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Professor Yascha Mounk observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presents two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5. On one hand, he notes that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Tuesday, Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies—delivers a compelling analysis of the rise of populism and its implications for the future of democracy. Professor Mounk identifies three key drivers that have contributed to the rise of populism in the United States: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens, rapid cultural and demographic transformations, and the rise of the internet and social media. These factors, he argues, have collectively fueled a sense of disillusionment and alienation among significant segments of the population, creating fertile ground for populist leaders like Trump to thrive.

As the November 5, 2024, US presidential election approaches, the stakes have never been higher. With Donald Trump’s re-election campaign gaining momentum, Professor Mounk states that ‘there are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016’. He also offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the United States. He reflects on the evolution of Trump’s political influence, noting that “Trump now has about a 45% chance, according to betting markets, of regaining power,” highlighting the tight race and the potential consequences of his victory. Touching on the potential consequences of a second Trump presidency, Professor Mounk warns that while Trump’s first term was damaging, his probable second term could be even more dangerous given his increased experience, a loyal base within the Republican Party and a desire for retribution against institutions he believes hindered his first administration. The risks to American democracy, Professor Mounk suggests, are substantial, and the outcome of the 2024 election could have long-lasting implications for the country’s political landscape.

Reflecting on the broader debate about the resilience of democracies in the face of populist threats Professor Mounk acknowledges the strengths that have allowed American democracy to endure, while he also cautions against complacency, noting that the challenges posed by populism are far from over. Mounk points out that Trump’s four years in office, while chaotic, were mitigated by the resilience of American institutions, including the federal system and the economy. 

One of the central themes of the discussion in the interview is the impact of the changing demographic landscape on American politics. Professor Mounk notes that while immigration and demographic change are related, they are conceptually distinct phenomena. He argues that frustration over perceived loss of control—over borders and the cultural direction of the country—has been a significant driver of populist sentiment. This has been particularly evident in the case of Trump, whose appeal to voters is deeply rooted in cultural identity politics rather than purely economic concerns. Professor Mounk explains that Democrats had once banked on demographic shifts securing their electoral future, assuming that as the number of non-white voters increased, so too would their dominance. However, this assumption has not played out as expected. “The leftward drift of the Democratic Party has pushed many of these voters away,” Professor Mounk notes, underscoring the complex dynamics that have kept Trump competitive.

Professor Mounk also delves into the evolving media landscape, highlighting the profound shift from traditional broadcast networks to a more fragmented and polarized media environment dominated by social media, podcasts and independent platforms. He expresses concern over the term “misinformation” and how it has been used to suppress certain viewpoints, urging a more nuanced approach to the concept in public discourse. Professor Mounk’s insights provide a timely and critical perspective on the future of democracy in the United States and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Yascha Mounk with some edits.

There Are Broad Commonalities in the Rise of Populism Across the World

Professor Mounk, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me dive right in with the first question. In your analysis, what are the key historical events that have contributed to the rise of populism in the US and how do they compare it to similar movements in other democracies?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I think the best way to approach this topic is by comparing different countries. While different factors play varying roles in different places, there are broad commonalities. In my book The People versus Democracy, published in 2018, I focused on three key factors.

First, there is the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens in many democracies, particularly in Western Europe and North America. In the immediate post-war era, people in these democracies felt that their life opportunities were vastly different from those of their parents. That sense of progress is no longer true for most citizens today.

Second, I highlighted the rapid cultural and demographic transformations in many of these countries. This includes ethnic diversification and, for example, the significantly larger role of women in society and greater acceptance of sexual minorities. While these are positive developments, they have also triggered fears among some segments of the population who feel that their social status has declined—they can no longer take for granted the status they once enjoyed.

Third, I discussed the rise of the internet and social media, which has made it easier for populist parties and candidates to build political movements. Social media has also shifted public opinion by making it easier to spread hatred and misinformation.

Today, I would add a fourth factor, which is partially mediated by social media but also relates to a deterioration in governance. This is the perceived distance between ordinary people and the elite. Many citizens feel that elites are not only corrupt in some places but also culturally distant. They live in separate circles and seem to look down on average citizens. This is a factor I didn’t emphasize as much initially, but now I would give it greater weight.

You’ve written extensively about the erosion of democratic norms. How has the US’s unique political culture contributed to the vulnerability of its institutions to populist movements?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, again, this is something we’re witnessing in many different countries at the same time, which suggests that a universally relevant factor—social media—plays a significant role. The ability to reach voters directly through social media platforms and make emotional, polarizing appeals has largely contributed to the breakdown of democratic norms. Social media platforms have been instrumental in this process.

When we look specifically at the United States, polarization plays a significant role. The primary system, in particular, makes most Congress members and many Senators more dependent on keeping the goodwill of the 5 to 10% of the population that are decisive in primary elections, rather than appealing to the median voter who decides elections in closely contested seats or states, of which there are not many. This has had a significant impact as well.

Economic inequality is often cited as a driver of populism. To what extent do you believe the economic policies of the last few decades have fueled populist sentiments in the US?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, the economy plays a role. As I mentioned earlier, it helps explain the erosion of what political scientists call “output legitimacy.” In the past, people might have said, “I don’t fully understand or trust politicians, but they seem to be delivering for us.” Now, many people feel that politicians are not delivering, leading them to question why they should trust them and consider trying something new. The sentiment of “how bad could things get?” is increasingly common.

However, I believe cultural factors likely play a bigger role than economic ones. If economic factors were the primary drivers, you would expect people to vote for populist parties that focus mainly on the economy, perhaps even those on the left. We’ve seen this in Greece with Syriza, where economic concerns were paramount and more recently in Argentina with Javier Milei, where hyperinflation fueled the rise of a right-wing populist movement.

But for the most part, this isn’t the case with leaders like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Narendra Modi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While they do talk about the economy and make economic promises, their primary appeal is cultural. They position themselves as defenders of the moral and religious traditions of a supposed majority—often a real majority—that feels sidelined and believes its preferences haven’t sufficiently shaped the public culture of the country.

Democrats Hold False Assumptions About Demographic Groups in the US

How has the changing demographic landscape in the US influenced the rise of populism and what role does identity politics play in this phenomenon?

Professor Yascha Mounk: We need to distinguish between immigration and demographic change. Immigration plays a significant role in the United States, as well as in many European countries. Most Americans and Europeans are willing to see the benefits of migration and recognize that countries need highly qualified migrants for economic reasons, acknowledging the real benefits they bring. However, opinion polls have shown that, for several decades now, majorities in these populations have preferred less, rather than more, migration. They feel that moderate and established political parties have ignored this preference. The frustration isn’t necessarily with the presence of immigrants but with the sense of having no control over who enters the country and no control over borders. This sentiment has been a big part of Donald Trump’s appeal. In the US, Trump is currently building his case for re-election not only on inflation during the Biden administration but also on the inflow of migrants in recent years. This is a real vulnerability for moderate political parties and a significant reason they’ve lost credibility among ordinary voters.

Demographic change is, of course, related to immigration, but it is conceptually distinct. Here, I would say the problem for moderate political parties, particularly the left in the US, has been a more roundabout one. Democrats had a very demographic view of the electorate, especially during the years when George W. Bush seemed dominant. They latched onto the hope that as the demographic balance in the country shifted, with the number of white voters declining and non-white voters growing, this would ensure inevitable electoral victories for them. However, this hasn’t turned out as expected. It was supposed to secure Hillary Clinton’s win in 2016, yet Donald Trump won the electoral college, even if he didn’t win the popular vote. The same assumption was expected to shift the electorate towards Biden in 2020. While Biden did improve his share of the white vote, Trump significantly increased his share among non-white voters, particularly among Latinos.

This false assumption—that victory was just going to fall into their lap—has been a real strategic problem for Democrats. They believed they could avoid making difficult trade-offs, thinking non-white voters were their base and were very progressive, which led them to think they didn’t need to moderate on any unpopular issues to win. However, this failed to recognize that historically, non-white voters in the Democratic electorate have been more moderate or even conservative than white voters. For instance, conservative white voters likely supported Republicans, but conservative Black or Latino voters often supported Democrats because they didn’t feel welcome in the Republican party. The leftward drift of the Democratic party has pushed many of these voters away and the anticipated demographic majority has not materialized. In fact, many working-class Latinos, some working-class Asian Americans and an increasing number of working-class African Americans are now tempted to vote for the Republican party, which is one of the reasons why Trump continues to be competitive.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to the US. In Brazil, for example, which is majority non-white, if non-white voters systematically refused to vote for Jair Bolsonaro, he would never have won the presidential election. His competitiveness was partly due to strong backing from evangelical non-white voters, including some of the less affluent segments of Brazilian society.

The Term ‘Misinformation’ Should Be Treated with More Skepticism

In your writings, you discuss the role of misinformation and media in the spread of populist ideas. How has the US media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, impacted the populist narrative?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, there’s been a significant structural transformation in the media landscape, particularly with the diversification of media sources. Fifty or sixty years ago, there were just a few major broadcast networks and most people got their news from them. Then came the introduction of cable news, which began to polarize information sources and made it much easier to broadcast purely partisan opinion programs. This was an important shift.

Then, of course, we saw the rise of social media, podcasts, YouTube channels and even talk radio, which really grew in importance. Today, Fox News isn’t as dominant as it once was. For example, in prime time, Fox News might have an audience of 300,000 to 400,000 viewers, whereas the Joe Rogan podcast can reach 5 to 6 million listeners per episode. Tucker Carlson appears to have even increased his audience since leaving Fox News and distributing his show independently on platforms like YouTube and X (formerly Twitter). This shift helps explain the irresponsible and partisan nature of much of our media today.

At the same time, I’m concerned about the profligate use of the term “misinformation.” Often, we refer to something as misinformation simply because it presents a worldview we disagree with or have misgivings about. Some positions that were censored as misinformation in recent years have turned out to have some truth to them, or at least some plausibility. For example, during the pandemic, scientists who speculated about the possibility that COVID originated from gain-of-function research in labs, potentially due to an inadvertent lab leak, were heavily censored. Now, this theory is taken seriously by mainstream news outlets and many federal agencies in the United States. This was perhaps the most prominent instance where the term “misinformation” was used to shut down a debate, and it should make us more self-critical about how we define and apply the term.

I believe we would benefit from treating the term “misinformation” with more skepticism than it currently receives.

Populism in the US has been linked to a growing distrust in traditional institutions. What socio-political factors do you believe are most responsible for this erosion of trust?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, we’ve touched on this issue throughout our discussion. It ties back to several key factors. First, there’s the lack of output performance—people feel that institutions are no longer delivering the results they expect. Then there’s the sense among some segments of the population that they’ve been deprived of the social status they once had and believe they naturally deserve.

Social media also plays a significant role. It’s now easier to highlight the actual failings of governing elites, who have always been imperfect, but whose flaws are much more visible now than in the past. Additionally, social media makes it easier for irresponsible actors to gain influence, to distort the failings of institutions, or to take decisions out of context, making them appear horrendous or obviously incompetent when there might be valid reasons for those actions.

In essence, the factors contributing to the loss of trust in institutions are the same as those driving the rise of populism.

Liberal Democracy Is Still the Only Legitimate Regime

In your article, “The End of History Revisited,” you argue in the conclusion, “It follows that the tempting phrase ‘the end of the end of history’ is, for now, premature.” It seems that you give credit to the thesis of The End of History, do you think the thesis is still valid?

Professor Yascha Mounk: In that article, I argue that it’s important to distinguish between two claims made in Francis Fukuyama’s seminal work. The first claim is that, during the mid-20th century, genuine ideological competitors to liberal democracy existed—namely fascism and communism. Each, in its own way, posed a serious challenge to liberal democracy and presented a consciously articulated alternative vision for legitimate governance. However, these alternatives ultimately failed and they failed catastrophically. By the time Fukuyama was writing, he argued that the only remaining grand theory of legitimate government with genuine international appeal was liberal democracy. This, for him, was the “end of history.” The second, more implicit claim was that liberal democracies would be particularly adept at solving their internal problems and would, therefore, prove to be more stable than those alternative regime forms.

On the first point, I think Fukuyama has largely been proven right—at least so far. I can’t say with certainty that we’ll never see another regime form that can genuinely compete with liberal democracy, but when we look around the world today, it’s clear that liberal democracy remains the only genuinely legitimate regime form. The alternatives each have significant limitations. For example, you have a form of Shia theocracy in Iran, but that doesn’t appeal to anyone outside of the Muslim world, or even outside of the Shia world, and it’s facing significant trouble even within Iran.

You also have strongman leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, who might appeal to some authoritarian-leaning individuals around the world, but there’s no global movement to adopt a “Russian model” of governance. Similarly, China is a genuine geopolitical and economic competitor to the West and perhaps a cultural one at some point. However, while the Chinese model might work well in theory, it’s a mess in practice and it’s entirely unclear how it could ever be exported. For instance, would people in Zimbabwe agree to be governed the way China is governed if it meant achieving the same level of wealth and development? Probably yes. But would they agree to let their leaders implement the Chinese model? Likely not, because it’s unclear what that would entail. While they might trust their leaders to centralize power in the way the CCP has in Beijing, they wouldn’t trust them to deliver the same results.

The Chinese model is built on 3,000 years of Mandarin meritocracy, 100 years of a centralized Communist Party and 30 years of a peculiar form of capitalism that claims to be socialist or communist while actually marketizing everything, including retirement and healthcare. It’s entirely unclear what it would mean to replicate this model elsewhere.

This situation highlights the continuing legitimacy of liberal democracy, as even clearly non-liberal and non-democratic regimes often pretend to embody both. There’s currently a lot of intellectual effort in China to argue why China is the true democracy, which you wouldn’t see if there were a self-conscious ideological alternative to the prevailing liberal democratic paradigm.

Where Fukuyama might have been overly optimistic, however, is in his predictions about the stability of liberal democracy at home. While liberal democracy remains the only legitimate regime form with genuine mass appeal worldwide, it is much more embattled and less popular domestically than it was in the past. This, I think, helps explain some of the chaos and uncertainty we are experiencing in our political moment.

In the same article you underline that “While there has of late been extensive speculation about the future of liberal democracies, there has been far less reflection on how dictatorships that issue from populism may fare in the long run.” In the year 2024 where populist movements all over Europe are on the rise, do you think we can now predict the future of populist parties more accurately or is it still very difficult?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, it’s clear that populism has become one of the dominant modes of politics today. Populist political parties, particularly those on the right, are now some of the largest political families around the world. In the European Parliament, for example, various incarnations of right-wing populism form a significant bloc and this is mirrored in national parliaments, which are even more consequential.

The critical question is what happens when populists actually win elections and begin to govern. Over the past decades, we’ve seen very different paths in different countries. On one side, you have countries like Venezuela and perhaps Turkey, where populist leaders have undermined democratic institutions to such an extent that free and fair elections are either nonexistent, as in Venezuela, or are in serious doubt, as in Turkey, where it’s questionable whether the opposition can still oust the sitting leader by democratic means.

Secondly, there are countries where populist movements have significantly damaged democratic institutions—limiting free speech, decimating independent institutions—but where elections remain meaningful, though perhaps no longer entirely fair. India, the world’s largest democracy, might be an example of this.

Lastly, there are countries where populists have, at least for now, failed to maintain power. Despite efforts to handicap the opposition, the opposition was able to remove them through elections. This has been the case in Brazil, in Poland and, at least in 2020, in the United States. However, as the American case indicates, this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the end of the story. For example, betting markets currently give Trump about a 45% chance of regaining power through the ballot box.

So, what we need to recognize is that there is a large variance in outcomes when populists take over. We also need to move away from thinking of democracy in binary terms—either perfect or completely destroyed. Populist victories don’t necessarily mean the imminent death of democracy, but they do often cause serious damage. The extent and lasting impact of that damage depend on a variety of complex social factors.

In your article written back in 2017, “European Disunion- What the rise of populist movements means for democracy,” you argue: “We’ve made real progress in understanding the nature of populism, moderate progress in analyzing its causes, and barely any progress in identifying its potential remedies.” In the year 2024, do you think we now have some remedies or are we at a total loss?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I don’t remember writing that article or that specific line, but I stand by it a hundred percent. Unfortunately, I don’t think much has changed since 2017.

Many Americans Feel the Democratic Party Is Out of Touch with the Mainstream

Before the presidential debate last Tuesday, you wrote that “Americans view Harris as too progressive. Tonight, may be her last best chance to course correct…Harris is on track to lose the election.” What do you think now, after the debate? Will she win the elections or lose it?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, as I mentioned earlier, betting markets, the last time I checked, gave Trump about a 45% chance of winning and Harris about a 55% chance. Harris did quite well in the debate. It always helps to remind the American electorate of just how irresponsible and chaotic Donald Trump can be. While he still has a base of supporters, most Americans do not like that approach.

Kamala Harris came across as competent and composed, while Trump made a series of outrageous claims, lost his temper and didn’t control himself well. This certainly helped her significantly. However, the election remains very close and I still believe there are actions Harris and the Democrats could take to increase their chances of victory in November. 

More importantly, to put an end to Donald Trump’s political career and the broader danger posed by his MAGA-inspired politics, we need to build a much broader electoral coalition. This coalition must be strong enough to win a series of elections decisively, forcing the Republican Party to transform itself. And the same is true inversely—if Republicans move to a more moderate stance, they could push Democrats to do the same.

I think it’s fine for Democrats to lean somewhat to the left on economic issues. Most Americans, like most Europeans, want a robust welfare state and policies that ensure wage growth for lower earners, even as they also believe in a market economy and care about economic growth. These priorities can be combined.

However, on cultural issues, it’s clear that many Americans feel the Democratic Party is out of sync with the mainstream. While I don’t personally share that opinion, more Americans believe Kamala Harris is too progressive than think Donald Trump is too conservative. To address this, Democrats, I believe, need to champion the values of inclusion and tolerance, which are non-negotiable. However, they should also make some cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails.

A Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than the First

What will happen to American democracy if Donald Trump is re-elected on November 5?

Professor Yascha Mounk: There are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016. America has certain strengths compared to other democracies, such as the federal system, which distributes power to governors—many of whom would still be Democrats. The system also includes numerous veto points in the legislative process, which made it possible for Democrats, especially after the 2018 midterm elections, to block much of what Trump wanted to do. Additionally, the US economy is sufficiently robust and the media landscape is developed enough that it’s difficult for the state to fully capture it, reducing the incentives to comply with the executive’s dictates. These strengths would likely remain in place.

However, there are also ways in which Trump could be more dangerous now than he was in 2016. Back then, he had no political experience, lacked a trusted team of people who shared his worldview and had limited control over the Republican Party, which at the time included many representatives and senators who were publicly ambivalent and privately disdainful of him. Moreover, Trump did not have a clear sense of the institutional changes he wanted to make.

Now, things are different. He has four years of experience in the executive office, has built a deep bench of loyalists willing to do his bidding from day one and the Republican Party has transformed itself. Many of the people currently in the House of Representatives and a significant number in the Senate ran as Trump Republicans and are much more aligned with his political agenda. Those who weren’t initially aligned have often made a political turn toward him, as it has become a necessity for survival in Republican politics. Trump also has loyalists who served with him in lower positions and now understand how the federal bureaucracy works. Lastly, Trump is out for revenge—he believes the institutions hampered his efforts during his first term and targeted him after he left office. He may now aim to dismantle those institutions to ensure that what he calls the “deep state” can no longer contain him.

These factors suggest that a second Trump presidency could be more dangerous than the first. How much damage he might manage to inflict is difficult to predict and could ultimately depend on various circumstances, including how much discipline he applies to transforming the system—something that, thankfully, remains uncertain.

Academicians like Steven Levitsky and Kurt Weyland argue that democracies have shown, time and again, resilience on the face of populist threat however institutions like V-Dem strongly argue that democracy is under serious threat. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Perhaps somewhere in between. It’s interesting to note that some objective metrics for measuring how democratic a country is seem to be holding up better than subjective ratings from institutions like V-Dem or Freedom House. For instance, if you look at how many journalists are in jail, the duration of governments in office, or how often term limits have been repealed, there doesn’t appear to be a significant change. The best research on this topic, in my view, comes from political scientists like Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev.

However, these statistics might not fully capture the extent of polarization, the breakdown of informal political norms, or the potential dangers on the horizon. In a country like the United States, for example, we’re certainly not at the point where journalists are being jailed, but we might be two or three steps away from a scenario where newspapers start to fall in line with more authoritarian tendencies.

This recent research provides a necessary and helpful corrective to some of the pessimism in the field, encouraging us to analyze the situation more carefully and perhaps with a bit more optimism that we can navigate through this moment. However, it’s certainly not a reason to stop being alarmed altogether.