of course, they will maintain their policies—against immigration, against Islam, and against a number of other things—but they do so because they believe there is probably a majority of people who could support those positions. Just enough. That’s their strategy. It doesn’t mean they have a free pass to establish a dictatorship in France.

Protests in Turkey.

Dr. Cevik: Turkey Has Crossed the Critical Threshold from Competitive to Full Authoritarianism

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a compelling interview with ECPS, Dr. Salim Cevik argues that Turkey has “crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.” Highlighting the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, Dr. Cevik sees it as a targeted move to eliminate democratic competition: “He is being arrested because he could potentially defeat Erdogan.” Populism, once central to Erdogan’s rule, is giving way to raw coercion: “Force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.” Dr. Cevik also condemns Western silence, especially from Europe and the US, warning that their inaction amounts to complicity. “Erdogan feels very strong… because he has international backing.” Drawing a parallel with past mistakes on Putin, he cautions: “You can’t really trust a personal autocracy for strategic partnership.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and sobering interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Salim Cevik—Political Scientist and Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs—offers a critical diagnosis of Turkey’s deepening authoritarian turn under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Framing the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu as a pivotal moment in Turkey’s political trajectory, Dr. Cevik asserts that “we’ve crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.” While acknowledging that political repression is not new in Turkey, he emphasizes that this particular case marks a critical rupture because it directly targets “the most potent rival of Erdogan” and aims to eliminate any realistic possibility for the opposition to win an election.

Dr. Cevik situates this development within Erdogan’s long-standing strategy of personalizing power and dismantling institutional checks and balances. Over the course of two decades, Erdogan has “sidelined all important political figures,” absorbed the party into his persona, and gradually brought the judiciary, media, business sector, and civil society under his direct control. This personalization of rule has been “formalized” through the switch to a presidential system, which Dr. Cevik sees as a culmination of earlier informal power consolidations.

While Erdogan’s rule was long bolstered by a populist strategy that fused economic provision with religious-nationalist rhetoric, Dr. Cevik argues that this strategy is faltering. Erdogan is now “no longer the popular figure” he once was, as economic decline has eroded his legitimacy among even his core supporters. This, Dr. Cevik suggests, is what pushes the regime to rely increasingly on coercion rather than consent: “Populist mobilization is no longer the key term to understand Turkish authoritarianism… Force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.”

Of particular concern is the muted response from Western powers, which Dr. Cevik interprets as tacit approval. He criticizes both the United States and the European Union for enabling Erdogan’s autocratization, noting that “Erdogan feels both very weak because he’s losing popular legitimacy, but he’s also feeling very strong… because he has international backing.” In Europe, especially, strategic interests tied to Turkey’s military capacity and geopolitical location have led to a dangerous silence. “Europe made the same mistake with Putin,” Dr. Cevik warns. “I see no reason why Erdogan should be trusted more than Putin… It’s not only normatively and morally wrong—it’s also strategically blind thinking.”

In this critical conversation, Dr. Cevik calls attention not only to Turkey’s alarming democratic backsliding but also to the global implications of Western complacency in the face of authoritarian consolidation.

Dr. Salim Cevik
Dr. Salim Cevik—Political Scientist and Researcher at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Salim Cevik with some edits.

Erdogan Regime Is No Longer Competitive—It’s Full Authoritarianism

Dr. Cevik, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: To what extent does the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu represent a definitive rupture in Turkey’s transition from competitive authoritarianism to full-fledged autocracy?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Thank you for inviting me, and for the question. I think this marks a major threshold. But to be honest, he is not the first politician to be arrested in Turkey. The country has been on an authoritarian trajectory for more than a decade, which has involved the imprisonment of many politicians—particularly members of the Kurdish political movement, who have been arrested en masse. Some are still behind bars, the most prominent among them being Selahattin Demirtas, who has been in prison for more than eight years. So, in that sense, Imamoglu’s arrest is nothing new in Turkey—but it is new in the sense that it aims to destroy the competitive element of the political regime.

When we talk about competitive authoritarianism, it is an authoritarian system, anyway—but what distinguishes it from full authoritarian regimes is that, in competitive authoritarianism, there is a realistic possibility that the opposition can win an election. Now, why is Imamoglu being arrested and not someone else? I think there is a clear answer to that: he is the most potent rival of Erdogan. He is being arrested because he could potentially defeat Erdogan in the next elections. If you put people who could win elections behind bars, that, by definition, undermines the competitive dimension of competitive authoritarianism. Because if you arrest whoever is going to win, then it’s no longer competitive—it becomes a fully authoritarian system. So, in that sense, I think we’ve crossed the biggest threshold from competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.

Force Is Now Erdogan’s Strategy

Turkey, Protest
University students stage a protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu — Istanbul, Turkey, March 24, 2025. Photo: Sedat Gulec.

How has Erdogan’s brand of populism evolved into an instrument of authoritarian consolidation, and how central is the creation of internal “enemies” to this strategy?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Populism and the creation of internal enemies have been central to Erdogan’s authoritarianism. That has been the case over the years—even when he was not yet a fully autocratic leader and when Turkey’s democracy was functioning relatively well. Erdogan has consistently employed a populist strategy for political mobilization, and he has now been in power for more than two decades. The first decade was relatively—or at least acceptably—democratic, and initially even pro-democratic. However, starting with his second term, during his second decade in power, he began to grow increasingly authoritarian.

Over these more than 20 years, he has always created internal enemies, and those enemies have actually changed over time. They have included Kemalists, Gulenists, Kurds, and Turkish nationalists—at different stages of his political career, he has targeted different groups. He managed to establish a minimum winning coalition to defeat each internal enemy. That’s his political style and strategy. In that sense, populism has been integral to the establishment of authoritarianism in Turkey. 

However, when we talk about this recent event—this arrest—and Turkey crossing a threshold from competitive to full authoritarianism, I don’t think populism is the right term here. Populism, by definition, is about being popular. Populist autocrats usually mobilize the majority around themselves, and they create internal enemies in order to build this minimum winning coalition—at least to configure a majority. That tactic—creating internal enemies—has been Erdogan’s strategy for more than 20 years.

But as I said in the previous question, we are now crossing a threshold from competitive to full authoritarianism. Erdogan has been a popular politician—he has always been a very popular politician. He consistently managed to create a winning majority, a coalition of a minimum winning majority. He is now crossing that threshold because he believes, and sees, that he can no longer do that. He is no longer the popular figure. He no longer has 51 percent behind him, and that’s why he is crossing this threshold. So, I think populist mobilization is no longer the key term to understand Turkish authoritarianism.

Of course, the process I’m talking about has just started, and we don’t know where it will lead. But if everything goes according to Erdogan’s expectations—and if Turkey becomes a full authoritarian regime rather than a competitive one—then he no longer needs to be popular. It will not be a majority authoritarian regime; it will be an authoritarian regime ruled by a minority. And that means he will be ruling by force, rather than by creating the consent of the majority through populist means. But, this is just the beginning of the process. Where we are heading is that populism is no longer Erdogan’s fundamental strategy. Now on, force is the fundamental strategy of Erdogan.

Populism Dismantled the Rule of Law—Now Erdogan Rules Alone

Would you characterize the current crisis as the culmination of a long-standing populist logic that inherently undermines liberal democratic norms?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Yes. This populist strategy that Erdogan has pursued so far has enabled him to reach this point. It has allowed him to dismantle the rule of law and undermine political liberties. It has enabled him to inflict suffering on individuals and groups he has designated as internal enemies. But, as I mentioned in the previous question, those internal enemies are no longer the minority. Now, he is creating an internal enemy that will likely, by the end of this process, be the majority—making it a forceful authoritarianism. Ultimately, it was populism—and the systematic dismantling of the rule of law and the liberal protections that accompany it—that brought us to this point and enabled Erdogan to cross the threshold we are now discussing.

In what ways has the personalization of power under Erdoğan blurred institutional lines between the state, party, and judiciary?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, in very fundamental ways. I mean, when Erdogan came to power, the AKP was a ‘cadre’ movement. It had a number two—Abdullah Gul—a number three, Bulent Arinc. Some would even call Abdullatif Sener number four, and the list would go on. We had a powerful cabinet with very prominent politicians, etc. So, it was a genuine cadre movement. Now, there is no number two within the AKP—let alone a number three or a cadre—and the ministers no longer carry any real weight. Even in this current crisis, we see that Erdogan is, in a way, defending himself. He no longer has credible political allies to speak on his behalf. So, everything is now personalized in Turkey.

But it has first started with the personalization of power within the party. Erdogan initially hijacked the party. It had been a party of prominent figures—a cadre movement with a political ideology, or at least a claim to conservative democracy. But step by step, he personalized power within the party. He sidelined all the important political figures and stripped the party of its political substance. When we talk about the party’s ideology or political beliefs today, there’s really nothing left—because over the past 20 years, Erdogan has continuously shifted his coalitions, leaving no consistent ideological foundation. So, the party became Erdogan.

After that, he personalized other centers of power. He brought the judiciary under his control. He turned the party’s control over the state into personal control—and since the party is Erdogan, this meant bringing the judiciary, the media, the business community, and civil society under his direct influence. So, at the end of the day—with the switch to the presidential system, which in many ways formalized these already existing informal power configurations—the regime became fully personalized. That transformation, already largely complete by 2013–14, was cemented through institutional change. Now, we are talking about a single individual ruling not only over the executive, but also the judiciary, the parliament, civil society, and all segments of power.

Strong Enough to Suppress, Too Weak to Compete

Ekrem Imamoglu
Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu addresses supporters during a protest under the banner “The Nation Stands by Their Will” outside the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality on December 15, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun

Is the recent political crackdown a sign of regime insecurity ahead of elections, or a calculated strategy to establish post-electoral authoritarian permanence?

Dr. Salim Cevik: I think it’s both a symptom of weakness and of strength at the same time. It’s a symptom of weakness because Erdogan is increasingly lacking popular support.

What made him so indispensable to his allies for so long was his ability to bring the majority of the public with him. He kept winning elections—or, to put it another way, we can certainly criticize the tactics he used to maintain his popularity—but ultimately, he succeeded in staying popular.

That’s no longer the case. In recent years, those who don’t want to see him as president now form a larger coalition than those who do. This was already true in the previous election two years ago, but he managed to survive using various tactics: he divided the opposition, ensured they backed a candidate who couldn’t unify them, and relied on judicial tools—there was already a court case against Imamoglu at the time. He used other instruments too. The key was preventing the opposition from uniting behind a single figure.

But that’s no longer working. The local elections showed that the CHP is now the central actor in the opposition and capable of building a majority larger than Erdogan’s. So in that sense, he’s very weak in terms of popular legitimacy—and that’s what’s pushing him to take these extraordinary measures.

At the same time, he remains very powerful. He controls the state apparatus, the judiciary, the media, and the security forces. And the international context—perhaps you’ll ask about this later, but I’ll mention it briefly—has emboldened him even further. He knows the US is on his side, and he knows that, for a variety of reasons, Europe will stay silent. In that sense, he’s very powerful.

So it’s a paradox: he’s powerful because he can take these steps, but weak because he has to. He can’t afford to leave the competitive authoritarian game as it is and risk an election—even a highly unfair one—that he might lose. So, he takes measures to avoid that risk. In short, he’s strong in terms of state control, but weak in terms of popular legitimacy—and that combination is exactly what’s driving these moves.

Erdogan Exploits Islam as Rhetoric, Not as Rule

Has political Islamism in Turkey under the AKP shifted from a reformist ethos to a mechanism of ideological legitimation for autocracy? Do you see the regime’s increasing reliance on religious-nationalist rhetoric as signaling a radicalization, or merely instrumental populist recalibration?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, as I mentioned in the previous question, political Islam in the early 2000s had adopted a reformist character. At the time, they denied being Islamists. The famous claim was that they had “changed shirts,” and instead labeled themselves as Conservative Democrats. But that was merely a rebranding—because in order to navigate Turkey’s stringent secularist laws, it was not possible to openly identify as a Muslim democratic party. Unlike in Europe, in Turkey you have to use the label “conservative,” even though the public understands that “conservative” essentially refers to Islam and religion.

So, as a Conservative Democratic party, the AKP was indeed a reformist movement in its early years. I have to say that during that period, religious discourse in society also became more pluralistic and democratic—this was part of the cultural conflict in Turkey between authoritarian secularists and the conservative majority. To defeat—or rather, to undermine—the authoritarian secularist powers, who were a minority, Islamist actors adopted the language of democratization and pushed for reform within the system.

But around 2010 to 2012–13—it’s hard to pinpoint an exact moment—once it became clear that Erdogan was no longer under threat, he no longer needed the reformist agenda. At that point, the logic shifted entirely, and Islam became an instrument of authoritarianism, used to justify his populist, majoritarian, and increasingly autocratic actions.

As for the second half of your question, I don’t believe we are witnessing a radicalization. Radicalization would imply a structural transformation of the regime toward a more overtly religious order. If I understand the question correctly, I don’t see that happening—nor has it happened over the past decade. Erdogan has consolidated power, but he has never actually used that power to turn the system into a more theocratic one—he hasn’t changed the legal framework or granted religion greater authority in the functioning of the state.

The only time he explicitly referenced the Quran in policy terms was when he lowered interest rates—an idea that was ill-advised not just from an economic standpoint, but also because it lacked a sound religious basis. Religion prohibits interest altogether—it doesn’t differentiate between high or low rates.

If he had said, “I want to remove interest entirely from Turkey’s financial system because religion requires it,” then we could talk about a genuine turn toward religious rule—where religious texts begin to dictate policy. That would have been a clear move away from secular governance. But instead, he said something else—and I find this very telling. He said, “I’m lowering the interest rates because Islam doesn’t like interest.”

In that moment, it was clear: religion was being instrumentalized to justify a pre-existing policy agenda. He didn’t abolish interest; he didn’t change the institutional rules. He used religion as a rhetorical tool. Religion, in this case, was merely a pawn. And I see no indication that this dynamic will change anytime soon.

Religious Rhetoric Remains, But the Provider Role Is Crumbling

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015.

To what degree does the AKP’s Islamic narrative still resonate with its core electorate, particularly in light of economic hardship and rising dissent?

Dr. Salim Cevik: It’s difficult to answer this as a simple yes or no. On the one hand, he clearly still commands a degree of popularity. As I mentioned, he has lost the majority and will probably never recover it, but he continues to enjoy the support of—perhaps—30, 40, or even 45 percent of the electorate. I can’t cite precise numbers, but some of that support undoubtedly stems from religious sentiment. Certain segments of society view him as a devout figure. More importantly, they harbor such deep resentment toward secularists that they rally around Erdogan, whom they see as a protective barrier between themselves and the secular elite. So, part of his enduring popularity is still grounded in religion.

On the other hand, that popularity is clearly in decline, and the driving factor is economic hardship. The economy alone may not be sufficient to build a majority coalition, but it is powerful enough to dismantle one. Or let me put it this way: up to now, Erdogan has played a dual role—both as an economic provider and a religious protector. He positioned himself as the guardian of religious values while delivering material prosperity. That balance was key to sustaining his electoral majority. But if he falters on either front, that majority begins to unravel. He continues to lean on the religious narrative, but he’s steadily losing the economic argument—the “provider” role.

So, yes, his base is eroding. But as I said, it’s a gray area. Religion remains a powerful political tool for him. Yet in times of economic hardship, it alone won’t be enough.

Unlike Gezi, This Time the Protest Began with Repression, Not Resistance

How do the current mass protests compare to the 2013 Gezi Park movement in terms of mobilization dynamics, ideological coherence, and regime response? Could the protests catalyze a broader democratic awakening, or will they be contained through increased repression and securitization?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Let me start with the second half of your question. If the mobilization continues and manages to force Erdogan to back down, it could mark the beginning of a new era of democratization in Turkey. That’s possible, but unlikely. The more probable scenario is that Erdogan will suppress the current mobilization and push the system toward an even more authoritarian model. Still, it’s a process in motion—we simply can’t know for sure yet.

Now, if we compare this to the Gezi Park protests, one major difference stands out. As we discussed in the previous question regarding the economy—when the Gezi protests erupted, they were largely a middle-class reaction. People were frustrated with Erdogan’s growing personalization of power—his attitude of “I am the ruler of this country, and I don’t care what you think; everything goes the way I say.” It was a kind of delegative democracy, as political scientists would call it. “I was elected, therefore I have all the power, and I don’t need to answer to anyone.”

That attitude contributed to the uprisings. And if those protests hadn’t been met with such severe repression, I don’t think they would’ve escalated the way they did. Gezi began as a peaceful demonstration—completely legitimate—and Erdogan could have simply let it happen. Had he done so, we might not have seen the full-scale protests or the resulting political crisis.

I don’t know whether he planned it all from the start, but at some point, Erdogan seemed to decide that Gezi wasn’t a threat but rather an opportunity—a way to boost his popularity. He could frame the protesters as urban, middle-class, secular elites. And that’s classic populist strategy: pitting “the elite” against “the people.” He painted Gezi protesters as privileged, urbanites who were safe and comfortable, yet complaining about trivial matters. That framing resonated with his base.

This current wave of protests, however, is different because it started with repression. It didn’t begin as a small demonstration that spiraled into something larger due to state violence—it began with the arrest of Imamoglu. It was repression from the outset. It was an intentional move to dismantle the competitive element of the regime. So, whereas during Gezi Erdogan’s stance was “I was elected and therefore I rule,” now it’s, “You once elected me, and I’ll make sure you never get the chance to unelect me.” That’s the key difference.

This time, it wasn’t police brutality that brought people to the streets. Rather, people were already in the streets, and Erdogan is trying to stop them with police brutality. It’s a different dynamic.

Also, I don’t think this protest is being led by the middle class. It’s being led by urban youth who feel economically crushed, who don’t see a future for themselves, and who are desperate. That’s why they’re protesting. In that sense, this moment feels more radical than Gezi. Back then, protesters were largely middle-class—they had something to lose. They wanted a more responsive government, but they weren’t acting out of despair.

Today’s youth have little or nothing to lose. That’s why even harsh state repression hasn’t stopped them—at least not yet. I was a young academic during Gezi—I was a university assistant, and by Turkish standards, I had a pretty good life. I honestly don’t think even full professors today enjoy the lifestyle I had back then. The economic decline has been dramatic. And I don’t think today’s university assistants, graduate students, or undergrads see much hope in their futures. That, too, fuels their willingness to take to the streets.

So yes, in that sense, there are some fundamental differences between then and now.

Ballots Aren’t Enough—The Opposition Must Mobilize the Streets

Turkey, Protest
University students protest at Beşiktaş Square in Istanbul on March 24, 2025, declaring a boycott in response to the arrest of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu. Photo: Sedat Gulec

What does the sidelining of Imamoglu suggest about the regime’s tolerance for political pluralism within the current constitutional framework? What risks do opposition parties face in navigating between electoral participation and resistance within an increasingly autocratic system?

Dr. Salim Cevik: Well, the opposition parties are now in a dilemma. I’ve been talking about how the competitive element is disappearing. It’s becoming a fully authoritarian regime, and I’m sure that at some point people will begin to ask: “Is this just theater? Why are we playing our roles in this performative act that only serves to legitimize Erdoğan’s authoritarianism? Why are we even competing in the elections?” I think that would be a trap—the same trap the Venezuelan opposition fell into at one point.

Whatever happens, there will be pressure on the opposition to boycott the elections or withdraw—but I think that would be the wrong path. No matter what, the opposition must go to the ballot box, participate in the elections, and make it clear to the public that they won. I’m not saying the regime can necessarily be unseated through elections—I think we are passing that threshold. I use “passing” intentionally—I’m not saying we’ve already crossed it. It’s a process. But even if we eventually do pass that threshold, and it becomes impossible to remove the regime through elections alone, the opposition must still participate and demonstrate that they hold the popular majority.

At the same time, they have to acknowledge that it probably won’t be enough. You can no longer unseat Erdogan simply through words or ballots. You need to mobilize the streets—through demonstrations and by raising a broad popular demand for change. The opposition must combine both strategies: win at the ballot box and sustain mobilization on the streets.

Europe Made the Same Mistake with Putin—Why Trust Erdogan?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo: Mustafa Kirazlı.

And lastly, Dr. Cevik, how do you interpret the EU’s and US’s muted response to Imamoglu’s arrest? Can this be read as a form of tacit legitimation or geopolitical pragmatism? To what extent does Western inaction amount to a “green light” for Erdogan’s continued autocratization?

Dr. Salim Cevik: I think this is a very important question, and thank you for asking this. And, as I said in one of the previous questions, Erdogan feels both very weak because he’s losing popular legitimacy, but he’s also feeling very strong because he has control of the coercive apparatus of the state, and he also has international backing. And when we say international backing, he has the backing of both Americans and Europeans.

We have to talk about this very briefly, so let me say a few words about both. I mean, if Trump talks with Erdogan, he would probably ask for advice on how to repeat what Erdogan is doing in Turkey in the United States. So obviously there would be no backlash coming from the American side, and all democracy movements in the world have to adapt to the fact that America is no longer ruled by a democrat. I mean, America’s own record for supporting democracies has always been a critical one. It has sold out democrats when it suited its strategic interests—that’s for sure. But it has now come to a point where America is ruled by a president who actually admires autocrats more than democrats. So we’ve left that era behind.

And for the Europeans, I think it’s clear—they will criticize it, and they do criticize it with weak words and sentences, expressions of concern. But nothing will come out of it, and everybody knows that they don’t mean it, because they actually feel that they need Turkey more than ever. Once Trump made it clear that American security guarantees are no longer reliable, Europe began discussing creating its own strategic autonomy, its own defense capabilities—and Turkey emerged as a very crucial actor here, with its strong military, large population, and growing defense industry, as well as its strategic location. So Turkey is a very important partner, potentially, for European security. And Erdogan knows this and hopes that Europe will ignore his authoritarian moves because they need him—and so far, he has been proven right.

But let me finish by saying that it is not only a normative mistake for Europe to allow Erdogan to make this move—hoping that Turkey is strategically important—but it’s also strategically blind thinking. Because once Erdogan removes all the thresholds between himself and full authoritarianism—once Turkey becomes a Putin-like regime—the question for Europeans should be: can a regime like that be trusted for security cooperation? Can it really be a security partner?

Turkish–European relations have been transactional for the last decade, and an authoritarian figure like Erdogan was quite fine for that. Transactionalism allowed for bargaining, and you could prefer to deal with a single individual rather than a state—and that was fine. But once you move beyond that—if you want to create a strategic partnership between Europe and Turkey, if Turkey is to become an important part of European security—then you can’t really trust a personal autocracy.

Europe made the same mistake with Putin. They hoped that by creating economic interdependencies, Russia would never be a threat to European security—and they were proven wrong. I see no reason why Erdogan should be trusted more than Putin in that sense, and why European security should be entrusted to a political system that is ruled by the whims of a single individual.

As I said, it’s not only normatively and morally wrong—it’s also strategically blind thinking on Europe’s part.

Professor Dogu Ergil

Professor Ergil: Turkey’s Crisis Stems from Eroding Line Between Persuasion and Coercion

by AuthoritarianismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a powerful interview with the ECPS, veteran political scientist Professor Doğu Ergil warns that Turkey has crossed from populist authoritarianism into full autocracy. “Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has evaporated,” he explains. “In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.” Professor Ergil outlines how Erdoğan’s regime has personalized power, delegitimized the opposition, and dismantled democratic norms. With Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu’s arrest and mass protests unfolding, Turkey, he says, faces a “deadlock” where the state’s legitimacy is crumbling from within. This is a timely and sobering reflection on democracy under siege.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), veteran political scientist Professor Doğu Ergil delivers a stark assessment of Turkey’s current political trajectory under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule. Framing the ongoing turmoil as a crisis of legitimacy and democratic erosion, Professor Ergil argues that the country has moved from a populist-authoritarian hybrid toward a more fully autocratic system. “The ongoing crisis,” he explains, “lies in the growing strength of the opposition and the blurring of the line between persuasion and coercion. Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has largely evaporated. In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.”

At the heart of Professor Ergil’s analysis is the paradox of populist regimes relying on democratic legitimacy while simultaneously undermining the very institutions that sustain it. “If you demonize, criminalize, and prosecute your opponents, and attack the very institutions that brought you to power,” Professor Ergil warns, “you begin to delegitimize the system—and, in doing so, yourself.” This dynamic, he observes, has led Turkey into a “deadlock,” where democratic procedures are maintained in form but hollowed out in substance.

Professor Ergil traces this degeneration to the AKP’s strategic shift from early reformism to an increasingly nationalist and authoritarian agenda, using political Islam not as a blueprint for governance, but as an ideological tool to legitimize power. He also underscores how the personalization of power around Erdoğan has dissolved the boundaries between state, government, and party—turning the state apparatus into an extension of partisan control.

Professor Ergil’s insights are especially timely in light of the recent arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, which he views as emblematic of the broader erosion of the rule of law and the manipulation of the judiciary for political ends. As Turkey experiences historical developments, this interview offers a compelling and sobering diagnosis of a political system teetering on the edge of autocracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Doğu Ergil with some edits.

Populism Under Erdogan Becomes Parochial and Authoritarian

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan watching the August 30 Victory Day Parade in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo by Mustafa Kirazli.

Professor Ergil, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the evolution of Turkish populism and authoritarianism under AKP’s and Erdogan’s rule, and how has it redefined the boundary between the people and the political elite? In what ways has the ruling AKP’s populist discourse transformed into a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation rather than democratic inclusion?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The nature of the political regime in Turkey has always been populist. The founding party of the Republic is called the Republican People’s Party, and one of the six principles of the regime has been populism. Anyway, I mean, it’s written down as populism rather than being populist. It is populist because the ruling elite wanted to execute a revolution from above, and they found the people not ready for a revolution to join the modern society or the modern world. Hence, to transform a backward society, they took the initiative of a revolution from above—an elitist revolution—and changed the fabric of society accordingly. So, the populist nature of the regime has always been there, ingrained in it. It’s in the DNA of it.

But now, with the incumbent AKP, it has become rather diluted. It’s no longer secular, and it’s less oriented to the world. It’s expressed as localism and nationalism, because in classical populism, there are the good people and the representatives of the good people against an evil, inefficient, and rather alien elite that forcefully wants to change the society—its culture, its identity, and so forth. But this localization and nationalization—rather than westernization and modernization, which were the true assets of the Republican regime at its outset—have made Turkish society and the present regime a rather local, non-elitist, and parochial society. In a virtual sense, more peasant-like, more Eastern, more Middle Eastern if you like, and more religious rather than secular, modern, and world-oriented.

Turkey’s Populism Has Turned Fully Autocratic

Can Turkey’s current political crisis be interpreted as a case study in populism transitioning into autocracy? If so, what distinguishes the Turkish model from its global counterparts?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Of course. The Turkish regime is not only popular but also populist, and increasingly authoritarian. This is largely because the incumbent party has blurred the distinction between the state and society by merging the government with the state apparatus. When this separation erodes, central authority becomes more consolidated and less differentiated, and the division of power weakens as authority becomes more centralized and autocratic.

In the Turkish case, it has become more personalized, and the personification of the government can be identified with the present president Erdoğan. So, all powers accrue in his hands, and he can exercise authority over all aspects of life and all institutions of the government, including the judiciary. The judiciary is now used as an extension of politics and control over society. Thus, Turkish populism has not only become more populist but more authoritarian and autocratic in this sense.

There are similar regimes in the world, but the Turkish one has become overly personalized—concentrating all possible powers—political, judicial, legislative, military, and so forth—in the hands of a single individual. The party that brought this man to power has effectively faded from view; it is no longer visible. What remains is the machinery of state power in the hands of one man—and the rest of society. That society is now split into two: the supporters of the incumbent government and its leader, and those who oppose them.

The ongoing crisis lies in the growing strength of the opposition and the blurring of the line between persuasion and coercion. Persuasion—which was once the AKP’s greatest success—has largely evaporated. In its place, coercion has become more prominent, and the instruments of coercion, including the judiciary, have proliferated.

Islam Became a Tool to Bolster Populist Power

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015.

How has political Islamism evolved under Erdoğan from a reformist agenda in the early 2000s to a more illiberal and authoritarian governance model today? Is the AKP’s version of political Islamism now functioning primarily as a tool for ideological legitimation, or does it still contain genuine theological, political or societal aims?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The AKP’s political Islamism is one of the contemporary ideologies that found a place in Turkish politics. The political landscape had long been partitioned: there were the socialists, and slightly to further left, the communists—though they were a small minority—followed by the social democrats, liberals, conservatives, and nationalists. Each ideology was represented by a political party with a distinct historical background.

When the AKP emerged and began to take the stage in Turkish politics, it had to anchor itself in something—and it chose religion. Religion served as a supportive mechanism for nationalism and populism. In this context, religion was not used as a foundation for governance per se, but rather as an instrument to bolster a populist, nationalist, and increasingly authoritarian regime.

This strategy was effective for a while. However, it has since lost much of its fervor and effectiveness, as religion is traditionally associated with values such as honesty, integrity, and efficiency.

All these other parties with different ideologies had not made Turkey as great as people expected. So, the Islamic powers’ rhetoric said, “Look, even the name of the party is ‘AK,’ meaning pure white.” They represented themselves as honest, non-corrupt, and also more popular—closer to the people. In that sense, they seemed more empathetic toward the people, more intertwined with their needs, and so forth. But as time passed and the AK Party exposed its weaknesses, it became clear that being religious doesn’t mean being honest. Being in control of everything—ending the tutelary system, at the center of which was the military, as you know—doesn’t mean that democracy would take root or that there would be a more efficient, less corrupt, more responsive society.

As the AKP lost its credibility, the Islamic rhetoric has also become dysfunctional. This is what has happened in Turkey. And because of that, this 23-year rule of the AKP has come to a halt with these apparent street demonstrations and protests, showing that the party and its leadership cannot deliver anymore. It cannot keep its promises. And it cannot do so any further. So, I mean, it has come to a halt.

Islamism in Turkey Has Been a Supportive Value System

To what extent has political Islamism been radicalized under the pressures of regime survival and repression of opposition groups like Kurds, Alawites, Gülen followers, and political figures like Selahattin Demirtas and, most recently, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Islam could not be radicalized because the entrenched institutions and the majority of believers believe in the general assets of the Republic. Turkey has been—though the founding fathers have been criticized for adopting the Swiss civil code, for example—benefiting from it. People have enjoyed all the advantages it brought, because there is no discrimination in that code. In it, women are much freer, men can act more freely in their daily dealings. Although that code has been criticized as being alien, people have benefited from it for many years, for many decades.

In that sense, people are not opposed to the republican regime, its laws and its values. People expect those to be furthered, to be reinforced, and new advantages and developments to be integrated into society, rather than taking society backward to another century where Islam dominated with its Sharia law. In Turkey, that never happened. Only a minority want Sharia law because they believe the system is not just. But Sharia law does not make a society more just, moral, or egalitarian. People understand that.

In that sense, Islamism in Turkey has been a supportive value system for an insufficient political system that could be improved, rather than bringing an abrupt halt to it and taking society back to another century.

Turkish Politics Has Become Warlike—Not Competitive

Protests sparked by plans to build on the Gezi Park have broadened into nationwide anti government unrest on June 11, 2013 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.

To what extent has Erdoğan’s populism depended on the construction of internal “enemies”—such as the Kurds, followers of the Gülen movement, and İmamoğlu—to sustain a polarizing narrative and consolidate power?

Professor Doğu Ergil: It didn’t start with Erdoğan. Populism is built on dichotomies and contradictions, as you know—such as the idea of a good society versus a bad elite, or good people rather than bad politicians. These dichotomies help consolidate the supporters of the government, the regime, or even the nation, as envisioned by the founders of the system.

Unfortunately, these contradictions—and the inbuilt conflicts they foster—have been present since the onset of the Republic. The definition of the nation was not an inclusive one embracing all citizens, but rather based on an ethnic identity, mainly Turkishness. This approach has, of course, automatically excluded others—if not legally, then emotionally, and later in practice, including politically.

Erdoğan did not change this, although Erdoğan and his party were non-nationalistic in the beginning, because Islamism transcends nationalism and ethnic boundaries. So, you can have a body of believers coming from different ethnic backgrounds and different nationalities.

But seeing that the bulk of the people are nationalistic, and that the founding ideology of the country is nationalism, the AKP and Erdoğan adopted nationalism and reinforced its Islamic leanings with the rhetoric of religion or Islam—but primarily became nationalistic. And nationalism always needs an enemy—or more than one, always. So, when you define “us” with certain qualities and deny those qualities to others—who are then cast as enemies—you create a conflictual atmosphere in which your supporters are closely knit, while the others become more than opponents; they become enemies. Thus, Turkish politics has become, rather than competitive, warlike.

By Undermining Their Rivals, They’re Undermining the System—and Themselves

What does İmamoğlu’s arrest signify in terms of the erosion of rule of law and judicial independence in Turkey?

Professor Doğu Ergil: The rule of law has been lost for a long time. I mean, we cannot find it anywhere—it has been hiding somewhere. It has been kept in chains or hidden somewhere. But it may reemerge if the incumbent government and its leadership see no other way—then they might return to the rule of law and democracy. Today, they still believe that they can win elections. And all this latest ado—imprisonments, crackdowns on the opposition, the incarceration of anyone who criticizes the government and its leadership—is due to the fact that they are losing hope of winning the next elections. 

So, they are clearing the way: first, by removing the supposedly successful competitors, and then by undermining the rules of engagement—that is, democratic rules and norms. But here lies a contradiction—a very substantial, significant contradiction. If you demonize, criminalize, and prosecute your opponents, and attack the very institutions that brought you to power, you begin to delegitimize the system—and, in doing so, yourself. That is, you undermine the very avenue you used to come to power. So, Turkey is now living in this unfortunate deadlock, because the delegitimization of the system through the delegitimization of the opposition is taking place.

The Judiciary Is Now a Tool of Politics

How do you interpret the strategic use of the judiciary to disqualify or imprison political opponents within Turkey’s broader trajectory from competitive authoritarianism toward full autocracy?

Professor Doğu Ergil: It’s so obvious. If you move from competitive authoritarianism to brute authoritarianism, of course the judiciary is either dismissed or becomes a tool of politics. That’s inevitable. This occurs everywhere in the world where the government or the regime becomes more authoritarian. So, this is almost inevitable. This is a choice, and this government and its leadership have chosen the path to autocratization and authoritarianism.

Do you see parallels between the Erdoğan regime’s control of institutions and historical patterns of soft coups in Turkish political history, or is this an unprecedented form of civil authoritarianism?

Professor Doğu Ergil: No, it’s not unprecedented. I mean, the same patterns are visible all over the world. We see it in Russia, Belarus, Latin America, Hungary, and so forth. In that sense, there is nothing unusual. The real question is why people tolerate such a deterioration of the regime. That’s important. I believe that where there is corruption, there is also the consent—at least by part of society—effectively becoming a silent partner in that corruption. In that sense, the people also need greater education in democracy. Rather than giving in to an authoritarian regime in return for favors, advantages, or privileges—rather than insisting on rights, freedoms, and equality—society, unfortunately, ends up deserving the poor governance it supports, at least for a time.

Ongoing Protests Have a Leader and a Clearer Purpose

Following the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, protests erupted across numerous cities in Turkey. Citizens took to the streets to voice their opposition to the decision and express growing discontent.
Photo: Dreamstime.

How do the ongoing mass protests compare to the Gezi Park movement in terms of scope, motivation, and political potential?

Professor Doğu Ergil: In the Gezi Park demonstrations, it was so colorful, so unexpected, and so detached from any particular political party, social class, or political agenda—it was a wonderful, kaleidoscopic movement, I would say. It had no organization, no leadership, and no ideology. When I say ideology, I mean—if not totally and neatly defined—at least a trajectory for action and its aftermath. What will happen later? How will we proceed, to do what? And what will we do after the moment? That’s a broad definition of ideology. In that sense, Gezi didn’t have this.

But this time, although people erupted into the streets unexpectedly, inadvertently, they found the CHP—the Republican People’s Party—already there protesting and already a victim of oppression and crackdown. So this wave, this popular wave, pushed the Republican Party forward, making it the leader of the movement. And the CHP lived up to that expectation. So far, it has successfully led the opposition. Although we do not know where it will take the movement, to what extent it can lead it, or what the outcome will be, the conditions of leadership and organization have so far been met.

Now, what will happen? How the regime will be transformed—and into what—is still unknown. But it’s clear that corruption must end, oppression must end, democratic institutions must be restored, and Turkey must become more aligned with the world. In that sense, there is no need for a neat ideology or ideological agenda. If these goals can be met, the outcome of these protests can be very productive.

With İmamoğlu sidelined, what implications does this have for the legitimacy of the upcoming local and general elections?

Professor Doğu Ergil: We do not know what will happen—whether the government’s crackdown will continue, and what the response of the people will be. I mean, whether protests will grow and the pressure placed on the government will lead it to change its authoritarian stance, or whether the crackdown will intensify and we will become an absolutely authoritarian regime. And whether the system can endure this much pressure—I mean, the economy, which is on the brink of collapse, may collapse entirely, and conflicts may escalate into outright friction in the streets or elsewhere. So, it’s hard to say. It depends on how events evolve, I think, and on the response of the opposing factions in the process.

Erdogan Regime Is Too Useful to Be Criticized by the West

And lastly, Professor Ergil, how do you think the second Trump administration is affecting Erdoğan and his regime?

Professor Doğu Ergil: Well, it has been rather surprising that the US government—not only Trump and his entourage, but in general the American civil society, and, for that matter, the European Union and European governments—have been rather quiet on the authoritarian ascent of the Turkish government. All these parties—American and European actors—are expecting things from trade. Europe wants to keep all those millions of refugees and migrants in Turkey, so that Turkey would not open the gates of the dam and let the flood into Europe. Europe is very apprehensive on that stance.

Secondly, they don’t want the radicalism that’s simmering in the Middle East to reflect on Europe, and they see Turkey as a barrier to it. And thirdly, now with Russia—after a possible peace deal with Ukraine—being a threat against the security of Europe, and with the US abandoning Europe and making its security rather liable, Europe needs Turkey as a military power—as cheap soldiers—and does not want to antagonize the Turkish government because of this.

As for the US government, as long as Turkey does not threaten the security and interests of Israel—which it doesn’t—Turkey is a good friend of the White House. Secondly, Syria has to be stabilized, and Turkey, as a neighboring country and as a factor that’s present on the Syrian political stage, can contribute to the stabilization of Syria. How? By supporting the transitional government in Damascus and also reconciling the Kurds and others with the incumbent government in Syria.

Thirdly, the US wants Turkey to be in the anti-Iranian axis—to share this with its other allies, at the top of which is Israel. All these combined, the US—meaning the Trump administration—sees Turkey as a rather advantageous ally in this volatile region, and it could serve the purposes of American foreign policy.

German Scholars.

Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2025). “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0096

 

Following Germany’s pivotal 2025 federal election, the ECPS hosted a high-level panel exploring the rise of the far-right AfD, democratic resilience, and the broader political shifts underway. Held on March 13, 2025, the event featured leading scholars, offering critical insights into the AfD’s electoral surge, its normalization and radicalization, and the East-West divide shaping German politics. Speakers examined key voter demographics—especially youth, working-class, and immigrant voters—and dissected issues like immigration, identity, gender, and economic anxiety that have fueled the far-right narrative. The session also addressed the implications for Germany’s transatlantic ties, institutional stability, and future party strategies. This report captures the panel’s core arguments, raising essential questions about how liberal democracies can respond to populist and authoritarian threats without compromising democratic norms or alienating significant voter blocs.

Report by Christo Pretorius

The 2025 federal election in Germany on February 23, 2025 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s postwar political landscape. Amid record-high voter turnout and deepening societal divides, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its most significant electoral gains to date. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened a special panel titled “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge” to assess the causes, consequences, and wider implications of the vote. Held online on March 13, 2025, the session brought together leading political scientists from Germany and beyond, each offering unique insights into one of Europe’s most closely watched political stories.

Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member, the discussion delved into the normalization and radicalization of the AfD, the party’s growing impact on Germany’s democratic institutions, and the broader realignment of the country’s political and social order. The panel also explored the East-West divide in voting patterns, the role of identity politics, youth and working-class engagement, and how key issues—such as immigration, economic anxiety, and gender—have been instrumentalized by the far right.

Moreover, speakers raised concerns about foreign influence on German politics, the future of the transatlantic alliance, and whether traditional parties should seek to exclude or accommodate the AfD. With contributions from Dr. Eric Langenbacher, Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Dr. Kai Arzheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Dr. Hannah M. Alarian, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and Dr. Sabine Volk, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences at the University of Passau, the panel offered a comprehensive and sobering look at a country grappling with both internal polarization and global geopolitical uncertainty.

This report summarizes the session’s key discussions and analytical takeaways, providing an in-depth overview of the far-right surge in Germany and its implications for democracy, governance, and European politics at large.

To start off this special session off, Dr. Cengiz Aktar highlighted two major trends that he noticed within Germany’s 2025 federal election results. First, was the rise of populism itself in Germany, and second was the interference of American decision makers, ‘both elected and unelected,’ in the election. He then gave the floor to the first speaker.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher’s presentation on “The AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship” began with an overview of the election results which highlighted the East-West divide in the country, with the former primarily serving as the Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) voter base in the election. This was followed by a quick look at important factors that affected the final result, such as age demographics of voters, and pointing out that this was the highest turnout since 1987’s election. 

Turning to his own takeaways from the election result, Dr. Langenbacher notes that the AfD has normalized within German politics but also radicalized in their policies. He notes that although the AfD does not have a majority in the Bundestag, they now have a blocking minority, which will make any action requiring a super majority, such as amending the constitution, difficult to do. He also notes that the results show a clear divide in German politics stemming from the old Cold War divisions, and that on a smaller scale these divisions affect AfD candidates from both the East and West. Western members are, in Dr. Langenbacher’s opinion, more pragmatic and willing to compromise if it meant joining a coalition government, juxtaposing their more hardline eastern counterparts. 

Moving onto his analysis of the Transatlantic Relationship, Dr. Langenbacher highlighted Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics but points out that there is no evidence suggesting that his endorsement of AfD had any effect on the result. He questions the Republican Party and right-leaning individuals from the United States’ support of the AfD in general, especially as the party contains many anti-American politicians that speak out against what they see as US hegemony over Germany. Dr. Langenbacher theorizes that this might be due to similarities in the AfD and Trump’s policies, especially regarding Russia and the Ukraine, but it could just as likely be a strategy to weaken the EU’s geo-political power. To conclude, Dr. Langenbacher finds that German foreign policy towards the US has been damaged beyond the point of fixing, and elected officials now seek alternative means to strengthen Germany on the global stage without US support, especially as it remains uncertain whether or not the US will continue to maintain a military presence in Europe and/or support NATO moving into the future. 

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD?

The next speaker was Dr. Kai Arzheimer, who investigated the question: “How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” Also pointing out the stark East-West divide in voter support for the AfD, Dr. Arzheimer notes the map most commonly used to highlight the political divisions within Germany is misleading – especially as East Germany is less populated with only one sixth of Germany’s overall population (without Berlin) and only made up a quarter of the total vote. The increase of AfD’s support in Western Germany is more important to analyze. Younger voters made up a significant proportion of the party’s support in the election, especially with young men, but this gender gap seems to be narrowing. The working class also supported the AfD more this time around, mobilizing 1.8 million former non-voters which joined the additional voters the AfD won from the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats. 

Immigration was still the most important policy issue for voters, especially the rejection of Muslims who are often mistakenly linked to terrorism and an increase in crime. Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD tends to play up terrorism and crime as out of control, even though evidence shows that it has gone down. Other ‘Culture War’ issues such as gender and the green transformation also played a part in AfD’s success, but economic anxiety is what pushed many working-class voters towards the party.

According to Dr. Arzheimer, from a geo-political perspective, the AfD had a near monopoly on peace politics, especially as Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine made it difficult to maintain their main pro-Russian narrative. To this end, they focused on the economy as an issue, and how it became worse after Germany’s involvement with the war, and how Germany’s energy security was being undermined. 

Unlike neighboring country’s right-wing parties, Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD is becoming ever more radical in their politics, using examples such as the party’s leader being convicted twice for using Nazi slogans during the European Parliament election campaign, and right-wing extremists from outside the party being staffed in the Bundestag. Identity politics has also radicalized, with some AfD members using the issue of immigration as a means to push their desired agenda of expelling Germans with a so-called ‘migration background’ from Germany. Despite this, their popularity has grown. 

Dr. Arzheimer went on to show a timeline of events in the last few years affecting the AfD’s popularity and concluded that he would estimate 50% of AfD voters have consistently voted for the party, and the other 50% of voters might still be swayable to other parties. He goes on to recommend that Germany’s other political parties should focus on their own policy issues, rather than compete with the AfD ‘on their field’ as they try to win back voters. 

Accommodation or Exclusion? 

The third presentation focused on “Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” and was presented by Dr. Hannah Alarian. Building on the previous presentations, she sought to investigate the question of what will happen after the election. Focusing once again on immigration as a key policy issue, Dr. Alarian highlighted the persistence of this issue for the electorate, with as many as one in six voters mentioning it as an important political problem. In the eastern states, more people favored greater restrictions on immigration, which correlates with their vote for AfD. Voters turned to the AfD as they were the party that was most eager to talk about the issue. The AfD’s 2021 party manifesto made more references to the issue than any other comparable party, and this trend continued into the 2025 election where most other parties seemed to have dismissed the issue altogether since they did not want to talk about it lest they draw attention to the AfD. This left a lot of voters to turn to the AfD as the only party addressing this key policy issue, and they controlled the narrative with various anti-migration media, some of which Dr. Alarian presents in her talk by sharing anti-immigration campaign posters used by the AfD. 

Looking forward, Dr. Alarian points out that the questions of democratic legitimacy, and party and government strategy are important – namely, do we accommodate, or do we exclude the AfD? By choosing to exclude the AfD, it excludes a large portion of the voting population, but inclusion allows the AfD access to the policy making space. Exclusionary tactics are already being used, such as the CDU’s refusal to enter a coalition with the AfD, but after the CDU relied on the AfD’s vote for an anti-migration measure, the people came out to protest in mass across the country. Dr. Alarian indicates that perhaps the people can be the ‘firewall’ then. However, according to her data, these made no real change towards people’s attitude of AfD. Similarly, AfD’s exclusion, nor other party’s adaptation to the political climate, also made no real change. 

To conclude, Dr. Alarian makes some recommendations for moving forward, including an acknowledgement of immigration as a political issue by other parties, and addressing socio-economic concerns of voters. In effect this will provide an alternative to the alternative vote. 

Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller started his presentation on “The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by focusing on who are the new voters, and what motivates them to vote for the AfD. He repeated some of the information from the previous presentations as to why the AfD doubled their votes in a lot of places compared to the last election – mainly the non-voters and policy issues such as immigration, internal security and the economy. 

Three surprising allies who voted for the AfD include immigrant voters, blue collar workers and young men. 10.4% of immigrant voters and 40.2% of post-soviet re-settlers voted for AfD, doubling since the last election. The number of voters lost by the SPD correlates with the amount gained by the AfD, highlighting how the working class shifted to the party this election. Finally, young men aged 18-24 voted overwhelmingly for the AfD. Dr. Ziller highlighted some explanatory frameworks for why these three groups voted the way they did, including: Cultural backlash against universalism, lack of social recognition, nostalgic appeal of the far right, a declining middle, structural transformations in the knowledge economy, transformations of the left parties, and group identities and out-group perceptions. 

Focusing in-depth on some of these frameworks, Dr. Ziller highlights academic research that might explain why the three highlighted groups voted the way they did. Social identity could be a factor as research found that marginalized people didn’t feel that they gained as much from a redistribution party, but by voting of a nationalist one with anti-immigrant views, they believed they would achieve a higher status in society. Arguments made for social belonging highlights how people can find a sense of community in right wing groups, which in particular attracts young men. Progressive policies are found to alienate blue collar workers who often feel they stand to lose from such policies. And finally, those who feel left behind turn to alternative parties to show their discontent at established parties and politics. 

Dr. Ziller provides some empirical insights from a survey he ran on a website in the days leading up to and after the election. 2,568 people responded, and the results closely reflected the election results. Predictors of an AfD vote include a low level of social trust, threat perception particularly against Muslims, and people who felt left behind. How this correlated to the three groups in focus paints the picture that all three groups felt left behind and displayed Islamophobia, although each one had different underlining reasons for voting AfD. To conclude he suggests that investment in left-behind places could regain the trust of disenfranchised voters, but the underlining question is whether or not we can roll back the ‘need for chaos’ preference in radical right-wing populist and authoritarian politics. 

Germany’s Far Right and Antifeminism

The final speaker, Dr. Sabine Volk, focused on the topic “The German Far Right: Antifeminism Sells.” Highlighting that the AfD were already campaigning in 2013 that there is a clear gender divide between men and women, the talk focused on gender issues which became more prominent within the AfD over successive elections. Dr. Volk presented the clear gender gap within the AfD party, which is comprised roughly of 19% women members overall. In the new Bundestag only 11.8% of the AfD’s group are women, and Alice Weidel is the only female AfD member in the Bundesvorstand(Federal Executive Board). As the face of the AfD, Alice Weidel juxtaposes a lot of AfD’s stances on gender and family, especially as she has a same-sex partner. 

AfD’s antifeminist stances have partially modernized on gender equality and sexual diversity, reacting on the processes of emancipation and seeking to maintain heteronormative power relations. Their key messages are heteronormative family relations, ‘Trans panic,’ and the mobilization of masculinity. The topic of gender is important to the AfD, but there is regional diversity within the party, with some more extreme factions being located in eastern Germany. According to Dr. Volk, what is missing from the discussion is the idea of female nationalism and the mobilization of women’s rights as part of an anti-Islam agenda present in previous elections. This allows for antifeminist alliances to be built with conservative and religious actors and groups and appeals to people with antifeminist attitudes – mostly located in eastern Germany. Gender is therefore of particular importance, and Dr. Volk predicts that discussions surrounding this policy area will only grow in the coming years. 

Thumbnail MGP19

The Impact of Religious and Nationalist Populism in Israel

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as: 

Stamoglou, Anastasia. (2025). “The Impact of Religious and Nationalist Populism in Israel.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0095

 
This report examines the key discussions from the 19th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, hosted by the ECPS on February 27, 2025. The session explored the influence of religious and nationalist populism on Israeli politics, media, and education. Prominent scholars analyzed how judicial overhauls, security-driven rhetoric, media manipulation, and educational policy shifts contribute to democratic erosion in Israel. The report highlights the increasing concentration of power, the delegitimization of opposition voices, and the broader global implications of Israel’s populist trends. By drawing comparisons with other global populist movements, the discussion underscored the necessity of protecting democratic institutions, ensuring media freedom, and preserving independent education.

Report by Anastasia Stamoglou

Introduction

The 19th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series, hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), examined the influence of religious and nationalist populism in Israel. The discussion highlighted how populist rhetoric, policy decisions, and institutional changes have shaped the country’s political, educational, and media landscapes. As populist leaders consolidate power, the balance between democratic governance and nationalist ideologies is increasingly at risk. The panel, moderated by Dr. Guy Ziv, Associate Professor at American University’s School of International Service, featured experts including Dr. Yaniv Roznai, Dr. Haleli Pinson, Dr. Shai Agmon, Yonatan Levi, Dr. Ayala Panievsky, and Dr. Tom Lourie. Their insights provided a comprehensive analysis of the challenges facing Israel’s democracy and the broader implications of populist movements.

The Institutional Vulnerabilities of Israeli Democracy

Dr. Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harry Radzyner Law School, Reichman University, opened the discussion by addressing the institutional weaknesses that make Israeli democracy particularly susceptible to populist influence. Unlike many democracies with rigid constitutional frameworks, Israel’s legal system is built upon Basic Laws that can be easily amended by a simple parliamentary majority. This structural fragility allows populist leaders to implement sweeping judicial overhauls and consolidate executive power with relative ease.

Dr. Roznai argued that recent attempts to weaken judicial oversight, particularly through proposed reforms aimed at curbing the powers of the Supreme Court, illustrate the dangers of this malleable legal framework. The Israeli government’s judicial overhaul efforts have been widely criticized as a direct assault on democratic institutions. Proponents of these measures frame them as necessary corrections to an overly interventionist judiciary, while critics warn that they enable executive overreach and threaten the rule of law. The public backlash against these proposed reforms, including large-scale protests, underscores the importance of an independent judiciary in maintaining democratic integrity.

Populism and the Transformation of Israeli Education

Dr. Halleli Pinson, Associate Professor at the School of Education at Ben-Gurion University, examined the role of right-wing populism in reshaping Israel’s education system. Education serves as a powerful tool for ideological reinforcement, and the rise of nationalist and religious populism has had a profound impact on curriculum design and policy decisions. Dr. Pinson identified three key trends in this transformation: the exclusion of critical perspectives, the promotion of nationalist narratives, and the increasing influence of religious ideology in state education.

One of the most notable examples of this shift is the banning of Breaking the Silence, an NGO composed of former Israeli soldiers who provide testimonies on the ethical dilemmas of military service in the occupied territories. The exclusion of such organizations from schools reflects a broader effort to limit exposure to dissenting views and reinforce a singular national narrative. Additionally, right-wing organizations have exerted pressure on the higher education system, targeting academics perceived as left leaning and promoting legislative efforts to curtail academic freedom.

Pinson also highlighted the growing presence of religious-nationalist ideology in Israeli schools. Policies favoring religious institutions over secular ones have facilitated the integration of theological perspectives into public education, further intensifying nationalist discourse. This shift has long-term implications, as it influences young generations’ understanding of national identity, democracy, and civic engagement. The suppression of alternative viewpoints and the promotion of a singular ideological framework contribute to a more polarized society, limiting the space for critical discussion and democratic engagement.

Security and Populist Political Strategy

Dr. Shai Agmon, Assistant Professor in Political Philosophy at UCL, and Yonatan Levi, PhD candidate at European Institute, LSE, explored the intersection of security and populist politics in Israel. Populist leaders frequently use security threats—both real and perceived—to justify policies that concentrate power and marginalize political opponents. Netanyahu’s political strategy has consistently framed opposition voices, civil society organizations, and minority groups as existential threats to national security, reinforcing a sense of urgency that legitimizes authoritarian measures.

Levi emphasized that this security-driven populism creates a climate in which dissent is equated with national disloyalty. Arab citizens, left-wing activists, and human rights organizations are often portrayed as internal threats, weakening their political legitimacy and restricting their participation in public discourse. This strategy not only consolidates power for the ruling elite but also fosters an ‘us vs. them’ mentality that deepens societal divisions.

Dr. Agmon further noted that security populism has led to the normalization of emergency measures that restrict civil liberties. Policies initially implemented as temporary responses to security crises—such as increased surveillance, restrictions on protests, and limitations on press freedoms—have gradually become permanent fixtures of Israel’s political landscape. This entrenchment of security-driven policies reflects a broader global trend in which populist leaders use crisis rhetoric to justify democratic backsliding.

The Role of Media in the Rise of Populism

Dr. Ayala Panievsky, Presidential Fellowship at School of Communication & Creativity, City University of London,provided a critical analysis of how populist leaders manipulate media narratives to control public discourse. The decline of independent journalism in Israel has been exacerbated by both state interference and the rise of alternative media platforms that amplify populist messaging.

One of the most effective strategies used by Netanyahu and his allies is the delegitimization of traditional media. Critical journalists and independent news organizations are frequently labeled as ‘leftist’ or ‘anti-Israel,’ eroding public trust in factual reporting. Simultaneously, government-affiliated media outlets promote a narrative that aligns with the populist agenda, reinforcing partisan divisions.

Social media has also played a crucial role in the spread of populist rhetoric. Netanyahu’s use of direct communication channels, such as Twitter and Facebook, allows him to bypass traditional media and address his supporters unfiltered. This direct engagement fosters a sense of loyalty and reinforces populist claims that mainstream media cannot be trusted. However, it also contributes to the spread of misinformation and the erosion of journalistic integrity.

Dr. Panievsky warned that the combination of media suppression, state influence, and social media manipulation creates an environment in which critical voices are drowned out. The decline of media independence undermines democratic accountability, allowing populist leaders to operate with minimal scrutiny.

Populism as a Survival Strategy

Dr. Tom Lourie, Researcher, Political Science, UC Irvine, examined how populism serves as a political survival strategy for embattled leaders. Netanyahu’s use of populist rhetoric has intensified in response to legal challenges, particularly his ongoing corruption trials. By framing himself as a victim of an elitist conspiracy, Netanyahu has successfully mobilized his base and delegitimized judicial institutions that threaten his hold on power.

Dr. Lourie compared Netanyahu’s tactics to those of other populist leaders, including Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán, and Jair Bolsonaro. A common pattern emerges when faced with legal or political crises, populist leaders adopt an anti-elitist stance, rallying their supporters against perceived enemies within the judiciary, media, and opposition parties. This strategy not only diverts attention from legal troubles but also reinforces the populist leader’s position as the true representative of the people.

The personalization of political power in populist movements poses a significant challenge to democratic institutions. Dr. Lourie emphasized that as long as populist leaders successfully frame themselves as indispensable to the survival of the nation, their supporters will continue to defend them against institutional checks and balances. This dynamic creates a feedback loop in which democratic erosion accelerates, making institutional recovery increasingly difficult.

Conclusion

The 19th session of the MGP Panel Series provided a comprehensive exploration of the impact of religious and nationalist populism in Israel. The discussions highlighted how populist rhetoric shapes policy, undermines democratic institutions, and fosters societal divisions. From the erosion of judicial independence and academic freedom to the manipulation of media and the securitization of political discourse, populism has fundamentally altered Israel’s democratic landscape.

The insights shared by the panelists underscore the urgent need for institutional safeguards against democratic backsliding. Strengthening judicial independence, protecting media freedom, and ensuring educational plurality are essential to countering the influence of populist movements. As Israel navigates these challenges, the lessons drawn from this discussion serve as a valuable resource for policymakers, scholars, and civil society organizations committed to preserving democratic governance.

Through its interdisciplinary approach, the session reinforced ECPS’s commitment to fostering critical discourse on the global impact of populism. By examining the mechanisms and consequences of populist governance, the panel contributed to a broader understanding of the threats facing democratic societies worldwide.

Faded USA vs Germany vs Japan national flags icon isolated on broken weathered cracked wall background, abstract US Germany Japan politics relationship divided conflicts concept texture wallpaper.

The Future Course of German and Japanese Capitalism in a Multipolar World under Trump 2.0

by ArticlesCommentariesEconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHome

In his compelling analysis, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk explores how “Trumpism 2.0” and a multipolar world order are challenging the foundations of German and Japanese capitalism. As the US shifts toward protectionism, economic nationalism, and corporate oligarchy, both countries—once revitalized by American support after WWII—must now reassess their strategic and economic futures. Ozturk examines how trade wars, supply chain disruptions, and declining US cooperation threaten their export-driven models. From demographic decline to digital transformation, Germany and Japan face urgent structural reforms. This timely commentary not only maps the common and unique risks confronting these two economic giants but also outlines actionable strategies to maintain resilience in a fragmented world. 

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

I argued in my commentary that “Trumpism 2.0” marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The United States (U.S.) is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.

This process will also challenge German and Japanese capitalism, distinct derivatives of America’s preferences after World War II and shaped by the demands and constraints of the Cold War context and the mentalities and cultural dynamics of German and Japanese societies. 

Considering new challenges, this commentary reveals a potential roadmap for German and Japanese capitalism. First, the article compares the characteristics of American and Japanese capitalism. Next, it examines the role of the US in revitalizing the struggling German and Japanese economies. The third section addresses the common and unique issues these countries face, along with the effects of the Trump Administration and a US-less world. The fourth section summarizes the possible responses from Germany and Japan.

Three Models of Capitalism under Flux

To compare Japanese, German, and American capitalism, one must examine their economic structures, government-business relations, corporate governance, labor markets, and cultural influences. As Robert Gilpin puts it, American, German, and Japanese capitalism embody distinct models shaped by historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. American capitalism, a Liberal Market Economy (LME), is highly market-driven and individualistic, characterized by minimal government intervention, shareholder-focused businesses, a flexible labor market, and a strong entrepreneurial culture, fostering innovation and financial dominance but also leading to corporate volatility, weaker social safety nets, and economic instability. 

On the other hand, German capitalism, a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), follows a stakeholder-oriented model with strong labor unions, long-term investment strategies, and an export-driven manufacturing sector, ensuring stability, high-quality production, and social welfare, though facing challenges in labor market rigidity, trade dependency, and adapting to disruptive technologies. 

Similarly, Japanese capitalism, a form of Developmental State Capitalism, is rooted in state-business coordination, the keiretsu corporate system, lifetime employment traditions, and a focus on incremental innovation, enabling industrial stability and technological leadership but struggling with an aging population, stagnant wages, and slow digital transformation.

Each capitalist model has distinct strengths and weaknesses: US capitalism is highly dynamic, fostering innovation and financial dominance but prone to volatility and inequality; German capitalism offers stability and social equity but lacks flexibility; and Japanese capitalism prioritizes long-term stability and industrial coordination but adapts slowly to change. While each system has trade-offs, nations often adjust their models over time. On the other hand, in the modern era, American influence played a significant role in shaping the German and Japanese models, and it is exerting pressure for change in another direction now.

America’s Revival of Japan and Germany

Germany’s assertive expansionism in Europe and Japan’s in Asia, driven by an obsession with becoming a leading global powerhouse during the first half of the 20th century, led both countries into the catastrophe of World War II. However, despite having inflicted severe defeats on them and initially signing humiliating surrender agreements that deeply restricted their rights to self-governance, independence, and sovereignty, the US, which emerged as the new hegemonic power—replacing Britain—did not choose to “punish” these nations after the war, due to the new global power contestations. Throughout the Cold War, the US considered the spread of communism the greatest threat to its hegemony and democracy, capitalism, and the free market economy. In response, it took steps to rebuild Europe, particularly Germany, and in Asia, Japan. By doing so, the US provided both nations a lifeline after the most devastating destruction in their histories, fundamentally changing their fate in favor of democracy and economic development.

Both countries were rebuilt through American economic aid, market access, and security guarantees, which allowed them to focus on economic growth rather than military spending. In terms of Japan, the US contributed to its economic development and industrialization via its post-war economic reconstruction through Marshall Aids, the war boom that came with the Korean War, and access to the US market with a Most Favored Nation status (MFN).

Starting with Japan, first under US occupation, led by General Douglas MacArthur’s SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), Japan’s economic reconstruction period (1945–1952) involved

🛑 Structural reforms like the demilitarization and restructuring of its economy.

🛑Land reforms that redistributed land from landlords to tenant farmers improved agricultural productivity.

🛑 The dissolution of Zaibatsu, large conglomerates that supported Japanese atrocities in Asia, aimed to dismantle industrial monopolies; however, later, keiretsu networks emerged, but this time, contributed to the development of a civilian and trade-oriented economy through the formerly well-established discipline and perseverance.

🛑 Labor reforms promoted unionization and strengthened worker rights. However, that measure was reversed after Japan’s alliance with the US against the expansion of communism in Asia.

🛑 Implementing the Dodge Plan 1949 aimed at fiscal austerity to manage inflation and stabilize Japan’s currency. As a result, the plan established a fixed exchange rate (1 USD = 360 yen), making Japanese exports competitive.  

Second, the measures’ first significant and advantageous outcome emerged during the Korean War Boom (1950–1953), when the US war effort in Korea turned Japan into a vital supply base, leading to rapid industrial growth. In this context, heavy industries (steel, machinery, textiles) thrived as Japan became a supplier of military goods. Moreover, US military protection under the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) freed Japan from defense spending, allowing it to focus entirely on economic growth.  

Third, the expansion of the Japanese production economy, characterized by a strong export focus, extended beyond the market established by the Allied forces in Korea. Notably, the MFN status allowed Japan access to the US market and supported its economic integration from the 1950s to the 1970s. In addition to full access to American markets, which enabled companies like Toyota, Sony, and Honda to grow globally, technology transfers and guidance from US firms helped Japan modernize its industries. Substantial US investment in Japanese sectors facilitated technological upgrades, and by the 1980s, Japan had become the world’s second-largest economy, challenging even the US in some areas. With government-industry coordination (MITI—Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Japan’s Economic Miracle (1955–1980s), focused on export-led growth and high-quality manufacturing, emerged prominently. 

In the case of Germany, first, American support for the war-thorned German economy included the Marshall Plan(1948–1952), which envisaged the disbursement of $1.4 billion (part of Europe’s $13 billion US aid package). The fund helped rebuild factories, roads, and energy infrastructure destroyed during the war. Like Japan, currency reform (1948) helped introduce the Deutsche Mark, replacing the unstable Reichsmark and stabilizing inflation.  

Second, West Germany’s membership in NATO (1955) allowed a US military presence and security umbrella, which meant Germany could spend less on defense and more on industry. The Cold War made West Germany a key US ally, ensuring sustained economic and military aid.  

The third significant contribution stemmed from Germany’s access to the U.S. market. The US encouraged trade with Europe (EEC in 1957, which later became the EU), integrating West Germany into global markets. Moreover, US investments in the German industry strengthened the growth of advanced manufacturing (e.g., Siemens, Volkswagen, BASF).  

Consequently, technological advancements and innovations enabled Germany to become an export powerhouse in manufacturing. They fueled GDP growth at 8–10% annually during the 1950s, culminating in the so-called West German Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder, 1950s–1970s). This era, along with Ludwig Erhard’s free-market policies and US support, led to rising wages and improved living standards. By the 1970s, Germany had emerged as the world’s third-largest economy, boasting robust automobile, machinery, and chemical sectors.

Key Similarities & Differences in US Support for Japan and Germany.

 

The US Impact on specific industries in Japan and Germany

Automobile industry: After World War II, the US played a crucial role in rebuilding and shaping the economies of Japan and West Germany, particularly in industries like automobiles, technology, and finance. This support was driven by Cold War strategy—strengthening allies against communism—and economic pragmatism, ensuring both nations became stable markets and production hubs.  

Technology transfers, quality management, and access to the U.S. market were the three most critical contributions to the automotive industry. Among other factors, introducing modern management and production techniques, such as W. Edwards Deming’s quality control principles, formed the backbone of the Japanese Total Quality Management (TQM) revolution, which enabled Japanese automakers to dominate the global market. Additionally, the US opened its market to Japanese cars, allowing brands like Toyota and Honda to thrive with fuel-efficient, high-quality vehicles, particularly after the 1973 Oil Crisis when American consumers looked for alternatives to fuel-hungry domestic cars. However, Japan’s MFN status almost culminated with the Plaza Accord (1985), when the US pressured Japan to revalue the Yen, making exports more expensive and prompting Japan to establish factories in the US, which led to direct investment and job creation.  

Like Japan, the precise contribution of the US to the automobile industry in Germany originated from the partnership between Daimler-Benz and Ford. Also, American capital and expertise played a pivotal role in revitalizing companies such as Volkswagen, which had fallen into disrepair after WWII. Through transatlantic trade and global expansion, the US emerged as a crucial export destination, allowing German luxury brands like BMW and Mercedes to dominate the premium segment.  

Technology and Electronics: Japan’s electronics giants, such as Sony, Panasonic, and Toshiba, benefited from US military R&D spillovers and Cold War-era procurement. However, the US-Japan trade war in the 1980s later limited their dominance in the semiconductor market. Meanwhile, Germany’s industrial powerhouses, including Siemens and Bosch, regained global market access through US investment, with NATO and defense contracts fueling demand for their precision engineering.

Financial and Banking Sectors: The US tolerated Japan’s keiretsu system, where conglomerates like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were linked to banks, enabling rapid industrialization. However, in the 1980s, it encouraged Japan to deregulate its banking sector, contributing to the asset bubble that burst in the 1990s. Similarly, the U.S. supported Germany’s financial reintegration by promoting Deutsche Bank’s global expansion and stabilizing the Deutsche Mark through the Bretton Woods system, aiding Germany’s integration into the international economy.

In conclusion, US economic support was crucial in transforming Japan and Germany into global industrial powerhouses, with Japan benefiting from technology transfers and market access. At the same time, Germany rebuilt its engineering and manufacturing sectors through US aid. Without US assistance, market access, and security guarantees, neither nation could have industrialized as rapidly post-WWII, highlighting a US-driven framework that still influences their economies today.

However, to understand how Trump and the emerging multipolar world—discussed in the next section—might shape the future of German and Japanese capitalism, it is crucial to recognize that the US approach to these economies reflects both global dynamics and America’s domestic interests. Since the 1980s, especially after the collapse of communism, the US has influenced the economic trajectory of these nations, which it began to see as “systemic rivals,” through trade disputes, financial pressures, and currency interventions. In the evolving, leaderless global order—often referred to as the “New Cold War Era”—changes in US strategy seem inevitable, bringing significant consequences for both Germany and Japan.

Germany and Japan under the Trump Administration and US-less World

Some of the problems and challenges facing the German and Japanese economies will be structural, some conjunctural, and some, it seems, will be Trump-related. Thus, the German and Japanese economies face a mix of common and unique challenges. Both countries struggle with similar demographic issues, such as aging populations and declining birth rates, leading to labor shortages, pressure on social welfare systems, and increasing healthcare costs, all of which impede long-term economic growth. Additionally, both nations face obstacles in modernizing their economies through digital innovation, with Germany contending with outdated infrastructure and excessive bureaucracy. At the same time, Japan wrestles with traditional work cultures and the slow adoption of AI and digital technologies. Furthermore, both economies heavily depend on exports, making them vulnerable to global slowdowns and geopolitical risks—Germany’s reliance on China and Japan’s exposure to US-China tensions exacerbate these vulnerabilities.

However, each country faces its distinct challenges. Germany’s energy crisis—from the shift away from Russian energy and delays in renewable infrastructure—has increased costs, impacting its industrial competitiveness. The transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and high manufacturing expenses have weakened Germany’s position amid fierce competition from China and the US. Meanwhile, bureaucracy hampers innovation, particularly in the public sector and among SMEs. In contrast, Japan is dealing with stagnant wages and deflation, which restrict consumer spending and hinder economic growth. The country also faces high debt levels, with government debt exceeding 250% of GDP, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Additionally, Japan’s dependence on energy imports and raw materials and supply chain vulnerabilities, especially semiconductor disruptions, put its key industries at risk.

With Trump ascending to the presidency for a second time, Germany and Japan are confronted with significant economic and strategic challenges. Their concerns about the Trump administration stem from worries regarding the effects of his protectionist trade policies, geopolitical unpredictability, economic nationalism, and the sidelining of the rule of law in favor of contingency management. Additionally, there is a tendency to exert power and force while ignoring international norms and values.

🛑Trade wars and tariffs caused key economic fears for Germany and Japan. To remind you, Trump previously imposed 25% tariffs on European and Japanese steel and aluminum under national security grounds (Section 232). He has also threatened new tariffs on European and Japanese cars, which could severely hurt Germany’s auto industry (VW, BMW, Mercedes) and Japan’s car exports (Toyota, Honda, Nissan). He has also criticized US trade deficits with both countries, which could lead to harsher trade barriers.  

🛑 The second fear concerns the disruption of global supply chains. Trump’s “America First” policy prioritizes reshoring manufacturing to the US, which could pressure Japanese and German companies to shift production away from their home countries. If Trump weakens or removes from the World Trade Organization (WTO), global trade could become more chaotic and unpredictable.  

🛑 Security concerns are the most common fear in Japan and Germany. Trump has threatened to withdraw the US from NATO, forcing Germany to increase military spending significantly. If US security guarantees weaken, Germany may have to allocate more funds for defense rather than industrial investment. Russia could exploit this security gap, leading to economic instability in Europe. Similarly, Trump has repeatedly criticized Japan for not paying enough for US military protection. If the US reduces its military presence, Japan may have to massively boost defense spending, affecting government budgets and economic growth. 

Potential Economic Scenarios for Germany & Japan Under Trump

Germany and Japan’s Possible Responses

The problems of German and Japanese capitalism go beyond Trump’s negative impact and the rise of the new Cold War era under multipolarity. Germany faces significant structural challenges, including energy dependence, industrial competitiveness, demographic decline, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and gaps in digitalization. Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms, strategic investments, and policy changesto enhance long-term economic resilience and competitiveness.

🛑 The expansion of renewable energy should be accelerated while diversifying LNG and nuclear sources, and industries should support green hydrogen to strengthen energy security and industrial competitiveness.

🛑 Strengthening manufacturing demands increased R&D in AI and semiconductors, support for SMEs and startups, and investment in EV and battery production.

🛑 Addressing labor shortages necessitates streamlined immigration policies, expanded childcare and reskilling programs, and greater adoption of automation.

🛑 Reducing bureaucracy through digital public services, tax reforms, and faster permit approvals will improve business efficiency.

🛑 Finally, accelerating digital transformation with nationwide 5G, AI-driven innovation, and enhanced tech education will elevate Germany’s competitiveness in the global economy.

On the other hand, Japan also faces deep-rooted economic challenges, including an aging population, stagnant wages, deflation, high public debt, slow digital transformation, and supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing these issues requires structural reforms, policy shifts, and innovation-driven strategies to ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 Japan must implement bold reforms to address its structural challenges and ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 To combat labor shortages and demographic decline, it should expand childcare support, streamline immigration policies, and invest in automation and AI.

🛑 Breaking stagnant wages and deflation requires tax incentives for wage growth, stimulating domestic consumption, and maintaining moderate inflation.

🛑 Reducing public debt calls for gradual fiscal consolidation, efficient public spending, and pension reforms.

🛑 Accelerating digital transformation through 5G expansion, AI adoption, and corporate modernization will enhance productivity and innovation.

🛑 Lastly, strengthening supply chains by diversifying energy sources, investing in domestic semiconductor production, and securing trade partnerships will improve economic stability. By tackling these issues, Japan can sustain its global competitiveness and long-term growth.

More recently, Trump has introduced new dimensions to these challenges in both countries. His return has resulted in increased tariffs, trade barriers, and geopolitical instability, putting pressure on the export-driven economies of Germany and Japan. Both nations must diversify trade, invest in strategic industries, and strengthen their regional alliances to reduce economic risks. The following measures and policy recommendations are plausible and foreseeable solutionsregarding conjunctural progress under the Trump administration and multipolarity. 

Strengthen Trade Ties with Other Regions.

🛑 Germany could deepen EU-China trade or increase ties with India and ASEAN.  

🛑 Japan could increase trade with Southeast Asia, Australia, and the EU. 

Accelerate Industrial and Technological Independence

🛑 Reduce reliance on US markets by boosting domestic demand and innovation.  

🛑 Invest in digital industries, AI, and green tech to diversify economies.  

Strategic Military and Security Adjustments

🛑 Germany may increase defense budgets and push for greater EU military cooperation.  

🛑 Japan may develop stronger regional security partnerships (e.g., with Australia, India, and South Korea).  

Conclusion

The resurgence of “Trumpism 2.0” and the evolving multipolar world are reshaping global capitalism, posing significant challenges for German and Japanese economic models. Historically shaped by American influence, both nations now face increasing pressure from protectionist policies, geopolitical uncertainty, and domestic structural issues. While Germany grapples with energy dependence, digital transformation, and industrial competitiveness, Japan contends with demographic decline, deflation, and technological adaptation. 

To navigate these shifts, both countries must pursue strategic diversification to navigate these shifts—strengthening trade alliances beyond the US, investing in innovation and industrial resilience, and adapting security strategies to new geopolitical realities. 

The coming years will test their ability to maintain economic stability and global influence amid rising fragmentation. However, this era of disruption also presents opportunities for transformation, pushing Germany and Japan toward greater economic autonomy and leadership in a rapidly changing world.

Dr. Eric Beinhocker, Executive Director of INET Oxford and Professor of Public Policy Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford.

Prof. Beinhocker: Populist Politicians Exploit the ‘Psychology of Broken Contracts’ to Gain Political Traction

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a time of rising populism, Professor Eric Beinhocker explains how populist leaders capitalize on economic grievances and social distrust to fuel their movements. “When people feel the system is unfair and rigged, they seek someone to blame,” he says, pointing out how populists exploit feelings of broken social contracts to gain political traction. According to him, trade wars and economic nationalism further exacerbate global instability. “No country can make an iPhone alone,” Professor Beinhocker states, stressing that interconnected supply chains make protectionism self-destructive. Tariffs and trade barriers, he warns, will “lower living standards and harm American competitiveness” rather than protect workers. This insightful discussion unpacks the economic forces fueling populism and the fragility of global trade.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era of rising political polarization and populist movements across the globe, the erosion of trust in institutions has become a defining challenge for democracies. In an intriguing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Eric Beinhocker, Executive Director of INET Oxford and Professor of Public Policy Practice at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford, discusses how populist politicians leverage the breakdown of the social contract to fuel political movements. He introduces the concept of the “psychology of broken contracts” as a key factor in the rise of populism, arguing that when people perceive a fundamental violation of fairness, “some of our strongest emotions arise from fairness violations,” leading to anger, resentment, and a desire to strike back—a phenomenon that populist leaders exploit.

According to Professor Beinhocker, the modern economy has undergone major shifts since the 1970s, particularly in Western democracies, where working-class citizens and those outside major metropolitan centers increasingly feel “the system isn’t working for them—that it is unfair, rigged, and benefits others at their expense.” He argues that these perceived injustices—whether economic or political—create fertile ground for populist rhetoric, which provides “a clear enemy,” often framed as elites, immigrants, or individuals outside of one’s identity group. Populist politicians, he explains, thrive on these grievances, “preying on and exploiting the psychology of broken contracts to gain political traction.”

A crucial factor accelerating this process, Professor Beinhocker contends, is the role of social media. While he does not see it as the primary cause of populism, he acknowledges its role in intensifying moral outrage. “Social media algorithms quickly identify that the content generating the most engagement is that which triggers moral outrage,” he explains, reinforcing tribal identities and making “resetting these emotions incredibly difficult.” Populist leaders capitalize on this dynamic, using divisive narratives to deepen distrust in institutions and erode democratic norms.

To counteract these trends, Professor Beinhocker suggests that restoring trust requires rebuilding fairness and re-establishing a strong social contract. He argues that past leadership, such as Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal, demonstrated how governments can “reset the social contract” through economic reforms, symbolic policies, and direct engagement with public concerns. However, he warns that “merely talking about trust is not enough—people need to experience fairness and institutional accountability.”

This interview provides a thought-provoking analysis of the intersection between economic shifts, political trust, and the psychology of populism, offering essential insights for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Eric Beinhocker with some edits.

Trust Erodes When the Social Contract Is Broken

A fatigued factory worker.
A fatigued factory worker experiencing exhaustion, weakness, hopelessness, and burnout. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Beinhocker, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your article “Trust, Populism and the Psychology of Broken Contracts,” you argue that over the last few years, there has been a worrying decline in faith by the citizens of many countries that institutions, including government and the media, are doing what is right. Can you explain the reasons why trust in institutions has eroded?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: I think a good starting point is that our relationships with key institutions like employers and governments are not just economic in terms of costs and benefits, as economists often think of them, but also emotional.

We can think of people as having a social contract with these institutions. I contribute work to my employer, follow their rules and norms, and, in exchange, I receive pay, along with other benefits such as status, social connections, and security. So, there is a two-way deal—a contract between people and institutions.

When people feel that this deal has been broken or violated in some way—what I call the psychology of broken contracts—they perceive fairness as being violated. Some of our strongest emotions arise from fairness violations. Psychologists have shown that this response is deeply biophysical—hormones flood the brain and body, triggering feelings of anger, resentment, and a sense of being taken advantage of. This emotional response can even override rational, thoughtful parts of the brain. Research also shows that people will sometimes strike back in ways that harm themselves, simply to restore a sense of fairness. There is an evolutionary explanation for this: enforcing norms of group cooperation is essential for social stability.

My interpretation of the rise of populism is that it stems from this reaction. Over the past few decades—beginning as far back as the 1970s in the US and parts of Europe—we have seen major changes to the social contract. People’s sense of what they contribute to society versus what they receive in return, particularly among working-class citizens and those with less education, has been disrupted. Many people outside of the large, prosperous cities feel that the system is not working for them—that it is unfair, rigged, and benefits others at their expense.

Often, these “others” are defined as people outside one’s identity group—those of different ethnic or religious backgrounds, immigrants, or elites in big cities with different cultural values. Populist politicians have exploited and preyed on this psychology, using it to fuel their narratives and gain political traction.

What is the relationship between the rise of populism and the lack of trust in institutions?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: When you feel that fairness has been violated, when you feel that the terms of the deal you had have been broken, you lose trust. This is very corrosive, both economically and politically, because our economic and political systems run on trust. They rely on the cooperation of millions of strangers—non-family members—working together in organizations and institutions. If we don’t have trust and that cooperation breaks down, our ability to function effectively is eroded, whether in economic or political spheres.

I argue in my work that at the core of restoring trust is the need to restore fairness and balance. People need to see and feel that they are getting a fair deal and that their expectations are being met. If we look back to Franklin Roosevelt and the Great Depression in the US, I think he understood this psychology very well. The New Deal was an explicit effort to reset the social contract, recalibrate people’s expectations, and, through concrete actions and lived experiences, rebuild trust.

You can’t rebuild trust just by talking about it—although language does play an important role—but rather through what people actually experience.

Fairness Violations Fuel Populism and Tribal Politics

Illustration by Ulker Design.

You argue that the ‘emotions of fairness violation’ may be playing a role in shaping politics and society today, which might be ‘the deeper and more universal explanation for the rise of populism,’ and add that highly emotional, seemingly irrational reactions have an underlying logic to them. Can you elaborate on this underlying logic?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: Well, first—and I’m sure you are studying this at the center—one striking thing about the rise of populism is how it has happened almost simultaneously across a number of quite different countries, economies, and even political systems. And even though the US and (Donald) Trump are getting a lot of attention today, this phenomenon has occurred in countries as diverse as India, Brazil, and Central European nations.

So, we have to ask: what are the more universal phenomena that might be driving this? This is where I come to an explanation at the intersection of economics, politics, and psychology, where changes in the economic and political environment have triggered these psychological reactions of fairness violation, which have then been easy prey for populist politicians.

Another universal phenomenon has been the change in the media landscape, particularly the rise of social media. While I don’t see it as a primary causal factor, it has clearly acted as an accelerant. When feelings of fairness violation occur, they trigger a form of moral outrage. Social media algorithms quickly identify that the content generating the most engagement is that which triggers moral outrage—it gets shared the most and garners the highest interaction, making it the most profitable. This creates a strong incentive for social media companies to fan the flames of these emotions.

Psychology research also shows that when people experience these emotions, it is very difficult to reset them. People literally stop listening when they are in this mode, and they tend to bond together tribally. If you feel wronged, or that someone has broken a deal with you, you become more powerful when you find others who feel the same way and work together to correct things.

To mitigate these responses and change the political landscape, political leaders first need to acknowledge these feelings and the realities behind them. In many center-left parties in the US and Europe, there has been a tendency to either tell people what is good for them or focus on issues that do not necessarily address their core concerns. Second, once these problems are acknowledged with empathy, leaders must credibly work on solutions to rebuild trust.

Populists Exploit Grievances to Deepen Identity-Based Divisions

Why do you think ‘identity-based tribalism’ and ‘inter-group conflict’ have increasingly gone up? Can you explain the link between the economic contract and the political contract and how the breakdown of these contracts plays into the hands of populists?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: As I mentioned, it’s a natural reaction. When people feel they are being treated unfairly by a system or that their trust has been violated, they look for people like them to team up with, strike back, avenge the harm, and try to reset the balance of the deal.

Social media has played an important role in helping people who feel this way find each other. The evidence I’ve seen suggests that many of the changes driving these feelings—such as shifts in employment, income levels, job security, and the role of the welfare state—have been affecting people for a long time. However, in the past, individuals may have felt these concerns in isolation. Someone might have worried about their job security, questioned whether their skills would remain relevant without a university education, or wondered whether their children would have opportunities in a declining area.

Previously, these concerns might have been personal and disconnected. But the internet has allowed people to find others experiencing the same anxieties, making them realize they are not alone. There is also a natural tendency to seek solidarity with those who share an identity group. For instance, white male working-class voters have been a prominent base of support for populists across multiple countries, as they have coalesced around shared grievances and a sense of being left behind. Populists have been highly skilled at linking these emotions with the need for identity and solidarity, capitalizing on the breakdown of both economic and political contracts.

You argue that when the social contract is broken, it is very hard to put the moral outrage genie back in the bottle, yet you give the example of the US as a successful case of containing social outrage. What should Europe do to combat the rise of far-right populism?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: I meant that the US historically, in the 1930s, was a successful case through Roosevelt and the New Deal. Whether it will be successful in putting the genie back in the bottle this time remains to be seen. Right now, the genie is very much out of the bottle in the US, and looking at all the results we’re seeing, the challenge is significant.

If we look at cases where social cohesion has been rebuilt, more research is needed because there have only been a few cases I’ve examined, and nothing systematic. However, what seems to happen is, first, leaders must express real empathy with the emotions involved—not deny them but acknowledge the real causes behind them and understand the people expressing them. Then, they need to outline a pragmatic path forward to restore fairness, rebuild the social contract, and address specific issues.

Sometimes, symbolic actions play a key role in demonstrating a commitment to recovery. For example, Roosevelt’s public works programs during the Great Depression, while large in scale, were not enough on their own to lift the country out of the depression. However, they had a huge symbolic impact in showing that Roosevelt and the government cared and were actively working to address these problems and restore people’s sense of mutual commitment with their government.

I think we need to think creatively about identifying the real underlying issues and what can practically be done to address them. However, the current environment presents a much greater challenge than Roosevelt’s time. The influence of social media has significantly eroded trust in basic ideas of truth and facts. That is a challenge we will need to figure out how to overcome.

The Clean Energy Transition Needs Global Cooperation and Capital

Aerial drone view of a hybrid solar and wind farm in Bannister, NSW, Australia, featuring large wind turbines in the background generating renewable clean energy on a sunny day. Photo: Steve Tritton.

Many clean energy transitions are happening in wealthier nations, while developing countries struggle with financing. What global financial mechanisms or cooperation strategies can ensure a just and inclusive transition? Are we on track for a sustainable and inclusive green transition?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: These are very important questions. A colleague and I at Oxford recently published a piece in The Wall Street Journal arguing that the clean energy transition now has significant momentum, and that the economics and technology behind it are very promising. Even if Trump is re-elected and takes an anti-clean energy stance, he is unlikely to stop the transition entirely—he might slow it down in the US, but at a global level, clean energy technologies will continue to grow.

Despite the fact that these energy sources are now cheaper than fossil fuels in many cases and are getting even cheaper as technology improves, they remain highly capital-intensive. Wealthier countries are increasingly finding ways to mobilize capital to make these investments and accelerate the transition.

However, as you point out, access to capital remains a major issue in developing countries. The shift to clean energy in many of these nations would be highly beneficial both economically and environmentally, yet the capital needed to make this transition is not being mobilized, even though these investments would be positive over time.

For a long time, the proposed solution has been global-level action through the UN process, development banks, and aid agencies. However, this has been a slow and cumbersome political process, and developing countries argue—rightfully so—that the promised capital flows have not materialized. Given the current environment of low global cooperation, particularly with the political situation in the US, I am not optimistic that this will improve significantly in the near term.

That said, perhaps a “coalition of the willing” among certain countries could take steps to improve the situation. The best answer, in my view, is to find ways to attract private capital to these countries and projects. Governments and multilateral organizations can play a crucial role in de-risking private capital flows, and there are various mechanisms to do this. My hope is that as the economics of clean energy technologies continue to improve, we can lower some of the barriers that currently prevent private capital from seeing the opportunities for clean energy investment in developing countries.

Trump’s Trade Policies Could Disrupt Global Supply Chains and Undermine Climate Cooperation

With Trump previously withdrawing from the Paris Agreement, how will his return to office impact global cooperation on initiatives like the Breakthrough Agenda? Will he further undermine international climate agreements?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: It’s clearly not good for international cooperation on climate. But my sense, from talking to folks in that field, is that we made it through the last Trump administration on these issues. While his return may slow things down and cause harm in some areas, we will make it through again. 

The US is an important player in these forums, but it is certainly not the only one. Other countries will need to find ways to keep the momentum going. The good news is that the economic and technological trends behind clean energy provide some tailwinds to support those efforts.

Given Trump’s second-term policies, how would a renewed “America First” approach impact global trade and climate initiatives, particularly in relation to tariffs on China, withdrawal from international agreements like the Paris Accord, and protectionist policies? How might these trade policies affect efforts like the Breakthrough Agenda, which aims to drive down clean energy costs?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: There was a piece by Tom Friedman in The New York Times several weeks ago where he interviewed me on Trump’s tariff plans. I think the part that hasn’t been discussed enough is that, of course, added tariffs increase costs and frictions on trade, reducing trade flows and raising costs for consumers—those are well-known effects. But what has been less appreciated in the analyses of the damage they will cause is just how interconnected global supply chains are.

It’s not like the old days, back in Adam Smith’s time, where one country makes wine, another makes cheese, and trade simply makes both better off. In the modern economy, I can’t even make the wine, and you can’t make the cheese without each other because so many inputs, machines, and supplies come from global supply chains. As I said in that article, no country on earth can make an iPhone alone. There’s probably no country that can make a modern jet aircraft, an automobile, or even many agricultural products without access to global supply chains.

Farmers today get their seeds from one country, fertilizer inputs from another, machinery from yet another, and so on. These trade wars and frictions may result in some restructuring of supply chains, but mostly, they will create difficulties in producing complex products, increase costs, and lower living standards for everyone. They will also severely hurt American competitiveness.

Trump believes that imposing these barriers will increase production in the US, but when you talk to the companies involved—like automakers—they will tell you they cannot operate in a country with these kinds of barriers. They rely on a global supply chain, and if they face trade restrictions, they will simply move production elsewhere to avoid these barriers. It seems quite unambiguous that these policies will be harmful—not just to the global economy, but significantly to US workers, consumers, and overall competitiveness.

Trump’s Tax Cuts Enriched the Wealthy While Exacerbating Inequality and Deficit

Demonstrators gather at the US Capitol on President’s Day to protest the actions of President Trump’s administration and billionaire Elon Musk in Washington, D.C., on February 17, 2025. Photo: Rena Schild.

Your work discusses the need to rethink economic welfare. How might Trump’s tax cuts for corporations and de-regulation affect economic resilience, especially for those most vulnerable to climate change? Could Trump’s fiscal and monetary policies worsen economic inequality and climate vulnerability?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: On the question of the Trump tax cuts, which they are looking to extend in this current congressional session, we actually now have several years of evidence on what the first Trump tax cuts did to the economy. The findings from those analyses are quite clear—they did very little to spur actual investment in productive assets.

The money that corporations received from those tax cuts largely went into stock buybacks, which inflated stock prices and enriched shareholders and CEOs, further exacerbating inequality while doing very little for average people.

Additionally, the tax cuts massively increased the deficit—likely the largest non-wartime increase in the US deficit in history, if I am remembering correctly. It was essentially a huge giveaway to the wealthiest, with minimal benefits for everyone else. Given that evidence, we would expect a renewal of those tax cuts to produce a similar outcome.

At the same time, while cutting taxes for corporations and the wealthy, they are simultaneously slashing other parts of the government. As a result, Americans will see critical services they rely on—such as veterans’ services, healthcare, education, and infrastructure—deteriorate.

Some economists anticipate that the combination of these tax cuts, trade wars, and changes in fiscal policy could lead to a very problematic mix of inflationary pressures and economic stagnation for the US economy.

Global Economic Fragmentation Is the Most Likely Scenario for the Foreseeable Future

And lastly, Professor Beinhocker, trade tensions, economic nationalism, and supply chain disruptions have led to “de-globalization” discussions. Is globalization in decline, and what are the consequences? Do you see a permanent shift toward regional economic blocs, or will globalization find new forms?

Professor Eric Beinhocker: What I would like to see is a kind of smart globalization. I haven’t—I’ve been a critic of the 1980s and 1990s neoliberal model of globalization, which essentially threw open the doors and let the chips fall where they may. We have seen that this approach has produced very mixed results.

On the one hand, globalization has led to increased trade and investment worldwide, yielding many positive benefits, such as helping developing countries and lifting millions out of poverty, particularly in China and other parts of the world. On the other hand, it has also had negative impacts on workers in certain sectors and regions of the US, Europe, and elsewhere.

Moreover, we need to be realistic about the geopolitical and security risks associated with the type of globalization we have had. COVID-19 exposed the vulnerabilities of supply chains that rely too heavily on a single country or supplier. Additionally, geopolitical tensions present risks if, for example, the US is entirely dependent on critical technologies from certain countries.

I believe there is a middle ground between the neoliberal “throw open the doors” approach and the Trump-era strategy of raising trade barriers. We should seek the benefits of globalization and global supply chains while also being strategic about diversification and forming trade relationships with reliable partners.

Janet Yellen, Biden’s Treasury Secretary, gave an insightful speech on this topic, advocating for what she called “friend-shoring”—strengthening trade relationships with the US’s allies and partners. Additionally, trade policies should consider the interests of workers, environmental protections, and broader societal concerns, rather than solely prioritizing corporate profits.

There are smarter ways to approach trade, and the Biden administration was making steps in that direction. Unfortunately, that is not the trajectory we are currently on. In the near term, it seems inevitable that trade will become more fragmented into regional blocs.

I was just listening to a report on how China has responded to Trump’s tariffs by lowering trade barriers with a large group of developing countries, attempting to form its own trading bloc with nations across Asia and other regions. Unfortunately, this kind of economic fragmentation appears to be the most likely scenario for the foreseeable future.

Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University.

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: A Democratic Revival Is Always Possible

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Despite recognizing the difficulties brought by growing authoritarianism, Dr. Roberto S. Foa of Cambridge University maintains a measured optimism regarding the prospects for democratic renewal. He highlights historical patterns of democratization and shifts in public opinion—such as those triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency—as indications that democratic principles can regain strength in response to perceived threats. However, he cautions against generalized solutions, stressing that each democracy grapples with distinct institutional and political hurdles that demand context-specific strategies for revitalization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The resilience of democracy in the face of mounting global challenges has become one of the most pressing questions of our time. As populist leaders continue to gain traction, democratic norms erode, and authoritarian tendencies rise, many scholars and policymakers are left wondering whether these trends signal a long-term shift or a temporary setback in the cyclical evolution of governance. Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa, Assistant Professor in Politics and Public Policy at Cambridge University, has dedicated his research to understanding the dynamics of democratic deconsolidation and the conditions necessary for democratic renewal.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Foa provides a nuanced perspective on whether the recent wave of democratic backsliding—evident in both Western and emerging democracies—represents an irreversible decline or a phase within a broader historical pattern. He highlights the importance of distinguishing between informal and formal democratic norms, explaining how social media, populist rhetoric, and political polarization have eroded basic principles of civility and accountability. However, he also underscores the resilience of institutions, particularly in Western Europe, where robust political frameworks have mitigated some of the more extreme consequences of democratic decline.

A key theme in this conversation is the role of economic hardship and cultural grievances in shaping voter behavior, particularly among younger generations. Dr. Foa explores how disillusionment with mainstream politics can lead to either political apathy or support for more radical alternatives, including both left-wing and right-wing populist movements. At the same time, he argues that traditional political parties must adapt to these shifting dynamics by engaging in meaningful reform, rather than relying on outdated strategies to counteract the appeal of extremist factions.

While acknowledging the challenges posed by rising authoritarianism, Dr. Foa remains cautiously optimistic about the potential for democratic revival. He points to historical cycles of democratization, as well as recent public opinion shifts following events such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the Trump presidency, as evidence that democratic values can reassert themselves in reaction to perceived threats. Ultimately, he warns against simplistic, one-size-fits-all solutions, emphasizing that each democracy faces unique structural and political challenges that require tailored approaches to renewal.

This interview provides a thought-provoking analysis of the current state of democracy and the pathways available for its restoration. It is an essential read for scholars, policymakers, and citizens alike who seek to understand the evolving nature of political power in the 21st century.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Roberto Stefan Foa with some edits.

From Democratic Apathy to Democratic Antipathy Among Youths

A group of multicultural, peaceful activists sit outside, holding hands and displaying posters in a demonstration against climate change. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Foa, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your research on democratic deconsolidation, you highlight a decline in public support for democracy in developed nations. Do you see this trend accelerating with the second Trump presidency and with the recent surge of far-right parties in Europe?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, not necessarily. I think, in some ways, what we’ve seen since Trump took office in January is that there has actually been a reaction in some countries, and that’s been quite clear. If you look, for example, at the polling of Poirier in Canada. Since then, if you look at the situation here in the UK, regarding Farage’s Reform Party and public support for them, I think you’ve actually seen, to some extent, an inoculating effect.

But whether that continues really depends a lot on the example that the Trump presidency sets—whether it gets mired in deeper and deeper difficulties on the economic side, in pushing forward its domestic reform agenda, in conflicts with the courts or the bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., and in its difficulties to date in delivering on Trump’s promises of peace in the Middle East and in Ukraine. So, I think that’s still very much to be seen.

How do you explain the paradox where younger generations in some countries lean toward populist movements while in others they disengage from politics altogether?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I don’t think there’s a paradox at all. In fact, I would describe it as a two-step process. In the first phase, in some countries, younger generations become disconnected or disillusioned with mainstream politics. This manifests in lower membership in traditional political parties, reduced electoral turnout, and declining interest in politics—what could be termed democratic apathy.

If this disengagement deepens, it can escalate into what might be called democratic antipathy. In such cases, younger generations—particularly young men in the United States and many parts of Continental Europe—become more inclined to support extremist parties, including populist movements on both the left and the right.

The Erosion of Informal Norms and the Failure of Traditional Parties

Given your research on public opinion and authoritarian resilience, how do you assess the impact of far-right leaders on democratic norms and political polarization in Europe and the US​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Well, I think these are very different contexts. However, there is one common factor between Europe and the US in how democratic norms have shifted, and that is primarily on the informal side. When populist movements, whether from the left or the right, gain prominence, we often see challenges to basic norms—civility in debate, truthfulness in politics, and accountability for mistakes in political life. These informal norms have eroded in many countries.

In terms of more formal threats to democracy—such as respect for free and fair elections, acceptance of electoral outcomes, intimidation, declining electoral integrity, or the politicization of the judiciary, courts, and civil service—we see these issues more prominently in the US than in Europe, particularly Western Europe. There are specific reasons for this. The political institutions in many parts of Western Europe tend to be more robust, making them more resistant to such erosion.

Does the rise of populist leaders across Western Europe and North America signal a failure of traditional political parties in responding to economic and cultural grievances?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think it signifies a failure of traditional political parties in responding to voter demands and concerns. That is almost true by definition—whenever new political parties break through, whether they are populist or not, whether they are right-wing, left-wing, or centrist, it clearly signals some failure in the existing party system to deliver what voters are demanding.

Now, whether that is a result of economic and cultural grievances, I think there are many different factors at play. Clearly, in some countries and among certain constituencies, there have been unaddressed economic grievances. Similarly, there have been unaddressed cultural grievances, particularly in Europe regarding immigration. However, I do not think there is a generalized thesis that applies across all countries regarding the specific types of grievances at play.

The Erosion of Accountability in the Age of Social Media

 

How significant is the role of social media and digital platforms in fueling democratic deconsolidation, and are these platforms more influential than traditional media​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Okay, I’ll take that one at a time. Yes, I think the rise of social media has had a significant effect, but I would say that its impact is largely limited to the informal norms of democratic life and competition.

It used to be the case that strong media gatekeepers held politicians accountable. If a politician was caught in a corruption scandal or, like Trump, taken to court and found guilty of an offense, there was no way around it. The only option was to acknowledge the fault, take responsibility, resign if necessary, and move on.

In the social media environment we live in now, however, that is no longer the optimal strategy. Trump’s approach to politics is a great example of this. It has become much more effective to double down, continue denying accusations, and keep shifting the conversation from one topic to another—something Trump is particularly skilled at doing on social media. And, of course, Trump is not the only example. Many populist politicians have adopted similar strategies on social media, which has eroded some informal democratic norms, particularly around truthfulness, civility, and responsibility in public life.

However, I do not believe social media is to blame for democratic deconsolidation in terms of the erosion of formal institutions. When we see threats to judicial independence or harassment of civil society activists, I do not attribute that to social media. That is a separate issue and something that does not occur in every country.

A Cycle of Democratic Erosion with No Clear Limits

Your research on America’s shift from “clean” to “dirty” democracy suggests a weakening of democratic norms​. How would a second Trump term impact democratic institutions in the US and beyond?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think in the US, it’s clear—we are already seeing these trends unfold. As you referenced, my article was about understanding these developments as part of a longer-term process. The United States has been on this trajectory for more than a generation, where both Republicans and, in some cases, Democrats have attempted to change the rules of the game to gain partisan advantage. This includes the breakdown of bipartisan consensus over the political neutrality of Supreme Court appointments and the excessive politicization of the judiciary and civil service.

This shift has contributed to increased polarization, which in turn fuels the next cycle of democratic erosion. If you look at the current Trump presidency, it is evident that there are virtually no limits to what Trump is prepared to do. His administration has been planning for quite some time—through initiatives like Project 2025—to implement sweeping changes. This includes placing pressure on senior civil servants and, in many cases, firing those who are perceived as bureaucratic obstacles within the federal government. Many of these individuals were seen as sources of resistance during Trump’s first term when they attempted to uphold institutional norms.

This process is clearly already in motion, and it will undoubtedly continue at least until the midterms. Even if Republicans do not win the midterms, Trump will still control the executive branch, meaning these trends will likely persist beyond that point.

Outside the US, I do not see this process occurring in exactly the same way. Every country has its own unique political dynamics. For example, in Israel, there have been intense debates over attempts to curtail judicial independence. While democratic backsliding is a concern in multiple contexts, the US remains the primary focus and the number one concern right now.

Europe May Step Up as the US Steps Back

EU flags in EU Council building during the EU Summit in Brussels, Belgium on June 28, 2018. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How will second Trump presidency affect international organizations like NATO, the EU, and the UN, which traditionally promote democratic norms?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I actually don’t think the effect will be as large as people currently believe or fear it may be. The major impact will be on the United States’ direct influence, which is quite clear—for example, eliminating USAID, canceling democracy promotion programs, and withdrawing US support for liberal internationalism.

However, I don’t believe that an organization like the European Union will be negatively affected in its own capacity to promote democracy. If anything, the opposite is more likely—there will probably be an increase in European solidarity and a greater effort by the EU to take on some of the programs that the US discards. We can already see this in direct support for Ukraine, provided both by European countries and the United Kingdom, including military aid. If US support declines, European countries may be required to increase their contributions in the coming year to compensate.

On the international level, I don’t think Trump’s presidency will have as significant an influence as some fear. The United Nations, however, is a different case. If the Trump administration truly follows through on pulling US funding for the UN, that would present a major problem, given that the US is one of its largest financial contributors. This could create a substantial funding gap. However, what we have seen so far is a trend where other Western democracies step up to fill the void.

Far-Right Unity Is More Myth Than Reality

Given Trump’s anti-globalist stance, what impact do you expect on global democratic solidarity movements or efforts to counter authoritarianism?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think that will vary depending on the region. Within Europe, where democratic values are already well embedded and the public strongly supports international democratic solidarity, I see less of a threat. In fact, as I mentioned earlier, in Europe, the reaction has largely been to step up and fill the gaps left by the US.

However, in emerging democracies, the situation is quite different. The United States has historically provided significant bilateral support to civil society movements and political actors working to protect and advance democratic norms in many parts of the Global South. In these regions, the withdrawal of US support poses a much greater threat to democratic consolidation and resilience.

But we see a broader alignment between right-wing populist leaders globally, where Trump serves as a rallying figure for European far-right movements?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: No, no. I think this is something that is frequently misunderstood. When conducting comparative analysis across countries or examining international relations, terms like “populism” and “far-right” need to be unpacked, as they encompass a wide range of movements with differing interests that do not always align—nor do they necessarily align with Donald Trump’s agenda in the United States.

For example, within Europe, since Trump’s election, we see leaders like Giorgia Meloni in Italy largely adhering to the European line. This was already the case under Biden, particularly regarding her policy on Ukraine. Even though she personally has connections with figures like Elon Musk and Trump, she has had to navigate Italy’s commitments carefully, including apologizing for the country’s potential withdrawal from certain international agreements.

So, I would not assume there is an automatic far-right international unity. These movements are often driven more by national interests and political differences within their respective countries, making them quite disparate.

Economic Struggles Are Reshaping Youth Political Behavior

Prices of fruit and vegetables in stores: A woman holds euro banknotes against the backdrop of a vegetable stand at a local market. Photo: Andrzej Rostek.

In your study on youth and populism, you argue that economic hardship fuels support for radical movements​. Given the cost-of-living crisis in Europe, do you anticipate a further shift of young voters toward far-right parties?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I think there could be a further shift. It may not necessarily be driven solely by the cost-of-living crisis, but economic factors certainly play a role. For younger generations right now, there is already evidence of economic struggles, particularly in the job market.

With automation and the replacement of jobs through AI, we are already seeing—and will continue to see—these challenges affecting younger generations as they try to establish themselves, pay off debts, secure employment, find housing, and move forward in life.

It is very clear that in countries where these challenges have been acute for a long period—such as France, Greece, and Italy—disillusionment among younger generations began much earlier, 20 to 30 years ago. I would anticipate that similar trends will continue in the US and the UK, where, until now, economic conditions for younger generations had not been seen as quite so dire.

How does the rise of nationalist-populist parties in Europe (e.g., AfD in Germany, Rassemblement National in France) affect the future of the EU and democratic cooperation​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Again, I would say it really depends on the party. When looking at far-right parties, I always distinguish between different factions. You have the ultra-conservative far right, which in the European Parliament is represented by the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) faction. This includes parties like the Conservative Party in the UK and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. These parties are actually quite pro-Western in their outlook, certainly very Atlanticist in their foreign policy platform. Their fundamental beliefs and views are a continuation of Cold War-era conservatism, structured around social conservatism, tradition, and national sovereignty. Ultimately, they may pose less of a threat to Western solidarity.

The far-right faction I see as most damaging is what I would call the mercantilist populist right. Trump is a prime example of this, as is Orbán in Hungary, and Erdogan in Turkey has increasingly adopted this approach in his international engagements. These leaders view the world through a purely mercantilist lens, focusing on national self-interest and short-term leverage—whether in trade, aid, or diplomatic concessions. As a result, they are quite willing to undermine EU solidarity, Western alliances, or NATO commitments for immediate political or economic gains. This is something we frequently see with Orbán, who consistently seeks to extract concessions at EU summits.

That said, I would not categorize either Rassemblement National (RN) in France or Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany within this mercantilist populist category.

Centrist Politicians Can Learn from Populist Challengers

In your view, what strategies should centrist parties adopt to counteract the far-right’s rise, particularly in countries with increasing voter disillusionment?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: It really depends on the country. In cases where there are proportional representation systems and coalition politics, the far right can sometimes be defused by including them as a minor party within a coalition. I know that this is a controversial stance, as many people support the idea of a cordon sanitaire and believe that far-right parties should never be given even a single ministry in government. However, this approach has been used in Denmark and Austria over time, and in some cases, the experience of governing has actually weakened these parties. A taste of power often delegitimizes them—holding office makes them accountable for scandals, forces them to take responsibility for government actions, and compels them to moderate their positions to remain in the coalition. As a result, they must justify more centrist policies to their voters.

However, this strategy only works in political systems with proportional representation and coalition politics. It is a different situation in presidential systems like the United States or France, or majoritarian systems like the UK,where a far-right party could potentially gain majority power with only a minority of the vote. In these cases, centrist parties must focus on winning elections outright rather than attempting to contain the far right within coalitions.

Looking at successful cases, Macron in France provides an interesting example. He understood the collapse in support for the Socialist Party and recognized that he could position himself as an anti-establishment challenger from the center. By creating a new party and engaging in what was not quite a populist style but certainly a highly personalist political approach, he successfully revived the center and has remained in power for two terms so far. This suggests that centrist politicians can learn from populist challengers, particularly in terms of adopting new styles of political engagement.

No Permanent Shift Toward Illiberalism

Does the rise of authoritarianism in countries like Hungary and other Central European countries indicate a long-term shift, or do you see the possibility of democratic revival​?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: Yes, there is always the possibility of a democratic revival. When discussing democratic backsliding, especially in a global context, there is often a pessimistic view that this decline started around 2005 or 2006—depending on the measure used, such as Freedom House rankings—and has only worsened over time. However, these processes tend to be cyclical. I have long believed that another democratic wave or a restoration of belief in liberal democratic values is possible at some point.

In fact, we have already seen some evidence of this. Earlier in our conversation, we discussed the Trump effect—how witnessing democratic erosion in the United States has led citizens in other countries to reconsider similar political trajectories. Similarly, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, public opinion data showed what could be described as a rally for democracy effect. Across Western countries, there was an increase in support for NATO, Western solidarity, and even liberal democracy—not a dramatic shift, but a noticeable one, particularly on the left. So, I absolutely believe that democratic revival remains a possibility.

Are we witnessing a permanent shift toward illiberal governance, or do you see democracy rebounding in the long run?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: I certainly don’t think there is ever a permanent shift in politics. Politics is not kind to those who predict permanent shifts of any kind. I do believe there is a cyclical nature to these trends. Democratization has historically occurred in waves, and we could see another wave at some point—that is always a possibility. Perhaps that is even the lesson of history in some broader sense. So no, I absolutely do not see any kind of permanent shift toward illiberalism. There is always a contest.

No One-Size-Fits-All Solution to Strengthening Democracy

And lastly, Professor Foa, if you could advise policymakers on one crucial reform to strengthen democracy, what would it be?

Dr. Roberto S. Foa: You know, Tolstoy famously said that “all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” I think the same is true for democracies. Stable democracies—like Iceland, Switzerland, or Norway—tend to share similar characteristics. However, failing democracies each have their own unique problems.

These challenges vary: in some cases, the most urgent need might be electoral reform; in others, it could be campaign finance reform—particularly in the United States, where the to-do list is quite long. In some situations, strengthening the independence of the judiciary and civil service or ending clientelism is crucial. So, while every democracy has its own set of necessary reforms, I wouldn’t say there is a one-size-fits-all solution.