Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 26, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/br0024
Tariq Modood’s groundbreaking work on multiculturalism is celebrated in this volume, highlighting his transformative contributions to the field. Through the concepts of “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a sophisticated framework that harmonizes diverse identities with a cohesive sense of national belonging. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, the book tackles pressing challenges such as populism, globalization, and transnationalism, while situating Modood’s legacy within global debates on identity and citizenship. Although the collection’s depth and interdisciplinary scope are impressive, its Western-centric focus somewhat limits its comparative applicability. Nonetheless, this volume is an indispensable resource for advancing multiculturalism as a counter to the populist radical right in both theory and practice.
The connections between populist radical right ideologies and racism, nativism, nationalism, welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration sentiment, Islamophobia, and anti-minority discourses, actions, and policies are undeniable. One potential countermeasure to this form of homogenizing cultural and racial populism is the establishment of a robust framework for multiculturalism, cultural hybridity, and heterogeneity. This framework should uphold and guarantee individual and collective rights and freedoms, both to and from, for minority groups and peace and comfort for dominant majority culture.
In this context, the contributions of Tariq Modood have garnered significant attention. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) has recognized the relevance of his work and decided to publish a review of the book The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice: Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, this volume explores and celebrates Modood’s influential ideas on multiculturalism and its practical implications in contemporary society.
The book serves as a tribute to Tariq Modood’s substantial contributions to the theory and practice of multiculturalism. It offers a wide-ranging exploration of multiculturalism as a concept that continues to evolve, addressing contemporary issues of identity, inclusion, and diversity in diverse societies. Divided into four thematic sections—philosophical orientations, diversity and inclusion, nationalism and transnationalism, and secularism—the book includes contributions from eminent scholars across these fields.
The chapter “Introduction: Modoodian Multiculturalism,” co-authored by the book’s editors, explores Modood’s influential contributions to multiculturalism, situating his ideas within global debates on identity, citizenship, and diversity. It emphasizes Modood’s interdisciplinary approach, blending political theory with sociology to address evolving multicultural challenges. Contextualizing critiques and the perceived decline of multiculturalism, particularly amid populist narratives, cultural “wars,” and political skepticism, the editors highlight its resilience as both a policy and theoretical framework. They underscore multiculturalism’s relevance in tackling racial and ethnic justice, as reflected in movements like Black Lives Matter and indigenous rights debates.
The chapter delves into Modood’s key contributions, particularly his formulation of “Modoodian multiculturalism,” integrating sociological insights with normative political theory. Central concepts include ethno-religious identities and cultural racism, addressing gaps in traditional anti-racism and secularist paradigms. Modood’s advocacy for plural anti-racism and “multicultural nationalism” is pivotal, proposing an inclusive reshaping of national identities to foster minority belonging. By articulating Modood’s innovative approaches to recognition, inclusion, and national belonging, the chapter situates his work as vital to advancing multiculturalism in theory and practice. It effectively introduces the volume, tracing Modood’s intellectual legacy and global relevance, while setting the stage for thematic explorations of multiculturalism’s enduring significance.
In the chapter “Invoking the Idealist World of Ideas,” David Boucher explores Modood’s intellectual engagement with British idealism, particularly the philosophies of Michael Oakeshott and R.G. Collingwood. Boucher highlights how Modood’s grounding in idealist traditions informs his conception of multicultural citizenship, shaping his interdisciplinary synthesis of political theory and sociology. Boucher argues that Modood’s work embodies a “world of ideas” rooted in Collingwood’s hierarchical and overlapping forms of experience and Oakeshott’s philosophical skepticism toward rigid abstraction. Modood’s rejection of the categorical separation between theory and practice, derived from Collingwood, becomes central to his critique of Oakeshott’s anti-essentialism and his emphasis on identity as dynamic and contextual rather than fixed. This conceptual orientation allows Modood to address the practical challenges of multiculturalism while remaining philosophically rigorous.
Boucher demonstrates how Modood adapts the idealist framework to contemporary issues of multiculturalism, such as identity, cultural continuity, and anti-racism. The author also situates Modood’s contributions within a broader philosophical revival, emphasizing his alignment with the idealist principles of “identity in difference” and “continuity through change.” Ultimately, Boucher’s analysis underscores the enduring influence of British idealism on Modood’s theoretical and practical engagement with multicultural citizenship, offering valuable insights into the philosophical underpinnings of his work.
In chapter titled “Intimating or Iterating? Modood on Contextualism and the Danish Cartoons of Muhammad,” Sune Lægaard critically evaluates Tariq Modood’s iterative contextualist methodology through the lens of the Danish Cartoon Affair. Lægaard examines the tensions between Modood’s stated commitment to contextual sensitivity and the practical application of this methodology in his writings on the controversy. Lægaard acknowledges Modood’s contextualism as a theoretically rich approach, particularly in its sensitivity to local norms and iterative refinement of general principles. However, he raises concerns about the selective nature of Modood’s contextual engagement. For instance, Modood’s interpretation of the cartoons, particularly the “bomb-in-the-turban” cartoon, is critiqued for privileging one interpretation—Muslims as targets of racism—while neglecting the cartoonists’ stated intentions, such as criticizing extremism. Lægaard argues that this selective framing undermines Modood’s broader claim to contextual neutrality.
Further, Lægaard challenges Modood’s use of analogies, such as Holocaust denial laws, to justify restrictions on speech targeting Muslims. He points out inaccuracies in Modood’s application of Danish blasphemy and hate-speech laws, which already protected religious groups, including Muslims, thereby questioning the relevance of Modood’s arguments in this specific case. While Lægaard commends the adaptability of Modood’s contextualism, he highlights methodological inconsistencies that weaken its application. These critiques underscore the challenges of balancing context-sensitive analysis with normative commitments in political theory. Lægaard’s analysis reinforces the need for greater precision in contextual methodologies, even as he acknowledges the enduring value of Modood’s broader theoretical contributions.
Simon Thompson’s chapter, “Tariq Modood and the Politics of Recognition,” provides a critical exploration of the role of recognition in Modood’s theory of multiculturalism. The chapter positions recognition as a cornerstone in Modood’s intellectual framework, especially in understanding and addressing the dynamics of multicultural societies. Thompson organizes his analysis around four themes: equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion. He commends Modood for his dual conception of equality—equal dignity and equal respect—and his emphasis on the interplay between individual and group recognition. Thompson also highlights Modood’s nuanced focus on ethno-religious identities, which distinguishes his work from traditional liberal multiculturalist theories. Further, he underscores Modood’s dynamic understanding of identity as a dialectical process shaped by insider self-ascriptions and outsider perceptions, framing struggles for recognition as central to addressing misrecognition and exclusion.
However, Thompson raises critical concerns about Modood’s framework. He critiques the lack of practical guidance on when and how to apply equal dignity versus equal respect and calls for a more robust metric to navigate this distinction. Additionally, he notes Modood’s relative neglect of socio-economic inequalities, arguing that a comprehensive theory of justice should integrate both multicultural and economic dimensions. Thompson also challenges the ambiguity in Modood’s conceptualization of group recognition, urging greater clarity about whether groups deserve recognition for their intrinsic value or for the sake of their members. Nevertheless, Thompson’s critique is constructive, acknowledging Modood’s valuable contributions while suggesting areas for further refinement.
In chapter titled “What’s to Be Done? Reuniting the People,” Charles Taylor engages with the divisive impact of exclusionary populism, proposing inclusive frameworks to reconcile societal divisions and foster cohesion. Taylor’s chapter is a robust examination of how modern democracies, fractured by inequalities and identity politics, might navigate towards unity through redefining national identity and embracing multicultural and intercultural narratives. Taylor’s analysis is compelling in its multi-faceted approach, identifying the dual fissures in contemporary democracies: the elite-populist divide and the tensions arising from cultural or ethnic differences. He underscores the need for democracies to craft inclusive political identities that honor both equality and historical narratives of national identity. His advocacy for interculturalism, particularly as a counterpoint to misinterpretations of multiculturalism in Europe, provides a roadmap for societal integration, emphasizing dialogue, collaboration, and a rejection of exclusionary policies. However, the chapter is not without shortcomings. Taylor’s solutions, while idealistic and principled, lack concrete mechanisms for implementation, particularly in polarized contexts where identity politics dominate public discourse. His reliance on examples like Canada and Quebec, while illustrative, may not translate seamlessly to societies with entrenched histories of racial and cultural strife, such as the US or France. Furthermore, his critique of exclusionary populism occasionally underplays the structural forces that sustain such ideologies.
In the chapter titled “The Unfinished Tasks of Multiculturalism: Thinking of Multiculturalism, Thinking with Tariq Modood,”Gurpreet Mahajan presents a thorough exploration of Modood’s contributions to multicultural political theory, with a specific focus on the interplay between multiculturalism, religion, and secularism. Mahajan highlights Modood’s approach to integration, which emphasizes the positive recognition of diverse identities, and his advocacy for reframing secularism as compatible with multicultural principles. This chapter stands out for its systematic articulation of “unfinished tasks” within multicultural discourse, inviting further scholarly and public engagement.
Mahajan effectively foregrounds the complexity of Modood’s argument that religion should be seen as a “public good,” thus challenging rigid secularist frameworks and pushing for inclusive policies that integrate minority religious perspectives into public life. However, this proposition raises critical questions regarding the balance between accommodating religious identities and maintaining secularism’s neutrality, especially in contexts where religious orthodoxy may conflict with liberal values. A notable strength of Mahajan’s analysis is her critique of multiculturalism’s perceived alignment with religious resurgence, which has alienated left-liberal allies. She also underscores the need for deeper engagement with intra-group inequalities and the homogenizing tendencies of identity-based discourses. While Mahajan successfully identifies pressing challenges for multiculturalism—such as inter-minority conflicts and the methodological tensions of de-essentializing communities—the chapter could benefit from more concrete proposals to address these gaps.
In her chapter titled “From the Race Relations Act 1968 to the Great Repeal Act 2018: Back to Square One in 50 Years?” Maleiha Malik presents a deeply analytical and historically grounded examination of the evolution of race relations in the UK, juxtaposing the promise of legislative progress with the regressive realities that culminated in Brexit. Malik’s work underscores the enduring influence of Britain’s imperial legacy on contemporary racial hierarchies, connecting colonial governance to modern racialized exclusion. Her critique of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1968 reveals its limitations in addressing structural racism, focusing instead on individual acts of discrimination, a pattern that persists through subsequent legal frameworks.
Malik’s critique of Brexit as a racially charged political project is particularly compelling. She argues that populist rhetoric glorifying the British Empire masked the exclusionary nationalism that defined the Leave campaign, fueling a backlash against migrants and minority communities. Her analysis highlights how cultural and religious discrimination—especially Islamophobia—has evolved, amplifying new forms of racialization beyond traditional categories of color or ethnicity. While Malik’s historical framing is powerful, her portrayal of race relations legislation as consistently undermined by nativist anxieties invites further exploration of successful counter-movements. Moreover, her reliance on Brexit as a focal point risks overshadowing broader trends in global populism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Overall, Malik’s chapter is a robust critique of Britain’s struggle to reconcile its imperial past with a truly inclusive multicultural future, urging renewed efforts to combat the structural legacies of racism.
In “Multicultural Nationalism as an Ethics of Social Membership,” Will Kymlicka offers an exploration of the interplay between multiculturalism and nationalism, presenting a potential reconciliation through the concept of “multicultural nationalism.” Drawing from T.H. Marshall’s citizenship framework, Kymlicka contends that national solidarity and multicultural inclusion can coexist by redefining shared societal membership in pluralistic terms. His argument builds on empirical data, highlighting both opportunities and challenges in fostering an inclusive national identity. Kymlicka’s analysis is commendable for addressing the perceived incompatibility between nationalism and multiculturalism. His argument that membership rights can act as a vehicle for inclusivity resonates with Modood’s advocacy for multicultural nationalism. However, the chapter also critically acknowledges the risks inherent in Marshallian politics, particularly its historical tendency to marginalize minorities and reinforce societal hierarchies. The discussion on majority perceptions of minority commitment adds a critical dimension, revealing how perceptions influence support for minority rights. However, this approach risks oversimplifying minority identities and aspirations by framing their inclusion primarily in terms of majority acceptance. Populism surfaces implicitly, as Kymlicka critiques nationalism’s potential for exclusion while emphasizing its capacity for solidarity.
In chapter titled “Integrating Modood and Kymlicka on National Inclusion,” Geoffrey Brahm Levey undertakes a critical analysis of Modood’s multicultural nationalism and Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism, arguing for a synthesis that leverages the strengths of both approaches to foster inclusive democracies. Levey critiques Kymlicka’s dismissal of significant differences between the two frameworks, as well as Modood’s assertion of the superiority of multicultural nationalism, ultimately advocating for an integrative model. Levey highlights Kymlicka’s recalibration of his cultural rights framework to emphasize minority contributions to society as a means of fostering solidarity. However, he critiques this shift for placing undue responsibility on minorities while neglecting structural adjustments required from majority groups. Similarly, he challenges Modood’s reliance on top-down transformations of national identity, arguing that such efforts often provoke resistance and caricature rather than fostering inclusion. The chapter engages with populism indirectly, critiquing majoritarian tendencies to frame minorities as undeserving or disloyal, which underpins populist rhetoric. Levey’s proposed integration of liberal and multicultural nationalism emphasizes concrete protections for minorities alongside a gradual reshaping of national identity through inclusive symbols and narratives. Levey’s analysis offers valuable insights into multicultural theory, though it underscores the challenges of balancing theoretical ideals with pragmatic strategies for fostering social cohesion.
Riva Kastoryano explores the complexities of transnationalism and its implications for nationalism and multiculturalism in her chapter titled “Transnational Experiences: Redefining Solidarity and Nationalisms.” She critiques state-centric multicultural policies, arguing that transnational belonging fundamentally reconfigures traditional nationalist paradigms by fostering non-territorial solidarities that challenge bounded national identities. Kastoryano draws on historical frameworks, such as Randolph Bourne’s concept of a “transnational America,” to contextualize modern transnational dynamics. She contrasts the civic integration goals of multicultural nationalism, as articulated by Modood, with the deterritorialized identities emerging from transnational networks. This juxtaposition highlights a tension: while multicultural nationalism seeks to integrate diverse groups within a nation-state framework, transnationalism transcends borders, creating new, imagined communities and solidarities based on shared identities or causes.
A key criticism is that state-driven multicultural nationalism may fail to address the non-territorial and fluid identities fostered by globalization. Kastoryano underscores the rise of “diaspora politics,” where states and transnational actors negotiate identities and allegiances, sometimes reinforcing exclusionary or populist discourses. She critiques the resurgence of ethno-cultural nationalism, often rebranded as populism, for exploiting migrants’ transnational solidarities as perceived threats to national sovereignty. Kastoryano’s chapter is a significant contribution to understanding the intersections of globalization, identity, and nationalism.
Anna Triandafyllidou’s chapter “What Can Migration and National Identity Look Like in the Mid-Twenty-First Century? Transnational Diasporas and Digital Nomads” examines the interplay of migration, digital technologies, and national identity, projecting forward into the mid-21st century. By bridging physical and virtual mobility, she explores how these evolving dynamics redefine notions of belonging, identity, and citizenship. The chapter reflects on theoretical frameworks like Modood’s multicultural nationalism, plural versus neo-tribal nationalism, and everyday nationhood, questioning their applicability in an era shaped by augmented reality and digital nomadism.
Triandafyllidou identifies a dichotomy between “cosmopolitan nomads,” who navigate globalized systems with ease, and “vagabonds,” marginalized by restrictive migration policies. She underscores the challenge of integrating virtual mobility into theories of migration and identity, noting its potential for both fostering transnational solidarity and amplifying socio-political exclusions. Particularly compelling is her discussion of neo-tribal nationalism, which thrives in the echo chambers of social media, reflecting the populist exploitation of mobility-induced anxieties. While the chapter is innovative in situating digital and physical mobility within broader global transformations, criticisms arise from its speculative tone and lack of empirical substantiation regarding the identity negotiations of digital nomads. Furthermore, the potential environmental and ethical implications of such mobility remain underexplored. Nevertheless, Triandafyllidou’s work opens critical pathways for rethinking nationalism and migration in an increasingly digitized and interconnected world.
Cécile Laborde’s chapter “Rethinking Race and Religion with Rawls and Modood” engages in a critique and synthesis of John Rawls’s and Modood’s perspectives on race and religion, proposing an interpretive framework that seeks to reconcile their divergent approaches. Laborde highlights the limitations of Rawls’s “bifurcated view,” which treats race and religion as separate normative categories rooted in distinct sociopolitical contexts. While Rawls centers religion within his political theory due to its epistemic and moral complexities, he relegates race to the realm of contingent injustice, underestimating its structural and enduring sociopolitical significance. Laborde effectively critiques Rawls for his intellectualist and decontextualized treatment of race, noting its inadequacy in addressing racial inequality and the historical interplay of race and religion.
Conversely, Modood’s integrated view, informed by his British context and the concept of “religio-racial” identity, is presented as a richer framework. Modood’s recognition of the intersectionality between race and religion and his advocacy for extending anti-discrimination protections to Muslims exemplify an inclusive approach to multiculturalism. Laborde deepens this perspective by introducing a dual “First-person” and “Third-person” framework to address individual agency and structural discrimination. While Laborde’s framework is compelling, critics might argue that it remains largely theoretical, with limited engagement with empirical case studies. Furthermore, the application of her dual perspective to real-world conflicts requires further elaboration, particularly in navigating populist discourses targeting religious minorities. Nevertheless, her chapter provides an invaluable contribution to debates on identity, justice, and multiculturalism.
Rajeev Bhargava’s chapter, “On Modood’s Moderate Secularism,” offers a comparative analysis of Modood’s “moderate secularism” and the Indian model of “principled distance,” critically examining their adaptability in addressing religious diversity in modern states. Bhargava acknowledges Modood’s significant contribution in theorizing moderate secularism as a model that accommodates religious pluralism while maintaining the autonomy of political authority. This framework, rooted in European traditions, challenges the rigid binaries of American and French secularism, advocating for an inclusive and multicultural approach.
Bhargava, however, critiques moderate secularism for its limited flexibility, particularly in accommodating deeply diverse societies. He highlights the entrenched biases in European secular frameworks that privilege Christianity, arguing that these models often fail to account for the structural inequities faced by Muslim minorities. Bhargava calls for a shift from mere institutional adjustments to broader conceptual reforms, aligning more closely with the Indian model, which integrates positive and negative engagements with religion to promote equality and mitigate inter- and intra-religious domination. The chapter’s populism-related insights emerge in Bhargava’s critique of European secularism’s inability to counter Islamophobic discourses, exacerbated by populist politics. While his proposal for adapting Indian principles to European contexts is compelling, critics might argue that the complexities of Western secular traditions and socio-political dynamics make such transplantation challenging.
In chapter titled “Secular State: Its Importance and Limits,” Bhikhu Parekh critiques rigid and dogmatic secularism, advocating for a nuanced and pragmatic approach that accommodates the complex interplay of religion and state. He emphasizes the instrumental nature of secularism, whose value lies in fostering liberty, equality, and common belonging in multicultural polities, rather than in adhering to an abstract ideal. Parekh aligns with Modood’s pluralist approach to secularism, commending its flexibility in recognizing religion’s potential contributions to public life. He highlights that secularism must balance the need for separation with the practical realities of mutual influence between religion and state, arguing against an absolutist interpretation. This is particularly significant in multicultural contexts where religion plays a vital role in cultural and communal identity. However, Parekh critiques secularism’s tendency to overreach, potentially alienating religious communities and fostering populist backlash, as seen in the rise of Hindutva politics in India. His critique extends to the failure of rigid secular models, like France’s laïcité, to equitably address diverse religious expressions, suggesting they inadvertently privilege majority traditions. Parekh’s proposal for context-sensitive, relational secularism is compelling, though critics may challenge its reliance on subjective interpretations of cultural and religious practices.
Tariq Modood’s chapter, “From Then to Now: Some Friendly Responses,” offers a reflective engagement with the contributions to the volume while advancing his key themes of multiculturalism and moderate secularism. This response consolidates Modood’s intellectual trajectory and his pluralist methodology, blending personal narratives with theoretical critiques. Modood adeptly addresses critiques of his contextualism, particularly Sune Lægaard’s challenge regarding its application in the Danish Cartoons affair. While acknowledging the shortcomings in execution, Modood underscores his iterative approach, emphasizing the dialogical and evolving nature of contextual analysis. Similarly, he engages Simon Thompson’s deconstruction of the concept of recognition, embracing its multidimensional framing—equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion—while expanding its relevance to majority identities.
A recurring strength of Modood’s responses lies in his openness to constructive critique. For instance, he engages with Maleiha Malik’s historiography of racial equality in Britain, connecting it to Brexit’s implications for multiculturalism. Yet, Modood avoids reductive binaries, advocating instead for the mutual recognition of majorities and minorities. However, the chapter is not without limitations. Modood’s defense of multiculturalism as a “democratic constellation” is compelling but raises questions about its applicability in non-Western contexts. Similarly, his critique of Charles Taylor’s Quebecan interculturalism as “majoritarian” invites further elaboration on balancing national identity and minority accommodations. Anyway, Modood’s chapter enriches the volume by weaving together critical reflections and advancing his theory of multiculturalism as an inclusive, dialogical framework. It exemplifies a balance of self-critical humility and scholarly rigor, making it an invaluable contribution to the discourse on diversity and inclusion in democratic societies.
Overall, this volume highlights Modood’s transformative contributions to multiculturalism, framing it as a vital and evolving approach to managing diversity in today’s societies. By advocating for “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a cohesive model that balances the recognition of distinct group identities with the promotion of a shared sense of national belonging. The book engages with critiques of multiculturalism, demonstrating its resilience in addressing challenges such as globalization, transnational affiliations, and the rise of populist movements. Modood’s work is contextualized within global debates, showcasing the strength of his framework in uniting diversity and fostering collective identity—a cornerstone of his idea of “multicultural nationalism.”
While the volume stands out for its philosophical depth and theoretical insights, some chapters—particularly those on secularism—are heavily centered on Western contexts, offering limited comparative perspectives on non-Western experiences. Furthermore, its focus on philosophical discourse may leave practitioners seeking more tangible policy recommendations. Despite these limitations, the book is an essential resource for scholars in political theory, sociology, and public policy. It underscores Modood’s groundbreaking role in redefining multiculturalism as a versatile and sustainable framework for diversity and inclusion in pluralistic societies. Beyond commemorating Modood’s legacy, the book fosters meaningful scholarly dialogue, ensuring that his ideas continue to shape and influence the ever-evolving discourse on multiculturalism.
Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi &Nasar Meer (eds.). (2024). The Resilience of Multiculturalism Ideas, Politics, Practice. Edinburgh University Press. 328 pp. Hardcover $110, Paperback $23,71, ISBN-13: 978-1399537261
Sargi, Islam. (2024). “Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0023
Teun A. van Dijk’s book explores how radical right parties adapt their discourses to cultural, economic, and historical contexts in Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, van Dijk reveals how nationalism, anti-globalism, and sociocultural backlash drive these narratives. With a focus on populism as a strategic discourse rather than ideology, the book underscores the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup rhetoric and its role in mobilizing support. While highlighting ideological clustering, the work offers valuable insights for scholars of political communication, critical discourse studies, and international relations.
Reviewed by Islam Sargi*
Teon A. van Dijk, a prominent scholar in linguistics, discourse analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is the founder of renowned journals such as Discourse Studies and Discourse and Communication. He also established the Center of Discourse Studies in Barcelona in 2017. Van Dijk’s book, Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right, part of the Critical Discourse Studies series, examines the political ideologies and discourse of radical right parties. It explores how these parties adapt their rhetoric to the unique economic, cultural, and historical contexts of four countries: Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The book bridges the gap between political science and discourse studies, providing a theoretically grounded analysis of radical right ideologies. Highlighting the limited research on the discourse of radical political parties, van Dijk incorporates a theoretical framework linking ideology as a form of social cognition to discourse and social structures.
By examining four cases—Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands—the book highlights the primary configurations, divergent ideologies, contextual impacts, populism, and the significance of national contexts. It argues that each country showcases distinct ideological stances. For example, while abortion is a central theme in the radical right discourse in Chile, it plays a less significant role in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments appear to be common across European contexts.
The author employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses, to investigate election programs from the four countries. Through this lens, the book explores language and discourse, emphasizing ideological positioning and political strategies. The findings reveal reactionary stances against social change, liberalism, and political correctness, framing these as part of a broader cultural backlash.
Through comparative analysis, van Dijk argues that radical right discourse and ideologies are shaped by country-specific contexts. For instance, in Chile, radical right discourse is rooted in Catholic ideologies, emphasizing traditional family values, such as opposition to abortion, and intertwining with the authoritarian historical narratives of the Pinochet era. The radical right in Chile also avoids engaging with the multicultural identities of the Mapuche people in their rhetoric.
In Spain, particularly in the case of the Vox Party, the focus shifts to nationalism, marked by a strict anti-separatist stance opposing the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque regions. This approach also embodies a strong rejection of modern globalist ideologies.
In the Netherlands, one of Europe’s prominent radical right parties, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), centers its discourse on Islamophobia, embedding it within broader national themes. Wilders portrays a struggle against liberal elites, who are perceived as eroding Dutch cultural identity and integrity.
In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) emphasize the preservation of culture, framing it as a social issue linked to crime and immigration. This case exemplifies a broader European pattern, where immigration is associated with security concerns and the preservation of national cultural hegemony.
Van Dijk’s analysis highlights how the radical right adapts its narratives to local contexts while sharing overarching themes such as nationalism, anti-globalism, and opposition to multiculturalism.
The author emphasizes that the electoral strategies of radical right parties in these four countries are shaped by their unique national contexts, cautioning against broadly categorizing them under the blanket term of populism. Populism, as a discursive phenomenon, requires an analysis rooted in discourse strategies rather than mere ideological critiques. This approach encourages a deeper exploration of ideological clustering and its role in fostering the radical right’s broader acceptance and integration within democratic systems.
Regarding the interplay between populism and discourse, the book highlights populism primarily as a strategic use of language by political parties rather than a cohesive ideology. This framework reveals that populist discourse often constructs narratives centered on the dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites.”
Moreover, the book examines the socio-cultural backlash against modern liberal ideologies, demonstrating how the radical right skillfully employs discourse to reassert traditional values. It underscores how radical right narratives leverage this backlash to challenge liberal norms and promote their vision of cultural and societal order, ultimately highlighting the ideological and cultural underpinnings of their discourse strategies.
The book makes a significant contribution to scholarship by offering a fresh perspective on ideological clusters, particularly the interplay of nationalism, racism, and political dynamics within radical right parties. It provides an insightful introduction to understanding how radical right ideologies are constructed, communicated, and situated within broader socio-political contexts, shedding light on their increasing influence.
By integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, the book appeals to those interested in exploring the psychological and linguistic foundations of political ideologies. Scholars and students in political science, sociology, and international relations will find value in the comparative case analyses, which illuminate the global patterns and localized adaptations of radical right parties and their discourses.
The author effectively integrates theories from discourse studies and social context, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding how political ideologies are constructed and communicated. This approach offers valuable insights into the tactics and strategies employed by radical right movements. By embedding his analysis within a well-articulated theory of ideology, van Dijk explores the cognitive foundations of radical right discourse, adding depth to the study and establishing a clear structure for his investigation.
Through comparative analysis, the author demonstrates how these movements adapt their rhetoric to cultural, economic, and historical contexts, offering readers a nuanced understanding of global patterns and local variations. The book sheds light on the pragmatic role of distinct national contexts in shaping political communication strategies, emphasizing how language is used to construct ingroup/outgroup dynamics. These dynamics are crucial for understanding the populist appeal and the ways radical right parties mobilize support locally.
Van Dijk further illustrates the interconnectedness of various ideologies within the radical right framework, showcasing their ideological composition and adaptability. This comprehensive approach underscores the role of language and context in shaping political narratives, making the book a valuable resource for scholars and students of political communication and ideology.
Although the book provides a broad comparative framework, its specific discourse analysis is somewhat limited. A more in-depth linguistic examination of concrete examples could better substantiate claims regarding the effectiveness or variability of discourse strategies. Additionally, the study’s focus on only four countries, while diverse, does not fully capture the global spectrum of radical right discourses or address the dynamics of emerging movements in other regions.
Methodologically, the book would benefit from greater transparency in its approach to discourse analysis. Clearer details on data collection and the analytical process would enhance the replicability and robustness of its findings. While the book persuasively argues that populism should be viewed as a discourse strategy rather than a fixed ideology, it does not thoroughly investigate the practical implications of this distinction in political behavior and communication.
Despite these limitations, van Dijk’s study remains a well-structured and significant contribution to critical discourse studies of radical right ideologies, offering valuable insights into the intersection of language, ideology, and political strategy.
(*) Islam Sargi holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Comparative History from the University of Szeged. His doctoral thesis examined the Kurdish question and Turkish modernization. iszeged509@gmail.com
van Dijk, Teon A. (2024). Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 95, Paperback £17.00, Hardback £49.99, ISBN 978-1-009-54993-6 Hardback, ISBN 978-1-009-54991-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009549929, Online ISBN: 9781009549929, Print publication: January 2, 2025.
In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.
Renowned historian and scholar of American politics and social movements, Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, offers a thought-provoking analysis of right-wing populism in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency in a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Framing contemporary politics as an “interregnum”—a period of transition—Professor Kazin draws on Antonio Gramsci’s observation that such times often produce “morbid symptoms,” which he associates with the global rise of right-wing populism. He explores how Trump’s leadership embodies this phenomenon, highlighting its implications for both domestic and international politics.
In the interview, Professor Kazin delves into Trump’s unique ability to sustain a populist movement despite his focus on personal popularity over policy. He discusses how Trump has galvanized his base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism, creating a potent political force that continues to shape American political discourse. Professor Kazin critiques Trump’s approach to governance, describing his first administration as “wretched,” marked by policy ignorance and self-serving actions. However, he acknowledges that Trump’s movement, particularly the MAGA base, has no parallel within the Democratic Party, providing him with a solid foundation of unwavering support.
Professor Kazin also examines the potential global ripple effects of Trump’s second term, noting his alignment with leaders like Viktor Orbán and the admiration he garners from right-wing populist movements in Europe. While Trump’s “America First” stance complicates the formation of international alliances, Professor Kazin suggests that his presidency could embolden far-right leaders worldwide. However, he tempers this with cautious optimism, emphasizing the resilience of American democratic institutions and the structural limits of Trump’s power.
Finally, Professor Kazin explores the broader dynamics of populism, contrasting left- and right-wing variants. He argues that left-wing populism, rooted in economic justice and social democracy, offers a constructive path forward. As global demands for equitable governance grow, Professor Kazin envisions the potential for a revival of progressive populism that challenges elite power while addressing urgent issues like economic inequality and climate change.
The interview with Professor Kazin offers a nuanced perspective on Trump’s presidency, the resilience of democratic institutions, and the evolving role of populism in shaping both domestic and global politics.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Michael Kazin with some edits.
Populism in America: Bridging or Deepening Divides?
Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.
Professor Kazin, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your book titled The Populist Persuasion, you discuss how populist rhetoric has evolved in the U.S. What role does populism play in bridging or deepening the divide between cultural and economic grievances today?
Professor Michael Kazin: As you know, populism is both a language and, some would argue, a governing philosophy. I focus on it as a language in American history, with ramifications for populism in other countries, of course. Historically, I think there has been a distinction in the United States—which is really all I can speak about with authority—between left-wing populism and right-wing populism.
Left-wing populism tends to focus on an economic elite—the 1% versus the 99%, the robber barons, the plutocrats, the monopolists. Many terms have been used to critique those with significant wealth and economic power. Left-wing populists aim to unite a large majority, regardless of gender, race, or national origin.
In contrast, right-wing populists in the US—and to some degree in Europe—view “the people” as a broad middle segment of the population, primarily native-born individuals. According to right-wing populists, this group is being exploited and oppressed by two forces: a small elite at the top (both economic and cultural, and sometimes perceived as controlling the state, such as the European Union in Europe or the federal government in the US) and a small but growing group at the bottom, often composed of non-white and immigrant populations.
Historically, this group at the bottom has included Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans. More recently, undocumented or illegal immigrants have been the focus. Right-wing populists argue that these groups are used by the elite to drive down wages and erode the cherished culture of the native-born middle class.
Generally, this is how left-wing and right-wing populists operate in the US, with similar analogs in Europe.
Currently, in American politics, left-wing populists—such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other progressives within and outside the Democratic Party—are striving to emphasize the tradition of left-wing populism. However, they face challenges because Democrats and progressives also prioritize cultural issues, such as more lenient immigration policies, transgender rights, and racial equality. This creates some tension with economic left-wing populists, who prefer to focus narrowly on issues like corporate greed, wealth inequality, and combating the power of the very rich, including figures like Donald Trump.
On the right, as most people are aware, Donald Trump exemplifies the continuity of right-wing populism from the 19th century to today. Right-wing populists argue that a “Hollywood elite” or “woke elite” in universities and cultural institutions seeks to impose its values on the hardworking, native-born majority. Additionally, they claim that undocumented immigrants take jobs from native-born Americans, drive down wages, and increase crime in cities.
This is how the two traditions of left-wing and right-wing populism are playing out in contemporary American politics.
Populist Rhetoric and Its Impact on Economic Inequality and Social Justice
How has populist rhetoric shaped the policy priorities of modern political parties in the US, particularly regarding economic inequality and social justice?
Professor Michael Kazin: Social justice is a term that’s hard to define. It’s been used by both the left and the right throughout American history, so I’ll set that aside for the moment. In terms of economic inequality, this has been a longstanding issue in American politics, but it has especially risen to prominence as a major concern for both right-wing and left-wing populists since the Great Recession of 2008–2009. Following the well-publicized but relatively small Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011–2012, progressive Democrats have increasingly focused on this issue. They argue that neoliberalism—which many view as the dominant ideology in American politics and economics since the 1970s, especially after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980—has exacerbated economic inequality.
Progressive Democrats have supported programs like those championed by Joe Biden, albeit with moderate success, to help unions organize, provide childcare benefits to all American families, and implement other measures aimed at narrowing economic inequality.
On the other hand, conservative populists, including figures like Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, argue that the primary issue with economic inequality lies with corporations that they claim are “too woke” and favor individuals with the “right” cultural politics over ordinary Americans. Some very conservative Republicans have embraced a form of anti-corporate politics.
For example, Josh Hawley, a Senator from Missouri, has supported the Teamsters Union, one of the largest unions in America. Additionally, some right-wing Catholic thinkers have drawn on the Catholic Church’s social justice tradition, referencing papal encyclicals like Rerum Novarum (1891) and others to argue that unions are essential for improving the lives of ordinary people and to criticize practices like excessive rents and interest rates that harm workers and the poor.
This trend has given rise to a form of “Catholic populism,” which uses these religious principles to legitimize arguments against corporate power. An interesting book on this topic, Tyranny, Inc., by a conservative journalist, critiques corporations for engaging in behavior that harms workers, such as union-busting, charging excessive credit card interest, and denying healthcare coverage.
There is, to some extent, agreement between right-wing and left-wing populists in the US on reducing corporate power and supporting private-sector unions. Currently, only 6% of private-sector workers in the US are unionized—a historically low figure.
However, significant disagreements remain between right-wing and left-wing populists, particularly on cultural issues, which are deeply entrenched and difficult to reconcile. For example, debates over abortion—whether it is a fundamental right for women or equivalent to the killing of babies—highlight how cultural arguments are often intractable and resistant to compromise.
In one of your interviews, you argue that ‘if the political and economic elites in our society and others around the world were more effective at living up to their ideals, populist talkers would likely be less popular.’ What do you mean by ‘ideals of political and economic elites?’
Professor Michael Kazin: Perhaps I should have said the ideals of the nation led by these elites to be more accurate. In the United States, especially—and to varying degrees in Europe—the stated ideals include equality, democracy, majority rule, and a government that promotes the common welfare, as referenced in the preamble to the American Constitution. These ideals are echoed in other historical documents, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man in Europe.
As a social democrat, I would say that if social democracy were practiced more widely and people were guaranteed a decent life in their societies, populism would likely be less popular. For example, in the United States between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s, despite many challenges, it was generally a prosperous time. Unions were very powerful, Social Security was extended to nearly every working American, and the beginnings of health insurance coverage for older and poorer individuals under Medicare and Medicaid were implemented. During that period, populist rhetoric was not particularly influential, and populist movements were relatively subdued. While there were significant social movements, such as the Black freedom movement, they were primarily advocating for the inclusion of an oppressed minority in American life rather than claiming to represent the great majority. Of course, there were radical elements within some movements, but they were not the mainstream.
In my recent book, What It Took to Win: A History of the Democratic Party, I argue that “moral capitalism”—a phrase I borrow from a fellow historian—was the governing promise of the Democratic Party during these years. Democrats were the majority party, and most Americans, including working-class citizens, believed that things were improving. When people believe their lives are getting better, populist leaders and movements struggle to gain traction.
Trump’s Leadership Defined by Self-Interest and Controversy
Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.
In one of your articles, you characterize Donald Trump’s first administration as ‘one of the most wretched president and administration in living memory.” What factors have contributed to your defining of Trump’s administration as the most wretched?
Professor Michael Kazin: Well, of course, “wretched” is a loaded, emotional term, and here I’m speaking from my own preferences. There’s no scholarly objectivity possible in this context. I could also talk about why he won again last November, but first, let me focus on the question.
As a leader, I think Trump is someone primarily interested in his own popularity and not particularly interested in policy. He wants to be the center of attention at all times and is committed to no ideal or policy unless it benefits him personally. He’s also unwilling to take risks, particularly when it comes to policy decisions, which I believe was evident during his first term and will likely remain true during his second term—though, of course, we’ll have to wait and see.
His personal behavior also contributes to this characterization. He has been credibly accused of actions that would be considered rape in many nations, though he wasn’t convicted of rape but rather of defaming someone who accused him. His statements about immigrants and what he referred to as “shithole countries,” among other things, reflect his character. As an individual, I find him to be a rather wretched person—someone I wouldn’t want to associate with or have anyone I know associate with.
That said, his administration itself was more cautious than I expected, in part because he leads a party that still includes more traditional, cautious members. Many corporate executives and traditional Republicans influenced his policies. For instance, his Cabinet included several conventional Republican figures, and the Speaker of the House for much of his term was Paul Ryan, a Reaganite libertarian Republican focused on cutting the size of government rather than pursuing anti-immigrant crusades.
The major accomplishment of his administration aligned with a long-standing conservative Republican agenda: cutting taxes, especially for wealthier Americans, though all Americans received some form of tax cut. This is something Ronald Reagan might also have done.
In that sense, while his administration had the potential to be wretched, it was less so than I expected. However, Trump’s statements and actions on immigration were deeply problematic. His attempt to build a wall across the southern border wasted significant funds and was ultimately easy to evade. This demonstrated not only ignorance about policy but also a lack of genuine concern for it.
Unlike other American presidents, as the leader of the most powerful state in the world, Trump showed very little interest in the actual workings of the state unless they directly benefited him personally. In that sense, I would still describe him as a wretched leader.
You argue that ‘like most adherents of left egalitarian politics, I believe the only path to such a future (the more egalitarian and climate-friendly society) lies in adopting a populist program about jobs, income, health care, and other material necessities, while making a transition to a sustainable economy? What exactly do you mean by ‘populist programs?’
Professor Michael Kazin: Well, by that, I mean majoritarian—programs that genuinely benefit the majority of people. When governments are popular, that’s typically what they do. So, in this sense, being “popular” and being “populist” can overlap, though they are not always synonymous.
As I mentioned before, I believe an honest social democracy, or what I would call “moral capitalism” in the US, is the best approach. Such programs would include housing allowances, universal health care that is well-administered and provides good working conditions for healthcare workers, unions to protect the majority of people against workplace abuse, and, critically, a vigorous transition to a sustainable economy—because without that, the entire world is in trouble.
Now, using the term “populist” might seem to betray my own definition of populism, which in American history refers primarily to a discourse or rhetoric. But I don’t subscribe to the simplistic view of “populism bad, liberalism good.” As I argue in my book, The Populist Persuasion, populism can be a way for ordinary people—and movements aiming to represent them—to highlight the gap between a society’s stated ideals and the actual performance of its elites, whether cultural, political, or economic.
Populism can play a very positive role by pointing out these shortcomings and harking back to a society’s ideals, including those rooted in religion, like charity and comfort for the afflicted. It doesn’t necessarily demand, as socialism often does, a completely different kind of society—although socialists can also adopt populist rhetoric. Instead, it appeals to the ideals of the existing society, challenging elites to live up to them.
This is why I think populism has an important role in producing a decent society. Unlike some critics, like Jan-Werner Müller, who argue that populism always fuels movements that lead to authoritarian leaders, I believe populism doesn’t have to serve that role. While it certainly has done so in some parts of Europe, where we see leaders with authoritarian tendencies in and out of office, I think left-wing populism can play a vital and constructive role.
Trump’s Second Term: The Future of Populist Politics in the US and Beyond
A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.
How do you explain Donald Trump’s victory for a second term, given his open and aggressive endorsement of populist policies both in the US and globally? Additionally, how might his administration reshape the populist narrative domestically, particularly in aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism?
Professor Michael Kazin: That’s an important question, obviously, and one we won’t really be able to answer until he’s been several years into his term. Let me address the first part of your question.
Again, you’ve probably read, and your viewers have likely heard and read, many analyses of why Trump won. The most important reason he won—and this is usually why anyone unseats an incumbent party in this country, and probably in others as well—is that most Americans believed the performance of the Biden administration, or the Biden-Harris administration, wasn’t good. This perception was based on several factors, including inflation, a more open immigration policy than most Americans preferred, and, I think, Biden himself, who is a very poor communicator.
Biden used to be a mediocre communicator when he was younger, but in the last couple of years, he became very bad at selling his own programs. Some of those programs, I believe, could have been quite popular if Americans had known more about them, but they didn’t.
This was an election that was actually rather close. For instance, if 232,000 voters in three key states—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—had voted differently, with slightly more in Pennsylvania than the other two states, Harris would have been elected, even though she would have won fewer popular votes than Trump. As everyone watching this knows, we don’t have a national popular vote in this country. We have state-by-state elections that determine the presidency.
Trump, on the other hand, is a charismatic figure. While he doesn’t have the majority of Americans on his side, a significant portion—perhaps 30%—strongly supports him. He has a movement, the MAGA movement, which the Democrats don’t have anything comparable to. Even though the Democrats had more people on the ground to get voters to the polls, Trump had more solid support.
As a result, he won somewhat more votes than he did in 2016—about 2 million more popular votes. However, Harris won 10 or 11 million fewer votes than Biden had in 2020. Trump’s victory was largely due to many Democrats deciding not to vote. They were disenchanted enough with the Biden-Harris administration’s performance but not sufficiently motivated by Trump to come out and vote against him.
Now, regarding what Trump will do in terms of reshaping the populist narrative—let me remind myself of the second part of your question here…
How much his administration reshapes the populist narrative domestically.
Professor Michael Kazin: Well, again, it depends on how well he performs, right? This is a question of contingency—how he navigates his role as president during the second term. Trump is a much better politician than he is a policymaker, so he will certainly try to maintain support from both the more traditional Republicans and the cultural populists within his coalition.
On the traditional side, he will aim to keep corporate Republicans on board—those who favor lower taxes, less regulation, and smaller government in general. Simultaneously, he’ll also work to retain the cultural populists who want to drastically cut immigration, both legal and illegal, and who oppose transgender rights and certain aspects of gay and lesbian rights.
Trump will likely attempt to strengthen US manufacturing, pushing for more products to be made domestically. However, this will be challenging given that final manufacturing in the US relies heavily on parts sourced from around the globe. Reducing this dependency and producing those parts domestically, which are currently made more cheaply elsewhere, will be difficult. Nevertheless, he will likely focus on this rhetorically.
As always, much will depend on the state of the economy, the presence or absence of scandals within his administration, and the outcome of the midterm elections. In 2026, Democrats are well-positioned to potentially take back the House of Representatives. If that happens, anything Trump aims to achieve would have to be done through executive actions. While some of these actions may be popular, others might not resonate as well with the public.
Additionally, the 2028 presidential campaign will overshadow the final years of Trump’s term. In fact, the campaign will likely begin even before the 2026 midterm results are fully processed. This means Trump might have only two effective years to accomplish his goals, including efforts to satisfy both the traditional and cultural populists in his coalition.
Trump’s Return: Shaking but Not Breaking American Democracy
Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud
How concerned are you about the second Trump administration in terms of the resilience of American democratic institutions? There are those pundits who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump term.
Professor Michael Kazin: Here I part ways with some others on the left. I don’t think that American democratic institutions are in serious trouble. I believe they will be shaken—and are already being shaken—by Trump’s reelection and his return to power next month.
First of all, Congress is still fairly evenly divided between the two parties, even though Republicans are in charge. Many large states, such as New York, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois, are governed by Democrats, and most of these states have Democratic majorities in their legislatures as well. These state governments can act and bring cases to court to challenge some of Trump’s policies.
Civil society in the United States remains relatively strong. There are significant non-governmental organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which will likely file lawsuits against some of Trump’s actions—particularly those related to immigration. For example, if he tries to deport children born in the US to immigrant parents (who are American citizens by birthright), the ACLU and others will step in.
Even though the grassroots left is somewhat dormant and exhausted since the election, there are still key groups on the left, including unions like the American Federation of Teachers and the United Auto Workers. These organizations were supportive of Kamala Harris and will mobilize opposition against Trump’s administration.
As always, Trump’s ability to act depends on how popular he remains. If his popularity holds, he will have more freedom to pursue his agenda. However, the court system remains a check on his power. While the Supreme Court leans conservative, with three justices appointed by Trump during his first term, other courts are more balanced, with progressives or liberal judges presiding over lower courts.
I anticipate chaos and turmoil, but that doesn’t necessarily mean democratic institutions are in existential danger.
One area of concern is Trump’s apparent eagerness to sue media organizations he disagrees with. For instance, he already sued ABC News over a comment made by anchor George Stephanopoulos, and ABC settled for several million dollars. He might pursue similar legal actions against other media outlets, particularly legacy institutions like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and major networks. While this could intimidate some of these institutions, he won’t be able to silence the Internet or prevent people from organizing protests.
The military, which served as a check on him during his first term—particularly during the protests of 2020—will likely play a similar role this time. He won’t be able to call on the military to suppress peaceful demonstrations, even if he expresses the desire to do so.
I wouldn’t call myself optimistic, but I am hopeful. Also, as I mentioned earlier, he only has four years in this term and likely only two effective years to implement policies. So, I’m not as fearful as some others I know.
Implications for Global Populism and Far-Right Alliances
And lastly, Professor Kazin, right-wing populism continues to rise across Europe despite the liberal European Union’s success story. How do you think populist parties and movements will be influenced globally after Trump begins his second term? Could his presidency embolden far-right leaders abroad and foster new alliances among far-right populist governments?
Professor Michael Kazin: Well, that’s certainly a possibility. As you know, he’s been very close to Viktor Orbán. Orbán has been invited to National Conservative Conferences, and there was even one held in Budapest, which I believe was the first time an American conservative organization hosted its conference overseas. Clearly, right-wing populist leaders, including those of parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, are likely very pleased with Trump’s reelection. This is probably true for right-wing populist parties and movements across the continent.
At the same time, if you emphasize “America First” and express suspicion toward European institutions such as the EU or NATO, it becomes very difficult to form any kind of operationally powerful alliance between Trump and his counterparts in Europe.
Structurally and historically, I believe we’re in what could be described as an interregnum—a period of transition. My friend Gary Gerstle, in his excellent recent book, describes the end of the neoliberal order, which has concluded in many ways and in some places entirely. As the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci famously said, during such an interregnum, “many morbid symptoms appear.” From my perspective, right-wing populism is one such morbid symptom.
However, as demands grow for the state to provide a decent living for a majority of its citizens—and as governments actually fulfill those demands—I think there could be a revival of left-wing populism or social democracy, even if it’s not labeled as such. People will demand that the government deliver on its promises to improve living standards for the majority, ideally in collaboration with private capital.
I am somewhat heartened by the fact that Trump is limited to four years. He cannot serve more than that without a constitutional amendment, which is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in this country—far more so than in many others.
Additionally, most Americans who support Trump are not particularly enthusiastic about alliances between the United States and other countries. They prefer the US to remain independent of such alliances, especially if those alliances are perceived to be costly. So, we’ll have to see how this unfolds.
Dr. Courtney Freer (Assistant Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, GA).
Speakers
“Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region,” by Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber (Professor, Chairholder, Institute of Political Science, Chair of Middle East Politics and Society, the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg).
“The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC,” by Dr. Gail Buttorff(Associate Director of the Center for Public Policy and Assistant Professor at the Hobby School, University of Houston).
“The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership,” by Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel (Postdoc at Geography Institute, the University of Heidelberg).
“The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies,” by Kardo Kareem Rached (Assistant Professor at University of Human Development, Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region of Iraq).
“Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” by Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan (Senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington).
Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045
Abstract
In the Hungarian context, the term ‘diaspora’ can refer to two types of communities: those formed through emigration and those emerging from the Treaty of Trianon redrawing borders in 1920. While emigrant-diasporas increasingly adopt migration as a political stance, transborder Hungarians’ strong desire to uphold their national identity aligns them with Fidesz’s nationalist narratives. It highlights their potential as agents of Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. In this paper, I explore how and to what results the two remarkably different experiences of national identity are bridged by Hungary in attempts to revive the historic nation through emigrant-diaspora engagement.
“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians outside the borders,” reported the 24.hu online portal after the 2022 Hungarian elections. This statistic might seem surprising for those familiar with recent emigration from Hungary. In response to the autocratic and populist government, which increasingly infringes on democratic principles, politically motivated emigration has slowly but steadily replaced the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 financial crisis (Sampson, 2021; Örkény, 2018; Moreh, 2014; Ayodele, 2018). Hallmarked by events such as the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like Central European University, the aggressive campaign pushing women into traditional childbearing roles, and severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ community, many Hungarians opted to start a new life abroad driven by a yearning for a more liberal political environment. For this reason, recent Hungarian migrants can be increasingly interpreted as having ‘voted with their feet’, a concept Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) used to describe resistance to the regime underlying the decision to leave. As such, the Hungarian communities forming in Western Europe can be seen as counter-diasporas, as highlighted by Szily’s 2018 report, which shows that only 7% of those living in London would vote for Fidesz. Similarly, a 2022 poll by the 21 Research Center involving 5000 Hungarians abroad found that only 11% supported the governing party (Rutai, 2022).
Therefore, it is vital to understand the people behind the 94%. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that result from people crossing borders and those that emerge from borders crossing people. When the Treaty of Trianon that closed World War I in 1920 detached two-thirds of Hungary’s territory and attached them to surrounding countries, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves under the sovereignty of another state overnight. As Feischmidt (2020: 130) argues, memory politics fuelled by the Trianon cult “became the engine of new forms of nationalism.” In 2004, a national vote was held on whether transborder Hungarians[1] should be granted Hungarian citizenship but failed due to low turnout. Despite this, when Fidesz came to power in 2010, they passed legislation granting dual citizenship to transborder Hungarians, followed by voting rights in 2011. The intergenerational trauma of being separated from Hungary, despite a strong Hungarian identity, made people living on these territories keen to support Fidesz’s nationalist agenda. As such, they became allies of the Orbán government’s nation-building efforts, not least when Fidesz turned its attention to the recently emigrated population through large-scale diaspora outreach.
The past decades have seen growing interest among social scientists in how home countries exert control over their emigrated populations transnationally. State-led transnationalism is defined by Goldring (2002: 64) as “institutionalized national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state’s political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory.” While the forms, goals, and extent of such involvement may vary (Levitt, 2001), Portes (1999) emphasizes that state-led transnationalism is driven by economic and political gains from the diaspora, leveraging emigrants’ feelings of belonging to encourage remittances, investment, voting, or lobbying in favour of their home state. According to Margheritis (2007), state-led transnationalism is typically implemented through political discourse that reinforces national ties and recognizes those living abroad as part of the nation. Gamlen (2008) further notes that diaspora narratives empower migrants by constructing transnational collective identities, elevating people who once saw themselves as minorities to being part of a global network.
With half of the world’s states estimated to engage in some form of diaspora outreach (Gamlen et al., 2013), research on diaspora engagement has become a key area of enquiry for the social sciences, which has been conducted with the primary aim of analyzing the contributions emigrants make within such frameworks. However, less attention has been paid to the micro-level implementation of these schemes, including the role of facilitators and the affective responses evoked in the targeted population. These responses are crucial in understanding how autocratic systems relying on populist narratives achieve their goals, as populism depends on provoking relevant emotions. In my ethnographically inspired paper, I focus on incorporating transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. I am interested in how their cultural identity is used to promote Hungary’s nation-building efforts, what narratives accompany their presence from the side of the home state, and what response this prompts in the emigrant-diasporas. I undertake the enquiry to uncover how the two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland amongst transborder Hungarians and emigrants from Hungary are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the historic nation. The data used in this paper was collected in London, UK, in 2022/23 and Dublin, Ireland, in 2016/17. All proper names, including those of organizations, are pseudonyms.
‘Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced by Hungarians’
It was my first visit to the Hungarian House, one of London’s longest-standing and most prestigious Hungarian diaspora institutions. The occasion was Whit Sunday, for which a ball with a three-course dinner, folk dancing, and live music had been organized. As I did not know anyone, I booked a randomly assigned seat. Once everyone arrived, we took our places and did a round of introductions. When it was my turn, my short monologue prompted one of my tablemates to jokingly comment: “We can hear from your accent that you are not from beyond the borders, but don’t worry, we will still talk to you.” It was then that I realized that on my table of 14, I was the only person who had migrated from within the current borders of Hungary. As my research unfolded, it became somewhat of an ethnographic commonplace to find transborder Hungarians dominate Hungarian events in London, even though most of them had never lived in Hungary. Some did not even hold Hungarian citizenship. While I initially found their overwhelming participation surprising, it can be explained by the place they have historically occupied in their respective home countries as ethnic minorities. Since the Treaty of Trianon attached two-thirds of Hungary’s territories to surrounding countries in 1920, transborder Hungarians cultivated their Hungarian identity under often oppressive regimes of the bordering countries, which have limited their freedom to practise their culture, most notably through restrictions imposed on the use of their mother tongue. Seeking out the company of other Hungarians for cultural preservation activities has thus become a crucial aspect of their lives. Moreover, they have been the beneficiaries of Hungary’s outreach for much longer than the emigrant population, with many schemes aimed at emigrant-diasporas modelled on initiatives successful in transborder communities.
At the core of diaspora politics is a concept shaped by the state that defines which groups constitute the nation, how co-nationals are connected, and what role the state fulfils in their lives. Verdery (1994) explains that the term ‘nation’ can refer to citizenship comprised of shared sovereignty rooted in political participation. However, it can also denote an ethnic connectedness, whereby a nation consists of individuals sharing a common language, history, or culture. In an ethnic understanding of the nation, political identity is defined by shared language and culture, while in a civic one, by shared citizenship and loyalty to political institutions. Verdery (1998) claims that unlike democratic constitutions in the West, where sovereignty resides with individual citizens, Eastern European constitutions often grant sovereignty to an ethno-nation. Although no state’s borders contain an ethnically uniform population, nations in Eastern Europe have historically been imagined around ethnocultural homogeneity, which members of the nation are expected to maintain. These expectations have often led to political measures, with Hayden (1992) proposing ‘constitutional nationalism’ to describe legal processes that privilege members of an ethno-nation.
Hungary is a clear example of a state that assigns national belonging on an ethnic basis. Since the turnover, there has been a strong emphasis on ethnic similarity as the organizing principle of the nation, with transborder Hungarians playing a crucial role. This was reflected in the 1989 amendment of The Fundamental Law of Hungary, which included a new section on the state’s commitment to them: “Bearing in mind that there is a single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of transborder Hungarians, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary” (Article D of The Fundamental Law of Hungary).
After Fidesz came to power in 2010 with a clear nationalist agenda, the Constitution and The Fundamental Law of Hungary were amended again to reflect a stronger sense of interconnectedness with Hungarians outside the borders, including transborder Hungarians and emigrants. While the old Constitution already stated that the president of Hungary represents the voice of all the world’s Hungarians inside and outside Hungary (Verdery, 1994), the new documents went further, emphasizing a ‘single Hungarian nation’ that transcends borders. The new Constitution includes the oath “to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century” (Körtvélyesi, 2012).
As illustrated by Hungary’s severe response to the refugee crisis of 2015, despite the alarming decrease in Hungary’s population due to outmigration, ageing, and declining birth rates, Hungary seeks to compensate for these numbers exclusively through ethnically Hungarian people. As Viktor Orbán stated at the 9th plenary session of the Hungarian Diaspora Council in 2019, “Hungarians can only be replaced with Hungarians” (kormany.hu). Joppke (2005) argues that right-wing nationalist parties engage co-ethnic populations abroad to counterbalance growing immigration and sustain the dominant national group’s claims over the state. Since 2010, 1374 billion HUF has been spent on national politics (kormany.hu). Notable schemes include the Bethlen Gabor Fund, which provides financial support for transborder and emigrant communities (Kántor, 2014); the Rákóczi camps organized to provide an opportunity for young people in the diaspora to visit the homeland; the Balassi Programme that enables Hungarian language training in Hungary; the Diaspora Scholarship, which brings talented young people of Hungarian roots to Hungary for study; ReConnect Hungary, the Hungarian birthright program; and the Julianus and Mikes Kelemen Programmes, which focus on preserving material culture in the diasporas.
Exemplary Communities of National Consciousness
In 2013, the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy introduced a new scheme called the Kőrösi Programme, which soon evolved into the flagship project of Hungarian diaspora engagement. Aimed at strengthening national identity in Hungarian emigrant-diasporas worldwide and consolidating ties between Hungary and its population abroad, young intellectuals have been delegated to locations with significant Hungarian populations. The Hungarian state had previously mapped independently emerging ethnic organizations to offer them state-affiliated status, which the facilitators would support. They would be in charge of organizing the community, disseminating knowledge, and conducting educational activities, which include teaching language classes, folk dancing and traditional instruments, facilitating scouting, and organizing events to commemorate national holidays. Facilitators are recruited through a competitive selection process and are required to “possess outstanding professional expertise relevant for the Hungarian diasporas and to have actively engaged in community organizing, traditionalist activities” (website of the Kőrösi Programme, 2018).
Transborder Hungarians have played a crucial role in the Kőrösi Programme. A quick look at the profiles listed on the programme’s website highlights that since its inception, around 60% of facilitators have been from transborder territories each year. Some had never lived in Hungary before their assignment and may struggle to provide in-depth knowledge about contemporary life in Hungary. However, their expertise in traditional cultural forms has often been prioritized, because, as described in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), transborder Hungarians “to the universal Hungarian culture is invaluable.” Amongst the detached territories, Waterbury (2023: 32) underlines explicitly the role of Transylvania in the nation’s cultural identity, describing the region as having a ‘mythical significance’ to Hungary, considered the ‘cradle’ of Hungarian civilisation […] and the Transylvanian rural Hungarian populations as the makers and carriers of ‘real’, ‘archaic’ and ‘authentic’ Hungarian culture.”
Their adequacy for these tasks was widely acknowledged. In a conversation with the first Kőrösi facilitator sent to Dublin in 2015, she confided in me her sentiment that she would never be as good at the job as transborder Hungarians, although she noted that some of these feelings stemmed from how the state labelled the two groups: “In my opinion, the ideal candidate was [mentions the name of the delegate sent to a different location in the same year of the programme], because on the one hand, she is from Transylvania, so that is somehow important. These days those who are not from Hungary are often considered more Hungarian than us, excuse me for my honesty. But yes, her identity is different from mine as somebody from Budapest. For me it is like I am Hungarian and then what? I am that and full stop. But for her, she and her parents and grandparents all had to fight for it. To keep it alive. So, it is crucial to her identity.”
Pogonyi (2015) argues that, unlike most diaspora schemes globally, Hungary’s outreach to its emigrated population was not devised to mobilize people for political or economic gain but to folklorize the emigrated population to strengthen Fidesz’s nationalist image. Analysing diaspora as a claims-making tool (Brubaker, 2005), Pogonyi defines Hungarian diaspora outreach as a non-instrumental identity project. Its principal goal is to reverse assimilatory tendencies, prevent intermarriage, and promote Hungarian national identification through education programs and a network of institutions reinforcing national identity. This is echoed in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), which claims that “the borders of the nation stretch as far as the influence of the national institutions, which help maintain the national identity”.
To incentivize Hungarians to (re-)cultivate their Hungarianness, the state has identified transborder Hungarians as indispensable. According to Fidesz’s discourse, transborder Hungarians are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, workshy rabble” (Kunz, 1985: 102) in the 1950s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), transborder Hungarians have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Placing them at the centre of diaspora schemes thus applauds them for preserving national consciousness for over a century despite often repressive circumstances. Hence, their presence communicates the Hungarian state’s expectations to all its citizens abroad.
As Kiss and Barna (n.d.) highlighted in the early 2010s, transborder Hungarians increasingly fail to consider Hungary as the primary destination of their emigration projects and, instead, tend to venture further afield. For people in the transborder territories without European Union membership when Hungary joined the EU in 2004 or under labour movement restrictions like Romanians after accession in 2007, Hungarian citizenship served as a passport to the West. Consequently, a growing number of transborder Hungarians decided to migrate to countries that they perceived as economically more viable than Hungary. Still, once in the country, they often sought out Hungarian diaspora organizations to join for sentimental reasons. It is therefore essential to highlight that while the involvement of transborder Hungarians in diaspora communities generally occurred out of their own will and enthusiasm, their presence is often interpreted through the lens of dominant Fidesz narratives, which influences not only their reception and integration opportunities in the community but also the extent to which their views are welcomed.
My fieldwork revealed that their presence often exacerbated resistance from the emigrant community against the government. On the one hand, they played a cultural revitalization role that was appreciated by families with young children and sensitized Hungarians to the fact that the ability to practise one’s identity, language, and culture should not be taken for granted. However, precisely the fervent practice of culture and strong national identity repelled emigrant Hungarians. Outbursts of appreciation for being Hungarian often made Hungarians from Hungary cringe, with critical remarks about what was commonly perceived as ‘magyarkodás.’ ‘Magyarkodás,’ a word that means the active cultivation of being Hungarian, denotes an overly zealous attitude towards expressing one’s Hungarian cultural identity. My informants saw ‘magyarkodás’ as irritating and something to be avoided, mainly due to its close association with the Orbán government and its expropriation of national symbols.
Such sentiments frequently translated into discriminatory remarks from Hungarians. While they welcomed the transborder Hungarians’ efforts to ensure the continuity of events, they complained that they were pushing them out of an organization that was supposed to be theirs. When I inquired into such feelings, I found that many had held resentment towards transborder Hungarians since their time in Hungary. Common reasons included the feeling that they were taking jobs and opportunities meant for locals, with many believing transborder Hungarian networks were strong and helped them get ahead quickly. Additionally, a large part of the resentment stemmed from the perception that these people received priority treatment from the Hungarian state, which seemed to care more about them than its citizens. For example, when the Hungarian state replaced the beloved priest of the community with a Csángó [ethnic Hungarians of Roman Catholic faith mainly living in the Romanian region of Moldavia] priest, it resulted in tangible resistance from the community, who complained about his unusual choice of Hungarian words, but most of all, his incorporation of nationalist sentiments in his sermons.
During my fieldwork, the Hungarian House was undergoing a slow but steady transition. Originally a refuge for all Hungarians who left their homeland after the World Wars, it became a vibrant place for Hungarian social and religious life since 1956, with the arrival of refugees fleeing the revolution against Soviet occupation. To this day, the leadership primarily consists of people who left Hungary during that time. They hoped to pass on roles to Hungarians who arrived post-accession. Still, since this group enjoyed a transnational lifestyle involving frequent trips home, they did not feel a strong need to cultivate their culture through diaspora organizations. Eventually, the group that took the initiative were transborder Hungarians, much to the dismay of the older generation. According to a transborder Hungarian committee member, the biggest challenge they faced was creating peaceful coexistence with older members, who viewed transborder Hungarians with growing suspicion. Despite this, the Hungarian House inevitably shifted towards becoming a predominantly transborder Hungarian organization, which ensured its continuity and gave it a cultural character that many of my informants from Hungary found hard to identify with.
Tapping the Diaspora’s Political Remittance Potential
On 2nd October 2016, the new Kőrösi facilitator in Dublin organized a memorial walk in the Glendalough mountains to honour Áron Márton, the bishop of Transylvania who dedicated his life to promoting Hungarian culture despite the oppressive Romanian government. As the facilitator came from a region of Serbia with a large ethnic Hungarian population, everybody understood that this commemoration was a project of personal importance to her. However, few understood why the meeting point was in front of the Hungarian Embassy in Dublin. As we later discovered, it was the day of the referendum on vetoing Brussels’ proposal to distribute incoming asylum seekers across the EU. As soon as the cars started arriving, the facilitator would quickly usher everyone into the Embassy, emphasizing that it was the duty of everyone with any national feelings to cast a vote.
Transborder Hungarians and the European Union (EU) represent two opposing poles in Fidesz’s thinking. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), populism divides society into two homogenous groups: the ‘pure people,’ associated with the nation, and the ‘corrupt elite,’ which hinders the nation’s unity. Populism’s belief that the people’s will is clear fosters authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on perceived threats to national homogeneity. Populist leaders argue that real power lies not with democratically elected officials but with illegitimate forces like organizations and bureaucracies undermining the people’s will. Hungarian populist discourses stem from a fear of external threats to national unity, often framed through the memory of Trianon. Anti-elite sentiments target foreign or supranational institutions, like the EU, frequently blamed for promoting a globalized outlook that conflicts with the national one. Like other xenophobic populists in Europe, Hungary views the EU as representing the interest of ‘aliens’ that threaten the nation’s purity, from which ‘the people’ must be protected. In this logic, if the EU is the villain, transborder Hungarians are glorified as the ‘true’ people who can save the nation.
The Orbán government has long relied on transborder Hungarians for support in national elections and referenda by making voting significantly easier, effectively allowing them to tilt the results. As Herner-Kovács (2020) explains, transborder Hungarians have come to represent a potent political remittance potential to the state as “politically active and organized communities with strong and effective ties to Hungary” (1161). Since they represent a predictable voter base, those with non-resident Hungarian citizenship – and thus the right to vote – have been granted access to letter voting. After Fidesz enabled ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship, nearly half a million have benefitted from the opportunity. Patakfalvi-Czirják (2017) argues that this created a moral obligation, and transborder Hungarians’ overwhelming support can be seen as a ‘vote of gratitude.’ Their perceived duty to defend Fidesz became especially evident during the 2022 campaign when the opposition leader was rejected by local representatives of several transborder territories (Bereznay, 2022).
Recent Hungarian emigrants to Western Europe, often perceived as critical of the Orbán regime and likely to vote for the opposition, face limitations in their election participation. In 2022, Hungarians in the United Kingdom were restricted to only three polling locations despite the 15 that the community lobbied for (Czinkóczi 2022), which meant a 1000-kilometre journey for some voters. Outraged by these arrangements, the Hungarian diaspora self-organized itself to fundraise money to support the travel costs of those who wanted to vote but could not afford to travel. The discrepancy between the opportunities given to transborder communities and emigrant-diasporas to exercise their democratic rights is apparent. This led Waterbury (2023: 1) to assert that the “2022 Hungarian parliamentary election highlights the phenomenon of competing external demoi, a situation that emerges when an incumbent government differentially enfranchises and mobilizes different external national communities for electoral purposes, thus triggering a competing mobilization of external voters by nonincumbent political actors.”
Incidents of transborder Hungarians incentivizing emigrant-diaspora members to vote have not been well received among the emigrant-diasporas. The unequal arrangements have generated feelings of jealousy and a sentiment that the Hungarian state prioritizes transborder Hungarians’ preferences about the direction in which the country is headed. Hungarians from Hungary find it unfair that people who may have never lived in Hungary would decide on issues affecting those living there. Among the emigrant-diaspora in London, three attitudes emerged toward voting. Some stated that they did not want to impact the outcome since they had committed to the UK. Though not planning to return, others felt responsible for the fate of their families and friends still in the country and found it important to vote. The third group insisted on voting, emphasizing that they would consider the return if Fidesz lost power. As such, to make sense of Fidesz’s overwhelming victory in the 2022 elections, a frequently uttered evaluation amongst emigrant Hungarians was that ‘Hungarians had no chance as the transborder Hungarian allies of Orbán decided the outcome,’ even if, their numbers are too small to have a significant impact.
‘The Carpathian Basin Coming Together’
Frigyes was impossible to miss in the Hungarian community in Dublin, not only because his manners were reminiscent of early 20th-century Hungarian novels – a literary period that inspired him greatly. Having initially migrated for economic reasons from the Hungarian-speaking region of Slovakia, Frigyes spent nearly a decade in low-paid service jobs, but eventually, he decided it was time to reap the benefits of his hard work: he registered as unemployed and committed himself entirely to the diaspora community. His enthusiasm was driven by a sense of finally being recognized as Hungarian after having experienced repression as a minority in Slovakia and as inferior in Hungary: “Borders have disappeared. It is a huge thing that for example at the [mentions specific event in Dublin] there are almost as many people from the transborder territories like from the mother country. […] Here, the fact that everybody is Hungarian is so natural that it is not even a question. Just like it is evident for you that you are Hungarian, not a question and is something that you take for granted. For me, it is a huge thing to see the Carpathian basin coming together, that the nation has come together and to see that this is not something unimaginable, but something that can actually function.”
Once facilitators began arriving in his community, Frigyes recognized himself as a Kőrösi facilitator: having dedicated years to supporting the diaspora community in Dublin, he was confident that he could excel at the task and thus decided to apply for the position. The application process was not straightforward, as it required first acquiring Hungarian citizenship, which posed a challenge. Slovakia, in opposition to Hungary’s policy of granting citizenship to transborder Hungarians, did not recognize dual citizenship. Despite this, Frigyes was determined and, in a bold move, gave up his Slovakian citizenship. Although he hoped to be assigned back to Ireland, he was open to taking on the role in any Hungarian diaspora community worldwide, indicating that his commitment was ultimately not to his host country but to the newfound freedom to be Hungarian fostered by emigrant-diaspora spaces. Shortly after, another transborder Hungarian from the Dublin diaspora followed suit and stayed in the job with her assigned community ever since.
Transborder Hungarians thrived in every diaspora community I studied, often attributing their success to the emigrant-diaspora space, which allowed them to express their Hungarian identity fully. Placing a great emphasis on national identity and cultural practices, they regularly attended diaspora events, which they described as giving them a sense of integration into the nation for the first time. Although some had spent much of their lives in Hungary, they described facing xenophobia and resistance from locals. One participant explained that identities are born out of people’s need to differentiate themselves from the people around them based on the ‘us vs them’ formula. Nonetheless, as the population of Hungary is relatively homogenous, there is not much option to create such distinctions. Therefore, as he put it, discrimination is often not based on fundamental differences but on perceptions that “paint one with the colours of the nation and the other one with the colours of distance.” In Ireland, however, where all Hungarians became a minority, it was a natural instinct to come together to maintain their identity, forming a unified community. While many transborder Hungarians initially arrived in Ireland to return to Hungary, their participation in the diaspora led them to reconsider that intention, as their connection to the home community conflicted with the fulfilment that emerged from being part of a cohesive Hungarian group abroad.
Rooted in this experience, in Ireland, transborder Hungarians felt that with their presence, they were actively contributing to a new definition of national unity, which involved the spreading of irredentist ideologies. As one of my participants explained, she had plans to bring her experience back home to Transylvania, but she often felt side-tracked by feelings experienced in her diaspora community. She explained, “They seem to like the thought of big Hungary and appreciate people from these territories a lot. And I find it fantastic to get this feeling. I always get goosebumps”—such processes aligned with Fidesz’s agenda. As Lowe and Peto (2013) emphasize, irredentist narratives are forever present in modern Hungarian politics. While Orbán has never specifically claimed to intend to re-attach the lost territories to Hungary, he consistently peeves neighbouring countries with the close ties he maintains with transborder Hungarians, not least by designating 4th June – the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon – as a ‘day of national unity.’ Lowe and Peto also note that Hungarian everyday life is scattered with allusions to the detached territories inherently belonging to Hungary, including the generalised use of the term ‘mai Románia területén’ [on the territory of current-day Romania] and weather forecasts showing temperatures for the detached territories. As Sava (2020) further illustrates, since 2018, Hungary has also opposed Europe’s celebration of the end of the two World Wars as moments of reconciliation and European integration, instead hoarding resentment against Western states for letting the Trianon Treaty happen.
At the New Year’s Eve ball at the Hungarian House, as the clock struck midnight, three anthems played to usher in the New Year: The Hungarian national anthem, the British national anthem, and finally, the anthem of the Székely people, an ethnic Hungarian group primarily living in Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș counties of Romania. I was already accustomed to hearing this anthem at Hungarian church services, so I did not question its inclusion in such an event. However, a fellow participant was visibly confused and asked, “What is this? Is this something from here? I’ve never heard it before!” When another person explained what it was, the first person sighed and made a face, clearly disapproving of the choice. When I inquired with the operating director of the event, he explained that the decision was personal, as he felt the anthem was meaningful and dear to many attendees. Other transborder Hungarian attendees justified the inclusion by referring to Fidesz’s decision to replace the European Union flag with the Székely flag on the National Parliament—an act many Hungarians from Hungary saw as provocative and irredentist. The incident highlighted the complex dynamic that Hungarian diaspora members often faced. By practicing their culture at the Hungarian House, they were forced to navigate the delicate balance between balancing a cosmopolitan European identity, which had helped their integration into the UK, and the growing nationalist and irredentist sentiments within the diaspora community, which suddenly seemed like a pre-condition to keeping their traditions alive.
Conclusion
Populism is a tool of isolation that works well with the restrictive ideologies of nationalism as illustrated by the recent political processes unfolding in Hungary. Nationalism centres on the nation as a community with shared values, culture, and identity and emphasizes the importance of sovereignty and independence. It frames the country as being threatened by external or internal forces, such as immigration, foreign influence, or globalization, to which the antidote is people loyal to the nation-building process through their insistence on the practice and preservation of the authentic culture pertinent to the nation. In the Hungarian context, Fidesz has identified transborder Hungarians as key allies for their patriotic feelings regarding Hungarian culture that evolved due to a century’s worth of being a minority.
In this paper, I enquired into one specific context in which their help in promoting nationalist narratives was relied on, namely the diaspora outreach programmes of the Hungarian state targeting recently emigrated Hungarians to the West of Europe. In line with the goals of diaspora engagement, their involvement was aimed to boost nationalist pride and cultivate Hungarian culture, incentivize voting behaviour on the side of Fidesz, and an irredentist approach. Further to the government being invested in mobilizing transborder Hungarians for such purposes, what enhanced their collaboration was that these people found a unique haven of identity preservation in emigrant-diasporas. In London and Dublin, transborder Hungarians thrived in emigrant-diaspora communities, primarily due to the deterritorialised nature of diaspora spaces. The territorial detachment from their country of origin and from Hungary rid them of the resistance of the states whose territories they used to reside on and the resistance of Hungarians in Hungary, who often perceived them as unwanted migrants. While, on the one hand, this new space empowered them to cultivate their Hungarian identity without limitations, at the same time, it reinforced their alignment with the Hungarian state’s goals: regardless of whether they supported Fidesz, their participation took places within dominant Fidesz narratives and as such, through their presence, Fidesz found a way to penetrate emigrant-diaspora spaces.
Nonetheless, the response was mixed. While the two communities studied were geographically not too far apart, the context differed: the Irish diaspora community in 2016/17 consisted of recent emigrants who were only trying to find their feet in the country. Most of these emigrants identified as economic migrants with plans to return. Thus, they were keen to stay in touch with their Hungarian roots and identified membership in the community of compatriots as a pre-condition to their success in the country. As such, the atmosphere in diaspora spaces was more community-oriented and forgiving of differences. However, in the case of the Hungarian House in London, which principally emerged out of political migration, people were less welcoming of state narratives and often penalized individuals who were seen to represent the home state’s ideologies. Nonetheless, in a community where most people lived transnational lives and felt equally invested in their host country, transborder Hungarians were often the only people motivated enough to invest time into keeping the community of Hungarians alive. By taking on such roles, they were transforming the very texture of what being part of an emigrant-diaspora meant: spaces of political resistance transformed into venues expressing nationalistic sentiments, reproducing Fidesz’s narratives. While on the surface, aligning transborder Hungarians with Hungarian diaspora outreach highlights a clever political move, it remains to be seen what impact this strategy can achieve. From the evidence gathered, it seemed that the long-term effect might be counter-productive and might result in the withdrawal of Hungarians from spaces dedicated to the preservation of Hungarian culture as they increasingly fail to identify with the state-led processes unfolding in them, thus undermining the very goal of diaspora outreach.
(*) Judit Molnar is a PhD researcher of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, where her research focuses on the correlations between home state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity amongst first-generation Hungarian and Venezuelan migrants to London, the United Kingdom. Judit holds a research Master’s in Cultural and Social Anthropology from the University of Vienna and another Master’s in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews. Judit has engaged with Hungarian diasporas in Ireland, Argentina, and the United Kingdom. Before coming to Oxford, she was a diaspora facilitator of the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy. She has also worked with the UN’s International Organization for Migration, focusing on the Venezuelan migration crisis, and the European Commission’s Cabinet for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, researching ways to foster a pan-European identity.
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Website of the Hungarian Government (2019) We Are Anti-immigration Because Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced with Hungarians. Accessed December 17, 2024. https://2015-2019.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/we-are-anti-immigration-because-hungarians-can-only-be-replaced-with-hungarians
[1] In academic literature, the term ‘kin-state minorities’ is also frequently employed.
As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.
As South Korea’s Constitutional Court begins reviewing President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his controversial attempt to impose martial law on December 3, 2024, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights that both sides of South Korean politics have failed to inspire public confidence. According to Dr. Shaw, a tit-for-tat dynamic continues to hinder systemic reforms while entrenching disillusionment with establishment politicians.
South Korea’s political landscape, shaped by its history of authoritarian rule and rapid democratization, faces persistent challenges rooted in populism, economic inequality, and geopolitical tensions. In an interview with European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.
“South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes,” Dr. Shaw noted, referencing the martial law imposed under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan that lasted nearly 15 years. These experiences, she explained, left a lasting legacy on political and social movements. “The so-called ‘386 generation,’ who fought courageously against martial law, still lean left-wing and remain deeply skeptical of right-wing leaders.”
Dr. Shaw also addressed the cycles of political retaliation and corruption that have plagued South Korea’s governance. “There’s a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family in ways that most would consider corrupt, followed by the opposition prosecuting and jailing members of the previous administration,” she explained, adding that this dynamic has obstructed meaningful reform.
Economic instability further complicates the political landscape. “South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change,” Dr. Shaw observed. Recent backlash against gender equality movements and perceptions of economic inequality have also fueled populism and anti-feminist sentiment.
Geopolitical narratives amplify these issues. “North Korea is always in the background—not just as a security threat but as a perceived economic burden,” Dr. Shaw remarked. She noted that South Korea’s emphasis on national identity often intertwines anti-communism with anti-Japanese sentiment, allowing political leaders to exploit these narratives.
As South Korea navigates the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment, Dr. Shaw emphasized the importance of reform-minded leadership. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” she said, calling for systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions. With the Constitutional Court set to hold its first public hearing on December 27, 2024, this interview offers a comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s ongoing political challenges and the lessons that could shape its future.
Dr. Meredith Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Meredith Shaw with some edits.
South Korea’s Struggles with Populism, Retributive Politics, and the Legacy of Authoritarianism
Professor Shaw, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How have South Korea’s historical experiences with authoritarian regimes, such as those under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, shaped the contemporary interplay between populism and authoritarianism in its political landscape?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes. As you know, it has had considerable experience with martial law in the past. Martial law was imposed under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship in 1972 and continued almost continuously for about 15 years until 1987.
People over 50 in Korea today would have some memory of this period, particularly the generation that was in college during the last years of martial law, the so-called “386 generation.” They remember fighting very courageously against martial law. As a result, they tend to lean left-wing, are generally very skeptical of right-wing leaders, and oppose the current Yoon administration, which is associated with the right-wing People Power Party (PPP). The real leaders of the anti-martial law movement from that generation, now in their sixties, along with younger activists, often continue to hold these views.
On a deeper level, South Korea has a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family members in ways that most would consider corrupt. Then, after those individuals are removed from power, the opposition conducts prosecutions and jails members of the previous administration. This has normalized the idea of a tit-for-tat dynamic, where each power shift from left to right (and vice versa) results in retaliatory prosecutions. While one might hope this cycle would encourage honesty, it instead perpetuates an ongoing issue of retributive justice on both sides, which has become particularly problematic in recent years.
Finally, the legacy of authoritarian regimes has contributed to the development of a strong leftist coalition in South Korea, consisting of unions, student activists, and agricultural cooperatives. This coalition retains the ability to quickly mobilize mass protests in response to public outrage. However, while one might expect such a coalition to strengthen democratic institutions, it often seizes on emotional triggers—such as the Itaewon tragedy, the Sewol Ferry disaster, or similar incidents—rather than pushing for systemic reform.
As a result, we often see massive protests, sometimes involving a million people in the city square, yet these demonstrations rarely translate into meaningful systemic changes. This creates a puzzle: the legacy of South Korea’s authoritarian past has left.
To what extent do economic factors, such as income inequality or economic crises, contribute to the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders in South Korea? Are these patterns similar to those seen in other countries?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: I think South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change. There have been some economic struggles and downturns in recent years.
Thinking most recently, President Yoon rose to power partly on a wave of male South Korean backlash against the gender equality movement and the perception that men are being left out of the economy as the feminist movement secures more opportunities for women. This has led to a strong anti-feminist and men’s rights backlash, which can inevitably be tied to economic inequality and uncertainty.
On the other hand, South Korea faces serious issues of opportunity and equality, particularly regarding access to higher education and career advancement. The opposition Leftist Democratic Party tends to champion these issues more, but they haven’t offered real solutions during their time in power. They often seem to get bogged down in expensive programs related to North Korea, which has not inspired much confidence.
Additionally, leaders from both parties tend to be beneficiaries of the entrenched institution of crony capitalism. As a result, many Koreans have lost faith in establishment politicians on both sides, making them more susceptible to populist appeals.
How Anti-Communism and Anti-Japanese Sentiment Shape South Korean Politics
How does South Korea’s emphasis on national identity, often tied to anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, influence the populist rhetoric of political leaders? Are these cultural narratives being manipulated to consolidate power?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: In South Korea, I would say North Korea is always in the background as a political presence—not just as a security threat, but also due to the perceived economic damage caused by lost investment as a result of that threat and past administrations’ massive aid projects, which often went nowhere and cost taxpayers a lot of money. This contributes to a sense of grievance, a strong sense of anti-communism, and the belief that things would be better if North Korea didn’t exist.
On one hand, the ongoing threat from North Korea makes it very difficult for South Korea to eliminate some of the legacy Cold War legal institutions designed to crack down on alleged pro-North Korean elements in society. These include still fairly draconian laws against distributing North Korean materials or making statements perceived as pro-North Korean. These laws can be easily abused by the political right wing, but it’s hard to remove them because North Korea is undeniably a real and persistent threat.
More so than European countries, South Korea struggles to shed this Cold War legacy. For example, President Yoon referenced “anti-state forces” in his declaration of martial law, which is essentially a euphemism for pro-North Korean forces. The fact that he was even able to declare martial law in the first place is partly due to these legacy institutions that grant the government stronger powers when it perceives or claims there is a threat from North Korea. In an ideal democratic society, the government shouldn’t have the ability to do such things, but this is a reality South Korea continues to grapple with.
On the other side, because North Korea exists and is often associated with the left being more sympathetic to it, the leftist opposition has difficulty countering that rhetoric without invoking a similar boogeyman of their own. This is where Japan sometimes comes into play. The right is often perceived as being too forgiving of Japan, and the left can exploit this by emphasizing that Japan has historically been a serious enemy and arguing that its history with South Korea needs to be addressed more strongly.
These two historical narratives—anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment—often play off each other in South Korean politics. President Yoon, for instance, has been seen as particularly pro-Japan and has made some rhetorical gaffes that reinforce this perception. However, because he has so many other scandals and gaffes unrelated to Japan, the opposition hasn’t focused on this issue in recent years. Still, anti-Japan sentiment could easily become a factor if the opposition needs further ammunition against him.
Considering South Korea’s history of democracy emerging from periods of anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, what historical and socio-political factors have contributed to the rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in the country? How might the current crisis surrounding President Yoon influence these trends?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: The rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in South Korea, I would say, is influenced primarily by the strong role of personalities in South Korean politics. The most powerful politicians on both sides often have family histories tied to being pro-Japan or associated with past dictatorships.
South Korea, more than most countries, tends to focus on who is related to whom, whose patronage a politician has received, and how those relationships might make them beholden to special interests. This scrutiny often leads people to become extraordinarily skeptical of legacy politicians and more inclined to support newcomers with less experience who claim to be anti-establishment. However, once those newcomers gain power, they quickly become part of the establishment themselves, almost immediately losing the anti-establishment appeal they once had.
If you look at President Yoon’s career trajectory, this pattern is clear. He comes from a very unusual background—he was never a legislator but a former prosecutor who was heavily involved in prosecuting the last conservative presidential scandal. This gave him a degree of independence from the political groups involved in that scandal and allowed him to claim he was anti-establishment.
When the liberal Moon administration became deeply unpopular, people wanted conservative leadership again. However, the mainstream conservatives were still tainted by connections to the previous scandal involving Park Geun-hye. This allowed Yoon to set himself apart and win the presidency. But now, as the establishment leader, he is at the center of scandals himself and appears to be rapidly losing support, even within his own party.
This situation could provide an opportunity for the conservative People Power Party to rebrand itself, though it’s hard to predict what will happen. The broader trend, however, remains consistent: the “outcast” or anti-establishment politician tends to gain popularity initially but loses that appeal very quickly once in power.
Lessons from South Korea’s Struggle to Preserve Democracy
South Korea has a long history of authoritarian military regimes, including extensive periods under martial law. Photo: Shutterstock.
From a historical perspective, how have populist and authoritarian tendencies impacted democratic institutions in South Korea, including governance, civil liberties, the rule of law, and the broader democratic framework? Given South Korea’s history of overcoming authoritarian regimes, what lessons from its political and social movements can inform the response to the current crisis and safeguard democratic governance?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: There is a legacy of suspending civil liberties in the name of defending against the communist threat from North Korea. This legacy, however, has also been retroactively intertwined with the idea of high economic growth. South Korea experienced its highest economic growth during the period of military dictatorship, and some people have come to associate authoritarian, somewhat imperialist leadership with stability and economic prosperity.
When economic concerns arise, or when instability is seen as driving away investment, there is a tendency to believe that a stronger president with more powers is necessary to overcome gridlock in the National Assembly. This perspective is linked to the fact that South Korea’s high economic growth coincided with its period under military dictatorship.
In contemporary times, South Korea has a very strong and evenly matched political competition between the left and the right. However, both sides have a tendency to use the tools of the Justice Ministry and the National Intelligence Service for political retaliation when in power. As a result, almost all surviving ex-presidents—if they don’t pass away soon after leaving office—end up in prison at some point. It has almost become an expectation, and the current president seems likely to face a similar fate.
The current crisis can be seen as part of this ongoing pendulum shift, swinging from right to left. We can likely anticipate more tit-for-tat prosecutions, but unfortunately, no real systemic reform to address this underlying issue. That said, one possible legacy of the current crisis is that no South Korean president is likely to attempt declaring martial law again for quite some time.
South Korea’s President, or rather, we should say, former President Yoon, declared martial law to save the country from what he called anti-state opposition parties, accusing them of using their legislative majority to paralyze the nation. Who are these anti-state parties, and what specific actions or strategies have they allegedly employed to paralyze the government?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: No, Yoon is still the President. He has been impeached by the National Assembly, but he remains President until the Constitutional Court removes him from power. When he made this announcement, referring to what you mentioned as “anti-state parties,” this is essentially code for leftists and those perceived as pro-North Korea.
In fact, I believe it’s enshrined in the Constitution that “anti-state” essentially refers to individuals or groups supporting North Korea or advocating for the overthrow of the democratic government in the name of communism. That’s the understood meaning of the term.
In his subsequent speech, President Yoon clarified further, and it seems he is primarily targeting the Democratic Party majority in the National Assembly. Since the last election, they have held a sizable majority, and they’ve been blocking his budget proposals, his appointees, and generally making it difficult for him to govern. Additionally, they have been prosecuting the President’s wife for bribery scandals that have been following him for quite some time.
Moreover, President Yoon has been attempting to investigate the National Election Commission (NEC) over allegations that his opposition somehow rigged the last election. He appears to be partially justifying his actions as necessary to uncover the truth about what happened at the NEC. However, the idea of using martial law as a solution to these challenges is, frankly, bizarre. I believe it stems from Yoon’s background as a former prosecutor. He seems inexperienced in dealing with the National Assembly and appears to have little patience for the normal gridlock expected in a democratic system—especially when the opposition holds such a significant majority in the Assembly.
There is also speculation about whether martial law was initially President Yoon’s idea or if it was suggested to him by the Defense Minister. This is something that will likely be explored in the court cases over the coming months.
Ultimately, martial law is supposed to be reserved for instances of imminent crisis, such as a genuine threat from anti-state actors or pro-North Korean forces actively working to undermine democracy. It’s not a tool meant to resolve legislative disagreements or to push through a budget. This entire episode suggests inexperience and a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic governance. By associating his political opposition with North Korea, President Yoon appears to be attempting to justify his actions.
Comparing Yoon Suk Yeol’s Declaration to Past Dictatorships
Martial law declarations in South Korea have been tied to periods of dictatorship and significant political upheaval. How does Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration compare with past instances under leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: In the past, during that 15-year period of martial law under military leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the declarations meant full military government with no functioning National Assembly. For ordinary people, it meant curfews imposed at night, harsh crackdowns on any form of student activism or gatherings, and strict state control of the media. The government provided the media with official talking points, and there was no deviation from them until the transition to democracy.
This most recent martial law declaration by Yoon Suk Yeol is extremely tame in comparison, although it was too short-lived to fully understand where it might have headed. Essentially, it amounted to a few hours of trying to seize control of the National Assembly and block legislators from voting, as well as an attempt to take control of the Election Commission, which the President wanted to investigate. There was no effort to restrict the media, the internet, or public gatherings, and only a few hundred troops were involved.
President Yoon is now retroactively trying to portray the martial law declaration as a mere warning rather than an actual implementation, claiming it was symbolic rather than substantive. However, it was martial law, and there was a serious attempt to prevent legislators from voting it down. How long he intended it to last, or what he hoped to achieve, is hard to say.
The key difference, in my mind, lies in the backgrounds of the leaders. Previous dictators like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were former military officers. They understood the military chain of command and thought in military terms. Yoon, on the other hand, is a prosecutor and a lawyer with no command experience. He seemed to lack a clear understanding of what he was doing, and the enforcement of the declaration was extremely inept.
For example, the commander of South Korea’s martial law command claimed he had not been given any advance notice and did not know what the military was supposed to be doing during those six hours. It seems the Defense Minister was effectively in charge of the situation, which is not how it is supposed to work. In several ways, this declaration was destined to fail. It’s hard to discern what it was meant to accomplish, and it doesn’t compare in scale or severity to the martial law of the past era.
What factors contributed to the rapid collapse of martial law? What roles did political parties and the broader public play in ending military rule?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: First of all, the immediate response from the lawmakers was crucial. The declaration occurred on a weeknight around 6 PM, so many lawmakers were still in town. They quickly rallied to do their jobs, backed by public support and local residents who, upon hearing the news, gathered to break down police barricades.
This was coupled with what I would describe as lukewarm participation by the troops involved. Political science has an entire branch of theorization about when troops will follow orders to fire on a crowd or choose to defy those orders. This situation will likely become an interesting case study for that field. In this instance, the words “martial law” elicited such a strong and visceral reaction in the South Korean public that opposition was immediate and resolute. The troops didn’t appear to fully support the declaration, and there was no indication they would fire on the crowd. It’s puzzling to consider what the administration’s expectations were in this scenario.
Yoon’s own political party, the People Power Party, did not seem to rally around him either. In fact, they now appear to be distancing themselves significantly, as evidenced by the impeachment vote. While his party might prefer for him to step down voluntarily rather than endure a drawn-out impeachment process in court, their support for him has been far weaker than one might expect if this were simply a party-line issue.
South Korea’s Democratic Institutions Face a Critical Test
A photograph which was taken during Candlelight March in South Korea. Photo: Shutterstock.
And lastly, Professor Shaw, now that President Yoon has been impeached by the South Korean Parliament, what perspectives do you foresee for the stability of democratic institutions, and what is the significance of this impeachment in the history of South Korea’s democratization process?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: For South Korea, this is the third time a President has been impeached. The most recent one was just eight years ago. I was in South Korea at the time, and I vividly remember it. They’ve survived this before, and they will survive it again.
I think this will be an opportunity for both parties to get their houses in order. Both major parties have recently gone through a phase of populist leadership, with Yoon on the conservative side and Lee Jae-myung leading the Democratic Party. Both leaders have become extremely unpopular. While it’s still a bit too early to predict, I believe the public might now be looking for steadier, more establishment-oriented leadership—especially with the uncertainty surrounding the incoming Trump administration and North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable behavior over the past year. Nobody seems to want a rabble-rousing, anti-establishment leader to emerge from this situation.
If this process unfolds similarly to the last impeachment, we can expect a winter of continuous protests. However, protests in South Korea often have the character of a peaceful, celebratory demonstration of democracy, almost like a festival. There will likely be a police presence to maintain safety, but not to crack down on crowds. If the Constitutional Court chooses to remove President Yoon from power, a snap election will follow. I believe there’s a short period—perhaps two or three weeks, though it could be longer—for parties to organize their campaigns and select candidates.
Currently, the Conservative Party is very splintered, which may result in multiple contenders vying for leadership. Meanwhile, their main rival, the Democratic Party, is also embroiled in scandals, and its leadership is highly unpopular. In fact, one reason some people hesitate to support impeachment is because the current leader of the Democratic Party is himself extremely unpopular.
Given this, we may see lesser-known figures emerge, and hopefully, some steadier leadership will arise as a result of these latest shocks. That said, South Korea fundamentally needs a strong left-wing party to address systemic inequalities in society and a strong right-wing party to defend against the very real threat from North Korea.
Unfortunately, in recent years, both sides have behaved in ways that fail to inspire confidence. I expect a much needed reckoning in the upcoming election, which I anticipate will take place in the spring.
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0092
Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.
Africa has become the focal point of a new great power struggle, reminiscent of the Cold War but with a distinctly civilizational dimension. Unlike the colonial powers of the past, today’s major actors—Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC)—position themselves as allies of the Global South, presenting alternative paths to modernization that challenge Western dominance. This competition is driven by the pursuit of Africa’s vast natural resources, strategic geographic positions, and potential economic partnerships.
The new great power competition in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political, economic, and security landscape. Unlike the colonial era, this competition is characterized by a narrative of anti-Western solidarity, TRIC states present themselves as alternatives to the Western model of development. Each position itself as a partner of Africa, offering infrastructure investments, trade, and security assistance without the liberal democratic conditions often attached to Western aid. At stake are billions of dollars in trade, access to critical minerals, and influence over strategic regions.
Turkey leverages its Ottoman heritage and cultural ties, combining soft power initiatives like education and humanitarian aid with increasing defense exports. Russia, through its Wagner Group and strategic partnerships, combines military assistance with anti-colonial rhetoric. India emphasizes historical ties and South-South cooperation while expanding its trade and energy partnerships across Africa. China leads this competition with extensive infrastructure projects, debt financing, and its Belt and Road Initiative, offering a model of authoritarian modernization.
These nations share a common goal: diminishing Western influence and promoting a multipolar world order. Their efforts resonate in Africa, where Western powers are criticized for their colonial past and for attaching conditions to aid. However, the involvement of these new great powers is not purely altruistic. Their strategies often involve competing among themselves for resources, markets, and geopolitical influence, with some adopting hard power tactics that echo the imperialism of the past.
This report provides actionable recommendations for policy makers, NGOs, and academics in both liberal democracies and African nations, aiming to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape while prioritizing Africa’s autonomy and development goals. It underscores the importance of collaboration, transparency, and shared values to ensure a balanced and equitable future for Africa in the global order.
Shared Motivations: Turkey, Russia, India and China seek to diminish Western influence, particularly that of the United States, in Africa. Each nation emphasizes a historical absence of colonial exploitation in Africa, contrasting their engagement with the imperialist history of the West.
Civilizational Narratives: China and Turkey assert the superiority of their civilizational values over Western norms, presenting themselves as models of development without liberal democratic constraints. Russia and India leverage their shared anti-colonial history with Africa, portraying themselves as partners in the broader fight against Western imperialism.
Strategies: Soft Power – All four nations employ development aid, infrastructure projects, and educational programs to gain influence. China leads in infrastructure, while Turkey and India focus on cultural and educational ties. Hard Power – increasing military engagements, such as China’s Djibouti base and Turkey’s defense agreements with African states, demonstrate a willingness to use force to secure interests. Russia’s Wagner Group and India’s naval presence underscore their strategic ambitions.
Opportunities and Risks: These powers offer no-strings-attached aid and economic partnerships, appealing to African leaders wary of Western conditionality. However, their growing use of hard power raises concerns about neo-imperialism, resource exploitation, and authoritarian influence, challenging the narrative of altruistic partnership.
Competing Interests: Despite a shared goal of diminishing US hegemony, China, Russia, Turkey, and India increasingly compete with one another for influence, creating potential flashpoints in regions like East Africa.
The new great power competition in Africa represents a complex struggle involving economics, geopolitics, and ideology. While China, Russia, Turkey, and India align in their opposition to Western dominance, they also vie against each other for strategic advantage. This competition challenges the liberal democratic order, offering Africans alternative development models rooted in authoritarian governance and civilizational narratives.
As these powers expand their presence, the risk of militarization and resource-driven exploitation grows, underscoring the complexity of Africa’s geopolitical landscape. For liberal democracies, this competition highlights the need for a recalibrated approach to African engagement. Transparent partnerships, infrastructure investments, and strengthened support for democratic institutions can counterbalance authoritarian models.
For African nations, this dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. Leveraging this competition to secure fairer terms for trade, development aid, and security assistance is essential to preserving sovereignty and fostering sustainable growth. Engaging with these emerging powers could accelerate development, but it may also erode democratic governance and foster dependency.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must reassess their strategies to remain relevant in a multipolar Africa. This evolving contest reflects a broader global shift toward multipolarity, with Africa positioned as a pivotal arena in the battle to reshape the post-Cold War world order.
Statue of a child slave in Zanzibar. Photo: Shutterstock.
In the 19th century, the competition among Europe’s major powers led to the invasion and colonization of almost the entire African continent. However, drawing a direct analogy between today’s great power competition in Africa and the colonial era oversimplifies the dynamics at play. Unlike the previous scramble for Africa, the so-called “New Scramble for Africa” (The Economist, 2019) might bring tangible benefits to ordinary Africans.
Africa, despite being the poorest inhabited continent, remains a region of immense potential. Its vast oil and mineral wealth, coupled with significant agricultural resources, are juxtaposed with widespread poverty. Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism about Africa’s future. The continent is increasingly recognized as a region of strategic importance by global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States, as well as regional actors like Turkey and India. Africa’s importance is rooted in its rapidly growing population—projected to be the largest globally by the end of the century—and its abundant natural resources, including minerals essential for emerging technologies like electric vehicles and mobile phones. While much of the developed world grapples with aging populations and declining fertility rates—some, like China, even confronting the paradox of growing old before achieving widespread prosperity—Africa’s demographic trends point to a youthful and dynamic future.
Between 2000 and 2020, African nations experienced stable economic growth (Zajączkowski & Kumar, 2020), a trend that has continued largely uninterrupted in sub-Saharan Africa, except during the COVID-19 pandemic. By the mid-2010s, Africa’s economic performance surpassed that of other developing regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2014, 2015). This growth has often been driven by internal demand, including private consumption, public infrastructure investment, and expanding trade ties with emerging markets (African Development Bank, 2019). Projections estimate that by 2060, Africa’s middle class will reach 1.1 billion people—approximately 50% of the continent’s population (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2012).
Despite these promising trends, Africa currently accounts for just 3% of global trade (African Development Bank, 2012; UNECA, 2013). However, the continent’s youthful population, rapid urbanization, and expanding educated middle class are transforming it into an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. Nations such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, the United States, and European powers are deepening their engagement with Africa, driven by a mix of strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.
The competition among these major powers has the potential to create a win-win scenario for Africans. By leveraging rivalries, African nations could secure better investment deals and improved terms of engagement. However, there are risks. This competition could result in increased external support for corrupt or oppressive leaders as foreign powers prioritize their strategic goals over good governance. Nevertheless, the potential benefits are evident: increased investment can create jobs, improve infrastructure, and enhance Africa’s influence within global institutions. For emerging global powers, Africa represents an opportunity not only to boost national wealth and secure access to critical raw materials but also to expand their global influence and military reach, often at the expense of established powers like the United States.
China, Russia, Turkey, and India, in particular, are deepening their economic, diplomatic, and military ties with African states using a mix of soft power, sharp power, and, occasionally, hard power.
The civilizational populism promoted by emerging powers like Turkey, China, and others provides a distinct alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. These nations seek to position themselves as “civilization-states,” claiming to reconnect with the values and traditions that historically made their societies great. This strategic positioning not only challenges the hegemony of liberal democratic norms but also resonates with African states seeking development paths that reject Western-imposed conditions and values.
In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan exemplifies this civilizational populism. Erdogan’s leadership employs a dual narrative: domestically, he positions himself as the defender of Islamic values against secularist elites, and internationally, he portrays Turkey as the protector of Muslim interests against Western dominance (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). By framing Turkey as the heir to Ottoman-Islamic civilization, Erdogan not only consolidates his domestic support but also positions Turkey as a leader of the Muslim world (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Central to this strategy is the AKP’s rhetoric, which invokes collective historical traumas and fears. This securitization narrative portrays Turkey as a nation under constant threat from internal and external enemies, including Western powers, secularists, and minority groups (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021). By doing so, Erdogan legitimizes authoritarian measures, silences dissent, and garners support for Turkey’s active role in global anti-Western coalitions (Yilmaz, Shipoli, & Demir, 2021).
In addition, civilizational populism heavily relies on narratives of victimhood. Erdogan’s political strategy has evolved to incorporate both national and manufactured victimhood narratives, which resonate deeply with his base. These narratives amplify historical grievances and create a sense of solidarity among supporters, portraying the AKP and its leader as the only forces capable of defending the “true” Turkish identity (Morieson, Yilmaz, & Kenes, 2024). These strategies extend beyond domestic politics to foreign policy. By aligning with anti-colonial sentiments and emphasizing solidarity with historically marginalized nations, Turkey appeals to African states as a partner that understands their struggles. Unlike the West, which ties aid and investment to democratic reforms, Turkey offers “no-strings-attached” assistance, furthering its influence in regions seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). This model of civilizational populism not only undermines liberal democratic norms but also demonstrates the AKP’s ability to adapt its messaging to different audiences. By emphasizing shared grievances and cultural pride, the AKP constructs a narrative of unity and resistance that resonates globally while reinforcing its domestic authority (Yılmaz, 2021).
These civilization-states emphasize anti-colonial solidarity and highlight their success in achieving economic growth without adhering to Western norms. Their strategies are designed not only to challenge American hegemony but also to position their governance models as viable alternatives to liberal democracy.
This report examines the strategies employed by China, Russia, Turkey, and India in Africa, focusing on their use of soft and hard power and their framing of themselves as civilization-states offering alternatives to Western liberalism. By analyzing their approaches, this report seeks to understand how these powers influence Africa’s development trajectories and what this means for the future of global power dynamics.
The Turkish Islamist humanitarian aid foundation IHH serves as one of the key instruments of the Erdogan regime’s policies in Africa. African children participate in activities promoting IHH in Niamey, Niger, on December 20, 2017. Photo: Burak Tumler.
Turkey’s Erdogan-led AKP government has demonstrated unprecedented interest in Africa, establishing 26 new embassies and 12 consulates across the continent since 2010, bringing the total to 44 (The Economist, 2019). This outreach aligns with Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which portrays Turkey as both a defender of Islam and the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023). For Erdogan, Africa represents a region with deep-seated resentment toward Western powers and a positive perception of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, offering opportunities to cultivate trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international bodies, including the United Nations.
Historically, Turkey’s engagement with Africa was limited. While the Ottoman Empire maintained ties with North Africa, the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect was shaped by Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that placed much of Africa under American or Soviet influence.
Erdogan has contrasted Turkey’s approach with that of Western powers, emphasizing solidarity over exploitation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he criticized Europe’s failure to provide vaccines to Africa, contrasting it with Turkey’s medical aid (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). He has frequently highlighted Europe’s selective application of universal values, pointing to the neglect of African refugees and Western double standards on human rights. According to Erdogan, “The EU is not in a position to defend all its self-proclaimed universal moral values while it turns a blind eye to sinking boats in the Mediterranean, building wire fences, and adopting a push-back policy” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Erdogan positions Turkey as a country free from colonial baggage, committed to anti-imperialism, and sharing values with Africa. He frames Turkey’s engagement as rooted in sincerity, brotherhood, and solidarity, rejecting “old colonial practices with new methods” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). Erdogan’s rhetoric emphasizes a “unique economic and development model” that Turkey can export to help Africa prosper without adopting exploitative or neo-colonial practices.
This narrative blend promises of mutual economic growth with appeals to shared values and opposition to the West. Erdogan adeptly connects Europe’s colonial legacy with its modern policies, particularly in redistributive justice. For instance, he has contrasted Turkey’s pandemic aid with Europe’s vaccine withholding, presenting Turkey as a genuine partner in Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Turkey’s African policy underwent a significant transformation in the post-Cold War era. After the European Union (EU) rejected Turkey’s membership, Ankara adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, moving away from exclusive Western alignment (Tepecikliogu, 2017). The “Opening to Africa Policy” of 1998 marked the beginning of this shift, with economic priorities playing a growing role. This approach intensified under the AKP government, which, after facing resistance to EU membership, turned to cultivating alliances in non-Western regions, including Africa.
In 2005, Erdogan’s government declared “The Year of Africa,” with Erdogan becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s economic growth under AKP leadership enabled the country to pursue a proactive foreign policy, focusing on the African continent as a region of strategic importance (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Today, Turkey positions itself as a reliable partner, offering an alternative to Western dominance while strengthening its presence in Africa through economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives.
Turkey’s soft power initiatives in Africa have been complex, leveraging humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, and infrastructure development. This aligns with President Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which frames Turkey as both a defender of its people and Islam, as well as a spokesperson for the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). In Africa, Erdogan perceives a continent harboring understandable resentment toward Western powers and views it as a region where Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are remembered positively. This creates opportunities for Turkey to gain trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international organizations such as the United Nations.
Historically, the Ottoman Empire maintained close ties with North Africa, but the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect stemmed from Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that left Africa under American or Soviet influence. However, Turkey’s interest in Africa increased following the Cold War, particularly as its relevance to the US and Europe waned and its bid for EU membership was rejected. In 1997, Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, diversifying its alliances beyond the West (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This shift included the 1998 “Opening to Africa Policy,” which coincided with the rise of a new Turkish bourgeoisie influencing foreign policy through economic priorities.
Under the Erdogan-led AKP government, which came to power in 2002, efforts to enhance trade and relations with non-Western states, including African nations, accelerated. When it became clear that the EU was reluctant to accept majority-Muslim Turkey, Erdogan sought to build alliances in regions like Africa. Economic growth under AKP rule enabled a proactive foreign policy, and 2005 was declared “The Year of Africa.” Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, signaling Turkey’s increasing focus on the continent.
In a 2011 speech in Mogadishu, Erdogan underscored Turkey’s commitment to Africa, describing the continent as “the cradle of civilization and one of the epicenters of the future of humanity.” He expressed support for “African ownership of African issues” and highlighted Turkey’s role as a “strategic partner of the rising Continent of Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This rhetoric emphasized Turkey’s distinction from Western powers often viewed as exploitative (Voice of America, 2024). Unlike Western nations, Turkey’s aid comes with few or no conditions regarding governance or human rights reforms, a stance that resonates with many African governments (GIS Reports, 2024). Erdogan has presented Turkey as an alternative to the West, emphasizing sincerity and partnership rather than exploitation (Voice of America, 2024).
Turkey’s engagement in Africa has primarily centered on humanitarian aid and development assistance, which complement its commercial interests (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Selin Gucum of the Observatory of Contemporary Turkey noted that Turkey has capitalized on African efforts to reduce reliance on former colonial powers for aid and security (Voice of America, 2024). Analysts like Teresa Nogueira Pinto highlight that Turkey avoids making its assistance conditional on governance or human rights, a key factor distinguishing it from Western aid models (GIS Reports, 2024).
Education has played a pivotal role in Turkey’s soft power strategy. Initially, the Gulen movement opened schools across Africa, but following the failed 2016 coup, which the AKP blamed on Gulen, these schools were replaced by the Maarif Foundation, which now operates 140 schools in Africa, educating 17,000 students (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, approximately 60,000 African students currently study in Turkey, fostering cultural and educational ties (TRT Africa, 2023).
Religion is another significant element of Turkey’s approach, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or those with sizable Muslim minorities. Turkey-funded mosques and schools promote socially conservative values that resonate with many Africans, especially in opposition to Western liberal norms. Erdogan’s rhetoric against LGBTQ+ rights and his emphasis on traditional family values often find a receptive audience in Africa (Voice of America, 2024).
Media has become an avenue for Turkish influence, with state broadcaster TRT reaching African audiences in multiple languages, including local African dialects. This allows Turkey to promote pro-Turkish narratives and portray itself as a friend to Africa while casting its adversaries as enemies of the African people.
Turkey has also invested in diplomatic training to strengthen ties with African nations. Since 1992, its Diplomacy Academy has trained 249 African diplomats through its International Junior Diplomats Training Program, aimed at capacity building and enhancing human resources upon requests from African foreign ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).
Infrastructure development further cements Turkey’s presence in Africa. Turkish Airlines (THY), for example, flies to 62 African cities, including Mogadishu, Somalia, where its planes land at an airport built with Turkish funds and expertise. This demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to connecting Africa with global markets and boosting tourism (Němečková & Varkočková, 2024).
Humanitarian aid, particularly disaster relief, has been another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. During Somalia’s 2011 famine, Turkey provided substantial aid, with Erdogan himself visiting the country to highlight the crisis and Turkey’s role in alleviating it. This not only improved Turkey’s image but also opened doors for Turkish businesses and NGOs to contribute to Somalia’s reconstruction. Somalia became a litmus test for Turkey’s Africa policy, with Ankara playing a mediating role in the country’s internal conflicts (Tepecikliogu, 2017).
Turkey’s initiatives extend beyond aid. It is exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in partnership with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like other rising powers, Turkey’s involvement in Africa is driven by both economic ambitions and a desire to expand its influence on the continent.
Erdogan’s rhetoric and policies have effectively positioned Turkey as a unique and reliable partner for African nations, contrasting sharply with Western approaches and emphasizing shared values, solidarity, and mutual growth. Through complex soft power initiatives, Turkey has carved a significant role for itself in Africa’s development narrative while pursuing its broader geopolitical and economic interests.
Turkey’s engagement in Africa extends well beyond disaster and famine aid. Today, Turkey is actively exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in collaboration with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like the BRICS group and Western powers, Turkey’s initiatives in Africa aim to achieve both economic gains and growing geopolitical influence on the continent.
Turkey has earned a reputation as a reliable partner in delivering major projects on time, which has enhanced its value across Africa. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Africa trade reached $34.5 billion annually in 2022, up from $5.4 billion in 2003—an extraordinary increase that underscores the economic rise of African nations and Turkey’s expanding interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). President Erdogan’s anti-colonial rhetoric further positions Turkey as a trusted ally of Africa, contrasting its sincerity with the perceived exploitation by Western powers. Erdogan also emphasizes Turkey’s unique economic model as a potential roadmap for Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit 2023).
Turkey’s hard power approach became more prominent in the 2010s, particularly during the Arab Uprisings and subsequent conflicts. The 2020 Libyan civil war marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, as Ankara supported the Tripoli-based government by deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval forces to counter Russian-backed factions. This intervention showcased the effectiveness of Turkish military technology, especially drones, which have since become highly sought after by African nations (GIS Reports, 2024).
The defense industry has been a major beneficiary of improved Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has increasingly signed arms deals with African governments, leading to a fivefold growth in defense and aerospace exports to the continent—from $82.9 million in 2020 to $460.6 million in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022; Demirdirek & Talebian, 2022). While still a small fraction of total arms sales to African states, this growth highlights Turkey’s expanding role as a defense partner. Despite its focus on humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships, Turkey’s security and defense sectors see Africa as a growing market for military goods.
Turkey’s intervention in Libya likely had two main objectives: securing access to the Libyan coast and maritime boundaries, and countering Arab and Russian influence in the region. Turkey’s successful defense of the Tripoli government relied heavily on-air superiority and UAV technology, demonstrating both the effectiveness of its military prowess and the utility of its hardware in modern conflicts.
Following the Libya intervention, Turkish UAVs gained popularity in Africa. Analysts note that Turkish defense products offer significant advantages to African countries—they are affordable, reliable, and battle-tested in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine (GIS Reports, 2024). For nations grappling with insurgent movements, porous borders, and under-resourced armies—such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia—Turkey’s drones and counterterrorism expertise have become especially valuable.
Turkey is primarily a supplier of arms and military training rather than an active combatant in Africa’s wars. It has signed defense agreements with countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, with expected agreements in Uganda and Mozambique. These agreements often encompass security provisions, technical support, and arms sales, though some, like the Mozambique deal, also involve sharing military intelligence (GIS Reports, 2024).
Somalia remains Turkey’s closest partner in Africa. In 2017, Turkey established a large foreign military base in Mogadishu and has since provided extensive training to Somali soldiers engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda (Atlantic Council, 2024). Such defense agreements serve not only Turkey’s strategic interests but also reinforce its image as a significant ally of African stability. Alper Aktas, Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia, remarked, “[Turkey] never considered Somalia’s stability separately from our own country’s stability” (ADF, 2024). Erdogan describes Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian” country, sharing common values and interests with African nations (Politics Today, 2022).
Turkey has positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russia, China, France, and the United States in supplying arms to Africa. Abel Abate Demissie, an associate fellow at Chatham House, observes that “Turkey provides a means of actually purchasing military hardware” (DW, 2022a). African nations are particularly interested in Turkish-manufactured armored vehicles, naval equipment, infantry weapons, and drones (DW, 2022a).
By deepening its defense partnerships and increasing arms sales, Turkey not only enhances its influence in Africa but also pushes back against competing powers like Russia and China. These efforts underscore Turkey’s broader strategy to carve out its sphere of influence on the continent while presenting itself as a reliable and cooperative partner to African states.
T-shirts for sale at Windhoek Market alongside a portrait of Putin in Windhoek, Namibia, on March 26, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
Russia developed strong relationships with African states during the Soviet era, competing with the United States to gain influence across the continent and spread its communist ideology. The Soviets offered development aid and, crucially, solidarity with leftist regimes fighting colonialism and Western imperialism, effectively capitalizing on widespread anti-Western sentiment in Africa (Bienen, 1982). After the collapse of communism, however, Russia struggled to compete with the United States in terms of soft and hard power, as it lacked the resources and global reach of its Soviet predecessor. Nonetheless, because Russia had minimal involvement in the colonization of Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it continued to be perceived by many Africans as a friend to their people and an opponent of Western colonialism and exploitation.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has consistently sought to maintain its influence in Africa, with efforts expanding significantly under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Putin’s government emphasizes Russia’s historic ties to Africa and its opposition to Western colonialism. For instance, at the second annual Russia–Africa Summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2023, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, declared that Russia would “pursue avenues that would liberate sovereign states from their colonial heritage.” This statement underscored Russia’s ongoing strategy of supporting anti-Western dictatorships and regimes that defy liberal norms. In exchange for Russian development and military aid, these regimes provide diplomatic backing for Russian initiatives in international bodies, including the United Nations Security Council.
In a 2022 speech in Moscow, Putin elaborated on his anti-Western narrative, blaming the “West,” particularly the “Anglo-Saxons,” for colonialism and the slave trade (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). He portrayed the Soviet Union and Russia as leaders of the 20th-century anti-colonial movement—a legacy, he argued, that the West has never forgiven. Putin framed Russia’s current opposition to Western liberalism and atheism as a continuation of its historic resistance to colonialism. According to this narrative, the West seeks to eradicate traditional ways of living and religious practices, while Russia, as a civilization-state, stands as a protector of Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and other faiths (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022).
Putin further claimed that the promises of democracy and wealth from the West have consistently led to poverty, imperialism, and the erosion of cultural and religious traditions in societies they influence. He argued that the West’s quest for “total domination” drives it to eliminate “sovereign centers of global development,” even by force if necessary (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). While this rhetoric may not carry the same ideological weight as it did during the Soviet era—when communism provided a compelling alternative to capitalism—it resonates in regions like Africa, where anti-Western sentiments remain strong, and where Western promises of democracy and development often fail to meet expectations.
In Africa, Putin’s anti-Western narrative finds an audience, particularly in areas with strong religious conservatism and enduring memories of colonial humiliation. Russia’s framing of itself as a champion of traditional values and a defender against Western imperialism bolsters its appeal, even as its actual resources and influence remain limited compared to its Soviet predecessor. This narrative continues to shape Russia’s engagement with African states, aligning with its broader geopolitical goals of challenging Western hegemony and asserting its role as a sovereign center of global influence.
The Putin regime does not, of course, rely solely on rhetoric to spread its influence across the African continent. Instead, it employs a range of soft and hard power programs designed to elicit support and back friendly nations in Africa. However, the institutions that Russia builds across Africa consistently promote a narrative blaming the West for Africa’s challenges and portraying Russia as an opponent of Western imperialism.
Russia’s overall strategy in Africa can be summarized as a combination of stabilizing the region to facilitate mineral extraction, opening alternative markets for its energy exports, and leveraging anti-colonial rhetoric and aid to win the support of African nations. While Russia does not actively seek to suppress democracy in Africa, the Putin regime has no qualms about supporting repressive regimes and often prefers dealing with authoritarian governments over democracies. Russia is particularly interested in competing with other global powers, including the United States, France, China, and Turkey, for influence in Africa. To this end, it portrays itself as a long-standing ally of the African people, emphasizing its history of supporting independence movements.
The Putin regime maintains ties with friendly African states by fostering collaboration between Russian and African educational institutions, building schools and training facilities, and assisting in securing mining operations and combating insurgencies. This latter aspect often involves the Wagner Group, whose activities in Africa have a mixed record. In 2024, the Wagner Group’s operations were incorporated into Russia’s Ministry of Defense’s African Corps.
Russia’s soft power efforts in Africa primarily focus on spreading Russian culture and language. Russian cultural centers operate in over 80 countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, offering Russian language courses and promoting Russian literature. Since 2019, Russia has expanded its language education initiatives to include 28 nations, with a goal of reaching at least 50. It also aims to follow the lead of China and France in admitting talented Africans to its universities to strengthen Africa-Russia ties.
Although Russia has succeeded in garnering support from some African states, including abstentions during votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would be misleading to assume uniform support across the continent or consistent alignment with Russia in UN General Assembly voting (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Russia’s popularity is not universal in Africa. Despite mostly positive relationships with some countries, it faces competition from wealthier nations better equipped to facilitate development.
Since 2003, Russia has established physical Russian language schools in Africa under the Russky Mir Foundation (Russian World Foundation). These schools teach Russian language and culture, often in collaboration with African governments and universities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Namibia (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). In return, Russia has pledged to teach African languages in Moscow schools, signaling respect for African cultures and languages (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024).
Russia has also increased its engagement with higher education institutions in Africa, launching the Russian-African Network University consortium in 2023. This initiative includes agreements with various Malian institutions, such as the National School of Engineering, the University of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Private University Ahmed Baba (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). These projects complement earlier Soviet-era initiatives, such as the university established in Egypt in 1960, underscoring Russia’s historical and ongoing interest in African education.
Olena Snigyr argues that Russian educational and cultural initiatives aim to expand a shared knowledge base and foster ideological alignment. Educational cooperation, Russian language and culture programs, and journalist training are central to Russia’s strategy of disseminating its narratives and ideas (FPRI, 2024). According to Snigyr, Russia’s narrative of “modernization with Russia” appeals to African nations struggling with poverty despite resource wealth, offering a partnership model distinct from the conditional aid frameworks of Western countries.
Russia positions itself as a protector of African interests, advocating for fairer representation in international organizations such as the UN, opposing foreign interference in political regimes, and supporting traditional values in African societies (FPRI, 2024). However, its impact remains limited. Only about 35,000 African students are currently enrolled in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University involves just 75 Russian and 27 African institutions, with significant participation from Zimbabwe (FPRI, 2024). Nonetheless, initiatives like the Consortium of Universities “Subsoil of Africa” at St. Petersburg Mining University, which includes over 130 organizations from 42 African countries, demonstrate Russia’s ambition to deepen collaboration with Africa on its own terms (FPRI, 2024).
In 2023, Russia diversified its educational initiatives, including courses in religion and journalism. For example, it signed an agreement with Burkina Faso to collaborate on secular and Islamic education to combat radical Islam (Russian Mufties Council, 2023). Additionally, partnerships with Nigeria focus on advanced technological education, such as robotics, microelectronics, and 3D printing, while negotiations with South Sudan involve constructing a refinery (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). Events like robotics and astronomy workshops in Tanzania, which featured a cosmonaut and attracted 800 students, further underscore Russia’s investment in portraying itself as a technological power in Africa (RT, 2023; Daily News, 2023).
These soft power efforts, while not unique to Russia, are integral to its strategy of portraying itself as a non-imperialist, anti-colonial partner to Africa. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized Russia’s appreciation for African states that resist Western pressure, framing the partnership as one of mutual respect and shared interests (Kornegay, 2023). This rhetoric has helped Moscow persuade some African states to resist Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. However, many African states continue to trade with Russia out of necessity, as food and energy shortages leave them little choice but to prioritize their immediate needs over geopolitical alignments.
Russian use of hard power in Africa has become increasingly prominent since 2017, largely through the activities of the Wagner Group, a private military company advancing Russian interests across the continent, often in opposition to Western priorities. The Wagner Group has been active in several African states, most notably the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya.
The Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, gained prominence during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. While commonly referred to as a single entity, it is better described as a complex network of businesses and mercenary groups operating in conflict zones and even in alleged peacekeeping operations worldwide (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Before 2023, the Wagner Group operated somewhat independently of the Kremlin. However, following its apparent rebellion against the Putin regime and Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an air crash, the group has operated as an instrument of the Russian state, with much of its operations absorbed into the Ministry of Defense in 2024. Even prior to these events, the Wagner Group was closely aligned with Kremlin objectives, despite its profit-driven motivations.
In Africa, the Wagner Group has approximately 5,000 personnel, including former Russian soldiers, convicts, and foreign nationals (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Among its most significant campaigns is its involvement in CAR, where Wagner soldiers were deployed in 2018, initially as military instructors. Their numbers later swelled to 1,500–2,000, transforming into a fighting force tasked with securing the country’s lucrative mining industry and protecting the pro-Russian government from rebels (Granta, 2024).
In 2019, Wagner began stationing forces around gold mines in central and eastern CAR and later expanded its presence to the north. Russian officials claim their operations have brought “peace and security” to CAR, but these claims are contested. The US State Department reports that Wagner has engaged in indiscriminate killings, abductions, and sexual violence in its efforts to control mining areas near Bambari (US State Department, 2024). UN experts further accuse Wagner of harassing journalists, aid workers, and international peacekeepers (OHCHR, 2021).
For instance, in October 2024, Wagner forces reportedly executed at least a dozen civilians in the gold-mining town of Koki, allegedly targeting artisanal miners. Witnesses recounted how Russian paramilitaries arrived by helicopter, indiscriminately opening fire on locals (Al Jazeera, 2024). Such violence is not isolated; it aligns with a broader pattern of Wagner’s operations, where violence often accompanies lucrative mining agreements between Russian companies and the CAR government. For example, the CAR government revoked mining licenses from a Canadian company and awarded them to Midas Resources, a Wagner-affiliated entity (Al Jazeera, 2024).
At times, Wagner’s priorities in CAR appear more focused on securing mineral resources than protecting the government. Wagner reportedly collaborated with the rebel group Union for Peace (UPC) to ensure the safety of its mining operations but later turned against the group, launching a counteroffensive targeting both rebels and local civilians (Al Jazeera, 2024).
CAR’s former Prime Minister Martin Ziguele expressed regret over inviting Wagner into the country, describing the group as a “criminal organization” now dominating CAR’s economic, security, and political spheres (BBC, 2023). Despite these criticisms, many in CAR view Wagner’s presence favorably, believing it has brought a degree of stability. In Bangui, the CAR government erected a monument honoring Wagner forces, depicting Russian troops protecting a woman and her children, accompanied by tributes to Yevgeny Prigozhin (BBC, 2023).
The Wagner Group’s activities in CAR exemplify both the potential and the pitfalls of Russia’s paramilitary strategy in Africa. On one hand, it highlights the failure of US and European initiatives to bring security and democracy to the continent. On the other hand, it demonstrates how Russian soft power effectively garners local support for the presence of its hard power. This growing influence strengthens Russia’s alliances in Africa, securing votes in the UN General Assembly and helping to shield Russia from Western economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. However, these developments also underscore the precarious balance between Russian objectives and the well-being of African states under Wagner’s shadow.
India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi greets heads of delegations at the alighting point during the 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi on October 29, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
India’s relationship with post-colonial Africa is longstanding and predates that of many other nations, including Turkey. Since the 1950s, India has actively engaged with African nations, with Prime Minister Nehru famously describing Africa as a “sister” continent. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which included India and all African nations except South Sudan, further solidified this bond. Shared opposition to European colonialism provided a strong foundation for collaboration, fostering a sense of solidarity and shared purpose.
In the post-World War II period, India and African states were united by their mutual aspiration to chart independent foreign policies, a vision that became even more pronounced during the Cold War era (Kidwai, 2023: 359). During this time, both India and African nations sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to advance their collective interests. India has been a consistent partner, offering humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and cooperating on defense and security matters. For example, as early as 1956, Emperor Haile Selassie requested India’s assistance in establishing a military academy in Harar, marking the beginning of India’s significant security cooperation with African states (Kidwai, 2023: 359).
Since the end of the Cold War, India’s engagement with Africa has deepened, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2014. Modi has portrayed himself as a leader of the ‘Global South’ and has positioned India as a steadfast ally of developing nations. This approach has been reflected in Modi’s initiatives, such as his advocacy for the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 during India’s presidency of the group. Modi’s rhetoric underscores the importance of Africa in India’s global strategy. “When we say we see the world as a family, we truly mean it,” Modi stated, emphasizing Africa’s significance in shaping a more inclusive global dialogue (CNN, 2023).
The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 was, according to Modi, a “significant stride towards a more inclusive global dialogue” (X., 2023). While this move demonstrated India’s commitment to amplifying African voices on the global stage, India’s interest in Africa is not purely altruistic. Like other major powers, India seeks to bolster its influence and expand trade relations with Africa to further its own strategic and economic interests.
Africa has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner among global regions. Trade between India and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly, rising from $47 billion in 2012 to nearly $90 billion in recent years (African Business, 2023). Total trade with all African nations reached $98 billion in 2024 (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2024). Energy is a cornerstone of this relationship, with African nations supplying roughly a quarter of India’s crude oil imports. Nigeria, in particular, has become India’s largest supplier of oil (African Business, 2023).
This increasing dependency on African energy resources underscores the continent’s importance to India’s economic security and growth. Consequently, the Indian government has prioritized building stronger ties with African nations through trade, security partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. India’s strategy also seeks to challenge the influence of other powers, such as the United States, China, Europe, and Russia, in the region. Africa’s growing economic potential and its strategic significance make it a focal point for India’s foreign policy ambitions.
India’s soft power in Africa is rooted in a shared history of anti-colonialism, trade, and humanitarian assistance. While India has historically provided aid to African nations, its primary focus has been on neighboring countries or, paradoxically, on receiving aid itself, such as from Great Britain. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly directed aid to African nations, particularly Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique—countries where China also has a significant aid presence. This reflects growing competition between India and China for influence in Africa.
Prime Minister Modi emphasizes that India’s engagement in Africa is aimed at fostering cooperation rather than rivalry. He stated, “As global engagement in Africa increases, [India and Africans must work] together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). This sentiment underscores India’s aim to position itself as a sincere partner to Africa, untainted by exploitative motives.
India’s foreign aid to Africa has grown significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 22% over the past decade. Initiatives like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program exemplify this approach, offering training and education to leaders and scholars from developing countries. With 40,000 alumni globally, ITEC serves as a soft power tool to cultivate goodwill and a generation of leaders with favorable views of India.
India’s soft power also extends to trade. Modi has often emphasized that India’s development partnership with Africa will be guided by African priorities. For example, he remarked that India’s support will “liberate your potential and not constrain your future” (Nantulya, 2023). India seeks to leverage its expertise in areas like the digital revolution to support Africa’s development, including expanding financial inclusion, improving education and health services, and mainstreaming marginalized communities.
Although trade between India and Africa is growing, it remains overshadowed by China-Africa trade. In 2023, China-Africa trade amounted to $282 billion, significantly surpassing India’s $90 billion in trade with sub-Saharan Africa and $98 billion overall (Indian Confederation of Industry, 2024). Nevertheless, certain sectors illustrate the growing depth of India-Africa economic ties. India imports significant amounts of minerals from Africa, while African nations benefit from India’s mining expertise and investment. Conversely, African countries import pharmaceuticals from India, with $3.8 billion worth of medicines and healthcare products purchased in 2020-2021.
India’s trade imbalance with Africa, particularly in manufacturing, is utilized as a soft power advantage. Modi has promised to keep Indian markets open to African goods and to support Indian industries investing in Africa. Furthermore, India is making strides in exporting green energy technology to Africa, positioning itself as a valuable partner in addressing climate change.
One of India’s unique advantages in Africa is the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Seychelles, South Africa, and Mauritius. Modi’s visits to African countries with large Indian communities underscore this connection. Under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, India has sought to engage the diaspora to advance its foreign policy objectives, including addressing security concerns and facilitating trade. However, Modi’s message to African audiences diverges from his focus on Hindu civilizational rejuvenation for the diaspora. Instead, he portrays himself as a leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity with Africa in advocating for a “just, representative and democratic global order” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
In sum, India’s soft power in Africa is a mix of historical ties, developmental cooperation, and strategic engagement. While India’s initiatives are dwarfed by China’s influence, they are nonetheless significant in cultivating goodwill and expanding India’s footprint across the continent. Through trade, aid, and a focus on shared aspirations, India positions itself as a genuine partner and advocate for Africa on the global stage.
India is not a major military power in Africa. Instead, its strength lies in its soft power—the perception that India is a trustworthy and benevolent partner to African nations—which gives it an advantage over rivals like China and the United States. Nevertheless, as India’s economic power grows, so too does its military capacity, and it is increasingly likely that India will expand its hard power presence in areas of strategic importance, including parts of Africa.
India’s hard power in Africa is primarily focused on the Indian Ocean region, which acts as a strategic corridor between the African continent and the Indian subcontinent. Indian military facilities have been established in key locations, including Madagascar, which hosts a radar and listening facility; Oman, where Indian Navy vessels have docking rights; Mauritius, where India is constructing an airfield and facilities for stationing soldiers; and the Seychelles, where India has installed a surveillance system to monitor surrounding waters (Military Africa, 2023; Voice of America, 2024; Deccan Herald, 2024; The Geostrata, 2021). These facilities, while modest compared to the expansive presence of the United States or even Russia in Africa, serve critical functions. They help India secure its interests in the region, combat piracy, and contribute to the stability of vital maritime routes.
India’s hard power initiatives are deeply tied to its aspirations as an Indo-Pacific power. The Modi administration has emphasized the importance of securing Indian influence in the region to counter the expanding presence of China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. India’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific includes establishing partnerships with African nations along the eastern shores of Africa, particularly in areas near the Indian Ocean.
Indian military engagements in Africa also highlight its collaborative approach to regional security. Prime Minister Modi has underscored India’s commitment to addressing shared security concerns, stating that India will prioritize “strengthen[ing] …cooperation and mutual capabilities [between India and Africa] in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). Modi’s rhetoric often emphasizes that Indian military activities are driven by the need for stability and collaboration rather than competition, asserting that “the world needs cooperation and not competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
While India’s military footprint in Africa is currently limited, its actions signal a gradual but deliberate increase in its regional hard power. India’s presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to expand further, as the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global maritime security and a counterbalance to Chinese and American influence in the region. Partnerships with African nations on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and peacekeeping missions will likely be pivotal in shaping India’s military strategy in Africa.
A Chinese yuan placed on a map of Africa symbolizes trade, tourism, economy, and investment between China and African countries. Photo: Oleg Elkov.
China’s rise is arguably the most consequential event of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Before the 2000s, it was commonplace in Western capitals to believe that China’s embrace of market capitalism would inevitably transform the country into a liberal democracy. This ahistorical and naïve belief shaped American policy towards China throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated China’s economic growth by dismantling barriers to trade. However, this approach failed to transform China into either a democracy or a reliable ally of the United States. Instead, following a period of economic reform and relative social liberalization under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s leadership has transformed China into a surveillance state governed by an authoritarian populist regime, which portrays itself as the culmination of “5,000 years of Chinese civilization” (Liu Qingzhu, 2023).
China’s growing economic strength, while it has created a large middle class, has not led to its transition into a liberal democracy. Although China’s middle class enjoys economic freedom, it remains either unwilling or unable to demand freedom of expression and other liberal reforms. From one perspective, it would seem irrational for Chinese citizens to challenge a regime that has delivered unprecedented prosperity. Indeed, China is arguably the world’s largest economic powers and its second greatest military power, giving its citizens a sense of prestige and influence not experienced for centuries. The Communist Party of China (CCP) continuously reinforces this narrative of national ascendancy, framing China’s increasingly assertive behavior in Asia—including its claims over maritime territories belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines—as part of a legitimate effort to reclaim territories historically taken from China by imperial powers (Zhang, 2019).
Simultaneously, China positions itself as a model for the Global South and is instrumental in building economic blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), aimed at countering the influence of the US and EU in global economic affairs (Char, 2024). For the CCP and its supporters, China’s rise is evidence of the superiority of its civilizational model over Western civilization and proof that modernization can occur without Westernization (Char, 2024). The CCP adopts a deeply civilizational perspective on global affairs and has repeatedly urged the US to respect civilizational differences and cease imposing liberal democratic values on non-Western nations (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).
China appears to recognize that liberal democracies tend to act peacefully toward one another but view the rise of non-liberal powers as existential threats, often responding with hostility. Xi Jinping has warned the US not to provoke a “clash of civilizations” by attempting to stifle China’s rise. Instead, he has called for an acceptance of China’s autocratic system and its hegemony in Asia as natural outcomes of its civilizational rejuvenation. To achieve harmony between civilizations, Xi advocates replacing “estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence” (Zhang, 2019: 19).
China’s rise serves as an inspiration to many developing nations, particularly in Africa, as it demonstrates rapid development achieved without capitulating to Westernization. Aware of this, China leverages its position as a rising non-Western power through soft power initiatives, presenting itself as a non-Western civilization that has risen above the West. The CCP claims that China is inherently more peaceful and civilized, emphasizing that it has never colonized or invaded other nations. While this narrative is not entirely accurate, it resonates with many Africans who continue to feel the historical pain of colonization. China’s claim of never having invaded African territory is particularly appealing, as it contrasts sharply with the history of European colonial powers.
China’s relationship with Africa is shaped by this self-image. The CCP portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a rejuvenated 5,000-year-old civilization capable of serving as a role model for other developing, non-Western societies. By positioning itself as an alternative to Western imperialism, China fosters goodwill and deepens its influence across the African continent.
Chinese soft power in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is considerable. China has opened more than 50 embassies across the continent—more than the United States—and has become the most significant trade and aid partner for a variety of African nations (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China provides infrastructure, including roads and railways, in areas where the US often does not, and facilitates development through aid and debt forgiveness. However, China also offers a different path to development and modernity, one that does not insist on compliance with liberal democratic norms and at times challenges, rather than imitates, Africa’s former colonial masters.
China is heavily involved in infrastructure development in Africa. For instance, in Kenya, China was responsible for the construction of the Nairobi to Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway, a project costing $4.7 billion, with plans to build industrial parks connected by the railway, which was also supposed to extend to Uganda (BBC, 2023). However, the railway is underused and widely considered unnecessary, leading to accusations that China has deliberately trapped Kenya in unmanageable debt to gain influence over the African state (BBC, 2023). Despite this, only 19.4% of Kenya’s debt is owed to China (BBC, 2023).
In Ethiopia, China has invested in hundreds of projects valued at over $4 billion (Cabestan, 2019). China has been instrumental in constructing roads and railways. Beyond infrastructure, China supported the Ethiopian government in December 2021 by voting against a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in the Tigray region (South China Morning Post, 2021).
China also constructed the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of $200 million (South China Morning Post, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the building was reportedly bugged, and its servers were regularly hacked by CCP operatives (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, China continues to build critical infrastructure across the continent. In 2018, China announced plans to build the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria (Xinhua, 2022). In 2022, China completed construction of the African Centre for Disease Control Headquarters (CIDCA, 2023). Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have built or financed dozens of presidential, prime ministerial, and other government buildings throughout Africa (Heritage Foundation, 2020).
China is also seeking control over African ports. For instance, Djibouti nationalized its Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China owns 25% of the port, gaining significant control over regional shipping. Chinese companies have also established large cargo facilities near the port, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers are stationed there. The People’s Liberation Army Navy uses the terminal for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations and likely other intelligence and power-projection activities (Bloomberg, 2018).
Reports suggest that China is looking to build a large maritime base, potentially in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, or Gabon (The Diplomat, 2024). Although these plans have not yet materialized, they indicate China’s intent to expand its military power in African waters to protect its lucrative fishing industry and extend its influence over African states (The Diplomat, 2024).
China has also invested in space programs in nine African states as part of its Belt and Road Space Information Corridor. China launches satellites for African states and trains Africans to work in the space industry (United States Institute of Peace, 2023).
Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications technology company, is thought to provide around 70% of Africa’s telecommunications and information infrastructure (DW, 2022; Feldstein, 2020). Across the continent, Chinese companies build telecommunication networks, including government networks. Nine African countries have adopted Chinese-designed and built surveillance projects as part of China’s “Smart City Surveillance” initiative, involving the installation of vast numbers of cameras. Whether the CCP has access to these cameras remains unclear (Financial Times, 2021; The Wall Street Journal, 2019).
China does not merely build infrastructure in Africa but also invites Africans to live and study in China, often at the Chinese state’s expense. This effort aims to create a generation of educated African elites with favorable opinions of China and its development model. For example, Xi Jinping’s approach to Africa, articulated in an editorial by China’s ambassador to the Seychelles, emphasizes “South-South cooperation” and building a China-Africa community based on “sincerity, real results, amity, and good faith” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Seychelles, 2023).
China’s efforts to develop relationships with emerging African elites align with its broader goal of exporting the “China model” of development, which emphasizes industrialization and modernization without democratization or the adoption of Western liberal values. Initiatives like the Sino-Africa Political Party Leaders program bring young African politicians to China for training in governance and economic development based on Chinese principles (Brookings, 2016). Additionally, in 2022, the CCP financed the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, which educates political leaders from six Southern African countries (FPRI, 2022).
Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, are widespread in Africa, though they have been criticized for spreading CCP propaganda. China has overtaken the United States in hosting African students, making it the second most popular destination after France for Africans pursuing higher education.
China measures its success in Africa partly by examining voting patterns in international organizations. African states are increasingly aligning with China in the UN, with many voting against resolutions critical of Beijing’s policies, such as its South China Sea claims or human rights abuses in Xinjiang (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China’s growing popularity in Africa reflects its strategy of combining infrastructure development, educational outreach, and alignment with African priorities. Despite criticisms of its authoritarian model and accusations of debt-trap diplomacy, many Africans view China as a reliable partner offering an alternative path to development. As African nations increasingly adopt aspects of the “China model,” it becomes evident that China’s influence in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political and economic landscape.
Military relations between the People’s Republic of China and Africa began during the Cold War, as China sought to combat both Soviet and American influence across the continent and portray itself as a fellow non-white society resisting white global power. During this period, China encouraged national liberation and socialist movements in Africa. Although it no longer attempts to foment communist revolutions in Africa, China continues to present itself as a non-white power naturally aligned with and sympathetic to Africans.
Under Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a policy of “hiding our capabilities” and projecting a friendly or benign face to the world. This approach meant that, while China was a significant arms supplier to African nations, it rarely involved itself directly or indirectly in African conflicts. Xi Jinping has broken with this policy, declaring that “China now stands tall and firm in the East” and should “take center stage” in global affairs (Nantulya, 2019).
As a result, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia and along its border with India, largely driven by efforts to reclaim land and maritime territories that once belonged to the Chinese Empire (e.g., Taiwan and the South China Sea). At the same time, China has long been involved in African conflicts and is eager to assert its military might in support of its national interests, as well as to “protect” ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living in Africa. China’s use of hard power in Africa is deeply tied to the CCP’s civilizational rejuvenation project, its conception of all Chinese globally as belonging to the “Chinese people,” and its efforts to restore China to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. For example, Xi (2017) emphasizes China’s “more than 5,000 years of civilized history,” portraying the Chinese as a people who “created a brilliant civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and became a great nation of the world.” Xi claims that the Chinese people are now being “rejuvenated” and will soon achieve a “moderately prosperous society” while becoming a global power.
Expanding its hard power influence in Africa helps China present itself as a global power and a civilization with its own development models and norms, which other nations may follow to achieve similar prosperity. Furthermore, this expansion allows China to protect friendly African regimes, prevent American-led coups or interventions, and secure its strategic interests.
China is also exporting its governance model to African states, most notably to Ethiopia, often referred to as the “China of Africa.” Many African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, have made “observable changes to their governance styles and models as a result of these deepening engagements.” These changes reflect the adoption of elements from the Chinese development model, including strong export-led growth, significant state involvement in the economy, and the promotion of labor-intensive industries (Nantulya, 2018). China is also believed to be exporting principles like “democratic centralism,” the establishment of special economic zones, and the concept that the military should remain loyal to the ruling party rather than the state or its citizens (Nantulya, 2018).
Despite considerable attention to China’s military footprint in Africa, it remains relatively small compared to that of the United States, which maintains military bases in 26 African nations under the auspices of the United States Africa Command. In contrast, China has just one military base in Africa, located in Djibouti. Nevertheless, given China’s global ambitions, it is likely to establish additional bases in Africa to defend its interests and challenge US, Russian, and Turkish influence in the region.
Though China has only one base in Africa, it has conducted military drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria. Its military medical units have collaborated with counterparts in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to improve combat casualty care as part of long-standing relationships involving arms sales and intelligence cooperation (Nantulya, 2019). China is also developing military ties with Burkina Faso, which recently ceased recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state (Nantulya, 2019).
In 2018, China held a Defense and Security Forum with officials from 50 African nations, resulting in a comprehensive security framework. Through this framework, China pledged to provide military and intelligence support to combat pirates, terrorists, and criminals, as well as to participate in peacekeeping operations. China committed $100 million toward building the African Union Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and contributed to the China-UN Peace and Development Fund and various training programs (ISPI, 2018).
China’s increasing interest in African security and defense reflects its desire to protect friendly regimes, facilitate trade, ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and safeguard ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals in Africa. While China’s actions often align with African interests, such as infrastructure development and security enhancement, the establishment of Chinese police stations and other security facilities across Africa is also part of projecting China as a civilization-state that protects Chinese people globally and maintains their loyalty to the CCP.
China has openly expressed its intentions in Africa. A 2015 Chinese policy paper emphasized “deepened military engagement, technological cooperation, and capacity building for Africa’s security sectors” (Nantulya, 2019). As a result, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest weapons supplier (SIPRI, 2018). Its exports include not only small arms but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and artillery (Nantulya, 2019).
China is also deeply involved in educating African military officers. Approximately 2,000 African officers train annually with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with an additional 500 attending the PLA Naval Medical University and another 2,000 receiving policing and law enforcement training at China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) schools (Nantulya, 2023). The PLA and PAP, as extensions of the CCP, advance the party’s ideological and political goals in Africa.
While China avoids direct military intervention in Africa, it increasingly leverages UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) to expand its influence. In West Africa, China has steadily increased the number and variety of personnel it contributes, including medics, engineers, and armed infantry. In Mali, China’s involvement in the MINUSMA mission is seen as symbolic but marks a new willingness to deploy combat troops (Merics, 2020). China’s peacekeeping activities are not politically neutral. Instead, they aim to promote a “Chinese approach” to peacekeeping, prioritizing regime stability and economic development while avoiding interventionism and democratization (Merics, 2020).
Not all Africans welcome China’s growing influence. For example, Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement, once complained that “China is trading petroleum for our blood” (Pant & Haidar, 2017). Anti-China violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Mali, and other nations, demonstrating that China’s activities are not universally accepted. Nonetheless, China continues to strengthen its position in Africa, often at the expense of democratic norms. These developments are part of the CCP’s broader civilizational rejuvenation project, aimed at reshaping the global order in favor of a multipolar world with China at its center.
The Debswana Jwaneng Diamond Mine pit in Jwaneng, Botswana, on November 15, 2022. Photo: Bashi Kikia.
The new great power struggle for influence in Africa contains a distinct civilizational element. However, rather than claiming to bring civilization to Africa, each non-African nation involved in this struggle presents itself as a representative of a broader civilization in conflict with the West, offering a new, non-Western path to development. At stake in this competition are billions of dollars in trade revenue, access to vital minerals, and control over key military staging points and geographically strategic areas.
Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC) share a common goal: to expand their influence across the African continent and weaken Western—particularly American—power in Africa. Their advantage over the West lies in their relatively untarnished history with Africa, their lack of a colonial legacy tainted by bloodshed, and their ability to point to their own economic successes as evidence that nations can achieve wealth and power without adhering to Western norms and governance models.
Each of these nations offers Africa—often addressing it as though it were a monolithic culture—friendship and ostensibly “no-strings-attached” development aid and direct investment, something the liberal West has traditionally refused to provide. They frequently cite the evils of the colonial period and the West’s insistence that aid be contingent on liberal democratic reforms as examples of Western arrogance and imperialism.
Turkey and China claim that their own civilizations possess values superior to those of the West, demonstrated by their peaceful engagement with Africa. Meanwhile, Russia and India emphasize their shared anti-colonial struggle and present themselves as allies of the Global South in its resistance to Western imperialism. All four nations position themselves as voices for the Global South in its ongoing struggle against the global North.
Yet, these nations are not altruistic actors. They, too, seek Africa’s mineral wealth and view the continent as a key territory for expanding their influence. Although their methods are not as violent or oppressive as those of the European colonial powers, their actions reveal a similar underlying motivation. The increasing reliance on hard power by Turkey, Russia, India and China in Africa highlights that these “new” great powers are not so different from the old ones.
Ultimately, the competition for influence in Africa pits Turkey, Russia, India and China not just against the West but also against one another. Yet, these four nations share a critical objective: constructing a multipolar world in which American power is no longer hegemonic. Winning greater influence in Africa is integral to this project, as is persuading Africans to reject reliance on Western assistance for economic growth and infrastructure development. Instead, the emerging powers argue that Africans should turn away from the values of their former colonial masters and draw on the experiences of rising civilization-states to develop their economies and construct vital infrastructure. Given the West’s failure to facilitate African development and the ongoing challenges faced by liberal democratic societies globally, it would not be surprising if Africans began to distance themselves from liberal democratic norms.
However, the United States remains by far the most powerful foreign nation in Africa, capable of projecting hard power across the continent at a level unmatched by any other nation.
From an Anglo-American—and broadly Western—perspective, the competition between the West and its old and new rivals may appear to be a confrontation between democratic and autocratic regimes. To some extent, the language used by states like TRIC, when presenting themselves as “civilization-states” with unique values, serves to legitimize authoritarianism. However, these regimes perceive the competition differently. They view it as a struggle to construct a new world order in which the US is no longer the central power and the ancient civilizations of TRIC regain the power and prestige they enjoyed before.
These nations are serious about displacing the US and dismantling the liberal norms and global order that have defined the world since the end of the Cold War. They, along with their growing number of allies, believe this shift is desirable, marking the end of Western imperialism and the notion that Western values—such as liberal democracy—are universal. At the same time, they compete with one another in Africa. For instance, if China’s base in Djibouti signals plans to establish further bases in East Africa, India may feel compelled to respond by increasing its military presence to counter Chinese influence, lest it risk an East Africa dominated by China and potentially hostile to Indian interests.
While it is possible that TRIC could find avenues for cooperation in Africa, it is far more likely that their competition will intensify. Despite sharing the common goal of diminishing American power in Africa and globally, their conflicting interests are likely to make Africa a critical arena of rivalry among these new global powers.
– Liberal democracies should emphasize the unique value of transparent, accountable governance and rule of law as part of their development partnerships.
– Shift from conditionality-based aid to partnerships that prioritize mutual benefits without sacrificing democratic values.
Strengthen Infrastructure Investments!
– Compete with China and others by funding large-scale infrastructure projects with transparent terms to counter debt-trap diplomacy narratives.
– Prioritize renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport networks to align with Africa’s long-term goals.
Increase Support for Democratic Governance!
– Offer robust support for democratic institutions in Africa through capacity-building programs for judiciary, electoral, and civil society.
– Collaborate with African governments to counter the spread of authoritarian governance models, such as China’s “democratic centralism.”
Develop Cultural and Educational Ties!
– Expand scholarships and exchange programs for African students in liberal democracies to compete with Chinese and Turkish educational initiatives.
– Support local language media and cultural initiatives to counter disinformation and propaganda from authoritarian states.
Enhance Military Cooperation!
– Strengthen military partnerships focused on combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime while avoiding neo-imperialist optics.
– Support African-led peacekeeping missions and regional security initiatives to offer alternatives to Russian mercenary involvement.
Collaborate with African Nations on Resource Management!
– Promote sustainable development models by partnering with African nations on equitable resource extraction and environmental conservation.
– Ensure that development initiatives include local community benefits to counter the exploitative practices of other powers.
Support Multipolar Engagement!
– Avoid framing the engagement as a “new Cold War”; instead, focus on inclusive global partnerships where African nations have agency in decision-making.
– Advocate for reforms in international institutions (e.g., UN, IMF) to increase African representation.
– Use the competition between great powers to negotiate better terms for aid, trade, and investment agreements.
– Insist on infrastructure projects that prioritize local employment, technology transfer, and long-term sustainability.
Diversify Economic Partners!
– Avoid over-reliance on any single country (e.g., China) by fostering diversified trade relationships with liberal democracies, BRICS nations, and regional blocs.
– Strengthen intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to reduce dependence on external powers.
Protect Sovereignty and Avoid Dependency!
– Resist pressures to adopt authoritarian governance models in exchange for development aid.
– Develop robust legal frameworks to prevent resource exploitation and ensure fair terms for foreign investments.
Invest in Regional Security Cooperation!
– Strengthen African Union (AU) and regional security mechanisms to reduce reliance on external military support, such as Russia’s Wagner Group.
– Build partnerships with global allies that respect African sovereignty and promote peacekeeping capabilities.
Promote Transparency in Aid and Trade Deals!
– Publicize the terms of agreements with external powers to foster public accountability and prevent corruption.
– Work with civil society organizations to monitor the social and environmental impacts of foreign-funded projects.
Expand Educational and Technological Opportunities!
– Collaborate with all partners to build higher education institutions, vocational training centers, and tech incubators.
– Develop programs to train a new generation of African leaders who can engage strategically with global powers.
Strengthen Civil Society and Democratic Institutions!
– Support NGOs and academic institutions to monitor and counter authoritarian influences from foreign actors.
– Foster dialogue on governance models that prioritize African values while safeguarding individual freedoms.
Build Alliances with Liberal Democracies!
– Partner with liberal democracies to balance authoritarian influences and ensure that Africa’s development aligns with global democratic values.
– Engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure African nations have a greater voice in multilateral forums like the G20 and UN Security Council.
These recommendations aim to balance the opportunities presented by the new great power competition with safeguards against exploitation, authoritarianism, and loss of sovereignty. Both liberal democracies and African nations must work collaboratively to create a mutually beneficial, sustainable, and democratic framework for Africa’s development.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.
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This paper examines the intricate relationship between populism, culture wars, and fundamental rights. It explores how the rise of populist movements and the intensification of culture wars reshape the interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, often polarizing societal values and threatening democratic principles. By delving into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena, the paper highlights how populism amplifies ideological divides, leveraging culture wars to contest principles of equality, freedom of expression, and social justice. The study categorizes populism into economic, political, and cultural strands, analyzing their combined effects with culture wars on the discourse and practices of democracy. Using examples such as the rollback of reproductive rights in the United States and the use of nationalist narratives in Brazil and India, the paper underscores the tangible consequences of these dynamics. This exploration reveals the challenges these contentious forces pose to the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, as well as their influence on competing democratic models: liberal, majoritarian, and minoritarian.
Keywords: populism, culture wars, fundamental rights, democracy.
By João Ferreira Dias
Introduction
Populism, characterized by its dynamic appeal to ‘the people’ against perceived elite or establishment forces, has gained significant traction worldwide, manifesting in diverse forms. These range from economic populism, with its emphasis on wealth redistribution and anti-establishment sentiments, to political populism, which focuses on governance and anti-elite narratives, and cultural populism, which capitalizes on identity politics and nationalistic sentiments. Each strand intersects uniquely with culture wars, conflicts that revolve around competing values, beliefs, and identities, deepening societal polarization.
The synergy between populism and culture wars presents substantial challenges to interpreting and protecting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, equality, and the right to privacy—cornerstones of democratic and human rights principles. Within this polarizing framework, these rights are contested, their interpretation shaped by ideological biases that reflect broader political struggles.
Furthermore, this dynamic interplay fuels competing concepts of democracy. The traditional model of liberal democracy, defined by individual rights, checks and balances, and inclusive governance, now contends with majoritarian democracy, which emphasizes the will of the majority, and minoritarian democracy, which seeks to protect marginalized groups and their social identities over common ground.
This paper aims to explore the intricate connections between populism and culture wars and their collective impact on fundamental rights. By examining how these forces challenge the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, we provide a framework for understanding and addressing the threats they pose to safeguarding fundamental rights in an era marked by these ideological confrontations.
Please cite as: Koskina, Stavroula. (2024). The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism and Populism in the Southern Caucasus. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0091
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, hosted by the ECPS, critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring six distinguished scholars, the discussion focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, analyzing how populism drives democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. Common themes included the erosion of liberal norms and the entanglement of political and economic power among elites. Panelists also examined the influence of global power dynamics, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on regional politics, highlighting how external pressures shape domestic strategies and policy orientations.
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring insights from six distinguished scholars, the event focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, offering a detailed analysis of their respective political landscapes. Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS, this session underscored the broader implications of populist and authoritarian trends on regional stability and global democracy.
The panelists emphasized how populism contributes to democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. While each country reflects unique manifestations of populism, shared patterns include the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the increasing fusion of political and economic power within ruling elites. The discussions highlighted how regional actors navigate shifting global power structures, particularly under the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These external pressures exacerbate domestic challenges, influencing political strategies and policy orientations across the region.
Country-Specific Analyses
The presentation of Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, provided a comprehensive analysis of Azerbaijan’s political trajectory and its broader implications for the South Caucasus. He highlighted Azerbaijan as a model of hegemonic authoritarianism, emphasizing its consolidation of power through a fusion of political and economic interests within the ruling elite. He noted Azerbaijan’s skepticism toward multilateral institutions and its alignment with illiberal regional actors like Russia and Turkey. De Waal underscored the Azerbaijani regime’s strategic use of sovereignty discourse to legitimize its dominance while curtailing civil liberties, media freedom, and opposition activity. He also addressed the geopolitical influence of the Ukraine war on the region, arguing that Azerbaijan’s approach reflects a broader trend of illiberalism gaining ground globally. Finally, he pointed to Azerbaijan’s vulnerabilities, including its reliance on declining oil revenues and the absence of mechanisms for political feedback, which pose challenges to the sustainability of its centralized authoritarian model.
The presentation of Dr. David Aprasidze,a Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University, critically assessed the damaging impact of populism on democracy in Georgia, particularly under the Georgian Dream Party. He argued that populism undermines democratization in hybrid regimes by eroding weak institutions, corrupting political actors, and suppressing opposition forces. Tracing the Georgian Dream’s transformation from a progressive, left-leaning populist movement into a conservative, nationalist entity, he highlighted its increasing alignment with illiberal models, such as Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. This shift has been accompanied by attacks on the European Union, restrictions on civil society and media, and the systemic manipulation of institutions to consolidate power. Dr. Aprasidze underscored that populism in hybrid regimes exacerbates public demoralization, weakens democratic resilience, and facilitates authoritarian consolidation. He concluded that the Georgian Dream’s trajectory exemplifies the broader risks of populism in hybrid regimes, portraying Georgia’s democratization as increasingly fragile and imperiled.
The analysis of Dr. David Matsaberidze, an Associate Professor at Department of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, explored the evolution of populism in Georgia through the concept of the “empty signifier,” tracing its progression from nationalist mobilization during the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the current rule of the Georgian Dream Party. He identified a pattern in Georgian politics of leaders utilizing populist narratives to consolidate power, emphasizing shifts from Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist independence rhetoric to Eduard Shevardnadze’s focus on order and stability and later Mikheil Saakashvili’s anti-corruption-crusade. Dr. Matsaberidze highlighted the Georgian Dream’s strategic pivot from left-leaning populism to conservative nationalism, blending Orthodox Christian values with populist sovereignty discourse to challenge the European Union’s liberal framework. He also criticized the party’s institutional manipulation, drawing parallels with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, noting the use of restrictive legislation, anti-LGBTQ+ policies, and attacks on NGOs and academia to erode democratic spaces. The party’s success, he argued, lies in its ability to exploit public concerns while fostering ambiguity between aligning with Brussels or Budapest, thereby undermining Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. Concluding with a pessimistic outlook, Dr. Matsaberidze warned that the Georgian Dream’s populist tactics and institutional control present significant obstacles to democratization and resistance by the opposition.
The presentation of Dr.Jody LaPorte from Department of Politics and International Relations at University of Oxford, examined Azerbaijan’s political regime, categorizing it as a hegemonic authoritarian model distinct from competitive authoritarianism due to the absence of meaningful opposition or electoral competition. She highlighted how Azerbaijan’s leaders, particularly President Ilham Aliyev, consolidated this regime through the marginalization of inherited opposition parties, extensive use of formal and informal mechanisms to suppress political activities, and active repression of emerging opposition groups. The regime’s centralized political economy, heavily reliant on oil revenues and controlled by the ruling elite, has further entrenched its authority by linking economic opportunities and upward mobility to political loyalty. Dr. LaPorte also noted the regime’s proactive measures to adapt to changing circumstances, including investments in green energy and economic diversification, which aim to sustain its authoritarian model amid declining oil revenues. While discussing potential vulnerabilities such as socio-economic inequalities and the finite nature of hydrocarbon resources, she emphasized the regime’s strategic efforts to reinforce its stability. Reflecting on the populism theme, she argued that Azerbaijan’s case is characterized more by a disconnect between politics and the populace than by populist appeals, with citizens largely feeling unrepresented by any political party.
The presentation of Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan, a Professor and Chair of Political Science at Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University, analyzed the impact of hybrid populism on postwar Armenia, its democratization efforts, and European integration. He employed a theoretical framework rooted in post-Soviet populist studies, drawing from definitions by scholars like Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau to highlight populism’s ideological and moral dimensions. Dr. Aleksanyan emphasized the unique challenges faced by Armenia, including the lack of robust political party infrastructure, weak ideological foundations, and an underdeveloped civil society, all exacerbated by the fallout from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. He identified hybrid populism as a critical factor in Armenian politics, characterized by divisive rhetoric framing issues through binary oppositions such as war versus peace, pro-Western versus pro-Russian, and democracy versus authoritarianism. He also explored the influence of external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and regional pressures from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which have collectively hindered Armenia’s European integration and democratization. Using a textual analysis of political speeches and party rhetoric, Dr. Aleksanyan demonstrated how populist discourse destabilizes democratic institutions, undermines reform efforts, and fuels societal polarization. He concluded by stressing the importance of addressing Armenia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening its political and societal structures to advance its European integration and democratic aspirations.
The presentation of Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, analyzed the limited influence of populism in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia, emphasizing the country’s democratic resilience despite its challenging geopolitical environment. He highlighted three primary factors that have curtailed populism: a robust civil society acting as a safeguard, the development of a democratic political culture, and the transitional government’s deliberate avoidance of populist rhetoric and practices. Unlike other contexts where populism thrives on anti-establishment and nationalist narratives, Armenian leaders have refrained from scapegoating elites, ethnicization of conflicts, or exploiting societal cleavages for political gain. Instead, the government has pursued pragmatic, often unpopular decisions, such as emphasizing peace and concessions, which reinforce democratic consolidation. Dr. Kopalyan contrasted Armenia’s approach with illiberal populist leaders elsewhere, noting the absence of tactics like undermining institutions, exploiting nationalism, or promoting cultural wars. He concluded that Armenia’s unique governance model, anchored in civil society, democratic norms, and a refusal to weaponize populism, has strengthened its democratization process and served as a critical component of its security architecture amid external pressures from Azerbaijan and Russia.
Concluding Reflections
The panel provided critical insights into the destabilizing effects of populism and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Across the region, the confluence of weak institutions, contested sovereignty, and geopolitical pressures fosters environments where populism thrives, further undermining democratic governance and societal resilience.
The event underscored the need for targeted international engagement to bolster democratic institutions, support civil society, and promote regional cooperation. Recognizing the distinct challenges each country faces, panelists stressed the importance of tailored strategies that address domestic vulnerabilities and external influences.
Stamoglou, Anastasia. (2024). The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0090
On November 28, 2024, ECPS hosted the 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series, titled “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey.” This session examined the transformative political strategies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring their impact on Turkey’s political and social fabric. A distinguished panel of experts discussed key topics, including the evolution of national identity, media manipulation, the gendered impacts of authoritarianism, and Turkey’s global influence through sharp power. The session offered critical insights, enriching the series’ mission to deepen understanding of populism’s global effects.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey,”on November 28, 2024. The session explored the intricacies of populism, authoritarianism, and nationalism in Turkey. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, it delved into the transformative political strategies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership, with a particular focus on how these strategies have reshaped Turkey’s political and societal landscapes.
Moderated by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, an authority on religion and politics, the panelists included Dr. Spyros Sofos, whose research examines Turkish populism through a historical lens; Dr. Emre Erdogan, an expert on political participation and populist dynamics in contemporary Turkey; Hafza Girdap, a gender studies researcher focusing on the intersection of political Islam and patriarchy; Ergun Babahan, a veteran journalist with deep insights into Turkey’s media landscape; and Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, who analysed Turkey’s use of sharp power in international relations. Together, they provided a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary exploration of the challenges posed by autocratic populism in Turkey.
The discussion critically examined topics ranging from the evolution of national identity and the strategic use of media to the gendered impacts of authoritarianism and Turkey’s sharp power influence on the global stage. This session contributed significantly to the series’ goal of fostering a comprehensive understanding of populism’s global impact.
Panel Overview
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University opened the discussion by contextualizing Erdogan’s rise within the broader trends of political Islam and populist ideologies. She highlighted the fluid interplay between nationalism and religion in Erdogan’s narrative, tracing its evolution from a seemingly democratic framework to an increasingly authoritarian model. Dr. Cesari emphasized how Erdogan’s governance reflects a strategic adaptation of populist tools, balancing appeals to religious identity with nationalist pride, in a bid to consolidate power while managing internal and external challenges.
Speaker Contributions
Dr. Spyros Sofos, Assistant Professor at Department of Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada, initiated the panel with a presentation titled “In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape.” His analysis centered on the historical construction of “the people” in Turkish political discourse, which he described as a dualistic symbol of innocence and incapacity. Dr. Sofos traced this metaphor’s roots back to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s republican reforms, where the populace was envisioned as a collective in need of guidance and reformation. This patronizing approach to the masses, Dr. Sofos argued, established a political tradition in which the people are alternately celebrated and marginalized. Moving to the contemporary era, he examined how Erdogan has repurposed this narrative, framing the people as both sovereign and subservient, a dichotomy legitimizing autocratic governance. Dr. Sofos underscored how this discourse has facilitated the exclusion of perceived “enemies” of the state while deepening divisions within Turkish society, situating Turkey’s case within a broader global pattern of populist authoritarianism.
Dr. Emre Erdogan, Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University, followed with a detailed exploration of Turkey’s recent electoral cycles in his presentation, “Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023–2024).” He provided a nuanced analysis of the dynamics that shaped the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections, highlighting the persistence of populist rhetoric rooted in nationalism and religious symbolism. His discussion revealed how the opposition adopted elements of populism to challenge Erdogan’s dominance, a strategy that produced mixed results. Dr. Erdogan examined how economic instability, natural disasters, and the migration crisis became pivotal themes in political campaigns, serving as both challenges and opportunities for populist actors. He argued that while Erdogan has maintained his core narratives, the rise of new actors and shifting voter behavior reflect a changing political landscape. The presentation offered valuable insights into the mechanisms through which populism continues to shape governance, polarization, and political alliances in Turkey.
Hafza Girdap from Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York brought a critical gendered perspective to the discussion with her presentation, “Autocratic Practices of the Gendered Regime in Turkey.”She dissected how the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has leveraged patriarchal and Islamist ideologies to consolidate power while systematically oppressing women and marginalized groups. Girdap traced the intersection of political Islam, nationalism, and patriarchy, demonstrating how these forces reinforce traditional gender roles and limit women’s participation in public life. Drawing on examples such as the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, Girdap highlighted the state’s failure to address gender-based violence and its role in perpetuating systemic inequalities. She also explored the compounded discrimination faced by Kurdish women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other minorities, emphasizing the use of gender as a tool of social control. Her analysis provided a powerful account of how authoritarian regimes exploit gendered hierarchies to maintain power and suppress dissent.
The presentation of Ergun Babahan, a veteran journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news, “Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” offered a deep dive into the strategic manipulation of Turkey’s media landscape under Erdogan. Babahan, drawing from his extensive experience as a journalist, described how Erdogan has systematically co-opted both state and private media to serve his autocratic agenda. He traced this trend back to Erdogan’s early political career, highlighting his strategic alliances with media proprietors and the use of state resources to undermine journalistic independence. Babahan argued that Erdogan’s media dominance now rivals the control exerted by military regimes in Turkey’s past, enabling the administration to shape public discourse and marginalize opposition voices. His discussion illuminated the broader implications of media suppression for democracy and public accountability, situating Turkey within a global context of declining press freedoms.
Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, concluded the panel with her presentation, “Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power.” She introduced the concept of sharp power to describe Turkey’s growing influence on the international stage, particularly through technology, censorship, and diaspora politics. Dr. Spancerska analyzed how Erdogan’s regime has leveraged these tools to suppress dissent both domestically and abroad while projecting power internationally. She examined the strategic use of digital platforms and surveillance technologies to monitor and control political dissidents, as well as the mobilization of the Turkish diaspora to extend Erdogan’s ideological reach. By positioning Turkey as a counterweight to Western liberalism, Erdogan has crafted a narrative that appeals to nationalist sentiments while justifying his autocratic practices. Dr. Spancerska’s presentation offered a critical perspective on the intersection of domestic authoritarianism and global power dynamics, underscoring the implications for international relations and democratic governance.
Conclusion
The 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series provided a comprehensive examination of the mechanisms through which populism, Islamism, nationalism, and authoritarianism intersect in Turkey. Each speaker brought a unique perspective to the discussion, collectively painting a nuanced picture of how Erdogan’s leadership has transformed Turkey’s political, social, and international landscapes. The panel emphasized the broader implications of these trends for Turkey and the global struggle against populist authoritarianism.
Through its insightful analysis and interdisciplinary approach, the session reinforced ECPS’s commitment to fostering critical discourse on populism’s impact worldwide. The insights shared during the event will undoubtedly serve as a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of Turkey’s political trajectory and the challenges facing democratic governance in an era of rising authoritarianism.
