With its reputation for political stability, social cohesion, and economic wealth, global-city Singapore is very rarely discussed as a case for thinking about populist politics. Kenneth Paul Tan will explore what lies behind this reputation and discuss how the Singapore system, led by a government celebrated as clean, meritocratic, and pragmatic, is now showing signs of change not necessarily in the direction of democratization, but towards authoritarian forms of populism, first of the right and then of the left.
Professor Kenneth Paul Tan delivered this presentation during the “Varieties of Populism and Authoritarianism in Malaysia & Singapore” panel on October 26, 2023, organized as part of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series.
Kenneth Paul TAN is a tenured Professor of Politics, Film, and Cultural Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. He teaches and conducts interdisciplinary research at the Academy of Film, the Department of Journalism, the Department of Government and International Studies, and the Smart Society Lab. His books include Asia in the Old and New Cold Wars: Ideologies, Narratives, and Lived Experiences (Palgrave MacMillan, 2023), Movies to Save Our World: Imagining Poverty, Inequality and Environmental Destruction in the 21st Century (Penguin, 2022), Singapore’s First Year of COVID-19: Public Health, Immigration, the Neoliberal State, and Authoritarian Populism (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), Singapore: Identity, Brand, Power (Cambridge University Press, 2018), Governing Global-City Singapore: Legacies and Futures After Lee Kuan Yew (Routledge, 2017), Cinema and Television in Singapore: Resistance in One Dimension (Brill, 2008), and Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture, and Politics (NUS Press, 2007). Previously, he was a tenured Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore. He has held visiting fellowships, and honorary and adjunct professorships at the Australian National University, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Georgetown University (on a Fulbright Fellowship), Harvard University, Sciences Po, the University of Duisburg-Essen, and the University of Hong Kong. His degrees are from the University of Cambridge (PhD, Social and Political Sciences) and the University of Bristol (BSc First Class Honours, Economics and Politics).
In an exclusive interview exploring the intricacies of declining democracy, the rise of far-right populism, and the adaptability of democratic systems, Prof. Staffan I Lindberg and Dr. Marina Nord voice their deep concerns, highlighting that this is a matter of significance for all. Prof. Lindberg emphasizes, “We’ve demonstrated through various publications that far-right extremist parties are not only populist but also hold anti-pluralist views in their rhetoric and policies. When they attain power, they often spearhead the ongoing wave of autocratization. I would be very concerned if that also translates into and materialized in the European Parliament elections.”
The state of democracy across the globe is under intense scrutiny as the world grapples with shifting political landscapes and the rise of authoritarian tendencies. In an exclusive interview, Professor Staffan I Lindberg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg and Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute, provide valuable insights into the complexities of this critical issue.
Addressing criticisms from Professor Steven Levitsky in an interview with the ECPS on October 12, 2023, the interview begins with a robust response to his contention that the global democratic decline highlighted in the V-Dem Project’s 2023 report may not be as dire as depicted. Lindberg and Nord emphasize the significance of their data, underlining the approach of population-weighted data, which accounts for the global impact of democratic changes in countries with large populations.
The interviewees discuss the apparent resilience of democracy and its concurrent decline, emphasizing that these findings are not necessarily contradictory. They point to countries such as that have made significant democratic improvements, as well as others where the situation has deteriorated. These varying experiences contribute to the complex global picture of democracy.
Prof. Lindberg explained the use of population-weighted data to assess the state of democracy worldwide, emphasizing that it gives more weight to countries with large populations due to their greater impact on the global state of democracy. This approach led to the conclusion that the global average for democracy regressed to 1986 levels in the V-Dem Project’s 2023 report.
Dr. Nord also pointed out that even when looking at country averages, there is a decline, which dates back to 1997. However, she highlighted the resilience of democracy in terms of the continuation of elections in many countries. The interviewees delve into the multifaceted nature of democracy, highlighting that it encompasses much more than the mere presence of elections. Dr. Nord notes that while elections may still take place in certain countries, the decline in essential democratic attributes such as freedom of speech and freedom of association is a pressing concern.
Prof. Lindberg also expressed a deep concern about the potential surge of far-right populist parties in the upcoming European Parliament elections in 2024. He emphasized that extremist and anti-pluralist parties often drive the current wave of autocratization, and their rise in Europe is worrisome.
Moreover, the interview explores the adaptation of democratic systems to specific cultural and socio-political contexts. Prof. Lindberg emphasizes the inherent contradiction in the concept of an “illiberal democracy” and highlights that the core principle of liberalism is the acceptance of opposing views, which is not compatible with an illiberal stance.
The interviewees conclude with the discussion of the recent Democracy Report by International IDEA, aligning with the findings in the V-Dem Project’s report. Professor Lindberg and Dr. Nord emphasize the urgency of collective action in the face of the growing number of countries undergoing autocratization.
In an exclusive interview exploring the intricacies of declining democracy, the rise of far-right populism, and the adaptability of democratic systems, Prof. Staffan I Lindberg and Dr. Marina Nord voice their deep concerns, highlighting that this is a matter of significance for all. Prof. Lindberg emphasizes, “We’ve demonstrated through various publications that far-right extremist parties are not only populist but also hold anti-pluralist views in their rhetoric and policies. When they attain power, they often spearhead the ongoing wave of autocratization. I would be very concerned if that also translates into and materialized in the European Parliament elections.”
The state of democracy across the globe is under intense scrutiny as the world grapples with shifting political landscapes and the rise of authoritarian tendencies. In an exclusive interview, Professor Staffan I Lindberg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg and Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute, provide valuable insights into the complexities of this critical issue.
Addressing criticisms from Professor Steven Levitsky in an interview with the ECPS on October 12, 2023, the interview begins with a robust response to his contention that the global democratic decline highlighted in the V-Dem Project’s 2023 report may not be as dire as depicted. Lindberg and Nord emphasize the significance of their data, underlining the approach of population-weighted data, which accounts for the global impact of democratic changes in countries with large populations.
The interviewees discuss the apparent resilience of democracy and its concurrent decline, emphasizing that these findings are not necessarily contradictory. They point to countries such as that have made significant democratic improvements, as well as others where the situation has deteriorated. These varying experiences contribute to the complex global picture of democracy.
Prof. Lindberg explained the use of population-weighted data to assess the state of democracy worldwide, emphasizing that it gives more weight to countries with large populations due to their greater impact on the global state of democracy. This approach led to the conclusion that the global average for democracy regressed to 1986 levels in the V-Dem Project’s 2023 report.
Dr. Nord also pointed out that even when looking at country averages, there is a decline, which dates back to 1997. However, she highlighted the resilience of democracy in terms of the continuation of elections in many countries. The interviewees delve into the multifaceted nature of democracy, highlighting that it encompasses much more than the mere presence of elections. Dr. Nord notes that while elections may still take place in certain countries, the decline in essential democratic attributes such as freedom of speech and freedom of association is a pressing concern.
Prof. Lindberg also expressed a deep concern about the potential surge of far-right populist parties in the upcoming European Parliament elections in 2024. He emphasized that extremist and anti-pluralist parties often drive the current wave of autocratization, and their rise in Europe is worrisome.
Moreover, the interview explores the adaptation of democratic systems to specific cultural and socio-political contexts. Prof. Lindberg emphasizes the inherent contradiction in the concept of an “illiberal democracy” and highlights that the core principle of liberalism is the acceptance of opposing views, which is not compatible with an illiberal stance.
The interviewees conclude with the discussion of the recent Democracy Report by International IDEA, aligning with the findings in the V-Dem Project’s report. Professor Lindberg and Dr. Nord emphasize the urgency of collective action in the face of the growing number of countries undergoing autocratization.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Staffan I Lindberg and Dr. Marina Nord with minor edits.
Democratic Erosion Prevalent Worldwide Across All Metrics
Prof. Steven R. Levitsky, in his article ‘Democracy’s Surprising Resilience’ co-authored withProfessor Lucan A. Way, argues that the data does not support your findings in V-Dem Project’s 2023 report. He writes: ‘The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project’s 2023 report claimed that global levels of democracy had declined to 1986 levels and, thus, that the global democratic advances of the last thirty-five years had been “wiped out’’. What is your response to Prof. Levitsky’s assessment?
Staffan I Lindberg: The data supports our findings otherwise, we wouldn’t publish it. It’s essential to note that this is a quote based on our calculations using population-weighted data. This approach gives more weight to larger countries with significant populations. The rationale behind this is that when we assess the overall state of democracy worldwide, the country-weighted averages treat all territories with governments equally. In this method, countries with small populations, like the Seychelles with 90,000 inhabitants, carry the same weight as a giant nation like India with 1.4 billion people. While this approach serves specific purposes, we believe that, in the context of assessing the state of democracy worldwide, it’s more meaningful. For example, when democracy declines in a country as populous as India, with 1.4 billion people, it has a more significant impact than democracy improving in the Seychelles with 90,000 inhabitants. According to the population-weighted measure, the global average regresses to 1986 levels. Marina, do you have anything to add to what I just mentioned?
Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
Marina Nord: Well, I would like to add that even when we look at country averages, we still observe a decline. While the decline might not be as dramatic, it harks back to 1997, if I recall correctly. Nevertheless, there is still an overall decline.
Prof. Levitsky highlights ‘Democracy’s Surprising Resilience’ all over the world which is exactly the opposite of your findings in the 2023 Democracy Report. How do you explain the two very different findings?
Staffan I Lindberg: These findings are not necessarily contradictory. It’s important to acknowledge that there are numerous countries globally that have made significant improvements in terms of democracy compared to their state in 1989. Large portions of Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Africa have made substantial progress, to name a few examples. However, there are also countries where the situation has deteriorated, and in some cases, significantly so. It’s entirely possible to have countries that democratized during the third wave of democratization, as Stephen Levitsky mentioned, and have since remained stable or even improved their democratic standing. Yet, the global average declines because other countries have witnessed declines. These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive.
Resilience in Elections Amidst Diminished Democracy Quality
Marina Nord: If one only considers the survival of democracy as the presence of contested elections, then, in many countries, elections are still being held. However, the quality of these elections and other aspects that contribute to democracy, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, are in decline. This is indeed surprising. So, while we observe resilience in terms of the continuation of elections, the decline in the quality of democracy and its essential attributes is a noteworthy concern. These findings don’t necessarily contradict each other; they provide different dimensions of the overall picture.
Alright. In his article ‘Democracy’s Surprising Resilience’, Prof. Levitsky further argues that: ‘Thus, even if Freedom House and V-Dem are correct in identifying an increase in incumbent abuse over the last decade or so, the consequences of that abuse appear to be modest, for many autocratic-leaning incumbents are failing to entrench themselves in power.’ How would you comment on this judgement?
Staffan I Lindberg: Well, if you were to ask serious observers of countries like Turkey, Hungary, and others, it’s not necessarily a viewpoint shared by many. The term “many” is quite flexible. While it’s true that we’ve witnessed cases where autocratizing incumbents have been defeated or removed from power recently, such as in Poland where transition is still ongoing, like Bolsonaro in Brazil and the Trump administration in the United States, there have also been reversals in countries like Zambia. We’ve seen periods of decline in South Korea that were eventually reversed. So, there are indeed significant instances where the autocratizing incumbents have failed. However, based on our data and assessments by organizations like Freedom House, there are many more countries where autocratizing parties and leaders have continued to undermine democracy and, in many cases, have dismantled democratic institutions. This broader trend is what we observe globally, rather than the isolated instances where incumbents fail to solidify autocracy.
Marina Nord: I would agree with that.
Autocratization Has Worsened Since 2019
In your article ‘A Third Wave of Autocratization is Here: What Is New About It?’ co-authored with Anna Lührmann and published in 2019, you argue that a new wave of autocratization is emerging. Given the time that has passed since its publication, do you still stand by its findings?
Staffan I Lindberg: No. We began our work on that article in 2016-2017, and it was eventually published in 2019. At that time, we observed the emergence of a third wave of autocratization, and it was still unfolding. I would say that it’s still ongoing, but I must clarify that it has worsened. In our subsequent research on waves of autocratization, and also in the work we conducted for the democracy report, that wave has become much worse. In the article, if I recall correctly, the maximum number of countries undergoing autocratization simultaneously was 28. In last year’s democracy report, in which Marina was also involved, we counted 42 such countries. This represents a significant increase. What I would not agree with in that article is the notion that there is no cause for panic and alarm.
Exactly. That’s next question: In the same article you underlined that ‘As it was premature to announce the “end of history” in 1992, it is premature to proclaim the “end of democracy” now.’ You argue that democracy is in decline, but it is no reason to panic. It seems that you agree with Prof. Levitsky when he says that democracy has proved to be resilient.
Staffan I Lindberg: No. I hope it’s still too early to declare the end of democracy globally. However, I find myself in a different position today than Anna Lührmann and I were back in 2018 before that article was published. I believe there is a reason to be very, very concerned, if not to panic, which might be an extreme reaction, but to be deeply concerned. Many others share this sentiment. I think that what Professor Levitsky and some other commentators are doing when they suggest that not much is changing is doing a disservice to the world. When I examine our data and witness daily news reporting, I see democracy under attack in so many places, including my own country, Sweden, where signs of another far-right, extreme anti-pluralist party have emerged. This is putting pressure on our current government and could lead to a trajectory of autocratization. It’s deeply worrisome when established democracies start experiencing these challenges. So, while it may not be a time to panic, I believe it’s essential to be extremely concerned and very worried.
Marina Nord: I agree with the sentiment that “panic” might not be the right word, but being worried is indeed appropriate. To provide you with some statistics, our latest data from 2020 indicates that 43 percent of the world’s population resides in autocratizing countries. This is a global trend. What’s concerning is that not only democratic countries like Brazil, Ghana, or Greece are undergoing autocratization, but already autocratic countries are further regressing into autocracy, such as Hungary, India, the Philippines, and Russia. In the case of Russia, which was already a stable autocracy, we’ve observed further autocratization. This is the reason for concern. So, I would say it’s a time for action, not panic, but to take action and pay attention.
Autocratization and Growing Discontent with Democracy
One of the findings of the Democracy Report 2023 by V-Dem is that the global advances of democracy achieved in the last 35 years has been wiped out. The level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen in 2022 is down to 1986 levels. How do you explain the dynamics of this downfall? What went wrong?
Staffan I Lindberg: Yes, I think that’s what it is called these days as one-billion-dollar question. I don’t think we have an answer, and the explanation is likely quite complex. Various forces are at play simultaneously in many countries and regions of the world, including local dynamics. What’s remarkable is that it’s a global phenomenon. We observe this trend in every region of the world, with countries undergoing autocratization across different levels of socioeconomic development, various ethnic, linguistic, and social identity configurations, ranging from countries with dominant/homogenous groups to highly heterogeneous ones, and varying levels of economic development and pre-existing democracy.
This diversity suggests that there are global forces at play. We know about some of these forces, such as Russia, which played a role in the third wave of autocratization. Putin in Russia turned things around in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and its subsequent actions, including the invasion of Ukraine, involvement in Brexit, interference in American elections, and support for far-right extremist parties and groups across Europe. Then there is China, which has been pushing back against the democratic wave since the mid-1990s, impacting both established democracies and countries in the global south. Let’s not forget about Saudi Arabia. They have been doing a similar thing by supporting anti-democratic Salafist movements. Salafis used to be the microscopic, little part of the Muslim world. It is no longer. Iran is another player on that side. Of course, there are many versions of practicing Islam, that are compatible with human rights and democracy and women’s rights, and so on. Salafism is not.
There’s a growing body of research suggesting that a significant increase in relative economic inequality, which began in the 1980s and spread worldwide, is providing fertile ground for wannabe dictators to exploit dissatisfaction and fears for the future often associated with inequality. While there’s no solid scientific consensus, a growing body of evidence points in this direction.
Marina Nord: I would agree that each case has context-specific factors, but a general explanation could be a growing discontent with democracy as a regime. In each instance, it might be triggered by factors like inequality, an economic crisis, or migration, which are often country-specific. This discontent can give rise to populist movements, ultimately paving the way for wannabe dictators to come to power within democracies. Once in power, these leaders significantly undermine elections.
What distinguishes contemporary autocratization from historical examples is that it’s often a gradual process, not happening overnight, and it often occurs under the facade of legality. This process is frequently referred to as “democratic backsliding” or “democratic corrosion,” marking a substantial decline in a country’s democracy over time.
Having Legislature Does Not Automatically Translate into a Democracy
In the V-Dem’s Democracy Report 2023, you underline that “Democracy broke down in seven of the top 10 autocratizing countries in the last ten years: El Salvador, Hungary, India, Serbia, Thailand, Türkiye, and Tunisia.” What do you mean by democratic break-down? In Turkey, for example, elections are still held, and the Parliament is open and keeps legislating.
Staffan I Lindberg: The same is also the case in Russia. The mere presence of multiparty elections and a functioning legislature on paper doesn’t equate to having a democracy. Back in the 1990s, Thomas Carothers and others referred to this as the “electoral fallacy.” Democracy necessitates more than just holding multi-party elections. To be considered a democracy, it’s crucial that these elections are genuinely free, fair, and held periodically. Furthermore, even if elections meet these criteria, it’s essential that opposition parties are not harassed, oppressed, prosecuted for political reasons, or otherwise impeded between elections.
Beyond this, democracy also requires freedom of speech, particularly in terms of media and individual freedom of speech. In a genuinely democratic environment, people can express their opinions freely. However, in cases like Hungary, where, since around 2018, Viktor Orban and his Fidesz party have gained control over 98 percent of the media, it becomes challenging to maintain a climate of free speech. Even if individuals on the street can technically voice their opinions without consequences, having a media regime controlled by those in power can shape public perceptions, leading to beliefs that align with the government’s agenda. In Hungary, for instance, the government-loyal press has propagated stories like Putin being compelled by NATO to invade Ukraine, thereby legitimizing Russia’s actions. Many people in Hungary have accepted this narrative, not because of freedom of speech but because of the media environment. Holding elections and having a functioning legislature does not automatically translate into a democracy. Furthermore, civil society’s ability to express opinions, demonstrate, and criticize the regime is vital for a true democracy. In the case of Turkey, many leaders, academics have been imprisoned or subjected to harassment, making it challenging for civil society to operate freely.
Marina Nord: I would like to emphasize that there are only six countries worldwide that do not hold elections at this moment. Therefore, democracy encompasses much more than just the act of voting. To illustrate, the Soviet Union had regular elections, but they were devoid of meaning. So, the mere presence of elections does not automatically signify the existence of a democracy.
Many pundits argue that the upcoming European Parliament elections in June 2024 will witness a surge of far-rights populist parties. How concerned are you about a possible victory of far-right parties?
Staffan I Lindberg: Very concerned and I think everyone should be. We’ve shown in a number of publications, also using the varieties of parties and party organization data set, which is separate from the regular V-Dem data set, but with data on individual parties that are far right, extremist parties which are not only populist, but they are anti-pluralist in the rhetoric and policies that when they come into power they are the ones in the current wave of autocratization that typically drive those processes. There are also a few instances of left-wing parties and leaders that have also talked recently, but they’re very few and far between
in comparison to the vast majority that are driven by these right-wing. So yes, I would be very concerned if that also translates into and materialized in the European Parliament elections.
Marina Nord: I would agree.
Illiberal Democracy Is an Oxymoron
Leaders like Erdogan and Orban who deviate from democracy and veer towards authoritarianism often claim that they have not strayed from democracy, rule of law, human rights and freedoms. They even argue that they are models for other aspiring democracies. They defend these claims by arguing that they have embraced a form of democracy tailored to their country’s socio-cultural characteristics. What is your response to the claim that beyond the democractic systems with universal values and forms we are familiar with, there can be different forms of democracies adapted to each country and culture?
Staffan I Lindberg: Yes, of course. We already see that among the established democracies. It’s been very different the way democracy has functioned in the United States, since they got a really good democracy in around 1970, very different from France and France is very different from Sweden in many ways. And in Ghana it also functions different as a culture, different cultural background, and so on. We can go down the line, of course. That doesn’t mean that any version of what some leader proclaim is democracy is a democracy. China also claims that they are actually -the last white paper they put out on that- the only democracy that works in the world. That was a white paper they issued after the first democracy summit that the Biden administration put together.
(Viktor) Orban claims to have or wants to have an illiberal democracy. That is an oxymoron. That is a contradiction in terms. A democracy cannot be illiberal because the founding principle of liberalism is the reciprocal acceptance and tolerance of opposing views. If you’re illiberal, you don’t accept the opposing views and that’s not compatible with democracy. Now, Orban tries to frame this in terms of LGBTQI and women rights and conservative family values and all that. But that’s just a framing. The real politics is about eradication of opposing views and opposing political forces. And that’s not compatible with democracy.
Marina Nord: I would just add that I have heard several times in Russian political circles that Russia is called as a “guided democracy,” and that also contradicts this definition of democracy that we have.
Lastly, latest Democracy Report by International IDEA found that almost half the countries have suffered a notable decline in democratic values. ‘What may be worse is that it is the sixth consecutive year in which countries with net declines outnumbers those with net advances, the longest such pattern in our data set’ argues the report. Are you surprised or feel vindicated by the findings of the report?
Staffan I Lindberg: These findings align closely with our Democracy Report, and they come as no surprise because most of the data used in the International IDEA report originates from V-Dem. While I don’t have the latest figures, it used around 70 percent of their data sourced from V-Dem. Therefore, the patterns observed in their report, released nine months after ours, closely mirror those in our Democracy Report.
Based on the findings of the IDEA report, what are your thoughts on where this trend is leading us?
Staffan I Lindberg: We are not in a position to make predictions; our role is to present the facts as they are. The stark reality is that the number of countries undergoing autocratization has seen a significant increase in recent years, and we have yet to witness a reversal of this trend. This is a cause for concern that should prompt collective action.
Dr. Garry Rodan (Honorary Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland).
Speakers
“Political Islam and Islamist Populism in Malaysia: Implications for Nation-Building,” by Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid (Professor of Political Science, University Sains Malaysia).
“Islamist Civilizationism in Malaysia,” by Dr.Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri (Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia).
“Authoritarian Populismin Singapore,” byDr.Kenneth Paul Tan(Professor of Politics, Film, and Cultural Studies, School of Communication, Hong Kong Baptist University).
“Populism, religion, and anti-LGBTQ+ attitudes in Malaysia,”Dr.Shanon Shah(Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London).
Dr. Fizza Batool (Assistant Professor, SZABIST University, Karachi)
Speakers
“The Radical Right and the Radical Left in Anno 2023: What Does Populism Got To Do With It?” by Dr. Andrej Zaslove (Associate Professor – Empirical Political Science, Radboud University.)
“Psychological Roots of Populist Voting,” by Dr. Bert N. Bakker (Associate Professor, University of Amsterdam).
“The Psychological Appeal of Populism,” by Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington (Associate Professor of Social Psychology, London School of Economics and Political Science)
“Electoral Populism in Pakistan and India,” by Dr. Farhan Hanif Siddiqui (Associate Professor, QAU).
“Populist Strategies of Erdogan in 2022 Elections,” by Dr. Salim Cevik (Associate at the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), SWP, Germany).
Dr. Fizza Batool is an academic and policy researcher with a particular interest in Comparative Politics, Comparative Democratization, Peace Studies and Populism. She is currently an Assistant Professor (Social Sciences) at SZABIST University, Karachi. Previously, she worked for over a decade in the research and development sector where she served in important managerial positions. Her works have been published in some prestigious research journals like South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, Pakistan Horizon etc. She is currently authoring a book on Populism in Pakistan, scheduled to be published in 2024 by Palgrave Macmillan. She also contributes to English dailies in Pakistan and international research magazines such as South Asian Voices. She was one of the 2020 SAV Visiting Fellows at Stimson Center, DC.
The Radical Right and the Radical Left in Anno 2023: What Does Populism Got to Do with It?
Abstract: Populist radical right and populist radical left parties are stable members of party systems in Western Europe. The rise of the populist radical right can be traced back to the 1990s, while the transformation of left-wing parties into populist radical left parties is more recent. This presentation will discuss the recent electoral success of left and right-wing populist parties. It will discuss some of the more recent changing features of these radical parties, discussing the extent to which, for example, the populist radical right has expanded it issue base. And it will assess the role of populism, for the parties and for their voters, discussing the manner in which populism remains important for the parties in question.
Dr. Andrej Zaslove is an Associate Professor of Empirical Political Science at Radboud University. He conducts research into populism and political parties. He measures populist attitudes among voters and political parties and examines the links between populism and democracy, foreign policy and gender. He also examines the impact of populism on party systems.
Psychological Roots of Populist Voting
Dr. Bert N. Bakker is an Associate Professor at the Amsterdam School of Communication Research (University of Amsterdam). His work focuses on contemporary issues social polarization and populism. In particular, he studies the psychological roots of citizens’ political beliefs with the most attention to the role of personality and emotions. His work has appeared in journals such as Nature Human Behaviour, Journal of Communication, the American Political Science Review and the Journal of Politics. He also serves as an Associate Editor at the Journal of Experimental Political Science. He is the co-founder of the Hot Politics Lab – a lab-group studying the role of emotions and personality in politics. He is also the founder and co-organizer of the Dutch Political Psychology Meetings which are held twice a year at the University of Amsterdam.
The Psychological Appeal of Populism
Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington is currently a Visiting Associate Professor in Psychology at New York University Abu Dhabi. She is also an Associate Professor in the Department of Psychological & Behavioral Science at the London School of Economics, a Faculty Affiliate of the LSE International Inequalities Institute, and an Associate Editor at the European Journal of Social Psychology and the British Journal of Psychology. Jennifer’s research examines (1) the consequences of material and social adversity on cognitive performance, self-regulation, affect, and decision-making, and (2) the psychological underpinnings of political attitudes such as egalitarianism and support for populist platforms. In drawing out the social and policy implications of her research, Jennifer has worked with the British Psychological Society, the UNDP, the World Bank, the Joseph Rowntree Foundation, and the Indus Health Network, Pakistan.
Electoral Populism in India and Pakistan
Abstract: The electoral popularity and victory of populist parties in India and Pakistan is often explained in terms of their mobilization and electoral strategies which detail a mix of incentives including bringing the younger generation of non-voters into the voting matrix combined with reliance on existing patronage networks. Moving beyond such explanations, the argument broached here borders on the production of a neo-religious ethos in India and Pakistan that pervades the electoral space. In India’s case, religion was a protracted feature of local electoral politics in the post-colonial years which was entrenched and equally evident in the politics of the Congress party. Under the BJP, the neo-religious Hindutva electoral politics has only become more pronounced and pervasive, a proposition that allows for surveying shades of electoral populism under the Congress party and the BJP. In Pakistan, religion had a symbolic and ideological appeal, which captured the imagination of high politics under the Pakistan People’s Party government in the 1970s, with the result that it provided grounds for the weaponization of the blasphemy laws and discourse. This weaponization worryingly in present times sways the imagination of not only religious political actors but more controversially also mainstream political parties, as evident in their electoral politics. In this sense, both India and Pakistan represent case studies of a majoritarian and hegemonic neo-religious revivalism utilized for electoral gains with devastating consequences for social cohesion, diversity-acceptance and peaceful coexistence.
Dr. Farhan Hanif Siddiqi is an Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His research interests border on ethnic politics, federalism, conflict analysis/resolution, societal security, and crisis management in Pakistan and South Asia. His new co-authored book, Introducing International Relations: Concepts, Theories, and Practices was published by the Oxford University Press in 2023. He is also the author of, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (Routledge, 2012).
Populist Strategies of Erdogan in the 2022 Elections
Abstract: Ahead of Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections in May 2023, many polls predicted that Erdogan would lose power after 20 years in power. But contrary to the expectations of many, Erdoğan has managed to cling to power through a series of populist and nationalist maneuvers. First, he accused the opposition of not being “national and authentic” and openly questioned their national loyalty. He also claimed that the opposition candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu was the favorite candidate of terrorist organizations. Thus, he attacked the legitimacy of opposition actors rather than their concrete policies. His tight control over the media enabled him to spread this line.
Second and relatedly, he played on techno-nationalism. Ambitious projects such as the national automobile and the national fighter jet were used to garner support. Developments in Turkey’s defense industry, exemplified in particular by the global success of Turkish drones, were used to bolster Erdoğan’s image as a capable leader with a global reputation. Constant references to the defense industry and the militarization of Turkish foreign policy dominated the discourse to the extent that a parallel was drawn between Erdoğan’s fate and the fate of the nation. Thus, opposing Erdoğan was presented as opposing the nation’s security.
Finally, Erdoğan pursued populist economic policies and went on a spending spree in the year leading up to the election. He granted early retirement rates, large salary increases, debt write-offs. While such measures are likely to worsen the economy in the long run, in the short term they have been very useful in restoring his popularity.
In response to Erdoğan’s tactics, the opposition has tried to build the broadest possible alliance. However, this has weakened the opposition parties because they have had to make direct or indirect alliances with parties at the opposite end of the political spectrum. But more importantly, the opposition entered the election with a weak and uncharismatic leader who was unable to counter the government’s propaganda, demonstrating the importance of the right candidate to defeat populist authoritarian leaders.
Dr. Salim Çevik is a fellow at the Center for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) established at the Berlin-based think tank German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP). Prior to joining SWP, he held researcher and/or teaching positions at Columbia University, Istanbul Bilgi University, Ipek University, Lund University, and the Free University of Berlin. He received his PhD from the Political Science Department of Bilkent University in 2015. His main areas of research are religion in politics, democratization, nationalism, and nation-building. His most recent publications are “A Comparative Approach to Understanding Regime Trajectories of Tunisia and Turkey” published by the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, (co-authored with Pelin Ayan Musil) and “New Turkey and Management of the Religious Realm: Continuities and Ruptures,” published by the European Journal of Turkish Studies.
In anticipation of the upcoming 2024 European Elections, let’s take a closer look at the political landscape of Europe. The rise of populism has steadily gained momentum since the 2014 elections. The 2019 European Elections demonstrated the sustained growth of populism, which is associated with Euroscepticism. How will this trend influence the 2024 elections? This analysis explores the implications of populism for the 2024 elections within the broader context of Euroscepticism, the COVID-19 pandemic, and migration pressures. It will argue that Euroscepticism is linked to reactionary emotional responses to global challenges and changes. The psychological drivers of populism, such as fear, anger, and mistrust, have influenced the political climate, exacerbated by social media. The article underscores the need for EU member states to address these issues and strive for political consensus to foster trust in democratic institutions and counter the populist wave.
The European elections are approaching, with the date set for June 6-9, 2024. They are one of the most critical procedures for the European Union (EU), producing MEPs of the European Parliament, who participate in revising the regulations proposed by the European Council and are also responsible for electing the Head of the European Commission. European Parliament is the only institution directly elected by the people of the Union’s member-states and, therefore, monitors compliance with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights and highlights problems and violations in Member States (European Parliament, 2020).
In light of the upcoming elections in 2024, it is helpful to reflect on what is taking place in Europe today and what could be done. The 2019 European election showed that populism, which seemed to be established in the 2014 elections, has not ceased, but on the contrary, has risen significantly since. Thus, it is of great interest to better understand how this trend will be in the upcoming 2024 European elections, as populism is not only a European tendency but is a phenomenon that progressively spreads around the globe.
Within the European structure, populist parties are closely linked to Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism is a broad sense, it’s as vague as populism. It emerged as a term to describe those who were sceptic about the governing model of the EU – those who opposed the further integration of their countries (ECPS, 2020). However, Majistorovic (2022) argues that Euroscepticism became a broad term used as a reference for hostile sentiments and actions against democracy. Hence, observing Eurosceptic rhetoric expressed by parties and party members will help us measure populism in Europe.
According to Treib (2021), there was a rise in Eurosceptic parties (who previously emerged in the 2014 elections) in the 2019 elections. While in 2019, there were some concerns about the size of the populist parties in the European Parliament, as results showed, there was no significant change. In 2019, more than 28 percent of MEPs belonged to populist/Eurosceptic parties (Treib, 2021: 177). Within the European Parliament, there are two major party groups, which have traditionally been in the lead – the EPP (European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)) and the S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament). Smaller party groups are Renew Europe, ID, Greens, ECR, GUE/NGL and NI (non-attached). The two major groups (European Parliament, 2019), the EPP and the S&D in the previous elections sustained some damage in the last elections, but the populist parties did not benefit from it. Interestingly, though, populist parties seemed to turn further to the right than the left. In total, in the 2019 European elections, after Brexit, 185 populist MEPs were elected, from whom, 112 were in the radical-right sphere – a number significantly bigger than the radical left populists which have 20 seats in the European Parliament (Treib, 2021: 177-179).
In 2023, after the Covid-19 pandemic and its restrictions, along with refugee pressures and inflation plaguing the world, there seems to be a concerted shift of Europe to the right, with the rise of right-wing coalitions with far-right parties across Europe (Lynch, 2023). Silver (2022) presents an extensive graph showing that since 2000, the populist trend from Greece to Sweden has progressively grown. Bergmann (2020) argues that nationalist populism emerges after a major crisis. The above is verified in Silver (2022), as especially after the economic crisis in 2008, there is a simultaneous upward trend in most European countries, but also the emergence of populist parties, such as Syriza (Greece), and Podemos (Spain). Populist parties, according to both Silver (2022) and Bergmann (2020), appeared after the migration flows in 2015. So now, after a major crisis, it is “natural” for populist parties to gain more strength and spread, especially since many countries have been unable to “recover from the shock” of 2015.
Populism in Member States
The top five radical right populist parties (by MEPs) are Lega (Italy), National Rally (France), Fidesz (Hungary), AfD (Germany) and Brothers of Italy (Treib, 2021: 178). Lega is the now ruling party of Italy, National Rally is the second party in France, and Fidesz is still the government of Hungary. On the national level, according to Silver (2022), AfD in Germany, as well as SYRIZA in Greece, for example, dropped dramatically since the previous national elections. However, in Germany, the most critical country in the European Union (in terms of administration), there seemed to be a twist, as the AfD came third in the state elections in Bavaria and Hesse, behind the CDU and CSU (Burchard and Angelos, 2023). The trend for AfD is upwards as polls show the party leading in the former East Germany with 28 percent. It is also expected to come first in the upcoming parliamentary elections in Brandenburg Thuringia and Saxony (Angelos, 2023).
In Greece, for example, SYRIZA is the opposition party but lost a fair share of votes. In the 2023 national elections, it’s the first time that three far-right populist parties made their way into the Greek Parliament. The first of them is a party named Spartans – which is a successor to the Nazist party Golden Dawn (which was in the European Parliament as well in 2014). Second came the Greek Solution – a party already in the parliament since the 2019 elections, and third came Victory (NIKI in Greek). The three combined are over 10 percent of the parliamentary seats (34 out of 300) (Ministry of Interior, 2023).
In 2023, in the elections held in the Netherlands, the populist BBB (Farmer – Citizen Movement) party, was the big winner, as it got 19 percent of the votes, securing seats in the parliament (Henley, 2023). Netherlands’ economy is based on the farming industry, as the agricultural sector exports around €65 billions of agricultural produce per year (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2023). The rise of BBB is due to Rutte’s government, which wanted to pass a law to reduce nitrogen emissions by 50 percent by 2030, as the Dutch soil is severely polluted by nitrous oxide, ammonia or nitrate emission (Vallet, 2022). Farmers felt attacked and started protesting shortly after the announcement of the new policy. In the Netherlands’ case, it is evident that anger and resentment towards the government were the cause of the BBB party’s rise in the elections.
Psychology of Populism
The above cases serve as examples, to show two things. First, it provides evidence that populism is a growing phenomenon within the European Union. Second, the Netherlands example shows that the emergence of BBB is due to negative feelings in a significant portion of the population. Maybe the case of the Netherlands can explain the rise of populism in other EU countries.
Fear and anger are powerful emotions, believed to be the primary emotions fueling support for populist parties (Rico et al., 2017). Fear is a means for populist leaders, according to Müller (2022), but also, to some extent, it seems to be the raison d’être of their social and political existence. Anxiety stems from insecurity or rapid social and economic change. Due to the fear of the unknown, people turn to populist movements, which keeps the vicious cycle of populist tendencies and trends running (Rico et al., 2017). Nowadays, fear and anxiety are systemically being cultivated in societies, mainly via social media.
According to Rico et al. (2017: 446): “The basic principle of evaluation is that people’s reactions to stimuli depend largely on the conscious and preconscious interpretations that each individual makes of a situation. [..] the way in which people appraise the environment in connection with their personal goals ultimately determines which particular emotion is aroused.” After a long period of economic instability within the euro area, which also caused intra-EU migration, the refugee influxes of 2015 brought the situation to a head. In the same period, terrorist attacks in Paris and Spain, for example, did not work in favor of the difficult situation created, as the European Asylum System proved problematic in managing the situation.
Migration is a topical issue within the EU and inevitably a main factor in favor of populism. In the past few days, the EU tried to settle the irregular migration. In the pre-agreed text of the deal that was about to be sealed in Granada, Spain, on the 5th and 6th of October 2023, Poland and Hungary opposed the hosting of migrants from Middle East or Africa, while Slovakia, Czech Republic and Austria abstained in the final vote (Baczynska, 2023). In Granada, Hungary and Poland refused to sign the final text, forcing the EU to drop the migration deal (Caulcutt et al., 2023).
Thoughts on the Upcoming Elections
A general view of the hemicycle during of a plenary session on BREXIT vote of the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium on January 29, 2020. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
The preceding analysis and examples serve as an indicator which based on comparative analysis. Thus, it shows how the populist parties of the 2019 elections are holding up today. The only way to predict the results of the European elections is to observe the political trends and results of the national elections. The results of the national elections usually indicate the results of the European elections, as there are no significant discrepancies as to which parties will enter the European Parliament.
The aftermath of the pandemic and war fueled fear, anger, and anxiety, promoted even more via social media. Social media can have a positive impact on politics, as a venue to transmit information and exchange opinions. On the other hand, it can undermine democracy by spreading mistrust about democratic institutions and civil society. This was evident, in social media about growing public opinion against the governments and their policies to tackle the pandemic, especially during the Covid-19 restrictions. Mistrust towards democratic institutions is a fuel that keeps populism going.
Mistrust can also be transformed into anger. Anxiety and insecurity first appeared among the left-wing populist parties in the countries most heavily affected by the 2008 economic crisis (Podemos – Spain, SYRIZA – Greece). Populist parties after 2015 were mainly right and far-right parties due to a need for shielding and securing European societies from refugees and migrants. This “second wave” grew in northwestern Europe (France, Netherlands, Germany, etc.), but also, in Greece and Italy, for example, more right-wing populist parties began to rise, as both countries suffered the heaviest pressures with the 2015 flows.
All in all, it seems that in these elections, populist parties will not cease. Either the number of populist parties will remain the same, or increase. If the Member States and the EU don’t work towards stabilizing societies, the turmoil will continue to benefit the populist parties. On one hand, it seems almost impossible for the EU to achieve such a goal within the next six months. On the other hand, the sooner states start developing a political consensus to sort out their problems and differences, the sooner the EU will prove that citizens should trust the institutions and their governments – that a proper democratic solution can be found.
Müller, J. W. (2022). “The Politics of Fear Revisited.” In: Schapkow, C., and Jacob, F. (eds), “Introduction.” In: Nationalism and Populism: Expressions of Fear or Political Strategies. pp. 11 – 21. De Gruyter Oldenbourg. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729740.
Rico, G., Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza E. (2017). “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes.” Swiss Political Science Review. August 2017. Vol. 23. No. 4. Pp. 444 – 461. DOI: 10.1111/spsr.12261.
Treib, O. (2021). “Euroscepticism is here to stay: what cleavage theory can teach us about the 2019 European Parliament elections.” Journal of European Public Policy. Vol, 28. no. 2. pp. 174-189. March 9, 2021. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1737881
“This process of a declining Liberal West, along with its increasing inability and unwillingness to promote democracy, presents a significant challenge in the world. Unfortunately, I don’t believe we can return to the world of 1990 to 2003 when democracy was, in many respects, almost the only game in town. Those days are over, and we now face a much more complex and challenging world,” says Professor Steven R. Levitsky.
Dr. Steven R. Levitsky, the David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies and Professor of Government at Harvard University, stated that “the process of a declining Liberal West, along with its increasing inability and unwillingness to promote democracy, presents a significant challenge in the world.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Levitsky analyzed the state of liberal democracy worldwide, saying, “Unfortunately, I don’t believe we can return to the world of 1990 to 2003 when democracy was, in many respects, almost the only game in town. Those days are over, and we now face a much more complex and challenging world.”
Primarily discussing the article jointly written by him and Professor Lucan A. Way for the Journal of Democracy on October 4, 2023, titled “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience,” where they emphasize that authoritarianism has a hard time consolidating power in countries with weak states, Levitsky argues that democracy promoters exaggerate democratic backsliding and criticizes those scholars for doing so because they want to highlight the degree of autocratization in the world. “I’m concerned that there has been an almost a rush to declare the world in a democratic recession, with an excessive focus on cases of backsliding, which are undoubtedly real. But they’re not the only thing happening in the world… Our assessment indicates modest backsliding over the last 15 years, rather than dramatic backsliding,” underlined Dr. Levitsky.
“This process of a declining Liberal West, along with its increasing inability and unwillingness to promote democracy, presents a significant challenge in the world. Unfortunately, I don’t believe we can return to the world of 1990 to 2003 when democracy was, in many respects, almost the only game in town. Those days are over, and we now face a much more complex and challenging world,” says Professor Steven R. Levitsky.
Dr. Steven R. Levitsky, the David Rockefeller Professor of Latin American Studies and Professor of Government at Harvard University, stated that “the process of a declining Liberal West, along with its increasing inability and unwillingness to promote democracy, presents a significant challenge in the world.” In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Levitsky analyzed the state of liberal democracy worldwide, saying, “Unfortunately, I don’t believe we can return to the world of 1990 to 2003 when democracy was, in many respects, almost the only game in town. Those days are over, and we now face a much more complex and challenging world.”
Primarily discussing the article jointly written by him and Professor Lucan A. Way for the Journal of Democracy on October 4, 2023, titled “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience,” where they emphasize that authoritarianism has a hard time consolidating power in countries with weak states, Levitsky argues that democracy promoters exaggerate democratic backsliding and criticizes those scholars for doing so because they want to highlight the degree of autocratization in the world. “I’m concerned that there has been an almost a rush to declare the world in a democratic recession, with an excessive focus on cases of backsliding, which are undoubtedly real. But they’re not the only thing happening in the world… Our assessment indicates modest backsliding over the last 15 years, rather than dramatic backsliding,” underlined Dr. Levitsky.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Steven R. Levitsky with minor edits.
“The Record of Democracy Is Actually Quite Impressive”
The first question is about Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and the leader of PiS in Poland, Mr. Kaczynski, who have been shaping their versions of illiberal democracies for over a decade. With Italy governed by the far-right-winger Georgia Meloni, Slovakian populist Robert Fico scoring a victory in recent election, and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party rising fast in the polls, the signal is that right-wing populism is gaining strength across Europe. Do you not see a looming danger for democracies in Europe?
Steven R. Levitsky: It’s important to note that among the cases you’ve listed, only one could be argued to have seen a significant breakdown of democracy, which is Hungary. Poland has experienced some democratic backsliding, and there is a very competitive election next week in which PiS could find itself without a majority. It is not as if democracy has been extinguished in Poland.
In the other cases, Robert Fico governed for four years in Slovakia without breaking democracy, and he won 23 percent of the vote and needs to form a coalition. So, it is not like seeing a Hugo Chavez-style takeover in Slovakia. In Italy, I don’t like the Brotherhood, and there is obviously much to worry about. However, it’s a coalition government that doesn’t pose an immediate threat to democracy.
The far-right is pretty illiberal in Europe, and of course, there is much to worry about. But in terms of democracy breaking down, the record is actually quite impressive. The only place in all the list that you just named, where democracy is arguably broken down is Hungary. So, my main point is, there’s a difference between being worried about a changing scenario and declaring that democracy is breaking down. We need to be clear about that difference.
Despite the arguments presented in your article, “Democracy’s Surprising Resilience,” we are witnessing the rise of far-right populism in almost every European country. How do you explain this rise of populism in Europe, given the terrible historical experiences with leaders like Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin?
Steven R. Levitsky: First of all, I am not an expert on far-right populism in Europe. I primarily study political parties in Argentina; I’m a Latin Americanist. I think there are pretty good, persuasive explanations suggesting that a combination of economic anxiety resulting from the 2008-2009 financial crisis and broader economic changes globally, coupled with the increasing ethnic diversity brought about by migration, has generated reactions among segments of the electorate, particularly among non-college-educated, rural, white Christian sectors in Europe. This phenomenon has occurred across the industrialized world, including the United States.
In various places, typically between 15 and 30 percent of the electorate, which is often non-college-educated, residing in small towns, more frequently male, and predominantly white, has supported right-wing populist parties. However, this doesn’t necessarily mean that fascism is imminent. Most far-right parties in Europe, while certainly holding illiberal views, have, for the most part, adhered to democratic norms. Golden Dawn in Greece is a significant exception. Therefore, we should be cautious about jumping from the rise of far-right parties to declaring an immediate threat to democracy, let alone the imminent arrival of fascism in the region. Frankly, I don’t see that on the horizon.
As a Turk, I would like to ask: You list Turkey as one of the three well-known backsliders, along with Hungary and Venezuela. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has recently announced his desire to draft a new constitution, and most pundits believe this desire stems from his wish to be re-elected for a third term, which is currently prohibited by the existing constitution. Do you foresee any danger to Turkish democracy if Erdogan succeeds in being elected for a third term?
Steven R. Levitsky: The danger to Turkish democracy is already present. Turkey hasn’t been a democracy for very long. Prior to the late 1990s, military power and restrictions on religious parties made Turkey less than democratic. It briefly achieved full democracy in the early 2000s during the early years of the AKP. However, democratic backsliding began in the first decade of the 21st century and escalated significantly after the failed coup attempt in 2016. Today, Turkey can be characterized as a competitive authoritarian regime, with Erdogan acting as an autocrat.
(However) he has not fully consolidated authoritarian rule, and it doesn’t surprise me that he is continuing to try to perpetuate himself in power. What’s interesting feature of Turkey is the degree of democratic pushback and Erdogan’s inability to prevent the opposition from winning power in the major cities even in elections with tilted playing fields that Erdogan had created. I have a very smart former graduate student who tells me if the opposition had nominated the mayor of Istanbul as its candidate, it probably would have won the recent election although Erdogan would almost certainly have tried many shenanigans to try to stay in power. There’s a good chance that Erdogan would have had to cede power. So, on the one hand, Turkey is a competitive authoritarian regime and on the other hand, the democratic pushback is such that elections remain really competitive. So, I don’t think the question is well framed in saying there’s a danger to Turkish democracy. The danger’s been there a long time and Turkey is not a democracy. But I think that the opposition stands as good a chance as of removing Erdogan in the coming years. It’s a pretty sort of evenly matched battle between an autocratic President and a pretty robust opposition.
“American Democracy Is Heading for Some Rough Times”
Turning to the United States, Professor Levitsky, if Donald Trump is re-elected in the US, what kind of strains do you anticipate for democracies worldwide? After Speaker Kevin McCarthy was ousted by the far-right Republicans, what do you foresee for American democracy?
Steven R. Levitsky: American democracy is heading for some rough times. Given the strength of opposition forces, I find it highly unlikely that we will witness the consolidation of an autocracy in the United States, akin to Russia or even Hungary. However, it’s very probable that we will observe what we used to call an unconsolidated democracy—a very unstable regime teetering on the brink of constitutional crises and possibly experiencing periods of weak authoritarianism. I wouldn’t be surprised to see a considerable amount of political violence, considering the level of extremism and the prevalence of firearms in the country.
The most significant problem lies with the Republican Party, which has largely abandoned democratic rules of the game. We see this in its willingness to continue supporting Donald Trump, even though he attempted to overturn the results of an election. If Trump wins, the US will undoubtedly slide into another democratic crisis, with the possibility of an authoritarian attempt. This time, it could be much more severe than before because Trump didn’t anticipate becoming President previously. He didn’t have a comprehensive plan for purging and packing the state as Erdogan and Orban did. However, if he succeeds this time, he will likely make a much more concerted effort to purge state institutions, pack them (with loyalists), and politicize them—similar to what we’ve seen in other cases of elected authoritarianism.
Such a scenario would send a terrible signal and have a detrimental impact on democracies worldwide. We’ve already witnessed this between 2016 and 2021 in countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and even Nicaragua, where autocrats perceived autocratization processes as tacit approval, not being opposed by the United States. Emerging autocrats, feeling emboldened by Trump’s actions, started copying his style by attacking the press and denying election results, which closely followed Trump’s rejection of the election outcome. Similar copycat efforts emerged in Peru and Brazil.
What transpires in the United States has global implications in two ways. First, people worldwide look at the United States as a model, so if it’s acceptable to be an autocrat in the United States, it will embolden autocrats elsewhere. Second, US foreign policy will change. While the Biden Administration could do more to promote democracy, it has at least been relatively active behind the scenes in opposing autocratic behavior. For example, we saw this in Guatemala recently and in Brazil after the election, where the Biden Administration pressured autocratic forces to step back. If Trump regains office, these efforts will likely diminish, and there may even be open support for autocrats in some cases. Consequently, a Trump re-election would have profoundly negative consequences for democracy worldwide.
May Weak State Institutions Be a Chance?
How does the presence of weak state institutions in low- or middle-income countries with authoritarian tendencies hinder the consolidation of authoritarian rule? Can you explain the role of these same weak state institutions, which have been observed as key factors contributing to insufficient democratic resilience against authoritarianism in cases like Turkey, Serbia, and Hungary, in contrast to the cases of the US and Brazil?
Steven R. Levitsky: Well, Turkey doesn’t have such weak institutions. Turkey possesses relatively strong institutions. Hungary also boasts quite robust institutions. When I refer to weak institutions, I’m mentioning countries like Ukraine, Albania, Benin, Honduras, Zambia, and Malawi. These are countries with weak state institutions. Turkey and Hungary, on the other hand, have relatively strong institutions. Serbia has slightly weaker institutions but is not excessively weak either. When we discuss the failure of democracies and the third wave of democracies, we have extended electoral politics to places where democracy had never previously existed, and where sustaining it is quite challenging. These are very poor countries, marked by high levels of inequality and very weak state institutions, such as Nicaragua, Benin, Albania, Mali, and Malawi. These are nations where almost every existing social science theory would predict that democracy would have a hard time to survive. Indeed, democracy has had hard time in such countries. However, the point we emphasize in the article is that authoritarianism has a hard time in consolidating power in countries with weak states, primarily for two reasons.
First of all, where the state is weak, governments have a hard time getting state officials to do what they want them to do so. That’s a problem for democracies, because democratic governments have a hard time implementing, enforcing their policies and providing public goods. But it’s problematic for autocrats, too. Because, when they want to steal an election, for example, they have a hard time getting bureaucrats and low-level state officials to go along with them. Similarly, when they want to repress or spy on opponents, they have a hard time getting state institutions to go along with them. We’ve seen that notoriously, for example, in Ukraine where, as my co-author Lucan Ahmad Way has shown, autocrats repeatedly have failed to consolidate power. I’m talking about people like Yanukovych, precisely because they couldn’t get the state to go along. So, when the state is weak, autocrats have a hard time enforcing their power.
Secondly, weak states result in poor governance. Governments govern ineffectively when state institutions are weak, and they have trouble ensuring security and implementing policies that matter to people. So, what does it mean for autocrats? It means that autocrats become unpopular. It means people turn against autocratic governments in the same way that they turn against democratic governments in response to poor performance. As long as elections are held, autocrats are going to have hard time to secure victory in countries with weak institutions. We have witnessed this trend in countries like Sri Lanka, Nepal, Honduras, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Ukraine, Zambia, and Malawi. Governments leaning towards autocracy fail, lose elections, and even lose unfair elections because people are dissatisfied with the government’s poor performance. This poor performance is rooted in the weakness of state institutions. Therefore, while democracy remains vulnerable in lower and middle-income countries, particularly those without significant oil resources, autocracies also prove vulnerable in many of these nations. Autocratic regimes often last for about 7-10 years before they collapse.
You have extensively analyzed the influence of internal factors and the general international political climate on democratic backsliding and democratic resilience. Do you believe that the well-coordinated efforts of authoritarian states such as Russia, China, and Iran to export their authoritarian or illiberal governance style through various economic, political, diplomatic, and technological means and projects play a significant role in these processes?
Steven R. Levitsky: I believe that the claim you just made is overstated. I don’t think there is much effective coordination among China, Russia, and Iran. These are three very different states with distinct interests and activities. While it’s true that all these states oppose the Liberal West and seek to counterbalance the power of the United States, they do work together at times and share an interest in limiting and thwarting US power. There’s no question about that and they have at times supported autocratic governments, but they’re not particularly well coordinated. They’re not particularly affective. Russia, in particular, has largely failed in its efforts, even in neighboring countries like Ukraine or Georgia, to prop up authoritarian allies.
Nonetheless, I completely agree with an element of your argument, which is that there is shift in the global balance of power away from US and European hegemony in the 1990s towards a more multi-polar world, in which the US and Europe are weaker and less influential, China and Russia and other powers are more powerful, pose a significant challenge for democracy. This shift limits the US’ willingness and ability to promote democracy in the global South and almost certainly will lead to some erosion of global democracy. However, it’s important not to overstate the extent of coordination among these states. Despite the substantial geopolitical changes that have been unfavorable to liberal democracy, we have only seen a relatively modest decrease in the number of democracies, namely 5-6 fewer democracies that we had 15 years ago. So, while it’s a real threat, we should be cautious not to overstate it, and the actual consequences of this threat have been surprisingly limited thus far.
“Democracy Promoters Exaggerate the Degree of Autocratization in the World”
Is it possible that the experience of democratic backsliding is different in various contexts? A small change in data might have a more significant local and global impact in certain geographic regions. So, even though the data shows resilience, is it possible that the experience of civilians in everyday life has changed catastrophically?
Steven R. Levitsky: Yes, it is possible. However, the term “catastrophically” may be an overstatement. To persuade me, you would need to provide evidence of catastrophic changes. Nevertheless, it is possible that the situation is worse than the data suggests. I believe we should begin with the data and address my critique of many democracy promoters, particularly V-Dem, in recent years. They have tended to overstate the case. For instance, V-Dem previously classified India as an electoral autocracy. I think they made this change in 2017 or 2019. Before that, they focused on the number of democracies and downplayed per capita figures, i.e., the number of people in the world living under democracy. However, when India shifted to electoral autocracy, V-Dem began emphasizing per capita numbers. Why are they doing that? They’re doing that because they want to highlight and even exaggerate the degree of autocratization in the world. We need to exercise caution and balance when interpreting the data. I’m concerned that there has been an almost rush to declare the world in a democratic recession, with excessive focus on cases of backsliding, which are undoubtedly real. But they’re not the only thing happening in the world. To answer your question, yes, it is possible that the situation may be worse than the data suggests. However, we should approach the data in a serious and balanced manner. Our assessment indicates modest backsliding over the last 15 years, rather than dramatic backsliding.
You suggest that if wealth, education, and urbanization continue to grow, authoritarian vulnerabilities may intensify. However, we have observed a different outcome in both the Russian and Chinese contexts, as well as in regimes supported by them. Could these cases be considered exceptions to the general trend you have discussed?
Steven R. Levitsky: When evaluating regimes, I consider their capacity to monopolize resources and control society. I’ve written a book arguing that regimes born of violent revolution, like China, tend to be very durable. It has also been shown that regimes sustaining high levels of economic growth (while China’s economy has changed, it remains a reasonably strong performer) are likely to survive. Revolutionary regimes overseeing economic growth, such as Vietnam and China, are in relatively good shape in the medium term.
Regimes with abundant energy resources, like oil and gas, as in the case of Russia, are also likely to be in good shape because they can monopolize resources, countering the impact of modernization. In Russia, despite it being a relatively wealthy and a relatively educated country, civil society is incredibly weak due to state control over many resources. Thus, Russia and China are relatively easily explained. Our focus is primarily on countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, where urbanization and transitioning into lower-middle-income status are occurring. They are no longer considered poor. Some countries like Burundi and Mali remain very poor. However, countries like Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, and others are experiencing significant modernization, which makes autocratization more difficult.
In Central Europe, Southern Europe, and South America, we see countries graduating into upper-middle-income status with large civil societies, developed private sectors, and robust opposition. This doesn’t make authoritarianism impossible, but it makes it much less likely. In these regions, despite some autocratization, the conditions make it much harder for authoritarian rule to solidify.
We’re seeing in Central Europe, Southern Europe and in South America the graduation of countries into sort of upper middle-income status with large civil societies, developed private sectors and robust opposition that doesn’t make authoritarianism impossible, but it makes it much less likely.
In the cases of South America, Central Europe, and Southern Europe, autocratization is evident primarily in Venezuela, which has abundant oil resources, and Hungary, which is a real outlier. Hungary is a case that theory predicts should not be an autocracy. The fact that the regime doesn’t lock up anybody, doesn’t kill anybody, doesn’t ban anybody and the fact that elections are still competitive suggest that this regime also may not consolidate long-term.
There are valid reasons why China and Russia are authoritarian, and we are not predicting global democratization in the short or medium term. Especially in countries with highly statist economies, impoverished societies, or revolutionary legacies, there are valid reasons to expect stable authoritarianism. However, in much of the world, from the Baltics to Central Europe, South America to parts of East Asia, levels of economic development provide democrats with a fighting chance in many more places than during the beginning of the third wave of democratization.
Lastly, in your famous book “How Democracies Die,” you wrote, “The 1990-2015 period was easily the most democratic quarter-century in world history—partly because Western powers broadly supported democracy. That may now be changing.” Do you still think so? How is that change unfolding?
Steven R. Levitsky: Unfortunately, but inevitably, the Western dominance of the initial third wave period—the extraordinary liberal Western hegemony from the fall of the Berlin Wall or perhaps even the era of Perestroika to the Iraq War, spanning the first decade of the 21st century—that era, the extraordinary liberty of 1989 to 2003 is gone, it is eroding, and will continue to erode. Both the United States and Europe, especially the United States, have accelerated the decline of Western liberalism through their own errors, internal conflicts, and strife. US democracy has become almost dysfunctional, making it extremely difficult to promote or defend liberal democracy globally.
This process of a declining Liberal West, along with its increasing inability and unwillingness to promote democracy, presents a significant challenge in the world. Unfortunately, I don’t believe we can return to the world of 1990 to 2003 when democracy was, in many respects, almost the only game in town. Those days are over, and we now face a much more complex and challenging world.
Sithole, Neo & Nguijol, Gabriel Cyrille. (2023). “Report on Mapping Global Populism — Panel 4: The Role of Populism, Radicalization and Hindutva in India.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 10, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0043
This report is based on the fourth panel of ECPS’s monthly series, entitled “Mapping Global Populism: The Role of Populism, Radicalization and Hindutva in India,” which took place online on August 31, 2023. The panel featured renowned scholars on populism from India. As a by-product of this fruitful panel the report consists of brief summaries of the speeches delivered by the panelists.
This report summarizes the fourth panel of ECPS’s monthly series, entitled “Mapping Global Populism”: The Role of Populism, Radicalization and Hindutva in India, which took place online on August 31, 2023. The panel was jointly organised by the ECPS, The Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), and the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Adelaide. The panel, which featured renowned scholars on populism from India, was moderated by Dr Priya Chacko, Head of the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Adelaide, Australia, and the speakers are by Dr Ajay Gudavarthy (Associate Professor at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi), Maggie Paul (PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations at the University of Adelaide, Australia), Dr Anuj Bhuwania (Professor at the Jindal Global Law School in India & currently Senior Visiting Fellow at the SCRIPTS ‘Cluster of Excellence’ at Freie University Berlin), Dr Monika Barthwal-Datta (Senior Lecturer in International Security at the University of New South Wales, Sydney) and Dr Shweta Singh (Associate Professor of International Relations at the South Asian University, New Delhi, India).
During the introductory remarks, Dr. Priya Chacko provides a much-needed overview of the profound impacts that authoritarian populism has had on Indian political life. These effects range from stifling organizational work, where NGOs and research centers have had their licenses revoked, to constraining critical thought and free speech. Scholars, journalists, and students have faced charges of sedition and languished in jails, while the few remaining independent media houses have been threatened with tax investigations or defamation lawsuits. Additionally, laws related to religious freedoms are under threat, taking the form of laws that restrict interreligious marriages or the consumption of beef, with one of the more troubling developments being the revocation of the constitutional autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, the introduction of religious-aligned citizenship laws, along with anti-Muslim actions, has raised concerns. Opposition parties have often been portrayed as opposition elites backed by Western authorities, depicting them as enemies of Hindu and thus Indian advancement. All of these are just a few developments that have taken place over the last decade; the following report provides a brief outline and description of the presentations and arguments shared by the presenters during the panel.
Dr. Ajay Gudavarthy: “Politics, Ethics, and Emotions in ‘New India’”
Dr. Gudavarthy posits that nationalism emulates faith-based religions through symbols like the national anthem, flag, and other national symbols, and as such, stands itself as a contemporary civic-based religion. The Hindu narrative offers a porous concept that ties into this civic religion, based on inclusive narratives that unite Indians with Hindu identities, generating a form of hyper-nationalism for Hindu identities. This, in turn, fosters a sense of belonging but also translates into toxic majoritarianism, which undermines institutions.
In this opening presentation, Dr. Ajay Gudavarthy draws inspiration from his new book entitled: “Politics, Ethics, and Emotions in ‘New India.’” The book delves into the hypothesis of whether populism can achieve this through appeals to everyday ethics and latent emotions, exploring how Hindu populism manages to accomplish both objectives simultaneously.
Dr. Gudavarthy sets the tone of the panel well, kicking off by briefly going over Laclau’s conceptual approach to populism, recounting the equivalence drawn between fragmented social demands used to create an authentic people’s group and the inherent antagonism between them and the elites, in a thorough political manner before globally emphasizing the relationship between traditional authoritarianism and social solidarity in India. To better develop his thoughts, he started by asking a main question: “Does Indian politics continue to remain authoritarian, or does it have elements that continue to reinforce social hierarchy?” The answer to this question was divided into two main narratives that Hindutva is adopting: the intercultural nation between caste and religion that tries to re-inscribe the traditional hierarchy and the adoption of nationalism as a new or civic religion.
The presentation emphasizes the Indian context where Hindu-aligned politics is emerging as a new form of civil solidarity that transcends caste divisions and has extended its appeal across religious and linguistic groups, even making appeals to Pasanda Muslims. Given the vibrancy of Indian society, it’s no small feat for populism to generate such majoritarian consciousness. However, the study highlights the contradictions within populist manifestations as they often maintain and operate along conservative lines, preserving social hierarchies and serving the interests of the established social powers and elites. Nonetheless, they have successfully appropriated the normative universality of cultural registers.
Dr. Gudavarthy articulates the growing sharpening of conflicts between subclasses and linguistic conflicts, or a resurgence of social conflicts triggered by these populist ideologies. Hindu populism challenges earlier notions that suggested the impossibility of a confessional majority in the Indian context, based on the enduring fragmentation of latent caste differences. What is happening today can be precisely characterized by the emergence of such a confessional majority made possible through the reinterpretation of caste and religion, not in terms of traditional religious identities, but rather as a way of life. Part of this stems from the heterogeneous interpretations based on Gandhi’s approach which emphasizes the preservation of collective living and cultural life aimed at dismantling the caste system from within, rather than relying solely on external liberal state measures and economic changes.
The ease of narrative restructure in the Indian case is made possible using populism’s lack of explicit critique, which allows for the reinterpretation of hierarchies and divisions as a unified collective supporting authoritarian constructions. By ‘re-signifying’ caste and religion as a way of life instead of rigid cultural identities, lower segments of society, such as Dalits, identify with these narratives and show little drive to change the oppressive societal structure. It also sheds light on the rejection of leftist liberal secular scholars who view it as an authoritarian top-down project.
When speaking on the adoption, or rather reformation of nationalism as a new civic religion, Dr. Gudavarthy posits that nationalism emulates faith-based religions through symbols like the national anthem, flag, and other national symbols, and as such, stands itself as a kind of contemporary civic-based religion. The Hindu narrative offers a porous concept that ties into this civic religion, based on inclusive narratives that unite Indians with Hindu identities, generating a form of hyper-nationalism for Hindu identities. This, in turn, fosters a sense of belonging but also translates into toxic majoritarianism, which undermines institutions.
In conclusion, we are exposed to thought-provoking findings from the results of a survey conducted by Pew Research 2021 on religious tolerance and segregation, reportedly the largest post-independence survey in India that includes a cross-section of castes, religions, and regions. Dr. Gudavarthy’s breakdown mentions how it highlights that 70 percent of respondents believe diversity is vital for democracy and value secularism. However, when asked about concrete living arrangements, 65 percent of respondents expressed a belief in segregated living, symbolizing the concept of living separately, which vindicates their position of how the narratives of Hindu majoritarian populism have successfully reinforced ethnic and caste divides.
Maggie Paul: “Ram Rajya 2.0: How Nostalgia Aids the Populist Politics of Neo-colonial Hindutva Futurism”
In the review of populist nostalgia, Maggie Paul introduces us to the concept of “futurist nostalgia,” describing how, based on Indian populism, futurist nostalgia is centered on drawing inspiration from past glory to paint a picture of an equally glorious future. This is exemplified by the reverence for figures like Lord Ram and the concept of Ram Rajya. Indian populism operates within an affective economy of optimism, confidence, duty, freedom, pride, and self-confidence. Its purpose is to generate a cross-religious and cross-class identity that transcends the segregated diversity of identity.
This presentation is informed by a paper that is still in development, which articulates the role of nostalgia in populist discourses through the retrieval, valorization, and recovery of ‘golden age symbols,’ both historical and mythological, which have been central in contemporary Indian populist politics.
The aim of the paper and presentation, according to Maggie Paul, was to identify the frequent and growing force of nostalgia in Indian populism used as a mobilization force for electoral means and then to draw out the links between nostalgia, affect, and populism, thereby better theorizing the affective politics of authoritarian populism in India and contributing to the burgeoning literature on nostalgia and populism. Pivotal to this conversation is the idea that in populist studies, ideational approaches are prevalent, and in these approaches, the importance of emotions is stated as crucial but is not given much in terms of theorization. Also, the study outlines the scope as being limited to Europe and Turkey; the work on Turkey, in particular, focuses on religious sentiment.
Opening the presentation is a quote from Prime Minister Narendra Modi given at the inauguration of the new parliament in May 2023, where Modi evokes an image of a glorious past when India was heralded as the most prosperous and splendid nation of the world, and how after centuries of slavery and colonization, India is turning that glorious stream of ancient times towards itself, filling the Indian people with pride. Following this, the presentation goes over how nostalgia is associated with the ‘recent past,’ like times when political correctness was not present or rife, a time when society was more homogeneous, or a time of the welfare state, especially amongst right-wing ideologies. Different types of nostalgia, like restorative or reflective, are more dominant in right-wing populism, taking a more ideational approach.
Her framework is based on the idea that populism is analyzed as a logic of political articulation according to Ernesto Laclau, and emotions, according to Sarah Ahmed, are considered as cultural practices. However, Maggie Paul highlights the limitations of Laclau in adequately addressing the emotional aspects of populism, with an emphasis on collective grievances and antagonism in generating collective identities; this is weak, but collective identities require strong collective emotions. In addition to things like fear and hate, love and happiness are also needed within identity. In doing so, we are made alert to the importance of understanding how emotions work to create groups and form collective identities.
In the review of populist nostalgia, Maggie Paul introduces us to the concept of “futurist nostalgia,” describing how, based on Indian populism, futurist nostalgia is centered on drawing inspiration from past glory to paint a picture of an equally glorious future. This is exemplified by the reverence for figures like Lord Ram and the concept of Ram Rajya. Indian populism operates within an affective economy of optimism, confidence, duty, freedom, pride, and self-confidence. Its purpose is to generate a cross-religious and cross-class identity that transcends the segregated diversity of identity. Ram Rajya is articulated as a pinnacle of morality, ethics, and good governance, in line with the principles of the Constitution. However, it also encompasses aspects that may involve restricting religious minorities like Islam, such as introducing Ramayana into school syllabi, declaring Thursday as the official weekly day off, and observing a national Hindu day. Additionally, it mentions efforts against religious conversions, the banning of Madrassas, and the removal of reservations for minorities.
Building on the presentation given by Dr. Gudavarthy, Maggie Paul discusses how the populist co-opting of Ram Rajya aims to unite different groups and create a vision of a glorious future. However, it’s worth noting that this sometimes involves the reinterpretation of religious mythology as actual history, despite pushback from the scientific community.
Continuing the presentation elaborates on how cultural infrastructure plays a significant role in invoking cultural and religious unity and futurism and the antagonistic frontiers that emerged at certain moments in Indian history when discussing figures like Lord Ram was avoided, which in turn led to infrastructural decay tied to religious places and cities—a decay that Indian populists argue can only be rectified through a politics and political state infused with the character and lessons of Lord Ram. It also emphasized how the willpower and determination associated with Lord Ram can lead the country to new heights, promoting values based on unity, development, and faith.
Before ending, the cultural dimensions of Indian populism and cultural renaissance were expanded upon and shown to involve monumental infrastructural projects aimed at promoting the coexistence of past and present India. This includes the restoration of temples, the creation of mega corridors with modern amenities, and the incorporation of local deities, gurus, and indigenous warriors to foster a unified cultural resurgence. This cultural revival serves to create a sense of heritage and identity while simultaneously fostering a sense of hatred for past invasions and destruction of cultural sites by Muslim invaders, with the dual aim of creating an enduring Hindu identity that dismisses the existing diversity and pluralism within Hinduism.
Dr. Anuj Bhuwania: “Constitutional Roots of Judicial Populism in India”
According to Dr. Bhuwania, the Indian constitution was drafted with a disregard for entrenchment, which is unusual because a constitution typically entrenches provisions that cannot be changed by the electoral majority. Through the highlighting of various articles found in the Indian constitution, it’s evident that these articles are being weaponized by the current government, which points to the problem of centralization of power within the political majority. Therefore, the Indian constitution can be seen as part of the problem. The procedure in Indian constitutional making has also enabled Modi to do what he does now.
This presentation shifts the panel’s focus from the religious aspects and behaviors of populism in India towards the implications of populist endeavors on the judiciary, taking an interesting spin on normative discussions around the institutional erosion caused by populists, particularly in relation to the courts and legal autonomy.
Seminally, Dr. Bhuwania suggests that in India, the reverse is true: Courts act as populist actors themselves. Central to this argument is the notion that constitutionalism has been less of a stumbling block on the path to Hinduism in the past decades than what populist scholars might have thought. Currently, global populist discourse often turns to countries like Poland or Hungary when analyzing what populism means for democratic backsliding, often noting that these regimes paired their populist discourses with constitutional changes, which then enabled populist leaders to chip away at the liberal foundations in those countries. What stands out from this ‘norm’ is that India, in comparison to other populist regimes, has experienced relatively minor changes to its constitution, a phenomenon that indicates that Prime Minister Modi has been able to advance his political agenda without introducing major alterations to India’s fundamental legal document. The study highlights the surprisingly high level of compatibility between the Hindu majoritarian agenda and the Indian constitution.
Dr. Bhuwania articulates the ability of the Indian constitution to be used as a populist tool, attributing it to the constitution’s inherent malleability, which allows India’s religious populism to make use of it with arguable ease. In some ways, this malleability also substantiates political claims made by Indian populist actors of wanting to uphold and seek to advance the Constitution, embracing the political legitimacy that comes with India’s constitutional pliability.
In displaying how the Indian constitution lends itself to the populist forces, Dr. Bhuwania refers the audience and panel to the ongoing matter related to the constitutional status of Kashmir, currently being heard before the Indian Supreme Court. This matter revolves around the changes brought about in August 2019 when the Government of India revoked the special autonomous status granted to Jammu and Kashmir by Article 370 of the Indian constitution, essentially facilitating their conversion into territories of India. This was done through the vote of a simple majority, a fact that is central to this part of the presentation. Dr. Bhuwania begins to unravel the dangers of the current state of the Indian constitution by reviewing how the constitution allows for unilateral changes to the very structure of states through a simple majority. Adding that it’s important to note that India has already become a Hindu majoritarian state, electorally speaking, meaning there is little standing in the way of allowing the Indian government currently to alter territorial lines without the need for constitutional changes.
Dr. Bhuwania also discusses India’s peculiar federalist nature, calling it a quasi-federalist state, considering the looseness of the federal characteristics. In addition, it is argued that India, through its federalist constitution, became a model for federalism for most multiethnic countries, with this idea peaking in the concept of the state-nation that became prevalent in 2012. The Indian Union’s ability to accommodate the demands of various ethnic communities displayed the flexibility and strength of the federal system by forging new states in the North-East of India. This underscores the importance of design choices when it comes to federalism.
The Indian constitution was drafted with a disregard for entrenchment, which is unusual because a constitution typically entrenches provisions that cannot be changed by the electoral majority. Through the highlighting of various articles found in the Indian constitution, it’s evident that these articles are being weaponized by the current government, which points to the problem of centralization of power within the political majority. The presentation also attempts to provide an understanding of why key provisions in the Constitution were not entrenched. One explanation is that the constitution, at least at the time of drafting, was a wartime constitution, likely referring to the height period of conflict in India, from independence movements to the Indo-Pakistani war.
Before closing, Dr. Bhuwania unpacked how being a single-party majority/dominant constitution breeds a threat to constitutional growth through change, noting the fact that in most single-party dominant systems, a single party dominant constitution sees no possible future of having any other party dominating the constitution, which means they have little cause to change the constitution. This also interestingly gives stability to the Indian constitution as well, as the usefulness means there is little reason to further align themselves with the global populist right and generate unwanted attention by attempting to introduce massive changes to the constitution. The constitution can be seen as part of the problem. The procedure in Indian constitutional making has enabled Modi to do what he does now.
Dr. Shweta Singh and Dr. Monika Barthwal-Datta: “India’s Refugee Policy Towards Rohingya Refugees: An Intersectional Approach to Populism”
The presentation outlines and analyzes shifts that have taken place since 2014 regarding refugee policy under the Modi Government in India. Firstly, there has been an institutional legislative shift involving amendments to domestic legislation used to govern refugees and foreigners in India. Secondly, it addresses the absence of an actual legal framework dedicated to governing refugees and foreigners in India, with states resorting to three different acts to monitor and control the movement of refugees, encompassing aspects like housing, detention, and deportation.
In this joint presentation, Dr. Shweta Singh and Dr. Monika Barthwal-Datta showcase their interest in the interconnection between populism and foreign policy, specifically concerning the issue of refugees. They are working on a draft paper on the subject that is still in the process of completion. Central to their contribution is their focus on the relationship between populism and domestic refugee policies, which have international implications. Their research centers on how populism affects the foreign policy preferences and outcomes of governments in power.
To begin the final presentation, Dr. Singh outlines the novelty of their work, emphasizing its contribution to the international dimension of populism studies related to refugee policy. Central to the argument presented by Dr. Singh is that in the context of populist studies, the issue of refugee politics/policies stands out as a marginalized discourse globally, referring to how we look at refugee policy and foreign policy and how we see this policy about populism internationally. The presentation recounted how few studies investigate the link between population and foreign policy shedding light to review three gaps found in current foreign policy-aligned populist literature while asking how these gaps relate to the issue of refugees seen as foreign policy, and how is it connected with the case of India? She mentions that while populism literature has covered the international ramifications of populism, the issue of refugee politics and policies remains a marginalized discourse in global populist studies. The presentation identifies three gaps in current foreign policy-aligned populist literature and explores how these gaps relate to the issue of refugees in India.
The first gap is related to the conceptualization of populism, particularly its application in non-Western contexts like India. It’s important to note that many studies that view populism as a thin-centered ideology face limitations when applied outside Western contexts. Additionally, a continuation of this initial gap pertains to the process of signification by referring to Laclau’s approach, which defines populism as a political logic centered on empty signifiers, most studies acknowledge the antagonistic relationship between the people and the elite. However, where they often fall short is in defining the category of “the people.”
Expanding upon Laclau’s work, Dr. Singh delves into the concept of populism as a political logic based on discursive identity assemblages. These assemblages are characterized by various constellations, which in this context refer to societal groupings. The presentation briefly touches on what makes Modi’s populism effective—namely, the existence of overlap in the discursive language used to bridge gaps across race, ethnicity, religious divisions, as well as class and caste. This overlap provides valuable insights into the complex formation and categorization of “the people,” taking into account the diversity of sub-groups within this broad and multifaceted term.
The second gap concerns the narrow conceptualization of foreign policy, which has primarily focused on bilateralism and multilateralism, largely neglecting issues related to refugees. Dr. Singh and Dr. Dr. Monika Barthwal-Datta aim to review how refugee policy affects both conflict outcomes and cooperative relations among states in South Asia, such as India-Bangladesh, India-Pakistan, and India-Afghanistan. For these researchers, refugee policy is a foreign policy.
The third gap discussed pertains to the lack of contextualization of populism and foreign policy. Dr. Singh explained that when examining the conceptualization of foreign policy, it’s essential to consider how contextual specificities related to various global variants of populism are taken into account. This approach offers the potential for an intersectional analysis. The focus on refugees arises from the argument that migration is a core function of a state’s foreign policies and is implicated in international agreements that recognize the rights of refugees through international treaties. In the context of South Asia, where many states, including Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh, have led South Asian countries to adopt different positions on global refugee protection instruments, our understanding of refugees becomes influenced by the extent of populist narratives present in government.
In her concluding remarks, Dr. Barthwal-Datta discusses how the paper outlines and analyzes shifts that have taken place since 2014 regarding refugee policy under the BJP Modi Government. Firstly, there has been an institutional legislative shift involving amendments to domestic legislation used to govern refugees and foreigners in India. Secondly, it addresses the absence of an actual legal framework dedicated to governing refugees and foreigners in India, with states resorting to three different acts to monitor and control the movement of refugees, encompassing aspects like housing, detention, and deportation. These legislative changes have been accompanied by shifts in discourse, with BJP leaders and other senior officials framing refugees, particularly Rohingya refugees, as threats. In conclusion, Dr. Barthwal-Datta emphasizes the significance of considering the various identity constellations at play, such as race, ethnicity, and religion, which influence the creation and approach to refugees. This aspect is crucial when attempting to adopt an intersectional approach to international populism and refugee-related issues.
(*) Neo Sithole is an intern at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Bachtiar, Hasnan. (2023). “Indonesian Islamist populism and Anies Baswedan.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 9, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0025
Abstract
Anies Baswedan emerges as a pivotal figure in Indonesian Islamist populism, notably for his role in defeating Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (Ahok) in the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election and his involvement in the criminalization of Ahok’s blasphemy case. His influence has fueled the rise of Islamist populism in the post-reform democratization era. Anies’s recent announcement as the National Democratic Party’s (Nasdem) presidential candidate for the 2024 election positions him against Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto. This article scrutinizes Anies’s prospects in the 2024 presidential election, exploring whether he continues to employ identity politics and Islamist ideologies to attack political opponents and what his overall stance is regarding Islamist populism. It raises pertinent questions about the impact of these developments on Indonesian democracy, pondering whether the looming challenges will culminate in storms or pave the way for clearer skies in the nation’s democratic landscape.
By Hasnan Bachtiar*
Scholarly discourse on the future of democracy in Indonesia frequently paints a grim picture, characterized by regression (Hadiz, 2017; Warburton & Aspinall, 2019; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019). Thomas P. Power (2018) even confidently highlights the emergence of authoritarian tendencies within the Joko Widodo (Jokowi) administration in response to a conservative shift and the concurrent rise of Islamist populism that threatens his authority. Jokowi’s argument revolves around the notion that economic development necessitates social and political stability, akin to the approach adopted during the Suharto regime. In the name of stability, that era witnessed the emergence of the ‘Reformasi 1998’ political style and people power, ultimately leading to the downfall of authoritarianism. However, the contemporary global context presents additional challenges, as countries worldwide grapple with the economic fallout of the Covid-19 pandemic.
A year later, as economic recovery seemed promising, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict further exacerbated the global economic crisis. Consequently, the government shifted its focus from economic development to crisis management. To safeguard the success of Jokowi’s development initiatives, diverse strategies have been employed to secure investment programs, including the contentious Omnibus Act, designed to offer added protection to investors (Mahy, 2022). These laws, which are imperfect and often detrimental to the populace, have faced critical opposition, particularly from people involved in populist movements. This unfolding situation occurs within a complex political landscape marked by the influence of oligarchic actors and persistent corruption. Consequently, the government has engaged in various negotiations, formed coalitions, and employed repression tactics tailored to the specific context, resulting in limited access to freedom for individuals and interest groups.
This intricate process also implicates various political actors and Islamist populism. Notably, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) have swallowed bitter pills and faced government bans due to their perceived threat to state ideology and security. Both Islamist populist movements espouse anti-diversity and anti-minority religious ideologies. The FPI is further entangled in acts of intolerance, religious-based persecution, intimidation, often accompanied by violence and vigilantism. Its existence poses a challenge to democracy, albeit its dissolution raises concerns of repressive measures.
Anies Baswedan emerges as a key figure in Indonesian Islamist populism, propelled by his role in defeating Basuki Tjahaya Purnama (a.k.a. Ahok) in the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election and his involvement in Ahok’s blasphemy case (Mietzner and Muhtadi, 2018). He is a catalyst for the rise of Islamist populism, which has found particular expression in the post-reform democratization. Anies has been announced as the National Democratic Party’s (Nasdem) presidential candidate, poised to challenge Ganjar Pranowo and Prabowo Subianto in the 2024 presidential election (Shafira, 2022). This article delves into Anies’s prospects in the 2024 election, examining whether he still employs identity politics exploiting emotions and Islamist ideology to attack his political opponents, while also assessing his overall attitude towards Islamist populism. Ultimately, this article contemplates whether the looming clouds over Indonesian democracy will lead to rainstorms or yield clear skies.
Who is Anies Baswedan?
Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan spoke about data on people infected with the Corona virus in City Hall on March 23, 2020 in Jakarta, Indonesia. Photo: Wulandari Wulandari.
Anies Baswedan, born on May 7, 1969, in Kuningan, West Java, is the son of Rasyid Baswedan (father) and Aliyah Rasyid (mother). Notably, he is the grandson of Abdurrahman Baswedan, a national hero, Masyumi figure, populist, and leader of a political movement that harnessed the power of Arab descendants to fight for Indonesian independence (Siallagan, 2022).
He commenced his undergraduate studies in economics at Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, in 1995. Two years later, he completed his master’s degree in International Economic and Security Policy at the School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland, US. In 2005, he obtained his PhD in the field of politics from Northern Illinois University, with a thesis entitled “Regional Autonomy and Patterns of Democracy in Indonesia.”
Armed with this impressive academic background, Anies embarked on a teaching career at Paramadina University. This institution, guided by Indonesia’s esteemed figure of pluralism and tolerance, Nurcholish Madjid, instilled the values of virtue in higher education. Anies excelled in his role, ultimately becoming the most influential figure on campus. He served as the university’s rector and initiated the ‘Indonesia Mengajar’ program, renowned for inviting top volunteers from across the nation and deploying them to the farthest and most remote areas to serve as teachers in foundational schools.
Subsequently, Anies was appointed as the Minister of Education and Culture in Jokowi’s cabinet, although his tenure was interrupted by a reshuffle. Nevertheless, his career continued to flourish. He contested the 2016 Jakarta gubernatorial election, securing victory over the incumbent Governor Ahok and Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono (AHY), the son of former Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Leveraging his experience as the head of the capital, Anies emerged as a presidential candidate for the 2024 election under the Nasdem party ticket.
Anies and the 2024 Presidential Election
Poster in Yogyakarta, Indonesia supporting Anies Baswedan to become president on September 1, 2023. Photo: Mbah Purwo.
Anies could be portrayed as one of the intellectual actors who mobilized Islamist populism in the lead-up to the 2016 gubernatorial election and the 2019 presidential elections. He is often characterized as a figure involved in the intricate realm of politics, where space is provided for intolerant and discriminatory political actions. By employing the identity politics of Islamism, he advocated for the general will of the Muslim majority to stand against an unjust ruling regime. His political maneuvers were shaped by invoking the religious primordialism of the Islamist masses in their struggle against corrupt elites.
However, people tend to overlook his role as a political spokesperson for Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election (Akuntono 2014). He stood by Jokowi’s side and eventually assumed a prominent position in the cabinet, serving as Indonesia’s Minister of Education and Culture. In this context, Anies was aligned with the same political group that presents itself as the defender of diversity. Nevertheless, his political shift in 2016 led to a significant victory as the Governor of Jakarta, alongside his deputy, Sandiaga Uno. In 2019, he threw his support behind Prabowo Subianto and Sandiaga Uno, who were challenging Jokowi’s presidency. Despite their eventual defeat, both eventually found a place in Jokowi’s cabinet, as Minister of Defense and Minister of Tourism respectively.
As we approach the 2024 election, Anies’s electability has surged. According to Drone Emprit data, which analyzes the frequency of certain political figures’ names on Twitter using the keyword “Anies Baswedan,” he is the most discussed figure among the public (Rahman, 2022). However, it’s essential to assess what proportion of voters and Twitter users actively engage in campaign-related discussions, debates, and political discourse. Similarly, in polls conducted by various institutions, Anies consistently secures a place in the top three positions, competing with Prabowo and Ganjar Pranowo. With strong electability, Anies has been nominated as a presidential candidate by the Nasdem party.
Naturally, announcing his candidacy early, before other candidates are officially revealed, carries risks, particularly concerning the formation of coalitions with other parties. Currently, Nasdem is in a coalition with the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and the National Awakening Party (PKB). However, their former partner, the Democratic Party (Demokrat), withdrew from the coalition, feeling betrayed when Anies was instead paired with PKB chairman Muhaimin Iskandar as the vice-presidential candidate. The Democratic Party advocates for Anies to be paired with AHY.
Without the Democratic Party in the Anies-Muhaimin coalition, it appears to have surpassed the parliamentary threshold of 25 percent based on previous votes in the House of Representatives (DPR). Nasdem holds 10.26 percent of the seats in the DPR, PKS holds 8.7 percent, and PKB holds 10.09 percent (Huda, 2023). Their combined coalition share reaches 29.05 percent. In contrast, their rival Ganjar, under the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) umbrella, commands 22.26 percent support and is backed by the United Development Party (PPP), which holds 3.30 percent (totaling 25.56 percent). Meanwhile, Prabowo’s Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) has 13.57 percent support, with backing from Golongan Karya (Golkar) at 14.78 percent, the National Mandate Party (PAN) at 7.65 percent, and the Democratic Party at 9.39 percent (totaling 45.39 percent).
Currently, Anies’s political coalition holds a higher percentage of DPR seats than Ganjar’s coalition but still falls significantly short of Prabowo’s alliance. If Anies is able to win the vote in the first phase of the election, the political map may change. Anies faces a challenging path forward, as does his political coalition. The Anies-Muhaimin coalition is expected to secure substantial votes from followers of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Muslim organization. PKB, a political party founded by prominent NU figure Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), plays a pivotal role in this regard. Interestingly, during the NU’s centenary celebrations in Sidoarjo on February 7, 2023, numerous state officials associated with the PDIP were prominently featured. Concurrently, Muhaimin Iskandar, with a ‘Nahdliyyin’ (NU follower) background, appeared to be absent. However, there was a so-called PKB-ization of the NU, a party with a large mass that he wrested from its founder Gus Dur.
With all these complexities, Anies still has a chance to win the battle against Ganjar and Prabowo, provided he secures the votes in Jakarta, West Java, and a substantial number of votes in East Java. To secure the major voting pockets, he needs to convince the parties that have endorsed him. On September 27, he met with the FPI’s Grand Imam, Rizieq Shihab, in an attempt to secure the support of the Islamist populist group. Concurrently, the leader of the NU, KH Yahya Cholil Staquf, declared that he would never support a political coalition that included religious groups threatening the nation’s unity.
Anies is making efforts to convince his Islamist populist followers that he won’t betray them, emphasizing pluralism, kindness to minorities, and opening doors to Chinese conglomerates and oligarchs—a formidable and almost impossible task. This is what was discussed during Anies’s interview with ABC News (2023). He asserted that his work in Jakarta demonstrates his leadership for all, characterized by non-discrimination, non-intolerance, and service to people regardless of their backgrounds.
It will be a gamble for him, unless he adopts a pragmatic approach to secure his political position first, recognizing that in the political arena in a political battle, betrayal can be both normal and tolerable. His experience with Jokowi has enabled him to counteract Islamist populism and mitigate the trend toward religious conservatism.
Anies’ Political Maneuver and Islamist Populism
DKI Jakarta Governor Anies Baswedan with residents of Kampung Akuarium in Jakarta, Indonesia on April 14 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
The greatest fear of a nation whose motto is unity in diversity is disintegration. The possibility of disintegration can result from fragmentation. Social fragmentation within society encourages the sharpening of differences, ultimately leading to various social and political frictions. Frictions that escape government control can escalate into conflicts. This becomes a serious problem when not adequately and properly managed. The problem is that Indonesia has faced significant polarization in electoral politics, particularly exacerbated when religious symbols, especially Islam as the majority religion, become embroiled.
In 2016, a year seen as preparatory for the 2019 realpolitik contest, religious symbols indisputably became a catalyst for intense social and political polarization. During the Jakarta gubernatorial election, incumbent governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama, known as Ahok, faced off against Anies Baswedan. This contest sadly involved the influence of identity politics (Islamism) and a substantial mobilization of supporters for Anies. Ahok faced accusations of blasphemy and was ultimately sentenced to prison. His supposed blasphemy occurred when he criticized political figures who invoked Surat al-Maidah in their election campaigns, aiming to expose the use of religion for political gain. In response, Anies, as part of a broader strategy, mobilized Islamist populism to protest against his political opponent, orchestrating a large-scale mass action known as Islamist populism.
In this context, populism assumes the form of resistance to Ahok, who is perceived as a political symbol aligning with corrupt ruling elites. These elites are viewed as corrupt because populists argue they often disregard or violate the general will of the people. Ahok, a political figure belonging to both religious and racial minorities (Christian and Chinese), is seen as a powerful minority who has not favored the Muslim majority. He stands accused of undermining justice and the welfare of the people from the perspective of Anies’ group.
Therefore, the populism unfolding is primarily characterized by criticism, resistance, the struggle of the majority (Muslims and the oppressed) against an elite minority (Ahok) seen as oppressors, foreign lackeys, servitors of the West and China, and a perceived threat to the development of the ummah’s civilization (Yilmaz, Morieson & Bachtiar, 2022). In this narrative, realpolitik actors like Anies are portrayed as champions of Muslim civilization, with Anies even being likened to Abu Bakar al-Shiddiq (a friend of the Prophet Muhammad), a figure described as patient, wise, and possessing good leadership qualities (Kumparan, 2017). This form of populism typically exploits rhetoric centered on civilization, which starkly contrasts ‘us’ with ‘them,’ emphasizing cultural and religious differences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023).
Following Ahok’s defeat, Anies assumed the influential position of ‘Jakarta 1,’ symbolizing the capital’s most prominent figure. However, Rizieq Shihab, the founder of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), faced a different fate. He became a target of the government, accused of being an intellectual actor of Islamist populism posing a threat to national security. In 2016, he managed to mobilize masses from cross-class alliances to enter the political arena against the corrupt elites and others. He then fled to Saudi Arabia. Upon his return to Indonesia, he was arrested for organizing a mass rally during the Covid-19 pandemic, which resulted in the shooting of his six supporters by the police and the banning of the FPI.
Upon his release on parole, Rizieq Shihab reconnected with Anies. In a baptism-like ceremony, in the presence of Rizieq Shihab’s recitation congregation, Anies was hailed as a leader who had fulfilled his promise as a governor favoring Muslims (Kumparan, 2022). He was contrasted with typical political figures who often renege on their commitments once in power. Rizieq asserted that Anies was different and deemed him a potential candidate for the presidency in Indonesia’s 2024 election, indicating that Anies had become the preferred choice of Islamist populists. However, as of October 2023, the Islamist populist movement has shown no signs of emerging as a large-scale political maneuver involving mass mobilizations.
Anies was respectfully dismissed by President Joko Widodo on October 16, 2022, based on Presidential Decree No. 100/P of 2022. Since then, Anies has begun mobilizing political forces to secure victory in the forthcoming 2024 presidential election. On October 3, 2022, Anies was officially declared a presidential candidate by Nasdem’s leader, Surya Paloh. When asked why Anies Baswedan was chosen, Surya Paloh responded, “Why not? He is the best,” during a press conference at the Nasdem Tower in Jakarta (Savitri, 2022). Additionally, before party officials, Surya Paloh emphasized, “There is no time for us to think and give intolerant thoughts, tolerance is for those who give tolerance. True nationalism, true national thoughts are associated with attitudes that are full of tolerance and that is what Nasdem is fighting for,” (Savitri, 2022).
Subsequently, other parties, including PKS, PKB, and Demokrat, initially voiced their support for Anies, although Demokrat later withdrew. It’s worth noting that Nasdem had previously aligned itself with the victorious PDIP. This means that Nasdem’s stance opposes the Islamist populist movement. In contrast, PKS favors populism and had disassociated from the coalition with Gerindra, the party of another presidential candidate, Prabowo. This shift toward emphasizing tolerance and nationalism, as opposed to Islamist populism’s rhetoric, is indicative of Anies’ evolving political maneuvering style. Nasdem’s expectation is for Anies to win the battle by winning the sympathy of voters outside the Islamist populist group. This does not mean that voters from Islamist populist circles or those who sympathize with identity politics of Islam should be ignored. The goal is for these voters to rally behind Anies rather than Prabowo.
Previously, both Anies and Prabowo had employed Islamist populism as a tool to challenge the ruling government, whether it was Ahok or Jokowi. However, shortly after Prabowo’s defeat in the 2019 presidential election, he accepted Jokowi’s offer to join his cabinet, assuming the pivotal role of Minister of Defense. While this move may have appeared rational, it somewhat eroded the trust of Islamist populist groups in Prabowo. Consequently, these groups shifted their support from Prabowo to Anies. With the additional votes from a diverse electorate less concerned with identity politics, Anies has a chance to outperform Ganjar. The Islamic populist movement may continue to play a role in Anies’ political strategy, albeit with a reduced emphasis on Islamist identity politics, if not its complete elimination.
The change in Anies’ political maneuvering style is evident in an interview with Solo Pos. When asked, “Can Pak Anies ensure that he will be a leader for all Indonesian people when he becomes president?” Anies responded, “I have worked in Jakarta for five years. Can you show me Anies’ policies that are intolerant, discriminatory, not inclusive, that reflect partisan views? So don’t ask about the future, because anyone can boast in front of you. Ask about the track record. …I can show you that in Jakarta we have the best democracy index, the best tolerance… even in cohesiveness (also the best). This is based on a study by Nanyang Technological University. In Jakarta there is no polarization, there is cohesiveness. Where is the polarization? On social media. There is no polarization in the community,” (Baswedan 2023).
Clearly, Anies’ real identity still remains uncertain. He may indeed be a pluralist, but it is also possible that he is ideologically aligned with staunch defenders of Islamism. As an academic and the rector of Paramadina University, a campus influenced by the progressive Muslim scholar Nurcholish Madjid, Anies understands the importance of fostering Indonesian pluralism. However, in politics, ideologies can change and adapt to serve one’s political interests. What the public can comprehend in this context is an adherence to an ideology that advances personal political ambitions. Anies’ moderation of Islamism, his role as a defender of diversity, and his efforts toward a more pro-equality, anti-discrimination, and tolerant form of Islamism may be driven by pragmatic political considerations rather than a fundamental shift to democratic post-Islamism, as proposed by Asef Bayat (2013). What is certain is that his ultimate goal appears to be securing practical political victories.
Conclusion
The public views Anies Baswedan not only as a potential presidential candidate but also as a prominent figure who played a crucial role in the Islamist populist movement during his bid for the governor’s seat in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. He was a central figure in the process that led to Ahok’s imprisonment, a symbol of political elites from religious and ethnic minority backgrounds. However, as the 2024 election draws near, Anies’ style of political maneuvering has undergone a transformation. Acting upon the advice of Nasdem, the party that endorsed him as a presidential candidate, Anies now presents himself as a figure committed to upholding the values of equality, tolerance, and nationalism.
In his recent article titled “Meluruskan Jalan, Menghadirkan Keadilan (Straightening the Path, Presenting Justice)” in Kompas (February 17, 2023), Anies expressed, “The essence of democracy is to provide equal space for all. Presenting legal certainty and security by guaranteeing the rights of citizens, especially safe spaces for women, children, people with disabilities, indigenous peoples and marginalized groups. … healthy democracy and legal equality that will drive equitable economic progress. Economic progress without the prospect of social justice will feel false.”
This change allows us to consider the post-Islamist thesis with an optimistic tone. Through Anies, the political style of Islamist populism appears to be evolving into a more democratic form. Anies presents himself as a democratic Muslim. Nevertheless, the post-Islamism thesis has faced significant criticism, particularly because Islamist figures, parties, and social and political movements have rarely advocated for substantive democratization. In this context, post-Islamism often seems more like a political expression that embraces democracy while engaging in Machiavellian political pragmatism that may disregard religious morality. In essence, it can employ various means, including instrumentalizing religion, to attain and maintain the status quo.
However, political reality unfolds dynamically. It is this dynamism that offers an opportunity for the development of a vibrant democracy, as argued by Dan Slater (2023). His thesis is, of course, far more optimistic than Thomas P. Power’s (2018) diagnosis and similar views, emphasizing that Islamist populism and state authoritarianism can lead to a regression of democracy in the country. We shall see—will Anies emerge victorious? And if he does and has to lead all ethnic groups, will he continue to present himself as a Pancasilaist or will he adopt a more populist approach, catering primarily to the majority?
The extent of these political shifts remains uncertain. Will it be as Kartini (2014) suggested, “Habis gelap terbitlah terang (Out of darkness comes light),” or will the darkness, as Power (2018) and his associates fear, usher in a continued regression of democracy? Nevertheless, Anies (2023) expressed in his article that “State administrators need to be humble, avoiding monopolization of the truth, and instead, providing comfortable spaces for citizens to come together and participate.” If he assumes the role of a state administrator, will he monopolize the truth as he did when aligning with Rizieq Shihab, the FPI, and other Islamist populist figures against Ahok? The future trajectory of Indonesian politics will provide answers to these questions.
(*) Hasnan Bachtiar is a lecturer at the Faculty of Islamic Studies, University of Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), Indonesia. Additionally, he is pursuing his Ph.D. in the Faculty of Arts and Education at Deakin University, Burwood, Australia.
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