Dr. Michael Montesano (Associate Senior Fellow, Thailand Studies Programme at Yusof Ishak Institute – ISEAS).
Speakers
“Political Legitimation and Authoritarian Nation Branding in Thailand,” by Dr. Petra Alderman(Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Leadership for Inclusive and Democratic Politics at the University of Birmingham, and a Research Fellow of CEDAR).
“Authoritarian Ministry of Truth: A Case of Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center,” by Itsakul Unahakate (PhD candidate at the University of Sydney and Lecturer at Thammasat University).
In examining the unexpected triumph of populist radical right leader Geert Wilders in the Dutch elections on November 22, Professor Matthijs Rooduijn highlights a noteworthy shift within mainstream parties. He notes their increasing embrace of more radical positions, which challenges the prevailing notion of substantial moderation within populist radical right parties. Delving into the narratives of prominent populist radical right figures like Wilders and Marine Le Pen, Professor Rooduijn contends that the observed changes are primarily stylistic rather than indicative of fundamental shifts in political programs.
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, provides insights into the normalization of far-right discourse globally, particularly in the wake of the surprising election results in the Netherlands on November 22, 2023. Dr. Rooduijn underscores a significant transformation within mainstream parties, as they increasingly adopt more radical positions, challenging the prevailing notion of substantive moderation within populist radical right parties. Examining into the narratives of prominent figures such as Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, he argues that observed changes are primarily stylistic, rather than representing fundamental shifts in political programs.
Delving into the complexities of populist radical right movements, particularly in the Netherlands, Dr. Rooduijn identifies nativism as the core feature, following Cas Mudde’s definition. Nativism, characterized by exclusionary nationalism, manifests in various expressions such as antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigration attitudes and racism. The interview provides insights into how Wilders’ anti-Islam agenda fits into the broader narrative of populist radical right ideologies.
Examining the international landscape, Dr. Rooduijn explores both the similarities and differences between populist radical right movements in the Netherlands and other European countries. While leadership may vary, the core ideology resonates with a significant portion of the electorate holding right-leaning cultural views. The interview scrutinizes the normalization of far-right discourse in the Netherlands, highlighting shifts in public perception and electoral strategies. Dr. Rooduijn notes the adaptation of mainstream right parties towards the radical right, contributing to the observed normalization globally.
The discussion extends to Wilders’ stance on immigration, distinguishing his emphasis on Islam from other far-right parties. Dr. Rooduijn provides insights into the intertwining of civilizational populism, nationalism, and their resonance with the Dutch public. The interview further explores the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism in Dutch politics, emphasizing Wilders’ hard-Eurosceptic position and its significance in the broader European context.
Dr. Rooduijn sheds light on the role of social media in the success and visibility of populist radical right parties, acknowledging its transformative impact on political communication. Analyzing the recent Dutch elections on November 22nd, he highlights the unexpected shift in the political landscape and underscores the challenges in forming a government coalition.
Looking forward to the European Parliament elections in June 2024, Dr. Rooduijn expresses concern about the potential surge of populist parties, emphasizing the discordance between their ideas and liberal democratic principles. The interview concludes by addressing the challenges faced by populist radical right movements in maintaining long-term political relevance, particularly the stigma associated with Wilders’ party and its impact on recruiting candidates for political positions.
Offering profound insights into the dynamics of Israeli politics and the evolving role of radical right-wing populism in the country, Professor Dani Filc of Ben Gurion University confidently asserts that the era of Benjamin Netanyahu is on the verge of conclusion. However, he also underscores that the influence of “clerical fascism” in Israel is poised to persist.
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dani Filc, a distinguished scholar in the Department of Politics and Government at Ben Gurion University in the Negev, confidently asserts that the era of Benjamin Netanyahu, a longstanding figure in Israeli politics, is on the verge of conclusion. However, he also underscores that the influence of clerical fascism is poised to persist.
Offering profound insights into the dynamics of Israeli politics and the evolving role of radical right-wing populism, the interview delves into the historical transformation of the ruling Likud. From its roots as a radical right vanguard to its current status as a sui generis form of right-wing populism, Likud’s evolution is explored. The discussion tracks Likud’s inclusive elements and examines the ideological shifts that occurred during Netanyahu’s tenure.
Addressing the intersection of populism with identity politics, Professor Filc highlights the dangerous chain of equivalencies used to demonize Israeli Arabs and the instrumental use of religion to differentiate the “in-group” and the “out-group.” Professor Filc also provides insights into Israel’s global alliances, pointing out the alliance with European far-right parties. Filc touches on the evolution of Likud under Netanyahu and its alignment with illiberal, right-wing populist movements in Europe.
Asserting that the ongoing war in Gaza signals the end of Netanyahu’s dominance in Israeli politics, Professor Filc predicts that “with the conclusion of the war in Gaza, Netanyahu will fall, leading to the abandonment of the judicial reform.” However, he expresses concerns about the lasting impact of the ongoing conflict on populist movements and calls for a just peace in the Middle East, highlighting potential dangers associated with civilizational populism or a clash of civilizations.
In this comprehensive interview, Professor Filc shares invaluable insights into the intricate landscape of Israeli politics, the evolution of populism, and the challenges posed by religious and right-wing populist movements in the country.
In examining the unexpected triumph of populist radical right leader Geert Wilders in the Dutch elections on November 22, Professor Matthijs Rooduijn highlights a noteworthy shift within mainstream parties. He notes their increasing embrace of more radical positions, which challenges the prevailing notion of substantial moderation within populist radical right parties. Delving into the narratives of prominent populist radical right figures like Wilders and Marine Le Pen, Professor Rooduijn contends that the observed changes are primarily stylistic rather than indicative of fundamental shifts in political programs.
In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam, provides insights into the normalization of far-right discourse globally, particularly in the wake of the surprising election results in the Netherlands on November 22, 2023. Dr. Rooduijn underscores a significant transformation within mainstream parties, as they increasingly adopt more radical positions, challenging the prevailing notion of substantive moderation within populist radical right parties. Examining into the narratives of prominent figures such as Geert Wilders and Marine Le Pen, he argues that observed changes are primarily stylistic, rather than representing fundamental shifts in political programs.
Delving into the complexities of populist radical right movements, particularly in the Netherlands, Dr. Rooduijn identifies nativism as the core feature, following Cas Mudde’s definition. Nativism, characterized by exclusionary nationalism, manifests in various expressions such as antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigration attitudes and racism. The interview provides insights into how Wilders’ anti-Islam agenda fits into the broader narrative of populist radical right ideologies.
Examining the international landscape, Dr. Rooduijn explores both the similarities and differences between populist radical right movements in the Netherlands and other European countries. While leadership may vary, the core ideology resonates with a significant portion of the electorate holding right-leaning cultural views. The interview scrutinizes the normalization of far-right discourse in the Netherlands, highlighting shifts in public perception and electoral strategies. Dr. Rooduijn notes the adaptation of mainstream right parties towards the radical right, contributing to the observed normalization globally.
The discussion extends to Wilders’ stance on immigration, distinguishing his emphasis on Islam from other far-right parties. Dr. Rooduijn provides insights into the intertwining of civilizational populism, nationalism, and their resonance with the Dutch public. The interview further explores the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism in Dutch politics, emphasizing Wilders’ hard-Eurosceptic position and its significance in the broader European context.
Dr. Rooduijn sheds light on the role of social media in the success and visibility of populist radical right parties, acknowledging its transformative impact on political communication. Analyzing the recent Dutch elections on November 22nd, he highlights the unexpected shift in the political landscape and underscores the challenges in forming a government coalition.
Looking forward to the European Parliament elections in June 2024, Dr. Rooduijn expresses concern about the potential surge of populist parties, emphasizing the discordance between their ideas and liberal democratic principles. The interview concludes by addressing the challenges faced by populist radical right movements in maintaining long-term political relevance, particularly the stigma associated with Wilders’ party and its impact on recruiting candidates for political positions.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn with minor edits.
How would you characterize the key features of populist radical right movements, both in Western Europe generally and specifically in the Dutch political landscape? In your analysis, how do these features manifest in the context of Geert Wilders’ political ideology, and what societal and political factors have contributed to the rise and sustained presence of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands?
Matthijs Rooduijn: To address the first question, let’s focus on the definition of the populist radical right. I adhere to Cas Mudde’s definition, which identifies nativism as the core feature. Nativism is an exclusionary form of nationalism, where parties center their focus on the nation. Consequently, they argue that elements or people not compatible with the nation pose a threat. This can manifest in various ways, such as antisemitism, Islamophobia, anti-immigration attitudes, and racism – all expressions of in-group and out-group thinking. This thinking places the nation as the in-group and others as the out-group, forming the core of the radical right.
Furthermore, radical right parties exhibit authoritarian tendencies, advocating for a highly ordered society. They believe that severe punishment should be meted out to those who break the law. This authoritarianism is another core aspect of the radical right. Additionally, these parties adopt a populist stance, emphasizing a group of people, typically portraying ordinary citizens as betrayed, corrupted, or ignored by an evil elite. This elite can be political, cultural, or media-related. Populism is often an integral part of the program for these populist radical right parties. Geert Wilders’ party serves as a prototypical example, distinguishing itself with a particularly strong anti-Islam component. This summarizes the essence of the populist radical right and Wilders’ program.
Substantial Segment of the Population Are Potential Voters for the Populist Radical Right
Dr. Matthijs Rooduijn, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam.
Considering the international context, are there similarities or differences between the populist radical right movements in the Netherlands, led by figures like Geert Wilders, and those in other European countries?
Matthijs Rooduijn: Yes, there are both similarities and differences. The type of leader varies significantly from country to country. Wilders differs markedly from Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, or Giorgia Meloni. What they share is their ideology. Economic circumstances, party systems, and media landscapes also differ. However, what’s common across most of these countries, and beyond, is a fertile breeding ground for the success of these parties. In Western Europe and elsewhere, there’s a substantial portion of the electorate that leans right on cultural issues, supporting more restrictive immigration policies, often coupled with a general sense of discontent with politics. This sentiment is prevalent in almost all European countries.
The success of populist radical right movements hinges on their ability to tap into this sentiment and discontent and convince voters to vote for them. So, there is a substantial segment of the population that represents potential voters for the populist radical right. The crucial differentiator is the extent to which politicians can effectively appeal to and persuade these voters, influenced by wider contextual factors such as media coverage and actions of other political parties. Success, therefore, really depends on the circumstances surrounding these parties.
Can you discuss any notable shifts or developments in the public perception of populist radical right ideologies in the Netherlands, particularly in relation to Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV), and how have these shifts influenced their electoral performance?
Matthijs Rooduijn: So, you’re inquiring about how voters, parties, and media perceive Geert Wilders over the years and the changes in this perception. Broadly, the rhetoric of the far-right has undergone a significant normalization in the Netherlands, a trend not exclusive to the country but observed globally. For instance, in 2002, right-wing populist Pim Fortuyn faced vehement criticism for his perceived radicalism, even being labeled an extremist. However, a comparison of his statements from two decades ago with Geert Wilders’ current rhetoric reveals Fortuyn as relatively moderate. This shift highlights the extent to which the general discourse in the Netherlands has moved towards the radical right.
Academic studies support this observation, indicating that mainstream right parties, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere, have adjusted their election programs towards the radical right. While they haven’t transformed into radical right parties, there has been a noticeable directional shift. This trend is echoed in the general discourse on immigration and identity issues, showcasing a movement towards the radical right’s framing of relevant topics.
Notably, during the recent election campaign, there was a shift in how Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) were portrayed by other parties. After approximately a decade of exclusion by mainstream right parties, Wilders was actively or passively presented as a negotiable political figure during this campaign. The mainstream right party opened the door to potential collaboration with Wilders in a government coalition, contributing to the normalization of the PVV. In conclusion, the normalization of far-right ideas is a prevailing trend not only in the Netherlands but also on a global scale. This normalization extends to both the ideas associated with the far-right and the PVV party led by Geert Wilders.
Geert Wilders Is Very Islamophobic
Geert Wilders and his Party for Freedom (PVV) are often associated with anti-immigration policies. Could you provide insights into how his stance on immigration fits into the broader populist radical right narrative in the Netherlands?
Matthijs Rooduijn: Geert Wilders’ primary focus is on Islam, he is very Islamophobic, and he holds strong Islamophobic views, advocating for the prohibition of the Quran, Islamic schools, and headscarves—issues that have consistently been at the core of his agenda. While these concerns are now intertwined with broader topics like asylum and immigration, they remain distinctive aspects that set Wilders apart from other far-right parties in the Netherlands. For example, the Forum for Democracy (FvD) led by Thierry Baudet also embraces a nativist ideology but places less emphasis on Islam. Similarly, Right Answer 2021 (JA21), another populist radical right party, does not prioritize Islam to the same degree.
During the recent election campaign, Wilders asserted that Islam was not his primary concern at that moment, highlighting immigration and housing as more pressing issues. However, he simultaneously affirmed that Islam remains an integral part of his party’s DNA. Notably, he did not retract any elements from his election program, which unequivocally outlines his stance on Islam. In essence, while nativism constitutes a fundamental element of the populist radical right ideology, Wilders’ specific expression of nativism is rooted in Islamophobia, complemented by general negative attitudes toward immigration and asylum.
How does the relationship between civilizational populism and nationalism play out in the context of Geert Wilders’ political discourse, and to what extent does it resonate with the Dutch public?
Matthijs Rooduijn: Geert Wilders’ nationalism is fundamentally expressed in his views on Islam, asylum, and immigration. He advocates for closed doors and borders, and exclusionary policies, with a primary focus on Islam, Muslims, and cultural symbols like headscarves. This specific form of exclusionary nationalism is a defining feature of his political program. During the recent election campaign, he strongly emphasized these aspects, which remain integral to his party’s identity and are referred to as its DNA.
Wilders’ Hard-Euroscepticism Surpasses the Eurosceptic Rhetoric of Many Other Far-right Parties in Europe
How has the relationship between populism and Euroscepticism played out in Dutch politics, particularly within the context of populist radical right movements?
Matthijs Rooduijn: We observe that most radical right parties tend to be Eurosceptic, although there are instances where some actors within the radical right may display a less overt form of Euroscepticism, framing it as a defense of Europe against external threats. However, Euroscepticism has been a consistent element in the programs of almost all radical right parties, especially in Western Europe, including Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom. Wilders’ Euroscepticism is multifaceted, encompassing resistance to European elites and technocrats in Brussels, which he perceives as threatening Dutch identity and impeding the nation’s self-determination. This Eurosceptic stance incorporates cultural, identity-related, and political arguments, emphasizing the perceived erosion of national identity by Brussels and the loss of citizens’ control over important matters.
Additionally, there’s an economic dimension to Wilders’ Euroscepticism, contending that excessive funds are being directed to other countries. Notably, his program advocates for the Netherlands’ exit from the EU, although the feasibility of this stands in contrast to the positions of other parties he is currently negotiating with, making it unlikely. The prospect of compromise on this issue might emerge if he becomes part of a government coalition. Despite this, it remains intriguing that Wilders maintains a hard-Euroscepticism in his election program, surpassing the Eurosceptic rhetoric of many other far-right parties in Europe.
Can you discuss the role of social media and communication strategies in the success and visibility of populist radical right parties in the Netherlands?
Matthijs Rooduijn: I have limited expertise on the subject of social media, as it falls outside my area of study. While I am aware that Geert Wilders is actively engaged on platforms like Twitter or X, I do not know to what extent social media have really helped to his success. In general, it could be argued that social media provides populist politicians, including Wilders, with a direct means of communication with their followers. In Wilders’ case, he has a sizable and devoted following, allowing him to communicate directly with a large segment of the population. This shift in the mode of communication with followers has undergone significant changes over the last two decades. While acknowledging its importance to Wilders, I cannot conclusively assess the specific role played by social media in his success during this election campaign.
Wilders Potentially Being Part of the Gov’t and Assuming the Role of PM Could Impact Int’l Relations
Can you explain what happened on the night of November 22nd in terms of populism in the Netherlands, populism in Europe, and populism across the globe?
Matthijs Rooduijn: What we have witnessed in the Netherlands is a remarkable and unexpected shift in the political landscape. Just a few weeks ago, it wasn’t anticipated that Wilders would emerge victorious in the elections. The last week of the campaign brought about significant changes. A noteworthy revelation is that one in four Dutch voters cast their ballots for a populist radical right party, indicating an unprecedented size for this party family. This figure becomes even more substantial when considering other radical right parties. Interestingly, voters, including Conservative Liberals, have contributed to the increased support for the PVV. It’s worth noting that some of these votes may be strategic and may not necessarily translate into enduring support for the PVV.
While the victory of the far-right is a significant development, the dynamics of forming a government coalition remain uncertain and complex. Predicting the outcome is challenging due to the absence of clear rules, allowing for various possible scenarios. The consequences of Wilders potentially being part of the government and assuming the role of Prime Minister extend beyond the Netherlands and could impact international relations. Additionally, it may influence how mainstream parties in other European countries approach populist radical right parties.
Simultaneously, when considering elections, it’s evident that, in most countries, the issues that resonate with voters on a national level play a pivotal role. The focus tends to be primarily on domestic matters, with international politics having a lesser impact. However, the upcoming European elections in June 2024 will be intriguing to watch. The strong performance of populist radical right parties in polls, not only in the Netherlands but also in other countries, indicates a noteworthy trend. While some projections for these parties in Poland and Spain fell short of expectations, the overall trajectory remains significant.
It’s crucial to recognize the significance of what transpired in the Netherlands. Yet, it’s essential to acknowledge that this represents a single moment in time. The election outcome could have unfolded differently with minor variations in the circumstances within the country. This emphasizes the fluid and contingent nature of political events.
Regarding the upcoming European Parliament elections, how concerned are you about the potential surge and victory of populist parties in Europe?
Matthijs Rooduijn: Undoubtedly, there is a substantial number of voters drawn to these parties. However, what is particularly concerning are their ideas, as several of them are not in harmony with liberal democracy, especially concerning minority rights, checks and balances, pluralism, and freedom of the media etc… This poses a significant problem. We have witnessed the consequences of such ideologies in countries like Hungary, Poland, and others in Europe. If a populist radical right party gains significant influence or becomes the most powerful actor in a government, it could have detrimental effects on liberal democracy. This is indeed a matter of serious concern.
Mainstream Parties Have Substantially Integrated the Discourse of Populist Radical Right Parties
What impact has the populist radical right had on the overall political discourse and policy agenda in the Netherlands, and how has it influenced the mainstream political parties? Or can we safely say that PVV has now been a mainstream party, and its discourse on immigration, the Moroccans, Islam, and the EU has been mainstream as well?
Matthijs Rooduijn: As mentioned earlier, mainstream parties have substantially integrated the discourse of populist radical right parties, and this is evident in the media landscape as well. The views expressed by figures like Pim Fortuyn, which were once considered radical, have now become relatively mainstream. Thus, the discourse of the far-right has been normalized, and mainstream parties have, to a certain extent, legitimized the arguments put forth by populist radical right parties. However, it would be inaccurate to claim that the populist radical right has become more mainstream in the sense of becoming more moderate. That’s not the case. On the contrary, it’s the mainstream parties that have shifted towards more radical positions. Over time, if we analyze the trajectory of populist radical right parties in Europe, they remain as radical as ever. While Geert Wilders may have projected a more moderate image during these elections, his election program retained its radical core. Similarly, in the case of Marine Le Pen in France, despite efforts to present a more moderate image, the National Rally (FN) remains a fundamentally populist radical right party. Therefore, any moderation observed tends to be more in the presentation style rather than a shift in the core elements of their political programs.
In your view, what are the main challenges faced by populist radical right movements in maintaining long-term political relevance, and how has Geert Wilders navigated these challenges in the Dutch political context?
Matthijs Rooduijn: I believe the primary challenge currently confronting Wilders is the persistent stigma attached to his party, making it challenging for him to garner support from other politicians. Despite securing a considerable number of votes, many political figures are hesitant to align themselves with the PVV. This reluctance poses a significant obstacle in recruiting candidates for political positions. For example, with 45 individuals on his list, a total of 37 were elected, leaving Wilders with only 8 potential replacements. In the event that some individuals assume ministerial roles in the government, he may encounter difficulty finding adequate replacements. The scarcity of willing individuals willing to be associated with him and the PVV makes it particularly challenging to identify suitable candidates for ministerial or significant political roles. Compounding this issue is the fact that Wilders faces personnel challenges due to the absence of party members; he is the sole member of his party and harbors trust issues with his colleagues in the PVV. This personnel shortage remains a considerable hurdle, even after his 17 years in politics.
Lastly, you counted anti-semitism as one of the basic features of populist parties. In the case of Geert Wilders, it is not the case. He is pro-Israeli. How do you explain this?
Matthijs Rooduijn: Antisemitism is not necessarily part of their program. What is part of the program is nativism, and nativism can express itself in different ways. It can manifest as antisemitism but also as Islamophobia, and that is how it is articulated in Wilders’ case. Nativism represents a broader framework of in-group and out-group thinking, centering around the nation versus dangerous others. When discussing antisemitism, the dangerous others are Jews. In contrast, when addressing Islamophobia, the dangerous others are Muslims, or, as Wilders argues, Islam as an extremist ideology. Thus, antisemitism is one manifestation through which nativism can express itself. However, Wilders is not antisemitic; he is Islamophobic. Therefore, it’s a distinct form of nativism, representing a different way in which his nativism finds expression.
Dr. Fizza Batool (Assistant Professor, SZABIST University, Karachi)
Speakers
“The Radical Right and the Radical Left in Anno 2023: What Does Populism Got To Do With It?” by Dr. Andrej Zaslove (Associate Professor – Empirical Political Science, Radboud University.)
“Psychological Roots of Populist Voting,” by Dr. Bert N. Bakker (Associate Professor, University of Amsterdam).
“The Psychological Appeal of Populism,” by Dr. Jennifer Sheehy-Skeffington (Associate Professor of Social Psychology, London School of Economics and Political Science)
Ozturk, Ibrahim. (2023). “Confronting Populist Authoritarians: The Dynamics of Lula’s Success in Brazil and Erdogan’s Survival in Turkey.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 6, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0027
Abstract
This article delves into the political trajectories of anti-establishment leaders Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) in Brazil and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, both of whom ascended to power in the early 2000s amid politically fragmented environments. The analysis explores the dynamics of their rise, governance styles, and the factors influencing the retention or loss of power. Lula’s success in the 2022 elections against right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro is attributed to his adept coalition-building and pragmatic policies. In contrast, Erdogan, facing economic crises and deep political unrest, managed to secure his position in the May 2023 elections, showcasing the complexities of populism. The article examines the leadership qualities, coalition-building strategies, and responses to challenges encountered by Lula and Erdogan. Despite initial similarities, Erdogan’s transformative approach to institutions and the establishment of a self-sustaining clientelist regime contributed to his longevity, in contrast to Bolsonaro’s defeat. The role of clientelism, rent-seeking, and corruption in both countries’ politics is discussed, emphasizing their impact on public perception. Lula’s effective positioning as an alternative to Bolsonaro is contrasted with Turkey’s lack of a convincing opposition. Despite bringing Turkey to the brink, Erdogan’s retention of power is attributed to maintaining a “man of the people” persona amid societal concerns for security and stability. In conclusion, the article underscores the nuanced dynamics of populist leadership, emphasizing the significance of historical context, governance strategies, and external factors in shaping the trajectories of leaders such as Lula and Erdogan.
In Brazil and Turkey, nations marked by histories shaped by military coups and dictatorships, establishment forces found themselves unable to thwart the ascent of anti-systemic actors to power. In the early 2000s, the leftist Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) and the rightist Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Erdogan) rose to prominence in a highly fragmented political environment, garnering support from individuals who had long been marginalized.
Contrary to apprehensions, the transition of power from so-called establishment elites to the “real people” occurred primarily within the existing rules, devoid of bloodshed or violence. Two pivotal factors played a decisive role in shaping this outcome. Firstly, the global landscape witnessed the winds of democracy and market economy reforms, coinciding with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the decisions of China and India to embrace globalization, and the zenith of the appeal of the European Union and the United States. Secondly, public anger and discontent intensified due to the escalating number and depth of economic and political crises in developing countries, such as Brazil and Turkey, which struggled to keep pace with globalization and increasingly found themselves on the periphery.
Furthermore, Turkey’s fragmented political environment, in addition to addressing country-specific challenges like corruption, terrorism, and natural disasters, contributed to the impetus for change. Despite Erdogan’s party receiving limited support with only 34.28 percent of the vote in the 2002 elections, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) disproportionately secured 363 deputies in the 500-seat parliament due to an unfair electoral system, while many other parties were excluded. In Brazil, the Lula-led alliance triumphed in the presidential race with 61.27 percent support, compared to 38.73 percent for its opponents. Recognizing the significance of coalition-building in such a delicate political climate, Lula moderated his left-wing working-class discourse in Brazil, and Erdogan adjusted his religious and anti-secular rhetoric in Turkey. Both leaders shifted towards the political center, aligning themselves with democratic and market-oriented principles. This suggests that citizens in both countries anticipated a measured and predictable change in central policies rather than a complete overhaul of the system.
Lula and Erdogan assumed power amid the implementation of painful austerity programs in response to economic crises, yielding impressive initial results in both countries. Consequently, they fostered a “responsible” image regarding market economy principles and demonstrated a “sensible” approach toward those experiencing poverty. In Brazil, where macroeconomic stability improved and capital inflows surged, significant commodity exports fueled growth, generating foreign currency. Meanwhile, Turkey garnered attention for its EU membership-oriented reforms, heightened institutional quality, predictability, and productivity. Positive developments in Turkey were primarily driven by structural reforms, leading to productivity and efficiency-driven growth, while in Brazil, the advantage of being a “commodity exporter” was leveraged through the rapid increase in global commodity prices.
Protesters protest for the freedom of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil on April 7, 2019. Photo: Cris Faga.
After Lula was barred from politics for a third term amid corruption allegations, unaddressed judicially, issues such as corrupt scandals, weakened economic growth, deteriorated income distribution, and political chaos paved the way for the rise of right-wing populist Jair Bolsonaro, with a military background, to power at the end of 2018. In contrast, Erdogan did not lose power. After securing control for the third consecutive time in the 2011 elections, Erdogan’s response to the economic crisis and systemic corruption scandals took on an authoritarian tone. He implemented “counter-coup” processes to legitimize his ultimate aim of marginalizing democracy in the country. This led to subsequent practices of a state of emergency, the enforcement of radical public security measures, and a rhetorical emphasis on national independence and sovereignty, defining the characteristics of his governance. That is, he maintained power by leveraging security concerns and intimidating voters.
Bolsonaro and Erdogan, facing the pandemic crisis, were expected to leave power due to the severe economic crisis triggered by their incompetent and arbitrary one-person regime practices. While this expectation came true when Lula returned to power for the third time in the March 2022 elections, Erdogan, who had been in power for 20 years, retained his position in the May 2023 elections. This article explores why Erdogan held onto his seat against a coalition led by a center-left-wing leader in 2023, while in 2022, a left-wing coalition led by Lula emerged victorious against the right-wing authoritarian populist Bolsonaro.
The paper unfolds as follows: after establishing a framework outlining the globalization-populism transmission mechanism in the next section, the third section focuses on a brief comparative perspective of the economies of Brazil and Turkey. The fourth section utilizes social welfare policies to elucidate Lula’s rise and Erdogan’s endurance in the aftermath. The fifth section delves into the nature of the “coalitions” subject to contestation between the populist incumbent regime and the mainstream opposition. The final section summarizes the main findings and derives some policy implications.
Populist Waves in the Post-Cold War Global Conjuncture
Over time, the Western-centered liberal multilateral order (LMLO), established in the post-Second World War (WW-II) era, and the unparalleled globalization it ushered have given rise to some pathological contradictions due to the economic, political, and social fault lines they activated. The traditional values and norms of the LMLO prioritized rapid growth, full employment, the pursuit of equality, and democracy, imposing a certain level of control and discipline on excessive capitalist tendencies. In other words, while economies became more integrated through trade, governments could maintain firm control of corporate activities and regulate labor markets, trade unions wielded strength, and, above all, finance was restrained (Kuttner, 2018).
Three global imbalances in different regions and countries triggered uncharted globalization, but self-serving market mechanisms failed to “correct” or neutralize them. First, with the opening up of China and India and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, billions of cheap surplus labors changed the nexus of the world economy, not through direct labor movements but through free trade. Second, radical technological shifts fundamentally transformed the existing global economic paradigm in trade, production, and finance, highlighting excessive connectivity and dependency. Third, the emergence of a substantial structural saving glut in northern Europe, centered on Germany, and in East Asia, centered on China and Japan, triggered enormous global financial flows (Cheung et al., 2020). Despite the surge in production, trade volume, and financial flows that created employment, generated income, and helped lift many people from absolute poverty, it also set parallel and more destructive trajectories in motion.
Taken together, these factors operated in diverse geographies in a complex manner, yielding asymmetric outcomes such as the ascent of a powerful and wealthy business elite, the decline of trade unionism, escalating worker insecurity, financial instability, and surging income and wealth inequality. This process triggered significant migrations and dislocations, perceived as threats to established endogenous lifestyles, national identity, and security in developed countries. Consequently, these outcomes inevitably and dangerously contributed to the rise of populist, xenophobic, and authoritarian attitudes among a growing proportion of the population (Cingano, 2014).
Simultaneously, the “voice of the great masses” emerged against elites who economically oppressed the people, humiliated them as a way of life, and excluded them politically. Given that globalization diminished national sovereignty and independence in both developed and developing countries from various perspectives, opposition to existing multilateral governance institutions (i.e., the United Nations, NATO, IMF, WTO, and World Bank) and multinational companies externally, along with criticism of the status quo internally, has become a prevalent trend. The possibility of pursuing multiple balanced politics, created by the emerging multipolar world, also provided a fertile ground for alternative combinations of populist rhetoric. As the global economic crisis (GER 2008-2009) and the COVID-19 pandemic (2019-2021) have shown, excessive connectivity undermines the resilience of national economies. Therefore, sustained economic growth and the protection of social peace in semi-peripheral countries like Turkey and Brazil rely on their capacity to manage their adaptation to the instabilities of the global economic system. The similar crises opened the avenue for further populism.
Experts highlight the crisis of trust in democracy over the last three decades, a period dominated by neoliberal globalization as the primary alternative. This crisis is primarily attributed to corruption and the failure of governments to provide essential public goods, particularly in health and education, ultimately impeding the transition of developing countries into higher-income status.
Therefore, populist leaders, who initially adhered to global market norms and upheld the rule of law amid the remarkable global economic growth from 2002, shifted their stance with the onset of the global economic recession (GER 2008-2009) associated with the neoliberal paradigm and its political and economic challenges. Taking advantage of the increasingly multipolar world order, they began gravitating towards their “hardcore” ideologies, legitimizing them with populist rhetoric. This era marked the golden age of global populism until the COVID-19 pandemic (Posner, 2017).
Recent studies (DEMO Finland, 2023; International IDEA, 2022; V-Dem Institute, 2023) measuring the global state of democracy underline that the number of countries moving towards authoritarianism is more than double that of those moving towards democracy, placing 37 percent of the world’s population under authoritarian rule (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2023). A recent report from Freedom House (2022) finds that only 43 percent of countries can be classified as free and considered democracies.
On the other hand, as discussed by Öztürk (2022a), the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic and the deepening economic crisis did not yield definitive results regarding populist trends. Viktor Orbán in Hungary defeated the opposition coalition and remained in power, while Donald Trump, who lost the elections but increased his votes in the USA, contested the results, refusing to concede peacefully and leaving behind “Trumpism.” In Brazil, Bolsonaro lost the election by a narrow margin and, like Trump, attempted to deny the results. In Turkey’s most recent case, the ruling populist Erdogan remained in power in largely unfair elections. While the defeat of populist leader Kaczyński in the elections in Poland (October 15, 2023) created some early signals for optimism, the victories of libertarian outsider populist Milei in Argentina and far-right Wilders in the Netherlands suggest that the populist backlash has resurged amid the economic crisis following the COVID-19 pandemic.
One of the paradoxes or fragilities of incumbent regimes is that, despite their shortcomings, they enable populist leaders to come to power through relatively free and fair elections. However, once in power, the populist leaders often deny the rules of the game, refraining from adhering to or improving upon the same rules, norms, and values, thereby turning elections into mere spectacles. Unsurprisingly, the “defeating of authoritarian populist leaders” has become a hot topic worldwide. Two such cases are Lula’s victory over the incumbent populist leader Bolsonaro and his subsequent rise to power. The other is Erdogan’s survival in office in the May 2023 elections despite multiple political and economic crises, pandemics, and a devastating earthquake.
Brazil and Turkey in Perspective
Introducing Main Political Figures
Although the international interconnectedness and geographic proximity (the so-called geostrategy), democratic experiences, population dynamics, economic structures, and cultural codes of these two countries are significantly different, the strategies and policies of said political leaders in mobilizing these different parameters can still provide a reasonable basis for a comparative study with an opportunity to draw far-fetched lessons in the fight against democratic backsliding. Lula and Erdogan ascended to power during a profound governance crisis in 2002. After decades of military dictatorship, Brazil emerged as a prominent and the youngest democracy in Latin America and the world since 1985, undergoing a relatively peaceful power transition. Subject to the separation of powers among the judiciary, legislative, and executive branches, Brazil also possesses a civil oversight mechanism comprising an independent media and an autonomous central bank. Its current constitution provides robust protections for civil liberties.
On the other hand, while Turkey’s democratization efforts date back to the second half of the 19th century, genuine multi-party free elections only took place after World War II. Despite numerous interruptions, the multi-party parliamentary system, based on checks and balances, persisted until the implementation of the Presidential Government System (PGS) in 2018. Theoretically, Turkey’s PGS can be characterized as a representative democracy and a constitutional republic within a pluriform multi-party system, where the president (serving as the head of state and head of government), parliament, and judiciary share powers reserved for the national government. In practice, since the consolidation of power in 2018, the political regime in Turkey has lost its democratic and rule-of-law-bound characteristics. The parliament has effectively become a rubber-stamping body, providing legitimacy cover for Erdogan’s arbitrary and erratic one-person rule. Numerous elected representatives have been expelled from the parliament and imprisoned. Elected mayors, particularly in the Kurdish region of the country, were ousted, imprisoned, and replaced by appointed public servants as “substitutes.” The judiciary underwent a thorough purge by the Erdogan regime, with positions filled by professionally unqualified individuals demonstrating a cult-like adherence to the regime.
Given the overarching characteristics of political regimes and the pragmatic, opportunistic, and contingent attitudes of populist leaders reflecting their personalities, comparing populists and deriving reliable, generalizable conclusions proves challenging. Nevertheless, despite differences in rhetoric, their discourse ultimately aligns with mainstream ideology when in power. In this context, Lula is a left-wing populist, Bolsonaro is right-wing, and Erdogan represents a hybrid form, oscillating between left and right-wing rhetoric.
Of working-class origin, Lula embarked on his career as a metalworker, evolving into a trade unionist during the 1970s. Amidst the Brazilian military dictatorship, he led significant workers’ strikes from 1978 to 1980. He played a pivotal role in founding the Workers’ Party in 1980, contributing to Brazil’s political opening and the end of the military regime. Although Lula has maintained ideological consistency, his two terms in power from 2003 saw him adopting a more market-friendly approach to gain confidence while concurrently upholding a “pro-citizen” stance through extensive social welfare policies.
In contrast, as a right-wing populist, Bolsonaro utilized anti-elitist sentiments, challenging the establishment and positioning himself as a spokesperson for the “common people” while championing family values. Bolsonaro, who entered politics in the late 1980s as a retired representative of a “democratically defeated military class,” is the complete opposite of Lula, who fought against the military class. His national populism relied on themes of neo-nationalism, social conservatism, and economic and fiscal conservatism. It should be an incredible coincidence that after successfully confronting Bolsonaro’s military forces in the late 1980s as a left-wing trade unionist, actively contributing to the revival of democracy in Brazil, Lula found himself in a new role as Bolsonaro’s rival in civilian politics in the 2020s. While Bolsonaro aimed to undermine Brazil’s democratic gains through civilian means, Lula declared his intention to advance democracy even further. As a seasoned trade unionist and politician, Lula again emerged victorious in the battle against Bolsonaro, this time in civil politics.
On the other hand, Erdogan, with a “hybrid” political personality, defies easy comparison with center-left-wing figures like Lula, right-wing figures like Bolsonaro, and others. This uniqueness led Cagatay (2017) to label him the “inventor of 21st-century populism” in the post-Cold War multipolar world. Beyond his personality and ideological affiliation, the geopolitics of Turkey has significantly shaped Erdogan’s approach, compelling him to adopt a pragmatic stance to balance competing interests at the intersection of the East and West, and the global North and the South. Additionally, the varied impacts of Brazil’s abundant natural and energy resources, along with Turkey’s dependence on them, have contributed to the formulation of distinct policies and strategies by these leaders.
Despite the mentioned differences between Lula, Erdogan, and Bolsonaro, and regardless of their tenures in power, they all fell short of exhibiting transformative leadership. Instead, they pragmatically engaged in transactional give-and-take relationships, mainly when circumstances were favorable. Ultimately, they could not steer the economy onto a sustainable growth path. As de Colvalho (2017) puts it, the combination of low-quality intellectual rather than political leadership, poor strategic thinking, and weaknesses in the face of financial markets made the adoption of ‘a liberal capitalism with a human look’ a done deal. In both countries, it was not a step in any direction but the result itself.
Campaign posters of opposition Republican People’s Party, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul, Turkey, on May 3, 2023. Photo: Tolga Ildun.
The final political actor to be considered in this analysis is Kemal Kilicdaroglu (referred to as Kilicdaroglu), the leader of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the opposition coalition’s presidential candidate in the May 2023 parliamentary elections. A retired bureaucrat with left-wing leanings, Kilicdaroglu observed a significant shift in political rhetoric toward right-wing ideologies during Erdogan’s rule. Recognizing the need to resonate with the conservative silent majority, he endeavored to align his discourse and the CHP’s rhetoric more closely with them. At the same time, Kilicdaroglu anticipated that the traditional elites would remain loyal voters to the CHP. However, neither he nor his party managed to establish a consistent, convincing, and trustworthy line within this evolving discourse. That is mainly because CHP is known to be the status quo party whose supporters include the elites, military and civilian bureaucrats, and a privileged, wealthy class. Aware of the ongoing negative political legacy or image of the CHP’s top-down societal engineering, repression, negation, and insult of the lifestyle of the so-called silent majority, Kilicdaroglu built his entire election campaign in 2023 on a kind of defense, apology, self-criticism, and the need for a new “social contract.” However, with his weaker and indeterminate leadership quality, these “last-minute efforts” were seen as a tactical maneuver and remained unconvincing. Although his established electorate continued to support him, in the end, he was not entirely successful in recruiting a significant number of “borrowed votes” from the alternative circles.
By leveraging his shared ethnicity as an advantage, he also managed to prevent the Kurds from fielding a separate presidential candidate and thereby secure their support. Although the nationalist tone of his discourse unsettled the Kurds and the conservative aspect troubled the secular Kemalists, the prevailing distrust towards Erdogan garnered him significant support. However, despite leading in the early phase of the first round of the May 2023 elections, he ultimately failed to secure victory after Erdogan’s alleged voting fraud which was left unchallenged and uninvestigated because every single apparatus of the state and the media is controlled by him and his cronies. Unfortunately, his passive response to political interference, silence, non-compliance with voter laws, cowardice, indecision, and the highly volatile nationalist stance he adopted in the second round resulted in a decline in his supporters’ numbers. As a consequence, Erdogan emerged victorious in the elections once again. However, rather than relying heavily on populist rhetoric, he should have shown that his party was more competent for power with his coalition partners than Erdogan. By triggering a populist race regarding distributive policies, he opened Eden’s doors by legitimizing Erdogan’s destructive policies. At a more fundamental level, as compared to Lula’s stance against Bolsonaro, Kilicdaroglu has no past combative stance or leadership capacity for such a Herculean race.
It can be stated that Kilicdaroglu failed to garner the support of (i) the white pro-status quo Kemalist Turks due to his ethnic Kurdish origins, (ii) a large Sunni Muslim population due to his minority religious affiliation (Alevism), (iii) Kurds and Leftists because of his Kemalist-nationalist ideology, and, last but not least, (iv) liberals and the big capitalists because of his distance from the market economy, inconsistent statements against the capital owners. Furthermore, given his late age, relatively weak leadership, the fact that he had lost every election he had contested, and opaque “negotiations” with various lobbying forces, it was unlikely that a coalition led by Kilicdaroglu would defeat Erdogan. In conclusion, while Lula competed in a more anti-establishment and anti-elite position than Bolsonaro in Brazil, Kilicdaroglu failed to settle in the same position against Erdogan’s competitive authoritarian regime.
Economic Challenges
When Lula and Erdogan took over the power in the early 2000s, they faced three main challenges with crucial implications for their success: i) Overly politized and excessively divided political culture hinders stability, social capital, and coalition building. ii) A decade of stagnated economy with chronic high inflation. iii) High level of uncertainty caused by a lack of trust in Lula’s hardcore left and Erdogan’s conservative Islamist ideology.
To address these serious concerns, starting from the election campaign at the latest, they emphasized trust building and maintaining social coalitions by promoting a pragmatic, flexible approach to economic management in their first years in power. They also promised to continue ongoing reforms, respect for the rule of law, and adherence to market economy principles. The external world was also quite supportive to their advantage, as the 2000s witnessed one of the golden ages of global capitalism in terms of production, trade, and financial flows. The ongoing austerity programs in the economies of both countries began to show positive results, and the reforms enabled them to take advantage of the new opportunities emerging in the expanding global economy. Turkey’s comprehensive reform program for the EU membership provided additional anchors.
To succinctly summarize the stylized facts of macroeconomic progress during the initial two terms of Lula and Erdogan, average growth generally aligned with Brazil’s and Turkey’s long-term averages of 4 and 5 percent, respectively. From a comparative standpoint, Brazil exhibited significant volatility compared to similar emerging market economies, while Turkey’s growth saw a consistent decline post-2014. In Erdogan’s initial years, the surge in productivity resulting from EU and IMF reforms took center stage in driving growth, whereas Brazil relied on commodity exports as the primary engine of economic expansion. Both countries achieved the upper-middle-income (UMI) country status regarding their per-capita GDP, which hit 13,000 dollars in Brazil in 2012 and 12,500 in Turkey in 2013. Both countries’ monetary and fiscal discipline, implemented in response to the persistent threat of inflation during the 1990s, played a pivotal role in achieving reasonably high growth and a successful disinflation process. Inflation remained in single digits for both nations. Alongside the disinflation process and the expansion of employment opportunities, capital inflows, surpassing historical benchmarks for the two nations, facilitated the financing of a substantial fight against poverty, leading to a notable improvement in income distribution.
However, the global financial crisis laid bare the vulnerable and fragile nature of both countries’ growth trajectories. The growth episodes in both nations, highly susceptible to external conditions, were significantly interrupted by the global crisis in late 2008, contributing to a deterioration in the political climate. Although the growth performance surpassed the OECD (2 percent) and world average (3 percent), it remained well below the growth achieved by the reference group of upper-middle-income countries (UMI) at 7.3 percent. This disparity can be attributed to both countries experiencing unstable and long-term declines in growth, indicating structural issues, an overemphasis on fiscal austerity, and a lack of well-designed and implemented industrial policies.
Over the subsequent decade, the situation further deviated. Average growth between 2011 and 2018 was 0.7 percent in Brazil during the unstable post-Lula years and 6.2 percent in Turkey until the full institutionalization of the one-person regime. In contrast to their 2012 achievements, Brazil and Turkey fell behind the world GDP per capita and the UMI group. Several negative factors, including the post-2014 recession bringing renewed unemployment and poverty, political instability, and associated uncertainty, paved the way for Bolsonaro’s rise to power in 2018. Turkey faced persistent reform backlogs, loss of EU membership perspective, and Erdogan’s increasing authoritarian tendencies after the 2011 election, resulting in significant regression. Widespread and systemic corruption scandals from December 17-25, 2013, Erdogan’s self-orchestrated coup attempts on July 15, 2016, and the system reform in 2018 triggered a period of deconstruction (Öztürk, 2022b; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020).
During the Bolsonaro era (2019-2022) and Erdogan’s single-man regime, average growth remained at 0.7 percent and dropped to 4.7 percent in Turkey. Professional and autonomous institutions in both countries were undermined and occupied by Erdogan’s incompetent but ambitious loyalists, becoming highly politicized and discredited. Consequently, these figures are deemed unreliable, exaggerated, and manipulated. Unlike Brazil, the excessive use of unsustainable expansionary monetary and fiscal policies made inflated growth costly and short-lived. Growth was significantly lower during Bolsonaro’s era and insufficient in Turkey after the presidential change in 2018.
In the 2019-2022 period, the most concerning socioeconomic indicators in Brazil include a surge in poverty due to low growth and a deteriorating fiscal balance resulting from the escalating public debt burden. Conversely, in Turkey, alongside these issues, the alarming increase in external deficits and inflation reaching triple digits are significant factors contributing to the economic challenges. It is crucial to note that these factors have led to an extreme depreciation of the Turkish lira.
From a comparative perspective, the rise of right-wing populist Bolsonaro to power in Brazil and the complete transformation of the Turkish parliamentary system towards one-person presidential rule in 2018 played a crucial role in the subsequent years of both countries. The argument that unsustainable growth dynamics and populist policies would lead to a deterioration in the macroeconomic environment and those populist leaders, contrary to their promises, would cause more significant damage to society was proven. Like Bolsonaro in Brazil, Erdogan worked to curb the country’s institutional capacity by attacking the judiciary’s power and electoral institutions. Their aggressive manner and attacks on women and journalists served as apparent methods of implementing a “divide and rule” strategy (Phillips, 2022). Their far-right rhetoric also exhibited hatred for minorities.
The pandemic also highlighted how populists deny science, scientists, and expertise. They both dismissed and denied COVID-19 and promoted unproven remedies (Burni & Tamaki, 2021). Even went beyond that, Erdogan mobilized people for political campaigns during the pandemic and expressed skepticism about vaccines. Both countries have recorded some of the worst COVID-19 responses, with death tolls presumed to be significantly undercounted (Béland et al., 2021; Phillips, 2022).
Neglecting the green economy deal and environmental sustainability has been another significant aspect of their populist approach. Deforestation in the Amazon region returned in Brazil, turning the country into a pariah in the global fight against climate change. In Turkey, the construction sector took center stage in Erdogan’s economic policy, leading to shrinking agricultural areas (Adiguzel, 2023; Le Monde, 10.08.2023).
Bolsonaro’s actions after the elections raised concerns about how authoritarian populist leaders (do not) leave power. Far-right supporters stormed the presidential palace, Supreme Court, and Congress in Brasilia on January 8, 2023, echoing the attack on the US Capitol in 2021. Erdogan’s use of state resources for the campaign and his slander against opposition candidates during the 2023 elections further highlighted populist tendencies. Both leaders have shown a pattern of opposing what they promised in opposition, resorting to unsustainable policies, and not leaving power quickly when unsuccessful.
With Bolsonaro’s election at the end of 2018 and Erdogan’s significant regime change in Turkey in the same year, the political environment in both countries took on an increasingly repressive character. Indicators of democracy, separation of powers, human rights, and quality of governance began to decline. The Freedom House Report (2023) classified Turkey as a “not free” country, contrasting Brazil’s status as a “free country.” According to the World Justice Project’s (WJP) Rule of Law Index (RLI) (Table.1), Turkey ranked 117th out of 140 countries in 2023, with an overall score of 0.42 (the higher the score, the better the rule of law). Turkey, which had a “rules-governed, albeit weak, country” status with a score of 0.52 in 2012 and 2013 when the WJP began, has steadily declined and has been mainly out of the “rule of law” realm since 2015. However, Turkey’s most worrying scores focus on limitations on government powers at 0.28, fundamental rights at 0.30, and criminal justice at 0.34.
These data clearly show that, besides the economy, fundamental rights have also been sacrificed under the arbitrary one-person regime introduced in Turkey in 2018. In Brazil, the RLI was 0.58 in 2012-2013, right after Lula. However, it fell steadily to 0.49 until 2022, when Bolsonaro lost the election.
So, if Bolsonaro had stayed in power as long as Erdogan and managed to reshape the system, the results in Brazil might have mirrored those in Turkey. This sheds light on why the authoritarian right-wing populist leader Erdogan, unlike Bolsonaro, successfully secured his 21-year seat and retained power in Turkey’s May 2023 elections.
Answering the question, “How and why was Bolsonaro defeated and had to accept the results so that Lula could return for a third term in 2022, while Erdogan retained power in Turkey’s 2023 elections?” leads to the first conclusion: Changing populist-authoritarian governments in power is a daunting task, especially if they persist and fundamentally change the regime, as Erdogan effectively did in 2018. As discussed by Yilmaz and Morieson (2022) from different perspectives, Erdogan’s ability to impose his point of view on society depends on taking control of the press, manipulating the justice system, and effectively using national culture. Society’s ability to adapt is influenced by time, and over the past two decades, Erdogan has found or artfully created such an opportunity in Turkey. While the elections in Brazil took place within a functioning democratic constitutional state, such an order was almost abolished in Turkey, turning elections into a mechanism for legitimizing an authoritarian leader.
The following section focuses on the extraordinary relationships that Lula and Erdogan have built through social welfare policies and the two leaders’ coalition-building ability with society to ensure that all of these factors produce results in the complex web of relationships with each other.
The Use of ‘Social Policy’
Family Stipend (Bolsa Família) During and After Lula
During their first two terms, economic growth in two countries with the above-discussed fragile aspects until the global economic crisis in 2008-2009 and the significant rise in national income allowed both Lula and Erdogan to implement social policies toward the most fragile targeted groups. To start with Brazil, the growing export surplus and rising tax revenues allowed the Lula government to fight widespread poverty by investing in social programs. During Lula’s era, social spending accounted for 16 percent of GDP through direct/indirect social assistance. Direct transfers included conditional cash transfer programs, non-contributory pensions, food transfers, unemployment benefits, exceptional circumstances pensions, etc. In-kind transfers are benefits of universal free public education and health systems. According to OECD (2023), with the addition of contributory pension payments, social spending topped 25 percent of GDP.
Among others, Bolsa Família (the Family Stipend), the core of Lula’s social policies, was implemented in 2003 as the world’s most extensive direct conditional cash-transfer program directly to the poor. It supported families with children with a per capita income of fewer than 70 dollars a month, granted a small sum of money per child (up to three children) as long as they were vaccinated, stayed in school, and did not engage in illegal child labor. The benefits are mainly paid to women via a chip card. As a result, as of 2010, 12.4 million households had enrolled in the program, and, in sum, 20 to 30 million Brazilians were rescued from poverty. According to Neri (2010), one-sixth of Brazil’s strides in poverty reduction can be attributed to this program, which only cost 0.5 percent of the Brazilian GDP.
Through Bolsa Família, nearly 13 million new jobs were created, and the increase in the minimum wage from $100 to $205 during Lula’s presidency was crucial in addressing Brazil’s traditionally skewed income distribution. Recent studies indicate that targeted cash transfer programs associated with Bolsa Família and minimum wage hikes accounted for more than half (55 percent) of the decline in earnings inequality among formal sector employees and thus contributed to Lula’s re-election for a second term in 2007 (Ferrari & Bittes, 2023).
According to World Bank (2022) indicators, the Gini coefficient, an inequality measure, stood above 0.60 in 1995 and was at 0.58 when Lula assumed office in 2003. It then declined to 0.53 after his two terms in 2010, signifying a noteworthy improvement, although still ranking as the highest among major countries and democracies. This is attributed to the constraints on the state’s social spending caused by financial needs, emphasizing the necessity for increased employment generation and targeted cash transfers to address the significant inequalities. Despite their significant success, Neto & Vernengo (2007) argue that Lula’s social policies failed to break the longstanding pattern of income inequalities and escalating social injustice.
After Lula, things rapidly changed.Dilma Rousseff, who ruled Brazil after Lula but was impeached in 2016, was subject to the nexus of problems like massive corruption scandals, economic recession, and fiscal crisis and had to limit social spending, especially after 2014. When Brazil’s worst-ever recession began in 2014, and GDP per Brazilian dropped by 10 percent from 2014 to 2016, progress stopped and, in some areas, reversed. Michel Temer, who led the country until the end of 2018, opted for a complete austerity program in which social spending would be cut entirely. Instead of turning to capital and the rich, he assumed that poverty would be combated under market conditions only after economic growth returned (Ferrari & Bittes, 2023). However, growth and the market mechanism alone are unlikely to eradicate poverty or improve income distribution.
An unusual aspect of social welfare spending in Brazil is that, although total social transfers reached an enormous 25 percent of Brazil’s GDP, even higher than in most prosperous countries, they have been “hardly redistributive” in Brazil. Interestingly, while 2015 taxes and transfers reduced the average Gini coefficient in OECD countries from 0.47 to 0.31, Brazil cut inequality by only half as much on average. The Gini coefficient stood at 0.53 in 2017 (Higgins & Pereira, 2013). One reason for this is the biased tax structure against the poor (OECD-IDB, 2020). At the end of 2018, the number of people living on less than $1.25 a day reached 8.2 million, the highest since 2007.
Besides other factors, that process finally allowed the right-wing party leader Bolsonaro to come to power. However, unlike his rhetoric favoring the poor, he did the opposite with the policies favoring the rich; like his predecessor Temer, he thought that economic growth and employment increases would contribute more to the fight against poverty than that kind of direct cash support. In that line of thinking, he underestimated hunger and malnutrition; thus, tens of millions were impoverished. Morevoer, Bolsonaro, who wanted to get out of Lula’s shadow, instead of developing and popularizing theBolsa Família, wanted to go around and erase it from the public’s memory with other names, measures, mechanisms, and policies. Among others, restricting applications, extending the waiting period, expelling the current beneficiaries, and reducing the real effect of aid amounts by not updating according to inflation were the central approach (Higgins & Pereira 2013).
According to experts, while many areas must be intervened to save a resource close to 10 percent of the national income, the Bolsa Família aid category, whose share of national income is meager but whose marginal contribution is unmatched, caused the most significant deterioration in income distribution. As a result, Brazil reappeared on the World Food Program’s “Hunger Map” of the United Nations (UN) in 2021, with 28.9 percent of the population living in food insecurity. Thirty-three million Brazilians faced acute hunger, and 100 million lived in poverty, the highest number in years. It was a significant setback for a country removed from the map in 2014 (France 24, 2022). As the 10th largest economy in the world, the largest one in Latin America, and one of the world’s largest food producers and exporters, Brazil’s return to the UN’s hunger map is not easier to bring any convincing explanation other than an overall wrong management system.
As compared to his rivals, during his first two terms, Lula remained in the past as a model and mechanism in the fight against poverty and income inequalities. Adapting a patriarchal approach, he regarded social expenditures as his blessing rather than handling them from a modern constitutional perspective. Thanks to favorable global economic conjuncture, he increased social aid significantly compared to the past. The society focused on aid, and the model, mechanism, and philosophy behind it remained of secondary importance. Most importantly, with time after 2010, the Lula period stood out as a success story due to the cutting of social aid that started with Temer and continued with Bolsonaro in the aftermath of the global crisis and an environment of instability and economic stagnation.
Erdogan’s ‘Green Card’ and Transactional Approach
The banner ‘Potato, onion, goodbye Erdogan’ was carried in the 1 May rally, which coincided with the critical 14 May elections in Turkey on May 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
Since 2003, Erdogan has employed social transfer and protection spending as practical fiscal policy tools to address poverty (Sarısoy and Koç, 2010). His social policies blend market-friendly economic strategies with substantial redistribution effects, incorporating health education elements and active labor market policies like training programs and public works (Sagdic, 2021; Baylan, 2019).
Besides the central government benefits, after the ruling AKP changed the Metropolitan Municipalities Law to expand municipalities’ social assistance capacities in 2004, benefits were exponentially expanded to poor families, encompassing various types of in-kind and cash assistance programs. For instance, by 2014, regular central government benefits in kind and cash for low-income families had risen to $260 monthly, while the official minimum wage stood at $370. Initially, a free healthcare card program for the poor (the Green Card program) was implemented and covered 6.9 million individuals, 4.2 percent of the population in 2003 and 12.7 percent in 2009. Finally, a universal healthcare system was established, and Green Card holders were included in the new system in 2022 (Yörük, 2023).
The number of beneficiaries and the share of government budgets allocated to these programs have dramatically increased. As a result, public social spending increased from 3.4 percent of GDP in 1995 to 12.5 percent as of 2016. Adjusted for inflation, spending increased by 176 percent between 2006 and 2017 (Yentürk, 2018; Üçkardeşler, 2015). Social programs are funded by the state’s general budget, municipalities, the European Union, and other funds for encouraging social assistance and solidarity.
The AKP’s wage policy also targeted society’s most fragile or vulnerable segments, composed of its potential conservative voters (Karataşlı, 2015). Intentionally or not, the minimum wages have been used as an income distribution policy in the form of “low-wage equalization.” With all these caveats, the minimum wage, $100-150 band in 2001, rose sharply to $450 by 2008. After 2018, marking the consolidation of the “contingency management” came with a one-man rule, the sharp rise in exchange rates from 2,20 per US dollar in January 2014 to 27 in July 2023, a 12-fold increase over a decade resulted in a steady decline of minimum wage, falling to an all-time low $220-250 range during 2021-2022.
A notable weakness in Erdogan’s approach, intentionally overlooked for reasons to be elucidated later, was the curtailment of the “protective welfare state.” This reduction specifically targeted passive labor market policies, including unemployment insurance, workplace regulation, and the tolerance of trade union activities, as well as agricultural support and housing subsidies.Considering all these facets, some economists characterize Erdogan’s social policies as “social neoliberalism” (Öniş, 2012).
What has a crucial implication from the viewpoint of the current discussion in this article is that despite Erdogan’s social spending policies failing to bring a lasting impact on poverty and income inequalities amidst a sharp increase in living costs, Erdogan has successfully maintained the adherence of even the most vulnerable segments of society to his political career, necessitating an explanation. In addition to Erdogan’s widely recognized populist strategies involving media manipulation, scapegoating the opposition as inept and colluding traitors, and employing fear-based politics by portraying the outside world as an enemy and a threat to national independence and sovereignty, a pivotal factor in his success is his transactional approach, linking aid and voting through sustained dependency.
The modern welfare state, aiming to “liberate the individual and protect his dignity,” as advocated by Amartya Sen (1999), necessitates transformational leadership with a focus on a clear vision, collective benefits, and long-term value. On the contrary, as Kuhnert and Lewis (1987) stated, transactional leaders prefer to operate within the existing organizational structure and culture, adhering to precedent rather than instigating change. In other words, instead of addressing poverty and permanently liberating individuals from its grasp, this approach perpetuates and manages poverty by creating a system that fosters people’s dependence on aid in exchange for votes, forming a parasitic symbiosis of “give-and-take.”
In this context, Erdogan’s leadership is characterized by a transactional approach centered on negotiations for short-term goals, seeking voter loyalty through clientelism—a pyramid structure wherein selective benefits are distributed, with the assistance of brokers, to individuals or groups in exchange for political support (Gherghina & Volintiru, 2017). The crucial aspect here is to furnish this structure with the essential political, cultural, and psychological elements that sustain loyalty and affiliation with politics based on this aid rather than prompting questioning the enduring poverty among those in need. This characteristic positions Erdogan as a contender for the title of the “populist of the 21st century,” as mentioned earlier.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has attended the rally in Izmir as part of the 14 May General Elections campaign in Izmir, Turkey on March 29, 2023. Photo: Idil Toffolo.
By taking the historical legacy of the patrimonial state, Erdogan has successfully positioned himself on the side of the people against the elites and the system and, more importantly, articulated social aid with this discourse. In the particular case of Turkey, transactional leadership involves: i) Honoring the so-called homogeneous, virtuous, silent majority by claiming to represent their voice and interests. ii) Legitimizing their visibility and vertical mobility as their right to effectively participate in governance has been severely blocked. iii) Improving income distribution by transferring a larger share of social assistance to the selected social groups.
This approach has long-term implications regarding the rule of law, economic development, democracy, and human rights. Erdogan comes from a political tradition claiming that the elites and institutions of the political establishment, such as the Constitutional Court and the High Judiciary, are allied to prevent people from achieving power. In that regard, as Aytaç and Öniş (2014) stated, like his predecessor Necmettin Erbakan, he continued employing the famous motto “Milli İrade” (The Will of the Nation), the term refers primarily to the Muslim lower classes as opposed to the establishment elites. The persistent and polarizing insistence of populists that the interests of “establishment elites” and the large silent majority, representing the “national will,” are mutually exclusive implies that, in power, those who subject to positive discrimination in controlling public resources will change hands.
Soon after coming to power, the AKP, garnering broad support from the urban poor and conservative masses affected by recurring economic crises, and who had lost trust in mainstream political parties, aimed to forge relevant coalitions and implement swift, albeit progressively more heterodox policies, to introduce new forms of targeted social policy. The essence of the matter is that, considering the volatile voting behavior among the average electorate, assisting the poor primarily through “modern state mechanisms” may not foster perpetual dependency and “loyalty.” For this reason, alongside conventional social state approaches outlined in the previous section, aid was also “privatized” through pro-business wealth transfer policies, individualized to the voters, closely monitored by party branches, and coordinated with governorates and municipalities.
All the way down to the neighborhood committees, local party organizations identify the loyalists and channel aid and employment opportunities. In doing so, the ruling party established mutual interdependence between the party, the urban poor, and the business or economic elites through highly partisan methods of targeted resource distribution. Over time, this symbiosis evolved into their shared destiny. In other words, with the flow of resources, privileges, and dependence on the AKP’s continued control of the state apparatus, the two constituents of this trio became increasingly partisan and apprehensive of redistribution and reprisal should the AKP lose power (Esen & Gumuscu, 2021). Through the social networks where Erdogan holds influence, mainly via various foundations and associations managed by his family members, close relatives, and other conservative structures, he cultivates self-fulfilling prophecies, portraying Erdogan as a patrimonial figure, a big brother, a modern-day Robin Hood who “takes from the rich and gives to the poor.” By that, he aims to implant in people’s consciousness the idea that “corruption is inevitable for the good of the people.” To reinforce this image, some religious authorities have even attempted to produce religious credentials (fatwas), discussing “what is corruption and what is a legitimate commission of the Sultan” in Islam (Yilmaz, 2020).
In essence, the efficacy of the “divide and rule” strategy lies in scapegoating others. In alignment with this approach, Erdogan, at the expense of the ongoing comprehensive reform and the EU membership agenda, subjugated the entire establishment. Instead of dismantling exclusive interest groups, he adopted a confiscation strategy in Olson’s (1982) terminology, institutionalizing corruption, political pressure, and exclusion, thus introducing a fundamentally new approach to social spending.
Erdogan’s transactional approach revolves around a well-established and highly sophisticated form of clientelism, emphasizing dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration (Hicken, 2011). It is more accurate to characterize these developments as a product of a learning-by-doing or trial-and-error process during his tenure as the mayor of Istanbul, which he assumed in 1994 amidst a highly divided opposition landscape, securing the lowest vote rate at the time. This incubation period allowed him to evolve his system from its rudimentary stages to a state of sophistication (Compiegne, 2022).
For Erdogan’s “give-and-take” or “win-win” game to operate successfully, the following conditions must be met:
i) Utilizing the state apparatus as a platform for executing the “distributional game” involves creating rent arrears in various regions and sectors as leverage for distributional purposes.
ii) Developing an anti-systemic religious-nationalist language for the “divide and rule” strategy (Tahiroglu, 2022).
iii) Gaining control of financially dependent media to collaborate in manipulating the public by disseminating fake yet appealing stories (Yanatma, 2021; Coşkun, 2020; Kizilkaya, E. 2023; Tahiroglu, 2022b).
iv) Distancing from external actors and anchors, such as the EU and the IMF, which advocate transparency, discipline, and compliance with the rule of law. Notably, Erdogan halted EU accession negotiations at the transparency and tender chapters, citing political, religious, and national reasons. Subsequently, Erdogan projected the image of a country failing to implement European Court of Human Rights decisions (Eurobarometer, 2022).
v) Enlisting “militant bureaucrats,” particularly within the judiciary, to cooperate in undermining systems like public procurement, facilitating favoritism and money laundering. The corruption files of December 17-25, 2013, revealed lenient treatment of government contract favoritism by law enforcement, ensuring a steady revenue stream in exchange for support in Erdogan’s re-election (Emek & Acar, 2015; Arslantas & Arslantas, 2020; Özgür, 2020; Akça & Özden, 2021; Özel & Yıldırım, 2019).
vi) Establishing dependent capitalists or an economic elite through extensive patronage networks of corruption and favoritism to serve as intermediaries in the rent distribution process (Esen & Gumuscu, 2021).
vii) Establishing effective intermediaries, such as local party branches, municipalities, foundations, associations, and religious sects, to facilitate the delivery of privatized aid to the targeted social segments.
As convincingly demonstrated by Esen and Gümüşçü (2021), Erdogan’s transactional approach and corruption are closely related and mutually supportive.First, in the abovementioned process, Erdogan established an alternative, dependent capitalist class. This class contributes a portion of the rents it acquires from the government, involving practices such as construction permits, land allocation, municipal companies, and large infrastructure projects without tenders but with customer guarantees (Emek, 2015). Second, the enormous corrupt economy allowed him to create massive sources of rent arrears and distribute it partly to people experiencing poverty in the form of “cash and kind or subsistence allowances in exchange for loyalty and votes.” (Buğra, 2020; Özel & Yıldırım, 2019). The explained pay-off matrix has brought critical political repercussions, namely, the AKP’s weakened reluctance to resign through democratic means and the increased tolerance of its coalition partners for democratic backsliding. Therefore, with the personalization of power and rising authoritarianism under Erdogan’s rule, especially after the 2018 regime change, the need to attract voters and dependence on the economy for private resources decreased, underlining a further alert on the collapse of democracy.
The same happened in Brazil but with different dimensions. Although clientelism, rent-seeking, and kleptocracy – altogether corruption- are the dominant features of politics in Brazil, they are not subject to profound public awareness or concern as long as economic growth delivers positive results. Rather than eradicating the sources of corruption, the regime’s grand barons use the existing “culture of ignorance” as an integral part of their reckoning in the struggle for power against one another. As an expression of social culture or helpless devotion, society tends to justify that mechanism by relying on the understanding of “he who keeps honey licks his finger” or “it does not matter if politicians steal from what they produce.”
Lula’s dismissal in 2010 at the height of his popularity, conviction in 2018, and return to power in March 2022 are case in point. Lula, who was argued to have been involved in “Operation Car Wash-2014,” the most extensive corruption investigation involving politicians, public institutions, and major construction companies, was found guilty and imprisoned in 2018. However, according to the UN resolution and many other observers, Lula’s trial process was unfair because of insufficient evidence and human rights abuses. Indeed, the appointment of the case judge as minister of justice by Bolsonaro, who won the 2018 elections while Lula was in prison, shows the nature of the above-mentioned intra-elite power struggle. To continue with the same logic, the fact that Lula’s case was dropped, and his political career was reopened due to the aforementioned systemic shortcomings does not show Lula’s absolute innocence either.
It is emphasized here that in many countries such as Brazil and Turkey, where institutions are weak, social culture is accommodative, and voters’ awareness of citizenship is insufficient, overt conflicts between elites through the judiciary and the media only prepare the ground for further negotiations between the status quo powers rather than radically reforming and improving the system to achieve better democracy, human rights, and economic development.
Establishing ‘Coalitions’Against the Populist Incumbent Regime
Establishing a coalition within the voter base to attain and retain power is crucial, but equally essential is forging a robust alliance in parliament after the removal of authoritarian populists. As observed in the 2022 elections in Brazil and the 2023 elections in Turkey, the electoral process witnessed significant economic, political, and social upheaval orchestrated by the reluctant incumbent populist government. Recent evidence also highlights that even in defeat, populists leave behind a resilient structure and a trail of destruction, particularly challenging when they narrowly lose elections. Overcoming these challenges necessitates efficient administration through sustained coalition building.
As Lemos (2022) discusses, the overarching goal is establishing a government committed to implementing essential reforms and mending the nation’s economic, political, and social fault lines. However, overcoming this legacy poses a significant hurdle for the new government, requiring efficient administration. It necessitates concerted efforts to gather diverse interests and navigate challenges posed by the remnants of the populist regime. The focus should be on acquiring and leveraging power to build a resilient government. This government must confront the enduring legacy of populism, enact necessary reforms, and prevent a recurrence of populist influences in future elections. Despite facing considerable resistance and witnessing the destructive impact of the right-wing authoritarian-populist leader in Brazil, Lula’s rallying cry to “let’s leave everything else aside other than taking back democracy and institutions” proved effective. Reflecting on his past success, society reconsidered its preferences, particularly evident in the second round of the election. In contrast, Turkish voters did not afford the opposition coalition a similar opportunity. The opposition encountered additional reluctance in garnering support, especially following apparent missteps in the second round of the election. Voters, skeptical of the leadership’s capacity to either counter Erdogan’s destructive actions or propel the system forward, chose to withhold their endorsement.
Highlighting Lula’s advantage, absent in the Turkish opposition coalition, it is crucial to note a shortcoming in Bolsonaro compared to Erdogan. Bolsonaro’s limited time in power prevented him from establishing an Erdogan-like kleptocracy, as described earlier. Unlike Erdogan, he couldn’t consolidate control over institutions and failed to institute a robust “transactional model” that resonated with voters. Consequently, Bolsonaro couldn’t position himself as an anti-establishment and anti-elite or embody the image of a “paternal figure” redistributing wealth from the affluent to the less privileged.
An important observation regarding Erdogan’s situation is that, unlike Bolsonaro in Brazil, he has gained control over the state apparatus, the judiciary, the press, and economic resources. That allowed him to manipulate the opposition to determine whom to cooperate with and compete against within the opposition. As a reminder, when Erdogan was President and his party lost power in 2015, neither CHP (Kilicdaroglu) nor MHP (led by Devlet Bahçeli) formed a coalition with Erdogan’s party. In the next elections that year, Turkey entered a turbulent phase marked by fear that came with political bloodshed, heightened public security concerns, and Erdogan’s party regaining power independently. As a reaction to Bahçeli’s resistance to establishing a “coalition government” following the June 7, 2015, events that caused Erdogan’s bloody victory, opposition within MHP intensified. Although Bahceli lost his post in the party congress in June 2016, the pro-Erdogan court came to his aid, declaring the party congress invalid and allowing him to maintain his leadership. However, that episode rendered Erdogan’s former rival politically beholden to him, resulting in a notable shift in his political discourse towards becoming Erdogan’s long-term coalition partner. Erdogan has also been proactive in disseminating compromising materials of a prominent opposition leader and orchestrating his replacement through various media manipulations.
The success of keeping his political rival, whom he had consistently defeated in previous elections, in his seat by portraying him as oppressed and victimized, with unfair attacks reminiscent of those directed against Erdogan in the past, serves as evidence of Erdogan’s strategy to divide and rule Turkey along deep fault lines. Indeed, taking it a step further, Erdogan, with his charismatic leadership, effectively dismantled the concept of “center politics” in the past. By steering the language of politics towards the right and conservative spectrum, he eradicated space for left-wing political discourse. Consequently, he compelled his opponents to navigate unfamiliar terrain, leaving them as guests, novices, or the away team, ultimately defeating them. (Korkmaz, 2022a-b).
To further consolidate the above perspective, it is interesting to briefly compare the Great Marmara Earthquake of 1999, which played a significant role in his rise to power amid ongoing significant political pressure, enduring economic crisis, and heightened political instability, with the recent earthquake in Southeast Anatolia in 2023. This time, it reflects Erdogan’s heavy toll of political-populist mistakes, economic crisis, and instability. Despite these challenges, he managed to stay in power. Besides the factors mentioned in the former earthquake, his performance in the mayorship of Istanbul, plus his unfair discrimination by the establishment forces in the media, judiciary, bureaucracy, and the military, brought him to power.
Unlike the 1999 Marmara Earthquake, conditions in the earthquake of 2023 were remarkably against the Erdogan government in power. In deep shock, his response to the earthquake was incomplete, incorrect, and significantly delayed. Similar to the previous natural disasters, the main reason was the government’s unpreparedness, the incompetence of civil servants, and the fragile institutions. In addition, the government prevented nongovernmental organizations outside the government’s direction and control from engaging because it feared this would be to its detriment. Despite the earthquake’s devastations, the loss of more than 50,000 lives, the economic destruction it brought, the heavy systemic corruption that caused it, and the ongoing economic crisis, aside from Turkey in general, Erdogan’s high vote in this specific earthquake-hit disaster region in the last election needs explanation.
Despite the recent economic hardships and the devastating earthquake that caused an unknown number of lives, exposing Erdogan’s corrupt regime, other things being equal, the outcome changed due to manipulations by Erdogan-controlled media and the belated yet highly organized efforts of agents in relief organizations closely aligned with Erdogan’s rent-seeking coalitions, like large private companies, religious civil society organizations, and public institutions. In other words, Erdogan’s well-functioning “transactional approach,” successfully implemented in the earthquake environment, came together with cultural codes, creating an invincible armada in his favor. This is not the first time the government bought political loyalty in return for short-term material rewards combined with religious-nationalist language. The same tactics have been successfully employed in many natural disasters and industrial or occupational accidents.
In the context of Kilicdaroglu, the opposition leader, (i) his low-profile leadership that lacks conviction, (ii) his perceived ethnic and religious affiliation, and (iii) CHP’s elitist, oligarchic, and pro-capitalist identity, rooted in the tradition of top-down social engineering, hinder him from gaining resonance in society. Conversely, Erdogan’s portrayal of him as “a coupist and junta supporter, collaborator with foreigners, and enemy of national will” has proven effective in triggering concerns related to national security, independence, and sovereignty. In an environment of shifted political cleavages and conservative-right-wing rhetoric, his efforts were perceived as a “last-minute tactical maneuver.”
Conclusion
In conclusion, the economic, social, and political crisis caused by unrestrained neo-liberal globalization and overconnectivity, highlighted during the contagious global financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the COVID-19 pandemic, has resulted in significant disappointments and a growing public inclination toward populist rhetoric.
Populists, capitalizing on fractures in existing governance structures, rise to power and attempt to retain it by transforming the main characteristics of the regime. This creates a “populist vicious cycle,” where their central ideology and personality lead to contingency management and arbitrariness in governance, inadvertently inviting failure by disabling institutions, rules, merit, independent-autonomous bodies, science, and check-and-balance mechanisms. As populists lose the capacity to fulfill extreme promises made while in opposition and exhibit effective governance, they tend to become even more oppressive, leaning towards a one-person regime.
This process ultimately gives rise to clientelism, rent-seeking, and kleptocracy, constituting corruption as a dominant feature of politics in countries like Brazil, especially under Bolsonaro since 2018, and in Turkey, starting with Erdogan’s third term in 2011.
The challenges of how populists come to power and leave it are markedly different. While it is possible to replace incumbent conventional politicians bound by the game’s rules, replacing a populist who stays in power for an extended period and shifts the regime from its central axis requires entirely different skills. Authoritarian populists leverage the state’s power during election campaigns, often pushing legal and ethical limits.
The personal leadership capacity of populists also plays a decisive role. For example, Erdogan’s crony capitalism, rooted in transactional rather than transformative leadership, is closely tied to his ability to blend cultural, economic, and political elements, combining hope with fear and security with short-term self-interest. This entails intertwining his political destiny with the fate of a large segment of voters.
In such a scenario, an opposition leader aiming to remove a populist from power must possess leadership capacity, the ability to form a coalition, and the capability to present voters with a more adaptable and transformative vision for the future, persuading them of its merits.
In contrast to Lula, who effectively positioned himself as a viable alternative to Bolsonaro in Brazil in 2022, the opposition in Turkey failed to do the same. Bolsonaro lost power not only because of his failures but also because of Lula’s past performance and high leadership quality in forming inclusive coalitions. Despite bringing Turkey to the verge of destruction during the 2023 election, Erdogan, by successfully using pro-citizen and anti-establishment rhetoric, presented himself as “the man of the people” persona. No leader emerged in Turkey to convincingly replace him amidst an environment of fear and societal concerns for security, stability, and sovereign independence.
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(Associate Senior Fellow, Thailand Studies Programme at Yusof Ishak Institute –
ISEAS).
Speakers
“Political Legitimation and Authoritarian Nation Branding in Thailand,” by Dr. Petra Alderman(Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Leadership for Inclusive and Democratic Politics at the University of Birmingham, and a Research Fellow of CEDAR).
“The Role of Military in Thai Authoritarianism,” by Dr. Napisa Waitoolkiat (Ass. Professor, Director of the College of ASEAN Community Studies).
“Authoritarian Ministry of Truth: A Case of Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center,” by Itsakul Unahakate (PhD candidate at the University of Sydney and Lecturer at Thammasat University).
“Youth Perspective: Is Populism for the People? An Ecofeminist Movement from Thailand,” by Pattanun Arunpreechawat(NUS Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy).
Dr. Michael J. Montesano is an Associate Senior Fellow at the Thailand Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute (ISEAS). Previously, Dr. Montesano served as the Coordinator of the Thailand Studies Programme and Co-coordinator of the Myanmar Studies Programme at ISEAS, where he has been a dedicated member since 2008. With a background that includes six years as the managing editor of the ISEAS journal SOJOURN: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Dr. Montesano’s extensive experience in the region began in the 1980s. During that time, he served as a United States Peace Corps volunteer in South Thailand and pursued studies in agriculture at the University of the Philippines at Los Baños. Dr. Montesano’s research interests span the economic and social history of modern Southeast Asia and its legacies, with a focus on Thailand, the Philippines, Myanmar, and Provincial Southeast Asia.
The Legacy of Thaksin and the Role of Pheu Thai and Other Political Parties in Thai Populism
Dr. Ukrist Pathmanandis a distinguished Research Professor of Political Sciences at the Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. With a wealth of expertise, he has been serving in this capacity since 2008, specializing in various fields such as ASEAN Integration, Regionalization of Capital, Energy, and Military in Asia, Thai relations with other countries, and the political economy of Non-traditional Security (NTS).
In addition to his role as Research Professor, Dr. Pathmanand has held key leadership positions within the academic community. Since October 2010, he has been serving as the Director of the Mekong Studies Center of Excellence (MSC) at the Institute of Asian Studies (IAS), Chulalongkorn University. Moreover, he has been the Executive Director of the Institute of Asia Studies since 2007.
Dr. Pathmanand’s contributions extend beyond research and teaching. He has played a pivotal role as the Executive Director of the Publication Project at the Institute of Asia Studies since 1986, showcasing his enduring commitment to advancing knowledge in the academic realm. With a career marked by leadership, scholarship, and dedication, Dr. Ukrist Pathmanand continues to shape the landscape of political science in the Asian context.
Abstract: Since the 2006 military coup that ousted the Thaksin Shinawatra government in Thailand, Thaksin’s political ideology, characterized by populism, has continued to exert influence on the country’s political and economic landscape. Despite spending 17 years in self-imposed exile, Thaksin’s populist policies and political legacy persist. His return to Thailand in mid-August 2023 has sparked a political tsunami, reinvigorated his dynamic political influence and placed Thailand back under the umbrella of Thaksin’s Pheu Thai party, which has become a core part of the current Thai government. Thaksin’s legacy and his political resurgence are not merely academic exercises but reflect a tangible political reality in Southeast Asia. However, there is ongoing debate and curiosity about the nature of Thaksin’s populism. Some refer to it as “Thaksinomics” or the “Thaksinization” of Thailand, suggesting a trend toward authoritarianism. In reality, Thaksin is just a charismatic politician who introduced innovative political mechanisms to gain votes and popularity. This presentation aims to rethink and reinterpret what Thaksin’s populism truly entails.
Political Legitimation and Authoritarian Nation Branding in Thailand
Dr. Petra Alderman is a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow in Leadership for Inclusive and Democratic Politics at the University of Birmingham, and a Research Fellow of the Birmingham’s Centre for Elections, Democracy, Accountability & Representation (CEDAR). Her main areas of research expertise are nation branding, authoritarian politics, elections and electoral management, and the politics of Thailand.
Abstract: Why do authoritarian nations brand themselves? And how do they understand and use this practice? In her new book, Dr Petra Alderman offers a novel approach to the study of nation branding as a strategy for political legitimation in authoritarian regimes using the example of military-ruled Thailand. This talk discusses how Thailand’s military junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (2014-2019), sought to use nation branding to shape the social attitudes and behaviours of Thai citizens during the almost 5 years of direct military rule.
The Role of Military in Thai Authoritarianism
Dr. Napisa Waitoolkiat is Director of the College of ASEAN Community Studies. She completed both an MA and PhD at Northern Illinois University in Political Science, after finishing a BA (also in Political Science) from Thammasat University in Bangkok. Her research is focused heavily on democratization and the political process—electoral politics, political accountability, and civil-military relations—both in Thailand and throughout the states of ASEAN.
Abtsract: Thailand’s military is an institution autonomous from civilian control which has been dominant across Thailand’s political landscape for decades. It has staged 14 successful coups since 1932, legitimized its clout through security laws, and rationalized its existence and dominance by suppressing insurgents and protestors who might threaten the status quo. However, the military has notably committed human rights violations, generally enjoying legal impunity for its acts. Throughout Thai history, governments have either failed to rein in military adventurism or have been led by the military itself. The result has been a tendency toward denying civilian control while perpetrating authoritarianism. In the latest episode of military control, 2014 witnessed Thailand’s latest (14th) military coup. Coup leader General Prayuth Chan-ocha institutionalized authoritarianism across Thailand, first through a series of decrees, then by a 2014 constitution which also amnestied the coup-makers. The junta moreover imposed a 2017 constitution which restructured political institutions (e.g., making the Senate a junta-appointed body) and ensured the appointment of pro-junta judges and Election Commissioners. In the 2019 election, the junta-created Palang Pracharat party won a considerable number of votes/seats due to assistance from the Election Commission. The Prayuth-led 2019-2023 elected government was a façade: despite appearing as civilian control, the military continued to control the levers of power. In spite of the advent of the elected Pheu Thai government in 2023, the military retains independence from civilian oversight. The military currently remains capable of authoritarianism whenever and however it wants. With no chance of effective civilian control, Thai democratic development remains limited, and seems to be eroding.
Authoritarian Ministry of Truth: A Case of Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Center
ItsakulUnahakate is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Economy, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, the University of Sydney. His research interests include the political economy of social media, particularly misinformation and disinformation. His thesis focuses on the state’s responses to ‘fake news’ in Thailand. He is also a lecturer at the Faculty of Economics, Thammasat University, Thailand, where he teaches political economy and institutional economics.
Abstract: This presentation is part of an ongoing study on the state’s response to the so-called ‘fake news’ in Thailand, focusing on fact-checking. In order to control fake news, many governments in authoritarian regimes aim to build their own ‘Ministry of Truth’ by establishing their own fact-checking bodies, which, unfortunately, cannot be guaranteed to be independent and non-partisan. Then, using content analysis, this part of the study compares the patterns of a state-controlled fact-checker’s reports (Thailand’s Anti-Fake News Centre: AFNC) during the COVID-19 pandemic with those of a third-party fact-checker (AFP Thailand). The results demonstrate significant differences between the reports of the two fact-checkers. These suggest that the AFNC is a shortcoming fact-checker, at least by the international standard, and it may have a hidden agenda in addition to its supposed fact-checking duties.
Youth Perspective: Is Populism for the People? An Ecofeminist Movement from Thailand
Pattanun Arunpreechawat is MPP Candidate at NUS Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy.
Abstract:In Thailand, political leaders often implement populist policies, mostly framed toward enhancing economic development and income distribution, targeting the rural poor. This includes a wide range of macroeconomic policies, including bilateral trade agreements. While Free Trade Agreements (FTA) aim to promote national growth, create jobs, and increase the country’s GDP, such policies can bring about negative effects on local communities and the environment, especially marginalized groups, and women. Using the ecofeminism framework, I attempt to analyze the connection between the environmental issue and the plight of marginalized people, especially women and the poor, and how certain populist policies entirely disregard the exploitation and oppression of both. I further argue that many Thai “populist” policies are not inclusive. Rather, they only function to benefit a certain group of people in society. This presentation strives to shed light on how populist policies favor the relentless pursuit of economic growth while disregarding the potential adverse impacts on the marginalized and the environment. Ultimately, the ecofeminist framework aims to create more space for the marginalized in the policy-making process to ensure a more inclusive society.
(Lecturer at Erasmus School of History, Culture and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam).
Speakers
“Accountability in a High-Performing Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Vietnam,” by Dr. Nguyen Khac Giang (Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme, Yusof Ishak Institute – ISEAS).
“Political Culture, Social Media, and Authoritarian Populism in Cambodia,” by Dr. Sokphea Young (Visiting Research Fellow at Queen Mary, University of London).
“Reflecting on 48 Years of Socialism in the Lao PDR: What Does This Mean, and What Comes Next?” byDr. Phill Wilcox (Research Associate at Bielefeld University).
“Is Myanmar a Totalitarian State?” by Dr. Mon Mon Myat (Instructor at the Peace Studies Department in Payap University, Thailand).
Dr. Nguyễn Yến-Khanh is currently a faculty member at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her research interests encompass health communication, social media marketing and sustainable consumer behavior, with the ultimate goal to drive positive social change. Her research put an emphasis on public policy, corporate social responsibility, diversity/inclusivity issues as well as society and consumer well-being. With 13 years of experience as a journalist, public relations specialist, marketing manager and marketing director for local and global companies, and 10 years in the academia, Khanh focuses her teaching and research on their relevance and impact as agents of change in real life and real work. She aims to develop graduates who are ready and passionate to go out there and change the world, in small or big ways.
Accountability in a High-Performing Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Vietnam
Dr. Nguyen Khac Giang is a Visiting Fellow at the Vietnam Studies Programme, ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute. He was formerly Head of the Political Research Unit of the Hanoi-based Vietnam Institute for Economic and Policy Research (VEPR). His academic work appears in, among others, the Asian Journal of Political Science, Contemporary Southeast Asia, the Constitutional Political Economy, New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies and the Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Victoria University of Wellington in New Zealand and is an oft-quoted expert on Vietnamese affairs, having written extensively for major Vietnamese and English news outlets.
Abstract: Vietnam has consistently been among the top-performing nations economically over the last four decades, evolving from a war-torn, centrally planned system into a vibrant society deeply integrated into international markets. Despite this economic metamorphosis, the political landscape remains unchanged, as Vietnam continues to be a one-party state under the exclusive control of the Communist Party of Vietnam. This situation poses a classic dilemma: how does an autocratic regime deal with a rising middle class increasingly less willing to compromise on civil liberties for material gains? At this juncture, I argue that autocrats have two paths. First, they can concentrate on building administrative strength and increasing control capacity, while avoiding pluralizing the political environment. Conversely, autocrats might choose to be responsive to popular demand, holding back control capacity, and allowing limited space for pluralization and thus maintaining a relatively high level of accountability. The latter’s arrangement, which I call a high-accountability equilibrium, is Vietnam’s resilience strategy. This presentation will describe this strategy, whether it is sustainable, and its implication for Vietnam’s prospect of democratization.
Abstract: Media, social media, in particular, is perceived to have mediated the democratization process in authoritarian countries. Given its ability to spread news and image news faster than traditional media, social media played a vital role in regime change in the Middle East. Such a notion was also believed to be an exemplar of Cambodia in 2013 when the opposition party gained ever-anticipated electoral support from most youth who subscribed to social media. The ruling regime then, on the one hand, suppressed the use of social media and exploited the latter to stimulate its anti-pluralism ideology, adopting an authoritarian populist style of leadership on the other. The success of this populist approach is bestowed by the entrenched culture of believing in the ruler’s spiritual prowess to rule and lead the country. Social media’s availability as a modern communication tool has strengthened the ruler’s cultural and religious propaganda among the population and social media users.
By examining social media as a platform of political participation, surveillance, and political culture, this paper illustrates how social media has transformed into a double-edged sword in the era of surveillance capitalism. While it remains a valuable tool to advocate against the authorities in the early period, it is a useful rhetorical weapon for the authorities to propagate their authoritarian populism. The paper argues that, although social media is the Western notion of democracy, given its ability to democratize information and news, it loses control to authoritarian populists in the age of surveillance capitalism. The authoritarian regime expropriates Western democracy devices to circumvent political pluralism and to fuel the culture of believing in strongmen.
Reflecting on 48 Years of Socialism in the Lao PDR: What Does This Mean, and What Comes Next?
Dr. Phill Wilcox is a Research Associate at Bielefeld University. She completed her Ph.D. in 2018 and has since published a monograph entitled “Heritage and the Making of Political Legitimacy: The Past and Present of the Lao Nation.” Dr. Wilcox is currently writing a second book about how rising levels of Chinese influence in Laos are perceived and negotiated by the Lao population.
Abstract: Laos has been a one-party socialist state since the deposition of its monarchy and the formal establishment of the country as a People’s Democratic Republic in 1975. In contrast to many other countries, one-party socialism did not fall around the time of the dissolution of the USSR and the contemporary state of Laos is soon to celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. This does mean though that the system has not seen significant change throughout the last five decades, including a retrenchment of authoritarianism in recent years. This presentation gives an overview of where Laos is in place, what keeps the authoritarian system in place and how this connects with local notions of political legitimacy, as well as some insights as to the challenges Laos faces in the future.
Is Myanmar a Totalitarian State?
Dr. Mon Mon Myat works as a full-time instructor at the Peace Studies Department in Payap University, Thailand. She has published articles in academic journals and university websites various works arising from her Ph.D. research. And she has contributed book chapters in three books.
Abstract: In the eyes of the world, Myanmar is a nation where a perpetual internal conflict between pro-democracy and pro-military forces has existed for decades. The coup of February 2021 is merely the latest iteration of a generations-long conflict. This is a tragically accurate impression. What is more difficult to grasp is the lack of condemnation and outrage from the international community at this enduring civil war. While the world focuses on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, it turns a blind eye to the terror tactics of the powerful Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s armed forces. Like the Russian Army, the Tatmadaw conducts air strikes against civilians, including school children and women. It drives indigenous peoples from their villages. Its tactics include massacres, murder, torture, and summary arrests, engaging in what holocaust survivor and political philosopher Hannah Arendt defined as the sine qua non of totalitarian states: “dominating and terrorizing human beings from within” (325).[1] This study set out to answer whether Myanmar under the current military regime meets Arendt’s definition of a totalitarian state from her first book, The Origins of Totalitarianism.
[1] Arendt, Hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism: New Edition With Added Prefaces, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973. The Origins of Totalitarianism is widely considered Arendt’s magnum opus. It was written in the immediate aftermath of the second world war, and was first published in 1951. It has subsequently been re-issued in many editions with additional prefaces. In this chapter, all page references are exclusively to this 1973 edition.
Please cite as: Nguijol, Gabriel Cyril; Sithole, Neo; Kastoriadou, Konstantina; Guidotti, Andrea; Diethelm, Johann Mathies and Mancini, Luca. (2023). “Symposium Report: Impacts of Global Power Transition on Authoritarian Populism and Multilateralism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 23, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0045
Achieving a peaceful hegemonic change and power transitions, perhaps for the first time in history, requires Herculean efforts. In this context, a realistic reform agenda against the ongoing negative trends should focus on i) implementing better regulatory regimes for environmental protection, the spread of epidemics, and financial stability; ii) protecting the most fragile and “forgotten” people through improving global income distribution; iii) providing equal opportunities in global collective responsibility areas through relevant international public goods based on the principles of pluralism, participation, and transparency; iv) strengthening national sovereignty and the autonomous decision-making capacity of nation-states vis-a-vis globalization.
Introduction
This report is based on the ECPS’s Second Annual International Symposium titled ‘Impacts of Global Power Transition on Authoritarian Populism and Multilateralism’ which was held online in Brussels on March 30-31, 2022.
Contrary to expectations, following a short period of revival in democratic governance in the post-Cold War era, “the third wave of authoritarianism” has gained momentum, particularly since the great recession of 2008-2009. For the first time in post-World War II history, there are more authoritarian states globally than democratic ones. This shift can be attributed, among other factors, to the rise of alternative powers with different norms and values in the emerging multiplex/multipolar world, the excesses of so-called hyper-globalization, and the failures of post-war multilateral cooperation mechanisms in addressing various global challenges.
The essence of the topic lies in the globalization of problems, coupled with the weakening of the liberal multilateral order (LMLO). This weakening has brought regional, national, and individual solutions to the forefront. Consequently, it sets the stage for alternative hybrid political-economic systems with different values and norms, creating a new space for populist politics that appeal to the people. Under the unpredictable, arbitrary, and contingent decisions of authoritarian populist leaders, the power transition process becomes more precarious, reminiscent of the painful memories of the recent past.
As we observe, the last hegemonic force, the U.S., has itself been threatened by populism. Conversely, with its authoritarian state capitalism, China has been aggressively defending its interests, positioning itself as a new power with a different interpretation of hegemony. Additionally, a long-consolidated authoritarian regime in Russia ultimately invaded Ukraine after unlawfully and forcibly annexing a strategically significant part of it, Crimea, in 2014. Lastly, the EU attempts to balance the emerging trends through alternative strategic partnerships with like-minded global partners to uphold its principles and values rooted in human rights, democracy, the rule of law, rule-based governance, and a free-market economy.
There are additional factors exacerbating the situation. Recent developments during and after the pandemic lockdown (2019-2022), such as disruptions in global value chains, a dangerous surge in global inflation, the associated energy-food crisis, accumulating debts, and a sharp deterioration in global income distribution, have the potential to influence the future course of populism and, consequently, the liberal multilateral order (LMLO).
Achieving a peaceful hegemonic change and power transitions, perhaps for the first time in history, requires Herculean efforts. In this context, a realistic reform agenda against the ongoing negative trends should focus on the following topics: First, implementing better regulatory regimes for environmental protection, the spread of epidemics, and financial stability. Second, protecting the most fragile and “forgotten” people through improving global income distribution, such as introducing universal income and welfare tax. Third, providing equal opportunities in global collective responsibility areas through relevant international public goods based on the principles of pluralism, participation, and transparency. Lastly, strengthening national sovereignty and the autonomous decision-making capacity of nation-states vis-a-vis globalization.
Considering all these issues, under the coordination of Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk and the auspices of Sir Graham Watson, our then-Honorary President, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organized this symposium on March 30-31, 2023, focusing on “the Impacts of Global Power Shift on Multilateralism and Populism.” The symposium brought together scholars from the political, social, and economic sciences, as well as populism experts and civil society audiences, to discuss the impact of global power transition on authoritarian populism and multilateralism. Distinguished scholars in the field contributed their insightful speeches. This report is the product of these fruitful conversations and is intended to document the symposium. It includes brief summaries of the speeches and links to the full videos of presentations.
Welcoming Remarks by Prof. Cengiz AKTAR
Professor Cengiz Aktar says: Populism appears to rival roof-based international order, human rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, gender equality, social and environmental justice, transparency, and accountability. Unfortunately, it gains ground in a vertiginous space everywhere in our contemporary world. Populist politics and authoritarian tendencies are all over the world, ranging from developed to developing countries. As with most of the problems we face today, there is no magic stick to counter its evils.
Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor and Senior Researcher at Foreign Policy Program of the ECPS, articulated how populism is undoubtedly one of the most important words of our times and a topmost adversary of liberal democracy and the democratic way of being. According to Professor Aktar, populism appears to rival roof-based international order, human rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, gender equality, social and environmental justice, transparency and accountability. Unfortunately, it gains ground in a vertiginous space everywhere in our contemporary world. Populist politics and authoritarian tendencies, according to him, are all over the world, ranging from developed to developing countries. As with most of the problems we face today, there is no magic stick to counter its evils. So, solutions cannot come from the feelings of human beings.
Furthermore, Professor Aktar highlighted that while the threat from populist movements is concerning, collective efforts from institutions like the ECPS have intensified to raise awareness about its dangers. These initiatives aim to translate academic research into more accessible formats for various stakeholders, including intellectuals, media, and policy-making communities. Engaging in a global effort, the ECPS serves as a knowledge hub and a platform for discussion, contributing to public goods and conducting evidence-based research in collaboration with relevant stakeholders. The goal is to provide timely alerts for the early identification of populist tendencies challenging democratic governments and to support an open society, market economy, multilateralism, the rule of law, and liberal democracy. Prof. Aktar concluded his welcoming speech by emphasizing that the annual conference aims to assess and take stock of these ongoing endeavors.
Opening Speech by Sir Graham WATSON
Addressing the response of liberal democracy to the challenges, Sir Graham Watson stressed the need for respect for universal principles against the politics of selfishness and resentment. He advocated for policies rooted in compassion, generosity, openness, and goodwill towards others. Moral education, the separation of church and state, and opposition to the political abuse of religion were identified as essential components.
In his opening speech, Sir Graham Watson, then-Honorary President of ECPS, underscored the pivotal role played by the ECPS in addressing global concerns and challenges. Sir Watson pointed out that nearly three-quarters of the world’s population now lives under autocracy, a significant increase from half a decade ago, highlighting the pressing nature of these concerns. He attributed this shift to two main factors discussed in the symposium: i) the decline of multilateralism resulting from a power shift, and ii) the exploitation of modern technologies and communications to evoke negative human emotions, causing adverse effects on liberal democracy.
Sir Watson identified many regions, both in Europe and beyond, as cradles of autocracy and illiberality. He cited examples such as China, characterized by illiberality under despotic rule, and Russia, described as a monster of autocracy involved in war crimes. Africa, hosting 40 of the world’s 59 authoritarian governments, was also mentioned. Despite challenges related to democratic recession stems from resurgence of intolerance based on ethnic, religious, or other affiliations, Sir Watson stressed the importance of a global sense of community. He cited Brexit as a recognized mistake, highlighting the continued global spread and rooting of democracy.
Sir Watson also highlighted the fact that modern conflicts challenged liberal democracy. The Russian invasion of Ukraine reminds us of how conflict is the most destructive behavior to liberal society as it is responsible for the murder of unarmed civilians, torture, abduction of children, destruction of homes and livelihoods, obliteration of infrastructures, all are costly in financial, physical and psychological terms. The danger of escalating is still there. This invasion and other conflicts elsewhere crystallize the battle between closed and open society, though peaceful resolution remains a high priority.
Addressing the response of liberal democracy to these challenges, Sir Watson stressed the need for respect for universal principles against the politics of selfishness and resentment. He advocated for policies rooted in compassion, generosity, openness, and goodwill towards others. Moral education, the separation of church and state, and opposition to the political abuse of religion were identified as essential components. Sir Watson outlined the foundation of an open society on moral principles, including equality, opportunity, social participation, and the rule of law for the benefit of all. He condemned intolerance and discrimination, emphasizing the importance of trust in the people.
Despite the challenges faced by these principles, such as the abuse of power and social inequalities, Sir Watson expressed optimism in the potential for reform and restructuring. He concluded by asserting that liberal democracy is not a lost cause but requires vigilance and resilience from its advocates to rebound and become stronger than ever.
Report by Gabriel Cyril Nguijol
Keynote Address
Věra JOUROVA: “Saving Multilateralism and Democracy Under Global Power Transition and Rising Authoritarian Populism.”
Věra Jourová’s address encompassed a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from global development goals, human rights, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to the rule of law, countering disinformation, EU enlargement, and unwavering support for Ukraine. The comprehensive nature of her speech underscored the EU’s steadfast commitment to international cooperation, the advocacy of democratic values, and addressing the multifaceted challenges of the contemporary world.
Věra Jourová, Vice President of the European Commission for Values and Transparency and former European Commissioner for Justice, Consumers, and Gender Equality, commenced her address by addressing the profound challenges facing the world today, notably the Russian Aggression and the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. She underscored the setbacks experienced by global development goals due to these crises. The commitment of the European Union (EU) and its member states in preparing for the 2024 EU Summit, with a focus on the ambitious “Pact for the Future,” was highlighted.
Turning to the sustainable development goals (SDGs), Jourová emphasized the EU’s dedication to accelerating the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda. She referenced the EU’s voluntary National Review of SDG implementation presented at the United Nations Higher-Level Political Forum in July 2023. Stressing the interconnection between peace, security, and SDG achievement, she asserted that goals such as human rights, gender equality, climate change mitigation, and ensuring water, energy, and food security hinge on the attainment of peace.
Jourová also expressed robust support for human rights, emphasizing the human rights dimension within the common agenda. Acknowledging the United Nations’ commitment to promoting and protecting global human rights, she highlighted the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 30th anniversary of the Vienna Declaration and Program of Action. These milestones were seen as opportunities to strengthen the UN framework for human rights, urging adherence to international laws and rules to bolster multilateralism and development.
Transitioning to the rule of law, Jourová underscored the core values underpinning the EU, prominently featuring human rights. She outlined various tools employed by the EU to address rule of law concerns within member states, including annual rule of law reports, reforms embedded in recovery and resilience plans, infringement procedures, and Article 7 procedures addressing systemic rule of law breaches. The speaker also referenced the budget conditionality mechanism designed to safeguard the EU budget against risks arising from violations of the rule of law.
The Vice President of the Commission addressed the European Democracy Action Plan, launched in December 2020, aiming to uphold free and fair elections, protect independent media, and combat disinformation, especially electoral manipulation. She emphasized the plan’s focus on enhancing journalist security and introducing legislation against abusive litigations targeting media outlets. Jourová discussed disinformation countermeasures, such as the Code of Practice against Disinformation, boasting 38 signatories, including major digital platforms, civil society organizations, and media entities. The EU’s approach centers on fostering societal action, including demonetization and fact-checking, rather than dictating truth or falsehood. The discussion expanded to financial inflows and their impact on European democracies, acknowledging their potential role in compromising electoral integrity. Jourová advocated for increased transparency in international donations and funds to prevent election interference.
In addressing disinformation challenges, Jourová drew a distinction concerning AI-generated disinformation, asserting the necessity of stringent measures due to its non-human origin. She highlighted the dual challenge: AI-generated content not only tests freedom of speech limits but also contributes to disinformation by producing convincing media forms that deepen societal divisions.
Regarding EU enlargement, the evolving geopolitical situation was elucidated, she acknowledged the EU’s past hesitance toward enlargement but emphasizing its current necessity in light of global dynamics. Ongoing discussions with Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia were disclosed, with a focus on evaluating their progress toward EU integration. Jourova underscored the imperative of providing EU support, technical assistance, and a phased accession perspective for these nations, placing particular emphasis on supporting Ukraine.
The speaker commended the unity and bravery displayed by the Ukrainian people and their supporters in the pursuit of security and democracy. The EU’s unwavering support for Ukraine encompassed military aid, macroeconomic assistance, sanctions, and a robust reconstruction plan. Recognizing the EU’s role as a partial contributor to Ukraine’s reconstruction, discussions are underway concerning the use of frozen assets and funds for this purpose. The objective is a substantial contribution to Ukraine’s recovery, considering its significance in securing the European neighborhood and upholding democratic values. Coordination among global donors for Ukraine’s recovery was deemed vital, with the EU actively engaging in the multi-agency donor coordination platform. Additionally, European cities are collaborating with Ukrainian counterparts to ensure inclusive and effective reconstruction efforts. Věra Jourová revisited the issue of human rights in Ukraine, highlighting ongoing investigations and prosecutions of alleged war crimes by Russia at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
Two attendees expressed concerns about the EU’s weakened position in effectively addressing challenges to democracies, citing recent elections in Hungary and Turkey, where allegations of ‘undemocratic and authoritarian’ government practices arose. Additionally, apprehensions were voiced regarding China’s asymmetric economic influence potentially swaying smaller future EU members, particularly in the Balkans, away from European values. This raised questions about the effectiveness of existing EU mechanisms in enforcing established democratic values.
In addressing these concerns, Věra Jourová emphasized the pitfalls of creating a blacklist or whitelist to identify safe or at-risk countries. She highlighted the challenge that the Union, the Commission, and their affiliates often have limited insight into the causes of authoritarian shifts until they become evident at the national level. She cautioned against overlooking countries such as the United States, despite its alliance with the Commission, noting its potential to pursue its divisive agenda. Stressing the importance of financial transparency as a vital control measure, she acknowledged that while it might not eliminate the issues, it would help gain a better understanding of unfolding developments.
Věra Jourová directed attention to the EU’s preventive enforcement measures when disciplining members. While acknowledging that preventative measures may not entirely resolve issues, she pointed to cases like Hungary and Poland, where enforcement measures such as sanctions or limiting EU funds played a role in addressing democratic backsliding. These examples underscored the utility of enforcement measures in curbing potential challenges to democratic principles.
Another participant voiced concerns regarding freedom of expression and media across all EU member states, prospective members, and neighboring allies like Turkey. The inquiry questioned whether the EU is doing everything within its power to safeguard these rights. The need for a delicate balance between the autonomy of various media platforms, both traditional and contemporary, and oversight procedures by the EU, Commission, and member states was underscored. The participant highlighted the fine line between verified facts and disinformation, emphasizing the necessity to reinforce this boundary.
The discussion also addressed the challenge of content removal, predominantly initiated by governments rather than citizens, creating a potential for the abuse of oversight mechanisms by authorities. While acknowledging the role of professional media and other entities, including states, in debunking disinformation, the complexity of this task within the context of the ongoing “information war” was underscored. The participants recognized the importance of handling this issue with care, considering its implications for European values. They stressed that an excessively stringent response by states could encroach upon freedom of speech, presenting a significant victory for illiberal leaders, such as Vladimir Putin.
The discussion delved into the persistent issue of populism surging across the EU, despite the efforts of organizations like the European Commission for Values. The inquiry focused on whether the speaker believed the populist trend would persist and if the EU’s actions were sufficient to counter its rise in member countries. The response indicated that populism is likely to increase, particularly in instances where governments fail to address the needs and concerns of their citizens and voters.
Drawing on the example of Greece, the discussion highlighted how populist sentiments surged due to escalating feelings of inequality, unaddressed anxieties toward technological changes, abuse of power, unchecked corruption, and a media landscape inundated with false and emotive content. It was emphasized that each of these factors is manageable when addressed promptly, but if left unattended, the outcomes become predictably unfavorable.
In conclusion, Věra Jourová affirmed that the Commission fulfills its mandated responsibilities to the best of its abilities within the established rules and competencies. While acknowledging the scope for improvement, she emphasized that any enhancements must align with the regulatory framework governing the Commission’s actions. This sentiment extended to other EU organs, each with distinct competencies, where a more activist role, as seen in the EU Parliament, could be exercised.
In summary, Věra Jourová’s address encompassed a broad spectrum of topics, ranging from global development goals, human rights, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to the rule of law, countering disinformation, EU enlargement, and unwavering support for Ukraine. The comprehensive nature of her speech underscored the EU’s steadfast commitment to international cooperation, the advocacy of democratic values, and addressing the multifaceted challenges of the contemporary world.
Report by Neo Sithole
Panel -I-
Multilateralism: The Past and the Future
The First Panel of the Symposium, moderated by Dr. Aline Burni, a Policy Analyst on International Relations at the Foundation for European Progressive Studies in Brussels, featured three distinguished speakers. The speakers, in order of appearance, were Dr. Mattias Kumm (S.J.D. Harvard, Research Professor for Global Constitutionalism, WZB Berlin Social Science Center), Dr. Richard Clark (Associate Professor, Department of Government, Cornell University), and Dr. Werner Pascha (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies-IN-EAST).
During her introductory speech, Dr. Burni underscored the significance of recognizing that, despite populist opposition to multilateral and international cooperation, these approaches remain crucial. She emphasized that multilateralism stands as the most effective means for the international community to address escalating global threats, such as climate change and digital challenges, which transcend national boundaries and necessitate collaborative efforts.
Dr. Mattias KUMM: “How International Law Enables Great Power Domination and Great Power Competition and Chat Can Be Done About It”
Dr. Mattias Kumm states that, “for a committed international community wanting to hold great powers accountable, there are paths to move forward, significantly enhancing the capacities of the international system to judiciously hold great powers accountable.” These three factors—1) The UN Security Council Veto, 2) Jurisdictional problems related to both a general court (comprising the ICJ and the ICC), and 3) The issue of unaccountability arising from the threats of the use of nuclear weapons—are, according to him, “the core structural features that enable the kind of great power competition we have in the present.
Dr. Mattias Kumm, S.J.D. Harvard, Research Professor for Global Constitutionalism at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center, delivered a presentation focused on the evolving dynamics of international relations over the past decade. He explored the structural enabling features of the current international legal order that have contributed to these changes. Dr. Kumm contends that a crucial issue lies in the lack of recognition that International Law itself requires reform. Supporting his argument, he began by citing the example of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and analyzing the reactions provoked by the conflict. The aim was to gain a deeper understanding of the Contemporary International Legal Order (hereafter: CILO). Despite widespread condemnation of Russia’s invasion by many nations (142 out of 190+ states), Dr. Kumm emphasized the absence of a compelling argument advocating for the reform of International Law.
Regarding reform, Dr. Kumm highlighted three core structural features that underpin the current state of great power competition: 1) The UN Security Council Veto, 2) Jurisdictional issues related to the General Court, encompassing the ICJ and the ICC, and 3) The challenge of unaccountability stemming from the potential use of nuclear weapons. It is essential to emphasize the inherent interconnectedness of these points.
Before delving into an analysis of these three factors, Dr. Kumm provided the audience with contextual information about the CILO and its formation. He traced the origins of the idea that the international order needed reform back to former U.S. President Roosevelt during the Second World War. Despite the initial reluctance of the United States to be directly involved in the war, it played a significant supporting role, acting as the “armory of democracy” by providing weapons, organizing coalitions, and offering support against aggressors. However, Dr. Kumm stressed that, by 1941, Roosevelt recognized the inevitability of U.S. involvement in the war. He underscored that, beyond immediate actions to support the Allies, particularly the UK against Germany, Roosevelt’s focus shifted to the mid- to long-term need for a transformation of the international order to prevent such conflicts from recurring.
At the conclusion of the Second World War, the establishment of the UN Charter and other multilateral forums, including the Bretton Woods institutions, signaled a recognition that the crisis at hand was indicative of a broader deficiency within the existing international legal order. This acknowledgment led to the understanding that the International Legal Order needed reform “to ensure that this type of thing, which has happened for a second time in a short period, and how to make sure that in both cases the USA was drawn into the conflict, [won’t happen again].” Thus, the connection between intervention and the imperative for a transformation of International Law was established. Dr. Kumm’s presentation underscores the pivotal role played by the United States in shaping the CILO.
Regarding the first core issue, Dr. Kumm argues, “If we ask: ‘Who are the great powers, who are likely to get away with murder, war crimes, they are not only those five, but others will get away only if they are under the protection of those five. So ultimately, the possibility to cast a veto and to ensure that condemnation or collective mobilization and the authorization of sanctions of various kinds can take place, is a very, very important part of ensuring unaccountability.”
While he deems the abolishment of the veto as utopian, he asserts, “there are other ways, that as a lawyer we could get into more discussions relating to the potential role of the UN General Assembly, as we already have here, under the uniting for peace process, but there are other legal techniques – the idea that certain vetoes casts are invalid and thereby should not undermine all the UN Security Council authorizing actions and so, there are a number of steps one might think of […] there are ways to address it through legal interpretation and legal creativity, which does not involve something utopian.”
His second argument focuses on jurisdiction as a contributing factor to the “unsatisfying state of affairs.” In a scenario where a state claims its rights are internationally violated, it can take the matter to an impartial and independent tribunal to assess the legality of the actions. The challenge arises from the fact that international courts only have jurisdiction if there is consent.
Dr. Kumm highlighted a historical context, stating, “there was a time in history where both the USA, Britain, and France had accepted the general jurisdiction of the ICC. But the US, after being condemned for its aggressive war in Nicaragua in the 1980s, withdrew. Similarly, when the French were criticized by the ICC for engaging in a nuclear weapons test in a way that arguably violated human rights, they also withdrew.”
The last argument pertains to nuclear weapons. Dr. Kumm contends, “The current conflicts would be unthinkable in a context with no nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are perpetually used as a threat in the background, as has been the case with Russia.” He proposes that in the scenario of Russia’s invasion, there might not have been a war in the first place if not for nuclear weapons, suggesting that NATO would have intervened. In the preceding point, he asserts that nuclear power serves as a destabilizing factor in the existing balance of power arrangements.
He concludes that, “for a committed international community wanting to hold great powers accountable, there are paths to move forward, significantly enhancing the capacities of the international system to judiciously hold great powers accountable.” These three factors—1) The UN Security Council Veto, 2) Jurisdictional problems related to both a general court (comprising the ICJ and the ICC), and 3) The issue of unaccountability arising from the threats of the use of nuclear weapons—are, according to him, “the core structural features that enable the kind of great power competition we have in the present. Unless we contemplate and actively address these challenges, we risk stumbling from one crisis to another, with a genuine danger of a major global conflagration as a consequence.”
Dr. Richard CLARK: “On the New Paradigms of Cooperation in the Rising World of Multiplexity in Countering Populism”
The key takeaway from Dr. Richard Clark’s presentation is his belief that populists are unlikely to exit or completely abandon IOs. Instead, they will engage with these organizations strategically, leveraging aspects like regime complexity to avoid policies they find intrusive or stringent. Populists will choose forms of engagement that offer them the best deal—a policy package that is least intrusive and erodes sovereignty minimally. This allows them to appeal to their base while interacting with international organizations.
The presentation by Dr. Richard Clark, Associate Professor at the Department of Government at Cornell University, focused on a chapter he is contributing to the upcoming Oxford Handbook on the International Monetary Fund titled “Regime Complexity and the Populist Challenge to Global Governance.” The central question he posed was: “Does populism truly signify the demise of international organizations (IOs)? How do populists navigate governance complexity?”
The key takeaway was his belief that populists are unlikely to exit or completely abandon IOs. Instead, they will engage with these organizations strategically, leveraging aspects like regime complexity to avoid policies they find intrusive or stringent. Populists, according to Dr. Clark, will choose forms of engagement that offer them the best deal—a policy package that is least intrusive and erodes sovereignty minimally. This allows them to appeal to their base while interacting with international organizations.
Dr. Clark highlighted the traditional populist opposition to IOs, emphasizing how populists often pit the “pure people” against the “corrupt elite.” This elite can be domestic or international, encompassing business figures. The “pure people” typically represent working-class individuals, often less affluent, and sometimes even the middle class in the US, who feel left behind by trends like globalization, international trade, and economic interconnectedness. International organizations, in this context, serve as popular scapegoats for populist leaders. They are identified as highly technocratic institutions employing experts, and these experts, being highly educated individuals, become the perfect scapegoats in the populist narrative framing the corrupt elite, particularly because they are seen as part of the international elite.
According to Dr. Clark, both right-wing and left-wing populists target international organizations (IOs), as these entities are often perceived as incompatible with populist ideologies. Left-wing populists, characterized as redistributionists, seek to redistribute wealth from the affluent elites, either domestically or in the global economy, back to the common man. This perspective leads redistributionists to oppose IOs, viewing them as primarily benefiting the wealthy on an international scale. On the right-wing side, nativists oppose international or foreign power groups, making IOs an ideal target since they represent a foreign elite or out-group. The argument is that IOs allegedly benefit foreigners more than the citizens governed by populist leaders.
Dr. Clark explained the concept of “regime complexity” as the governance by multiple international bodies with overlapping mandates. In simpler terms, it refers to the involvement of numerous international bodies with shared responsibilities. Using the World Bank as an example, he noted that what was once the sole multilateral financing forum for infrastructures has now expanded to 28 overlapping forums. He highlighted those countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan regions, can be members of multiple forums, allowing them to choose the most favorable deal or shift operations between regimes to minimize adjustment costs.
In his research, Dr. Clark focuses on the conditionality of policy requirements attached to foreign aid, whether from bilateral sources (such as China, the US, or the EU) or multilateral institutions (like the IMF and World Bank). These requirements may involve how funds should be spent to prevent corruption or governance features such as democracy and human rights. Populist leaders often view these conditions as intrusive to state sovereignty, which is a primary reason for their hesitation and dismissive stance towards IOs.
In the contemporary landscape, countries can strategically utilize the array of international forums, even employing the threat of forum shopping to generate bargaining leverage, according to Dr. Clark. Various regional forums, such as The Chiang Mai Initiative, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement, BRICS institutions, and the European Monetary Institution, offer alternatives. A country might signal to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that it is considering substituting its financial support from another source, thereby potentially obtaining funds on terms more favorable to its preferences and reducing conditions that could threaten sovereignty. Dr. Clark contends that there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that populists are particularly inclined to pursue this strategy, seeking to avoid adjustment costs that erode sovereignty and distancing themselves from IOs rather than engaging in negotiations, which are often highly public, especially in the context of loan programs, which is the primary focus of his research.
Furthermore, Dr. Clark emphasized the IMF as an ideal target for populists due to its highly technocratic and bureaucratic nature. He underscored that the IMF imposes stringent conditions on countries under loan programs, including mandates for privatizing state-owned enterprises, cutting wages, and implementing measures that may lead to short-term adjustment costs such as unemployment and currency devaluation. These consequences can have significant political ramifications, potentially jeopardizing the positions of leaders, whether populist or not, particularly in democratic countries. Dr. Clark also highlighted instances, such as in Hungary, where the presence of IMF bureaucrats for routine surveillance became politicized, with leaders like Orbán emphasizing the importance of distancing oneself from these IOs.
In a presented graph, Dr. Clark illustrated that countries with non-populist leaders have a 10% chance of entering an IMF program, whereas those with populist leaders have a 7% chance. Although he didn’t present specific data, he argued that populists are particularly prone to avoiding these programs when they have alternative options. According to reports from sources like the New York Times and Financial Times, there is a growing indication that China is emerging as a significant competitor to the IMF.
In a second graph, he demonstrated that “populist leaders can negotiate fewer conditions,” resulting in a nearly 20% reduction in the number of conditions imposed in a program when transitioning from a non-populist to a populist leader within a given country. This suggests that populist leaders, despite their critical stance toward elites and international organizations, maintain engagement with the IMF. They do not outright leave these institutions; instead, they have representatives working behind the scenes, fulfill their financial obligations, participate in voting, and, in essence, act as responsible members of these institutions.
In conclusion, Dr. Clark emphasized that “populists engage with IOs despite their hostile rhetoric, but they leverage regime complexity to minimize the costs of doing so.” He highlighted the material costs associated with economic reforms tied to loans, especially at the IMF, and reducing conditions serves as a strategy to alleviate these material and short-term costs. Populist leaders also aim to minimize audience costs or the inconsistency between their rhetorical criticism of IOs and their practical engagement with these organizations.
By portraying their engagement as a favorable deal or by exploring alternatives in less stringent forums, populists seek to mitigate the dissonance between their words and actions and present this as a strategic move to the public. However, Dr. Clark pointed out that such an approach limits the ability of IOs to promote reforms and fulfill their mandates, leading to negative consequences for these organizations.
Nevertheless, according to Dr. Clark, maintaining superficial engagement, even if it involves populist leaders, is preferable to their outright exit or cessation of cooperation with IOs. A widespread revolt, considering the prevalence of populist leaders globally, could be severely detrimental to the liberal international order. The advantage of keeping a level of engagement, even if it appears merely symbolic, is that when non-populist leaders assume power, it becomes relatively straightforward to repair these relationships. This has been demonstrated, for instance, in the transition from the Trump administration to the Biden administration in the United States. There exists a method to preserve the legitimacy and vitality of these institutions, ensuring their collective acceptance through repairable means after populists leave office.
Dr. Werner PASCHA: “Mini-literalism in the Indo-Pacific as an Alternative to Multilateralism and Bilateralism? The Role of Public Support and Populism”
According to Dr. Werner Pascha, there is a notable co-evolution of minilateralism and populism. He posited that the promotion of minilateral schemes is something populists would attempt if they wielded sufficient influence, as not all countries can engage in such initiatives for various reasons.
Dr. Werner Pascha, Professor of Economics at Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies-IN-EAST, explored a theme closely aligned with Dr. Richard Clark’s presentation, examining the correlation between populism and minilateralism. The central question he addressed was whether populism serves as a catalyst for the development of minilateralism in the region, and what the implications might be, backed by empirical evidence.
He began by defining minilateralism as the association of a small number of countries with each other. Unlike multilateralism, minilateralism involves the smallest number of countries necessary to have the most significant impact on solving a specific problem. This concept is rooted in efficiency, as minilateralism is expected to be more effective, arguing that with a small number of like-minded countries working together informally, it becomes easier to address issues compared to dealing with larger entities like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
He argued that some of these minilateral groups may be regional, while others may not. However, typically, as a small number of countries, they serve a specific and targeted purpose in areas such as trade, infrastructure, security, international security, and the environment. Importantly, they do not attempt to substitute entities like the World Trade Organization (WTO) but rather focus on specific ideas within their designated domains.
According to Dr. Pascha, minilateral events in the Indo-Pacific region began emerging gradually since 2013, exemplified by MIKTA—an informal cooperation involving non-G7 and non-BRICS members of the G20, including Turkey, South Korea, Australia, Mexico, and Indonesia. MIKTA is an illustration of groups extending beyond regional borders. Notably, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017, involving Australia, India, the US, and Japan, is one of the most prominent minilateral events. While it is perceived by some as directed against China, its primary focus revolves around the open seas, the rule of law, and freedom in various contexts. The Australia-Japan-India Trilateral Agreement (AJI) in 2015, focusing on supply chain resilience, and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) in 2016, involving Southeast Asian countries and China, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, demonstrate the potential for minilateralism among non-liberal democratic countries. Lastly, the AUKUS grouping in 2021, similar to the Quad but without India, focuses on military cooperation. Under AUKUS, the US and the UK are supplying Australia with nuclear power, submarines, and other military capabilities.
Dr. Pascha then posed the question, “Why do we have these kinds of minilateral events?” The conventional argument is rooted in the perceived deficiencies of multilateralism, as mentioned earlier by Dr. Clark. These deficiencies are often attributed to the formality of multilateralism, leading to clumsiness, and the challenges countries face in navigating it. The complexity of bilateralism, often referred to as the “spaghetti effect,” and the intricacies of multilateralism further contribute to the appeal of minilateralism. Dr. Pascha argued that the shortcomings of these alternatives ultimately drive the preference for minilateralism based on considerations of effectiveness and efficiency. The informality of like-minded partnerships is seen as expediting processes, offering flexibility, modularity, and the opportunity for experimentation.
However, he also highlighted the downsides of minilaterals, including their potential to undermine multilateral mechanisms, engage in forum shopping, lack transparency in accounting for agreements, be perceived as toothless, and pose challenges when dominated by one partner, potentially leading to an unfair association. Thus, the crucial question emerges: “Are minilaterals a meaningful alternative or not?” Dr. Pascha asserted that the answer depends on the political process behind it and who drives for minilaterals.
The preceding question led him to explore the idea that populist governments exhibit a strong interest in minilaterals, particularly due to the simultaneous rise of populism and minilateralism. To establish a connection between populism and minilateralism, he delved into the reasons behind the emergence of populism, asserting that it is intertwined with the economic aspects of international relations.
Dr. Pascha pointed to inequalities resulting from globalization, concentrated specifically among certain characteristics such as low-skilled workers and certain regions. He argued that multilaterals struggle to address these issues and crises effectively. The challenges related to migrants and refugees further exacerbate the problems, creating a sense of dissatisfaction with multilateral schemes. He aligned with Dr. Clark’s observation that there is tension in the current international order. However, he phrased it as a dissatisfaction with multilateral schemes, and for populists, there is a perceived need or hope to find an alternative that can be presented as an easy solution. In this context, Dr. Pascha asserted that minilateral schemes become the preferred option for populists.
To support this argument, he presented the case of the US and Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, contending that they play a primary role in the proliferation of minilateral agreements, with other countries reacting to their initiatives.
In the case of the US, AUKUS and QUAD represent perhaps the most notable attempts to establish like-minded partnerships in the region, according to Dr. Pascha. Initiated during the Trump Administration, these endeavors align closely with the argument presented. They are linked to a rejection of multilateral mechanisms, as evidenced in official documents, where it is explicitly stated that existing multilateral schemes, or what has been termed the international rule of law, are deemed ineffective. There was an expectation that the US would assume a dominant political role in these partnerships, emphasizing the need to find like-minded countries. Consequently, said Dr. Pascha, it is evident that the populist United States, in practice, became a leader in minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific.
The case of Japan is somewhat more intricate due to the question of whether Japan can be considered a populist country. Dr. Pascha referred to Prof. Axel Klein’s presentation in ECPS symposium from the previous year, noting that according to Klein, Japan, in terms of ideology, ideas, strategy, and other aspects, “cannot be considered as a populist country.” However, Dr. Pascha disagrees with this assessment, particularly based on definitions 3 and 4 (communication style and policies). He focused on the styles of Prime Ministers Koizumi and Abe, citing Koizumi’s public approach, often described as a “lion,” as indicative of a populist style. In terms of policies (definition 4), he pointed to Abenomics, characterized by expansive economic measures that generated criticism from conventional economists. Dr. Pascha views this as a typical populist policy seeking an easy solution that ultimately proved unsuccessful. Additionally, he highlighted Abe’s attempts to change the constitution and the presence of anti-migration sentiments during the period of interest. Consequently, the question remains somewhat ambiguous on this matter.
Dr. Pascha concluded that there is a notable co-evolution of minilateralism and populism. He acknowledged the challenge of quantitatively studying this co-evolution due to the difficulty in precisely defining both multilateralism and populism. Nevertheless, he argued that a co-evolution exists between them and suggested that he could demonstrate a connection between the rise of minilateralism and domestic political effects. He posited that the promotion of minilateral schemes is something populists would attempt if they wielded sufficient influence, as not all countries can engage in such initiatives for various reasons. As he argued in the beginning, it’s not quite clear whether the pros or other cons effects of minilateralism are most striking.
Reported by Konstantina Kastoriadou
Panel -II-
Power Shift, Multiplex World, and Populism
The second panel of the first day of the symposium was titled “Power Shift, Multiplex World, and Populism” and moderated by Professor Emilia Zankina, Interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement and Dean at Temple University in Rome.
Dr. Sara CARIA: “Cooperation Regimes and Hegemonic Struggle: Opportunities and Challenges for Developing Countries”
Dr. Sara Caria: Functioning within the ambit of US hegemony, United Nations’ 2030 SDG Agenda strives to perpetuate the primacy of GDP trade growth and integration into the global value chain as the primary drivers of global economic development. Furthermore, this framework advocates for homogeneous global macroeconomic models, establishing common goals for the world irrespective of the diverse developmental stages of countries. It also sustains identical rules, thereby maintaining developing countries in impoverished and subordinate conditions.
Dr. Sara Caria, Research Professor at The Center for Public Economics and Strategic Sectors at the Institute of Higher National Studies, initiated her presentation with an overview of the key cooperation frameworks utilized by countries to extend or preserve their international leadership. These frameworks also function as specific types of regimes, offering insights into how they evolve into arenas of hegemonic dispute and how different countries functionally employ them as rhetorical devices.
According to Dr. Caria, regimes encompass the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures that converge around actors’ expectations within a given issue arena. Moreover, they articulate a worldview, set praxis, define behaviors, establish decision-making procedures, and reflect the stability of the international world order. Notably, regimes delineate expected behaviors for stakeholders and the allocation of resources among different actors and participants. In this context, the concept of hegemony assumes significance, denoting a situation where state relationships are balanced in a way that enables one party to impose rules over others across economic, military, diplomatic, and cultural domains. These rules are established to favor the interests of the hegemon.
Dr. Caria stated that the initial cooperation framework within the 2030 SDG (Sustainable Development Goals) Agenda was established in 2015 under the UN and the dominance of Western countries. It encompasses 17 primary goals and 169 targets to be achieved. Functioning within the ambit of U.S. hegemony, it strives to perpetuate the primacy of GDP trade growth and integration into the global value chain as the primary drivers of global economic development. Furthermore, this framework advocates for homogeneous global macroeconomic models, establishing common goals for the world irrespective of the diverse developmental stages of countries. It also sustains identical rules, thereby maintaining developing countries in impoverished and subordinate conditions.
For this reason, it aligns with the neoliberal project forged in the 1980s, giving primary consideration to economic growth and regarding wealth inequality and ecological concerns as marginal. Nevertheless, China is currently attempting to gain leverage within the framework. Developing countries have successfully incorporated certain principles, albeit at a rhetorical level only, such as standard and differentiated responsibilities and policy coherence.
The second cooperation framework is South-South cooperation, which is centered on collaboration between developing countries. It encompasses two primary understandings: (i) cooperation as collective self-reliance, involving coalition building among developing countries to disrupt the power dynamics of the Global North within the UN assembly; (ii) technical cooperation based on technological transfer and capacity building, grounded in the belief that developing countries, while heterogeneous, share very similar needs. Some key concepts of this framework include solidarity, respect for national sovereignty, and a commitment to non-interference in domestic affairs. These principles are considered more important than the necessity to quantify the amount of cooperation to provide and the resources to be mobilized. This sometimes leads to a preference for an authoritarian allocation of resources rather than market-based assignment mechanisms. In summary, this cooperation framework is particularly advantageous for regional leaders as it enables them to function as global actors within their respective regions.
The third cooperation framework, according to Dr. Caria, is international cooperation for structural change, with China playing a central role. The core principles of this framework revolve around the concept of a New Structural Economy, which places economic growth at the center of development but assigns a guiding role to the state in the process. The underlying assumption is that China serves as a more accessible and benevolent model for developing countries to follow. Consequently, the focus shifts from multilateral relations to the ability to choose bilateral relations.
Nevertheless, multilateralism still holds certain advantages for developing countries, providing opportunities to build alliances and access a diversified cooperation landscape with various financial prospects. On the flip side, adhering to multilateralism poses challenges, including dependence and marginal roles for developing countries, along with the need for more political consensus on development policy. This contributes to institutional and fiscal fragility in the face of international market mechanisms.
Dr. ZHANG Xin:The Chinese Perspective of Multilateralism, Power Transition, and the So-called New World Order
Highlighting the four levels of connotation regarding the concept of multilateralism, Dr. Zhang Xin stated that China positions itself as the champion of genuine multilateralism. This stance is guided by the ‘Silk Road spirit’ of openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit, positioning China as the defender of ‘free trade and globalization’. To achieve this, the Chinese discursive approach focuses on values such as ‘whole-process democracy’ and ‘total security’, built upon the effort to disseminate China’s ‘indigenous knowledge’ to the outside world.
Dr. Zhang Xin, Associate Professor at the School of Politics and International Relations, Deputy Director of the Center for Russian Studies, East China Normal University, Shanghai, focused his intervention on how the concept of multilateralism shapes China’s foreign policy. In other words, he delved into how the Chinese government takes, uses, and perceives diplomatic and multilateral political strategies in its foreign policy and international relations.
According to Dr. Zhang Xin, we can observe four levels of connotation regarding the concept of multilateralism. First, multilateralism is most often contrasted with unilateralism and is used in conjunction with either protectionism or hegemonic thinking. Second, multilateralism has been associated with the concept of multipolarity. An interesting case is Russian foreign policy, where the term multipolarity is extensively used. Concerning China, multipolarity emphasizes the concept of the pole as singular and unique and is understood as a way to avoid the idea of a world consisting of different and several poles with specific spheres of influence related to them. Third, multilateralism represents a possibility of socialization against isolation, as China experienced, especially in the 1980s. Fourth, multilateralism expresses an institutional or rule-binding behavior instead of non-institutionalized behavior.
Historically, Chinese multilateralism underwent diverse phases. In the 1980s, there was a clear strategy based on observation, learning, and a careful disposition to wait actively before engaging. By the 1990s, a gradual shift occurred, and the rate of participation in joining organizations slightly increased, leading to a deep engagement in international institutions by the early 2000s. From the mid-2000s, there was an effort to establish parallel institutions, followed by a progression towards openly proposing policies and reforms. Eventually, China sought to maneuver existing regimes in new directions. In summary, the evolution witnessed an initial avoidance of contact with multilateral practices, a reactive and conservative attitude, and then a shift towards more actively shaping and employing the concept.
Regarding multilateral practices, according to Dr. Zhang Xin, Chinese behavior can be characterized as neo-revisionist. Neo-revisionist powers are generally dissatisfied with the hegemonic nature of the current inter-state system. They often support and abide by the foundational principles of the ‘primary institutions’ of the current international society without directly challenging the logic of liberal internationalism. The strategy involves constantly questioning the practices and the main actors for deviating from the principles underpinning these practices. Sometimes, the results of that strategy are contradictory, leading to a systemic stalemate and deadlock situation. Consequently, the international system is often stuck in a sub-optimal condition that leaves most international actors dissatisfied. An example is the Doha Round of negotiations under the WTO (World Trade Organization) about free trading negotiations: rising powers were increasingly participating, but the anti-hegemonic stance of the previous rounds of negotiations blocked further progress.
More recently, as stated by Dr. Zhang Xin, multilateralism has been employed alongside the concept of global governance and integrated into the idea of a ‘Community with a Shared Future for Mankind’. Additionally, American hegemony is criticized for engaging in what is perceived as fraudulent multilateral practices, including the unequal relationship between big and small states, the formation of bloc alliances, and violations of the UN Charter and international law. In other words, ‘fake multilateralism’ is viewed as undermining the international order and fostering confrontation and division under the guise of agreed-upon rules. This perspective is reinforced by the narrative that there was no real liberal international order to begin with. Consequently, China positions itself as the champion of genuine multilateralism, guided by the ‘Silk Road spirit’ of openness, inclusiveness, mutual learning, and mutual benefit, and as the defender of ‘free trade and globalization’. To achieve this, the Chinese discursive approach focuses on values such as ‘whole-process democracy’, ‘total security’, and is built upon the effort to disseminate China’s ‘indigenous knowledge’ to the outside world.
Dr. Ibrahim OZTURK:The Belt and Road Initiative: Tracing China’s Perspective on Globalization and Multilateralism
Dr. Ozturk explained that because China is employing a mercantilist approach characterized by visible exclusion from its lucrative markets, enforced partnerships and technology transfers, weak property rights, and restricted information flows, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) should not be considered a game-changer. Nevertheless, the BRI has been used and abused by some governments for kleptocracy, corruption, and shaping governmental policies to dominate the use of technology and cut foreign competitors. It is also detrimental both for citizens and global stability, serving as a form of debt-trap diplomacy with many countries failing to pay back their debts.
Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk, Professor of Economics at the University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies, and ECPS Senior Researcher, focused on the Chinese multilateral strategy from the perspective of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this context, the BRI is considered a governance attraction and, following the logic of a global public good argument, a reincarnation of the Chinese historical world system approach based on the Investiture System. According to this concept, China has been actively working to increase its global influence. For instance, it attempted to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran to resume their diplomatic relations. Additionally, China has been strengthening strategic partnerships with Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan, while also seeking to persuade Saudi Arabia to join the Shanghai Security Organization.
According to Professor Ozturk, as both a local and global public good, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) should encompass core activities aimed at addressing collective problems faced by countries and motivating them to tackle global challenges. To achieve this, China should offer updated knowledge platforms, material technologies for energy transformation, and artificial intelligence tools. Specifically, an open platform should be provided for exchanging information, articulating joint behavior to achieve convergence among various actors’ preferences, and enhancing the ease of compromise to secure high-quality contracts in principal-agent relations.
Describing the Chinese strategy, Dr. Ozturk highlighted the idea that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is attempting to position itself between Western liberal multilateral practices and socialist ones, aiming to construct a new and distinct governance structure. While the initiative is expected to adhere to some established international rules, China is also anticipated to export some of its unique terms and conditions. In essence, Chinese state capitalism embodies unfair economic protectionism by implementing liberal economic principles outside of the country while adopting protectionist policies internally. It also involves selective market opening, licensing, and restrictions on foreign investments. Consequently, the share of state-owned firms in terms of bank loans granted has risen to almost 70 percent, while the share of the private sector has stagnated. Additionally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has imposed some of its party members on the boards of private companies (mainly foreign ones) to oversee and control their business strategies. This is reflected in the asymmetric and hierarchically shaped transactional world that the BRI seeks to achieve. Partner countries are not compelled to participate in such a scheme but are incentivized by the potential trade and security benefits.
From the Chinese rhetoric and perspective, there exists a community of common destiny, emphasizing relational interactions, responsible behavior, generality, and equality. The choices made should be independent from one country to another, but actions should be interdependent, facilitated through a memorandum of understanding. Consequently, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is characterized by the absence of conditionality and enforcement, a lack of delegation of sovereignty, no binding everyday decisions, and no autonomous reviving committee. In essence, it is built on institutional minimalism with high flexibility and bargaining.
From the UN’s viewpoint and in accordance with sustainability criteria, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) must offer an updated knowledge platform for data classification, adhere to common standards such as transparency, fair competition, local inclusion, social responsibility disclaimers, and employ a multi-factor assessment of projects. Additionally, it should prioritize multidimensional capacity building in developing countries. As an illustration of weak accountability-related issues, almost 75 percent of Chinese companies operating abroad, including those involved in the BRI, do not disclose corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports.
The BRI initiative is thus encountering some systemic problems, according to Dr. Ozturk. Firstly, China needs to gain global experience in creating local public goods; it excels in national complementary activities but is weaker in core activities that possess a cross-border nature. Secondly, the projects are often of significant size and complexity. Additionally, government involvement in these contracts, the concealment of work, entrenched national interests, and opportunities for skimming, corruption, fraud, and money laundering hinder the achievement of set goals. Thirdly, limited local capacities, coupled with asymmetries with China’s opaque behavior and the non-transparent, authoritarian governments involved in the projects, undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of the initiatives themselves. As an outcome, BRI’s contracts are susceptible to ‘pressure-resistance-negotiation-pragmatism,’ leading to a weaker structuring of principal and agent relations.
Summarizing his presentation, Dr. Ozturk stated that China is employing a mercantilist approach characterized by visible exclusion from its lucrative markets, enforced partnerships and technology transfers, weak property rights, and restricted information flows. As a result, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) should not be considered a game-changer or a pathbreaker. In any case, due to several asymmetries, the project is destined to rejuvenate the Chinese Tributary Investiture System in the upcoming years. Moreover, the BRI has been used and abused by some governments for kleptocracy, corruption, and shaping governmental policies to dominate the use of technology and cut foreign competitors. Finally, the BRI is detrimental both for citizens and global stability, serving as a form of debt-trap diplomacy with many countries failing to pay back their debts and thus undermining their financial stability.
Reported by Andrea Guidotti & Johann Mathies Diethelm
Panel -III-
The ‘New Globalization’ and Countering Populism
The third panel of the symposium, titled “The ‘New Globalization’ and Countering Populism,” was held on March 31, 2023, with Dr. Helmut Wagner, Professor of Economics at Fern Universität in Hagen, serving as the moderator. The three presentations collectively provided stimulating insights into the latest developments of the “new globalization,” denoting the high growth rates of international markets and their interconnections, with a specific focus on the reactions of populist parties to these transformations.
Dr: Oscar MAZZOLENI: Economic Populism and Sovereigntism: The Rise of European Radical Right-wing Populist Parties
Dr. Oscar Mazzoleni’s presentation provided an enriching new perspective on the issue of economic populism. The scholar emphasizes the importance of considering this phenomenon as a specific dimension of populist claims. Economic populism, according to Dr. Mazzoleni, addresses contemporary societal problems and plays a pivotal role in explaining electoral support for European populist radical right parties, particularly concerning economic stability and security.
Dr. Oscar Mazzoleni, Professor of Political Sciences at the University of Lausanne, commenced the Third Panel with a presentation that illustrated the linkages between populist radical right (PRR) parties in Europe and economic aspects, developing an analytical framework for this phenomenon. His approach involved exploring the populist standpoint on economic issues through an unconventional discursive lens, examining socio-psychological reactions of voters.
Dr. Mazzoleni aimed to elucidate the support for PRR parties from both the supply and demand sides by assessing the significance of economic factors, such as economic crises, unemployment, socioeconomic conditions, public policies proposed by populist actors, and protectionist measures for citizens. Rather than concentrating on material economic conditions or public policies, as canonical studies do, his work delves into socioeconomic discourses and citizens’ attitudes regarding wealth and prosperity, examining how populist economic narratives sway individuals to vote for PRR parties.
Economic populism is characterized by a discourse framework that relies on the traditional opposition between “the pure people” (representing the ultimate holder of democratic legitimacy) and “the corrupt elite” (seen as betraying the people’s interests). This dichotomy is infused with economic elements, where “the people” correspond to the national economic community of consumers and taxpayers. The economic well-being of this community is perceived as being damaged, ignored, or betrayed by “the elite,” which could include neoliberal forces or globalizing elites. Populist parties, operating within this framework, pledge to restore prosperity by purportedly defending the people’s interests. In this context, two central concepts are pivotal: “producerism” and “sovereigntism.”
Producerism frames the dichotomy in economic terms, dividing society into “producers” and “parasites,” where producers contribute to the economy, and parasites exploit the work of others. Economic populism positions the “real people” as producers. Sovereigntism, on the other hand, presents the people as sovereign over their destiny, political life, and prosperity. In essence, this framework advocates for the reclaiming and restoration of a fair society where people can enjoy prosperity.
Through a survey conducted in Switzerland and France, Dr. Mazzoleni, in collaboration with Dr. Gilles Ivaldi (SciencesPo Paris), examined the impact of producerism and sovereigntism on voters’ attitudes. Specifically, they aimed to highlight the statistical relevance of what they termed “Economic Populist Sovereigntism” in mobilizing and influencing voters of PRR parties in France and Switzerland. On the supply side, the authors identified the significance of the “Threatened Producers” frame, suggesting that individuals’ prosperity is in jeopardy, and mainstream parties’ economic policies and decisions are detrimental to it. Additionally, PRR leaders advocated for greater citizen involvement in decision-making processes related to economic issues.
Overall, Dr. Mazzoleni’s presentation provided an enriching new perspective on the issue of economic populism. The scholar emphasizes the importance of considering this phenomenon as a specific dimension of populist claims. Economic populism, according to Dr. Mazzoleni, addresses contemporary societal problems and plays a pivotal role in explaining electoral support for European PRR parties, particularly concerning economic stability and security.
Dr. Micheal LEE: “Populism or Embedded Plutocracy? The Emerging World Orders”
Dr. Michael Lee briefly explained how populist governments interact on the world stage. He described that, at the international level, governing populist parties are not isolated but cooperate in unusual and informal ways. In other words, these actors do not use more institutional channels or tools typical of the current international order, which relies on cooperation through institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund in the case of economic crises.
Dr. Michael Lee, Professor at CUNY-Hunter College, New York, presented an interesting comparison between populist and non-populist governments in the international economic scenario at the national and international levels. His speech revolved around two key questions: “Do populist parties govern differently from non-populist actors?” and “How do populist parties interact on the world stage, particularly concerning financial and economic issues?”
Lee began with a definition of populism as an ideology dividing society between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” He argued that the central challenge in democratic politics is providing public goods to secure the next election. While liberal democracy is theoretically suitable for producing and broadly distributing public goods, the reality is more complex due to various socioeconomic and sociopolitical cleavages in a democratic society. These divisions pose obstacles for leaders developing policies, forcing them to select specific strata of society, thereby increasing competition among parties.
Dr. Lee also argued that after the economic crisis of 2008/2009 and the European debt crisis in 2011/2012, many populist parties worldwide gained power, challenging the functioning of democratic regimes. He contended that while populism is thin at the level of elites (being a political strategy to gain votes), it is not necessarily thin at the level of the people. However, understanding the triggers for voters to form the notion of “the people” remains puzzling. Moreover, for elites, populism is advantageous as it effectively persuades citizens, while liberal democracy is not, given its need to divide public goods and face various obstacles and delays inherent in the democratic process. Liberal democracy often involves delegating power, such as to scientific experts during the decision-making process in Covid-19 pandemic years or giving autonomy to Central Banks on financial issues, which can lead to potential discontent among the citizenry.
Hence, Dr. Lee argued that populism serves as a tool to construct a narrow but solid electoral base. However, parties inevitably need to broaden their electorate to win elections. To stay true to their nature, populist actors maintain a Manichean dichotomy of us-against-them but adapt to contingencies by modifying their positions or ideas on particular themes. The distribution of goods is intended to be a tool to gain votes and win elections, but even the most populist party must be open to adaptation (e.g., the Italian Five Stars Movement supporting Mario Draghi’s government). This adaptability has been observed in various instances, including Matteo Salvini in Italy, the institutionalization of Brexiters, the softening of Eurosceptic parties, and the approaches of leaders like Donald Trump, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador.
In conclusion, Dr. Michael Lee briefly explained how populist governments interact on the world stage. He described that, at the international level, governing populist parties are not isolated but cooperate in unusual and informal ways. In other words, these actors do not use more institutional channels or tools typical of the current international order, which relies on cooperation through institutions such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund in the case of economic crises.
Dr. Marcus TAUBE: “Chinese “Hub and Spoke” – Multilateralism and the Notion of Populist Economic Policy”
According to Dr. Marcus Taube, as in the typical populist dichotomy, China claims to represent the “global south” against the “elitist Western multilateralism” (but mainly the US), which establishes protectionist barriers and increases military tension, akin to the Cold War. In other words, then, it is conceivable maintaining that Chinese “populist multilateralism” is a mere economic reaction towards the US political and economic (assumed) hegemony and that Beijing is attempting to spoil it by allying with underdog countries.
Dr. Marcus Taube, Professor of East Asian Economics/China at the Mercator School of Management, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Duisburg-Essen University, offered an overview of Chinese populist multilateralism, an economic reaction towards Western markets’ implementation policies during his presentation. His presentation provided an unusual and thrilling perspective on a hot topic in current politics: the (economic) opposition between Washington and Beijing and, more generally, on the latest international relations moves of a central player within the current global order.
Referring to the visit of the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, to China and her meeting with Xi Jinping in early 2023, Dr. Taube emphasized the importance of the EU-China relationship in terms of commercial cooperation, as an attempt to dissuade Beijing from supporting Vladimir Putin too far in his invasion of Ukraine. However, the first notable developments of Chinese multilateralism must be traced back to Donald Trump’s presidency and the harsh protectionist norms that forced China to change its attitude towards the global market. Contrary to what several columnists thought, China did not retreat from the international economic scenario but developed its populist multilateralism, according to Dr. Taube.
Indeed, in recent years, Western economic measures, particularly US protectionist norms, have compelled China and Chinese elites to defend their case. The famous Trumpian slogans “Make America Great Again” and “America First” prompted a Chinese reaction through decoupling and the imposition of protectionist barriers. Western countries established a form of “qualitative multilateralism,” explained Dr. Taube, based on the respect for shared principles, the indivisibility of the group’s beliefs, and the acceptance of diffuse reciprocity. This Western “qualitative multilateralism” is driven by mutual trust and shared principles, fostering cooperation among Western nations to achieve long-term goals.
In contrast, China has developed a form of “true multilateralism” that does not necessarily include shared values. Instead, China recognizes clauses such as the respect for national sovereignty, the recourse to consultations to manage global affairs, and opposition to international sub-groups that rely on values beyond the UN Charter. China’s “populist multilateralism,” as Dr. Taube argues, implies a concentric and asymmetric relationship where Beijing is always at the center. This dynamic is evident, for instance, in many of China’s multilateral initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative (2021), the Global Security Initiative (2022), and the Global Civilization Initiative (2023).
Therefore, China has established various “hub-and-spoke” systems with asymmetric power relationships, where China holds the most significant influence in the dialogue. Undoubtedly, China is distributing goods, but it is also wielding political influence and influencing national decisions. It achieves this through the “civilization process,” disseminating Chinese technological know-how to expanding areas of interest.
In conclusion, Dr. Taube explained that China organizes its identity-building process by presenting a narrative of itself as a knight fighting against evil powers and protecting the most vulnerable countries hierarchically positioned below China. According to Dr. Taube, these metaphorical arrangements are nothing more than the externalization of the Chinese Communist Party’s national populist rhetoric. In this typical populist dichotomy, China claims to represent the “global south” against “elitist Western multilateralism” (primarily the US), which establishes protectionist barriers and increases military tension, akin to the Cold War. In other words, it is conceivable to argue that Chinese “populist multilateralism” is merely an economic reaction to assumed US political and economic hegemony, with Beijing attempting to undermine it by aligning with underdog countries.
Indeed, as in the typical populist dichotomy, here, China claims to represent the “global south” against the “elitist Western multilateralism” (but mainly the US), which establishes protectionist barriers and increases military tension, akin to the Cold War. In other words, then, it is conceivable maintaining that Chinese “populist multilateralism” is a mere economic reaction towards the US political and economic (assumed) hegemony and that Beijing is attempting to spoil it by allying with underdog countries.
Reported by Luca Mancini
Closing Keynote Speech
Dr. Jan Nederveen PIETERSE: “Multipolar Globalization, Learning Curves and Populism”
Dr. Jan Nederveen Pieterse: Developmental-centered states in the global South, characterized by pragmatism and investor-friendly approaches, leave minimal room for populist posturing. Exceptions are found in national governments and national security states that tend to restrict divergent voices, which may be more prone to populist expression. Latin America stands out as an outlier, exhibiting a historical tradition of left-wing populism, making populism somewhat ‘native’ to the local politics.
In this comprehensive overview, Dr. Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Mellichamp Chair and Distinguished Professor of Global Studies & Sociology at the University of California, Santa Barbara, examines various aspects of the current international order. His analysis encompasses multipolar globalization, populism, its occurrence in advanced economies, and the dynamics of political economy across different regions.
The inquiry begins by exploring whether there is a global surge in populism, particularly in the global South, or if there is a leaning towards nationalism. Dr. Pieterse notes that developmental-centred states in the global South, characterized by pragmatism and investor-friendly approaches, leave minimal room for populist posturing. Exceptions are found in national governments and national security states that tend to restrict divergent voices, which may be more prone to populist expression. Latin America stands out as an outlier, exhibiting a historical tradition of left-wing populism with figures like Juan Perón, Julio Vargas, Lula da Silva, Hugo Chávez, Christina Fernández and Nestor Kirchner, Evo Morales, Maurice Lévy, and Pablo Castillo, making populism somewhat ‘native’ to the local politics.
Shifting focus to Asia, which represents 60 percent of the global population, populism is generally absent, with outliers like the Philippines. Dr. Pieterse emphasizes the unique position of the Philippines, which is characterized by a security-oriented government, aligning more closely with Latin America than other Asian nations, influenced by historical factors such as Spanish and American colonialism.
The examination delves into South Asia, particularly India, where institutions beyond the media often characterize the government as populist under Narendra Modi. However, it is argued that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), as an established political entity and the political arm of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), has deeper historical roots and broader agendas beyond populism. The discussion extends to Asia’s populist figure, Imran Khan in Pakistan, known for his agenda of anti-corruption, Islam, and a welfare state. Dr. Pieterse further explores the topic of electoral authoritarianism, mentioning studies of ‘spin dictatorships’—a term used to describe dictatorial states encompassing media, social media, and technology deployment in countries like Hungary, Russia, Singapore, and Israel.
In the closing speech, the Middle East was characterized as generally devoid of populism, dominated instead by national security states. Syria and Israel were cited as examples, each with a heavy focus on security and distinct political landscapes. In Africa, populism was described as scarce, with established or rising parties often relying on ethnic mobilization.
Turning to Russia, the presentation highlighted that the political landscape allows room only for nationalism. Entities such as the Wagner Group, Alexei Navalny, and anti-corruption nationalists were noted as potential influences. Interestingly, Dr. Pieterse observed that populism is most prevalent in high-income advanced economies. This raises the question of what enabling factors contribute to this trend. Brief points were discussed, including destabilizing political economy, post-industrialism, de-industrialization, and the collapse of stable correlations as contributing dynamics.
A broader consideration was given to the political economy dynamics associated with populism. The discussion encompassed financialization, shadow photos, and derivatives as representations of chaos capital without enduring commitments, leading to the creation of a billionaire world. The role of disruptive technology in influencing politics was also emphasized, with media portrayed as more aligned with show business than truth business. Global inequality, wars in the Middle East, and the European Union’s response to these challenges were discussed as part of the wider context. A general point was then made about learning curves and professionalization in populism, noting that populism represents a shift toward the center, where right-wing populism adopts conservative family values and moderate economics. This pattern is observed in various European countries and the United States, with populism responding to crises like the 2008 financial downturn.
In wrapping up his analysis, Dr. Pieterse presented a cross-regional focus covering the Atlantic economies (the US and the UK), Continental Europe, Eastern Europe, and Mediterranean Europe. Each region was examined in terms of its economic structure, political landscape, and the rise of right-wing populist movements.
In the final segment, the speaker addressed the issue of ethnicity and populism, drawing parallels between ethnic mobilization and the organized efforts of ethnic entrepreneurs. The importance of effective organization, leadership, methods, technology, and timing was underscored in the context of populism. The discussion also touched upon the organizational differences between established parties and emerging populist movements.
The presentation concluded with reflections on the representation of events in a ‘cartoon world,’ emphasizing the significance of entanglements that may not be readily apparent. Dr. Pieterse highlighted the roles of intelligence, think tanks, donors, parties, factions, and media in shaping narratives. An illustrative example involving selective information sharing between American and Australian intelligence about China and subsequent geopolitical developments was presented, underscoring the complexity and interconnectedness of global events. The session ended with reflections on the challenges posed by Taiwan, asserting that China may adopt a patient approach, stretching the timeline over several years rather than seeking a short-term resolution.
Following the conclusion of Dr. Pieterse’s talk, the floor was opened for questions, allowing participants to seek further clarification and engage in a more interactive discussion on the presented topics. One question addressed the relationship between globalization and multilateralism, prompting Dr. Pieterse to acknowledge the varied forms of multilateralism, distinguishing between the multilateralism of law and the multilateralism of power. He highlighted China’s emergence as a geopolitical player, citing strategic moves in brokering talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia, presenting a peace plan grounded in the UN Charter, and seeking participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Dr. Pieterse noted China’s unique historical perspective, patience, and millennia-old status, suggesting a different approach to global affairs compared to more recent powers. In response to another question regarding Dr. Pieterse’s prior work, references were made to published books, including “Globalization and Culture” and “Globalization or Empire,” acknowledging the focus on sociological perspectives.
Despite the global far-right’s excitement over Javier Milei’s victory, it is crucial to approach Milei’s election cautiously and avoid interpreting it as a definitive sign of a substantial conservative shift in Argentine politics. To comprehend Milei’s success, it is essential to delve into the Argentine context, where it seems to signify more a public frustration with the establishment than a straightforward resurgence of right-wing populism.
By Imdat Oner*
After a second-round election on November 19, 2023, libertarian candidate Javier Milei emerged as the president-elect of Argentina, securing 56 percent of the votes compared to his opponent Sergio Massa’s 44 percent. This victory marked a significant milestone, as Milei garnered the most votes in any election in Argentine history.
In the wake of Milei’s decisive win, former US President Donald Trump commended the Argentinian president-elect, asserting that Milei would “truly make Argentina great again.” Jair Bolsonaro echoed these sentiments, hailing the victory as a triumph for “progress and freedom.” Some right-wing activists are already envisioning a domino effect, anticipating that Milei’s success could pave the way for Trump and Bolsonaro to reclaim power in 2024 and 2026.
Despite the global far-right’s excitement over Milei’s victory, it is essential to approach Milei’s election with caution and refrain from interpreting it as a clear sign of a significant conservative shift in Argentine politics. Understanding Milei’s success necessitates a nuanced exploration of the Argentine context, where it seems to reflect more a manifestation of public frustration with the establishment than a mere resurgence of right-wing populism.
Milei’s ascension to the presidency is unprecedented, marking the first occurrence of an outsider leading Argentina. His far-right inclinations, epitomized by his self-proclaimed anarcho-libertarian stance, set him apart from the conventional political spectrum. Peronism has upheld its supremacy in Argentine politics by building an alliance that encompasses both the left and the right, uniting trade unions and major businesses. The party movement has effectively established an organizational structure with widespread influence, extending across the country.
Milei, a former TV commentator and economist, presented himself as a symbol of change against this establishment that has been in power in Argentina for the past two decades. His campaign was marked by a strong anti-establishment narrative, echoing the widespread dissatisfaction among voters. He focused on economic ideas and blamed past administrations resonating with a population weary of traditional politics. His use of a chainsaw as a symbol of cutting state spending emphasized his commitment to making radical changes.
In this context, Milei’s electoral success primarily derives from economic dissatisfaction rather than an embrace of far-right policies. The economy with inflation over 140 percent yearly and 40 percent of the people in poverty has fueled a collective desire among citizens for a departure from the existing status quo. Massa, the current Minister of Economy, faced the full force of public frustration during one of Argentina’s most severe economic crises in decades. Milei smartly connected with people by presenting himself as the leader of significant and quick change, contrasting with what many see as the mishandling of past administrations.
However, Milei’s confrontational style, lack of political experience, and limited allies in Congress add an additional layer of unpredictability for the future. In reality, he could turn out to be one of the least influential Argentine presidents in many years. His political party, Freedom Advances, currently has only seven out of 72 seats in the Senate and 37 out of 257 seats in the lower Chamber of Deputies. Even if legislators from right-wing parties, including members of Mauricio Macri’s Republican Proposal party, support Milei, he won’t have enough support for a governing majority. The complexity of passing laws and radical reforms requiring a qualified majority poses a significant governance challenge for the president-elect. Securing the necessary majority for passing laws and projects entails negotiations with various factions within Peronism. Furthermore, Milei’s coalition does not have a single governor in any of Argentina’s 23 provinces.
The difficulties ahead for Milei extend beyond legislative hurdles. The implementation of a shock therapy in the economy often results in substantial adverse effects on employment and income, potentially sparking social unrest that could further strain the country’s already complicated situation. The extent of Milei’s ability to capitalize on his personal popularity will play a significant role in shaping his political influence over the country. To achieve the objective of forming a legislative majority, Milei will need to maintain popular support.
In conclusion, while Javier Milei’s political style may bear similarities to Trump and Bolsonaro, his success in Argentina is more indicative of a deep-seated frustration with the establishment and traditional politics. As Milei assumes the presidency, the world watches with curiosity to see whether his unconventional approach can bring about the promised change in Argentina or if it encounters the challenges inherent in radical policy shifts.
(*) Imdat Oner is a former Turkish diplomat who recently served at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela. He holds a Ph.D. from Florida International University, where he wrote a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” His articles have been published in the Journal of Populism, War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamerica, and the Miami Herald.
