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From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During the Second Trump Administration

Please cite as:
Young, Alasdair R. (2026). “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00128

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Abstract
The transatlantic economic relationship is the most valuable intercontinental relationship in the world. It is also uniquely interpenetrated by European and American firms, which are extensively invested in each other’s markets. Absent a comprehensive trade agreement, the transatlantic economic relationship has been characterized by ‘muddling through’ within the broad framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The economic relationship between the United States (US) and Europe has periodically been punctuated by sometimes intense trade disputes. Historically, these disputes were narrowly focused and left the bulk of the transatlantic economic relationship untouched. Starting in spring 2025, the Trump administration dramatically departed from past US trade policy, imposing sweeping ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on all US trade partners as well as industry-specific tariffs on national security grounds. The European Union (EU) sought accommodation rather than confrontation, leading to a framework agreement in August. This agreement is fragile, but while it holds, it is a manifestation of ‘muddling through’, albeit under worse trading conditions than before Trump returned to office. It is possible that the relationship could deteriorate further.

Keywords: European Union; retaliation; tariffs; trade; Donald Trump; United States

 

By Alasdair Young*

A Valuable and Previously Generally Calm Economic Relationship

The transatlantic economy is the ‘largest and wealthiest market in the world’ (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, 2). Despite the current political focus on trade in goods, in which the United States has run a persistent deficit with the EU for more than a quarter century (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, 12), the transatlantic economy is rooted primarily in mutual foreign direct investment (FDI). Almost 40% of the global stock of US FDI is in the EU, and EU firms account for slightly more than 40% all the FDI in the United States. The economic activity of transnational corporations in each other’s markets is therefore an important component of the transatlantic economy (see Table 7.1). The overall transatlantic economic relationship is much more balanced than a focus on just goods would suggest. Moreover, due to the extent of the investment relationship, 64% of US goods imports from Europe in 2023 occurred within the same firm as did 41% of US exports to Europe (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, vii). Thus, goods imports are used as inputs in domestic production.

As there is no bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the United States – the most ambitious effort to create one, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, ended with the first Trump administration – their trading relationship is subject to the rules and the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs they agreed to under the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Chapter 8 in this report). Despite not having a trade agreement, in 2024, their average tariff rates were low and comparable: 1.47% on US imports from the EU and 1.35% on EU imports from the United States (Barata da Rocha et al 2025).

Table 7.1. The transatlantic economic relationship (2024)
(US$ billion)

  United States to the European Union European Union to the United States US–EU balance
Goods 372 609 –237
Services 295 206 89
Value-added by FDI (2022) 494 456 38

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2025).

The transatlantic economic relationship has historically been relatively calm. It has, however, periodically been punctuated by high-profile trade disputes from the ‘Chicken Wars’ in the 1970s to disputes over bananas, hormone-treated beef, genetically modified crops and commercial aircraft subsidies in the 1990s and into the 2000s. Despite the attention they attracted, these disputes affected only a tiny fraction of transatlantic trade, and the more recent ones were contained within the WTO’s dispute settlement process (see Chapter 8 in this report). There were persistent, if episodic, efforts to try to address these transatlantic trade tensions, beginning with the ‘new transatlantic agenda’ in the 1990s. Historically, there was far more cooperation than conflict in the transatlantic economic relationship.

The Populist Turn in US Trade Policy

The transatlantic economic relationship has become much more confrontational under President Trump. He shares the populist view that trade is harmful and that the United States is being taken advantage of by foreigners, abetted by domestic elites (Baldwin 2025a, 1; Funke et al. 2023, 3280; Jones 2021, 29; and Box Figure 7.1). Trump considers the EU to be a particularly venal trade partner, describing it as ‘one of the most hostile and abusive taxing and tariffing authorities in the world’ (quoted in Gehrke 2025).

Figure 7.1 Trump’s populist view of trade

Globalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very wealthy. But it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache. … We allowed foreign countries to subsidize their goods, devalue their currencies, violate their agreements, and cheat in every way imaginable. – ‘Declaring America’s Economic Independence’, 28 June 2016.We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength. – First Inaugural Address, 20 January 2017.… over the last several decades, the United States gave away its leverage by allowing free access to its valuable market without obtaining fair treatment in return. This cost our country an important share of its industrial base and thereby its middle class and national security. – The President’s 2025 Trade Policy Agenda, 3 March 2025.For decades, our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by nations near and far, both friend and foe alike. American steelworkers, auto workers, farmers and skilled craftsmen…watched in anguish as foreign leaders have stolen our jobs, foreign cheaters have ransacked our factories, and foreign scavengers have torn apart our once beautiful American dream. — ‘Liberation Day’ speech, 2 April 2025. 

In line with this rhetoric, President Trump took several steps during his first term that deviated from traditional US trade policy (Grumbach et al 2022, 237; Jones 2021, 71). He imposed a series of punitive tariffs on China in response to what the United States considered unfair trade practices. He also blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, bringing the dispute settlement process to a halt (see Chapter 8 in this report). Despite characterizing the EU as ‘worse than China’ on trade in 2018 (Korade and Labott 2018), only the tariffs imposed on aluminium and steel imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (the so-called ‘Section 232 tariffs’) on the grounds of protecting national security directly impacted the EU. This use of Section 232 tariffs invoked a uniquely expansive understanding of national security that included trade causing substantial job, skill, or investment losses (Jones 2021, 74–75). The Trump administration also threatened tariffs on European governments that imposed digital services taxes on US platforms, although it did not impose them after those governments agreed to postpone implementation of the taxes. It was also set to impose national security tariffs on automobile imports when Trump left office. It did adopt enforcement tariffs on the EU as part of the long-running dispute over subsidies to Airbus, but that was in line with conventional US trade policy. The transatlantic economic relationship therefore deteriorated during the first Trump administration, but only modestly.

The Biden administration was not a huge fan of free trade (see, for instance, Sullivan 2023). It did not pursue bilateral trade agreements, seriously engage with WTO reform or enable the resumption of WTO dispute settlement. The United States also made extensive use of controls on semiconductor exports to China, including forcing European companies that used US intellectual property or inputs to comply with them. Under Biden, however, the United States focused on the economic and geopolitical challenges posed by China, so it adopted ceasefires with the EU over the steel and aluminium tariffs and in the aircraft dispute. Thus, while the transatlantic economic relationship did not fully return to where it was before Trump entered office, it was considerably better than when he left.

Trade policy in Trump’s second term, however, has made his first term look like a warm-up act.

A Shocked Transatlantic Economic Relationship

The second Trump administration has adopted a series of unprecedented trade measures that have dramatically impacted the EU. It significantly expanded its use of Section 232 tariffs, imposing them on a range of products important to the EU, including cars and car parts, aircraft and pharmaceuticals. President Trump also used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in an unprecedented way to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on all US trading partners. President Trump initially announced that EU products, other than those subject to Section 232 tariffs or investigations, would be subject to an additional 20% tariff on top of the United States’ MFN tariff. He almost immediately announced that the additional tariffs would be lowered to 10% until 1 August to allow time for negotiations, but subsequently threatened to impose a 30% additional tariff on EU goods if no agreement were reached by the deadline.

With the deadline looming, the United States and the EU reached a political agreement, which was subsequently elaborated in a framework agreement. This agreement established a baseline 15% tariff on most EU products (see Table 7.2). It had the effect of significantly reducing the tariffs the United States would have imposed on some of the EU’s most valuable exports, which were subject to Section 232 tariffs or investigations. Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, medicaments, cars and car parts and aircraft and associated parts accounted for 34% of the value of EU exports to the United States in 2024 (own calculations based on Eurostat 2025a). To secure this less-bad treatment, the EU agreed to eliminate all remaining tariffs on American industrial goods; give preferential market access for certain US seafood and non-sensitive agricultural products; and indicated that Europeans would purchase US weapons and liquified natural gas, and EU firms would invest in the United States (Politico 2025). The EU did not accede to US pressure to address its digital content and competition rules (Politico 2025). The European Commission (2025, 2) stressed that the deal ‘compares well’ to those secured by the United States’ other trade partners and thus EU exports remain competitive against other US imports. It also characterized the agreement as the ‘first important step’ toward reestablishing the stability and predictability of the transatlantic trading relationship and as a ‘roadmap’ for continuing negotiations to improve market access (European Commission 2025, 2).

Table 7.2 Framework agreement tariffs in context

Sector 2024 Without the deal With the deal
General (IEEPA ‘reciprocal’) 3.4%* 30% + MFN rateAdditional tariff for steel and aluminium content 15%
Cars and car parts 2.5%  27.5% 15%
Pharmaceuticals (patented) 0–5% 100%** 15%
Pharmaceuticals (generic) 0–5% 0–5% 0–5%
Semiconductors 0–5% Subject to Section 232 investigation 15%
Aircraft Low Subject to Section 232 investigation Low
Aluminium 10% above the duty-free quota (based on historical levels) 50% New tariff-rate quota to be negotiated
Steel 25% above the duty-free quota (based on historical levels) 50% New tariff-rate quota to be negotiated

Notes:
* The United States’ average MFN rate, which is the more appropriate comparator to the headline rate for the new tariffs, applies to a bit over 60% of EU exports, so the average tariff rate is lower (Nangle 2025).
** Unless the manufacturer is building a plant in the United States.
Source: revised and updated from Berg (2025); European Commission (2025); WTO (2025)

The deal also included commitments to hold talks to address non-tariff barriers, to strengthen cooperation on economic security, including investment screening and export controls, and to enhance supply chain resilience, including for critical minerals, energy, and chips to power artificial intelligence (AI) (European Commission 2025; Politico 2025). These are long-standing areas of transatlantic cooperation that have yielded few results, with the notable exception of coordinating export controls on Russia in response to its war in Ukraine. It is therefore hard to assess how meaningful these new commitments are.

The EU’s commitment to eliminate industrial tariffs is unlikely to significantly affect EU industries, as these tariffs are generally low and already zero for all countries with which the EU has concluded free trade agreements (Berg 2025). The one exception is automobiles, where the EU’s tariff is relatively high (10%), and the United States is a major producer, although American cars are not necessarily to European tastes. The EU’s pledges on weapons and energy purchases, as well as new investments, are not binding (Berg 2025). The deal is very one-sided, but key EU industries – aviation, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors – avoided the worst that might have happened, and the EU did not concede much of economic significance. However, the agreement only mitigated the harm caused by higher US tariffs. By forestalling a trade war but not restoring the economic relationship to the way it was at the end of 2024, let alone improving it, the deal is a manifestation of ‘muddling through.’

The agreement, however, is fragile for three reasons. One is that there is opposition to the agreement in the EU. In particular, the European Parliament must approve lowering tariffs on US industrial and agricultural goods and it is considering amendments that would alter the agreement by making the preferential tariffs only temporary, allowing the EU to suspend preferential treatment if there is a surge in US imports and postponing EU tariff cuts on aluminium and steel until the United States reduces its own tariffs on the metals (Lowe 2025). The Commission will not be able to accept these changes to the deal, so there is likely to be a protracted process before the Parliament adopts the legislation necessary to implement the EU’s side of the deal. The United States has already expressed its unhappiness at the delay (Williams and Bounds 2025). Another reason the deal is fragile is that the Trump administration is known for coming back with further demands after an agreement has been reached (Sandbu 2025). For instance, since the deal, it has demanded that the EU ease environmental rules that impose burdens on US firms (Hancock, Foy and Bounds 2025). The United States, therefore, might threaten even higher tariffs to pressure the EU to change regulations that irritate US companies. The current deal is not great, but things could get worse.

The third source of fragility runs in the opposite direction. On 5 November 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on whether President Trump’s use of IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs exceeded his authority, as two lower courts had found. Based on the justices’ questioning, there is an expectation that the Court will rule against the President in the next few months. If it does, the IEEPA tariffs that are part of the reason for the EU-US deal will go away. As the real benefits (such as they are) for the EU are due to the caps on the Section 232 tariffs, it would probably not be in the EU’s interests to try to renegotiate the deal, even if new tariffs are not imposed under other provisions.

Possible Policy Options for the EU

Although the EU contemplated imposing retaliatory tariffs, it has thus far chosen compromise over confrontation. As a result, there has not been a transatlantic trade war. Several commentators have criticized the EU for not retaliating, which might have led the United States to accept terms more favourable to the EU (Alemanno 2025; Baldwin 2025a, xii; Bounds et al. 2025; FT Editorial Board 2025; Malmström 2025). French President Macron lamented that the EU was not ‘feared enough’ by the United States (quoted in Caulcutt et al 2025).

While sufficiently robust retaliation might have made the United States more willing to strike a more favourable deal, the downside risks for the EU were considerable. In particular, the United States has ‘escalation dominance’ for at least two reasons (see also Berg 2025; Gehrke 2025). First, the EU relies on the United States militarily, which is particularly important in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine (Alemanno 2025; Berg 2025). Sabine Weyand, the EU’s director-general for trade, explained that ‘The European side was under massive pressure to find a quick solution to stabilise transatlantic relations with regard to security guarantees’ (quoted in Ganesh 2025). Second, European leaders have been more concerned than Trump about the adverse effects that imposing tariffs would have on their economies. Given those economic and security concerns, the member states were unwilling to support a trade war with the United States (Berg 2025; Bound et al. 2025; Malmström 2025).

There are three intersecting issues confronting the EU going forward: 1) How to mitigate the negative economic costs of the United States’ new, higher tariffs; 2) How to reduce the EU’s dependence on the United States to improve its bargaining position; and 3) How to respond should the United States come back with further demands for politically unacceptable changes to EU policies. The first and third of these issues might be affected by the Trump administration’s emerging concern about the harmful impact of tariffs on prices in the wake of dramatic Democratic victories in November’s elections (Desrochers 2025; Swanson et al. 2025).

The EU has already taken steps to mitigate the consequences of losing access to the US market. The Commission has begun the process of signing the EU’s trade agreement with Mercosur and its upgraded agreement with Mexico. It has also finalized negotiations with Indonesia and is pursuing negotiations with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Even combined, however, these economies come nowhere near the importance of the US market (see Table 7.3). Given the EU’s economic and geopolitical concerns about China, a trade agreement with China is out of the question (see Chapter 6 in the present report). There are no other significant markets with which the EU does not already have preferential trade agreements. There is, however, scope to improve trading arrangements with the UK and Switzerland, which accounted for 13% and 7% of EU exports in 2024, respectively (García Bercero et al. 2024). Nonetheless, the EU will not be able to offset the loss of access to the US market through trade agreements. That said, the White House’s greater concern about the cost of living raises the possibility that the EU might be able to secure tariff relief for additional products (Foy 2025; Gus 2025).

Table 7.3 European Union exports to selected markets in 2024

  € million Share of extra-EU exports
United States  532,697 21%
Mercosur 55,168 2%
India 48,701 2%
UAE 44,389 2%
Malaysia 17,854 1%
Indonesia 9,810 0%
Philippines 7,730 0%

Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat (2025).

Given the limited scope for securing improved market access, there is a strong case for the EU to look inward to pursue reforms that will both foster economic growth and competitiveness and enhance its military capabilities. The former will help to offset the loss of the US market, while the latter will help to redress the United States’ escalation dominance. The EU and its member states have launched initiatives on both goals, but they will take time to yield results, even with greater political impetus.

Brussels will face tough choices if Washington threatens to impose even higher tariffs unless the EU changes its rules on food safety, the environment and/or the digital economy. The EU could choose to retaliate to try to get the United States to back down. To avoid the adverse effects of imposing its own tariffs, the EU might target services – especially digital and financial services – where the United States runs a trade surplus (Gehrke 2025; Sandbu 2025). The EU might also restrict exports of key inputs to US manufacturing, since it accounts for 19% of such inputs and is a particularly important source of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and manufacturing machinery (Baldwin 2025b). The EU could also limit US firms’ access to some key services – including insurance, shipping and commodity trading. Curbing those goods or service exports, however, would negatively affect European firms. 

Thus, while the EU has the potential to inflict economic pain on the United States, doing so would significantly harm itself. Rather, it might be better for the EU to simply endure the tariffs and wait Trump out. Arguably, it was not China’s retaliatory tariffs that caused the United States to back down during the summer, but the domestic economic and political pain caused by sky-high US tariffs on key Chinese industrial inputs (Baldwin 2025b). Given the administration’s greater concern about the cost of living, particularly with the US midterm elections approaching in November 2026, it might refrain from imposing tariffs or be unable to sustain them for long. Should the EU choose to retaliate against new US tariffs, a trade war would be likely, which would imply the transatlantic trading relationship ‘breaking apart’. Continuing to ‘muddle through’ is probably the preferable approach.


 

(*) Alasdair R. Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.  He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017–2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015–2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years.  Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission. Email: alasdair.young@gatech.edu


 

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The World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—the only international organization responsible for setting and overseeing the rules governing trade between countries. Photo: Hector Christiaen.

Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization

Please cite as:
Jones, Kent. (2026). “Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the WTO.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00129

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Abstract
This chapter traces the evolution of transatlantic trade relations within the rules-based trading system established during the post-Second World War period by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO). United States-led hegemonic stability supported European recovery through the Marshall Plan and later through backing for European integration, linking trade liberalization with political stability and containment of Soviet influence. As European economies revived, commercial frictions emerged, but most disputes were managed – if not always resolved – through GATT/WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. Globalization created new opportunities but also regulatory tensions that multilateral rules struggled to accommodate. Efforts to craft deeper discipline through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) ultimately failed amid divergent regulatory approaches. Over time, differences on core WTO principles have eroded the shared legitimacy of panel and Appellate Body rulings. The election of Donald Trump marked a rupture: his use of national security exceptions and abandonment of most-favoured nation (MFN) practices triggered a global trade conflict and challenged the WTO’s foundations. The European Union (EU) now confronts difficult choices on diversification, systemic WTO reform and future trade leadership.

Keywords: transatlantic trade; European Union; populism; World Trade Organization; Donald Trump

 

By Kent Jones*

Introduction

Transatlantic trade relations during the post-Second World War period coincided with the establishment of the global trading rules system, first under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later transforming into the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with the development of European economic and political integration. While there were numerous transatlantic trade disputes, GATT/WTO dispute settlement provisions and a joint political commitment to peaceful trade relations contributed to joint economic growth and stability. As postwar recovery continued, however, disruptive elements began to appear. The growth in GATT/WTO membership among developing countries – including China – created trade pressures on both the United States and European Union (EU) member states as global trade competition increased. The informal GATT dispute settlement procedures gave way to the more legalistic approach of the WTO, making US–EU disputes lengthier and more contentious.

Meanwhile, the increasingly complex issues of regulatory and trade-adjacent issues prevented a successful conclusion of a formal bilateral US–EU trade agreement. Finally, the mercantilist tendencies of the Trump presidency escalated US–EU trade tensions and led to a significant erosion of WTO rules themselves. With the United States retreating from its former leadership role and institutional obligations in the WTO, the EU was forced to consider various strategies for dealing with the evolving institutional environment of global trade, including leadership or joint leadership in a reformed WTO-like global trading order, an enhanced set of new bilateral trade agreements, or ‘muddling through’ the current difficulties with hopes of bringing the United States and China back into a reconstituted WTO.

US-led Postwar Trade, Aid and Security for Europe

Postwar US trade policy focused on creating a framework for global trade liberalization and economic growth. The launch of the GATT in 1947 established US-centred hegemonic stability, based on common trade rules for all participants, a forum for negotiations and a process of dispute settlement. The most-favoured-nation clause required non-discrimination among trading partners in the system, along with tariff binding through trade liberalization treaties and the peaceful resolution of trade disputes to prevent trade wars. These institutional features also promoted growing transatlantic investment flows, which reinforced trade growth. All current EU member states joined the GATT (or later the WTO) either before or in conjunction with their EU accession.

Transatlantic trade relations were also linked with postwar recovery through the Marshall Plan (1948–1951) and US support for European economic integration. The US policy goal was to create regional political and economic stability as a bulwark against Soviet expansion, thereby supporting democratic governments in Europe (Gehler 2022). The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 cultivated a close military and security relationship among the United States, Canada and European countries explicitly designed to deter Soviet aggression. Its membership grew during the Cold War and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and many Eastern European countries formerly aligned with the Soviet Union also joined. Strong US leadership of NATO paralleled the expansion of transatlantic trade, as most European NATO members were also part of the EU. Between 1960 and 2024, transatlantic trade increased in real terms from roughly $100 billion to $8.7 trillion. This expansion corresponds to a compound annual growth rate of 7.3% – higher than the United States’ trade growth with all partners (6.3%) and the EU’s global trade growth (6.9%). 

Transatlantic Trade and the GATT/WTO System

Continued postwar economic growth and globalization created further transatlantic trade opportunities but also heightened tensions, driven by competing commercial interests and differing trade policies. These issues were largely contained, if not always resolved, through GATT/WTO dispute settlement and negotiation. In the early years of European integration, trade disputes under the GATT system primarily concerned agricultural issues and clashes over US trading partners’ access to the common market (Hudec 1988). As European economic integration expanded and deepened, later disputes became more complex, contentious, longer-lasting and often bitter. The GATT’s successor organization, the WTO, took over protracted disputes over allowable government subsidies for Boeing (from the United States) and Airbus (from the EU), the contested safety of beef hormones, banana trade preferences for former EU colonies and controversies over the use and limits of WTO safeguard measures. Yet throughout these years, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement served a valuable purpose by providing an institutional framework for compartmentalizing such disputes while allowing normal trade relations to continue. The United States and the EU shared an ethos of cooperation that favoured trade liberalization and the stability of trade relations.

However, globalization and the expansion of the WTO to include many developing countries created new pressures on the trading system. Adjustment problems mounted in advanced industrialized countries, reaching a peak after China joined the WTO in 2001. Evolving comparative advantage, combined with increasingly mobile capital in the global economy, culminated in the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, further dampening support for globalization (Hays 2009). The weight of rapid change also put pressure on the dispute settlement system, as many countries used WTO trade law measures and subsidies to protect their domestic industries, which their trading partners challenged. China posed a special problem, as its government support for state-owned enterprises did not neatly fall under WTO subsidy disciplines. Dispute settlement decisions in all these cases did not always satisfy the litigants, and the United States and EU grew increasingly frustrated with certain WTO dispute settlement outcomes, including several between them.

A particularly volatile flashpoint was the growing criticism of the WTO dispute settlement Appellate Body’s (AB) controversial decisions, sparking charges of judicial overreach and a violation of WTO members’ sovereignty (Miranda and Miranda 2023). President Obama subsequently vetoed the appointment of AB judges he deemed unfair to US interests, an action repeated later by President Trump. Other countries, including the EU, suspected that judicial nominations were becoming politicized (Shaffer et al. 2017). These conflicts culminated eventually in the suspension of Appellate Body activities in 2019. Since then, the WTO dispute settlement body has been unable to litigate cases to completion, a sign that the WTO system has been weakening under the weight of rigid judicialization of dispute settlement (Busch and Reinhardt 2003).

After the founding of the WTO in 1995, multilateral trade liberalization also weakened. Several rounds of earlier GATT/WTO negotiations had lowered global tariffs, but many non-tariff barriers remained. Existing GATT/WTO rules appeared inadequate to secure future gains from trade by removing non-tariff barriers specific to particular industries and governments, calling for new negotiations on trade-related government policies and more flexible dispute settlement rules and processes. Meanwhile, the WTO’s protracted Doha Round of negotiations (2001–2009) failed to achieve broad and comprehensive trade liberalization, suggesting that the WTO had become too large and divided to address the varied issues of its increasingly diverse membership.

With these WTO constraints and shortcomings in mind, many countries turned to regional trade agreements under GATT Article 24, which proliferated rapidly. The United States and the EU also set out to negotiate an ambitious bilateral agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Negotiations began formally in July 2013, creating 24 joint working groups that indicated the complexity and breadth of the negotiations. The most important issues focused on harmonizing regulations and reducing non-tariff barriers. Yet the negotiating bandwidth was not wide enough to accommodate cross-cutting trade and non-trade issues, including climate change, financial regulations, subsidies, labour standards and health and safety measures. Bargaining over trade-offs across so many sectors of public interest was especially difficult since their trade negotiators could not effectively represent adjacent environmental and social health interests in their home capitals in a coordinated manner.

Furthermore, limited public access to information on the negotiations sparked a backlash in both the United States and the EU, and a final agreement would have required contentious ratification in all EU countries and in the US Congress. The election of Donald Trump – no friend of trade cooperation – to the presidency in 2016 stalled the TTIP talks shortly afterwards, and the European Commission (EC) abandoned the negotiations in 2019. Since then, a US–EU agreement of deeper economic integration has remained out of reach.

The Trump Shock

The WTO, in its already weakened state, faced threats to its very foundations with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and transatlantic trade relations suffered as a result. Trump’s presidential campaigns combined anti-immigrant rhetoric with a protectionist platform linking imports with de-industrialization, which he described as ‘American carnage’. He placed blame for both issues at the feet of ‘global elites’, whom he accused of opening US borders to illegal immigrants and job-stealing trade agreements. Trump’s political strategy was typical of right-wing populism, instilling anger in his base of disaffected, culturally conservative ‘true Americans’ against liberal elitist internationalists.

Trump also had a long-standing fascination with tariffs as the key to a country’s prosperity, but unlike other populist leaders, he was uniquely positioned to attack the foundations of the global trading system. Not only was the United States the world’s largest import market, but it was also the country most responsible for founding and leading the GATT/WTO system. Trump adopted a zero-sum mercantilist approach to trade in which imports amounted to a loss of national wealth and exports served as the primary measure of economic strength. In this framework, tariffs became a form of retribution against countries Trump accused of dumping ‘unwanted’ imports into the US market. He also asserted that tariffs were always paid by foreigners, a key element of his false claim that tariffs do not raise prices.

In his first administration, Trump waged a trade war with China and imposed national security tariffs on steel and aluminium under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (the so-called ‘Section 232 tariffs’). This move was his first significant anti-WTO action, a subversion of GATT Article 21. The rarely used provision had always been reserved for member countries facing demonstrably hostile foreign actions from other member countries, against which they could legitimately suspend GATT/WTO rules and restrict imports. Trump declared that the United States could self-declare a national security emergency for any reason, including unemployment and reduced output in ‘strategic’ industries. Other WTO members, he asserted, could not challenge the US decision or retaliate against it. This reinterpretation of the rules opened the door for any WTO member to unilaterally raise tariffs on any domestic industry for any self-declared national security reason. All foreign suppliers of steel imports to the US, not least the EU, were surprised to discover that their shipments suddenly represented a security threat to their largest trading partner and erstwhile trade ally. In his second term, Trump extended Section 232 tariffs to cover automobiles, auto parts, copper, pharmaceuticals, kitchen cabinets, bathroom vanities and heavy trucks, with more products planned (Covington and Burling LLP 2025).

However, Trump had even broader tariff plans, having devised a narrative of global foreign responsibility for US trade deficits. He announced a set of tariffs against nearly every country, while abandoning all negotiated WTO tariff commitments and the MFN clause completely. Denouncing what he considered an unfairly low, long-standing US effective tariff rate of approximately 2.1%, he devised a set of variable ‘reciprocal’ tariffs based on a flawed economic explanation of trade imbalances and applied them in a discriminatory manner, ranging from 10% to 49% (Doherty 2025). Each US trading partner would have to submit concessions to Trump individually to avoid his unilateral tariffs and gain any additional access to the US import market, usually in the form of greater and sometimes preferential market access for US exports, the elimination of what Trump deemed unfair non-tariff barriers, and commitments to make significant foreign investments in US-based manufacturing. Trump’s goal in his trade policy was to achieve total control over tariffs and trade negotiations. To this end, he chose to impose his global tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which he interpreted as giving the president complete control over trade policy by executive order. Tariff rates and their duration would be at the president’s discretion and subject to change at any time, according to his preferences, without congressional ratification or mandatory review.

The Trump–EU Trade Framework

Trump’s abandonment of WTO rules became abundantly clear in his announcement on 2 April 2025 of unilateral tariff increases that discriminated among countries, followed by bilateral negotiations with the EU and other countries. These measures violated GATT articles 1 (MFN) and 2 (tariff binding). The primary basis for US ‘emergency’ tariffs was a long-standing US trade deficit, which appears inconsistent with GATT Article 21 (Kho et al., 2024). In bypassing WTO dispute settlement procedures, the United States also violated Article 3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which was meant to prevent trade wars, a key underlying motivation in establishing the original GATT. The Trump negotiations were entirely bilateral and one-sided, with his demands for concessions in exchange for US import market access, violating the WTO norm of multilateralism and the provisions of GATT Article 24. US demands for preferential market access to the EU in certain products further violate GATT Article 1. In addition, final tariffs in the US–EU agreement were not bound, a further violation of GATT Article 2, leaving open the possibility that Trump could unilaterally raise those tariffs in the future (WTO 1999).

The initial US tariff assigned to the EU was an alarmingly high 30%, along with special Section 232 tariffs of 50% on steel and aluminium. From the perspective of the initial US tariffs, the Trump–EU ‘framework’ agreement was greeted with relief by many EU officials, even though the final 15% baseline tariff was more than twelve times the average US tariff rate of 1.2% on EU goods that prevailed at the end of 2024 (see U.S. Department of Commerce 2025). Young (chapter 7 in this report) provides details of its provisions. EU trade officials, like those from other countries, had faced a one-sided, coercive negotiation. Many observers complained that the EC had failed to fight hard enough for EU economic interests through retaliation (Stiglitz 2025). The final package, however, seemed to indicate that the United States softened its terms, perhaps to forestall possible EU retaliation, as shown by lower US tariffs and more exemptions than originally announced. Christine Lagarde (2025) insisted that EU tit-for-tat escalation would only have provoked the tariff-loving Trump, risking a much worse outcome for the EU (see also Baldwin 2025, 83–92). An economic perspective suggests that retaliation would be justified only if it forced the United States to back down from a multi-stage trade war, which typically amplifies economic damage to all parties. The EU did in fact prepare retaliatory measures that could have demonstrated its resolve, including limiting US tariffs on automobiles and pharmaceuticals, two of the EU’s most valuable export products (UN Comtrade 2025).

While the framework agreement contains specific tariff commitments, it lacks the structure and specificity of a WTO treaty. US negotiators were careful to make the US tariff rates contingent on European Parliament approval of its new US trade obligations, but there is no corresponding mention of required US congressional approval or ratification, presumably since Trump was basing the agreement on an executive order with no congressional input. The United States’ obligations therefore appear not to be treaty obligations. Another aspect of the deal is that EU commitments on natural gas and computer chip purchases, and on $600 billion of foreign investment in the United States, appear not to be legally enforceable, as they involve largely private, contingent commercial transactions and investment. If these or other targets are not met, the question arises as to what recourse the United States will have to redress the EU’s noncompliance. The answer appears to be that Trump, through the end of his term in 2028, would be able to raise US tariff rates on EU goods unilaterally in response.

Outlook for the European Union

Despite many trade disputes between the United States and European countries since the end of the Second World War, the GATT/WTO transatlantic trade rules enabled trade to expand. Dispute settlement procedures, while imperfect, tended to keep trade conflict separate from broader trade relations until Trump’s second term. The best strategy for the EU in response to Trump’s disruptions is therefore to seek, as much and as broadly as possible, to expand rules-based trade with its non-US trading partners. Trade with the United States will require an extended period of capricious tariff policies by Trump and possibly his successors, but the framework agreement with the United States suggests that the EU is likely at least to maintain access – albeit reduced – to this valuable import market in the meantime. ‘Muddling through’ the current US–EU trade framework will probably require the EU to adopt a transactional (rather than rules-based) approach to transatlantic trade, involving sector-by-sector or item-by-item bargaining, matching Trump’s mercantilist instincts. After Trump leaves office, it may be possible to establish more systematic and predictable trade relations, as US businesses are likely to push for a more open and predictable trade and investment environment.

Nonetheless, the EU should seek to apply WTO rules in expanding its export markets through new trade agreements (see Poletti, chapter 6 in this report), as growth in international trade is likely to occur outside the United States, especially in Southeast Asia (Altman and Bastian 2025). Inevitably, EU trade expansion under WTO rules could trigger threats and sanctions from the United States if it persists in forcing its trading partners to grant preferential treatment to US exporters, in violation of MFN rules. Managing this problem will be challenging in any EU efforts to ‘muddle through’ mercantilist US trade policies. Yet the EU and other countries have continued to apply WTO rules to their non-US trade, and the United States is likely to reach the limit of its ability to bully its trading partners into cheating on WTO rules they wish to maintain as long as the United States remains a WTO member. Successful WTO-based trade expansion by the EU and other countries could also provide an incentive for the United States to return to the same rules.

Planning trade policies for the future, however, is difficult because of uncertainties in the short- and medium-term. Trump’s tariffs are unpopular with the US electorate, but there will be no legislative check on his policies as long as Republican majorities in Congress remain beholden to him. However, Democrats will challenge these majorities in the 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential election. It remains unclear who will run for president in 2028. Vice President J.D. Vance appears to be Trump’s successor for the nomination, but it is not certain that he commands the loyal following that Trump has. The Democratic Party, for its part, has no clear leading presidential candidate at this writing, and no clear alternative trade policy platform to rally around. A more trade-friendly US president from either party could eventually move the United States back towards trade policies consistent with WTO rules, but this may also depend on reforms in contested WTO rules and dispute settlement procedures, especially as they pertain to China’s trade policies.

A more immediate issue, unresolved at this writing, is the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) case challenging the constitutionality of Trump’s IEEPA tariffs. SCOTUS has agreed to expedite the decision, but is not bound by a timetable, and its verdict may not be definitive. A verdict vindicating Trump’s tariffs would allow them to stand indefinitely, or until Congress succeeds in challenging them. An unconditional overturning of Trump’s tariffs would cause them to revert to a pre-Trump effective level of 2.1%. Yet compromise verdicts might allow the tariffs to continue, subject to duration or level limits, or to additional congressional oversight or legislation (see Miller and Chevalier 2025). Even a complete reversal of the IEEPA tariffs is unlikely to deter Trump from imposing additional tariffs under other emergency trade laws, especially Section 232 (Werschkul 2025).

Beyond US domestic politics, geopolitical uncertainties abound. The vacuum left by Trump’s abandonment of US leadership in the WTO, if it continues, will require a large country or a coalition of countries to fill or coordinate new institutional leadership roles. The difficulty of resetting WTO rules-based trade is that no single country can replace the United States in terms of economic size, political influence, financial market depth and reserve currency status, elements that reinforced the United States’ previous leadership of the global trading system. The United States may eventually re-emerge from its Trumpian protectionism to reclaim leadership of the multilateral trading system. Still, a prolonged period of US tariffs and economic nationalism is likely to severely weaken the US economy. The more US economic and political attributes erode due to self-inflicted damage, the closer the United States comes to forfeiting its chance to return to its previous position of global hegemonic leadership.

In the meantime, the EU’s role in the future trading system faces a highly volatile global institutional environment marked by geopolitical divides, scepticism towards globalization, and a general lack of international trust and cooperation (Zelicovich 2022). The EU will first need political consensus among its own member countries to pursue a broader role in global trade governance and corresponding enthusiasm from its potential partners in leading any post-US trading system.

A crucial issue in this regard is devising a system that can accommodate, if not discipline, China and its state-managed trade policies. The United States missed the opportunity to rally other countries to common action regarding China’s opaque trade interventions through negotiation and reform of WTO rules. In the absence of US leadership, a revitalization of rules-based trade liberalization will require a strong coalition of countries to bargain together to address this problem. Only then might large regional trade alliances such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the EU and perhaps others merge, possibly eventually drawing in China and the United States as well, to provide the critical mass for a new global trade institution. The ability of the EU to take on a more prominent role in global trade leadership will depend on the strength of its internal economy, its internal political cohesion, its foreign policy engagement and its skill in trade diplomacy (see Smith 1999). If the EU is not capable of the sort of hegemonic leadership the United States once exercised, a different, more fragile institutional model of cooperative trade leadership will be necessary. Yet an EU committed to WTO principles will still be able to play a crucial role in achieving institutional change alongside other trading powers.

The Trump trade war, disruptive as it has been, may ironically provide an opportunity for the EU and other WTO members to correct, reform and strengthen WTO rules and processes of dispute settlement and trade liberalization for all countries. The EU should continue its efforts to bridge the gap in WTO dispute settlement through its Multiparty Interim Appeal (MPIA) initiative (Wouters and Hegde 2022). The scope of policy space in trade agreements, issues related to changing technologies, and the WTO consensus rule should all be on the table for reform. Differences in trade-related environmental, labour and human rights preferences, as well as dissimilar approaches to regulation, need to be made compatible with normal trade relations at the global level. One potentially important, but so far little-used, provision of the WTO is Annex IV, allowing sub-groups of WTO members to conclude plurilateral agreements on smaller agendas of specific issues, while being open to the accession of new members. Hoekman et al. (2025) suggest this approach for negotiating new agreements among like-minded countries on environmental and other trade-related issues. Negotiating such agreements could free the WTO from its consensus straitjacket, which has stymied progress on many trade liberalization proposals. The EU in particular would benefit from a ‘variable geometry’ of social interests in trade policy that are currently difficult to pursue within the existing WTO framework. Adapting to the realities of globalized, developmentally diverse, environmentally sensitive and geopolitically engaged world trade, perhaps on an incremental basis, is likely to be essential for its institutional survival.


 

(*) Kent Jones, Dr. ès sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria.  In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State. Email: kjones@babson.edu


 

References

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Baldwin, Richard. 2025. The Great Trade Hack: How Trump’s Trade War Fails and the World Moves On. Paris and London: CEPR Press. https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/great-trade-hack-how-trumps-trade-war-fails-and-world-moves

Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. “Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement.” In Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US and the WTO, edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. Pollack, 1–28. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Covington & Burling LLP. 2025. “Status of Section 232 Actions by the Trump Administration.” Alert, July 28. https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2025/07/status-of-section-232-actions-by-the-trump-administration

Doherty, Emma. 2025. “Economists Take Issue with Trump’s Tariff Formula.” CNBC, April 5. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/05/economists-take-issue-with-trumps-tariff-formula-arguing-rate-is-inflated.html

Gehler, Michael. 2022. The Signing of the Rome Treaties 65 Years Ago: Origins, Provisions and Effects. Discussion Paper C270. Bonn: Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.

Hays, Jude C. 2009. Globalization and the New Politics of Embedded Liberalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hoekman, Bernard, Betül K. O. Taş, and Rohit Ticku. 2025. Plurilateral Approaches to Managing Cross-Border Industrial Policy-Related Spillovers. RSC Working Paper 2025/27. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu

Hudec, Robert E. 1988. “Legal Issues in US–EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960–1965.” In Issues in US–EC Trade Relations, edited by Robert E. Baldwin, Carl G. Hamilton, and André Sapir, 1–36. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity

Please cite as:
Azmanova, Albena. (2026). “Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00138

DOWNLOAD CHAPTER 17

Abstract
This chapter examines how impoverishment, inequality and precarity have become defining features of contemporary societies in Europe and the United States, reshaping domestic politics and altering the foundations of the transatlantic relationship. Poverty persists despite overall affluence, with COVID-19 reversing earlier gains in Europe and entrenched racialized and generational disparities characterizing the United States. Inequality follows divergent patterns: Europe experiences wide variation shaped by austerity and structural barriers facing migrants, while the United States is marked by extreme wealth concentration and systemic racial gaps. Yet inequality alone does not fully explain public discontent. Instead, precarity – politically produced vulnerability across class, gender, age and status – emerges as the central grievance. Expanding temporary and platform work, weakened labour protections and strained welfare systems expose women, youth, migrants and racial minorities to compounding risks. The chapter argues that rising precarity undermines trust in governance and shifts transatlantic cooperation toward transactionalism, requiring renewed social investment and stronger labour and environmental standards.

Keywords: poverty; precarity; inequality; employment; insecurity; populism

 

By Albena Azmanova*

Introduction

Over the past decade, Europe and the United States have faced intensifying social vulnerabilities stemming from economic shocks, political realignments and labour market transformations. Transatlantic EU–US relations are increasingly shaped by internal socioeconomic pressures, especially the precarization of labour and the rise of populist politics responding to widespread physical, economic, social and cultural insecurity. These forces are subtly but significantly reshaping cooperation across trade, security and global governance. The domestic pressures driving change have especially to do with deteriorating employment conditions – marked by low wages, gig work, weakened unions and eroded social protections. This trend is evident in both the United States and the EU, although with different institutional buffers. Economic insecurity – especially post-2008 and post-COVID-19 – has fuelled resentment toward globalization, trade liberalization and perceived elite consensus, which have historically underpinned transatlantic cooperation. To this adds cultural and physical insecurity – including migration anxieties, demographic shifts and perceived threats to national identity – which have intensified populist narratives that challenge liberal internationalism. In what follows, we review three interlinked trajectories in domestic developments – poverty, inequality and precarity – to highlight structural patterns, policy responses and emerging fault lines that are likely to affect domestic political attitudes and, consequently, transatlantic relations.

Poverty: Persistent Risks and Shifting Demographics

Europe: The fragmented landscape of poverty amidst wealth

After the 2008 financial crisis, poverty rates in Europe slowly declined. However, COVID-19 disrupted this trajectory, leading to a renewed increase in poverty risk across many EU countries. The ‘Europe 2020’ strategy aimed to lift 20 million people out of poverty by 2020 – a goal that went unmet, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating vulnerabilities and deepening the scarring effects of poverty across the continent (Mussida and Sciulli 2022). The pandemic increased the risk of poverty, particularly for already vulnerable groups and widened disparities between countries due to differences in policy responses. Southern European countries (e.g., Italy, Spain, Greece) experienced sharper increases in poverty risk due to weaker welfare systems and higher reliance on tourism and service sectors. Northern and Western European countries, with stronger social safety nets, were better able to cushion the impact.

In 2024, 21% of the EU population – approximately 93.3 million people – were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, according to Eurostat’s AROPE indicator, which combines income poverty, severe material deprivation, and low work intensity (Eurostat 2025a). Rates remain highest in Bulgaria (30.3%), Romania (27.9%), and Greece (26.9%). Notably, in-work poverty is rising: 10.9% of employed individuals are still at risk of poverty.

Gender disparities persist: overall, women face a higher risk of poverty (21.9%) than men (20.0%), largely due to wage gaps and disproportionate caregiving responsibilities.

The United States: Structural poverty and policy gaps

According to the OECD, the United States has one of the highest relative poverty rates among member countries, with income inequality and poverty deeply entrenched (OECD 2024). The bottom quintile earns less than 3% of national income, while the top quintile earns over 50%.

Racialized poverty remains a defining feature: Black, Hispanic and Indigenous populations face disproportionately high poverty rates, compounded by housing segregation and educational disparities. Child poverty is particularly acute, with 16.1% of children living below the federal poverty line in 2023 (Guzman and Kollar 2023). Elder poverty is rising due to healthcare costs and insufficient retirement savings (Scott 2024).

Despite solid economic growth, real income gains have been uneven, and intergenerational mobility remains low (Kochhar and Sechopoulos 2023; Kochhar 2024). Impoverishment – both absolute deprivation (inability to meet basic needs) and relative poverty (living below a certain percentage of median income in a given society) – has been on the rise in Europe and the United States. This rising poverty has fuelled grievances about affordability, as households struggle to cover essential costs such as housing, food, utilities and debt repayments. Affordability grievances have been prominent in anti-establishment mobilizations, which have placed cost-of-living issues at the centre of national elections. In Europe, this has led to challenging EU integration, migration policy and austerity legacies – which are perceived as causes of impoverishment. In the United States, public anxiety over purchasing power and declining real incomes have driven support for populist candidates who frame globalization and liberal elites as threats to national sovereignty and working-class dignity.

Inequality: Structural Divides and Policy Responses

Europe: Between convergence and divergence

Income inequality in Europe varies widely. The Gini coefficient ranges from 23.8 in the Slovak Republic to 39.5 in Bulgaria (World Bank Group 2023). Post-2008 austerity widened inequality in Southern and Eastern Europe, with long-term effects on youth and low-income workers (Oxfam 2013).

The protective role of higher education has diminished, while employment stability and childcare provision have become more important in mitigating poverty and inequality (Mussida and Sciulli 2022). Migrant populations often face structural barriers to income parity, with limited access to housing, education, and labour protections (ETUC 2024).

The United States: Polarization and policy stagnation

The United States has seen a dramatic rise in income and wealth inequality. Households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution own 79% in the United States (OECD 2024, 86). Tax expenditures disproportionately benefit high earners, exacerbating inequality and reducing fiscal space for redistribution. Coastal urban centres show high income levels but also high living costs, while rural and post-industrial regions face stagnation. Racial disparities in educational attainment, access to capital, and exposure to environmental hazards deepen inequality (Beard et al. 2024). While impoverishment in absolute terms (i.e., reduced purchasing power) has often been expressed in social discontent, inequality (relative impoverishment) has not been reliably traced to social discontent, even as it has been at the centre of academic research and public debate.

Precarity: Labour Market Insecurity and Social Dislocation

Precarity – politically produced vulnerability caused by social threats to lives, livelihoods, and lifeworlds (Azmanova 2020; 2023) – has recently been identified as a critical condition afflicting contemporary democracies, cutting across class, gender, age, educational attainment, professional attainment and even income levels.

Europe: The rise of precarious work

Precarity has intensified through non-standard employment. Eurostat data show that young workers aged 30 or younger are disproportionately represented in temporary and low-paid jobs (Eurostat 2025b). Women are more likely to be in part-time or informal work, often linked to caregiving responsibilities.

Sectors such as hospitality, retail and care show high levels of precarity, with limited union coverage and weak protections. Platform work has expanded, but regulatory frameworks lag behind. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has called for the full implementation of the EU’s directive on platform work and for universal social protections (ETUC 2023).

The pandemic disproportionately affected workers in precarious employment, temporary contracts, and low‑income service sectors. This disproportionate impact has reinforced the link between insecure labour markets and the persistence of poverty (Mussida and Sciulli 2022).

The United States: Fragmentation and Flexibilization

The US labour market is characterized by high flexibility but low security. Gig economy workers often lack health insurance, paid leave, or retirement benefits (Human Rights Watch 2025). Union membership has fallen to historic lows, around 10% (BLS 2023). Frequent job changes, layoffs and contract work contribute to income volatility and psychological stress. Employer-based health insurance ties security to employment, making job loss a significant risk factor for medical debt and coverage gaps. Policy debates over universal basic income, portable benefits and labour classification have gained traction but remain politically contentious.

COVID‑19 intensified poverty in Europe and the United States by exposing the precariousness of households and labour markets, undoing part of the progress made since the Great Recession. It significantly worsened mental health globally, with sharp rises in anxiety, depression, and stress (WHO 2022), while lockdowns and social isolation also triggered a surge in gender‑based violence, often described as a ‘shadow pandemic’ (UN Women 2020).

Overall, even as societies on the two sides of the Atlantic have returned to economic growth, economic and social precarization has persisted. Labour market insecurity and cost-of-living concerns are diminishing public trust in existing systems of governance and driving an upsurge in anti-establishment, populist mobilizations.

Vulnerable Groups: Intersectional Risks and Policy Blind Spots

Across both regions, certain groups face compounded vulnerabilities, resulting from impoverishment and precarization:

  • Women: Gender pay gaps, caregiving burdens, and exposure to part-time work increase risks (UN Women 2023).
  • Migrants and refugees: Legal status, language barriers, and discrimination limit access to services and stable employment (ETUC 2023)
  • Youth: Entry-level job insecurity, student debt and housing unaffordability create long-term precarity.
  • The elderly: Fixed incomes, rising healthcare costs, and social isolation contribute to poverty (Tornton and Bowers 2024).
  • Racial and ethnic minorities: Structural racism, residential segregation, and unequal access to education and healthcare deepen inequality (Bailey et al. 2017; Mirza and Warwick 2024; Clark et al. 2022; Yearby et al. 2022; Kisa and Kisa 2025).

Thus, while precarity is becoming the overarching grievance in Western democracies, it is strongly stratified and is most acutely felt among the poor and socially marginalized. However, as economic and social insecurity are becoming ubiquitous across income levels and educational attainment, precarity is increasingly being identified as the key factor driving social discontent and fuelling anti-establishment, populist mobilizations (Azmanova 2004, 2020, 2023; Apostolidis 2020; Zhirnov et al 2024; Scheiring et al 2024; Rodríguez-Pose 2020).

Protections: Welfare States, Labour Rights and Emerging Models

Europe: Welfare retrenchment and innovation

European welfare states offer a range of protections, but austerity and demographic pressures have strained their capacity. Some of the key developments include:

  • Minimum income schemes: These vary widely across countries, with some offering robust support (e.g., France’s Revenu de solidarité active (RSA)) and others providing minimal assistance.
  • Universal healthcare: This remains a cornerstone of European social protection, although access and quality vary.
  • Labour market policies: Active labour market programs (ALMPs), vocational training and unemployment insurance help mitigate precarity.
  • EU-level initiatives: The European Pillar of Social Rights and the Recovery and Resilience Facility aim to strengthen social cohesion post-COVID-19.

However, gaps remain in coverage, adequacy and enforcement, especially for non-standard workers and migrants.

The United States: Fragmented safety nets and policy innovation

The United States lacks a comprehensive welfare state, relying instead on a patchwork of federal, state and local programs. Key features include:

  • Means-tested programs: SNAP (food stamps), Medicaid, and TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) provide targeted support but face eligibility barriers and stigma.
  • Tax-based transfers: The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit offer income support, although coverage is uneven.
  • Healthcare reforms: The Affordable Care Act expanded coverage but left millions uninsured or underinsured.
  • Local innovations: Cities like New York and San Francisco have piloted guaranteed-income schemes, tenant protections and worker cooperatives.

Despite these efforts, systemic gaps persist and political polarization hampers federal reform.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted that poverty is not only cyclical but also deeply tied to structural vulnerabilities in employment and welfare systems. It revealed how poverty dynamics are shaped not only by economic shocks but also by institutional resilience. Emergency measures (short‑time work schemes, income support, moratoria on evictions) mitigated some effects, but structural weaknesses in welfare systems left many households exposed. Recent policy shifts in the EU that have placed a higher priority on competitiveness and defence spending risk weakening social investment and deepening employment insecurity.

Comparative Reflections and Policy Implications

Since the turn of the century, the combined effects of labour market liberalization, automation and the radical opening of national economies have generated widespread employment insecurity and wage depression, fuelling fears of real, perceived and anticipated losses of livelihood. More broadly, political attitudes have been shaped by anxieties linked to physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement and economic precarity driven by flexible labour markets, outsourcing and competition with immigrant workers. Together, these four sources of anxiety constitute the core of a new antiprecarity public agenda centred on demands for order and security. This agenda of public concerns cuts across the left–right divide and tends to replace the left–right vectors of electoral competition with a new risk–opportunity divide shaped by the social impact of the new economy of open borders and information technologies (Azmanova 2020, 68–69, 140; See also Azmanova 2004, 2011).

Although these developments are tangible in both the United States and Europe, the transatlantic comparison reveals that Europe’s welfare states offer more robust protections but face demographic and fiscal pressures. The United States exhibits higher inequality and precarity, with fragmented safety nets and racialized vulnerabilities. Both regions struggle to adapt protections to non-standard work and intersectional risks. Policy innovation is emerging at subnational levels, but national coherence is lacking.

Social exasperation resulting from ubiquitous precarity is fuelling both economic and cultural xenophobia and undermining solidarities within countries and between the EU and the United States. This is expressed in adversarial foreign economic policy and in the undermining of the traditional EU–US political and economic partnership. Populist movements in Europe (e.g. the AfD in Germany, the Rassemblement national in France) and the United States (especially under Donald Trump) often frame transatlantic institutions as out of touch with ‘ordinary people’. These actors tend to be sceptical of multilateralism, critical of NATO and hostile to EU regulatory frameworks, which complicates traditional alliance structures.

Populist governments or pressures can lead to policy volatility, weakening long-term commitments to shared goals such as climate action, digital regulation and democratic norms. Indeed, trade tensions have resurfaced, especially around subsidies, digital taxation and industrial policy. The EU’s Green Deal and the United States’s Inflation Reduction Act have created friction over protectionism and competitiveness. While security cooperation remains strong on Ukraine and NATO, it diverges on China, Middle East policy and defence spending expectations.

Fundamentally, institutional trust is eroding. The EU increasingly hedges against US unpredictability by deepening internal defence and tech strategies, while the United States questions European burden-sharing. Under populist demands for short-term stabilization measures, a shift is underway from normative alliance-building to interest-based transactionalism. This shift means cooperation is increasingly contingent on short-term domestic political gains rather than shared values. The EU is recalibrating its strategic autonomy, while the United States – especially under populist leadership – prioritizes sovereignty and unilateralism.

Countering precarization as the root driver of reactionary populism would require a systematic effort for building a ‘political economy of trust’ (Azmanova 2020) that provides economic and social stability along two trajectories: domestic and global. In terms of domestic policies, this means replacing the current focus on competitiveness in the global economy (which is prompting governments to cut job security and social investment) with an industrial policy that generates good jobs, as well as increased investment in the commons (public services and social insurance). In terms of global market integration, the logic of pursuing competitiveness, which is prompting governments to weaken labour and environmental standards, should be replaced by a more rigorous implementation of labour and environmental standards of production, trade and consumption.


 

(*) Albena Azmanova is Professor of Political and Social Science at City St George’s, University of London. She has held academic positions at the New School for Social Research, Sciences Po Paris, Harvard University, UC Berkeley, and the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. Her research spans critical social theory, political economy, democratic transitions, populism, and the rule of law, with a focus on how precarity has become the defining social harm of contemporary capitalism. Her book Capitalism on Edge (2020) is the recipient of numerous awards, among them the American Political Science Association’s Michael Harrington Award for scholarship advancing social justice. Beyond academia, she has served as a policy advisor to institutions including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament.


 

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Labor Day protest outside Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue, Midtown Manhattan, September 1, 2025, where demonstrators demanded better wages and working conditions. Photo: Dreamstime.

Can Mamdani’s Municipal Socialism Counter Democratic Backsliding?

In a period of deepening global democratic recession Zohran Mamdani’s ascent as mayor of New York City poses an important question: Can municipal socialism provide meaningful resistance to authoritarian and oligarchic drift? Mamdani’s redistributive agenda—rent freezes, universal childcare, fare-free transit, public groceries, and a $30 minimum wage—seeks to decommodify basic needs and challenge monopoly power. His platform echoes broader critiques of financialized capitalism and “techno-feudalism,” offering a localized experiment in restoring democratic control over markets. Yet structural constraints—capital mobility, state-level authority, and limited municipal capacity—risk reducing his project to a palliative rather than transformative intervention. Still, Mamdani’s rise signals renewed potential for democratic agency within advanced capitalism and highlights the symbolic power of left urban governance.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

In an era marked by the ninth consecutive year of global democratic decline—with more autocracies than democracies worldwide—the question of whether municipal socialism can serve as a meaningful counterweight to authoritarian drift has acquired renewed urgency. In my earlier analysisTrump and the New Capitalism: Old Wine in a New Bottle, I argued that the rise of populist-authoritarian tendencies represents not an aberration but an outcome of structural transformations within capitalism. The fusion of excessive neoliberal deregulation, financialization, and techno-feudal monopolies has produced a regime in which power is concentrated in networks of rent-seeking elites while democratic accountability erodes. Within this global configuration, figures such as Donald Trump exemplify a politics of reaction, harnessing social discontent to reinforce rather than transcend capitalist contradictions.

The newly elected mayor of the New York municipality in the US, Zohran Mamdani, represents another countermovement that is evolving. Having an Indian lineage, born in Kampala, Uganda, in 1991 and educated at the Bronx High School of Science and Bowdoin College in the US, Mamdani is a community organizer and politician representing a new generation of democratic socialists in New York City politics. His family background reflects a distinguished intellectual lineage: his father, Mahmood Mamdani, is a renowned Ugandan academic and political theorist at Columbia University, while his mother, Mira Nair, is an internationally acclaimed Indian filmmaker. This cosmopolitan and intellectually engaged upbringing informs his perspective on justice, diversity, and structural inequality. Before his mayoral campaign, he served as a state assembly member for Queens, gaining recognition for his advocacy on housing, transport, and labor rights.

The emergence of Mamdani, a self-described democratic socialist and now mayor-elect of New York City, raises a critical question: Can left municipalism, operating within the framework of advanced capitalism, achieve more than temporary relief? Can it open pathways toward structural transformation, or does it risk serving merely as a palliative to capitalism’s crises? This commentary examines Mamdani’s project as a potential alternative within the confines of globalized urban capitalism and explores whether it constitutes a genuine rupture or a managed reform.

Mamdani’s Program and Its Socialist Premise

Mamdani’s platform centers on affordability—housing, transit, groceries, childcare—labor empowerment, anti-monopoly measures, and public-sector revival. His proposals include rent freezes, universal childcare, fare-free buses, city-owned grocery stores, and a minimum wage of $30 by 2030. The program is explicitly redistributive—funded through higher taxation on the wealthy, municipal bonds, and redirected public investment—and endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America. Reports from The Nation and The Guardian emphasize his focus on social affordability and economic justice.

Taken together, these policies articulate a coherent vision of municipal socialism that seeks to reconcile equity with feasibility. They represent not merely an electoral program but a normative statement about how value creation and distribution should be reorganized in an era of inequality and urban precarity.

Alignment with Structural Critiques of Capitalism

While Mamdani’s proposals emerge from the immediate material pressures of urban life—housing unaffordability, wage stagnation, and public disinvestment—they also speak to deeper theoretical concerns. His platform implicitly challenges the dominant accumulation regime that has shaped advanced capitalism since the 1980s.

  • Constraining monopoly and platform power: His regulation of delivery apps and advocacy for municipal alternatives echo calls to counter techno-feudal control.
  • Fiscal re-politicization: Expanding municipal investment and debt capacity revives the Keynesian principle of democratic capital allocation, countering the austerity logic.
  • Labor empowerment: Raising wages and curbing algorithmic exploitation of gig workers directly addresses the erosion of collective bargaining in the digital economy

In essence, Mamdani’s local socialism represents a municipal-scale experiment in reversing the disembedding process. It seeks to restore social control over markets without dismantling the capitalist framework entirely.

Structural Constraints and the Risk of Palliative Reform

Despite its radical rhetoric, Mamdani’s agenda faces formidable structural limits:

  • Jurisdictional dependency: Many proposals—such as rent control, wage laws, and tax reform—require state-level approval. Dependence on higher-tier institutions (Albany, Congress) restricts municipal sovereignty.
  • Financial constraints: Global capital mobility enables landlords and investors to circumvent local regulations through capital flight or pre-emptive rent inflation.
  • Administrative capacity: Rebuilding the state apparatus after decades of privatization demands resources, expertise, and political endurance.
    Global market discipline: As I noted elsewhere, cities embedded in global capital circuits cannot easily alter systemic rules of accumulation.

Thus, while progressive, Mamdani’s project risks acting as a palliative: It might ease inequality, precarity, and housing shortages without actually transforming the fundamental regime of accumulation. In this way, it resembles the New Deal paradox—reforms that saved capitalism from itself by institutionalizing social compromise.

Theoretical Implications: From Populism to Municipal Socialism

In contrast to populist movements such as Trumpism that weaponize social anger for authoritarian consolidation, Mamdani represents a left-populist or socialist response oriented toward redistribution and participation.

Drawing on thinkers such as Shoshana ZuboffYanis Varoufakis, and McKenzie Wark, genuine transformation would require dismantling the global rentier system based on data extraction, monopolistic control, and financial dominance. Mamdani’s measures operate largely at the level of urban welfare and infrastructure, not at the structural nexus of digital and financial capital.

This suggests that while municipal socialism can create breathing space for democracy, it cannot, alone, displace capitalist command over value creation. Nevertheless, its symbolic power is significant: It demonstrates that political agency still exists within capitalist democracies and that redistribution, social housing, and decommodification are viable public policies.

A Short Reminder from the Obama Experience

While Mamdani’s rise has generated enthusiasm among progressive circles, historical experience counsels caution regarding the transformative potential of reform within existing institutions. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 offers a revealing precedent. His campaign, built around the populist slogan “Yes We Can,” unleashed one of the most powerful waves of civic mobilization in modern US history.

A signature pledge—the creation of a single-payer healthcare system—was quickly abandoned amid intra-party resistance. Even with a unified government, centrist Democrats refused to support the plan. The resulting Affordable Care Act represented a policy milestone but fell short of structural transformation.

Simultaneously, the conservative backlash was immediate and fierce. The Tea Party movement– funded by corporate networks and amplified through right-wing media—redefined the Republican Party and laid the groundwork for Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) insurgency. 

The political consequences were swift. In the 2010 midterms, Democrats lost both houses of Congress. Even vacancies in the Federal Reserve Board and the Supreme Court remained unfilled, enabling the next administration to reshape the judiciary decisively.

A Constraint Hope for the Future

Zohran Mamdani at the Dominican Heritage Parade on 6th Ave in Manhattan, New York City, August 10, 2025. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin.

Mamdani’s rise signals a generational shift toward pragmatic socialism—a reassertion of collective goods amid a cost-of-living crisis. His program offers hope within limits: Hope that governance can be reoriented toward equality and sustainability; limits because the city remains bound to global circuits of capital and data.

If such movements scale upward—through cooperative federalism, trans-urban alliances, and progressive taxation—the Mamdani experiment could prefigure a new model of democratic socialism adapted to the 21st century. Otherwise, as warned in Trump and the New Capitalism, the system will continue oscillating between neoliberal authoritarianism and fragmented reform.

Engineers conducting research at a solar energy R&D center. Photo: Dreamstime.

Creative Destruction or Destructive Consolidation? Nobel Reflections on Growth Under Populism

This commentary examines the tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven growth, drawing on the insights of Nobel laureates Joel Mokyr, Philippe Aghion, and Peter Howitt. Their research highlights that sustainable prosperity relies on creative destruction, institutional openness, and freedom of inquiry. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these conditions by eroding pluralism, legal stability, and academic autonomy. Using comparative cases such as China, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk shows how populist regimes politicize innovation systems, stifling long-term productivity. The essay concludes that innovation is not merely economic—it is institutional, cultural, and democratic. Without inclusive institutions and free knowledge systems, technological progress becomes extractive rather than transformative.

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

This commentary explores the fundamental tension between authoritarian populism and innovation-driven economic growth, drawing on the work of Nobel laureates Joel MokyrPhilippe Aghion, and Peter HowittThese scholars emphasize the critical role of knowledge, institutions, and creative destruction in fostering sustainable growth. In contrast, authoritarian populism undermines these pillars by eroding institutional openness, pluralism, and policy stability. Combining their contributions with insights from economists like Acemoglu and North, this commentary underlines that technological progress without institutional freedom becomes extractive rather than transformative. Innovation, therefore, is not solely an economic process—it is profoundly institutional, cultural, and democratic.

Innovation Ecosystems and the Foundations of Long-Term Growth 

The awarding of the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economics to Mokyr, Aghion, and Howitt comes at a pivotal moment, as authoritarian populism gains ground globally, including in liberal democracies like the United States and across Europe. This recognition is more than an academic endorsement; it serves as a warning against the populist trajectory—and as a call to reaffirm the institutional foundations necessary for long-term, inclusive prosperity. Together, these laureates have transformed our understanding of how innovation drives growth and why it depends critically on inclusive, resilient institutions. 

Joel Mokyr provides a historical and cultural framework, arguing that technological advancement arises not simply from material conditions, but from epistemic institutions—universities, protections for dissent, and a culture of inquiry that supports the creation and diffusion of knowledge. Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt, meanwhile, formalized the process of innovation-led growth through their endogenous growth model, rooted in creative destruction. Their work illustrates how growth is generated when new technologies and firms continuously disrupt the old, enabled by competition, R&D investment, and enabling public policy. Their combined message is clear: Sustainable innovation cannot thrive without freedom of inquiry, legal stability, institutional independence, and competitive markets. When these are eroded, growth not only slows—it may become directionally regressive, channeling resources toward control rather than creativity.

Authoritarian Populism and the Threat to Innovation Institutions 

While the Nobel laureates underscore the importance of institutional infrastructure for innovation, the global rise of authoritarian populism presents a sharp countercurrent. Populism’s consolidation of executive power, erosion of checks and balances, and hostility toward expertise and dissent undermine the very systems that make innovation possible. This raises two fundamental questions: i) What can we learn from the intellectual legacy behind the 2025 Nobel Prize in an era of resurgent populism? ii) If our primary concern is sustainable and inclusive economic prosperity, what paths do the populist versus institutionalist frameworks each offer? 

The answers lie in the institutional costs of populism. Populist regimes, as Rodrik (2019) explains, often emerge from economic discontent and cultural anxiety—but they typically respond by concentrating authority and limiting contestation. This instinct directly conflicts with the unpredictability and disruption inherent in innovation.

How Populism Damages the Mechanisms of Creative Destruction 

Creative destruction, the engine of Aghion and Howitt’s growth model, is inherently destabilizing. It disrupts incumbents, transforms labor markets, and threatens established power structures—dynamics that populist regimes seek to resist. Though some argue that authoritarian populists could theoretically design innovation-friendly policies, empirical reality suggests otherwise. Populist leaders prioritize short-term visibility and control over long-term, uncertain processes like R&D. Consequently, megaprojects and state-industrial policies replace long-term innovation strategies. As Portuese (2021) notes, populists may even weaponize antitrust policy, using it to punish disloyal firms and protect politically connected monopolies—thereby cultivating a climate of fear and rent-seeking, not innovation. The erosion of judicial independence, university autonomy, and press freedom disables the feedback mechanisms essential for adaptive learning. As institutions hollow out, clientelist redistribution replaces competitive funding. Brezis and Young (2023) demonstrate how innovation systems under populist rule become politicized and inefficient, redirecting resources away from discovery and toward loyalty.

Empirical Evidence: Populism’s Innovation Deficit 

Numerous case studies support this idea: China, despite its strong state capacity, faces innovation stagnation at the frontier due to censorship, limited peer review, and politically driven science (To, 2022). While China has made significant advances in frontier technologies—ranging from electric vehicles and green energy to artificial intelligence and quantum computing—this progress exists alongside growing structural barriers. Recent reports by the Financial Times (2024) and the World Bank (2023) highlight a widening gap between technological investment and productivity results, indicating that innovation has become increasingly state-led but not more efficient.

The politicization of science limited academic independence, and the expanding influence of party committees within universities and tech companies has hindered the creativity and openness necessary for frontier innovation. Although China has surpassed the United States and the EU in patent volume and some industrial technologies, its overall total factor productivity growth has slowed sharply since the late 2010s, meaning that technological accumulation is not leading to widespread productivity gains. As Foreign Policy (2025) analysis points out, China’s innovation model now risks “technological involution,” where large R&D spending only reproduces existing ideas rather than creating breakthroughs; in short, centralized control can mobilize resources on a large scale but also limits the institutional diversity and critical inquiry that are essential for true creative disruption.

The situation in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, which exhibits highly strong populist authoritarian hybrid governance mechanisms, shows a similar trend. Turkey’s shift toward authoritarianism after 2011 reversed earlier gains in R&D and scientific output as scientific governance became politicized (Apaydin, 2025). In Hungary and Poland, Ágh (2019) finds that populist leaders systematically undermined institutional independence, leading to stagnation in innovation indices despite EU integration. 

While Turkey’s R&D investment and publication output grew rapidly during the 2000s, the post-2011 erosion of academic autonomy—and particularly the post-2016 state-of-emergency decrees—triggered a systemic collapse in institutional freedom and international collaboration. Studies by the Freedom House (2023) and V-Dem Institute (2024) show Turkey’s academic freedom score falling to the bottom decile globally, coinciding with an 18–25% drop in publication activity and widespread self-censorship across universities. The World Bank (2023) further notes that this institutional degradation has curtailed the country’s innovation potential, as politicization redirected R&D spending from independent inquiry toward regime-aligned projects.

In Hungary, the Orbán government’s transformation of public universities into quasi-private “foundations” after 2020—where board members are appointed by the ruling Fidesz party—has drawn strong criticism from the European Commission (2022) and led to suspension of EU research funds under the Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe programs. According to the European Innovation Scoreboard (2024), Hungary remains a “Moderate Innovator,” showing stagnation or decline in scientific co-publications and R&D intensity.

Poland exhibits a similar trajectory: rule-of-law backsliding and politicization of the judiciary under the Law and Justice (PiS) government have weakened legal predictability and university independence. The Freedom House (2023) report documents a marked decline in judicial independence and civil liberties, while the European Innovation Scoreboard categorizes Poland as an “Emerging Innovator,” lagging behind EU averages in R&D expenditure and innovation outputs. 

Collectively, these cases demonstrate that while state-led development under populist or illiberal regimes may yield short-term industrial gains, it ultimately erodes the very institutional foundations—autonomy, rule of law, and international openness—upon which decentralized, pluralistic, and experimental innovation systems depend.

Institutional Resilience and the Direction of Innovation 

As Acemoglu and Johnson (2023) argue, innovation is not inherently progressive or welfare-enhancing. Its social impact depends on who funds it, controls it, and decides where it is applied. Under authoritarian populism, technological advancement often serves repression—surveillance, military tools, propaganda—rather than social welfare. By contrast, democratic and pluralistic systems encourage innovation aligned with public interest. Independent media, civil society, and open debate create a feedback-rich environment that improves allocative efficiency and mitigates risks. 

Importantly, innovation ecosystems are not simply clusters of firms and labs—they are institutional configurations that support curiosity, tolerate failure, and reward experimentation. Where expression is free, laws are predictable, and academia is autonomous, breakthrough innovation thrives. Conversely, populist regimes undermine all three. Furthermore, their nationalist isolationism curtails international collaboration, peer review, and talent mobility—all of which are essential for frontier innovation, especially in an era of global challenges like climate change and pandemics.

Conclusion: Innovation Requires Democracy, Market, and Competition 

The message from the 2025 Nobel Prize is unambiguous: Innovation is not merely an economic outcome—it is a political and institutional achievement. Prosperity does not arise from investment alone, but from the freedom to thought, challenge, and experiment. Where institutions collapse, innovation recedes. Where pluralism flourishes, discovery thrives. 

Authoritarian populism, by closing civic space and concentrating power, not only compromises democratic legitimacy—it dismantles the very foundations of long-term economic growth. As Acemoglu and Johnson warn, without inclusive institutions, innovation becomes a tool of control—not of emancipation. Thus, the future of progress lies not only in laboratories or startups, but also in constitutions, courts, and universities. Any society that seeks prosperity through innovation must first protect these spaces.


References

Acemoglu, D., & Johnson, S. (2023). “Power and progress: Our thousand-year struggle over technology and prosperity.” Public Affairs. https://www.publicaffairsbooks.com/titles/daron-acemoglu/power-and-progress/9781541702093/

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Ágh, A. (2019). Declining democracy in East-Central Europe: The divergence of Poland and Hungary. Edward Elgar Publishing. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788972157

Apaydin, F. (2025). “Repression and growth in the periphery of Europe.” Competition & Change, 29(2), 150–175. https://journals.sagepub.com/home/cch

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Mokyr, J. (2002). The gifts of Athena: Historical origins of the knowledge economy. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691094830/the-gifts-of-athena

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Photo: Dreamstime

Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison

Please cite as:

Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2025). “Capitalist Disruptions and the Democratic Retreat: A US–EU–China Comparison.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000116

 

Abstract

The accelerating erosion of regulatory safeguards, widening wealth inequality, entrenched elite influence, and the proliferation of surveillance regimes mark a new phase in the global crisis of corporate capitalism—one that is narrowing the normative and institutional gap between liberal democracies and authoritarian states. Building on Karl Polanyi’s notion of the double movement and Fernand Braudel’s distinction between market exchange and capitalist domination, this article develops a comparative political economy framework to examine how structural disruptions in capitalism are reshaping global governance and fueling the rise of populist authoritarianism. The analysis contrasts the institutional trajectories of the United States, the European Union, and China, highlighting both convergent and divergent patterns in their responses to this systemic crisis. By integrating insights from political economy, comparative governance, and authoritarian studies, the paper advances a theoretical synthesis that explains the mechanisms of “authoritarian convergence” without reducing them to a deterministic path. It concludes that resisting this drift requires re-embedding markets within democratic institutions and forging a renewed, inclusive global social contract capable of constraining both corporate and state power.

Keywords: Corporate Capitalism, Authoritarian Convergence, Populism, Democratic Backsliding, Karl Polanyi, Double Movement, Fernand Braudel, Global Governance, Inequality, Regulatory Failure, Comparative Political Economy

By Ibrahim Ozturk*

1. Introduction: Capitalism, Crisis, and the Convergence of Systems

With the collapse of central planning and the global decline of communist ideology in the early 1990s—preceded by the wave of neoliberal deregulation in the early 1980s associated with the so-called Washington Consensus—liberal democracies came to be viewed not only as models of modern governance, marked by openness, transparency, and institutional pluralism, but also as systems capable of guiding countries such as China and, later, Russia toward a liberal worldview grounded in free-market economics and democratic governance.

After an initial period of reform—primarily in the economic sphere—beginning in China in the early 1980s and later in Russia in the early 1990s, developments appeared to support the anticipated trajectory of convergence, broadly continuing until the mid-2000s. However, the post-2008 Great Stagnation marked a decisive turning point, dispelling the “liberal fallacies” rooted in overoptimism and ideological faith in inevitable convergence. Not only did several countries once expected to converge begin diverging from liberal democratic norms, but many established democracies with market economies also started adopting features traditionally associated with authoritarian governance. Moreover, regimes long regarded as illiberal—such as China and Russia—demonstrated remarkable adaptability by integrating market mechanisms, digital innovation, and populist rhetoric into their authoritarian rule. Taken together, these developments underscore that liberal and authoritarian regimes are not merely coexisting but, in significant ways, are converging.

That is, as liberal regimes increasingly adopt features characteristic of illiberal governance, illiberal regimes have, in turn, successfully integrated into the market and globalization processes driven by corporate capitalism, while maintaining their authoritarian political systems. This two-way process—referred to in this article as reverse convergence—is rooted in a common underlying factor: the systemic crisis of corporate capitalism.

Economic activity, which ought to be embedded within society and regarded as an integral part of social life (Polanyi, 1944; Braudel, 1982; Block, 2003; Sandel, 2012), has instead come to be perceived as a narrow, detached sphere shaped by the immunization of the corporate capitalism (Greider, 1992 & 2003) through “financial fundamentalism” that Vickrey (1998) warned against. Increasingly, it is viewed as a domain dominated by elites, operating contrary to the broader public interest—or at least perceived as such by large segments of society.

Especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, this perception has fueled a countermovement marked by diverse forms of critique. Despite their ideological differences, these critiques converge on a common theme: the call to restore the will of the “virtuous people” against unaccountable elites (Mudde, 2004; Laclau, 2005; Müller, 2016; Norris & Inglehart, 2019)—a formulation closely aligned with the core definition of populism. In this sense, the global reaction against corporate capitalism has been effectively appropriated and redirected by authoritarian populist forces (Fraser, 2017; Zuboff, 2019; Piketty, 2020; Brown, 2019).

Recent political and economic developments in the United States (US), the European Union (EU), and China—where these transformations are particularly pronounced—reflect dynamics long anticipated by scholars, most notably Karl Polanyi (1944) and Fernand Braudel (1984). Polanyi, through his concept of the “double movement,” explored how societies historically respond to the destabilizing effects of unregulated markets by demanding protective social and political countermeasures. Braudel, in turn, distinguished between market economies and hierarchical capitalism, highlighting how modern economic elites operate within spheres largely insulated from democratic accountability.

More recently, these foundational frameworks have been extended by scholars analyzing the rise of digital capitalism. Zuboff’s (2019) theory of surveillance capitalism, Wark’s (2019) notion of the vectoralist class, and Varoufakis’s (2023) concept of techno-feudalism each offer critical insights into how corporate power, digital infrastructures, and state capture are reshaping the structures of political authority. Building on the approaches of Polanyi and Braudel, this article investigates how structural transformations in global capitalism—particularly under the pressures of digitalization, the expansion of cyberspace, rising wealth and income inequality, and the ensuing populist backlash—have increasingly blurred the boundaries between regime types.

This study uses comparative case analysis to examine the US, EU, and China as key regions where the disruptions caused by corporate capitalism align with the rise of authoritarian populist strategies. Each case offers a unique way of managing, challenging, or exploiting the structural pressures of global capitalism. Through this comparative approach, the paper aims to explain why and how different political systems are increasingly adopting illiberal norms, such as centralized authority, elite entrenchment, and norm erosion, even as they officially support divergent ideologies.

The structure of the paper is outlined as follows. After this introduction, the next section details the theoretical framework behind the concept of reverse convergence. Section 2 examines the contributions of Polanyi, Braudel, and other key scholars, situating their ideas within the context of current global trends. Section 3 presents a comparative empirical analysis of governance patterns in the US, the EU, and China, utilizing policy documents, governance indicators, and regulatory frameworks. The final section presents the normative implications of these findings in a nutshell. The article ends with key policy implications and recommendations.

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Activists stage an anti-corruption demonstration in Solo, Central Java, Indonesia. Photo: Dreamstime.

People versus Elites, Populist Logics in Indonesia’s 2025 Unrest

Indonesia is witnessing its largest wave of protests since Reformasi, sparked by the death of Affan Kurniawan during Jakarta’s labor demonstrations. Demands range from fair wages and job security to dismantling elite privileges and revising the controversial Omnibus Law. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist reason, the article analyzes how heterogeneous grievances converged into a collective identity of “the people” against “the elites,” fueled by widening inequality, institutional distrust, and elite arrogance. It further examines government securitization, social media narratives, and intra-elite rivalries, situating the unrest within Indonesia’s democratic backsliding. Hasnan Bachtiar argues this moment marks a potential turning point — either toward renewed progressive populism or deeper authoritarian entrenchment.

By Hasnan Bachtiar

Affan Kurniawan (21) was still wearing the green jacket from his app-based food-delivery job as he stepped out to earn a living. The family’s breadwinner, he was expected to bring home a small bag of rice for everyone to share when he returned from work. But in the middle of a labor protest in Jakarta, he was struck and crushed by a nearly five-ton police armored vehicle.

On the night of August 28, 2025, he died. But his death unleashed a larger, unstoppable wave of populist anger, like a boil about to burst. The protests that day were not limited to Jakarta, they also broke out in cities such as Surabaya, Bandung, Semarang, Yogyakarta, Medan, Banda Aceh, Batam, Palembang, Lampung, Banjarmasin, Pontianak, Samarinda, Makassar, Gorontalo, Ambon, Ternate, and Jayapura, among others, spreading across all 38 provinces of Indonesia.

The protests demanded an end to outsourcing and poverty wages, a halt to layoffs, a higher minimum wage, a higher non-taxable income threshold, the removal of taxes on holiday bonuses and severance pay, limits on contract employment and on foreign labor, and the repeal of the Omnibus Law in favor of a new labor code.

It turned out this wave of protests was the twelfth in a series, preceded by eleven demonstrations throughout 2025, including one organized under the hashtag #IndonesiaGelap. The following day, and continuing to the present, the protests have carried on with even more serious demands. For the record, several others died after Affan, they are Septinus Sesa (West Papua), Iko Juliant Junior (Semarang), Andika Luthfi Falah (Jakarta), Syaiful Akbar (Makassar), Muhammad Akbar Basri (Makassar), Sarinawati (Makassar), Rusmadiansyah (Makassar), and Reza Sendy Pratama (Yogyakarta).

Populis Logics

What is happening appears to align with Ernesto Laclau’s thinking in his work On Populist Reason (2005). He sees populism as a political logic that constructs a collective identity of “the people” in antagonism to the elite by using broad, flexible, and recognizable symbols and discourses to unite disparate demands.

Initially, a scatter of heterogeneous demands kept surfacing. Because the authorities failed to respond adequately, people came to feel they shared a common enemy. They then experienced a shared fate and burden as “marginalized subjects.” This spread, solidifying public sentiment and spurring the formation of “equivalential chains.” They arrived at a collective claim that “the people demand justice,” to be pursued through a movement of resistance as a hegemonic articulation. From a more ontological perspective of “the people,” as suggested by Yilmaz et al. (2025), if the elite prove incapable of governing the country, they should be replaced or even dismantled. 

On the surface, it began with reports circulating about pay and benefit increases for officials, especially members of parliament. This came at a time when the public was facing severe economic hardship. On one side, the executive branch was rolling out “efficiency” measures that led to layoffs, service cuts, and heavier tax burdens. On the other, the elite were enjoying higher salaries and perks, access to lucrative projects, and economic rents. For comparison, while officials were set to receive 100 million rupiah (USD 6,092) per month, about 3 million rupiah (USD 184) a day, 68 percent of the population was getting by on less than 50,000 rupiah (USD 3). With incomes roughly sixty times higher than most people’s, this was seen as elite indifference toward the public and the imposition of a harsh double standard.

Moreover, some of those officials even danced in the parliament building when they heard about the pay raise. Others, like Uya Kuya (National Mandate Party/PAN), said that three million a day was a small amount compared to his salary. When the public flooded social media with criticism, lawmaker Eko Patrio (PAN) put out a DJ parody, blasting loud music, dancing, then covering his ears with headphones. This came across not only as a sign that they did not care about the criticism, but as an insult. They were dancing on the public’s suffering. When people grew furious and called for parliament (the DPR) to be dissolved, Ahmad Sahroni (National Democratic Party/NasDem) responded by calling them “the dumbest people in the world.”

The combination of economic hardship (crisis), a deficit of trust in the government, and widespread psychological pressure, especially a collective sense of humiliation, led the public to feel a shared grievance and to move together against a common enemy, the corrupt elite. All of this then manifested in collective protest movements filled with popular anger and even accompanied by violence that seemed inevitable.

Hijacking the Reformasi

Rather than engaging with the substance of public anger, the government responded with a hardline narrative with unproven claims of foreign infiltration. This seemed to be the point when the distance between the state and its citizens felt widest. The public demanded accountability, the state answered by criminalizing dissent. These dueling narratives hardened for a basic reason, that the people no longer believed that their representatives, whether in the executive or the legislature, would take their side, while the state treated criticism as a danger to be crushed. To confront the protesters, the government deployed not only the police but also military troops.

The public’s collective anger is clearly directed at the ruling regime. People see signs of recentralization as a replay of what happened for more than three decades under the military general Suharto. There is now symbolic militarization, increasingly entrenched political coalitions, and the concentration of state assets within a narrow circle, especially among those close to President Prabowo. All of this is viewed as the culmination of the post-1998 Reformasi trajectory. Reformasi, which was expected to open civic space, now seems instead to be in the process of being brutally dismantled.

More ironically, the rhetoric of fiscal efficiency is being wielded downward, squarely at ordinary people. Budgets for the regions have been cut, and the social safety net has shrunk, while luxury perks for parliament (the DPR) and defense spending have ballooned. For the record, the national defense budget rose from 139.27 trillion rupiah in 2024 to 247.5 trillion rupiah. At the start of 2025, the value-added tax (PPN) was raised to 12%, which many fears will significantly weaken purchasing power. Other issues seen as worsening the public’s socio-economic situation include the circulation of adulterated “premium” fuelshortages of LPG canisters on the market, the nickel case in Raja Ampatthe transfer of four islands from Aceh to North Sumatrathe freezing of 120 million bank accounts by Indonesia’s Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), and a rule under which idle land and houses would be seized by the state, among others.

So, for the public, “efficiency” has become a pretext for tightening their own belts, not for reining in elite appetites. Because budget “efficiency” is centralized, local governments that would normally receive transfers from the center have been left scrambling, with little choice but to raise local revenues. On August 13, 2025, residents protested in the city of Pati, Central Java, after the Pati regent, Sudewo (from Gerindra Party), raised the Land and Building Tax (PBB, essentially the property tax) by 250%. Other local governments that faced public backlash included Jombang (a 1,202% tax hike), Cirebon (1,000%), Semarang (441%), Bone (300%), and Lhokseumawe (248%).

In this context, the reform agenda appears to have been hijacked. An alliance of politicians, bureaucrats, and big business interests has deepened the private accumulation of public resources through seemingly democratic institutions. Meanwhile, political parties show almost no real ideological differentiation, they appear to speak with one voice in service of an oligarchic logic. At the same time, freedom of speech exists, and social media teems with criticism, but the distribution of economic and political power remains skewed. When the public pressed its case during the #IndonesiaGelap protests on February 17-20, 2025, the Chair of the National Economic Council and Special Presidential Advisor for Investment, Luhut Binsar Pandjaitan, replied: “Darkness lies in you, not Indonesia.”

The People’s Articulation

President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the 7th President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, at the 79th Indonesian National Armed Forces Anniversary in Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 5, 2024. Photo: Donny Hery.

It cannot be doubted that the spread of protests was the result of many triggers converging at once. Tension in the streets created space for a populist mood to take hold, reinforced by narratives circulating on social media, kitchen-table anxieties, and political symbols that ignited collective emotion. The picture was further muddied by orchestrated messaging from anonymous “buzzers” (paid online amplifiers), making it hard for the public to see who was really behind the unrest.

On the ground, the crowd was heterogeneous (workers, students, online ride-hailing driver communities (ojek), and civil society organizations) pursuing overlapping aims that were not always identical, which often slowed coordination. Under that pressure, crowd psychology amplified emotions. Each new casualty triggered broader solidarity while also opening space for infiltration and provocation. At the same time, intra-elite conflicts (especially Prabowo-military vis-à-visJokowi-police) fueled the escalation. Factions within the ruling bloc competed, some ratcheted up tensions, while others capitalized on the moment for political gain.

The crowd’s anger in these protests was aimed at four main targets they saw as sources of injustice. First, the DPR (parliament) was perceived as a symbol of privilege and a legislature that often produces policies that betray the popular will. Then, the security forces (the police) because repeated violence and impunity have eroded the public’s sense of safety. Political parties were viewed as lacking real ideological differences and serving mainly to reinforce an oligarchic logic. The ruling faction (Prabowo) was criticized for pushing recentralization and was feared to be further narrowing the civic space that should belong to citizens.

From the streets, two tiers of demands rang out loud and clear. First came the urgent demands to be met by September 5, 2025, an independent investigation into cases of police violence against protest victims, an end to the involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in civilian affairs, the release of all detained protesters, accountability for security forces, a moratorium on increases to benefits for DPR members (parliament), full budget transparency, ethics sanctions for officials who displayed arrogance, an open public dialogue with the DPR, and comprehensive protections for workers.

Second, there were structural demands to clean up the parliament (DPR) of corruptions, to reform political parties and the system of executive oversight, to build a fairer tax system, to strengthen the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) through an asset-forfeiture law, to make the police professional, to ensure the military returns to the barracks without exception, to bolster the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) and other independent bodies, and to review economic and labor policies so they favor the public.

The demonstrations are not just seasonal “riots.” They are a serious sign that the state’s legitimacy is eroding. Indonesia learned in 1998 that when an economic crisis collides with a political crisis and injustice, the result is a multidimensional crisis. Those symptoms are back now, only with a new face, the public is more informed, more digitally connected, and more willing to test the state’s narrative against everyday experience. 

Democracy rarely collapses overnight. It usually erodes slowly under the pretext of maintaining order. That is why this moment can be understood as an inflection point, will Indonesia slip back into a new form of authoritarianism hiding behind procedural democracy, or use it as a chance to repair a fractured social contract?

This is where progressive populism becomes relevant. The popular movement, now articulated through anger and concrete demands, opens the door to building a new political bloc committed to economic and social justice, transparency, and accountability. Rather than merely mobilizing emotion, progressive populism can serve as a platform to knit scattered demands into a coherent, measurable collective agenda.

Affan’s death has come to symbolize how a single life from the poor can speak louder than a thousand official speeches. If the establishment chooses to turn a deaf ear, whatever legitimacy remains will only grow more fragile. But if it dares to listen and channel the people’s energy toward a fairer transformation, this tragedy could mark the beginning of renewal.

Protests in Turkey.

The Erdogan Regime and Its Future Amid Mass Protests: Prospects for Change?

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political journey reflects a dramatic transformation—from a reform-minded leader once hailed as a model for Muslim democracies to an autocrat presiding over a deeply polarized and economically fragile Turkey. His consolidation of power, particularly after the 2016 coup attempt, has ushered in a regime marked by institutional erosion, economic mismanagement, and authoritarian repression. Recent mass protests sparked by the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu highlight growing public resistance, yet the broader trajectory remains one of democratic backsliding. Erdogan has found space to entrench his rule in an increasingly multipolar world, with Western pressure diluted by competing geopolitical priorities. The critical question now is whether domestic mobilization can meaningfully challenge this entrenched authoritarianism.

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

Populist rhetoric, which denounces the deficiencies of the established order while claiming to embody the will of “the people,” is inherently problematic. Populist leaders typically emerge from within a system of rules, institutions, values, and routines—even if that system is imperfect. Once in power, they frequently seek to undermine the structures that enabled their ascent, engaging in arbitrary and opportunistic governance. Confronted with the inevitable challenges of effective administration, their policies often fail to fulfill their promises and increasingly veer towards autocracy. 

The central irony of populism lies in its capacity to mobilize marginalized or resentful constituencies by implying that the prosperity and freedom typically associated with rule-based institutional governance can instead be achieved through contingent modes of rule—marked by unpredictability, uncertainty, and the personalized authority of charismatic leadership.

Even more concerning is the global diffusion of these populist ‘illusions.’ They have gained traction not only in advanced, affluent societies such as the United States and across Europe—despite the historical entrenchment of robust welfare state institutions—but also in major developing countries of the Global South, including Brazil, Hungary, India, Russia, and Turkey, where similar narratives have found fertile ground.

In the case of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan has at times been cited by social scientists as an exemplar of ‘positive’ or ‘progressive’ populism, particularly in light of the early wave of comprehensive reforms undertaken during his initial years in power. However, his governance trajectory over the subsequent decade has increasingly veered toward a regressive and authoritarian model. Notably, following the 2011 general elections—which secured him a third consecutive term—his reliance on contingent and arbitrary modes of decision-making, marked by repetitive ‘trial and error’ and ‘learning by doing’ strategies, contributed to systemic rent-seeking and widespread corruption. These dynamics, in turn, played a significant role in precipitating a deepening economic crisis.

Multiple independent sources suggest that, following the revelation of widespread government corruption during police investigations between December 17 and 25, 2013, the Turkish state apparatus under President Erdogan orchestrated or capitalized on the failed coup attempt of July 15, 2016. In its aftermath, and under the guise of heightened security imperatives, Erdogan moved to dismantle the constitutional system of checks and balances, culminating in the 2018 transition to a de facto one-man rule. Much like the instrumentalization of the Reichstag fire in Weimar Germany, this episode marked a turning point that ushered in a prolonged era of political instability and economic decline.

From Democratic Leadership to Absolute Authoritarianism: The Political Trajectory of Erdogan

Lord Acton famously observed that ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely,’ underscoring the inherent risks of unchecked authority in enabling corruption and authoritarianism. This insight resonates strongly with the trajectory of the Erdogan regime, which, after eroding its electoral viability through manipulative tactics and the strategic distribution of financial incentives disguised as ‘election bonuses,’ has increasingly moved to suppress direct opposition and compromise the integrity of the electoral process—ultimately at the expense of the public.

Beyond the prolonged pretrial detention of civil society figure Osman Kavala, attorney Selcuk Kozagacli, and parliamentarian Serafettin Can Atalay, the Erdogan regime has systematically targeted political adversaries across the ideological spectrum—from left-Kurdish leader Selahattin Demirtas to right-nationalist party leader Professor Umit Ozdag—often in the absence of substantive judicial proceedings. The latest escalation—the pretrial detention of Ekrem Imamoglu, Mayor of Istanbul, one of the world’s largest metropolitan centers—has significantly exceeded the limits of societal tolerance, triggering a sharp upsurge in public outrage. Imamoglu’s arrest on March 19, 2025, has provoked widespread condemnation: citizens have flooded the streets of Turkey’s major cities, university students have launched campus protests, and demands for ‘rights, law, and justice’ resonate across all social media platforms.

Let us begin with a set of critical questions: How did the Justice and Development Party (AKP), after a decade of seemingly successful governance between 2003 and 2013, descend into authoritarianism and preside over profound economic and political deterioration? How can we account for the stark contrast between President Erdogan’s two political trajectories—first, as a leader widely hailed as a model for the Islamic world, steering a ‘Muslim yet secular, democratic, modern, and European-oriented’ nation with a liberalizing market economy; and later, as the chief architect of accelerated Putinization, complete authoritarianism, and systemic economic decline?

More critically, the question now is: Where is Erdogan’s trajectory headed, particularly in light of the legitimacy afforded by the global rise of authoritarian right-wing populism—most notably in the United States and increasingly within the European Union—amid escalating challenges related to security and migration? In this context, Erdogan occupies a strategically pivotal position. What values, normative frameworks, and strategic latitude does the emerging multipolar world order afford him? Is Turkey gradually evolving into a new ‘Iron Curtain’ state within a reconfigured Cold War landscape—defined by transactional, interest-based relations with its traditional US and EU allies? As some have suggested, was the centennial of the Turkish Republic, founded by Ataturk in 1923, merely a symbolic intermission—now giving way to a neo-Sultanist order governed by a singular authority, one unrestrained by modern institutional checks or even the fixed doctrinal constraints of Sharia, thus allowing for unprecedented levels of conditionality, contingency, and arbitrariness?

In a comprehensive analysis I authored for Project Syndicate and Al Jazeera following Erdogan’s third general election victory in 2011, I acknowledged his government’s relative ‘economic miracle’ but concluded with a note of cautious skepticism: ‘The big question is how Erdogan will use this increasing power in the coming period.’ In the years since, Erdogan’s governance has offered considerable clarity regarding his long-term ambitions—developments that can be analytically divided into three distinct subperiods.

Episode One (2003–2013): The More Orthodox, the Greater the Success

The two successive analyses referenced above emphasized that during the AKP’s first decade in power (2003–2013), the implementation of comprehensive reforms aligned with the European Union accession agenda—coupled with the oversight of the IMF and World Bank—catalyzed substantial economic growth, largely driven by a notable rise in productivity for the first time in decades. In addition to favorable global liquidity conditions, Erdogan’s strong electoral legitimacy and effective leadership further reinforced this period of economic and political consolidation.

Despite rapid growth, the surge in productivity and currency appreciation—both closely tied to capital inflows—underpinned Turkey’s macroeconomic transformation. Decades of chronic inflation, which had hovered in triple digits in the early 2000s, declined to single digits by 2005, while income distribution improved markedly. Supported by wide-ranging structural reforms and sustained macroeconomic stability, the European Union officially recognized Turkey as a ‘functioning market economy’ in 2006. During this period, Turkey’s performance outpaced that of many peers in emerging markets. Declining risk premiums and an increasingly favorable investment climate ushered in a wave of foreign capital across nearly all categories—from long-term credit to record foreign direct investment (FDI) levels. This capital surge was driven by privatization initiatives, mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and substantial greenfield investments.

Source: World Bank data set.

However, this growth model soon revealed its structural limitations. Turkey failed to consolidate its early gains due to emerging signs of reform fatigue, policy reversals, and a gradual shift away from the European Union accession framework after 2007. Additionally, the model became increasingly reliant on short-term foreign capital inflows and debt-fueled expansion, while economic growth was driven largely by currency-induced consumption booms and a surge in construction and service sectors—rather than high-value-added manufacturing. This pattern of deindustrialization rendered the economy particularly vulnerable to external shocks, as evidenced during the global financial crises of 2008 and 2009. As a result, Erdogan entered his second term amid growing policy uncertainty and strategic drift.

Episode Two: Experimenting with a Sui Generis Model

During Erdogan’s second term (2013–2018), a series of significant policy shifts deepened his alignment with loyalist business elites, notably through the preferential allocation of state contracts and the consolidation of crony capitalist networks. The corruption investigations of December 17–25, 2013, exposed the extent of this system, triggering an intensification of political crackdowns and a decisive turn toward authoritarianism. Systematic attacks on institutional autonomy—particularly targeting the judiciary and the Central Bank—undermined the rule of law and eroded policy credibility. Economic growth slowed to a range of 3–5%, while political unrest, exemplified by the mass Gezi Park protests and the controversial 2016 coup attempt (widely seen as orchestrated or exploited by Erdogan), exacerbated instability. Market volatility intensified, compounded by rising US interest rates and Erdogan’s growing interference in monetary and fiscal policy, which together eroded investor confidence, prompted capital flight, and accelerated the depreciation of the Turkish lira (₺). Despite ongoing flagship infrastructure projects—such as the Istanbul Airport and Kanal Istanbul—that remained central to Erdogan’s economic narrative, Turkey shifted from a trajectory of reform-led growth to one of deepening economic and institutional uncertainty, primarily driven by the consolidation of authoritarian governance. This pivotal second period was catalyzed by the revelations of the 2013 corruption investigations.

Despite experiencing his first electoral setback on June 7, 2015, President Erdogan not only obstructed the formation of a coalition government but also exploited a climate of fear—amplified by a series of leveraged terrorist attacks—to regain electoral support under the guise of restoring ‘stability,’ ultimately securing victory in the snap elections of November 2015. This trajectory culminated in the aftermath of the controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, which Erdogan leveraged to consolidate his authority further. The event served as a pivotal pretext for the contested and coercively implemented regime transformation of 2018, marking the onset of his third term under a newly centralized executive presidential system.

Source: Author’s compilation from national and international datasets.

 

Episode Three (2018–Present): Crossing the Rubicon with Heterodoxy

Following the comprehensive dismantling of institutional checks and balances through the formal institutionalization of the presidential system in 2018, President Erdogan departed from conventional economic orthodoxy in favor of what he termed a “homemade indigenous model with a nationalistic outlook,”—a framework rooted in heterodox and highly politicized economic policies. The most prominent indicators of this period in the economic sphere included the politicized capture of key institutions such as the state statistical agencies and the Central Bank, accompanied by sustained political pressure that severely undermined their autonomy. Economic policymaking became increasingly unmoored from rational, evidence-based frameworks and was instead dictated by short-term political imperatives. From 2021 onward, this phase was marked by aggressive currency manipulation, credit rationing, the provision of subsidies through public banks, and a range of direct and indirect rent-transfer mechanisms benefiting political insiders aligned with the ruling elite.

The consequences were severe: hyperinflation, wage erosion, currency collapse, and escalating economic instability. The Turkish lira lost over 90% of its value between 2018 and March 2025. Inflation, which stood at 20% in 2021, soared to 85% in 2022, moderated to 43.5% in 2024, and remained high at 39.5% by March 2025. While these dynamics disproportionately burdened the poor and middle classes, they enriched Erdogan’s political allies through preferential access to state contracts and financial mechanisms, exacerbating wealth inequality. Despite this deterioration, the economy experienced short-term growth, driven by elevated public spending and an export boost facilitated by a severely devalued currency. This third era represents the most acute economic crisis under Erdogan’s leadership—one largely self-inflicted through policy mismanagement and institutional degradation.

In summary, Erdogan’s political trajectory can be delineated into three distinct phases. During his first era (2003–2013), he emerged as a pro-business reformer who modernized Turkey, attracted substantial foreign investment, and lifted millions out of poverty. The middle period (2013–2018) was marked by mounting political instability, decelerating economic growth, and an increasing consolidation of authoritarian control. The most recent phase (2018–present) has been defined by self-inflicted economic turmoil, characterized by hyperinflation, financial mismanagement, and institutional erosion. Over time, Erdogan has shifted from being hailed as an economic success story to assuming the role of a crisis manager. At the core of this transformation lies his unwavering determination to retain power and reengineer the political regime through an experimental economic and governance ‘model’—one that he neither fully comprehends nor implements coherently, operating instead through a framework of disorder, contingency, and arbitrariness.

Governance Tragedy

Erdogan’s somewhat surprising—yet, in retrospect, foreseeable—abandonment of his previously successful economic and political development model following the 2011 elections precipitated a profound governance crisis. Echoing, in form if not in content, Mao’s Cultural Revolution in China, Erdogan embarked on a series of self-declared, large-scale experiments characterized by opaque logic, undefined mechanisms, and uncertain causal relationships. Adopting a ‘learning by doing’ approach, he entrusted critical policymaking to inexperienced party loyalists and ideologically driven militants. Whereas the initial phase of governance was marked by competent technocrats and the strengthening of institutional capacity, the subsequent phase, particularly after 2018, was defined by institutional degradation, as unqualified yet ambitious individuals assumed control over key state structures. This transformation has far-reaching implications for the stability and functionality of the Turkish state apparatus.

The government’s patronage practices have extended well beyond large corporations aligned with the ruling party, encompassing individuals deemed politically loyal through strategic appointments to secure and well-compensated public sector positions. The transformation in the scale and composition of Turkey’s civil service is well documented. As of 2024, the number of public employees stands at approximately 5.3 million—more than double the 2 million recorded in 2002. Between 2002 and 2024, an estimated 3.3 million individuals were recruited into the civil service. Notably, of the 2 million civil servants employed in 2002, roughly 1 million have since retired, bringing the cumulative number of civil servants hired during the AKP era to approximately 4.3 million. This dramatic expansion reflects a broader trend of public sector growth under Erdogan’s leadership, characterized by the politicization of state institutions and the instrumental use of public employment as a means of consolidating political loyalty.

As of January 1, 2025, the national monthly minimum wage in Turkey has been set at a net TRY 22,104.67, while the base salary for civil servants has reached approximately TRY 43,726—nearly double the minimum wage. This stark disparity underscores the material privileges afforded to public-sector employees, a cohort that has increasingly been leveraged as a tool of political patronage. In contrast, individuals outside the ruling party’s patronage networks face systemic barriers to accessing public employment and are disproportionately relegated to the lower-wage private sector, where monthly earnings generally fall within the same range as the minimum wage and civil service floor (TRY 22,104.67 to TRY 43,726).

The consequences of Turkey’s governance crisis are clearly reflected across all major governance indicators. According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, which evaluates six key governance dimensions for over 200 economies between 1996 and 2023, Turkey has experienced a marked and persistent decline in performance. Each WGI dimension is measured on a scale ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak governance) to 2.5 (strong governance). Table 3 summarizes Turkey’s scores across selected years, illustrating the country’s overall trajectory of governance erosion. For example, the ‘Control of Corruption’ indicator improved in the early 2000s, rising from -0.45 in 2002 to 0.08 in 2005, reflecting early reform efforts. However, by 2023, this score had deteriorated to -0.50, signaling a reversal of progress and deepening institutional fragility. Similar negative trends are observable across the other five dimensions, underscoring the systemic nature of Turkey’s governance decline.

This sustained decline in governance indicators reflects a broader erosion of Turkey’s rule of law and civil liberties. The Rule of Law Index, published by the World Justice Project, assesses countries based on factors such as constraints on government power, absence of corruption, and protection of fundamental rights. In 2024, Turkey ranked 117th out of 142 countries, significantly deviating from rule-of-law standards. Similarly, the Freedom in the World Index by Freedom House—which evaluates political rights and civil liberties globally—assigned Turkey a score of 33 out of 100, classifying it as ‘Not Free.’ Further underscoring this deterioration, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which ranks countries on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean), shows Turkey’s score declining from 50 in 2013 to 34 in 2024. This sharp drop reflects a growing perception of entrenched public sector corruption and declining institutional integrity.

While definitive assessments are best left to subject-matter experts, President Erdogan’s underlying motives for Turkey’s authoritarian turn can be broadly summarized as follows:

📌 The 2008 Constitutional Court case that sought to dissolve the Justice and Development Party (AKP)—posing a direct threat to Erdogan’s political survival—catalyzed a sustained effort to assert control over the judiciary.
📌 Perceptions of European Union double standards, particularly regarding issues such as the Cyprus dispute, the stalled modernization of the EU–Turkey Customs Union, and persistent delays in the EU accession process, contributed to Turkey’s gradual disengagement from reform commitments. The government also strategically instrumentalized these grievances to avoid implementing critical reforms tied to transparency, inclusivity, and fair competition in public procurement, especially in infrastructure investment tenders.
📌 The collapse of the Kurdish peace initiative resulted in a resurgence of violence, further destabilizing domestic politics and hardening Erdogan’s security-focused posture.
📌 The fallout with the Gulen movement, once a close ally of the regime, culminated in a sweeping purge of state institutions following the 2016 coup attempt, consolidating Erdogan’s unchecked authority.
📌 Facing a shortage of qualified technocrats, Erdogan increasingly staffed key institutions with ideologically driven loyalists, while shifting economic focus toward sectors amenable to centralized control—such as construction, tourism, and rent-seeking industries.
📌 Ideologically influenced by the National View (Milli Görüş) movement, Erdogan has pursued the replacement of Turkey’s Kemalist-secular state tradition with a sui generis, neo-Ottoman model of governance marked by centralized power, religious symbolism, and historical revisionism.
 

Conclusion

Turkey’s recent development trajectory reveals a recurring pattern: periods of economic and political advancement have tended to coincide with phases of openness and integration with the West, while inward-looking, ‘local and national’ strategies have frequently corresponded with stagnation or regression. Given its geostrategic location, Turkey’s engagement with Western institutions and normative frameworks has not been merely opportunistic, but structurally imperative for sustaining reform and modernization. However, shifting global power dynamics have expanded Turkey’s strategic autonomy, simultaneously weakening the external normative pressures that once served as a moderating force on its domestic governance and policy orientation.

Available evidence strongly suggests that President Erdogan has decisively abandoned democratic norms, transparent governance, and the rule of law. The current international environment—marked by growing multipolarity, the global resurgence of populist movements such as Trumpism, and Europe’s acute focus on security and migration—has provided Erdogan with the strategic latitude to expand executive authority with minimal external resistance. Although recent episodes of public dissent may pose temporary tactical constraints, they are unlikely to alter the broader trajectory of authoritarian consolidation that appears poised to define Turkey’s political future.

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

Dr. Boucher: Trump Is Not the Cause, but a Symptom

In this incisive ECPS interview, Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher, Associate Professor at the University of Calgary, explores how populism is reshaping US foreign policy—from tariffs as symbolic resistance to institutional erosion under Trump 2.0. Arguing that “Trump is not the cause but a symptom,” Dr. Boucher warns that even without Trump, populist forces will endure, backed by media ecosystems, think tanks, and loyalist networks. He emphasizes that “this is not really an economic argument. It’s a political and populist argument,” driving a shift from multilateralism to nationalist retrenchment. A must-read for anyone interested in the ideological drivers behind today’s turbulent geopolitics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this timely and penetrating interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher—Associate Professor at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science—offers a comprehensive assessment of how populist ideology is transforming American foreign policy, institutional norms, and multilateral engagement. Central to Dr. Boucher’s argument is a provocative but sobering claim: “Trump is not the cause but a symptom.” Even if Donald Trump were no longer on the political stage, Dr. Boucher insists, “this movement would remain part of the political conversation,” underscoring the durability and depth of populist forces within American society and institutions.

Dr. Boucher advances the ideational approach to populism, which links belief systems to behavioral patterns. Rather than viewing populist discourse as purely performative or strategic, he argues that “these people really believe in these values and these hierarchies of beliefs, and they’ll start to act upon it.” This perspective, he contends, helps explain the internal coherence of Trump’s policies across domains, including trade, immigration, and foreign relations.

One of the interview’s central themes is the symbolic repurposing of trade tools like tariffs. For Trump and his supporters, tariffs are no longer just economic instruments; they are reimagined as expressions of national sovereignty and resistance against a “globalist elite.” As Dr. Boucher puts it, “this is not really an economic argument. It’s a political and populist argument.” This reframing speaks to broader populist tendencies that elevate identity, emotion, and anti-elite resentment over technocratic expertise and institutional procedure.

Throughout the conversation, Dr. Boucher traces how institutional degradation—accelerated under what he calls “Trump 2.0”—is being enabled by a growing ecosystem of populist actors, from think tanks like those behind Project 2025 to social media influencers and tech elites. He warns that foreign policy institutions like the State Department and Department of Defense are being hollowed out, potentially making way for a more centralized, nativist, and unilateralist foreign policy doctrine.

Ultimately, Dr. Boucher’s analysis is a call to recognize the structural, not merely electoral, nature of the populist threat. “There’s significant support for it,” he reminds us. Understanding this dynamic is essential for those hoping to defend democratic institutions and multilateralism in an era of resurgent populism.

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher—Associate Professor at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy and Department of Political Science.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher.

They Don’t Just Talk Like Populists—They Behave Like Populists

Professor Boucher, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How does the ideational approach to populism help us understand the continuity between Trump’s first and second administrations in shaping foreign policy through anti-elitist and pro-people rhetoric?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: That’s a great question, as it delves into a central debate in populism studies: the distinction between the discursive and ideational approaches. What I appreciate about the ideational approach is its emphasis on the connection between beliefs, values, and behaviors. This perspective posits that populist leaders and their supporters don’t merely articulate anti-elitist and pro-people sentiments—they genuinely hold these beliefs and act accordingly. Thus, when viewed through the ideational lens, populism is seen not just as rhetoric but as a guiding ideology that influences actions across various domains. This framework helps explain the consistency in populist behavior, as individuals internalize these values and implement them in practice.​

And this is why I really like the ideational approach to foreign policy—because the argument is that Trump not only holds a thin-centered populist ideology, but also implemented policies aimed at realizing these ideas, targeting elites and advancing pro-people narratives. This approach influenced not only domestic politics but extended into foreign policy as well. When using a discursive approach, it’s harder to explain why a populist would shift across different policy sectors. But if they have an ideology, the assumption is that this belief system extends across various domains—economics, immigration, and, in this case, foreign policy. So, I really believe the ideational approach helps us better understand the consistency in the Trump Administration’s policies.

In foreign policy, for example, the first Trump administration made several decisions closely tied to populist views. There was a strong emphasis on tariffs, as well as on immigration—remember the travel ban and the push for anti-Muslim policies. These moves clearly reflected a blend of populism and ethnonationalism at the core of the administration’s agenda. And we’re seeing similar patterns emerging again in Trump 2.0. I think that’s important to understand.

You’ve written about populism’s impact on foreign policy coherence. In the current environment, can foreign policy institutions remain resilient under populist leadership, or do they inevitably erode?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: When you sent me that question, I really thought about it, and I’m still kind of debating it in my head. I think there’s a lot of interesting research about  populism on how populist leaders go after institutions and try to change or disaggregate them so that a lot of the power centers shift back toward the populist leaders and away from these institutions. In foreign policy, we’re seeing the same thing, especially in Trump 2.0.

In the first Trump administration, foreign policy institutions—the State Department, the Department of Defense, even the Department of Homeland Security—were more or less able to maintain their integrity. A lot of the so-called “adults in the room” at the time came from the national security and foreign policy environment.

But when we look at Project 2025, a lot of the post-Trump reflections suggest that one of the administration’s misgivings about the first term was that these institutions resisted Trump’s agenda. In Trump 2.0, a major focus is on restructuring these institutions—the State Department, the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, even the NSA. There’s a strong push against the elites and a shift toward loyalists.

At the international level, Trump is doing the same thing: pulling the US out of the WHO, expressing skepticism about the G20 and G7, and generally trying to undermine international institutions that might constrain his foreign policy decisions.

What I find interesting is that Trump uses the same kind of discourse to justify what he’s doing domestically and internationally. He talks about elites controlling institutions, about those institutions not representing the will of the people, and about the need to undo them so that the people’s voice is heard. And you see the same thing at the international level, where he argues that globalists and internationalists are controlling those institutions. That’s why, he claims, the United States has to put Americans—the American people—first and, in doing so, take back control from those institutions that influence foreign policy.

Extending the Manichean Divide: From Domestic Elites to Global Conspiracies

How has the Trump administration weaponized populist narratives that portray global trade regimes as elite conspiracies to justify protectionism?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: This is a question I’m asking myself all the time. I think it really— from an ideational perspective—it’s not just about weaponization. My question always, in my head, is whether populists really believe what they say, or is it just kind of a way to frame their issues? And if you take an ideational approach, you’ll say these populists actually believe that that’s true.

Trump has been very consistent across his career in thinking that tariffs are a good way and a good policy, and much of the argument was that outside actors and the elites were essentially taking over American policies and abusing the American people unfairly. It’s about transposing this kind of anti-elite argument from the domestic environment onto the international level, and saying: “All of these countries in the world and all of these globalists are creating this network that’s abusive to the United States,” and that somehow they have removed the capacity of Americans to make their own policies and decide for themselves—that the American people have lost agency.

Trump really used this kind of language to articulate a protectionist policy that frames outside actors as abusive and corrupt institutions, countries, and people—and that he, as the populist leader, is fighting back and reclaiming these powers for the American people.

So the way I see it, you essentially extend the Manichean view of populism to the international level, where “the people” becomes the American people and “the elites” are reimagined as foreign actors or global institutions seen as corrupt and exploitative. It’s the same framework of a divided world: the corrupt versus the pure people, who are portrayed as disenfranchised and disempowered by those elites.

Your chapter in a recently published book highlights the role of nativist securitization in justifying the travel ban. In today’s context, how might similar nativist framing be deployed in foreign policy debates such as immigration from conflict zones or relations with ‘globalist’ institutions?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: The paper was written a long time ago, and it’s ironic that it took so long to get published—only for the same kinds of nativist and anti-immigration policies to reemerge. It’s depressing to realize that, in a grim way, we were right. The argument in that paper was that, on immigration issues, ethno-nationalism and populism were structured similarly, creating a framework of outside and inside actors—an idea central to ethno-nationalist thinking.

I thought at the time that it was an interesting way to frame those issues in the populist context. Others have worked extensively on populism, far-right populism, and ethno-nationalism. In this context, what we saw was that Trump’s framing of immigration issues was really centered around the narrative of elites versus the people—with “the people” portrayed as a kind of ethno-nationalist, pure group—and this created an outside/inside actor dynamic. That framing was central to the policy and shaped much of how these issues were understood. That’s how we approached the argument.

Trump Is the Symptom of a Deeper Foreign Policy Shift

A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.

In the light of the increasing overlap between populism and foreign policy, do you foresee a lasting structural transformation of US foreign policy priorities—away from multilateralism and toward identity-driven narratives of national sovereignty and civilizational conflict?

Jean-Christophe Boucher:  I do. I think so. I’m a Canadian, and of course, we’re very close to the Americans. We’ve been witnessing a lot of what’s happening—and as you know, we’re bearing the brunt of much of the United States’ abuse at this time: being called the 51st state and facing challenges to our sovereignty.

What we see from our perspective—and I think this applies to the populist perspective as well—is twofold. On the one hand, we sometimes mistake the leader for the movement. We tend to think that Trump, the populist leader, is the architect of everything. That’s a mistake. What we’re seeing among the American people right now is a real appetite for populist discourse at the grassroots level—at the demand level—and Trump is merely an embodiment of that pressure. Many individuals within American institutions and among the elite also hold populist ideas. Even if Trump were to disappear from the scene, the movement would remain part of the political conversation, and I don’t think it would fundamentally change what’s happening in the US. Trump is not the cause but a symptom. There’s a broader movement that supports the way he behaves, which helps explain why the pushback against his undermining of institutions hasn’t been as strong as one might expect—because there’s significant support for it.

The second part is that systematically, the Trump administration is going after the foreign policy establishments and institutions in the US—State Department, DoD, DHS. At all levels, there’s been a deep dive into these institutions and an uprooting of many programs and checks and balances that had been in place. It’s not just USAID. If you look at what the Department of Defense is doing on DEI and other issues, there’s a deep restructuring underway. So even if Trump moves away in 2028, those institutions will look very different from when he came in. It will take time to rebuild them—if that even happens.

Not only is there an appetite for what Trump represents, but the institutions that once safeguarded against that appetite may no longer exist. We’ll be left with institutions that make it easier for a populist leader to pursue a foreign policy that is more self-centered, more nativist, and more protectionist. And I think that’s the future we’re likely to see in the coming years.

Social Media Lets Populist Leaders Sidestep Institutions and Speak Unfiltered

Given your findings on the use of social media to propagate populist foreign policy, how do you assess the evolution of this communication strategy in Trump’s second term, especially with shifting media platforms and increasing polarization?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: I think it’s part of the argument. There’s a lot of good research on why populist leaders prefer social media or alternative media as a way to communicate with the people. There are a lot of arguments. One is that mainstream media are portrayed as those of the elites, and somehow populist leaders have a deep-seated obsession about that. But social media also allows the populist leader to have a direct connection with the people and talk to them specifically.

If you look at what the Trump administration is doing, there’s a lot of that. In Trump 1.0, there were all these attacks on mainstream media, on fake news, and all of those were constant. We see it in our data on tariffs, but even on nativism—a lot of the anti-elite discourse coming directly from Trump and from the people is directed against those media institutions that seem to represent the elites.

What I find interesting right now in Trump 2.0 is that Trump is actually going after those institutions directly. You’ve seen, for example, how they’re suing CBS and other institutions, cutting ties with NPR, and really going after a lot of the power centers of mainstream media.

You also see how he’s allowing a lot of alternative media to attend press conferences, giving those outlets a larger impact.

Finally, we see that the Trump administration—like Trump 1.0—really communicates many of its ideas and arguments on social media. On tariffs, for example, policy officials actually learn about new directions in tariff policy through Trump’s posts on Truth Social or X. Social media becomes a really strong way for him to do this.

It also allows the populist leader to sidestep all the checks and balances of institutions—but also internally—where what he can say and how he addresses himself is unrestrained by those actors. And that really makes it an important part of that conversation.

Trump Is No Longer Alone—Populism Now Operates as an Institutionalized Ecosystem

Photo: Dreamstime.

You demonstrate that populist narratives were reinforced by networks of actors beyond political elites, including media and think tanks. How do you see these networks evolving under renewed populist leadership, and what new actors have emerged in this space since 2017?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: This is one of the things we wanted to highlight. The more I reflect on how we wrote about those issues at the time, the more I realize that our central argument was this: much of the literature focuses on populist leaders but overlooks the broader network that supports them. In fact, if you’re trying to understand a populist movement, you have to consider all the actors who enable and sustain the leader. It’s very difficult for a populist leader to operate in isolation—there’s always a constellation of other actors involved.

When we looked at social media networks and influencers, we found that while the populist leader was the most influential figure, there were many other groups—advocacy groups, think tanks—that supported the environment around him.

Today, you see exactly the same thing. Some of those actors are now part of the Trump administration. For example, Project 2025, which was at the center of a think-tank effort to produce populist ideas on transforming government in a potential Trump 2.0 administration, is now embedded in the administration. Figures like Elon Musk and the tech bros, who pushed populist ideas on social media, were essential to Trump’s reelection and are now part of the governing sphere, helping implement the president’s agenda.

People like Jack Posobiec and other far-right network figures who were once just part of the ecosystem around Trump and the MAGA movement are now in or close to government. So, when we think about the Trump administration, we should stop thinking of Trump as the sole actor—there’s an entire ecosystem that was nascent in Trump 1.0 but is now fully institutionalized in Trump 2.0.

What I saw in 2016–17 was a loose, informal network. Over the last four years, that network has crystallized into a proper movement—with influencers, money, institutions, and architecture that now serve as the base of the MAGA movement. It’s a lot more formalized.

That’s why the Trump administration is now able to move faster on its agenda and more effectively push its populist ideas into the system—because of the support from all these actors. He wouldn’t be able to do what he’s doing without Elon Musk and others backing him. He wouldn’t be able to move without Mike Johnson controlling Congress. Many of those actors who were loosely connected in 2016–2020 are now firmly part of his circle, accelerating and deepening the reach of his agenda into institutions.

How have Trump’s populist politics redefined the symbolic value of tariffs—not merely as economic tools, but as performative instruments of sovereignty and resistance against the ‘globalist elite’?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: This is where the populist argument comes in—where you mix the economics of it with the politics and belief system behind it. In the US right now, in the conversation around tariffs, there are really two conversations happening at the same time. You have the economic conversation, where a lot of economists are trying to explain why tariffs are a good thing for the US and trying to justify them. I’m less interested in that, because it seems like all the data goes against that argument. The idea that tariffs are economically beneficial is a marginal one.

What I find more interesting and more conducive to explaining what’s happening is this belief system. Trump genuinely believes that tariffs will undo the power of the elites and recreate a structure of economics that refocuses on the good of the American people. And somehow, that’s how it should be. The interesting part is, you can hear it when he talks—he recognizes that this will have deep economic impacts. He says, “This will be difficult. This will produce pain. But this is a good thing for the American people.” We’re going to bring back real jobs for real Americans—for workers—and that matters more.

Despite the economic pain, this is not really an economic argument. It’s a political and populist argument that explains why he supports tariffs. And when you listen to his political rationale, it makes a lot more sense than if you approach it purely from an economic perspective. I also think that’s why trying to argue with the Trump movement on economic terms doesn’t work—because in their view, it’s not an economic argument at all. It’s a political belief system they’re trying to put in place. They really don’t care if some economic pain is produced in that process. What they’re seeking is to re-center economic power around the American people, and not around what they see as the elites and people in the cities who benefit from a global international system.

Tariffs Are Populist Symbols of Sovereignty and Struggle

3D illustration: Lightspring.

You argue that foreign policy is increasingly shaped by emotional and identity-based appeals. To what extent do you see populist trade wars as cultural projects, not just economic or strategic ones? Are we now seeing what you anticipated: the normalization of tariffs as political theatre, rather than as policy tools grounded in economic rationale?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: Remember that we wrote this paper in 2017–2018—it was a long time ago. What really concerns me is that I was hoping we would be wrong, or that it would turn out to be just a passing moment. But today, it’s becoming more and more about exactly that—and it’s not just within the Trump administration. We’re seeing increasing arguments that trade and protectionism are being framed as formal expressions of the will of the people. I think that’s the important part.

One of the arguments we see in the populist movement is that global trade networks really removed the center of power from the people to these elites—the bankers, the traders—who were able to control global markets, while the people were left behind. And, of course, they characterize these people—these Davos and World Economic Forum elites—as corrupt actors controlling the international economic system.

What I find interesting—and this is why I think it’s an ideology more than just a discourse—is that most populist leaders, from the left and the right, have the same rhetoric. From Marine Le Pen in France to Nigel Farage in the UK to Orban in Hungary, you’re seeing the same kind of argument: that we have to take power away from the globalists, create protectionist policies to protect the people, and disengage from these global economic networks.

I believe that right now we are in that phase. We’re seeing a retrenchment from global politics and a refocusing on national manufacturing and supply-side arguments. Trade will become more sticky, and there will be more friction in international trade than we were used to.

What I find interesting—last point—is that even without Trump, when we listen to the Biden administration, there’s a lot of talk about supply chain management, supply chain security, and bringing back manufacturing jobs and national economic capacities. So even without Trump, you still have this kind of retrenchment from loose international trade and a renewed focus on domestic politics and domestic economics.

Tariffs Aren’t Just Economic Tools—They’re Instruments to Recenter Power on ‘the People

Drawing on your “I, Tariff Man” analysis, how has Trump’s second term intensified the personalization and performative use of trade policy? In what ways does this reflect broader populist tendencies that reject institutional expertise and multilateralism while mobilizing domestic political support?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: From an ideational perspective, populism—and its Manichean view of the world—shapes how people think and behave. In the trade environment, we see this clearly: tariffs become a tool for constructing a populist framework. Through tariffs, institutions built to manage global trade are effectively weakened or disassembled. Power is taken away from the elites who control international networks and redirected toward “the people,” refocusing economic forces inward.

In the populist literature, there’s always this argument—whether populism is a disease of democratic systems or a correction to a lack of representation in an economic system. And I really think the way a lot of populists think about tariffs reflects the latter. It’s seen as a corrective to brittle trade negotiations that took economic power away from the people and handed it to elites—people in cities, in the service industry, who were able to live well while workers became less powerful. So, retaking that power becomes the goal.

I don’t think it’s just performative. I think they genuinely believe this will recenter power on the people and help recreate a manufacturing base. When you listen to how some economists frame it, they suggest it will make life harder for service industries in cities, reduce their economic influence, and shift that power toward manufacturing and “Middle America,” where more of the population resides. Personally, I don’t think it will work that way—automation and other structural factors have played a major role in the erosion of US manufacturing—but from their perspective, the argument is clear: jobs were exported, elites benefited, and the people suffered. Tariffs are intended to sever those global networks and refocus the economy internally.

It might result in a less productive America. It might hollow out the cities and the service economy. But for populists, that’s probably the point—and they’re okay with that.

We’re Heading Toward a Smaller, Less Open World

With Trump’s renewed disengagement from WTO norms, do you see this as a terminal moment for the postwar liberal trade order, or is there still a path to restoration? What lessons can be drawn from the Trump era about the vulnerability of international economic governance to populist subversion, and what reforms are needed to future-proof institutions like the WTO from nationalist retrenchment?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: As a Canadian, I think about this all the time—and to be honest, there’s a lot to consider.My first assumption is that the Trump administration is just a symptom. So you’re still going to see a broader retrenchment from free trade, and even if, say, in 2028, a new president were elected, I don’t think this kind of protectionism would simply go away. A lot of international institutions will have a hard time surviving in that kind of system.

What I’m seeing, at least from Canada’s perspective, is that maybe some countries will keep these institutions alive and reduce the dominance of large multinational corporations. My sense is that the future lies in minilateralism—where like-minded countries who still see value in trade will maintain these institutions, but more for their own benefit than for the global system.

At the EU level, I think we’ll see more internal consolidation of trade and governance policies—unless, of course, a far-right government comes to power in a major state like France, which could unravel key aspects of the EU. Countries like Canada still want more trade and strong relationships with institutions like the WTO, but I believe the global trade environment will be significantly smaller than it once was.

Governments like ours can’t replace the United States in terms of global leadership—our prime minister recently said “if the Americans won’t lead, Canada will,” but let’s be honest: no one can replace the US in terms of resources and influence. What we might see is more involvement from China, Russia, and Iran in shaping these institutions—but their vision for the international system is quite different from that of the US and its allies.

So, my assumption is that we’re entering a deeply transformative period. The world will become smaller, more fragmented into blocs of countries defending their own values and interests—and far less open at the international level.

In the end, I think the countries that will suffer most are those in Africa, Latin America, and other regions of the Global South, because they benefited significantly from openness and multilateral institutions. Wealthier nations can still provide many of the services and information gathering that multilateral institutions once offered, but smaller states can’t. If you were a small country in Africa, those institutions were a lifeline.

I guess I’m a pessimist here, but I do believe we’re heading toward a smaller, less open world.

Multilateralism Is No Longer a Principle—It’s a Strategy

And lastly, Professor Boucher, how should policymakers in Canada respond to the dual threat of economic harm and normative erosion posed by populist-driven trade wars? What counter-narratives can be mobilized to restore public trust in multilateralism?

Dr. Jean-Christophe Boucher: Even in Canada, I’d say that—let’s put it this way—there was a movement not that long ago, when I was doing my PhD, that argued multilateralism was more of a practice than a belief. The idea was that what was good was not multilateralism as an end in itself, but as a means—a mode of engagement. The work in practice theory and international relations emphasized that what mattered was the activity of multilateralism, rather than its outcomes.

I don’t think that holds anymore, even in Canada. I think Canadians are now less and less devoted to multilateralism as a principle, and more interested in promoting their own views and strategic interests. What we see here is a sense that the world is retrenching, becoming smaller, and that we need to refocus our attention more narrowly.

The rise of China and Russia has shown how difficult it is for multilateral institutions to adapt. Now that the United States has also joined this retrenchment, I think it signals that those institutions won’t survive in their present form. As a result, a lot of Canada’s foreign policy is moving away from traditional multilateralism and toward more bilateral or minilateral relationships.

For example, if you look at what Canada is doing: we’re deepening ties with key European partners—not just through Brussels, but also through Paris, London, and Berlin. There’s been increasing talk about Canada joining the European Union, and frankly, if there were a referendum today, it might actually pass. Many Canadians feel that makes sense strategically.

Recently, we also published a document formalizing our Indo-Pacific strategy. If you look at where Canada is focusing its efforts, it’s clearly on strengthening relationships with partners in the Pacific—Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Australia. There’s a renewed emphasis on ASEAN as well.

So we’re moving away from the big, universalist international institutions and focusing more on regional, minilateral partnerships. It’s just easier. The commitment to shared values is clearer, and the conversations are more straightforward than what we often encounter at the global level.

Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

Professor Jones: Trump’s ‘Tariff Dictatorship’ Is Undermining the Global Trade Order

In an in-depth interview with ECPS, Professor Kent Jones warns that Donald Trump’s second-term trade strategy amounts to a “tariff dictatorship,” dismantling WTO norms and centralizing unprecedented power. “Trade has become a populist weapon,” says Professor Jones, “used to stoke anger and identify scapegoats rather than manage the economy.” He explains how Trump’s emotionally charged, anti-globalist rhetoric recasts trade deficits as existential threats while ignoring economic realities. Yet Professor Jones remains cautiously hopeful: “Globalization has faced downturns before. The human impulse to exchange and specialize endures.” As America retreats, he argues, others may step up. “If the US won’t lead, new trade alliances will form. But unpredictability is a burden—not a strength.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In this timely and wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Prof. Kent Jones—Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College and author of Populism and Trade: The Challenge to the Global Trading System—offers a sobering yet analytically rich critique of the Trump administration’s second-term trade strategy. Drawing on decades of experience and deep institutional knowledge, Professor Jones warns that the United States is no longer the steward of the postwar liberal trade order, but rather its chief saboteur. He argues that President Donald Trump’s erratic and hyper-personalized approach to trade—what he calls a “tariff dictatorship”—has effectively dismantled key pillars of the World Trade Organization (WTO), including most-favored-nation treatment and tariff binding, while concentrating unprecedented power in the hands of one individual.

Professor Jones emphasizes that trade policy, under Trump, has ceased to function as a tool of economic management and has instead become a populist weapon—repurposed to rally a nationalist, anti-elite political base through emotionally charged narratives about foreign threats and national decline. Trade deficits are recast as existential challenges, tariffs are imposed arbitrarily, and America’s longstanding commitments to multilateralism are eroded in favor of bilateral, loyalty-based deals that reflect Trump’s personal brand of grievance politics.

Yet amid this bleak portrait of institutional decay and populist distortion, Professor Jones also leaves room for cautious optimism. He underscores that globalization has weathered cyclical downturns before and that the human impulse to exchange, specialize, and cooperate across borders remains strong. While the US has stepped back, other actors—including the European Union, Canada, and emerging regional blocs—may step forward to rebuild a rules-based trade system, albeit imperfectly and without American leadership. Furthermore, Professor Jones suggests that the very unpredictability and economic pain caused by Trump’s tariffs may provoke renewed public scrutiny, mobilizing calls for Congress to reclaim its constitutional role in trade policymaking.

Ultimately, Professor Jones invites us to consider not only what has been lost, but what might still be recovered—provided that political institutions, civil society, and international alliances respond with resolve. As the world faces growing economic fragmentation, his insights provide a vital lens for understanding what’s at stake and how democratic societies might chart a path forward.

Dr. Kent Jones, Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College and author of Populism and Trade: The Challenge to the Global Trading System.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Professor Kent Jones.

Trade as a Psychological Tool in Trump’s Populist Arsenal

Professor Jones, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has trade policy been strategically deployed by Donald Trump as a tool of electoral mobilization? To what extent has the administration’s populist trade rhetoric succeeded in forging a durable political coalition that bridges economic grievances and cultural identity politics?

Professor Kent Jones: As I try to communicate in my book, Trump undoubtedly used trade as a strategic element of his electoral platform. However, it must be understood within the broader context of other grievances he exploited—particularly in the most recent election in November—many of which could be described as cultural. Immigration, for instance, was a major concern for many Americans. Inflation was also a key issue, even though it wasn’t as severe as Trump portrayed it; nonetheless, he promised to bring prices down. These issues were part of a larger constellation of concerns, including cultural ones—such as transgender politics—which, in my view, received disproportionate attention.

What Trump effectively managed to do was to construct a political package in which trade plays a central role in identifying a scapegoat—namely, the globalist elite—whom he claims is responsible for many of the country’s problems. To the extent that he succeeded in doing so, he was able to extend his appeal beyond his base of highly enthusiastic and passionate supporters to include individuals concerned with broader issues—such as border security. At the same time, he found it politically expedient to block Congressional efforts to address immigration, ensuring that the issue would remain salient within his campaign platform.

My focus on trade has always been that it’s part of a larger—perhaps psychological—set of issues that allows a candidate like Trump to say: “Look at immigration and what a problem it is. Well, trade is a very similar thing. Globalists have destroyed American manufacturing, just as immigrants have come in and polluted our population with foreign, unfamiliar, non-American elements.” These themes converge. Trade, as it turns out, is a very important part of Trump’s populist agenda. I don’t see this as a general populist tendency. Most of the other countries I studied in my book had governments led by populists, but many of them were small, open economies that did not have the capacity to use trade as a weapon in their populist platforms. For example, Israel, which currently has a populist government, is a small, open economy that remains broadly committed to free trade. You’re not going to see the same railing against the WTO and related institutions from countries like that as you did from Trump.

Now, regarding whether this is a viable coalition—I think that remains to be seen, because Trump has not kept his promises on bringing inflation down. The immigration problem has somewhat subsided, but he now appears to be focusing as much on that issue as on tariffs. For example, deporting Venezuelans to El Salvador—something that is constitutionally very questionable, and probably illegal. The Trump administration is now trying to position itself as being independent of rulings by courts, including even the Supreme Court, in pursuing its policies. There’s a multi-pronged effort by Trump to gain and concentrate more and more power, and trade is playing a role in that. I think this also reveals some weaknesses in his use of trade, because while people may be upset about jobs being sent abroad, they are equally upset about being charged significantly more—for automobiles, clothing, steel, and aluminum—as a result of his tariff plan. So, I see this as a Trump attempt to use trade politically, but not yet a successful one in cementing a durable populist coalition.

Anger as the Engine in Populist Playbook

Have we now entered the phase you previously anticipated, in which economic expertise in trade policy is increasingly eclipsed by emotionally charged populist narratives? Under Trump’s renewed administration, what specific events or discursive strategies are being used to reignite trade as an emotional flashpoint?

Professor Kent Jones: Yes, of course. In the study of populism, the issue of affect is important. If you can make people very angry, you’re more likely to be successful as a populist—and I think Trump has done that to a certain extent. I’m not sure whether this coalition—going back to your previous question—is very stable, but when it comes to trade, this is something that, as an economist, I’ve always lamented: the idea that a trade balance or imbalance is a valid justification for tariffs.

Trump has attempted to weaponize trade by claiming that foreign countries have, as he puts it, “cheated” and “ripped off” Americans over the past decades by causing the US to run a trade deficit. If you take a close look at his tariff formula, economists have thoroughly ridiculed it. It’s essentially a trade balance-based formula that imposes tariffs according to the size of a country’s trade surplus with the United States—purportedly to justify his so-called “reciprocal tariffs.”

But these tariffs aren’t actually reciprocal, because they don’t target foreign tariffs levied against US imports. Instead, they create a system in which Trump can identify grievances—some trade-related, some not—and then use them to pressure countries into negotiating access to the US market. In this way, he is attempting to weaponize trade by consolidating sole decision-making power over market access. I call it a “tariff dictatorship,” and this authority has, in many ways, been enabled by Congress. It is now backed by a Republican majority that refuses to challenge him effectively.

This is the context in which trade is being used as an emotional issue. For example, many people were bewildered when he claimed, “Canadians have been ripping us off for years.” Most people don’t have that view of Canada. It seems like a friendly country, and yet Trump portrays it as a dark force damaging the American economy.

So yes, I agree that the typical populist playbook relies heavily on affect—on stirring voters’ emotions, particularly anger. The angrier people are, the more likely they are to follow you. When I was conducting research for my book, I found that anger motivates voters more than anything else—even more than fear. If you can make them angry, you can get them to the polls. An angry voter tends to be a more reliable populist voter. Maintaining that level of anger is, therefore, key to Trump’s political strategy and success.

But the Achilles’ heel for any populist, in my view, is basic economic performance. Once a populist is in control of the government, he can no longer present himself as the anti-elitist, because he becomes responsible for policy outcomes. I think the danger Trump faces now with his tariff policy is that he’s making a lot of people nervous—and even angry—because their retirement accounts are being eroded, the bond market is collapsing, the dollar is weakening, and interest rates are likely to rise.

He’s tried to point back to Biden as the cause of these problems, but it’s increasingly difficult to do that when you, as a populist, actually control the White House and both houses of Congress.

At Its Core, This Is About Power—Not Policy

Would you argue that the appeal of ‘economic nationalism’ has now overtaken economic rationale as the dominant force shaping US trade policy?

Professor Kent Jones: Well, certainly under Trump it has. The focal point of my book was the impact of all this on institutions. We’ve had tariffs before, and there are actually many Democrats who favor tariffs and may have been more reluctant to criticize Trump in principle for using them.

My argument—ever since these new tariffs began—is that regardless of whether you support tariffs, it is deeply problematic to vest all tariff authority in a single individual who can change them at will, for whatever reason he chooses, under the justification of an emergency economic powers act. Many now argue that this justification is not even legal, because its premise—that there’s a national emergency requiring tariffs as a solution—is questionable.

Just this morning, there was news of a new group of businesses suing the Trump administration over its use of tariffs, claiming it contradicts the very law invoked to support them. What we’re witnessing is the erosion of institutional checks and balances, with trade policy effectively centralized in one person.

There’s also a psychological factor to consider. When you have an individual with a narcissistic personality like Trump, who is used to getting his way, the accumulation of power becomes an end in itself. It enables him to exact revenge on perceived enemies, compel others to seek his favor, or pressure countries into buying more American goods or signing bilateral deals skewed in America’s favor.

So, at its core, this is about power. Trump has managed to concentrate it, and many voices are now calling on Congress to step up and reclaim the authority the Constitution grants it. According to Article I, Section 8, Congress—not the president—has the power to regulate commerce and trade. This is where the institutional battle lies, and it’s where the future of trade governance will likely be contested.

US Trade Has Become a One-Man Operation

Photo: Shutterstock AI.

Are we now witnessing the culmination of what you’ve described as the ‘delegitimization of trade institutions’ in US politics? If so, what are the broader implications of continued US disengagement from multilateral trade frameworks for global economic stability and governance?

Professor Kent Jones: Well, certainly—as long as Trump is President—we’re not going to see much engagement with the WTO in US trade policy. As I’ve documented in my book, and more recently in my commentaries on his tariff policy, Trump has already done away with key institutional principles of the WTO.

For example, he’s discarded the most-favored nation rule, which is foundational to the WTO framework. He’s also rejected tariff binding, the commitment that countries won’t arbitrarily raise their tariffs. These principles stand in the way of Trump’s pursuit of unilateral power. Once those constraints are removed, he can assign different tariffs to different countries’ products—entirely contrary to the GATT/WTO system—and negotiate individual agreements that maximize his own leverage.

Trump claims there are now 75 countries wanting trade deals with him, meaning he can sit down with each one individually, judge the outcome on his own terms, and adjust tariffs at will. There’s no need for congressional input or legislative approval—just Trump’s personal satisfaction. That effectively turns US trade policy into a one-man operation.

This is the antithesis of what the GATT and WTO systems were designed to prevent. Back in 1947, when the GATT was founded, the memory of the Great Depression and the tariff wars of the 1930s—especially the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act in the US—was still fresh. The global economic community had learned that trade wars were harmful, and for 70 to 80 years, that lesson held.

Now, Trump has effectively resurrected the notion that “trade wars are good and easy to win.” He justifies this by pointing to America’s trade deficit, claiming that other countries will bear the cost. But in practice, the 145% tariffs on Chinese goods, for instance, are paid by American consumers. People are starting to realize this—whether it’s an iPhone that might jump from $1,000 to $2,000 or $3,000, a house built with increasingly expensive Canadian lumber, or an automobile that now costs $10,000 to $15,000 more due to a 25% tariff.

These developments are creating a growing crisis for Trump. That’s likely why he’s started pausing tariffs and promising “great deals,” and recently announced some product-specific exemptions—such as with Chinese imports and possibly with automobiles. He knows that if Americans can’t afford their cars, it’ll hit both foreign and domestic models hard, and even drive up the cost of used cars—something already affected by COVID-era supply shocks.

All of this contributes to an unpredictable trade environment, largely because Trump has assumed complete control over tariff policy. At this point, no one else is making trade decisions—just Donald Trump.

Tariffs Have Become Symbols, Not Solutions

3D illustration: Lightspring.

In Trump’s second term, how have tariffs been repurposed more as political symbols than as instruments of economic policy? How is the administration using revived trade rhetoric to frame persistent trade deficits as existential threats, and how is it justifying these measures politically despite their mixed economic outcomes?

Professor Kent Jones: Yes, this really gets to the core of the economic critique of Donald Trump’s trade policy. When you use a trade deficit as a justification for imposing tariffs, there is no theoretical basis for that in economics. Economists understand trade deficits as a macroeconomic phenomenon resulting from the imbalance between savings and investment in a country.

In the United States, the persistent trade deficit reflects higher levels of consumption relative to production, and lower savings relative to investment. When consumption exceeds production, the difference naturally comes from imports.

Trump tried to use this logic in his first term to justify a trade war with China, and now he has extended that rationale globally. But this effort was not successful. The tariffs did not significantly reduce the US trade deficit—not even with China. And as long as the structural imbalance between savings and investment persists, the trade deficit will remain.

Moreover, any reduction in imports from China led to trade diversion. Chinese firms simply rerouted production through third countries like Vietnam, Cambodia, the Philippines—even Mexico. For instance, Vietnam’s trade surplus with the US grew substantially. Trump is now using that as justification for imposing global tariffs rather than China-specific ones.

So trade deficits are being repurposed symbolically. Whenever Trump can point to a trade surplus from another country, he frames it as a hostile act against the United States. Many Americans, including politicians in Washington, still believe that having a trade deficit means the US is “losing.”

As I often point out in my classes, the US is not a company with a balance sheet—it’s 300 million individuals making consumption decisions. A trade deficit is like an individual going to the grocery store and spending money. That doesn’t mean the store is cheating you. Likewise, if Americans choose to buy Korean cars or Vietnamese clothing, that doesn’t reflect economic weakness or foreign deception. In fact, it’s often a sign of economic strength—of choice, affordability, and productivity.

Nonetheless, Trump has succeeded in convincing many people otherwise. But eventually, the economic consequences catch up. Americans are now seeing the costs in the form of higher prices—for phones, homes, cars, and everyday goods. The stock market and bond market, both globally integrated, are reacting negatively, and that’s something even Trump cannot control.

He’s trying to de-globalize domestic production, but reshoring takes time. Manufacturing shoes, nails, clothing—these can’t be brought back overnight. He says it’ll take six months or two years, but that’s highly unrealistic.

So people are starting to ask: when does the promised pay-off arrive? When will we see the benefits that justify the current pain—higher prices, falling stock values, a weakening dollar, and a diminished global economic reputation?

This is likely why Trump is starting to pause certain tariff measures and promise relief. The symbolic transformation of tariffs into a nationalist cause has been attempted—but economic realities are hard to avoid, especially when you’re the one in charge and can no longer blame your predecessor.

Uncertainty Is the New Normal for Global Trade and the Vulnerable Pay the Price

What socio-economic burdens are likely to be borne by ordinary citizens—both in the US and globally—as a consequence of the Trump administration’s erratic and politically charged trade and tariff wars? How do these unpredictable policy shifts impact everyday economic security, particularly for vulnerable populations?

Professor Kent Jones: Well, certainly in the United States, one of the most significant developments in trade policy analysis has been the emergence of what we now call “uncertainty analysis.” In fact, indexes of trade policy uncertainty have become an increasingly prominent tool for tracking how markets react to Trump’s trade policies.

The original idea behind the WTO was to create stability. Everyone followed the same rules, and everyone benefitted from that predictability. These rules included non-discrimination and tariff binding—principles that gave businesses the confidence to invest in trade-related activities. If you were exporting to a foreign market, you could count on that market upholding WTO rules. If you were an importer in the US, you could similarly rely on your own government to follow those rules and not change tariffs arbitrarily.

There were, of course, accepted exceptions in the WTO framework—such as anti-dumping measures—but these were limited and rule-bound. That embedded liberalism allowed trade to flourish within a relatively stable system.

What we’re now seeing, however, is the erosion of that system. The socioeconomic consequences will come first through higher consumer prices. We’re already seeing that. Then, likely, through higher interest rates as global confidence in the US economy diminishes. And higher interest rates increase the likelihood of a recession, with all the accompanying hardships—job losses, reduced investment, and economic insecurity for average Americans.

Globally, the situation is equally troubling. We’re seeing punitive tariffs applied even to poor countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Cambodia. In some cases—like Madagascar, which exports vanilla to the US—American trade officials are complaining that these countries don’t import US automobiles, using that as justification for tariffs. The logic is absurd and completely contrary to the idea of comparative advantage. Expecting a country like Madagascar to buy American cars in exchange for sending vanilla exemplifies the irrationality of these policies.

This kind of policy undermines the efficiency and fairness of the global trading system and inflicts economic pain on both developing nations and their trading partners. The decline in global trade efficiency will affect the most vulnerable—both at home and abroad.

As a result, other countries are beginning to rethink their trade strategies. We’re already seeing Canada and the EU discussing deeper trade ties with each other. And there’s emerging talk of building new multilateral frameworks that exclude the United States.

Of course, a global trading system without US leadership won’t be as effective. The US was, for decades, the anchor of global economic order after World War II. But with Trump’s retreat from multilateralism, we’re now seeing a broader pattern—one that also extends to military alliances. NATO, for instance, has been encouraged to think more about European-based defense. The war in Ukraine adds another dimension to this shifting landscape.

Altogether, this reflects a larger withdrawal of the US from global engagement. And that retreat has consequences. American stability and leadership added enormous value to global affairs. Take that away, and others will suffer—but it may also spur efforts to reconstruct international cooperation through alternative means.

Trump’s History Lessons Are More Political Theater Than Economic Strategy

How is trade policy being used in Trump’s second term to reinforce nationalist and anti-elite populist messaging, and what role do ‘chrono-political’ narratives—drawing on selective historical memory and future promises—play in sustaining public support for renewed protectionism?

Professor Kent Jones: We have a president who likes to use history for his own purposes. The more immediate history, of course, is that all of America’s current problems—including those Trump himself has created—are, according to him, really the fault of President Joe Biden. That’s one way he uses history: to convince people that during his first term, everything was a “golden age,” and then when Biden came along, everything fell apart. So, if there are problems now, don’t blame Trump—blame Biden.

Another interesting use of history—particularly for Americans who know their history—is Trump’s fascination with President William McKinley. Actually, not just President McKinley, but also Senator McKinley, a Republican from the 1890s who sponsored a major tariff bill. At that time, tariffs made up about half of US government revenue, since there was little in the way of income tax. Trump has used this historical reference to argue that we could eliminate income taxes altogether and rely on tariff revenue instead.

You may have seen news about Trump wanting to rename the tallest mountain in Alaska—Denali—back to Mount McKinley, because of this admiration. But historically, the McKinley Tariff was highly unpopular. After it passed, the Republicans lost many congressional seats in the next election because the public faced higher prices and increased industrial concentration. Trump doesn’t seem to think this historical lesson applies to him, but it’s already proving to be a similar liability.

So, we see a selective and manipulated use of history. The narrative is: “Look how great America was in the 1890s—look how we were growing, how proud people were to be Americans.” But in reality, that era had deep problems—racism, immigration tensions, and inequality—that tariffs didn’t solve. In fact, the introduction of a broader income tax in 1913 allowed the US to move toward a more liberal and successful trading regime. American economic growth since then has been strong—so why go back?

Trump continues to insist that tariffs are paid by foreigners, not Americans. He argues that this makes tariffs an ideal way to fund the US government—as if foreign countries are footing the bill. His advisors know this isn’t true, but you won’t hear them say so publicly.

In short, Trump is using history in a way that serves his populist message, but not very effectively. If he were a better student of history, he might find stronger justifications for his policies. As it stands, invoking the McKinley era and blaming “woke Democrats” for current issues doesn’t offer a coherent economic argument—especially when you consider that the US economy under Obama and Biden has actually performed quite well.

Trump’s China Policy Turns Trade into a Populist Proxy for National Decline

Photo: Shutterstock.

How does the Trump administration’s hardline stance toward China reflect a broader populist narrative of foreign threats and national decline? In the context of ongoing decoupling efforts from China, how is this policy being used to mobilize anti-globalization sentiment and reinforce the administration’s appeal to its populist base?

Professor Kent Jones: It’s very interesting the way Trump seems to view China. On the one hand, he appears to admire President Xi as a strong, tough leader—something Trump seems to find admirable. At the same time, he insists that China has been “ripping us off” through its trade practices, largely because of the large volume of imports the US receives from China.

I think Trump has been surprised—and perhaps disappointed—by how assertive Xi has been in responding to US tariffs. Xi has made it clear he won’t back down. Trump would like to portray Xi as someone he can deal with—someone who respects him and will sit down to work out a deal. But if we look back at Trump’s first administration, we see how that played out.

The trade war Trump initiated in 2018, with escalating tariffs against China, did not, in fact, reduce the US trade deficit. By January 2020, Trump declared victory and announced a “Phase One” trade deal with China. This was essentially a countertrade agreement—China would commit to importing a specific value of US goods, and in return, the US would reduce tariffs. The goal was to balance bilateral trade flows.

But such a deal was never feasible. It would require a Soviet-style, government-managed trade system, completely incompatible with a market-based global trading regime. It violated WTO principles such as non-discrimination and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions. And ultimately, it didn’t work—COVID-19 disrupted global trade, and China didn’t meet its import commitments. Trump’s administration could blame COVID, but the agreement itself was flawed from the start.

Now, Trump claims that 75 countries are lining up to negotiate similar deals, and that he’ll finalize them within 90 days. Anyone with experience in trade negotiations knows that’s unrealistic. Bilateral trade deals are complex and time-consuming. My prediction is that we’ll see vague, formulaic agreements—pieces of paper promising balanced trade flows without any serious enforcement or economic logic behind them.

Trump may even try a version of this again with China. But the structural issues remain: we live in a world of complex technological interdependence, and the US cannot simply de-couple from China. Instead of trade wars, what we need is a return to multilateral cooperation. If the US worked with Europe, Canada, and other OECD countries, it could form a united front to pressure China into complying more fully with WTO rules.

China’s state-led economic model makes it difficult to enforce existing trade norms, but a coordinated multilateral effort could make progress. Unfortunately, the US—once the architect and guarantor of the global trading order—is now undermining it. That leadership vacuum is at the heart of the problem.

So to return to your original question: Trump’s framing of China as a threat fits squarely within his broader populist narrative of national decline and foreign exploitation. But his policies haven’t solved the trade imbalance—and now he’s trying to apply the same flawed logic to the entire world. He wants to control all trade through bilateral, Trump-approved formulas for balance, which are economically irrational and unworkable.

In the end, like many populist strategies, these deals may sound good in the abstract but will likely prove disappointing once implemented. The rhetoric may mobilize his base, but the economic outcomes could be far less favorable.

Globalization Is on Ice—But Far From Over

A metaphorical image depicting the US-China trade war, economic tensions and tariff disputes on imports and exports. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Jones, in light of ongoing debates and speculation about the potential collapse or end of globalization, how do you assess the current trajectory of global economic integration, and what indicators do you consider most critical in evaluating whether globalization is truly in decline?

Professor Kent Jones: Well, certainly globalization is being damaged by President Trump’s policies—there’s no doubt about that. He’s taking the largest economy in the world, the original architect of the WTO and the postwar trade order, and essentially reversing its role. The WTO is now portrayed as the enemy by Trump and his followers.

So yes, globalization has clearly suffered. However, one thing I’ve learned as an economist—particularly from my early training in Geneva—is the value of taking a long historical view of trade. Trade has always gone through waves. Periods of free trade have often been followed by periods of protectionism, and vice versa.

Take Britain’s repeal of the Corn Laws in the 19th century, which ushered in an era of freer trade and economic expansion built around the British Empire. The US came on board later. Then came the Great Depression, which triggered a new wave of protectionism. The post-WWII creation of the WTO system marked another liberalizing wave. Now, with the resurgence of economic nationalism and protectionism, we appear to be in another downward swing.

That said, globalization has always required flexibility. The decline of some industries must be managed so others can emerge. In the 1800s, this adjustment was relatively smooth. But the entry of China into the global economy in the 2000s created a massive shock—its capacity to produce across a wide range of sectors was something even the US struggled to adapt to quickly.

We also cannot ignore the role of technology. Are we really going to return to an economy of cobblers and factory floor workers in an age of robotics, AI, and complex supply chains? It seems unlikely. I think it all circles back to what Adam Smith said about the innate human tendency to “truck and barter.” Even before language, early humans were trading. We’ve always valued specialization and exchange—and I believe that instinct endures.

Suppressing globalization won’t eliminate that fundamental impulse. If the US abandons its leadership role, others will step in. We may see regional trade agreements emerge as partial substitutes for global ones. It’s not a perfect replacement, but it’s better than nothing.

Technological progress is also linked to globalization. If you halt global exchange, you risk slowing innovation. Still, I believe there’s opportunity. Many countries that once focused heavily on trade with the US will begin looking elsewhere. China may try to lead, but many are skeptical of that. Perhaps another leadership structure will emerge—or perhaps we simply wait until 2028, when some hope the US will again elect a president who values multilateralism and stable partnerships.

What Trump doesn’t seem to understand is that unpredictability, which he views as a strength, is actually an economic burden. It erodes trust and undermines investment. The global economy thrives on rules and stability—not arbitrary decisions.

So, to return to your question: Yes, globalization has been put on ice for now. But I don’t think it’s over. There’s still a strong drive—among individuals, firms, and governments—to rebuild trade networks. Even if US leadership is absent, globalization will find ways to adapt and re-emerge.