In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the often-overlooked ecological consequences of modern warfare. Moving beyond traditional analyses focused on military strategy and territorial control, he argues that contemporary conflicts produce long-lasting environmental damage that can destabilize societies for decades. From contaminated farmland and polluted water systems to devastated ecosystems and forced migration, war’s environmental fallout directly undermines human security. Drawing on historical examples such as Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Kuwaiti oil fires during the 1991 Gulf War, the commentary highlights how ecological destruction persists long after hostilities end. Dr. Solaja ultimately calls for stronger international environmental governance and greater integration of environmental protection into global security and peacebuilding frameworks.
By Dr. Oludele Solaja*
Thinking About War in an Ecological Framework
When war is finished in terms of battles, water systems remain polluted, nature destroyed, and infrastructure shattered—and continues to shape the ways in which societies survive and exist. Whereas the majority of scholarly focus concerning warfare centers on issues of military victory, deterring enemies, or controlling territory, the environmental consequences of war can often produce effects that can persist over decades (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019; UNEP, 2009). The current confrontation between the United States, Iran, and Israel, for instance, should be understood not merely as a geopolitical conflict, but as an ecological disaster, as well. The bombing and attack on industrial and energy infrastructure result in more than mere destruction of physical property; these incidents produce ecological disarray, which can lead to widespread contamination of landscape, livelihood and inhabitants, even long after the end of hostilities (Foster et al., 2010; Ide, 2021).
Understanding war in relation to ecology and displacement is one way of looking at the long-term consequences of military combat. Destruction to environment can create instability for societies by contaminating farmland, polluting water sources, or even eliminating the natural resource base required to survive. Therefore modern warfare reaches beyond the battlefield to create different forms of insecurity that may exist in the environment for generations (Nixon, 2011). Hence a sociological study of war, examining both strategic and environmental results of battle, should be adopted in understanding conflict in the 21st century. In an age of increasing environmental crises and security concerns, treating war as an ecological affair can become as significant as viewing it as the domain of military actions (Foster et al., 2010).
Environmental Effects of Modern Warfare
Even though destruction of the environment has historically been a factor of warfare, it often goes overlooked in analyses of security. It can create massive ecological devastation, not just exacerbate humanitarian crises within a warzone, but create an environmental crisis for surrounding regions as well (UNEP, 2009; Lawrence & Stohl, 2019). Aerial bombardment of infrastructure can spread poisons into the air, water sources and natural habitat required for sustenance. Industrial buildings and energy sources—refineries, chemical plants, water treatment plants—are sometimes prime targets. When these sites are destroyed, dangerous pollution can linger in land, air and ground water long after fighting has ended, with effects on human security far reaching (Ide, 2021).
Toxic lands may become unfit for farming and public health will be compromised by contaminants and the food supply jeopardized. It can often take decades to repair the environmental damage so that it may become safely habitated again (UNEP, 2009). Attacks on Iranian oil refineries and petrochemical industries, for example, could cause catastrophic environmental degradation over a wide region of the Middle East, compromising public health and damaging natural ecosystems of the area (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019).
Historical Evidence of Environmental Destruction during War
The long-term humanitarian effects have historically been a characteristic of war-induced ecological damage. Between 1961 and 1971, the US deployed large quantities of Agent Orange across Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Large portions of farmland and forest became useless while their soils were contaminated with toxins. In addition to long-lasting health problems, communities continue to deal with the aftermath of these chemicals (Vo & Ziegler, 2018).
Also, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi troops burned hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells in an attempt to deter advancing forces. Large quantities of pollutants were released into the air, and oil slicks devastated marine life (Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). As in Vietnam, long-lasting human security issues and a devastated ecosystem resulted from environmental disaster during wartime. The widespread destruction of natural and manmade landscapes caused during conflict does not end immediately and the need for their repair is a long-term challenge that often prolongs instability within nations affected by war. Such environmental harm frequently unfolds gradually and invisibly, what Nixon describes as “slow violence,” in which ecological destruction continues to affect communities long after the immediate conflict has ended (Nixon, 2011).
War, Environmental Degradation and Human Security
Seeing war as a source of ecological devastation helps to better understand the link between war and human security. Attacks on water systems, farms or factories can harm societies through ecological harm which causes social consequences. An attack on an ecosystem could destroy farms, harm public health through pollution of water sources and prompt migration as farming has no longer become an option. These elements—war, environment, displacement—can therefore be described as having a circular relationship, where destruction to one aspect of existence directly fuels destruction in another.
Rural communities are particularly susceptible, since their entire way of life is contingent on their surrounding environment. Without the existence of healthy ecosystems, a livelihood becomes unsustainable and this leads to forced migration in order to survive (Ide, 2021). Homer-Dixon has emphasized the importance of the environment as the driver of conflict through its impact on resource availability and human security; with widespread ecological destruction during conflict, this connection is intensified, creating an even more dire situation (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
Implications for International Environmental Governance
The ecological devastation that war leaves in its wake makes clear the need for international action to help govern the conduct of war so that environment is not harmed so severely and, hopefully, at all. Although international laws of armed conflict are already in place to help alleviate the harm inflicted upon the environment during war, their enforceability has not been successfully maintained (UNEP, 2009). The long-lasting results of ecological destruction often are not considered and may never be compensated for or rectified in the absence of stronger governance structures.
The establishment of environmental monitoring systems, strict liability laws for states or parties engaged in warfare that are responsible for ecological damage, and inclusion of environmental restoration within peacebuilding initiatives would all serve to diminish the long-term negative effects of war on ecology (Ide, 2021). Making protection of the environment a component of security strategy will make policies aligned with global security concerns, and address issues of ecological sustainability as well.
Conclusion
The conflict with Iran highlights the vast ecological consequences of modern warfare. It is a process that not only brings conflict to lands and peoples, but can reshape entire landscapes. Its consequences, historically in war zones such as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, show that it can be a far more destructive phenomenon to ecosystems than merely battlefield action, lasting far into the future of human habitation (Vo & Ziegler, 2018; Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). Considering war an ecological threat has made it easier to grasp its entire meaning, and looking at warfare from a strategic and environmental perspective allows for a far greater understanding of warfare itself. In an age of increasing geopolitical turmoil, it may soon become just as significant as military victories, if not more so, to understand the environmental threat war poses.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Al-Dabbous, A. & Kumar, P. (2014). “Environmental impacts of the Gulf War oil fires.” Environmental Pollution, 189, 59–68.
Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. Monthly Review Press.
Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton University Press.
Ide, T. (2021). “Environmental peacebuilding and the impact of war on ecosystems.” Global Environmental Politics, 21(1), 1–12.
Lawrence, M., & Stohl, A. (2019). “The impact of military emissions on climate change and air pollution.” Nature Communications, 10(1), 1–9.
Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press.
UNEP. (2009). Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law. United Nations Environment Programme.
Vo, M., & Ziegler, A. (2018). “Agent Orange and the environmental legacy of the Vietnam War.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 13(2), 1–28.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 9, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00144
Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political arenas. Chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Oxford School for Global and Area Studies), the panel brought together interdisciplinary perspectives on populism, democratic participation, and representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović analyzed the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve explored how participants in France’s Yellow Vests movement sought to institutionalize grassroots assembly-based democracy. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez examined the exclusion of stateless and marginalized communities from international diplomacy, arguing for a “right to diplomacy.” Together, the contributions illuminated the evolving and contested meaning of “the people” in contemporary democratic politics.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On Thursday, March 5, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the thirteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” Bringing together scholars from political science, democratic theory, and critical diplomacy studies, the session addressed one of the most urgent questions in contemporary political analysis: how “the people” are imagined, institutionalized, contested, and reconfigured across different political settings. From post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and assembly-based democratic experiments to the exclusions embedded in international diplomacy, the panel examined the shifting boundaries of political representation in a time of democratic strain and institutional transformation.
The participants of the session were introduced by Reka Koleszar, ECPS intern. Chairing the session, Dr. Leila Alieva of the Oxford School for Global and Area Studies framed the discussion as the product of an increasingly mature and sophisticated intellectual agenda within the workshop series. As she observed, by the thirteenth session the series had reached a “quite intricate level of analysis,” with all three presentations deeply interconnected in their exploration of “the genesis, evolution, and formation of populism, and concepts and images related to that.” She underscored the broader strengths of the ECPS project—above all its multidisciplinary, comparative, and constructivist orientation. In a post-Cold War environment marked by uncertainty, complexity, and multiple interacting forces across political, social, and international levels, such a broad approach is particularly necessary. The rise of populism, she suggested, cannot be adequately understood within the limits of a single discipline; rather, it must be approached through the combined lenses of political science, international relations, democratic theory, and broader social inquiry.
Under Dr. Alieva’s chairmanship, the panel featured three speakers whose papers illuminated distinct yet overlapping dimensions of democratic representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović (University of Sarajevo) explored the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering a new framework for understanding inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms within a post-Dayton consociational order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve(Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain) examined how participants in the Yellow Vests movement in France sought to institutionalize direct democracy through popular assemblies, thereby pushing beyond protest toward constituent democratic experimentation. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (UNPO) extended the discussion into the international arena by arguing that diplomatic representation itself must be rethought as a pillar of democracy, especially for unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, and politically marginalized communities.
The session also benefited from the incisive engagement of its two discussants, Associate Professor Christopher N. Magno (Gannon University) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London). Their interventions not only drew out the conceptual strengths of the presentations but also situated them within wider comparative debates on populism, democratic innovation, sovereignty, and political exclusion. Together, chair, speakers, and discussants produced a rich exchange that revealed both the diversity of contemporary democratic struggles and the common tensions that run through them. As Dr. Alieva noted in her concluding reflections, the discussion demonstrated that populism often functions as a sign of deeper institutional pressure—an indication that inherited political forms are struggling to respond to changing social realities. Session 13 thus offered a compelling interdisciplinary inquiry into how democratic subjects are made, constrained, and reimagined across multiple arenas of political life.
Assist. Prof. Jasmin Hasanović: “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina”
Dr. Jasmin Hasanović, Assistant Professor and researcher in the Department of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo.
Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović presented a theoretically informed analysis of populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposing a conceptual rethinking of how “the people” are politically constructed within the country’s ethnically structured post-conflict order. Moving beyond dominant interpretations that treat populism as a thin ideology attached to ethno-nationalism, Dr. Hasanović advanced a discursive and relational understanding of populism grounded in Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical framework. His presentation examined how populist logics interact with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutionalized ethnic power-sharing system, producing multiple and sometimes contradictory constructions of the political subject known as “the people.”
Dr. Hasanović began by situating the Bosnian political system within its historical and institutional context. The end of the Bosnian war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement established a complex power-sharing arrangement among the country’s three dominant ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The agreement institutionalized a consociational structure that translated wartime territorial and political balances into a post-war governance framework characterized by parity, consensus mechanisms, and territorial division into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. This arrangement, while designed to stabilize a deeply divided society, also embedded ethnic identity into the very architecture of political representation and competition.
Within this institutional environment, political life has largely been structured through ethnically segmented arenas. Electoral competition and party organization tend to operate primarily within ethnic constituencies, resulting in parallel political subsystems rather than a fully integrated national political sphere. Existing scholarship, Dr. Hasanović observed, has therefore tended to interpret Bosnian politics through the lenses of ethnic nationalism, power-sharing institutions, or the challenges of democratic consolidation. When populism is discussed, it is frequently conceptualized either as “ethnic populism” or as a thin ideological layer attached to ethno-nationalist politics.
Dr. Hasanović challenged this prevailing approach by proposing that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina should instead be understood as a political logic that discursively constructs collective political subjectivities. Drawing on Laclau’s conceptualization, he defined populism not by its ideological content but by its form: a discursive strategy that constructs a political frontier between “the people” and an antagonistic order of power. In this perspective, populism does not mobilize a pre-existing people; rather, it actively constructs the people by linking heterogeneous social demands into what Laclau calls a “chain of equivalence.” When one demand temporarily comes to represent a wider set of grievances, it becomes an “empty signifier” capable of symbolically unifying those demands and establishing a political frontier between the people and those perceived as responsible for their grievances.
Building on this theoretical foundation, Dr. Hasanović argued that the ethnicized power-sharing system itself generates populist dynamics by producing persistent unmet political demands across society. Rather than viewing populism as an external threat to democratic institutions, he suggested that populist logics emerge from within the structural tensions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict governance system. In order to capture these dynamics, he identified three interconnected forms of populism operating within the Bosnian political landscape: inter-ethnic populism, intra-ethnic populism, and cross-ethnic populism.
The first and most visible form is inter-ethnic populism, which largely corresponds to what earlier research describes as ethno-nationalist populism. In this configuration, the populist frontier is constructed horizontally across ethnic groups rather than vertically between the people and elites. Political actors mobilize discourses that distinguish “our people” and “our elites” from “their people” and “their elites,” reinforcing antagonism among ethnic communities. Here, the “empty signifier” that unifies social demands is constrained by ethnic identity, meaning that only demands framed through ethnic belonging can enter the chain of equivalence. As a result, the political subject constructed through this form of populism is an ethnicized people whose grievances are directed toward perceived injustices within the constitutional order established after the war. Dr. Hasanović emphasized that ethnicity in this context is not simply a cultural category, but a politically constructed subject formed through populist articulation of dissatisfaction with the post-Dayton system.
The second form, intra-ethnic populism, emerges within the segmented political arenas created by the power-sharing arrangement. According to Dr. Hasanović, because electoral competition takes place largely within monoethnic constituencies, populist rhetoric frequently develops inside ethnic communities rather than across them. In this case, the populist frontier assumes a vertical form, opposing “our people” to “our corrupt elites.” Opposition parties and splinter political movements often deploy such narratives, accusing established ethnic leaders of monopolizing representation, capturing state institutions, and exploiting public resources through clientelistic networks. These actors frame themselves as authentic representatives of the people against entrenched political insiders. Yet despite its vertical orientation, intra-ethnic populism remains bounded by the ethnic framework. The political subject it constructs is still defined ethnically, and the critique of elites does not transcend the segmented structure of the political system.
The third and most fragile form identified by Dr. Hasanović is cross-ethnic populism, which attempts to construct a political subject that transcends ethnic divisions altogether. Unlike the previous forms, cross-ethnic populism articulates the people primarily as citizens rather than members of ethnic groups. It mobilizes grievances that cut across ethnic boundaries, including socio-economic inequality, corruption, demands for justice, and broader calls for institutional accountability. Dr. Hasanović pointed to civic protests, grassroots mobilizations, and civil society initiatives as examples of this form of populism. One illustrative moment occurred during the protests of 2013–2014, when demonstrators adopted the slogan “We are hungry” expressed simultaneously in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. By articulating a shared experience of economic hardship across linguistic variations, the slogan attempted to construct a unified citizenry opposed to an unresponsive political establishment.
Despite its emancipatory potential, however, cross-ethnic populism faces significant structural obstacles. Ethno-national elites frequently reinterpret cross-ethnic mobilizations as threats to their respective communities, portraying them as externally driven attempts to undermine group interests. Such reframing disrupts the formation of a durable chain of equivalence capable of unifying heterogeneous demands across the broader population. Consequently, cross-ethnic populist initiatives have struggled to produce a stable and lasting political subject capable of challenging the entrenched ethnopolitical order.
In conclusion, Dr. Hasanović argued that these three forms of populism interact dialectically within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system. Inter-ethnic populism reinforces ethnic fragmentation and inadvertently stabilizes the existing power-sharing framework, even when it rhetorically criticizes it. Intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities, challenging the dominance of entrenched elites while remaining confined to monoethnic arenas. Cross-ethnic populism, by contrast, represents an attempt to destabilize the entire hegemonic configuration by constructing a new political subjectivity beyond ethnic identity.
To Dr. Hasanović, these dynamics suggest that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be understood simply as a democratic threat or a corrective force. Rather, it operates as a political logic embedded within the structural conditions of a post-conflict power-sharing system. The Dayton constitutional order continuously generates antagonistic frontiers that shape how political actors construct and mobilize “the people.” As Dr. Hasanović emphasized, the concept of the people is never neutral or pre-given; it is always discursively mediated and shaped by the institutional and social dynamics of a particular society. His analysis therefore contributes to a deeper understanding of how populist logics function within divided post-conflict states and how the very meaning of “the people” remains contested, constructed, and continuously renegotiated in political practice.
Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve: “Institutionalizing the Assembled People”
Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve is Postdoctoral Researcher at Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain.
Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve presented a theoretically and empirically grounded exploration of grassroots democratic experimentation under the title “Institutionalizing the Assembled People.” Drawing on research derived from her doctoral dissertation, Dr. Van Outryve examined how ordinary citizens engaged in radical democratic practices during the Yellow Vests movement in France attempted not merely to deliberate collectively but also to institutionalize direct democratic governance. Her analysis offered an important contribution to contemporary debates on democratic theory by investigating how political actors outside formal institutions conceptualize and attempt to institutionalize forms of self-government.
The presentation began by situating the problem historically. For centuries, the processes of instituting democratic systems and making decisions on public affairs have largely been monopolized by professional political elites. Representative institutions, while formally democratic, have tended to concentrate both constitutive and decision-making authority in a specialized political class. Against this background, Dr. Van Outryve advanced the central hypothesis guiding her research: that ordinary citizens are capable not only of deciding on public affairs but also of determining the institutional procedures through which those decisions should be made. This hypothesis challenges the conventional model of democratic innovation, which typically proceeds from top-down reforms initiated by states or policymakers.
Dr. Van Outryve examined this proposition through extensive fieldwork conducted in the town of Commercy in northeastern France during and after the emergence of the Yellow Vests (Gilets Jaunes) movement in 2018. Over the course of two years, she undertook a comprehensive ethnographic study of local democratic practices that developed within the movement. Her research methods included participant observation in assemblies, demonstrations, and meetings; two rounds of interviews conducted before and after the municipal elections of 2020; a collective interview session lasting two days; and the collection of approximately 2,500 documents produced by the movement. Through this combination of qualitative methods, Dr. Van Outryve sought to reconstruct how participants themselves conceptualized and institutionalized their democratic experiment.
The theoretical orientation of the research was articulated through what Dr. Van Outryve termed “inductive political theory.” This approach seeks to bridge normative political theory and empirical research by deriving theoretical insights from the practices and reflections of political actors engaged in real-world democratic experiments. Her doctoral project pursued two parallel objectives: the elaboration of a normative democratic theory based on assembly-based direct democracy—what she refers to as “communist direct democracy,” inspired by the ideas of Murray Bookchin—and the empirical reconstruction of how such democratic practices were attempted by grassroots actors. By allowing participants themselves to address fundamental questions about democracy and self-government, the project aimed to generate a political theory grounded in lived democratic practice.
The empirical core of Dr. Van Outryve’s presentation focused on the case of Commercy, a town of roughly 5,400 inhabitants that became a notable site of democratic experimentation within the Yellow Vests movement. Like many other local groups across France, activists in Commercy initially organized daily assemblies in which participants gathered to deliberate collectively on political grievances and strategies. These assemblies operated according to principles of direct democracy: equality of participation, one person–one vote, and open deliberation without permanent leadership. Instead of formal leaders, the assemblies appointed rotating spokespersons tasked with conveying collective decisions. The assemblies also sought to coordinate with other similar groups, forming confederated networks of local assemblies.
At this early stage, these practices functioned primarily as prefigurative politics—that is, attempts to enact the democratic forms participants wished to see in society at large. However, the trajectory of the Commercy group evolved when some participants decided to contest the municipal elections in March 2020. Their objective, to Dr. Van Outryve, was not to assume traditional representative authority but rather to institutionalize the direct democratic practices that had emerged during the movement. The electoral list they presented proposed to transfer effective political authority to a popular assembly open to the residents of the town. Elected officials would remain formally responsible for administrative tasks, but their mandate would be strictly tied to decisions made by the assembly.
This transition from prefigurative activism to institutional design marked a crucial stage in the movement’s development. During the electoral campaign, participants engaged in what Dr. Van Outryve described as a constituent process, drafting several foundational documents intended to define the institutional architecture of this proposed system. Among these were a local constitution and a commitment charter specifying the relationship between elected officials and the popular assembly. Through this process, participants confronted a series of classical questions in political theory, including the nature of sovereignty, the boundaries of political authority, and the mechanisms through which democratic decisions should be made and revised.
One of the central theoretical dilemmas addressed by the group concerned what Dr. Van Outryve referred to as the “constituent paradox.” This refers to the problem of how a political community decides on the procedures through which it will decide—in other words, how to “decide on how to decide.” Participants grappled with this issue by collectively debating the rules governing deliberation, participation, and decision-making within the assembly. These discussions extended to practical questions such as where assemblies should be held, how information should be shared with the broader population, and how to address the challenges of participation and self-selection among citizens.
The resulting proposals envisioned the assembly as the central locus of political power. The assembly would deliberate on municipal issues, organize specialized commissions, determine decision-making procedures, and supervise the actions of elected representatives. At the same time, participants were acutely aware of the potential risks associated with direct democracy, including the possibility that assemblies might adopt decisions that could be perceived as unjust or undesirable. This concern led to the development of self-limiting institutions designed to regulate the exercise of collective power.
Dr. Van Outryve highlighted this dimension as a particularly significant aspect of the experiment. Drawing inspiration from historical precedents in ancient Greek democracy—particularly the institution of graphe paranomon, which allowed citizens to challenge laws adopted by the assembly—participants devised mechanisms through which decisions could be reviewed. One such mechanism involved the creation of a Citizens’ Constitutional Council, whose members would be selected by lot. This body would examine whether decisions taken by the assembly were compatible with the principles articulated in the preamble of the local constitution. If a decision were found inconsistent with these principles, it would be returned to the assembly for reconsideration.
Importantly, the safeguards envisioned by participants were not intended to constrain democratic debate or impose ideological boundaries on the assembly. Rather, they reflected a commitment to what Dr. Van Outryve described as the democratization of dissensus. Participants explicitly rejected the idea that assemblies should strive for unanimity or suppress political disagreement. Instead, they emphasized that conflict and disagreement are inherent features of democratic politics and should be managed collectively by citizens rather than monopolized by party competition within representative institutions.
This perspective also shaped their understanding of political neutrality and partisanship. While the movement sought to remain non-partisan and unaffiliated with established political parties, this stance did not imply the absence of political conflict. On the contrary, participants insisted that assemblies must remain open spaces where diverse viewpoints could be expressed and debated. The aim was therefore not to eliminate disagreement but to create institutional conditions in which political conflict could be deliberated among citizens themselves.
Throughout the presentation, Dr. Van Outryve underscored that the Commercy experiment represented a broader attempt to rethink foundational concepts in democratic theory through lived political practice. Participants revisited questions concerning representation, deliberation, participation, and constitutional authority, seeking to rearticulate them within a framework centered on assemblies rather than elected representatives. In doing so, they attempted to move beyond a model of democracy based primarily on consent to authority toward one in which citizens collectively exercise political power.
In concluding, Dr. Van Outryve emphasized that the creation of democratic institutions enabling widespread participation cannot be designed solely by theorists or political elites. Echoing the reflections of Cornelius Castoriadis, she argued that the development of non-alienating forms of democracy must ultimately emerge from the collective creativity and practical experimentation of the people themselves. The Commercy assemblies thus illustrate how grassroots movements can contribute to democratic theory by demonstrating that citizens are capable not only of governing themselves but also of collectively determining the institutional frameworks through which self-government may be realized.
Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez: “Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy”
Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is a Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.
Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez presented an ambitious and conceptually rich paper that examined democratization from a diplomatic perspective. Her presentation, “Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,”proposed that diplomacy should not be understood merely as a technical instrument of interstate relations, but as a normative and institutional domain deeply implicated in the realization—or denial—of democratic participation. In doing so, she shifted the discussion of democracy beyond domestic institutions and electoral representation toward the international arena, where questions of voice, visibility, recognition, and participation remain profoundly unequal.
The central argument of the presentation was that the exclusion of unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, minority communities, and non-sovereign political actors from meaningful diplomatic engagement constitutes a structural failure of democratic governance at both national and international levels. Drawing on critical and post-positivist approaches to diplomacy, Cancela Sánchez argued that diplomatic representation should be regarded as a foundational pillar of democracy rather than as an external or secondary concern. Her intervention therefore sought to expand the conceptual boundaries of democracy by foregrounding the institutions and practices through which political communities seek recognition, negotiate their futures, and participate in decisions that affect their lives.
The presentation opened with a reflection on the well-known phrase that begins the United Nations Charter: “We the Peoples of the United Nations.” This rhetorical commitment to peoples rather than merely states served as a point of departure for a critical inquiry into the actual functioning of multilateral diplomacy. Cancela Sánchez asked to what extent contemporary diplomatic institutions live up to this promise. While diplomacy has undoubtedly changed over recent decades—with broader issue agendas, the increasing involvement of multiple governmental and non-governmental actors, and expanding forums for participation—she emphasized that these developments have not eliminated the deep inequalities that shape access to diplomatic representation. Spaces of participation may have widened, but they remain uneven, contested, and structurally constrained.
A key contribution of the presentation lay in its conceptual discussion of diplomacy itself. Cancela Sánchez traced an evolution from classical, state-centric definitions toward broader and more socially embedded understandings. Traditional definitions present diplomacy as the conduct of business between states or as communication through official channels in a system of states. By contrast, post-positivist scholars have redefined diplomacy as a practice of representation structured through institutions and processes that manage relations among human beings more broadly. Particularly important for her argument was the idea that diplomats, like elected representatives, function as agents entrusted by principals. This analogy enabled her to draw a direct conceptual link between diplomatic representation and representative democracy.
On this basis, Cancela Sánchez explored the nexus between democracy and diplomacy. Although the two may pursue different immediate objectives—democracy oriented toward equality and freedom, diplomacy toward the peaceful advancement of interests—they nevertheless share important underlying principles, including participation, negotiation, representation, and cooperation. The question, then, is whether diplomacy can genuinely claim democratic legitimacy if it fails to reflect the full diversity of those in whose name it operates. Her answer was clearly negative: where entire peoples are denied meaningful access to diplomatic arenas, democracy is compromised at its foundations.
The presentation further argued that the absence of diplomatic representation has serious normative and legal consequences. Exclusion from diplomatic spaces silences communities in settings where decisions affecting their future are made. This, Cancela Sánchez suggested, compounds violations already recognized in international legal instruments concerning civil and political rights, Indigenous rights, labor rights, and participation. Such exclusions thus cannot be dismissed as procedural oversights; they represent systematic denials of political agency. In response, she drew on the recently developed concept of the right to diplomacy, which provides the normative framework for her analysis.
As presented by Cancela Sánchez, the right to diplomacy goes beyond mere presence or symbolic inclusion in international forums. It requires meaningful participation, including the right to be consulted, to negotiate, to provide free, prior, and informed consent, and to contribute to shaping the legal and institutional arrangements that govern one’s community. This framework challenges the hierarchical, state-centered organization of diplomacy by insisting that actors beyond sovereign states possess legitimate claims to diplomatic agency. Democratizing diplomacy, in this view, requires both normative and institutional transformation.
To illustrate the practical relevance of this argument, Cancela Sánchez examined the case of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991 to address the exclusion created by the formal requirement of recognized statehood for participation in international decision-making. UNPO, she argued, functions as an institutional workaround that enables unrepresented peoples and minority communities to engage international institutions, gain visibility, and mediate relationships with the broader international community. Yet it also reveals the limits of informal or substitute forms of representation when access to binding diplomatic power remains restricted.
Her first case study, Tibet, demonstrated the constraints of diplomatic action without sovereignty. The Tibetan government in exile has created institutional structures resembling a foreign ministry and established offices abroad to represent Tibetan interests. Tibetan representatives have engaged in negotiations and have, in some cases, received forms of ambassadorial recognition. Yet these interactions remain fundamentally precarious and unofficial. Governments may engage Tibet informally while avoiding formal recognition of its right to diplomatic participation. As Cancela Sánchez showed, Tibet’s diplomatic efforts therefore remain confined to the margins, illustrating the profound limitations imposed by the denial of formal standing.
The second case, East Timor, offered a contrasting example of what diplomatic representation can achieve when political space is opened. During the Indonesian occupation, East Timorese representatives used platforms such as UNPO to sustain international visibility, engage foreign governments and civil society, and keep humanitarian concerns on the global agenda. This sustained diplomatic representation contributed to the eventual conditions under which the East Timorese people could participate in a UN-supervised referendum in 1999. For Cancela Sánchez, East Timor demonstrated that diplomatic representation can make politically visible what would otherwise remain excluded from international negotiation and resolution.
The third case, the Chamorro people of Guam, revealed the paradoxes of disenfranchisement within a formal democratic order. Although Chamorro people are citizens of the United States, they lack full political representation within the institutions that govern them. At the same time, their appeals to international institutions regarding military expansion, decolonization, and cultural survival have encountered resistance. Through Guam, Cancela Sánchez underscored that diplomatic exclusion is not limited to non-state peoples external to democratic states; it can also affect communities formally located within them.
In conclusion, the presentation argued that exclusion from diplomatic spaces is a structural and democratic problem with far-reaching implications for self-determination, human rights, and cultural survival. While organizations such as UNPO provide valuable frameworks for advocacy and visibility, they cannot substitute for full diplomatic standing. Cancela Sánchez therefore called for a rethinking of both democracy and diplomacy, insisting that meaningful diplomatic participation should be recognized as a democratic right of all peoples. Her presentation made a compelling case that democratizing diplomacy is not peripheral to democratic theory but essential to any serious account of inclusive political representation in a deeply unequal international order.
Discussants’ Feedback
Feedback by Assoc. Prof. Christopher Magno
Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University.
Serving as discussant for Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Associate Professor Christopher Magno offered a series of reflections and critical questions engaging with the three presentations delivered in the panel. His comments highlighted the conceptual contributions of the papers while situating them within broader debates on populism, democratic innovation, and diplomatic representation. Rather than offering extensive critique, Assoc. Prof. Magno focused on identifying key analytical insights and raising questions that could further develop the presenters’ arguments.
Assoc. Prof. Magno began with a brief summary of Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted that the paper addressed an important puzzle: how populism operates in a post-conflict society where politics is already structured around ethnic power-sharing arrangements. Unlike many studies of populism that focus on Western democracies and conceptualize populism primarily as a vertical conflict between “the people” and political elites, Bosnia presents a distinct configuration in which political competition is embedded within a tri-ethnic institutional framework. Assoc. Prof. Magno highlighted Dr. Hasanović’s typology of inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populism as a useful analytical framework for understanding these dynamics. In this context, populism does not appear as a singular political logic but as a multi-layered phenomenon shaped by ethnic competition between groups, political rivalry within groups, and occasional civic mobilization across ethnic boundaries.
Expanding on this point, Assoc. Prof. Magno emphasized that inter-ethnic populism remains the dominant form in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as political actors often frame politics as a struggle between ethnic communities. Political elites mobilize historical grievances, wartime memories, and narratives of collective threat in order to maintain political support. In contrast, intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities by challenging the authority of established leaders and accusing them of corruption or betrayal. Cross-ethnic populism, while comparatively weaker, attempts to articulate common socio-economic grievances—such as unemployment, corruption, and inequality—across ethnic divisions. However, Assoc. Prof. Magno observed that the institutional structure of the Bosnian political system continually redirects political competition back into ethnic categories, thereby constraining the development of broader civic mobilization.
Building on Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Assoc. Prof. Magno proposed an additional analogy drawn from contemporary digital politics. He suggested that similar dialectical dynamics of identity formation can be observed in online communities shaped by algorithmic sorting and psychographic profiling. Social media platforms often cluster users into identity-based networks that reinforce shared narratives and ideological affinities. Within these networks, horizontal conflicts between different online “tribes” mirror the dynamics of inter-group populism, while internal disputes between members and community leaders resemble intra-group populist tensions. Although presented as an illustrative parallel rather than a direct theoretical claim, this observation pointed toward possible connections between identity-driven populism and digitally mediated political environments.
Assoc. Prof. Magno then turned to Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve’s presentation on the institutionalization of popular assemblies emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. He framed the paper around a central question: whether grassroots democratic practices can be transformed into durable governing institutions. The case of the Commercy citizens’ assembly, he noted, represents an attempt not merely to protest representative democracy but to construct an alternative institutional model grounded in direct citizen participation. By drafting a local constitution and designing institutional mechanisms linking elected officials to the citizens’ assembly, participants effectively acted as a constituent power seeking to redefine how political authority should be exercised.
In discussing the analytical contribution of the paper, Assoc. Prof. Magno identified three central challenges associated with institutionalizing assembly-based democracy. The first concerns the boundaries of political participation—that is, who constitutes “the people” in such assemblies. While the Commercy model opened participation to all residents, voluntary participation raises questions about representativeness and the risk of self-selection bias. The second challenge relates to deliberative procedures. Assemblies initially served as spaces for expressing grievances but gradually evolved into arenas for collective deliberation in which preferences could be revised through discussion. Assoc. Prof. Magno connected this process to broader theories of deliberative democracy, including the idea of the public sphere as a space where citizens transform private concerns into collectively debated public issues. The third challenge involves the limits of power, particularly the tension between radical democratic experimentation and the existing institutional framework of representative government. Even when assemblies claim political authority, they must operate within established legal and electoral systems, raising questions about whether such initiatives can transform existing institutions or whether they will ultimately be absorbed by them.
Finally, Assoc. Prof. Magno briefly addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He highlighted the paper’s effort to rethink the relationship between diplomacy and democracy by questioning whether state diplomacy genuinely reflects the diverse populations it claims to represent. In democratic theory, diplomacy is often assumed to aggregate the will of a population through state representation. Yet in practice, Assoc. Prof. Magno noted, states frequently operate as strategic actors pursuing national interests rather than consultative representatives of internal constituencies. This tension, he suggested, creates a gap between a consultative model of diplomatic representation and a sovereignty-driven model in which governments act autonomously in international negotiations. The “right to diplomacy” framework discussed in the presentation seeks to address this gap by proposing that communities inadequately represented by states—including Indigenous peoples and non-self-governing territories—should gain more direct or mediated access to diplomatic platforms.
Across his remarks, Assoc. Prof. Magno concluded by posing several questions intended to stimulate further discussion among the presenters. These included whether populism might strengthen democratic participation under certain conditions, whether assembly democracy can realistically function as a governing system, and how diplomatic representation might be reimagined to better reflect the voices of marginalized communities. Through these interventions, his commentary framed the session as a broader exploration of how “the people” are constructed, represented, and institutionalized across different political arenas—from post-conflict societies and grassroots democratic movements to the structures of international diplomacy.
Feedback by Dr. Amedeo Varriale
Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism.
Serving as second discussant for Session 13, Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered thoughtful reflections on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His commentary emphasized the analytical contributions of the papers while situating them within broader comparative debates on populism, democratic experimentation, and diplomatic representation. Drawing on his own comparative research on political ideology and populism, Dr. Varriale focused particularly on the conceptual frameworks advanced by the presenters and their potential applicability beyond the specific cases examined.
Dr. Varriale began by addressing Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He commended the paper’s effort to conceptualize populism within the context of a post-Dayton political system characterized by externally imposed power-sharing institutions and deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. In his view, the principal strength of the work lies in its proposed typology distinguishing inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms. This categorization, he argued, provides a useful analytical framework for understanding how populist mobilization operates in Bosnia’s consociational political environment.
Beyond its immediate empirical application, Dr. Varriale emphasized the broader analytical value of the typology. He suggested that these categories possess considerable “travelability,” enabling scholars to apply them to different political contexts outside the Balkans. For example, he noted that dynamics resembling inter-ethnic populism can be observed in cases where political actors mobilize territorial or cultural divisions within a state. He pointed to early iterations of the Northern League in Italy as a case in which political mobilization drew upon regional divisions between northern and southern Italians while simultaneously employing anti-elitist rhetoric.
Similarly, the concept of intra-ethnic populism resonated, in his view, with developments associated with several left-wing populist movements across Europe. Parties such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, and Syriza in Greece have often framed their political discourse in terms of reclaiming democratic power from corrupt or detached elites and returning agency to ordinary citizens. In such cases, populist rhetoric may contribute to enhancing political participation by giving voice to constituencies that perceive themselves as excluded from established decision-making processes. Cross-ethnic populism, although less common, can also appear in transnational or supra-national initiatives that attempt to mobilize citizens across national boundaries, such as the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 associated with Yanis Varoufakis.
While praising the conceptual innovation of Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Dr. Varriale also raised a question regarding the relative weight of populism in certain Bosnian political parties. Specifically, he wondered whether some parties often categorized as populist might more accurately be understood primarily as ethno-nationalist formations that employ populist rhetoric instrumentally. Parties such as the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) may rely heavily on ethnonationalist narratives, with populism functioning as a secondary strategic component rather than the core ideological element. This observation, he suggested, may represent a fruitful avenue for further reflection within the broader theoretical framework proposed in the paper.
Turning to the presentation by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France, Dr. Varriale highlighted the paper’s relevance for understanding contemporary debates about democratic participation. At a time when representative democratic institutions are often perceived as increasingly detached from ordinary citizens, the case examined in the paper illustrates how grassroots movements attempt to operationalize alternative democratic forms at the local level.
Dr. Varriale emphasized that one of the principal contributions of the research lies in its detailed reconstruction of how direct democratic practices can be translated into institutional arrangements. While the concept of direct democracy is well known in theoretical discussions, empirical studies examining its practical implementation remain comparatively rare. In this respect, the paper’s analysis of the Citizens’ Assembly in Commercy provides valuable insights into the institutional design, deliberative processes, and practical challenges associated with such democratic experiments. In particular, he noted that the tensions described between the Citizens’ Assembly and the municipal council illustrate a long-standing theoretical dilemma: the coexistence—and often conflict—between radical forms of direct democracy and the institutional structures of representative liberal democracy.
Dr. Varriale also observed several parallels between the democratic practices described in the paper and developments associated with European left-wing populist movements. Mechanisms such as imperative mandates, the principle of one person–one vote, and participatory decision-making processes resemble organizational features adopted by parties such as Italy’s Five Star Movement. These parallels suggest that contemporary movements seeking to revitalize democratic participation frequently converge around similar institutional innovations, even when operating in distinct political contexts.
While commending the sophistication of the theoretical and methodological framework—particularly the extensive fieldwork underpinning the study— Dr. Varriale suggested that future research might further situate the case within the broader political context of France. Additional discussion of the political conditions that facilitated the emergence of the Yellow Vests movement, as well as the reactions of state institutions, could enrich the analysis. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the paper successfully demonstrates how social movements can function as laboratories for democratic experimentation.
Finally, Dr. Varriale addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He noted that the case studies presented—Tibet, Timor-Leste, and Guam—highlight different forms of political exclusion within the contemporary international order. The example of Guam, in particular, drew his attention as a striking illustration of democratic contradiction within an established democratic state. Despite holding US citizenship, residents of Guam lack voting representation in Congress and cannot participate in presidential elections, revealing a gap between democratic principles and constitutional structures.
Dr. Varriale observed that among the cases examined, Timor-Leste represents the most evident example of diplomatic success, as international engagement ultimately culminated in a referendum enabling self-determination. This outcome illustrates how diplomatic advocacy and international visibility can, under certain conditions, contribute to political transformation.
Concluding his remarks, Dr. Varriale reflected on the tension between sovereignty and democratic inclusion in international diplomacy. Sovereignty, he noted, provides a framework of order and legitimacy that structures diplomatic relations among states. Yet, at the same time, the formal authority associated with sovereignty may obscure the political voices of communities that lack recognized statehood. The challenge, therefore, lies in reconciling the stability provided by the sovereign state system with the normative imperative to expand political voice and representation within international decision-making processes.
Responses
Response by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez
In her brief response to the discussants’ remarks, Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez elaborated on several aspects of her research concerning diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy,” while clarifying the broader scope of her study beyond the case studies presented during the session.
Cancela Sánchez first addressed comments regarding the role of the UNPO. She emphasized that the examples discussed in her presentation represent only a small portion of the organization’s broader membership and historical trajectory. Over the years, UNPO has included communities with diverse political aspirations, ranging from groups seeking full statehood to those primarily concerned with securing recognition, representation, and voice in international decision-making processes. In some cases, UNPO has served as a platform through which political entities later achieved internationally recognized statehood. Estonia and Latvia, for example, were once members before eventually becoming sovereign states. These trajectories demonstrate that UNPO can function both as a diplomatic platform for stateless nations and as a transitional space within broader processes of political recognition.
At the same time, Cancela Sánchez stressed that not all members pursue independence. For many communities—such as the Chamorro people of Guam—the central objective is not statehood but meaningful political representation and the ability to articulate their interests in national and international arenas. Such cases illustrate the diversity of political claims that exist beyond the state-centered diplomatic order.
Responding further to methodological questions, Cancela Sánchez clarified that the “right to diplomacy” framework, developed by Costas Constantinou and Fiona McConnell in 2023, forms the conceptual foundation of her research. This framework builds on post-positivist and critical approaches to diplomacy, seeking to rethink diplomatic practice by emphasizing the representation of peoples rather than exclusively sovereign states. As she noted, the framework is still relatively recent, and ongoing research—including her own work—aims to contribute to its further theoretical and empirical development.
Finally, Cancela Sánchez briefly addressed the broader structural context of international diplomacy. Contemporary diplomatic institutions remain fundamentally state-centered, and even the limited mechanisms created to include non-state actors often impose significant barriers to meaningful participation. Forums such as ECOSOC consultative mechanisms, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and the UN Forum on Minority Issues provide important avenues for engagement, yet they remain uneven and insufficient to guarantee direct diplomatic representation for all affected communities. Her research therefore seeks to highlight these structural limitations while exploring pathways toward a more inclusive and representative diplomatic order.
Response by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve
In her response to the discussants’ remarks, Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve elaborated on several conceptual and practical issues raised during the discussion of her paper on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. Her reflections focused primarily on the questions of participation, institutional feasibility, and the democratic risks associated with direct forms of governance.
Addressing first the issue of participation, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that the legitimacy of an assembly-based democratic system fundamentally depends on sustained citizen involvement. If only a small number of participants attend assemblies, the democratic claim of such institutions would be weakened. However, she emphasized that participants in the Commercy experiment did not conceptualize participation merely in numerical terms or as a short-term challenge. Rather, they viewed it as a long-term political process. According to this perspective, meaningful participation becomes more likely when citizens perceive that their deliberations have real political consequences. In contrast, participatory initiatives that lack decision-making authority often experience declining engagement over time.
Dr. Van Outryve illustrated this dynamic by referring to the French Citizens’ Climate Convention, which demonstrated the capacity of ordinary citizens to deliberate effectively but ultimately saw several of its proposals set aside by the government. For activists in Commercy, such outcomes underscored the importance of granting assemblies genuine decision-making power. When citizens recognize that their contributions directly influence policy outcomes, the motivation to participate is expected to increase. Empirical experiences from nearby municipalities experimenting with similar institutional models suggest that high levels of engagement are possible. In one neighboring locality where participatory institutions were introduced, approximately half of the population attended assemblies, indicating that even non-activist residents may become involved when participatory mechanisms are institutionalized.
Dr. Van Outryve further explained that the solutions proposed by activists to address participation barriers emerged directly from their practical experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization. Recognizing the social constraints faced by working-class participants—such as irregular work schedules, family responsibilities, and limited free time—the movement explored various institutional adaptations. These included organizing multiple assemblies on the same topic at different times, creating mechanisms to synthesize and circulate deliberative arguments across meetings, and allowing citizens to vote either in person or through accessible channels. Additional measures such as childcare services, transportation assistance, and flexible meeting schedules were also considered to facilitate broader participation.
Another institutional mechanism designed to compensate for potential low attendance was the introduction of a local citizens’ referendum. Under this arrangement, if a specified portion of the electorate—approximately ten percent—challenged a decision adopted by the assembly, the issue could be referred to a broader vote. This mechanism aimed to ensure that decisions retained broader democratic legitimacy even when participation in assemblies fluctuated.
Turning to the broader question of whether assembly-based democracy could realistically function as a governing system, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that significant structural obstacles currently exist. Assemblies attempting to exercise political authority must operate within the framework of representative institutions that continue to dominate contemporary political systems. Nevertheless, she emphasized that the long-term strategy envisioned by participants extends beyond isolated municipal experiments. Inspired by traditions of communalist political theory, activists envisioned a network of self-governed municipalities confederated through delegated and recallable mandates. Such a configuration would create a form of dual power between existing state institutions and a confederation of locally governed communes.
Dr. Van Outryve also noted that similar governance structures have been attempted in other contexts, citing the example of the Kurdish political experiment in Rojava as an illustration of how assembly-based forms of governance can operate at larger territorial scales under particular historical conditions. However, she acknowledged that the pathways leading to such transformations differ significantly depending on political context.
Finally, responding to concerns about the potential risks associated with direct democracy—including the possibility of authoritarian or exclusionary outcomes—Dr. Van Outryve emphasized the central role that deliberation plays in the democratic vision articulated by participants in Commercy. For activists involved in the movement, collective deliberation is not simply a procedural step but a transformative political practice capable of reshaping citizens’ perspectives. Their experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization reinforced the belief that sustained dialogue among citizens can challenge entrenched political divisions and foster mutual understanding.
In this sense, the Commercy experiment reflects a broader conviction that democratic renewal may depend not only on institutional reform but also on the creation of participatory spaces in which citizens engage directly with one another in the ongoing process of collective self-government.
Response by Dr. Jasmin Hasanović
In his response to the discussants’ comments, Dr. Jasmin Hasanović elaborated on several conceptual aspects of his framework for analyzing populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Addressing questions raised by the discussants, he clarified both the theoretical foundations of his argument and the structural conditions that shape the forms of populism observed in the country’s post-conflict political order.
Dr. Hasanović began by reflecting on the broader question of whether populism inherently deepens political division. In his view, political division should not be regarded as an anomaly but rather as an intrinsic feature of political life. From this perspective, populism does not generate social antagonisms ex nihilo; rather, it operates as a political logic that articulates and organizes existing tensions within society. Drawing on a discursive approach inspired by Ernesto Laclau, Dr. Hasanović emphasized that populism links disparate grievances into a chain of equivalence through which a political subject—the people—is constructed in opposition to a perceived adversary.
Within the Bosnian context, however, the construction of “the people” has been profoundly shaped by the institutional architecture established after the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to Dr. Hasanović, the consociational power-sharing arrangement effectively replaced a civic conception of sovereignty with an ethnically structured system of political representation. Instead of the demos functioning as the primary bearer of sovereignty, political subjectivity has largely been organized around ethnically defined collectivities. In this sense, Bosnia and Herzegovina operates less as a conventional liberal democracy than as an ethnocratic system in which ethnic identity constitutes the central axis of political competition.
This institutional configuration helps explain why inter-ethnic populism remains more prominent than cross-ethnic forms of mobilization. Political actors frequently construct antagonistic narratives that position one ethnic community against others, thereby reinforcing horizontal divisions within society. Dr. Hasanović noted that such dynamics cannot be understood independently of the broader institutional and territorial arrangements established after the war. The country’s administrative divisions, including the highly autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, correspond largely to ethnically homogeneous territories that emerged through wartime processes of ethnic cleansing and displacement.
Furthermore, the logic of consociational democracy itself reinforces ethnic segmentation. As theorized by Arend Lijphart, such systems grant ethnic groups significant autonomy in matters considered central to their identity, including cultural, linguistic, and religious affairs. While intended as mechanisms of conflict management, these institutional arrangements also contribute to the entrenchment of ethnic political identities. Over time, the ethnic principle has extended beyond representation to shape broader patterns of social and political life, producing what Dr. Hasanović described as a deeply pillarized society.
Within this framework, Dr. Hasanović also addressed the question raised by discussants regarding the relationship between populism and ethnonationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather than treating populism as a fixed ideological label, he proposed understanding it as a political logic through which actors construct antagonistic boundaries. From this perspective, ethnonationalist parties may employ populist discourse when mobilizing their constituencies against perceived adversaries, even if ethnonationalism remains their primary ideological foundation.
Given these structural constraints, Dr. Hasanović suggested that the most realistic arena for democratic transformation may lie within intra-ethnic political competition. In the current institutional setting, political contestation largely unfolds within ethnically segmented party systems. Strengthening pluralism and ideological differentiation within these arenas could create conditions for more substantive democratic competition. Over time, the emergence of ideologically convergent actors across different ethnic constituencies might facilitate more cooperative forms of power-sharing and potentially open space for broader cross-ethnic political projects.
In this sense, Dr. Hasanović concluded that the reconstruction of “the people” as a democratic political subject remains a central challenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Expanding pluralism within existing political arenas may represent an incremental pathway through which more inclusive forms of democratic politics could eventually emerge.
Closing Remarks by Dr. Leila Alieva
Dr. Leila Alieva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA).
In her closing remarks, Dr. Leila Alieva reflected on the key themes and insights that emerged from the thirteenth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series. She expressed appreciation to the presenters, discussants, and audience for what she described as a rich and intellectually stimulating discussion that not only addressed important questions but also generated new avenues for inquiry.
Dr. Alieva emphasized that the presentations collectively highlighted populism as a broader political signal—an indicator of underlying tensions and contradictions within contemporary political systems. In this sense, populism can be understood as a symptom of institutional arrangements that increasingly lag behind evolving societal, political, and economic dynamics. The session’s contributions illustrated how such pressures often manifest through contested relationships between society, political actors, and institutional frameworks.
Reflecting on the individual presentations, Dr. Alieva noted how Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s analysis illuminated the enduring influence of institutional legacies in shaping the construction of “the people” within post-conflict political systems. Similarly, the work presented by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve shed light on tensions between different models of democracy, particularly the contrast between established representative institutions and emerging participatory practices through grassroots assemblies. These dynamics illustrated how societies may attempt to compensate for perceived institutional shortcomings by experimenting with alternative forms of democratic organization.
Dr. Alieva also highlighted the importance of the comparative perspective raised during the discussion. As noted by the discussants, examining cases across different regions—from Eastern and Western Europe to post-Soviet contexts—revealed both shared patterns and distinctive trajectories in the relationship between populism, democracy, and institutional change. Finally, she underscored the significance of Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez’s contribution, which addressed the often-overlooked question of representation and inclusion within diplomatic institutions.
Conclusion
Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered an interdisciplinary exploration of how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political contexts. By examining cases that ranged from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict constitutional order to grassroots democratic experimentation in France and the diplomatic marginalization of stateless or underrepresented communities, the panel illuminated the multiple arenas in which the meaning of popular sovereignty is negotiated. Collectively, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is neither a stable nor a self-evident political category; rather, it is continuously shaped through institutional arrangements, political struggles, and discursive practices.
The discussions also revealed a shared analytical thread across the three papers: the recognition that contemporary democratic tensions often arise from mismatches between evolving social demands and the institutional frameworks designed to represent them. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing structures constrains the formation of broader civic political subjects. In the French case, grassroots assemblies reflect citizens’ attempts to reclaim agency in the face of perceived distance between representatives and the represented. In the international arena, the exclusion of unrepresented peoples from diplomatic participation exposes structural limitations within a state-centered global order that formally invokes “the peoples” while largely privileging sovereign states.
In sum, the session underscored that debates about populism, democratic participation, and representation cannot be confined to a single institutional domain. Instead, they span local, national, and international levels, revealing interconnected struggles over voice, legitimacy, and political inclusion. By bringing these diverse perspectives into dialogue, Session 13 contributed to a deeper understanding of the dynamic processes through which democratic subjects are formed and contested. In doing so, it reinforced the broader aim of the ECPS workshop series: to provide an interdisciplinary platform for critically examining the evolving meanings of democracy and “the people” in a rapidly changing political world.
In this reflective Voice of Youth (VoY) commentary for International Women’s Day, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how gender hierarchy persists not only through overt exclusion but through the subtle normalization of unequal recognition. Using the contrasting reactions to the US men’s and women’s hockey gold medals at the 2026 Winter Olympics, she argues that women’s athletic success is still too often treated as supplementary rather than self-evidently equal. The issue, she suggests, lies less in explicit insult than in the quiet cultural codes that frame male achievement as the default and female achievement as the exception. By focusing on laughter, tone, and seemingly minor acts of dismissal, Papapavlou offers a sharp critique of how misogyny survives in normalized everyday reactions, revealing the distance that still separates formal equality from genuine social recognition.
By Emmanouela Papapavlou*
At the 2026 Winter Olympic Games, the United States won two gold medals in hockey. One by the men’s team. One by the women’s team. Same sport, same flag on the chest, same summit. A few hours later, in a conversation with the President of the United States, it is announced that the men’s team will be invited to the White House to be honored for their victory. And in the flow of the conversation, comes the phrase, “we have to invite the women too.” The players burst into laughter. A spontaneous, collective, light laugh.
It was not an insult. It was not an attack. Nothing explicitly degrading or offensive was said. And yet, in those few seconds, something deeper was revealed. Because the women’s victory entered the sentence as a footnote. As a reminder. As something that “also” happened.
A gold medal has no gender. The flag is raised the same way, the anthem sounds the same, while on paper, in official statements, in medal tables, the two achievements are absolutely equal. And yet, in our collective reaction, they are not. The men’s category is considered the default version of sport. The women’s is the special category. The men’s is the prototype, while the women’s is treated as its variation.
And this was not born in that room. It did not begin with a joke. It is the product of a culture that has learned to treat male success as a given and female success as an exception. As something worthy of congratulations, but not of the same unquestioned recognition. As something that “it would be good to honor as well.”
We live in 2026 and sport remains deeply male-dominated. Not only in terms of funding and visibility, but in symbolism. The hero, the captain, the leader, the warrior. Think about it. The images that accompany these words are still male. When a woman wins, we often describe her journey as “inspiring,” her endurance as “moving,” her presence as a “role model.” When a man wins, we speak of dominance, power, greatness. One victory moves us. The other confirms expectations.
What is most troubling, however, is not the difference in adjectives. It is that the laughter caused no discomfort. There was no pause. No split second of silence suggesting something was off. It felt natural. And that sense of naturalness is the problem. So why did it feel so natural in the first place?
Misogynistic mentality today rarely appears through shouting. It does not openly declare that “women are worth less.” It shows up in subtle tones. In inflections. In glances. In “jokes” that pass unnoticed. In the familiar “come on, don’t take it so seriously.” In an invitation framed like an obligation. In an achievement treated as an addition rather than as an unquestioned equal.
These small things, which seem insignificant, are what sustain the larger structure. As with every form of gender inequality, the root does not lie only in extreme incidents. It lies in what we have learned to consider normal. In the fact that unequal treatment no longer surprises us. In the fact that it does not bother us enough to react. In the fact that we laugh too or remain silent.
That is how hierarchy is built without ever naming it. Through small concessions. Through subtle diminishments. Through a society that speaks of equality on paper, yet in practice continues to place the male experience at the center and the female one at the margins. If the medal is equal, why isn’t the reaction?
And today, on International Women’s Day, we will once again speak about rights, achievements, and struggles that were fought to get us here. We will honor the women who fought to stand on fields that did not want them, in competitions that did not count them, in societies that preferred them silent. For every woman who spent countless hours training, who endured doubt, mockery, less funding, less coverage, less recognition. For every woman who reached the top knowing that even there she would have to prove her worth all over again, only for the very country she represented to remind her, the next day, with a laugh, that her effort and her victory were not quite as important.
This is not about oversensitivity. It is not about “political correctness.” It is about value. If a woman’s success requires a reminder in order to be acknowledged, then it is not considered self-evident. If inclusion provokes laughter, then equality has not taken root. It has merely been legislated.
So the question is not whether someone had bad intentions. The question is why diminishment fits so easily inside a joke. Why the idea that “we have to invite the women too” sounds like an add-on rather than an obvious part of the sentence. Why, even today, female success requires clarification.
Perhaps because our sense of normal has not changed as much as we think. Perhaps because the equality we proclaim has not yet moved from law into consciousness. And until it does, we will continue to encounter misogyny not only in the loud and blatant moments, but in the small, smiling ones.
The issue is not to stop laughing. The issue is to start asking ourselves what exactly we find funny.
(*)Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com
In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian offers a penetrating account of Iran at a moment of war, repression, and political uncertainty. As the Israel/US–Iran conflict deepens and succession struggles intensify in Tehran, he argues that the central issue is the systematic erasure of Iranian popular agency. For Dr. Arian, the Islamic Republic has evolved from an ideological revolutionary order into an increasingly militarized system—“basically a killing machine”—while external intervention risks further marginalizing the people in whose name it claims to act. Moving from everyday micropower and censorship to the IRGC’s rise, social humiliation, and the politics of war, he underscores a stark reality: neither foreign powers nor clerical elites genuinely represent the Iranian people.
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian—Iranian American writer and journalist, and Assistant Professor of Creative Writing at Binghamton University—offers a powerful and deeply textured analysis of Iran’s current condition at a moment of extraordinary peril. As the Israel/US–Iran war expands into a broader regional conflict marked by bombardment, civilian displacement, and intensifying regime-change rhetoric, Dr. Arian cautions against narratives that erase the agency of the Iranian people themselves. In a context where President Donald Trump has demanded Iran’s “unconditional surrender,” openly declared an interest in shaping the country’s postwar leadership, and where succession debates have reportedly intensified following the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Dr. Arian’s central warning is stark: “neither of them has anything to do with the Iranian people.”
That insistence on popular agency—and on its systematic denial—runs through the interview as a whole. For Dr. Arian, Iran’s predicament cannot be reduced either to foreign pressure alone or to a simplistic image of “clerical rule.” Rather, he describes a political system that has evolved over 47 years from an ideological revolutionary order into something far more militarized, coercive, and socially corrosive. What began with “a very strong ideological core, surrounded by a security apparatus,” he argues, has gradually become “less and less ideological and more and more militarized.” In his starkest formulation, the regime today is “basically a killing machine,” one whose relationship to society has been reduced to a binary of “friend and enemy.”
Yet Dr. Arian’s account is not confined to the spectacular violence of war and mass repression. One of the interview’s greatest strengths lies in its insistence that authoritarian domination in Iran is reproduced through everyday practices, cultural control, and administrative routines. Recalling his own childhood and youth, he explains that in the 1980s and 1990s one “felt the presence of the state almost on your skin.” From school rituals and anti-American iconography to compulsory hijab and the disciplining of bodies, the regime exercised what he calls a “very Foucauldian kind of presence of power in daily life.” The same logic extended into literature and language: censorship, exile, and the weakening of Persian literary culture did not merely restrict expression but also narrowed the horizons of political imagination itself.
At the same time, Dr. Arian foregrounds the uneven social distribution of repression. The Islamic Republic, he notes, presents itself internationally as a defender of “the poor, the wretched of the earth, the underdog,” yet “nobody has suffered at its hands more than the poor.” Women, Baha’is, workers, and peripheral communities have borne disproportionate burdens of exclusion, persecution, and violence.
Against this backdrop, his analysis of the current war is especially sobering. If military intervention deepens, he warns, “the will of the people becomes the last thing that counts.” The core question, then, is not simply whether the regime survives, but whether Iranians themselves can recover political agency from both authoritarian rulers and external powers claiming to act in their name.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Assistant Professor Amir Ahmed Arian, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Iran Regime’s Presence Felt Omnipresent
Billboard depicting Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei and Imam Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini on a building wall in Tehran, Iran, April 2018. The portraits honor the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ruhollah Khomeini (Supreme Leader 1979–1989), and his successor Ali Khamenei (Supreme Leader 1989–2026), whose images frequently appear in public spaces as symbols of the regime’s ideological authority. Photo: Dreamstime.
Professor Amir Ahmed Arian, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Having grown up and begun your literary career inside Iran, how would you describe the everyday texture of life under Iran’s clerical-authoritarian system? At the level of routines—schooling, workplaces, gender norms, religion, and bureaucracy—how do these micro-practices reproduce obedience, negotiation, or subtle forms of resistance?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: In Iran, one caveat I have to give at the beginning—which will apply to all my answers—is that when we talk about the Islamic Republic, we are talking about 47 years of rule by this political system, and it has evolved and changed a lot over time. So, the practices that you mentioned—the way they were conducted in the 1980s and the 1990s—are very different from those in 2000 or 2010. The rulers have changed a lot as well. Depending on who the president was, society changed dramatically. And even more importantly, Iranian society itself sheds its skin very quickly, generation after generation.
What you see among young people now—this generation—has very little to do with my generation. People who were born around the time of the revolution are now middle-aged, and the twenty-somethings today do not really listen to us or care much about what we think. So, what I am saying is mainly founded on my own personal experience growing up there. I left Iran in 2011, and over the last fifteen years the country has changed quite dramatically. So, what I say is less a comprehensive analysis of what is going on in Iran and more an account based on my own personal experience.
To answer your question, growing up in Iran in the 1980s and the 1990s, you really did feel the presence of the state, because that was the strictest period after the revolution. After the reformist movement in the late 1990s, things began to open up. But in those first two decades, you felt the presence of the state almost on your skin.
It was overwhelming and omnipresent all the time. To give you one example, the way they tried to inculcate their foreign policy in the mind of a child was that throughout my education—during elementary school, high school, and later in college, when I attended the University of Tehran—there were massive flags of the US and Israel painted on the ground in front of the gates of all those institutions.
So, when you walked into the school or through the university gate, you could not even enter without stepping on them. Imagine doing that for twelve years in school and then five years in college—almost every day. Not just me, but millions of children across the country stepped on the US and Israeli flags in order to enter school. Just imagine what that does to your unconscious mind—how it shapes the way you see the world unwittingly, beyond what you consciously know or learn.
For women especially, there was another, much more aggressive layer, which was the compulsory hijab. This started in elementary school. Six-year-old girls had to wear uniforms and maghnaeh, these tight scarves, and they had to keep them on throughout the day. Of course, in public spaces there was also a very strict dress code for women. Women could not appear in the street without complying with it. I do not think anything embodies the aggressive presence of the state in all aspects of daily life as clearly as the compulsory hijab.
These are just two small examples.
The way the system worked was that, instead of relying only on a top-down system of propaganda, there was also the presence of micropower spread throughout society. These mechanisms were designed to strictly control bodies and constantly remind you that the state is here, and the state is watching you. So, it was a very Foucauldian kind of presence of power in daily life.
Iran’s System Is Not Just Clerical Rule—It Is a Militarized Security State
Analysts often reduce Iran’s system to “clerical rule,” yet your work suggests a far more complex configuration of institutions. How should we conceptualize the Iranian regime today—as a theocratic regime, a bureaucratic-security state, or a hybrid authoritarian system combining ideology, patronage networks, and coercive institutions?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: It’s basically all of the above. From the beginning of the revolution, the system has had a very strong ideological core, surrounded by a security apparatus. And you have the Revolutionary Guards, which constitute a very complicated and vast network of people. Within it, there are individuals who are completely cynical and technocratic, or those who are there to run their own businesses through military means, as well as truly apocalyptic warriors who want to bring about Armageddon and believe they are involved in some sort of end-of-the-world battle.
In between, you have all kinds of government bureaucracies and institutions that try to find a foothold in this network.
But the point is that, as time has gone on—from the beginning of the revolution to now, over these 47 years—the Iranian government has become less and less ideological and more and more militarized. So right now, more than anything, it resembles something like a European fascist regime in the 1930s and 1940s, one that was completely reduced to security forces. It is basically a killing machine. And the last moment when we saw that very clearly was this January.
On January 8 and 9, they opened fire with live ammunition on unarmed protesters all over the country and killed at least 8,000 people. I know that number is very contested, but at this point we have 8,000 names identified without a shadow of doubt. The organization that documented this is also working on verifying 11,000 more names. Many of them are already partially verified, but the process of full verification is ongoing. So even if half of that is true, we are looking at a five-digit death toll in basically 36 hours, which would make it the bloodiest massacre a state has committed against its own population in modern history.
That alone should make it very clear that the ideological façade and the bureaucratic elements are collapsing. The ideological façade is gone, because what they did then cannot be justified by any religious doctrine—or, frankly, by any ideological doctrine other than some form of fascism, perhaps something like Shia fascism. And the bureaucratic veneer is also very thin now; I would even argue that it has largely disappeared. Because no reasonable governing entity—whether a state or any other governing body—would do that simply to control society. You only do that when you see your own people as the enemy. There is really no other explanation.
So right now, the system has been reduced to a very hardcore security corps composed of armed elements of the Basij, the Revolutionary Guards, and parts of the police. And their relationship with the Iranian people is essentially one of friend and enemy. You are either in their camp, or you are not. And if you are not, they are out there to eliminate you. They do not really want you to exist anymore. So, of all the political systems that have existed, from what little I know of European history, they remind me of Franco’s regime in Spain—something that functions in a very similar way or resembles certain forms of 20th-century fascism.
The Revolutionary Guards Have Become a Military–Political–Economic Juggernaut
Platoon of Iranian army soldiers carrying the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran during the international military competition ARMY-2018 in Pesochnoye, Kostroma Region, Russia, June 2018. Photo: Dreamstime.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps occupies a central position in Iran’s political and economic life. Should the IRGC be understood primarily as a military institution, a security apparatus, a sprawling economic conglomerate, or even a ruling class? What does its economic embeddedness mean for reform, regime durability, or potential transition?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: So again, that’s another case with the IRGC, or the Sepah. It started off as a military organization at the beginning of the revolution, mainly to help the official army during the Iran–Iraq War. It was almost exclusively military in the beginning. Then, as time went on, it started consolidating power, accruing more and more influence through the decades. This became especially evident during the reformist movement, because the commanders of the IRGC were opposed to Khatami and the reformists in power, as well as to the political elite that came to power in the late 1990s. After that, they decided to become increasingly involved in politics.
Another turning point came later with the economic sanctions imposed after the controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. Following these disputes, Western countries began imposing some of the harshest sanctions in the world on Iran. As we know, such conditions often become a recipe for corruption. In my view, these sanctions cast something like a net over Iran’s economy. They disrupted the natural flow of exports and imports, especially oil exports. However, there was a significant hole in this net: Iran’s access to China. China was simply too powerful to fully comply with the sanctions and follow the United States’ lead, so it continued to purchase oil from Iran. Because China has an enormous and constant appetite for energy, Iran could sell oil to it below market price and still sell large volumes. As a result, even under very harsh sanctions, Iran was still able to generate a considerable amount of revenue through oil sales to China.
The problem, however, was that this revenue flowed through only one channel: the Revolutionary Guards. As a result, large segments of the economy gradually became concentrated in their hands, which almost inevitably led to corruption. Over time, within the ranks of the Revolutionary Guards, you can see an oligarchy beginning to take shape. And not just within the Revolutionary Guards—the broader political elite, especially their children and relatives, also joined this oligarchic network. Perhaps a few thousand people became involved in the export and import of oil with very little accountability. As a result, they began making themselves extremely rich, often at the expense of the well-being of ordinary Iranians and their daily lives.
At that point—perhaps by the mid-2010s—you could see that the Revolutionary Guards, which had started as a military organization and later evolved into a military–political organization, were becoming a military–political–economic juggernaut. It became something like an octopus, with tentacles reaching into almost every aspect of Iranian society, and that has continued to be the case until now.
Humiliation Is One of the Main Engines of Protest in Iran
Your writings frequently evoke emotions such as humiliation, anger, fear, and exhaustion. How do these affective dimensions shape political mobilization in Iran? In particular, how do humiliation and generational frustration interact with social fatigue to influence the timing and intensity of protest movements?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think humiliation is really key, especially if you watch the state media in Iran. It is a relentless and non-stop process of insulting your intelligence through the way propaganda is produced. It is really as absurd as looking at the sky in broad daylight while the TV tells you that it is nighttime. And they say it very aggressively, with zero respect for the intelligence and dignity of their audience.
Iranians are very well aware of the source of their problems. They know that the main source of their misery is their rulers, the Islamic Republic. Yes, sanctions have contributed heavily. The hostility from Israel, all the stories about the nuclear program—some exaggerated, some fabricated—and the accusations coming from a state that possesses far more nuclear weapons than Iran will ever have all contain a degree of hypocrisy. Iranians recognize that. But when you look at the political landscape of Iran, it is very clear to everyone that most of what we have gone through is the responsibility of the Islamic Republic. And the rulers know that too. It is not a secret to them.
But for 47 years, you look at their behavior and see that they have not taken a single step toward the people of Iran. Not one. They have never shown any willingness to make concessions to civil society or to protesters in the streets. They have never demonstrated any real interest in listening to them. Every time people have come out to protest, the regime initially responded with batons, and as protests intensified, with bullets. And we saw just last month what a wholesale massacre was essentially.
Even today, they continue to deny most of their responsibility for the absolute disaster they have inflicted on Iranian lives. So, when you look at this while living inside Iran, you see a government responsible for the immiseration of multiple generations yet unwilling to take even a shred of responsibility for what it has done. They have shown no willingness to change course.
This is the frustration, the rage, and the humiliation that it instills. And it can very easily boil over and drive people into the streets.
Iranians know how brutal their rulers are, how willing the regime is to kill them, and yet protests continue. In fact, you have rarely seen street protests as frequently anywhere in the world as in Iran over the past 10 or 15 years. Every couple of years there is a major wave of mass protest—whether over economic conditions, the compulsory hijab, or other issues.
Each time, people know they will be met with extreme violence, with bullets and batons. Every time they go out into the streets, they know they may never return home. Yet they still do it, because the sense of humiliation and frustration runs so deep that, in their minds, risking death can feel worthwhile simply to express it publicly.
Iranian woman standing in middle of Iranian protests for equal rights for women. Burning headscarves in protest against the government. Illustration: Digital Asset Art.
Women, Minorities, and the Poor Bear the Heaviest Burdens of Repression
For those who challenge the regime—writers, activists, workers, or ordinary protesters—what does the spectrum of repression look like in practice? How are risks such as censorship, economic exclusion, detention, torture, or exile distributed across class, gender, ethnicity, and geography?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: Probably the biggest irony of the Islamic Republic is that its outward presence to the world—its public face—and unfortunately many in the West buy into that, especially people on the left, is that it presents itself as standing up for the poor, for the wretched of the earth, for the underdog, for the downtrodden, and so on. So, it defines itself as one of the few states in the world that stands with the underdog. But when you go inside Iran, nobody has suffered at its hands more than the poor, working people, and those who do not have the means to make ends meet.
And this has been the case for decades, at least since the 1990s. You could argue that in the 1980s the regime implemented some policies aimed at creating a degree of economic equality. But definitely since the 1990s, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, it has essentially operated as an economic system that consistently favors the rich while suppressing the poor. It has only worsened over time, and as I mentioned earlier, the sanctions have also contributed to this dynamic.
So if you are poor—and there is a reason why in more recent demonstrations and protests you see more working people and poor citizens from the margins of society, from smaller towns near the borders where poverty is particularly severe—those are often the people who take to the streets and risk their lives more than people in the major cities. That was not the case back in 2009 during the Green Movement.
Then, of course, there are religious minorities, especially the Baha’is. It is actually a principle of their religion not to engage in political activism, so they have never posed any significant threat to the political order in Iran. Yet, because of the dogmatism and fanaticism of the Shia clerics in power, that community has been persecuted more savagely than almost any other group.
So, you have the persecution of the poor through economic means, the persecution of the Baha’is for religious reasons, and of course the situation of women, who have effectively been treated as second-class citizens since the beginning of the revolution. They have been fighting for very basic rights for a very long time. And just three years ago, during the Women, Life, Freedom movement, they finally managed to force the state to abandon the enforcement of compulsory hijab—though at enormous cost—after months of civil protests across the country.
So, this is also a form of gender apartheid. You have extreme economic discrimination against the poor, religious discrimination against minorities, and what amounts to a flat-out system of gender apartheid from which women have suffered enormously over the last half century.
Iran Regime Is Not a Well-Oiled Machine, It Is Corroded by Corruption
You have often suggested that repression in Iran operates through mundane institutional routines rather than overt ideological fanaticism. To what extent does this resemble Hannah Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil,” where ordinary bureaucratic practices normalize authoritarian violence?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think there is an important difference there. In Arendt’s articulation of the banality of evil, it emerges from a bureaucratic machine that actually functions extremely well. You have a system whose cogs rotate together very efficiently. The Nazi extermination process was, in that sense, a highly organized and well-oiled machine. Every officer was a small cog within that machine, carrying out their assigned tasks without really reflecting on the consequences of what they were doing.
In the case of Iran, however, what you see is incompetence—sheer incompetence. Part of the problem is that the state has essentially collapsed, and its bureaucratic institutions are no longer functioning properly. There is so much corruption, so much nepotism, and so much discrimination based on factors such as religious beliefs, social background, or political loyalty—especially when it comes to employment in government institutions, even in very basic administrative matters.
Over time, this has corroded the system of governance to such an extent that it simply no longer works effectively. Even very simple things—like renewing a driver’s license or dealing with routine banking procedures—can become extremely frustrating experiences when you live inside Iran.
So, the way government authority grates on people’s nerves stems less from a highly efficient bureaucratic machine and more from pervasive incompetence and corruption, rather than from a system operating smoothly but devoid of moral reflection.
No One Has Damaged Persian Literature More Than the Islamic Republic
Drawing on your own experience with literary censorship, how does the state’s control over cultural production shape not only what can be said publicly but also what can be imagined politically? In other words, how does censorship function as a technology of power over narrative and collective imagination?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: There is another irony here. The state in Iran has always prided itself on having a kind of nationalist element. They made a great deal out of independence when you go back to the beginning of the revolution. The main slogan was “Independence, freedom, the Islamic Republic.” So, independence came first. There was always a kind of Islamic nationalism embedded within the discourse. And the Persian language was always part of that. Especially Mr. Khamenei, the supreme leader who was recently killed—he was very much into Persian poetry. He was a very skilled orator, a very good speaker, and he knew Persian very well. They were enamored with Persian literature and the history of Persian poetry, and so on. Yet no one has damaged the Persian language or launched such a profound assault on Persian literature as the Islamic Republic has through censorship.
I am just one example. Until I was 30 years old, I was a writer in Iran. I published a number of books and many articles, and I loved writing in my mother tongue. But they basically forced me out of Iran. At some point after the Green Movement, it became impossible to continue living there. So, I had to move out of Iran—first to Australia and then to the United States—and I had to switch to writing in English.
I am just one small example. I could have contributed to that language and to that literary culture. I could have added something to it. I was doing well there as a writer. But over extremely small and trivial issues, the censorship office started banning my books, and they effectively took away my job as a newspaper writer. So, I had to leave. And I am just one example among thousands of writers like me who loved that language and that culture and were more than willing to contribute to it and devote their lives to it. But the state did not want us around.
Through censorship, what has happened is an extreme weakening of the Persian language itself. When you talk about political imagination, language is crucial. When a language is battered for so long—when it has been depleted of its resources through censorship for half a century—it inevitably loses many of its tools. Its toolbox becomes depleted.
Some of those tools have started to return since the emergence of the internet, but it is very different to have a formal written culture in a society than to have a writing culture mainly on social media. These are two very different phenomena.
What the state has done is to erode the abilities and capabilities of the Persian language, which historically has been a very strong force in maintaining the fabric of Iranian society. Through that erosion, they have negatively affected not only Iranian culture and literature but also the broader cohesion of Iranian society as a whole.
Military Intervention Often Pushes the Will of the People to the Margins
Large poster of Mahsa Amini displayed by the Iranian Diaspora Collective in the Chelsea neighborhood of Manhattan, New York City, November 23, 2022. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph / Dreamstime.
In the context of the ongoing confrontation between Iran and the US–Israel alliance, how might external military pressure reshape internal political dynamics? Historically, do wars weaken authoritarian regimes by exposing their fragility, or strengthen them by mobilizing nationalism and securitizing dissent?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: It is very hard to say now. We are right in the middle of the war, and it is very unclear how it will turn out—at least it is unclear to me. Right now, there are so many contradictory accounts and reports about who has the upper hand, whose military is in a weaker position, who is running out of ammunition, and who is running out of defensive shields, and so on. So, it is very difficult to draw conclusions at this point.
But at the end of the day, we have many examples of military intervention, especially in Middle Eastern countries, and none of them have ended well. The way events are unfolding now can already be seen in the recent quarrel over the selection of the next Supreme Leader.
The Assembly—the council of elders, as it is sometimes called in Iran—consists of the people who choose the next leader. There are about 80 very old clerics, all men and all clerics. They are very old and do not represent Iranian society in any meaningful way. In fact, they are about as far removed from Iranian society as possible, yet they are tasked with choosing the next leader. So, whoever they choose will have nothing to do with the Iranian people. It does not matter who it is; it is simply not a democratic process.
On the other hand, you have Donald Trump, who just yesterday said that he wants to have a say in choosing the next Supreme Leader of Iran. He almost sounded as if he meant it, so I will take him at his word. He said something like, “I need to be there when they choose the next Supreme Leader. I want to have a say.”
So, you see two entities talking about selecting the Supreme Leader—the highest political position in Iran—and neither of them has anything to do with the Iranian people. This is often what happens in the aftermath of military intervention. The will of the people becomes the last thing that counts. The agency of the Iranian population is already pushed aside, unless, after this war, they somehow manage to reclaim it.
A Political Vacuum Could Activate Long-Dormant Ethnic Fault Lines
One of the most catastrophic scenarios involves state fragmentation, separatist mobilization, and armed conflict across border regions. Given Iran’s complex ethnic landscape—including Kurds, Baluch, Arabs, Azeris, etc.—how real is the risk of civil conflict if state authority weakens, and what might a pluralistic settlement look like in such conditions?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: That’s another thing I can’t really say. I have no idea how that will turn out. Iran is a little different from other Middle Eastern countries that have this sort of ethnic tension, in that it has existed within roughly the same borders for about 400 years now. I mean, it has lost some territories over time, but since the Safavid era in the 17th century, Iran has largely remained the same territorial entity that it is today. It is smaller than it was back then, but the core of the country has remained intact.
In this area, all of the ethnic minorities you mentioned have been living together fairly peacefully for hundreds of years. So, Iran is not a colonial construction in the same way that Syria or Iraq are. Because of that, there is more cohesion and a greater possibility of coexistence. Civil war and ethnic conflict are probably less likely in Iran than people sometimes assume, given the long history of these communities living together for many centuries.
But when you have a political vacuum at the center, combined with a deep accumulation of discontent and rage toward the central government, anything can happen. When you bring down a sledgehammer on a society—or a double-stage sledgehammer, both from the government and from a foreign invader—you activate all these fault lines that may have been dormant for centuries, perhaps even millennia. Those fault lines can then produce tremors and earthquakes here and there. How destructive they might become is anyone’s guess. But they could potentially end up destroying this political entity that has existed for many centuries.
When Soldiers Defect, the End of the Regime May Be Near
Lastly, Professor Arian, looking ahead over the next months, what early-warning indicators should observers watch—elite defections, labor strikes, inflation thresholds, prison dynamics, clerical positioning, IRGC cohesion, or international mediation—to determine which trajectory Iran is moving toward? And do you see the emergence of a “fifth scenario,” a hybrid outcome that analysts currently underestimate?
Dr. Amir Ahmadi Arian: I think defection, definitely. Defection—and also what you mentioned about IRGC cohesion, which is kind of synonymous with defection. As I said before, the government in Iran has been reduced to a security force. Right now, more than anything, it is essentially a military entity that is fighting both its own people and the United States and Israel. So, labor strikes are a fantasy at this point. Under bombs, no one can organize a labor strike.
And what the clerics say or think really does not matter anymore. In this situation, you always have to look at the armed forces—the people in uniform. If you see any form of substantial defection in their ranks, both in terms of rank and numbers—meaning defections among high-ranking officers as well as a significant number of personnel—then I think that would be the strongest indication that regime collapse is imminent. But as long as you do not see that, other scenarios should still be considered. I think defection is the key sign we should be looking for.
In this interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda offers a nuanced assessment of Bangladesh’s post-2026 political transition. Reflecting on the first general election after the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina, he argues that a landslide electoral mandate alone cannot resolve the country’s democratic deficit. What matters, he emphasizes, is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.” Dr. Huda warns that preventing a “reverse norm cascade” depends less on electoral formalities than on how political actors behave in power—especially the ruling party. Stressing trust, institutional restraint, and freedom of criticism, he argues that Bangladesh’s democratic future will hinge on whether political parties govern responsibly, inclusively, and within genuinely pluralist constitutional limits.
Bangladesh’s February 2026 general election marked the country’s first national vote since the Gen Z-led uprising of August 2024 that toppled Sheikh Hasina after fifteen years in power. That uprising, which followed a violent crackdown on protesters that reportedly left around 1,400 people dead, was widely interpreted as a decisive rupture with one of South Asia’s most entrenched hybrid regimes. The election that followed was therefore more than a routine transfer of power: it was a test of whether Bangladesh could move from revolutionary mobilization to institutional politics. With turnout approaching 60 percent and many voters describing the experience as an opportunity to cast ballots “without fear,” the election appeared to signal at least a partial reopening of democratic space.
Yet, as Associate Professor Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda from the University of Dhaka makes clear in this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), electoral change alone does not resolve the deeper crisis of democratic legitimacy. While the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returned to power with a commanding parliamentary majority and the Jamaat-e-Islami-led alliance emerged as the principal opposition, Assoc. Prof. Huda cautions against equating electoral victory with democratic repair. “A landslide victory helps, but it is not everything,” he argues, insisting that such a result “does not by itself wash away the democratic deficit.” For Assoc. Prof. Huda, what ultimately matters is whether “procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.”
This emphasis on institutional and relational legitimacy is central to the interview’s broader argument and directly underpins its headline claim: Bangladesh’s democratic future depends less on who wins power than on how power is exercised. In Assoc. Prof. Huda’s formulation, the post-2026 order will be judged not simply by the fact of electoral competition, but by whether political actors—above all the ruling party—act with restraint, responsibility, and democratic seriousness. “Whether Bangladesh avoids returning to previous patterns—or prevents a reverse norm cascade—largely depends on how political parties behave,” he says. Most pointedly, he stresses that “the greatest responsibility rests with the ruling party,” especially in protecting freedom of speech and ensuring that opposition parties can criticize the government.
Assoc. Prof. Huda’s analysis gains further relevance in light of the new political landscape. Alongside the parliamentary vote, citizens endorsed the reform-oriented July Charter, which proposed constitutional reforms including term limits, bicameralism, and stronger judicial independence. At the same time, Bangladesh remains marked by unresolved tensions: the Awami League was barred from contesting the election, Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India, and debates over justice, accountability, Islamist mobilization, and political inclusion continue to define the fragile post-uprising order.
Against this backdrop, Assoc. Prof. Huda offers a sober but cautiously hopeful assessment. “If the current political parties—those in power and those in the opposition—behave responsibly, then we do not have to retreat,” he observes. The decisive question, then, is not whether Bangladesh has entered a new era, but whether its political class can transform a moment of rupture into a durable democratic settlement.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
A Landslide Victory Cannot by Itself Eliminate the Democratic Deficit
A woman casts her ballot at a polling station during Bangladesh’s general election in Dhaka, January 7, 2024. Photo: Mamunur Rashid / Dreamstime.
Professor Kazi Huda, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin with the first question: After years of competitive authoritarianism and the post-2024 rupture in Bangladesh, how should we evaluate the legitimacy of the new order? Does a landslide electoral mandate reduce the democratic deficit, or is legitimacy contingent on deeper institutional reconstruction and renewed civic trust?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Thank you for having me. A landslide victory helps, but it is not everything, and it does not by itself wash away the democratic deficit that you mentioned. A landslide victory helps a political party—it gives the party a certain level of comfort in ruling or governing. It provides some confidence that people are with them. At the same time, what is actually important is whether there is procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, or what I would call sociological legitimacy.
When election procedures are fair, we can easily claim that the victory is fair—that is procedural legitimacy. If there is constitutional legitimacy, then we can say that power is structured legitimately. On the other hand, sociological legitimacy concerns the relationship with the opposition and the broader political environment—a kind of politically professional relationship.
So, I do not think a landslide victory resolves everything when it comes to the democratic deficit. It may take you some distance along the path of democratization, but what ultimately matters are whether procedural legitimacy, constitutional legitimacy, and sociological legitimacy are present.
Without Political Trust, Elections Risk Becoming Procedural Rituals
In the post-2026 context, what minimum institutional guarantees are necessary to prevent a “reverse norm cascade”—where elections remain procedurally competitive yet politically hollow, especially under conditions of parliamentary supermajority?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: To understand whether the post-2026 election context can prevent what is called a reverse norm cascade, we first need to understand why Bangladesh held an election in 2026 at all.
As you know, Bangladesh experienced a mass uprising in 2024 that ousted an authoritarian regime. After five or six weeks of bloodshed, a government that had been in power from 2009 to 2024 came to an end. During that long period, Bangladeshi people experienced disappearances, killings, and many other abuses that should never have occurred. The mass uprising created a new aspiration among citizens that Bangladesh might finally develop a political landscape that would not revert to authoritarian tendencies—what we often describe as democratic backsliding.
To prevent a reverse norm cascade, it is essential to ensure a relationship of trust among all political parties. Equally important is a trusting relationship between political parties and the general public. Why did people protest in 2024? Because they had lost trust in the existing political parties. As a result, the general public came out into the streets to take matters into their own hands, believing that mainstream political parties had failed for the past 15 years—or at least the past decade.
One of the key reasons the 2024 mass uprising succeeded was that it was led by a non-partisan student body rather than by any political party. Political parties joined the movement in large numbers, but they did not act under their own banners when they took to the streets. Instead, they followed the leadership of the student body that organized and led the uprising.
Now, in the post-2026 election context, if political parties fail to regain people’s trust—or if there is no trust among the political parties themselves—then there is a real possibility of returning to the conditions we experienced before. This includes a lack of trust between the ruling party, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the opposition party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, and the student-led National Citizen Party.
So, what is required in this context? The primary responsibility lies with the ruling party, the BNP. As we know, power comes with responsibility. Since they are now in government, they must behave responsibly and in ways that support a democratic and sustainable political environment.
Whether Bangladesh avoids returning to previous patterns—or prevents a reverse norm cascade—largely depends on how political parties behave. Among them, the greatest responsibility rests with the ruling party: whether it seeks to control everything, whether it protects freedom of speech, and whether it ensures that opposition parties have the opportunity to criticize the government—conditions that are fundamental to any democratic environment. If the ruling party, together with other political parties, can uphold these principles and fulfill their responsibilities as they should, then I believe Bangladesh has a very promising future ahead.
Legitimacy in Transition Depends on Both Reform and Timely Elections
Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.
You have cautioned that elections without credible reform can reproduce dysfunction. How would you design a sequenced transition that preserves electoral legitimacy while avoiding the destabilizing vacuum and contestation that prolonged interim rule can generate?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: This is a difficult question: how can we design a sequenced transition that ensures a timely election while also guaranteeing that meaningful reforms are implemented?
In my view, what was needed was a time-bound interim government. Initially, when the interim government came to power on 8 August 2024, it was unclear how long it would remain in office or when the election would be held. Many expected that elections might take place within the first six or seven months.
However, as time passed, the interim government realized that this uncertainty was creating confusion among the public. People were in the dark about whether an election would occur at all, and pressure was mounting from major political parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. At some point they announced that elections would be held in the first half of April (2025). In fact, as you know, the election eventually took place this year on February 12.
A time-bound interim government is therefore essential for the kind of sequenced transition you mention. Such a government should also have a clear agenda—one that specifies what it intends to do, what it will not do, and how it plans to proceed. Because this was an interim administration, people placed a certain degree of trust in it to carry out reforms, and in some respects it did so. It facilitated dialogue among political parties, excluding the Bangladesh Awami League, which had been the previous ruling party.
As a result of these dialogues, what came to be known as the July National Charter was produced and broadly agreed upon by most active political parties in Bangladesh, although there were some dissenting views—something that could be discussed separately.
The key point is that an interim government should have a clear reform agenda. This might include constitutional reform, police reform, or other institutional reforms. At the same time, it must remain strictly time-bound and pursue these reforms within a clearly defined time frame.
Finally, the interim government must organize an election that is widely accepted—both domestically and internationally. In this respect, I think the Bangladeshi interim government was largely successful, and it deserves recognition for arranging an election that was, to a considerable extent, fair.
Public Trust Is the Foundation of Any Neutral Electoral Administration
Bangladesh’s recurring crisis over “who runs the election” seems to reflect a deeper legitimacy problem. What would a constitutionally durable, neutral election-time administration look like—one that cannot be easily abolished, captured, or informally intimidated by incumbents?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: A durable and neutral election-time government must, above all, be a government that people can trust. Trust is crucial here. If people perceive that there is an election-time administration—whether it is called a caretaker government, an interim government, or something else—and if they believe that those responsible for organizing the election cannot conduct it impartially, then the system simply will not work.
Therefore, during the caretaker or interim period, the election-time government must be able to command public trust. How can it achieve that? This is where the broader state apparatus becomes relevant.
Individuals appointed to positions within such a government—whether as advisers, election commissioners, or in other roles—are not elected; they are selected. Therefore, it is essential to select individuals from civil society and from different sectors of society who have strong professional reputations, personal integrity, and respected public standing.
The first priority should always be appointing individuals whom the public can trust and rely upon. In situations like this, public perception matters enormously. Second, during the caretaker government period, the administration must have a certain degree of authority over key institutions, including the security forces, the civilian bureaucracy, and the military bureaucracy.
At the end of the day, the caretaker government is responsible for governing the country during the election period. If it lacks authority over these institutions, then its directives will not be taken seriously.
For that reason, an election-time government must consist of strong personalities—individuals who possess both credibility and the capacity to act decisively. At the same time, they must also be impartial.
Bicameralism Only Makes Sense if It Provides Genuine Institutional Balance
Activists of Bangladesh Nationalist Party form a human chain to mark International Human Rights Day as they protested human rights violations against leaders and activist in Dhaka, December 10, 2023. Photo: Mamunur Rashid.
How do you assess the reform proposals (e.g., bicameralism and proportional representation in an upper chamber) as remedies to Bangladesh’s recurrent winner-takes-all dynamic? Under what conditions could these reforms actually constrain executive concentration rather than be circumvented?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: The question you just raised will likely become one of the major points of contention in the coming months in Bangladesh. As I mentioned, the July National Charter includes 47 or 48 proposals for constitutional reforms. One of them, as you noted, is bicameralism and the creation of a proportional representation (PR)-based upper chamber.
The basic proposal is that the distribution of seats in the upper chamber should be proportionate to the public votes received in the lower chamber. However, the major political party, the BNP—which is now the ruling party—has expressed its dissent, arguing that the seats of the upper chamber should instead be proportionate to the shares of seats in the lower chamber.
If that position is accepted, then the structure would be quite different. One important point to note is that in the charter, proposals that are not agreed upon by all political parties—such as the proposal regarding the upper chamber—include formal notes of dissent. The BNP expressed such a note.
There is also a provision stating that if a dissenting political party wins the election on the basis of an election manifesto that clearly mentions this dissent, then after winning the election it may proceed according to its own position. In other words, it is not strictly bound by the proposal.
Therefore, the ruling party—the BNP—can potentially argue that it expressed its dissent, included this position in its election manifesto, and after forming the government should now be able to proceed accordingly.
Interestingly, however, the referendum ballot did not mention this dissent. The referendum ballot only stated that there should be a PR-based upper chamber. Because of this, I assume there will be debates and contestation in Parliament—and possibly even in the streets—over how the upper chamber should be formed: whether it should be based on public votes or on lower-chamber seat shares.
If you ask for my own view, I do not agree with the BNP’s position regarding the formation of the upper chamber. In fact, I do not see a strong necessity for bicameralism or for an upper chamber in a country like Bangladesh. We already have around 300 members in our National Assembly. Adding another 100 members in an upper chamber and bearing the associated costs is quite burdensome for a country with Bangladesh’s economic conditions.
However, if one still believes that an upper chamber is necessary, then it should not simply become a replica of the lower chamber. If it merely replicates the lower chamber, there is little point in having it at all.
The BNP has also expressed dissent on several other proposals. Some of those points are understandable, but particularly regarding the PR-based upper chamber, I do not think their position makes much sense.
Post-authoritarian transitions often elevate “accountability” into a mandate. How can Bangladesh pursue accountability for past repression while avoiding collective punishment, party bans, or exclusionary practices that risk undermining democratic inclusion and long-term stability?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Accountability is important. It is important in personal life, and it is also important when it comes to governing the state and conducting politics. However, if accountability is interpreted as collective responsibility, then this is something we should question. Collective responsibility—or collective culpability—can exclude an entire political party from the political landscape. What we need instead is individualized culpability. We need fair trials, and we need institutional reforms so that we do not return to the previous situation. As you mentioned, we should avoid a reverse norm cascade.
Therefore, what happened before August 2024 should not be addressed through collective blame. We should not claim that a political party as a whole is responsible for particular crimes. Rather, through fair trials, we should identify the individuals who were involved in these crimes and bring them to justice, instead of stigmatizing an entire political party.
Political Actors Often Convert Grievances into Moral Mandates
In your critique of populist narratives, you emphasize how symbolic indignation can displace problem-solving governance. What are the main discursive mechanisms through which Bangladeshi actors convert grievances (justice, sovereignty, moral renewal) into mandates for exclusion, retribution, or institutional bypass?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: The use of discursive mechanisms through which political actors convert grievances into mandates is not unique to Bangladesh. It happens worldwide, as many political actors try to capitalize on grievances in order to garner public support. Bangladesh is no exception.
In Bangladesh, we see such mechanisms in practices like invoking martyrdom—what I would call Shahidhood. Sometimes, when you criticize a particular political party, you may be labeled as anti-nationalist. You might be branded as pro-Pakistani, pro-Indian, pro-American, and so on. Political parties also frequently portray their opponents as traitors while presenting themselves as morally pure. At times, they even act as though they are the sellers of a “ticket to heaven.”
These are the kinds of discursive mechanisms we observe in Bangladesh today. Another important pattern—visible both under the previous regime and even now—is that some political actors try to capitalize on narratives of victimhood. In effect, they market victimhood in order to mobilize public support and secure electoral mandates.
The Post-Uprising Divide Reflects Competing Visions of Justice and Reform
Voters line up outside a polling station in Feni during Bangladesh’s 13th national election on February 12, 2026. The scene reflects the high voter turnout of approximately 59.44% in this historic “Gen Z-inspired” election held under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. Photo: Belayet Hossain / Dreamstime.
Revolutionary coalitions often mobilize around a shared enemy but fragment after victory. How does this dynamic apply to the 2024 student-led uprising, and what risks follow when “people vs regime” narratives persist into the period of institution-building?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: In 2024, not surprisingly, Bangladeshi people had only one enemy: the ruling authoritarian regime. After successfully removing that regime, however, the coalition that had formed during the uprising began to show many fractures. We now observe that it has divided into different groups.
This division—or, as you noted, fragmentation after victory—depends on several factors, particularly in the Bangladeshi context. One form of fragmentation is based on ends, specifically the question of justice and how it should be ensured. One group believes that justice can be achieved through reform. If the constitution is sufficiently reformed, they argue, Bangladesh may avoid returning to a regime-like situation in the future. Others believe that those responsible must be brought into the justice system and punished. There is also another group that advocates a mechanism of reconciliation and healing.
Thus, some groups are divided based on ends. At the same time, there are also divisions based on means, and these groups often overlap. Groups defined by their goals and those defined by their strategies frequently intersect. Among those divided by means, some political parties and individuals believe that elections should come first, with reforms following afterward. Another group argues that before holding elections, the constitution and various institutions and sectors of the state should first be reformed.
We also see fragmentation shaped by identity-based narratives—whether someone is labeled nationalist or anti-nationalist, whether they are described as pro-Indian, and so on, as I mentioned earlier.
This fragmentation is therefore quite widespread. The coalition that emerged during the mass uprising has now divided into different groups. I think this is a normal development after a successful movement, because different interest groups pursue different priorities, and people tend to divide according to their interests.
Islamist Parties Can Participate in Democracy if They Respect Constitutional Limits
With Islamist actors gaining unprecedented parliamentary weight, how should we distinguish analytically between (a) democratic inclusion of religious parties, (b) rightward drift of the political center, and (c) programmatic Islamization that constrains pluralism—particularly on gender equality, minority rights, and academic freedom?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: Personally, I do not have any problem with the democratic inclusion of religious political parties. Unless they are too extreme, every ideology—whether religious or political—has the right to participate in politics in a liberal democratic system, provided that they operate within constitutional limits, respect equal citizenship, and do not violate human rights.
I also have a particular view regarding the rightward drift of the political center. The political center is never fixed; it shifts depending on circumstances. Sometimes it tilts toward the right, and sometimes toward the left. Therefore, if a leftward drift of the center is not considered problematic, then a slight drift to the right should not necessarily be seen as a problem either.
If we try to analytically identify a rightward drift of the political center in Bangladesh, we can observe that even secular political parties often use religious symbolism when campaigning for votes. We see politicians wearing religious caps or clothing, praying with people, and engaging in similar practices. Even some leftist political figures have done this recently. Bangladesh is a country where about 90 percent of the population is Muslim, so even so-called secular politicians often resort to such symbolism during elections in order to connect with Muslim voters.
Regarding the third issue—programmatic Islamization that constrains pluralism—the rise of religion-based political parties is not unique to Bangladesh. It is a global phenomenon. We see similar developments in Europe and other parts of the world, where religion-based political parties are gaining visibility and influence in political discourse.
In such contexts, both the state and society must play an important role. By society, I mean civil society organizations, other political parties, and the government itself. All of them have responsibilities to ensure that religious political actors do not undermine gender equality, minority rights, or other democratic principles.
If we want to assess whether programmatic Islamization is increasing in Bangladesh, we should examine whether these parties are gaining popularity. Indeed, they are becoming more prominent. For example, a major religion-based political party, Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, received around 32 percent of the vote. However, this outcome was achieved partly through alliances with other political parties—many of which are also religious—and partly through cooperation with the National Citizen Party, a student-led political movement.
One interesting aspect of Jamaat-e-Islami is that it appears to be trying to reshape itself in order to operate within a liberal democratic framework. We can observe changes in its language. In the past, the party frequently used strongly religious terminology, but during the recent election it appeared to adopt more liberal political language rather than explicitly religious rhetoric.
So, we do see some changes within these political parties. If they are allowed to operate within a liberal political sphere, they may gradually adapt themselves to that environment. For this reason, I do not currently see a major risk that Bangladesh will soon experience a sharp rise in extremism or a dramatic escalation of religion-based politics.
Responsible Political Leadership Can Still Secure Bangladesh’s Democratic Future
And lastly, Professor Huda, looking ahead to the next decade, what are the most plausible political trajectories for Bangladesh? Do you envision a pathway toward democratic consolidation anchored in institutional reform and pluralist consensus, or does the current configuration—marked by populist mobilization, Islamist resurgence, and intense polarization—risk entrenching a new hybrid order where competitive elections coexist with ideological majoritarianism and periodic instability? What key indicators should scholars and policymakers watch to assess which trajectory is unfolding?
Assoc. Prof. Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda: So, you mentioned three trajectories: one is a consolidation pathway, another is a hybrid order, and the third is a cycle of instability. As a person, I am an optimist. I think that if the current political parties—those in power and those in the opposition—behave responsibly, then we do not have to retreat. This is a moment that we should seize and use to look forward to a better future.
However, to understand whether we are moving forward or backward, we need to look at certain indicators. For example, we need to see whether elections in Bangladesh take place regularly, whether those elections are fair, and how opposition parties are treated by the ruling party. We also need to observe whether security forces behave impartially or whether the government uses security forces to pursue its own political agenda.
Another important factor is whether the bureaucracy functions properly and whether citizens are able to enjoy their fundamental and human rights. If we examine these indicators over the next two or three years, we will be able to predict where Bangladesh is actually heading.
If we see that these indicators are improving and functioning well, then we can hope for and predict a democratic and sustainable future. In that case, Bangladesh may develop into a stable democracy that does not repeatedly slip into instability.
In this analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how geopolitical tensions around the strategic oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz transmit economic shocks across the global political economy and disproportionately affect African states. Because many African economies remain highly dependent on commodity exports and imported energy, oil price volatility quickly translates into inflation, fiscal stress, and social pressure. Even oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria face paradoxical effects, benefiting from higher crude revenues while simultaneously suffering from rising domestic fuel costs. These inflationary pressures can fuel economic discontent, weaken government legitimacy, and create fertile ground for populist mobilization. Dr. Solaja argues that recurrent commodity shocks expose deep structural vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for economic diversification, energy transition, and stronger regional integration to build resilience.
By Oludele Solaja*
Geopolitical conflicts rarely stay within their battlefield boundaries. In a world with integrated economy, war in strategic energy corridor would swiftly lead to inflation, political instability and governmental pressures far from conflict. Geopolitical tensions in the strategic energy corridor are central to the functioning of the global political economy. The Strait of Hormuz holds a peculiar important position in the transit routes among all. Some one fifth of the global petroleum liquids passes through the narrow maritime passage in between Iran and Arabian Peninsula (US Energy Information Administration, 2023), hence the perception of armed conflict even if it’s just the rumor of one in the area would lead to an immediate volatility shock in the global oil market.
Not just the physical supply disruptions but the uncertainty itself would create price volatility. Higher cost of insuring the vessels, shifting of the routes and market responses all contribute to the volatility as well. Scholars of energy politics have always acknowledged that oil markets are intrinsically connected with national security and strategic rivalry (Bridge & Le Billon, 2017). As such, conflict occurring in energy producing areas could have economic impact across nations without any boundaries.
The effects on the developing nations would be even worse. World Bank warns that such shocks from the Middle Eastern energy supply chains could push the oil prices beyond $100/barrel, creating inflation pressure and fiscal burden upon developing nations. In an integrated global economy, a geopolitical shock will be transmitted across the commodity supply chain. Energy supply, food production, transportation network and capital flow are all interconnected.
Inflation Transmission and African Political Economy
When energy prices shock happens in African countries, typically there are two related effects: windfall profit to oil exporters, and inflationary pressure to domestic markets.
On one hand, oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria could profit from rising crude oil prices through high export revenues and balance of payments surplus. In theory, windfalls can stabilize fiscal conditions and support increase development expenditure. Nevertheless, political economy literature argues that commodity windfalls often reproduce and strengthen existing vulnerabilities of the economies, which fail to transform into sustainable development instead of generating rent-seeking behavior without firm institutions and diversified economies (Auty, 2001; Ross, 2012).
On the other hand, rising global oil prices will transmit inflation through the domestic economies. Transportation costs rise with higher fuel prices, pushing the price up of goods including foods, which need logistics and transportation, as well as costs for manufactured goods and fertilizers for farming. Electricity costs are also higher and so forth.
In Nigeria, this paradox is crystal clear. Despite being one of Africa’s biggest exporters of crude oil, Nigeria needs to import its supply of refined petroleum products as its own refining capacity is insufficient. This creates two divergent effects at the same time: Nigeria has to pay high fuel import costs from imported refined oil, while export revenue is expected to rise with higher crude prices. Informal sector workers who are in the vast majority in Nigerian labor market would experience increasing cost of living.
The consequences for oil-importing African countries are even harsher. Rising costs of fuel import not only leads to greater trade deficit and depreciation of national currency but also increase countries’ exposure to sovereign debt distress.
Commodity Shocks and Politics of Economic Discontent
The macroeconomic impact beyond energy sector can reshape the domestic political landscape by raising costs of living especially in the vulnerable societies. Political scientists have noted that a sudden increase in living costs can cause popular unrest, weaken government legitimacy, and contribute to the emergence of populism (Rodrik, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).
In this case, a global economic shock would have translated into domestic political pressure. When confronting with inflation pressures, African governments often are compelled to subsidize the consumption of oil or enforce price caps, which have proven to undermine fiscal positions and postpone necessary structural adjustments. Repeated commodity shocks in institutionally weak economies can reproduce the same vicious cycles of economic discontent and political instability.
Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors therefore do more than creating turbulence for economies. They challenge domestic political legitimacy by accentuating conflicts between different strata of society about inflation, social welfare, and commodity distribution.
Structural Vulnerability in Commodity-dependent Economies
All of the aforementioned highlights the inherent structural vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent economic systems. Dependency theorists have consistently asserted that countries that depend on exports of primary commodities are exposed to volatility in international commodity markets (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1976). Moreover, the “resource curse” debate emphasizes rent seeking, volatility, and limited industrial development in extracting economies (Ross, 2012).
Energy geopolitical shock can only intensify this vulnerability. Shipping disruptions or higher freight costs resulting from higher insurance fees due to conflict at Persian Gulf can be re-routed around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, further intensifying the costs borne by all importing nations, especially those relying on food imports, manufactured goods and agricultural inputs. In such cases, the impacts of wars fought at energy corridors are redistributed across the commodity markets that link the Strait of Hormuz to consumers across a faraway land.
Policy Implications: Building Resilience
Mitigating vulnerability of geopolitical commodity shocks requires a long-term perspective beyond ad hoc management strategies. The first thing for African countries is to speed up economic diversification (industrialization and value adding in agriculture), because it will lead to sustainable development not only by reducing dependence on the exports of oil. Secondly, investment in infrastructure and on renewable energies will lead to energy sustainability in African countries and reduces the reliance on imported refined goods. Third, strengthen the social safety net (cash transfers, food security program, etc.) can shield the poorest households from inflationary shocks. Fourth, expand intra-African trade using the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make the region reduce dependence on unstable international commodity market.
Conclusion
Volatility in strategic energy corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz is a manifestation of geopolitical tensions’ spread across the global political economy. For Africa’s commodity-dependent economies, it amplifies the persistent structural vulnerabilities that are embedded in extraction-based development strategies. Short term export gains associated with rising prices rarely outweigh the subsequent inflationary pressures and fiscal instability in the longer run. Unless these development strategies are actively reformed to emphasize diversification, energy transition and resilience, each commodity shock following every conflict will result in the similar outcomes: temporary windfall gains followed by inflation-induced hardship and fragile development. Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors, hence, are not just regional security issues; they are fundamentally tests of structural resilience in the development agenda of the Global South.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Monthly Review Press.
Auty, R. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press.
Bridge, G., & Le Billon, P. (2017). Oil. Polity Press.
Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.
Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press.
Rodrik, D. (2018). “Populism and the economics of globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33.
Ross, M. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.
U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023). World oil transit chokepoints. https://www.eia.gov
World Bank. (2023). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.
Bangladesh’s 2026 election—the first since the 2024 uprising that toppled Sheikh Hasina—has been widely framed as a democratic turning point. Yet in this interview with the ECPS, Samzir Ahmed, a Bangladeshi politics expert, argues that the moment should be interpreted more cautiously. Rather than a democratic restoration, he describes the upheaval primarily as “a restoration of politics itself,” following what he calls a long period of depoliticization. Ahmed contends that the institutionalization of actors such as Jamaat-e-Islami represents a critical turning point, emphasizing that “institutionalization is an acid test for populist politics.” While populist and Islamist movements often thrive outside formal power structures, their integration into institutional politics may fundamentally reshape their strategies—and expose new constraints on their influence.
Bangladesh’s February 2026 general election marked the country’s first national vote since the Gen Z–led uprising of August 2024 that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina after fifteen years in power. The uprising followed a violent crackdown on protesters that, according to UN reporting, left around 1,400 people dead and precipitated the collapse of one of South Asia’s most entrenched hybrid regimes. Widely viewed as a test of whether Bangladesh could transition from revolutionary protest to institutional politics, the election unfolded largely peacefully. Turnout approached 60%, and many voters described the moment as an opportunity to cast ballots “without fear” after years of elections marred by intimidation and allegations of manipulation.
The results reshaped the country’s political landscape. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman—who returned to Bangladesh in December 2025 after seventeen years in exile—won a sweeping victory with roughly 212 parliamentary seats, returning the party to power after two decades. The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami–led alliance secured about 77 seats, marking its strongest parliamentary showing and establishing it as the principal opposition. Alongside the parliamentary vote, citizens also endorsed the reform-oriented “July Charter” in a referendum, which proposes significant constitutional reforms, including term limits for the prime minister, bicameralism, and strengthened judicial independence. Yet the broader political transition remains contested: the Awami League was barred from contesting the election, Sheikh Hasina remains in exile in India following a war-crimes conviction, and debates over justice, accountability, and political inclusion continue to shape Bangladesh’s fragile post-uprising order.
Against this volatile backdrop, the incoming BNP government faces daunting challenges: rebuilding institutions weakened by years of authoritarian consolidation, restoring law and order after a turbulent transitional period, reviving an economy strained by inflation and youth unemployment, and navigating complex regional diplomacy as India, the United States, and Pakistan recalibrate relations with Dhaka. These overlapping pressures raise a deeper question about whether the 2026 election represents a genuine democratic turning point—or merely the beginning of another cycle in Bangladesh’s long history of majoritarian power and polarized politics.
In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Samzir Ahmed, Lecturer at the Department of Bangla at Netrokona University, offers a sobering interpretation of this moment. Drawing on his concept of the “compromised strongman,” Ahmed argues that the election should not be interpreted as a democratic restoration. Rather, he situates the upheaval within a deeper historical pattern in which Bangladesh oscillates between depoliticization and renewed political mobilization. As he explains, the country had been experiencing “a long trend of depoliticization,” and the July uprising marked a rupture that represents primarily “a restoration of politics itself.” In his words, “democracy, however, remains far away.”
Ahmed also highlights the structural dynamics behind the BNP’s victory and the reconfiguration of Bangladesh’s ideological landscape. While the election signals a rightward shift in political gravity, he notes that such a development reflects a longer process that accelerated during the final years of Hasina’s rule. At the same time, the institutionalization of Islamist political forces—particularly the emergence of Jamaat-e-Islami as the main parliamentary opposition—signals a transformation in how populist and religious movements operate within Bangladesh’s political system. For Ahmed, this transition is crucial because “institutionalization is an acid test for populist politics.” Populist movements, he suggests, often flourish when they remain outside formal power structures but face new constraints once they become embedded within institutions.
More broadly, Ahmed situates the country’s current uncertainties within the unresolved dual nationalist structure that has shaped Bangladeshi politics since independence. With the Awami League banned and its leadership in exile or imprisoned, the political vacuum raises unresolved questions about representation and polarization. Whether secular constituencies will eventually reorganize under a revived Awami League, find accommodation within the BNP, or generate a new political formation remains uncertain.
Moreover, Ahmed reflects on the generational dynamics unleashed by the student-led uprising that triggered the transition. The protests, he argues, reflected “generational frustration with traditional patronist-centric politics.” Yet the digital hyperconnectivity that enabled rapid mobilization against authoritarian rule may simultaneously complicate the creation of durable political alternatives. In one of the interview’s most striking observations, Ahmed captures this dilemma succinctly: “The present is denied, but the future is not invited either.”
Ahmed’s reflections suggest that Bangladesh is entering another phase of intense political contestation rather than a settled democratic transition. Whether the July Charter reforms, ideological reconciliation, and institutional reconstruction can transform this turbulent moment into genuine democratic consolidation remains, for now, an open question.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Samzir Ahmed, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Strongman Politics Has Always Been a Structural Possibility in Bangladesh
A woman casts her ballot at a polling station during Bangladesh’s general election in Dhaka, January 7, 2024. Photo: Mamunur Rashid / Dreamstime.
The 2026 election has been described as both a democratic restoration and an ideological rightward shift. In light of your concept of the “compromised strongman,” do you interpret the BNP’s supermajority as a democratic reset—or as the beginning of a new configuration of strongman politics under altered ideological conditions?
Samzir Ahmed: I would not describe it as a democratic restoration. Rather, I would say that Bangladesh has been experiencing a long trend of depoliticization. The July upheaval—or uprising—marked a significant break in that trajectory. In this sense, what we are witnessing is, first and foremost, a restoration of politics itself. Democracy, however, remains far away.
I do agree that a rightward shift is taking place, but it is largely a continuation of a process that began several decades ago and gained considerable momentum during Hasina’s time in power. It was the outcome of the compromise that I discussed in my paper. Strongman politics has always been a structural possibility in Bangladesh. The ban on our military’s political activities has also contributed to this dynamic. At this stage, what matters most is the nature and depth of this new form of re-politicization and how it will shape the future trajectory of politics in the country.
Given your argument that democratic erosion in Bangladesh is rooted in unresolved nationalist fractures, how should we interpret the BNP’s two-thirds majority? Does it risk reproducing the same executive centralization that enabled Sheikh Hasina’s consolidation?
Samzir Ahmed: I think the BNP lacks a strong ideological rhetoric. That is a major problem for the party. Their brand of Bangladeshi nationalism, although it sounds inclusive, has always tilted toward the right. For now, the nationalist structure is dormant—albeit very temporarily. However, with the resurgence of Islamist politics, the factional divide is bound to return with greater force. So that would be my take on this.
The Banning of the Awami League Has Created a Political Vacuum in the Secular Bloc
You argue that split nationalist identity has repeatedly destabilized democratic consolidation. How does the banning of the Awami League reshape that dual nationalist structure? Does exclusion deepen polarization or temporarily suppress it?
Samzir Ahmed: Yes, it is going to deepen polarization. The question is: who is going to represent the secular bloc? In this election, they voted for the BNP, but historically Awami movement—at least on paper or during elections—represented them. Their activities have been banned, and their major leaders are either fugitives or in jail. So, there is now a vacuum. The unresolved question, then, is whether the deepening split will make their return inevitable, whether the BNP will serve as a proxy, or whether a new party will emerge. At this moment, however, I am not very hopeful about the third option. So, we are essentially left to choose between the other two possibilities.
With Jamaat-e-Islami emerging as the principal opposition, do we see a normalization of political Islam and Islamist populism within parliamentary competition—or the institutionalization of the religious pole in Bangladesh’s long-standing nationalist split?
Samzir Ahmed: Yes, we are witnessing a normalization of political Islam and its institutionalization. However, I see this as an advancement in a particular sense. For a long time, Jamaat-e-Islami has practiced politics in a rather unpolitical way. They run school programs and try to influence school students. Even when they ask for votes, they tend to present themselves as some kind of Islamic messiah. In universities, they have run campaigns such as “I Hate Politics” or “We Don’t Want Politics on Campus.” Their success is evident in their clean sweep of student union elections.
Now, as they appear more visibly in an institutional political form, the rhetoric of anti-politics is likely to lose its force. This rhetoric— “I hate politics”—served Jamaat-e-Islami very well for a long time. But as they move more openly into the political arena, that narrative is unlikely to remain effective.
So, as they have now formally entered politics in a more visible way, something interesting is really taking shape. I am not saying that they were not formally present in politics before, but their strategy was largely unpolitical. Now they are losing that strategy, which is why I say that something interesting is unfolding.
The Uprising Was Against Something—Not Clearly for Something
Voters line up outside a polling station in Feni during Bangladesh’s 13th national election on February 12, 2026. The scene reflects the high voter turnout of approximately 59.44% in this historic “Gen Z-inspired” election held under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus. Photo: Belayet Hossain / Dreamstime.
The student-led uprising that toppled Hasina seemed to signal generational democratic aspirations. Yet the National Citizen Party’s limited electoral success suggests something more complex. Does this reflect ideological fragmentation, populist volatility, or structural resistance to centrist pluralism?
Samzir Ahmed: I think something more complex is at play. The uprising was against something, but not clearly for something. So, the signal should be read as generational frustration with traditional patronist-centric politics, rather than a straightforward aspiration for democracy.
The NCP’s political trajectory suggests that they were never actually prepared for this moment or for the kind of political opportunity they have enjoyed. In the age of digital hyperconnectivity, which facilitates a new wave of populist politics, it is relatively easier to build consensus against power. But this form of connectivity, at the same time, makes it equally difficult to rebuild or reconstruct our polity. The present is denied, but the future is not invited either.
You note that radical right groups in Bangladesh historically function as “kingmakers” despite limited electoral dominance. In the current context, is Islamism transitioning from pressure politics to institutionalized parliamentary leverage?
Samzir Ahmed: Yes, they have gained leverage, but it may work in their favor—or it may risk their future. I think institutionalization is an acid test for populist politics. Populist politics functions really well when such actors are not in power or not operating within an institutionalized setting.
In Bangladesh, although Jamaat-e-Islami is now positioned as the opponent, we have to keep in mind that it has historically been a close ally of the BNP. So, they are likely to enjoy some share of power. In that sense, they will gain leverage, but that leverage also comes with risks.
Opposing Women’s Empowerment Is Politically Counterproductive
Reports of increasing gender-based anxieties and Islamist rhetoric during the election cycle suggest a societal shift. Do you interpret this as an organic religious revival, a strategic mobilization by political elites, or a symptom of nationalist identity re-negotiation?
Samzir Ahmed: I do not think the increasing gender-based anxiety suggests a broader social shift. Jamaat-e-Islami generated controversy by taking a position against women’s leadership and empowerment. They are ideologically bound to produce such controversies unless they prioritize voting strategy over ideology. But this has already proved counterproductive.
Female participation in education and in the labour market is very high in Bangladesh, and women’s political participation is also rising. So, going against women’s empowerment may prove counterproductive for any political party. I am not forgetting that there are other forms of gender identity, but female identity has found a place in populist rhetoric, while others have not.
Institutional Design Alone Cannot Resolve Political Contradictions
If the July Charter’s constitutional reforms (term limits, bicameralism, judicial independence) are only partially implemented, does this reinforce your thesis that institutional design alone cannot overcome foundational nationalist contradictions?
Samzir Ahmed: That’s an interesting question. The future of the July Charter is very unclear at the moment. Foundational nationalist contradictions are political problems, and they cannot be solved simply through institutional design. I myself proposed a design for police reform. But without political resolutions, these reform initiatives are bound to face difficulties. We have some good laws, but the problem is that we are not in any shortage of ways to bypass them.
For example, faculty recruitment in universities is highly politicized. Previously, recruitment was only merit-based. To ensure better accountability, many universities introduced written examinations, but that has become even more problematic. Delays are often created during the written examination stage. Politically biased recruitment can now even find written evidence in its favor. So, I could give any number of such examples. In that sense, I reassert my position that institutional design alone cannot overcome foundational nationalist contradictions, which is fundamentally a political problem.
Public Support for Both Democracy and Sharia Is an Enigma
Supporters gather at an election rally of the Jamaat-e-Islami–led alliance in Feni, Bangladesh, on January 30, 2026, ahead of the national elections. Photo: Borhan Uddin Nishan / Dreamstime.
You describe Bangladesh’s democratic oscillation as driven by “anti-incumbency” rooted in split identity. Has the 2026 election broken this cycle, or does it represent another turn in a structurally reactionary political pattern?
Samzir Ahmed: I think it represents another turn in a structurally reactionary political pattern. The BNP-led government has already started receiving serious backlash, at least in the digital sphere. So, I think it is going to be another turn, but it is still early days. We have to wait and see how it unfolds.
In your analysis, strongman leaders have historically sought legitimacy through Islamization. Could the BNP now rely less on populist compromise and more on explicit religious-nationalist consolidation—or would that destabilize its broader electoral coalition?
Samzir Ahmed: It is an interesting scenario. While autocratic leaders have always used varying degrees of Islamic legitimacy, the situation for the BNP is quite unprecedented. Structurally, direct Islamic rule may appear to be the easiest option if they move toward electoral autocracy. However, this time they came to power with substantial secular support. So, this is very new. The future is, therefore, very challenging for the BNP.
Survey data cited in your work suggest simultaneous support for democracy and Sharia-based governance. How should scholars interpret this apparent normative contradiction? Is it cognitive dissonance, layered sovereignty, or alternative conceptions of democratic legitimacy?
Samzir Ahmed: The recent survey by Prothom Alo, the major national daily in Bangladesh, has also shown strikingly similar results, depicting overwhelming support for both Islamic law and democracy. So, this requires serious further research. I would prefer to avoid being speculative here, but it is a kind of enigma that I am genuinely interested in exploring further. Perhaps in the near future.
Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Direction Remains Unclear
With renewed balancing among India, China, Pakistan, and the United States, how does Bangladesh’s foreign policy reflect its unresolved nationalist duality—particularly between anti-Indian sentiment and pragmatic economic alignment?
Samzir Ahmed: The BNP-led government’s foreign policy is still not very clear. There are some hints, but there are still many things to watch for. At the same time, there is constant pressure from the United States regarding some controversial agreements. However, anti-Indian sentiment has had a rollercoaster trajectory in Bangladesh. It rises whenever the Awami League is in power and declines when its opponent holds power. So, this dynamic is very much connected to the reactionary political pattern.
Comparatively, do you see Bangladesh moving toward competitive authoritarianism, hybrid populism, or another variant of strongman governance? How does your “compromised strongman” framework travel beyond Hasina to the current moment?
Samzir Ahmed: It is still very early to comment on this. I see the election as the institutionalization of another cycle of re-politicization. However, the structural possibility and template for strongman politics are always there. So, autocratic solutions are traditionally available. What a government needs is the right kind of problem. So, yes, I see it in this way.
Democratic Consolidation Requires Reconciliation First
And lastly, your article suggests that the failure to build a cohesive nation of equal citizens underpins authoritarian drift. What would genuine democratic consolidation require in Bangladesh: institutional reform, ideological reconciliation, or a re-founding narrative of national identity?
Samzir Ahmed: Bangladesh needs all three. If I were to rank them, I would put ideological or political reconciliation first. Then, based on that reconciliation, a re-founding narrative of national identity. And finally, institutional reform. Institutional reform, which has been given much emphasis this time, would therefore come last in this order. So, yes, I think Bangladesh needs all three.
This research note introduces high frequency “real-time” Google Trends data as a novel tool for studying public engagement with major political speeches. Unlike traditional dial-testing, which captures emotional reactions, “googling” patterns reveal cognitive engagement—moments when audiences actively seek information about claims, people, or policies mentioned by the speaker. Analyzing the 2026 State of the Union Address by President Donald J. Trump, the study shows that search activity spiked around issues such as TrumpRX, “Trump Accounts,” and D.E.I., as well as narratives tied to culture-war themes like the story of Sage Blair. The findings suggest that policy proposals addressing material needs—combined with culture-war framing—can mobilize significant public attention, echoing strategies seen in contemporary populist politics.
This research note introduces high frequency “real time” Google Trends data as a tool for research on the general public’s engagement with high-profile political speeches. Contrary to the well-known dial-testing – providing data on emotional engagement – “googling” patterns offer glimpse into the cognitive engagement – actual efforts to obtain additional information on the issues introduced in the speech.
The 2026 State of the Union (SOTU) Address by President Donald J. Trump offered promising testing ground for such tool, due to its prominence, extraordinary length, diverse content and involvement of extraordinary invitees personifying the key narratives. The results indicate that TrumpRX and “Trump Accounts” – generated substantial interest among audience – as well as D.E.I. (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion). Moreover, search data revealed noticeable interest in the history of Sage Blair – an example of engaging framing of the culture war issues. These narratives could be applied in forthcoming campaigns to construct the mix of policies addressing material needs of anti-elitist voters and the culture war narrative – the sort of “bread and circuses” already deployed by Central European illiberals.
Introduction
On 24 February 2026 President Donald J. Trump delivered the first State of the Union (SOTU) address of his second term. The one hour and 47 minutes performance – breaking President Clinton’s 2000 record by over 20 percent (Peters, 2026) – provided unique communication opportunity for president facing tensions among his MAGA fandom as midterm elections approaches.
Staged in the most “presidential” setting imaginable – a joint session of the United States Congress in a year marking 250 years of US independence – President Trump’s spectacle involved proclamation of “the golden age of America,” litany of 47th President’s achievements and bashing on the “craziness” of his opponents. It also featured appearance of extraordinary invitees, personifying President’s narratives on the past, present and future of the United States. Indeed, as noticed by The Economist, the speech was “light on policy and heavy on theatre” as “more than 60% of it made no reference to specific proposals, far more than any other address in the past 50 year.”[1]
According to the Nielsen data, SOTU attracted 32.6 million TV viewers.[2] In a 24 February survey, conducted for CNN via text message using the SSRS Text Message Panel among 482 respondents who watched the speech,[3] 64% reacted positively (of them 38% very positively) and 36% negatively (of them 20% very negatively). Noteworthy, the sample was noticeably skewed towards the right – only 18% of respondents described themselves as Democrats, 41% as Republicans, and 41% as independents or others.
As put by W. Mead, “Trump does not speak in order to convey information to his hearers” but rather say things and then see how they react.[4] Undoubtedly SOTU spectacle offered extraordinary occasion for that, with President spending nearly two hours probing wide array of themes and narratives. In that sense the event can be considered an experiment, and the vast amount of collected data will likely be meticulously crunched in order to develop communication strategies for approaching midterm elections.
On top of surveys, such data can be collected using so called dial-testing – technique developed in 1984 to record real-time reactions of the focus group participants (Kirk & Schill, 2011). For example, Fox News enriched its covering of 2026 SOTU address with dial-testing results from panel made up of 29 Democrats, 30 independents and 41 Republicans.[5]
The goal of this research note is to introduce another data source, that can be applied to elicit real-time reactions audience of such political event – the “real time”[6] high-frequency Google Trends data.
Contrary to the dial-testing, aimed at recording feelings and attitudes (emotional reaction), Google Trends reflects actual behaviour of millions of people engaging in the effort to obtain additional information on the issues introduced by the speaker. That could involve attempts to fact-check or learn more about the piece of information mentioned as a part of the bigger narrative.
The rest of the note is structured as follows. Section II briefly introduces Google Trends as a data source, Section IIIapplies them to the President Trump’s 2026 SOTU address, focusing on people explicitly mentioned by the President, as well as keywords relevant for his key topics. Section IV concludes.
2) “Real Time” Google Trends data
Presented research design is based upon assumption that as of 24 February 2026, “googling” remained sufficiently popular tool for searching factual information in the USA (as compared to alternative search engines or conversations with AI chatbots), that Google Trends data can provide meaningful depiction of this process.
As explained in FAQ about Google Trends data,[7] its aim is to “display interest in a particular topic from around the globe or down to city-level geography.” Search data is normalized “to the time and location of a query … each data point is divided by the total searches of the geography and time range it represents to compare relative popularity … the resulting numbers are then scaled on a range of 0 to 100 based on a topic’s proportion to all searches on all topics.”
Some categories of searches are filtered out, including: (i) searches made by very few people; (ii) repeated searches from the same person over a short period of time; (iii) queries with apostrophes and other special characters as well as (iv) searches made by Google products and services. However, it is admitted that data “can also reflect irregular search activity, such as automated searches or queries that may be associated with attempts to spam our search results.”[8]
Technically, public Google Trends tool produces data using “largely unfiltered sample[9] of actual search requests made to Google.” The “real time” data relies on sample spanning seven days only, however it can be accessed in intervals up to one minute – frequency sufficiently high to trace reactions to the political speech. Unfortunately, reliance on sampling and the “rolling” character of the data diminishes replicability of the results.
Summing up, the search data provided by public Google Trends tool have serious limitations from the scientific point of view. Indeed, users are directly reminded that it is “not scientific and might not be a perfect mirror of search activity.”
However, it offers too many opportunities to be simply ignored, as indicated by application to the topics ranging from macroeconomics (Varian & Choi, 2012), electoral politics (Prado-Román et al. 2021) and pandemic dynamics (Saegner & Austys, 2022).
3) The Results
To gain in-depth insight into the search patterns of US general public during the SOTU address, “real time” Google Trends data for the territory of the United States had been collected with highest available frequency – i.e. with one-minute intervals. The data spanned window from 9:00 PM to 11:00 PM Eastern Time, with SOTU address scheduled at 9:00 PM ET (actually started at 9:11 PM ET).
By design, the values of the search volume index ranged from 0 to 100 – which, in this particular sample, denoted the search volume for “Trump” at 9:42 PM, after President discussed “Trump Accounts”.
3.1. Searches related to the individuals mentioned during the 2026 SOTU address
To demonstrate analytical potential of “real time” Google Trends data for analysis high-profile political speeches, search volume for each of the 30 individuals explicitly referred to by the President Trump during 2026 SOTU address (see table 1 for list) had been plotted on figure 1.
Table 1. Summary of individuals mentioned by President Donald J. Trump during 2026 SOTU address
Name
Description based on the President Trump’s address and open sources
Joe Biden
46th US President
Connor Hellebuyck
Ice-hockey goaltender, gold medalist of Team U.S.A.
Buddy Taggart
World War II veteran
Milly Cate McClymond
Survivor of Texas flood of 4 July 2025
Scott Ruskan
Coast Guard rescue swimmer during Texas flood of 4 July 2025
Megan Hemhauser
Beneficiary of President Trump’s tax cuts
M. and S. Dell
Donors of the $6,250,000,000 to fund the “Trump accounts”
Brad Gerstner
Another donor for “Trump accounts”
Catherine Rayner
Beneficiary of President Trump’s drug discounts, undergoing IVF
Raysall Wiggins
Placed bids on 20 homes but lost to gigantic investment firms
Nancy Pelosi
Member of the U.S. House of Representatives
Dalilah Coleman
Victim of a car crash caused by “illegal alien”
Lizbeth Medina
Victim of a murder committed by “illegal alien”
Sage Blair
In 2021 socially transitioned to a new gender
Melania Trump
The First Lady
Charlie Kirk
Assassinated MAGA activist
Anya Zarutska
Ukrainian war refugee, victim of a murder
Sarah Beckstrom
National Guard Specialist killed in the terrorist attack in Washington, DC
Andrew Wolfe
National Guard Staff Sgt., survivor of the terrorist attack in Washington, DC
Steve Witkoff
Special Envoy
Jared Kushner
Special Envoy, Ivanka Trump’s husband
Marco Rubio
U.S. Secretary of State
Suleimani
Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps general killed in U.S. attack
Nicolás Maduro
President of Venezuela raided by US forces in 2026
Delcy Rodríguez
Acting president of Venezuela
E. and A. Gonzalez
Venezuelan opposition leader freed from prison and his niece
Eric Slover
U.S. Army Chief Warrant Officer 5, helicopter pilot during Maduro raid
Royce Williams
World War II, Korean war and Vietnam war veteran
Thomas Jefferson
Founder of the USA, Third US President
Source: Own compilation based on transcript by The New York Times[10]
As one could expect, celebrity status of C. Hellebuyck and Melania Trump was reflected in the volume of related searches. Other individuals mentioned by President Trump, who attracted highest search volumes involved: (i) Michael and Susan Dell and (ii) Brad Gerstner – “Trump Accounts” donors, (iii) Nancy Pelosi, (iv) Sage Blair – personifying narrative on risks associated with gender transition, (v) Charlie Kirk – assassinated MAGA activist, (vi) Andrew Wolfe – Washington D.C. terrorist attack survivor , (vii) Marco Rubio – US Secretary of State and (viii) Royce Williams – war veteran awarded with Congressional Medal of Honor.
Undoubtedly the exact reasons for “googling” specific individuals in a given time can differ. To use example of Nancy Pelosi, first peak involved President’s quip on Stop Insider Trading Act, and the second coincided with her appearance in Fox broadcast[11] wearing “Release the Files” button.[12] Despite that, the search volume for “Epstein” remained unaffected (see fig. 2). One can imagine that peak for Thomas Jefferson reflected the attempts to fact-check date of his death provided by the President.
3..2. Search words related to key issues raised by President Trump during 2026 SOTU address
Figure 2 plots second group of keywords examined in this note – those related to the topics raised by the President Trump, selected on the basis of the transcript of the speech.
The top panel illustrates the most-searched keywords, starting with the President himself, D.E.I. and two Trump-named programs – “Trump accounts” (saving vehicle for American children[13]) and TrumpRX (website providing access to large discounts on high-priced medicines[14]). Also, the recent decision of the Supreme Court on tariffs and President’s quip on the renaming of Fort Bragg had been reflected in “googling” data.
The middle panel illustrates primarily keywords referring to the economy and costs of living. Despite President Trump’s references to the inflation data or the remarks on the price of eggs and beef, there is no doubt that “$1.85 a gallon for gasoline” inspired the most factchecking.
Finally, the searches on crime and murder peaked as President Trump urged Congress to pass “tough legislation to make sure violent and dangerous repeat offenders are put behind bars, and importantly, that they stay there” (search volume for murder previously peaked when President proclaimed that the “murder rate saw its single largest decline in recorded history”). Also, President’s references to the insider trading and voter ID legislation – as well as quips on “Somali pirates who ransacked Minnesota” – had been reflected in the respective keywords search volumes.
In a survey conducted for the CNN,[15] 45% of respondents claimed that the President focused too little on the economy and costs of living (according to 53% it was the right amount) and 38% claimed that he focused too much on immigration (according to 56% it was the right amount) – assessment that seems consistent with patterns observed in web searches. As of foreign policy 62% claimed the President devoted the right amount.
Given substantial search volumes for D.E.I. and two Trump-named programs, it is interesting to explore their state-level differences. The data indicates that in some states D.E.I. was “googled” much more intensely than both Trump-named programs (like Rhode Island and Vermont). TrumpRX attracted considerably more attention than D.E.I. in several Republican states, as well as District of Columbia and Virginia. “Trump Accounts” did so in Alaska, Montana and D.C., but not in South Dakota.
4) Conclusions
The goal of this note was to introduce high frequency “real time” Google Trends data as a tool for examining the general public’s reactions to the high-profile political speeches. Contrary to the well-known dial-testing – providing data on emotional reactions – “googling” patterns offers glimpse into the cognitive reactions – actual efforts to obtain additional information on the issues introduced in the speech. The 2026 SOTU address by President Trump offered promising testing ground for such tool, due to its prominence, length, range of topics and extraordinary invitees personifying the key narratives.
To illustrate its analytic potential, one can compare obtained results with the conventional wisdom on 2026 SOTU. In particular, relatively scant attention is paid to the issue of TrumpRX or “Trump Accounts” – that actually inspired a lot of information searching.
That could indicate, that as of 2026, programmes directed at the material needs of voters – although with distinct, US characteristics, like reliance on market mechanisms and billionaire donations – could resonate among President Trump’s bases. Thereby, their importance in his political strategy could increase.
Moreover, as judged by “googling” patterns, topics like D.E.I., political correctness (like renaming Fort Bragg) still attract attention of US public. The interest in the history of Sage Blair confirmed that her story offered engaging example of framing culture war issues.
If indeed deployed, the mix of policies addressing material needs of anti-elitist voters coupled with the culture war narrative could provide MAGA with the sort of “bread and circuses” already deployed by Central European illiberals, ending what Timothy Snyder called “sado-populism.”
(*) Kamil Joński, Ph.D. is an assistant in the Department of Tax Law at the Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) and an economist by training. He holds a degree from SGH and is currently employed as part of a research project at the institution. Dr. Joński has participated in several research projects funded by the National Science Centre and conducted at the Warsaw School of Economics, the University of Economics in Kraków, and Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. His research focuses on the functioning of public institutions—particularly common and administrative courts—as well as public policy formulation and implementation, tax policy, and legislative processes.
References
Peters, G. (2026). “Length of State of the Union Addresses in Minutes (from 1966).” The American Presidency Project. Ed. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California. 1999-2026. Available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/324136/ (accessed on February 26, 2026).
Prado-Román, C.; Gómez-Martínez, R.; Orden-Cruz, C. (2021). “Google Trends as a Predictor of Presidential Elections: The United States Versus Canada.” American Behavioral Scientist. 2021;65(4):666-680. doi:10.1177/0002764220975067
Saegner, T; Austys, D. (2022). “Forecasting and Surveillance of COVID-19 Spread Using Google Trends: Literature Review.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 2022, Sep 29;19(19):12394. doi: 10.3390/ijerph191912394.
Kirk R.; D. Schill. (2011). “CNN’s Dial Testing of the Presidential Debates. Parameters of Discussion in Tech Driven Politics.” In: Hendricks, J.A., & Kaid, L.L. (Eds.), Techno Politics in Presidential Campaigning: New Voices, New Technologies, and New Voters, Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203851265
Footnotes
[1] https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2026/02/25/our-language-analysis-of-donald-trumps-state-of-the-union-address (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[2] https://www.nielsen.com/news-center/2026/32-6-million-watch-2026-state-of-the-union-address/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[3] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27411442-cnn-poll-conducted-by-ssrs-state-of-the-union-reaction/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[4] LSE public event “American foreign policy in the age of Trump”, 19 February 2026, available at: https://youtu.be/5OhbCXoJ-kM?list=PLK4elntcUEy3kR3B4Ws8PcKndb1g5a68Y&t=779 11584551 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[5] https://www.foxnews.com/politics/voters-react-trump-touts-signature-tariff-plan-state-union (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[6] https://medium.com/google-news-lab/what-is-google-trends-data-and-what-does-it-mean-b48f07342ee8 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[7] https://support.google.com/trends/answer/4365533 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[8] It is explained that “these searches may be retained in Google Trends as a security measure: filtering them from Google Trends would help those issuing such queries to understand we’ve identified them”.
[9] As explained later: “Providing access to the entire data set would be too large to process quickly. By sampling data, we can look at a dataset representative of all Google searches, while finding insights that can be processed within minutes of an event happening in the real world”.
[10] https://www.nytimes.com/2026/02/25/us/politics/state-of-the-union-transcript-trump.html (Accessed 2 March 2026). See also text and video available at: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/386357 (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[11] Video recording by LiveNOW from FOX, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zF7Vve53z4k (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[12] https://nypost.com/2026/02/24/us-news/democratic-womens-caucus-reps-wear-all-white-attire-epstein-related-pins-to-state-of-the-union-2026-address/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[13] https://www.whitehouse.gov/research/2025/08/trump-accounts-give-the-next-generation-a-jump-start-on-saving/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[14] https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/02/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-launches-trumprx-gov-to-bring-lower-drug-prices-to-american-patients/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
[15] https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/27411442-cnn-poll-conducted-by-ssrs-state-of-the-union-reaction/ (Accessed 2 March 2026).
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein argues that Trumpism is best analyzed not primarily as populism, but as patrimonial rule—where “the state itself becomes an extension of the ruler’s household” and governance turns into “a family business.” In this ECPS interview, Professor Kopstein distinguishes patrimonialism from classic competitive authoritarianism: rather than merely “tilting the playing field,” patrimonial leaders seek to “own the entire field.” He traces how loyalty tests, selective legality, and the “monetization of office” reshape elite incentives and accelerate institutional hollowing. Drawing on Weberian theory, Professor Kopstein warns that irreversibility arrives when career survival depends on pleasing a patron rather than serving an office—and when the line between public and private interests starts to seem “quaint.” The interview also examines selective impunity, conditional judicial autonomy, personalized coercion, and why democratic resistance must target structural vulnerabilities rather than “waiting for collapse.”
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Jeffrey Kopstein, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Irvine, offers a conceptually rigorous reinterpretation of Trumpism that moves beyond the familiar vocabulary of populism and competitive authoritarianism. Anchored in Weberian state theory and comparative authoritarianism, Professor Kopstein argues that the most analytically precise framework for understanding the contemporary transformation of American governance is patrimonialism—a form of rule in which the state is treated as the personal domain of the leader. As he memorably puts it, under patrimonial logic “the state itself becomes an extension of the ruler’s household,” collapsing the boundary between public authority and private interest and turning governance into what he repeatedly calls “a family business.”
Professor Kopstein’s intervention challenges dominant scholarly narratives that focus primarily on rhetoric, electoral manipulation, or ideological polarization. While competitive authoritarianism “rigs the game,” he contends, patrimonialism seeks something more radical: ownership of the system itself. In his words, the logic is “not simply to tilt the playing field, but to own the entire field.” This shift, he suggests, captures a deeper transformation from constitutional republicanism toward personalized rule structured by loyalty, selective legality, and the monetization of office. Trumpism, he argues, is best understood through this lens because its defining features—“loyalty tests, public humiliation of subordinates, monetization of office, and the personalization of coercive authority”—are not incidental pathologies but the governing principle of the system.
A central theme of the interview is institutional hollowing. Drawing on Max Weber’s theory of modern bureaucracy, Professor Kopstein explains how privileging personal loyalty over professional expertise erodes state capacity from within. When career advancement depends on pleasing the patron rather than serving impersonal offices, information deteriorates, policy becomes erratic, and public goods provision declines. The critical threshold, he warns, is reached when citizens and elites alike lose the ability to distinguish between public and private interests—when that distinction begins to seem “quaint.” At that point, patrimonial consolidation is effectively complete.
Equally significant is Professor Kopstein’s analysis of elite incentives. When public office becomes a revenue stream, neutrality becomes costly and adaptation becomes rational. Economic success increasingly depends not on market entrepreneurship but on proximity to power, reversing the conventional liberal assumption that wealth generates political influence. In patrimonial systems, he notes, the causal arrow often runs in the opposite direction: political power produces wealth. This dynamic helps explain why scandals, legal controversies, or reputational crises frequently fail to weaken such regimes. Surviving scandal without consequences signals immunity and reinforces an aura of invincibility among supporters.
By reframing Trumpism as a patrimonial project rather than merely a populist movement, Professor Kopstein invites scholars to redirect analytical attention from mass ideology to elite control over institutions, resources, and coercive capacity. The interview thus situates contemporary American politics within a broader comparative perspective on personalist rule, offering a sobering account of how democratic systems can be gradually transformed without the overt dismantling of formal institutions.
Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.
Not Tilting the Field but Owning It: Trumpism as Patrimonial Rule
US President Donald Trump delivers a speech to voters at an event in Phoenix, Arizona. Photo: Danny Raustadt.
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In yourPersuasionarticle, you argue that Trumpism represents a shift from constitutional republicanism toward patrimonial rule. Conceptually, how does this transformation differ from classic competitive authoritarianism, and why does patrimonialism better capture the logic of power under Trump?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: First of all, thanks so much for having me. Competitive authoritarianism—I’m not a specialist on exactly that concept, but I’ve read it, and I know Lucan Way very well—refers to regimes that manipulate electoral competition while preserving institutional arenas as sites of contestation. Elections still matter, courts still operate, and opposition exists, albeit under constraints.
By contrast, patrimonialism treats the state itself as an extension of the ruler’s household. It becomes a family business. Offices turn into instruments of personal loyalty, law is applied selectively, and the boundaries—most importantly—between public power and private benefit collapse. The logic here is not simply, to use their language, to tilt the playing field, but to own the entire field. In this view, the state is a family business.
Stephen Hanson and I argue that Trumpism is better understood in patrimonial terms because its defining features are loyalty tests, public humiliation of subordinates, monetization of office, and the personalization of coercive authority. These are not incidental excesses; they are the governing principle. If I could leave you with a sound bite, competitive authoritarianism rigs the game, whereas patrimonialism claims ownership of the stadium.
When Pleasing the Patron Overrides Serving the Office
Drawing on Weberian theory and your work on modern statehood, how does the systematic privileging of personal loyalty over bureaucratic expertise in the US reshape state capacity—and at what point does institutional hollowing become politically irreversible?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: Let’s go back to Weber. It’s always the right thing to do. Weber argued that modern statehood depends on impersonal offices and expertise. When loyalty replaces competence, three things happen: information degrades, exits increase, and compliance becomes politicized. Policies become erratic, feedback loops collapse, and public goods deteriorate.
Irreversibility sets in not in a single legal moment, but when expectations shift—when career incentives depend on pleasing the patron rather than serving the office. At that point, even restoration-minded elites begin to hesitate to act.
So, there is no single point of no return, but it arrives when survival in government depends on loyalty rather than competence. We are not in a perfect patrimonial world yet in the United States. The way I would put it is this: our notion of the state depends on a clear separation between the public interest and the private interest. When we are no longer able to understand that difference, when it seems quaint, then we will know that the patrimonial regime has fully consolidated.
From Market Entrepreneurship to Proximity to Power
Caricature: Shutterstock.
You describe the Trump presidency as collapsing the boundary between public authority and private enrichment. How does this blurring alter elite incentives, especially among business, judicial, and security elites who must decide whether to resist, adapt, or profit?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It’s a really important question. Clearly, Trump has been very busy turning the state into a family business, and as we say in the article, business is booming. When public office becomes monetizable, elites shift incentives toward adaptation and profit rather than resistance. And we see that already. We see that with chip makers; rather than economic entrepreneurship, it’s proximity to power that determines whether you are a rich elite. We just saw that this last week with Anthropic and AI.
If you’re out of favor with the government, they can, sort of, crush you. Even in that dust-up between Elon Musk and Trump, it’s super interesting. Here you have the richest man in the world versus the most powerful man in the world, and in that fight, my judgment is Trump crushed him like a bug. It was not close. We’re used to thinking in the United States—and basic political science says—that if you’re rich, that gives you power, that economics determines political power. But in many parts of the world, and at many times in history, it’s actually the reverse: great power yields great wealth. And I think we’re starting to see that in the United States. So, the bottom line is that when office becomes a revenue stream, neutrality becomes a liability.
In Patrimonial Systems, Scandals Create an Aura of Invincibility
How should scholars interpret the political effects of the Epstein files and Trump’s alleged proximity to that scandal—not in moral terms, but as a demonstration of selective impunity within a patrimonial system? Under what conditions do scandals cease to delegitimize power and instead reinforce it?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: In patrimonial systems, surviving scandal often reinforces power. Scandals cease to delegitimize authority when media ecosystems are polarized, selective enforcement is normalized, and elites expect law to be wielded strategically rather than neutrally.
So, under these conditions, I think proximity to scandal that produces no consequences signals immunity—that they can’t be punished. And everybody understands this. So, people stop thinking in terms of enforcing the law, or in terms of, is Trump competent? Is he crazy? Is he a pervert? I mean, all of those things become sort of uninteresting. It’s not that people won’t continue to try; it’s that each one of those he survives within a patrimonial regime doesn’t weaken him—it actually strengthens him, because it creates this aura of invincibility.
So, the bottom line is that, in a rule-of-law system, the kinds of things that would have disqualified Trump long ago—in a patrimonial system—succeed, at least for his most ardent followers, in creating, to put it in Weberian terms, for the leader and his staff, a kind of image of strength.
Patrimonial Stability Rests on Ambition, Fear, and Beneficiaries
Comparatively speaking, how does Trump’s apparent insulation from reputational or legal consequences resemble patterns observed in other patrimonial regimes, such as Russia, Turkey, or Hungary? Is this best understood as elite coordination failure or as successful authoritarian learning?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: Does it have to be either? It could be both. Insulation from consequences reflects both coordination failure and successful authoritarian learning. The fragmentation of opposition enables consolidation, and we see that with the Democratic Party in the United States right now. It’s somewhat of a mess, although they are trying to find their footing.
In Hungary, we’re going to see what happens. Orban has succeeded, in a sense, in playing the opposition like a fiddle. He appears to be threatened right now, and we will see whether he moves toward a full authoritarian route, as opposed to the competitive authoritarian route, though he may. The same dynamic applies to Turkey as well—though you would know much better than I do. My understanding is that it is also in a similar situation. Over time, rulers manage elites through selective reward and punishment, especially through court-politics dynamics. People at the top, if they begin opposing, either leave—or, if the regime is fully consolidated, as in Russia, they may face physical liquidation.
Now, in most patrimonial regimes, it is not like Russia. You can have patrimonialism in both a democracy and a dictatorship; the line runs orthogonal to the distinction between the two. It is not coterminous with it. Patrimonial stability does not require universal support. It relies on individualized ambition and fear. There are large numbers of distributional beneficiaries of Erdogan, of Orban, of Netanyahu in Israel, and now increasingly of Trump in the United States. So, yes.
Courts Persist Under Patrimonialism but Align in Political Cases
The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.
You note that courts rarely disappear under patrimonialism but instead become conditionally autonomous. How does the high rate of judicial alignment with Trump administration interests reshape expectations about the judiciary as a democratic backstop?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I think you raise a really important point. Even in a patrimonial regime, even in an authoritarian regime, for the most part courts continue to exist. They handle normal matters—inheritance, ordinary criminal behavior, standard criminal law—but here we are really talking about political cases, cases that deal especially with the power of the executive.
Under those circumstances, the courts begin to align with the patron. You see that somewhat in the United States. There are already things that people on the Court want. Those who, for example, are interested in libertarian ideas hope Trump will deliver them, although Trump is not a pure libertarian. Those interested in Christian nationalism in the United States hope he will give them what they want as well. Those interested in enhanced executive authority—there are some on the Court in that camp too—are also aligned with the Federalist Society and want that outcome. They, of course, expect Trump to deliver it.
That said, there are certain issues on which the Court will resist. We saw that in the case of tariffs, where the Court ruled against Trump. They may still allow him to pursue similar goals by other means. Over time, the Court figures out how far it can contradict the great father figure—which is what patrimonialism actually implies—and where it cannot.
From a patrimonial perspective, how does the use of agencies such as ICE—operating with diminished oversight and heightened personal loyalty—alter the relationship between citizens and the state? Does this represent bureaucratic drift or deliberate personalization of coercion?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It could be both, but patrimonialism really highlights the personalization of coercion. If you look at the US budget right now, Trump has, on purpose, cut a huge number of regular bureaucratic jobs, which appears to align exactly with what one would expect Republicans to do. However, the budget has not gone down.
They have actually created this huge new bureaucracy that is personally dependent on Trump, and that’s ICE. And it’s becoming not just a personal empire; it’s becoming something like a real estate empire. They’re acquiring a lot of territory, which, of course, Trump likes—real estate. So this personalization of coercive agencies is deliberate. It takes away not only from legal oversight, but also removes or disempowers people who are not personally dependent on Trump.
Thus, the legal forms remain while the zones of exceptional enforcement expand. When oversight weakens and loyalty is rewarded, enforcement becomes personalized. It becomes somewhat theatrical. The objective is not efficient enforcement, but loyal enforcement. Those two things can overlap, but they can also be very different.
Episodic Force and Symbolic Threat as Tools of Control
Border Patrol agents monitor an anti-ICE protest in downtown Los Angeles, June 8, 2025. Demonstrators rallied against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights. Photo: Dreamstime.
Unlike 20th-century dictatorships, Trumpism relies less on mass repression and more on episodic coercion and symbolic threat. How much actual violence is necessary for patrimonial consolidation in a mature media democracy?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I’ve written pretty extensively on this. Consolidation does not require mass repression. There has been a lot of discussion of fascism and totalitarianism and all that kind of stuff, Hanson and I worry about it a great deal. But what is probably also true is that selective, visible coercion effectively reshapes expectations. A few exemplary punishments communicate risk pretty broadly. It’s not to say that there won’t continue to be resistance to ICE. We saw that in Minnesota; we’ve seen it in other places. I’m here in California, where we have a pretty active resistance, and our state government—California has 40 million people; it’s a country—has continued to resist. But ICE is still around; it’s in my neighborhood. It doesn’t need to terrorize everyone; it only needs to make everyone calculate as if it could. And that’s the case. It changes expectations.
Succession Anxiety Is the Structural Weakness of Personalist Rule
You argue that succession is the Achilles’ heel of patrimonial regimes. How does Trump’s discourse around a third term function strategically to freeze elite expectations and delay post-Trump realignments?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: It’s absolutely crucial. As you said, succession is the Achilles’ heel of a patrimonial regime. Under most circumstances, patrimonialism is the oldest form of government in the world. Under most circumstances, patrimonialism is related to kingship or queenship. It passes on through the royal family. Of course, remaking the state as a family business in the modern world—we don’t have kings or queens anymore—so you would think it would pass through his family. It doesn’t seem all that likely in Trump’s case that the sons are going to be the successors. Interestingly, the daughter Ivanka is probably the most cognitively fit to be the successor. But patrimonial women don’t do very well either.
But the key here is that personalist regimes destabilize when elites anticipate an endpoint. So, signaling negotiable terms that that endpoint may not come freezes expectations and discourages hedging. As the end comes closer, the staff start scrambling like rats on the deck of a sinking ship. And the whole point of this third-term discussion—which he may very well want, and I don’t think he could easily get, but he will try, and it is to be taken extremely seriously as a pressure point against the consolidation of a patrimonial regime—is that it is extremely important that it be opposed, because it’s all about maintaining the leader and his staff. And if the staff see that endpoint, the regime itself becomes destabilized. So, yes, succession anxiety is the Achilles’ heel of a patrimonial regime. All experience shows that.
To what extent does labeling Trumpism as “populist” obscure its deeper patrimonial logic? What analytical errors follow if scholars focus too heavily on mass ideology rather than elite control of resources and institutions?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: I think it’s really important. On the one hand, populism—most of political science, most scholars, most social science are very interested in this, and populism is part of it—focuses on how people come to power, the rhetoric, the appeal, and how they stay in power. What patrimonialism looks at is something different: it examines what they do when they come to power, how they actually govern. Governance is extremely important, and populism, we think, obscures patrimonial control. It highlights rhetoric.
Patrimonialism highlights elite control over appointments, enforcement, resources—things that populism doesn’t talk about at all. The two aren’t completely contradictory, but they address really different dimensions. So, populism, or dictatorship versus democracy, is part of a discourse concerned with how leaders come to power and stay in power. Patrimonialism is interested in what they do to the state once they come to power. And that’s just something very different.
Foreign Policy as Regime Maintenance by Other Means
US Army advances during a demonstration at MCAS Miramar, October 5, 2008. Photo: Anton Hlushchenko / Dreamstime.
How does Trump’s coercive, transactional foreign policy—toward NATO allies, territorial revisionism (as in Greenland), and extraterritorial enforcement—serve domestic patrimonial consolidation rather than traditional strategic goals?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: As we’re talking about this, of course, the world’s foreign policies are in great flux and turmoil with what’s going on in the Middle East. One of the things about patrimonialism is that patrimonial leaders, because they have a very traditionalist view, no longer see borders as legal; they view them as historical and traditional—fuzzy, if you will—and that really works at odds with the modern world.
Even more important than that, they view their relations with other countries, as you said, as transactional. Transactional diplomacy dramatizes sovereignty and creates distributable rents for loyalists. So, who’s going to control Greenland? Will it be Donald Trump Jr. creating mines for strategic minerals that university professors will be forced to work in like a gulag? I don’t think so, but that’s the idea.
So, foreign policy becomes a sort of regime maintenance by other means. It’s an extension. Traditional international relations tends to ignore the makeup, the regime type, of domestic politics, but we think that foreign policy—and Trump’s foreign policy in particular—is especially driven by this domestic makeup, by domestic politics.
Patrimonial Stability Depends on Cohesion Between Leader and Staff
From a comparative international perspective, how likely is it that sustained allied resistance and strategic balancing against the United States could feed back into domestic regime instability—or do patrimonial rulers generally externalize such costs successfully?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: They can. It’s an excellent question, and we don’t have a great answer to that, to be honest. But, on the one hand, foreign wars—and we’re in one right now—can produce a sort of rally-around-the-flag phenomenon, although in the United States right now my understanding is that the war, the bombing of Iran, is not very popular.
But here’s the point: external resistance destabilizes only if it fractures key domestic elites. That’s the point. Again, Weber and patrimonialism tells us, that you need to look at the relationship between the leader and his staff.
And so it only works—it only destabilizes—if it fractures the elites underneath the leader. And why? Because balancing imposes costs. Destabilization occurs when those costs split the coalition. So, that’s how I would answer that, although our emphasis is really not on foreign policy. But it’s an important question.
When the State Becomes a Family Business, Public Goods Deteriorate
You emphasize that patrimonial regimes are structurally bad at providing public goods. What kinds of policy failures—climate disasters, pandemics, financial crises—are most likely to puncture the aura of inevitability surrounding Trumpism?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: What you would expect from a patrimonial regime, as you said quite correctly, is that as a bureaucracy based on merit recruitment is degraded and becomes a plaything of the family business, you would see a systematic under-provision of public goods, or only those public goods that serve the interests of the extended household of the leader being provided. So, you’d expect two things to happen. One—and the one you pointed to—is that when we need the state to respond to disasters, and we saw this with COVID, but you can also see it with financial crises and other kinds of public health breakdowns, there is an institutional halt. When we need the state, what the state represents under those circumstances is a hedge against disaster. And so we need the state, and we may not have it.
I’m living here in California. We get earthquakes. If we need the state after a really bad earthquake, if it has been degraded enough, we won’t have it. But there’s a second type of deterioration that is slower moving, and that is the under-provision of public goods for things like roads, bridges, and airports. Over time, what you should see is public infrastructure decaying, and we already have that in the United States, and it’s going to get worse. I live next to the second-largest city in the United States, Los Angeles, and the airport here is like a third-world airport. It’s not really being built up or maintained. That’s called LAX (Los Angeles International Airport). You should expect to see much of the public infrastructure in the United States start to look more and more like LAX.
Effective Opposition Raises the Costs of Loyalty and Lowers the Costs of Exit
“No Kings” protest against the Trump administration, New York City, USA — June 14, 2025. Demonstrators march down Fifth Avenue as part of the nationwide “No Kings” movement opposing President Donald Trump and his administration. Photo: Dreamstime.
And finally, Professor Kopstein, given your critique of “waiting for collapse,” what forms of democratic resistance are most effective against patrimonial rule? Specifically, how can opposition forces exploit structural weaknesses—succession anxiety, declining popularity, and governance failure—without reinforcing siege narratives?
Professor Jeffrey Kopstein: That’s the hardest question you’ve asked yet, but I want to reinforce the assumption we make, and as we wrote in this article, that we should not expect scandal, incompetence, the Supreme Court, nor foreign policy failures to save us. None of those things will probably work. Patrimonial leaders are pretty good at dealing with all of them. The weaknesses of patrimonialism, as we’ve been discussing, are much more structural, as you said quite explicitly. They’re slow-moving. They’re unspectacular. So, we’ve talked about splits, succession failures, institutional hollowing—things that are slow-moving and fly under the radar. That is why it is so difficult for us to deal with this type of regime, to understand it, and to expose it.
So, I think focusing on succession and undermining inevitability is key. That is why each congressional House race matters: if you can show that the Democrats won by more than expected, or that Trump did not win by as much as he expected in a particular district, that punctures the aura of inevitability. Most important is to connect governance failures to institutional hollowing. That is the key weak point here—to connect those two—and to avoid rhetoric that is easily reframed as elite disdain. The bottom line is: don’t wait for collapse. Raise the costs of loyalty, fracture the elite, and lower the costs of exit.
Along Nigeria’s vulnerable coastline, climate change is not a projection but a daily struggle shaping survival, governance, and democracy. In this incisive commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reveals how communities—from Lagos to Cross River—are filling critical gaps left by weak institutions, organizing drainage cleanups, mangrove restoration, and informal warning systems to confront flooding, pollution, and shoreline loss. These grassroots practices constitute “climate security from below,” challenging state-centric narratives that equate security with national planning alone. Yet this resilience also exposes deep democratic deficits, as citizens assume responsibilities that should belong to public authorities. The Nigerian case calls for a rethinking of climate security—one that bridges community initiative with accountable governance and recognizes local actors not as substitutes for the state, but as indispensable partners in building sustainable, democratic adaptation.
By Oludele Solaja*
Along the Nigerian coast, climate change is not a distant forecast; it is an everyday reality. Floodwaters inundate homes. Shorelines relentlessly recede. Saltwater contaminates freshwater supplies. Drains choke with plastic refuse, transforming streets into temporary lakes when the rains arrive. For those in the Niger Delta and adjacent coastal areas, climate insecurity is not a concept but a lived experience.
Yet climate security is often discussed in terms of state stability, resource conflicts, or national-level adaptation planning. On the ground, the picture is very different. In many parts of the Nigerian coast, securing the climate is a local endeavor—it is climate security from below.
All along Nigeria’s long coastal belt—from Lagos in the west to Cross River in the east—communities are filling governance gaps caused by weak infrastructure, state absenteeism, and an economy structured around extractive activities. Their everyday efforts to prevent environmental hazards, safeguard livelihoods, and protect daily life from environmental instability constitute a concrete instance of climate security from below.
Climate Risk and Governance Gaps
Among all regions of Nigeria, the coastal zone—characterized by high population density, vital ecosystems, and extensive oil-sector industrial development—is one of the country’s most climate-sensitive areas. Devastating nationwide floods (2012 and 2022) caused massive population displacement (UN OCHA, 2023), while the low-lying areas of the delta region are vulnerable to flooding due to the combined effects of sea-level rise and subsidence. The persistent and serious pollution of marine and coastal areas by oil (UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2021) is another major challenge to the region’s resilience, in addition to the issue of waste disposal.
However, these climate hazards do not operate independently of existing governance failures: the most basic measures of environmental protection—drainage, waste management systems, shoreline stabilization, and adaptation measures—are still absent from the majority of coastal Nigerian communities even after over half a century of oil production. The institutions responsible for addressing these hazards often exist only on paper rather than being effectively implementable, and are seen by communities as out of reach, lacking sufficient resources, or being overly controlled by industrial corporations (Watts, 2004; Adekola & Mitchell, 2011).
National planning and large infrastructure projects have come to dominate official discourse on climate security. However, daily maintenance tasks—such as unblocking drainage channels and maintaining vegetation cover along coastlines—appear to receive little attention. The resulting governance gaps mean that environmental risks mount even as the ability of institutions to respond to them fails to keep pace. The response? Communities themselves have filled these gaps.
Everyday Climate Security
Across the Nigerian coast, locals organize cleanups of drainage channels in anticipation of the rains. Youth groups remove plastic waste from waterways. Local fishers actively plant mangrove trees that offer protection from storm surges, and some local leaders invest in manually reinforcing shorelines. Informal communication networks are established to disseminate warnings during extreme weather events. These actions perform critical climate-security functions: clearing waterways reduces flooding risks, planting mangroves strengthens coastlines, waste removal enhances public health, and social networks bolster community solidarity during critical moments.
This is climate security lived through everyday practice. It involves the extensive use of local ecological knowledge—the implicit understanding of local tidal systems, sedimentation processes, vegetation cover, and flood dynamics that formal engineering approaches sometimes fail to capture (Berkes, 2018). These efforts are frequently outside state plans, organized through communal labor, volunteers, and community associations (Adger et al., 2005; IPCC, 2022). This form of security has moved from a distant policy objective to a matter of routine—often invisible, often unpaid—maintenance that ensures continued habitation in these communities.
The Politics of Resilience
However, community agency is only one aspect of the story. It reveals deep democratic deficits in Nigeria’s governance landscape. Many communities in Nigeria’s coast have had minimal participation in environmental decision-making and very limited input in planning related to coastal infrastructure (Adekola & Mitchell, 2011). Environmental damage and subsequent exclusion caused by the operations of the oil industry in the Niger Delta continue to fuel local suspicion and resentment of both the state and oil companies (UNEP, 2011).
Dominant narratives about national development tend to focus on megaprojects, especially those involving infrastructure such as new highways and expanding coastal reclamation schemes, instead of the vital work of maintaining drains or planting mangroves. Communities therefore take on tasks that ought to be part of municipal governance. On the one hand, this enhances community resilience; yet, on the other, it may inadvertently normalize state withdrawal and a general lack of commitment from both national and subnational governments. When people do not expect the municipality to respond, self-help becomes the norm, and they may no longer notice the absence of this state function. Climate security from below becomes both a function of and evidence of failed state governance. Understanding this dynamic is critical; the ability of a community to exhibit resilience through its own actions should not serve as justification for abandoning its rights to a participatory state governance structure.
Informality and Legitimacy
A significant proportion of this community-based environmental management along Nigeria’s coast operates informally. There are no municipal plans that document these practices, nor are there official funds allocated to support them, yet they possess strong local legitimacy. The practice of collective labor and a long tradition of shared ownership over local environments continue to be powerful social resources. The application of indigenous ecological knowledge enhances their efficacy, given that local actors may possess more detailed knowledge of flood dynamics than engineers. For instance, locally managed mangrove planting may have higher survival rates than centrally implemented technical solutions that are often not sensitive to local ecology (Berkes, 2018; IPCC, 2022). Nevertheless, informality means that these efforts struggle when faced with widespread industrial pollution or encroaching urban waste. Sustained resilience under such conditions requires not only community initiative but also institutional support and legitimacy.
Rethinking Climate Security
The Nigerian case thus requires a reconsideration of conventional understandings of climate security. Security may not simply entail preventing conflict and safeguarding states but also includes the protection of livelihoods, human health, and natural ecosystems threatened by contemporary climate change processes. In the Global South, resilience is emerging first in informal, grassroots, locally managed communities rather than through national adaptation planning.
To achieve sustainable climate security, bridging grassroots efforts and inclusive state governance institutions must be a priority. Formal acknowledgement of these community-led adaptations within national adaptation frameworks, cooperative frameworks integrating local knowledge and technical capacity, participatory planning mechanisms to overcome democratic gaps, small-scale climate financing to support community projects without over-bureaucratization, as well as the integration of local ecological knowledge into formal assessments are some policy strategies. This reconfigures communities not as a substitute for the state but as legitimate and important partners in governance.
Conclusion
In fact, climate security is already being constructed from below on Nigeria’s coast—with drainage repair, mangrove planting, waste disposal, and vigilant self-policing, communities are managing daily life under accelerating environmental breakdown. This is indicative of both community strength and utter policy collapse simultaneously. The Nigerian case makes clear that strategies for climate security need to consider possibilities beyond the state and engage in discussions around daily security practices if adaptation is to become the practice of democratic, responsive statehood.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Adger, W. N.; Hughes, T. P.; Folke, C.; Carpenter; S. R. & Rockström, J. (2005). “Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters.” Science, 309(5737), 1036–1039.
Adekola, O. & Mitchell, G. (2011). “The Niger Delta wetlands: Threats to ecosystem services, their importance to dependent communities and possible management measures.” International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 7(1), 50–68.
Berkes, F. (2018). Sacred ecology (4th ed.). Routledge.
IPCC. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press.
UNEP. (2011). Environmental assessment of Ogoniland. United Nations Environment Programme.
UN OCHA. (2023). Nigeria floods situation report 2022–2023. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Watts, M. (2004). “Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta.” Geopolitics, 9(1), 50–80.
World Bank. (2021). Climate risk country profile: Nigeria. World Bank Group.