This commentary examines the tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven growth, drawing on the insights of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. Their research highlights that sustainable prosperity relies on creative destruction, institutional openness, and freedom of inquiry. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these conditions by eroding pluralism, legal stability, and academic autonomy. Using comparative cases such as China, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk shows how populist regimes politicize innovation systems, stifling long-term productivity. The essay concludes that innovation is not merely economic—it is institutional, cultural, and democratic. Without inclusive institutions and free knowledge systems, technological progress becomes extractive rather than transformative.
This commentary explores the fundamental tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven economic growth, drawing on the work of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. These scholars emphasize the critical role of knowledge, institutions, and creative destruction in fostering sustainable growth. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these pillars by eroding institutional openness, pluralism, and policy stability. Combining their contributions with insights from economists like Acemoglu and North, this commentary underlines that technological progress without institutional freedom becomes extractive rather than transformative. Innovation, therefore, is not solely an economic process—it is profoundly institutional, cultural, and democratic.
Innovation Ecosystems and the Foundations of Long-Term Growth
The awarding of the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economics to Mokyr, Aghion, and Howitt comes at a pivotal moment, as authoritarian populism gains ground globally, including in liberal democracies like the United States and across Europe. This recognition is more than an academic endorsement; it serves as a warning against the populist trajectory—and as a call to reaffirm the institutional foundations necessary for long-term, inclusive prosperity. Together, these laureates have transformed our understanding of how innovation drives growth and why it depends critically on inclusive, resilient institutions.
Joel Mokyr provides a historical and cultural framework, arguing that technological advancement arises not simply from material conditions, but from epistemic institutions—universities, protections for dissent, and a culture of inquiry that supports the creation and diffusion of knowledge. Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, meanwhile, formalized the process of innovation-led growth through their endogenous growth model, rooted in creative destruction. Their work illustrates how growth is generated when new technologies and firms continuously disrupt the old, enabled by competition, R&D investment, and enabling public policy. Their combined message is clear: Sustainable innovation cannot thrive without freedom of inquiry, legal stability, institutional independence, and competitive markets. When these are eroded, growth not only slows—it may become directionally regressive, channeling resources toward control rather than creativity.
Authoritarian Populism and the Threat to Innovation Institutions
While the Nobel laureates underscore the importance of institutional infrastructure for innovation, the global rise of authoritarian populism presents a sharp countercurrent. Populism’s consolidation of executive power, erosion of checks and balances, and hostility toward expertise and dissent undermine the very systems that make innovation possible. This raises two fundamental questions: i) What can we learn from the intellectual legacy behind the 2025 Nobel Prize in an era of resurgent populism? ii) If our primary concern is sustainable and inclusive economic prosperity, what paths do the populist versus institutionalist frameworks each offer?
The answers lie in the institutional costs of populism. Populist regimes, as Rodrik (2019) explains, often emerge from economic discontent and cultural anxiety—but they typically respond by concentrating authority and limiting contestation. This instinct directly conflicts with the unpredictability and disruption inherent in innovation.
How Populism Damages the Mechanisms of Creative Destruction
Creative destruction, the engine of Aghion and Howitt’s growth model, is inherently destabilizing. It disrupts incumbents, transforms labor markets, and threatens established power structures—dynamics that populist regimes seek to resist. Though some argue that authoritarian populists could theoretically design innovation-friendly policies, empirical reality suggests otherwise. Populist leaders prioritize short-term visibility and control over long-term, uncertain processes like R&D. Consequently, megaprojects and state-industrial policies replace long-term innovation strategies. As Portuese (2021) notes, populists may even weaponize antitrust policy, using it to punish disloyal firms and protect politically connected monopolies—thereby cultivating a climate of fear and rent-seeking, not innovation. The erosion of judicial independence, university autonomy, and press freedom disables the feedback mechanisms essential for adaptive learning. As institutions hollow out, clientelist redistribution replaces competitive funding. Brezis and Young (2023) demonstrate how innovation systems under populist rule become politicized and inefficient, redirecting resources away from discovery and toward loyalty.
Empirical Evidence: Populism’s Innovation Deficit
Numerous case studies support this idea: China, despite its strong state capacity, faces innovation stagnation at the frontier due to censorship, limited peer review, and politically driven science (To, 2022). While China has made significant advances in frontier technologies—ranging from electric vehicles and green energy to artificial intelligence and quantum computing—this progress exists alongside growing structural barriers. Recent reports by the Financial Times (2024) and the World Bank (2023) highlight a widening gap between technological investment and productivity results, indicating that innovation has become increasingly state-led but not more efficient.
The politicization of science limited academic independence, and the expanding influence of party committees within universities and tech companies has hindered the creativity and openness necessary for frontier innovation. Although China has surpassed the United States and the EU in patent volume and some industrial technologies, its overall total factor productivity growth has slowed sharply since the late 2010s, meaning that technological accumulation is not leading to widespread productivity gains. As Foreign Policy (2025) analysis points out, China’s innovation model now risks “technological involution,” where large R&D spending only reproduces existing ideas rather than creating breakthroughs; in short, centralized control can mobilize resources on a large scale but also limits the institutional diversity and critical inquiry that are essential for true creative disruption.
The situation in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, which exhibits highly strong populist authoritarian hybrid governance mechanisms, shows a similar trend. Turkey’s shift toward authoritarianism after 2011 reversed earlier gains in R&D and scientific output as scientific governance became politicized (Apaydin, 2025). In Hungary and Poland, Ágh (2019) finds that populist leaders systematically undermined institutional independence, leading to stagnation in innovation indices despite EU integration.
While Turkey’s R&D investment and publication output grew rapidly during the 2000s, the post-2011 erosion of academic autonomy—and particularly the post-2016 state-of-emergency decrees—triggered a systemic collapse in institutional freedom and international collaboration. Studies by the Freedom House (2023) and V-Dem Institute (2024) show Turkey’s academic freedom score falling to the bottom decile globally, coinciding with an 18–25% drop in publication activity and widespread self-censorship across universities. The World Bank (2023) further notes that this institutional degradation has curtailed the country’s innovation potential, as politicization redirected R&D spending from independent inquiry toward regime-aligned projects.
In Hungary, the Orbán government’s transformation of public universities into quasi-private “foundations” after 2020—where board members are appointed by the ruling Fidesz party—has drawn strong criticism from the European Commission (2022) and led to suspension of EU research funds under the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs. According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (2024), Hungary remains a “Moderate Innovator,” showing stagnation or decline in scientific co-publications and R&D intensity.
Poland exhibits a similar trajectory: rule-of-law backsliding and politicization of the judiciary under the Law and Justice (PiS) government have weakened legal predictability and university independence. The Freedom House (2023) report documents a marked decline in judicial independence and civil liberties, while the European Innovation Scoreboard categorizes Poland as an “Emerging Innovator,” lagging behind EU averages in R&D expenditure and innovation outputs.
Collectively, these cases demonstrate that while state-led development under populist or illiberal regimes may yield short-term industrial gains, it ultimately erodes the very institutional foundations—autonomy, rule of law, and international openness—upon which decentralized, pluralistic, and experimental innovation systems depend.
Institutional Resilience and the Direction of Innovation
As Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) argue, innovation is not inherently progressive or welfare-enhancing. Its social impact depends on who funds it, controls it, and decides where it is applied. Under authoritarian populism, technological advancement often serves repression—surveillance, military tools, propaganda—rather than social welfare. By contrast, democratic and pluralistic systems encourage innovation aligned with public interest. Independent media, civil society, and open debate create a feedback-rich environment that improves allocative efficiency and mitigates risks.
Importantly, innovation ecosystems are not simply clusters of firms and labs—they are institutional configurations that support curiosity, tolerate failure, and reward experimentation. Where expression is free, laws are predictable, and academia is autonomous, breakthrough innovation thrives. Conversely, populist regimes undermine all three. Furthermore, their nationalist isolationism curtails international collaboration, peer review, and talent mobility—all of which are essential for frontier innovation, especially in an era of global challenges like climate change and pandemics.
Conclusion: Innovation Requires Democracy, Market, and Competition
The message from the 2025 Nobel Prize is unambiguous: Innovation is not merely an economic outcome—it is a political and institutional achievement. Prosperity does not arise from investment alone, but from the freedom to thought, challenge, and experiment. Where institutions collapse, innovation recedes. Where pluralism flourishes, discovery thrives.
Authoritarian populism, by closing civic space and concentrating power, not only compromises democratic legitimacy—it dismantles the very foundations of long-term economic growth. As Acemoglu and Johnson warn, without inclusive institutions, innovation becomes a tool of control—not of emancipation. Thus, the future of progress lies not only in laboratories or startups, but also in constitutions, courts, and universities. Any society that seeks prosperity through innovation must first protect these spaces.
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In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University—analyzes how Donald Trump has reshaped the Republican Party and advanced classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain asserts. He situates Trumpism within long-term demographic, institutional, and ideological shifts while underscoring Trump’s unique use of crisis narratives, bullying tactics, and federal coercion. Professor Cain also warns that Trumpism has exploited structural weaknesses in party regulation, executive power, and campaign finance, stressing the urgency of reinforcing democratic guardrails to prevent lasting authoritarian consolidation.
In a wide-ranging and incisive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Bruce E. Cain—Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West—offers a penetrating analysis of how Donald Trump’s leadership has reshaped the Republican Party and pushed American politics toward classical authoritarian strategies. “There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game,” Professor Cain observes. “There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.”
Professor Cain situates Trumpism within broader structural transformations of American politics, emphasizing long-term demographic, geographic, and institutional shifts that made Trump’s rise possible. He points to “social sorting” and “party sorting” since the 1960s, along with growing racial diversity and economic inequality, as crucial background conditions. These shifts, he argues, preceded Trump and “made his rise possible,” even as his “adroit use of social media” and personal brand amplified their impact.
Central to Professor Cain’s analysis is Trump’s deliberate exploitation of crisis narratives and authoritarian tactics. Reflecting on Trump’s response to crises such as the Charlie Kirk assassination, Professor Cain notes that “Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game” and has escalated his reliance on bullying tactics compared to his first term. He highlights Trump’s willingness to deploy federal forces in Democratic-run cities, calling it “very disturbing and very unusual,” and likens it to the EU sending troops into member states to enforce policy—an action that violates deeply held American principles of state sovereignty.
Professor Cain also examines the evolving coalition underpinning the contemporary Republican Party. He underscores the critical role of the MAGA base, describing it as “maybe, at best, 40%, but more likely 30% of the Republican Party’s support,” driven in part by cultural grievance politics and white nationalist narratives. Yet, he stresses the uneasy alliance between this base and more traditional Republicans, warning of internal tensions that could shape future elections.
Institutionally, Professor Cain warns that Trumpism has both exploited and accelerated structural weaknesses in the American political system—from the weakening of party authority and campaign finance regulation to the expansion of executive power. He cautions that if the Supreme Court legitimizes Trump’s expansive claims of emergency powers and unilateral action, “it’ll be monkey see, monkey do,” with Democrats following suit—leading to instability and democratic erosion.
Professor Cain concludes by emphasizing the urgency of shoring up democratic guardrails, particularly regarding executive power, emergency provisions, and the role of the courts. His analysis offers a sobering reminder that while Trump may be unique, the authoritarian strategies he has deployed are embedded within deeper institutional vulnerabilities that will persist beyond his presidency.
Bruce E. Cain is a Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and Director of the Bill Lane Center for the American West.
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Bruce Cain, revised for clarity and flow.
How Demography and Party Sorting Paved the Way for Trump
Professor Cain, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Many scholars locate the transformation of the American Right within long-term structural changes dating back to the 1970s—such as realignments in race, region, and party organization—while others highlight the Trump and MAGA era as a moment of acute disruption. How do you conceptually distinguish between these deeper ideological and institutional evolutions and the more contingent, charismatic, and stylistic ruptures introduced by Trump?
Professor Bruce Cain: This is a really important point that you’re making. Because Trump sucks all the oxygen out of the conversation, people tend to think that everything has to do with Trump himself—his personality and his adroit use of social media. But it’s crucial to emphasize that there were larger demographic and political trends behind Trumpism.
Because the list is very long, I’ll focus on a couple that are particularly important. One is what we call social sorting. America is a very mobile society, and because of this mobility, many states—as well as rural and urban areas—have come to reflect the partisan makeup of different parties. We now have heavily Democratic urban areas and heavily Republican rural areas. This is partly enabled by the fact that people tend to move into neighborhoods with others who are like themselves. As a result, you get social sorting that reinforces what happens online, where people similarly find their way into virtual communities that mirror their own demographics.
The second is party sorting, as we describe it in political science. Party coalitions underwent a sorting process beginning in the 1960s and 1970s with the signing of civil rights legislation. From that period forward, the Democratic Party—which had been a coalition of liberal elites in blue areas and, if you like, very conservative, racially conservative Southern Democrats—broke apart. Essentially, the social conservatives, and racial conservatives in particular, moved to the Republican Party, while liberal Republicans shifted to the Democratic Party.
As a result, the parties—rather than remaining more heterogeneous and containing internal breaks within their coalitional structures—became more ideologically consistent along lines of social and political liberalism versus conservatism.
Then there are factors outside the political process per se, though they are partly the result of policies we passed. One is the incredible rise in inequality, largely based on education, as the American economy became increasingly service-oriented and high-tech. Another is the change in immigration policies during the Civil Rights era, which opened the country to groups from all over the world and increased the racial diversity of the United States. That trend continues, partly because once immigrant groups arrive, they tend to have higher birth rates; even if immigration were to be curtailed, diversity would still grow.
Finally, there are the residual racial tensions from the earlier period, particularly around African Americans and, to some extent, Latinos. So yes, Trump made things worse—but crucially, there were demographic and political trends that preceded him and made his rise possible.
Grievance Politics and the New Republican Base
The contemporary Republican coalition increasingly rests on rural, white, non-college-educated constituencies mobilized through identity-based appeals rather than policy commitments. How has this demographic and geographic consolidation reshaped the movement’s ideological core, and to what extent has the strategic shift toward cultural grievance politics weakened traditional party mediation and fostered extra-institutional ecosystems like the alt-right and online mobilization networks?
Professor Bruce Cain: Yes, and again, this is another one of these underlying trends that really is so critical. I’m an old man, and when I was growing up, there was more of a working-class versus non-working-class managerial divide in American politics. Today, it’s much more college-educated versus not college-educated. The problem for the Democratic Party is that, while there are a large number of college-educated people in the United States, the percent of people who’ve graduated from college is about 37%, and those who do not have a college education make up about 60%.
What that means is that, as we moved away from manufacturing, particularly in the middle of the country, we were taking a whole bunch of jobs—union jobs and well-paying non-white-collar jobs—and giving them over to other countries. Our free trade policies were undermining not only the economic basis of the middle of the country but also that of blue-collar workers throughout the United States.
I believe one element of this is just the anger about downward social mobility on the part of people who do not have a university education. But you also mentioned, and I think it’s right to say, that there’s been a shift in terms of cultural grievance. Part of it is that, along with the economic downward mobility, comes social and political loss of power and loss of status, and that certainly contributes to the grievance that you’re talking about.
But there was also the fact that the court got way out ahead on abortion policy and took it away from the states, nationalizing a policy I tend to agree with, but nonetheless, many Catholics and many fundamentalist Protestant groups don’t agree with, which is the right to abortion. Abortion really played a major role, on top of the racial divisions, in creating a divide between the Democratic and Republican Party.
So, yes, absolutely, I think grievance politics is now a very important part of what we’re talking about here.
Typical cold winter scene in the Rust Belt city of Cleveland, Ohio, with a steel mill in the background. Photo: Dreamstime.
Harnessing Crises for Authoritarian Ends
Trump’s response to events such as the Charlie Kirk assassination reveals how crises can be harnessed to justify extraordinary measures. How would you situate Trump’s use of crisis narratives within classical authoritarian playbooks—such as “Reichstag fire” strategies—and do you see this as a deliberate authoritarian project or an improvisational charismatic populism that nonetheless has authoritarian consequences?
Professor Bruce Cain: That involves psychoanalyzing Mr. Trump, which unfortunately I can’t do. I think some of it is absolutely a deliberate strategy, but some of it is simply that this is not a man who controls his emotions very well. And perhaps, if he follows the path of his father into dementia, we may see more of this kind of emotional rollercoaster, because that’s one of the features of dementia. So, believe me, we’re worried about that in the United States.
There’s no question that, whether by instinct or by deliberate strategy, Trump is playing the classical authoritarian game. There’s no doubt that’s what he’s trying to do. It suits the way he has run his companies, and it suits the kinds of leaders he admires in other countries. He’s essentially following in their footsteps.
But I will say this: so far, he is tracking other presidents—the three presidential administrations, including Trump One—in terms of his popularity with the public. His numbers have been dropping; he’s now at about 41% favorability, which is where he was during Trump One, when he suffered a major setback in the by-election that followed his 2016 victory.
There are also many more courts now, particularly below the Supreme Court level, that are blocking his attempts to implement authoritarian measures, whether involving the use of troops or emergency clauses. Admittedly, we still have to wait for the Supreme Court to weigh in on these matters, but it seems the Court is waiting to hear from many of the district and appellate courts. If I were the Trump administration, I would suspect he’s going to lose a fair number of these cases.
Then, of course, the press corps are increasingly angry with him. Most recently, when the Defense Department tried to get journalists to sign pledges not to use leaked information, virtually the entire press—including the right-wing press—rejected the move.
So, yes, there’s no question that he wants to play the authoritarian playbook. The question is whether that’s actually possible in the United States, even in these very divided times.
Trump’s Legacy and the Institutionalization of MAGA
Do you view the MAGA movement as populism evolving toward a stable authoritarian formation, potentially institutionalized through mechanisms like Project 2025, or as a personalist phenomenon tied to Trump’s leadership that may dissipate with his exit? What institutional or cultural legacies do you expect to persist beyond his tenure?
Professor Bruce Cain: Again, it’s a mix. You can’t take Trump out of the equation. His ability to use social media, the fact that he is a self-financed candidate who was able to launch his campaign with his own money, and his status as a TV star on a show that portrayed him as a strong business leader—even if we think that image was fake—all of these factors mattered. It’s not clear that anyone else could have brought all those elements together, so there is a unique dimension to Trump in that regard.
But the reality is that there was a base composed of people who were unhappy about many of the social issues we’ve been discussing and people who were experiencing downward mobility. There was always the potential to mobilize this base, which we now call the Make America Great Again base, or MAGA base. That base is a critical part of the equation, and it likely won’t disappear, even if Trump decides not to contest the next presidential election because he believes he can run a third time. The Constitution says no. But the MAGA base will remain, no matter what happens to Trump.
Another issue we face is the extremely close contestation between the two parties. Many of our most stable periods have occurred when one party held clear dominance. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was the Democratic Party; during the Reagan years, it was the Republican Party. Today, neither party has a firm grip, which means we’re likely to see a lot of back-and-forth, closely contested elections. This dynamic creates opportunities for mischief, as both sides try to extract tactical and strategic advantages from the system.
So yes, much of this will endure even after Trump moves on. But Trump brings a unique element to the equation—one that I don’t see anyone else in the Republican Party being able to duplicate.
Militarizing Politics: A Break with American Norms
46th US Presidential Inauguration in Washington, D.C. — Held on January 20, 2021, under heightened security following the January 6 insurrection. Public access was restricted, and 25,000 National Guard troops were deployed around the US Capitol. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s willingness to deploy more National Guard in major Democratic-run cities raises questions about federal coercion, politicization of armed forces, and the subversion of local democratic autonomy. How might such measures operate within an authoritarian power-consolidation strategy, particularly in delegitimizing urban, racially diverse political centers framed as “internal enemies”?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’re worried about that. There’s no question that what’s different about Trump is his attempt to incite division rather than suppress or mediate it, along with his use of extra-controversial methods—going around the rules in dubious ways—and waiting for the courts to slap his hand. The courts, of course, are very deliberate; they will examine these matters carefully before making decisions that will shape the future.
This is what’s troubling. Compared to Trump One, there is much more bullying. There was always a bullying element in Trump One, but he has really taken that a step further. He’s now extending it into the states, which is a major violation of American political norms. It would be the equivalent of the EU entering Spain, France, and other European countries and deploying military forces to enforce EU policies.
In the United States, we believe that states have sovereign powers over areas such as education, policing, fire services, and other local affairs. For Trump to coerce at that level is both disturbing and highly unusual. I believe it will ultimately be struck down by the courts, but it will take time before these issues are fully litigated.
DEI Backlash and the Toleration of Extremism
“White replacement” and “white genocide” conspiracies have become central to far-right mobilization. How integral are these narratives to sustaining the contemporary Republican coalition, and how do they interact with institutional party strategies versus grassroots extremist currents?
Professor Bruce Cain: For the MAGA base, these narratives are absolutely essential. The MAGA base constitutes, at best, around 40%, but more likely closer to 30% of the Republican Party’s support. I don’t believe that the white replacement and white genocide conspiracies are significantly influencing traditional Republicans. What may resonate with them, however, is concern over what they perceive as overly zealous efforts to implement Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion (DEI) initiatives. But that doesn’t mean they’ve embraced white nationalism.
The Republican Party should be seen as a coalition between those who believe in the white nationalist agenda that Trump is promoting and traditional Republicans who supported him for tax cuts and regulatory relief. Many in the latter group were willing to tolerate the former, using perceived DEI overreach as a justification for accommodating the white nationalist wing of the party.
As a result, these groups exist in an uneasy coalition within the Republican Party. However, I don’t believe the party as a whole is fully aligned with the MAGA agenda on this issue.
The Secular Strongman of a Sacred Cause
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
The intensified fusion of evangelical Christianity and Republican politics under Trump has transformed the political theology of the Right. How has this religious alignment shaped authoritarian tendencies, policy radicalization, and the sacralization of political conflict?
Professor Bruce Cain: The secular–religious divide in America has deepened over the lifetime of many of us. Those of us who were boomers and grew up in the 1960s and 1970s remember a time when the Democratic Party, under Carter, for example, had an evangelical wing. The abortion issue and subsequent legal decisions created a separation, and George Bush Jr. then brought more evangelicals over to the Republican side.
Trump is not a religious man. He pretends to be, but I don’t think anyone seriously believes he is a pious human being. It is striking that perhaps one of the most secular and morally compromised figures imaginable has become the leader of the religious right. But they view him much like someone views their divorce lawyer: they don’t care about the lawyer’s personal morality as long as they get the divorce.
Trump functions in the same way. They know he’s not a decent person, but they appreciate that he stands up for them, and they overlook the fact that he is anything but a religious man himself.
Strategic Ambiguity on White Nationalism
Republican elites have alternated between embracing and distancing themselves from alt-right and white supremacist movements. How should we interpret this oscillation—tactical ambiguity, strategic co-optation, or deeper ideological convergence?
Professor Bruce Cain: I don’t think it’s completely resolved how far they’re willing to go with this sort of white nationalism. I know too many educated Republicans who don’t share that perspective. For example, at Stanford, one of the most powerful people on campus is the head of the Hoover Institute, Condoleezza “Condi” Rice, an African-American woman who is widely respected. She certainly doesn’t tolerate white supremacist beliefs.
So, it’s an uneasy alliance, and as I mentioned before, it’s justified for the time being because there’s a belief that Democrats went a little too far in promoting diversity, equity, and inclusion measures, and that affirmative action went too far as well—leading some to feel that fairness has been denied in the present to redress past injustices.
There’s a clear distinction between Republican skepticism about DEI and outright supremacist thinking. It’s really a small part of the base that genuinely holds those extremist views. This makes for an uneasy coalition, which could become problematic at some point in the future—perhaps as soon as the next presidential election.
The Activist–Billionaire Nexus in GOP Politics
nti-Trump protest during the Labor Day Parade in New York City on September 6, 2025. Demonstrators gathered on Fifth Avenue across from Trump Tower during the annual parade in Midtown Manhattan. Photo: Dreamstime.
Drawing on your work on party autonomy, how has Trumpism altered the internal structure and strategic independence of the Republican Party? Has it hollowed out institutional authority or merely displaced it toward charismatic leadership and movement actors, especially within a nomination system that was reformed to democratize candidate selection but arguably enabled populist capture?
Professor Bruce Cain: There’s definitely, again, an element that is peculiar to Trump and his very strong bullying methods. That’s enabled him to capture the party. But if we step back, we see that there are longer-term trends that made it possible for him to do this. Right at the top of the list is social media. Social media, as we’ve seen, has become a powerful tool for bullying—everything from doxing to the ability to publicly shame people to mobilizing crowds instantaneously. All of these dynamics have made bullying and intimidation much stronger, not only in politics but also in the lives of our children and in our communities. Trump was definitely a beneficiary of that.
But there were also things we did through political reform that weakened parts of the party. In America, we think of the party as having three components: the party in office, namely the partisanship of the officeholders; the party in the bureaucracy, which consists of the people in the Republican National Committee (RNC), the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and the 50 state parties—those who run the machinery of the party; and finally, the activists.
To make a long, complicated story short, political reforms have strengthened the activists, who are by far the most ideological component of the electorate, while weakening the power of officeholders. Congress is now so afraid of party primaries because primaries do not attract all voters; they attract only the most partisan, activist ones. As a result, the control activists have over the primaries skews both parties to either the left or the right.
Another key factor is that the Supreme Court has allowed wealthy individuals to spend as much money as they want, creating almost limitless self-financing. This helped Trump significantly, as he was able to use his own money to catapult himself into the primaries. There is now far more independent spending, which essentially dwarfs the money given directly to candidates. We are awash in ideological and interest group money, and our inability to control campaign finance has unquestionably helped Trump and made the situation much worse.
Emergency Powers and Democratic Stability
The rise of executive-centered partisanship has weakened Congress and elevated the presidency as the primary partisan engine. Do you see this imbalance as reversible through institutional reform, or has it become structurally entrenched within the constitutional order?
Professor Bruce Cain: We’ll know a lot more about the answer to this question over the next year, as the Supreme Court will have to decide how far emergency powers can be used—the use of emergency powers to suspend normal processes, the use of impoundment activities (i.e., deciding upon entering office not to spend the money allocated by the previous Congress), and how much authority the president has to remove people in the bureaucracy who are nonpartisan rather than political appointees. In other words, how much of the Progressive Era reforms designed to create a nonpartisan bureaucracy can be undone.
If the Court condones these actions, it will be a case of monkey see, monkey do, because the Democrats will take whatever powers are given to the president to politicize everything, use emergency powers, and undo everything that Trump is doing. The Democrats will do the same thing, which means there will be far more instability in American positions vis-à-vis Europe, trade, and climate change. Essentially, the system will become much more schizophrenic and variable, and I believe this will ultimately undermine capitalism, investment, and infrastructure. Whether we are headed in that direction—and whether it becomes permanent—will be decided by the Supreme Court over the next year or two.
Money as Speech—and as a Tool of Power
Image of a pile of dollars currency and text of Trump Effect, symbolizing Trump Effect in American economy. Photo: Paulus Rusyanto.
In your work on “dependence corruption,” you highlighted how financial flows shape representation. How do emerging funding ecosystems—around MAGA media, Christian nationalist donors, tech billionaires, and PACs—challenge existing regulatory frameworks and deepen authoritarian tendencies within the movement?
Professor Bruce Cain: I do believe that America, because it has a very liberal interpretation of the First Amendment—i.e., because we believe that money is speech and that we can only restrict it under the narrowest purposes, namely to prevent quid pro quo corruption, meaning money that’s given directly to a candidate—has opened up the floodgates to a lot of money. That can still work if the money is balanced on both sides, and on many issues, that’s true. But what we’re seeing, for example, with digital currencies is that Trump has brought in lots of billionaires—tech billionaires—who want to create meme coins and invest in large server farms to generate value for digital currency.
All of these developments are tied not only to corruption stemming from campaign contributions but also to Trump himself cutting deals, investing in currency, and then making policy that favors those investments. We’re seeing in America now a level of corruption that we didn’t think was possible after the reforms of the 1970s. It’s approaching the levels of the 19th century, with people getting into office or power and then using it to make themselves richer. This is a major concern, and many of us in the legal and political science communities will be thinking seriously about how to strengthen the system against it.
Reinforcing Democratic Guardrails
Lastly, given these structural, ideological, and institutional transformations, what democratic guardrails or institutional reforms do you view as most urgent to counteract potential authoritarian consolidation on the American Right? Are there specific vulnerabilities—such as in party regulation, executive power, or information ecosystems—that should be prioritized?
Professor Bruce Cain: I would say that many people in my world of political reform are going to try to restore some of the institutions we once had, like the filibuster—i.e., supermajority votes that aim to create bipartisanship. They’re going to try to bring that back, but I think this runs up against the underlying political culture in America right now. Where the Court really needs to draw the line to save American democracy is on executive actions—specifically, the degree to which the President can act unilaterally by imaginatively reinterpreting existing legislation and issuing executive actions.
Secondly, emergency provisions. If everything is an emergency, then nothing is a democracy. That’s essentially where we’re headed if we’re not careful, because political parties can pretty much declare anything an emergency—whether it’s somebody being attacked in a city, an immigration issue, or economic downturns. If everything qualifies as an emergency, democratic norms erode. That is a major vulnerability that needs to be addressed.
Lastly, for both the United States and within the EU, there must be a clear understanding that states’ rights—the ability of states to check the federal government, to serve as laboratories of innovation, and to act differently from the federal government—are critically important. It’s essential that the Court continues to recognize the importance of state sovereignty as granted under the Constitution.
These are the most important steps to take right now, and Trump has made it very clear that we need to shore up both judicial interpretations and, potentially, some of the statutory and constitutional language associated with these issues.
The conviction of Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officers for plotting a coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazil’s democratic history. For the first time, both a former president and high-ranking commanders have been held accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. In her interview with the ECPS, Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz calls this a “historic” cultural shift: “Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy.” She emphasizes that this resilience stems from institutional maturity and judicial independence. By focusing on concrete evidence rather than rhetoric, Brazil’s Supreme Court set a vital precedent: authoritarian populism meets its legal limit when courts remain credible veto players.
The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and senior military officials for plotting a coup marks a watershed moment in the country’s democratic trajectory. For the first time in Brazil’s history, both a former head of state and high-ranking military leaders have been held criminally accountable for attempting to subvert constitutional order. This unprecedented development raises fundamental questions about judicial independence, civil–military relations, and the resilience of democratic institutions under populist pressure.
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz—a legal scholar with a J.D. from the Federal University of Juiz de Fora, a PhD in Law from the University of Brasília, and currently a PhD student in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Madison—describes the moment as “historic.” As she emphasizes, “I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.”
This “cultural shift,” she argues, reflects both institutional maturation and societal change. For decades, Brazil had maintained a tradition of impunity for military elites. “When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law,” Dr. da Cruz explains. “Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.”
For Dr. da Cruz, this is not only about judicial assertiveness but also about broader institutional cooperation: “It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome.” This inter-institutional collaboration, she suggests, has been vital in resisting authoritarian populist attempts to erode democratic checks and balances.
Yet, the trial has also exposed risks. Justice Alexandre de Moraes emerged as the central figure in Bolsonaro’s prosecution, raising concerns about over-personalization of judicial power. While Dr. da Cruz acknowledges that this could fuel narratives of “judicial dictatorship,” she maintains that the verdict will likely enhance trust: “If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court… it shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.”
Ultimately, Brazil’s experience highlights both the vulnerabilities and strengths of democracies confronting authoritarian populism. By focusing on hard evidence—charges of armed conspiracy and constitutional subversion—rather than rhetoric or political speech, Brazil’s Supreme Court has set a precedent of judicial accountability rooted firmly in due process. As Dr. da Cruz underscores, “There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is now constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept.”
This interview situates Brazil’s democratic resilience in comparative perspective, with lessons for other democracies confronting populist threats.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
A Historic Break with Brazil’s Tradition of Impunity
Alexandre de Moraes, Justice of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a press conference in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 5, 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Bolsonaro has been sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup—the first time in Brazil’s history that a president and military leaders involved in such an attempt have been convicted. How does this break with Brazil’s tradition of impunity, and what does it reveal about the maturation of its democratic institutions?
Dr. Tatiana Paula da Cruz: Thank you so much for having me. It’s such a pleasure to be here. As you just said, this is the first time something like this has happened in the history of Brazil, and it marks a huge break with the tradition of impunity. When the dictatorship ended, we didn’t have transitional justice—no generals were tried, no one was convicted—and this created the perception that they were all above the law. Now, that has changed. We have major military players convicted, and we also have a former president convicted of attempting a coup.
For me, this demonstrates two things above all. First, judicial independence: our Supreme Court has shown that it can and will enforce the Constitution whenever necessary. But perhaps even more importantly, other institutions have matured as well. It wasn’t just the Supreme Court; the federal police, the federal prosecution, and the courts all worked together effectively to reach this outcome. Finally, I would highlight a cultural shift. Brazilian society is no longer willing to tolerate such attacks on democracy. This makes the moment truly historic for us.
Legitimacy Gained, Risks Remain
Justice Alexandre de Moraes meticulously built the case for over two years, defying Bolsonaro’s claims of judicial persecution. From your perspective on judicial politics, does this verdict strengthen long-term trust in the Supreme Federal Court (STF), or risk deepening narratives of “judicial dictatorship”?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is the hard question that we are all asking right now, because it can cut both ways. If I were to bet, I would say this will strengthen trust in the Supreme Court, raising both levels of trust and legitimacy, because it is another instance of the court showing it can act under pressure. COVID was the first such instance in the recent past. During COVID, everyone in the government was against the Supreme Court’s measures, yet the Court was able to enforce the Constitution, and it has done the same now. This shows the population that they can count on the Court to uphold the Constitution.
But, there might be a second possibility. Justice Alexandre de Moraes became the face of this prosecution, the face of the inquiry and the conviction. In my opinion, this is problematic for the Court, because it personalizes such an important verdict in one person, which should not be the case. The main verdict involved other justices, of course, but he became the highly visible player in this case. This can fuel arguments of “judicial dictatorship,” which could play out negatively.
That said, if I were to bet, I think this will ultimately be positive for the Supreme Court. The population will see that the Court stands firm, even when the government is not siding with it. But we will have to wait and see.
Authoritarian Populism Meets Its Legal Limit
Bolsonaro’s conviction included charges of armed criminal conspiracy and attempted abolition of the democratic rule of law. How do these charges fit into the conceptual vocabulary of authoritarian populism—are they an appropriate legal reflection of political subversion?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think they are. For me, this is one of the most important points here, because we could have had a conviction based on opinion or public statements that Bolsonaro made. That would have risked a much more politicized trial. Instead, the court chose to focus only on the concrete facts, which were mainly about the armed conspiracy—an organized and violent attempt against important political figures such as President Lula and Justice Alexandre de Moraes. They focused on the coup plot itself. They didn’t dwell on rhetoric, social media posts, or other statements that might have raised accusations of politicization.
This goes directly to the heart of authoritarian populism. There is a threshold, a limit at which society must say: this is no longer rhetoric, this is now armed conflict, this is constitutional subversion—and this we will not accept. In that sense, the court acted appropriately by applying the criminal code in the most strictly legal way possible.
Bolsonaro and his lawyers insist the trial was politically motivated, echoing populist claims of “witch hunts.” How should scholars distinguish between legitimate judicial accountability and lawfare in cases involving populist leaders?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: If we can take Brazil as an example, the most important guarantee courts should focus on is due process. This is exactly what our Supreme Court did. Every time the defense asked for information or made requests, they were granted, even though there is a strong argument that trying these individuals in the highest instance of the judiciary violates the right to defense. The court, however, had several precedents showing this was not the case, and this was not the first instance in which people were tried in the Supreme Court. Due process was observed at every step. Alongside this, there was strong factual evidence and credible witnesses—in our case, even a whistleblower—that demonstrated this was not a conspiracy or a witch hunt, but a legitimate trial conducted with due process and proportionality. That is the key: showing that the law is being upheld, and that the law allows for this punishment to happen.
Dissent as Democratic Strength, Not Judicial Weakness
Luiz Fux, Justice and President of the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil, during a presentation in Salvador, Bahia, Brazil, on July 31, 2018. Photo: Joa Souza.
The STF split 4–1, with Justice Luiz Fux voting to absolve Bolsonaro on procedural grounds. Could such dissents provide legal ammunition for appeals and, more broadly, do fragmented judicial opinions undermine institutional legitimacy in high-stakes political trials?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I heard a lot, and I read a lot about this during the last few weeks, and I side with the people who think that this is actually positive and beneficial for our democracy. By having a strong dissent like we had with Justice Fux, it shows that justices are allowed to think otherwise, that there was evidence, and that there were arguments from the defense that could persuade justices to think differently, and that the court is not hunting someone at any cost. So, this dissent demonstrates that the court can dissent, that it can have different arguments, and this is actually positive in a high court such as the Supreme Court.
In terms of appeals, I don’t think this is a huge problem here. We have a specific appeal that would be possible if this decision were a 3–2 decision. So if we had two justices siding with Bolsonaro, then he would have a specific appeal that would apply to this case. With only one dissent, this appeal does not apply, so the idea that it opens the ground for the defense to explore more possibilities of appeals doesn’t apply in this case specifically. In my view, the dissent was too long—it took the entire day to read the vote, and it was much more procedural than based on evidence itself—but it plays in favor of the Supreme Court. It shows that, unexpectedly, someone dissented completely on the verdict, and this demonstrates that the Supreme Court can have a debate, which is positive.
The Militarization of Bureaucracy Was a Legal Process
Then Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro attends the 74th Anniversary of the Parachutist Infantry Battalion at the Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo Rodrigues.
Your research shows Bolsonaro strategically militarized bureaucracies while eroding public trust in the Armed Forces. How does the sentencing of senior officers alter Brazil’s civil–military equilibrium, and could it delegitimize the armed forces as political actors?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: We have always had this problem with civilian control over the military. Since the dictatorship, when the new constitution was drafted, so much power was given to the military that we could almost never say they were not allowed to play a specific role. What I call the militarization of bureaucracy was, in fact, a legal process—and this is the problem for me. There were laws that allowed the military to occupy primarily political positions. I’m not just talking here about the Ministry of Health, where a general was appointed to a political position. That was highly problematic; we had never before seen active-duty military in such a high office, and it was questionable.
But that is not the only issue. I’m talking about positions at all levels of the political bureaucracy that the military was allowed to occupy by law. Several changes in federal legislation permitted military personnel to serve up to four or even six years outside of strictly military posts and instead take politically appointed positions. Bolsonaro knew how to exploit this in his favor. An unprecedented number of military officers occupied his bureaucracy, and this undoubtedly laid the groundwork for him to secure the support he needed when the time came.
So, in order to rebuild civilian control over the military, much more is needed than simply changing the Ministry of Defense and appointing a civilian instead of a general. What is needed is legal reform that critically examines and justifies, for example, why we would need a sergeant in the Ministry of Health, or why it would be important to place a soldier in the Ministry of Education. Do these assignments make sense? That is the most important issue right now. We should be questioning the very reasons why legislation allows people to leave military functions and assume civilian roles.
Resilience and Fractured Loyalties Coexist
Bolsonaro’s failed coup was partly foiled because top military commanders withheld support. Should this be read as evidence of institutional resilience, or as a sign of fractured loyalties within Brazil’s security establishment?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I think it’s actually both. If we had the Ministry of Defense plus the three commanders in Brazil—which in the US we would call the Secretary of the Air Force, Secretary of the Army, and Secretary of the Navy—if all of them, along with the Minister of Defense, had said, no, we cannot side with this, it would have been a stronger sign of resilience. But that’s not what happened. In this trial, we had the conviction of the Minister of the Navy and the Minister of Defense. Both sided with Bolsonaro very strongly, saying, we support you, we’ll be by your side. Only the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force said otherwise.
So yes, it’s resilience, because two of the main players showed they don’t want to compromise or play completely political roles anymore. But it’s also fractured loyalties, because out of four, Bolsonaro still managed to get two on his side. The point here is that he could have had all of them siding with him, had he chosen the right commanders, so to speak. So this is resilience, but it is also fractured loyalty—and that’s the problem. If loyalties fracture, the outcome could be very different, and that’s what we don’t want. We want an institution that no longer sides with political groups at any cost.
Military Must Stay in Military Roles
Having served as a legal advisor in the Air Force, how do you assess the prospects of rebuilding robust civilian control in the defense sector after this episode of politicization and militarization?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I guess I will repeat myself a little bit, because from my experience, what I see is that there is a legal foundation—federal rules that allow the military to serve outside of strictly military positions. This means they can serve basically anywhere, as you can imagine. You can have a military officer in the Ministry of Education, or a soldier in the Ministry of Construction or Agriculture, in specific cases. For me, this is what takes control over the military out of the hands of civilians. The military should be serving in essentially military positions.
We could question, for example, why we have military officers serving in a superior military court. Some may think they are needed there, that they can provide an important perspective in those cases, but we should have a civilian structure capable of handling anything that is not entirely military. That civilian structure becomes fractured when you allow the military to leave the barracks, leave their military functions, and take on civilian posts. During Bolsonaro’s government, we had military personnel spread across virtually every civilian and public position you could imagine, and this, in my view, is the biggest problem with civilian control.
As I said, this is about much more than simply changing the Minister of Defense and placing a civilian in charge. What we need is legal reform—legislation that clearly defines when, if ever, the military can leave their military functions for civilian roles. In my view, this is what should not be happening.
Crisis Moments Can Reinforce Judicial Trust
In your article on courts and democracy, you highlight how crises can paradoxically bolster judicial trust. Do you see Bolsonaro’s conviction producing a similar “crisis effect,” strengthening institutional legitimacy, or will it reinforce distrust among his base?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: That’s precisely correct. In my article, I analyzed this crisis effect during COVID. When the federal government opposed vaccination and isolation measures, the court said “no.” It emphasized the need to give autonomy to municipalities and states so they could decide on their own isolation measures—something Bolsonaro was completely against. In that moment, the court upheld the Constitution, even though this meant going against the president of Brazil during a crisis. This proved positive for the court, as the population sided with it for defending constitutional principles.
I think this could be precisely the case here. Right now, the population can—and, if I’m correct, will—recognize that even under strong pressure against the verdict, the court relied on constitutional guarantees to rule and to uphold the Constitution, despite street protests and pressure from Bolsonaro’s side. So, this crisis effect may well be unfolding again in the near future.
Bolsonaro’s Son Fueled Misinformation in the US
Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump has denounced Bolsonaro’s conviction, raised tariffs, and framed the trial as a parallel to his own legal troubles. How might this US intervention reshape Brazil’s democratic trajectory, and what does it reveal about transnational populist solidarity?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not a specialist in American politics—I work mostly on Brazilian politics. Here is my personal opinion: there is a transnational solidarity among leaders who face similar situations, but in this specific case, there was enormous pressure from one of Bolsonaro’s sons, a federal deputy who now lives in the US. He was feeding false information to the US government, and because of this misinformation and the pressure to side with Bolsonaro, I think that was the main reason for the outcome—raising tariffs, public speeches against the Supreme Court in Brazil, punishing Supreme Court judges by revoking visas, etc. This congressman, who is irregular—not completing his functions in Congress and living in the US—was the major player in this huge mess surrounding the verdict.
Courts Must Remain Veto Players Against Populism
From a comparative perspective, what lessons does Brazil’s trial of a former president and generals offer for other democracies facing populist challenges, such as the US, Israel, Turkey, or Hungary?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: The best comparison we can make here is between Brazil, Turkey, and Hungary—I would add Israel as well, given the major reformulation of its judicial system. In those cases, the failure was in guaranteeing that the main body overseeing the Constitution had the independence it needed to do its job. When a populist comes and gradually cuts every possible check the court can exercise over the executive, step by step, by the time you need the court to act, it cannot do so anymore because it is no longer powerful, no longer a veto player. That is what happened in those three cases.
In Brazil, whenever Bolsonaro tried to impeach a judge or push measures that would curb the court, the court showed clearly that this was unconstitutional, not allowed, and it was able to rally popular support against such moves. In this way, the court managed to remain legitimate, even under heavy pressure. In the other countries, however, the curbing was gradual and consistent, to the point where it could no longer be reversed. And when the court was finally needed, it was no longer truly operational.
Brazil Shows How Judicial Independence Can Resist Populism
Bolsonaro’s rhetoric mirrors Trump’s in portraying judicial accountability as elite persecution. Do you see Brazil’s case as a model of democratic resilience, or does it risk setting a precedent where judicial overreach becomes a populist rallying cry?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: This is a question I don’t really have a clear answer for right now, because it will take time for us to understand. What I can say is that internationally, public attention has portrayed Brazil as doing what the US could not do, what the US Supreme Court could not do—that Brazil is a sign, an example of resilience. The main reason for this resilience, I will repeat myself, is that we were able to keep judicial independence throughout Bolsonaro’s tenure. He was not able to change the court in the way he intended, so the court remained independent. This is what we want to show to the world. We had a populist leader who tried attacking the court, but the court survived, and it was able to uphold the Constitution against him shortly thereafter. This is the precedent we want to set. Whether this will create a perception of, or a cry of, judicial overreach is too soon to say. It certainly can, and it probably will, but will that be stronger than the claim that the court was strong? I don’t think so.
And lastly, Dr. Da Cruz, in the US, Trump floated deploying the National Guard in major cities under the guise of “law and order.” From your research on Brazil’s bureaucratic militarization, what hidden agenda do you see behind such proposals—are they about restoring order, or normalizing military involvement in domestic politics?
Dr. Tatiana Paula Da Cruz: I’m not an expert in American politics, so what I can say is about what happened in Brazil. The moment we saw those numbers of military bureaucratization growing was during the federal intervention in Rio de Janeiro. From that intervention, the military received control over the police in Rio de Janeiro because of claims of drugs and crime, etc. That was something we could not stop anymore. Years later came Bolsonaro and his Minister of Defense, who had once been “the interventor” in Rio de Janeiro, so every military politician traces back to this intervention in the police in Rio de Janeiro that happened years before Bolsonaro’s tenure. When we decided to do this, it backfired against our democracy. So, this is what I can say: it is very problematic when you bring the military into issues and problems that are not meant for the military to handle.
In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias traces the rise of white Christian nationalism from Nixon’s “Southern Strategy” and Reagan’s Moral Majority to the Tea Party and today’s MAGA movement. He argues that what appears as grassroots populism is, in fact, a carefully engineered project to transform fringe radicalism into a national force. Electoral restrictions, demographic anxieties, and evangelical mobilization have converged to produce a politics that is ever more exclusionary, authoritarian, and puritanical. Dr. Dias asks: Is MAGA truly the majority, or is it the triumph of minority rule through strategic manipulation?
The Charlie Kirk Memorial was a turning point in the American ideological trajectory for the next decade, leaving the US in a state of social fracture only comparable to the civil rights era and the Vietnam War. We are witnessing the “great awakening” of nationalist evangelism, reminiscent of the peak of that authoritarian fusion between evangelical Christianity and political power in the 1930s, so vividly portrayed in the Perry Mason television series.
Indeed, Jason Stanley (2018) argued early on that Donald Trump revived the 1930s, precisely the period when fascist ideals were in vogue in the United States, with the cult of the “nation” and the strong leader, moral panic, and pamphleteering attacks against minorities and immigrants, as well as the cult of radically conservative religious values.
But is the MAGA movement truly a majority in the US, or are we witnessing a power grab by a minority through carefully engineered political strategy, with Trump serving merely as its face?
From a sociological perspective, there are clear demographic, cultural, and political changes fueling a socio-economic panic over the loss of social status—what Barbara Ehrenreich (1989) called the “fear of falling.” This has led to radicalization around ethnonationalist values, broadly classified in Political Science as nativism (see Art, 2022; Betz, 2019, 2017).
Nowhere has this shift been more evident than in the US, with a well-identified turning point: the civil rights movement, which transformed the Republican Party into what one of its strategists, Stuart Stevens, called the “de facto white party,”its key base being Southern whites, historically Democrats.
Richard Nixon and later Ronald Reagan capitalized on the Southern white vote with the rhetoric of “law and order.”Reagan went further by adding a Christian dimension to the white front, giving rise to the Moral Majority. From then on, the Republican Party was captured by what Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt (2024) call the “racially conservative base,” responding to demographic changes in the US from the 20th to the 21st century, as the white population fell to just 58% by 2020 and the proportion of non-white members of Congress quadrupled. A new racial order emerged in America, and the white majority entered into demographic and social panic, exacerbated by progressive shifts in American society.
With non-white Americans voting in growing numbers, Black voter turnout surpassed white turnout for the first time in US history in 2012. Faced with these profound changes, the Republican Party had two options: change its rhetoric/strategy or change the electoral map. It chose the latter. This was done through state-level legislative changes, such as requiring photo ID to vote, disproportionately affecting poor, Black, and Latino citizens—Blacks are twice as likely and Latinos three times as likely not to have photo identification. In Kentucky, Virginia, and Florida, those with a criminal record cannot vote, a maneuver that once again disproportionately impacts racial minorities, in a country marked by racialized incarceration and sentencing disparities. Additionally, attempts were made to pass laws shortening early voting and preventing election extensions in cases of long lines—measures struck down in court for deliberately targeting the African-American electorate.
Yet restrictions continued, with seven of the eleven states with majority African-American electorates and twelve states with majority Hispanic electorates adopting mechanisms that effectively disenfranchised these populations.
Amid demographic change, the Republican Party skillfully read and instrumentalized the fears of a shrinking white population. Many whites interpreted these demographic shifts, combined with changes in the social pyramid, as a threat. A 2015 poll found that 72% of white evangelicals believed America had changed for the worse since the 1960s, alongside another poll showing a growing perception of “anti-white prejudice.”
It was in this context that the Tea Party (Formisano, 2012) — a reactionary movement of mostly middle-aged white evangelicals — emerged in 2009 after Obama’s election, spreading quickly under the slogan of “taking the country back.” The old social order of Jim Crow laws (Tischauser, 2012) was remembered with nostalgia. The Tea Party’s social impact was crucial in shaping the MAGA movement, decisively rooting white Christian nationalism as a core identity marker of Republican politics in America.
Therefore, the answer to the question posed in this text is clear: we are witnessing an electoral and political engineering process that has transformed radicalized fringe electorates into a national electoral force, steering the country toward white Christian nationalism—ever more exclusionary, ever more puritanical, ever more authoritarian.
References
Art, D. (2022). “The myth of global populism.” Perspectives on Politics, 20(3), 999-1011.
Betz, H. G. (2019). “Facets of nativism: a heuristic exploration.” Patterns of Prejudice, 53(2), 111-135.
Betz, H. G. (2017). “Nativism across time and space.” Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 335-353.
Ehrenreich, B. (1989). Fear of falling: The inner life of the middle class. New York: Pantheon Books.
Formisano, R. P. (2012). The Tea Party: a brief history. JHU Press.
Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2024). Tyranny of the minority: Why American democracy reached the breaking point. Random House.
Stanley, J. (2018). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House Trade Paperbacks.
Tischauser, L. V. (2012). Jim crow laws. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.
In an interview with ECPS, Dr. Mom Bishwakarma reflects on Nepal’s September 2025 uprising, widely described as a Gen Z revolution. While youth mobilization toppled a government and ignited debates on corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that deeper inequalities remain untouched. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change,” he stresses. Despite promises of inclusion in the 2015 constitution, caste discrimination and elite dominance persist, leaving Dalits marginalized. Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, he cautions that without dismantling entrenched structures, Nepal risks repeating cycles of revolt and disappointment rather than achieving a genuine democratic transformation.
The September 2025 youth-led uprising in Nepal, widely framed as a Gen Z revolution, has generated global debate about the prospects for democratic renewal in post-conflict societies marked by entrenched inequality and elite capture. To probe the deeper social and political implications of this moment, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, researcher in the Department of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Sydney and sessional academic at the University of Tasmania, Australia. A specialist on caste politics and Dalit struggles for justice, Dr. Bishwakarma situates the uprising within Nepal’s broader trajectory of populist-authoritarian bargains and incomplete democratic transformation.
At the heart of the movement, he explains, was not caste or identity politics but a narrowly defined resistance against corruption and “Nepo baby” privilege. As he notes, “To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities… Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of ‘Nepo baby’ privilege and the elitism of the ruling class.”This narrow focus, centered especially on the government’s attempt to ban social media, created mobilization energy but left deeper structures of inequality intact.
Digital platforms played a pivotal role, enabling new forms of youth subjectivity while simultaneously constraining the scope of protest. “Youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems,” Dr. Bishwakarma observes, yet he underscores the limits of such digitally mediated politics in a semi-feudal society where caste discrimination remains pervasive. For Dalit youth in particular, visibility remained minimal: “We can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement… This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal.”
The uprising also revealed the fragility of Nepal’s federal constitutional order. Despite provisions for inclusion, everyday discrimination remains widespread, with law enforcement institutions often biased and ineffective. For Dr. Bishwakarma, this gap underscores a sobering conclusion: “One legal provision alone does not guarantee rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide.”
Above all, he stresses that the uprising has not yielded the systemic change many anticipated. “Basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.”
Drawing parallels with Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising, Dr. Bishwakarma warns that Nepal too risks sliding into cycles of disappointment unless its youth movements move beyond symbolic anti-elite populism toward a deeper confrontation with caste, inequality, and authoritarian legacies.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. Mom Bishwakarma, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
The Uprising Changed the Government, But Not the System
Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Bishwakarma, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts frame the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution. From your perspective, how did entrenched caste-based inequalities and elite hegemony intersect with rising youth discontent to generate this rupture? And to what extent should we interpret this upheaval as a repudiation of Nepal’s long-standing populist-authoritarian bargains between ruling elites and marginalized publics?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this opportunity. Of course, we have to look at the recent political uprising in Nepal from different perspectives. From the point of view of caste inequality, this movement could certainly have done much more. To be honest, it has not really addressed the issue of caste inequalities. Basically, Gen Z started this movement against corruption and against any form of elite hegemony in Nepal’s ruling system. In that sense, it was broadly against discrimination, but more specifically it focused on corruption and on the government’s attempt to ban social media.
In this regard, I should say that caste issues have not been central to the Gen Z movement, and they have not been explicitly addressed. I know this is a very difficult and important issue in Nepal, but at this stage Gen Z could not directly confront caste inequalities. Instead, they were primarily resisting forms of “Nepo baby” privilege and the elitism of the ruling class. As a result, the movement did not specifically take up the concerns of marginalized communities. So, I would conclude that the uprising was not directed against caste discrimination or other forms of discrimination per se. It was mainly targeting corruption in Nepal.
Much of the mobilization was digital and youth-led. How do you interpret the relationship between Nepal’s semi-feudal social order and the emergence of digitally mediated political subjectivities among Gen Z, particularly in light of global debates on how new media both enables and disciplines democratic dissent?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Looking at Nepal’s recent development process, social media has been one of the areas where there has been massive change — a significant digital transformation, we might say. Basically, access to phones and social media has been a really important shift. That is the main reason why Gen Z became affiliated with each other in different groups, formed associations, and started creating resistance against corruption and other issues.
But looking at society itself, Nepal is still semi-feudal, with persistent discrimination and many challenges yet to be addressed. Digitalization, moreover, has not penetrated rural areas or many other parts of society. So yes, young people are very comfortable with social media, and they are using this tool to raise issues and push for change. Essentially, youth use social media as a means of organization and as a medium to express discontent against various problems. However, they have not fully engaged with the deeper social issues or the root causes behind them. They could have raised concerns about caste inequalities, other forms of inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, or unemployment — all of which would have been valuable. Instead, they focused mainly on two issues: corruption and the government’s attempt to ban social media.
This narrow focus has not created a real chance for broader change in Nepal, nor has it produced significant transformation in other areas. Yes, of course, the uprising changed the government, but at the end of the day, we are not seeing the outcomes that many people in Nepal were hoping for or expecting.
Nepo Babies Have Been Resisted, But Caste Discrimination Has Been Left Untouched
The discourse against “nepo kids” suggests a moral economy of resentment. Do you see this as a continuation of older struggles against caste privilege and elite reproduction, or as a qualitatively new form of digitally amplified populist class politics rooted in spectacle and affect?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: This Nepo babies movement is essentially rooted in social media. Of course, it stands against any form of elite hegemony in the country, but it is not directly addressing the issue of caste discrimination. We can see that in the leadership of the Gen Z movement, not many youths from so-called marginalized or lower-caste groups are represented. They are not in leadership positions, nor are they given that opportunity.
Many young people from different classes and communities may have joined the resistance, but they remain outside leadership roles. So, in essence, this is more of a symbolic resistance against elite hegemony or authoritarian governance, rather than a movement that specifically addresses caste or other marginalized groups. It is, in effect, resistance against political leaders, Nepo babies, and elite authoritarianism in Nepal.
With symbols of state power set ablaze, some argue the uprising reflected anarchic nihilism, while others see a democratic re-founding. Do you interpret this as a destructive rejection of institutions, or as the embryonic formation of what might be called a post-elitist and post-authoritarian democratic imagination?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: We have to look at this from two perspectives. Yes, of course, we can see it as post-elitist, or an anti-elitist movement, and there is a reimagining of a new democratic process in Nepal. But the way it has unfolded in the political system, particularly after the uprising and the formation of the interim government, shows that they are still working within the current constitution, and there has not been much change in the governance system.
Gen Z demanded a directly elected prime minister or a directly elected president, reforms in the electoral system, and strict action against corrupt political parties, but not much of this is happening. After the uprising, an interim government was formed, led by the former Chief Justice and other independent leaders who are very well known in the country, but they are still operating under the articles of the existing Constitution. This means there has been no suspension of the Constitution.
There is no guarantee of a directly elected prime minister or president. There is no guarantee of a new electoral process that would ensure representation of all communities, including marginalized groups. In other words, there has not been a real outcome from this process. So, basically, we can say this has brought some destruction to political institutions, but not real change. People were expecting deeper reform, but this political outcome has not been delivered. I am not very hopeful that it will bring the transformation the country needs.
What Nepal Needs Is Total Reformation, Not Symbolic Change
A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.
Your book stresses the twin imperatives of redistribution and recognition in the struggle for Dalit justice. Do you see Nepal’s Gen Z revolution as embodying these imperatives—or does its populist anger risk collapsing recognition into resentment and redistribution into vague anti-elitist rhetoric?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you for this question as well. I would again like to emphasize that, yes, we are expecting much more change, deeper change, or reformation. As I stated in my book, to address the issues of Dalit and other marginalized groups in Nepal, there must be total reformation — both redistribution of state resources and recognition of communities like the Dalits in Nepal. But after this youth-led or Generation Z-led uprising, we are still not seeing much redistribution, nor is total reformation likely to happen in the country.
This means there is still a great deal to be done, even though the Constitution of Nepal in 2015 addressed a wide range of issues — for example, social inclusion, the republican system, and different forms of governance, such as local, federal, and state government. Many things were introduced with that new constitution, but there has not been real change regarding caste discrimination and other forms of exclusion.
Young people, in particular, are looking for rapid change and fast development in Nepal, which has not materialized, either after 2015 or, if we look back further, after 2006, when the republican system was introduced in 2008. People expected much more meaningful change so that there would be development, opportunities, and inclusion. Yes, there was some symbolic inclusion in Parliament and in other mechanisms — Dalits and other marginalized groups were included, as were women and other communities — but in rural areas, ordinary people did not feel the impact.
There has continued to be high unemployment and high corruption. So, from that perspective, yes, there is still much to be done in Nepal, and what is needed is total reformation rather than symbolic change. This particular uprising is indeed a revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, but it is not producing meaningful change, nor is it bringing about the kind of total reformation Nepal needs.
Despite legal prohibitions, everyday caste discrimination persists. To what degree do Gen Z protests transcend entrenched caste boundaries, and how do you assess whether Dalit youth achieved disproportionate visibility—or conversely remained marginal—in this anti-authoritarian mobilization?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Thank you so much for this very good question. As I stated before, Dalits once again seemed to be marginalized in this process, because we can’t see even a single person leading the Gen Z movement. If you look at the composition of Gen Z leaders, I don’t see any Dalit in that position. Of course, there were a couple of people killed during the protest, and there are other incidents as well, but in terms of leadership, I can’t see any Dalit member included in that process. This means that the protest was not specifically raising the issue of caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination in Nepal. It was more focused on anti-corruption and the ban on social media. Yes, of course, that is really important for the development of the nation, but when it comes to issues like caste inequalities, other forms of discrimination, and many broader social concerns, they have not really been addressed at this stage. That’s why I am again saying that, in the case of caste and other forms of discrimination, we need another form of revolt or resistance that truly addresses the issue of caste, so that there will be no discrimination, and marginalized communities will have more opportunities and be able to develop in Nepal.
Without Effective Mechanisms, Discrimination Persists Nationwide
Federal restructuring and the 2015 constitution promised inclusive representation, yet inequalities remain deeply institutionalized. Did the 2025 uprising expose the limitations of Nepal’s federalism as a tool for substantive equality, or was it more a populist indictment of the state’s moral legitimacy?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: I’ve already mentioned this issue before, but I would like to emphasize again that, yes, the 2015 Constitution specifically addressed social inclusion. Because of that constitution, there is representation of marginalized groups, including Dalits, women, and other ethnic communities, in Parliament as well as in local and state government. But it has not directly addressed caste inequalities or everyday discrimination.
Discrimination remains widespread across the country. The government’s law enforcement mechanisms are either ineffective or deeply biased, which is why existing laws are not being properly implemented. Yes, there is legislation against caste-based discrimination — an act from 2000 that was enforced after 2011 — and the 2015 Constitution also clearly states that caste discrimination is illegal.
There are rights on paper for Dalits and other marginalized communities, but one legal provision alone does not guarantee those rights, nor does it prevent the persistence of discrimination nationwide. What is needed is an effective implementation mechanism, such as police and administrative institutions, that take the issue of discrimination seriously. At the moment, such mechanisms are absent, and there is also a lack of Dalit representation within law enforcement itself. This creates a vacuum and leaves little hope for people, especially those from lower-caste and Dalit communities in Nepal.
Critics warn that anti-corruption and anti-nepotism discourses can be easily co-opted by authoritarian populists who claim to “purify” politics while entrenching new hierarchies. Do you see parallels between the risks inherent in caste-based identity mobilization and the dangers of these new anti-elite narratives?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Of course, I agree with that point, because this present youth uprising, or Gen Z movement, is against elite authoritarian government systems and the leaders who were running the government in Nepal. But there is always the issue of caste identity and representation. Most of the leaders of the Gen Z movement are again from higher castes, and there are not many Dalits or other marginalized groups included in leading positions or processes. This clearly shows that caste inequality and caste identity have not been specifically addressed through this uprising, even though they could have been. The core issues of the movement were essentially anti-corruption and opposition to the social media ban. This means they did not give much attention to other social problems, such as caste discrimination, unemployment, and broader structural inequalities. That is why there is always a risk: if the youth and others involved in such movements do not fully understand Nepal’s social fabric, history, and the deeper changes needed, their mobilization risks remaining superficial.
Another point I want to emphasize is that, even though these young people are driven by social media and digital transformation, their mindset is still shaped by their families, parents, and society. Many come from elite backgrounds and continue to enjoy caste privilege. That is the real risk and danger. It means that, in the future, even if they come to power — whether as ministers or prime ministers — they are unlikely to directly address caste discrimination or other forms of marginalization. That remains a serious danger in Nepal’s current context.
People Expected Faster Progress on Corruption and Development
Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.
Nepal’s Maoist insurgency once mobilized Dalits and marginalized groups in large numbers, but its legacy was one of institutional capture and elite circulation. How do today’s youth movements relate to—or explicitly repudiate—this Maoist populist-authoritarian inheritance?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: Many people now view the Maoist revolt as another form of elite authoritarian process, and in that sense, it did not fulfill expectations. But we also need to look at it from a historical perspective. Nepal was then ruled by a king, opportunities were very limited, and although there was democracy, there was little real progress and no meaningful inclusion. After the Maoist movement, however, many things did change.
For example, the issue of inclusion was strongly raised, and afterward a new constitution was promulgated. That constitution guaranteed social inclusion, secularism, and a republican federal system in the country. Still, these gains did not translate into substantial improvements on the ground. Change was happening, but people were expecting much faster progress in addressing corruption, unemployment, and development. Corruption, in particular, was a major issue, and while the Maoists attempted to address it when they came to power, they ultimately fell short.
This led to political shifts. The main parties, like the Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, came together, formed a coalition, and removed the Maoists from power. So elite resistance was strong. At the same time, many argued that the Maoists themselves had become elitist, were involved in corruption, and failed to deliver real change. That became a major criticism of the Maoist Party.
Another structural issue was the electoral system. The Maoists favored a full proportional system, but the 2015 political settlement established a first-past-the-post system. This system made it almost impossible for any single party to win a full majority, leading to frequent coalition governments and instability. That is also why the recent youth uprising demanded reforms: a directly elected prime minister or president, a different electoral system, and a state-funded electoral process.
But even after this uprising, none of these demands have materialized. With Parliament dissolved, constitutional amendments cannot move forward. We now have to wait and see what the interim government does. One of its mandates is simply to hold another election. After that, we will see whether a single party can secure a majority, or whether a youth-led party will emerge and participate in the elections. These are the developments we will need to watch in the future.
Dalit Politics Requires Both Recognition and Redistribution
Your scholarship emphasizes Dalit demands for recognition alongside material redistribution. Do you think the revolutionary anger of Gen Z risks dissolving such group-specific claims into a homogenized “anti-elite” populism that reproduces old exclusions under new slogans?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: While doing my research, I argued for two key points. First, for Dalit communities in Nepal, there must be total reformation and recognition of the Dalit community. Within the Dalit community itself, there are many different groups, and there is not much unity. To bring them together around their common concerns, there should be recognized group politics. That is why I argued that group politics for the Dalit community should be formally acknowledged by political parties and state institutions.
The second point is redistribution — the redistribution of state resources and state positions, including, for example, land reform and other measures. But even the 2015 Constitution of Nepal did not truly address either redistribution or recognition. Yes, to some extent it recognized Dalit issues, but only superficially.
In terms of representation, because the constitution did not establish a fully proportional electoral system, there is no guarantee of 13% representation for the Dalit community, even though Dalits make up around 13% of the population. In this sense, I always argue that there must be total reformation — one that meaningfully addresses caste discrimination, lack of representation, unemployment, poverty, and related issues. The 2015 Constitution addressed some of these concerns only partially.
The recent uprising and the new process have not specifically addressed caste inequalities or other forms of discrimination. So, I am not very hopeful that the new process — meaning the new election and new parliament — will directly address inequality, since no new constitution is likely to emerge. I don’t know which political parties will return to power or form a government, whether there will be an absolute majority for one party, or whether a youth-led government will emerge. At this stage it is not clear. That is why I am not fully confident that the new process will specifically address caste inequalities or Dalit concerns.
Nepal Risks Sliding Into the Same Disappointments as Sri Lanka and Bangladesh
Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister’s office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.
Lastly, Sri Lanka’s Aragalaya and Bangladesh’s 2024 uprising both toppled governments but slid toward renewed authoritarian populism or elite restoration. What lessons should Nepal’s Gen Z revolution draw from these trajectories if it is to avoid similar cycles of disappointment?
Dr. Mom Bishwakarma: You’re right that the recent examples from Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, as well as other forms of civic resistance in different parts of the world, show that even when there is revolt or resistance against elite authoritarianism, the outcomes are often disappointing. That is exactly what happened in Sri Lanka, in Bangladesh, and in Nepal. The similarities are clear: young people want total reformation, development, and change. That is what the youth in Bangladesh demanded as well, but at the end of the day, the political process did not move in that direction.
In Bangladesh, for instance, there was a revolt against the government, the prime minister fled to India, and a new interim government was installed. Yet elections have still not been held. The same risks exist in Nepal. Here, an interim government was also formed, and young people demanded an independent figure as prime minister. That is why the Chief Justice was appointed as interim prime minister, with a mandate to organize elections by the given deadline. But looking at the current political process, it is not moving in the right direction. Whether elections will even take place on time is uncertain, and many people are openly speculating about delays.
The problem is that dialogue with political parties has not yet begun. At the end of the day, democracy requires political parties to be central stakeholders. Without them, a democratic election cannot be organized. Elections cannot simply be carried out without agreement among the political parties.
For this reason, I am not hopeful that there will be real change, or that the core demands of the Gen Z movement will be addressed either by the interim government or by the new government after elections. Yes, the uprising was a real resistance against elite authoritarianism in Nepal, but the results so far are not heading in a positive direction. The outcome is not what the people of Nepal had hoped for.
I am also not optimistic that the new process will address deeper issues such as caste inequalities or caste-based discrimination. Until and unless the caste system in Nepal is dismantled, discrimination will persist. If there is no new constitution, or at least no specific program aimed at uprooting the caste system, then marginalized groups such as Dalits will continue to face severe discrimination in the future. We will have to wait and see what happens, but at this stage, it remains very unclear what kind of change will come even after new elections in Nepal.
The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted a panel titled “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding.”The session gathered distinguished scholars to examine the accelerating erosion of democracy, the potential transition from populism to fascism, and the moral and intellectual duties of those who continue to defend democratic values in dark times.
Selcuk Gultasli, ECPS Chairperson, opened the session by emphasizing the urgency of the theme. He noted that the panel sought not only to analyze the rise of populism but also to confront how authoritarian tendencies may harden into fascism. ECPS, he explained, is committed to making the discussion widely accessible through a detailed report and online recordings, ensuring that policymakers, academics, and engaged citizens can benefit from the insights shared.
Moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, then set the tone by recalling ECPS’s mission: to document and analyze how populism threatens democracy worldwide. He warned that populist leaders are not isolated figures but draw legitimacy from mass support, which, in Arendtian terms, provides the essential condition for fascist governance. Today’s task, Professor Aktar concluded, is no longer about building democracy but about preventing its collapse.
Professor Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University) opened with a comparative analysis of populism in Europe and the United States. She argued that American populism, embodied by Donald Trump, is marked by unpredictability and authoritarian experimentation, untethered from coherent historical anchors. The most dangerous development, she suggested, lies not in street militias but in “social authoritarianism”—elite legal and intellectual projects such as Project 2025 that aim to dismantle democracy from within. The elevation of Charlie Kirk as a martyr, she warned, signals a new form of religious-political mobilization with fascistic overtones.
Professor Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg) challenged the myth of a pristine democracy interrupted by an authoritarian onslaught. He argued that the current model of democracy was already exclusionary before the rise of authoritarianism, and the current Western model itself is failing. By ignoring the dangers of private corporate power and clinging to Eurocentric notions of “consolidation,” democrats have overlooked the deeper roots of disillusionment. For Professor Friedman, the task is to redefine democracy as equal human choice in all decisions that affect people’s lives—a principle that requires confronting both state and private power.
Professor Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida) provided an ethnographic perspective on Christian nationalism in the United States. She mapped three strands—evangelical dominionism, Catholic integralism, and Pentecostal-charismatic movements—that, despite historical rivalries, now converge in rejecting pluralism and democracy. She also highlighted the convergence of these religious forces with secular techno-utopianism and nihilistic online subcultures. The result, she argued, is a coalition oriented toward collapse and accelerationism, united less by theology than by anti-democratic aspirations.
Professor Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University) situated the discussion in a global frame. He argued that democracy was tarnished long before populism’s rise, corrupted by Cold War secrecy, US hypocrisy in international law, and the exploitative logic of capitalism. Populism, in his view, compounds these crises by waging an “epistemological war” against truth and expertise. Facing climate change, nuclear peril, and extreme poverty, Professor Falk urged intellectuals to embrace utopian thinking and even revolutionary transformation, reorienting governance toward the global public good.
Professor Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) concluded with a stark warning about the authoritarian project underway in the United States. Drawing lessons from leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán and Turkey’s Erdoğan, he argued that Trump and his allies are pursuing a systematic strategy of democratic dismantling: media capture, judicial purges, lawfare, and gerrymandering. While fascistic elements are present, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of terminological precision. Resistance, he suggested, requires early mobilization, broad coalitions, and a focus on economic issues that resonate with ordinary voters.
Together, the panelists painted a sobering picture: populism today is no longer merely a style of politics but a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with global reverberations. From Christian nationalism to techno-utopianism, from corporate power to manipulated legal frameworks, the threats are multifaceted. Yet the panel also underscored a common responsibility—that intellectuals must speak with clarity, resist euphemism, and foster new visions of democracy suited to the crises of our age.
Professor Mabel Berezin: “Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe”
People gather at Turning Point USA headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, for a memorial following the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk during his speech at Utah Valley University in Orem. Photo: Dreamstime.
In her presentation, Professor Mabel Berezin delivered a sobering analysis of the current trajectory of democracy in the United States and Europe. Speaking from the vantage point of an academic who has long studied populism and fascism, she situated the discussion within a comparative framework, but with particular urgency regarding developments in the United States since the 2024 presidential election.
Berezin opened with a reflection on the language used to describe contemporary democratic crises. The term “democratic backsliding,” she argued, now feels wholly inadequate for the American case. Since Donald Trump’s return to power, the country has been subject to what she described as a “high-speed wrecking ball” against its democratic institutions. While democratic erosion is a global phenomenon, its forms vary across national contexts, depending on political histories and institutional resilience. This, she suggested, underscores the need for context-specific strategies of intellectual and civic engagement.
European Populism and American Exceptionalism
Berezin revisited an argument she first articulated in 2017 in her essay “Trump is Not a European-Style Populist and That is Our Problem.” In that piece, she observed that while European far-right populists—such as Marine Le Pen in France or Giorgia Meloni in Italy—often ground their appeals in nostalgia for a stronger nation-state and postwar social protections, the American populist right is marked by unpredictability. European populists, she argued, want “more state, not less,” and their grievances frequently revolve around immigration and monetary issues within the European Union framework. By contrast, the American case lacks a coherent historical anchor, and Trump’s political appeal did not fit neatly into established narratives.
For Professor Berezin, this unpredictability made Trump particularly dangerous. While European populists often pursue recognizable policy goals rooted in the past, Trump’s movement was untethered, fueled instead by volatile grievances and charismatic mobilization. The absence of clearly defined political expectations in the US created fertile ground for authoritarian experimentation.
The Rise of Social Authoritarianism
Turning to the US after the 2020 and 2024 elections, Professor Berezin noted the growing academic consensus that Trumpism bears fascist characteristics. However, she argued that the most pressing threats to democracy are not necessarily the paramilitary groups that rallied in Charlottesville or stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Instead, the greater danger lies in what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a project spearheaded by intellectual cadres aligned with institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the Federalist Society, and the architects of “Project 2025.”
These actors, she explained, represent the true intellectual core of the movement. Unlike the visible extremists brandishing weapons, these figures deploy law, language, and bureaucracy as instruments of authoritarian consolidation. By targeting institutions and systematically reshaping the judiciary, they seek to dismantle the so-called “deep state” and restrict fundamental freedoms under the veneer of legality. As Professor Berezin quipped, it is easier to imprison someone who fires an AR-15 than it is to restrain a legal strategist whose weapon is a thesaurus.
The Paramilitary of Jesus
While she downplayed the long-term mobilizing potential of armed militias, Professor Berezin identified a new and alarming development: the posthumous elevation of Charlie Kirk, a conservative media figure assassinated in September 2025. Initially dismissing him as a fringe podcaster, Professor Berezin admitted she was shocked by the scale and spectacle of his memorial service, which she described as a “paramilitary of Jesus with the blessings of the state.” The event drew millions of attendees and viewers, including Trump and much of his cabinet, and revealed a level of organization, youthful enthusiasm, and emotional intensity that Professor Berezin found profoundly unsettling.
What struck her most was the fusion of evangelical symbolism with political mobilization. The service emphasized family, reproduction, and communal solidarity, urging followers to “have more children than you can afford” and to embrace family as one’s central role in society. While the rhetoric appeared religious, Professor Berezin suggested it was in fact a form of secular mobilization—anchored less in theology than in a cultural project of authoritarian belonging.
Kirk’s assassination, she argued, paradoxically strengthened the movement. In death, he was transformed into a martyr, his charisma frozen in time, and his image available for endless appropriation by the MAGA movement. This development, she warned, fills a “missing link” in the analytical framework of American authoritarianism, supplying the movement with an emotionally powerful narrative and a mobilizing force that mainstream democratic actors struggle to match.
Intellectual Responsibilities
The central theme of Professor Berezin’s speech was the intellectual responsibility of scholars in confronting authoritarianism. She acknowledged the limitations of academic writing and debate in the face of mobilized authoritarian forces but insisted that silence or timidity is not an option. Universities, law schools, and other institutions must be willing to say “no” to authoritarian incursions, resisting the erosion of academic freedom and democratic values.
Dialogue, she suggested, remains valuable, but only if understood not as a tool of conversion but as a means of fostering engagement. In her own teaching on fascism and nationalism, Professor Berezin frequently encounters conservative students who seek to talk rather than proselytize. Creating spaces for such conversations, she argued, can generate a deeper understanding of democratic principles across divides.
Yet Professor Berezin also warned against complacency. She noted that the rhetoric of Trump’s movement is saturated with appeals to “freedom,” while democracy itself is rarely mentioned. The gap between these two concepts must be addressed directly. For her, one crucial task is rearticulating what democracy actually means in the public sphere. Many Americans, she lamented, support democracy as an abstract good but lack a concrete understanding of its practices and requirements.
Democracy and Education
Professor Berezin concluded by situating intellectual responsibility within the longer history of democratic education. She invoked John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and the civic initiatives launched in the United States during the onset of World War II, such as the National Foundation for Education and American Citizenship. These historical precedents, she argued, remind us that democracy must be taught, nurtured, and continuously reinforced through education.
For Professor Berezin, the path forward lies not in rhetorical denunciations of fascism but in cultivating a renewed public understanding of democracy itself. Education, both formal and informal, is the most effective channel for resisting the deeply embedded authoritarian forces now at work. If democracy is to be saved—or at least its decline attenuated—scholars, educators, and intellectuals must reclaim their role in shaping civic culture.
Conclusion
Professor Berezin’s presentation offered a bracing assessment of the state of democracy in America and beyond. By contrasting European and American populisms, highlighting the intellectual underpinnings of authoritarianism, and analyzing the symbolic mobilization of figures like Charlie Kirk, she illuminated the complex and evolving threats facing democratic societies. Her call to intellectual responsibility—grounded in education, engagement, and the defense of democratic institutions—underscored the urgent role of scholars in meeting this historical moment.
Professor Steven Friedman: “Democracy for All: Rethinking a Failed Model”
The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.
In his presentation, Professor Steven Friedman offered a provocative and deeply critical re-examination of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Speaking as both a South African scholar and a citizen who lived through apartheid and the democratic transition of 1994, Professor Friedman challenged prevailing assumptions about democracy’s origins, legitimacy, and sustainability. His core argument was clear: the crisis facing democracy today is not merely the product of authoritarian incursions or populist disruption but the collapse of a flawed model of democracy that has dominated global thinking for the past three decades.
The Myth of a Pristine Democratic Past
Professor Friedman began by dismantling what he called the “myth of the pristine democratic environment.” Many observers, he argued, continue to think of democracy as a fully functioning, well-ordered system that has been corrupted by external “barbarians.” While acknowledging the existence of authoritarian challengers, Professor Friedman insisted that this framing misdiagnoses the problem. According to him, democracy has not simply been hijacked; rather, the dominant model itself is failing. To understand today’s crisis, we must interrogate the assumptions underpinning this model.
Democracy as a Western Export
The first of these assumptions, Professor Friedman argued, is the idea that democracy is inherently Western. For decades, he noted, democracy outside North America and Western Europe has been judged by the extent to which it resembles an idealized Western model. This attitude, embedded in the “transition to democracy” scholarship of the late twentieth century, created a hierarchy in which Africa, Asia, and Latin America were cast as perpetual apprentices striving to approximate Western democracies.
He pointed to the academic obsession with “democratic consolidation” as an example. Despite the proliferation of literature on the subject, there has never been a coherent definition of what a “consolidated democracy” actually is. In practice, Professor Friedman argued, the concept functioned as a mirror: if a country looked like Western Europe or North America, it was deemed consolidated; if not, it was considered deficient. This was less a political theory, he suggested, than an ethnic bias.
Today, the irony of this model is stark. The very Western democracies once held up as exemplars are themselves eroding fundamental freedoms. Professor Friedman shared a telling personal anecdote. During apartheid, South Africans envied Western societies for their freedoms of speech and assembly. Yet today, he noted, German academics fear losing their jobs for participating in discussions critical of Israel, and Americans risk detention for political speech. The “boot,” he observed, “is now on the other foot.” Modeling democracy on the West, he concluded, is no longer tenable.
Palestine as a Democracy Problem
Professor Friedman underscored this argument with a pressing contemporary example: Palestine. He contended that the suppression of pro-Palestinian expression in Western democracies represents a profound democratic failure. Citizens in the UK and elsewhere have been arrested for holding signs opposing genocide, while in many countries, calls for boycotts—an elementary form of democratic speech—are criminalized.
Equally troubling, Professor Friedman argued, is the gap between public opinion and elite policy. Surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for a just resolution to the conflict, yet Western governments either ignore this consensus or offer token gestures while maintaining policies that sustain the crisis. This disconnect illustrates how democracy, when treated as a Western possession, erodes its own legitimacy. For Professor Friedman, the Palestine issue is not peripheral but central to understanding democracy’s current global malaise.
Ignoring Private Power
The second flawed assumption of the dominant model, Professor Friedman argued, is its fixation on the state as the sole threat to freedom. According to this view, democracy exists primarily to constrain state power and ensure accountability to citizens. While important, this perspective ignores another crucial reality: private power can be equally oppressive when left unregulated.
Professor Friedman reminded his audience that this insight is hardly radical. Theodore Roosevelt, in the early twentieth century, warned that unregulated commercial power could dominate and oppress citizens just as much as the state. For much of the postwar period, Western democracies acknowledged this reality, regulating corporate influence to safeguard public interests. Yet in the past thirty years, this recognition has disappeared from mainstream democratic theory. Private power is rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarship or policy debates, leaving citizens vulnerable to corporate domination.
He illustrated this point with evidence from the 2024 US elections. Democratic candidates who campaigned on regulating corporate price gouging outperformed their peers by 8–10 percentage points, sometimes winning in unexpected constituencies. This, Professor Friedman argued, underscores the centrality of addressing private power to democratic renewal. Citizens disengage not because they are seduced by authoritarianism, but because they see mainstream parties as unwilling or unable to improve their material conditions.
The Real Crisis: Disillusionment, Not Populism
Professor Friedman pushed back against the notion that democracy’s greatest threat lies in the rise of populist strongmen. The problem, he suggested, is not the growth of the authoritarian right but the erosion of faith among non-right constituencies. In the US, for example, Trump did not dramatically expand his base between 2020 and 2024. Instead, 17 million former Democratic voters simply abstained. Disillusionment, not conversion, handed Trump his victory.
This phenomenon is not unique to the US. Across Western Europe, too, the crisis of democracy stems less from the swelling of the right than from the alienation of citizens who feel their votes no longer matter. When private power goes unregulated and living standards stagnate, democratic participation declines. Professor Friedman emphasized that this structural disillusionment is a more urgent challenge than the electoral gains of right-wing populists.
Redefining Democracy
In concluding, Professor Friedman turned to the question of intellectual responsibility. Scholars, he argued, must abandon the failed model of democracy and reimagine its meaning. For him, democracy is not a set of institutions or a Western inheritance but a principle: every adult human being should have an equal say in every decision that affects them.
He acknowledged that no society has ever fully realized this ideal. But, citing South African theorist Richard Turner’s essay “The Necessity of Utopian Thinking,” Professor Friedman insisted that such standards must serve as guiding measures. Without them, democrats risk losing sight of their goals.
Placing equal human choice at the center of democracy, Professor Friedman argued, has two transformative implications. First, it erases the Western bias by recognizing democracy as a universal entitlement, not a Western export. Second, it compels recognition that private power must be regulated just as much as state power to ensure genuine freedom. Free speech, free assembly, and other democratic rights flow from this foundational principle.
Conclusion
Professor Friedman’s presentation was both a diagnosis and a manifesto. He rejected nostalgic narratives of a lost democratic golden age, instead locating today’s crisis in the flaws of a dominant model that has privileged Western forms and ignored private power. By highlighting the Palestine issue, he demonstrated how democratic principles are being eroded in the very societies that claim to embody them. By pointing to corporate power, he revealed the blind spots of a state-centered understanding of democracy.
Ultimately, Professor Friedman’s call was for a radical rethinking of democracy as a universal system of equal human choice. Only by embracing this vision, he argued, can democrats move beyond disillusionment and resist both authoritarianism and apathy. His intervention offered a powerful reminder that democracy’s renewal depends not on replication of Western models but on confronting the structural inequalities—both public and private—that undermine it.
Professor Julie Ingersoll: “That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US”
Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.
In her presentation, Professor Julie Ingersoll offered a sobering ethnographic analysis of how religious and ostensibly secular movements in the United States have converged into a powerful populist force. Drawing on more than three decades of field-based scholarship on American religion, Professor Ingersoll explained how seemingly disparate strands of Christianity—along with nonreligious ideological currents—have coalesced into a theocratic, anti-democratic vision that underpins the populist movement known as MAGA. Her intervention highlighted the importance of rethinking how scholars conceptualize religion itself, arguing that theological differences often obscure shared cultural and political commitments.
The Ethnographer’s Lens
Professor Ingersoll situated her perspective within her disciplinary background. Unlike scholars who approach populism through theories of democracy or abstract political models, her work is rooted in ethnography and the close study of religious communities over time. Her aim, she explained, is not to prescribe strategies for saving democracy but to document the lived dynamics of religious movements and to clarify what society is up against. This commitment to description and analysis, she argued, is itself a vital intellectual responsibility: to bear witness, to explain, and to equip others with a deeper understanding of the cultural forces reshaping American politics.
Three Streams of Christian Nationalism
Central to Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her mapping of Christian nationalism into three distinct but increasingly interconnected traditions.
Evangelical Protestant Dominionism: The first stream emerges from white conservative evangelical Protestantism, particularly the Reconstructionist movement of the 1950s. These groups believe the Bible speaks to every area of life and advocate a theocratic social order rooted in pro-slavery Southern Presbyterianism. They view pluralism and social equality as heretical and insist that Christians are commanded to exercise “dominion” over the world, a mandate they trace back to Genesis. This dominionist vision has informed generations of evangelical activism, positioning biblical law as the sole legitimate foundation for governance.
Catholic Integralism: The second stream arises from Catholic integralism, a minority tradition within Catholicism that rejects church-state separation and seeks to organize society according to Catholic teaching. Integralists draw inspiration from the historic doctrine of the divine right of kings and today align themselves with efforts to dismantle the administrative state. Professor Ingersoll pointed to Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society’s transformation of the US Supreme Court as evidence of integralist influence. Their promotion of the “unitary executive” doctrine reflects a broader ambition to consolidate political power in ways that erode checks and balances.
Charismatic and Pentecostal Movements: The third stream comes from charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity, particularly the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) that arose in the 1990s. Emphasizing prophecy, apostleship, and spiritual warfare, these groups interpret the world as a literal battlefield between divine and demonic forces. Their “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions Christians seizing control of key spheres of society, from government and business to media and education. Professor Ingersoll warned that this branch of Christian nationalism, with its apocalyptic worldview and demonization of opponents, is especially prone to violence.
While historically divided and even hostile to one another, these three streams have forged common cause within the MAGA movement. Their theological disagreements, Professor Ingersoll argued, often matter less in everyday practice than their shared opposition to pluralism, egalitarianism, and democracy.
Rethinking Religion
A major contribution of Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her challenge to conventional understandings of religion. Too often, she argued, scholars and observers treat religion as a coherent set of theological beliefs derived from sacred texts. In reality, religious communities function as shifting assemblages of practices, narratives, and cultural markers that organize social life, demarcate insiders and outsiders, and legitimate particular hierarchies.
She illustrated this with a simple example for her students: when people choose a church, they often do so based on social comfort and community ties, not doctrinal precision. Over time, their beliefs shift to align with the group. In this sense, theology frequently follows social belonging rather than the other way around. Recognizing this dynamic, she argued, helps explain how divergent Christian traditions can set aside doctrinal disputes to advance a shared political project.
The Blurring of Religious and Secular
Importantly, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that Christian nationalism does not exist in isolation. It converges with ostensibly secular ideological movements, most notably Silicon Valley techno-utopianism. Tech futurists, accelerationists, and advocates of the “Dark Enlightenment” envision the collapse of democracy and its replacement by corporate-style governance, with CEOs and elite boards as rulers. They promote building digital and physical enclaves—whether in the cloud, on artificial islands, or even on Mars—where hierarchy replaces equality.
Despite their secular self-image, these movements align with Christian nationalism on core commitments: hostility to egalitarianism, skepticism toward democracy, and openness to societal collapse as an opportunity for renewal. Together, they form a strange but potent coalition, bound less by shared theology than by shared anti-democratic aspirations.
Professor Ingersoll also pointed to nihilistic online subcultures that defy the left-right binary, particularly those implicated in the assassination of Charlie Kirk. These groups embrace collapse and seek to accelerate it, even if what follows is “nothingness.” Though ideologically incoherent, they reinforce the broader accelerationist impulse uniting religious and secular anti-democratic forces.
Theocratic Visions and Apocalyptic Anticipations
Across these groups—whether dominionist, integralist, Pentecostal, techno-utopian, or nihilist— Professor Ingersoll identified a common conviction that society is in chaos and decline, and that collapse is either inevitable or desirable. Some even imagine themselves as agents accelerating history toward apocalyptic ends. Though they may diverge sharply on what comes after collapse—the Kingdom of God, a Mars colony, or nihilistic nothingness—they are united in their rejection of democracy and equality in the present.
This convergence, she warned, explains why observers have underestimated their power. Analysts often dismissed each strand as fringe or mutually exclusive, missing the cultural work that bound them together. Only by reframing religion not as fixed belief but as lived practice can we see the coherence of this coalition.
Intellectual Responsibilities
Professor Ingersoll concluded by reflecting on the intellectual responsibilities of scholars in this precarious moment. She admitted that offering prescriptive solutions has never been her strength, nor does she claim to have a plan for saving American democracy. What she can do, she insisted, is “stay in her lane”: documenting, explaining, and bearing witness to the forces reshaping society.
She acknowledged the difficulty of gaining perspective within the United States, where daily life remains unchanged for many even as democratic institutions crumble. Yet she argued that democracy has already collapsed in significant ways, and the upcoming 2026 election may already be compromised beyond repair.
For academics, the challenge is compounded by growing pressures to remain silent. Universities, law firms, media organizations, and even independent institutions have faced campaigns to suppress dissent. Faculty—tenured, untenured, and even retired—have been fired or disciplined for their speech, often on the basis of accusations tied to social media. The silencing of intellectual voices, Professor Ingersoll warned, represents not just an attack on individuals but an erosion of democracy itself.
Conclusion
Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation illuminated the deep entanglements of religion, culture, and politics in the rise of American populism. By tracing the convergence of evangelical dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal charismatics, techno-utopians, and nihilist subcultures, she revealed a coalition united not by theology but by anti-democratic commitments. Her insistence on reframing religion as lived practice rather than doctrinal belief opened new avenues for understanding how these disparate groups reinforce one another.
Ultimately, her message was both analytical and cautionary. The coalition she described thrives on visions of collapse and acceleration, rejecting democracy and equality in favor of theocratic or technocratic alternatives. For scholars, the responsibility is to continue speaking, documenting, and explaining—even in the face of silencing. As Professor Ingersoll made clear, the stakes are nothing less than the future of American democracy.
Professor Richard Falk: “Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time”
UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.
In his presentation, Professor Richard Falk offered a sobering international perspective on the decline of democracy, the failures of US leadership, and the urgent need to rethink political responsibility in light of global crises. Speaking as a longtime scholar of international law and global order, Professor Falk situated the challenges of populism and authoritarianism within broader structural failures—of US democracy, capitalism, and the international system established after World War II.
The Tarnishing of Democracy
Professor Falk began by challenging the notion that populism alone is the cause of democratic erosion in the US. Democracy, he argued, was already “badly tarnished” long before the rise of Trumpism. For decades, the United States projected itself as the world’s exemplary democracy, yet in practice it offered citizens only a “choiceless democracy.” The two-party system, constrained by Cold War ideologies, provided little space for fundamental debate on the most pressing issues.
Secrecy further hollowed out democratic practice. The CIA and other US agencies subverted democratic movements abroad—staging coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere—while concealing these actions from the American public under the guise of national security. By normalizing criminal interventions as necessary for security, Professor Falk argued, the US “permanently corrupted the moral sensibilities of the citizenry.” Democracy was reduced to participation in elections that offered no real alternative, fueling disillusionment among the poor, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups whose grievances were consistently dismissed.
The Global Projection of Hypocrisy
Internationally, the United States squandered the opportunity after World War II to construct a just world order. Instead, it entrenched a system that privileged the victors. The United Nations Security Council institutionalized inequality by exempting the five permanent members from compliance with international law. As Professor Falk emphasized, this design elevated geopolitics over morality and law, undermining the credibility of global governance from the start.
The consequences of this hypocrisy are evident today. In conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza, international law is selectively invoked: wielded as a weapon against adversaries while ignored when allies commit violations. This double standard, Professor Falk argued, has transformed the US from a supposed champion of the rule of law into “the champion of moral hypocrisy.” The result is widespread alienation across much of the Global South, where US credibility as a promoter of democracy has eroded.
Capitalism, Populism, and the Assault on Truth
A further obstacle to democratic renewal lies in the current stage of global capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Professor Falk argued, is both exploitative and ecologically destructive. By privileging short-term profits over sustainability, it undermines governments’ ability to act in the public interest. Corporate influence on politics ensures that urgent global challenges—climate change, poverty, and disarmament—are subordinated to private interests.
Within this context, populism becomes not a solution but an amplifier of democratic decay. Trumpism, Professor Falk contended, embodies an “epistemological war against the Enlightenment.” It is hostile to expertise, reason, and evidence, and sanctions those who attempt to tell inconvenient truths. The suppression of international voices speaking out about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, including United Nations officials, is emblematic of this assault on truth. Words such as “genocide” are rendered almost unspeakable, even as atrocities unfold in real time. By eroding the possibility of truth-telling, populist politics undermines responsible citizenship and corrodes the foundations of democratic accountability.
Toward Emancipatory Politics
Against this backdrop, Professor Falk posed the critical question: what does it mean to be a responsible citizen in such dark times? His answer pointed toward the necessity of utopian thinking and, potentially, revolutionary transformation. Incremental reform within existing structures, he argued, is insufficient. The dominant social forces—military-industrial complexes, corporate lobbies, and entrenched elites—must be displaced by actors committed to the global public good.
For Professor Falk, the form of governance is less important than its orientation toward reality. Addressing existential challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, mass poverty—requires political systems that privilege truth, sustainability, and the collective interest over short-term expediency. Intriguingly, he noted, some of the most responsible practices in these areas currently come from China, a state that is highly autocratic and, in many respects, anti-democratic. This paradox raises the possibility that the ecological and geopolitical crises of the twenty-first century may demand post-democratic or post-populist forms of governance if humanity is to survive.
Conclusion
Professor Richard Falk’s presentation was a sweeping indictment of both US democracy and the international order it helped create. He argued that the failures of American democracy—its secrecy, its choicelessness, and its moral corruption—have reverberated globally, eroding trust in the very idea of liberal democracy. Coupled with an ecologically destructive capitalism and a populism hostile to truth, these dynamics leave humanity in a perilous position.
Yet Professor Falk’s talk was not only diagnostic but also prescriptive in spirit. He called for a politics of emancipation grounded in truth-telling, utopian imagination, and global solidarity. Whether through democratic renewal or through new, post-democratic arrangements, he urged that political systems must be reoriented toward the survival and flourishing of the human species. In a dark time, emancipation requires both courage and a willingness to envision radical alternatives.
Professor Larry Diamond:“Combatting Authoritarian Populism”
In his presentation, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a sweeping and sobering assessment of the threats facing democracy in the United States and around the world. Framing his remarks against a backdrop of rising authoritarian populism, Professor Diamond emphasized that the global tide of illiberalism is far from cresting. Instead, the forces of democratic backsliding—anchored in right-wing populism—are accelerating across multiple continents, diffusing strategies and legitimizing authoritarian models. Against this international canvas, he examined the United States as a critical battleground, where Donald Trump’s return to power has raised the prospect of a systematic dismantling of liberal democracy.
A Global Wave of Authoritarian Populism
Professor Diamond began by situating current US dynamics within a global context. Across Latin America, he observed, populist models inspired by both Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele are gaining traction. Chile may soon see a populist restoration, Bolivia and Colombia could follow suit, and Ecuador has already taken a hard turn to the right. These trends reflect a wider diffusion effect: just as democratic activists once drew inspiration from leaders such as Mario Soares in Portugal or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, today’s populist movements model themselves on figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.
Europe, too, faces serious risks. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally stands poised to take power in France, while Nigel Farage has become a plausible candidate for prime minister in the United Kingdom. Germany, traditionally a bulwark of liberal democracy, now contends with dynamics of polarized pluralism reminiscent of interwar Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, right-wing parties are resurgent, with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party threatening hard-won democratic restoration. Taken together, Professor Diamond warned, these developments mark an era of “deeply, dangerously fluid” political polarization.
Trumpism and the Project of Authoritarian Entrenchment
Within this global wave, the United States has reemerged as both a model and a cautionary tale. After returning to the presidency, Trump has pursued a far more methodical strategy to consolidate power, guided by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. This playbook, Professor Diamond explained, echoes Orbán’s transformation of Hungary from a liberal democracy to what he termed an “illiberal non-democracy”—a regime that preserves the appearance of competitive elections while hollowing out checks and balances.
Trump’s project, Professor Diamond warned, has advanced along nearly every step of the authoritarian “12-step program” outlined in his earlier book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. These steps include extreme polarization, demonization of the opposition, systematic attacks on the media, politicization of the courts, and the purge of independent institutions. What distinguishes the current moment, he stressed, is that these efforts are no longer impulsive but deliberate, refined over four years of preparation.
The Assault on Media, Courts, and Institutions
Professor Diamond catalogued the multiple fronts of authoritarian encroachment. Independent media face unprecedented threats from concentrated ownership by Trump-aligned billionaires, such as the Ellison family’s acquisitions of TikTok and Paramount (including CBS News). Once pillars of journalistic independence, these outlets risk being transformed into regime mouthpieces. The trend mirrors patterns in Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, where businessmen allied with ruling parties purchased media outlets to neutralize dissent.
The judiciary has likewise been targeted. Inspectors general across federal agencies were summarily dismissed at the outset of Trump’s new administration. Judge Advocate Generals in the Army, Navy, and Air Force—key advisors on constitutional limits within the military—were purged, raising concerns about the politicization of the armed forces. This, Professor Diamond noted, is a particularly ominous development: authoritarian leaders often seek to secure military loyalty as a safeguard against democratic resistance.
Universities, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations are also under attack. As in Hungary, where Orbán vilified George Soros, Trump’s allies have begun targeting major civil society organizations such as the Open Society Foundations and the Ford Foundation. Lawfare—weaponizing legal mechanisms to intimidate and suppress—has become a defining strategy, extending even to efforts to prosecute political opponents like former FBI director James Comey.
Gerrymandering, Lawfare, and Electoral Manipulation
At the electoral level, Trump’s allies have embraced grotesque gerrymandering to entrench minority rule. By redrawing districts with ruthless precision, they aim to secure durable Republican control of the House of Representatives, even without majority support. Echoing Orbán’s tactics in Hungary, such manipulation risks creating a façade of competition while structurally foreclosing alternation in power.
The broader strategy, Professor Diamond explained, is not to abolish elections but to subvert them—maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy while ensuring outcomes favorable to the regime. This is why vigilance over the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential elections is crucial. Without robust mobilization and institutional safeguards, the US risks sliding into electoral authoritarianism.
Intellectual Responsibilities: Rigor and Precision
Responding to the session’s theme of intellectual responsibility, Professor Diamond underscored the importance of terminological clarity. While Trumpism has fascistic elements—such as the stigmatization of minorities and the elevation of a charismatic leader—he cautioned against prematurely labeling the United States a fascist regime. Misusing charged terms, he argued, risks polarizing discourse further and alienating potential allies in the defense of democracy. Instead, scholars must distinguish carefully between illiberal democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and full-fledged authoritarianism. Intellectual rigor, he insisted, is itself a form of civic responsibility.
Lessons for Resisting Authoritarianism
Professor Diamond concluded with several lessons drawn from global experiences of democratic backsliding.
Mobilize early and vigorously: The sooner authoritarian projects are resisted, the greater the chance of success. Once the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services are stacked with loyalists, reversing course becomes exponentially harder.
Combine institutional and civic strategies:Courts, legislatures, and oversight mechanisms remain critical tools, even if weakened. Judicial rulings can still draw lines, and regaining control of congressional committees would enable investigations into corruption. At the same time, civil society mobilization is indispensable: protests such as “No Kings Day,” which drew millions into the streets, exemplify the power of mass resistance.
Build broad electoral coalitions: Ultimately, authoritarian leaders are most often defeated at the ballot box. Opposition coalitions must transcend class and identity divides, adopting inclusive strategies that resonate beyond traditional partisan bases. Professor Diamond cited Turkey’s municipal elections, in which campaigns of “radical love” forged unlikely alliances, as an instructive model.
Prioritize economic performance: Voters care most about material conditions. Autocrats often mismanage economies due to corruption and cronyism, creating openings for opposition campaigns focused on bread-and-butter issues. As James Carville’s dictum reminds us: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Professor Diamond noted that Trump’s approval ratings are underwater across all policy areas, including crime and immigration, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with his governance.
Conclusion
Professor Larry Diamond’s presentation painted a stark picture of democracy under siege. Around the world, populist leaders are modeling themselves not on democratic icons but on illiberal strongmen. In the United States, Donald Trump’s methodical pursuit of power threatens to transform the country into an electoral authoritarian regime. From media capture and judicial purges to gerrymandering and lawfare, the signs are clear: America is far along the authoritarian pathway.
Yet Professor Diamond also offered hope rooted in historical lessons. Authoritarian regimes often collapse under the weight of their corruption, economic mismanagement, and overreach. Intellectuals must contribute with rigor and clarity, resisting hyperbolic labels while documenting authoritarian encroachments. Civil society must mobilize boldly, institutions must be defended, and electoral coalitions must be broadened.
The struggle, Professor Diamond concluded, is urgent but not lost. The fate of American democracy—and its global influence—will hinge on the ability of citizens, scholars, and leaders to confront authoritarianism with courage, precision, and unity.
Q&A Highlights
A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.
The Q&A session following the panel underscored the urgency and complexity of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. Questions probed deeply into the militarization of politics, the durability of authoritarian regimes, and the prospects for democratic renewal. The exchange illuminated both the dangers at hand and the intellectual responsibility of scholars to frame these dangers with clarity.
Militarization of Politics in the US
The first question raised the issue of Donald Trump’s overt and covert attempts to draw the military into American politics. Referencing the July 4th military parade and the deployment of the National Guard in major US cities including Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, the questioner asked whether such actions risked militarizing US politics or politicizing the armed forces, with potential implications for other struggling democracies.
Professor Larry Diamond responded with grave concern. He described these moves as “serious, intentional, and very dangerous,” with both symbolic and practical consequences. Beyond rallying an exclusionary nationalism, Trump’s efforts have raised fears of outright constitutional violations. Professor Diamond relayed the warning of a senior retired military officer that Trump might attempt to deploy the National Guard in contested districts during the 2026 congressional elections to interfere with ballot access and recounts. Such maneuvers, he stressed, would mark a decisive step toward authoritarianism, as they seek to build a military apparatus personally loyal to Trump and the MAGA movement.
Professor Julie Ingersoll added another dimension, noting the religious undercurrents in Trump’s ties to figures such as Pete Hegseth, whose deep connections to Christian Reconstructionist networks highlight the fusion of military symbolism with theocratic ideologies. This overlap, she argued, further illustrates the blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and authoritarian aspirations in the US.
Can Authoritarian Regimes Be Reversed?
A second question asked whether history offered examples of authoritarian governments being deposed through democratic means, referencing Armitage’s claim that such reversals are rare. Responding, Professor Diamond acknowledged the difficulty but pointed to Poland as a partial example of democratic restoration, albeit one fraught with constitutional landmines left behind by previous authoritarian-minded governments. He predicted that future reversals would similarly confront dilemmas: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without replicating their illiberal methods.
Professor Diamond rejected the notion that authoritarian projects last indefinitely. Their corruption, failures, and reliance on aging leaders such as Erdoğan, he argued, ultimately erode their viability. New democratic moments do emerge, though they face immense challenges. For the US, the fundamental test will come in the 2026 midterm elections, where the integrity of voting and counting remains the essential condition for democracy.
Concluding Reflections by Professor Cengiz Aktar
In his closing remarks, moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar reflected on the themes of the discussion with a sobering tone. He observed that the global zeitgeist had shifted dramatically: no longer are scholars debating how to build democracy, but rather how to prevent its collapse. Echoing Richard Falk’s notion of “dark times,” Professor Aktar emphasized that naming the threat accurately—calling fascism by its name—is essential. Euphemisms, he argued, obscure the gravity of the crisis.
Professor Aktar pointed to both danger and paradox. While populist and authoritarian leaders draw significant mass support, their rise reveals the gap between freedom and democracy. He recalled Professor Mabel Berezin’s warning that invocations of “freedom” are often decoupled from democratic commitments, enabling libertarian and extremist actors to weaponize speech through digital platforms. At the same time, freedom of expression is selectively curtailed, as seen in the suppression of voices denouncing atrocities such as the Gaza genocide.
Ultimately, Professor Aktar concluded that the world is entering an especially perilous period marked by democratic erosion, mass manipulation, and authoritarian resilience. In this context, he stressed the vital role of intellectual gatherings like this one, noting that the ECPS will likely need to convene further forums to analyze and resist these trends. His remarks closed the session on a sober but mobilizing note: intellectuals, activists, and citizens alike must remain vigilant and engaged in defense of democracy.
Overall Conclusion
The ECPS panel “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding” offered a sobering yet clarifying examination of the forces eroding democracy across the globe. What emerged most clearly is that populism today cannot be dismissed as a passing style of politics or a democratic “correction.” Rather, it increasingly serves as a vehicle for authoritarian entrenchment, exploiting institutions, culture, religion, and technology in ways that carry fascistic echoes.
Professor Mabel Berezin’s analysis highlighted the transformation of US populism into what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a strategy less reliant on militias than on legal, cultural, and intellectual frameworks that dismantle democracy from within. Professor Steven Friedman dismantled the illusion of a pristine democratic past, reminding us that Western models themselves are faltering, especially when they ignore the power of corporate interests and the structural exclusions on which they rest.
Professor Julie Ingersoll exposed the convergence of Christian dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal-charismatics, and techno-utopians into a shared anti-democratic coalition—an unlikely but potent fusion united by hostility to pluralism and democracy. Professor Richard Falk placed these developments in global perspective, underscoring the hypocrisy of US democracy promotion, the corrosive effects of secrecy and capitalism, and the urgent need for emancipatory politics grounded in truth-telling and ecological survival. Finally, Professor Larry Diamond warned of deliberate authoritarian projects in the United States, modeled on Orbán and Erdoğan, that weaponize law, gerrymandering, media capture, and even the military to consolidate power.
The Q&A deepened these concerns, particularly around the militarization of politics under Trump and the fragility of democratic reversals. The possibility of deploying the National Guard for electoral interference, as Professor Diamond relayed, illustrates how quickly democratic norms can collapse.
Moderator Cengiz Aktar closed with a stark reminder: the global zeitgeist has shifted. We are no longer asking how to build democracy but how to prevent its collapse. The panelists converged on a central responsibility—that intellectuals must resist euphemism, call authoritarianism and fascism by their names, and provide frameworks that clarify rather than obscure. In an era marked by disinformation, selective freedoms, and systemic crisis, clarity itself becomes a democratic act.
The challenge, then, is twofold: to defend democracy where it still exists and to reimagine it in forms capable of confronting the structural inequalities, ecological perils, and authoritarian tactics of our age.
Dr. Cengiz Aktar (An Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens).
Speakers
“Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe,” by Dr. Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University).
“Democracy for all: Rethinking a Failed Model,” byDr. Steven Friedman(Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg).
“That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US,” by Dr. Julie Ingersoll(Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida).
“Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time,” by Dr. Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University).
“Combatting Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Larry Diamond(Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University).
Dr. Cengiz Aktar is an adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens and a former UN director specializing in asylum policies. A leading advocate of Turkey’s EU integration, he has been active in major civil initiatives, including Istanbul’s European Capital of Culture bid and the “European Movement 2002.” His research focuses on EU integration, refugee law, political centralism, and the politics of memory concerning ethnic and religious minorities.
Speakers
Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe
Dr. Mabel Berezin is Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University. A comparative sociologist, her work examines challenges to democracy, nationalism, and populism in Europe and the United States. She is the author of Making the Fascist Self, Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times, and co-editor of Europe without Borders. Her forthcoming book, The End of Security and the Rise of Populism (Oxford University Press), explores the global resurgence of nationalism and its implications for democratic practice.
Abstract: Democratic backsliding in its various authoritarian forms is a global phenomenon that demands a response in the academy and beyond. This talk will argue that the threat to democracy varies depending on national context and the struggle to overcome these threats will depend on specific political histories.
Democracy For All: Rethinking a Failed Model
Dr. Steven Friedman is Research Professor in the Humanities Faculty at the University of Johannesburg. A political scientist, he has written extensively on South Africa’s transition to democracy and more recently on the relationship between democracy, inequality, and economic growth. He is the author of numerous books and articles on democratic theory and practice and writes Against the Tide, a weekly column in Business Day on current political trends.
Abstract: I will argue that democracy is currently threatened because the model of democracy which has reigned over the past three decades has made the current backlash against it inevitable. While the model has, rightly, insisted on the need for citizens to hold public power to account, it has ignored the need to do the same to private power. This has handed excessive power to the wealthy and has left citizens at their mercy. While proclaiming democracy as a universal system which enables all human beings to exercise choice, it associates democracy with Western-ness. This has weakened its appeal outside the West and left it unable to cope with racial and religious diversity within it. The solution is a democracy which recognises the need to restrain private and public power and is unabashedly universal.
That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US
Dr. Julie Ingersoll is Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida. She is a foremost scholar of Christian Reconstructionism, a 20th century movement that underpins much of today’s Chrisitan Nationalism. She is author of Building God’s Kingdom: inside the world of Christian Reconstruction and Evangelical Christian Women:: war stories on the Gender Battles. She has written broadly on religion and politics, religion and violence and related topics.
Abstract: I’ll discuss how seemingly contradictory social movements (both “religious” and “secular” share immediate, earthly concerns, values, and perspectives that have brought them together in the US despite their differences. As factions they have been dismissed as “fringe” groups, but I’ll show why what they share matters more than their differences, and how combined they’ve become a profound threat to democracy.
Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time
Dr. Richard Falk is Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus, at Princeton University, and former Visiting Distinguished Professor in Global and International Studies at the University of California, Santa Barbara. A leading scholar of international law and global governance, he has served on the Independent International Commission on Kosovo and on the editorial boards of The Nation and The Progressive. He is also Chair of the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.
Abstract: I will explain briefly why authoritarianism has flourished, and seems trending toward fascism in many parts of the world. My main attempt will be to argue that an emancipatory political future for the Global West seems ‘impossible,’ but that the impossible happens (e.g. Mandela release, Soviet collapse, Arab Spring) and the future unknowable, making it rational for those of democratic and progressive inclination to struggle for what they believe. The alternative of silence in the face of evil in such a convulsive period is as Gramsci put is to nourish ‘monsters.’ I want to insist that at such historical and political crisis ‘angels’ can also emerge.
Combatting Authoritarian Populism
Dr. Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, where he leads programs on global democracy, Arab reform, and Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific. He is founding co-editor of the Journal of Democracy and a senior consultant at the National Endowment for Democracy. His research focuses on democratic trends, challenges, and reforms worldwide. His most recent book, Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency, examines threats to liberal democracy and strategies to defend it.
Abstract: This talk will explain how and why authoritarian populists gain power and seek to expand it to erode or destroy democracy, and how democratic forces can resist this project.
Please cite as: Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118
Abstract
Since January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests against the governments’ plan to restrict the power of the Supreme Court. The government, a coalition between the Likud’s populist party, the Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right announced a legislation package threatening Israel’s institutions’ -limited- liberal constitutionalism, opening the possibility of authoritarianism. Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse, it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
In January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations against the government’s reform plan depicted as a threat to democracy. The government, a coalition between the Likud, Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right parties, one hitherto excluded from coalitions, introduced a legislation package that would, according to its opponents, undermine Israel’s democratic institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, and open the way for authoritarianism. The protestors, who took to the streets in the name of liberal democracy, compared the developments in Israel to those in Hungary and Poland, argued that the government plan would not only undermine Israel’s [already limited] democracy but also threaten civil rights, freedom and gender equality. Not only the threat of authoritarianism but also the potential transformation into a theocracy evoked the protests. Coalition agreements and proposed laws, advocated by the religious parties, would, once legislated, it was argued, undermine secular, LGBTQ+, and women’s rights. The protest involved not only large-scale demonstrations for months, but also roadblocks, economic boycotts, appeals to international leaders and media, and even declarations of army reservists they would not report to duty if the proposed legislation would be completed as planned.
Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.
It is impossible to predict whether authoritarianism was curbed, even more so in light of the war in Gaza after Hamas attack in October 2023. Rather, our purpose is more modest, to highlight the inconsistencies within right-wing populism that enable opposition and potentially prevent authoritarianism based on the experience from Israel. Accordingly, we ask, first, looking beyond instrumental benefits, what explains the formation of a coalition between different expressions of radical right and religious fundamentalism? Second, how the anti-liberal and anti-democratic trends and commitment to religious ideas and identities combine and contrast in the government’s plan? And third, how have the anti-liberal and anti-democratic threat of Israeli right-wing populism enabled the opposition?
In an exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—former Executive Director of Human Rights Watch and now at Princeton—warns that Israel is cynically using charges of antisemitism to shield what he calls genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” Drawing on three decades of human rights leadership, Professor Roth situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a broader authoritarian playbook: populist leaders tilt elections, capture institutions, and scapegoat minorities while silencing dissent. His central warning is stark: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism, and blurring this line endangers both Palestinians and Jews worldwide.
In this exclusive ECPS interview, Professor Kenneth Roth—longtime executive director of Human Rights Watch and now Charles and Marie Robertson Visiting Professor at the Princeton School for Public and International Affairs—warns that the Israeli government is cynically using allegations of antisemitism to silence criticism of what he describes as genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza. “Netanyahu and his supporters are not defending Jews worldwide,” Professor Roth stresses. “They are sacrificing them—cheapening the very concept of antisemitism just when it is most needed.” For him, conflating criticism of Israel with antisemitism not only shields state crimes but also undermines real protections against anti-Jewish hatred.
Professor Roth’s reflections build on more than three decades of global human rights advocacy. At Human Rights Watch, which he directed until August 2022, he oversaw the organization’s expansion into one of the world’s leading rights watchdogs, active in about 100 countries. Earlier, he worked as a federal prosecutor in New York and on the Iran-Contra investigation in Washington. From that vantage, he situates Israel’s narrative strategy within a wider pattern of populist-fueled authoritarianism. Today’s autocrats, Professor Roth argues, “still crave elections but tilt the playing field,”systematically undermining courts, capturing media, restricting NGOs, and intimidating universities. Democracy, he insists, cannot be reduced to ballots alone—it requires freedoms of expression, association, and the rule of law, all under attack.
Even amid authoritarian resurgence, Professor Roth emphasizes the power of coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting states. He recalls decisive breakthroughs such as the treaty banning landmines and the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)—both achieved despite superpower opposition. More recent successes, from UN oversight of the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen to European-Turkish pressure curbing Russian strikes in Syria, show that principled middle-power alliances still matter. NGOs, too, must remain unwaveringly consistent: “Our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe—we apply the same standards to everybody,” Professor Roth explains. That consistency, he argues, sustains credibility and strengthens the politics of shaming.
The interview traverses urgent contemporary debates: Trump’s embrace of authoritarian leaders, his sanctions on the ICC, and his “flood-the-zone” tactic of overwhelming institutions with constant shocks. Professor Roth dissects the dangers of scapegoating minorities, the misuse of Holocaust memory to excuse present atrocities, and the precedent of blurring law enforcement with war in extrajudicial killings. At every step, he insists that human rights must not be selectively applied or subordinated to cynical populist narratives.
Taken together, Professor Roth’s insights offer both a sobering indictment and a pragmatic roadmap: exposing the authoritarian logic that links populism, repression, and impunity, while affirming that principled coalitions and civil society can still defend rights. Above all, his warning is clear: criticism of Israel is not antisemitism—and protecting the integrity of that distinction is essential for Jews worldwide, Palestinians under siege, and the universality of human rights.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Kenneth Roth, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Autocrats Still Crave Elections but Tilt the Playing Field
Nested dolls depicting world autocrats Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump and Recep Erdogan on the counter of souvenirs in Moscow
Thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent writings, you stress the fragility of checks against authoritarian drift and note how today’s rulers “raise the cost” for defenders by targeting courts, media, and NGOs. What, in your view, makes this current wave of populist-fueled democratic backsliding distinct from earlier authoritarian surges, particularly in the subtler tactics of regulation, funding, and legal harassment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure it’s completely unique, but clearly autocrats are learning from each other. The current wave is characterized foremost by what you might call electoral authoritarianism. That is, autocratic leaders who still want the legitimacy of an election but use the steps of the autocrat’s handbook to undercut checks and balances on their authority and to tilt the electoral playing field in their favor.
It’s pretty straightforward what they do: they target the various potential checks on their authority—courts, lawyers, journalists, academics, civil society—and use different techniques to undermine their independence. With the media, for example, outlets may be owned by large corporate conglomerates vulnerable to government pressure. We’re seeing that in the United States right now. It could also take the form of regulations that make it harder for civil society to secure funding, particularly from abroad. Sometimes it’s direct attacks, such as withholding funding, which we’re now seeing Trump do with universities.
These are variations on a theme, but the aim is always the same: to stymie and weaken the elements that sustain democracy. Because democracy is not just about elections. It is about the freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, as well as the rule of law that holds leaders accountable to the law and to the rights it embodies. And these autocrats are intent on undercutting those checks. It’s pretty clear.
Coalitions of Democracies Can Overcome Superpower Opposition
You have argued that coalitions of mid-sized states—beyond the West—can sometimes defend human rights more effectively than major powers, urging leverage toward countries like India, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, and even China. Two decades on, do you still see these “plural centers of pressure” as the backbone of rights defense, or has today’s fractured multilateralism, intensified authoritarian entrenchment, and the rise of populist geopolitics blunted that strategy—and what would an updated map of leverage look like?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I wouldn’t say that coalitions are better than the major powers, but that they can serve as substitutes when the major powers stand in opposition. At this stage, when the US government has essentially stopped promoting human rights, I don’t think we should just throw in the cards and give up. There have been many cases in the past where coalitions of governments have compensated for the absence—or even the opposition—of the US government, not to mention the Soviet or Russian government, or the Chinese government. I describe this in my book Riding Wrongs, where repeatedly, coalitions of democratic, rights-respecting governments, when banded together, have had the moral authority to overcome superpower opposition.
That’s what happened with the treaty to ban landmines. All the major powers opposed it, yet a group of about 60 governments—a coalition that Human Rights Watch and our colleagues helped to build—overcame that opposition. We ended up sharing the Nobel Peace Prize for that effort. Something very similar occurred with the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC). You may recall the Clinton administration was adamantly opposed to a court that could even theoretically prosecute an American. That was not its idea of justice. Yet in the final vote in Rome in 1998, the US lost overwhelmingly—120 to 7—marking a decisive victory for the rule of law.
More recently, as I describe in my book, despite a lack of any assistance, if not outright opposition, from Washington, a group of governments led by the Netherlands secured oversight from the UN Human Rights Council of the Saudi-led coalition’s bombing in Yemen—making a huge difference in terms of saving civilian lives. Another coalition, involving Germany, France, and Turkey, pressured Putin in March 2020 to stop bombing the three million civilians in Idlib province in Syria, the last area at the time held by the armed opposition.
These are just a few among many examples showing how coalitions of governments can effectively defend human rights—not only without Washington, but often despite its opposition.
NGOs Must Be Principled—Apply the Same Standards to All
Since major powers like the US, Russia, and China routinely instrumentalize human rights for geopolitical ends, how should NGOs and the broader rights community rethink their strategy—balancing naming-and-shaming with ally-seeking—while avoiding the slide from principled engagement into complicity in populist or authoritarian projects?
Professor Kenneth Roth: The idea that governments instrumentalize human rights is nothing new. This has always happened. If you just go back historically, there was a tendency during the Cold War to highlight the human rights abuses of one’s opponents and neglect the human rights abuses of one’s allies. So, this has always been a problem. I think the role that NGOs should play is to be principled. That is to say, to ensure that our work doesn’t distinguish between perceived friend and foe, but that we apply the same standards to everybody. That enhances the capacity to shame, because people understand that when human rights groups condemn somebody, when we spotlight a government’s abuse, we’re not pursuing some geopolitical strategy. We are pursuing a universal, principled effort.
Now, shaming is never the only thing that human rights groups do. We also enlist influential allies to try to put diplomatic or economic pressure on a target government, and I describe this in my book. These are important supplements to the process of shaming.
The fact that governments are selective in their defense of human rights does undermine their credibility, but doesn’t preclude our ability to enlist them, because frankly, nobody is consistent. So, we try to enlist allies where we can, push them to be more principled. But we don’t have a rule that you’ve got to be perfect before we enlist you, because then we’d enlist nobody. We’ve got to be a bit more pragmatic than that and try to maximize pressure on a target government from any credible source that we can find.
This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.
Trump’s open admiration for autocrats such as Putin, Bolsonaro, Erdogan, and Netanyahu blurs distinctions between democracy and authoritarianism, while also resonating with a global populist style that treats rights as obstacles to “the people’s will.” To what extent has Trump shifted the normative boundaries of US foreign policy on human rights, and what does this mean for the wider contest between populism and rights-based democracy?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, I would not say that Trump is blurring the distinction between democracy and authoritarianism. He’s simply embracing authoritarianism. I don’t think anybody believes that because Trump embraces Putin, suddenly Putin is a democrat. That’s absurd. Trump, as an aspiring autocrat, admires leaders who have managed to secure autocratic power for themselves. That’s what he does. And we obviously have to push back against that.
This is a bad period for US foreign policy, but it’s not the first time we’ve seen something like this. Think back to the George W. Bush administration, when the so-called global war on terrorism became an excuse not only to support abusive governments but also to engage in severe human rights abuses by the US government itself—systematic torture and the use of Guantanamo for endless detention without trial.
We have seen this flouting, this unwillingness to abide by human rights standards emanating from Washington before. Our job in the human rights movement is to spotlight complicity in human rights violations, or responsibility for them, when the government behaves inconsistently, and to push for it to be even slightly less inconsistent. Fortunately, the American people—and I think this is also true globally—want a more consistent human rights policy.
That’s why spotlighting inconsistency is valuable, because it forces leaders like Trump to pay a political price. When he is seen as aiding and abetting genocide in Gaza, we can already see the effect on US public opinion. People are turning against Israel; they are upset with the unconditional US support for Israel. We’ve seen Trump react to that somewhat already—not sufficiently—but this effort is worthwhile. Ultimately, this is how we can pressure Trump to do the one thing that would end the genocide: suspend or condition massive US arms sales and military aid to Israel until the genocide stops.
Rulings Mean Little Without Government Backing
You’ve argued that “democracy” without rights is easily gamed by “despots masquerading as democrats.” After the ICJ advisory opinion(s) and an emboldened ICC, can international courts still constrain leaders amid intensified lawfare and sanctions against judges/prosecutors? What insulating reforms (treaty, funding, travel protections) matter most?
Professor Kenneth Roth: There’s a lot in that question, so let me try to dissect it a bit. First, when despots masquerade as democrats, it means they still hold periodic elections, but they tilt the playing field so much that the elections become meaningless. This can be a dangerous endeavor. Take Viktor Orban in Hungary or Erdogan in Turkey: they are classic autocrats who still hold competitive elections but with very severe limitations. Orban today faces a serious challenger in Peter Magyar, who is charismatic and has united the opposition. It may not work for him. Erdogan went so far as to lock up his main opponent because, according to the polls, that opponent was going to win. His party had already won the major mayoral elections in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and elsewhere. The more an autocrat moves toward a zombie election—that is, one with zero credibility—the more they lose the very legitimacy they seek. That’s what Daniel Ortega did in Nicaragua, Museveni in Uganda, Putin in Russia, and Lukashenko in Belarus. They hold electoral charades, but no one is fooled, and they simply become dictators.
I don’t view international courts as particularly effective against these kinds of autocratic attacks on democracy. The courts are more useful in addressing mass atrocities. For example, with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) entering the fray in Gaza, and with the ICC charging Putin and four generals for Ukraine, these are important efforts. They may someday lead to actual trials in The Hague. Even short of that, they are incredibly stigmatizing. They mean that these leaders cannot travel to the 125 ICC member states without risking arrest.
Of course, an ICJ judgment or an ICC arrest warrant does not self-execute. They don’t automatically constrain leaders because these Hague-based courts don’t have police forces; they depend on governments for enforcement. That’s always a problem. So, we need governments that claim to uphold the rule of law to act consistently with these rulings. Take the ICJ advisory opinion on the illegality of Israel’s endless occupation: governments should now ensure they do nothing to support that occupation. On the ICC, Trump outrageously imposed sanctions on the ICC prosecutor, the two deputies, and six judges. It’s important, particularly for the European Union, to use its so-called blocking statute to neutralize those sanctions so that judges and prosecutors can continue to access their bank funds and operate normally.
I would also encourage the prosecutor to examine whether this constitutes obstruction of justice—a violation of Article 70 of the Rome Statute—which I think it clearly does. One option would be to actually charge Trump for this blatant interference with an independent institution of justice. So, there is plenty that still can be done, but we shouldn’t deceive ourselves into thinking that international courts, simply by issuing rulings, automatically change the world. They need the backing of governments.
Being a Drug Trafficker Doesn’t Make You a Combatant
In critiquing Trump’s extrajudicial killings of Venezuelan traffickers, you warned of the drift from policing to “war” rules in law enforcement. If such precedents take hold—turning metaphorical wars on drugs or terror into literal grounds for lethal force—what global spillovers do you foresee, and what bright-line doctrines should civil society insist on to prevent their entrenchment?
Professor Kenneth Roth: First, let me explain the two sets of rules that govern the use of lethal force. In war, you’re allowed to shoot combatants on the other side, and unless they’re surrendering or injured and thus out of combat, you can shoot to kill. There is no duty to detain them. By contrast, in law enforcement situations, it’s almost the opposite: lethal force can be used only as a last resort to meet an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. It is an extremely limited use of lethal force; otherwise, the duty is to arrest and prosecute.
Now, Trump has ignored that distinction. He has declared Venezuelan suspected drug traffickers—people we have no real knowledge about—and has, in three separate incidents, blown up boats and killed those on board, simply on the claim that they were traffickers. But being a drug trafficker does not make you a combatant. There is no war, no armed conflict here. If you believe Trump’s account, these people were committing crimes and should have been arrested and prosecuted. The US Coast Guard is fully capable of interdicting these boats, detaining the suspects, bringing them to Miami or elsewhere, and prosecuting them.
Trump is disregarding the strict law enforcement rules on lethal force by declaring this a “war,” and therefore claiming the right to shoot to kill. That is an incredibly dangerous precedent, because he could label anyone a combatant or terrorist—terms he wrongly uses interchangeably. But even terrorists are criminals who must be prosecuted, not summarily executed. We have to be very careful here, because what’s to stop him from declaring a war on civil society or a war on the political opposition and then justifying killings on that basis?
This is a very dangerous precedent. Even though drug traffickers are unpopular, it is essential to start with the principle: even if they are suspected traffickers, they should not simply be blown up. They have the right to be detained, charged, and prosecuted if the administration’s claims are true. That is why it is crucial not to let metaphorical wars on drugs or terrorism be transformed into literal wars that substitute the narrow rules on lethal force in law enforcement with the much more permissive rules governing armed conflict—which this clearly is not.
How Populist Autocrats Weaponize Minorities to Mask Their Failures
Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve tracked how strongman admiration and majoritarian claims corrode protections for minorities and migrants. Has Trump’s second term normalized an executive theory of unfettered discretion that will outlast him in US foreign policy—and how should allies signal costs early to deter that stickiness?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you’re suggesting in your question, populist autocrats frequently rally support by demonizing some unpopular minority in their country. It could be immigrants, LGBT people, or Muslims—it varies from country to country. It is very important to push back against this. Typically, they resort to such tactics to divert attention from their lack of a political program that could actually address the economic and political needs of their base. Usually, their base is the ethnic majority working class.
When you see leaders demonizing immigrants or LGBT people, you can almost be certain there is no serious program to help the working class. Trump is a perfect example. He loves to demonize immigrants. Then he puts forward a massive economic plan that cuts taxes for his cronies while eliminating healthcare for many who need it. This doesn’t help the working class—it decimates it.
It’s important to expose this sleight of hand—the use of scapegoating unpopular minorities to distract from harmful economic policies. So, what’s the best way to push back? First and foremost, by defending the rights of these minorities. We cannot pretend that an attack on one unpopular group will stop there. In fact, I often view attacks on LGBT people as the canary in the coal mine for broader assaults on civil society. Those almost always follow.
We need to recognize the path populist autocrats are taking and nip it in the bud. We cannot ignore the early stages just because the victims are unpopular. This is a well-trodden path, and it must be stopped at the outset.
Countering Trump’s Flood-the-Zone Strategy
You’ve described Trump’s “flood-the-zone” strategy—overwhelming opponents and institutions with constant shocks—as a hallmark of autocratic playbooks. From the resistance you’ve observed, what lessons proved transferable to other democracies under stress, and which were context-specific wins?
Professor Kenneth Roth: I’m not sure that Trump’s flood-the-zone strategy is typical. It’s pretty unique to Trump. It especially characterized his first few months in this second term, when there was one outrage after another, day after day, and people were so busy responding to yesterday’s crisis that they didn’t know where to start with today’s. Now it has slowed down a bit, but he continues to use the tactic—finding some new provocation every few days to divert attention from what he had already done.
The key for the targets of these efforts is not to let themselves be overwhelmed but to band together and coordinate their defense. We didn’t always see that in the United States. For example, certain universities, like Columbia, cut deals with the Trump administration, while others have since taken a more principled stand and joined forces. Some big law firms also cut deals, while others chose to fight back in court—and are now winning. Trump has also turned his threats toward civil society, but here too, many large progressive private foundations have banded together, issuing a joint statement declaring that they will not be divided and will fight back collectively.
That kind of collective response—the refusal to let Trump pick off opponents one at a time, as he has done with certain media outlets—is essential. When a powerful government can target one victim at a time, the victims usually lose. But when it faces a coordinated defense, the chances of success rise significantly.
When Sovereignty Becomes Impunity
The flag in front of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands on March 27, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.
Trump’s sanctions on the ICC—aimed at blocking investigations of Israel and US officials—highlight how powerful states can obstruct accountability through jurisdictional caveats and intimidation. What does this precedent mean for the enforceability of international criminal law, and what enforcement pathways remain viable to safeguard prosecutorial independence?
Professor Kenneth Roth: When you say jurisdictional caveats, I think what you’re referring to is that the Trump administration, like the US government for much of the last 20-plus years, has objected to the International Criminal Court’s so-called territorial jurisdiction. That is, the court can prosecute anybody who commits a crime on the territory of a member state. Going back to the Clinton administration, the US government hated that because it meant that American military personnel could theoretically be prosecuted if they committed a crime on the territory of a member state. That’s why the US government was so outraged, in the first Trump administration, when the ICC opened an investigation into Afghanistan—because there was fear that Bush-era torturers, many of whose worst crimes were committed there, might be subject to prosecution. Now, that turned out to be more of a theoretical concern, but that’s the territorial jurisdiction the US government has always objected to.
Ironically, when that same territorial jurisdiction was used by the ICC to charge Putin for crimes committed in Ukraine, everything changed. Biden called it justified. Lindsey Graham, the leading Republican senator who had always opposed the ICC, suddenly said, “I’ve changed my mind, we support the ICC now.” He even pushed through a unanimous resolution, and the Senate upheld what the ICC had done. That remained the case until that same territorial jurisdiction was used to charge Netanyahu for crimes committed in Gaza, in Palestine—a member state. Then suddenly it was back to outrage. The US position has been utterly unprincipled. Fortunately, nobody else accepts that. As I mentioned, the US lost its efforts to block territorial jurisdiction in Rome at the outset by a vote of 120 to 7. This is a losing proposition, and the key is for the 125 member states to reaffirm their support for territorial jurisdiction.
Of course, a state should be able to say, in a time of crisis, if our courts are not working—if we can’t prosecute people who commit crimes on our territory ourselves—we should be able to delegate that power to the ICC. That should be an inherent aspect of sovereignty. For the US to say, “Oh, well, because we’re American, we can commit a crime on your territory with impunity”—that’s crazy. If I, as an American citizen, were to go to Brussels and murder somebody, is it an affront to American sovereignty if Belgium prosecutes me? Obviously not. So why would it be an affront to American sovereignty if, under extreme circumstances, Belgium delegates that prosecutorial power to the ICC? This is normal. But the US insists on American exceptionalism when it comes to the rule of law. Nobody buys that, and governments should find ways to push back.
The Vanity Lever: Using Trump’s Ego to Pressure for Human Rights
You’ve suggested Trump’s transactional ego—the “vanity lever”—can sometimes be used to pressure him on rights. How realistic is it to constrain authoritarian choices through vanity appeals, and where should we draw the ethical line between pragmatism and entrenching cynical politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: What I’ve written about is that if you approach Trump frontally and say, support human rights, he’ll probably look at you and say, what are those? This is not a guy who is going to openly support human rights. But, as I describe in my book, the process of shaming always has to look at the target and figure out what they care about. In Trump’s case, what he cares about is his self-declared reputation as a master negotiator. In his book The Art of the Deal, he defines what he thinks is great about himself.
That gives us some leverage. For one, he wants a Nobel Peace Prize. Fine—you’re not going to get a Nobel Peace Prize by endorsing the mass ethnic cleansing of Palestinians from Gaza. You’ll get the Nobel Peace Prize by actually securing a just peace, including recognition of a Palestinian state. Another effective strategy is to spotlight how Putin in Ukraine and Netanyahu in Gaza are actually bamboozling Trump. They’re manipulating him, they’re playing games with this supposed master negotiator, and Trump looks naive.
He hates that. This is a guy with a fragile ego who doesn’t like criticism. If people are laughing at him, ridicule is horrible when you’re an autocrat. So, I think that provides an opportunity. We’re already seeing some movement by Trump in Ukraine. He has not yet imposed the so-called severe consequences he promised if Putin continues to obstruct ceasefire negotiations, but his rhetoric has become somewhat tougher. In the case of Gaza, we also see Trump distancing himself in certain ways from Netanyahu—for example, rejecting Netanyahu’s false claim that there is no starvation in Gaza, criticizing him for attacking the Hamas negotiators in Qatar, and twice imposing temporary ceasefires.
So, there is some distance there. I think we just need to keep pushing, with the aim of getting Trump to do the right thing for the wrong reasons. I don’t think that’s cynical—it’s simply pragmatic. If that’s what it takes to stop mass atrocities, I’ll do it.
When Ethnic Cleansing Becomes a Defense to Genocide
Destruction in Shejayia, Gaza City, Gaza Strip. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve argued that Israel’s actions in Gaza meet the Genocide Convention through killings and life-destroying conditions, even alongside ethnic-cleansing motives. How do you answer critics who say genocidal intent is unproven, and what evidence most strongly supports its inference under current ICJ standards?
Professor Kenneth Roth: If you look at either the extent of the killing or the imposition of conditions of life designed to destroy, in whole or in part, an ethnic or national group, what’s going on in Gaza is clearly genocide. At this point, the clearest example is the imposition of mass starvation, mass deprivation, and the wholesale destruction—today of Gaza City, but overall of all Gaza. The aim, quite clearly, is to make Gaza unlivable so that it becomes “humane” to then force everybody out into Egypt. The ultimate aim here is ethnic cleansing, a supposed solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by getting rid of the Palestinians—first in Gaza, and then later in the occupied West Bank. That’s clearly what’s going on.
The only real challenge here—you mentioned the International Court of Justice standards—is that the court ruled in the Croatia v. Serbia case more than a decade ago that if you are going to infer genocidal intent from conduct, it has to be the only possible inference. I think that’s a wrong standard. They are going to have to re-examine it, because in effect what they have said is that the motive of ethnic cleansing becomes a defense to genocide, which makes no sense. To prove genocidal intent, the standard should be absolute: are you clearly demonstrating genocidal intent? The fact that there may be a mixed motive—that there may be genocide in the service of something else—is often how genocide takes place.
So, I do think the ICJ will have to revisit its standards. It will have an opportunity in the Gambia v. Myanmar case concerning the Rohingya, where something very similar occurred. The Myanmar army killed, say, 10,000 Rohingya in order to force 730,000 to flee into Bangladesh. That was genocide as a means to mass ethnic cleansing. I hope the court uses that case, which will come first, to re-examine its standards, to find that the conduct does permit an inference of genocidal intent. That would then also apply positively to the case of Gaza.
Criticism of Israel Is Not Antisemitism
Election billboard showing Netanyahu shaking hands with Trump, with the slogan “Netanyahu. Another League,” in Jerusalem on September 16, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
You’ve warned that equating criticism of Israel with antisemitism both silences accountability and weakens real protections for Jews. What are the dangers of this conflation, and what concrete standards can help distinguish legitimate criticism from antisemitic incitement without suppressing dissent?
Professor Kenneth Roth: That’s an important question. Let me begin by saying that the problem of antisemitism is an acute one today facing Jews around the world, and it has become much more intense since October 7, 2023. So, this is a genuine problem. But what we’ve seen is that Netanyahu, the Israeli government, and some of its supporters are using charges of antisemitism to try to silence criticism of Israel’s genocide and mass atrocities in Gaza.
That’s a very cynical move, because it cheapens a concept that is badly needed. If people come to see claims of antisemitism as just an effort to change the subject and defend Israel’s inexcusable conduct in Gaza, they will become cynical about antisemitism at the very moment we need it to remain a viable concept. In effect, what Netanyahu and his supporters are doing is sacrificing Jews around the world for the benefit of the Israeli government. They’re basically saying: we’re going to throw Jews worldwide under the bus. Who cares if you face antisemitism? Who cares if we’re cheapening the concept? All we care about is defending the Israeli government. That’s a horrible thing to do—but that, in essence, is what the Netanyahu government is doing.
Now, are there standards on antisemitism? Yes. The standard that legitimizes this cynical approach is the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) working definition of antisemitism. The way it’s been interpreted has lent itself to saying that criticism of Israel, or efforts to demonize Israel, are somehow antisemitic.
There are two far superior definitions of antisemitism: the Jerusalem Declaration and the Nexus Document. The reason they are superior is that they make explicit that mere criticism of Israeli misconduct is not antisemitic. They define antisemitism in positive terms similarly, but they also include negative examples to make clear that antisemitism should never be weaponized to shield Israeli misconduct.
So, if the concern is truly antisemitism, people should adopt the Jerusalem Declaration or the Nexus Document. But if the concern is simply defending Israel while throwing Jews around the world to their fate, then go with the IHRA definition.
“Never Again” Means Never Again for All
You argue that Israel’s invocation of “never again” and its Holocaust halo have been weaponized to justify present atrocities. How has this complicated recognition of genocidal conduct, and how can we honor historical victimhood without letting it serve as a blank check—while restoring legal clarity around proportionality and civilian protection?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As you suggest, the Israeli government, much like the Rwandan government, cites the Holocaust for Jews and the Rwandan genocide to suggest that the current government is somehow above it all. The logic is: how could the victims of genocide, in turn, commit mass atrocities? Obviously, that’s illogical, but they use the argument implicitly to try to defend the indefensible.
For me, “never again” doesn’t mean never again except for Israel, never again except for Rwanda. It means never again for anybody. Part of the advantage the Israeli government has is that when people think about genocide, they tend to focus on the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide, where the aim, after a certain point, was to kill every Jew or every Tutsi that could be found.
But if you read the Genocide Convention—the treaty that defines genocide and that many governments have ratified—genocide can be aimed at destroying a group in whole, as in the Holocaust or Rwanda, or in part. This is where the Holocaust and Rwandan examples can mislead, because it is also genocide if you target part of a group, either for killing or through conditions of life that bring about their partial destruction. That is what defines Gaza today. The Israeli government is not trying to kill every single Palestinian. But it is trying to kill enough Palestinians and deprive them with enough severity that they are forced to flee into Egypt. Genocide with an intent to destroy a group in part is what’s really going on here. The Holocaust leads us astray because that’s not what it was about. So, we need to read the Genocide Convention as written and recognize that the Holocaust alone does not define genocide. There are other forms—such as the one playing out in Gaza today.
Past Genocides Do Not Justify Present Atrocities
And lastly, you’ve drawn parallels between Kagame’s Rwanda and Netanyahu’s Israel in weaponizing past victimhood to justify present crimes. How can the human rights community dismantle such narratives without denying past genocides, and which accountability tools—aid conditionality, arms suspensions, or regional pressure—have proven most effective against such impunity politics?
Professor Kenneth Roth: As I mentioned, both Netanyahu and Kagame play on past genocide to divert attention from their current mass atrocities—Netanyahu in Gaza, and Kagame through both his repression at home and, most acutely, his invasion of Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo through his own forces as well as the proxy M23 rebel group.
The goal of the human rights community is obviously not to deny the Holocaust or the Rwandan genocide. These are facts, these are horrific episodes in human history. But the point is to say: “Yes, they happened, but they don’t excuse present abuses.” So, we have to carefully document what’s happening in Congo and in Gaza and press for real pressure to stop it.
That pressure can and should include economic measures. Sadly, the European Union—while many of its members are recognizing a Palestinian state—has yet to suspend Israel’s trade benefits, despite vows from Commission President von der Leyen to do so soon. In eastern Congo, back in 2012, a similar Rwandan invasion via the M23 was stopped in its tracks when the US and British governments told Kagame they would cut off aid unless he withdrew. Within days, the M23 crumbled. Today, that isn’t happening. Trump cut a deal allowing Rwanda to stay and exploit the minerals.
So, we need to look at what has worked in the past, namely intense economic pressure. I would like to see the International Criminal Court (ICC)—which has already acted in part in Gaza—do much more and also extend its action to eastern Congo. It has done so in the past, but not with respect to this current invasion. Plenty of steps remain available to help rein in Kagame and Netanyahu and to stop their misuse of past atrocities as an excuse for committing new ones today.
In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Dinesh Paudel argues that the September 2025 youth uprising in Nepal was “the result of long-brewing frustrations.” Far from a sudden outburst, he situates the revolt at the intersection of elite failure, geopolitical maneuvering, and structural economic decline. Young Nepalis, caught in what he calls a “triple disjuncture” of mass migration, precarious labor markets, and digital mobilization, transformed simmering anger into protest. Yet Professor Paudel cautions against viewing it as a revolution: “It will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions.” Professor Paudel highlights corruption as the “governing logic of elite power” and signals volatile struggles over Nepal’s political and economic future.
The September 2025 uprising in Nepal has been described by analysts as a “Gen Z revolution,” but as Professor Dinesh Paudel emphasizes, “It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paudel—Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University—offers a critical interpretation of the forces driving this moment of rupture. His central argument is clear: “The youth uprising in Nepal is the result of long-brewing frustrations.”
These frustrations, he explains, stem from a convergence of structural, political, and geopolitical factors. Domestic elites failed to adapt to generational aspirations, leaving young Nepalis alienated from politics and unable to envision themselves in the nation’s future. At the same time, external pressures intensified: “Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, at the center of the Himalaya and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West.” Such tensions, combined with India’s long-standing dissatisfaction with Nepal’s constitutional framework and a dependent, deindustrialized economy, created the combustible conditions for revolt. Social media then amplified negativity and spread the belief “that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that ‘something else’ was never really thought through.”
Professor Paudel situates this eruption within what he calls a “triple disjuncture” confronting Nepal’s youth: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. These forces, layered onto chronic inequality and unemployment, have generated new forms of political subjectivity—angry, aspirational, yet fragile. “I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not,” Professor Paudel cautions. Instead, he views it as part of a recurring cycle in Nepal’s modern history: “Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center.”
At the same time, Professor Paudel underscores that symbolic battles—such as the viral backlash against “nepo-babies”—have sharpened frustrations against entrenched entitlement. These spectacles, he argues, expose the persistence of a “feudal political structure still dominant in the country.” Yet he warns that generational framings risk obscuring deeper inequalities rooted in class, caste, and land.
Ultimately, Professor Paudel interprets corruption not as an aberration but as the very “governing logic of elite power.” For him, corruption sustains both domestic hierarchies and Nepal’s insertion into a regional and global economic order defined by dependency. Without profound restructuring—particularly rebuilding a national productive base—Professor Paudel doubts the present movement will transform Nepal’s political economy.
And yet, he insists that youth frustration is real and points toward new possibilities. “What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system.” Whether such aspirations can overcome entrenched interests and regional constraints remains an open question—but the long-brewing discontent that exploded in September 2025 ensures that Nepal has entered a volatile new era.
Professor Dinesh Paudel is a Professor in the Department of Sustainable Development at Appalachian State University.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Dinesh Paudel, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
Elite Failure, Geopolitics, and Youth Anger Collide
Professor Dinesh Paudel, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Analysts describe the September 2025 uprising as a Gen Z revolution, yet youth mobilization in Nepal has a long genealogy. From your perspective, what specific social, economic, and political configurations enabled this generation to rupture the cycle of elite reproduction where earlier movements failed—and how do corruption, nepotism, and entrenched elite dominance fit into the deeper structural drivers that made such an eruption possible now?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Thank you for this great question. It’s long overdue. It was already brewing. This kind of uprising and discontent had been in the making for a long time. But the current conjuncture has multiple factors coming together, leading to this eruption.
One factor is the internal political dynamics within the parties. They were not able to understand the new generation’s aspirations. They also failed to govern in a way that allowed the young generation to see themselves in politics and in the future of the nation. That’s one of the main factors—the internal failure of the party system. The internal conjuncture of power dynamics ruptured.
The second important point is geopolitical tension. It is about how the government was overthrown and how the young population began mobilizing their force. It was carried away by other interests, creating a kind of popular imagination of revolution. But in reality, multiple bigger powers were trying to secure their interests in a country that is geopolitically strategic—physically between China and India, at the center of the Himalaya, and at the heart of what some call a Second Cold War, especially between China and the West. India’s relationship with the West is not in the best shape at the moment. Nepal sits right where these possibilities converge, and many people anticipated this.
The third point concerns India specifically, which was not happy with the government in Nepal. This discontent started with the promulgation of the constitution 10 years ago. India never wanted Nepal to have that constitution, but the issue escalated when the constitution included part of historical Nepal now controlled by India. Including this in the constitution angered India further.
The fourth point is social media, amplified by intellectual and journalistic voices, which propagated negative perceptions of the governing system. They presented things as not working, and this negativity grew steadily. It spread among the general public, particularly through youth on social media, fostering the belief that nothing works in Nepal and that something else must come—even though that “something else” was never really thought through.
Finally, development programs, NGOs, and modern aspirations led the public to believe they deserved development in a new way. But this remains controlled by an extremely dependent economic system. A very few elites—primarily Indian, some Chinese, and others—control it. The Nepali market is essentially the Indian market. The production system is crumbling, and deindustrialization has been ongoing for many years. This has produced a particular corporate culture that dominates politics, media, intellectual life, and more. It is a system that fostered extraordinary dependence, out-migration, exploitation, and inequality, particularly between rural and urban areas. All of that came together in a moment when people just burst into action.
But the impact resulted not only from the protests. Other interests also infiltrated and pushed the movement further. That’s the current situation. Basically, it reflects the failure of the political regime to institutionalize its agenda, but it has also been pushed by geopolitical forces seeking to destabilize Nepal and secure a stronger footing in the country.
Nepal’s Youth Caught in a Triple Disjuncture
Nepal’s youth today confront what might be called a triple disjuncture: mass migration, precarious labor markets, and the expansion of the digital public sphere. How do these dynamics intersect to produce a new political subjectivity that resists both elite capture and authoritarian closure? In particular, how have structural forces such as economic inequality, chronic youth unemployment, and the dependence on migration shaped the political consciousness and mobilizing capacity of Gen Z in Nepal?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Very good question, and this is exactly that conjuncture of multiple forces you mentioned that resulted in a particular type of economic precarity. Especially young people’s aspiration was to become economically successful, but the opportunities to do so were really decimated. But you cannot just blame the current political structure. You have to go back almost 30 years to understand what produced this. As soon as Nepal entered multi-party democracy in 1990, the government was forced to adopt an open market economy in such a way that the industrial sector basically collapsed in front of Indian and Chinese industrial and corporate power. That led to massive closures of national industries. The frustration from that also fueled the Maoist Revolution, which started in 1996. The Maoist movement, lasting for 10 years, led to massive out-migration from rural areas, while the open market economy that destroyed the national economy pushed people to migrate abroad.
So, Nepal lost two things: national productive capacity—the industrial base—and the labor force. That severely degraded national production. Over the last two and a half decades, this has produced massive unemployment, while national and international forces facilitated a process by which young people migrated to other countries. In effect, they wanted to solve the Maoist problem by exporting young people, so that they would not join the revolution. But then it became systematic: rural populations moved to urban areas, and from urban areas to other countries, primarily Gulf and Middle Eastern states, numbering in the millions. Nepal thus lost not only industrial capacity—in terms of organizing, owning, and mobilizing capital—but also massive labor power, which created a lack of farming in rural areas. In some places, more than 70% of land is uncultivated, which used to be farmed in the past, because there is no labor.
This kind of economic situation continues to create chronic problems for generating opportunities in the country. All of this has reinforced political patronage and historical feudalistic conditions within the party system. That, in turn, made young people extraordinarily frustrated. They were frustrated by the economic situation, frustrated by dependency, and frustrated because they could not realize their dream of being modern and advanced. At the same time, the political structure adopted a feudalistic culture in which young people could not find their space. All this is leading to deep frustration, and the danger is that it will create further problems, because there are no coherent responses. Sometimes I feel it could evolve into a kind of gang politics. I am worried, even though it has not yet reached that point. But if this kind of mob-based, violent politics continues, there is real danger. Yet it seems inevitable, because the political structure has not been able to manage, understand, and maintain its hegemonic order. In other words, this is a failure of elite hegemony.
Even though the elites created these conditions, they have also been unable to preserve the very hegemonic structure that favors them. As a result, ruptures have emerged. I would not call this a youth revolution—it is not. Rather, it forms part of a longer trajectory of revolutions. Every decade Nepal has seen movements—the democratic movement, the Maoist movement—and young people have always been at the center. But those earlier uprisings were politically led, whereas this one is somewhat different. Still, I would not call it a revolution, because it will not fundamentally alter the political structure that produced these conditions. Sometimes I describe it instead as a kind of development: a double situation in which the political structure generates upheaval, but the outcome also reinforces the same structure. It will not truly transform the system. That leaves youth aspirations blocked from finding another path. Judging from how events have unfolded so far, it will not reach a transformative point.
The Social Media Ban Was a Trigger, Not the Cause
The ban on social media is often cited as the immediate spark of revolt—yet should this be understood as a mere tactical blunder by Oli’s government, or rather as symptomatic of a deeper authoritarian reflex embedded within Nepal’s ruling elite?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The social media ban… you have to look at it from two perspectives. One is the aspiration of young people and how embedded they are in the social media structure. But at the same time, you have to look at it from the perspective of a smaller country. These social media and multinational companies do not want to recognize, for example, Nepali sovereignty. They do not want to register; they do not want to pay taxes. Even social media companies—Twitter, Yik Yak—officially said that Nepal is a corrupt country, so they cannot register or be taxed. That undermines national pride, nationalism, and everything. We need to understand the positionality of a smaller country. So, people think they must register. Why not? If they registered in India, then they should register in Nepal; it’s the same—a similar sovereignty situation. That’s one aspect of it.
But at that moment, the youth protest against corruption and the demand for good governance was already planned, and social media was used to organize those movements. So yes, it fueled the process, but it was not really the cause. The social media ban did not trigger it. Similar bans had happened in the past as well. They banned TikTok, and TikTok came back, registered, and now pays taxes to the country. But these other companies do not want to do that. Still, there is a Nepali psyche and intellectual understanding that Nepal’s sovereign rights must be respected. Young people support that too, actually. But deeply embedded, long-simmering social frustration, lack of employment, lack of good governance, and systematic corruption—it’s not just the political class, they are part of it. It’s the totality of the system that mobilizes all kinds of power nexuses in building corruption. That is what led to this frustration, and that was the culminating point, rather than it really being about authoritarianism tied to the social media ban.
People haven’t really looked at this. They use the word authoritarianism because they want to make a political point, but in fact, Nepal had been trying to get these companies to register for many years, and that process started long ago. Legislation was passed with 100% support in parliament one year ago, and the government called on these companies regularly to respect the law and comply. I don’t think it was an authoritarian attitude that led to the social media ban. Rather, the ban triggered other frustrations—that’s how I would put it.
Nepo-Babies Symbolize a Feudal Political Structure Still Dominant in Nepal
The viral outrage against “nepo-babies” seems to reveal a moral economy of resentment against elite entitlement. To what extent did the digital spectacle of political heirs flaunting luxury lifestyles crystallize diffuse frustrations into a new form of class politics—one mediated by resentment, spectacle, and digital culture, and distinct from the agrarian or proletarian struggles of earlier eras?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: Right. This is a very fundamental part of it. The corrupt kind of system, this nepo-babies idea, is a good instrument to utilize—not only against politicians, but also other kinds of forma and everything. It really helps people understand how the feudal family structure mobilizes the political structure for its benefit. So, it’s real.
But at the same time, it is not really pervasive. Not every politician managed to make their kids that way. And the corruption in Nepal is actually maintained and regulated by a particular type of corporative capitalist—middlemen business structures that mobilize and consolidate power, creating nexuses. These nepo-babies are part of that; they are enrolled into those nexuses and act as mediators in negotiations through karopsana (patronage brokerage / political fixing in Nepalese) and everything.
So, in that sense, it’s a particular agenda in creating a certain kind of populism. “Nepo-babies” is a very easily sellable term. But there is also a reality: it symbolizes that the feudal political structure is still dominant in the country, and that really helps people to grasp it. However, there is a danger in this kind of new generation movement, because it is framed in generational rather than other forms of inequality. Class, gender, caste, and socialist structures are deeply embedded in South Asia and in Nepal. So, this generational framing risks undermining those other dimensions of inequality. That danger is emerging.
There are generational inequalities, yes, but the young generation in Nepal is often better off than the older generation, especially in rural areas. The subsistence farmers live very hard lives and are the ones doing the lowest-level jobs. By contrast, the young generation leading this movement lives better lives than many others. They are urban, educated, and from well-off families. They are not the everyday working people—those are the millions working abroad in the Middle East in factories.
My worry is that the inequality perpetuated in Nepal through pluralistic land structures and a pluralistic political and economic system requires deep class-based analysis, and this generational lens may obscure that. At the same time, there is an oligarchic attitude toward politics: “Okay, this is for me, next is my wife, then that.” This attitude is dominant. It’s not only in Nepal—it’s big in India, Bangladesh, and many other countries. The symptoms were already present in Nepal, too. This revolt has hit hard against that pattern and may disrupt it temporarily. But it will likely reconfigure within the elite structure, and regardless of which elites dominate, the elite-based political structure will continue unless there is massive restructuring of the economic system that maintains this power balance.
Without a national production system and without mobilizing substantial yields toward the national economy, this is not going to change. In Nepali, they call it Bicholia—basically brokers. It is a broker’s-rule political system. These brokers—traders, contractors, suppliers—are the ones who mobilize everything. Unless those structures are directly addressed and transformed, it will be difficult to imagine a different political and economic system emerging in Nepal or the region.
This also requires understanding at the regional level. It is not only Nepal—it is part of an open economic structure. The majority of traders are from India or other countries, with only local agents in Nepal, who manage the political structure from behind the curtain. One therefore needs to understand the local political dynamics and economic structures, but also their relation to regional systems. In that sense, I consider this a necessary, even natural, kind of revolt. But the optimism that it will lead to deeper restructuring of the country is, I think, very minimal.
Corruption in Nepal Is the Governing Logic of Elite Power
The municipality office in Inaruwa, Sunsari, lies heavily damaged after protesters targeted it during the nationwide demonstrations against corruption and the social media shutdown on September 9, 2025. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula
Corruption in Nepal is often framed as administrative weakness, but your work emphasizes its structural role in reproducing elite hegemony. How should we theorize corruption—not as deviation but as a governing logic—in post-monarchical Nepal? Do you see corruption in Nepal primarily as a symptom of weak institutions, or as an intentional system of elite reproduction and authoritarian consolidation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a great question. Corruption is deeply embedded, and I would say it mobilizes both kinds of structures. It reproduces elite dominance, and it’s one way of maintaining elite hegemony in the political-economic system. But it is also systematically introduced at every level of society and governance in such a way that it became a ladder for making political-economic progress, from the local to the national elites.
To understand corruption, we must also look at the massive development projects implemented over decades. Nepal was one of the priority countries for international—especially Western—actors to carry out such programs, along with international investments through banks, the World Bank, and others. Instead of focusing on national priorities, these actors pursued their petty geopolitical or other interests. They mobilized elites to implement their programs and, at every scale—from small to large—channeled resources so that they would have better access to contractors. They could harvest trees, collect sand, build roads, construct buildings, or procure everyday goods. In return, they would always provide some kind of commission—“okay, you do this, then I’ll offer you this.” These practices, sustained over decades, systematically developed an internal, informal institutional system that entrenched corruption in the country.
There are also checks and balances, of course. The public watched and pushed back—it was always there. But at the same time, even at the small municipal level, people, even minor officers, would not act without taking bribes. Over decades, corruption became normalized, and it took a long time for everyone to grasp the root causes. For me, corruption is a symptom of how the pluralistic political structure maintains itself, but it is also the result of the particular form of economic system introduced over the last 30 years—one that required sustaining political power structures through bribes and political payoffs. This allowed the larger corporate world to control the economic system and labor production, supplying laborers cheaply to other countries while selling whatever they wanted by shutting down Nepal’s national production system. Industries collapsed—they could not compete with others, or they were simply bought out.
So, corruption is not something that any politician can fix in Nepal. It requires a systematic overhaul—a restructuring at every level with the introduction of a national production system. Otherwise, it will remain deeply embedded in how the state functions every day, at every level. At the same time, there is widespread understanding among the public that corruption is a big problem and must be eliminated. Any slogan with an anti-corruption agenda will therefore gain strong political support from the public. But those who bring such agendas are themselves part of the same political structure; they are not separate from the economic and political system. For this reason, I do not see corruption disappearing soon, unless Nepal achieves economic independence and builds a self-reliant economic structure—which has now been overtaken by the corporate world and is no longer under Nepal’s control.
Populist Agendas in Nepal Will Not Dismantle the Elite Structure
In your work on ethnic identity politics, you demonstrate how elites instrumentalize social divisions to consolidate authority. Do you see a similar risk with today’s anti-nepotism and anti-corruption discourses—that they could be co-opted by authoritarian populists who reframe them as projects of “purification,” while ultimately reproducing exclusionary politics and elite dominance?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: The answer is yes. The danger of populism is that populist agendas have always been propagated to maintain the elite structure. For me, I would consider this almost as a fight between elites. There is no rural poor people’s mobilization, and real thinking toward an egalitarian political structure is not there. So, populism in South Asia—like Hindu nationalism in India, the recent uprising in Bangladesh, similar things in Myanmar, with some exceptions in Sri Lanka, and now in many other places—has taken a very different route. There are some people-centric agendas, but most of the time in the South Asian context, it looks cultural or political, but it ultimately serves elite interests.
In Nepal, too, the populist mobilization around anti-corruption, youth inclusion, and similar issues is important, as in India. But it will not dismantle the elite structure that has dominated for a long period of time. So, my fear is that there was huge damage under this mobilization this time. Nepal lost billions of dollars and many people. It’s a huge damage. But what will it result in? It will not move outside the elitist structure already in place in Nepal.
Nepal Faces More Instability
The unprecedented state violence of September 2025 raises questions about authoritarian consolidation. Should we interpret the crackdown as a desperate last stand of a collapsing elite order, or as evidence of a longer trajectory in which coercion is becoming normalized within Nepal’s democratic institutions?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I would say it’s a degradation of the elite structure, in one sense, which has created these ruptures—and the ruptures are already there. It’s a continuous process along this path, which is an interesting thing. Politics is propagated under these ruptures. But it will also create space for another similar elite-based structure. That’s my fear, and I already see it happening.
So yes, it is a pillar within the elite structure that was maintained through a particular type of political party system. But these political party systems also became vulnerable to external pressure and influence. They were always managed by external forces.
Truly national interest and genuine national decision-making haven’t happened on either side—the rebuilding side or the elite side. Therefore, once mobilized, the elite structure continues to be reproduced. I do not imagine that the elitist structure will go away—that is not a possibility. But the current conjuncture of political elites, especially an older generation of political leaders, is now losing ground and space quite drastically. The danger, however, is that those spaces will be filled in ways that probably create even more instability in the country.
My sense is that Nepal will go through more political instability, and that will harm the region more broadly. That harm may in fact serve the interests of some geopolitical forces, because if the political structure is unstable, they can more easily insert their interests. That is the fate of smaller countries in the Global South in particular.
Without Economic Reform, Nepal Risks Mass Youth Exodus
A Nepali farmer at work in a rural field during the monsoon season. As the rains arrive, farmers across Nepal become busy in their fields, though most still rely on traditional farming techniques. Photo: Shishir Gautam.
Your ethnographic work on the Maoist revolution highlights how rural communities once generated alternative political imaginaries. To what extent do you see continuities—or disjunctures—between those insurgent subjectivities and the digitally mediated agency of Gen Z?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: That’s a very good one. There are some continuities in the sense that Nepali people have always sought alternative imaginaries, but there is also a complete disjuncture between the current generation and the past. The current generation does not really know the rural dynamics. They do not understand the moral economic system. They have no clue about present politics.
So the ideas of alternative imagination are almost opposite. Rural imaginaries were more sober, rooted in production and autonomy, while today’s are more connected to modern lifestyles and jobs, moving away from the traditional economic system. Both are alternative imaginations, but what they are looking for is different.
If they could find some kind of synergy, it could lead to real change in the country. But that synergy requires political negotiation and organizing—and that is not going to happen. Primarily, rural areas are heavily influenced by the traditional structures of political parties, while the urban youth are deeply alienated from them. So, the negotiation between the two will likely not happen anytime soon.
That unnegotiated gray space is where all kinds of interests will grow—and that is the danger for Nepali youth, their aspirations, and their inspiration. I would not be surprised if, in the next few years, out-migration of young people from the country increases massively. Without correcting the economic structure, there will not be more jobs. There will not be much of anything. Simply changing the government will not do it, because deeper structural changes are required.
But young people now have big hopes, and those hopes may soon turn to frustration. Either they will leave the country, or Nepal will face further instability and imbalance. So, the future scenario for the next few years looks extraordinarily volatile.
From Red Revolution to Red Neoliberalism
Given the Maoists’ descent into corruption and clientelism, can their revolutionary legacy still serve as a democratic resource for the present, or has it become a cautionary tale of how emancipatory struggles are absorbed into elite circulation?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: This is a wonderful question, because the kind of feudalism and elite-controlled politics was propagated by the Maoists themselves. They became the victims of elitism within their own movement. Yes, they challenged the political conjuncture and elitism of that time, but only to reintroduce their own. So, I would not consider that the old Maoists, in the structures they proposed, were ever going to be non-elitist or truly helpful.
The frustration that young people are expressing today also comes directly from the Maoists. When they entered peaceful politics and the new constitution was introduced, the Maoists became the only party in the country that was always in government—sometimes in coalition with one party, sometimes with another—but their performance was the most miserable.
It is very important to note that while the Maoists had an interesting political vision for the country, they had no vision for the economy. They became victims of the open economic structure, which I call red neoliberalism. They adopted neoliberal policies in such a way that they dismantled national production capacity, especially in industry, and alienated young people. They could not really understand this dynamic, became part of it, and therefore contributed directly to the dissatisfaction we see today.
Young people today have learned some lessons from that history, but they see no real connection to the Maoists’ promises, because they view the Maoists themselves as the problem. The Maoists destabilized rural areas, triggered mass out-migration, and destroyed national productive capacity. So, today’s youth frustration is deeply tied to what the Maoists promised versus what they delivered. And what they delivered was further dependency, out-migration, bad governance, and overall decline.
Crude Nationalism Cannot Satisfy Young People’s Aspirations
Thousands joined a joint morning procession organized by the CPN-UML and Nepali Congress district committees in Inaruwa Bazaar on September 19, 2025, to mark Constitution Day. Photo: Nabin Gadtaula.
Finally, do you see in Nepal’s youth movement the embryonic forms of what might be called a post-elitist or post-authoritarian democracy—an order rooted not in patronage or coercion but in new modes of participatory and inclusive politics?
Professor Dinesh Paudel: I do not see that happening right away. But this has raised a lot of questions for the population, the political elites themselves, and others. The country will suffer more through various challenges, but this is the beginning of a different kind of political imagination that is emerging. Probably it will not find success quickly.
This particular episode may do more harm than good. Looking at the last couple of weeks, I can see it in the way they are now appointing ministers, the way they are appointing political elites back into power, and the way they use military force to enforce their agenda—all of which reflect an extraordinarily feudalistic structure in the country.
Given this, the current moment will not do much to change elite hegemony in Nepal. But no matter what happens, young people’s frustration is directed against elitism. What they are seeking in the future is post-elite—some kind of egalitarian economic and political system. That aspiration is a positive sign toward new possibilities. But this episode alone will not do much other than reintroduce the same elitist structure.
Primarily, young people are not questioning the economic structure. They are not really grasping how the dependent economic system in the country continues to produce an elite-controlled political system. This is similar to Bangladesh, where a major revolt not long ago did little to address the country’s economic situation. A similar pattern is emerging in India, too. Youth-led frustration will continue across South Asia—it will not stop in Nepal. I see big brewing parties emerging in India, which is a major hot spot. I am not sure when it will erupt or in what form, but for decades—almost 70, 80, 100 years—the economic feudalistic structure has not been resolved. I see something coming.
Even though India uses neighboring political instability to its advantage, crude nationalism alone will not satisfy the aspirations of young people, especially amid growing economic inequality. Regional change will happen only if something major occurs in other countries, especially in India and beyond. Still, this is a good symptom: unless elites create space for young people—and some form of inclusive system, even if not fully post-elite—these tensions will persist, not only in Nepal but across the region, for decades to come.