Migration - ECPS

Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany.

Dr. Ziller: Terror Attack in Munich Likely to Sway Voters More Than J.D. Vance’s AfD Endorsement

February 17, 2025

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Extremism & Radicalisation Home Interviews Migration

Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, discusses the key factors shaping voter sentiment ahead of Germany’s elections. In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, he argues that the recent terrorist attack in Munich is likely to have a greater impact on voter behavior than US Vice President J.D. Vance’s endorsement of the far-right AfD. Highlighting the growing openness of radical right parties, Dr. Ziller warns of the AfD’s shifting strategy—from Euroscepticism to consolidating political power through ideological alliances and nationalist rhetoric.

As Germany heads into a pivotal election on Sunday, Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, sheds light on the factors shaping voter sentiment, particularly the growing influence of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Monday, Dr. Ziller argues that while the recent endorsement of the AfD by US Vice President J.D. Vance is significant, it is unlikely to shift voter behavior as much as real-world events, such as the recent terrorist attack in Munich.

“I don’t believe J.D. Vance’s statement will have a major impact, but the recent terrorist attack in Munich might, as it is a deeply tragic event that affects people on an emotional level,” he explains. “This, of course, is a serious issue. I think such incidents have a greater effect on voter sentiment than what J.D. Vance said.”

Dr. Ziller situates this development within a broader trend: the increasing openness of populist radical right parties about their true political ambitions. “Vance’s endorsement is part of a broader effort to shift the political narrative further to the right and enable more power for the AfD,” he notes, emphasizing that “what is surprising is how openly he has expressed his support.” This, he argues, reflects a larger shift in global politics, where far-right movements no longer attempt to mask their agendas but instead push their narratives forward with unprecedented transparency.

This shift presents both challenges and opportunities for European leaders. “In a way, this increased openness could be beneficial because it allows European leaders and the European Union (EU) to fully recognize the situation and take action accordingly,” Dr. Ziller observes. He points to the upcoming conference on Ukraine as an example of how European leaders are already strategizing to counter the rise of nationalist and far-right influences across the continent.

Another key factor in the AfD’s rise is its evolving stance on European identity and sovereignty. Unlike traditional nationalist parties that focus on ethnic distinctions, the AfD’s rhetoric has shifted toward ideological alliances rather than national ones. “Previously, right-wing populists or extremists in Germany might have rejected alliances with Southern Europeans, people from Turkey, or Eastern Europeans, insisting on a strictly German national identity. Now, however, these ethnic categories are no longer as significant,” Dr. Ziller explains. Instead, the AfD aligns itself with like-minded political figures such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Vladimir Putin, forming transnational far-right networks based on shared political goals rather than national identity. While the party remains Eurosceptic, its focus is not on defining who belongs within Europe, but rather on shaping alliances that strengthen its broader nationalist and anti-immigration agenda.

Against this backdrop, the upcoming elections in Germany will be a test case for how effective the AfD’s strategies—capitalizing on issues like immigration, security, and anti-elitist sentiment—will be in mobilizing support. In this interview, Dr. Conrad Ziller delves into the party’s tactics, its positioning within the broader European far-right movement, and the implications for democracy in Germany and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Conrad Ziller with some edits.

The AfD Thrives on Fear—Immigration, Welfare, and Political Distrust

Professor Ziller, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland – Alternative for Germany) capitalized on anti-immigrant sentiment in Germany? In your research, how do you see social trust mediating the relationship between nativist attitudes and radical right-wing support?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: Thanks for having me. Immigration is at the forefront of this election, and the AfD is capitalizing on it, as you already mentioned. Why are anti-immigrant attitudes and immigration such important topics?

First of all, there have been terrorist incidents in Magdeburg, Aschaffenburg, and Munich, which are highly problematic. At the same time, these incidents have increased the salience of the immigration issue. Not only the AfD but also mainstream parties have taken a very strong stance on immigration, competing over who can be the toughest on it.

Immigration is a salient topic, but it is also proximate—people experience immigration in their everyday lives. Additionally, it is an ambivalent issue. On one hand, immigration can contribute to economic growth, but on the other hand, it may also increase conflict and raise concerns about newcomers benefiting from the welfare system.

So, it is a complex issue, and politics can play a crucial role in shaping public perception. Unlike topics such as unemployment or economic growth, which are widely agreed upon, immigration remains a subject of ongoing debate. This is where politics has normative power—it can shape public discourse about immigration.

What role does welfare chauvinism play in the AfD’s electoral success? How do perceptions of welfare access by migrants influence native support for far-right parties?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: Welfare chauvinism refers to the view that public support is needed, but at the same time, it should be restricted and only be available to non-immigrants. There has been a huge debate about this, and as I already mentioned, all the mainstream parties are currently quite restrictive toward immigration. If you look at the electoral manifestos and programs of these parties, most of them—except for the Left, the Greens, and the SPD—favor restricting immigrants’ access to welfare. The center and right-wing parties, including the liberal FDP, also advocate for limiting these benefits.

A key issue is the so-called Bürgergeld, which is the basic welfare support that everyone has the right to receive, including Ukrainian refugees. The AfD strongly opposes this and seeks to take these benefits away from immigrants who are already eligible. Both centrist and right-wing populist parties are using welfare chauvinism as a strategy to shift public discourse further to the right, with right-wing populists, in particular, capitalizing on these sentiments to mobilize electoral support.

Strong Local Governance Can Curb Nativism

Does local governance efficiency impact nativist sentiment? Your research highlights how local government performance affects public attitudes toward immigrants. Could decentralization in Germany mitigate or exacerbate these attitudes?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: First of all, immigration presents a challenge to the social cohesion of receiving societies. Newcomers may not speak the language, and both immigrants and local residents need time to adapt to the new system. At the same time, there is the question of how integration should be structured, which can come with certain transactional costs.

The ability of local governments to efficiently manage integration-related tasks—such as housing—while maintaining high-quality public services is crucial. Administrative work, public service availability, and the management of public spaces, including street maintenance, all play a role. When local governments perform well in these areas, it can help mitigate resource competition, reducing the perception among non-immigrants that something is being taken away from them. This, in turn, helps maintain social cohesion.

Moreover, effective local governance fosters strong community structures by supporting organizations and associations that facilitate integration. A well-functioning local government contributes to a stable and cohesive social fabric where newcomers can be integrated more smoothly. In this way, efficient local governance can be a key factor in reducing nativist sentiment and fostering a more inclusive community.

Misinformation Spread by AfD Fuels Division

AfD’s Alice Weidel and Tino Chrupalla at a meeting in Berlin, Germany on July 4, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

What is the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and far-right support in Germany? Does misinformation play a role in strengthening AfD’s voter base? If so, to what extent has the AfD leveraged conspiracy theories to mobilize support, and how do these narratives influence public trust in democratic institutions?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: The AfD is a right-wing populist party, and we see that, especially from the radical right, but also to some extent from the radical left, there are conspiracy theories. You can think of Trump and the Republicans, and also the QAnon movement, which accused politicians of being engaged in child abuse and other extreme things. In Germany, it is not like this—there are no typical conspiracy theories of that magnitude. However, there is, of course, misinformation, which is something we do see here, though not as much conspiracy theorizing.

This misinformation is problematic because it challenges social norms, serves to break political correctness, and hinders the narrative of equality. If people believe there is a corrupt political elite that they must act against, it opens the door for even more misinformation. You can think of this as a kind of “information smog,” where people struggle to distinguish between what is true and what is false.

This is also a strategy used by the right-wing populist AfD. They engage in a significant amount of misinformation, both about political elites and about immigrants, making it difficult for ordinary people to discern what is right and what is wrong. So, while conspiracy theories are not as prominent, the AfD does engage in spreading misinformation and contributing to this information smog.

Your research suggests that political corruption erodes trust in institutions and drives radical right support. How has this dynamic played out in Germany, and what role has the AfD played in capitalizing on political distrust?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: Political distrust is a really important issue that has gained momentum in the past years. One strategy of the AfD is to undermine the competencies of the established center parties, especially regarding immigration and integration. They deflect from other pressing issues such as prices, climate problems, and inequality by shifting the focus to immigration.

By making immigration the dominant issue, the AfD positions itself as the party with the toughest stance, claiming to have the best solution—namely, restricting immigration as much as possible. If immigration becomes the primary topic in political discourse and the AfD is perceived as the most competent in handling it, this naturally undermines public confidence in the established political actors and fosters political distrust.

Regarding corruption, Germany has not experienced many corruption scandals in recent years, at least not in comparison to Southern and Eastern European countries. Corruption is not the most pressing issue here. However, issues related to government quality and economic policies have also faded into the background, as political discourse is largely dominated by other topics.

Political discontent can stem from two main sources. One is the experience of actual unfairness, such as firsthand encounters with corruption. While some corruption does exist in Germany, it remains relatively limited compared to other countries. The second source is the perception of problems that may not actually exist. If people struggle to distinguish between real issues and fabricated ones, this fuels political discontent.

It is also worth noting that the AfD itself has faced issues related to campaign donations and financial transparency, making it one of the parties with more corruption-related concerns. However, much of the political discontent today arises from perceived rather than actual problems, which is a key factor shaping public attitudes at the moment.

Affective Polarization Fuels AfD’s Growth by Deepening Divides

What impact does affective polarization have on radical right-wing support? Are voters more motivated by anti-elite sentiment or ideological alignment when choosing to support the AfD?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: Both are important. Affective polarization occurs when parties, especially nowadays, are divided not so much along the economic left-right axis but more along the social-cultural left-right axis. For example, progressive parties like the Greens in Germany stand in opposition to socio-culturally conservative parties like the AfD on the right.

If these opposing groups increasingly dislike each other and develop strong negative sentiments toward one another, this further fuels the perception that center parties do not represent them. As a result, voters may feel compelled to align with either the far-left or the far-right. Affective polarization is partly a consequence of the increasing popularity of populist right-wing parties, but it also serves to reinforce their growth.

Anti-elite sentiment is another key factor. It has long been a central narrative alongside anti-immigration stances. This aspect becomes particularly important for voters who may not be strongly anti-immigrant themselves. Even established immigrants—those who arrived in Germany years ago—can be drawn to anti-elitist rhetoric. The AfD actively exploits this, particularly through social media.

For example, on platforms like TikTok, many AfD-affiliated channels specifically target individuals with a Turkish immigrant background. These channels do not focus as much on anti-immigration rhetoric but instead emphasize anti-elite narratives. This messaging has proven quite effective, while democratic and center parties struggle to develop similarly compelling narratives that can attract voters in the same way.

In your work on public support for state surveillance, you highlight the role of security threats in shaping policy preferences. How has the AfD framed surveillance policies, and what are the implications for civil liberties in Germany?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: I think the most important thing is that most people are no longer as critical of state surveillance. A lot of this has to do with the fact that we have already become quite accustomed to it through our use of cell phones and digital technologies.

As a result, there isn’t much of a political debate about surveillance in the sense that some parties are strongly against it, advocating for civil liberties, while others push for more surveillance. That kind of clear divide does not really exist. Most people accept surveillance, but it is not currently a politically salient issue. It tends to resurface from time to time, especially in response to terrorist attacks, such as those we have seen recently in Germany, for instance, in Munich or Aschaffenburg.

However, in these discussions, the focus is more on surveilling immigrants. The debate is framed around where agencies have struggled to track or monitor certain immigrants—particularly Islamic individuals who could potentially commit terrorist attacks. Essentially, the conversation revolves around immigration policy, with political actors competing over who has the toughest rules and the most restrictive stance on immigration.

Beyond that, there are also broader discussions, such as whether Germany should maintain a registry of individuals with specific psychological conditions—both to provide them with help and to track them if issues arise. However, due to Germany’s historical experiences with the GDR and National Socialism, civil liberties and data protection remain highly valued. Unlike some northern European countries, it is not easy to create such registries in Germany.

So while surveillance remains an important topic, it is largely discussed in the context of immigration, and aside from that, it is not a major political issue at the moment.

Crisis and Social Media Propel AfD’s Rise in Germany

AfD demo with slogan Stop Islamization and counter demonstration of the Left in Luetten Klein in Rostock, Germany on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany. Photo: Shutterstock.

The AfD has gained traction by opposing immigration and EU policies. How does their success compare to other radical right parties in Europe, and what unique factors have contributed to their rise in Germany?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: The AfD is similar to other right-wing populist parties in Europe, which are currently quite successful. There are different reasons for this. One key reason is the series of crises we have faced—the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the conflict in Gaza between Israel and Palestine, and, to some extent, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. There is a general feeling of insecurity among many people, and the AfD, like other right-wing populist parties, does not need to be constructive or implement policies. They have an easy time positioning themselves because they can simply be against something and act as critics without needing to govern or prove that their ideas work.

Another major factor is that immigration remains a highly salient and visible issue, as I previously mentioned. The AfD currently holds a stable support base, similar to parties like the FPÖ in Austria, ranging from approximately 18% to 25%. This is a significant increase compared to three and a half years ago during the last federal election when they had only around 10% or 11% of the vote.

I believe this rise is largely due to the ongoing crises, but also because right-wing populists have been highly effective in promoting themselves on social media. They have been particularly successful in reaching younger cohorts—who are not only experiencing these crises firsthand but are also more engaged with digital platforms. The AfD has developed a strong strategy in terms of marketing and social media outreach, which has contributed to their recent electoral gains.

How does AfD’s position on European integration shape its voter appeal? What factors drive the party’s Eurosceptic stance, and how does it compare to other radical right parties in Europe?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: The anti-European Union stance was a core narrative for the AfD in the mid-2010s. When the party was founded in 2013, its main focus was anti-EU rhetoric—calls to return to the national currency, withdraw from Schengen, and even leave the European Union entirely. One of the key motivations for the AfD’s formation was opposition to the bailout of Greece during the financial crisis. Greece was still struggling, and resisting financial aid to Greece was a primary reason for establishing the party in the first place.

Nowadays, the EU is not their central focus. If you look at the AfD’s current election program, the European Union is still mentioned, but the rhetoric has shifted. Their arguments are more about the EU lacking legitimacy—claiming that the EU should not have the authority to raise taxes but does so anyway—and suggesting that Germany should refuse to pay. The AfD’s broader vision is to replace the EU with a federation of European nations, essentially dismantling the existing structure. They also oppose Germany’s financial contributions to the EU, knowing that Germany plays a key role in funding the Union. If Germany were to withdraw, it would severely destabilize the EU in its current form.

However, the AfD’s approach to solidarity is conditional. If other countries were also led by right-wing populists, they might be open to cooperation, but we are not at that stage yet. At the moment, while they remain anti-EU, their primary focus has shifted. Their main emphasis is now on immigration and gaining political power.

Compared to previous elections, this shift is evident—the AfD is now actively working to gain influence in parliament and explore potential collaboration with the conservative CDU. This is a significant change from their earlier strategy, which was primarily focused on opposing the European Union. Now, they really want to grab political power.

AfD’s Politics Is Less About Identity, More About Ideological Alliances

Election poster of Björn Höcke for the AfD party with the slogan roughly translating to “forbidden good” in Sonneberg, Thuringia, Germany, on August 4, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

How has the AfD framed the EU as a threat to German identity? Does its discourse on sovereignty and immigration reflect broader trends in European far-right movements?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: I think that immigration and the question of who belongs—who is considered a citizen—are still central issues. This is particularly important for immigrants in Germany, who may worry about whether their citizenship could be withdrawn or, if they do not yet have citizenship, what might happen if the AfD gains more political influence, even if they do not attain full power.

For immigrants without citizenship in another European country, these concerns are especially pressing. However, when it comes to the AfD’s stance on European identity, I would say that it is not a priority for them. They are not particularly concerned with the idea of a shared European identity. This is not the framework in which they think. Instead, their perspective is shaped more by a distinction between friends and foes—who is an ally and who is an enemy.

What we have seen over the past ten years is that right-wing populists and extremists have increasingly formed connections across borders. Previously, right-wing populists or extremists in Germany might have rejected alliances with Southern Europeans, people from Turkey, or Eastern Europeans, insisting on a strictly German national identity. Now, however, these ethnic categories are no longer as significant.

Instead, the focus has shifted to aligning with political groups and leaders who share similar ideological positions. The AfD has built connections with figures such as Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Marine Le Pen in France, Giorgia Meloni in Italy, and, of course, Vladimir Putin in Russia. These relationships are based on shared political stances rather than ethnic or national identity.

As a result, questions of European identity—such as defining who is or is not European—are not central to the AfD’s discourse. While these issues were once more relevant to debates about the European project, the AfD does not actively frame or engage with them in its political messaging today.

AfD Exploits Anti-Elite Narratives While Facing Its Own Corruption Scandals

Your research explores how direct experiences with corruption influence voting behavior. How does the perception of elite corruption fuel support for the AfD, and how does the party itself navigate corruption scandals?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: Direct experiences of corruption can occur in situations where, for example, someone needs a doctor’s appointment and has to pay extra to get one or if someone encounters trouble with the police and can offer a bribe. However, in Germany, instances of everyday corruption are extremely rare, similar to what we see in Northern European countries. In Southern and Eastern Europe, corruption is somewhat more prevalent, but still not at the level seen in developing countries in the Global South. So, corruption in daily life is not a major issue in Germany.

The idea behind this research was to examine whether individuals who have encountered corruption—however rare—experience a decline in political trust, which in turn could lead them to support radical right-wing populist parties. There is some connection between these factors, but it is not strong or systematic enough to conclude that corruption is a primary driver of radical right support.

What is more significant, however, is the broader sense of deprivation—when people feel they are not receiving what they believe they deserve. This feeling contributes to anti-elite sentiments, where people perceive that a corrupt political elite is operating behind the scenes. The AfD actively reinforces this perception, promoting the narrative that the established political parties are not only incompetent but also corrupt.

Ironically, the AfD itself has been embroiled in numerous corruption-related scandals, particularly regarding campaign donations of undisclosed origins. Some AfD politicians have also been linked to China and Russia—countries considered political adversaries of Germany—which could be labeled as political corruption. So, the party that frequently accuses others of corruption is often the one facing the most serious allegations.

The question, then, is why voters continue to buy into the AfD’s anti-corruption narrative despite these scandals. The answer lies in the AfD’s ability to deflect attention from its own issues. Rather than attempting to conceal their actions, they openly acknowledge their efforts to dismantle institutions, weaken administrative structures, and undermine principles of equality—similar to the approach taken by Donald Trump in the US. Instead of hiding, they shift the focus to other issues, primarily immigration, while painting all other parties as corrupt.

Surprisingly, this strategy has been highly effective. Many of their voters no longer deny the party’s extremist tendencies; instead, they openly embrace them. Over the past four to five years, public discourse and social norms have shifted significantly, making these radical positions more mainstream.

Vance’s Endorsement Unlikely to Sway Voters, but Munich Attack Might

U.S. President Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

And lastly, Professor Ziller, American Vice President J.D. Vance and Elon Musk have both openly supported the AfD. How do you think their support will influence the elections on Sunday?

Dr. Conrad Ziller: This is a good question. This is similar to Friedrich Merz, who introduced a law in Parliament that was also supported by the AfD, leading to a significant debate about the extent to which this shift in their firewall policy might influence election outcomes.

What we are seeing at the moment is that the AfD is not necessarily gaining beyond 20 or 21%. Their support remains relatively stable. One might ask whether we are underreporting their numbers or whether some voters are not openly disclosing their support for the AfD. Perhaps a few do underreport, but overall, our surveys indicate that a considerable number of respondents now openly state their intention to vote for the AfD. This is a notable shift compared to previous years.

In the end, I don’t think we are underestimating what the AfD might gain. However, a significant segment of the German electorate remains undecided about how they will vote on Sunday. For these voters, the final days leading up to the election may still be crucial, and certain events or rhetoric could influence their decision.

I don’t believe J.D. Vance’s statement will have a major impact, but the recent terrorist attack in Munich might, as it is a deeply tragic event that affects people on an emotional level. This, of course, is a serious issue. I think such incidents have a greater effect on voter sentiment than what J.D. Vance said. However, his endorsement is part of a broader effort to shift the political narrative further to the right and enable more power for the AfD. What is surprising is how openly he has expressed his support.

This is also reflective of a larger trend in which populist radical right parties are becoming more transparent about their real intentions. In a way, this increased openness could be beneficial because it allows European leaders and the European Union to fully recognize the situation and take action accordingly. In fact, they are already responding, as seen in the upcoming conference on Ukraine, where efforts are being made to strengthen cooperation.

Hundreds of migrants attempt to cross the US-Mexico border as the Texas National Guard works to prevent irregular crossings in Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico on March 21, 2024.
Photo: David Peinado Romero.

The “Awkward Alliance” of the Left and the Right

January 15, 2025

by ECPS_admin Commentaries Editor’s Choice Home Migration

The politics of immigration in the U.S. reveal peculiar alliances on both sides of the aisle. For Democrats, the coalition spans ethnoracial diversity, balancing ideals of equality with the economic and cultural concerns of immigration. This tension often leaves the Left grappling with its own contradictions. For Republicans, an equally uneasy partnership emerges. Grassroots voters, driven by ethnonationalist anxieties, align with capitalist elites who benefit from cheap immigrant labor. This “awkward alliance” pits anti-immigrant rhetoric against the economic realities of business reliance on immigration, fueling policies that prioritize elite agendas while alienating vulnerable voters.

By Sanne van Oosten*

Politicians of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) often cite material scarcity faced by the populations of receiving countries as arguments against immigration. Whether the argument is that ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs, public services, or housing; materialist concerns are central to their arguments against immigration. The mobilisation of perceived economic injustice has proven to be an effective strategy for attracting voters, with the most recent U.S. elections serving as yet another example.

The U.S. Republican Party now also champions strong anti-immigration narratives, though this has not always been at the top of the party’s political agenda. This shift occurred during the Obama-era. Despite Obama’s first campaign and term being predominantly focused on healthcare reform, beneath the surface of the Republican Party, anti-immigration sentiments swelled, with many voters perceiving Obama as a symbol of immigration. While he didn’t, in reality, let more immigrants in than his Republican predecessors, Bush or Reagan. Although voters are generally positive about Black politicians, Obama’s African roots invigorated the Tea Party, a grassroots movement, leading them to turn to immigration as a response to the latent, smouldering old-fashioned racism his presidency stirred.

Even in the most conservative corners of the U.S., openly admitting to being racist is stigmatised, prompting many to mask such views. Concerns over economic justice often serve as a justification for racism by pointing to the scarcity of ‘our’ jobs, public services, housing; or whatever scarce economic resource is the challenge of the moment. By invoking these appeals to economic justice, one can pull off xenophobic claims without the stigma attached to more explicit expressions of xenophobia. These forms of strategic masking not only help avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, Republicans also can leverage these strategically against Democrats. After all, weren’t Democrats the ones who were supposed to protect ‘our’ jobs, public services, and housing? Didn’t they claim to care about the people and economic justice? Well, with all the immigrants they’re letting into our country, I guess they don’t!

Besides materialist masking, ‘civilisationist‘ masking serves to destigmatise racist and xenophobic claims while simultaneously dividing Democratic voters. Trump’s call to protect ‘our’ women from Latino immigrant rapists is a prime example of contemporary U.S. femonationalism. His calls to protect American gay people from dangerous Muslims illustrate homonationalism. Amid student protests against the war in Gaza, Trump also invoked the need to protect Jewish safety—what I refer to as Judeonationalism. Essentially, the infamous U.S. election campaign quote, ‘they are eating the pets,’ was also a form of civilisationist masking—what I call animeauxnationalism. These arguments follow the same logic and purpose as materialist justice: they not only serve to avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, but they also act as a wedge to internally divide the Democratic electorate.

And the truth is, in Western countries, the Left represents a much more ethnoracially diverse voting coalition, creating an ‘awkward alliance’ as I call it. White Leftists often support the Left out of ‘conviction’ for equal rights for all, including women and gay people, as well as animals and nature, while non-white Leftists tend to stay with the Left out of ‘necessity:’ the opposition denies their identities, yet, they often prioritise other concerns over equal rights and individual freedoms. This uneasy coalition unsettles political elites of the Left, leaving them uncertain about how to navigate this political catch-22.

Indeed, there is an inherent awkwardness in the Democratic claim to champion individual freedoms and equal rights while also supporting (or at least tolerating) immigration of people who do not necessarily hold the same core national values. This awkwardness mirrors the one found in materialist concerns: the Democrats advocate for workers, stronger public services, and affordable housing, yet they also support immigration, which some believe jeopardises jobs, strains public services, and drives up housing prices. Very awkward indeed.

Yet, the alliances on the other side of the aisle might be even more awkward. The Republican Party unites forces from the top-down and the bottom-up. From the bottom-up, Republicans represent an ethnonationally anxious voting base unsettled by ‘demographic panic’ due to immigration, grown from the grass roots Tea Party movement. From the top-down, the Republican alliance consists of large business elites (such as the Koch-network) who benefit from immigration by relying on workers willing to take jobs that many white Americans won’t, such as hard agricultural labour. These forces—both top-down and bottom-up—create another ‘awkward alliance,’ or an ‘uneasy marriage,’ or even ‘strange bedfellows,’ between a voting base riled up by anti-immigration sentiment and capitalist elites who profit from cheap labour and the economic growth that immigration fuels. The racist views that are often masked by arguments of economic justice serve as a ‘godsend’ for capitalist plutocrats, enabling them to mobilise an ethnonationalist electorate. Meanwhile, top-down forces prefer concealing the fact that their voters might not be voting in their own best interest through expressing and fuelling anti-immigrant sentiment by keeping unsettling news about immigration on the national agenda and the back of people’s minds.

These top-down capitalist elites are, however, most interested in boosting business, cutting back on regulations, and shrinking government social spending by, ironically, courting a voting base that is often reliant on Social Security and Medicare. ‘Anti-Obama anger,’ fuelled by racist undertones, proved to be a ‘godsend.’ For instance, by dubbing universal healthcare ‘Obamacare,’ opposition to government spending was built with the help of racism-driven xenophobia, even among those most dependent on the exact same public services, and those who are positive about the policies when not named after the first Black president, but Clinton. Even though immigration helps their businesses grow, these capitalist elites accept Trump’s strong anti-immigration stance as ‘unpleasant ransom’ to advance their libertarian agenda, which benefits capitalism and large corporations to the detriment of the lesser-educated voters riled up by anti-immigration rhetoric. This may be the most ‘awkward alliance’ of all.

(*) Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a postdoctoral researcher at Centre for Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford.

Muslim women wearing hijabs walking on the streets of Paris, France, June 15, 2012. Photo: Shutterstock.

The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands

January 12, 2025

by ECPS_admin Articles Home Migration Populism & Politics (P&P)

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Please cite as:

van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046

Please find all replication materials including data, code and appendices here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/T7G5N

Abstract

The voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities is a topic that attracts much speculation, with some claiming that racial and ethnic minorities do vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) and some claiming they do not. In the European Union, where saving data on individual’s race and ethnicity is prohibited, it is very difficult to contribute to these conversations with real facts. Do ethnic minorities and majorities tend to vote for PRRP and what explains their (lack of) support? Thanks to a novel yet costly sampling method, I surveyed racial/ethnic minority and majority voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands and asked them about their propensity to vote for Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands. I compare racial/ethnic minority groups, including Muslims, with majority groups and test the mechanisms that might predict their support for PRRPs. My findings indicate Muslims are among the least likely to vote for PRRPs, though the difference with voters without a migration background is only significant in the Netherlands. When testing what explains the propensity to vote for PRRPs, I find that indicators of in-group favouritism usually explain support to larger extent than out-group hate. Though anti-immigration attitudes predict PRRP voting in all three countries, in-group favouritism explanations explain PRRP voting to a slightly stronger extent. In France and Germany, the ethnocentrism scale predicts voting for RN/AfD more than immigration attitudes do. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands explains voting for the PVV the most. Amongst Muslim French, German and Dutch voters, in-group favouritism, or the lack thereof, explains voting for PRRPs as well. French Muslims who feel more attached to France are more likely to vote for RN. German Muslims who do not believe in religious freedom for Muslims are more likely to vote for AfD. This also applies to Dutch Muslims, though immigration attitudes also predict voting for the PVV: the more a Dutch Muslim is against immigration, the more likely they are to vote PVV. Generally, this study makes a case for expanding the standard predictors of PRRP voting towards more indicators of in-group favouritism for the majority in-group, while for Muslims PRRP voting is more driven by policy attitudes. Feeling close or distant towards ethnic in- or out-groups does not predict PRRP voting in any of the cases. These findings contribute to our understanding of PRRP voting in Europe.

Keywords: Populism, Muslims, race, ethnicity, voting behaviour, France, Germany, Netherlands, RN, AfD, PVV.

By Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at Oxford University, sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk)

Introduction

Political pundits and strategists have long believed that increasing diversity and gender equality would naturally expand the US Democratic voting base, assuming racial and ethnic minorities would reject ethnonationalist extremism in the Republican Party and have nowhere else to turn (Judis & Teixeira, 2002; Skocpol & Tervo, 2020). While this view has been challenged over time (Judis & Teixeira, 2023; Lee, 2008), the 2024 US elections highlighted the complexity of racial and ethnic minority voting behaviour, with racial and ethnic minority voters shifting from Democrat to Republican, though still leaning Democrat (ANES, 2021).

In Europe, studying minority voting behaviour is more challenging due to privacy regulations, yet it remains crucial as the “Replacement Theory” — a conspiratorial claim that immigrants are brought in to vote for political elites — has shaped far-right rhetoric across France, Germany, the Netherlands (Bracke & Aguilar, 2020) as well as the US (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). Despite this, some pundits suggest that racial and ethnic minorities are increasingly inclined to vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs), with figures like Geert Wilders[2] and Donald Trump[3] claiming that Muslim and Black voters support them. However, all of these claims remain underexplored in Europe. This paper investigates whether Muslims and ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the Netherlands vote differently from their white counterparts, and what factors drive any differences in their voting behaviour.

Answering these questions in the European Union is more difficult than in the US or UK (as shown by the wealth of data in Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font & Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim.

In this paper, I test how likely Muslims or other minority groups are to vote for PRRPs compared to majority groups, and why. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to vote for the PVV in the Netherlands, though they are just as likely to vote for RN or AfD in France or Germany, respectively. I also explore what predicts the likelihood of Muslims voting for PRRPs. The literature on minority voting is not focused on voting for PRRPs, but explanations vary from issues, belonging and in-group favouritism, or the lack thereof, in this case. I find that issues explain PRRP voting, or the lack thereof, the most amongst the Muslims in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

Amongst majority groups, voting for PRRPs is generally often explained by economic and cultural factors, or their level of education and attitudes towards immigration. In-group favouritism is generally not studied, despite the longstanding evidence that in-group favouritism operates independently from out-group hate (Brewer, 1999). My various indicators of in-group favouritism indeed predict voting for PRRPs more strongly than immigration-attitudes and the impact of level of education disappears when including policy positions and in-group favouritism in the models.

In essence, this research advocates for broadening the conventional factors used to predict PRRP voting to encompass a greater emphasis on affinity towards the dominant in-group. Conversely, among Muslims, PRRP voting tends to be influenced more by policy stances. Whether one feels a sense of closeness or detachment from ethnic in-groups or out-groups doesn’t seem to have any bearing on PRRP voting outcomes in any scenario examined. These discoveries deepen our comprehension of PRRP voting patterns across Europe.

Theory

It has long been believed that increasing racial and ethnic diversity and gender equality would naturally lead to an expansion of the US Democratic voting base (Judis & Teixeira, 2002), as racial and ethnic minorities are put off by ethnonationalist extremism in the Republican Party (Skocpol & Tervo, 2020; Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) and, therefore, have nowhere else to go (Judis & Teixeira, 2002). Though this thesis had been questioned for a longer time (Judis & Teixeira, 2023; Lee, 2008), the most recent US elections drove the point home that reality is more complicated than the “demography is destiny” thesis claims it is[4]: The 2024 US elections saw a significant swing of racial and ethnic minority voters from voting Democrat to voting Republican[5], though the latest most robust data still indicate that the majority of Latinx voters prefer the Democrats[6], just as in 2020 (ANES, 2021). Studying the voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities is relatively easy in the US and UK, yet the more stringent privacy regulations in the European Union (EU) make sampling European racial and ethnic minorities more costly and, therefore, rare. In this paper, I use a novel sampling method and study to what extent and why racial and ethnic minority and majority voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP).

In Europe, the influential conspiratorial “Replacement Theory” claims that immigrants are imported by political elites so they will vote for the political elites who imported them[7][8], as recently propagated by Elon Musk in an effort to promote Trump in the US election campaign[9], this narrative shapes the “demographic imagination”[10] on both sides of the Atlantic. In France, the Great Replacement theory was introduced by writer Renaud Camus in 2011 (Bracke & Aguilar, 2020: 685-686), while similar claims were being made in the US before that (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011: 79-80). Promoted by right-wing figures like Marine Le Pen, it has become central to nationalist rhetoric, suggesting that French culture and identity are at risk due to immigration. This conspiracy theory has influenced political discourse, especially within far-right parties, fuelling xenophobic fears of cultural “submersion.”[11] In Germany, similar views gained traction through the works of Thilo Sarrazin, who claimed that mass immigration would lead to the decline of ethnic Germans. The theory has also been propagated by figures from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who argue that immigration policies are designed to replace native Germans. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, populist politicians such as Geert Wilders and the current chair of Dutch Parliament, Martin Bosma, have embraced the theory as well.[12][13][14]

However, pundits and PRRPs also sometimes claim the opposite: that racial and ethnic minority voters are actually very much inclined to vote for PRRPs. For instance, when Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) won the Dutch general elections on November 22, 2023 (van Oosten, 2023b), Geert Wilders gave a speech in which he thanked all of his voters, especially the many Muslims who had voted for him.[15] Pundits weighed in by giving anecdotal evidence of Muslims voting for Wilders.[16][17] Were these claims an effort to legitimize Geert Wilders as a potential prime minister of all Dutch people, or was it really true? Given the lack of research on the voting behaviour of minority groups, these claims remained unsubstantiated.

In summary, the voting behaviour of Muslims, ethnic minorities and immigrant origin individuals is speculated about wildly. As seen above, in an effort to gain perceived legitimacy, some pundits and PRRP leaders will argue minorities vote for them. Conversely, to amplify “demographic anxiety,”[18] PRRP leaders will argue minorities vote for the pro-immigrant Left. So, which one is it? Do Muslims and ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the Netherlands vote differently than their white majority counterparts? And what drives the differences?

In this theoretical framework, I first discuss the literature on minority voting which is mostly based on policy positions held by minority voters and discrimination they have experienced. Then, I discuss the most frequent explanations of PRRP voting amongst majority groups. I conclude with a discussion about in-group favouritism and how the dynamics of in-group favouritism differ amongst majority and minority groups.

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Minority Voting

I do not know of any literature on PRRP voting amongst minorities in Europe, though there is literature on the tendency for minorities to vote for left-wing parties. In general, claims that ethnic minority voters vote for Left-wing parties because of their tendency to prefer redistributive policies (Bird et al., 2010: 10–11) have been debunked (Baysu & Swyngedouw, 2020; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Sobolewska, 2006: 206–207; van Oosten et al., 2024e). Cultural issues play a much larger role in explaining voters’ choices than economic issues do (Otjes & Krouwel, 2019: 1159, 1152; Vermeulen et al., 2020: 445, 448). Many of these issues directly influence the way racial and ethnic minority voters see their place in society (Loukili, 2021a, 2021b), and the discrimination that they have experienced (Grewal & Hamid, 2022; Nandi & Platt, 2020; Phalet et al., 2010), or the discriminatory rhetoric they hear coming from politicians on the Right, making them side with the Left, not out of conviction, but out of necessity (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) or circumstance (Rovny, 2024).

Though racial and ethnic minority voters align with the Left in their views on immigration, integration and Islam, they are less likely to do so on issues such as gender equality (Spierings & Glas, 2022), Lesbian Gay, Bi and Trans (LGBT)-rights (Geurts et al., 2023) and anti-Semitism (Koopmans, 2013). These differences between racial and ethnic minority and majority voters within the Left-wing voting coalition (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) are used to drive the Left-voting coalition apart (Brubaker, 2017; Farris, 2017; Puar, 2007; van Oosten, 2024e). The general assumption is that racial and ethnic minority voters make the trade-off between aligning with the Left on issues such as immigration, integration and Islam on the one hand, and making compromises on gender and sexuality issues on the other hand (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). The extent to which this is true, remains under researched, but the rhetoric of this “awkward alliance” (van Oosten, 2025) has influenced political narratives and has rendered party strategists on the Left anxious about how to deal with cultural issues such as gender equality, immigration, and LGBT-rights (Dancygier, 2017; van Oosten, 2022a, 2022b, 2023a).

The awkwardness of the assumed diverse voting coalition of the Left has led to some similar civilisationist forms of nationalism (Brubaker, 2017). Homonationalism, femonationalism, and judeonationalism are examples of these forms of nationalism that instrumentalize vulnerable groups such as women, LGBT individuals, and Jewish people to justify exclusionary practices, particularly against Muslim immigrants. Homonationalism, coined by Puar (2007), refers to the use of LGBT-rights, particularly in Western countries, to contrast “civilised” Western values against perceived intolerance in non-Western groups, particularly Muslims. Femonationalism, introduced by Farris (2017), involves the strategic use of gender equality, often framing Western interventions as a means to liberate women in non-Western countries, such as the justification for the war in Afghanistan.

Homonationalism and femonationalism are not the only forms of civilisationism. For instance, Judeonationalism, recently coined by me (van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f), refers to the instrumental use of antisemitism to discredit immigrants and justify anti-immigrant rhetoric. Animeauxnationalism (van Oosten, 2024h) is a term I coined to describe the infamous US election campaign quote, ‘they are eating the pets,’ as another form of civilisationism that leverages the idea that racial and ethnic minorities do not believe in animal rights, especially the rights of pets, not so much farm animals, to the same extent as white majorities do. These, and many other, forms of nationalism are often mobilized to promote xenophobia by framing vulnerable groups as symbols of Western values under threat from outsiders, contributing to the marginalization of immigrants and minorities. However, because the literatures on homonationalism and femonationalism are much more developed, I will focus on the impact of these narratives on voting.

Homonationalism first emerged in the Netherlands in 2002 with populist radical right leader Pim Fortuyn, as a response to perceived threats to the country’s liberal values. This was particularly in reaction to Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, coinciding with the Netherlands’ legalization of same-sex marriage in 2000, the first in the world (Brubaker, 2017). This unique context juxtaposed a traditionally progressive stance on LGBT-rights with an alleged Islamic intolerance (Mepschen et al., 2010). In contrast, around the same time, femonationalism gained more traction in the United States, where it was initially used to gather support for the war in Afghanistan by framing it as a mission to liberate oppressed Afghan women (Farris, 2017). This strategic instrumentalization of gender equality has since spread to other Western countries, particularly in Europe (Rahbari, 2021). Meanwhile, Judeonationalism—the use of antisemitism to discredit newcomers—has been especially prominent in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, particularly following the Palestine protests in the spring of 2024 (van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f).

Civilisationism is frequently leveraged during political crises or when national identity is perceived to be under threat, particularly from cultural outsiders (Brubaker, 2017; Farris, 2017; Puar, 2007; van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f). Conceptual work on these narratives indicates they are primarily elite-driven, top-down efforts aimed at stoking xenophobia, particularly Islamophobia (Khalimzoda et al., 2025), to scapegoat minorities and distract from failing policies (de Haas, 2023). Politicians and media elites, however, frame civilisationist narratives as reactive responses to imminent threats particularly following high-profile acts of violence against women or LGBT-individuals (e.g. Frey, 2020).

Existing research demonstrates that civilisationist rhetoric affects public opinion amongst majority populations (van Oosten, 2022a, 2022b, 2023a), but it remains unclear whether this extends to racial and ethnic minority voters and Muslims. Might views on gender and sexuality impact whether racial and ethnic minority and Muslim voters vote for PRRPs? Or are minority voters more influenced by their views on immigration, integration and Islam?

Indeed, immigration policy and discrimination do impact the everyday lives of racial and ethnic minority voters. Immigration policies play a key role in determining the opportunities for family reunification, while Islamophobia and anti-discrimination laws affect access to the job market, and so on. It is therefore logical that these matters would influence the voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, Muslims endure particularly high rates of discrimination in their day-to-day experiences (Awan, 2014; Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Mansouri & Vergani, 2018), and witness their inclusion in society be mobilized for electoral purposes (Schmuck & Matthes, 2019: 739). This research will analyse the extent to which racial and ethnic minority voters and Muslims trade-off economic, gender and sexuality-related cultural issues, as well as immigration and Islam-related cultural issues influence voting for PRRPs.

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Majority Voting

There are two main schools of thought on how to explain why majority groups vote for PRRP: cultural and economic explanations. Just as is the case with minority voters, popular claims that voters are attracted to PRRPs because of economic insecurity instead of cultural issues are largely debunked with cultural issues being the most explanatory of all (Abou-Chadi & Helbling, 2018; Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2019; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). However, economic factors also continue to explain PRRP voting, when the scarcity created by the arrival of immigrants is thrown into the argument.

Although migration experts agree that the economies of receiving countries benefit from immigration (de Haas, 2023; Kustov, 2024), economic challenges and the perceived injustice faced by the populations of receiving countries are often cited as arguments against immigration: whether the argument is that ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs (Thom & Skocpol, 2020), public services (Cremasci et al., 2024), or housing (Fernández-Reino et al., 2024; Ghekiere & Verhaegen, 2022), material concerns rooted in scarcity lie at the core of the debate. The mobilization of perceived economic injustice has proven to be an effective strategy for attracting voters, with the most recent U.S. elections serving as yet another example.

The US Republican Party now champions the strongest anti-immigration narratives, though this has not always been at the top of the party’s political agenda (Skocpol, 2020). This shift occurred during the Obama-era. His first campaign and term were predominantly focused on healthcare reform (idem). However, beneath the surface, anti-immigration sentiments swelled, with many voters perceiving Obama as a symbol of immigration (idem). While he didn’t, in reality, let more immigrants in than his Republican predecessors, Bush or Reagan (Thom & Skocpol, 2020). Although voters are generally positive about Black politicians (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Obama’s African roots invigorated the Tea Party, a grassroots movement, leading them to turn to immigration as a response to the latent, smouldering old-fashioned racism his presidency stirred (Tesler, 2013).

This puts into question whether concerns over economic issues are not actually concerns over cultural issues, in other words: immigration and racism. Even in the most conservative corners of the US, openly admitting to being racist is stigmatized, prompting many to mask such views (Creighton, 2023). Concerns over economic justice often serve as a justification for racism by pointing to the scarcity of ‘our’ jobs, public services, housing, or whatever scarce economic resource is the challenge of the moment (idem). By invoking these appeals to economic justice, one can pull off xenophobic claims without the stigma attached to more explicit expressions of xenophobia (idem). Putting into question, once again, whether claims of economic injustice are real, or masks to justify anti-immigration views, racism and Islamophobia.

Anti-immigration views and Islamophobia are also not one and the same dimension that can be studied interchangeably. Views towards Muslim predict voting behaviour in the US (Jardina & Stephens-Dougan, 2021; Weller & Junn, 2018). Even those with more positive attitudes towards immigrants are far more critical towards Muslims (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018), suggesting that discrimination based on religion is much more accepted than discrimination based on ethnicity. The study at hand also sets out to answer whether views towards immigration on the one hand, and Islam on the other impact PRRP-voting differently. This research I am conducting here, will compare and contrast all of these cultural and economic explanations of PRRP-voting for both majority and minority groups. On top of this, I will also include how in-group favouritism compares to the explanations we already know.

The Differential Impact of In-group Favouritism Amongst Minorities and Majorities

According to Social Identity Theory, humans strive towards a positive self-image, and a central strategy to achieve this is in-group favouritism, which is the tendency to prefer members of one’s own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In-group favouritism is an effort to achieve, what Social Identity Theory calls, positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the tendency to seek a favourable comparison of one’s self (positive distinctiveness) through preferring members of one’s own group (in-group favouritism) (Haslam, 2001, 21). Many people mistakenly assume that in-group favouritism is a universal phenomenon, despite the pioneers in Social Identity Theory specifying specific conditions under which this occurs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 36). I highlight how individuals can be incentivized to consider alternative strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness without in-group favouritism and the role social status plays in these dynamics.

Social Identity Theory proposes that individuals use three possible strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness: individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition. The choice of strategy depends on various factors such as the group’s social status, belief in social mobility or change, the permeability of group boundaries, perceived security of group relations, and the perceived homogeneity/heterogeneity of the out-group.

Low-status groups, such as racial and ethnic minority or Muslim voters, can use the three strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness in different ways. Some groups may perceive their boundaries as permeable, for instance because they have a name or appearance that makes them pass as part of the high-status out-group. This could be the case amongst German citizens with a migration background in the Former Soviet Union or Maghrebi French with fair skin and a French name. If that is the case, they will be likely to strive for individual mobility to join the high-status group, leading to out-group favouritism through accepting the out-group’s superiority. Other groups may perceive their boundaries as impermeable, possibly due to having an ethno-racially distinct name or black skin. This may be the case amongst citizens with a migration background in Turkey or French citizens from Sub-Saharan Africa. In that case, boundaries are impermeable. If group relations are seen as legitimate and stable, individuals will try to achieve positive distinctiveness through social creativity by redefining the dimensions of group comparison or attributing different meanings to current comparative dimensions (Haslam, 2001: 25), think of Muslim women in Europe countering common stereotypes of themselves as complacent and docile (van Es, 2019). This redefinition of group membership coincides with avoiding a direct challenge to the out-group’s superiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable and status differences as illegitimate and/or unstable, low-status groups are more likely to choose social competition, leading to direct and open in-group favouritism (Haslam, 2001: 25), also known as “fighting fire with fire” in the case of Muslim voters voting for a political party advocating for and run by Muslims in the Netherlands, DENK (Loukili, 2021a, 2021b). In summary, not all low-status groups favour their in-group.

For high-status groups, the same three strategies exist, but they always lead to in-group favouritism. If group boundaries are perceived as permeable, high-status groups expect low-status groups to exert individual mobility and join them. If not, high-status groups may argue that low-status groups are guilty of causing their own inferiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable, legitimate, and stable, high-status group members may exhibit “magnanimity” while engaging in latent discrimination and covert repression (Haslam, 2001: 26), which may be the case amongst high-status groups claiming to be colour-blind (Tiberj & Michon, 2013). If a high-status group perceives group relations as unstable and threatening, they may resort to “supremacist ideologizing, conflict, open hostility, and antagonism” by directly promoting the out-group’s inferiority (Haslam, 2001: 26), as is the case with some members of populist radical right parties (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019; Kortmann, Stecker, & Weiß, 2019). For high-status groups, all strategies lead to in-group favouritism, as already demonstrated for voting behaviour (Nadler et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2024g).

Comparing France, Germany, the Netherlands and their PRRPs

I conducted this research in France, Germany and the Netherlands, three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state, there are no religious parties in the political landscape of France (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Schotel, 2021) and the approach towards Muslims is characterized by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of PRRP and Christian parties in Parliament (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019), and a history of guest workers from Turkey and Morocco and immigrants from former colonies such as Surinam and Indonesia (Vermeulen et al., 2020). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and PRRPs espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of PRRPs and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker 2017).

In France, secularism (laïcité) tends to frame debates on Islam more than in Germany and the Netherlands (Kuru, 2008). For decades, French discussions on the headscarf have more often been related to religious neutrality of the state than to gender equality (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2021). Although Marine le Pen, leader of France’s PRRP Rassemblement National (RN) mixes civilisationist weaponization of gender equality and LGBT-rights with Christian conservatism championing traditional gender roles and the abolition of marriage equality (Scrinzi, 2017: 5; Snipes & Mudde, 2020: 455–456), gay French voters are still attracted to RN more than their straight counterparts (Dancygier, 2017: 188). Nevertheless, the supposed binary between gender equality/LGBT-rights on the one hand and Islam on the other remains a powerful civilisationist argument against Islam in France (Brubaker, 2017: 1201; McGlynn, 2020).

In Germany, the first Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP) emerged relatively late in the Bundestag, compared to France and The Netherlands (Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2008; Althof, 2018). Germany has relatively conservative policies on homosexuality, such as not yet adopting marriage equality (Schotel, 2021). Germany’s PRRP Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has a more conservative Christian nature and following than their French and Dutch counterparts. AfD propagates traditional gender roles and opposition to marriage equality and to homosexual couples adopting children (Althof, 2018: 341), although examples of German homonationalist rhetoric do exist (Ayoub, 2019: 25). The rare instances of a civilisationist backlash against Islam are more often framed in feminist than homonationalist terms (Choi et al., 2021; Dancygier, 2017: 188).

The Netherlands is considered the most striking example of a country that uses civilisationist rhetoric in combating Islam (Brubaker, 2017: 1194). While France and Germany’s PRRPs need to navigate between civilisationist rhetoric and courting of conservative Christians (Marzouki et al., 2016), Dutch PRRPs have not been nearly as inhibited by constraints posed by conservative Christian electorates. Therefore, the weaponization of gender equality and LGBT-rights in combating Islam are more common, more ingrained and more virulent than in France and Germany (Brubaker, 2017: 1193–1197; Mepschen et al., 2010). Islamophobia is by far the highest in The Netherlands, compared to France and Germany (Heath & Richards, 2019: 29). Nonetheless, of the three countries, the Netherlands is the only one to recognize Islam as a state religion (Saral, 2020: 5).

The electoral systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands could help explain the different flavours of PRRPs we see in the three countries. Germany knows mixed-member proportional representation, with a first vote for a direct candidate of their constituency and a second vote for a party list. The threshold of five percent for a political party to enter the Bundestag and elements of a single-member district system and the sizable Christian population make it necessary to court conservative Christian voters, partially explaining why AfD chases conservative Christians in the way they do.

France belongs to a completely different family of voting systems with single-member districts and a two-round runoff for national elections, making it even more necessary for new parties to enter politics with a broad coalition of voters. Despite France’s strong history of secularism, exacerbating civilisationist rhetoric, RN needs to woo conservative Christian electorates in order to make it first past the post. This means that civilisationist rhetoric is less likely to be visible.

The Netherlands knows party list proportional representation and a very low voting threshold: a mere one seat in parliament. This system allows for many parties who each have their own flavour of populism and Christian conservatism separately. Indeed, the Netherlands has four PRRPs in parliament at the time of writing and three separate Christian parties as well. Dutch PRRPs are therefore less likely to need to court Christian conservatives. This explains, in part, why civilisationist rhetoric pitting Dutch secular liberal values against a regressive Islam did not need to be combined with pursuing Christian conservative voters as much as we see in France and Germany, making Dutch civilisationism “strikingly” (Brubaker, 2017: 1194) different and all the more virulent.

Methods

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font & Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritized groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations (Phalet et al., 2010; Verkuyten & Yildiz 2009; Dangubić et al., 2020), making it possible to disentangle whether effects are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven.

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, see Appendix, I gathered data between March and August of 2020 and surveyed 3.058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public. One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission, 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, we redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, we either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled me to form sizable groups of minority citizens for my final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (Coppock & McClellan, 2018; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015). Though there is still a chance of selection bias, I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanization and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights. All data, survey questions, information about the sampling strategy implemented, pre-registration details, and ethical review documentation can be found on Harvard Dataverse for France (van Oosten et al., 2024b), Germany, (van Oosten et al., 2024c) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024d). I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

I asked all respondents about their ethnic and religious identification. For ethnic identification I asked: “In terms of my ethnic group, I consider myself to be… (max. 2 answers).” I presented the respondents a list of 13 answer categories, including French, German, Dutch, Turkish, Maghrebi, Yoruba, Former Soviet Union, Kazakh, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Hindustani, see the full list on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d). The last questions of the survey were about religious identification. I asked: “Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” If the respondent answered yes, I followed up with “Which one?” allowing respondents to answer “Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Other, [specify].” Respondents were able to indicate that they identified with a max of two ethnic groups, of which one could be French, German or Dutch and one religion. Table 1 shows the exact number of each group of respondents based on their migration backgrounds, and the percentage of which identified as Dutch, an ethnic minority group or belonging to a religion.

For each ethnic group and religion respondents selected, the respondents then received a list of four statements with answers ranging from 0 (disagree) to 10 (agree), which together form an ethnic in-group favouritism scale (Bizumic et al., 2009). Respondents received this battery of four statements between zero and three times, depending on how many ethnic or religious groups they identified with. I measured levels of ethnic and religious in-group favouritism on a scale from 0 to 10. I asked respondents to answer the following questions:

In general, I prefer doing things with [ethnic or religious group] people.
The world would be a much better place if all other groups are like [ethnic or religious group] people.
I don’t think it is good to mix with people from other groups.
We should always put [ethnic or religious group] interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others.

I conducted principal component analysis and the Chronbach Alpha for the ethnic scale was 0.87 and for the religion scale it was 0.80.

I measured issue stances in both the cultural and economic dimensions, split into eight issues: taxing the rich, social benefits, climate change, fuel prices, immigration, Islam, equal pay for men and women, and Lesbian, Gay, Bi (LGB, I did not measure attitudes towards trans rights)-rights. I standardized all independent variables to run from 0 to 1. For the exact measurements of issues, belonging in the Netherlands and experiences with discrimination, age, gender and level of education, see the full list of survey questions on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d).

As the dependent variable, I measured propensity to vote (PTV) for RN, AfD and PVV by asking respondents: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain you will vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course, you can also choose an intermediate position” (as formulated in LISS, 2018). I also measured the PTV for all other parties in parliament at the time of gathering data, see the data and appendix on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d).

In figure 1a, 1b, and 1c, I analyse and present the data using marginal means where I compare different subgroups because I wish to avoid confusing readers with different reference categories (Leeper et al., 2020). I present marginal means of PTV-scores for all racial, ethnic and religious groups sampled separately. I do not use weights. I ran robustness checks with weights for the general population and didn’t find differences between the outcomes with and without weights, see code. Weighting the data for the minority and majority groups separately is impossible because France and Germany do not have population data of educational attainment, gender, age, urbanization, or region of ethnic minority and majority citizens, let alone Muslims. I analyse the underlying mechanisms using linear models. I prepared the data using R-package “tidyr” (Wickham, 2020), analysed it using linear models with R-base, and visualized it with R-package “ggplot2” (Wickham et al., 2020).

Findings

Intergroup Voting Differences

How likely are the racial, ethnic and religious groups to vote for PRRPs? In Figure 1a, I present the mean PTV-scores of RN in France and show that voters with a Turkish background in France are most inclined to vote for RN, followed closely by Christian and non-migrant French voters. Conversely, Muslims exhibit the lowest likelihood of supporting RN, significantly less than Turkish-background voters. In Figure 1b, I present the mean PTV-scores of AfD in Germany and show that voters from the Former Soviet Union are most likely to support AfD, with no significant difference in Muslim voters’ likelihood to support AfD compared to other groups. Finally, in Figure 1c, I present the mean PTV-scores of PVV in the Netherlands and find that Dutch voters without a migration background are most inclined to vote for PVV, while Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to support PVV compared to other groups, with Muslims showing the lowest likelihood.

Based on Figure 1a, voters with a background in Turkey are the most likely to vote for RN in France, with a score of 3.26 (SD = 0.34). This is closely followed by Christian voters, with a score of 2.78 (SD = 0.19), and French voters without a migration background, with a score of 2.78 (SD = 0.30). Voters with a background in North Africa come next, scoring 2.66 (SD = 0.37), followed by non-religious voters, scoring 2.56 (SD = 0.24). Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for RN, scoring 2.25 (SD = 0.45). When considering confidence intervals, there is overlap between all groups except for voters with a background in Turkey and Muslims. This suggests that the difference in voting likelihood between only these two groups is statistically significant, indicating that voters with a background in Turkey are more likely to vote for RN than Muslims in France. Although the group of French citizens with a background in Turkey is small (N=87) and mostly secular. It is important to note that Muslims are just as likely to vote for RN as non-religious and Christian voters, as their confidence intervals overlap with those groups. This suggests that there’s no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of Muslims voting for RN compared to non-religious or Christian voters in France.

In the German case, voters with a background from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are the most likely to vote for AfD, scoring 2.42 (SD = 0.39). This is followed by Christian voters, with a score of 2.34 (SD = 0.37), and German voters without a migration background, scoring 2.08 (SD = 0.34). Non-religious voters come next, scoring 1.97 (SD = 0.27), while voters with a background in Turkey score 1.72 (SD = 0.43). Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for AfD in Germany, scoring 1.50 (SD = 0.53). Notably, there is no significant difference between Muslims’ likelihood to vote for AfD and any other group, as the confidence intervals for all groups overlap. This suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in voting likelihood between these groups when it comes to supporting the AfD in Germany.

In the Netherlands, Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to vote for PVV (Party for Freedom, Partij voor de Vrijheid) compared to non-religious voters and Dutch voters without a migration background. Dutch voters without a migration background have a score of 1.99 (SD = 0.33), followed by Surinamese voters at 1.60 (SD = 0.29), non-religious voters at 1.67 (SD = 0.24), and Christian voters at 1.62 (SD = 0.24). Turkish and Moroccan voters have lower scores, 0.99 (SD = 0.26) and 0.63 (SD = 0.13) respectively, while Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for PVV, scoring 0.66 (SD = 0.20).

What Explains PRRP Voting Amongst Muslims?

Figure 2a, 2b, and 2c provide insights into the factors influencing the voting behaviour of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding PRRPs. In France, attitudes towards fuel prices, social distance towards Maghrebi individuals, and attachment to France significantly impact voting for RN. In Germany, level of education, attitudes towards social benefits, Islam, perceived social distance towards FSU individuals, and in-group favouritism towards Muslims are significant predictors of AfD support. In the Netherlands, attitudes towards taxing the rich, immigration, and Islam, along with social distance from Dutch Moroccans, influence the likelihood of voting for PVV among Dutch Muslims.

What predicts whether French Muslims vote for RN? The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.08931. Among the predictors, significant variables include the perceived social distance towards the ethnic minority group Maghrebi (Estimate = 1.67036, p-value = 0.03644), and attachment to France (Estimate = 2.58745, p-value = 0.00703), indicating that these factors have a significant impact on predicting whether French Muslims vote for RN. However, other variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, climate, fuel prices, immigration, Islam, equal pay, LGB-rights, and several measures of social distance and group favouritism were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis.

The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.4062. Among the predictors, significant variables include level of education (Estimate = -2.2044, p-value = 0.00763), attitudes towards social benefits (Estimate = -1.9359, p-value = 0.03729), Islam (Estimate = -3.2628, p-value = 0.00124), perceived social distance towards FSU individuals (Estimate = 2.2490, p-value = 0.00566), and in-group favouritism towards Muslims (Estimate = 2.1648, p-value = 0.04216). However, other variables such as taxing the rich, climate, immigration, equal pay, LGB-rights, perceived social distance towards Turkish, German, Christian, and non-religious individuals, Belonging, attachment, and self-identified ethnic group were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis. In addition to the significant variables mentioned earlier, some predictors came close to meeting the threshold for significance. These include attitudes towards fuel prices (Estimate = 1.4701, p-value = 0.08188), equal pay (Estimate = 1.3387, p-value = 0.06756), and German in-group favouritism (Estimate = 2.6970, p-value = 0.06304).

The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.1914. Among the predictors, significant variables include attitudes towards taxing the rich (Estimate = -0.6797338, p-value = 0.038547), immigration (Estimate = -1.1692163, p-value = 0.003246), and Islam (Estimate = -1.3668919, p-value = 0.000557). The more positive at Dutch Muslim is about taxing the rich, immigration and Islam, the less likely a Dutch Muslim is to vote for PVV. The more distant one feels from Dutch Moroccans, the more likely one is to vote for the PVV (Estimate = 0.7867001, p-value = 0.051232). These results suggest that perceptions of immigration, attitudes towards Islam, and social distance from Moroccans significantly influence the likelihood of Dutch Muslims voting for PVV. However, other variables such as education, social benefits, climate, fuel prices, equal pay, LGB-rights, perceived social distance towards Surinamese, Turkish, Dutch, Muslim, Christian, and non-religious individuals, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands, attachment to the Netherlands, self-identified ethnic group, and favouritism towards Dutch and Muslim in-groups were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis.

In-group Favouritism

The analysis of in-group favouritism amongst ethnic minority and majority groups, as well as Muslims and Christians in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, reveals differences in in-group favouritism scores. Amongst the majority ethnic group voters, in-group favouritism emerges as notably higher compared to minority ethnic groups. Muslim and Christian in-group favouritism are comparable.

In-group Favouritism as a Stronger Predictor to Voting for PRRPs

The findings across Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c underscore the significance of measuring in-group favouritism when examining voting behaviour for PRRPs. In each case, a substantial portion of the variance in the likelihood to vote for these parties is accounted for by factors related to in-group favouritism and attachment. Notably, French and German in-group favouritism emerge as the strongest predictors of voting behaviour for RN and AfD, respectively, outweighing other variables such as immigration attitudes. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands was the strongest indicator of voting PVV, with those who feel less accepted being more likely to vote PVV. While negative attitudes towards immigration remain a potent predictor across all cases, views that pertain to the in-group predict PRRP voting more strongly.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether French voters without a migration background vote for RN is 0.1626, indicating that approximately 16.26% of the variance in likelihood to vote for RN is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -1.727, p < 0.01), feeling accepted as belonging in France (estimate = -1.363, p < 0.05), French in-group favouritism (estimate = 2.731, p < 0.001), and feelings of attachment to France (estimate = 1.360, p < 0.05). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration and a strong sense of French identity are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for RN, while positive attitudes towards France and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for RN. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for RN in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was French in-group favouritism. Having a stronger preference for the French in-group is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for RN.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether German voters without a migration background vote for AfD is 0.2739, indicating that approximately 27.39% of the variance in likelihood to vote for AfD is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -1.905, p < 0.01), feelings of acceptance as belonging in Germany (estimate = -0.744, p < 0.05), German in-group favouritism (estimate = 3.862, p < 0.001), and Christian in-group favouritism (estimate = 3.25373, p < 0.001). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration and a strong sense of German and Christian identity are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for AfD, while positive attitudes towards Germany and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for AfD. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for AfD in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was German in-group favouritism. Having a stronger preference for the German in-group is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for AfD, amongst Germans without a migration background.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether Dutch voters without a migration background vote for PVV is 0.2732, indicating that approximately 27.32% of the variance in likelihood to vote for PVV is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -2.463, p < 0.001), concern about climate change (estimate = -1.579, p < 0.05), raising fuel prices (estimate = -1.246, p < 0.05), feelings of acceptance as belonging in the Netherlands (estimate = -2.616, p < 0.05), and preference for the Dutch in-group (estimate = 1.784, p < 0.05). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for PVV, while positive attitudes towards the Netherlands and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for PVV. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for PVV in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands. Feeling less accepted is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for PVV.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the likelihood of minorities and majorities to vote for PRRPs and what explains the voting likelihoods. In France and Germany, there are remarkably few differences in the likelihood of voting for minority and majority groups. In France, voters with a Turkish background exhibit the highest inclination to support RN, followed closely by Christian and non-migrant French voters. Conversely, Muslims show the lowest likelihood of supporting RN. In Germany, voters from the Former Soviet Union are most likely to support AfD, with no significant difference in Muslim voters’ likelihood to support AfD compared to other groups. In the Netherlands, Dutch voters without a migration background are significantly more inclined to vote for PVV, while Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to support PVV compared to other groups, with Muslims showing the lowest likelihood.

I also discuss the factors influencing the voting behaviour of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding PRRPs. Generally speaking, issues are the biggest predictor of Muslim voting for PRRPs. In France, attitudes towards fuel prices, social distance towards Maghrebi individuals, and attachment to France significantly impact voting for RN. In Germany, level of education, attitudes towards social benefits, Islam, perceived social distance towards FSU individuals, and in-group favouritism towards Muslims are significant predictors of AfD support. In the Netherlands, attitudes towards taxing the rich, immigration, and Islam, along with social distance from Dutch Moroccans, influence the likelihood of voting for PVV among Dutch Muslims.

Moreover, when it comes to majority voters, I find in-group favouritism predicts voting more than issues do. French and German in-group favouritism emerge as the strongest predictors of voting behaviour for RN and AfD, respectively, outweighing other variables such as immigration attitudes. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the country was the strongest indicator of voting PVV, with those who feel less accepted being more likely to vote PVV. Overall, negative attitudes towards immigration remain a potent predictor across all cases, while views related to the in-group predict PRRP voting more strongly.

Lastly, the examination of in-group favouritism among ethnic minority and majority groups, alongside Muslims and Christians in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, reveals that in-group favouritism is much higher among racial and ethnic majority voters. Meanwhile, the analysis shows remarkably low levels of in-group favouritism within minority groups. This trend underscores that groups with more power and privilege tend to uphold and reinforce their social dominance through favouring their own group, while the groups with less power and privilege do not favour their in-group to the same extent and might benefit more from siding with the dominant out-group.

I argue that in-group favouritism can be extended towards voting for PRRPs because the analysis reveals that French, German and Dutch in-group favouritism and PRRP voting are strongly related for racial and ethnic majority groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands. The relationship between majority group in-group favouritism and PRRP voting is stronger for majority voters compared to minority voters due to the dynamics of social identity and power asymmetry. For majority voters, who typically hold higher social status and enjoy dominant societal norms, in-group favouritism serves as a reinforcing mechanism of their perceived superiority and control over resources. In-group favouritism not only bolsters their positive self-image but also reinforces their position of privilege within the social hierarchy. I argue this extends to PRRP voting. Moreover, for majority voters, in-group favouritism and PRRP voting is intricately linked with the preservation of their cultural and political hegemony. Supporting policies or political parties aligned with their group interests not only reinforces their social identity but also serves to protect and advance their collective interests within society. In-group favouritism as well as voting for PRRPs becomes a means of maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to their dominance from minority groups.

In contrast, minority voters often face systemic barriers and discrimination that limit their access to resources and opportunities. Sometimes their situation leads to in-group favouritism, but in some situations it is more beneficial to favour the dominant out-group. This is most visible in France and Germany, where racial and ethnic minority and Muslim voters are just as likely to vote for PRRPs as their majority counterparts. In France, the Turkish group of voters is even most likely to vote for PRRPS, possibly because they are only a very small part of the population and do not have a very large in-group community to favour, unlike in Germany and the Netherlands where there are larger Turkish communities. Thus, siding with the out-group through PRRP voting might reveal an inclination towards favouring the dominant out-group to navigate existing power structures. In the Netherlands, the strong focus on multiculturalism historically, might have bolstered the Muslim, Turkish and Moroccan communities leading them to be much less likely than other groups to vote for PRRPs. However, this could also be due to the relatively explicit nature of the PVV in their opposition against Muslims, especially those of Turkish and Moroccan descent.

In conclusion, the significance of in-group favouritism varies between majority and minority voters due to the differential distribution of power and privilege within society. For majority voters, in-group favouritism reinforces their social dominance and cultural hegemony, whereas for minority voters, it may be one of many strategies employed in the pursuit of equality and social change. In-group favouritism is also more important compared to immigration attitudes in predicting PRRP voting. While negative attitudes towards immigration remain a significant predictor across most cases, I show that in-group favouritism often outweighs immigration sentiments, especially among majority voters. This suggests that for majority groups, the allegiance to their in-group holds greater sway in shaping their electoral choices than attitudes towards immigration, arguably the out-group.

Conversely, among minority voters, policy positions, especially regarding issues relevant to their community, such as immigration policies, play a slightly more decisive role in guiding their voting behaviour. This relationship between in-group favouritism, immigration attitudes, and policy preferences underscores how important it is to consider in-group favouritism in future research, recognizing its relationship with power dynamics. By doing so, we can deepen our understanding of the factors shaping electoral behaviour and contribute to a more inclusive and equitable democratic process.

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Footnotes

[1] Please find all replication materials including data, code and appendices here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/T7G5N

[2] https://www.nu.nl/formatie-2023/6292199/moslims-stemmen-helemaal-niet-massaal-op-de-pvv.html

[3] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-01/donald-trump-suggests-kamala-harris-suddenly-became-black/104167996

[4] https://www.theamericanconservative.com/is-demography-still-destiny-after-2024/

[5] idem

[6] idem

[7] https://apnorc.org/projects/immigration-attitudes-and-conspiratorial-thinkers/

[8] https://apnorc.org/1-in-3-fears-immigrants-influence-us-elections-ap-norc-poll/

[9] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-musk-x-election-influence-immigration/

[10] https://europeanstudiescentre.blogspot.com/2024/06/democracy-of-last-man-politics-of.html

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html

[13] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/01/22/kasteelheer-slaat-alarm-over-cultuur-van-europa-a1589332

[14] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2024/06/21/de-diepe-racistische-wortels-van-de-omvolkingstheorie-a4857248

[15] https://www.telegraaf.nl/video/45024727/geert-wilders-bij-overwinningsspeech-nederland-bedankt

[16] https://www.ad.nl/politiek/switchten-moslims-in-nederland-massaal-naar-de-pvv-dit-zeggen-de-cijfers~afea4f90/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

[17] https://www.nu.nl/formatie-2023/6292199/moslims-stemmen-helemaal-niet-massaal-op-de-pvv.html

[18] https://europeanstudiescentre.blogspot.com/2024/06/democracy-of-last-man-politics-of.html

Easter festival in the folklore village of Hollókő, Hungary: On April 18, 2022, as part of the tradition, men sprinkle water on women in celebration. Photo: Shutterstock.

Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement

December 20, 2024

by ECPS_admin Articles Home Migration Populism & Politics (P&P)

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Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045

Abstract

In the Hungarian context, the term ‘diaspora’ can refer to two types of communities: those formed through emigration and those emerging from the Treaty of Trianon redrawing borders in 1920. While emigrant-diasporas increasingly adopt migration as a political stance, transborder Hungarians’ strong desire to uphold their national identity aligns them with Fidesz’s nationalist narratives. It highlights their potential as agents of Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. In this paper, I explore how and to what results the two remarkably different experiences of national identity are bridged by Hungary in attempts to revive the historic nation through emigrant-diaspora engagement.

Keywords: nationalism, diaspora politics, transborder Hungarians, emigrant-diaspora outreach, state-led transnationalism

By Judit Molnar*

Introduction

“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians outside the borders,” reported the 24.hu online portal after the 2022 Hungarian elections. This statistic might seem surprising for those familiar with recent emigration from Hungary. In response to the autocratic and populist government, which increasingly infringes on democratic principles, politically motivated emigration has slowly but steadily replaced the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 financial crisis (Sampson, 2021; Örkény, 2018; Moreh, 2014; Ayodele, 2018). Hallmarked by events such as the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like Central European University, the aggressive campaign pushing women into traditional childbearing roles, and severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ community, many Hungarians opted to start a new life abroad driven by a yearning for a more liberal political environment. For this reason, recent Hungarian migrants can be increasingly interpreted as having ‘voted with their feet’, a concept Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) used to describe resistance to the regime underlying the decision to leave. As such, the Hungarian communities forming in Western Europe can be seen as counter-diasporas, as highlighted by Szily’s 2018 report, which shows that only 7% of those living in London would vote for Fidesz. Similarly, a 2022 poll by the 21 Research Center involving 5000 Hungarians abroad found that only 11% supported the governing party (Rutai, 2022).

Therefore, it is vital to understand the people behind the 94%. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that result from people crossing borders and those that emerge from borders crossing people. When the Treaty of Trianon that closed World War I in 1920 detached two-thirds of Hungary’s territory and attached them to surrounding countries, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves under the sovereignty of another state overnight. As Feischmidt (2020: 130) argues, memory politics fuelled by the Trianon cult “became the engine of new forms of nationalism.” In 2004, a national vote was held on whether transborder Hungarians^[1] should be granted Hungarian citizenship but failed due to low turnout. Despite this, when Fidesz came to power in 2010, they passed legislation granting dual citizenship to transborder Hungarians, followed by voting rights in 2011. The intergenerational trauma of being separated from Hungary, despite a strong Hungarian identity, made people living on these territories keen to support Fidesz’s nationalist agenda. As such, they became allies of the Orbán government’s nation-building efforts, not least when Fidesz turned its attention to the recently emigrated population through large-scale diaspora outreach.

The past decades have seen growing interest among social scientists in how home countries exert control over their emigrated populations transnationally. State-led transnationalism is defined by Goldring (2002: 64) as “institutionalized national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state’s political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory.” While the forms, goals, and extent of such involvement may vary (Levitt, 2001), Portes (1999) emphasizes that state-led transnationalism is driven by economic and political gains from the diaspora, leveraging emigrants’ feelings of belonging to encourage remittances, investment, voting, or lobbying in favour of their home state. According to Margheritis (2007), state-led transnationalism is typically implemented through political discourse that reinforces national ties and recognizes those living abroad as part of the nation. Gamlen (2008) further notes that diaspora narratives empower migrants by constructing transnational collective identities, elevating people who once saw themselves as minorities to being part of a global network.

With half of the world’s states estimated to engage in some form of diaspora outreach (Gamlen et al., 2013), research on diaspora engagement has become a key area of enquiry for the social sciences, which has been conducted with the primary aim of analyzing the contributions emigrants make within such frameworks. However, less attention has been paid to the micro-level implementation of these schemes, including the role of facilitators and the affective responses evoked in the targeted population. These responses are crucial in understanding how autocratic systems relying on populist narratives achieve their goals, as populism depends on provoking relevant emotions. In my ethnographically inspired paper, I focus on incorporating transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. I am interested in how their cultural identity is used to promote Hungary’s nation-building efforts, what narratives accompany their presence from the side of the home state, and what response this prompts in the emigrant-diasporas. I undertake the enquiry to uncover how the two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland amongst transborder Hungarians and emigrants from Hungary are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the historic nation. The data used in this paper was collected in London, UK, in 2022/23 and Dublin, Ireland, in 2016/17. All proper names, including those of organizations, are pseudonyms.

‘Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced by Hungarians’

It was my first visit to the Hungarian House, one of London’s longest-standing and most prestigious Hungarian diaspora institutions. The occasion was Whit Sunday, for which a ball with a three-course dinner, folk dancing, and live music had been organized. As I did not know anyone, I booked a randomly assigned seat. Once everyone arrived, we took our places and did a round of introductions. When it was my turn, my short monologue prompted one of my tablemates to jokingly comment: “We can hear from your accent that you are not from beyond the borders, but don’t worry, we will still talk to you.” It was then that I realized that on my table of 14, I was the only person who had migrated from within the current borders of Hungary. As my research unfolded, it became somewhat of an ethnographic commonplace to find transborder Hungarians dominate Hungarian events in London, even though most of them had never lived in Hungary. Some did not even hold Hungarian citizenship. While I initially found their overwhelming participation surprising, it can be explained by the place they have historically occupied in their respective home countries as ethnic minorities. Since the Treaty of Trianon attached two-thirds of Hungary’s territories to surrounding countries in 1920, transborder Hungarians cultivated their Hungarian identity under often oppressive regimes of the bordering countries, which have limited their freedom to practise their culture, most notably through restrictions imposed on the use of their mother tongue. Seeking out the company of other Hungarians for cultural preservation activities has thus become a crucial aspect of their lives. Moreover, they have been the beneficiaries of Hungary’s outreach for much longer than the emigrant population, with many schemes aimed at emigrant-diasporas modelled on initiatives successful in transborder communities.

At the core of diaspora politics is a concept shaped by the state that defines which groups constitute the nation, how co-nationals are connected, and what role the state fulfils in their lives. Verdery (1994) explains that the term ‘nation’ can refer to citizenship comprised of shared sovereignty rooted in political participation. However, it can also denote an ethnic connectedness, whereby a nation consists of individuals sharing a common language, history, or culture. In an ethnic understanding of the nation, political identity is defined by shared language and culture, while in a civic one, by shared citizenship and loyalty to political institutions. Verdery (1998) claims that unlike democratic constitutions in the West, where sovereignty resides with individual citizens, Eastern European constitutions often grant sovereignty to an ethno-nation. Although no state’s borders contain an ethnically uniform population, nations in Eastern Europe have historically been imagined around ethnocultural homogeneity, which members of the nation are expected to maintain. These expectations have often led to political measures, with Hayden (1992) proposing ‘constitutional nationalism’ to describe legal processes that privilege members of an ethno-nation.

Hungary is a clear example of a state that assigns national belonging on an ethnic basis. Since the turnover, there has been a strong emphasis on ethnic similarity as the organizing principle of the nation, with transborder Hungarians playing a crucial role. This was reflected in the 1989 amendment of The Fundamental Law of Hungary, which included a new section on the state’s commitment to them: “Bearing in mind that there is a single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of transborder Hungarians, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary” (Article D of The Fundamental Law of Hungary).

After Fidesz came to power in 2010 with a clear nationalist agenda, the Constitution and The Fundamental Law of Hungary were amended again to reflect a stronger sense of interconnectedness with Hungarians outside the borders, including transborder Hungarians and emigrants. While the old Constitution already stated that the president of Hungary represents the voice of all the world’s Hungarians inside and outside Hungary (Verdery, 1994), the new documents went further, emphasizing a ‘single Hungarian nation’ that transcends borders. The new Constitution includes the oath “to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century” (Körtvélyesi, 2012).

As illustrated by Hungary’s severe response to the refugee crisis of 2015, despite the alarming decrease in Hungary’s population due to outmigration, ageing, and declining birth rates, Hungary seeks to compensate for these numbers exclusively through ethnically Hungarian people. As Viktor Orbán stated at the 9th plenary session of the Hungarian Diaspora Council in 2019, “Hungarians can only be replaced with Hungarians” (kormany.hu). Joppke (2005) argues that right-wing nationalist parties engage co-ethnic populations abroad to counterbalance growing immigration and sustain the dominant national group’s claims over the state. Since 2010, 1374 billion HUF has been spent on national politics (kormany.hu). Notable schemes include the Bethlen Gabor Fund, which provides financial support for transborder and emigrant communities (Kántor, 2014); the Rákóczi camps organized to provide an opportunity for young people in the diaspora to visit the homeland; the Balassi Programme that enables Hungarian language training in Hungary; the Diaspora Scholarship, which brings talented young people of Hungarian roots to Hungary for study; ReConnect Hungary, the Hungarian birthright program; and the Julianus and Mikes Kelemen Programmes, which focus on preserving material culture in the diasporas.

Exemplary Communities of National Consciousness

In 2013, the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy introduced a new scheme called the Kőrösi Programme, which soon evolved into the flagship project of Hungarian diaspora engagement. Aimed at strengthening national identity in Hungarian emigrant-diasporas worldwide and consolidating ties between Hungary and its population abroad, young intellectuals have been delegated to locations with significant Hungarian populations. The Hungarian state had previously mapped independently emerging ethnic organizations to offer them state-affiliated status, which the facilitators would support. They would be in charge of organizing the community, disseminating knowledge, and conducting educational activities, which include teaching language classes, folk dancing and traditional instruments, facilitating scouting, and organizing events to commemorate national holidays. Facilitators are recruited through a competitive selection process and are required to “possess outstanding professional expertise relevant for the Hungarian diasporas and to have actively engaged in community organizing, traditionalist activities” (website of the Kőrösi Programme, 2018).

Transborder Hungarians have played a crucial role in the Kőrösi Programme. A quick look at the profiles listed on the programme’s website highlights that since its inception, around 60% of facilitators have been from transborder territories each year. Some had never lived in Hungary before their assignment and may struggle to provide in-depth knowledge about contemporary life in Hungary. However, their expertise in traditional cultural forms has often been prioritized, because, as described in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), transborder Hungarians “to the universal Hungarian culture is invaluable.” Amongst the detached territories, Waterbury (2023: 32) underlines explicitly the role of Transylvania in the nation’s cultural identity, describing the region as having a ‘mythical significance’ to Hungary, considered the ‘cradle’ of Hungarian civilisation […] and the Transylvanian rural Hungarian populations as the makers and carriers of ‘real’, ‘archaic’ and ‘authentic’ Hungarian culture.”

Their adequacy for these tasks was widely acknowledged. In a conversation with the first Kőrösi facilitator sent to Dublin in 2015, she confided in me her sentiment that she would never be as good at the job as transborder Hungarians, although she noted that some of these feelings stemmed from how the state labelled the two groups: “In my opinion, the ideal candidate was [mentions the name of the delegate sent to a different location in the same year of the programme], because on the one hand, she is from Transylvania, so that is somehow important. These days those who are not from Hungary are often considered more Hungarian than us, excuse me for my honesty. But yes, her identity is different from mine as somebody from Budapest. For me it is like I am Hungarian and then what? I am that and full stop. But for her, she and her parents and grandparents all had to fight for it. To keep it alive. So, it is crucial to her identity.”

Pogonyi (2015) argues that, unlike most diaspora schemes globally, Hungary’s outreach to its emigrated population was not devised to mobilize people for political or economic gain but to folklorize the emigrated population to strengthen Fidesz’s nationalist image. Analysing diaspora as a claims-making tool (Brubaker, 2005), Pogonyi defines Hungarian diaspora outreach as a non-instrumental identity project. Its principal goal is to reverse assimilatory tendencies, prevent intermarriage, and promote Hungarian national identification through education programs and a network of institutions reinforcing national identity. This is echoed in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), which claims that “the borders of the nation stretch as far as the influence of the national institutions, which help maintain the national identity”.

To incentivize Hungarians to (re-)cultivate their Hungarianness, the state has identified transborder Hungarians as indispensable. According to Fidesz’s discourse, transborder Hungarians are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, workshy rabble” (Kunz, 1985: 102) in the 1950s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), transborder Hungarians have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Placing them at the centre of diaspora schemes thus applauds them for preserving national consciousness for over a century despite often repressive circumstances. Hence, their presence communicates the Hungarian state’s expectations to all its citizens abroad.

As Kiss and Barna (n.d.) highlighted in the early 2010s, transborder Hungarians increasingly fail to consider Hungary as the primary destination of their emigration projects and, instead, tend to venture further afield. For people in the transborder territories without European Union membership when Hungary joined the EU in 2004 or under labour movement restrictions like Romanians after accession in 2007, Hungarian citizenship served as a passport to the West. Consequently, a growing number of transborder Hungarians decided to migrate to countries that they perceived as economically more viable than Hungary. Still, once in the country, they often sought out Hungarian diaspora organizations to join for sentimental reasons. It is therefore essential to highlight that while the involvement of transborder Hungarians in diaspora communities generally occurred out of their own will and enthusiasm, their presence is often interpreted through the lens of dominant Fidesz narratives, which influences not only their reception and integration opportunities in the community but also the extent to which their views are welcomed.

My fieldwork revealed that their presence often exacerbated resistance from the emigrant community against the government. On the one hand, they played a cultural revitalization role that was appreciated by families with young children and sensitized Hungarians to the fact that the ability to practise one’s identity, language, and culture should not be taken for granted. However, precisely the fervent practice of culture and strong national identity repelled emigrant Hungarians. Outbursts of appreciation for being Hungarian often made Hungarians from Hungary cringe, with critical remarks about what was commonly perceived as ‘magyarkodás.’ ‘Magyarkodás,’ a word that means the active cultivation of being Hungarian, denotes an overly zealous attitude towards expressing one’s Hungarian cultural identity. My informants saw ‘magyarkodás’ as irritating and something to be avoided, mainly due to its close association with the Orbán government and its expropriation of national symbols.

Such sentiments frequently translated into discriminatory remarks from Hungarians. While they welcomed the transborder Hungarians’ efforts to ensure the continuity of events, they complained that they were pushing them out of an organization that was supposed to be theirs. When I inquired into such feelings, I found that many had held resentment towards transborder Hungarians since their time in Hungary. Common reasons included the feeling that they were taking jobs and opportunities meant for locals, with many believing transborder Hungarian networks were strong and helped them get ahead quickly. Additionally, a large part of the resentment stemmed from the perception that these people received priority treatment from the Hungarian state, which seemed to care more about them than its citizens. For example, when the Hungarian state replaced the beloved priest of the community with a Csángó [ethnic Hungarians of Roman Catholic faith mainly living in the Romanian region of Moldavia] priest, it resulted in tangible resistance from the community, who complained about his unusual choice of Hungarian words, but most of all, his incorporation of nationalist sentiments in his sermons.

During my fieldwork, the Hungarian House was undergoing a slow but steady transition. Originally a refuge for all Hungarians who left their homeland after the World Wars, it became a vibrant place for Hungarian social and religious life since 1956, with the arrival of refugees fleeing the revolution against Soviet occupation. To this day, the leadership primarily consists of people who left Hungary during that time. They hoped to pass on roles to Hungarians who arrived post-accession. Still, since this group enjoyed a transnational lifestyle involving frequent trips home, they did not feel a strong need to cultivate their culture through diaspora organizations. Eventually, the group that took the initiative were transborder Hungarians, much to the dismay of the older generation. According to a transborder Hungarian committee member, the biggest challenge they faced was creating peaceful coexistence with older members, who viewed transborder Hungarians with growing suspicion. Despite this, the Hungarian House inevitably shifted towards becoming a predominantly transborder Hungarian organization, which ensured its continuity and gave it a cultural character that many of my informants from Hungary found hard to identify with.

Tapping the Diaspora’s Political Remittance Potential

On 2nd October 2016, the new Kőrösi facilitator in Dublin organized a memorial walk in the Glendalough mountains to honour Áron Márton, the bishop of Transylvania who dedicated his life to promoting Hungarian culture despite the oppressive Romanian government. As the facilitator came from a region of Serbia with a large ethnic Hungarian population, everybody understood that this commemoration was a project of personal importance to her. However, few understood why the meeting point was in front of the Hungarian Embassy in Dublin. As we later discovered, it was the day of the referendum on vetoing Brussels’ proposal to distribute incoming asylum seekers across the EU. As soon as the cars started arriving, the facilitator would quickly usher everyone into the Embassy, emphasizing that it was the duty of everyone with any national feelings to cast a vote.

Transborder Hungarians and the European Union (EU) represent two opposing poles in Fidesz’s thinking. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), populism divides society into two homogenous groups: the ‘pure people,’ associated with the nation, and the ‘corrupt elite,’ which hinders the nation’s unity. Populism’s belief that the people’s will is clear fosters authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on perceived threats to national homogeneity. Populist leaders argue that real power lies not with democratically elected officials but with illegitimate forces like organizations and bureaucracies undermining the people’s will. Hungarian populist discourses stem from a fear of external threats to national unity, often framed through the memory of Trianon. Anti-elite sentiments target foreign or supranational institutions, like the EU, frequently blamed for promoting a globalized outlook that conflicts with the national one. Like other xenophobic populists in Europe, Hungary views the EU as representing the interest of ‘aliens’ that threaten the nation’s purity, from which ‘the people’ must be protected. In this logic, if the EU is the villain, transborder Hungarians are glorified as the ‘true’ people who can save the nation.

The Orbán government has long relied on transborder Hungarians for support in national elections and referenda by making voting significantly easier, effectively allowing them to tilt the results. As Herner-Kovács (2020) explains, transborder Hungarians have come to represent a potent political remittance potential to the state as “politically active and organized communities with strong and effective ties to Hungary” (1161). Since they represent a predictable voter base, those with non-resident Hungarian citizenship – and thus the right to vote – have been granted access to letter voting. After Fidesz enabled ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship, nearly half a million have benefitted from the opportunity. Patakfalvi-Czirják (2017) argues that this created a moral obligation, and transborder Hungarians’ overwhelming support can be seen as a ‘vote of gratitude.’ Their perceived duty to defend Fidesz became especially evident during the 2022 campaign when the opposition leader was rejected by local representatives of several transborder territories (Bereznay, 2022).

Recent Hungarian emigrants to Western Europe, often perceived as critical of the Orbán regime and likely to vote for the opposition, face limitations in their election participation. In 2022, Hungarians in the United Kingdom were restricted to only three polling locations despite the 15 that the community lobbied for (Czinkóczi 2022), which meant a 1000-kilometre journey for some voters. Outraged by these arrangements, the Hungarian diaspora self-organized itself to fundraise money to support the travel costs of those who wanted to vote but could not afford to travel. The discrepancy between the opportunities given to transborder communities and emigrant-diasporas to exercise their democratic rights is apparent. This led Waterbury (2023: 1) to assert that the “2022 Hungarian parliamentary election highlights the phenomenon of competing external demoi, a situation that emerges when an incumbent government differentially enfranchises and mobilizes different external national communities for electoral purposes, thus triggering a competing mobilization of external voters by nonincumbent political actors.”

Incidents of transborder Hungarians incentivizing emigrant-diaspora members to vote have not been well received among the emigrant-diasporas. The unequal arrangements have generated feelings of jealousy and a sentiment that the Hungarian state prioritizes transborder Hungarians’ preferences about the direction in which the country is headed. Hungarians from Hungary find it unfair that people who may have never lived in Hungary would decide on issues affecting those living there. Among the emigrant-diaspora in London, three attitudes emerged toward voting. Some stated that they did not want to impact the outcome since they had committed to the UK. Though not planning to return, others felt responsible for the fate of their families and friends still in the country and found it important to vote. The third group insisted on voting, emphasizing that they would consider the return if Fidesz lost power. As such, to make sense of Fidesz’s overwhelming victory in the 2022 elections, a frequently uttered evaluation amongst emigrant Hungarians was that ‘Hungarians had no chance as the transborder Hungarian allies of Orbán decided the outcome,’ even if, their numbers are too small to have a significant impact.

‘The Carpathian Basin Coming Together’

Frigyes was impossible to miss in the Hungarian community in Dublin, not only because his manners were reminiscent of early 20^th-century Hungarian novels – a literary period that inspired him greatly. Having initially migrated for economic reasons from the Hungarian-speaking region of Slovakia, Frigyes spent nearly a decade in low-paid service jobs, but eventually, he decided it was time to reap the benefits of his hard work: he registered as unemployed and committed himself entirely to the diaspora community. His enthusiasm was driven by a sense of finally being recognized as Hungarian after having experienced repression as a minority in Slovakia and as inferior in Hungary: “Borders have disappeared. It is a huge thing that for example at the [mentions specific event in Dublin] there are almost as many people from the transborder territories like from the mother country. […] Here, the fact that everybody is Hungarian is so natural that it is not even a question. Just like it is evident for you that you are Hungarian, not a question and is something that you take for granted. For me, it is a huge thing to see the Carpathian basin coming together, that the nation has come together and to see that this is not something unimaginable, but something that can actually function.”

Once facilitators began arriving in his community, Frigyes recognized himself as a Kőrösi facilitator: having dedicated years to supporting the diaspora community in Dublin, he was confident that he could excel at the task and thus decided to apply for the position. The application process was not straightforward, as it required first acquiring Hungarian citizenship, which posed a challenge. Slovakia, in opposition to Hungary’s policy of granting citizenship to transborder Hungarians, did not recognize dual citizenship. Despite this, Frigyes was determined and, in a bold move, gave up his Slovakian citizenship. Although he hoped to be assigned back to Ireland, he was open to taking on the role in any Hungarian diaspora community worldwide, indicating that his commitment was ultimately not to his host country but to the newfound freedom to be Hungarian fostered by emigrant-diaspora spaces. Shortly after, another transborder Hungarian from the Dublin diaspora followed suit and stayed in the job with her assigned community ever since.

Transborder Hungarians thrived in every diaspora community I studied, often attributing their success to the emigrant-diaspora space, which allowed them to express their Hungarian identity fully. Placing a great emphasis on national identity and cultural practices, they regularly attended diaspora events, which they described as giving them a sense of integration into the nation for the first time. Although some had spent much of their lives in Hungary, they described facing xenophobia and resistance from locals. One participant explained that identities are born out of people’s need to differentiate themselves from the people around them based on the ‘us vs them’ formula. Nonetheless, as the population of Hungary is relatively homogenous, there is not much option to create such distinctions. Therefore, as he put it, discrimination is often not based on fundamental differences but on perceptions that “paint one with the colours of the nation and the other one with the colours of distance.” In Ireland, however, where all Hungarians became a minority, it was a natural instinct to come together to maintain their identity, forming a unified community. While many transborder Hungarians initially arrived in Ireland to return to Hungary, their participation in the diaspora led them to reconsider that intention, as their connection to the home community conflicted with the fulfilment that emerged from being part of a cohesive Hungarian group abroad.

Rooted in this experience, in Ireland, transborder Hungarians felt that with their presence, they were actively contributing to a new definition of national unity, which involved the spreading of irredentist ideologies. As one of my participants explained, she had plans to bring her experience back home to Transylvania, but she often felt side-tracked by feelings experienced in her diaspora community. She explained, “They seem to like the thought of big Hungary and appreciate people from these territories a lot. And I find it fantastic to get this feeling. I always get goosebumps”—such processes aligned with Fidesz’s agenda. As Lowe and Peto (2013) emphasize, irredentist narratives are forever present in modern Hungarian politics. While Orbán has never specifically claimed to intend to re-attach the lost territories to Hungary, he consistently peeves neighbouring countries with the close ties he maintains with transborder Hungarians, not least by designating 4^th June – the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon – as a ‘day of national unity.’ Lowe and Peto also note that Hungarian everyday life is scattered with allusions to the detached territories inherently belonging to Hungary, including the generalised use of the term ‘mai Románia területén’ [on the territory of current-day Romania] and weather forecasts showing temperatures for the detached territories. As Sava (2020) further illustrates, since 2018, Hungary has also opposed Europe’s celebration of the end of the two World Wars as moments of reconciliation and European integration, instead hoarding resentment against Western states for letting the Trianon Treaty happen.

At the New Year’s Eve ball at the Hungarian House, as the clock struck midnight, three anthems played to usher in the New Year: The Hungarian national anthem, the British national anthem, and finally, the anthem of the Székely people, an ethnic Hungarian group primarily living in Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș counties of Romania. I was already accustomed to hearing this anthem at Hungarian church services, so I did not question its inclusion in such an event. However, a fellow participant was visibly confused and asked, “What is this? Is this something from here? I’ve never heard it before!” When another person explained what it was, the first person sighed and made a face, clearly disapproving of the choice. When I inquired with the operating director of the event, he explained that the decision was personal, as he felt the anthem was meaningful and dear to many attendees. Other transborder Hungarian attendees justified the inclusion by referring to Fidesz’s decision to replace the European Union flag with the Székely flag on the National Parliament—an act many Hungarians from Hungary saw as provocative and irredentist. The incident highlighted the complex dynamic that Hungarian diaspora members often faced. By practicing their culture at the Hungarian House, they were forced to navigate the delicate balance between balancing a cosmopolitan European identity, which had helped their integration into the UK, and the growing nationalist and irredentist sentiments within the diaspora community, which suddenly seemed like a pre-condition to keeping their traditions alive.

Conclusion

Populism is a tool of isolation that works well with the restrictive ideologies of nationalism as illustrated by the recent political processes unfolding in Hungary. Nationalism centres on the nation as a community with shared values, culture, and identity and emphasizes the importance of sovereignty and independence. It frames the country as being threatened by external or internal forces, such as immigration, foreign influence, or globalization, to which the antidote is people loyal to the nation-building process through their insistence on the practice and preservation of the authentic culture pertinent to the nation. In the Hungarian context, Fidesz has identified transborder Hungarians as key allies for their patriotic feelings regarding Hungarian culture that evolved due to a century’s worth of being a minority.

In this paper, I enquired into one specific context in which their help in promoting nationalist narratives was relied on, namely the diaspora outreach programmes of the Hungarian state targeting recently emigrated Hungarians to the West of Europe. In line with the goals of diaspora engagement, their involvement was aimed to boost nationalist pride and cultivate Hungarian culture, incentivize voting behaviour on the side of Fidesz, and an irredentist approach. Further to the government being invested in mobilizing transborder Hungarians for such purposes, what enhanced their collaboration was that these people found a unique haven of identity preservation in emigrant-diasporas. In London and Dublin, transborder Hungarians thrived in emigrant-diaspora communities, primarily due to the deterritorialised nature of diaspora spaces. The territorial detachment from their country of origin and from Hungary rid them of the resistance of the states whose territories they used to reside on and the resistance of Hungarians in Hungary, who often perceived them as unwanted migrants. While, on the one hand, this new space empowered them to cultivate their Hungarian identity without limitations, at the same time, it reinforced their alignment with the Hungarian state’s goals: regardless of whether they supported Fidesz, their participation took places within dominant Fidesz narratives and as such, through their presence, Fidesz found a way to penetrate emigrant-diaspora spaces.

Nonetheless, the response was mixed. While the two communities studied were geographically not too far apart, the context differed: the Irish diaspora community in 2016/17 consisted of recent emigrants who were only trying to find their feet in the country. Most of these emigrants identified as economic migrants with plans to return. Thus, they were keen to stay in touch with their Hungarian roots and identified membership in the community of compatriots as a pre-condition to their success in the country. As such, the atmosphere in diaspora spaces was more community-oriented and forgiving of differences. However, in the case of the Hungarian House in London, which principally emerged out of political migration, people were less welcoming of state narratives and often penalized individuals who were seen to represent the home state’s ideologies. Nonetheless, in a community where most people lived transnational lives and felt equally invested in their host country, transborder Hungarians were often the only people motivated enough to invest time into keeping the community of Hungarians alive. By taking on such roles, they were transforming the very texture of what being part of an emigrant-diaspora meant: spaces of political resistance transformed into venues expressing nationalistic sentiments, reproducing Fidesz’s narratives. While on the surface, aligning transborder Hungarians with Hungarian diaspora outreach highlights a clever political move, it remains to be seen what impact this strategy can achieve. From the evidence gathered, it seemed that the long-term effect might be counter-productive and might result in the withdrawal of Hungarians from spaces dedicated to the preservation of Hungarian culture as they increasingly fail to identify with the state-led processes unfolding in them, thus undermining the very goal of diaspora outreach.

(*) Judit Molnar is a PhD researcher of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, where her research focuses on the correlations between home state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity amongst first-generation Hungarian and Venezuelan migrants to London, the United Kingdom. Judit holds a research Master’s in Cultural and Social Anthropology from the University of Vienna and another Master’s in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews. Judit has engaged with Hungarian diasporas in Ireland, Argentina, and the United Kingdom. Before coming to Oxford, she was a diaspora facilitator of the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy. She has also worked with the UN’s International Organization for Migration, focusing on the Venezuelan migration crisis, and the European Commission’s Cabinet for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, researching ways to foster a pan-European identity.

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Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism

December 5, 2024

by ECPS_admin Articles Editor’s Choice Home Migration Populism & Politics (P&P)

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Please cite as:

Tostes, Ana Paula. (2024). “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 5, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0043b

Abstract

The article seeks to investigate the EU crises impacting electoral support for new right-wing and left-wing extremist ideologies with populist characteristics. We examine populist political parties’ performances in national elections in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of specific and diffuse Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002). Finally, we confirm that Euroscepticism increases in periods of crisis and can be identified as expressions of those contesting EU policies related to the economy, specifically, or social and political integration when it encompasses a more generalized attitude against the EU.

Keywords: populism, Euroscepticism, EU crises

(Received June 6, 2024, Published December 5, 2024.)

By Ana Paula Tostes*

Introduction

Despite the ambiguities of the concept of populism (Judis, 2016; Müller, 2016; Kaltwasser, 2012), in this article, we discuss its emergence in the context of the EU integration process, reflected in the increase in Euroscepticism. Popular support for EU institutions and policies has been the primary measure of the legitimacy of the authority of the European institutions, as it provides greater transparency on the coherence between the expectations and perceptions of European citizens and EU governance (Cmakalová & Rolenc, 2012). Public opinion and voter preference for pro-European political parties have been considered relevant in the conditions under which direct elections are held only for the European Parliament, and supranational institutions have been created without public participation and sufficient understanding of the European public.

For this study, we used the national electoral results of extremist political parties from the time the new European far-right ideology emerged in the late 1980s to 2023. We examined the electoral platforms, political strategies, and electoral support of populist political parties in 15 Western European countries to understand better the current state of Euroscepticism in the region and extremist far-right and far-left political parties.

There is a significant amount of literature about the impact of regional integration on European societies, domestic politics, and party systems. Scholars have engaged in lengthy debates on its impact levels, limits and importance (e.g. Kitschelt, 1992; Gabel, 2000; Mair, 2005, 2007; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996). Taggart (1998) and Marks et al. (2002, 2006) examined voter preferences in national elections based on the level of support for regional integration. They found that national political parties’ position on the regional integration process in Europe is an important variable in explaining voter preferences. Marks et al. (2002, 2006) rated European electors’ ideological and party positions according to the level of support for integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Issues related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” elements in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters.

Since the early single market consolidation until the euro crisis in 2008-2009, views that strongly oppose economic integration, such as the ones voiced by far-left political parties, have not received much support from voters. Criticisms of the liberal model for a single market have not been enough to convince citizens that the integration process could cause actual harm, especially those who are distant from it and do not feel that it threatens economic losses. On the contrary, throughout the 1990s, the countries affected the most by the 2008 financial crisis benefitted from the European Structural Funds resource transfers. The situation was similar during the COVID-19 pandemic, which resulted in an unprecedented economic contraction in 2020. In both cases, the EU transfer of benefits and funds was fast, forceful and well-coordinated at all levels.

The same cannot be said about the opponents of social and political integration, the same groups in European societies that see the migration crisis as a critical element causing intolerance and populism to grow in the region. Since the European migration crisis began in 2015, there has been a considerable increase in the politicization of the defence of national identity and culture due to the stances of new far-right political parties.

We have researched public documents and sources and political party manifestos to classify populist political parties by country and, according to Marks et al. (2002, 2006), scale for the consideration of ideological positions impacting the support for integration in the economic sphere and the political and social spheres. Then, we collected the number of votes each party received in each national (Parliamentary) election in the 15 Western European countries to apply the dimensions of Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002).^[1]

EU Contestation and Populism

No crisis in the history of the European Union (EU) compares to the massive wave of migration to Europe, which reached its highest point in 2015 and has not yet come to an end. The EU is a complex and long-term construction, which would only be possible to build continuously or without route changes. There have been essential crises in recent decades, including the Maastricht crisis in the 1990s, the attempt to approve the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and the series of crises triggered by the economic and financial collapse that affected all the countries in the eurozone in 2009. The EU’s crises have been the object of research and theories to explain different features, contexts, and impacts on the legitimacy and stability of its institutional structure and policies (Brack & Gürkan, 2020). However, a common consequence of the economic and migration crises was the growth of political radicalism and EU contestation. Over the last two decades, the resurgence of terrorism and political radicalism has contributed to the emergence of a socio-political scenario that has become a new normal for Europe: one fraught with assuming populisms and nationalisms that have chosen the EU as a target of criticism.

This article does not ignore a broader, global wave of conservatism that uses populist political platforms, affecting political environments across the Americas, from the United States to Argentina, Brazil and other Latin American countries. However, in the case of the EU, which represents the most critical and successful regional organization and is mentioned as a model for other regions such as South America, it is important to understand under which political circumstances greater integration among states generates opposition. In other words, when does support for regional institutions and norms turn into criticism and skepticism?

Populism found fertile ground to develop during the two major recent crises in the EU: when the euro crises shook the eurozone’s member states (2008-2009) and during the peak in European immigration levels (2015). Although this new acceptance and recognition of criticisms of the excesses of EU institutionalization and the distance between it and national civil society sectors had different effects on different groups, EU contestation was a common strategy for many of them. Criticisms about accountability and participation in building European architecture have always existed. Still, the “nudges” (Sunstein, 2020) are not capable of generating a new set of critical positions articulated around a narrative that accuses elites and representative models of usurping nativist and identity preferences. We now know, especially after the Brexit experience, that criticism of the EU is stronger among portions of the UK population that do not feel that they benefit from globalization or integration, not even the way they facilitate the circulation of people, goods, services and capital within the European Single Market region.^[2] Disapproval of the representative model, which extends to the EU, has come mainly from those who possibly (or apparently) perceive themselves as having been harmed by European regional integration or not benefitting from it, even if their dissatisfaction with political, social or economic issues are not related to regional integration itself.

Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) examined voter preferences in national elections and the relations, if any, to regional integration. The authors rated voters’ ideological and party positions according to their level of support for European integration in the economic, political and social spheres. Themes related to identity, sovereignty, security, etc. – that is, “non-material” issues found in ideological positions on both the right and the left – proved to be variables that influence the preferences of European voters. Based on their categorization of political parties’ party family by ideology (Mair & Mudde, 1998; Marks et al., 2002), we expect that economic crises are more likely to affect voters with critical views from the left and alternative side of the ideological spectrum, while those related to immigration affect more conservative and nationalist voters, whose ideological preferences are similar to those of the new extreme right-wing political parties.

In both cases, parties at the opposite ends of the political spectrum promise immediate and easy solutions to complex problems, which they frame in similar, comparable scenarios while evoking “fears,” “frustrations,” “anger,” or “resentments” (Müller, 2016, p. 12). Although populism is on the rise in different social and political contexts around the world, this article discusses a possible correlation between critical events associated with EU politics and policies and the increase in votes for populist electoral platforms fueled by social groups related to the new political cleavages identified with the extreme left and the extreme right (Marks et al., 2002; Kurt, 2013). When we look at national electoral results, we find that political and social turmoil is conducive to the success of populist strategies in EU member states’ national elections.

For this article, we used data from the 15 Western European member states (EU15) on electoral support for extremist political parties over nearly 40 years. These countries allow us to consider similarities in their political party ideologies and systems, as the period of the research enables us to identify changes in support for extremist political parties in national elections, as it goes from the time the new European far-right parties emerged in the 1980s (Ignazi, 1996) in the EU15 to recent days.^[3]We do not consider their success in obtaining seats in national parliaments, but rather the votes they obtained to indicate voter support for the extremists’ platforms.

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

The EU represents the status quo for liberal democracy, and it claims to be the promoter of the rule of law and Western values, both within the region of integration and outside it, through its international relations policies and strategies. Anti-establishment voters who fuel criticisms of representative institutions in national elections ground their positions on the regional model of EU institutionalization based on representation without any mechanisms for direct participation. The European Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, and the European Parliament elections are seen as “second-order” (Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Reif & Norris, 1997) and less important than national ones. To support our argument, we revisited the literature on populism to find signs of populist political strategies in national elections that feed on dissatisfaction with supranational governance and regional integration.

Euroscepticism and Populisms

Euroscepticism has become a “catch-all term” (Bertoncini & Koenig, 2014) broadly used by society and the media, but also by the academic world that seeks to classify and conceptualize it to clarify positions on and the dimensions of skepticism towards Europe and its model of economic and political integration. As a result, there is a point where Euroscepticism and populism overlap. The latter is an older concept with several historical and methodological variations but no single unambiguous definition. Thus, in recognition of the conceptual difficulties related to the term “populism”, it is necessary to clarify how the term will be used and the limits of its use in this article. While we do not consider Euroscepticism a subcategory of populism, Eurosceptic parties have used populist strategies in their campaigns and accused Brussels of many economic problems and the migration crisis.

Although there is no single definition of populism, two common affirmations in the literature are that the term is generally used to discredit political opponents associated with an elite that has expropriated the power of the people and that the populist leader appears as an alternative for reclaiming legitimacy and the authority to represent the “popular will” (e.g., Taggart, 2000, 2002; Laclau, 2005; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Stanley, 2008; Müller, 2016).

Political scientists use the term “populism” to refer to the call for the “people” to assume their place as historical actors. The social sciences field originally coined the term “populism” in the Weberian sense of “charismatic” leadership: in other words, a populist is a leader who seeks to have his actions legitimized directly by the people and replace institutions. Even so, new populism aims to use public consultations strategically to restore democratic legitimacy. A common conclusion in the literature is that populists attract voters who are “frustrated” with traditional politics and “angry” with or “resentful” towards elites that allegedly did not heed their demands (Müller, 2016). This helps to understand why populists demand public consultations to evade institutional control. This is not a novelty in the contemporary world, as Max Weber had already identified back in the 19^th century in England (in “Politics as a Vocation”, published in 1919 in Germany) the practice of “charismatic leaders” holding direct consultations with the people. These leaders use plebiscitary democracy and direct dialogue with the masses, without the intermediation of institutions, to seek legitimacy to bypass procedures and representative institutions. Therefore, the most significant danger of contemporary populism is that it adopts democratic procedures and values to denounce the illegitimacy of democracy. They promise to rescue the people’s “will” while opposing an “elite”.

The “real” power of the people will not, however, be “democratically rescued” by promises of ongoing political participation nor by an “open-ended process of deliberation among actual citizens to generate a range of well-considered popular judgments” (Müller, 2016, p. 29). Populists use referendums to ratify what populist leaders have already chosen as the real issue for people to approve or disapprove to regain their lost identity (Müller, 2016). Popular participation is to substitute the action of representative institutions. It should be noted, however, that populism is not necessarily a prerogative of populist leaders or parties but rather a strategy that mainstream political groups can adopt. For instance, David Cameron’s promise to hold the British referendum on Brexit during the 2014 campaign to guarantee his victory in 2015 has been classified as a populist act committed by a non-populist leader.

Another example is the referendum held on July 5, 2015, in Greece, in which the “no” to the European bailout plan won. Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza, promoted the referendum while he continued to negotiate austerity packages for Greece. Tsipras opposed leaving the EU but allowed the referendum, as he did not believe the popular consultation would produce the outcomes it did. The people of Greece did not realize that the agreements on the rescue plan were already on the negotiating table with the Troika and that the alternative to austerity measures was the Grexit. Those who voted against the measures did not necessarily support the idea of Greece withdrawing from the EU. This is a clear case, then, where the oversimplification of an issue during a referendum can produce results that go against the people’s will and threaten the future of the EU. In any case, the strategic use of plebiscitary democracy in the EU to gain popularity and power is a topic of research that warrants further study.

Finally, populism is based on the promise of salvaging morality. The moralization of political discourse and the idea of recovering dignity lost or threatened by corrupt or mistaken politicians justify replacing institutions and procedures with calls for the people to make general decisions on often complex and multifaceted problems. Müller (2016) describes well the difference between “participation” and “the use of referendums” to approve predetermined ideas that do not always reflect the complexity of the solution to a political problem.

A Perfect Match: The EU’s Institutional Complexity and Populist Strategies

The EU is one of the most vital innovations in international relations in the 20th century, mainly due to its institutional network and the regionalization of domestic policies. The creation of the EU intensified diplomatic ties in the region and increased intergovernmental cooperation on national policy issues such as justice and security. It also established a supranational legal framework and regional governance. However, this institutional development was not accompanied by a proportional increase in the different societies’ understanding and information about the European model of integration’s impacts on the social and political life of the citizens of EU member states.

Created only in the 1990s, nearly four decades after the first steps towards regional integration were taken, European citizenship was to contribute to the consolidation of social integration. The existence of European citizenship was to generate a compelling connection between individuals and supranational institutions, such as European Community Law, which organizes not only relations between member states but also between the EU, its institutions and individuals. All this institutional construction was, however, the result of diplomatic action between national governments without the direct participation of the European public. Public consultations were rare, and significant reforms and regional policy innovations were carried out without efforts to raise public awareness about the impacts they would have on national societies.^[4] Intergovernmental and diplomatic negotiations used the instruments of representation and indirect democracy to their fullest. This partly explains why mistrust and rejection of European policy grows as EU institutions become more consolidated and visible to citizens.

Ignazi (1996; 2003) and Kitschelt (1994, 1995) associate the force of the new extreme right in Europe with the significant changes in the political spectrum in the region. These authors consider the new European far-right parties a by-product of post-industrial societies and thus classify them as “anti-system parties”. Stefano Bartolini (2007) highlights another critical event in the development of post-industrial European societies. The author sustained that no other issue in “post-war electoral history” has had the same broad and standardizing effects across the European party system as the regional integration process has.

In this integration scenario, when immigration started to increase considerably, we witnessed anti-immigration policies become one of the main points on the platform of new far-right populist parties in the region when they reformulated the focus of their arguments and criticism of democratic institutions. At a lower level, anti-immigration attitudes have emerged since the signing and implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1985,which generated the slow (but consistent) growth of this new far-right ideology throughout the 1990s. Between 1989 and 1999, in response to the occupancy of seats in the EP by representatives of the far-right, racism and xenophobia began to be monitored regularly in the region, which led to the publication of the first report on the issue in June 1999.^[5] It was clear, then, that European citizens’ coexistence with different cultures and nationalities generated social integration and defensive and xenophobic reactions. Around that time, the National Front, the most consolidated political party of the new far-right in Europe, founded in 1972 by Jean-Marie Le Pen (father of Marine Le Pen, president of the party since 2011), began to win seats in the French parliament in 1986. Jean-Marie Le Pen was elected to the European Parliament for the first time in 1984 and has not lost electoral support to represent French extremists in the EU since then.^[6]

There is a wealth of theoretical works and empirical studies that establish definitions for and characterize a new right-wing ideology that emerged in Europe in the 1980s and its refinement and organization into parties in the 1990s (e.g., Ignazi, 1996; 2003; Kitschelt, 1988; 1994; 1995; Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Taggart, 1996, 1998). While regional integration has undeniably impacted domestic politics, societies and party systems in Europe, there are different views. Scholars eventually reached a consensus that national political parties’ position on regional integration is essential in explaining voter preferences (Taggart, 1998; Marks et al., 2002; 2006).

The literature identifies a “new political cleavage” from industrial capitalism’s transformation into post-industrial capitalism (Betz, 1994; Ignazi, 1996; Marks et al., 2002). As this cleavage resulted from positions critical of globalization and the liberal model of representative democracy, the region of European integration became fertile ground for new ideas on identity and demands related to the expropriation of sovereignty by “an elite” or threats to local and national culture. Common populist rhetorical strategies seek to incorporate these ideas in their justification for alternatives to liberal democracy based on representation and the rule of law.

In the early 2000s, Marks, Wilson, and Ray (2002) used the cleavage theory (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) to create a new definition of transnational cleavage. Later, transnational cleavage was accepted by the literature related to the rise of the supranational governance of the EU and the benefits and criticisms of the high level of regional institutionalization (Hooghe & Marks, 2018). They argue that contestation on European integration can structure political competition focusing on two faces of the EU: political (and social) integration and economic (liberal) integration. The result is that on the far-left, Euroscepticism appears stronger concerning measures of economic integration (the far-left is firmly against economic integration and moderately against political integration). Euroscepticism appears diffusely on the far-right (or the “new” far-right, as the authors described). In other words, no support is expected at all for the EU policies from the new far-right.

Kopecky and Mudde (2002) identified two categories of European scepticism that complement the classification of the European political parties described above: diffuse Euroscepticism and specific Euroscepticism. Looking at national elections in Europe in recent decades, we see that the difference between the two sides of Euroscepticism is reproduced in the Eurosceptic ideological positions defended by the left and the right. Diffuse Euroscepticism refers to a “support for general ideas of European integration that underlie the EU” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300), which is more present in the ideas and platforms of the far-right parties. In contrast, in the case of the far-left, we found more specific criticisms of the EU by denoting support for reforming more general practices or rules. The critics are about “the EU as it is and as it is developing” (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002, p. 300). In other words, they can demand reforming the EU politics but not eliminate it (specific Euroscepticism).

Analysis & Discussion

Analyzing the national elections of the 15 Western European countries that were part of the EU before 2004—known as the EU-15—provides a clearer understanding of the changes in European voters’ positions regarding extremist and populist political parties and potential future changes in voter preferences. The exclusion of Eastern European countries in this article is justified by the need for different approaches for East and West countries.

We classified extremist political parties according to the party family typology proposed by Marks et al. (2002) and the identification of a new transnational cleavage in the EU region (Hooghe & Marks, 2015). However, in the case of the far-left, we excluded traditional communist parties aligned with a clear ideology advocating changes in the economic model as they are not necessarily populist. We are interested here in the emergence of a new far-left populism.

Selection Criteria and the Lists of Political Parties

During the time frame chosen for this study, political parties emerged, while others disappeared, and some changed their names. Tables 1 and 2 below list all extremist parties that received more than 1% of votes in elections between the late 1980s and 2023 by country. We did not describe the history of each political party in detail, which would require a large amount of space.^[7] The selection criteria were based on two sources of classification: i) recognition of the party as far-right or far-left and as having populist characteristics in the literature, and ii) examination of political party manifestos (when available in the Manifesto Project’s data^[8] or on the political parties’ official websites).

There are cases of what Ignazi (1996; 2003) refers to as the “renewal of political parties”. This is when, without changing their name, a few political parties became more radical and started to designate themselves as the new (and no longer traditional) extreme right, as was the case of the Portuguese National Renewal Party (NRP). From 2009 onwards, the NRP started to assume more populist characteristics and changed its political orientation, describing itself as a “new right-wing”. The same thing happened on the far-left, although in fewer cases. Here, we consider political parties far-left based on their adoption of rhetoric and themes such as anti-elitism, opposition to the establishment and other signs of anti-systemic stances. Some are openly nationalist, anti-immigrant, sovereigntist (radical), and in favor of the country leaving the European Union, while others identify as Eurosceptic and anti-EU.

Table 1- List of far-left parties

Country	Political parties*	Lifetime (first year they received votes/or the few years in which the party received votes)*
Austria	N/A	N/A
Belgium	N/A	N/A
Denmark	N/A	N/A
Finland	N/A	N/A
France	La France Insoumise (FLI/FI)Left Front	since 2017since 2012
Germany	Die Linke	since 2009
Greece	SYRIZA	since 2004
Ireland	United Left Alliance (more traditional left)	since 2011
Italy	M5SPRCProletarian Democracy	since 20131992-20061983, 1987
Luxembourg	N/A	N/A
Netherlands	N/A	N/A
Portugal	B.E.	since 1999
Spain	PodemosUnidos Podemos (electoral alliance of left-wing parties)	2015since 2016
Sweden	N/A	N/A
United Kingdom	N/A	N/A

* Only political parties that received more than 1% of the votes are listed, and the table only contains the years within the article’s time frame.

Source: Dataset created by the author based on MANIFESTO PROJECT. MARPOR (Manifesto Research On Political Representation. WZB. 2024: https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ and public election data from: http://www.electionguide.org/; https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/elections.

Table 2- List of far-right parties

Country	Political parties*	Life time (first year receiving votes/or the few years in which they received votes)*
Austria	FPÖBZÖ	since 1979since 2006
Belgium	VB (Vlaams Blok/Vlaams Belang)LDD (Lijst Dedecker)PPNational Front	since 19812007, 2010since 20101991-2007
Denmark	Z (Fremskridtspartiet)DFP	since 1981-1998since 1998
Finland	Finnish Rural party (joined to Finns Party)True Finns/ Finns Party	1979-1995 since 1999
France	National Front	since 1986
Germany	REPNPDAfD	1990, 1994, 1998since 2005since 2013
Greece	LAOS	since 2004
Ireland	N/A	N/A
Italy	LN (LN/MA, 2006)FT	since 19921996, 2008
Luxembourg	ADRNM	since 19891989-2004
Netherlands	LNLVFPVVCD	20022002-2003since 20061994
Portugal	N/A	N/A
Spain	N/A	N/A
Sweden	SDND	since 20021991-1994
United Kingdom	UKIP	since 2001

* Only political parties that received more than 1% of the votes are listed, and the table only contains the years within the article’s time frame.

Populist Characteristics and Their Impact on Support for the EU

As well summarized by Carlos de la Torre (2019), right- or left-wing populists share the same anti-institutional political logic, which is “based on the construction of a political frontier” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 66) between people and institutions. Despite their different narratives on who “the people” are, both right-wing and left-wing populist leaders and political parties use “similar politicizations of grievances and emotions” and they “aim to rupture exclusionary institutional systems to give power back to the people” (de la Torre, 2019, p. 68). The difference is in how they define “the people.”

“Right-wing populists use essentialist criteria of ethnicity to exclude minority populations. The people as constructed by Donald Trump, for example, face ethnic and religious enemies such as Mexicans, Muslims, or militant African American activists (de la Torre, 2017). Similarly, rightwing European populists defend the ordinary people against those below, such as immigrants, refugees, and former colonial subjects, and the privileged cosmopolitan New Class above. An alternative conceptualization of the people is primarily political and socioeconomic. Left-wing populists construct the category of the people as the majorities of their nations that were excluded by neoliberal policies imposed by supranational organizations like the IMF or the Troika. Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa, Pablo Iglesias, and Alex Tsipras face the oligarchy.” (de la Torre, 2019, 67

We then calculated the votes cast for all political parties classified as far-right and far-left in national elections over the last 40 years.^[9] Populist parties on the far-right were selected based on criteria used in the literature on this subject (Mudde, 2007, 2016, 2017; Ignazi, 2003; Marks et al., 2002; Poguntke & Scarrow, 1996), especially the terms they use in their political platforms. In some cases, the parties openly label themselves as the “new far-right”. For other parties that were not as forthcoming, we analyzed their history and platforms first to determine what the “new” and “old style” of far-right is (such as Nazi and antisemitic political parties, although the latter were not included in our analyses) and we classified them accordingly. Far-left populist parties were selected based on their demagoguery and their promises of simplistic solutions to complex problems and crises, often accusing neoliberal policies and the EU market of being responsible for the social and economic ills of member countries.

The election results were selected for far-left parties (FLPs) and far-right parties (FRPs) for approximately 40 years –from the first elections held in the early 1980s in the EU-15 until recent elections. After collecting data, to illustrate our findings and give a broader overview of the impact of crises on the shift in behavior in the countries studied, we divided the countries into two groups to identify the growth of votes on populist political parties from the left and the right: i) the countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Ireland), and ii) the countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom).

The international crisis had the most significant impact on the eurozone countries between 2009 and 2013. Table 3 includes countries with four years of negative growth, measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product), between 2009 and 2013, plus Ireland. Ireland was an exception in this group because it suffered from the effects of the economic crisis earlier, experiencing negative growth as early as 2008 (as did Italy). It had the highest negative growth rate (-7.8% in 2009).

Table 3- Growth of populist votes in countries affected the most by the 2008-2009 economic crisis

	Votes for FLPs	Votes for FRPs
GreeceTend to a more specificEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisis	growth in period of migration crisis
ItalyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis(syncretic with economic platform)	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
IrelandTend not to present Euroscepticism
PortugalTend to a more specificEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisis	growth in period of migration crisis
SpainTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of migration crisis	growth in period of migration crisis

Source: Dataset created by the author based on public election data (http://www.electionguide.org/; https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/elections)

From the election results of the group of countries in Table 3, we conclude that once the euro crisis erupted in the region in 2008-2009, voters who supported left-wing ideology became more critical of EU austerity policies and rules (specificEuroscepticism). However, as the economy returned to a certain degree of normality and the migration crises emerged as a new source of regional instability, left-wing populist parties began to lose strength in most EU 15 countries, and far-right populism gained ground.

In cases such as in Portugal and Greece, it is essential to say that once far-left party leaders had been elected to government or stabilized themselves in coalitions to govern, they changed their strategies. Previously considered populist leaders, they lost space in their political parties or abandoned old narratives that accused the EU of all their ills and started to defend responsible policies as soon as they arrived in government. A new scenario followed the euro crisis in these two countries. The political parties of the Bloco de Esquerda (Left Bloc) in Portugal could no longer be classified as populist since they gained the government coalition. The old populist narratives in economic promises have been replaced by a responsible government that maintained leadership in the country until recently. A similar situation was seen in Greece when the split in Syriza generated by the rupture between Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and Yanis Varoufakis, the minister of finance, occurred during the peak of the sovereignty crisis and the impasses in the negotiations with the Troika.^[10] The result can be interpreted by what Judis (2016) has developed very well and de la Torre (2019) has considered as a de-radicalization of Syriza since 2015 and Podemos since 2018.

Ireland was the only country from Table 3 whose results showed no Euroscepticism in political parties’ positioning (considering the selection criteria of the political parties and level of public support). Until a few years ago, many questioned why Ireland seemed immune to the influence of populism. The country has far-right parties, such as the National Party, but they exist on the margins and have never won seats in the Irish Parliament. As for the new migration crisis, there was a kind of cooperation and an attitude of shared responsibility by the political elites and society. There is a general feeling of national pride and solidarity with refugees in the Irish public opinion.

More recently, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generated an influx of Ukrainian refugees and asylum seekers to Ireland. While many welcomed them, an increase in anti-immigrant protesters in the country has been reported. Far-right populists saw this as an opportunity to spread feelings of rejection towards refugees and to be more critical of European and national governments due to a devastating housing crisis in the country.

Italy and Spain were cases of diffuse Euroscepticism that appeared among countries in Table 3. Left-wing populism in Spain (as in Greece and Portugal) found space in the government coalition in 2016, becoming less radical and less populist. Although Italy was significantly impacted by the immigration crisis, even before 2015, we highlight that far-right ideology in the country has already existed since the 1980s. It is also important to emphasize that Italy was the only case in which we saw the emergence of a populism already associated with the left (as shown in the table). Still, it is better associated with a syncretic position, as the more alternative and anarchist Italians self-designated themselves. A syncretic populist spectrum grew significantly during the euro crisis, behaving as a good example for the Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) spectrum of the new political alignments addressed by Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson (2002). Here, we emphasize that we consider the votes for the Five Star Movement (M5S) not aligned with a left/right dimension of political ideology. Exceptionally, in our research, the movement professed the desire to “stay to change the Union from within” with a populist and economic platform, as the defence of a referendum on the euro in Italy (Zotto, 2017), but with a more GAL political dimension designed by the M5S’ leaders as a “syncretic” position.

We investigate the influence of a second dimension, a new political dimension that we conceive as ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN). We find that this dimension is the most general and powerful predictor of party positioning on the issues that arise from European integration.

As explained above, the countries in Table 4 are selected as those that were (comparably in the EU15 region) least affected by the euro crisis, having presented less than four years of growth, measured by negative GDP, between 2009 and 2013. Also, the countries in Table 4 appeared to have been more impacted by the migration crisis, which reached its highest point in 2015, than the economic one. In this case, the far-right ideology legitimated intolerant attitudes and xenophobia in the face of the humanitarian catastrophe that Europe was in the middle of.

Table 4 – Growth of populist votes in countries less affected by the 2008-2009 economic crisis

	Votes for FLPs	Votes for FRPs
AustriaTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of migration crisis	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
BelgiumTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of the economic crisis
DenmarkTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisis	growth in period of migration crisis
FinlandTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
FranceTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
GermanyTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism	growth in period of the economic crisis	growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
LuxembourgTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
NetherlandsTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of the economic crisisgrowth in period of migration crisis
United KingdomTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of migration crisis
SwedenTend to a more diffuseEuroscepticism		growth in period of migration crisis

Source: Dataset created by the author based on public election data (http://www.electionguide.org/; https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/elections)

Most of the countries, as expected, presented a trend to increase vote preference for FRPs during the immigration crises. They tend to have a more diffuse Euroscepticism.^[11] Also, Although Belgium presented no growth of votes for FLPs during the period of the euro crisis, we saw an increase of FRPs in the two moments of crises considered in this article. Austria appeared as an outsider. The Austrians presented a new trend to vote for the populist far-left during the immigration crisis. However, there has been a decrease in radical votes since the legislative election of 2019, when the Free Party of Austria (populist far-right) lost 20 seats in the Parliament.

The UK results show a clear relationship between populists of the far-right and the referendum that resulted in Brexit, followed by a quick decrease in support after the June 2016 event. Interestingly, the strength of populism in the country was evident in public manifestation, and the use of the media to promote an oversimplified view of the social problem raised by the rise in immigration in the country was not reflected in elections for the British Parliament. Even so, the case of the Brexit referendum is the clearest example of the influence of populism on electoral behavior and its consequences. The post-referendum shifts in public opinion from criticism to support for the EU revealed an apparent lack of understanding of the brutal consequences of Brexit for the British.^[12]

Finally, when we look at the impact of migration crises on voter behavior, tables 3 and 4 illustrate that populism explains the growth of the far-right more than the economic crisis does. By separating the countries into ones affected the most and ones affected the least by the financial crisis (tables 3 and 4), we found that although the far-left grew more significantly in countries that suffered the most from the economic crisis, in most cases, left-wing radicalism tended to lose ground after the crises. While the rise of the far-right is prevalent during crises in general, the increase in votes for far-right parties occurred in 13 of the 15 countries analyzed during the migration crisis. Support for the far-left, however, increased during the migration crisis in Austria, France and Italy only.

Concluding Remarks

The article aims to investigate if and to what extent two decisive crises in the region affected support for political parties with Eurosceptic characteristics, which are more commonly aligned with extremist right or left-wing populist positions. The article sought to identify patterns in the growth of far-right and far-left populist parties to confirm the general perception that Euroscepticism and populism benefit from regional crises. We thus aimed to further the discussion on the risk of crises in the EU contributing to the increase in Euroscepticism and the tendency to vote for political parties that can weaken the European model based on the principles of liberal democracy, representation and the rule of law. The best predictor of the growth of Euroscepticism is migration issues. Our findings revealed the growing resistance in EU societies to the increasing number of immigrants in the region.

Also, in general, the results of this study show that populist agendas (both from the left or the right) found fertile ground in environments where support for democratic measures based on liberal institutions and representation was on the decline, “revealing hidden preferences that might have existed all along, but individuals were discouraged from making them public” (Brescia, 2019). We have seen a decline in the approval of EU institutions and norms and the emergence of intense hostility towards representative politics in countries during the period when populism was on the rise. However, to understand variations in the performances of populist political parties radically opposed to the EU, we analyzed them in the context of the two most significant crises challenging EU policies and politics in the last 40 years. Each country’s electoral findings in this article deserve a more in-depth analysis that could be better explored and developed in future works.

EU crises are seen as events that impact the behavior of European voters, and we assume that the growth of populism is harmful to democracy, even when populist parties and leaders are not elected (Müller, 2016). This is because the ability to spread ideas that discredit politics and representation as a norm of democracy has been dramatically strengthened by digital media, enabling populists to coordinate and promote these ideas transnationally, often linking them to conspiracy theories and denialism. In this context, the EU bureaucracy and its complex governance model are a clear target of populists. The EU adds supranational and intergovernmental institutional constraints to national ones (Müller, 2016, p. 95) and becomes an easy ‘punching bag’ for populist rhetoric.

We conclude that in a wave of growth of support for far-left parties in Western Europe, there are now signs of a bonanza for specific Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is more centered on criticisms of typical changes and reforms in the EU’s economic model of integration and more specific EU politics affecting the far-left political platforms. However, Diffuse Euroscepticism (Kopecky & Mudde, 2002), which is associated with a general contestation of the EU, involves its representative model of integration with supranational institutions and policy coordination. This side of Euroscepticism seems to be more closely associated with far-right populist narratives that are very much alive in the region.

(*) Dr. Ana Paula Tostes is Jean Monnet Chair at the Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ), Brazil. Professor at the Graduate Program in Political Science at the Institute of Social and Political Studies (IESP/UERJ) and the Department of International Relations (DRI/UERJ). She is a Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations (CEBRI) and was a visiting researcher at the Free University of Berlin (FUB). She holds a PhD in Political Science (IUPERJ/IESP) and a Postdoc at the University of São Paulo (USP). She was a visiting researcher (2016-2017) at the Free University of Berlin (FUB) and an associate professor at Michigan State University (MSU). Currently, she is the coordinator of the Project for International Cooperation (PROBRAL CAPES/DAAD, 2023-2026) between IESP/UERJ and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg, Germany. Results of research supported by the European Union (JMC Project EUgac n. 101127443), Productivity Scholarships from FAPERJ (Prociência/UERJ) and CNPq (n. 316785/2021-0).

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Footnotes

^[1] http://www.electionguide.org/https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/elections; http://www.electionworld.org/topic/europe

^[2] Cf. e.g., https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0176268018301320; https://whatukthinks.org/eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NatCen_Brexplanations-report-FINAL-WEB2.pdf

^[3] This includes national elections held up until the writing of this article.

^[4] Since the 1970s, the Eurobarometer has been measuring the European public’s level of knowledge about regional integration. It shows that the level of information increased when the EU was in operation and its supranational institutions were being consolidated.

^[5] Cf. http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/1999/eumc-annual-report-1998

^[6] Le Pen is currently in his tenth consecutive mandate. He was elected during the last EP elections, which were held in 2014.

^[7] We included the data of the first general election in which the political party received support (but did not necessarily win seats in a national parliament). The information in the database constructed to conduct the analyses on the votes cast in each election for each political party in each country is broader and more complex than what is shown in Tables 1 and 2. However, they provide minimal information to show why the parties were selected.

^[8] Cf. MANIFESTO PROJECT. (2024) MARPOR: Manifesto Research On Political Representation. WZB. https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/ (accessed on September 30, 2024).

^[9] Parties that did not obtain more than 0.01% of votes were excluded from our calculations.

^[10] Syriza is a party created in 2013, based on an anti-EU agenda and a populist narrative. In 2012, the country’s GDP had collapsed by 25%, unemployment reached almost a third of the population (28%) and hundreds of thousands of companies went bankrupt. Between 2010 and 2015 alone, Greece received three emergency rescue packages from the European Union (EU), totalizing more than 320 billion euros. After such negotiations, Prime Minister Tsipras accepted the EU’s conditions as a better option than bearing the consequences of leaving the eurozone. Despite the disappointment of many of populist leaders associated with Syriza, Greek voters chose to vote for moderate politicians without populist narratives than to take risks with the old elites or baseless promises.

^[11]Sweden deserves to be studied as a separated case. A report (Demos Report), conducted by an Open Society Foundations initiative represents a pilot project tackling innovative approaches to keeping societies open in Europe. Findings revealed that since 2010, when far-right populists in Sweden entered the national parliament, their voters already showed a different profile from the rest of Europe. A large proportion of voters for the Swedish far-right, especially those who already followed the populist party Sweden Democrats on Facebook, were young people between 16 and 20 years old. In a 2010 survey, 63% of the party’s Facebook followers (the main social media platform at the time in the country) voted for the party – leaving out mainly those who were not old enough to vote in the country. (see Benfield, Jack. Populism in Europe: Sweden. Open Society Foundations. February 2012. https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/populism-europe-sweden accessed on September 27, 2024).

^[12] Cf. WHAT UK THINKS EU. (2024). https://www.whatukthinks.org/eu/ (accessed on September 30, 2024).

Table of Abbreviations

CEBRI Brazilian Center of International Relations

EU European Union

EP European Parliament

FAPERJ Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro

FLP Far-left parties

FRP Far-right parties

FUB Free University of Berlin

GAL Green/alternative/libertarian

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GIGA German Institute of Global and Area

IMF International Monetary Fund

MSU Michigan State University

NRP National Renewal Party

JMC Jean Monnet Chair

TAN Traditional/authoritarian/nationalist

UERJ Rio de Janeiro State University

USP University of São Paulo

A group of migrants entered the U.S. from Mexico through an opening in the border fence near Sasabe, Arizona, and turned themselves in to a waiting CBP agent on July 15, 2023. Photo: Aaron Wells.

Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions

November 11, 2024

by ECPS_admin Book Reviews Home Migration

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. November 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0021

Immigration Realities is a thorough, research-based analysis that examines and debunks widespread myths surrounding immigration while highlighting the contributions of immigrants. Authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione present an alternative view to common misconceptions by contextualizing migration within broader global frameworks. While the book’s perspective may not align with all viewpoints, its well-supported insights make it a valuable resource for readers interested in a nuanced, evidence-based understanding of migration, encouraging a thoughtful approach to policy and public dialogue.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

In their recently released book, Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions, authors Ernesto Castañeda and Carina Cione address some of the most pervasive and misleading assumptions about immigration, inviting readers to critically examine often-repeated beliefs with fresh, research-backed insights. They deconstruct prevalent myths about immigration, providing a research-informed perspective to clarify these misconceptions. Each chapter explores a central question, such as “Is the US-Mexico border truly dangerous?” and “Would a border wall keep undocumented immigrants away?” Further questions tackled include whether immigrants are more likely to commit crimes, if they avoid learning English, and if they are disproportionately dependent on welfare and other government programs. The book also addresses critical issues like remittances and the debate on whether they drain the host economy, the supposed “refugee crisis,” and the broader relationship between globalization and migration.

The book then extends its focus to key questions around Brexit’s impact on immigration to the United Kingdom, examining “Will the decision to leave the European Union stop immigration?” Finally, the authors explore whether immigrants integrate into host societies and what lessons can be learned from different cities and countries regarding immigrant integration. Through these questions, the book provides a robust foundation for a more nuanced understanding of migration issues.

Through this rigorous analysis, Immigration Realities not only dispels common myths but also contextualizes immigration as part of larger global and historical processes. Castañeda and Cione emphasize that migration is not merely a legal issue but a human experience shaped by complex dynamics, including exclusion and belonging. By discussing concepts such as emigration and immigration, they examine how the realities of migration are affected by issues like crimmigration, xenophobic stereotypes, and pushbacks. These discussions are balanced with an exploration of themes such as assimilation, social integration, and cosmopolitanism, revealing how migrants navigate inclusion and exclusion in host societies.

The authors further address how broader forces—globalization and deglobalization, for instance—impact migration patterns and individual experiences, while examining the effects of isolationism in shaping migration policies and public opinion. In this work, readers will encounter discussions of migradollars (remittances sent by immigrants to their home countries) and social remittances (the transfer of ideas and practices across borders), highlighting the multidimensional impact of migration on both host and origin countries.

By integrating these varied concepts, Immigration Realities seeks to bridge the gap between academic research and public understanding, making complex ideas accessible for readers who may be new to contemporary migration studies. This comprehensive approach underscores the importance of viewing migration through a lens that recognizes both its socio-political challenges and its contributions to society.

In the introduction, the authors argue that immigration, especially in the United States, is highly politicized and frequently portrayed in a way that alarms native-born populations. Misleading stereotypes about immigrants, particularly those of color, have fueled negative perceptions, creating an “us vs. them” mentality that often casts immigrants as threats to social and economic stability. The authors emphasize that these misconceptions are not only harmful but also lack factual basis, as only around 3.5% of the global population lives outside their country of birth. Castañeda and Cione also advocate for a broader understanding of migration beyond legal frameworks, viewing it as a fundamentally human experience.

They emphasize that migration is part of larger historical and global processes, including globalization, cosmopolitanism, and deglobalization. This introductory section lays the groundwork for an in-depth exploration that challenges readers to critically engage with the nuanced realities of migration, making the topic accessible without sacrificing complexity. By framing each chapter around a misconception, the authors aim to equip readers with a factual, empathetic perspective on immigration, positioning the book as both a scholarly work and a timely resource for anyone interested in understanding the multifaceted nature of migration.

Chapter 1 of Immigration Realities, titled “The Southern Border is Safe, but Border Enforcement Makes it Unsafe for Many,” challenges the common portrayal of the US-Mexico border as a dangerous, lawless region. Through secondary data, published research, and surveys of El Paso residents, Castañeda and Cione argue that this image is largely a media-driven myth. In fact, border cities are some of the safest in the US, with lower crime rates than other areas due to heavy surveillance and Border Patrol presence. However, the authors highlight a stark contrast in experiences: while White Americans generally feel secure, migrants and minority communities face disproportionate threats of violence, detainment, and deportation, intensified by far-right rhetoric that criminalizes immigrants.

The authors underscore how populist rhetoric, notably from figures like Donald Trump, has fueled xenophobia and support for restrictive border policies. They link these policies to a border security industry that profits from a militarized approach, reinforcing exclusionary ideologies that endanger marginalized groups and undermine human rights. The chapter invites readers to question the prioritization of safety in border security discourse and raises awareness of the human rights violations inherent in populist-driven enforcement policies.

Chapter 2 of the book, titled “Border Walls Do Not Keep Immigrants Out of a Country,” offers a critical analysis of border walls’ ineffectiveness as immigration deterrents and the negative social, economic, and environmental impacts they impose. Castañeda and Cione argue that these walls, rather than serving functional purposes, act as symbolic tools driven by far-right ideologies equating border security with national identity preservation. Tracing the political momentum for a US-Mexico border wall from Reagan and Clinton through Trump’s administration, they contend that these policies stem more from ideological stances than practical immigration control.

The authors illustrate how Trump’s portrayal of immigration as an “invasion” fueled nationalist fears, leading to measures like the 2019 government shutdown over wall funding. They reveal that border walls, despite their high costs, fail to stop illegal immigration or drug trafficking, which primarily occurs at legal entry points, while also causing severe environmental damage. This chapter critiques the financial interests underlying the wall agenda, noting that private contractors, security firms, and detention centers profit from the manufactured perception of crisis. Castañeda and Cione advocate for redirecting resources toward humane immigration policies that recognize immigrants’ economic and social contributions, underscoring the need for cooperation over confrontation.

In Chapter 3, Castañeda and Cione dismantle the persistent myth that immigrants are more likely to commit crimes than native-born Americans. Through a comprehensive examination of crime data, historical analysis, and social research, the authors argue that this misconception is not only false but rooted in long-standing stereotypes and xenophobic biases. They emphasize that foreign-born individuals, especially Hispanic immigrants, tend to have lower crime rates than their native-born counterparts. For example, border cities like El Paso, which have significant immigrant populations, consistently report lower crime rates than comparable non-border cities. Additionally, immigrants contribute to safer neighborhoods, likely due to strong social networks and a desire to avoid interactions with law enforcement that could endanger their immigration status.

The authors further explore how political rhetoric has fueled the criminal immigrant stereotype, particularly through statements by figures like Trump, who in his 2016 campaign described Mexican immigrants as “bringing crime” and “rapists.” Castañeda and Cione reveal that such narratives are not only misleading but strategically used to justify exclusionary policies. They describe how these stereotypes perpetuate a “crimmigration” system that criminalizes immigrants, with laws such as the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) intensifying immigrant detentions and deportations, often for minor infractions that would not result in criminal penalties for US citizens. By debunking the idea that immigration increases crime, the authors point out that as immigration has risen, national crime rates have simultaneously dropped. They advocate for a critical examination of these stereotypes, urging readers to question how political agendas shape public perceptions.

In Chapter 4 of the book the authors this time confront the prevalent myth that immigrants refuse to learn English and fail to integrate into American society. The authors argue convincingly that immigrants are, in fact, highly motivated to acquire English language skills, viewing it as essential for social and economic mobility in the US. However, they also highlight the many barriers immigrants face, including limited access to language education, financial constraints, and systemic discrimination. They reveal how immigrants often experience prejudice in the classroom and discrimination in daily interactions when speaking their native languages. This “language shaming,” they argue, leads many immigrants to avoid using their native tongues in public, despite the strong desire to maintain a connection to their cultural heritage.

By addressing the structural factors that limit language learning—such as the high cost of classes, lack of time, and socioeconomic status—the authors debunk the stereotype of the “unwilling immigrant.” They argue that rather than resisting integration, immigrants are often forced to prioritize immediate survival over language acquisition. The chapter makes a compelling case for more robust support systems to assist immigrants with language learning and challenge readers to reconsider simplistic narratives around language and integration, urging empathy and policy reforms to foster a more inclusive society.

The following chapter addresses the widespread misconception that immigrants rely heavily on welfare programs. The authors provide a compelling analysis backed by historical and contemporary data to demonstrate that immigrants generally access fewer social services than native-born individuals, even when eligible. This chapter examines the social and political dynamics that contribute to this myth, such as policies from the Trump administration, which attempted to block “undesirable” immigrants based on financial criteria, using misleading statistics to justify these actions. The authors delve into the structural barriers that limit immigrants’ access to welfare, such as the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), which reduced immigrants’ eligibility for programs like Medicaid and SNAP. They highlight that these restrictions disproportionately affect low-income immigrant families and have lasting effects on their well-being, as they often forgo essential services out of fear of jeopardizing their immigration status.

The chapter also expands the discussion to international contexts, including European Union countries and Australia, revealing similar patterns of limited welfare use among immigrants globally. By addressing racial and ethnic stereotypes, such as the stigmatization of Black and Latin American immigrants as “welfare abusers,” Castañeda and Cione illustrate how these prejudices fuel public opposition and restrictive policies. Thus, they challenge readers to reconsider the welfare myth surrounding immigrants, urging for data-driven policies that acknowledge immigrants’ contributions, such as their role in the labor force and taxes, while promoting equitable access to social services. The authors effectively debunk the stereotype of the “dependent immigrant,” emphasizing instead the resilience and economic independence of immigrant communities.

In Chapter 6, Castañeda and Cione tackle the misconception that remittances—money sent by immigrants to family in their countries of origin—drain host economies. The authors highlight that remittances, contrary to popular belief, do not deplete economic resources in host countries but rather enhance the global economy and contribute to local economies in multiple ways. The chapter addresses arguments from political figures, such as Trump, who claimed that remittances should be taxed to fund projects like the US-Mexico border wall. The aurhors argue that such taxes would not only be burdensome to implement but would also drive remittance flows underground, leading to informal, unregulated channels. Furthermore, the authors clarify that the income immigrants remit has already been taxed in the host country, making additional taxation on remittances an unfair “double taxation.”

Additionally, they emphasize that remittances are not equivalent to foreign aid, as remittances are private, intra-family transactions that meet immediate needs, such as food, education, and health care. These funds contribute directly to the welfare of recipient families without government or bureaucratic interference, unlike traditional aid. While remittances can bolster struggling economies, they are not designed to function as development tools or replace structural support. The authors advocate for respecting the economic agency of immigrants and the crucial support remittances provide to families and economies globally.

In Chapter 7, the authors critique the narrative of a “refugee crisis” as a social construct rooted in xenophobic and colonial attitudes. They argue that labeling refugee arrivals as a “crisis” frames them as societal issues, distracting from the underlying causes of displacement, such as war, imperialism, and economic exploitation by Western powers. This chapter also delves into the impacts of historical and ongoing imperialism, illustrating how Western interference in regions like the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America has destabilized nations, leading to migration and asylum-seeking. The authors point out that Western countries often resist responsibility for these displacements, even as they benefit from economic arrangements that perpetuate inequality. For instance, the term “crisis” is frequently used by media and politicians to justify strict immigration controls rather than address the systemic issues creating forced migration. The chapter advocates for a reframing of refugee discourse, emphasizing the need for policies that prioritize humane treatment and cross-cultural support for refugees, recognizing their agency and dignity.

The authors explore the often misunderstood relationship between globalization and migration in Chapter 8, emphasizing their independence. They argue that, while globalization and migration can appear interlinked, they are largely distinct processes. According to them, historical evidence shows that economic globalization—characterized by trade liberalization and capital movement—does not necessarily increase migration. Yet, the public often assumes a direct connection between these phenomena due to political rhetoric that conflates them. The chapter discusses how economic downturns, like the 2008 financial crisis, intensified backlash against globalization, which is sometimes unfairly directed at immigrants instead of economic policies. Castañeda and Cione illustrate how globalization’s impact on labor markets has led some politicians to blame immigrants for economic issues, reinforcing xenophobic sentiments rather than addressing systemic inequalities. By dissecting globalization’s influence, the authors advocate for a nuanced understanding that separates migration policy from global economic trends.

In Chapter 9, the authors critically analyze Brexit’s impact on immigration to the UK. They argue that Brexit’s promise to reduce immigration, championed by anti-EU campaigners, is largely a misconception. Although Brexit allows the UK to impose stricter regulations on European Union immigrants, it has not significantly decreased immigration rates. Instead, Brexit has complicated the legal status of many EU nationals in the UK and disrupted the lives of British expatriates across Europe. In this chapter, the authors explore how Brexit, fueled by xenophobic rhetoric and a desire for “sovereignty,” reflects a deeper issue of misinformation about immigration’s economic and social impact. They underscore that immigrants, especially highly educated ones, contribute positively to the UK’s economy, addressing labor shortages and raising GDP. Despite Brexit’s restrictive policies on EU immigrants, non-EU immigration remains largely unchanged due to existing points-based systems. Thus, the authors challenge the belief that restricting EU immigration will “take back control” of British borders. Instead, it highlights Brexit’s potential for economic drawbacks, such as labor shortages, while debunking myths about immigrants’ supposed drain on resources.

According to the authors, immigrants can effectively integrate into their host societies without sacrificing their cultural identities. They explore in Chapter 10 the concepts of assimilation, acculturation, and integration, highlighting how each affects the immigrant experience differently. Unlike assimilation, which expects immigrants to abandon their heritage, integration allows for cultural coexistence and mutual respect, fostering a more inclusive society. Drawing on case studies from New York, Paris, and Barcelona, the authors illustrate how local policies and civil initiatives can significantly shape immigrants’ sense of belonging and success. For example, according to the authors, New York City’s multicultural framework and high tolerance for diversity make it a model of inclusion, contrasting with the more rigid and assimilationist policies seen in places like Paris. In Barcelona, public policies support cultural differences, helping immigrants maintain their identities while participating actively in society. Castañeda and Cione emphasize the role of cities and civil organizations in promoting integration, encouraging local governments to adopt policies that respect immigrants’ rights and cultural heritage.

Immigration Realities offers a well-researched, comprehensive analysis that dismantles common myths about immigration while championing immigrants’ rights and contributions. Castañeda and Cione provide a valuable counter-narrative to mainstream misconceptions, effectively contextualizing migration within global economic, political, and social frameworks. However, the book’s left-leaning perspective, though clear and thought-provoking, may limit its appeal to readers with differing political views. The focus on systemic critiques—while essential to understanding many challenges facing immigrants—sometimes overshadows a nuanced discussion on how diverse perspectives might contribute to more balanced immigration policies. Nonetheless, the book’s grounded research and emphasis on compassion make it a crucial resource for readers seeking a deeper understanding of migration beyond divisive rhetoric. By bridging academic insights with accessible language, Immigration Realities encourages readers to see immigration as a multifaceted, enduring human experience that merits both empathy and informed policy reform.

Ernesto Castañeda & Carina Cione. (2024). Immigration Realities: Challenging Common Misperceptions. Columbia University Press. 368 pp. Paperback $30, Hardcover $120, ISBN: 9780231203753, ISBN: 9780231203746

Headquarters of the populist radical-right Chega party in Vila Nova de Gaia, Portugal, on April 4, 2021. Photo: Nuno M. Maia.

Portugal in Cultural War: Racism, Security, and the Social Contract at Stake

October 30, 2024

by ECPS_admin Commentaries Editor’s Choice Extremism & Radicalisation Home Human Rights Migration

Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.

By João Ferreira Dias

James Davison Hunter stands as one of the most prominent and enduring authors on the topic of “cultural wars” in the United States. He emphasizes how so-called moral issues tend to undermine the “common ground” that forms societies, with the potential to become an effective war by sharpening citizens’ moral divisions (Hunter, 1991). Conversely, Fiona Morris and other contributors in Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005) challenge this view, arguing that polarization largely operates within the media, while society as a whole tends toward consensus.

However, time has lent more credence to Hunter’s perspective and the work of other scholars who focus on cultural wars. Ezra Klein, in Why We’re Polarized (2020), argues that moral values and social identity issues have become central to our political identity, aligning with Cass Sunstein’s arguments in #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media(2018), which highlights how social media has become an echo chamber for tensions around morality and “customs,” amplifying socially divisive themes. But what does this theoretical prelude have to do with recent events in Portugal involving the case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public unrest? Quite a lot, as it turns out, and the reasons are worth exploring.

Among the polarizing issues within society, racial matters stand out prominently. In Portugal, we have engaged in ongoing debates over whether or not racism exists, what constitutes racism, whether Portugal is a racist country, and if structural racism is present. Much of this discussion is either redundant, given the evidence, or overly theoretical.

In summary:

i) racism exists wherever individuals are differentiated based on race, creating hierarchies of value and access (Bonilla-Silva, 2014; Fanon, 2008);

ii) racism operates as a social process in which such differentiation disadvantages some while benefiting a dominant group—typically Caucasian in Western societies due to the legacies of slavery and colonialism. According to Achille Mbembe (2019), colonial histories have left profound imprints on social hierarchies, with racialized groups enduring forms of systemic marginalization that permeate all levels of society. In his concept of “racialized social systems,” Eduardo Bonilla-Silva (2014) argues that racism is not a mere individual prejudice but is embedded in societal structures, creating a social order that inherently privileges certain racial groups over others. Theoretical discussions around power, privilege, capitalism, and racialization are ideologically relevant yet often seem to lack practical contributions in tackling urgent issues, though they offer critical insights into systemic challenges (Wynter, 2003).

iii) Portugal is a country where racism is evident, with unique characteristics that should not be oversimplified through comparative analysis with other contexts. Its documented history includes ties to late colonialism and scientific justifications for the supposed cultural, biological, and mental inferiority of Black populations (Mbembe, 2001). The continued influence of colonial narratives has shaped racial and social dynamics within contemporary Portugal, as examined by Carla Rodrigues and Jorge Leal (2009), who reveal how these legacies reinforce discriminatory practices that marginalize racialized communities.

To understand the recent incidents centered in Zambujal – the neighborhood where protesters fired cars and a bus, with latter mimetic acts in some areas of Lisbon – it is necessary to consider a history of misguided policies regarding the inclusion of racialized individuals within Portuguese society, as discussed in O Estado do Racismo em Portugal (2021), edited by Silvia Rodriguez Maeso. Despite critiques of its activist bias, this work rigorously details systemic issues related to racial policies in Portugal, including urban planning and policing, which are directly relevant to this case. Such policies, compounded by socioeconomic inequalities and an enduring colonial mentality, contribute to a racialized social order that perpetuates marginalization and exclusion for racialized communities (Mbembe, 2019; Fanon, 2008).

The decision—albeit somewhat understandable—to address the urban integration of people from former Portuguese colonies by establishing social housing has, as in other countries, led to ghettoization. This pattern has perpetuated social exclusion and generational poverty, with vulnerable families often lacking resources or sufficient parental involvement, leaving children exposed to criminal networks. Meanwhile, underfunded schools and educational neglect further diminish prospects for youth in these areas. Together, these factors create a “social cauldron” that stigmatizes these communities as socially excluded islands, often becoming the target of state policing.

Policing such isolated social islands fosters a cycle of mutual distrust, generating a divisive “us vs. them” mentality. For many in these communities, the police are the sole representatives of the state, fostering stereotypes and resentment. Bonilla-Silva (2014) describes how such dynamics reinforce the racialized social system, where state practices contribute to the social reproduction of racial hierarchies. Furthermore, police violence against racialized individuals in Portugal has been documented in international human rights reports, compounded by reports of far-right groups within the security forces. These conditions highlight a significant state failure on racial matters.

The Cultural War over the Police State

While we await judicial proceedings in the case of Odair Moniz’s death, another discussion has emerged. In summary, Portugal faces an endemic racism problem affecting opportunities for racialized populations, who generally confront the intersection of economic, educational, and gender-related issues. Although white social groups may share some of these challenges, racialized groups face additional disadvantages due to “race.” Portugal also has issues with the rapid and haphazard urban integration of racialized groups, leading to territories where poverty and crime are disproportionately associated with these communities. Consequently, policing efforts, compounded by resentment and distrust as well as racism within segments of the security forces, have sparked a surge in police violence against racialized individuals.

Thus, poverty, social exclusion, urban segregation, and police violence underlie these events, fueling popular outrage. However, as this outrage increasingly manifests as vandalism—absent an organized structure and peaceful leadership—it loses the capacity to garner widespread empathy, as it impinges upon fundamental and primary rights within the rule of law, such as the right to security and private property.

Hence, the “cultural war” over a “police state” or “security state” emerges from chaos. André Ventura’s – radical right Chega party leader – recent calls for a protest supporting the police, framing it as “cleaning the streets” of “criminals,” echo Brazil’s Bolsonaro and his supporters, embodying the mantra, “A good criminal is a dead criminal.” By organizing a pro-police demonstration, Chega openly aligns with a surveillance state model that prioritizes “law and order” over constitutional governance—a step towards a state that surveils citizens beyond constitutional limits. Public support for this stance has been evident on social media, as people trade freedom for order, recalling Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning that in times of chaos, people are prone to sacrifice freedom for the promise of order.

Meanwhile, for the cultural war to thrive, two opposing poles are necessary. Radical elements within the Left, associated with the Bloco de Esquerda party, have seized upon these events to encourage a racial revolution. While motivated by a desire to rectify racial injustices, this rhetoric parallels the radical right’s, both potentially threatening social cohesion and the “common ground” essential for future generations. Social changes addressing racial dynamics should not take a revolutionary approach, which may ultimately intensify racial divisions and compromise democracy.

Thus, it is within democracy and the hard-won social-liberal principles that we must pursue the republican ideal of effective equality—not authoritarian “equality” under radical poles, but the equality promised by constitutional ideals under the banner of human rights. Achieving this requires justice in Odair’s case and others like his, alongside public policies that, while slower than revolutionary impulses, restore the rule of law, social peace, and constitutional norms—enabling us to address what we’ve thus far swept under the rug.

Conclusion

The case of Odair Moniz and the ensuing public response illustrate a deep-seated cultural and social rift in Portugal, revealing unresolved tensions around race, security, and the role of the state. This incident aligns with James Davison Hunter’s concept of culture wars, where moral divisions sharpen into polarized conflicts, eroding shared social foundations. In Portugal, these conflicts intersect with a colonial legacy that perpetuates systemic exclusion and racial disparities, creating an environment ripe for populist rhetoric.

As seen in André Ventura’s reaction, populist figures often exploit such moments, promoting a “law and order” narrative that taps into public fears, mirroring strategies observed in other countries. This populist stance risks shifting Portugal toward a security state model that emphasizes control over democratic principles. On the other side, radical responses advocating racial revolution pose their own challenges, as they could polarize society further and jeopardize social cohesion.

Ultimately, meaningful progress requires that Portugal confront these issues within a democratic framework, advancing policies that address structural racism and urban inequality while upholding the rule of law and human rights. Only by fostering genuine social inclusion and resisting polarizing impulses can Portugal hope to rebuild its social contract on a foundation of equality and shared values.

References

Bonilla-Silva, E. (2014). Racism without Racists: Color-Blind Racism and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in the United States. Rowman & Littlefield.

Fanon, F. (2008). Black Skin, White Masks. Grove Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. Basic Books.

Klein, E. (2020). Why We’re Polarized. Simon & Schuster.

Maeso, S. R. (Ed.). (2021). O Estado do Racismo em Portugal. Edições 70.

Mbembe, A. (2001). On the Postcolony. University of California Press.

Mbembe, A. (2019). Necropolitics. Duke University Press.

Morris, F., Fiorina, M. P., Abrams, S. J., & Pope, J. C. (2005). Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America. Pearson Longman.

Rodrigues, C. U., & Leal, J. (2009). Portugal não é um país pequeno: Contar o “império” na pós-colonialidade. Edições 70.

Rodrigues, S. R., & Araújo, M. (2019). Racism and Racialization: Experiences in Portugal. In Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (Eds.), Racism and Media (pp. 113–126). Routledge.

Sunstein, C. R. (2018). #Republic: Divided Democracy in the Age of Social Media. Princeton University Press.

Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the Coloniality of Being/Power/Truth/Freedom: Towards the Human, After Man, Its Overrepresentation—An Argument. CR: The New Centennial Review, 3(3), 257–337.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures

October 24, 2024

by ECPS_admin Articles ECPS Youth Editor’s Choice Home Migration Policy Papers

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Please cite as:
Bottura, Beatrice; O’Keeffe-Johnston, Paris; Gkampeta, Pinelopi; Malai, Ludmila; Lynch, Matt; Park, Joon & Gräf, Leon. (2024). “Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0001

This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.

Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf

Edited by Beatrice Bottura & Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston

Executive Summary

As the “Common Implementation Plan” for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Commission in June 2024 (European Commission, 2024a), the European and international political landscape was changing. The results of the EU 2024 parliamentary elections revealed a rise of Right-wing populist parties (RPP) on the European scene, a trend which mirrors recent national electoral results (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024). This right-wing shift is causing a tightening of migration policy across EU countries and affecting the viability of the EU Pact on Migration, with almost half EU countries openly contesting its initiatives and some countries even considering an opt-out, following the Netherlands’ recent opt-out request (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Simultaneously, former president Donald Trump is running for office once again.

This policy paper examines how the results of the 2024 presidential election might affect EU politics, especially in regard to the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Though a horizon scanning methodology, the paper found that Trump’s previous presidency coincided with a period of increased Euroscepticism within member countries (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Additionally, Trump has built strong connections with RPP leaders which, in the past, have become more vocal as Trump gained power (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). Given Trump’s stance on political elites, supra-national organizations and migration, the paper predicts that:

– in the case of Trump’s victory: Eurosceptic sentiments and restrictive migration policies might increase across the EU, especially among Trump’s European supporters

– in the case of Trump’s loss: events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack might occur (Abramowitz, 2024) which could further distrust in electoral processes both in the US and the EU. This could be leveraged by populist actors, which, to a lesser extent compared to a Trump victory, could still increase fragmentation across EU member states

Finally, given these findings, the paper provides policy options for the European Commission to take into consideration for a successful implementation of the plan. Among these, the paper focuses on the introduction of regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) which are aimed at creating country-tailored implementation strategies for the Pact. In practice, by shedding light onto nation-specific issues when it comes to migration and asylum, these ICRs would allow national leaders to have more control over the actual implementation of the Pact. This should increase the willingness to cooperate of RPPs as it brings together both national sovereignties, an important value to these parties, and European policy.

1. Introduction

Migration is one of the most discussed political and security challenges today. Worsening conflicts, natural disasters, and the hopes of better economic opportunities bring people from across the world to migrate to other areas that are deemed more prosperous or can offer something their homeland cannot. The nature of migration is transboundary, often exacerbating geopolitical issues among countries that are expected to share the burden. This can be illustrated by Trump’s abandonment of the EU during the refugee crisis, leaving Europe alone in dealing with the issue (Koppa, 2017).

As of 2022, there are 46.1 million migrants in the US (Geiger, 2024). Anti-migration and its link to nationalism are core aspects of Trump’s political campaigns and of his past presidency (Löfflmann, 2019). Indeed, during his past campaigns, Trump had made promises for stricter migration policies. Quotes such as “America First” and “Make America Great Again” were commonplace in his speeches and rallies (Lacatus, 2021; Löfflmann, 2022; Magcamit, 2017; Mirza et al., 2021). Unlike other populists, Trump succeeded in passing several anti-migration policies while in office (Table 1).

Europe has also faced difficulties controlling the increasing numbers of its migrant population. According to the International Organization for Migration (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024), there are approximately 87 million migrants living in Europe. In the context of migration crises, which often disproportionately impact EU member states, balancing European cohesion has fragmented the Union. Additionally, in recent years, Western politics has witnessed a trend of a right-wing shift (see Figure 1) and increased support for populist leaders, which exacerbates this fragmentation (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024).

Trump’s US presidency coincided with a period of EU instability which saw the rise of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in Europe and the significant decision for Britain to leave the EU, with migration a core topic for the Leave campaign (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Authors such as Fusiek & Marconi (2021) argue that the popularity of a nationalistic populist in the US gave confidence to populist political actors in Europe to become more vocal and gather support. In the face of EU fragmentation, the Union must be prepared for leniency with its Pact on Migration and Asylum if it wishes to maintain cohesion.

Note: Data sourced from European parliament election 2024, by Europe Elects, 2024 (https://europeelects.eu/ep2024/). Data sourced from Parliament Européen (2019, 2014, 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 1989, 1984, 1979), by Europe Politique, 2024.(https://www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm).

This paper delivers policy suggestions for the successful implementation of the Pact, especially in the context of the 2024 US Presidential elections and of its possible repercussions. To do so, the paper briefly delves into the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, focusing on its strengths, its weaknesses, and how it is perceived by EU member states. Following, the paper conducts a horizon scanning methodology to discuss the possible outcomes of the 2024 US elections and how they could affect international politics and the implementation of the Pact. Finally, the paper provides recommendations to the European Commission to ensure readiness and resilience in the implementation of the Pact in any scenario deriving from the result of the upcoming US elections.

2. The EU and Migration

The EU has faced difficulties in dealing with migration, especially as the issue disproportionately affects certain member states. In dealing with this issue, the EU has developed the EU Pact on Migration, for all EU member states to adhere to.

2.1 The Pact on Migration and Asylum

The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum establishes a comprehensive and flexible framework that addresses border management, asylum processes, and migrant integration while introducing a mandatory yet adaptable solidarity mechanism (European Commission, 2024b). This framework, as shown in Figure 2, aims to distribute responsibilities more fairly among member states, allowing contributions through relocations, financial support, or alternative measures (Ibid.). However, the Pact faces significant challenges, including bureaucratic complexity, varying political will, and potential conflicts with member states resistant to migration, such as those of the Visegrád Group (V4: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary), which will be discussed in section 2.2 of the paper.

Note: From Pact on Migration and Asylum, by European Commission, 2024b. (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en). Copyright 2024 by the European Union.

A SWOT analysis of the Pact (Figure 3) was made by the authors which found that the resource-intensive nature of the Pact may strain member states’ capacities, particularly amid shifting political priorities. Nonetheless, it offers opportunities for enhanced cooperation, stronger external partnerships, and economic benefits through managed migration. These potential gains are counterbalanced by threats such as geopolitical instability, rising anti-immigration sentiment, legal disputes within the EU, and the risk of migrants resorting to more dangerous routes due to increased border controls. The success of the pact will depend on its ability to navigate these complexities while ensuring the protection of human rights and fair distribution of responsibilities.

2.2 Backlash from Member States

The Pact has received severe backlash from a number of actors within the EU for very different reasons. On the one hand, due to its attempt at regulating and partially restricting immigration, many on the political left view the Pact as giving too many concessions to the far right, and failing to protect fundamental rights (Griera, 2024). For example, the German Left MEP Cornelia Ernst called the pact “a pact of shame and disgrace,” while other MEPs from Left and Green parties considered the Pact to be a model for a fortress of Europe and a victory for the far-right (Ibid.). Many NGOs also criticized the Pact, with Amnesty International attesting a “surge in suffering” for asylum seekers, if the Pact was to enter into effect (Nattrass, 2024). On the other hand, right-wing governments and parties across the EU also greatly criticized the Pact.

However, contrary to the above-mentioned examples, their main concern is that the Pact is not strict enough on immigration regulation and forces every EU member state to contribute and show solidarity, hence overruling national sovereignty (Nattrass, 2024). The Visegrád countries in particular – namely: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – heavily criticized the Pact and its solidarity mechanisms, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk promising that Poland will “find ways so that even if the migration pact comes into force in a roughly unchanged form, we will protect Poland against the relocation mechanism” (Nattrass, 2024), while the Hungarian government also pledged to find ways to avoid taking in immigrants and called the Pact “another nail in the coffin of the European Union” (Nattrass, 2024).

In addition to the Visegrád Group, an increasing number of member countries is expressing its discontent with the Pact, a trend tied to the rise of RPPs throughout Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, this is manifesting through a push for tighter deportation and border control measures across Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). 17 countries in the Schengen area – Austria and the Netherlands and endorsed by Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden. Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein – have recently signed an appeal to the EU executive to toughen return policies when asylum applications are rejected as well as increasing European coordination when it comes to deportations (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Additionally, numerous countries in the Schengen area – i.e. Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden (Dell’Anna, 2024) – are increasing border controls, which hinders the right to freedom of movement. In addition to these general trends, in countries where RPPs are gaining executive positions, the stance on migration policy is toughening even more (Carlson, 2024; Stekić, 2024; Vinocur et al., 2024). Recent examples of this trend – including the extreme example of the Netherlands’ request to opt-out of the Pact – are shown visually in Figure 4 and a full table is available in Appendix A.

This restrictive stance appears also at the European level where, as illustrated in section 1, right-leaning groups have gained more influence (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and of the European People’s Party (EPP) support the toughening of deportation mechanisms, the increase of asylum-seeker reception centers outside of the EU, and the funding for extra EU border control (Ibid.).

In sum, the Migration Pact, which is supposed to offer a compromise, is seen negatively by both sides of the political spectrum for respectively leaning too much into the opposite political spectrum, a trend that has led countries to push for a re-draft of the pact (Vinocur et al., 2024). In this context, the main challenge to the successful implementation of the Pact remains to satisfy parties and voters on the left-wing and pro-immigration side and on the right-wing anti-immigration side concurrently. This challenge will be addressed in section 5 of this policy paper, where policy options and recommendations are provided.

3. Methodology

Horizon scanning is used by building on early warning signs and predictions based on current events, by analyzing political discourse. Geopolitical issues are increasingly complex and interconnected. With such challenges, the use of horizon scanning is crucial to prepare and inform policymakers and decision-makers about potential opportunities and threats (Amanatidou et al., 2012). There are two core aspects of horizon scanning: alerting and creating. Alerting includes the early identification of emerging issues, whereas the creative aspect refers to the reassembly of current issues into a prediction for what might develop into a policy problem. Current political discourse in Europe has centered around a migration debate and discontent towards failing solutions to handle the issue, simultaneously the US Presidential debate has Donald Trump potentially returning for a second term.

4. Examinations of Findings: The US 2024 Presidential Elections

As a two-party system, there exists only two possible results of the US Presidential election – a Trump victory, or a Harris victory. Regardless, there shall be a possibility of outcomes in either scenario. Having conducted horizon scanning, there are two possible scenarios that may impact European politics on migration: whether Trump should achieve victory, or whether Trump reacts poorly and encourages disruption in the event of a loss.

4.1 A Trump Victory

In the event that Trump achieves victory, there are two core aspects that will shape the political landscape around migration. Trump has demonstrated an ability to influence and encourage populists in the EU to be more vocal and gather support, as illustrated in Figure 5 (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). In this regard, it can be expected that the political landscape in Europe will continue to favor populism during a revival of right-wing shift while Trump would have his second term. A second Trump presidential term would likely embolden European populist leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Jarosław Kaczyński, and even populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) or Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) by validating their nationalist, anti-EU, and illiberal policies (Naughtie, 2024). During his first presidency, Trump openly praised some of these leaders, especially Viktor Orbán, Trump was quoted saying “Let me just say about world leaders, Viktor Orbán, one of the most respected men, they call him a strong man” and undermined multilateral bodies, sending a clear signal that illiberal governance and nationalist policies are able to thrive without any significant repercussions from the US (Euractiv, 2024).

Note: Authors’ creation. Purple shows the Visegrád Group countries and yellow shows Western European states.
Politicians who have a direct link or friendship with Trump are highlighted in red.

Trump’s alignment with right-wing ideologies would also likely embolden these leaders to promote policies that further marginalize minority groups, restrict immigration, and consolidate political power by undermining judicial independence and press freedoms. In a second term, Trump’s open disdain for international organizations like NATO and the EU would likely reduce pressure on these populist leaders to adhere to democratic norms (Stekić, 2024). By downplaying concerns over democratic backsliding and encouraging isolationist policies, Trump would create an EU environment where these leaders and parties continue to push their nationalist agendas further, almost completely free from the fear of diplomatic or economic consequences.

Further issues that may surface from a Trump victory is the implementation of Project 2025: a Republican policy mantra with strict consequences for migration (The Heritage Foundation, n.d.). Core proposals of the project include continued and increased funding of the ‘Border Wall’, the deportation of migrants, and the removal of visa categories for victims of crime and human trafficking (Wendling, 2024). The project calls for the dissemination of the Department of Homeland Security to be replaced with stronger immigration enforcement bodies for stricter border control (Ibid.). Legal migration would also face stricter measures, through increased fees for visa applications (Ibid.). Donald Trump, as a form of populism, has been linked to the Brexit debate and fueling the “politics of anger”, a concept which some believe has contributed to euroscepticism across the Union (Smorag, 2020; Wind, 2017). If Trump were to be re-elected, it could be expected such sentiments may become prevalent in European political discourse again.

Should Trump win and implement Project 2025, the EU could mirror a restrictive stance again. This prediction is increasingly plausible (Vinocur et al., 2024), especially given the latest trends highlighted in section 2b. Overall, Trump’s influence has the power to destabilize democracies through the use of disinformation which causes greater distrust. Trump may prompt RPP leaders and their parties to entrench their power through policies aimed at curbing media freedom, overhauling the judicial system and the rule of law both at the national and supranational level, and even denouncing opposition parties.

4.2 Reactions to A Trump Loss

On the contrary, should Harris be elected as the first woman President, implications will lead to different roads. It is possible that the post-election events of January 2021 – i.e. the Capitol attacks – could have a sequel (Abramowitz, 2024). Many EU leaders took to the media to condemn the attack on the Capitol, denouncing the use of violence in any form of democratic process. Most were outright with their criticism of Trump’s handling of the situation and the consequences of his words. Common responses from RPP leaders and members – i.e. Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Victor Orbán- were to include a condemning of violence, protecting democracy, whilst simultaneously illustrating Trump in a positive light, often as a ‘peacemaker’ for his limited calls to avoid violent attacks during the protest, whilst others excused Trump of any wrongdoing (Herszenhorn et al., 2021). Should a similar situation arise, where Trump would instigate a protest after losing the election, it is expected that the previously mentioned EU leaders would follow similar actions as before. In this scenario, European leaders are likely to hold a consensus view that democracy is the forefront of our political system, not to be undermined. Likewise, it is expected that Harris would share the same sentiments for democracy and condemn his final attempt at power.

Regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election, Europe is undeniably fragmented politically, which significantly impacts the practical implementation of the EU Migration Pact. In recent months, in Germany, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been vocal about its opposition to migration. It further supports a “remigration” implementation (Hockenos, 2024) that has surged in federal elections. In Austria, the Freedom of Austria Party (FPÖ) won in the recent election. The FPÖ is expected to push a hardline stance on immigration and resist EU-level initiatives. The FPÖ will likely join forces with other mainstream populist parties (Cameron & and Goldstein, 2024).

In addition to the success of far-right parties across Europe, the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drive a wedge between nations more friendly and dependent on Russia to take a harder line on accepting Ukrainian refugees, let alone migrants from the Middle East or North Africa. Nations such as Greece and Italy continue to deal with the Mediterranean migration crisis, which is expected to continue for years. These existing crises continue to be a launch pad for far-right populist parties’ rhetoric.

5. Policy Options

At the time of writing, there was around one month remaining until the 2024 US Presidential election would be held. Three policy options were created for the European Commission to consider for a smooth and coherent implementation of the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.

The European Commission must organize a commonly managed and coordinated European asylum system centered around the wellness of human beings: the EU should work on the defense of fundamental human rights, immigrants’ safety and dignity. It is also suggested that the Union ought to use the reservation of migrants as a last resort and try to create other effective solutions, like open reception centers, since prolonged detention results in devastating effects on migrants’ mental health (International Rescue Committee, 2023).
The European Commission should strengthen the resettlement of refugees in the Union Resettlement Framework (URF): this includes timely and just handling of the reception and integration of refugees and immigrants from day one. More specifically, the Union must offer decent reception conditions throughout the EU, such as providing education and healthcare. Moreover, the Union ought to worry about the progress with an organized and transparent mechanism for monitoring the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.
The European Commission should fund and conduct regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to track the impact of the Pact on Migration and Asylum at a national level and allow for country-tailored implementation strategies:similar reviews are already conducted by the Commission such as European Semester reports, the Environmental Implementation Review and economic IDRs annually. These reviews would provide a mechanism for member states to detail the impact of migration in areas that are core concerns for countries. Each country review should conclude with action points and priorities at the member state and EU-level.

Though all three policy options are of equal importance to ensure the successful and coherent implementation of the plan, this paper proceeds to focus on the last policy option as a strong recommendation to the European Commission, in order to ensure preparedness for the ongoing implementation of the Pact in this time of political uncertainty. The reasons and specifics behind this recommendation follow in the next subsection.

5.1 Recommendations

The recommendation of ICRs within the context of the implementation of the Pact acts as a preventative method which focuses on three areas and values that are important for European RPPs with the aim of ensuring their increased cooperation in the implementation of the Pact. First, the country-specific analyses yielded by the IDRs would allow national leaders to suggest implementation strategies tailored to each nation’s socio-economic needs and capabilities. These tailored solutions will preserve national sovereignty. Second, through these country-specific analyses and implementation strategies, it would be possible to put a specific attention on a proper cultural integration of migrants, ensuring their wellbeing within society whilst preserving national traditions. This possibility could strengthen social cohesion, hence appeasing any anti-immigration sentiments that are likely to be strengthened by Trump’s influence. Finally, IDRs would strengthen national agency and allow for national interests to be at the heart of policy implementation whilst EU’s core objectives and values are upheld.

In particular, to ensure their above-mentioned purpose, we envision ICRs to present key sections as follows. First, an Economic Contributions and Challenges of Migration section of the review would report statistics relating to the economy, workforce and their welfare states. This will allow member states to further detail shortages in the job market where migration of people with work experiences related to the field are required. For example, countries experiencing shortages of agricultural workers, healthcare, or otherwise may request that their migrant quota includes those able to contribute to those sectors. Migration is often talked about as a burden by RPPs, highlighting the skills and benefits migrants can bring to suffering industries should mitigate this issue.

Second, a section dedicated to reporting on Social Dynamics and Community Integration would allow states to report statistics related to socio-cultural data, such as attendance to language courses, educational attendance, and integration into society through work or social programmed. This would address the common concerns of RPP tied to the erasure of national identity and traditions due to immigration. It is hoped that providing member states an avenue to report on socio-cultural impacts of migration will demonstrate an effort to protect national identity whilst promoting integration

Finally, a section for Impacts Not Otherwise Stated is proposed. This would allow member states to flag any additional issues they are facing in the implementation of the Pact to EU institutions. Such issues could include difficulties in processing of incoming migrants, including manpower, biometrics, and service availability. Overall, this should help with national governance for the Pact.

All ICRs ought to conclude with a plan for the future. Plans should enable co-working between the Commission and Member States to come up with priorities and action points for each stakeholder going forward with the Pact, as similar EU reports conclude with. With this recommendation, member states can agree with the EU on what is most important and applicable to the individual country, rather than having a “one size fits all” method applied to all EU members.

Due to the politically sensitive nature of migration, the importance of impartiality was noted. It is recommended that the ICRs are conducted independently, with assistance from the Eurostat peer-review team. The EU has six funding pools that it may draw from that can achieve this recommendation feasibly: (1) Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, (2) Internal Security Fund, (3) European Social Fund Plus, (4) European Regional Development Fund, (5) Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and (6) Emergency Assistance and Other Ad Hoc Funding.

6. Conclusion

At this stage, the result of the American elections is ambiguous. The scenario of Trump’s re-election to power will bring about unfavorable results both at the overall EU level and on the immigration issue, as a Trump presidency would entail significant disruptions in US-EU relations (Frangeul-Alves & Weber, 2024). Trump’s troubled relations with the EU and his pursuit of isolationism, as well as his apparent apathy towards immigrants and refugees, mean that the former president will once again leave the Union alone on the issue that plagues it. Therefore, the developments in the field of immigration will differ greatly depending on the US election results.

In any case, the EU should not be complacent, regardless of the election result, as the migrant – refugee crisis plagues Brussels. Migration is one of the most important policy issues (Lovato, 2021) and it has turned into a geopolitical issue. Immigration is a labyrinthine for the EU and a complex problem, thus the solution will not be easy, especially given EU member states’ diverse opinions on the matter (Donceel, 2024).

To conclude, this policy paper delved into the implementation of this Pact, focusing on how it is susceptible to the rise of populism both in Europe and abroad. In particular, after conducting a SWOT analysis of the Pact and providing an overview of how it is perceived across Europe, the paper focused on how the implementation of the Pact could be affected by the results of the upcoming US presidential elections. Based on previous cases, it is expected that in case of victory Trump will incentivize his EU “allies”, such as Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Meloni, and Slovakia’s Fico (Naughtie, 2024), resist the Pact in the name of national sovereignty and anti-elitism. In the case of Trump’s loss however, the likely scenario is that the former president would encourage them to challenge the election outcomes and attempt to undermine democratic processes. This could deepen the public’s distrust in representative institutions across the US and the EU, ultimately furthering the disengagement from electoral processes (i.e. increasing voter absenteeism).

The authors of this paper believe that the recommended introduction of periodic in-depth country reviews (ICRs) would serve as a preventative measure in anticipation of Trump influencing RPPs in Europe. Of course, whilst future outcomes are uncertain due to the vivacity of the electoral campaigns in the US as well as worsening international orders, we are confident that as the European Commission sustains the cooperative nature of the Pact across political spectrums – which we recommend doing by ensuring tailored implementation strategies across member states’ government – its implementation will be successful.

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park and Leon Gräf during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024.

Authors’ Biographies

Beatrice Bottura is a Sciences Po master student in Public Policy, specializing in Social Policy and Social Innovation, and a Central European University (CEU) graduate in Philosophy Politics and Economics. Her research interests revolve around the crisis of democracy and how it relates to political attitudes and policymaking. She has explored this in her bachelor thesis “Ethnopopulists’ reaction to crises: the case of Fratelli D’Italia”, from which she derived an article for the Horizon Europe project “AuthLIB – Neo-Authoritarianisms in Europe and the Liberal Democratic Response”, which she is involved in as a research assistant. For this project she has worked with CEU’s Democracy institute and Sciences Po’s Centre d’Études Européennes (CEE). Particularly, she conducted discourse analyses for the working paper “Illiberalism and Social Policy: A Four-Country Comparison”, is authoring an upcoming publication on varieties of illiberalism across policy areas with CEU and has coded speech for the CEE’s work measuring “Ideological configurations”.

Joon Park is a third-year student at George Washington University, pursuing a bachelor’s in international Affairs and Finance with a minor in Economics. Born to Korean immigrants and raised in Germany, her academic focus spans EU economics, German domestic and foreign politics, U.S. foreign policy, and East Asian geopolitical strategy. She is currently researching the rise of right-wing populism in Europe in collaboration with the Center for Faith, Identity, and Globalization in Washington, D.C. Joon’s passion lies in exploring how global political systems and economic dynamics intersect to shape international relations and policy.

Matthew Lynch is a Master of Science candidate in Global Studies and International Relations at Northeastern University in Boston. He received a Bachelor of Science in Supply Chain Management from the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. With a background in international business, his current research focuses on how populism creates vulnerabilities in EU defense and security, particularly the potential for external actors to exploit these weaknesses. He also researches German foreign and defense policy.

Leon Gräf holds a BA in Political Science and Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, Germany and an MA in Political Science, University of Mannheim, Germany. He is currently working as Research Fellow at the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, and as a Research Assistant at the Chair of Empirical Macrosociology at Heidelberg University. Additionally, is has been working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) since 2021. His MA thesis focused on mediator characteristics and their effect on ceasefire success across different regions.

Pinelopi Gkampeta is a graduate student in the Advanced M.Sc. in “European Integration” in Brussels School of Governance (VUB) and she currently lives in Brussels. Furthermore, she has obtained a master’s degree in “International and European Governance and Politics” from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a bachelor’s degree in “Philosophy” from the same university. She has taken part in the Erasmus+ Program “Maritime Security Common Module “by European Security and Defence College and Hellenic Naval Academy. Moreover, she is a research intern in the Institute of International Relations (Athens, Greece) and also an editor and analyst at the Association of International and European Affairs. Pinelopi worked as a research assistant for the Identity and Conflict Lab (Yale University) for some months. Her areas of interest and research are EU as a Global Actor, EU External Relations, EU Security and Defense Policy, Maritime Security and Immigration Policy.

Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston holds an MA in International Relations, Conflict & Security from Northumbria University. Her research focuses primarily on societal security, with an emphasis on digital threats. Her dissertation explored how EU policy documents framed cybersecurity as an existential threat. Currently, her research interests have expanded to include the societal risks posed by AI. This includes how populists may use generative AI to either gather support or create the illusion of widespread backing, as well as to drive disinformation campaigns. By investigating this area, she aims to uncover how algorithms could be leveraged for early detection and mitigation of polarizing content ahead of elections.

Ludmila Malai is an experienced EU Project Manager at the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, with a diverse academic background in Economics, Administration, Politics, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. She holds a Master’s in International Law and Security Studies from the Free University of Brussels and is fluent in English, French, Russian, Italian, and Romanian. Over the past six years, Ludmila has specialized in writing and coordinating European projects focused on CVE/PVE, radicalization, combating racism, Antisemitism, Islamophobia, the security of places of worship, women’s empowerment, and youth civic engagement.

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Death Toll Much Higher Than Reported: Rising Casualties Among Migrants Attempting to Reach the EU

May 20, 2024

by ECPS_admin ECPS Youth Home Migration Voice of Youth

Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean Sea, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded.

By Greta Martinez

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a large number of migrants risking their lives in search of better life and opportunities. Tragically, this search sometimes results in death. The danger of this route is too great to ignore, and this paper aims to examine the intersection between migration policies, populism, human rights, and the escalating number of deaths.

In the last decade, Europe has faced an unprecedented number of migrants attempting to cross its borders, particularly via the Mediterranean Sea, which is infamous for being the deadliest migration route. The number of deaths is alarming; in 2023, the total number increased by 20%, making it the deadliest year for migrants since the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began keeping records (IOM Report, 2024). Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, as the IOM explains, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded (Migration Data Portal, 2024).

Populist Migration Policies to Blame for Increasing Death Tolls

To understand the reasons behind the rising death toll and the increasing number of migrants taking more dangerous routes, it is necessary to examine the interaction between these deaths and populist migration policies. The growing popularity of populist politics across Europe has dramatically impacted migration policies. Populist policymakers are known for their nationalistic rhetoric, which fosters fear of the unknown and of those who are different. Border protection policies are a central element of populism, prioritizing border security over human lives. This results in policies that focus on protecting borders rather than saving the lives of those fleeing unstable states, poverty, or wars (Osuna, 2022). When countries restrict legal routes for refugees, they force individuals to undertake even more perilous journeys to reach safety (Oxford, 2024).

The externalization of border control by populist governments often involves proposing migration deals to improve partner countries’ border management and migrant interception capabilities. Examples of these policies include the recent bilateral agreement between Italy and Albania signed by Italian populist Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and a similar agreement with Libya, primarily signed by former populist Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Martini & Megerisi, 2023). These agreements shift the responsibility of handling migrants to third-party states, which do not always respect fundamental human rights or adhere to the Geneva Convention. Populist migration policies are frequently criticized by international human rights organizations for violating international laws and agreements on asylum and refugee rights (Muižnieks, 2017).

The migration policies followed by populist governments, which often result in more deaths, include measures such as refusing docking rights to rescue ships. A notable example of this was the ‘Sea Watch Case’ in Italy. The then Italian Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, did not permit the docking of the NGO “Open Arms” rescue ship. However, the ship’s captain, Carola Rackete, defied his orders and docked anyway, sparking a legal dispute about the interpretation of humanitarian aid for migrants with sanitary needs. The policy of denying docking rights to ships in the European Union after a long and perilous journey often leads to more deaths in the Mediterranean Sea due to delayed responses from authorities. It is crucial to highlight the dangerous situations that delayed responses create for migrants arriving in the EU on illegal boats. Late actions by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) or national authorities can result in shipwrecks, such as the one that occurred in Cutro, Italy, on the night of February 25, 2023.

Border States’ Responsibility to Save Lives: The Italian Example

Populist parties in Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece are known by the EU Commission (Triandafyllidou, 2013) for emphasizing migration issues more strongly than other EU states, as these border countries are more affected by the illegal arrival of irregular ships. The increase in deaths is linked to the inadequate response of these states often lacking the resources and infrastructure to cope with the influx of arrivals. For example, the Italian approach to the migrant crisis has gained significant attention and generated controversy, with their closed-border policies raising critical humanitarian concerns. Italy has been a primary destination for migrants coming from North Africa and the Middle East.

The new regulations, which are part of the migration policy followed by Italian PM Meloni to prevent irregular migration, reduce the possibility of multiple rescues and introduce sanctions and administrative measures for violations. These measures have consequently led to an increase in deaths on the Mediterranean Sea. By closing ports and restricting rescue operations, Italy has effectively left thousands of migrants stranded at sea in dangerous conditions, as seen in the Cutro catastrophe. This fatal incident occurred just three days after the approval of the restrictions on NGO rescues. The cause of this shipwreck was Italy’s delayed response following the FRONTEX report of a ship needing rescue. The Italian authorities approached the situation as a police operation to stop irregular migration, not as a humanitarian mission (Pons, 2023). Despite the application of this new regulation, in 2023, Italy experienced a 50% increase in migrants arriving by sea compared to 2022.

Conclusion

As noted in the analyzed example of Italy, populist governments justify stringent migration policies as necessary for their national security and sovereignty. However, they often do not respect international refugee and migration law and fundamental human rights. The protection of borders, fueled by populist agendas, perpetuates and maintains a lack of empathy towards the deaths during the migration process, reducing these tragedies to mere numbers in European newspapers. Furthermore, populist agendas create and perpetuate a narrative of “us versus them,” neglecting the ethical imperative to protect human rights. This undermines European credibility as an exemplar of human rights advocacy on the global stage. The escalating number of deaths at EU borders is a stark reminder of the human cost of racist and restrictive migration policies driven by populist agendas. To prevent further deaths, the EU must adopt an approach that prioritizes protecting human rights, human lives and fosters international cooperation to avoid casualties.

References

Oxford, D. (2024). “Why refugee deaths at an all-time high.” Al-Jazeera. March 8, 2024. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/8/why-are-refugee-deaths-at-an-all-time-high (accessed on May 15, 2024).

Osuna, J. J. O. (2024). “Populism and Borders: Tools for Constructing ‘The People’ and Legitimizing Exclusion.” Journal of Borderlands Studies, 39(2), 203–226. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2022.2085140

Black, J.; Warner, K.; Manke, M.; Borja, M.G.; Abdelazim, M. & Sigman, Z. (2024). A Decade of Documenting Migrant Deaths: Data analysis, and reflection on deaths during migration documented by IOM’s Missing Migrants Project,International Organization for Migration. Berlin. https://missingmigrants.iom.int/MMP10years (accessed on May 15, 2024).

Martini, L.S. & Megerisi, T. (2023) “Road to Nowhere: Why Europe’s Border Externalisation is a Dead End.” European Council on Foreign Relations. https://ecfr.eu/publication/road-to-nowhere-why-europes-border-externalisation-is-a-dead-end/ (accessed on April 15, 2024).

Migration Data Portal. (2024). Migrant deaths and disappearances. https://www.migrationdataportal.org/themes/migrant-deaths-and-disappearances (accessed on April 16, 2024).

Muižnieks, N. (2017). Populism? Human Rights Regression and the Role of the Ombudsman. Keynote Speech at IOI Europe Conference, Barcelona. https://rm.coe.int/16807095ff (accessed on May 20, 2024).

Pons, L. (2023). “Naufragio di Cutro, cosa è successo: la dinamica e le responsabilità.” Fanpage. June 7, 2023. https://www.fanpage.it/politica/naufragio-di-crotone-cosa-non-ha-funzionato-nella-catena-dei-soccorsi-ai-migranti/ (accessed on May 15, 2024).

Triandafyllidou, A. (2013). “Migration policy in Southern Europe: challenges, constraints and prospects.” European Website on Integration. October 18, 2013. https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/library-document/migration-policy-southern-europe-challenges-constraints-and-prospects_en (accessed on May 20, 2024).

View of the A15 motorway near Paris, where the demonstration of farmers in tractors, are blocked by the police on January 29, 2024. Photo: Franck Legros.

Connection Between Populism and Identity Politics in the European Union Before the 2024 European Parliament Elections

February 6, 2024

by ECPS_admin Articles ECPS Youth Environment & Climate Home Migration Voice of Youth

The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right, as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what forecasts we can identify for the elections in 2024.

By Katharina Diebold

The upcoming elections of the EU Parliament and the next presidency of the Council of the EU, which will be Hungary, are contentious issues for the European Community (Henley, 2024). The polls for the 2024 EU elections and the Hungarian presidency indicate a rise of right-wing and anti-Europe populist parties. These tendencies fuel the transformation of the EU towards the right and conservativism (Wax & Goryashko, 2024).

The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right, as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts (Henley, 2024; Suiter, 2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what forecasts we can identify for the elections in 2024.

In this essay, I propose that recently adopted EU legislation, the Green New Deal (including the Nature Restoration Regulation and Deforestation Regulation), and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, are influenced by populism and identity politics and harm the EU. In connection with this, populist candidates driven by identity politics threaten the future of the EU.

Theoretical Framework

Populism is defined as a thin ideology comprising three key elements: the people, the general will and the elite, (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021; Mudde, 2004). Additionally, it incorporates the dimension of the “dangerous others,” often represented by migrants, positioned in contrast to the people (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015).

Even though populism is in Western Europe closely associated with the right, the left has increasingly adopted populist strategies. The negligence of academic research about the populist left can be responsible for those recent findings. This seems even more relevant when we consider the outstanding electoral performance of populist left parties compared to populist right parties for the last elections of the European Parliament in 2019, such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Sinn Féin in Ireland (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2021; Statista, 2024).

For example, The Greek Syriza Party (founded in 2004) and the Irish Sinn Féin Party (founded in 1905) were only recognized as left-wing populist parties in 2014 (O’Malley & Fitzgibbon, 2014; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Nevertheless, Syriza’s populism has been questionable through its government term and recent opposition in 2021 (Markou, 2021).

Identity is a set of labels describing persons distinguished by attributes (Noury & Roland, 2020). Identity politics is the belief that identity is a fundamental focus of political work, which can be connected to lifestyle and culture (Bernstein, 2005). Politicizing immigrants as the other is an example of that. In Europe, identity politics is referred to as the protection of the “silent majority” from harmful consequences of immigration, which is used by right-wing populists (Noury & Roland, 2020).

The effect of rising populism within the EU on the right- and left-wing can already be recognized by looking at EU-party campaigns or populist candidates for the upcoming elections. Besides the right, the left populists also employ identity politics. The left populism can be seen in promoting marginalized identities, such as racial and ethnic identities and seeking to transform the shame previously associated with these identities into pride (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2018). Accordingly, these protests generate others, including people who abide by a different value system and also the privileged elite who overlook intersectional identities as a threat. While promoting human rights, advocacy for intersectional identities can also fall into the trap of populism among leftist groups and other advocates (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). However, intersectionality may not be the only advocacy that can turn into a populist movement in the name of advocacy. Climate and human rights activists can also be politicized and positioned as polarized identities (Mackay et al., 2021).

Inherent Populism in EU Legislation

Environmental politics presents contention for both the right- and left-wing populist parties. Both the right and left-wing parties instrumentalize newly adopted legislation to increase the public appeal of voters (European Commission, 2023). This can be exemplified in the recent regulations. The newest adopted legislation, the European Green New Deal, including its Deforestation Regulation and its Regulation on Nature Restoration, and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, have elements of otherization and marginalization of identities. A closer examination of de jure analysis and how these laws, as portrayed in political language, unearths the need for more interest in realizing the general goals of protecting nature. It looks like nature is wiped of its identity within the hands of humans who instrumentalize nature as a theme broadly advocated by large swaths of society. Therefore, identity politics exploiting nature must be identified and widely discussed to protect nature and the shared values of humanity, not to sacrifice basic human dignity for politics, especially before the upcoming elections.

The European Green New Deal

The European Green New Deal, including the Deforestation Regulation, entered into force on June 29, 2023, and the provisional agreement for the Regulation on Nature Restoration was accepted on November 9, 2023. These legislations gaining the support of the left can also be instrumentalized to boost the attention and sympathy of left-wing parties before the elections.

The populism surrounding the Nature Restoration Regulation can be approached as a case showcasing populist politics appealing to the left (The EU #NatureRestoration Law, 2023). The left uses advocacy of this legislation, especially the Greens/EFA, in the elections for greenwashing purposes and voter accumulation. However, this law focused more on economic benefits than actual environmental protection and lost its progressiveness throughout the legislative procedure. Therefore, it is based on the misconception that this regulation substantially improves nature restoration and indigenous rights protection (Pinto, 2023). Moreover, this law increases the financial burden for the forestry, fishery, and farming sectors, claims the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) (Weise & Guillot, 2023). However, these realities are dismissed in the political language of environmental advocacy.

The Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) campaign clearly describes the people as the “citizens, farmers, fishers and business in the EU.” The elite is defined as “the conservatives, far right and some liberals” who “try to tear down a new EU law to restore nature.” The general will of the people focuses on tackling “biodiversity and the climate crisis (GreensEFA, 2023). The campaign by the Greens/EFA for this regulation plays into identity politics as the party uses a language claiming to advocate for the protection of marginalized indigenous and local communities. While this claim remains to be only a discourse, regardless, it boosts the popularity of the Greens. Zoomed closely, the ostensibly evergreen legislation advocating the protection of biodiversity promotes local cartels and exploitative companies that benefit and take advantage of the EU partnerships (Euronews, 2023). The hypocrisy and the tact in the use of language can be seen in the advocacy language of the party that left these cartels intentionally out.

Deforestation Regulation

The Greens/EFA campaign for the Deforestation Regulation shows characteristics of populism (European Commission, 2023). Greens/EFA characterizes “the people” as the “people that must always come before profit.” Thus, this regulation favors European distributers instead of the exploited farmers in the developing countries. In this case, “the elite” is the group of companies that need to safeguard no deforestation or human rights violations along the production.” “The general will” is intended to “end EU-driven deforestation” (Greens/EFA, 2023). This is an example of how left parties connect political anti-elitism to economic anti-elitism and the argument that hardworking, ordinary citizens are betrayed by the political-economic power elite (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015).

Additionally, the new regulation will only prevent EU customers from buying products derived from deforestation. However, the actual deforestation and sales of deforested products to other customers worldwide can continue (Greenpeace, 2021). The regulation also lost its progressive and ambitious character throughout the legislation procedure (Fairtraide.net., 2022).

New Pact on Migration and Asylum

The left and the right use identity politics as a tool to increase sympathy for the upcoming elections through the usage of marginalized identities such as “migrants” and “asylum seekers” (Greens/EFA, n.d.). The recent pact on migration can be shown as an example of populist identity politics transcending the right and left binary, uniting the voters around the so-called threat posed by the influx of migrants and asylum seekers.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum reinforces the topic of illegal migration and thus supports the right-wing campaigning for the European Elections 2024. The political language on this regulation is laden with populist elements. Firstly, the right-wing European Peoples Party defines “the people” as “the hard-working EU citizens.” Secondly, “the elite” is defined as “smugglers and traffickers controlling illegal migration” (Press Statement von der Leyen, 2023). Thirdly, “the general will” is defined as stopping the suffering of the EU through migrants (Press Statement von der Leyen, December 20, 2023; Press Statement Schinas, 2023).

The populist language forebears the identity politics around migration appealing to both the right and the left. The New Pact and statements by the EU Commission play into identity politics through the terminology of the “bad migrants,” positioning them as “dangerous others.” Unfortunately, the New Pact has been under debate in the EU since 2020 and is now used as a promotional tool for the upcoming elections to attract voters on the right and the left (Georgian, 2024).

The New Pact can also be used by the Greens/EFA populist campaign for the European Elections 2024, reinforcing the idea of a unified peace union. “The people” are defined as “us and the migrants and asylum seekers, that we do not leave behind.” “The general will” is to “uphold human rights and international law” (GreensEFA, 2023). “The elite” is defined as the authoritarian national governments of developing countries, making it necessary for refugees to flee (Greens/EFA, n.d.).

Additionally, the Pact favors the reinforcement of border controls, returns and re-admissions over legal migration opportunities. Those stay symbolic, vague, and distant policy goals. Recent reviews of policy documents show that the EU prioritizes regulating irregular migration, and despite its rhetoric for “strengthening legal migration,” concrete action is missing (Sunderland, 2023).

Identity Politics and Candidates

Introducing inexperienced candidates tailored to resonate with particular social groups is a common strategy employed by both left and right populist parties to garner support. This practice serves as another instance of identity politics shaping the European political landscape. Following in the footsteps of their forerunners, like Marie Le Pen or Hugo Chávez from the past, these charismatic political figures engage in populist rhetoric, addressing a diverse range of social and legal issues in their political discourse—from environmental protection to EU identity and migration (Serra, 2017).

Examples for the upcoming European Parliament elections 2024 include Nicola Gehringer, promoted by the German right-wing party CSU (Christian Social Union), on place nine. Gehringer is a successful executive assistant of a big corporation “Neoloan AG” with potential to attract successful business owners. Another figure is the farmer and agriculture expert Stefan Köhler, who runs for the CSU on place six to attract farmers (Zeit Online, 2023). With the recent increasing farmer’s protests in Germany, France and the Netherlands, farmers have become increasingly crucial in the European discourse (Trompiz & Levaux, 2024).

Legal and security experts are also running with public appeal to the voters across political divides. The German candidate for “Die Linke,” a leftist Party, is Carola Rackete. She is a human rights activist fighting for better refugee rights and asylum laws, running for the second position (MDR.DE., 2023). The human rights activist as a candidate can increase the amount of more radical voters from the left. The German Green Party is heading with a policeman on place eighteen towards the elections, trying to include more right-leaning social groups as well in the Green voter repertoiresince police officers can tend to vote for conservative and right-wing parties (Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016).

In Austria, the first candidate for the Greens party is Lena Schilling, a climate activist of “Fridays-for-future.” Schilling has a high chance of attracting young voters as she is the only young female top candidate among all running top party candidates in Austria (Völker, 2024). The second place will be Thomas Waitz, a sustainable and organic farmer who aims to attract sustainable farmers in Austria (Waitz, 2023; Schweighofer, 2024). The references to elite vs the people in their language blur the lines between the right and the left ideologies and connect these figures around a shared sentiment: fighting for the people against a designated elite. This populist sentiment fuels populism and social conflict, undermining liberal democracy and EU values.

Conclusion

The increasing populism of left and right parties in the EU and the fanatism of those who want to increase their share of voters for the upcoming EU elections are tremendously responsible for the outcomes of recent EU legislation. The populist rhetoric before and after the adoption of new EU legislation clearly shows how parties instrumentalize the outcomes of EU legislation procedure instead of trying to find real compromises and long-term future-oriented solutions for the problems of unregulated migration and the climate crises.

Regulated migration is still almost not touched upon in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been part of discussions in the EU since 2020. The Green New Deal, especially with the Nature Restoration and Deforestation Regulations, was a proper start to increase sustainability, environmental protection, and indigenous rights. However, both proposals lost their progressiveness and lacked ambition and actual help for developing countries outside of the profit-making fetishism of the EU. If the upward trend of populism persists on both the left and right, EU politics and legislation may increasingly adopt populist and voter-driven approaches, potentially jeopardizing the democratic and compromise-oriented decision-making process within the EU. This heightened polarization between parties could further contribute to a climate of bashing and hinder cooperative efforts.

Remarkably, identity politics not only permeates the populist rhetoric of EU party politics but also extends to the selection of candidates for upcoming elections. If identity politics continues to embed itself deeply within the strategic political framework of EU parties, the shift towards prioritizing short-term voter turnout and popularity contests over substantive and long-term democratic considerations seems inevitable. This trend risks undermining EU values by leveraging EU legislation for immediate political gains rather than establishing enduring goals for the European Community. It is imperative to educate voters about this form of political manipulation that compromises EU values for short-term advantages. No political gain should supersede long-term EU objectives, as such a scenario would entail the erosion of EU values and identity.

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The AfD Thrives on Fear—Immigration, Welfare, and Political Distrust

Strong Local Governance Can Curb Nativism

Misinformation Spread by AfD Fuels Division

Affective Polarization Fuels AfD’s Growth by Deepening Divides

Crisis and Social Media Propel AfD’s Rise in Germany

AfD’s Politics Is Less About Identity, More About Ideological Alliances

AfD Exploits Anti-Elite Narratives While Facing Its Own Corruption Scandals

Vance’s Endorsement Unlikely to Sway Voters, but Munich Attack Might

Introduction

Theory

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Minority Voting

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Majority Voting

The Differential Impact of In-group Favouritism Amongst Minorities and Majorities

Comparing France, Germany, the Netherlands and their PRRPs

Methods

Findings

Intergroup Voting Differences

What Explains PRRP Voting Amongst Muslims?

In-group Favouritism

In-group Favouritism as a Stronger Predictor to Voting for PRRPs

Conclusion

References

Footnotes

Introduction

‘Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced by Hungarians’

Exemplary Communities of National Consciousness

Tapping the Diaspora’s Political Remittance Potential

‘The Carpathian Basin Coming Together’

Conclusion

References

Introduction

EU Contestation and Populism

Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

Euroscepticism and Populisms

A Perfect Match: The EU’s Institutional Complexity and Populist Strategies

Analysis & Discussion

Selection Criteria and the Lists of Political Parties

Populist Characteristics and Their Impact on Support for the EU

Concluding Remarks

References

Footnotes

Table of Abbreviations

The Cultural War over the Police State

Conclusion

References

Executive Summary

1. Introduction

2. The EU and Migration

2.1 The Pact on Migration and Asylum

2.2 Backlash from Member States

3. Methodology

4. Examinations of Findings: The US 2024 Presidential Elections

4.1 A Trump Victory

4.2 Reactions to A Trump Loss

5. Policy Options

5.1 Recommendations

6. Conclusion

Authors’ Biographies

References

Populist Migration Policies to Blame for Increasing Death Tolls

Border States’ Responsibility to Save Lives: The Italian Example

Conclusion

References

Theoretical Framework

Inherent Populism in EU Legislation

The European Green New Deal

Deforestation Regulation

New Pact on Migration and Asylum

Identity Politics and Candidates

Conclusion

References

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